

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Page 1

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21	memo	Saunders for the File sanitized 11/10/15 per NLJ/RAC 15-140	S	1	7/7/66	A
25	memo	Special Memorandum [Sanitized per RAC, 9/00] same sanitization 10/9/15 per NLJ/RAC 15-141	S	15	5/22/68	A
~~42a~~	~~rpt~~	~~Bio Sketch~~ open 8/17/15 per NLJ/RAC 15-97 [Duplicate of #60b, NSF, CF, Iraq, V1]	~~C~~	~~2~~	~~1/67~~	~~A~~


Collection Title National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders
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6/9/2010


Initials

Aug 1

July 30, 1968

Lois:

After checking with State, both Ernie Goldstein and I separately saw Shafiq Qazzaz, the bearer of this letter.

We don't answer letters from Barzani since he heads a continuous rebellion in northern Iraq.

So action is completed -- as much as we can -- and this can be filed.

Hal

Att. *General*
Letter from *Mustafa Barzani*,
Commander in Chief of the *Kurdish*
Revolutionary Army and President
of the *Democratic Party of*
Iraq - Kurdistan, to LBJ - 7/15/68.

Page 2

July 22, 1968

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: A Clearer Picture of the Iraqi Coup

While you were gone, the situation in Iraq became much clearer. The new government could still be a little harder for us to deal with than the old -- if we ever have a chance to deal with it -- but if we had to have a Baathist government there, this is probably the best we could expect.

The Baathists are from the right-wing of the party -- the opponents of those in control in Syria -- and non-Baathists are playing a major role in the new government. The Syrians had nothing to do with the coup; in fact, one of the most interesting questions raised by the coup is whether the Iraqi example will encourage the moderate Syrian Baathists now in exile to take a crack at the Syrian regime.

The inability of the Aref government to deal with Iraq's domestic problems was the reason -- or excuse -- for the coup, and the new government is talking mainly about economic reforms, eliminating corruption and solving the Kurdish problem. They have made the usual statements about Zionism, Imperialism and Arab unity, but so far there have been no indications that Iraq's foreign policy will become more radical. It's too early to know whether there will be progress on a Kurdish settlement or more trouble -- a key determinant of how free Iraqi troops will be to menace Israel.

Until we see these people in action, we won't know for sure what problems we might face, but there seems to be less cause for concern over anything radically different now than there was last Wednesday.

John W. Foster

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol. XXI, #200
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-2-05

~~SECRET~~

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SECRET

July 17, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: The Iraqi Coup

Until things sort themselves out, and until we get better information--we have no representation in Baghdad--it's impossible to tell what the effect of last night's coup will be. We can't even be sure that the coup leaders' claim of military support is true. A counter-coup tomorrow is conceivable.

The intelligence community's initial reading is that the new group--apparently Baathists--will be more difficult than their predecessors, but at this point no one knows how radical they will be. So far, their communiques have taken a fairly moderate line by Iraqi standards, promising economic reforms, honest government, a "wise" solution of the Kurdish problem, and Arab unity against the Zionist and Imperialist threats. On the other hand, if these people are Baathists, their tendencies will be towards moving Iraq even closer to Fatah, the Syrians and the Soviets. From our point of view, the most important question is whether they will continue Iraq's support for King Hussein. Iraq has about 25,000 troops in Jordan and could easily make life difficult for the King.

This is just to give you the best reading we have before you leave.

John Foster

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, #199
By CSM, NARA, Date 8-2-05

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April 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Soviet Move into Iraqi Oil Production

This is to put the reports that the Soviets have made a major oil deal with Iraq into some perspective. The Russians have made a significant move in the oil business without becoming as deeply involved as Western oil companies usually do, and this move is likely to cause us trouble in a few years.

The oil picture in Iraq looks like this. The Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) has the concessions for all of the producing fields (about 4% of world production), but does not control Iraq's non-producing proven reserves (3.3 billion tons or 6% of the world's reserves). IPC is a Western company with Standard of New Jersey and Mobile jointly owning a quarter.

The Iraqis took over the undeveloped fields in 1961, but late this year gave a French company a concession for part of them. They have now signed an agreement with the Russians for technical help including everything from exploration to marketing probably for a field in Southern Iraq which contains about a fifth of Iraq's proven reserves. The Soviet deal is different from most Near East oil agreements. In oversimplified terms, oil companies usually rent a field from Arabs, the Russians are renting an oil company to the Arabs.


The oil agreement may give the Russians a little more leverage in Iraq, but the real danger is the new Soviet involvement in the oil business. The Soviet wells won't be in production for about two years--the time could vary greatly either way--but then the oil will have to be moved out of Iraq. This means it will go through the Persian Gulf or through pipelines which the IPC owns to the Mediterranean. The oil companies don't think it is feasible to move the oil through the Gulf--especially if the Suez Canal remains closed--but if the Soviets choose this route they will probably be aiming at Western markets in the Far East. If they try to move the oil through IPC pipelines, or use other IPC facilities, the IPC intends to resist even if it means the end of IPC.

We still don't know the details of the agreement, and even when we do we won't know exactly what the Soviets are planning to do. They appear to have left themselves the options of playing this as technical aid or actually becoming involved in producing oil outside the USSR for sale outside the USSR. In any case there is going to be more competition for US companies, and the US government could face all the problems of an expropriation of a major US investment in Iraq.

John W. Foster
John Foster

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *clm/ly*, NARA, Date 2-25-70



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Time

To Note



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ACTION NEA 15

INFO AF 15, ARA 15, EUR 20, EA 15, GPM 03, SC 01, RSC 01, USIA 12, H 02,

NSC 10, L 03, INR 07, P 04, CIA 04, DOD 01, SP 02, SS 20, SAH 03, AID 28,

E 15, NIC 01, COM 08, INT 06, TRSY 08, NSAE 00, STR 08, RSR 01, MM 01,

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INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 197
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 279
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SUBJ: OIL-IRAQ AND USSR

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BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED

1. DEC 26 ARAB WORLD PUBLICATION, REPORTING BAGHDAD RADIO ANNOUNCEMENTS RE SOVIET-IRAQI OIL DEAL, COMMENTS THIS AGREEMENT "MAY WELL BE MOST IMPORTANT OIL DEAL. SOVIETS HAVE EMBARKED ON IN ARAB WORLD." REPORTEDLY USSR IS TO PROVIDE IRAQ WITH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND EQUIPMENT NOT ONLY FOR EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION OF OIL IN IRAQ BUT ALSO FOR TRANSPORTING IT AND MARKETING IT ABROAD. IN EXCHANGE, USSR TO RECEIVE SHIPMENTS OF IRAQI CRUDE.

2. ARAB WORLD REPORTS TWO SIDES EXCHANGED LETTERS OF INTENT SIGNED BY INOC CHAIRMAN AL-JADER AND S.A. SKATCHKOV, "CHAIRMAN OF SOVIET COMMITTEE FOR FOREIGN TRADE RELATIONS." DECREE ISSUED IN BAGHDAD DEC 24 ANNOUNCED ENDORSEMENT OF LETTERS BY GOI COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. AL-JADER REPORTEDLY RELEASED TEXT OF LETTERS AT

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DEC 24 PRESS CONFERENCE, LETTERS STATED USSR WILL PROVIDE IRAQ WITH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND MACHINERY FOR DRILLING OF WELLS IN SOUTHERN IRAQ "IN AREAS OF PROVEN RESERVES." ARAB WORLD COMMENTS THIS COULD BE REFERENCE TO NORTH RUMAILA FIELD, ALTHOUGH AL-JADER WOULD ONLY STATE IN REPORTED RESPONSE TO PRESS QUESTION THAT AREAS COVERED BY DEAL NOT YET SPECIFIED. (ARAB WORLD BELIEVES NORTH RUMAILA COULD THEREFORE BE INCLUDED AND THAT GOI MAY BE REQUESTING SOVIET ASSISTANCE FOR INOC'S DIRECT EXPLOITATION OF NORTH RUMAILA IF TALKS BETWEEN INOC AND CFP (REFTEL) FAIL.) AL-JADER ALSO REPORTEDLY STATED NEW AGREEMENT DIFFERENT FROM INOC/ERAP AGREEMENT IN THAT INOC WILL EXPLORE AND EXPLOIT IRAQI OIL DIRECTLY WITH SOVIET ASSISTANCE AS OPPOSED TO ERAP WORKING AREAS ITSELF UNDER CONTRACT TO INOC. GOI/SOVIET DEAL ALSO PROVIDES FOR SOVIET ASSISTANCE FOR GEOLOGICAL AND TOPOGRAPHICAL SURVEYS IN AREAS OF NORTHERN IRAQ WHERE NO OIL HAS YET BEEN DISCOVERED. AMOUNT OF IRAQI OIL USSR TO RECEIVE FROM INOC IN RETURN SOVIET AID WILL BE SPECIFIED LATER WHEN EXACT EXTENT OF SOVIET ASSISTANCE IS DEFINED.

3. ASKED IF ERAP AND SOVIET AGREEMENT COVERED ALL AREAS AT

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PAGE FOUR RUQMBE 5181 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
DISPOSAL OF INOC, AL-JADER REPORTEDLY SAID THEY COVERED ONLY
SMALL PORTION THESE AREAS AND THAT INOC WAS CONSIDERING OFFERS
FROM VARIOUS FOREIGN CONCERNS (NAMES OR NATIONALITIES UNDISCLOSED)
TO EXPLORE THOSE AREAS.

4. REGIONAL (FRENCH PRESS SERVICE) REPORTS FROM BAGHDAD THAT
AL-JADER ALSO SAID INOC HAD REJECTED OFFERES MADE BY SOME SHARE-
HOLDERS IN IPC "BECAUSE THESE OFFERS WERE FAR FROM MINIMUM
REQUIREMENTS IF IRAQ." END UNCLASSIFIED.

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5. COMMENT. POSSIBLE SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO INOC TO EXPLOIT
RICH, PROVEN NORTH RUMAILA RESERVES RAISES PROSPECT OF IMPORTANT
TURN IN SOVIET OIL POLICY WHICH SINCE EXPORT DRIVE DURING LATE 50'S
HAS BEEN RELATIVELY DORMANT AS USSR CONSOLIDATED STABLE EXPORT
MARKET IN EUROPE. AS NOTED OCT 30 ISSUE OF PIW, SOVIET SALES TO
FAR EAST HAVE DROPPED DRAMATICALLY WITH CLOSURE OF SUEZ CANAL.
AVAILABILITY LARGE AMOUNTS IRAQI CRUDE IN PERSIAN GULF WOULD
CERTAINLY IMPROVE SOVIET MARKETING POSITION AS OPPOSED TO ITS OWN

CRUDE COMING FROM THE BLACK SEA. IN ADDITION, SOVIET ASSISTANCE
TO INOC FOR PRODUCTION OF ALREADY PROVEN NORTH RUMAILA CRUDE
PROBABLY WOULD NOT TAX SOVIET PETROLEUM TECHNOLOGY AS

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GREATLY AS OTHER VENTURES, E.G., SYRIA, OR SIBERIAN LINK UP TO
FAR EASTERN MARKETS. MOREOVER, RESULT OF SOVIET/IRAQI DEAL COULD
PUT USSR IN COVETED POSITION OF INTERNATIONAL MAJORS TODAY, I.E.,
CRUDE SALES FROM SOURCES IN BOTH WESTERN AND EASTERN HEMISPHERES.
IN IRAQ, INOC DESIRE TO EXPLOIT NORTH RUMAILA (WITH SOVIET
ASSISTANCE) COULD EXPLAIN PUZZLING DELAY INOC ACCEPTANCE OF
OTHER OFFERS FOR NORTH RUMAILA AND WOULD PUT INOC (AND AL-JADER
FACTION IN GOI) IN (ADVANTAGEOUS POLITICAL) POSITION OF MAKING
"MYTH" (PARA 3, REFTTEL) OF RUMAILA A REALITY. FINALLY, ONE
MUST ASK WOULD DIRECT INOC EXPLOITATION NORTH RUMAILA,

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MOVEMENT OF CRUDE PRODUCED VIA IRAQI TANKERS (LOANED BY USSR, ALTHOUGH NOT IN UNLIMITED NUMBERS), AND SALE OF CRUDE DIRECTLY BY IRAQIS OR THROUGH SOVIET MIDDLEMEN PUT IPC LAWYERS INTO MORE OF A QUANDRY THAN WOULD BE CASE WITH, SAY, ENI, WHICH COULD BE THREATENED WITH ATTACHEMENTS, ETC.? MOREOVER, ANY SOVIET-ASSISTED INOC PRODUCTION FROM NORTH RUMAILA COULD WELL REQUIRE USE OF EXISTING IPC FACILITIES IN SOUTHERN IRAQ, E.G., GAS SEPARATION PLANTS, AND INSISTENCE BY GOI FOR SUCH IPC COOPERATION COULD RAISE SPECTER OF EMOTIONALLY CHARGED LEGAL BATTLE WHICH MIGHT ENDANGER EXISTENCE OF IPC ITSELF IN IRAQ. ON OTHER HAND, HOST

PAGE SIX RUMHHE 5181 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
OF PROBLEMS RAISED BY POSSIBLE INOC EXPLOITATION, INCLUDING, WE SUSPECT, POLITICAL OPPOSITION WITHIN GOI, DOES NOT MAKE REPORTED GOI/SOVIET DEAL A FAIT ACCOMPLI. WE CAN ONLY SPECULATE THAT GOI/SOVIET COOPERATION MIGHT BE MORE DIFFICULT TO ATTACK LEGALLY BY IPC SHAREHOLDERS AND ALSO GIVE THEM MORE IMMEDIATE HEADACHES THAN HAS BEEN CASE SINCE WASIM.
PORTER.

