

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

| FORM OF DOCUMENT | CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|---------------------|---|--------------------|--------------|
| #1 memo | Smith to Vance <i>Sanitized 5/23/01 NS 97-372</i> S- 1 p [same sanitization 12/14/07 NLJ 06-26] | 8/25/67 | A |
| #1a memo | Smith to President S- 1 p [sanitized 12/14/07 NLJ06-26] | 8/24/67 | A |
| #1b memo | Johnson to Smith [sanitized 12/14/07 NLJ06-26] S- 1 p | 8/24/67 | A |
| #1c memo | Nitze to President S- 1 p | 7/6/67 | A |
| #1d rpt | Attachment to #1c S- 1 p | undated | A |
| #1e rpt | Attachment to #1c S- 1 p | undated | A |
| #2 memo | Rostow to Vance <i>Sanitized 5/23/01 NS 97-372</i> S- 1 p [more information released 12/14/07 NLJ 06-26] | 7/8/66 | A |
| #2b memo | Rostow to President, 7:00 p.m. S- 1 p [sanitized 12/14/07 NLJ06-26] | 7/5/66 | A |
| #2d memo | Vance to President S- 2 p | 6/27/66 | A |
| #3a memo | Keeny to Bundy C 2 p <i>Open 8-25-04 NW 97-121</i> | 9/21/65 | A |
| #5 memo | Bundy to Vance <i>Sanitized 5/23/01 NS 97-372</i> S- 1 p [same sanitization 12/14/07 NLJ 06-26] | 7/7/65 | A |
| #5a memo | Johnson to Bundy S 1 p <i>Sanitized 8-20-06 NW/PALCO 3A</i> | 7/6/65 | A |
| #5b memo | Vance to President S- 2 p | 7/2/65 | A |
| #6 memo | Bundy to SecDef <i>Sanitized 5/23/01 NS 97-372</i> TS- 1 p <i>Sanitized 4-1-10 NW 06-19</i> | 6/14/65 | A |

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Subject File, Nuclear Weapons, Netherlands, Vol. I

Box 34

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

| FORM OF DOCUMENT | CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------|--|---------------------|--------------|
| #6b memo | Johnson to Bundy TS- 1 p <i>Sanitized 4-1-10 NLJ 06-19</i> | 6/11/65 | A |
| #6c memo | McNamara to President TS- 3 p | 5/24/65 | A |
| #7 ltr | Bundy to Anderson C 1 p <i>Open 8-25-04 NLJ 97-121</i> | 10/16/64 | A |
| #10 ltr | Seaborg to Bundy S 2 p <i>Open NLJ 97-122 4-6-99</i> | 10/8/64 | A |
| #10a memo | SecNavy to Vance S 2 p | 9/3/64 | A |
| #10b memo | Rickover to SecNavy S 1 p | 9/3/64 | A |
| #10c rpt | "Comments of Manager..." S 1 p | 9/3/64 | A |
| #11a ltr | Draft letter to Senator Anderson C 2 p <i>Open 8-25-04 NLJ 97-121</i> | undated | A |
| #13 rpt | "Comments of Manager..." S 7 p | 9/3/64 | A |
| #14a ltr | Sen. Anderson to President C 3 p | 9/15/64 | A |
| #15 airgrm | The Hague A-716 S 4 p <i>Exempt 3-26-99 NLJ 97-118</i> <i>EXEMPT 8-21-06 NLJ 00-28</i> | 3/26/64 | A |
| #5 memo | Bundy to Vance S 1 p | | |

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Subject File, Nuclear Weapons, Netherlands, Vol. I

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~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

[REDACTED]
6.2(A)
1

~~SECRET~~
~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

August 25, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] 6.2(a)

[REDACTED] 6.2(a)
It was noted that the
Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission concur in the
requested dispersal.

The President has approved the requested authority with the understanding that all weapons to be dispersed under this authority will be programmed for permissive link installation in accordance with NSAM 160. It has been noted that U. S. unilateral communications to the U. S. custodial detachment will be operational prior to weapon dispersal and that all other requirements for custodial facilities, personnel, security and communications will be completed prior to the dispersal of these additional weapons. It is further understood that the approval of this request will not involve any increase in the area total of nuclear weapons proposed for dispersal to West Germany over the dispersal ceiling established for planning purposes by NSAM 364.

