

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
Memo w/	Dick Moose to Jim Jones re visits of PMs Chung and Maiwandwal & Pres. Sunay (CONFIDENTIAL) <i>State Dec 8/9/77</i>	12/30/66	A
Memo	Walt Rostow to the President (x ref-CIA 5/CO 151) re US trade & investment mission to Korea (CONFIDENTIAL) <i>open 5-17-89 NLS 88-132</i>	12/2/66	A
Letter w/ attachments	Walt Rostow to Chang Ki-Yong re President's trip Korea & Korea's economic progress (CONFIDENTIAL-grp 1) <i>AIID H 3/31/78</i>	11/18/66	A
Memo	Walt Rostow to the President re PM visit (CONFIDENTIAL) <i>State Dec 8/2/77</i>	7/27/66	A
Page 2 of memo:	"topics you may wish to raise" (CONFIDENTIAL)	Rec'd 1/4/66	A
<i>19-19f</i> Memo w/	Chester L. Cooper to Jack Valenti through McGeorge Bundy re Cahannig Liem (SECRET) <i>Exempt, State Dec 8/9/77</i> <i>exempt NLS 95-175</i> <i>Exempt NLS</i>	3/20/65	A and C
<i>20-20e</i> Memo w/ <i>#20e</i> attachments	Jack Valenti to the President re presentation of credentials of Korean ambassador Hyon Choi Kim (CONFIDENTIAL-grp 1) <i>Exempt, State Dec 8/9/77</i> <i>#20, 20a, 20b, 20c, 20d open 1-16-08</i> <i>#20e Exempt 12-4-08 NLS/RAC 08-27</i>	12/11/64	S-ad-A and C
<i>23</i> Tgm	Dept. of State message to Commander in Chief, UN Command (x ref-ND 19-37/CO 151) re Korean air incident (CONFIDENTIAL) <i>open 3-14-05</i>	2/18/64	A

FILE LOCATION

C.F. CO 151 Korea (1964-1965-1966)

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 30, 1966

MEMO FOR JIM JONES

Jim:

I believe the three visits described in the attached memo should be considered along with those mentioned in Brom's memo of December 23, 1966. I have removed the telegrams referred to in the Read/Rostow memo because they have now been largely overtaken by other events. They would in any event have to be revised in the light of your recommendations.

The dates presently under consideration for these three additional visits are as follows:

Prime Minister Chung of Korea -- March 13-14 or
March 14-15

Prime Minister Maiwandwal of Afghanistan -- March 28-29

President Sunay of Turkey -- April 3-5

In your absence I checked the timing of these visits with the Social Office to see if there were any special considerations. The dates shown above reflect adjustments which the Social Office recommended and which I have checked back with the State Department.

After you have had a chance to look this over, I would like to discuss the matter with you. I expect to be in Saturday morning.



Dick Moose

ATTACHMENT
Read/Rostow 12/23/66

RECEIVED
JAN 21 1967
CENTRAL FILES

C. F.
00151
0011
00296
FG105

3



19065

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 23, 1966

53120

1 - Wriggins
2 - Ritt
1a

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Visits During March and April

attached

Attached are telegrams to Seoul, Kabul, and Ankara suggesting dates for official and State visits during March and April.

Although the President had authorized visits from both Korean Prime Minister Il Kwon Chung and Afghan Prime Minister Maiwandwal during the month of April, we are suggesting dates during the last 10 days of March for these two visitors in order to accommodate the Turks who have requested rescheduling President Sunay's State visit for April and in order to allow a little time prior to the President's departure for the Latin American Summit meeting tentatively scheduled for April 12-14. We believe Il Kwon Chung will be pleased to move his dates up because of the Korean elections which are scheduled for April 22. Maiwandwal needs to get back to Kabul for convening of Parliament April 13 and had proposed dates only a few days after those we suggest.

The dates should not conflict with invitations already proffered during March. We have requested that Taipei urge C. K. Yen to visit Washington during the first half of March if at all possible. The visit of Tubman, which the President authorized for March, and that of King Olay authorized for April can be delayed until May since approaches for scheduling dates have not yet been made to either of these two.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State let 8/9/77

By mg, NARS, Date 9/1/77

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

A tentative schedule incorporating these suggestions is attached.

12/25
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

As stated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BB/

C.F.

TAS/CO151

(6)

SENT
WHCA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CO151

Sent

1:39 PM

EEA426
DD WTE10
DE WTE 2494

1966 DEC 2 19 39

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP661145

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECEMBER 2, 1966

SUBJECT: US TRADE AND INVESTMENT MISSION TO KOREA

AID, STATE, AND COMMERCE HAVE COME SOME DISTANCE IN SHAPING UP THE MISSION WHICH WOULD BE "INDUSTRY ORGANIZED-GOVERNMENT APPROVED." TIME TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR MARCH.

THE KEY QUESTION NOW IS A TEAM LEADER. THEY HAVE PUT FOUR NAMES TO ME AND REQUESTED THAT I SOUND THEM OUT IN A PRIORITY ORDER YOU DETERMINE. THEIR NAMES ARE: ROBERT B. *ANDERSON; GEORGE W. *BALL; C. DOUGLAS *DILLON; WALKER L. *CISLER. THEY WANT A MAN OF DISTINCTION WITH PUBLIC AS WELL AS BUSINESS EXPERIENCE AND NO DIRECT BUSINESS CONNECTIONS IN KOREA.

THEY HAVE A GOOD FALLBACK IN TRISTAN BEPLAT SENIOR VICE-PRESIDENT OF MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST. THEY BELIEVE HE WOULD SERVE AS NUMBER TWO IF A BETTER KNOWN FIGURE COULD BE FOUND AS NUMBER ONE.

THE QUESTIONS ARE:

1. SHOULD I APPROACH ANY OF THE SUGGESTED MEN TO HEAD THE MISSION? OTHERS?
2. IF SO, IN WHAT ORDER?
3. SHOULD WE GO WITH BEPLAT AS NUMBER ONE?

DTG: 021802Z DEC 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GP230 IMI230

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 88-132

By 208 NARA, Date 4-19-89

RECEIVED
DEC 12 1966
CENTRAL FILE

1-207 Mc ✓
3 C. F. ①
November 18, 1966 C0151
Bernstein, Joel
FO
FG105-4

Dear Mr. Chang:

Let me first tell you how greatly we enjoyed our time in Korea during the Asian trip.

For me it was a real satisfaction to be able to see the exhibition on the next 5-year plan, and to talk with you and your colleagues engaged in the field of economic development. As promised, I enclose a copy of the talk I gave in Argentina on the problem of inflation, development, and democracy, entitled "The Chapter That Keynes Never Wrote." (You are perfectly free to reprint it in Korea if you judge it relevant to your problems.)

As you gather momentum and begin to see possibilities ahead, it is obviously of the greatest importance that you combine rapid growth with stability. From the experience of Latin America and elsewhere, nothing is more capable of disrupting and distorting a sound development program than rapid inflation, some of the specific effects of which are detailed on pages 6-7 of the text.

I would again underline to you the two points I made to the Minister of Finance:

-- the importance of driving hard on feasibility studies and getting as much of your plan into bankable projects as soon as you can;

-- the importance of engaging private foreign capital in your next development plan in the sectors you regard as important.

But I return to my main theme: the satisfaction we all felt in our visit with you, and my personal gratitude for the many kindnesses shown me by my Korean colleagues.

Yours,

W. W. Rostow

His Excellency
X Chang Ki-Yong
Deputy Prime Minister
Seoul

Enclosure

RECEIVED
JAN 17 1967
CENTRAL FILES

3a

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
UNITED STATES OPERATIONS MISSION TO KOREA
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96301

November 8, 1966

Office of the Director

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. W. W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20501

DECLASSIFIED

Authority AID ltr 3/31/78

By mmg, NARS, Date 4/10/78

Dear Walt:

The President's visit here certainly gave a lift to Korean morale, and will be very helpful in the development of positive Korean-American relations. Your own expressions of admiration for Korea's accomplishments and of optimism regarding its prospects certainly contributed importantly to these results. You are widely known and highly regarded here as an authority on development matters, and so your words carry very special weight.