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4-7
6
April 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Soviet Move into Iraqi Oil Production

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The oil agreement may give the Russians a little more leverage in Iraq, but the real danger is the new Soviet involvement in the oil business. The Soviet wells won't be in production for about two years--the time could vary greatly either way--but then the oil will have to be moved out of Iraq. This means it will go through the Persian Gulf or through pipelines which the IPC owns to the Mediterranean. The oil companies don't think it is feasible to move the oil through the Gulf--especially if the Suez Canal remains closed--but if the Soviets choose this route they will probably be aiming at Western markets in the Far East. If they try to move the oil through IPC pipelines, or use other IPC facilities, the IPC intends to resist even if it means the end of IPC.

We still don't know the details of the agreement, and even when we do we won't know exactly what the Soviets are planning to do. They appear to have left themselves the options of playing this as technical aid or actually becoming involved in producing oil outside the USSR for sale outside the USSR. In any case there is going to be more competition for US companies, and the US government could face all the problems of an expropriation of a major US investment in Iraq.

John Foster

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EQ 13292, Sec. 3A
BY *clm/f*, NARA, Date 2-25-10

March 13, 1968

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MEMO FOR MR. GOLDSTEIN

We've long had a problem dealing with representatives from Barzani. We've tried to treat the Kurdish rebellion as an internal Iraqi affair. After the Kurds and the Iraqi government reached a tentative agreement in mid-1966, we sponsored a food program for the Kurdish areas, but that ended with the break in relations last summer. So for the moment, our hands are tied unless we want to begin clandestine aid to the Kurds, and we haven't so far seen much to be gained from that. In the past, we've let the more junior officers in State handle these representations because any official response from the President would have naturally upset the Iraqi government. Now when we have no relations the problem isn't so ticklish, but we probably want to stick to our general approach until there seems good reason to change it.

Hal Saunders

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March 12, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Talk with Mr. Shafiq Qazzaz

Mr. Ernest Goldstein, at the request of Justice Douglas, yesterday received Mr. Qazzaz, who gave Mr. Goldstein a letter to the President from Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani. Mr. Goldstein then asked Mr. Saunders to speak with Mr. Qazzaz, an Iraqi Kurd who has lived here for seven years and who visited Barzani in February.

Mr. Qazzaz reviewed the situation in Iraq along the general lines of his paper (attached), but emphasized the paper's final point-- the Kurds are the only unified force which can save Iraq. Unless something is done to solve the Kurdish problem along the lines of the 1966 agreement, and unless the Kurds are given a chance to become a stabilizing factor in Iraq, Iraq is going to continue downward. He was not at all clear about how the Kurds are going to play their role in Iraq or about what, if anything, the US government should be doing about this. Mr. Saunders deliberately avoided asking what he wanted the USG to do.

The action he wants from the US government is on a different problem. He would like the American Red Cross to do something in the Kurdish controlled areas where years of war have left the population in great need of food and medical supplies. Aid through the Iraqi Red Crescent has usually gone to the few Kurds who are friendly to the government, but aid could be channeled through Iran as the ICRC has recently done.

Qazzaz feels that the Red Cross is aware of the situation, but that it is being held up by a lack of approval from the US Government. He asked that we inform the Red Cross that such a program would be all right. He said he understood that the USG could not officially aid the Kurds under present circumstances.

Mr. Saunders replied that we want to preserve the independence of the Red Cross and that therefore we don't want to become involved in suggesting programs to them. Any initiative should come from the Red Cross, and they should be the ones to seek government opinion as necessary. He suggested that Mr. Qazzaz approach the Red Cross directly.

John W. Foster

cc: Mr. Goldstein
Mr. Rostow
Mr. Battle

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March 12, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Talk with Mr. Shafiq Qazzaz


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John W. Foster

cc: Mr. Goldstein
Mr. Rostow
Mr. Battle

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The Kurdish Question in Iraq

The Kurdish movement began at first as a small resistance group fighting the government of Abdul Karim Kassim in September 1961. The government fought the Kurds unsuccessfully until it was overthrown in February 1963 and replaced by a new regime under Abdul Salam Arif. It was at the same time that a cease-fire agreement was concluded with the Kurds as a step towards negotiations to grant the Kurds their rights within the framework of "autonomy within Iraq." These negotiations did not fare well and the war was resumed by the government in June of the same year. The fighting this time was characterized by an unusual degree of brutality by which the Baathist government hoped to crush the Kurdish revolt completely (some Western newsmen even described it as a war of extermination). The Baathist regime came to an end in November 1963 when Abdul Salam Arif took complete control of the Iraqi government and a military-dominated cabinet was formed under the premiership of General Tahir Yahya, who is also serving as premier in the present Iraqi Government. It was not until February 1964 that a cease-fire agreement was reached and talks began to settle the problem. Chances for a settlement looked dim especially after the government had issued the new May 4 Constitution, which did not include the granting of national rights of the Kurds as it had been previously promised.

It was also at this time that signs of a split among the leadership of the Kurdish Democratic Party became evident. This finally led to a complete split between a group led by Ibrahim Ahmed (then General Secretary of the KDP) and Jalal Talabani and the rest of the Kurdish movement led by General Mustafa Barzani.

Having reached no agreement with the Iraqi Government, the Kurds set up a de facto autonomy in November 1964, which consisted of a Command Council and an Executive Bureau under the leadership of Mustafa Barzani himself. On April 15, 1965 Abdul Salam Arif's government attacked the Kurds once again. In September an attempted coup by the then Premier Aref Abdul Razzak was put down and for the first time since 1958 a civilian, Dr. Abdul Rahman al-Bazzaz became the new premier. Bazzaz's efforts to solve the Kurdish problem through waging a diplomatic offensive against the Kurdish movement rather than negotiating with them directly, did not succeed and the Iraqi army began a winter offensive in December. On April 15 Abdul Salam Arif died in a plane crash and Bazzaz assumed presidential powers and at the same time became one of the prospects to succeed Arif; but the Council of Ministers and the Defense Council elected General Abdul Rahman Arif (Abdul Salam Arif's brother) to the presidency, and Bazzaz remained as premier. The new president promised autonomy to the Kurds, but later Iraqi

officials denied such a promise by Arif and in May a new government offensive was launched against the Kurds. The new military offensive failed and towards the end of June 1966 Premier Bazzaz announced which has since then been known as the June 29 plan for the settlement of the Kurdish question. Shortly thereafter Bazzaz resigned and was replaced by General Naji Talib as premier. Both the new government and the present one of General Tahir Yahya promised to implement the June 29 plan, but nothing so far as been done and the Kurds seem to have lost all hope in arriving at a peaceful settlement through the implementation of this plan. Relations between the government and the Kurdish Revolution have constantly deteriorated, especially in the last two months when the Kurds began withdrawing their representatives and are gradually cutting their contacts with the Iraqi Government.

Personal Observations

These observations are based upon a trip made recently to Iraqi-Kurdistan, during which I had the opportunity to see the Kurdish leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani and also to travel throughout the Kurdish-controlled territory.

*I was struck by the extent of poverty and disease, which in addition to the hardships of the last six years, have left definite scars upon the health and well-being of the Kurdish community. Though these conditions seem to have had little effect upon the faith of the people in their cause, they are deeply disappointed that the United States has thus far not extended to them any humanitarian aid. This sense of disappointment is compounded by the fact that several other and less able countries have come forth with such aid.

*The strength of the Kurdish movement lies basically in the quality of the Peshmerge (the Kurdish army) and in the personality of its leader, Mullah Mustafa Barzani. The people seem to have reached the conclusion that at the present time Barzani is the only person who can lead the movement. It is also important to realize that Mustafa Barzani is probably the only political figure in the Middle East who can claim and be certain of the loyalty of several thousand armed men.

*The split which occurred in 1964 between some members of the Kurdish Democratic Party and Mustafa Barzani has had definite weakening effects upon the organization and the administration of the Kurdish movement, but there is reason to believe that the movement has survived and is on its way to recovery. The important point here is that the survival of the movement under the leadership

of Barzani is as much due to the miscalculations of the Talabani group as it is a result of Barzani's effective leadership and the work of the men around him. As far as the Kurdish community is concerned, the Talabani group could not have committed a worse political mistake than cooperating with the Iraqi Government.

*The Kurdish army (Peshmerge) seems to have been little affected by the split; its organization, training and equipment remain very much the same as before; and the rank and file of the army seems confident and capable of continuing the armed struggle if the fighting resumed once again.

*While the Kurds are disappointed in the United States' attitude towards their question, they feel certain that once the U.S. realizes their potentials and intentions, it will be more willing to cooperate not only to extend help to them but also to pursue the kind of relationship which will serve her own interests.

*The Kurds' attitude towards Communism stems from a basic distrust of the Communist bloc countries and misgivings about the activities and intentions of the Iraqi Communist Party. The danger of possible Communist influence upon the Kurdish movement and upon Iraq as a whole comes from the fact that the present unstable atmosphere in Iraq is most conducive to the increase of Communist activities. The Kurdish movement seems determined to check Communist activities provided that it is helped and strengthened in the face of the growing activities of the Iraqi Communist Party.

*The Kurdish movement, by having under its command a substantial number of armed men, constitutes the only organized political force in Iraq which has the means to bring about effective change in the country as a whole. The sense of responsibility and moderation which characterizes the leadership of the Kurdish movement causes one to believe that this movement should be aided not only to solve Iraq's most urgent problem, but that it could serve effectively as a means towards establishing a better and more stable Iraq.

Shafiq Qazzaz
February 1968

Shafiq Qazzaz
1420 Hampshire West Court
Apartment 10
Silver Spring, Md. 20903

Home 454-7034
Work 526-3051

June 3, 1967

Gray

WALT -

Subject: Feedback from Pachachi's
Discussions

I learned today in the State Department that "Arab sources" report that Pachachi was pleased by his reception in Washington and found discussions useful.

There is no information as to what he will do as a result of the talks.

Howard Wriggins

~~SECRET~~

June 1, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Pachachi's Conversations So Far

The main points to emerge from Gene's long conversation with Pachachi just ended are:

1. Pachachi believes we could establish a breathing spell on the Straits issue provided no Israeli flag ship and no oil tankers pass through the Straits. Other ships with non-strategic goods could pass.
2. The Arabs differ with us over what constitutes a belligerent act. While they consider it perfectly right to stop a ship and search it, we would consider that a hostile act.

*not completed
and not sent.*

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.4
By com/18 NARA, Date 2-25-10

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Sing
Lebanon
10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 1, 1967

BKS:

I recommend we clear both the attached. These do no more than give contingency authority in Beirut and Baghdad to evacuate our people if our Ambassadors consider it necessary. As the crisis draws on with no lessening of the likelihood of confrontation, the possibility of retaliation against our interests and people in the peripheral Arab states grows.

This is the same way we handled this issue in the three states most immediately affected--Israel, Syria and the UAR.

HHS

Att: Read to Rostow memo, 5/31/67,
att. cable to Beirut (WH-2103)

Read to Rostow memo, 5/31/67,
att. cable to Baghdad (WH-2102)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
Excm/s, NARA, Date 2-25-10

Page 11

Revised by W W R
5/81

~~SECRET~~

May 31, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment with Iraqi Foreign Minister

Attached is Secretary Rusk's recommendation that you see Iraqi Foreign Minister Pachachi. Since he has just been in Cairo and is a responsible man, he could turn out to be one of our better channels to the Arabs.

I doubt we will be able to pin him to the same kind of commitment to secrecy we got from Eban. However, there might even be some virtue in his talking if he did so responsibly.

Secretary Rusk would see him before you, but Pachachi would probably have to be told before he'd come down from New York that he had an appointment with you.

I believe you should give serious consideration to seeing him. In Arab eyes, we are completely committed to Israel. It would be healthy, if we are to salvage any of our Arab interests from this crisis, if a responsible Arab could carry away an impression of both your resolution and your goodwill for Arabs who are trying to restore peace.

W. W. Rostow

I'll see him _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (a)
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By cbm/jw, NARA, Date 8-2-05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

April 5, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to Iraqi President Aref

Ambassador Strong will be calling on President Aref tomorrow morning before returning here on consultation and home leave. Since Aref's term as President has just been extended, he would like to deliver personal congratulations from you in the form of the following message:

"I was pleased to learn that the Cabinet and Defense Council have extended your term of office. My sincere congratulations both to you and to the people of Iraq."

I recommend you approve. This would be another in the series of relatively short messages of this kind which you have used to establish a personal relationship with this man who appears to be leading Iraq gradually into a more moderate course. He deeply appreciated your receiving his top generals last December, and this seems an appropriate time for another short message.

We will have to get this out tonight if you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (416)
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By obm/jw, NARA, Date 8-2-05

~~SECRET~~

launders

13

frag

February 21, 1967

WALT -

Here is a note for the
President regarding those Iraqi
Generals who came to see him
with a carpet. Remember?

