

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
Memo	Jim Gaither to President re steel exports (x ref-TA 6/Steel) (CONFIDENTIAL) <i>open 1-22-93 NLS 92-195</i>	8/2/68	A
Memo	Office of Special Rep/for Trade Negotiations to Dean Rusk/Henry Fowler re (x ref-TA) trade discussions w/Europeans (CONFIDENTIAL) <i>open 2-26-93 NLS 91-346</i>	1/30/68	A
Memo	Eugene V. Rostow to Secy of State (x ref-FO 4-1) re Balance of Payments prgm (SECRET) <i>open 3-11-83 per NLS 83-38 in</i>	1/8/68	A
Memo	Charles Maguire to President (x ref-ED 5) re TV (educational) in Vietnam (CONFIDENTIAL) <i>open 3-4-97</i>	11/25/67	A
Memo w/ attachment	Walt Rostow to the President (x-ref re PM Sato's speech) (SECRET) <i>sanitized 5-4-83 open 1-10-95 NLS 94-320 NLS 83-31</i>	11/15/67	A
Memo	Richard M. Moose to Marvin Watson (x rf-ND 19/CO 312) re Tokuma Utsunomiya (CONFIDENTIAL) <i>open 10-9-01</i>	9/15/67	A
Memo	Secy of State to the President (x ref-IT 65) re 6th mtg of Jt. U.S.-Japan Com. on Trade & Economic Affairs (SECRET) <i>open 4-12-94 NLS 93-321</i>	9/12/67	A
Memo	Dean Rusk to the President re U.S.-Japan cabinet level talks (SECRET grp 3) <i>open 2-2-83 per NLS 83-33 in</i>	9/4/67	A
Memo w/ attachment	Henry H. Fowler to the President re Jt. Cabinet Mtgs. (SECRET) <i>sanitized 6-6-85 open 10-13-99 NLS 97-188 NLS 83-32</i>	8/31/67	A

FILE LOCATION

C.F. CO 141 Japan

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
Memo #10 <i>same partition 3-6-82 NL 83-319</i>	Robert S. McNamara to the President re talking pts. for Japanese Foreign Minister's visit next month (CONFIDENTIAL-grp 4) <i>Sanitized 11/19/82</i>	8/30/67	A
Memo	Walt Rostow to the President re mtg w/former PM Kishi <i>open 5-4-83 per NLJ 83-31</i>	3/21/67	A
Memo	Secy of Treasury to the President (x ref-IT 80) re trip to Tokyo/Manila (SECRET) <i>open 11/6/79</i>	11/8/66	A
Memo	Richard L. Sneider to McGeorge Bundy (x ref-SP 3-162) re draft speeches for Pres.'s trip (CONFIDENTIAL) <i>open 2-19-97</i>	10/14/66	A
Tgm	Dept. of State to Amembassy Tokyo-State 62636 (x ref-FO 7/A*) re message to PM Sato (CONFIDENTIAL) <i>open 5-6-96 NLJ 96-92</i>	10/8/66	A
Tgm	Message from Pres. to PM Sato (x ref-SP/CO 291) re Thai Foreign Minister's speech 8/3 (SECRET) <i>open 4/6/79</i>	8/4/66	A
Memo w/ attachment	Stanley Nehmer to Harry McPherson (x ref-TA 1) re cotton textiles: Kennedy Round Sector Discussions (CONFIDENTIAL) <i>open 2-16-88 NLJ 88-37</i>	9/30/65	A
Memo	Special Rep., for Trade Negotiations to Harry McPherson re wool textiles (CONFIDENTIAL) <i>open 3-4-97</i>	6/25/65	A
Memo	McGeorge Bundy to the Pres. (x ref-TA 6/Textiles) re wool textiles (CONFIDENTIAL) <i>open 3-30-83</i>	12/9/64	A
Memo w/ attachment	R. W. Komer to the President re visit of PM Ikeda to UN in Nov. (CONFIDENTIAL-grp 3) <i>State 100 8/16/99 (2 letters)</i>	8/27/64	A

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
Memo	Dept. of State to the President (x ref-LE/NR 2) re S. 1988 (CONFIDENTIAL) <i>open 1-12-94 NLS 93-162</i>	5/14/64	A

FILE LOCATION

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OO WTE10
DE WTE 2951

(F)

Received: Washington CommGen
8:51 PM EDST Friday 02 August 1968

Received: LBJ Ranch CommGen
8:31 PM CDST Friday 02 August 1968

FROM JIM GAITHER
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO JOE CALIFANO
CLARK CLIFFORD
CITE CAP81774

C. F. (7)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TAG/Steel
BE4/Steel
C0141
C043
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FG115
CM/Steel
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AUGUST 2, 1968

AS CALIFANO INDICATED TO YOU IN A MEMORANDUM LAST NIGHT, THE EUROPEAN STEEL INDUSTRIES HAVE INDICATED INFORMALLY THAT THEY WOULD AGREE TO TIGHT RESTRICTIONS ON EXPORTS OF STEEL WHICH, IF AGREED TO BY THE OTHER MAJOR EXPORTERS OF STEEL (JAPAN, CANADA AND GREAT BRITAIN), WOULD REDUCE U.S. IMPORTS BY UP TO THREE MILLION TONS IN THIS FISCAL YEAR. IN ADDITION, THEY WOULD AGREE TO LIMIT EXPORTS IN FUTURE YEARS TO A FIVE PERCENT INCREASE OVER THE PRECEDING YEAR.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-195
By , NARA, Date 12-10-92

THE U.S. STEEL INDUSTRY (ACTING THROUGH THE U.S. STEEL INSTITUTE WOULD PREFER LEGISLATIVELY IMPOSED IMPORT QUOTAS. BUT APPARENTLY BELIEVING THAT THEY COULD NOT GET IMPORT QUOTAS THIS YEAR, THEY HAVE BACKED OUR EFFORTS TO SECURE VOLUNTARY RESTRAINTS. THE INDUSTRY IS PLEASED WITH THE EUROPEAN PROPOSAL AND HAS ASKED TONY SOLOMON TO TRY TO GET THE JAPANESE TO AGREE TO THE EUROPEAN FORMULA WHICH IS MORE RESTRICTIVE THAN THE FORMULA WHICH THE JAPANESE AGREED TO. THE PLAN WAS TO HAVE SOLOMON INVITE JAPANESE REPRESENTATIVES TO THIS COUNTRY BEFORE THE FINAL JAPANESE-EUROPEAN STEEL INDUSTRY MEETING WHICH IS SCHEDULED FOR AUGUST 21. AT THAT MEETING, THE EUROPEANS HOPE TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE JAPANESE ON VOLUNTARY RESTRAINTS. IF SUCCESSFUL, THEY WOULD THEN APPROACH BRITAIN AND CANADA, THE OTHER TWO MAJOR STEEL EXPORTERS.

ART OKUN AND NICK KATZENBACH FEEL THAT WE SHOULD NOW CALL LLOYD CUTLER, ATTORNEY FOR THE U.S. STEEL INSTITUTE, TO SUGGEST THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO REEVALUATE OUR POSITION AND SUPPORT OF THE VOLUNTARY RESTRAINTS IF THE STEEL INDUSTRY WERE TO JOIN BETHLEHEM IN AN ACROSS-BOARD 5 PERCENT INCREASE IN STEEL PRICES. NICK FEELS THAT WILBUR MILLS SHOULD BE CALLED IN ADVANCE AND THAT MILLS WOULD AGREE TO THIS APPROACH.