Bromley Smith
Bromley Smith

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 06-26
By *isl* NARA, Date 11-27-07

~~SECRET~~ ~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

Despatched 8/25/67

Rept. #201

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

1a

~~SECRET~~

August 24, 1967

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

Thursday, 5:20 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

6.2
(a)

[REDACTED]

6.2
(a)

This is the request for specific dispersal authorization of the actual weapons. On August 14, 1967, you approved the dispersal of these weapons in general terms for planning purposes (NSAM 364).

All of these weapons to be dispersed will be equipped with permissive link installation [REDACTED]

6.2
(a)

[REDACTED] over the dispersal ceiling established by NSAM 364.

Your approval of the attached is recommended. If you approve, I will sign the attached memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Approve ☒

BKs
Bromley Smith

Disapprove ☐

See me ☐

~~SECRET - FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 06-26

By: isl NARA, Date 11-27-07

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

August 24, 1967


~~Formerly Restricted Data~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BROMLEY SMITH

SUBJECT:

Here is a routine dispersal action for the President's consideration. It has no unusual features. The President had previously (August 14, 1967) approved for planning purposes the dispersal of these weapons to [REDACTED] (NSAM 364). Presidential authorization is required on a case-by-case basis to disperse weapons to each squadron as it reaches operational status and this is the request for specific dispersal authorization of the actual weapons. The applicable [REDACTED] instructions have been observed.

I recommend that you submit this request to the President.


Charles E. Johnson

~~SECRET - FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 06-26
By isl NARA, Date 11-27-07

File Cy

2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~
~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

July 8, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Dispersal of Nuclear Weapons to Support the

6.2(a)

Reference is made to your memorandum for the President of
June 27, 1966, requesting that authority be granted for the dispersal

[REDACTED]
Fighter-Bomber Squadron assigned to NATO. It was noted
that the Department of State and Atomic Energy Commission have
concurred in this requested dispersal action.

6.2
(a)

The requested authority has been approved with the understanding
that all weapons to be dispersed under this authority are program-
med for permissive link installation in accordance with NSAM 160
and the yields of these weapons are within the limits of NSAM 143.
It is further understood that this approval will not require any
increase in the area totals of nuclear weapons proposed for dispersal
[REDACTED] in FY 1966 over those reflected in NSAM 334.

6.2
(a)

W W Rostow
W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET-FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

Dispatched 7/8/66 - Rcpt. No. 219

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 06-26
By isl, NARA, Date 11-27-07

✓

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2a

July 8, 1966

Mr. Rostow:

As you know, the President
has approved your signing the
attached three documents.

BKS

Bromley Smith

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

July 5, 1966 -- 7:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Authorizations [REDACTED]

The Department of Defense, with the concurrence of the Department of State and Atomic Energy Commission, has requested authority to disperse modern [REDACTED]

squadrons. The squadrons have been re-equipped with F-104G's and modern weapons will improve their effectiveness while permitting us to actually reduce the number of weapons dispersed. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] we are replacing [REDACTED]

If you approve, I will sign the three attached memoranda to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Walt Rostow

☒ Approved

☐ Disapproved

☐ See me

The President's wishes relayed to by telephone from the LBJ Ranch by Jake Jacobsen.

July 7, 1966

5:15 p

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 06-26

By *isl*, NARA, Date *11-27-07*

FS
Done

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

OK
B 165

2-C


June 30, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. W. W. ROSTOW

Walt --

I have bunched these three dispersal actions for the President's consideration. They are all routine and contain no unusual features. The actions have been fully anticipated and staffed and are in accordance with applicable policies as contained in NSAM 334 and 160.

I recommend that you transmit them to the President.


Charles E. Johnson

SECRET

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~ Attachments

3
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

10/4/65

Alice,

Mac's question was answered
at Friday's staff meeting. File
or destroy.

Spurgeon
Spurgeon

231

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 21, 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Subject: Security Aspects of the Dutch Nuclear Submarine Proposal

I have discussed the security questions related to the Dutch nuclear submarine proposal with OSD and Navy personnel and find their case for restricting the "espionage perimeter" of our nuclear submarine technology very unconvincing. While I think we should try to discourage the Dutch from going ahead with this proposal, I think that it would be incorrect to base this decision primarily on the security issue.