President Aref was very
grateful for the reception.

Howard Wriggins

February 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Iraqi Generals take back the good word.

President Aref of Iraq has cabled his thanks for the message and gifts you sent to him through his Generals (you will recall you saw them on January 25 -- and they brought you a carpet).

He also expresses appreciation for the treatment the delegation received elsewhere in the government.

W. W. Rostow

Att: Baghdad 1455

Walt

February 20, 1967

WALT -

Here is a memorandum for
the President seeking authorization
to provide a low-key verbal reply
to Barzani, the Kurdish leader.

Howard Wriggins

February 20, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Acknowledgment of a letter from Kurdish leader Barzani

The attached letter from the Kurdish Insurgent Leader Barzani addressed to you was delivered to the Department of State in late January. It asks you to press the Government of Iraq to give the Kurds a fair break politically and to provide help for destitute Kurds.

In fact, we've been urging the GOI for some time to seek accommodation with the Kurds within the framework of Iraqi sovereignty. There has been a truce since June 1966 but no real settlement yet. And we have been supplying relief supplies to Kurdish refugees and others made destitute by the Kurdish war.

The Kurds are an important minority representing 30% of Iraq's population. There are also Kurds in Iran and Turkey. Ordinarily, you would not be bothered by a communication from a man like Barzani; but his minority is being actively courted by Soviet agents, and State wants to handle a very low-key response this way:

A desk officer in State will verbally acknowledge to a friend of Barzani who is in Washington that Barzani's letter has been received and passed to the White House. Barzani's friend will be reminded that our humanitarian interest in the Kurds is evidenced by the continuing flow of food to destitute Kurds.

Such an acknowledgement would be consistent with the way we've handled previous messages from Barzani.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

See me _____

WWR:HW:lw

Att: file #534

Image 15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 25, 1967

BKS:

The attached arrived too late for use.

However, after talking with the Country Director last night I put essentially the same in Walt's memo to the President.

So all taken care of. The meeting was warm and friendly and accomplished its purpose.

HHS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Att: Memo, Read to Rostow, 1/24/67
Subj: Call on the President by the Deputy
Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Army (WH-267)

DECLASSIFIED
EO 13526, Sec 3.4
By *cbm/s* NARA, Date 2-25-10

16

Iraqis to call on the President 25 January:

Major General Hassan Sabri
Ambassador Nasir Hani
Major General Abd al Jabbar Shanshal
Brigadier Zeki Hussain Hilmi
Brigadier Nasif Jassin al Samaraa(i)
Colonel Bashir Ismail al Talib

U. S. Army Lt. Col. William Quarrie,
escort officer

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 24, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Iraqi Generals--25 January

This need only be a brief ceremonial meeting. Its main purpose is to receive warmly a friendly gesture by Iraqi President Aref.

General Sabri, who heads the Iraqi delegation, will present you with a gift (a carpet, we believe) and convey an oral message from President Aref.

In return, Secretary Rusk suggests you present a silver cigarette box for President Aref and ask General Sabri to convey your own good wishes and your desire to build an ever closer relationship between our two governments. (You need not be more specific. But our real purpose is to encourage the Iraqi moderates whom Aref heads to become a stabilizing influence in a tense area.)

Ambassador Hani will accompany the generals. You will recall your chat with him when he paid his respects at the hospital last fall.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13232, Sec 3.4
1/16/01, NARA, Date 2-25-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Gift and Message from Iraq's President

Attached is a special recommendation from Secretary Rusk that you briefly receive the Deputy Chief of the Iraqi Army on January 23, 24 or 25 just long enough for a few words and an exchange of gifts.

This is a rather unusual request but one that warrants serious consideration. General Sabri is here at the Pentagon's invitation for an orientation tour with four other senior officers who have considerable political power in Iraq. But President Aref at the last minute took advantage of his trip to have him bring you a personal gift (a carpet) and message.

I wouldn't normally recommend you spend your time this way--nor would Secretary Rusk. However, we both feel strongly this is an opportunity we shouldn't miss.

Iraq is at a crossroads. If its moderates--headed by Aref--can win out, Iraq could break out of Nasser's sphere and become stabilizing influence. In the short run, this is important to our oil companies which are trying to work their way out of the box Syria has them in. A more radical government in Iraq might threaten to nationalize them. In the longer run, our objective in the Middle East is to encourage governments like Aref's to stand on their own--and not to get sucked into the more radical Arab nationalist movements that cause us (and Israel) so much trouble.

We have considered inviting Aref here for a visit but so far have judged that would do him more harm than good in his own sensitive political situation. However, by this gesture he is reaching out to strengthen his relationship with you. This is unexpectedly encouraging. I believe we ought to reciprocate by receiving his emissary.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (2/14)

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By dm/jw, NARA, Date 8-2-05~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Secretary Rusk, to save you, has suggested only that you receive General Sabri. It would spread the advantage we gain to receive all five of the generals because the corps commanders in Iraq are often the keys to political stability. I recommend you receive the entire delegation.

W. W. Rostow

I'll see General Sabri _____

I'll see all five together
if Secretary Rusk would like _____

Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

frag

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 25, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Ambassador Strong in Iraq asks for authorization to transmit orally to President Aref the attached personal message.

Affairs in Iraq have been unsteady for some time, but Aref is a moderate energetically pacifying historic antagonisms. He is being opposed by Communist broadcasts from Eastern Europe, left-leaning elements in the administration and also by pro-Cairo nationalist zealots who tried a coup d'etat last summer.

Despite these challenges, Aref has shown a steady hand and real courage in (a) seeking peace with the Kurds and in (b) persisting in efforts to broaden his base of support among Iraq's diverse populace.

A message from you would be a sound encouragement, demonstrating that you are watching and approving of his efforts to promote moderation and consensus.

I recommend you approve Ambassador Strong's request.

HW:lw

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cbm/ly, NARA, Date 2-25-70

Iraq
20
/

November 19, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BKS:

Ambassador Strong will shortly call on President Aref in his new capacity as dean of the diplomatic corps in Baghdad. He's recommended he be authorized to convey a general message from the President. The attached simply asks for suggestions and reports Ambassador Hani's call on the President at the hospital.

Recommend we clear.

HHS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Att: Memo, Read to Rostow, enc. tel to Baghdad
(WH-4082)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/s*, NARA, Date *2-25-10*

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EO 13526
3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
21

*Iraqi
+
UAR*

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

July 7, 1966

[redacted] following the 30 June attempted pro-Nasser 3.3(b)(1)
coup in Iraq. Iranian Foreign Minister Aram felt that the government of Iran
should use supposed UAR involvement in the coup to demonstrate to the Iraqi
government where its true enemies lie.

Iran has long indicated its concern over UAR influence in Iraq, and
has claimed that no improvement in Iranian-Iraqi relations was possible until
such influence had been eliminated. Nothing may come of this Iranian demarche
because the Iraqis can reply that the UAR took no overt part in the attempted
coup. However, the incident demonstrates the interplay between Iranians' and
Egyptians' influences in Iraq.

Harold H. Saunders

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SANITIZED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

By UUS NLJ /RAC 15-140
NARA, Date 10-14-2015

~~SECRET~~

May 27, 1966

Saunders

Iraq ²²

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Visit of Prime Minister Bazzaz of Iraq

You will recall the special business reason why Bob Anderson urged us to invite Prime Minister Bazzaz of Iraq for a visit.

Ambassador Strong has already suggested that Bazzaz should be invited and NE is studying the matter. They are reluctant to press his case because there are so many others from that area who want to come; but a certain forthcomingness on our part may pull his non-alignment more in our direction. Last year while at the General Assembly, he popped down and saw the Vice President in a rather helter-skelter visit. State would like to do better next time if they can.

Recommendation: The business part of his visit might just as well be discussed by you, to spare the President. We could then summarize the matter in a private memo to LBJ without directly involving him.

We should discourage his coming to Washington during the General Assembly, and State will do that, I am sure.

If State asks for a visit at some other time, we should consider it favorably if the President's schedule can stand it and if State's political argumentation is plausible at that time.

Howard Wriggins

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13362, Sec. 3.4
By clm/h NARA, Date 2-25-10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 14, 1966

WWR:

Iraqi President Aref and a couple of his Ministers were killed in a plane crash last night. The funeral will be Saturday. State is asking White House approval to send Hare as the President's personal representative and a condolence message. I'm attaching a wire to the Ranch if you want to clear these.

As far as we know, there was no foul play. Nevertheless this will provoke a new round of jockeying for power in an already unstable situation. There is nothing we can do about the basic balance. Since Hare is going out for next week's CENTO meeting anyway, it makes sense to capitalize on his trip. I don't feel as strongly as State does that we absolutely have to send someone. They feel our absence would set us back and that the Soviets will make a splash. I am not so sure we have all that much to lose (CIA shares this view) but since Hare will be in the area, it's an inexpensive and appropriate gesture.

The net outcome of Aref's death could be positive, though no one should expect great improvement in our position there. Prime Minister Bazzaz, one of the candidates to succeed, has tried since he took over last fall to bring Iraq closer to a midpoint between us and the Soviet Union but the situation is inherently unstable and none too compatible.

HHS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By *Cbm/ly*, NARA, Date *2-25-10*

230

April 14, 1966

FOR PRESIDENT FROM ROSTOW

Iraqi President killed in plane crash. Funeral Saturday.

Request your approval:

1. Designate Ambassador Hare your personal representative at funeral. He already slated go to Ankara for CENTO meeting next week anyway. Must leave this afternoon.

2. Send following condolence message:

To Baghdad:

Please pass following message from President to

Acting President Bazzaz:

"On behalf of the Government of the United States and of the American people I wish to convey my sincerest condolences on the death of President Abd al-Salam Muhammad Arif, Minister of Interior Abd al Latif al-Daraji, and Minister of Industry Mustafa Abdulla. I am certain that their leadership and dedication to the service of their country will long be remembered."

We do not intend release this text but have no objection if GOI wishes do so.

April 12, 1966

Just

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I appreciate very much your kind words of congratulation on my new appointment. I am sorry to be so long in acknowledging them, but a combination of winding up my old duties and embarking on my new ones before departure for Vietnam left little time for many equally important obligations. I assure you that, even though I am moving into a new area, I will continue to watch with interest the affairs of the Middle East.

Yours sincerely,

/s/

R. W. Komer
Special Assistant
to the President

His Excellency Nasir Hani
Ambassador of Iraq
Washington, D. C.

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~~Secret~~

EO
13526
3.5(c)

→ JF
Iraq



BOARD OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES

SPECIAL MEMORANDUM

IRAQ: The Stagnant Revolution

~~Secret~~

22 May 1968
No. 11-68

4

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 15-141

NARA, Date 10-05-2015

By UKD

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

22 May 1968

SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 11-68

SUBJECT: Iraq: The Stagnant Revolution*

SUMMARY

Ten years have elapsed since the revolution in Iraq, but the government continues to be ineffective and fumbling. The regime is dominated by the military, and military backing gives it a firm grip on power, but it has no real basis of popular support. Kurdish dissidence still smolders in northern Iraq, since the government is unable to stamp it out and unwilling to settle with it. The emergence of political leadership capable of giving direction to the country is unlikely.

Iraq has traditional interests and claims in the Persian Gulf, and the impending British withdrawal may bring Baghdad to pay more attention to the Gulf region. But it is likely to react to developments there rather than to take initiatives.

* This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National Estimates. It was discussed with representatives of the Office of Current Intelligence, the Office of Economic Research, and the Clandestine Services, who are in general agreement with its judgments.

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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Introduction

1. Ten years have elapsed since the revolution in Iraq ousted the monarchy, destroyed the power of the land-holding class, and drastically reduced ties to the US and the UK. Domestic political, social, and economic affairs have since pre-occupied the country. Indeed, under Qasim Iraq was isolationist. In the five years since his overthrow, however, Iraq's various governments have been involved in broad Arab interests, though Baghdad has not been an exporter of revolution as have Cairo and Damascus. Though its seaborne trade and more than a third of its oil exports pass through the Gulf, Iraq's major foreign policy concerns are with the Arab states west of it and with the Arab-Israeli question. Its relations with Iran focus on Kurdistan and Khuzistan. Except for the now dormant claim to Kuwait, governments in Baghdad have paid relatively little attention to the Persian Gulf. But the impending British withdrawal is likely to stimulate Iraq's interest in that region.

Domestic Affairs

2. The military establishment has dominated Iraqi governments since the 1958 revolution, except for eight months in 1963,

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when the pan-Arab Socialist Baath Party held power. Although the Iraqi officer corps is chiefly drawn from the Sunni Arab element of the population,* the Iraqi military establishment is far from united; factions within it support a variety of political ideologies and parties. The army does not have the capacity to run the government entirely by itself. Moreover, there is a widespread feeling in Iraq that civilians should have a share in governing. In these circumstances, the army must pay some heed to public opinion; it has worked out arrangements whereby various political elements have some share in government.