OKUN FEELS THAT KATZENBACH SHOULD MAKE THE CALL TO CUTLER AND THAT NEITHER HE NOR SECRETARY SMITH SHOULD GET INVOLVED.

SECRETARY SMITH OPPOSES ANY ACTION ON THIS FRONT ON GROUNDS THAT THE APPROACH IS NOT SELECTIVE AND WOULD HURT THE STEEL COMPANIES WHO HAVE SHOWN RESTRAINT AS WELL AS THOSE WHO HAVE ANNOUNCED EXCESSIVE INCREASES. MOREOVER, HE DOES NOT FEEL THAT THIS TYPE OF ACTION WOULD HELP IN OUR EFFORTS TO SET U.S. STEEL TO HOLD BACK.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON
20506

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TA
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CO 1-9
CO 141
~~76 105~~
January 30, 1968
76 110

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State

Honorable Henry H. Fowler
Secretary of the Treasury

Subject: Trade Discussions with Europeans

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-346
By ing, NARA, Date 1-6-93

Before reaching a decision on tariff increases or export rebates, we should have a short hard go at the Europeans (and Japanese).

-- To see if we can get them to act in ways that improve our trade account (liberalizing their commercial policies and stepping up their domestic expansion), or failing that,

-- To obtain a firmer commitment that they will stand still for our action.

1. This is necessary for two reasons.

First, we have no real assurance that the Europeans will stand still for our trade measures (or support a GATT waiver) -- and thus that we can in fact come out ahead. Indeed, as of now we are almost certain the Europeans will not stand still if Japan, Australia, and Britain were to join us in restrictive trade moves -- as they almost surely would. We would be in a much better tactical position to deter retaliation if we consult in depth -- and offer the Europeans an out -- before going ahead.

Second, it is possible that countries such as Germany would rather take expansionary trade measures than be faced with restrictive actions by the United States. The Europeans, of course, are divided among themselves on trade and domestic economic policy; our intervention might give the liberals a leg up on the Franz Josef Strausses. This clearly would be

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FEB 1 1968

CENTRAL FILES

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

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FO4-1

FO5

January 8, 1968

CO141

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FG-105

MEMORANDUM FOR: S - The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: M - Eugene V. Rostow

SUBJECT: The Balance of Payments Program: Next Steps after the First Round of Talks.

These observations were written on the plane coming back. They reflect reactions of the talks we had in Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, and to what we read of Nick Katzenbach's talks in Europe.

The first reactions to the announcement of our balance of payments program on January 1 have been constructive. The speculative pressure on the dollar through the gold pool has stopped, for the moment at least. The governments and central bankers, by and large, have said two things: (1) the American action was necessary, courageous, decisive, and useful, but (2) they are also worried about its possible impact not only on their own economies, but on the world economy as a whole. They are concerned about the prospect of an acute shortage of funds, credits, and reserves, causing higher interest rates; about the risks of an outbreak of protectionism, especially if we decide to move for border tax legislation; and about an atmosphere of uncertainty which could express itself in the postponement of investment decisions, and a rising tendency to sell securities and hold assets in liquid form. Such a tendency could break some of the weaker currencies, and even lead to a pell mell for liquidity, in the pattern of 1931.

Action by the United States has an entirely different psychological effect from that of any other country. If we take limited protective steps which other countries take as a matter of course, men react altogether differently. The fact that we have undertaken a mandatory balance of payments program is in itself a shock. That we are considering a border tax adjustment as part of the program -- effectively a devaluation

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~Authority NLS 83-38By isa, NARS, Date 3-11-83

November 25, 1967
6:15 p.m.

C. F. 4
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Leonard Marks gave you an initial report on fostering educational TV in Vietnam. You requested that Marks report his plans to the Japanese Ambassador.

Marks told me this morning that he is sending an emissary to Tokyo and Saigon next Monday. He will meet with the Japanese representatives in Tokyo and travel with them to Saigon for a conference with the Minister of Education.

Marks feels that the Japanese Ambassador "can add nothing to our progress at this stage." Bill Bundy is also informed.

I checked this with Bill Jorden. He thinks it might do no harm if he met early next week with a representative from the Japanese Embassy to convey the gist of Mark's progress and plans.

Do you want Jorden to handle it at this level for now?

Yes _____ No _____

DECLASSIFIED

Authority USIA guidelines

By jm, NARA, Date 2-27-97

Charles Maguire

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By jm, NARA, Date 2-27-97

cc Walt Rostow

CONFIDENTIAL

KKXCM:pcs

B/B/g

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

C. F. ACTION

*CO 141
SP/CO 141
Mr Watson
ST 57-3*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, November 15, 1967 -- 7:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

I received at 7:00 a.m. this morning a call from Mr. Kei Wakaizumi. He first asked what I thought of Prime Minister Sato's speech.

I said that I thought it was an excellent expression of Japanese interest.

He asked if I had any changes to suggest on a personal basis, since there was still an opportunity for changes.

I said that I would not suggest changes in a speech by the chief of another government.

He then asked if it was possible to extend the time that Prime Minister Sato could see you alone this afternoon. I said that I did not know your schedule but I would communicate this suggestion.

I do not know what it is that Prime Minister Sato wishes to discuss; but, given the importance of the visit, you may wish to see if you could run somewhat over the scheduled time in a further private talk this afternoon.

At 10:30 p.m. last night the Japanese gave us the attached fall-back language on the Ryukyus. Sec. Rusk will be meeting with Prime Minister Sato at, I believe, 10:00 a.m. this morning. In the light of the Japanese proposal and the language acceptable to Sen. Russell, I see no reason why they cannot come up with an agreed passage for the communique.

W. Rostow

Have Marvin extend scheduled time
by, say 30 minutes _____

No _____

See me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-320
By cb, NARA, Date 1-4-95

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NOV 15 1967
CENTRAL FILES

JAPANESE TENTATIVE PROPOSAL

10.30 P.M. - 1/14

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The President and the Prime Minister frankly discussed the Ryukyu and the Bonin Islands. The Prime Minister emphasized to the President the strong desire of the Government and people of Japan for the reversion of these islands, and expressed his belief that an adequate solution should ^{to this problem} promptly be sought on the basis of mutual understanding and trust between the Governments and people of the two countries. He further emphasized that an agreement should be reached between the two Governments within a few years on a date satisfactory to them for the reversion of these Islands. The President stated that he fully understands the desire of the Japanese people for the reversion of these islands. At the same time, the President and the Prime Minister recognized that the United States military bases on these islands continue to play a vital role in assuring the security of Japan and other free nations in the Far East.

As a result of their discussion, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that the two Governments should keep under joint and continuous review the status of the Ryukyu Islands, guided by the aim of returning the administrative rights over these Islands to Japan and in the light of these discussions.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-320
By CG, NARA, Date 1-4-95

BB/ MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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CO141

September 15, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WATSON

MURAKAMI Yasushi
Asian Culture Study
Center

Attached is a letter which you recently received from Representative Utsunomiya which you referred to Mr. Rostow for further reply. Also attached is a file of related correspondence. *Sakuma*

The form letter attached to the Representative's letter was received by a number of prominent Government officials. The State Department strongly recommends against the White House acknowledging this letter in any way, and has advised other recipients not to reply.