Although the details of the Dutch request are extremely vague, I believe it essentially is to give the Dutch the full technical information and know-how necessary to permit them to construct on their own a nuclear attack submarine similar to the Skipjack. This would make available to them our technology as it existed in the late 1950s. Any information that subsequently became available to the Soviets would be at least ten years old and could not appear in their operational submarines until the 1970s. The same information was made available to the U.K. in 1958.

Our principal technical assets in this field are: nuclear technology, over-all operational reliability, and noise reduction. Since the Soviets now have operational nuclear submarines, any improvements in nuclear technology that they might learn from the Dutch would not give them a new capability but would at most improve the efficiency of operation of their future reactors (e.g., longer core life). While Admiral Rickover is justly proud of the very high operational reliability of both our equipment and personnel, this does not appear to me to be a quality that can be transferred by espionage. Finally, although it is true that Soviet nuclear subs at present are quite noisy by our present standards, the Skipjack was also a noisy

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 445 97-121
By cbm, NARA, Date 7-15-04

3a
Spurge:
if it doesn't make sense
oh then jump. why bother
+ write with Graham + Rickover?
Let's pass against it.
where is it. for decision?
2/3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

submarine by our present standards. The Soviets are sufficiently aware of the engineering details involved in noise reduction to do this on their own without assistance from the design features of the Skipjack.

At the same time, as a result of my discussions with DOD personnel I am convinced that on technical grounds alone this proposal is not very realistic and that an effort should be made to discourage the Dutch from going ahead with it. If the Dutch undertake this project on their own, they will presumably have to develop all of the necessary industrial techniques and establish new facilities to construct fuel elements and reactor cores and to service the submarine in the future. This will prove a very difficult and expensive undertaking. Our present nuclear attack submarines cost approximately \$70 million a piece. This cost does not include any of the development or facility costs that have gone into our nuclear submarine program and which would in part have to be duplicated by the Dutch to establish the facilities and the techniques to duplicate this production program.

In summary, while I don't think this proposal makes much sense from a military-technical point of view, I fail to find any element of this problem that differentiates it fundamentally from other fields of military and civilian technology where information five to ten years old is no longer a critical asset relative to the Soviet Union.

Spurgeon
Spurgeon Keeny

cc: Mr.CEJohnson
Mr.FMBator

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 4, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Mac --

Both John Palfrey and Dwight Ink got the message to the Joint Committee about what was really going on in the discussions with the Dutch about a nuclear submarine for the Dutch navy. Our word came in time to head off the drafting of a letter of protest (which was being discussed in the Joint Committee) but the Committee had already requested an informal report from DOD on what was going on. This request has not been withdrawn and I'll stay in touch with DOD to find out what they furnish the Joint Committee.


Charles E. Johnson

cc: F. Bator
S. Keeny

5

~~SECRET~~

July 7, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

6.2
(u)

[REDACTED]

6.2
(u)

It was noted that the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission concur in the requested dispersal.

The requested authority has been approved with the understanding that all weapons to be dispersed under this authority are programmed for permissive link installation in accordance with NSAM 160 and the current PAL schedule.

[REDACTED]

6.2
(u)

McGeorge Bundy

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 06-26
By isl, NARA, Date 11-27-07

~~SECRET~~

Dispatched 7/7/65 Rept # 276

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

5a

~~SECRET~~


July 6, 1965


NOTE FOR MR. BUNDY

Mac --

I recommend that you sign these two authorizations for the additional dispersal of nuclear weapons. They are similar to the other five which you signed in the last two weeks. The only unusual aspect is the tremendous increase in the number of weapons being made available to the [REDACTED] forces. This, however, was provided for in NSAM 334 and I'm afraid that I am complaining about proliferation to which we are already committed.

3.3(b)(6)


Charles E. Johnson



~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 06-34
By isl, NARA, Date 7-26-06

6.2
(a)

June 14, 1965

6

~~TOP SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: SACLANT ASW Nuclear Weapons Operational Dispersal
Requirements Plan for the Eastern Atlantic Area

The above plan referred to in your Memorandum to the President of May 24, 1965, has been reviewed in light of the standards of NSAM #197 and of SACLANT's stated need for additional nuclear ASW capability. It has been noted that the plan has been reviewed by the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and that they have not objected thereto.