We are concerned, in the Embassy and USOM, that some of your comments here are being misinterpreted, and that there is serious danger of their misuse for purposes that would be contrary to U. S. and Korean interests. Let me explain, and solicit your help in applying a remedy.

Korea's rapid economic progress in recent years has reflected major improvements in the economic policy environment and basic economic institutional framework that provides the incentives and the opportunities to millions of Korean farmers and businessmen to make more productive decisions. You've no doubt read about some of these improvements in the economic environment (attached is a list of some key ones). These environmental changes-- including the very important factors of increased political stability and continuity of economic management and policy-- have permitted a fuller release of Korea's excellent development potential. The environmental changes (including fiscal and monetary policies) were needed particularly to promote savings, their channeling into productive

GP-1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading & declassification

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. W. W. Rostow
November 8, 1966
Page 2

investment, and exports-- thereby stimulating output and income and reducing the key gaps in the economy (balance of payments gap, budget gap, investment/savings gap, and gap between output and jobs on the one hand and income and employment needs on the other). These environmental changes were promoted through joint ROKG-U.S. planning and action to try to achieve the best possible reconciliation between the interrelated goals of stabilization and growth. They were reinforced by a series of continuing direct efforts to stimulate the growth of agriculture and industry, including a new marketing emphasis.

Throughout these efforts, the greatest Korean problem has been to stay within the bounds of monetary and budgetary expansion that would permit an adequate reconciliation between stability and growth. Conversely, the constant threat to the progress being made has been a strong tendency to expand money supply, investment, and Government expenditure too fast, and thereby trigger a reversal of the mutually reinforcing cycle of increasing price stability, increasing public willingness to hold monetary assets, increasing channeling of investment into more productive forms rather than into more holding of real assets as a hedge against inflation, and resultant acceleration of exports, output and employment. The positive effects of the measures referred to in the previous paragraph are in constant danger of being reduced or stifled by inflationary binges.

Korean psychology tends towards an expansionist, "damn-the-torpedoes", and also Epicurean outlook. (The old Chinese histories identify the Koreans as a people who like to sing, dance and drink.) These tendencies can, of course, be positive developmental forces, if they are adequately channeled and disciplined, but that is the problem. In economic terms, Koreans have not yet sensed the principle of marginal utility as fully as would be desirable and tend, instead, to embrace the doctrine that you can't have too much of a good thing. On the other hand, they also tend to be very practical, imaginative and adaptable. Consequently, we are optimistic regarding their ability to learn rapidly from their experience as to what it takes to succeed in developing a modern economy, and to change their habits as their experience dictates the need.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. W. W. Rostow
November 8, 1966
Page 3

In the foregoing context, the key problem of Korean economic development is the low domestic savings rate. Korean savings performance is in stark contrast with that of Japan, where domestic savings are about one-third of GNP, permitting rapid investment and monetary expansion without excessive inflation. Until the last few years, Korea's net domestic savings have been negative, i. e., consumption exceeded production. The data on savings is weak, but USOM's best estimate is that domestic savings were -1.7% of GNP in 1962, 6.2% in 1965, and might exceed 10% in 1966 (although October economic trends are bad for savings).

This recent rapid improvement in the Korean savings rate is the most encouraging among the many encouraging economic trends here-- in terms of building a vital economy able to sustain high growth rates without excessive reliance on outside help. However, it has not been gained easily. Inducing Korean action that would encourage savings has been a prime focus of U.S. attention. For reasons that I've indicated, the trend of increasing savings is still very fragile and vulnerable. Koreans' natural tendencies to overdo expenditure are aggravated by the strength of political factors, especially in an election year, by irresponsibility in some quarters, by the desire to rationalize failures to exert necessary self-disciplines, etc.-- in the familiar patterns seen all over the world. Achieving reasonably stable growth in Korea is a very delicate balancing act. The U. S. has used its influence here to offset tendencies to upset the balance of policies that is needed to maintain the rapid forward momentum of the economy. In Korea, the dominant tendencies threatening this balance are those of excessive expenditure, as I've explained.

In this context, some Koreans have already seized on certain statements attributed to you, have used them out of context, and have interpreted them in ways that I know you would not sanction. I'm afraid this tendency could easily spread. You are being quoted as saying that conventional economists always underestimate demand for the products needed in a growing economy, that Korea should not worry about overcapacity because demand is always underestimated, that estimates of requirements should be made in the ordinary way and then everything should be doubled, and that economic development is too serious a matter to leave to economists who do not understand it adequately.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. W. W. Rostow
November 8, 1966
Page 4

I understand and have, in fact, long advocated the basic points at which I believe you are driving (tendencies of "experts" to retard attainable progress by the very common practice of underestimating demand and supply potentials, and by failure to adapt mechanical economic calculations to the political and psychological needs of people; the need to involve all segments of national leadership in development planning and policy and to reflect the views and aspirations of the broad spectrum; etc). However, I fear that this good advice is being given to the wrong clients, and that they will misunderstand and misuse it to support positions that you would not support. There is relatively little danger of the ROKG's making the errors of setting their sights too low that you describe (although some of their "experts" have at times underestimated the growth of demand for particular products-- and have also overestimated). The dangers in Korea today are primarily in the opposite direction. A psychologist might find it therapeutic to give a lecture on the psychological dangers to the individual's health and welfare of undue repression of natural appetites, but he would not want to give such a lecture to a voluptuary. I'm not suggesting that Koreans are voluptuaries, but only that prescriptions should fit the malady of the patient in hand.

The dangers here are that you will be cited, as a distinguished American authority on economic development and Presidential assistant, as justifying positions taken by those Koreans who:

- (1) wish to compile national investment programs by aggregating what someone wants, sector by sector, without regard to the aggregate investment expenditure that Korea can sustain without serious inflation, or to market analysis, or to investment priorities in terms of the relative yield in whatever types of return are judged economically or politically desirable;
- (2) want excessive growth of heavy industry, beyond the sizeable growth already provided in the 1967-71 Development Plan, thereby pre-empting resources needed for agriculture and for medium and light industry that will produce more income, jobs and exports for the money invested;

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. W. W. Rostow
November 8, 1966
Page 5

- (3) want to justify precipitate action to approve a great flood of foreign commercial loans with Government guarantee, without adequate review of such matters as the economic, technical and financial feasibility of the projects being financed, whether there is overcosting or suitable loan terms, or the questions under (1) and (2) above (the actual motive for the project sometimes being a slice taken from the original loan transaction, without any substantial risk on the project being taken by anyone but the ROKG and the people or economy as a whole);
- (4) want to cover up failures in their own judgment or performance-- and to ward off domestic and international criticism-- where efforts to restrain inflation have been inadequate (your remarks on the timidity of economists are also being interpreted to argue that concerns about undue monetary expansion are unwarranted), or who wish to escape from the rather rigorous policy logic imposed by recognition of the crucial Korean need for expanded domestic savings;
- (5) would like to be able, where convenient, to discredit sound Korean or international advice on the foregoing points as being too conservative or theoretical and lacking in real policy understanding (including some U. S. Government positions taken in negotiations with the ROKG on self-help and other matters, which some Korean sources have found unpalatable), whereas their real motive is one of those described above.

Some Koreans are already making such interpretations, even to President Park, and the danger is in encouraging backsliding on the painful, step-by-step, but important, progress that has been made by the ROKG over the past couple of years on the various points mentioned above.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. W. W. Rostow
November 8, 1966
Page 6

Of course, your statements are being used out of context, and the users conveniently ignore the stress that you placed while here on good investment project planning, and your very helpful comments during your previous visit to Korea on the bad effects of inflation on Latin American economic development.