3. Formal political organizations in Iraq are few; the sole legal party is the government-sponsored Iraqi Arab Socialist Union. The pre-revolutionary political parties have disappeared, and most individuals prominent in the public life of that period are no longer active. The bulk of Iraqi politicians are split roughly into a group of doctrinaire radicals and a somewhat larger group of men of a moderate and pragmatic outlook. The Baath Party still

* Of Iraq's eight million people, half are Shia Arabs living in the area south of Baghdad. Sunni Arabs and Kurds each account for about a fifth of the population, with several other minority groups comprising the rest.

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functions, but is divided, and neither its radical pro-Syrian faction nor its more conventional members enjoy much support.

4. Communist influence in Iraq is limited. The Iraqi Communist Party has recovered somewhat from the injuries which the Baath regime inflicted on it. It is split into three factions by leadership quarrels and by pro-Moscow and pro-Peking attitudes. While the Communists could emerge as a significant force in a chaotic situation, they are unlikely to be more than a nuisance at least as long as the present type of government prevails. The Soviets themselves, despite the substantial military and economic aid they have provided to Iraq, appear to have little influence on the Iraqi regime's policy decisions.

5. The Iraqi political radicals, typified by National Oil Company head Jadir and Prime Minister Yahya, want to emulate the Egyptian approach to domestic affairs. They have concentrated on imposing controls on the economy and are eager to get Iraqi control of oil production. They also seek a highly centralized political system, with all political activity limited to regime sponsored and directed organizations. The moderates, whose impeccable credentials as nationalists and Iraqi patriots protect them against charges of foreign influence or self-interest, want

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a freer economy and a measure of choice in political matters. They also feel that heavy involvement in intra-Arab affairs operates against Iraq's best interests. They do not admire Nasser, but they are careful to keep on good terms with him, for they believe that an Iraqi regime strongly opposed to Nasser cannot long survive.

6. The present Iraqi government is, in theory, a transitional one and is committed to write a new constitution and hold free elections. In fact, such developments are probably many years away. It is headed by President Abd al-Rahman Arif, who was chosen as the least controversial man available to succeed his dead brother, Abd al-Salam, in 1966. The President has shown some sympathy for the moderate point of view but he is not a strong figure. Of the various individuals who have been Prime Minister, the most important are probably General Tahir Yahya and Abd al-Rahman Bazzaz. Yahya, the present incumbent, has generally been the leading spokesman for the extremists, Bazzaz for the moderates. The extremists have dominated the Iraqi regime since the overthrow of the Baath in 1963, except for the year from mid-1965 to mid-1966 when Bazzaz was Prime Minister. The balance of forces is such that

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no group feels powerful enough to take decisive steps; the result is a situation in which many important political and economic matters are simply ignored.

7. The civilian extremists are allied with like-minded fellows in the senior levels of the military establishment and are willing to let the army have its way in acquiring military equipment and in taking a strong line with the Kurds. This military-civilian combination has proved strong enough to ensure that Iraq does not take positions in inter-Arab affairs seriously at variance with those of Egypt. Domestically, the extremists face opposition. The moderate faction's opposition has deterred them, for example, from trying to re-institute the cumbersome centralized banking, industrial, and commercial organization which they constructed in 1964 and which the moderate government of Bazzaz dismantled during its year in office. Nor have the extremists lately tried very hard to put life into the Iraqi Arab Socialist Union. Bazzaz and other moderate politicians are publicly urging a return to a more representative form of government, which by implication would be a non-military one. Student demonstrations centering on Baghdad University during February appear to have supported the moderates, although our information on this is imprecise.

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8. These conditions of unstable equilibrium seem likely to prevail for some time. The radical civilian-military combination will probably continue successfully to resist pressures for more representative government; Arab-Israeli tensions provide them with a handy excuse for maintaining a "patriotic, united" government. The factional tug of war will probably result in cabinet changes from time to time. There is a possibility of an effort to change the present government by violence. Some part of the army would of necessity be involved in such an attempt -- perhaps a group allied with a pan-Arab organization, e.g., the Baath or the Arab Nationalists Movement, perhaps by some officer who sees himself as the country's savior. Any coup group would face the same problems of governance that the present regime does and would probably be no more successful in overcoming them. While such a government might be more radical than the present one, deterioration of political affairs to a Syria-like situation is improbable.

9. Over a period of years -- probably a decade or more -- there is a fair chance that moderate political forces will reassert themselves in Iraq. The demise of Nasser would deprive the radical cause of much of its appeal; the moderates would be

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much less concerned about Cairo's political influence in Baghdad. The existing Iraqi sentiment for government in some measure responsive and responsible to the public is likely to grow, especially among the professional, business and intellectual classes which are politically important. At best, however, the growth of moderate political forces will be slow and subject to setbacks. It could be especially harmed should there be a series of efforts at governmental change by coup.

10. The Kurdish Problem. The Kurdish trouble is now in its eighth year. Several years of fighting between Kurdish tribesmen, led by Mustafa Barzani, and government forces have left effective control of northern Iraq, except for principal towns and main roads, in the hands of the Kurds. They continue to receive aid from Iran and from Israel. The bulk of the Iraqi army is in the North watching the Kurds, but it remains unable to subdue them in the event of new fighting. Despite this incapacity, sentiment in the army strongly opposes concessions and favors imposing a harsh settlement on the Kurds. Nonetheless, a large amount of commerce moves between government controlled and Kurdish controlled areas.

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11. There have been only sporadic shooting incidents since the Bazzaz government effected a cease-fire in 1966 and agreed to assist in rehabilitating the North and to allow the Kurds a measure of local government. The government in Baghdad is supporting a faction of Kurds opposed to Barzani's leadership, in order to weaken the chief Kurdish leader, both in the event of new fighting and to limit his capacity to press the government to carry out the provisions of the 1966 agreement. The government is unlikely to concede to the Kurds legal control of the North. Neither it nor Barzani wants new hostilities, and continued stalemate is the most likely course. But there are possibilities for miscalculation. Should serious fighting break out, however, Baghdad would probably feel compelled to withdraw most of the troops it has stationed in Jordan.

Oil and the Economy

12. 1967 was a bad year for oil revenues, which are the principal source of Iraq's government income. In January and February, Syria closed the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) pipeline to the Mediterranean; at the time of the Arab-Israeli war in June, Iraq itself suspended oil shipments to the US, UK, and West Germany. As a result, Iraq's oil revenue dropped from

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nearly \$400 million in 1966 to about \$360 million in 1967.* Future revenue from IPC is unlikely to be much above \$450 million annually. Even so, these revenues are sufficient to finance the Iraqi government's operations; overall economic performance is likely to reflect the stagnation in the political arena, though serious economic difficulties are not likely.

13. Since 1961, when the Iraqi government seized the non-producing portions of IPC's concession area (99.6 percent of the total), IPC has spent virtually no money on capital improvements. IPC raised production by 300,000 barrels a day in 1963 shortly after Qasim was overthrown; production increases since have been small, since the fields are producing close to capacity. Baghdad worked out a draft agreement with IPC in 1965, but did not ratify it because of extremist opposition to dealing with "imperialist" oil concerns. Although the IPC terms and offers from French and other Western firms were lucrative, nationalist pride led Iraq in April 1968 to announce that the Iraqi National Oil Company would produce

* The latter figure includes an advance of \$22 million from IPC in 1967, which must be repaid in 1968 and 1969.

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and market the oil from the most prolific area seized from IPC, North Rumalia. Iraq may be able to have 100,000 barrels a day for sale by 1971, but potential buyers are likely to offer bilateral trade agreements rather than the hard currency Iraq wants.

Foreign Relations

14. Iraq takes a generally neutralist stand in its foreign policy, and is associated with Egypt on many area issues. It rushed troops to aid Jordan in June 1967. These forces remain and are active in supporting fedayeen operations against Israel. Much of this support is probably due to the initiative of local commanders; the Iraqi government is verbally bellicose on Israel, but it is fairly well disposed toward Jordan and its policy, in matters dealing with Israel, is a prudent one of following the Egyptian lead.

15. Iraq's relations with Iran are correct, but flawed by mutual suspicion. The Shah aids Barzani's Kurdish dissidents in Iraq because he believes that such help keeps Iraq weak and thus less able to help his enemy, Nasser. The Shah is also concerned that Iraq might seek to stir up trouble among the

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Arabs of Khuzistan, where the southern part of the Iraq-Iran border divides Arab tribes. In fact, Iraqi meddling in this district has been on a very minor scale, and it is unlikely that Baghdad would see much advantage in stirring up trouble here.

16. Foremost of Iraq's interests in the Persian Gulf is its claim to Kuwait. This was first put forth in the 1930s, surfaced briefly during the short Iraqi-Jordanian union in 1958, and dramatically asserted by Qasim in 1961. It presently is dormant, but most Iraqis believe that Kuwait belongs to Iraq. The claim rests on a temporary submission of the Shaikhs of Kuwait in the last century to the Ottoman Pasha of Basra. Kuwait has bought diplomatic recognition from Iraq by generous loans which it does not expect to be repaid. The countries are now surveying the border between them; actual demarcation would add to Kuwait's feeling of legitimacy. Iraq would probably seize Kuwait if it thought it could do so with impunity. But as long as other area states, e.g., Saudi Arabia, Iran, and even Egypt remain opposed to such action, the Iraqis are not likely to undertake it. This is the more true as long as a substantial

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part of the Iraqi army is occupied in Jordan and most of the rest faces the Kurds in northern Iraq.

17. With the impending departure of the British from the Persian Gulf, the Iraqis will probably feel compelled to demonstrate that they have a legitimate role there. In the field of clandestine and subversive activities, Iraq has given some support in the past to the Omani and Dhofari rebel movements in the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. It has also assisted nationalist anti-regime elements in Bahrain. These activities have not involved large numbers of people, nor have they been pursued with much vigor. The British were for a time concerned that Iraq might seek to promote its claims to Kuwait by subversive means, but there is no evidence that Iraq has attempted seriously to carry out such action.

18. Over the next several years, Iraq's internal pre-occupations -- Kurds, oil, and the domestic power struggle -- will absorb a great deal of its energies. Iraq will probably continue to provide some assistance to anti-regime movements in the smaller Gulf states, mostly on its own initiative, but

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occasionally in collaboration with the Egyptians. If such movements gather momentum, particularly as the time of British withdrawal draws nearer, Iraq would be likely to increase such assistance. The level of such assistance would depend on such factors as accessibility of the movement and its political coloration. (The present Baghdad government would not give much help to a Baathist group, for example.) In general, we do not believe that the Iraqis will initiate much anti-regime activity in the Gulf over the next few years, but that they would respond to calls for aid, probably by providing significant amounts of arms and training.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:


Chairman

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Seag 26/

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*See John Foster memo
for Record - 3/12/68
and HHS memo for
Mr. Goldstein 3/13/68*

March 11, 1968

To Hal Saunders:

Hal, Walt has the originals. Please
call me so that we can get you together
with Qazzaz.



Ernest Goldstein

Attachment

26a

GENERAL MUSTAFA BARZANI
COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE KURDISH
REVOLUTIONARY ARMY AND PRESIDENT OF
THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF IRAQI-KURDISTAN

President Linden B. Johnson
The White House
Washington D. C.

January 15, 1968

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I would like to inform your Excellency that in spite of the fact that a year and a half has passed since the June 29, 1966 plan was issued, the Iraqi Government has failed in implementing the provisions of the plan and the Kurdish question has remained unsolved. Furthermore and in the face of the Government's recent provocations, we have had to withdraw our representatives from Baghdad knowing full well that our attempts during the last year and a half for arriving at a peaceful solution have gone in vain. These fears and misgivings have been confirmed by the Iraqi Government's recent acquisition of arms from both the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

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Sincerely yours


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Shafiq Qazzaz
February 1968

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1420 Hampshire West Court
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GÉNÉRAL MUSTAFA BARZANI
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REVOLUTIONARY ARMY AND PRESIDENT OF
THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF IRAQI-KURDISTAN

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*Returned to
file with
HHS memo
1/30/68.*

January 15, 1968

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*Mr. Barzani
to RSC
1/15/68*

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February 1968

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1420 Hampshire West Court
Apartment 10
Silver Spring, Md. 20903

Home 434-7039
Work 526-3031

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 11, 1968

To Hal Saunders:

Hal, Walt has the originals. Please
call me so that we can get you together
with Qazzaz.



Ernest Goldstein

Attachment

GÉNÉRAL MUSTAFA BARZANĪ
COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE KURDISH
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
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

RECEIVED
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BOWDLER
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KEENE
LEONHART
ROCHE
TAYLOR

RSB-7, January 15, 1968

ADVANCE COPY

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes
Subject: The Soviet Oil Agreement With Iraq

The recent Soviet agreement in principle to assist the Iraqi Government in the development of its oil resources has given rise to speculation about the motives of the Soviet move and its possible implications for Western oil interests. This memorandum examines the provisions of the Soviet-Iraqi exchange of "letters of intent" and their significance in the light of past Soviet oil policy, its domestic supply situation, and probable Iraqi motivations for requesting Soviet assistance at this time.

ABSTRACT

On December 24 Soviet foreign aid chief Skachkov and the head of Iraq's National Oil Company (INOC) signed an exchange of letters on Soviet assistance for the development of Iraq's oil resources. According to this "initial agreement," the USSR, in response to a request by Iraq, stands ready to supply equipment and technical assistance for prospecting and drilling of exploratory and production wells, as well as to help market Iraqi crude, with Soviet expenses to be repaid by oil shipments from Iraq. The exchange of letters gives no clue to the scope and terms of Soviet assistance, and other details such as the location of Soviet-aided projects also remain to be specified in subsequent negotiations and implementing agreements.

