

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1763

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1b memo	to the President from Bator <i>open 9/20/02</i> secret <i>sanitized 1992</i> <i>dup #7, tms file</i>	4 p 03/16/66	A
#2 memo	for the President from Komer secret <i>open 7-26-94 NLJ 94-179</i>	2 p 03/16/66	A
#3 memo	for the President from George Ball secret <i>open 3/3/94</i>	1 p 03/16/66	A
#3a letter	for the President from ? <i>open 7-11-07</i> secret	6 p undated	A
#3b statement	re: NATO secret	8 p undated	A
#6 memo	for the President from Francis Bator secret <i>open 3/3/94</i>	2 p 03/16/66	A
#7 memo	for the President from Francis Bator secret <i>open 9/20/02</i> <i>dup #16, tms file</i>	4 p 03/16/66	A
#8 cable	Bonn 2825 <i>open 6/12/03 NLJ 02-233</i> secret <i>Exempt 10-5-94 NLJ 94-180</i>	3 p 03/15/66	A
#10a report	re: NATO secret <i>open 12-12-94 NLJ 94-184</i>	5 p undated	A
#11 memo	to Bator from Keeny top secret <i>open 7-26-94 NLJ 94-179</i>	1 p 03/11/66	A
#11a memo	for Asst Sec Def from W. J. Howard top secret	4 p 03/11/66	A
#12 memo	to Secretary from Mr. Acheson secret <i>open NLJ 94-180 10-5-94</i>	3 p 03/11/66	A
#14 cable	Bonn 2731 secret <i>open 8-12-94 NLJ 94-96</i>	5 p 03/08/66	A
#15 cable	#1696 Paris " Secret	3 p 03/07/66	A
#16 cable	#1697 to all NATO capitals " secret	3 p 03/08/66	A
#17 cable	#1692 to All NATO Capitals " secret	2 p 03/07/66	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Files of Robert W. Komer

NATO,

Box 1

RESTRICTION CODES

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

2703

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#18 cable	Moscow 2691 <i>Open 3/25/94</i> secret	2 p 03/08/66	A
#20 cable	Brussels 1069 <i>Open 6/12/03 NLS 02-233</i> secret	2 p 03/08/66	A
#21 cable	Paris 5577 secret <i>Open 9/20/02 NLS 9483</i>	1 p 03/08/66	A
#23 cable	Paris 5580 secret <i>Open 9/20/02 NLS 9483</i>	2 p 03/08/66	A
#25 agenda	for Tuesday Lunch secret	1 p 03/08/66	A
#27a cable	text of cable from Amb. Tyler to Sec Rusk secret <i>Open 3/25/94</i>	1 p 03/07/66	A
#28 cable	Paris 5559 secret <i>Open 3/25/94</i>	2 p 03/07/66	A
#29 cable	from Amb. Bohlen in Paris <i>Open 9/20/02</i> secret <i>NLS 9483</i>	2 p 03/07/66	A
#30 cable	from Paris 5553 <i>Edup #35, this file</i> <i>Open 10-15-08</i> secret <i>NLS 08-115</i> <i>Edup #86, NSECE, France, "NATO Dispute, V. 1" Box 177</i>	4 p 03/07/66	A
#31 cable	Bonn 2726 secret <i>Open 8-12-94 NLS 94-96</i>	4 p 03/07/66	A
#32 cable	Bonn 2726 (see 2 of 2) secret	1 p 03/07/66	A
#33 cable	for the President from Bator secret <i>Open 3/25/94</i>	2 p 03/07/66	A
#34 cable	Paris 5541 <i>Open 9/20/02 NLS 9483</i> secret	5 p 03/07/66	A
#35 cable	The Hague 708 secret <i>Open 10-5-94 NLS 94-180</i>	1 p 03/07/66	A
#36 cable	Paris 5553 <i>Open 10-15-08 NLS 08-115</i> secret <i>Edup #30, this file</i>	5 p 03/07/66	A
#37 letter	to PM Aldo Moro from Pres. Johnson <i>Open 3-11-94 NLS 92-377</i> possible classified info	1 p 03/07/66	A