Mr. Utsunomiya has been described as a violent Vietnam critic, an enemy of US-Japanese military cooperation, a publicity hunter and, by other LDP members, as virtually without influence. He has travelled extensively in Communist countries, publicly criticizing Prime Minister Sato's foreign policy to the considerable embarrassment of the LDP. He is also prone to quote bits of correspondence from US officials out of context for his own purposes.

OK

I, therefore, suggest that we not take any further action.

Dick
Richard M. Moose

File attached

cc: Mr. Jordan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: WALT ROSTOW
FROM: W. MARVIN WATSON
8/28/67
for reply

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 97-187
By *plies* NARA. Date 8-23-01

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 12, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Sixth Meeting of the Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs

The Joint United States-Japan Committee will hold its Sixth Meeting in Washington September 13-15. The Japanese delegation, led by Foreign Minister Miki, landed at San Francisco Sunday, September 10. They were flown directly by SAM aircraft to Williamsburg, Virginia for two days of rest and recreation as guests of the United States Government. My Cabinet colleagues and I will meet them on their arrival in Washington, tomorrow evening, September 12.

The plenary sessions on the Agenda will take place Wednesday and Thursday morning. Thursday afternoon is reserved for bilateral counterpart discussions. After approval of the communique and general discussion on Friday, September 15, the meeting will terminate at noon when I conduct a joint press conference with Foreign Minister Miki.

You have agreed to host a stag luncheon in the White House Wednesday, September 13 at 1:00 p.m. The Japanese Cabinet delegation to the Sixth Meeting has changed completely from that which you entertained at lunch at the Fourth Meeting in July 1965, with the exception of Foreign Minister Miki, who was at that time Minister of International Trade and Industry.

Miki is the outstanding member of the present delegation. He is an articulate and outspoken politician who has strong ambitions to be Prime Minister. He has shown a constructive approach to Japan's role in Pacific and foreign affairs and he has energized Japan's foreign policy since he took over his portfolio. Miyazawa, Director of the Economic Planning

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 93-321
By WJP, NARA, Date 4-11-94

Copy in Mrs Terrell's Office

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

C. F. ② 3408
CO 141
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~~SECRET~~

September 4, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: United States-Japan Cabinet-
Level Talks

You have asked for my views on what we want from the Japanese with more specific reference to the upcoming Cabinet-level talks:

Fundamentally, we want Japan as a partner -- not as a rival -- in Asia, but as partner sharing the political and economic burdens of regional responsibility. While we do not now seek a greater Japanese military role, other than in its own defense, Japan's actions should contribute to -- and not detract from -- effective fulfillment of our military and security commitments to Asia. This is particularly true of any solution to the Ryukyu and Bonins issues.

During the talks with Foreign Minister ^xMiki and his Cabinet colleagues, I would propose to:

-- Adopt largely a "listening brief" on the Ryukyus and Bonins, leaving the way open for more conclusive talks with Prime Minister Sato in mid-November but pointing the Japanese in the direction of interim steps to reduce disparities between Okinawa and Japan and thus to ease our problems of the 1968 Ryukyu elections and Japanese public opinion.

-- Spell out the heavy burden we now shoulder for both the security and economic development of Asia.

-- Press the Japanese to take on a greater share of regional leadership and the financial burden of economic assistance and of redressing the imbalance in our balance of payments.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-33
By is, NARS, Date 2-2-83

~~SECRET~~
GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

Copy in Mrs Tenet's office

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

In more specific terms, the major objectives I would currently seek from the Japanese:

-- Support on key United Nations issues and possibly a role in United Nations peacekeeping in the Middle East if this materializes.

-- Continued support and responsible action on Vietnam, with greater economic aid to the Government of Vietnam.

-- Adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

-- Matching contributions on major East Asian economic development programs, including the Asian Development Bank Special Funds.

-- Significant reduction in our bilateral balance of payments deficit which results in part from increased military-related expenditures in Japan during the Vietnam conflict.

Basically, what we want and need is a still more mature and responsible attitude on the part of Japan towards the threat posed by the Chinese Communists and by the internal instability of the countries on the periphery of China. Japan has a greater stake than we do in countering this threat. It should understand that our ability to maintain continued support from Congress and the American public for our own commitments in Asia could depend on Japan's assuming responsibilities commensurate with its stake in regional security and stability.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

C. F. 3367
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THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

AUG 31 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In response to your request at the National Security Council meeting yesterday, I am attaching my views of what the United States should be saying to the Japanese in forthcoming meetings, beginning with the September 13-15 Joint Cabinet Meetings.

It is important that we pursue these balance of payments objectives with Japan independently and separately, regardless of what may evolve in negotiations over the Ryukyu Islands.

The time has passed for general discussion with Japan of balance of payments cooperation, and we should make the specific points set forth in the attached paper.

Henry H. Fowler
Henry H. Fowler

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-188
By cb, NARA Date 7-16-99

~~SECRET~~

copy in Mrs. Terrell's office

9a

Talking Points for Use With Japanese Officials

1. The U.S. proposes that the U.S. and Japan form a balance of payments committee -- under Treasury and Finance Ministry leadership -- which would have the following tasks (among others which may be defined):

- a. To discuss each country's trends and outlooks,
- b. To maintain a current joint accounting of each country's balance of payments, and
- c. To examine the various technical possibilities for balance of payments cooperation, including the field specifically of military transactions.

2. With respect to military-financial planning the U.S. places great importance on complementary U.S./Japanese actions. Within the framework of complementary military roles in the area of Japan and an overall level of defense as determined by the Japanese Government, we believe there is wide potential for increased Japanese military procurement in the U.S. -- up to 1/3 of the \$2.8-2.9 billion in the Five Year Defense Plan earmarked for procurement of new equipment. (See attached principles for military-financial planning which would also be presented to the Japanese.)

3. We should seek to cover by other financial measures any gap which remains between the receipts from Japanese military procurement in the U.S. and the amount of U.S. defense expenditures in Japan (a gap of probably at least 65%). Such measures would expand current cooperation to consider purchase of long-term (4-5 years) U.S. securities, prepayment of debts (PL 480, GARIOA etc., amounting to over \$400 million) and repurchase of Japanese securities held by U.S. agencies. Arrangements might consider earmarking the funds invested in securities for increased Japanese contributions to regional economic development at the time of redemption.

4. The U.S. suggests also that we jointly consider other means for balance of payments cooperation and sharing the non-military economic burdens in Asia, such as Japanese actions to: (a) liberalize its outward investment controls (b) seek increased access to European capital markets (c) remove non-tariff barriers (d) expand markets in Europe and reduce reliance on exports to the U.S. (e) expand its economic aid contributions in Asia and (f) assume a larger share of non-military aid to South Vietnam and plan a major role in rehabilitation efforts there after the conflict ends.

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

Principles for U.S.-Japanese Military-Financial Planning

1. Japanese dependence on local industry for military supply principally when it is cheaper than supply from abroad.
2. Japanese acceptance of the principle that U.S. industry should have a full opportunity to compete with third countries for military purchases.
3. Japanese purchase of military equipment from the U.S. whenever it is desirable to do so for cost, technological or military compatibility reasons.
4. Japanese development and production in selected cases where a premium for the technology rather than employment is considered particularly advantageous to the future national, as distinct from solely military, growth.
5. Establishment of a cooperative research and development program, whereby (a) Japanese interests in military technology can be advanced to the maximum possible extent consistent with most efficient use of its budget resources, and (b) projects in the field of equipment co-production can be facilitated.
6. Japanese cooperation in continuing U.S. efforts to reduce the amount of its defense expenditures in Japan.