This is to record an approval, in principle, of the proposed SACLANT ASW Nuclear Weapons Operational Dispersal Requirements Plan for the Eastern Atlantic Area subject to the qualifications and recommendations expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as stated in your memorandum of May 24, 1965. It is noted that this approval will permit SACLANT to seek approval of the Standing Group, NATO and the North Atlantic Council, to coordinate with NATO and to develop infrastructure funding of facilities to support NATO ASW dispersal requirements. In approving the proposed plan, it is understood that dispersal actions requested under the terms of NSAM #143 relating to the ASW weapons covered by the SACLANT plan, will describe the means for verifying the existence of satisfactory assurances against unauthorized use of such weapons.

15/
McGeorge Bundy

SANITIZED
EO. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 06-19 (#9)
By NARA, Date 1-22-10

~~TOP SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~

Dispatched 6/15/65 Rept # 240

6a

1. Mr Keeney OST *Amk*
2. Mr Bundy

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~


6-b

June 11, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY


Mac:

Spurg and I have gone over this proposal in detail with Jack Howard and I have discussed it with Jeff Kitchen's staff in State.



6.2(a)
3.3(b)
(5)(6)

This is another instance in which we are going down the slippery slope of initiating the dispersal of more tactical nuclear weapons without any very clear idea of how and when they would be used. However, in view of the unanimous support of this plan by Defense, State and AEC, there seems to be little basis for withholding approval. Therefore, Spurg and I recommend that you sign the draft memo presented herewith.


Charles E. Johnson

~~TOP SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 06-19 (# 9-b)
By isl, NARA, Date 2-2-10

7
October 16, 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Senator Anderson:

The President asked me to answer your letter of September 15 on the possibility of our giving technical aid in the field of nuclear submarines to The Netherlands, and perhaps to other nations. I have had a good look at this matter and I find that while the question has been considered within the Department of Defense, no encouragement has been given to anyone in the Dutch Government. In fact, informal Dutch inquiries about U. S. willingness to lend assistance were answered in the negative last summer through diplomatic and military channels.

I can also assure you that the field representatives of the Departments of State and Defense are well aware that both the law and Administration policy prevent any unauthorized discussion of sensitive kinds of nuclear cooperation with other governments, except with the approval of the President. No such approval is likely in the present instance unless and until there is a sharp change in our estimate of the importance of protecting the security of our submarine nuclear technology.

Sincerely,

McGeorge Bundy

The Honorable Clinton P. Anderson
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 97-121
By cbm, NARA, Date 7-15-04

8
October 12, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

HONORABLE JOHN McNAUGHTON

I have looked at this business of an answer to Senator Anderson's letter, and I must say I think we ought to be pretty straightforward about it. On the other hand, I don't want to upset Paul Nitze unduly, and I ask you to check informally to find out how much trouble this draft would give him, and whether you or he have any ameliorating amendments to suggest.

McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

9

October 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Mac --

John McNaughton has submitted the attached draft reply for your signature to Senator Anderson's letter to the President of September 15, on the subject of U. S. assistance to the Netherlands on nuclear submarine construction. McNaughton's transmittal is also attached.

In the file is a letter from Glenn Seaborg, the burden of which is that we could be more emphatic in our denial that there is any hanky-panky with the Dutch or other Allies, and also should be responsive to Anderson's proposal for a Presidential directive. Seaborg attaches some correspondence between Nitze and Rickover that is worth scanning. Rickover's views are summarized in three short paragraphs that I suggest you read if you don't have time to scan the entire correspondence. I find him to be interesting and convincing on this subject.

Dick Bowman reports that General Goodpaster is satisfied with the draft reply although he "thinks it a Navy matter." I told Bowman to tell the Joint Staff that nuclear matters can never be strictly Service concerns and always have political-military implications of the highest importance. It was for that reason that the draft was requested of the Department of Defense and the attention of the Chiefs was directed to Senator Anderson's letter.