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

383

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
^{36a} # 32a letter	to Harold Wilson from Pres. Johnson possible classified info <i>open 3-11-74 NLJ 92-377</i> 1 p	03/07/66	A
^{36b} # 32b letter	to Charles de Gaulle from Pres. Johnson possible classified info " 1 p	03/07/66	A
^{36c} # 32c letter	to Dr. Ludwig Erhard from Pres. Johnson possible classified info " 1 p	03/07/66	A

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Komer

March 17, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your 6:30 P.M. Meeting (Thursday)
on NATO-France

Attached is a short one-page agenda. It is designed to focus discussion on basic issues of strategy, rather than short term tactics.

At Tab A is a copy of my memorandum of last evening containing a paragraph of private comment for your use on each of the agenda items. It suggests some questions you might want to pose for your advisors at the meeting.

I understand Bill Moyers has given you the Moyers/Komer/Bator version of a letter to deGaulle. It is designed to provide a clear statement of what the U.S. is for, without quoting deGaulle back to deGaulle and picking unnecessary fights. And it makes clear that there will always be an empty chair waiting for France.

(H)

Francis M. Bator

1a

AGENDA FOR NATO-FRANCE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT
6:30 P.M., Thursday, March 17, 1966

I. Discussion of Major Issues

1. Relocation of Military Facilities (U.S. and SHAPE)
2. French Forces in Germany -- what line should we take on a possible French-German bilateral arrangement?
3. U.S. Nuclear Support for French Forces in Germany
4. France and the Treaty
 - a. French membership in the Treaty and the security guarantee
 - b. French participation in NATO technical arrangements (infrastructure, etc.) /
 - c. How should we manage bilateral military relations with the French (re-entry rights, etc.)? /
5. General U.S. attitude Towards France -- what line to take in Europe? with the Congress?
6. New Initiatives to Strengthen NATO

II. Near-Term Tactics for Getting U.S. Position Fully on Record

1. Private Letter to deGaulle?
When? Copies to Wilson, Erhard, Moro, others?
2. A Public Presidential Statement (press conference "voluntary"?)
Text by and large same as letter?
When -- after deGaulle receipt of letter?

18

Wednesday, March 16, 1966, 9:10 p.m.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your NATO-France Meeting at 6:30 P. M.
Tomorrow (Thursday)

By tomorrow, the State contingent will have a revised version of the letter. Mr. Acheson has proposed that the letter itself should not be published but that you should use virtually the entire text in a press conference voluntary (without revealing that the text is from a Presidential letter to deGaulle.)

I am afraid the entire business of the letter is at least premature. Before we decide whether we should send any letter, and what it should say, your advisors own it to the President to present the basic policy issues and choices in dealing with deGaulle. Management of our relations with other senior politicians -- even those with 18th century inclinations -- is clearly Presidential business. Our job is to present you with options and not canned tactical solutions. (The fact that the deGaulle challenge poses some dilemmas in our relations not only with France but also Erhard, Harold Wilson, etc., only lends force to the point.)

The following is a short list of the basic policy issues on which you might want to get a sense of your advisors' views, and on which eventually we will need your thinking and guidance. (It is, by and large, the list which I sent in this morning.) If you agree that tomorrow we need first to focus on basic questions of objectives and strategy, this list provides the elements of an agenda. (In any case, I think we should wait with the letter until after the weekend -- after the Fourteen Nation Declaration of Friday has played itself out.)

These are, I believe, the basic issues:

(1) Relocation of military facilities (U.S. and SHAPE) -- can we relocate in a way which will be sensible in military terms, help cement the Alliance, and not cost a great deal of extra money?