Koreans deserve much credit for the great progress that has been made in rebuilding their economy and their society. Americans here use every opportunity to give them the maximum possible credit. We do so not only for the usual reasons of building good relations, but because the building of Koreans' confidence in themselves and each other is a crucial need for their national development. Among ourselves, however, it is important to avoid overestimating Korean capabilities and to recognize that notwithstanding the primary role of the Koreans themselves, U. S. influence on Korea's economic policies-- both positive and restraining-- has been a very important factor in the country's economic advance, in addition to the resources and technical help that the U. S. has provided.

There has been an encouraging growth of Korean understanding of their economic problems and of the measures needed to deal with them most effectively, and I'm sure that there are responsible Koreans who understand much more than we ever will about many aspects of their problems. There has also been an encouraging growth of Korean willingness to accept disciplines and difficulties involved in obtaining good solutions to the basic economic problems of allocating their scarce resources among alternative needs. (Where else has domestic revenue more than doubled in two years?) Yet, these advances in understanding and willingness are still tentative and limited in scope. Their further strengthening is essential to achieve U. S. purposes in Korea, and will need continuing U. S. reinforcement.

Thus, it is important that we continue to do our best to maintain the influence of our policy advice until the positive trends in Korean economic policy making have advanced further. To forestall the possibility that Korean misunderstanding of your views would damage this purpose, I would like to suggest that you write some appropriate comments for Korean consumption. An early letter to the Deputy Prime Minister, indicating

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. W. W. Rostow
November 8, 1966
Page 7

that copies were going to Ambassador Brown and myself, would be helpful. Later on, you might want to consider doing an article for some suitable Korean publication. If you would like, for this purpose, we could send you some suggestions of themes that seem to us particularly appropriate to discuss for a Korean audience. For the letter to the DPM, I would suggest that you include stress on: (1) the effects of continuing, sizeable inflation on development, and the importance of Korea consolidating its grasp on this problem; and, (2) the multiple importance of feasibility studies and good investment project planning. You have spoken and written on these points most eloquently in the past, and would, I'm sure, make a very salutary impression on the DPM and others who would see or hear of your letter.

I regret the length of this letter. But I know your great interest in the subject matter and felt that it needed an adequate explanation. Incidentally, I probably will be in Washington during the first week of December, and would be glad to call on you then if you wish.

Sincerely yours,



Joel Bernstein
Director

Attachment a/s

cc: Mr. Rutherford M. Poats
Assistant Administrator
Bureau for the Far East
A. I. D.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Institutional Progress

During the period August 1964 - April 1965, Korea made unusually great progress in introducing institutional developments that facilitate economic growth. The following lists important steps, reflecting USOM influence, to build into the country's management structure, on a continuing basis, new and better ways of doing things. (Excludes reforms in methods of programming and handling U.S. aid, which are not regarded as part of the permanent institutional structure, although the experience gained may affect that structure.)

1. Exchange Rate System

Establishment of the floating exchange rate system, facilitating maintenance of a realistic, unitary exchange rate, which in turn facilitated removal of trade controls, export expansion, and many other improvements.

2. Trade Controls

Dismantling of bulk of import quotas (covering about 80% of imports), with a policy of progressive removal of most of the remainder. Simplification of control and administrative procedures to provide easier and quicker access by business to needed imports and simpler export procedures: work continuing on this.

3. Monetary Management

a. Intelligence. Revision of types of basic data collected, establishment of greatly improved systems for data collection organization, and analysis on continual basis.

b. Management Structure and Procedures. Establishment of multi-faceted intragovernmental structure of continuing assignments of responsibility, staff groups for continual analysis and recommendation of policy and operational actions, and policy level review and decision-making at Ministerial and Presidential level. (This has brought about, for the first time in Korea, a system that can truly be described as active monetary management of the economy, as distinguished from ad hoc and largely passive monetary action reactions to disturbances in the economy.)

c. Control of Money Supply. Introduction of system of indirect controls to replace the relatively inefficient credit quotas. Coupled with better analysis of liquidity developments and prospective needs, and new structure for active forward management of monetary situation.

4. Money Market and Interest Rates

Major shift of interest rate structure to realistic official rates, thereby providing official monetary institutions (banks) with much more substantial role in collecting savings and channeling to investment uses: result is greater savings, more credit on more suitable terms, better management capability for monetary authorities. Strengthening quality (management) and quantity of long-term, developmental credit available from the KRB: same under way for the MIB. Work with ROKG to improve rural credit system. Preliminary steps towards development of number of other institutions of the money market, e.g., private development banking and securities marketing, life insurance, credit unions, in-service training to upgrade bank staffs, home loan and savings.

5. Export Promotion

Apparatus for continuous, comprehensive export program institutionalized. Permanent trade promotion organization (KOTRA) established and strengthened. Elaborate structure of Government and Government-private committees established, from Cabinet down, for continuing policy formation, operational planning, and surveillance of results -- including monthly Presidential reviews.

6. Savings Program

Comprehensive program approach similar to export promotion established more recently, covering all aspects of national savings activities and policies (Government, business, and individual savings.) Work on 3. and 4. also makes the major substantive contribution here.

7. Government Revenue

As with export and savings generally, Korean predilection for campaigns and programming mobilized to provide continuing organizational support for policy of expanding revenue. Tax administration raised from Bureau to level of Office of Taxation, with organizational strengthening. Process of structural reform of revenue system begun. Tax rates adjusted (mostly upward).

8. National Economic Planning

Major improvements in scope and concepts of planning, and in Government organization for planning. Broadened participation in planning process throughout Government, including provincial and local governments, resulting in greater effect of work. (USOM work on PL 480, Title II programs and other rural development work has had a particularly significant effect in strengthening the influence of provincial and local levels on national programs.) Preliminary discussions of further strengthening of local government planning.

9. Investment Programming

Strengthening and regularizing of procedures and criteria for analyzing and screening investment projects requiring ROKG financing or guarantees. Relating this to development of next five year Economic Plan (1967-71).

10. Agricultural Institutional Development

Improvements in agricultural co-op and credit organizations and variety of their services, grain storage, system for stabilizing grain prices, development of use of lime and mixed fertilizer, further development of extension system, reorganization of fisheries co-op and program, early steps towards introducing commercial approach to forest development, preliminary steps towards strengthening of agricultural marketing, early development of elements of ~~grape industry~~, etc. *food processing*. Variety of institutional analytical work by outside experts, including most of foregoing areas plus the Korean system of land tenure and use.

11. Industrial Research and Development

Launching of main new institute for industrial research and development: hope to have profound effect.

12. Industrial Extension Services

Early stages of developing effective industrial extension services from the Korean Productivity Center, and some similar provincial organizations. Preliminary steps for strengthening related work by universities. Related work to strengthen quality control and inspection policies and services.

13. Private Investment Promotion

New government organization about to be launched after period of planning and discussion. Some steps taken and others under way to strengthen policies and services in this area. Advances in areas 1 - 6 above of considerable significance here.

14. Educational Planning

Series of important new initiatives taken to establish fundamental planning for tackling basic deficiencies of educational system: most of work just getting under way or not yet started.

15. Transport

Improved organization and management systems for railroads. Preliminary steps towards strengthening of highway management, and towards integrated planning and management for total transportation system (road, rail, air, sea). Air travel planning and operational services were also strengthened.

16. Manpower Planning

Preliminary steps towards overhaul of manpower planning apparatus: better data collection and appraisals, and better use of data for planning general educational programs, vocational training, investment programs, labor market services.

17. Research Program

Greatly expanded program of contracting for research on current policy and operational problems of Government by Korean universities and other private research organizations and scholars. (Serves to tap skills and brainpower beyond what otherwise available to Government, and to involve intelligentsia positively in work on Government problems to increase their positive identification with and understanding of problems, and to improve knowledge and work of teachers and other intellectual leaders.)