I think the draft is acceptable because it makes the two major points that everybody thinks should be made:

- (1) We have made no commitment to the Dutch or any other Allies and are not encouraging them to think that we intend to give them assistance on the construction of nuclear submarines.
- (2) This does not mean that the situation may not change in the future so that it will be necessary to change our policy.

I recommend that you adopt the McNaughton draft with the following three paragraphs added at the end:

"You are absolutely correct in your understanding that the Administration's philosophy and policy is to prevent the further development of independent national nuclear forces. Any specific proposals will be looked at against this policy background and there would have to be a preponderant U. S. national security advantage before this Administration would support a proposal contrary to our continuing and historic policy.

"In view of the assurances I have received from the Department of State and Department of Defense concerning the activities of their respective representatives, I can see no need for a Presidential directive at this time. If it appears that the Administration's policy is being misunderstood or ignored in the field by U. S. representatives dealing with our Allies I know that Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara will know how to cure the condition.

"You may be assured that this Administration will not make binding commitments to other countries on these matters in advance of full consultation with the responsible Congressional leaders."

I have not tried this language on McNaughton. If you concur I will inform him. Moreover, I have not talked with Seaborg or Palfrey on this matter because I agree with McNaughton that AEC does not have any substantive knowledge in this specific matter. Their concern is largely prompted by the politics of dealing with JCAE and I believe that the new language I have proposed will take care of their concerns.


Charles E. Johnson

P. S. Since dictating the letter, I have talked with AEC and they concur in the draft letter as it has been amplified by me.

~~SECRET~~
UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

10

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

October 8, 1964

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-122
By is, NARA Date 4-6-99

Dear Mac:

I understand from your office that you would like our specific comments on the proposed reply to Senator Anderson on the dissemination to the Netherlands of nuclear submarine data and technology.

In general, the Commission feels that the proposed reply is not sufficiently responsive. Senator Anderson in his strongly worded letter to the President raises the specific issue of a Presidential Directive prohibiting dissemination of nuclear warship technology. This issue probably should be faced and answered, not avoided.

I am attaching for your information an exchange of correspondence between the Secretary of the Navy and Admiral Rickover concerning this question. These memoranda seem to indicate that more encouragement was given than is admitted to in the draft reply. Further, the language in this proposed reply, such as "the matter was not formally raised by the Netherlands Government with the United States" is poor since it can then be logically interpreted that the matter then was informally raised with us.

The Commission's final concern is in the first paragraph on the second page, where other interests in nuclear submarine propulsion are alluded to. We are not certain just what the phrase "as regards other Allies" is meant to represent - for example, are we excluding the French and the UK and do we consider the apparent Italian interest in nuclear submarine propulsion as not equivalent to the Netherlands interest?

DOCUMENT TRANSMITTED
HEREWITH CONTAINS CLASSIFIED
DEFENSE INFORMATION

When separated from enclosures, handle this document
as ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(insert proper classification)

~~SECRET~~


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-2-

Perhaps the best way of finally resolving this matter of a reply to Senator Anderson satisfactorily may be for representatives of the Department of Defense, and the AEC to meet with you in a drafting session.

Cordially,



Glenn T. Seaborg

Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

Attachments:

Memo fm Secy of Navy, dtd 9/3/64 (Secret), cy 1 AEC-A
Memo fm VADM Rickover, dtd 9/3/64 (Secret), cy 1 AEC-A
w/attach Summary, dtd 9/3/64 (Secret), cy 1 AEC-A

~~SECRET~~



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

In reply refer to
I-14487/64

6 OCT 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES E. JOHNSON
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Draft Reply to Senator Clinton P. Anderson's Letter to
the President

Attached is a draft reply for Mr. Bundy's signature to Senator Clinton P. Anderson's letter to the President regarding US assistance in the field of nuclear submarine cooperation with the Netherlands and other Allies.

Secretary Nitze and Mr. Kitchen's office concur in the draft. Dr. Seaborg's office has not coordinated since they do not have any substantive knowledge in this specific matter.

We have not addressed Senator Anderson's suggestion to issue a directive setting forth the administration's policy regarding the transmittal of nuclear warship technology to foreign nations.

John T. McNaughton
Assistant Secretary of Defense

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

11a

DRAFT

Dear Senator Anderson:

The President has asked me to reply to your 15 September letter which raised the question of the US providing technical aid to the Netherlands and possibly to other Allies for the production of nuclear submarines.