The Joint Staff has a \$700 million (plus or minus) plan, which involves reproducing the present setup (more or

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5 + NLJ 91-229

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By cbm/jw NARA, Date 8-16-02

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less) in Belgium-Holland. I doubt if this makes sense, and McNamara will probably push for a much cheaper arrangement, which will involve some doubling up at existing bases in Germany. But this might involve a fight with the Chiefs.

(2) French forces in Germany -- where do we stand on a possible French-German bilateral deal to keep them there?

This is the toughest problem on the table -- and we run the danger of being caught in the middle. Militarily, the two French divisions don't much matter. But the terms on which they remain, or are withdrawn, will deeply affect French-German relations, and might become a hot political issue in Germany. The Germans will, as usual, look to us for guidance. Our natural tendency will be to discourage any special bilateral arrangement, for fear of setting a bad precedent in further fragmenting the Alliance. But there is a danger that if we discourage them from trying to work out a deal with the French, we will get the blame in Germany and the rest of Europe for driving the French out. On this one, there are no easy answers. A signal from you that we should tread very carefully would be useful.

(3) U.S. Nuclear support for French forces in Germany

This is straightforward -- when they withdraw French forces from NATO, we will certainly want to withdraw U.S. nuclear support. But you might wish to have a report on timing, public relations, etc.

(4) France and the Treaty

(i) Do we accept the French view that they are still party to the Treaty, or do we bring into question the security guarantee (Article V)? Is there a credible middle way? (As you know my view is that -- in part because the threat to abandon them is geographical nonsense -- we must tread softly on this. You might want to hear especially from Dean Acheson. (A memo of mine on this subject is at Tab A)

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(ii) What about French participation in NATO technical arrangements: infrastructure, air defense, liaison officers?

(iii) What about U.S. - French military relations? Should we work out a bilateral deal for wartime reentry rights? (This is linked with an economical relocation arrangement.)

(5) General U.S. attitude towards France -- what line to take in Europe? with the Congress?

You might wish to give us your mind about the appropriate blend of tough dealing with the French on real issues, and maintaining meticulous good manners in public and private. (A signal from you that we don't want to engage in deGaulle-baiting at third and fourth levels -- especially in Europe -- might be very useful.)

(6) New initiatives to strengthen NATO

There are a number of positive things we can and probably should do: more intensive joint planning, burden sharing, systematized multilateral offset arrangements, etc. But I am very much afraid that the MLF-ites will once again start pushing for some form of nuclear sharing involving hardware. They will argue that French objections are no longer relevant, and that it is even more important now, following deGaulle's attack, to give the Germans a sense of security. You have heard the arguments on this many times. I am afraid that nothing will increase deGaulle's support more, throughout Europe (Germany included) than an American initiative to push some kind of a hardware solution down reluctant European throats -- and nothing would be more divisive of the Alliance. (You will probably not want to get into this issue tomorrow, unless it is raised by George Ball. But your staff will have to keep a close watch, if we are to avoid letting this issue get out of hand. The last thing we want is to get the Germans all excited once again, only in the end to face a "no" because none of the other Europeans really want to play.)

(7) How do we react to a Paris-Moscow non-aggression pact?

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One last point: while it hurts me to agree with any close friend and colleague, I think Bob Komer's memo of this afternoon on this subject, which I have just read, is excellent.

Francis M. Bator

FMB:mst

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-179

By ~~1-8~~, NARA, Date 6-22-94~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, March 16, 1966, 6:30 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Do we want a full-blown war with De Gaulle? Bator will be sending a brief for the session tomorrow, but this matter is of sufficient gravity that I want to weigh in too. In presenting you with a series of last-minute tactical decisions (a letter here, a statement there), we may be showing you only the trees and not the forest, with risk that we end up backing you into a war you may not want.