~~SECRET~~

RESERVED
SEP 15 1967
CENTRAL FILES

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C.F. (3) 3338
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

30 August 1967

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 94-319
By is, NARA Date 10-26-99

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You have asked for my views on the positions we should take during the Japanese Foreign Minister's visit next month.

I believe we should:

a. Listen to Foreign Minister ^XMiki's proposal for the reversion to Japan of the Ryukyus, Bonins and other Western Pacific islands.

b. Explain to Miki that the issues to be discussed are much broader than the narrow subject of "reversion" -- they relate to fundamental issues of U.S. and Japanese foreign and defense policy. The basic question is not "should the Ryukyus 'revert' to Japan", but rather "will the U.S. Congress and the U.S. public support:

1. Extension of the 'one-sided' U.S.-Japanese security treaty beyond 1970.
2. Retention of U.S. military bases in the Ryukyus for the protection of Japan.

(u)
[Redacted]

c. Ask Japan to permit us to compete on equal terms with her own manufacturers for the sale of military equipment to the Japanese government. The objective should be to increase Japanese purchases of U.S. military equipment from the current level of approximately \$60 million per year to approximately \$200 million per year. \$200 million would represent only 40-50% of the expenditures we are currently making in Japan in support of our joint defense.

I would base our approach to the Japanese, both in September and in the next two or three years, on the propositions that: our people will never again allow our nation to "stand alone" in the far Pacific; our bases in that area are there at least as much for the protection of the Japanese as they are for the defense of the United States; and, it will be impossible for us to maintain those bases unless the Japanese move gradually to share the very heavy political and economic costs of providing security to the area.

Robert S. McNamara
Robert S. McNamara

CONFIDENTIAL
Downgraded from CONFIDENTIAL
by *is* on *10-26-99*
Copy - Mrs. F. ...

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5357
Sec Def Cont Nr. X-

July 11, 1967

(F)

C. F. //

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MEMORANDUM FOR DICK MOOSE

I have marked 1 p. m. Wednesday, September 13 for a luncheon for the Japanese Cabinet Ministers.

Will you notify the necessary persons and let me have a list of who will attend.

James R. Jones

cc: Bess Abell
Charles Maguire

JRJ:sas

RECEIVED
SEP 13 1967
CENTRAL FILES

✓ JMT/MC
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

C.F. ①
20141 12

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, March 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Former Prime Minister Kishi of Japan

X You have agreed to receive former Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi at noon on Wednesday, March 22. His purpose is to pay a short courtesy call on you.

Mr. Kishi was most cooperative during his tenure as Prime Minister (1956-1960). His leadership was particularly important in working out the revised Security Treaty in 1960.

Though he now holds no official position -- except his seat in the parliament -- he remains one of the most influential men in Japanese political life. He is the brother of Prime Minister Sato. One of his followers, Finance Minister Fukuda, is probably the most likely candidate to succeed Sato.

Kishi's influence continues to be of great potential help to us -- regarding our security relations and support for our position in Vietnam. He will be seeing Secretaries Rusk and McNamara.

He is travelling in a private capacity, and is not likely to raise any specific problems. You may wish to:


- Discuss briefly your views on the present situation in Vietnam. Kishi is basically very sympathetic with our position.
- Express your admiration for Japanese contribution to regional Asian cooperation in various fields, including political, banking, and agricultural areas, and for the substantial aid which Japan is giving to less developed Asian countries.

Walt Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 83-31
By ms, NARS, Date 5-4-83

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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CENTRAL FILES



C. F.

3

13

February 13, 1967

CA
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FG175-6
FG105
FG115
FG211
CO 141

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

The President today signed an Executive Order entitled "Providing for the Regulation of Air Transportation in the Ryukyu Islands."

#11326

Sincerely,

William J. Hopkins
Executive Assistant
to the President

The Honorable
The Acting Attorney General
Washington, D. C.

tmj

Green Copies used for FG#12
Military Aide advised Feb 13, 1967
No announcement by Press Office
E.O. dated 2/13/67 & sent to Archives 2/13/67

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FEB 13 1967
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THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

14
Disseminated
to the President
7/21/79

C.F.
IT 80
C0141
C0230
FG110

November 8, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Authority Treasury 5/3/78
By NTE, NARS, Date 11/5/79

Subject: Questions relating to my trip to Tokyo and Manila

As you know, I will be in Tokyo to attend the November 24-26 Inaugural Meeting of the Governors of the Asian Development Bank. The major push for setting up the Bank came from your April 1965 Johns Hopkins speech, and in March of this year you signed the Asian Bank Act, which received great support in both Houses of Congress.

The Tokyo Meeting will bring together Finance Ministers, Central Bank Governors and other high officials from eighteen Asian nations and eleven other non-Asian nations that are joining us in financial support of this new regional Bank. This could provide an opportunity to help shape our own planning on a program which is viable and enduring financially, as well as militarily and politically in the reconstruction of Vietnam and long-range development and security in the Far East.

The Task Force which you on October 16 instructed me to set up on this problem has been reviewing magnitudes that might be involved. It will be too early to give you a definitive report of their thinking before I leave for Tokyo. My own thought to which I would like your reaction is to use the opportunity I will have in Tokyo to start the financial officials thinking about 1) these future costs, 2) the ways in which these costs might be shared without adding to balance of payments strain, and 3) the best "multilateral umbrellas" through which we, together, might channel this combined effort. I might also take advantage of the fact that the Governors at the meeting will be electing the first President of the Asian Development Bank, Mr. T. Watanabe of Japan, who is well known to many of us here in the U.S. and who was with the World Bank for a number of years. I propose:

- talking informally to the Asian Bank President and some of his people to get their thoughts about sharing

~~SECRET~~

Original in Mrs. Terrell's office

Discussed with the President by Sec. Fowler on 11/9/66 at the bank

RECEIVED
NOV 15 1966
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Magical
C.F.
SP3-162
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15

TO : PE - Mr. Bundy

DATE: October 14, 1966

CD141

FROM : PE/J - Richard J. Sneider

SUBJECT: Draft Speeches for the President's Trip

1. On reviewing the draft speeches, I find that there are all the usual references to Japanese initiatives in the regional context, such as ROK-Japanese normalization, Japan's role in Indonesian creditors club, and the Japan-sponsored conference on agricultural development. For some reason, the Japan-sponsored conference of Foreign Ministers last April on South-east Asian economic development is not mentioned and should be.

2. However, from the Japanese viewpoint the chief problem I see is the failure to distinguish the Japanese role and initiatives from those of the other Asian countries. To make this point, I would suggest that we talk of Japan in the following terms: Japan is the first nation in Asia, outside Oceania, to reach the stage of advanced industrial and technological growth and is soon to be the third ranking industrial power in the world; for the first time, an Asian Nation--Japan--is both able and willing to bear a major share of the burden for supporting the efforts of other Asian nations to make a similar breakthrough.

3. I think most of the obvious pitfalls in unhelpful references to Japan have been avoided in the speech drafts with one exception. I found several references in the Honolulu and Manila drafts particularly to World War II. I hope we can avoid these or at a minimum play them in the lowest possible key.

4. Specific Comments: Honolulu speech: page 4 last line Instead of the reference to the occupation, I suggest the following language -- "We have reason for pride in the creation of our present relationship with Japan of partnership and common purpose."