18. Other

USOM work, during this period, had lesser but appreciable effects in other areas of institutional development, such as urban planning, police capabilities, family planning, public health planning, overall planning for Government organization, Government in-service training, management of the electricity system, planning for tourism development, telecommunications planning, urban water supply planning.

19. The National Industrial Research Institute (NIRI)

Belongs under 2

A USOM project since 1958, NIRI has received help in the form of staff training, equipment and technical assistance to become the nation's testing laboratory for South Korea. The inspection system for export products is being mounted on NIRI's services as they are expanded through the provincial laboratories. These latter are being rehabilitated with USOM assistance as part of the Industrial Area Development Program in Taegu and Pusan. Additional areas will include Kwangju and possibly Taejon. Totally, this is an already measurable effort toward better quality and quality control through physical testing.

WVZ 148
OO WTE 17 KOREA
DE WTE 2031

SENT
WHCA

1966 NOV 1 02 29

FROM: JOE CALIFANO
TO: THE PRESIDENT
INFO: BILL MOYERS
CITE: CAP66865

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS REPORT FOR OCTOBER 31, 1966

1. THE PRESS FRONT PAGE:

THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO SOUTH KOREA WHERE 2 MILLION TURNED OUT TO SEE HIM WAS THE FEATURED NEWS IN THE EVENING STAR. IT WAS A "WILD WELCOME EXCEEDING EISENHOWER'S IN 1960."

THE PRESIDENT'S WARNING TO PEKING THAT ITS PURSUIT OF NUCLEAR POWER "INVITES DANGER TO CHINA ITSELF" WAS TOP NEWS IN THE BALTIMORE SUN.

THE WASH. POST, N.Y. TIMES, L.A. TIMES, AND N.Y. NEWS TOPPED THEIR NEWS WITH THE FOIKING OF A MINUTEMEN PLOT IN NEW YORK. THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP WAS ALSO PAGE ONE NEWS.

OTHER FRONT PAGE NEWS INCLUDED:

HO RESTATES PEACE TERMS IN AN APPARENT REJECTION OF ALLIED OVERTURES -- BALT. SUN.

GUINEA ARRESTS U.S. ENVOY IN A SPAT OVER GHANA'S ARREST OF ITS 19-MEMBER DELEGATION - WASH. STAR, WASH. POST, N. Y. TIMES.

KENNEDY BIDS U.S. STOP SELLING "UNNECESSARY" ARMS TO LATIN AMERICA -- N.Y. TIMES.

CONSERVATIVES MAY LOSE SOME POWER IN SENATE ELECTIONS -- L.A. TIMES.

EDITORIALS

THE N.Y. TIMES ALSO URGES THE PRESIDENT TO REVEAL PLANNED REVISIONS IN THE NATIONAL BUDGET. "THE NATIONAL INTEREST DEMANDS A FRESH AND RELIABLE APPRAISAL AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE."

THE WASH. STAR SUPPORTS AGNEW FOR MARYLAND GOVERNOR; AND SAYS THAT DEGAULLE "ONCE AGAIN HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT HE IS ONE OF THE WORLD'S OUTSTANDING STATESMEN, VISIONARY POLITICAL THINKERS, AND PAINS IN THE NECK."

IN THE COLUMNS

RICHARD WILSON (STAR) SEES FINE PRINT IN PARAGRAPH 29 OF THE MANILA COMMUNIQUE. IT IS THAT WE WILL WITHDRAW "WHEN VIOLENCE DISAPPEARS." THIS AND OUR WITHDRAWAL ARE LIKELY TO BE A LONG TIME COMING.

CONFIDENTIAL

C. F.

PR 18
TR 100
CO 151
FO 4-1
FG 11-3
PL 2

NOV 1 1966
40

copy in folder
filed CF TR 100

313/

L

MBK060ZCZCWWZ114
OO WTE 20
DE WTE 1997

FROM: JOE CALIFANO
TO : JAKE JACOBSEN
CITE: CAP66840

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOMMY CORCORAN ASKED ME TO PASS ON THE FOLLOWING
MESSAGE TO YOU:

QUOTE:

"RALPH^x OLMSTEAD, WHO WAS FORMER SECRETARY TO POPE OF IDAHO, RECENTLY VISITED KOREA AS MEMBER OF DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE-COMMERCE TEAM TO DISCUSS FOOD CONDITIONS IN THE PACIFIC. OLMSTEAD MADE QUITE AN IMPRESSION ON KOREANS AND WAS ENTERTAINED BY PRESIDENT OF KOREA AND OTHER HIGH OFFICIALS DURING HIS VISIT. IF OLMSTEAD'S NAME IS RAISED BY THE KOREANS, PRESIDENT JOHNSON WILL RECOGNIZE IT."

DTG 291607Z OCT 66

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5/ C.F. (4)
Received Bangkok F05
C0151
Oct 29 11 39 PM '66 TR 100

G.F.

6

TR 100
CO 312
ND 19/CO 312
CO 92
CO 303
CO 18
CO 151
CO 312/CO 18

President had everything
in attached Folder on his
Asian Trip - Oct. 17 - Nov 2, 1966

- ① Memos re Vietnamese
- ② Proposed ltr. to Peru re earthquake
- ③ Proposed msg. to Erhard - Germany
- ④ Memo re non-proliferation re
Russia
- ⑤ Messages from Amb. Edw. Clark -
Australia
- ⑥ Memo re Russia & Vietnam war
- ⑦ Memo re Korea
- ⑧ Komer's memo re Press Contact
- ⑨ Komer's memo re his trip to V.N.
- ⑩ CIA Report

BB/

G.F. (3)
TR 100
CO 151
Chalk, O. Roy
PR 11

October 13, 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Walt:

I tried to reach you today to report to you on recent discussions I've had with the group of visiting Korean dignitaries, headed by General Jong Pil Kim, who visited and dined with me at my home in New York City this past Sunday.

The group was a very influential one and consisted of the following:

- General and Mrs. Jong Pil Kim
- Mr. Taik Soo Kim
National Assembly
- Mr. Sung Won Kang
Democratic-Republican Party
- Mr. Sung Hee Kim
Democratic-Republican Party
- Mr. Sang Kook Han
- H.E. Mr. Yong Shik Kim and Mrs. Kim
Republic of Korea to the United Nations
- Mr. and Mrs. Un Yong Kim
Republic of Korea to the United Nations

In view of the fact that President Johnson has included Korea on his Far East schedule, and in view of my unusual "amicus curiae" relationship with President Park, General Jong Pil Kim who is Chairman of the Democratic-Republican Party and Prime Minister Chung as well as innumerable other leaders of distinction throughout Korea, I am sure I can be of special service to the President. If the President wishes, I would be honored to accompany him to the Philippines or precede him to Korea.

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
BY TH ON 11-24-86

CONFIDENTIAL
150-11-2602
7-27-82

JMT/

8/

G. F. ⑦

TR100

CO18

CO203

CO291

CO151

CO235

CO333

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
SECRET ENCLOSURES

October 7, 1966

Executive Office Building
Mr. Charles Maguire

Per your request enclosed
is background information on:

1. Australia
2. New Zealand
3. Thailand
4. Korea
5. Philippines
6. Malaysia



Robert L. Bruce

RECEIVED

NOV 7 1966

CENTRAL FILES

material filed in

* Oversize Attachment

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

C. F. 9

00151

July 27, 1966 -- 6:25 p. m.
Wednesday

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dates for Visit by Korean Prime Minister

In mid-May, on the recommendation of Secretary Rusk, you approved in principle an invitation to Korean Prime Minister Chong to visit Washington in the early autumn.

Although State had previously hoped for a mid-September date, that month is now heavily booked, given the Ne Win and Marcos visits. Unless you are willing to set aside any time in October, we should now inform the Koreans of our willingness to receive their Prime Minister in late November or December.