Soviet agreement in principle to furnish assistance to INOC represents the latest in a series of Soviet moves to promote the development of

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By 10m/s, NARA, Date 2-25-10

GROUP 5
Downgraded 20 years
Interviewed
automatically declassified

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- ii -

indigenous oil industries in developing countries which has become one of the key elements in USSR aid policy. The USSR has long been interested in strengthening the viability of fledgling national oil companies in LDC's, partly as a means to undermine the dominant position of Western, and particularly US and UK, oil interests. The anti-Western feeling generated by the Arab-Israeli conflict makes this a propitious time for Moscow to strengthen its foothold in the oil sectors of the Arab countries.

Possible Soviet entry into the marketing phase, if that aspect of the agreement is implemented, would be a significant new extension of Soviet activity in LDC petroleum industries. Soviet interest in accepting oil from developing countries in repayment for credits, while not entirely unprecedented, represents a relatively novel feature of such assistance. Although the USSR, one of the world's major oil producers, has been and will remain a net exporter of oil in the foreseeable future, imports of crude oil on a barter basis would be an economically sound proposition. Such oil could either be re-exported to the West for hard currency or to Eastern Europe at inflated prices, or release an equivalent amount of Soviet petroleum for export purposes.

It is not yet clear whether the Iraqis' principal purpose in requesting Soviet aid is to enable them to develop at least part

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- iii -

of their oil resources independently of Western help, or whether this move was designed primarily to elicit better offers from Western oil companies. The latter have been interested in exploitation arrangements in some of the areas for which Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) and its affiliates formerly held concessions--most of them withdrawn in 1961.

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On December 24 Radio Baghdad announced the conclusion of what it described as an "initial agreement" between the USSR and Iraq on Soviet assistance to be extended for the development of Iraq's oil resources. The agreement was signed in Baghdad by Semyon A. Skachkov, Chairman of the Soviet State Committee on Foreign Economic Relations and Adib al Jadir, Chairman of Iraq's National Oil Company (INOC). **Prior to the Soviet foreign aid chief's arrival, a** delegation of 16 Soviet petroleum experts had been touring various oil fields and installations in Iraq since November 27.

At the signing ceremony Al Jadir linked the proposed Iraqi-Soviet oil cooperation with the USSR's political support of the Arab countries during the Arab-Israeli conflict last June. He also asserted that there "remained a vast scope" for cooperation with other companies and states. Skachkov in his remarks stressed that Soviet assistance was being offered in response to Iraq's request and **emphasized that the** preliminary nature of the present exchange of memoranda, **would** require more specific agreements for implementation.

What the Agreement Provides

According to the information released by Baghdad, the "agreement" consists of an exchange of letters which state that the USSR has agreed to assist the Iraqi Government "in directly developing its own oil industry" through drilling production wells and providing the necessary machinery and equipment for this purpose in the southern regions of Iraq; providing transport facilities; marketing oil; conducting geological surveys in Iraq's northern regions and locating sites for oil wells to be drilled in areas with proven deposits in southern Iraq. Soviet expenses for technical assistance, equipment supplied, experimental and productive well drilling, and all other operations connected with development of Iraq's oil resources are to be repaid **with oil shipments from Iraq. The scale,** bases, and terms of Soviet assistance, as well as of the Iraqi oil shipments, are to be specified in subsequent talks between the representatives of the two countries.

Soviet Participation in North Rumaila?

Of the many questions left open by the information disclosed on the Iraqi-Soviet oil agreement, the one that has attracted the greatest

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- 2 -

attention is the possibility of a Soviet role in the exploitation of Iraqi oil fields which would include the proven North Rumaila reserves in southern Iraq. The Soviet oil experts visited this **area as** well as three other fields prior to the conclusion of the agreement. Questioned on this point, following publication of the exchange of letters with the USSR, INOC Chairman Al Jadir stated only that "the areas covered by the agreement were not specified in the memoranda," but would be stipulated in subsequent agreements which could include such a possibility. As noted above, the agreement mentions only Soviet aid in "locating sites for oil wells to be drilled in areas with proved oil deposits in southern Iraq."

The North Rumaila field is claimed by the IPC (Iraq Petroleum Company),¹ which once held concessions over almost all of Iraq--most of them withdrawn in 1961. The best prospect apart from fields actually being worked, North Rumaila was to have been returned to the IPC under a draft 1965 agreement which was never ratified by the Iraqi Government, and IPC is still negotiating with the Iraqis for an exploitation agreement. Other Western companies, including Italy's ENI (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi), the French CFP (Compagnie Francaise Petroliere) (an IPC partner) and ERAP (Entreprise de Recherches et d'Activites Petrolieres) have recently held discussions with the Iraqis about exploitation contracts, but only ERAP has succeeded in securing such a contract, which does not, however, cover the North Rumaila field. Regarding the latter arrangement, the INOC chairman stated that ERAP will be working areas as a contractor for INOC, whereas **under the agreement with the USSR INOC would directly explore and exploit oil resources with Soviet help.** It is not yet clear whether this is INOC's principal purpose in seeking Soviet aid, or **whether the move is aimed primarily at putting pressure on IPC and spurring better offers from other interested Western companies.**

Soviet Marketing of Iraqi Oil

Another aspect of the Soviet-Iraqi exchange of letters which has given rise to speculation is the reference to Soviet assistance in marketing Iraqi oil. Although this might merely involve the oil which the USSR would receive in payment for its technical services and supplies under the agreement, it could also imply Soviet willingness to act as a middleman in selling crude to be produced by INOC.

1. Actually by the Basra Petroleum Company, an affiliate of IPC owned by the same shareholders.

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- 3 -

During the Soviet-Iranian negotiations in early 1967, there were hints that the USSR was interested in such an intermediary role in oil sales to Eastern Europe. As far as Iraqi oil is concerned, its location near the Persian Gulf would be favorable for shipments to Far Eastern countries. Such shipments could supplement Soviet crude exports which originate largely from the Black Sea.

There have also been indications that the USSR is interested in improving its marketing facilities in Western Europe. Recently, the Soviet oil export organization Soyuzneft established a company, Nafta s.a., in Antwerp to import and distribute Soviet refined products throughout Belgium in association with two Belgian firms. Belgian oil industry sources do not rule out the possibility that the new firm, which is to start activities early this year, may plan to acquire refining facilities in the future.

Assistance for Indigenous Petroleum Development--A Key Element of Soviet Aid Policy

The agreement in principle to provide assistance to INOC represents the latest in a series of Soviet moves to strengthen the development of indigenous oil industries in developing countries, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, which has become one of the key elements in USSR economic aid policy in this area. On the one hand, such aid is designed to increase Soviet presence in the recipient countries, and it may well yield considerable political dividends since it **concerns** a field central to their nationalist feelings and aspirations to economic independence. **On the other, by increasing** the viability and thus strengthening the hand of the fledgling national oil companies, Moscow promotes its long-range objective of eroding the dominant position of Western, and particularly US and UK, oil interests in this area.

Beyond that, the USSR may well be aiming for a bigger role on the international oil scene. The Soviet offer of April 1967 to assist Iran with its oil development, which seemed to raise the possibility of eventual Soviet involvement in oil exploitation in that country--a prospect which appears remote at this time--pointed in that direction. Soviet entry into the marketing phase of oil, if the initial agreement with Iraq is implemented, could mark a significant new extension of Soviet activity in LDC petroleum industries. Obviously this is a propitious time for the USSR to secure a foothold in the oil sector of Arab countries, and reported Soviet overtures to Kuwait in July are

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- 4 -

at least one indication that Moscow is seeking to capitalize on the anti-Western feeling generated by the Arab-Israeli conflict and to gain entrée **as well to conservative Arab oil-producing states which** previously had been unresponsive to Soviet overtures.

Economic Benefits to the USSR

While the USSR has furnished technical assistance and equipment for oil extracting and refining industries to LDC's on credit for at least ten years, provisions for repayments in crude oil are a recent innovation. The two known instances of such an arrangement prior to the present agreement with Iraq involve Iran and Algeria.

The communique following top-level Soviet-Iranian economic discussions in April 1967 envisaged the possibility of large-scale Soviet assistance to Iran in the fields of general industrial development, communications, power, dam construction, irrigation, mining, and metallurgy, as well as oil exploration in certain areas of Iran. The expenses incurred by the USSR would be paid by Iranian deliveries not only of natural gas but also of crude oil, although details are lacking on the magnitude of such oil exports to the USSR.

A Soviet-Algerian agreement concluded in August 1966, which provided for supplying Soviet drilling and geophysical equipment to the Algerian national oil company Sonatrach on credit, also envisages repayments in crude oil, according to the Soviet foreign trade journal Vneshnyaya Torgovlya of February 1967. There is no further information on the amounts, terms, and timing of such Algerian deliveries.

Since the USSR is one of the world's major producers and a net exporter of oil, the question arises why Moscow should be interested in acquiring crude oil from developing countries. In 1967 the USSR produced about 290 million tons of oil, and the target for 1970 has been set at 345-355 million tons, which should be reached without difficulty. It is expected that **over the next few years the Soviet Union will continue to export between 25 to 30 percent of this output.**

Clearly, the USSR has no foreseeable need to meet its own overall domestic requirements with imports from abroad. Nonetheless, such imports on a barter basis are economically advantageous to the USSR. They could be re-exported to the West for hard currency--petroleum in recent years has been the Soviets' largest single hard currency earner--either directly or they could release an equivalent amount of Soviet oil for export to this favored market.

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- 5 -

Even sales to Eastern European communist countries (except Romania), although they would not yield hard currency, would be advantageous to the USSR. Despite earlier Soviet advice to the East Europeans to find supplementary sources of supply, Moscow for political reasons would undoubtedly prefer keeping them largely dependent on the USSR for this strategic commodity, as long as this does not cut into potential Soviet oil exports for hard currencies.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~ Attachment

3639

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

30

September 22, 1967

FOR: Mr. Walt W. Rostow ←
The White House
FROM: *John P. Walsh*
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Attached herewith is a
copy of a memorandum concerning
Pachachi's conversation with
Robert Anderson.

~~SECRET~~ Attachment

Send copy to Anderson

Iraq

300

~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM

September 21, 1957

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: NEA - Lucius D. Battle

SUBJECT: Ambassador Pachachi's Conversation with
Mr. Robert Anderson

Mr. Robert Anderson called me to report that Ambassador Pachachi of Iraq had called on him today for a full review of the Middle Eastern situation. During the special session of the General Assembly, Mr. Pachachi was the spokesman for a group of moderate Arabs with Mr. Anderson and others.

Mr. Pachachi, basing his comments on a meeting of his group (although UAR and others are not yet in New York), said that there was general concern because the Arabs did not believe they knew the position of the United States. The United States has not been explicit, they felt, in describing that position. There is some concern that this stems from U.S. support of the Israeli desire that nothing happen for a time since the Israelis are convinced that time is on their side. The moderate Arabs hope that our position is not also one of inaction as they consider that there must be an early settlement to the difficulties. If there is not an early settlement, U.S.-Arab relations will suffer considerably.

The moderate Arabs do not consider that their dialogue with the U.S. is adequate. They believe that there should be more contact with Ambassador Goldberg (which I urged during the last Assembly and urged today). Representatives of the group would like to meet with me, and I have agreed to get together with them the early part of next week in New York.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 03-175

By ins, NARA, Date 12-17-03~~SECRET~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

~~SECRET~~

2

Ambassador Pachachi was asked how far the Arabs were prepared to go at this time. He replied that they were willing to accept "almost complete rights of passage" in the waterways. There is no problem on Aqaba, and the Suez Canal could be opened to all but Israeli flagships. When Mr. Anderson expressed doubt that the Israelis would accept such an arrangement, Mr. Pachachi replied that, while he could not speak for Nasser, it was even possible that the Canal could be opened to Israeli flagships if necessary to obtain a settlement.

The Arabs are willing to guarantee all borders, but they must have retreat from occupied territories.

Withdrawal from Sinai could be coupled with a demilitarization arrangement.

They would accept demilitarization of the Syrian Heights under United Nations direction.

They will accept a unified Jerusalem provided there is some kind of administration by the Arabs (presumably the Jordanians) over the old Arab quarter.

Mr. Pachachi remarked that the Russians will "go as far as the Arabs want them to go provided the United States will join." The Eastern Bloc is, according to Pachachi, largely pro-Israel in attitude and the Russians cannot ignore this feeling on the part of satellite countries.

The Arabs are willing to accept a declaration of the end of a state of belligerency in some form.

They cannot accept direct negotiations alone with the Israelis. They will accept, if necessary, negotiations with a third party in the room. They would prefer to have the Arabs in one room, the Israelis in a second room, and a representative of the third country in a room between the two. They admit, however, that there is some precedent for them to sit at the same table provided a third party is present.

COMMENT: The foregoing is the most forthcoming offer yet reported. As I told Mr. Anderson, it is possible that Pachachi will be more open with him than he would be with a Government official. I would suspect that Pachachi's position

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3

with Mr. Anderson will not be fully reflected in an official talk, but I will try to find out during the next few days. If the Arabs are willing to make a deal along the foregoing lines, this is very encouraging.