Page 8 line 3 Suggested new language -- "Asian Foreign Ministers met at Tokyo last April to consider Southeast Asian economic development and agricultural ministers will meet again in December to study ways of raising agricultural productivity" (a similar revision should be made on page 4 of the Bangkok speech).

FE/J:RLSneider:sd

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *State letter 3-10-78*

By *[signature]*, NARA, Date *2-19-97*



5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-92
By mp, NARA Date 8-31-96

C.F. 365
FOIA 6263
CO141

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
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Classification

86

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Origin ACTION: Amembassy TOKYO PRIORITY

Oct 8 1966

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- USIA
- NSC
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- CEA
- NSA
- DOD
- CPR

STATE 62636

1. Ambassador Takeuchi called on Under Secretary Katzenbach October 6 to deliver following message from Prime Minister Sato to President:

QUOTE Prime Minister Sato is deeply grateful that President Johnson, on the occasion of his attending the coming Manila Conference and visiting various Asian and Pacific region countries, has sent him a most understanding message, remembering the invitation to visit Japan extended to the President by the Prime Minister during his visit to the United States in January 1965.

The Prime Minister feels that the various considerations set forth in the President's message are based on the most thorough reflection, and acknowledges the President's decision resulting from them. The Prime Minister hopes that the Manila Conference will contribute to the early achievement of peace and stability in South East Asia, and wishes earnestly for the success of the President's mission and the safety of his journey.

The Prime Minister believes that Japan should continue her efforts towards contributing to the return of peace and stability in

** Asian Countries, meeting with leaders of*

also sent to Central Files as of 10-19-66

Drafted by: FE/J:RMPetree:jy 10/7/66
Tel. Ext. 6051
Telegraphic transcription and classification by: FE/J - Richard L. Snider

Clearances:
FE - Mr. Lakeland
FE/P - Mr. Gaiduk
P - Mr. McCloskey

U - Mr. [unclear]
White House - Mr. [unclear]

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OCT 11 1966
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BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L
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SEPTEMBER 26

1. EMBASSY RECOMMENDS MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO PRIME MINISTER SATO REGARDING TYPHOON DISASTER IN JAPAN AS FOLLOWS: BELIEVE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE RELEASE SHOULD BE LEFT TO DISCRETION OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.
2. SUGGESTED MESSAGE: "DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE BEEN SHOCKED AND SADDENED BY THE LOSS OF LIFE AND DAMAGE CAUSED IN JAPAN BY TYPHOONS WITHIN THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS. PLEASE ACCEPT MY SINCERE CONDOLENCES". EMERSON
BT

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 27

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RECEIVED
SEP 26 6
CONFIDENTIAL

September 14, 1966

18
C. F.

TAI

CO 141

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The President on September thirteenth
signed a proclamation entitled "Proclamation
3744
of Trade Agreement With Japan Providing
Compensatory Concessions."

Sincerely,

William J. Hopkins
Executive Assistant
to the President

The Honorable
The Secretary of Commerce
Washington, D. C.

rrg

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, 4:00 pm
August 15, 1966

Mr. President:

Edwin O.
Ambassador Reischauer, in his
"swan song" ~~X~~ policy cable from
Tokyo, gives the reasons why he
believes we should alter our policy
toward Communist China.

From Tokyo, he sees our differences
with Japan over how to deal with the
Chinese Communist menace as the
most serious problem in U.S. -
Japanese relations.

Bromley Smith
Bromley Smith

19
C.F. - ①
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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE, COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

2712
SP/CO291
CO13
CO141
ND19/CO312
PC
F07
FOR OC/T USE ONLY 20

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy TOKYO IMMEDIATE

Info

RPT INFO: Amembassy BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE

STATE.

8/4/66

EXDIS.

Request that you deliver following letter from the President to Prime Minister Sato:

QUOTE Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have noted, as I am sure you also have, the very interesting speech made by the Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman in Bangkok on August 3. The Foreign Minister's suggestion that the nations of Asia take their destiny into their own hands and that those nations in Asia which have been in the forefront in promoting constructive undertakings for peace and progress take the lead in establishing a Peace for Asia Committee to seek to hold a conference in Asia which would include all of the principals in the war in Viet-Nam seems to me to be very constructive. Although the Foreign Minister did not discuss this proposal with us and we therefore do not know exactly how he would hope to implement it, I would hope that your Government would find it possible to give him encouragement and advice on how this effort might be made to move forward. Even if the Communist powers initially reject

Created by: G:UAJohnson/iges 2232 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: S - The Secretary
8/4/66

Clearance: FE - Mr. Unger The White House

~~SECRET~~

Classification

FORM DS-322 8-65

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AUG 15 1966
CENTRAL FILES

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NSC 6721/78
By: [Signature] Date: 4/6/79

BK

C.F. (D)

21

June 13, 1966
11:30 a.m. Monday

CO
FG-105-7
FG-105
CO122
CO18
30301
CO50-1
CO141
CO291
CO160

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Luncheons with appropriate Ambassadors

not in file
You will remember that in commenting on my memorandum of June 8, 1966, you indicated that you desired to re-instate the luncheons with foreign Ambassadors that Jack Valenti formerly handled, but desired that the staff be cut down to, at the maximum, three persons.

I have talked with Bill Moyers concerning this, particularly as to the selection of people, and he suggests that only Ambassador Symington, Assistant Secretary Bundy, and myself attend the first luncheon where it is suggested that the Ambassadors from Indonesia, Australia, Burma, China, Japan, Thailand, and Laos be invited.

I had included the names of Bill Moyers and Walt Rostow but Moyers' reaction is that Rostow sees the Ambassadors frequently, as does Moyers, and it is not necessary for them to be there.

Does this meet with your approval, or would you like either Moyers or Rostow or both present?

Approve: Yes _____ No _____

Add Moyers: Yes _____ No _____

Add Rostow: Yes _____ No _____

Robert E. Kintner

REK:ny

RECEIVED
JUN 14 1966
CENTRAL FILE

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARRING
BY JH ON 11-24-86

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 10, 1966
3:30 P.M. Friday

C.F.

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FO2100141
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PR18

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22

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

George
Mac Bundy phoned me today to remind me that the ^xFord Foundation Board is scheduled to elect David Bell as an officer of the Foundation at the Board meeting June 23 and 24. I wrote you a note previously about this but Mac pointed out again that he did not want to cause any embarrassment in the event a member of the Board leaked the fact that Bell was elected an officer.

K

Mac will not say anything, but he says that if past practice prevails, the minutes of the meeting will probably be printed the following day in some newspaper, due to talking by some Board member.

He also pointed out that the ^xHarvard ^{University} Overseers have appointed Ambassador ^xReischauer as a professor. This has yet to be announced but may come out at any time. I did not know about this, but perhaps you do.

Robert E. Kintner

embarrassment
No must hold Bell *rental*
for aid Bell gets thro
if we can
L

Orig. to Mrs Fevits

*Rec'd 6/13/66
C. files*

DETERMINED TO BE
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
BY TH ON 11-24-86

C. F. (2)

MC/CO

CO 141

~~76 100~~

(K)

Date: 5-27-66

TO: W. MARVIN WATSON

FROM: JAMES R. JONES

This meeting with the Japanese Cabinet is in Japan and the dates are firm.