As regards the Netherlands, the situation is as follows: The Netherlands Defense Minister announced to Parliament on 24 June 1964 that its future defense plans included the construction of nuclear ASW submarines. Following this announcement, informal Dutch queries about US willingness to lend assistance were answered in the negative through diplomatic and military channels. The subject of Dutch nuclear submarines was again brought to public attention at The Hague in September when the defense budget for 1965 was submitted to Parliament. A newspaper report at that time erroneously stated that the Defense Minister's transmittal note to Parliament indicated that two nuclear submarines were to be constructed with US help. As I say, the press story was mistaken. The United States was not specifically linked with the Dutch nuclear submarine program in either of the two official communications to the Dutch Parliament.

I can assure you that no representative of the Department of State or the Department of Defense has encouraged the Netherlands Government to include nuclear submarines in its recently presented defense budget or to seek assistance from the United States.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 97-121
By cbw NARA, Date 7-15-04

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2117

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

As regards other Allies, I am not aware of any recent comparable specific interest in nuclear submarine propulsion. The same general considerations applicable to assistance to the Netherlands in this field would also be applicable to other Allies, and I reiterate that US representatives are not encouraging requests for any technical aid in the field of nuclear submarines.

Insert (A)

This does not mean, however, that we can avoid related defense responsibilities of equal seriousness. Effective national security planning requires that the strategic capabilities of the United States and its Western Allies be analyzed on a continuing basis. No reasonable hypothesis drawn from these forces, either now available or projected in the future, can be exempted from analysis. When the Netherlands Defense Minister announced that plans included the construction of nuclear ASW submarines, it became clear that the advantages and disadvantages of US assistance to the Dutch should be examined.

I can assure you that current studies on possible US assistance are carried out strictly within a contingency planning framework with no prejudice to a decision for or against assisting a foreign nation.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Clinton P. Anderson
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

draft

Dear Senator Anderson:

The President asked me to answer your letter of September 15 on the possibility of our giving technical aid in the field of nuclear submarines to The Netherlands, and perhaps to other nations. I have had a good look at this matter and I find that while the question has been considered within the Department of the Navy, ~~the fact is that we have had no discussions whatever with The Netherlands and that no~~ encouragement has been given to anyone in the Dutch government. In fact, informal Dutch inquiries about U. S. willingness to lend assistance were answered in the negative last summer through diplomatic and military channels.

I can also assure you that ~~there already exist directives whose~~ *the field representatives of the Departments of State and Defense are well aware that both the law and Administration* ~~purpose is to~~ prevent any unauthorized discussion of sensitive kinds of nuclear cooperation with other governments, except with the approval of the President. ~~In this case, I can assure you that~~ *No* such approval is likely unless and until there is a sharp change in our estimate of the importance of protecting the security of our submarine nuclear technology.

Sincerely,

McG. B.

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J. J.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

14

Spurge:

Will you check with Brown

& AEC

& McNamara, & draft an

answer for my sig.

MB

14-b

CLASSIFIED MATERIAL RECEIPT

To:

Office of The President
The White House

FROM:

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
Room H-403 Capitol Building

Original of this receipt to be signed personally by recipient and returned to Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Duplicate of receipt to be retained by recipient.

| LETTER | REPORT | OTHER | ENCLOSURE | DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT | DATE OF DOCUMENT | FILE NO. | CLASSIFICATION |
|--------|--------|-------|-----------|---|------------------|----------|---|
| x | | | | 3 page letter to The President from Senator Clinton P. Anderson, Chairman, Subcommittee on Security Copy 1 of 2 Series A | 9/15/64 | 8128 | Confidential/ Defense Information |

Avoid identifying material in any manner which might necessitate classification of this receipt.

I have personally received from the sender the material, including enclosures and attachments, as identified above. I assume full responsibility for the safe handling, storage, and transmittal elsewhere of this material in full accordance with existing regulations.

Date dispatched:

September 16, 1964

Signature of recipient:

Date received:

Congress of the United States

JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

John D. Foster
U. S. S.

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Doc # 8128

1/2

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| ORIGIN/ACTION | | |
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

Ukeap. Netherlands
 DEF 12.2
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A-716
 NO.