What is your preference?

Walt. Rostow

October ☒ *any OK by me*

Late November ☒ *either*

December ☒ *either*

Specific Date? ☐ *N*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *State ltr 8/2/77*
By *hmg*, NARS, Date *8/8/77*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED
NOV 10 1966
CENTRAL FILE

62-1

C.F. 2

10

MA3
CO151

The President of the United States of America, authorized by Act of Congress, July 20, 1942, has awarded the Legion of Merit (Degree of Chief Commander) to

x
KIM SUNG-EUN

MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, REPUBLIC OF KOREA

for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services:

Minister Kim Sung-Eun distinguished himself by exceptionally meritorious service as Minister of National Defense, Republic of Korea, from March 1963 to June 1966. Throughout this period Minister Kim demonstrated strong leadership and professional competence in molding a 600,000 man Republic of Korea Armed Force into a cohesive, well-balanced and well-trained fighting element of the Free World. Through his determination and expert guidance he contributed greatly to strengthening the combat effectiveness of all the military forces of the Republic of Korea. The efficiency and dispatch with which elements of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces were prepared to depart for combat in Vietnam, and the highly commendable manner in which they conducted themselves in both military operations and in providing assistance to the people of Vietnam, are in large measure due to Minister Kim's personal efforts and exemplify his devotion to the cause of freedom. Minister Kim's distinguished service and outstanding accomplishments reflect great credit upon himself, the Republic of Korea Armed Forces and his country.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Signal 6/21/66

Original to Lyndon Johnson 6/22/66
202H

March 2, 1966
12:30 P.M. Tuesday

C. F. ②

FOB-2

CO 151

ND19/C0312

FG 105

FG 115

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

When I was in Korea, Kim Sung Eun, Minister of Defense,
had a private conversation with me and insisted on putting
in my hands the attached document. I thought it should be
in your hands also. I am sending a copy to the Secretary
of Defense.

Jack Valenti

Ltr. to JV dated February 23, 1966 from above
on material problem of the Republic of Korea.

RECEIVED
MAR 18 1966
CENTRAL FILES

Green Copies Used for FG #2

9ad
DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Ltr. 8/9/77 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
By hmg, NAKs, Date 9/1/77 -2-

C. F. 12

00 151

Topics You May Wish to Raise:

Korea-Japan Settlement - You may wish to congratulate President Park warmly on his Government's success in achieving the long-sought Korea-Japan settlement. We believe it will have important and lasting benefits not only for the peoples of the two countries, but for the entire Free World. You might also reassure him, as the President and Secretary Rusk have done, that our basic policy of extending military and economic aid to Korea will not be affected by the Korea-Japan settlement. Many Koreans have feared that the U.S., following a Korea-Japan settlement, might seek to shift part of its Korean burdens to Japan.

Assistance to Viet-Nam - It is recommended that you express to President Park our deep appreciation for Korea's important military contribution to the struggle in Viet-Nam. You will undoubtedly wish to reiterate U.S. determination to stand fast in support of that beleaguered Free World outpost. (An additional Briefing Memorandum on this subject is attached.)

Korean Political and Economic Progress - It is suggested that you also express admiration to Park for his capable handling of the domestic political situation during the past year. In spite of strong opposition efforts, including street demonstrations, to frustrate the Korea-Japan settlement and despatch of Korean forces to Viet-Nam, Park's firmness and political acumen brought the nation safely through these crises into the present atmosphere of domestic order and relative political stability.

Despite reductions in U.S. economic aid to Korea, growth in real GNP has exceeded six percent in each of the last two years. 1964 industrial production was 51 percent greater than in 1960. In view of this impressive economic progress, you may wish to congratulate Park also on his success in moving towards a self-sufficient economy within a framework of democratic institutions.

Institute for Industrial Technology and Applied Science - You might also note with satisfaction the progress being made by Korea and the United States in bringing into reality the Institute for Industrial Technology and Applied Science proposed in the May 18, 1965 Johnson-Park Joint Communique. AID and the Battelle Memorial Institute are working closely with the Korean Government on this important project. Establishment of the Institute will be a major breakthrough in relating Korean scientific effort to industrial development and in providing Korean scientists a modern environment for creative research.

Topics Park May Raise

Korean Economic Benefits from Viet-Nam - The Korean Government hopes to secure substantial economic benefits from its participation in the Viet-Nam conflict, through increased Off-Shore Procurement by AID and the Department of Defense, increased employment in Viet-Nam of Korean technical personnel, and increased U.S. budgetary support for the maintenance of the Korean military establishment and Korean economic development. If President Park raises this with you, you might tell him we understand his concern and will give Korea

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

first page not sent to file

gan/

MR. VALENTI ⑤

13

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

7G 440
December 26, 1965 MC/CO

FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

76105
00151
FROM: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

CO 50-1

CO 141

SUBJECT: Briefing Book for Vice
President's Visit to the
Far East

Enclosed are 3 copies of a revised page 2 of the Vice President's Briefing Memorandum for his visit to Seoul, Korea. Three copies of the books for the visit were earlier sent to the White House, including one copy for Mr. Valenti who will accompany the Vice President on the trip.

Please insert revised page 2 of the Briefing Memorandum (HHH/BP-4) under TAB 1 in the section of the books marked SEOUL.

Enclosure:

Revised Page 2

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

File Memo
10/1/65
CC

FG 11-8-1/Busby, Horace	
CO 151	ND 19/CO 62
PR 18-2	FG/RS
PL 7	FG 165
FG 11-4	PR 16
FG 226	ST 1
NR	CO 1-3
FG 1	CO 62
SC	FG 202
FG 400/MC	WE

Box no. 1306 containing the following material sent to Central Files on the above date by Mr. Busby's office. Correspondence dated 1964 & 1965,

Loose Leaf Binders:

1. President of Korea Park - Visit - list of employees who will attend ceremony
2. President's Press Conference Briefing Papers - 3/11/65 & 3/20/65 (2 binders)
3. Draft of chapters from Democratic Fact Book
4. National Aeronautics & Space Council (3 binders)
5. Federal Aviation Agency - report on Natural Beauty
6. Three years of Progress - The Kennedy - Johnson Administration 1961-1963 (dated 1964)

Other Material

1. Memo - How Science and Technology will affect Press Relations, etc. 7/20/65 - Charles S. Sheldon
2. Minutes of meeting with Congressional Leadership on Dominican Republic
3. Weekly Compilation of Reports from Dept. & Agencies
4. Memo to President from HEW - current interest
5. William W. xBroom - xRidder Publications
6. A survey of Public Opinion in Alabama - Poll Book
7. Arno Nowotny - xUniversity of Texas
8. Memo 2/15/65 Wm. Bundy from W.W. Rostow - Some Thoughts on Southeast Asia
9. Status of American Citizens in Dominican Republic
10. Atomic Energy Commission Biweekly Reports
11. Memo from Sec. Hodges to Malcom Kilduff for the President re National Goals - Economic Growth

CF

File Memo
10/1/65
CC

FG 11-8-1/Busby, Horace

FG 11-8-1/Valenti, Jack	FG 165
FG 440	JL 3
FG 105	JL 5
FG 11-8-1/Watson, Marvin	LE
FG 245	FG 100
FG 251	FG 600
FG 250	WH 5-1
FG 11-4	SP 3-50
FG 11-8-1/White, Lee	FG 11-9
FG 160	WH 14-1
SP 3-50/ST42	CO 151
FG 155	PR 18-2
SO 2/6/22/65	

Box no. 1304 containing the following material sent to Central Files on the above date by Mr. Busby's office. Correspondence dated 1964 & 1965.