The President told Sec. Rusk that Rusk, Secretaries Cannon, Freeman and Wirtz and Udall (if he insisted) could go to the conference. However, Secretary Fowler and Ackley cannot go.

jrj

May 26, 1966
10:30 a.m. Thursday

C. F. ①

PP13-11/PR12

WA 4-1

CO 18

CO 111

FG 296

PR 12

PP13-11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting with Irving Gitlin

Irving ^xGitlin is a former producer who worked with me at NBC. He produced the American NBC White Papers and many other outstanding documentaries. Before that he worked, in the same capacity, for CBS Reports. He is now an independent producer. He is ingenious, creative, but somewhat difficult to control.

As background you talked with Arthur ^xKrim about extending your film on your flight from Australia to Japan to a half-hour and asked him to get a producer who could do it. He talked with Gitlin who would like to do it. Gitlin has rather elaborate ideas of interviewing the people on the flight, etc. which you should ask him about.

If the question of money comes up, Arthur Krim said to forget about it. I don't know what he had in mind, but perhaps we could get the USIA to finance Gitlin's project if you approve. I think it is a good idea to develop such affilm and perhaps if it is satisfactory to you could be used abroad by the USIA.

Robert E. Kintner

Bill Moyers
CC: Marvin Watson
Jake Jacobsen

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

7.14 11-24-86

May 24, 1966
6:15 p.m. Tuesday

C.F. (7)

ST/MC
FG100
IT45
C0141

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MEMORANDUM FOR MARVIN WATSON

In checking, per your request, on the availability of the Cabinet on July 4 and 5 for the Governors' Conference, I found that Secretary Rusk has scheduled, at least tentatively, a meeting with the Japanese Cabinet by the United States Cabinet on July 5 to 7. Secretary Rusk will be leaving the United States on June 25 or 26 and will be gone until July 9. He will attend a SEATO meeting, and on July 5 to 7 has tentatively scheduled a^xJapanese-American Joint Cabinet meeting.

FG105
FG100/MC
IT47-26
FG11-3

Holdberg, Arthur

Since Secretary Rusk was away, I asked Secretary Ball what Cabinet Members were tentatively on the list to be invited. Secretary Ball said he was not sure but he indicated that if the Japanese-American Joint Cabinet meeting were approved (I do not know whether it has been previously approved) that Secretaries Fowler, Freeman, Connor, Udall, Wirtz, and Director Ackley would be invited.

This would conflict with the Governors' Conference in Los Angeles July 4 and 5. On checking, without commenting and on a confidential basis, Attorney General Katzenbach said he would be available although he had planned a vacation, Secretary Udall said he was available - apparently he does not know about the Japanese idea, but Secretary Fowler mentioned the Japanese meeting. Postmaster General O'Brien, Secretary Gardner, and Secretary Weaver would be available. I have not been able to reach several Secretaries, but I thought you should know about the Japanese-American Cabinet meeting conflict in the event the President desires to make a tentative decision.

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MAY 26 1966
CENTRAL FILES

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BY TH ON 11-24-86

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 10, 1966

C.F. ⑧

FO3-2 C
CO 33
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CO 201
CO 237
CO 305

26

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State

FOR: The Under Secretary for Economic Affairs

SUBJECT: Determination under Section 103(b) of the
Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act

Pursuant to Section 103(b) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 and in accordance with the recommendation contained in your letter of January 25, 1966, concurred in by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, and the Agency for International Development, I hereby direct the continuance of United States assistance to Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.

You are hereby directed to inform the chairmen of the six Congressional Committees of this determination pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 103(b) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951.

*Mr. Bolens office handled
delivery of original
WPA*

gan/

MR. VALENTI ⑤
G.F.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

27

7G 440
MC/CO

December 26, 1965

FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

76105
CO 151

FROM: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

CO 50-1
CO 141

SUBJECT: Briefing Book for Vice
President's Visit to the
Far East

Enclosed are 3 copies of a revised page 2 of the Vice President's Briefing Memorandum for his visit to Seoul, Korea. Three copies of the books for the visit were earlier sent to the White House, including one copy for Mr. Valenti who will accompany the Vice President on the trip.

Please insert revised page 2 of the Briefing Memorandum (HHH/BP-4) under TAB 1 in the section of the books marked SEOUL.

Enclosure:

Revised Page 2

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 9, 1965
11:30 a.m. Tuesday

TO: The President
FROM: Jack Valenti

⑧ 28
G. F.
NDI-1
705
MC/CO
CO 203
CO 141

Carl Marcy^x has written a letter to Secretary Rusk about over-the-water transportation for Senator Fulbright and five Senators to New Zealand -- and for Senator Morse and six Senators to Japan.
Wayne^x

Secretary Rusk and I talked about this yesterday.

I fear that your sending Senator Mansfield^x by Presidential plane and not providing any kind of over-water transportation for these other delegations may cause some pain.
Mike

In conversation again this morning with Douglas MacArthur, I offer the following suggestion:

1. Secretary Rusk returns from South America on November 24.
2. That 707 will be available, then, to take both delegations (Morse and Fulbright) across the water -- dropping Morse and his people in Japan, and going onto New Zealand with Fulbright.
3. They would use local transportation from then on.
4. Eugene Black could then use the plane on November '29 (by delaying his departure by one day).
5. Return flights for Morse and Fulbright: We could possibly schedule one of your planes to pick up Morse in Rome on December 20 and return his delegation -- and pick up Fulbright in Hawaii on December 11 to return his delegation.
J.W.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C.F. ①
29
TAI
FG 729
IT 5-4
C0141
C0305
FG 155
TA6/Textiles
TA6/Cotton Textiles

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20230
September 29, 1965

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Francis Bator
The White House

Subject: Cotton Textiles: Kennedy Round Sector Discussions

You had asked me for a memorandum on the cotton textile sector discussions. The following brings you up to date on the problem.

1. Formulation of Package Deal on Cotton Textiles in Kennedy Round

Earlier this year Eric Wyndham White, Director General Japan, the United Kingdom, and the in the Kennedy Round sector discussions on cotton textiles under which the to extend the Long-Term Cotton an additional five years and the to negotiate a reduction in tariffs liberal administration of the LTA. the result of two principal factors seriously impair international trade able future. One was the forthcoming ch the exporting countries would endment to the LTA to restrict the , and in particular the United States, under the Arrangement. The other was cotton textiles on the exceptions list statement of the United States when it textiles, that it assumed the LTA at expiration in 1967.

is point of view, the LTA has been a o control imports of cotton textiles hird LTA year (which ends September 30, . (Attachment I summarizes imports of

TRANSMITTAL FORM - U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

FORM CD-82
(8-2-60)

DATE 9/30/65

TO : Mr. McPherson

FROM: Stanley Nehmer *SN*

I thought you might be interested in the attached memo to Francis Bator on the cotton textile sector discussions, prepared at his request of some time ago.

DO NOT USE FOR PERMANENT RECORD INFORMATION

USCOMM-DC 34243-P64

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 88-37
By *ing*, NARA, Date 2-16-88

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

File 15952

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ACTION: Amembassy TOKYO 966

C.F.

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Valenti

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ATTN: SCIENTIFIC ATTACHE

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Below you will find the text of the President's statement to the

*US-Japan Cooperation in Medical Science meeting in Honolulu October 4.

Text may be changed in minor detail however draft below has been cleared through White House and may be delivered to appropriate officials in Japanese foreign ministry:

"When Prime Minister Sato and I met together in January, we agreed to undertake a greatly expanded program of cooperation in medical science, directed towards attacking some of the most serious medical problems that afflict the peoples of Asia.