Copies to:

U - Mr. Katzenbach
M - Mr. Rostow
G - Mr. Kohler
IO - Mr. Sisco
USUN NEW YORK

NEA:LDBattle:lab
9/21/67

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 31, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment for Dr. Adnan Pachachi,
Foreign Minister of Iraq

Recommendation:

I recommend that you receive Dr. Adnan Pachachi, Foreign Minister of Iraq, who arrived in New York on May 29 and plans to remain until June 1. Dr. Pachachi has come to the United States for several days in the hope of seeing you in connection with the Arab-Israel crisis.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Background:

Dr. Pachachi is an extremely able and experienced diplomat who, in several past UN General Assembly sessions, has been designated by the Arab states as their principal spokesman and negotiator in dealing with our delegation on Arab-Israel issues. He has the full confidence of the Iraqi Government, and his mission has cabinet approval. He is moderate and reasonable. He has just been in Cairo and wishes to submit the Arab point of view to you, as well as to make whatever other contribution he can toward reducing the current tension. Your reception of an Arab statesman of this caliber would help balance any Arab reaction to the visit of Foreign Minister Eban of Israel.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

*Others of us will have a full round
with him before you see him*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (12a)
State Dept. Guidelines
By *cm/jc*, NARA, Date *8-2-05*
+ FRUS, Vol. XXI, # 192, p. 2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Battley)

unless
we have
the final
already
filed

Iraq

TO : The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM : NEA - Lucius D. Battle

SUBJECT: The Iraqi Foreign Minister's Meeting with
the President - ACTION MEMORANDUM

The President has agreed to see Foreign Minister Adnan Pachachi of Iraq at 6:30 p.m. on June 1. The attached briefing memorandum has been prepared for the President. In addition to the Iraqi Ambassador, Dr. Nasir Hani, and myself, Mr. Houghton (NEA/ARN) will accompany the Foreign Minister to the White House. (Probably Rodger Davies)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the attached briefing memorandum.

Clearances:

NEA/ARN - Mr. Houghton
NEA - Mr. Davies

Attachment:

Memorandum for the President

NEA/ARN:DLGamon:dmg, Ext. 2700, 5/31/67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec 3.4
By cbm/j, NARA, Date 2-25-10



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

320

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister
Adnan Pachachi, June 1, 6:30 P.M.

You have agreed to receive Dr. Adnan Pachachi, Foreign Minister of Iraq on June 1, at 6:30 p.m. Dr. Pachachi has come to the U.S. to explain the Arab point of view in the current Arab-Israeli political crisis.

Dr. Pachachi has been Foreign Minister of Iraq since April 1966. He had previously been permanent representative of Iraq to the United Nations where he often served as the principal spokesman and negotiator of the Arab bloc in dealing with the United States on Arab-Israeli affairs. Dr. Pachachi received his higher education in the United States, respects American institutions, and has developed good working relationships with U.S. officials. He speaks excellent English. In diplomatic debates he is highly articulate, stubborn but reasonable.

Dr. Pachachi has just been in Cairo and can be expected to give Cairo's views on the current crisis, but with more detachment. Iraq maintains close ties with the UAR and attempts to maintain unity of policy with the latter except when this might contradict vital Iraqi national interests. It is possible that Pachachi might attempt

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Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By sjr/abm MIRA, Date 3-8-06

to act as the UAR's broker in the present crisis. He will undoubtedly adopt the UAR legal position on the status of the Gulf of Aqaba.

Following are points which you and others may wish to make in your discussions with Dr. Pachachi:

1. The United States is seeking to avoid hostilities and to achieve a resolution of the crisis through the United Nations if possible. We fully back the Secretary General's efforts to find ways to re-establish peace in the Middle East. We agree with his assessment that the current crisis is more serious than at any time since 1956.

2. We value our relations with the Arab world and realize the mutual danger we could suffer if a peaceful solution by the international community could not be attained.

3. We have urged all members of the Security Council to support the Secretary-General in his efforts to find a peaceful solution to the problem. We believe that a breathing spell not impairing free passage through the Strait of Tiran is needed for diplomatic activities to take place, and for the Council's more deliberate disposition of the underlying issues. We are in favor of a resolution endorsing the Secretary-General's appeal to all parties concerned to exercise special restraint, to forego belligerence, and to avoid all other actions which could increase tensions.

4. In the pursuance of this effort we have dissuaded the Israelis, for the time being, from taking military actions. We now need a conciliatory approach on the part of the Arabs.

5. Our legal position on the Gulf of Aqaba is based on international law and on Article 16, para. 4, of the Law of the Sea Convention of 1958 and was clearly stated by you on May 23. It is important that all concerned understand the depth and firmness of our commitment to free passage through the Strait of Tiran for the ships of all nations.

CONFIDENTIAL

New Paragraph #6

This principle has nothing to do with Israel and the UAR. The second principle on which our position rests is equally important: We support the territorial integrity and political independence of all the countries of the Middle East. This principle has been affirmed by four American Presidents. It has been invoked to protect the Egyptians against the Israelis in 1956, in the Lebanon crisis of 1958, and in behalf of other Arab governments as well. We wish all the friendly Arab governments thoroughly to understand this fact and recall the occasions when the principle was invoked in their behalf.
(This paragraph was inserted in final memo.)

Old Paragraph #6 becomes #7.

CONFIDENTIAL

8. We believe that effective steps must be taken to reaffirm the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement and revitalize the Armistice machinery (we note that the UAR also called for this in the May 29 Security Council meeting).

Dean Rusk

~~SECRET~~

Arab
Israel
x Iraq ✓
x P.D.
33

Wednesday, May 31, 1967 -- 8:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment With Iraqi Foreign Minister

Attached is Sec. Rusk's recommendation that you see Iraqi Foreign Minister Pachachi. Since he has just been in Cairo and is a responsible man, he could turn out to be one of our better channels to the Arabs.

We shall aim to tie him to the same kind of commitment to secrecy we got from Eban.

Sec. Rusk would see him before you, but Pachachi would probably have to be told before he'd come down from New York that he had an appointment with you.

I believe you should give serious consideration to seeing him. In Arab eyes, we are completely committed to Israel. It would be healthy, if we are to salvage any of our Arab interests from this crisis, if a responsible Arab could carry away an impression of both your resolution and your good will for Arabs who are trying to restore peace.

My recommendation is that he carry away a firm sense of how deeply meant were all aspects of your May 23 speech.

W. W. Rostow

I'll see him _____

See me _____

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *Chm/ly* NARA, Date 2-25-10

WWRostow:rlh

Unless we are told otherwise within 24 hours of ²⁴
time stamped on transmittal memo, it will be
assumed NO REPLY NECESSARY recommendations
are approved and State will be so informed.



7191

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 28, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Message to the President from
President Arif of Iraq

The enclosed message from President Abdul Rahman Arif thanks President Johnson for his congratulations on the occasion of the extension of the term of Arif's office. President Johnson's message was conveyed orally through Ambassador Strong in Baghdad. The Department does not believe that a further reply is necessary.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Message to the President

1460
Iraq
1- Rostow
2- Rostow
HS 34a

Ret'd BRS- 4/29/67

OK HHS

The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honour to request that the Protocol Office at the Department of State convey the following message from President Abdul Rahman Arif to The President of the United States Lyndon Baines Johnson:

Dear Mr. President:

I was deeply touched by your congratulations and would like to take this opportunity to express to you personally my sincere thanks and to wish you the best of health and happiness and the American peoples all success and prosperity.

Abdul Rahman Arif

The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of State the assurances of its highest consideration.

The Department of State

Office of Protocol

Washington D.C.,

April 26, 1967



35

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Info
ACTION: Amembassy BAGHDAD

IMMEDIATE

APR 6 10 37 AM '67

STATE

LINDIS

BAGHDAD 1712

1. During your meeting with President Aref you may convey following message from the President:

Quote I was pleased to learn that the cabinet and defense council have extended your term of office . My sincere congratulations both to you and to the people of Iraq. End quote.

~~XXXX~~ ~~XXXXXX~~ Iraqis
2. We envisage this as a private informal message. If ~~XXXXXX/XXXX~~
~~XXXX~~
wish to release it to press, however, we would not object.

GP-3

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

NEA/ARN/MWiley:jh 4/5/67

Tel. Ext:

3236

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

NEA/ARN - RBHoughton

S/S - Mr. Thompson

White House - Mr. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By *cm/fy* NARA, Date 2-25-10

~~SECRET~~
AmEmbassy BAGHDAD

IMMEDIATE

STATE

LIMDIS

BAGHDAD 1712

During your meeting with President Aref you may convey following message from the President:

Quote I was pleased to learn that the cabinet and defense council have extended your term of office. My sincere congratulations both to you and to the people of Iraq. End quote.

GP 3

END

*Ruth -
Lois received
L B G's approval +
told S/S this
morning - 4/6/67
H.S.*

NEA/ARN/MWiley:jh 4/5/67

3236

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

NEA/ARN - RBHoughton
S/S -
White House

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By *clm/ly*, NARA, Date 2-25-10

*L.B.G.
Per. Brief
4/6/67*

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1967 APR 5 AM 10 54

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 1712

P

CALL ON PRESIDENT AREF

USIA

REF: BAGHDAD 1696

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

CPR

RSR

1. SITUATION HAS CHANGED SINCE I REPORTED THAT NO MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON REQUIRED. BY ACTION OF THE CABINET AND NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL APRIL 3 LIMITATION OF ONE YEAR ORIGINALLY PLACED ON AREF'S TENSURE LAST APRIL HAS BEEN CANCELLED AND HE THUS HOLDS OFFICE INDEFINITELY.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE AUTHORIZATION TO TELL AREF THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON IS PLEASED AT THIS ACTION AND EXTENDS HIS PERSONAL CONGRATULATIONS.

GP-3. STRONG

BT

003470 AM 4 59
1967 APR 0

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13232, Sec. 3.4
By *clm/ly* NARA, Date 2-25-10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD

NSC

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

CPR

STATE GRNC

BT

RSR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 1719

CALL ON PRESIDENT AREF

BAGHDAD 1712.

MY CALL ON AREF SCHEDULED FOR 1130 HOURS
APRIL 6. WOULD APPRECIATE HAVING AUTHORIZA-
TION REQUESTED.

GP-3. STRONG

BT NOTE: PASSED S/S-O, WHITE HOUSE AT 7:35 AM 4/5/67

00385 1967/APR 5 AM 7 31

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *Choddy* NARA, Date 2-25-10

pls. return to
HHSaunders, Rm. 372-a
EOB when signed.

37

~~SECRET~~

April 5, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to Iraqi President Aref

Ambassador Strong will be calling on President Aref tomorrow morning before returning here on consultation and home leave. Since Aref's term as President has just been extended, he would like to deliver personal congratulations from you in the form of the following message:

"I was pleased to learn that the Cabinet and Defense Council have extended your term of office. My sincere congratulations both to you and to the people of Iraq."

I recommend you approve. This would be another in the series of relatively short messages of this kind which you have used to establish a personal relationship with this man who appears to be leading Iraq gradually into a more moderate course. He deeply appreciated your receiving his top generals last December, and this seems an appropriate time for another short message.

We will have to get this out tonight if you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Approve  _____

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (16)
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By cm/jw, NARA, Date 8-2-05

~~SECRET~~

Just make
sure with
Ruth ^(Booth) That
someone has
told Astate

H.

She will do. 5/9/67.

T.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Hal

380

Iraq

W. W. R. says no
need to get LBT on
this because no

February 20, 1967

signature required.

llb.

2/20/67

TNT -
What ever
happened to
this?

Not Sent

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Acknowledgment of a letter from Kurdish
leader Barzani

The attached letter from the Kurdish Insurgent Leader Barzani addressed to you was delivered to the Department of State in late January. It asks you to press the Government of Iraq to give the Kurds a fair break politically and to provide help for destitute Kurds.

In fact, we've been urging the GOI for some time to seek accommodation with the Kurds within the framework of Iraqi sovereignty. There has been a truce since June 1966 but no real settlement yet. And we have been supplying relief supplies to Kurdish refugees and others made destitute by the Kurdish war.

The Kurds are an important minority representing 30% of Iraq's population. There are also Kurds in Iran and Turkey. Ordinarily, you would not be bothered by a communication from a man like Barzani; but his minority is being actively courted by Soviet agents, and State wants to handle a very low-key response this way:

A desk officer in State will verbally acknowledge to a friend of Barzani who is in Washington that Barzani's letter has been received and passed to the White House. Barzani's friend will be reminded that our humanitarian interest in the Kurds is evidenced by the continuing flow of food to destitute Kurds.

Such an acknowledgement would be consistent with the way we've handled previous messages from Barzani.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

See me _____

⁸⁵
AIRGRAM

POL 15-1 US/JOHNSON

39

RM/R REP AF ARA

Original to be Filed in _____ Decentralized Files.

FILE DESIGNATION

EUR FE NEA CU

UNCLASSIFIED

A-47.

INR E P IO

HANDLING INDICATOR

NO.