1. Memos to Valenti
2. Memos for the Vice President
3. Memos for Mrs. Lee Walsh - Dept. of State
4. Memos to M. Watson
5. Weaver, Robert, Housing & Home Finance
6. Webb, Charles A. Chairman I.C.C.
7. Memos for James E. Webb (NASA)
8. Memos for Ed Welsh
9. Memos for Lee White
10. Memos for Sec. Wirtz
11. Memphis, Tenn. 10/64 - Draft of Speech
12. Morton, James, Commerce
13. Miller, J.I. - White House Dinner Business Leaders
14. Messages - HEW Crime & Delinquency
15. Legislation Reports - Cabinet (Requested 1/11/65)
16. Interagency Committee Reports (Requested 2/25/65)
17. White House Mail Referrals
18. Campaign Speech Drafts 11/64
19. Office of Science & Technology
20. xOrtiz, Caesar - returned from Texas aboard Presidential Aircraft
21. Park Visit 5/17-19/65 - President of Korea
22. Press Conferences Report - Cabinet

C.F.

16

File

CO 208
NORWAY CO 80
Friendly CO 203
CO 333
CO 235
CO 312
CO 151

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

I. Brief Background on Norway

The Kingdom of Norway has a rugged 2,125 mile coast line, extending from Russia in the Arctic Ocean to Sweden in the North Sea. Its area of 125,000 square miles is slightly larger than New York, Pennsylvania, and Maine combined. Its population of 3.7 million or 29 per square mile makes Norway the second (after Iceland) most sparsely populated country in Europe. Norway is a constitutional monarchy governed by a unicameral parliament of 150 members. The next Norwegian national elections are scheduled for September 12-13 of this year. The governing Labor Party has been the dominant political party in coalition governments since 1935 and since World War II, with the exception of a short interval in 1963, it has ruled alone. With the exception of the small Communist Party and the left-wing Socialist Peoples Party, who support the Government's Scandinavian-style domestic social welfare and economic planning goals, all political parties are agreed on the basic aspects of Norwegian foreign policy of adherence to NATO and the maintenance of close ties to the West. Norway exercises an influence on international affairs out of proportion to its relatively small size largely because of the high caliber of its representatives such as Foreign Minister Halvard M. Lange.

In view of its extremely rugged terrain, limited arable land, and lack of natural resources, Norway is heavily dependent upon foreign trade for its relatively high standard of living. Norwegian exports of goods and services, the later comprised largely of the earnings of its huge merchant fleet, are equivalent to approximately 40% of its GNP. Principally through the expansion of industrial production, in large part based on cheap hydro-electric power, the Norwegian economy has maintained a substantial 4% average annual rate of growth in the past 10 years. Recurrent trade deficits have been a problem but net inflows of capital from abroad have permitted Norway's gold and foreign exchange reserves to increase steadily during this period.

II. Biographic Data on Ambassador Hans Engen

Ambassador Engen was born in Norway in 1912. He was educated at the University of Oslo and in Sweden and Germany. He is married to an American and has two adopted children. The Ambassador was very active in the communication field for the Norwegian Government-in-exile during World War II. After several years of private newspaper work he rejoined the Norwegian Government as Press Attache with the Norwegian mission at the UN. In 1951 he was promoted to Deputy Permanent Representative at the UN and to Permanent Representative in 1952. He became Under Secretary in the Norwegian Foreign Office in 1958 where he remained until he became Norwegian Ambassador to the United States in September, 1963.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RECEIVED
SEP 28 1965
CENTRAL FILES

556-92
CONGRESSIONAL

✓
May 17, 1965

C. F. 17
CO 151
76400

Dear Senator:

This is to acknowledge your memorandum of May 11 to the President regarding the possibility of President Park's addressing a joint session of Congress.

Your memorandum has been called to the personal attention of the President.

Sincerely yours,

Lawrence F. O'Brien
Special Assistant
to the President

Honorable Thomas J. Dodd
United States Senate X
Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED j1/jf
MAY 20 1965
CENTRAL FILES

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Saturday

May 15, 1965

1:45 pm

2 / 4/15/65
MC
CONGRESSIONAL

9

17a

MR. PRESIDENT:

Larry O'Brien has just talked with Senator Mansfield about the possibility of President Pak of Korea addressing a Joint Session of Congress next week.

Senator Mansfield is opposed to this for the following reasons:

1. The last Joint Session was by President Segni of Italy. Since then we have had several Heads of State and heads of governments ask to address a Joint Session and they have all been turned down.
2. If we grant Session -- we would get several noses out of joint.
3. To let President Pak address a Joint Session to the exclusion of all others looks like we are using this man because he is with us.

O'Brien says that Mansfield is quite firm in his opinion. Because of this we have not gone on to Speaker McCormack. At this point the Joint Session is stalled unless you would like Larry and me to go back to Mansfield and talk with him further.

Jack Valenti

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday
May 14, 1965
7:50 pm

10
F

MR. PRESIDENT

Since time is running short, I wanted to get this on in to you. A copy has gone to Larry O'Brien for acknowledgement.

Jack Valenti

*I favor this unless
there is a good argument
against it - If so
let me hear it*

RECEIVED

CENTRAL FILES

RECEIVED
MAY 20 1965
CENTRAL FILES

original sent to Mr. Tamm

RECEIVED
MAY 18 1965
CENTRAL FILES

May 14, 1965
8:00 p.m.

Claude 17c

MEMO FOR ~~LARRY~~ O'BRIEN

The original went to the President
with a note that you were acknowledging.

Jack Valenti

J. W. FULBRIGHT, ARK., CHAIRMAN
JOHN SPARKMAN, ALA.
MIKE MANSFIELD, MONT.
WAYNE MORSE, OREG.
RUSSELL B. LONG, LA.
ALBERT GORE, TENN.
FRANK J. LAUSCHE, OHIO
FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO
STUART SYMINGTON, MO.
THOMAS J. DODD, CONN.
GEORGE A. SMATHERS, FLA.
JOSEPH E. CLARK, PA.
CLAIBORNE PELL, R.I.

BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, IOWA
GEORGE D. AIKEN, VT.
FRANK CARLSON, KANS.
JOHN J. WILLIAMS, DEL.
KARL E. MUNDT, S. DAK.
CLIFFORD P. CASE, N.J.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

CARL MARCY, CHIEF OF STAFF
DARRELL ST. CLAIRE, CLERK

May 14, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO: The President

FROM: Senator Thomas J. Dodd

RE: A FEW BACKGROUND NOTES FOR YOUR CONVERSATIONS
WITH PRESIDENT PARK

(1) During the course of my visit to Korea, I had two long confidential conversations with President Park, two conversations with Prime Minister Chung, and several conversations with Kim Jong Pil, the President's closest advisor. I encouraged them to speak with complete frankness to me, because I felt that only in this way would our conversations be truly useful.

(2) I must say that I was tremendously impressed by President Park, Prime Minister Chung, Kim Jong Pil, and the people around them. These are strong and capable men--and the proof of this lies in the striking record of economic accomplishment under the Park administration, the conclusion of the treaty normalizing relations with Japan, and in the remarkable degree of political stability--relative admittedly, but remarkable by Korean standards--since President Park first took power in May, 1961.

(3) Relations between the Embassy and the Park administration are now excellent on both sides. In this sense, the present situation represents a marked improvement over the situation that existed for a period of time after President Park took power, when Ambassador/Berger was our representative in Seoul.

The Embassy, during this period, was inclined to be suspicious of President Park and the junior officers around him. Relations reached an all-time low during the Presidential campaign in November, 1963, when several members of the Embassy were photographed at the residence of Yun Po Sun, the opposition candidate, and when the opposition press openly implied, without refutation, that the American Embassy was sympathetic to them.

It is to Ambassador Brown's great credit that he appears to have completely overcome the unfortunate background of suspicion and hostility which he inherited on his arrival.