"Some of the foremost medical scientists of our two countries are now gathered in Honolulu, for a conference to review the present state of knowledge on such problems and to join their talents in working towards solutions. This conference represents a long step forward in carrying out the program Prime Minister Sato and I had envisaged, and is a splendid example of the spirit of partnership that animates our relations with Japan.

"There

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SEP 30 1965
CRIMINAL FILES

Drafted by:

SCI:REScantlebury:rg 9/29/65

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

SCI - J. Wallace Joyce

Clearances:

WHITE HOUSE - Mr. Cater (substance)
Mr. Bundy (substance)
Mr. Valenti (substance)

EA/J - Mr. Sylvester (substance)

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"There is perhaps no greater challenge today than to seek to dispell the black clouds of suffering and disease that darken the horizon of millions of people. We can hope to meet that challenge effectively, if our two nations work together and with others to overcome common problems, and at the same time we will be advancing toward the goal of a peaceful world and a better world for all.

"I should like to extend my warm greetings to the participants, and to wish them every success in their endeavors."

Japanese Embassy Washington has been provided above text.

End.

BALL

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Dear LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ATTACHMENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

RECEIVED
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

August 20, 1965

1965 AUG 21 AM 10 42

42
31
NR 2
FG 105
CO 141

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read *BHR*
Executive Secretary

Enclosed for Mr. Jack Valenti is a copy of an information memorandum from Under Secretary Mann to Secretary Rusk informing the Secretary of discussions on the Bristol Bay salmon problem between Mr. Mann and William C. Herrington of the State Department and Senators Bartlett and Magnuson.

EV X *wa* X

Enclosure:

As stated.

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SEP 4 1965
CENTRAL FILES

E. F.

(4)

CA 7/Pan American
Pan American
Curlin
CO 170
~~CO 141~~
Japan Airlines

August 17, 1965

Dear Jim:

I have your letter of August 12
and appreciate your sending me
the material.

Sincerely,

Lee C. White
Special Counsel to the President

X
Mr. James Rowe
Corcoran, Foley, Youngman & Rowe
1511 K Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

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AUG 20 1965
CENTRAL FILES

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Textiles Wool

C.F. ②

TAG/Wool

FG11-10

CO141

33

June 25, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR

Honorable Harry G. McPherson

Subject: Wool Textiles

A U.S. Government-industry delegation has recently returned from Japan where it urged the Japanese to agree to participate in an international conference aimed at finding a solution to the problem of rapidly rising wool textile exports to certain markets, including our own. The U.S. Government presentation included the warning that if the Japanese rejected an international meeting, our Congress might take unilateral action. The Japanese Government rejected this proposal, and in reaction to the warning, one Japanese representative made a caustic and somewhat insulting statement in the course of the meeting. Our own industry representatives came away annoyed, and they may now increase pressure on Congress and the President to take unilateral action to restrict imports from Japan, or at least to promise to move in that direction in the next year or two. Such action could involve either new legislation raising tariffs, or creating quotas, or both; or an attempt with Presidential pressure to negotiate a bilateral agreement with Japan.

We feel strongly that unilateral action in this field would be very unwise for the following reasons:

1. It would constitute a major step in a protectionist direction. This would certainly undermine our position in the Kennedy Round, where we have been trying to persuade other countries to adopt a liberal trade policy and make substantial cuts in their tariffs.

2. Under GATT rules, we would have to pay compensation in the form of reduced tariffs on the same value of trade as that on which we imposed restrictions. Our wool textile imports are presently running at an annual rate of about \$250 million. If other countries would not accept compensation, they could retaliate by raising their tariffs on an equivalent value of our exports; thereby penalizing other U.S. industries.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLS 91-318

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By *[signature]* NARA. Date 2-27-97

① Jan Lewis
② Central Files
③ G. F.

June 4, 1965

NR 2
CO 141
7G 103

CONGRESSIONAL

gab
CONFIDENTIAL?

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. John P. Walsh
The Executive Secretariat
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

SUBJECT: Telegram to the President from Congressman
Pelly regarding North Pacific Salmon

We have received a Read-Bundy memorandum of June 3rd attaching a draft White House reply to the telegram of May 29 from Congressman Thomas M. Pelly, of Washington State, on the subject of Japanese fishing activities in the North Pacific region.

As I told you on the phone, it is our judgment that this matter should be dealt with through a response from the Department of State, most appropriately from the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs.

Because of the time that has already passed since Congressman Pelly sent his telegram, we would greatly appreciate a State response to the Congressman by tomorrow at the latest.

Many thanks for your help on this matter. Please let me know the outcome on this, so that I may inform Mr. O'Brien's office.

James C. Thomson, Jr.

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JUN 5 1965
CENTRAL FILES

CONFIDENTIAL



THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

35

C. F. 6

CO 141
ND19/CO 3/2
FO4-1
FO 5
FG110
AMER. ELEC.
Power Co., Inc.

April 5, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Donald C.

I am returning herewith ~~Don~~ *Donald C.* Cook's letter dated March 27. I will be in touch with him on his return from Europe.

Henry H. Fowler
Henry H. Fowler

Attachment

Nothing else sent to
Central Files as of *4/10/65*

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APR 9 1965
CENTRAL FILES

Copy Mrs. Terrell

3:44
35a (45)

AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER Company, Inc.



2 Broadway, New York, N. Y. 10008
HA 2-4800

DONALD C. COOK
President

March 27, 1965

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. President:

The partner of a very good friend of mine, both of whom are leading figures in the investment banking business here in New York, was recently in Tokyo to carry on certain business negotiations and general discussions with Prime Minister Sato. Upon his return I was advised that these general discussions with the Prime Minister covered a greater range and took more time than had been expected by my American friend, and produced some extremely interesting information you might like to have.

Rather than attempt to paraphrase the information, I will quote it verbatim:

"It was soon clear that he wanted to get a message to President Johnson. I immediately started to maneuver into the position that we could report his conversation to Ambassador Reischauer. In Japanese, to his official interpreter, which Chuji of course understood, he said he would do that himself when the Ambassador returned to Tokyo later this week.

"The message which the Prime Minister wants to get to President Johnson is that there is needed here in Japan a clear-cut, understandable, unilateral statement by the United States respecting Vietnam as to what our conditions are for termination of hostilities and, presumably, withdrawal. He says that the statements now being made by us are taken here, not as reasons for our presence in Vietnam but as justification of our bombing the Communists.

"The foregoing is a broad, but I believe an accurate, interpretation of what the Prime Minister has in mind."

orig Mrs. Teruoto


DECLASSIFIED TO BE BY
AT 10:00 AM ON 08/12/2010
BY SP-10 JCD/STW
HONOLULU, E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY scb ON 12-3-86

It may be that there is nothing in the above that will be regarded by you as news, since I am sure that the governmental sources of information are necessarily much more extensive than any private source could possibly be. However, I send this information to you because it is well known that government officials periodically find it useful to send semi-official messages through trusted private citizens and because, in any event, this letter will serve to ensure that the information comes to your personal attention.

I am leaving for Italy tomorrow evening and will be away approximately three weeks. While I am there I will have an opportunity to talk to the leading bankers in the country, and I hope to obtain some useful information regarding both the Italian and the general European balance of payments situation, as well as their attitude toward the corrective program of your Administration. If the information appears to be of sufficient value, I will pass it on to you when I return.

Sincerely yours,



Donald C. Cook

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House
Washington, D. C.