For example, a cardinal issue in the draft thrust before you this morning is not just its tone but what certain key phrases in it imply. We all have the natural impulse to get back at De Gaulle, and to explain to the French people why he is wrong. But the draft goes much further when it says that we not only intend to continue our past NATO policies "but to urge extension of these principles of common and joint preparation wherever they can be usefully applied" (p. 5), and that you dedicate us not just to preservation of NATO but "to the creative task of strengthening it ..." (p. 6).

This is not just rhetoric. As Dean Acheson told you, his group feels that we must seek to strengthen NATO by something new, so that we don't end up with "the same old NATO slightly weaker" (without France). In short, the best way to stop De Gaulle is to beef up the alliance -- make it more integrated rather than less.

This is great stuff if we can do it. But will it work?

Before we announce that we're going in the precise opposite direction from De Gaulle, let's first look at "how." To my knowledge, the only "new" idea we have for strengthening the alliance is the well-known MLF (or the UK variant -- ANF). Query -- is this proposed new strengthening of NATO simply an opening for a new push on MLF?

ANF/MLF has many advantages -- you've heard the arguments. Moreover, the NATO country most spooked by Gaullist wrecking will be West Germany. What better way to reassure Bonn than to give it a finger on the nuclear trigger, or at least a greater sense of nuclear participation? Bonn itself is already talking up this line.

But there may also be real disadvantages which need full airing before we jump. That France's withdrawal from the NATO structure inevitably enhances Germany's role will worry many allies -- Scandinavians, Italians, Benelux, UK. They may not be so eager to see a US/UK/German combination, without the continental counterbalance of the French.

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March 16, 1966

Second, what we all fear now is new French initiatives toward the USSR. There are few issues in which Paris and Moscow might see a greater common interest -- or one more popular in Europe -- than in opposing a nuclear role for Bonn. So taking this road toward strengthening NATO may help bring about precisely what we want to avoid.

Third, and not least, does a political crisis in Europe help or hurt us at home? Exerting firm leadership of the Western Alliance is one thing, but what if all it leads to is a great ruckus with little concrete result? We already have one war in Asia, and I can see the Europe-firsters clamoring that Lyndon Johnson is leading us into trouble on both flanks. Don't we also risk Republican charges that we're losing two wars instead of one?

Finally, can we win a war with De Gaulle just now over more integration vs. less? I doubt it. He's just been elected for seven more years and nobody believes we can get him to reverse course -- whether what he's doing is popular in France or not. Even to try may risk splitting NATO further by giving play to all the latent centrifugal tendencies in Portugal, Norway, Denmark, Turkey and Greece. Can we afford to have yet others play the same game as De Gaulle?

Indeed, the lessons of recent history all suggest that we stop, look, and listen before flinging down the gauntlet to De Gaulle. He may well be right in thinking he has us in a spot where we can't react vigorously -- let's not underestimate him. Isn't he dead right in appreciating that the threat of Soviet aggression is less and that he can thus get away with more? He also has a receptive European audience for his mischievous contention that we might drag NATO into a larger war emerging from Vietnam. Nor should the basic merit of our own grand design for European integration blind us to the likelihood that moving it further forward may be an uphill fight till Britain decides to enter Europe or De Gaulle passes from the scene.

So before answering State's clarion call to propaganda battle, you deserve to be convinced that it's one we can reasonably expect to win. If not, it may be wiser to outwait De Gaulle -- while limiting the damage he can do. This alternative calls for a firm defensive stance whereby the rest of NATO proceeds with business as usual, while reserving an "empty chair" till France outlives De Gaulle. To thus prevent NATO from slipping backward may be the best that we can hope for just now. The real problem, as always, is not France but Germany -- and the more we agitate the alliance the more we may bring this potentially divisive issue to the fore.

This memo deliberately accentuates the negative, and my worries may be overdrawn. But our staff job is to give you both sides of any story -- and to show the options if others don't. In any case I see no reason for precipitate action on a letter or a statement; this matter could well stand mulling over for a week or so. Counsels of caution need not be those of cowardice.