~~SECRET~~

COPY NO. 79

SERIES B

15

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

This document consists of 2 pages. Copy 1 of 2

INFO : PARIS FOR POLAD

FROM : Amembassy THE HAGUE

DATE: MAR 26 1964

SUBJECT: U. S. Liability for Incidents in Netherlands

REF : Deprel 1372

On March 24, J. van der Valk, Deputy Director of NATO Affairs, Netherlands Foreign Ministry, handed Embassy officer Aide Memoire NA 31588, March 24 (copy enclosed) together with plain sheet (copy enclosed) comprising GON remarks in response to questions raised by reftel.

Aide Memoire informs U.S. that GON is submitting to Parliament on or about April 10 draft law which, if adopted, "would entail certain changes in the nature and extent of the United States Government's present liability [redacted]"

Aide Memoire adds GON ready to discuss consequences to both Governments brought about by new law when adopted by Parliament.

In presenting Aide Memoire van der Valk emphasized that Government after long consideration had decided to go ahead with legislation intended to apply as well to military as civilian [redacted] installations. Foreign Office had argued against application of law to military storage facilities but had been overruled.

van der Valk explained that pressure for rapid passage of bill comes from General Electric which is connected with construction of atomic power plant at Dodewaard (near Nijmegen) and wants some legislative protection before proceeding further.

GROUP 3
 Downgraded at 12 year intervals.
 Not automatically declassified.

- ACTION ①
- POL
- INFO
- ALB
- DCM
- ECON
- MAAG
- MILATS
- SUBJECT
- READING
- CHRON

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 06-28

By isl NARA, Date 6-1-06

FORM 4-62 DS-323

~~SECRET~~

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☒ In ☐ Out

Initd By: POL:RNNoble:rm 3/26/64

Contents and Classification Approved by:
 POL - D. L. Horowitz

E.O. 12958
 3.3 (b)(6)

DCM (in draft)

~~SECRET~~

Page 2, A-716 from The Hague

(This aspect of the legislation was adverted to in Government note to Second Chamber dated March 20, in which it was said that a bill on legal liability in field of nuclear energy was shortly to be submitted; bill meant to be a temporary solution to problem until coming into force in Netherlands of amended Paris and Brussels conventions.)

In handing over plain sheet with responses to reftel questions, van der Valk made it clear that while answers were being provided to questions U.S. had raised, it was not to be construed that his Government was entering into discussions with United States concerning national legislation being proposed.

It should be noted that final paragraph of responses contains assurance that Article VIII of NATO Status of Forces Agreement of June 19, 1951, "remains untouched."

Embassy would appreciate Department's comments, including information as to how similar problems are being handled elsewhere in Europe.

RICE *gic*

Enclosure:

Aide Memoire with attachment (5 copies)

~~SECRET~~

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It is agreed that the applicability of the Paris Convention of July 29, 1960 and the Supplementary Convention of January 31, 1963 to military weapons is disputable.

However, these Conventions do not exclude national legislation which would cover a wider field than the conventions themselves.

It is the opinion of the Netherlands Government that persons suffering damage [redacted] in connection with military activities should in principle not be in a less advantageous position than those suffering damage from [redacted] incidents of an other nature.

[redacted]

Concerning the liability of the operator the Paris Convention in its article 7 provides that it shall not be more than 15 mln European Units of Account. In accordance with article 3 c (i) of the Supplementary Convention, however, Contracting Parties are to establish the maximum liability of the operator at the amount of 120 mln. European Units of Account.


The Netherlands Government is at present not proposing any new agreement or understanding concerning this matter between the United States and Netherlands Governments. The provisions of article VIII of the NATO status of Forces agreement of 19th June, 1951 remain untouched.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
THE HAGUE

NA 31588

A I D E M E M O I R E


The Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Embassy of the United States on July 24th, 1963 of the Netherlands Government's intention to submit for parliamentary approval a special law concerning third party liability



This draft law is now to be submitted to Parliament on or about April 10th, 1964.

The Netherlands Government would of course be ready to discuss with the United States Government, if so desired, the consequences to both Governments of the changes in liability, brought about by the new law when adopted by Parliament.

A2



The Hague, March 24th, 1964.