*m/p J. - Hand to Kennedy -
→ Then to Fowler -
N*

*Noted HMF.
Will be in touch with Cook
when he returns.
(HMF)*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 22, 1965

C. F. [initials]
TAG / TYPEWRITER-RIBBON
CLOTH
FG 11-10
C 0141
FG 297 5653

TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Lee C. White [signature]

Attached for your approval is a memorandum prepared by Governor Herter's office recommending (with the unanimous approval of all departments) that you not request a further investigation of the cotton typewriter-ribbon cloth industry to determine whether the higher tariff imposed in 1960 as a result of an "escape-clause" proceeding should be reduced. Although normally many departments would be expected to recommend such an investigation, all are agreed that the agreement with Japan by which Japanese exporters have voluntarily limited their U. S. exports compels that we not run the risk of lowering the tariffs which apply to European countries.

Accordingly, I urge that you approve the recommendation of Governor Herter's office by signing in the space marked "Approved".

Encl.

Signed + Dated 3/23/65
Sent to Wm M. Roth -- Trade Negotiations
EOB 3/24/65 -- Delivered by hand

RECEIVED
MAR 29 1965
CENTRAL FILES

*Noted
92*

Rec'd
-12/9/64
3:35 PM
gab

G. F. (4)
TAG/Sept
CO 305
CO 127
CO 141

37

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Wool Textiles

1
Wilson, Harold

1. Pursuant to your instructions, I have reached an agreement with the Prime Minister on the way in which we will treat the wool textile matter. It is agreed that we will both say on demand that you have raised the question with him, that you proposed a meeting of the representatives of the two governments to discuss a possible conference with Italy and Japan, and that the Prime Minister has agreed to consider this proposal. (It is not likely that the British will accept this particular way of going about it, which gives them great difficulties. I think they will agree, in sum, to continuing discussions among experts on both sides.)

2. In return, the Prime Minister asks to be able to say that he raised with you the problems created for British shipping by some of our rules and regulations. I agreed to this on the condition that your own position should be fully protected.

3. I am telling Mike Feldman that this mission has been accomplished and that we can expect in due course to hear back from the British.

McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 83-36
By ics, NARS, Date 3-30-83

File
Hold for later
CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR

August 27, 1964 *38*

THE PRESIDENT

If Japanese Prime Minister Ikeda does come to the UN in November (Tokyo reports it as likely) you will almost have to see him. Given our stake in Japan, you will want to do so in any case.

Therefore, Rusk's proposal that we get credit for asking him makes good sense.

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

Approve _____
hjs

Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLASSIFIED

Authority *State Dec 8/16/77*

By *rmg*, NARS, Date *8/23/77*

4498

38a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 25, 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Washington Visit by Hayato Ikeda,
Prime Minister of Japan

Recommendation:

That you authorize Ambassador Reischauer to inform the Japanese Government, in response to a specific inquiry or otherwise at his discretion, that you would welcome a one to two day working visit by Prime Minister Ikeda in November, should Ikeda be in New York for the Nineteenth General Assembly of the United Nations.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Background:

Prime Minister Ikeda is considering coming to the United States to address the General Assembly in mid-November and reportedly would welcome an invitation to come to Washington to meet with you at that time.

Prime Minister Ikeda was re-elected on July 10 to a third term as President of the governing Liberal Democratic Party and will probably remain in office for the next two years. His speech to the General Assembly and meeting with you would reinforce both Japan's image as a major power and Ikeda's personal position as a world leader and close friend of the United States.

Ikeda visited Washington briefly to attend President Kennedy's funeral. His only previous visit was a State Visit in June 1961. If he visits Washington following his planned November General Assembly address, useful discussions could be held on U.S.-Japan economic problems, U.S.-Japan mutual security questions, relations with Communist China and Japan's role in Southeast Asia.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Dec 16/77
By mg, NARS, Date 8/23/77

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

8/26/64

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CENTRAL FILES

apx

39

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 11, 1964

(19)
E.F.
CA7/11/64-15
60141
FG105
FG-99
CA7-TRANS Pacific
Mansfield, Sen Mike
Humphrey, Sen H.H.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: U.S. - Japan Civil Aviation Consultations

We are now engaged in discussions with Japan working toward a new aviation agreement.

Japan now has a route to San Francisco and to Los Angeles across the Central Pacific. They seek a continuation of this route to New York and beyond.

The Civil Aeronautics Board opposes granting Japan any additional route rights. The Department of State, however, believes we should respond to the Japanese request. They suggest a package granting Japan a trans-Pacific route to either San Francisco or Los Angeles and on to New York. In return, Japan would give up either San Francisco or Los Angeles and grant us the rights to Osaka (the second most important traffic point in Japan), and a confirmation of U.S. rights beyond Tokyo to Asia and Europe, including an important right for Northwest to operate as our second carrier to Hong Kong.

American Airlines will oppose any negotiations because they will be hurt by the grant of a right to New York. TWA and United will also oppose negotiations, but not quite as strongly as American. Northwest will approve this package so long as it does not include any competition to them by way of the Great Circle from Tokyo to New York. Pan American will offer token opposition. Although they are adversely affected by the proposed package, they fear the consequences of no agreement. Japan could harass our airlines.

gpt

F. F.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

LE/NR2

May 14, 1964

NR2

CO141

FG105

Cm/King Crab

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: S. 1988, "AN ACT To prohibit fishing in the territorial waters of the United States and in certain other areas . . . "

RECOMMENDATION: I recommend that you defer signature of S. 1988, "AN ACT To prohibit fishing in the territorial waters of the United States and in certain other areas by persons other than nationals or inhabitants of the United States" for a few days until we have had an opportunity to work out with the Japanese the public handling of the serious questions in our relations with Japan raised by this bill.

DISCUSSION: The Japanese Ambassador called on me under instructions yesterday and left with me a formal note expressing deep concern over the provisions of S. 1988 "insofar as it purports to restrict freedom of the high seas beyond the territorial waters of the United States" and to include in our jurisdiction the fishery resources of the Continental Shelf, especially king crab.

Today Alexis Johnson had a one-hour conversation with Ambassador Takeuchi during which he formally advised him that the bill does not in itself affect in any way the extent of U. S. fishing jurisdiction; that it is concerned primarily with providing meaningful protection to such rights as now exist or which might be acquired at some time in the future, and that before any determination is made that the legislation be applied to king crab we would discuss the matter with the Government of Japan.

The Ambassador found this explanation unsatisfactory and, while admitting to its legal correctness, said that the Act would inevitably be interpreted in Japan as a threat against the long-established and economically important Japanese king crab fishing industry in the Bering Sea. The Ambassador was unusually emphatic in strongly asserting the adverse effects this would have in Japan on our relations. He asserted that these serious effects could only be averted if there were categorical assurances from the United States that

there

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 93-162

By *ju*, NARA, Date *1-10-94*

CONFIDENTIAL

WF
February 17, 1964

C.F.
FG 115
FG 405
FG 105
ND 3
ND 11
CO 141
UTI-3

3

41

Dear Mr. Comptroller General:

This is in acknowledgment of your letter of February fourteenth to the President, enclosing a copy of your supplementary report to the Congress on excessive charges for leased telephone services incurred by United States Forces in Japan, containing the comments of the Department of Defense and Department of State on your findings and recommendations and your evaluation of their comments.

It has been noted that two copies of this supplementary report are being sent to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

Sincerely,

Ralph A. Dungan
Special Assistant
to the President

Honorable Joseph Campbell
Comptroller General
of the United States
Washington, D. C.

rah

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FEB 18 1964
CENTRAL FILED