RECEIVED
MAY 18 1965
CENTRAL FILES

original sent to Mrs. Terrell
Copy to John Lewis

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-484
By fw, NARA, Date 11-19-93

C.F. (35)
CO 151
FOI/CO 151
FO 3-2

17d

The President

-2-

May 14, 1965

(4) One of the most sensitive issues confronting us in Korea is the Status of Forces Agreement, currently under negotiation.

President Park and the members of his government expressed the hope that an agreement could be reached which gives the Korean Government at least the same degree of authority as the Japanese Government enjoys under our Status of Forces Agreement with Japan. They were worried that anything less than this would strengthen the hands of the opposition and perhaps even undercut the possibility of ratifying the treaty of normalization with Japan.

It is my understanding that we have recently submitted to the Korean Government a draft of our final proposal for a Status of Forces Agreement, and that this draft does fall short in several important respects of the Status of Forces Agreement now in effect with Japan and of a parallel agreement which is currently being negotiated with the Philippines.

I do not profess to be an expert in this complex area of international law. However, knowing how unscrupulous the Korean opposition has been in opposing the treaty with Japan, there is no doubt in my mind that they would make an issue of it, if the Park Government were obliged to sign a treaty which appears to concede more in terms of legal jurisdiction over American forces in the country, than had been conceded by the Japanese Government in signing their Status of Forces Agreement, or than will be conceded by the Filipino Government.

This is one of the few items on which President Park may be in a position to make a concrete announcement on his return home. Without pretending to any opinion on the terms of the Agreement, I would, nevertheless, urge that the present draft be reconsidered, not merely with a view to providing the optimum degree of protection to American forces in Korea, but also in a manner that takes into consideration the existing political situation in Korea and the need to forestall, or at least limit, any extremist nationalist agitation on the issue.

(5) President Park and his associates also spoke to me about the importance of increasing our military aid program. They pointed out: (a) That their reserve divisions are seriously under-equipped; (b) That the diet of their troops is not up to recommended standards, that they do not have adequate blankets or clothing, and that the soldiers' pay is very low, even by Asian standards--which, taken together, creates a serious morale problem; (c) That their Air Force is far weaker than the North Korean Air Force, both over-all and in terms of the quality of their equipment.

The President

- 3 -

May 14, 1965

What they told me on these points was pretty well borne out by the briefing I received from General Howze, and by what I saw during my helicopter tour of the front lines. I visited one outpost in the mountains where the air was still chilly, but where the men had only two blankets, for ground cover and top cover, compared with the three blankets called for by Army regulations.

One Army commander laid out a day's diet for me to drive home the point that the average allowance for food, now 20 cents per day per soldier, is inadequate in both protein and caloric content, but that with 23 cents per day per soldier, the diet could be brought up to the recommended minimum.

Without being a military expert or an expert on economics, it nevertheless seems to me that there is some validity to the position of the Korean Government. It is in our interest, as well as their interest, to maintain the ROK armed forces at least at their present strength in numbers and at a very high level of efficiency.

It makes sense to me to cut back on economic aid to Korea as Korea builds up its own economy and expands its export trade. But it may be placing too heavy a burden upon them--it may even retard the recent remarkable rate of economic growth--if we ask the Korean Government simultaneously to accept a progressive reduction in economic assistance and the added cost of expanding, properly outfitting, adequately paying, and re-equipping its armed forces. An increase in our PL 480 program, it seems to me, could help to defray the costs.

This, again, is an area where a more generous attitude on our part may pay added dividends in the form of enhanced political stability, an increased rate of economic growth, and much stronger military forces.

Tom Dodd

May 11, 1965

MEMORANDUM

TO: President Johnson

FROM: Senator Thomas J. Dodd

RE: The Possibility of Having
President Park Address Joint
Session of Congress

I have heard, indirectly, that the Korean Embassy put in a bid to have President Park address a joint session of Congress when he visits Washington next week, and that they were informed that this would not be possible.

I am under the impression that this is a situation in which there is some flexibility, since several visiting dignitaries have addressed joint sessions of Congress in recent years. If it is not too late, therefore, I would like to urge that the matter be reconsidered.

If it were simply a matter of showing respect to a visiting dignitary, I would not make this proposal; but I feel that it would be very helpful to have President Park address a joint session at this time because he can be relied upon to speak in the most affirmative terms in support of our Vietnam policy, and to warn against the consequences for all the free countries of Asia if Vietnam were ever abandoned to communism.

In addition, I have reason for believing that President Park would be prepared to state that the present commitment of 2,000 Korean engineers to South Vietnam is only a first installment, that his country is committed all the way in the battle for freedom in Southeast Asia, and that they are prepared to send combat troops if the South Vietnamese Government feels that this would be helpful.

While I was in Korea I heard from sources close to President Park that the Government has already discussed sending two divisions to South Vietnam.

I believe that such a message would be well received by Congress--all the more so because Park is a most dignified and impressive figure.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-484

By JW, NARA, Date 11-19-93

Tom Dodd

[illegible]

BROUGHT FORWARD

C. F.

C 0151
Previously Filed

5/14/65
Date

NAME Sen Thomas J. Dodd

ORGANIZATION _____

C. F.

New File Symbol

5/17/65
Date

FINAL ACTION Mr O'Brien to
Sen. Dodd

✓
554
gh
19
C. F.
20/51
FG105
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 20, 1965

For: Jack Valenti

Thru: McGeorge Bundy

Yu, John
State University
City College
of N.Y.

I spoke to Bob Fearey about the attached telegram addressed to the President by Mr. Liem, and subsequently sent Fearey the original copy of the message and bio data on Liem. Also attached is my note to Liem, suggesting he contact Fearey -- So the ball is now in Liem's court.

OK

CFC
Chester L. Cooper

19a
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 23, 1965

For the Record:

Mr. Channing Liem came to Washington on March 22 and called Mr. Watson's Office to find out why he had not gotten a reply to his telegram. I checked around and found that a reply was sent to his office in New York and so informed Mr. Liem about the subject of the letter from Mr. Cooper. (Mr. Cooper advised me to call him.)

5
ruby g. moy

19b

March 18, 1965

Dear Mr. Liem:

The President has asked me to thank you for your telegram, and your offer to come to Washington to discuss the situation in Korea.

I suggest that you get in touch with Mr. Robert Fearey, Director of the Office of East Asian Affairs, in the Department of State. I have alerted Mr. Fearey to this.

Thank you again for your message.

Sincerely,

Chester L. Cooper

Mr. Channing Liem
State University College
of New York
New Paltz, New York

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 08-86
By ial, NARA, Date 6-30-08

RECEIVED
MAR 24 1965
CENTRAL FILES

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

19c

DECLASSIFIED


E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

March 16, 1965

NLJ 08-86

By isl, NARA, Date 6-30-08

To: McGeorge Bundy

From: Jack Valenti 

Will you have someone check this out and either handle the wire yourself or advise me how to respond.

Mec -

See Attached Memo

(from CIA).

Suggest we put them on to State Office North Asia Affairs (Feary). If you agree I'll follow through.
Yes ☒ No ☐ C

19d

March 18, 1965

Dear Mr. Liem:

The President has asked me to thank you for your telegram, and your offer to come to Washington to discuss the situation in Korea.

I suggest that you get in touch with Mr. Robert Fearey, Director of the Office of East Asian Affairs, in the Department of State. I have alerted Mr. Fearey to this.

SW 3-
113317

Thank you again for your message.