L FBO AID ^{5/3}
₅

TO : Amembassy, BAGHDAD

Iraq

FEB 2 1 40 PM '67

AGR COM FRB INT

FROM : Department of State

DATE:

LAB TAR TR XMB

SUBJECT : Letter from President Johnson for President Arif

AIR ARMY NAVY OSD

REF :

USIA NSA CIA ^{NSC}
₆

SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION

The enclosed letter has been received from the White House for transmission. It is an expression of appreciation from President Johnson for the gifts and message which were delivered in President Arif's behalf by the Iraqi military delegation on January 25. It is requested that the letter be delivered in such manner as may be considered most appropriate.

POST ROUTING

RUSK

TO: Action Info. Initials

AMB/ PO

DCM

POL

ECON

CONS

ADM

AID

USIS

FILE

Action Taken:

Enclosure:
From the President,
January 30, 1967.

Date:

UNCLASSIFIED

For Department Use Only

Initials:

FORM 10-64 DS-323

☐ In ☒ Out

Drafted by:

Drafting Date:
2-1-67

Phone No.:
5576

Contents and Classification Approved by:
S/CPR:James W. Symington

Clearances:

NEA/ARN-- LLKinsolving *llc*

COPYFLO-PBR

1967 FEB 2 PM 2 37

RBG to Pres. Arif 2/2/67

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

45
Action
NEA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Info

024348

SS
GPM
P
USIA
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INR
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NSA
DOD
CPR

EIC630VV QTA435V BGA784
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FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 1338

1967 JAN 28 AM 6 09

File with memo on Iraqi general

RSR

SUBJECT: IRAQI MILITARY DELEGATION CALL ON PRESIDENT JOHNSON.

REF: STATE 125694

AM GRATEFUL TO PRESIDENT FOR RECEIVING DELEGATION AND TO OTHERS INVOLVED FOR VARIOUS ARRANGEMENTS. BELIEVE TONE AND INTENSITY OF PUBLICITY JUST ABOUT RIGHT AND EFFECT HERE SATISFACTORY. SHOULD BE ENCOURAGING TO MODERATES, PARTICULARLY WHEN DELEGATION RETURNS AND SPREADS WORD THROUGH PERSONAL CONTACTS.

GP-3. STRONG
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13282, Sec. 3.4
By cbm/s, I&ARA, Date 2-25-10

Iraq

Pls. return to HHSaunders
Rm. 372-a EOB when signed.

41
/

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 24, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Iraqi Generals--25 January

This need only be a brief ceremonial meeting. Its main purpose is to receive warmly a friendly gesture by Iraqi President Aref.

General Sabri, who heads the Iraqi delegation, will present you with a gift (a carpet, we believe) and convey an oral message from President Aref.

In return, Secretary Rusk suggests you present a silver cigarette box for President Aref and ask General Sabri to convey your own good wishes and your desire to build an ever closer relationship between our two governments. (You need not be more specific. But our real purpose is to encourage the Iraqi moderates whom Aref heads to become a stabilizing influence in a tense area.)

Ambassador Hani will accompany the generals. You will recall your chat with him when he paid his respects at the hospital last fall.

RS/Walt
W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13252, Sec. 3.4
By *clm/ly* NARA, Date *2-25-10*



1347

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 24, 1967

267
1-Wriggins
2-Rit.
Cy Moose 42

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Returned to
PWS - 1/25/67
with KHS memo

SUBJECT: Call on the President by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the
Iraqi Army

As outlined in the Secretary's memorandum of January 22 to the President, General Hassan Sabri, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Army, is bearing not only a gift but also a personal message from President Aref of Iraq for the President. A biographic brief of General Sabri is attached.

We do not know the contents of the oral message but we assume that it consists basically of a renewed expression of friendship and good will.

We recommend that the President reply that he wishes to reassure President Aref of the friendship and good will of the American Government and people for the Iraqi Government and people, and that he wishes Iraq well in its continued economic development and its progress towards political stability.

John H. Read
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Biographic Brief of General Sabri

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *Chm/ly*, NARA, Date 2-25-10



420

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

IRAQ

Major General Hassan SABRI Muhammad Ali
January 1967

(U) NAME: Major General Hassan SABRI
Muhammad Ali, Army.

(U) POSITION: Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations since May 1966.

(C) SIGNIFICANCE: One of more competent Iraqi
senior officers. Considered to have excellent
potential for advancement.

(C) POLITICS:

(C) International: Friendly toward U.S.
Scheduled for U.S. orientation tour, Jan 1967.

(U) Internal: Not considered politically
ambitious.



(U)

(1957)

(U) PERSONAL DATA:

(U) BIRTH: 16 Jun 1920, Baghdad, Iraq.

(U) Family: Wife, Fatme Nevin Abdul, speaks English. Two sons
(1957 information): Felah, born 1950; Faisal, 1954.

(U) Description: Height 5'9", weight 163 pounds; dark hair and eyes.
Somewhat reticent but personable and approachable.

(U) Languages: Native Arabic, Fluent English and Turkish, some
German.

(U) Religion: Islam.

(U) CAREER:

1938	- Royal Military College, Iraq.
1941	- School of Engineers.
1942	- Small Arms School.
1943	- School of Minor Tactics.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 15-97

By 448

NARA, Date 07-22-2015

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP-3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.

Encl 11 (S-2128/AP-51)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IRAQ
Major General Hassan SABRI Muhammad Ali
January 1967

1947	- Iraqi Staff College.
1948	- Military History Instructor, Royal Military College.
1950	- Staff Officer, Directorate of Operations.
1951	- CO Engineer Training Depot.
1952	- Staff Captain, Inf Bde Hq.
1953	- Bde Major, Mechanized Force.
1954	- Staff Officer for Training, Royal Military College.
1956	- U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, Regular Course.
1959	- First General Staff Officer, 4th Div.
1962	- Director of Military Training.
1963	- Accountant General assigned to Field Force Hq.
1966	- <u>Dep Comdr</u> , Field Force Hq.
1966-Present	- Dep Chief of Staff for Operations, May. U.S. orientation tour, Jan 1967.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pls. return to HHSaunders,
Rm. 372-a EOB when signed.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Gift and Message from Iraq's President

Attached is a special recommendation from Secretary Rusk that you briefly receive the Deputy Chief of the Iraqi Army on January 23, 24 or 25 just long enough for a few words and an exchange of gifts.

This is a rather unusual request but one that warrants serious consideration. General Sabri is here at the Pentagon's invitation for an orientation tour with four other senior officers who have considerable political power in Iraq. But President Aref at the last minute took advantage of his trip to have him bring you a personal gift (a carpet) and message.

I wouldn't normally recommend you spend your time this way--nor would Secretary Rusk. However, we both feel strongly this is an opportunity we shouldn't miss.

Iraq is at a crossroads. If its moderates--headed by Aref--can win out, Iraq could break out of Nasser's sphere and become stabilizing influence. In the short run, this is important to our oil companies which are trying to work their way out of the box Syria has them in. A more radical government in Iraq might threaten to nationalize them. In the longer run, our objective in the Middle East is to encourage governments like Aref's to stand on their own--and not to get sucked into the more radical Arab nationalist movements that cause us (and Israel) so much trouble.

We have considered inviting Aref here for a visit but so far have judged that would do him more harm than good in his own sensitive political situation. However, by this gesture he is reaching out to strengthen his relationship with you. This is unexpectedly encouraging. I believe we ought to reciprocate by receiving his emissary.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13262, Sec. 3.4
By *Chm/s* NARA, Date *2-25-10*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Secretary Rusk, to save you, has suggested only that you receive General Sabri. It would spread the advantage we gain to receive all five of the generals because the corps commanders in Iraq are often the keys to political stability. I recommend you receive the entire delegation.

W. W. Rostow
W. W. Rostow

I'll see General Sabri _____

I'll see all five together
if Secretary Rusk would like _____

Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

229
Iraqi
x
See WWR memo for
President 1/21/67
44
January 20, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Presentation of Gift from Iraqi President

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that you receive Major General Hassan Sabri, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Army, on January 23, 24, or 25 long enough for him to present a gift sent to you by the President of Iraq, and that you present him with a gift in exchange.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

DISCUSSION:

Major General Hassan Sabri, accompanied by four other senior Iraqi Army officers, is arriving in Washington on January 22 for a Military Aid Program orientation tour in the United States. The delegation, whose members have considerable political power in Iraq, will be carrying both an oral message and a gift for you from President Aref of Iraq. The gift is understood to be a carpet. Our Ambassador in Iraq strongly recommends that you receive the delegation plus the Iraqi Ambassador here for a few minutes in order to exchange gifts.

Ambassador Strong's recommendation is undoubtedly prompted by the fact that Iraq is entering a critical

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *Chm/lf* NARA, Date 2-25-10

decision period. President Aref has been trying to build up an "Iraq-firster" regime which would put Iraq's national interests ahead of the strained attempts to maintain unity of policy with the radical Arab nationalist states such as the UAR and Syria. The Syrian shutting off of the main oil pipeline of the part American owned Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) is contributing to the importance of the decision President Aref will have to make on the composition of his government. The present cabinet has shown itself too weak to make the sort of decisions required of it by the expected drastic decrease of the IPC revenues on which the Iraqi Government depends. A more radical cabinet might attempt to nationalize IPC, a course which would be self-defeating and precipitate a greater economic crisis. In the current juggling in Iraq, Aref heads the forces of moderation which are trying to find a non-disruptive solution to the oil crisis. In the long term, if these moderates can maintain power in Iraq they will make an important contribution to stability in the area.

We therefore believe that in the forthcoming critical period, we should continue to stiffen President Aref's morale, and that any such personal recognition by you of his special emissary would serve this purpose by strengthening the cordial ties already established by past messages exchanged between you and President Aref through diplomatic channels.

General Sabri will be available in the Washington area January 23, 24, and 25. If you can receive him and the Iraqi Ambassador for a few minutes during that period, the Department of State could provide a silver cigarette box bearing the Presidential seal for you to make an exchange present for President Aref.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

87

UNCLASSIFIED
IMMEDIATE

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy BAGHDAD

NEA

Info:

STATE 111240

Dec 31 6 00 PM '66

SS

P

USIA

NSC

CPR

1. Please deliver following message from President to President Araf:
QUOTE: On the occasion of the New Year, I should like to extend my own and my countrymen's best wishes to you and the people of Iraq for 1967. We have watched with admiration your successful efforts during the past year to restore peace in the North. It is our sincere hope that Iraq under your leadership will enjoy continued peace and increasing prosperity in the New Year.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

2. White House does not plan release to press but has no objection if GOI wishes to do so.

~~End control upon receipt~~

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

NEA:ARN:LLKinsolving;es:12/28/66

classification approved by: NEA-Stuart W. Rockwell

Clearances:

NEA/ARN-Mr. Atherton
~~White House~~
NEA-Mr. Handley

S/S - Mr. Shaver
UNCLASSIFIED
~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

208
Pres. Araf
12/31/66

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

05619

46

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Jul 12 2 19 PM '66

BATOR
BOWDLER
BOWMAN
BUDGET
JESSUP
JOHNSON
JORDEN
KEENE
KORNER
KOWERS
TAYLOR
WIGGINS

86

Origin
CPR

ACTION: AmEmbassy, BAGHDAD
STATE 5619

Info:

SS
G
NEA
P
USIA
NSC
SSC

FYI following message will be sent direct via
Arif
commercial channels to President, July 14. "On the
occasion of this celebration of the National Day of
the Republic of Iraq I wish to express the best wishes
of the people of the United States of America and my
own personal greetings, to you and to the people of
Iraq. In the interest of human freedom and world
peace it is our earnest desire that the friendly
relations between our two nations will continue.
LYNDON B. JOHNSON"

Department will release upon confirmation of
receipt unless objection perceived.

RUSK

LBG
To
Pres. Arif
7/12/66

Drafted by: S/CPR:LNichols:pr 7/11/66	Tel. Ext. 2008	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: James W. Symington Chief of Protocol
Clearances: NE - Mr. ~~XXXXX~~ Atherton NEA - Mr. ~~XXXXX~~ Constable		S/S-C - Mrs. Denham S/S - Mr. Shaver
WHITE HOUSE CONCURRENCE NOT NECESSARY		
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE		

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

04617

47

43

Origin

SS
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy BAGHDAD PRIORITY
INFO.: Amembassy PARIS

Dray-Kurd

JUL 9 1 12 PM '66

☐ BATOR
☐ BOWDLER
☐ BOWMAN
☐ BUDNIT
☐ JESSUP
☐ JOHNSON
☐ JORDEN
☐ KEENE
☐ KOMER
☐ MEYERS
☐ TAYLOR
☒ WRIGHT

STATE 4617

LIMDIS

1. President has received following telegram from ~~paris~~ Paris:
2. QUOTE. On the occasion of the hundred ninetieth anniversary of the United States day I congratulate you and the American people in the name of Kurdish people and myself wishing that it will return every year and United States has made more progress for the sake of serving humanity and peace in the world. Faithfully yours,
(Signed) General Barzani, Commander in Chief of the Kurdish Revolution. END QUOTE.
3. Message obviously poses special problem in view current GOI-Kurdish negotiations. We see disadvantages both in ignoring message and in sending reply. One possibility which occurs to us would be to instruct you to pass verbal acknowledgment to Barzani through Embassy Kurdish contacts. Your views requested.