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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March 16, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed Letter to General De Gaulle
and Statement

I am enclosing a proposed draft of a letter to General De Gaulle, together with a statement that you might wish to issue a few days after the letter is sent. As you will note, the draft statement closely follows the letter but relies on the information contained in the Aide Memoire and thus avoids quoting General De Gaulle's letter to you. Secretary Rusk has seen and approved both of the enclosed documents.


George W. Ball

Enclosures:
As noted.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-502
By gpl/jw, NARA, Date 3/25/94

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Dear Mr. President:

On March 7 you wrote to inform me of the general course of action your Government proposes to follow with regard to the North Atlantic Treaty and the joint arrangements made in accordance with its undertakings. In acknowledging your letter I stated that the course you proposed so seriously affected the security and well-being of citizens of all the allied states that I must seek the counsel of the other Treaty members. This I am doing. Meanwhile I should like to set forth further views of my Government on this matter.

The American conception of the purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Alliance it creates appears to differ materially from your own. Under our Constitution that Treaty is the law of the land, Like our Constitution, it is not a mere legal document. It is the outward and visible form of a living institution, the Great Alliance--not an alliance for war, but an alliance for peace--that has for nearly two decades provided peace and security for the North Atlantic area and thereby greatly reinforced stability throughout the world.

Hardly,

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Authority FRUS, Vol. 13, #146
By chm/bm NARA, Date 3-11-07.

Hardly had the Treaty been signed than its Article 3 was given life, vitality and effectiveness by the leadership of the French Government. It was Frenchmen who pointed out that "liberation is not enough." It was France that put us on the true path under the Treaty, raising it above the classical conception of an alliance to fight together when war should come, to a great new conception that if we acted jointly for the common interest war would not come. The organization to achieve this--NATO--became in truth, an Organization for Peace.

The Organization combined the contributions of the member nations into a great common means of deterring war by preparing, in common, to meet it, if aggression should occur. As you rightly say, conditions have changed since 1949. They have greatly changed for the better through the success of our combined efforts under the Treaty. But let no one be deceived. This situation can be reversed as quickly as it was created--indeed, far more quickly--should the element of collective effort be removed.

You informed me that the French Government now expects to remain a party to the North Atlantic Treaty.

You

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You interpret this to mean that, "unless events in the course of the next three years should change the fundamental elements of the relations between East and West, she (France) would be, in 1969 and later, determined, just as today, to fight beside her allies if one of them should suffer unprovoked aggression." Such, of course, is not the obligation specified in the Treaty itself; but is, I take it, the reciprocal obligation that the French Government would in the future construe as existing between France and her allies.

Even a firm commitment to fight together when one should be attacked--a conventional alliance for war--has not been regarded by the United States Government and its allies, including prior French Governments, as adequate to achieve the purposes and commitments of the Treaty. Deterrence of war has been regarded as essential to the maintenance of peace and security in the North Atlantic area.

Thus I find even more distressing than the divergence of our views about the scope and major purpose of the Treaty your expressed intention to undo the major part
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that France has played in creating an effective deterrent to war. You describe your intentions as:

"recovering, in French territory, the full exercise of her sovereignty, now impaired by the permanent presence of Allied military elements or by the habitual use being made of her air space,"

"terminating her participation in the 'integrated' commands," and

"no longer placing forces at the disposal of NATO."

It would not have occurred to me that the presence of Allied military elements on French soil at French invitation and in pursuance of a common plan to further the peace and security of the French nation and her Allies was an impairment of French sovereignty, but rather a wise and far-seeing exercise of it. But, of course, sovereignty, by its very nature, may be exercised in ways that are not wise and may even be destructive of the best interests of the sovereign and its allies.

My Government holds strong views on the need for an integrated command and for placing forces at the disposal
of

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of NATO. We intend to continue not only our past policies of full participation and cooperation but to urge extension of these principles of common and joint preparation wherever they can be usefully applied in the Atlantic Alliance. We do not consider that those principles and policies are in any sense an impairment of our sovereignty. We would consider their abandonment as a dereliction of our duty to look to the defense of the United States and of those with whom we are joined by treaty in an effective security arrangement.