Sincerely,

Chester L. Cooper

D173230
x507

Mr. Channing Liem
State University College
of New York
New Paltz, New York

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 08-86
By isl, NARA, Date 6-30-08

Cooper
Suggest That I call
& give
info

MAILED
CENTRAL FILES

The White House
Washington

1965 MAR 15 PM 4 05

19f
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NJ 08-86
By il, NARA, Date 6-30-08

WA 601 PD

NEW PALTZ NY MAR 15 1220P EST

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

A PROMINENT KOREAN OSTENSIBLY FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT BUT IN REALITY CARRYING URGENT MESSAGE CONCERNING EXPLOSIVE CONDITIONS IN KOREA ARRIVED IN AMERICA RECENTLY. HE WAS INSTRUCTED BY A GROUP OF LEADING KOREAN EDUCATORS CLERGYMEN AND POLITICIANS TO CONFER WITH ME AND TO BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION TRUE FACTS AND VIEWS OF THE PEOPLE AS THEY SEE THEM. WHILE SOME IN THE GROUP ARE

10417

KNOWN OPPONENTS OF PRESIDENT PARK OTHERS ARE NON-PARTISANS WHO COMMAND THE RESPECT OF MILLIONS OF KOREANS ALL OF THEM ARE FEARFUL THAT UNLESS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CLEARLY UNDERSTANDS THE VIEWS AND ASPIRATIONS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE AND PURSUES POLICIES DESIGNED TO SATISFY THEM KOREA WILL BECOME THE SECOND VIETNAM AND ARE ANXIOUS TO MAKE THIS KNOWN TO YOU. I CONFERRED WITH HIM AT LENGTH AND FEEL THAT THE URGENCY AND GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION ARE SUCH THAT IN THE INTEREST OF BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND REPUBLIC OF KOREA WE SHOULD BRING THEM EITHER TO YOU OR ANYONE WHOM YOU DIRECT AT THE EARLIEST

POSSIBLE MOMENT WE CAN COME TO WASHINGTON ANY TIME BETWEEN MARCH
22 AND 26 KINDLY ADVISE

CHANNING LIEM FORMER KOREAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

C. F. 20
C 0151

December 11, 1964

MR. PRESIDENT:

There are six countries plus two special representatives of Panama who need to present you credentials.

The countries are: Panama, Mali, Tangania, Ecuador, Korea, Vietnam, and Zambi.

Angie Duke and I make the suggestion that we schedule a coffee in the Mansion on Tuesday, December 15, at eleven o'clock. All of the Ambassadors would come into a room on the first floor and be served coffee by Ambassador Duke. You would arrive in another room adjacent to the one where the coffee was being served. Ambassador Duke would bring in the Ambassadors one at a time to be presented to you. After the presentation you could if you chose spend a few minutes mingling with them.

Then you could be on your way to your office for your noon appointment.

This seems to be the speediest, most efficient way to do this with the least consumption of your time.

May we set this up?

Yes _____

No _____

Jack Valenti

RECEIVED
DEC 12 1964
CENTRAL FILES

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 11, 1964

MR. VALENTI

As you know, allowing the Panamanian Ambassador and the 2 special representatives to return without presenting credentials would probably have serious repercussions in Panama.

Since there are also 6 other Ambassadors waiting to present credentials, Angie Duke and Gordon Chase suggest that we schedule a ^{some morning next week} coffee at 9:00 or 9:30 and wipe the whole business out at one time.

Can we set this up?

Yes _____

No _____

Perry Barber

202
Panama
Mali
Zanzibar
Ecuador
Korea
Viet Nam
Zambia

Mr. Valenti:

We have something of a problem of the seven Ambassadors and the place they are to be received.

Bess Abel says this will mean closing the Mansion if it is held in the Blue Room as Protocol wants -- and she does not like to close the Mansion for tours unless it is very necessary, it dissappoints many people standing in line waiting to see the White House.

Gordon Chase is to talk to Ambassador Duke re the problem, but do you have any suggestions as to a place in the Mansion and still not necessitate closing the House?

~~I don't know about the third floor, or even if it is appropriate to have~~
~~it there.~~ Or, could we put them in the Cabinet Room then have them go into the office?

Advice, please?

Gwen

My gh

0

C.F.

Co 151

② +

20c

October 16, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President concurs with your opinion and has requested that you inform the Government of Korea that the appointment of Mr. Hyon Chol Kim as Ambassador would be agreeable to the Government of the United States.

McGeorge Bundy

cc: Office of the Chief of Protocol

RECEIVED
OCT 18 1964
CENTRAL FILES

20d

OCT 16 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE~~

Dear Mr. President:

The Department has received a communication from the American Embassy at Seoul which states that the Government of Korea has inquired whether this Government agrees to the appointment of Mr. Hyon Chol Kim as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Korea to the United States. A biographic sketch of Mr. Hyon Chol Kim is enclosed.

I believe that the appointment of Mr. Hyon Chol Kim as Ambassador of Korea at Washington would be satisfactory and, if you concur in this opinion, I shall be pleased to inform the Government of Korea of your approval.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Biographic Sketch.

The President,

The White House.

~~CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE~~RECEIVED
OCT 16 1964
CENTRAL FILES

BROUGHT FORWARD

C. F.

C0151

10/16/64

Previously Filed

Date

Memo for Sec. of State
NAME Frank M. Bundy
Approval of Hyun Chol Kim
ORGANIZATION as Amb. of Korea

same

12/11/64

New File Symbol

Date

FINAL ACTION Memorandum to President
From Mr. Valenti

May 5, 1964

Dear Mr. Comptroller General:

This is in acknowledgment of your letter of April thirtieth to the President, enclosing a copy of your report to the Congress entitled "Problems Incident to the Fielding of an Air Defense System Overseas Due to Supply Support Deficiencies During 1962 and 1963 in the Department of the Army."

It has been noted that two copies of this report are being sent to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

Sincerely,

Ralph A. Dungan
Special Assistant
to the President

Honorable Joseph Campbell
Comptroller General
of the United States
Washington, D. C.

rah

RECEIVED
MAY 8 1964
CENTRAL FILE

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

23
G.H. 6
ND19-3/CO151

48

Action

FE

Info

SS

G

SP

L

H

SAL

EUR

IO

P

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

SCA

SCS

RMR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BUNDY-SMITH

ALEXANDER

BELK

BRUBACK

CHAST

1964 FEB 18 AM 4 14

COINTEL

FOUR

FLASH

JOHNSON

KERIN

SAUNDERS

SCHLESINGER

SMITH, WM. Y.

F02/CO151

CO151

ND 4-1

FG120

SUMMARY

*****ZZ RUEHCR

DE RUALOS 03E 18/0840Z

Z 180830Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUHPA/CINCPAC

STATE GRNC

BT

CONFIDENTIAL ACTION FLASH DEPT-1047 INFO IMMEDIATE

CINCPAC 448 FEBRUARY 18, 5PM

VERBATIM TEXT

DEPT PASS OSD AND JCS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

1. FOLLOWING LETTER DELIVERED TODAY THROUGH JOINT DUTY OFFICERS OF MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION AT REGULAR JOINT DUTY OFFICER MEETING 1200 HOURS FEBRUARY 18, KST:

"PYONGYANG, FEBRUARY 17, 1964

"TO: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND

CFN 1047 448 18 5PM 1. 1200 18 17 1964

PAGE TWO RUALOS 03E C O N F I D E N T I A L

I RECEIVED YOUR LETTER DATED NOVEMBER 6, 1963.

IN YOUR LETTER, YOU DISTORTED THE SITUATION AS IF BEN WEAKLEY, STUTTS AND CARLETON WILLIAM VOLTZ, PILOTS OF THE U.S. ARMY, MADE A "FORCED LANDING" IN THE TERRITORY OF OUR SIDE DUE TO "INADVERTENT INCIDENT" WHILE CARRYING OUT A "PEACEFUL MISSION".

SUCH ALLEGATION OF YOURS IS ONLY DESIGNED TO ESCAPE YOUR RESPONSIBILITY FOR HAVING MADE THE ABOVE PILOTS ILLEGALLY INTRUDE INTO THE AIR OVER THE NORTHERN PART OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND PERPETRATE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES AND THEREBY VIOLATE THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT FLAGRANTLY.

RECEIVED
FEB 20 1964
CENTRAL FILES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 92-161 (*88)

jc/w NARA. Date 3-14-05