*Gen Barzani
to R. H. H.
7/9/66*

END

GP-3

ACTING

BALL

Drafted by:

ARN:LLKinsolving:lab 7/9/66

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - Raymond A. Hare

Clearances:

NEA/ARN - Mr. Atherton
EUR - Mr. P.T. Baneville

S/S - Mr. Thompson

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *Chm/s* NARA, Date *2-25-70*

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

03091

85

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy BAGHDAD

NEA
Info:

SS

G

P

USIA

NSC

CPR

STATE

3091

1. Following message received by White House July 4, 1966:
QUOTE It pleases me to extend on behalf of the Iraq people their government and in my own name sincere congratulations on the occasion of the anniversary of independence. I wish Your Excellency the best of health and happiness and to the American people prosperity. Major General Abdul Rahman Mohammed Arif President of the Republic of Iraq. UNQUOTE
2. Please deliver following reply to President Arif: QUOTE On behalf of our people and Government, I thank you for your good wishes on the 190th anniversary of the independence of the United States of America. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE.
3. White House does not plan to release above reply but has no objection if GOI wishes to do so.

END

BALL

BALL ACTING

Drafted by:

NEA/ARN:PEBeard:es:7/7

Tel. Ext. 3236

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA/ARN - Alfred L. Atherton

Clearances:

S/S-S - Mr. Alsdorf

NEA - Mr. Constable

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~



C-158

S/S 6921

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 27, 1966


1. Saunders 49
2. Riv.
orig ret'd BKS 4/28
Iraq

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Telegram to the President from
President Arif of Iraq

I refer to Mr. Bromley Smith's route slip of April 26 asking for a recommendation on the telegram to the President from the President of Iraq. Since the Iraqi President's message is a thank-you for President Johnson's message of congratulations, we believe no reply is needed.

OK HHS


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Message from the President of Iraq.

Arif
to LBS
4/26/66

APR 28 1966

49a

1966 APR 26 PM 1 35

WN1 110 VIA RCA

BAGHDAD 1800 APRIL 26 1966

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

I THANK YOUR EXCELLENCY AND THE FRIENDLY AMERICAN PEOPLE
FOR YOUR KIND CONGRATULATIONS ON THE OCCASION OF MY ELECTION
TO THE PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO EXTEND ON BEHALF OF THE IRAQ PEOPLE AND
GOVERNMENT AND THE FAMILY OF THE LATE PRESIDENT AND IN MY NAME
OUR THANKS AND GRATITUDE FOR YOUR KIND FEELINGS WHICH COMFORTED

US IN OUR GREAT MISFORTUNE

I WISH YOUR EXCELLENCY THE BEST OF HEALTH AND TO THE FRIENDLY
AMERICAN PEOPLE EVERY GOOD WISH

MAJOR GENERAL ABDUL RAHMAN MOHAMMED ARIF
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

FORM 805 PRINTED BY THE STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY, U. S. A.

15009
Sent State for info
cc Saif
✓5

C-154

Office of the
Military Secretary
to the President

50

1966 APR 26 PM 1 35

Jraq

WN1 110 VIA RCA

BAGHDAD 1800 APRIL 26 1966

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

I THANK YOUR EXCELLENCY AND THE FRIENDLY AMERICAN PEOPLE
FOR YOUR KIND CONGRATULATIONS ON THE OCCASION OF MY ELECTION
TO THE PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO EXTEND ON BEHALF OF THE IRAQ PEOPLE AND
GOVERNMENT AND THE FAMILY OF THE LATE PRESIDENT AND IN MY NAME
OUR THANKS AND GRATITUDE FOR YOUR KIND FEELINGS WHICH COMFORTED

US IN OUR GREAT MISFORTUNE

I WISH YOUR EXCELLENCY THE BEST OF HEALTH AND TO THE FRIENDLY
AMERICAN PEOPLE EVERY GOOD WISH

MAJOR GENERAL ABDUL RAHMAN MOHAMMED ARIF
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

FORM 805 PRINTED BY THE STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY, U.S.A.

Amf
to LBJ
4/26/66

FORM 805 PRINTED BY THE STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY, U.S.A.

RECEIVED
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1966 APR 26 PM 3 13



OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

09189

47

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy BAGHDAD PRIORITY

NEA

Info:

Please deliver the following message to newly appointed President of

APR 18 11 23 AM '66

SS Iraq:

G

P

USIA

NSC

CPR

QUOTE.

Excellency:

My best wishes to you on the assumption of your heavy and
important responsibilities.

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

On behalf of the American people I extend also wishes for
peace, progress, and happiness of the people of Iraq.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE.

White House does not intend to release but has no objection to GOI
release.

END

Drafted by:

NEA:RFDavies:lab 4/16/66

Clearances:

S/S -Mr. Thompson
S/CPR - Mr. Pace

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: NEA - Rodger F. Davies

White House - Mr. Smith
P - Mr. Franklin

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SMITH
BATOR
COOPER
HAYNES
JESSUP
JOHNSON
KEENE
KOMEI
MOODY
SAUNDERS
THOMSON

RIISK

289
to
Pres of Iraq
4/18/66

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

40

Origin
NEA
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy BAGHDAD PRIORITY

478

07311

52

*Iraq
x Iraq cables*

APR 14 1 07 PM '66

SS
P
NSC
CPR

1. Please pass the following message from the President to Acting

President Bazzaz:

QUOTE: On behalf of the Government of the United States and of the American people I wish to convey my sincerest condolences on the deaths of President Abd al-Salam Muhammad Arif, Minister of Interior Abd al Latif al-Daraji and Minister of Industry Mustafa Abdulla. I am certain that their leadership and dedication to the service of their country will long be remembered. if
Lyndon B. Johnson END QUOTE

2. We do not intend release this text but have no objection/UN GOI wishes do so.

END

RUSK

BUNDY-SMITH
BATOR
BOWDLER
BOWMAN
CHASE
COOPER
JERSUP
JOHNSON
KEENEY
KOMER
MOODY

Exempted from automatic
decontrol

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

NEA:NE:MMWiley:es:4/14/66

classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

NE - Mr. Symmes

s/s - Mr. Walsh

S/CPR - Mr. Armour

White House - Mr. Bromley Smith

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Intelligence
Note -234

April 14, 1966

53

To : The Acting Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - George C. Denney, Jr. *h.c.d.*

Iraq Summary

Subject: Iraqi President's Death Opens Power Struggle

Death an Accident. Iraqi President 'Arif together with the Ministers of Interior and Industry, the provincial governor of Basra, and six staff members were killed in a helicopter crash at 7:10 p.m. local time April 13, shortly after taking off from al-Qurnah, near Basra in southern Iraq. Although 'Arif had become unpopular and several coups had been plotted to overthrow him, foul play is not suspected: the crash apparently was caused by one of the sudden sand storms that are a frequent hazard to flight in the Basra vicinity. The remains were not found until dawn Thursday: the death was announced at 1:30 a.m. Washington time. Funeral services are scheduled for 3:00 p.m. Baghdad time on April 16.

Power Struggle Underneath Constitutional Forms. All government activities and schools are closed down, and the country is under curfew. Following the forms prescribed in the temporary Constitution, Prime Minister Abd al-Rahman Bazzaz has assumed the presidential office in an acting capacity and has announced elections within one week, by the combined Cabinet and National Defense Council, of a new President. Election requires a two-thirds majority of the combined bodies.

GROUP 3
Declassified at 12 year
interval
automatically declassified

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *clm/h*, NARA, Date *2-25-10*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

The National Defense Council, however, consists of "Original" members who are Cabinet Ministers and "Supernumerary" members who "shall be invited" to participate "when necessary and according to the needs of the situation." The "supernumerary" members are the country's ranking military officers including the commanders of the five divisions-- the true arbiters of power in Iraq. It is not clear whether these "supernumerary members" of the Defense Council will take part in the election. Their inclusion might help to prevent a seizure of power before the elections. If the officers do participate, the alignment of Army factions may take place quite openly; if not, a power struggle will take shape behind the scenes.

The Likely Contenders. Among the likeliest contestants are the following:

Prime Minister Bazzaz is operating from the vantage point of the acting presidency, is shrewd and adroit at political maneuver, but has no personal power base. The first civilian Prime Minister since the 1958 revolution, he is not popular with the army and held office through Arif's personal backing. He has some chance of being elected as a compromise candidate in the event of a standoff among other contestants. His tenure, however, would most likely be brief while the major army rivals gathered their forces.

Gen. Abd al-Rahman 'Arif, the late President's brother and Chief of Staff, might make a try for the top spot, but his chances are small. His appointment over the heads of many senior officers owes entirely to personal loyalty to his brother: he is poorly regarded in the Army. If he succeeds to power it will be as a weak figurehead masking a further power contest, or as a front for some stronger personality. 'Arif is presently in Moscow heading an arms purchasing mission. He presumably will return at once.

Gen. Abd al-Aziz 'Uqayli. Defense Minister and by far the strongest individual in the present cabinet, 'Uqayli has gained national stature and

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

respect among the officer corps since his appointment in September 1965. He is tough, able, a good administrator, and occupies a key position from which to consolidate his support. Although long known as an admirer of Nasser and one of a small coterie of nationalist officers, he would set independent policy lines according to Iraqi interests as he perceived them. He might be less flexible than Bazzaz, more obdurate toward the Kurds, and stiffer with Iran. Through his brother, who is Director General of the National Oil Co., 'Uqayli has more understanding of the complex IPC negotiations than any other likely candidate, and company negotiators have been told that he desires a settlement. He was friendly with the American Consulate in Basra while he was Port Director there, and seems well-disposed toward the US under his strongly nationalist-neutralist bearing.

Gen. Tahir Yahya al-Tikriti, next-to-last Prime Minister, has been living in quiet retirement in Baghdad and reportedly plotting to seize power from Arif. His chances now are hurt by the fact that he is outside the power structure. Moreover, some of his officer supporters were dislodged some weeks ago, when they came under suspicion. His principal remaining friend and backer is Gen. Said Sulaybi, commander of the Baghdad Garrison. Tahir Yahya has held high offices -- Chief of Staff to Defense Minister to Prime Minister -- under three successive regimes. While making himself amenable to Qasim, the Ba'thi rulers, and Arif, he has been in contact continuously with at least two groups of exiled officials from the days of the monarchy. He probably is the person most acceptable to conservatives in Iraq and abroad. But his chameleon propensities have lost him the respect of knowledgeable Iraqis, both civilian and military. The Kurds, with whom he has negotiated extensively, have also come to distrust him.

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Loss to the UAR. Nasser's position suffers a symbolic loss with 'Arif's death, if only because of the open identification 'Arif had sought with him. Actually, the change is more apparent than real. His few fanatical adherents in Iraq are no longer in a position to really influence events, although they might make a noisy effort complete with student demonstrations. All of the contenders for succession are likely to seek Nasser's endorsement at the outset, and equally likely to take an independent course once established in power. The decline in UAR influence is already a fact, however, which will only become more apparent with the change in presidency. Some 700 UAR troops that have occupied a camp on the outskirts of Baghdad at 'Arif's request and served as a visible token of UAR support were in the midst of departure for home when the accident happened. Some undoubtedly remain, but it is very unlikely that Nasser would permit them to take an active part in the internal power contest. Requests that they do so would be highly embarrassing to him. The withdrawal probably will be completed as soon as it can be done inconspicuously.

From Nasser's point of view, Tahir Yahya probably would be the least acceptable, because he is publicly identified with the removal of pro-UAR elements from 'Arif's regime. He probably has little preference among the other contestants, and may refrain from embracing the next government in such a way as to commit his prestige as he did with 'Arif.

The Kurds and the Succession. The projected spring military campaign against the Kurds will be stalled while ranking officers are deeply engaged in national power politics. The Kurds themselves probably will also concentrate on political activity, endeavoring to strike the best possible bargain for a

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tacit truce while the next leader consolidates himself. They might also offer to influence Iranian opinion, for a price. The Kurdish leverage is considerable in this situation, but they probably will exert it toward gaining political concessions for themselves rather than in the interests of one or another of the contestants.

Iran's Stake in Succession. Iran's measures of public mourning go beyond the strict requirements of neighborly courtesy. If Iran also refrains strictly from any agitation or covert attempt to influence the succession, a dramatic improvement in relations could result. Baghdad will watch the Iranian border with alert suspicion, however, and will interpret any small incident as an attempt to meddle at this delicate moment in Iraq's affairs. Tahir Yahya probably would be the Shah's favored candidate.

Slight Warming Toward US. Obviously, no new government will be strong enough for some time to take new policy initiatives. In any case, and whoever wins to power, Iraq's attitude toward the US will be little altered. The atmosphere may be slightly warmer, however, and officials somewhat more accessible since any of the likely successors would be more intelligent and more open-minded than 'Arif.

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April 14, 1966

TO: Ben Read, S/S

FROM: Bromley Smith

The President has approved the following message to
Acting President Bazzaz:

"On behalf of Government of the United States and
of American people I convey my sincerest condolences
on death of President Abd al-Salam Muhammad Arif,
Minister of Interior Abd al Latif al-Daraji, and
Minister of Industry Mustafa Abdulla. Their leader-
ship and dedication to the service of their country will
long be remembered."

Will you send through your channels? Release should
be coordinated with White House press office.