It seems to me elemental that the command structures, strategic and tactical plans, the creation and designation of forces in being--steps taken in advance of any crisis--and for use in a crisis--are essential if the treaty is to have force and reality in time of crisis. The Treaty fully commits its members to come to the aid of any of them who are subjected to an armed attack within the areas specified in the Treaty. Governments fulfill their commitments in accordance with their own constitutional procedures. The vital point that I am making here is that these commitments should be honored effectively and not ineffectively. Therefore, it seems to me essential that all members of the alliance

must

must be prepared against any emergency to act in common through their common organization and in accordance with its plans.

But I take the propositions you now advance as meaning that whatever future action France may take in fulfilling what it conceives to be its treaty obligations will be taken unilaterally, by independent French forces, in accordance with French plans with, at most, only limited coordination with the joint common plans and forces. Such a course of action can only weaken the alliance.

I find it difficult to believe that France, which has made a unique contribution to Western security and development in the two past fruitful decades, will stay long withdrawn from the common affairs and responsibilities of the Atlantic. At the moment I dedicate my Government, not only to the preservation of the whole deterrent system we call NATO, but to the creative task of strengthening it so that it will continue to serve even more effectively the great common purposes of the Western nations.

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DRAFT OF STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT REGARDING
FRENCH PROPOSALS WITH REGARD TO NATO

On March 7, 1965, President de Gaulle wrote to inform me of the general course of action the French Government proposed to follow with regard to the North Atlantic Treaty and the joint alliance made in accordance with its undertakings. This letter was followed by aide memoires in substantially identical form transmitted by the French Government to each member of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Since the actions proposed by the French Government would so seriously affect the security and well-being of citizens of all the allied states, the United States Government has felt it necessary to consult the other Treaty members. This consultation is now in progress. Meanwhile, on _____, all of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty, except France, joined in a declaration expressing their full support for the continuance of the Atlantic Alliance and of the integrated military organization established pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty.

In view

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLTJ 94-136 (#250c)
By isp/abm NARA, Date 7-11-07

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In view of the importance of this matter to all Americans and the peoples of all the nations of the Alliance, I feel it may now be useful to state more fully the position of the United States with regard to the issues raised by the French communications.

The American conception of the purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Alliance it creates appears to differ materially from that expressed by the French Government. Under the United States Constitution the North Atlantic Treaty is the law of the land. Like our Constitution, it is not a mere legal document. It is the outward and visible form of a living institution, the Great Alliance--not an alliance for war, but an alliance for peace--that has for nearly two decades provided peace and security for the North Atlantic area and thereby greatly reinforced stability throughout the world.

Hardly had the Treaty been signed than its Article 3 was given life, vitality and effectiveness by the leadership of the French Government. It was Frenchmen who pointed out that "liberation is not enough". It was

France

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-3-

France that put us on the true path under the Treaty, raising it above the classical conception of an alliance to fight together when war should come, to a great new conception that if we acted jointly for the common interest war would not come. The organization to achieve this--NATO--became in truth, an Organization for Peace.

The Organization combined the contributions of the member nations into a great common means of deterring war by preparing, in common, to meet it, if aggression should occur. The French aide memoire quite properly points out that "the conditions which prevail in the world at the present time ... are fundamentally different from those of 1949." They are not only fundamentally different, they have greatly changed for the better through the success of our combined efforts under the Treaty. But let no one be deceived. This situation can be reversed as quickly as it was created--indeed, far more quickly--should the element of collective effort be removed.

It is apparent from the language of the aide memoire and from other communications from the French Government that

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that "except for events which, during the coming years, might come to modify in a fundamental way relations between the East and the West", France would propose to fight at the side of its allies if one of the members of the Alliance suffers unprovoked aggression. The French commitment so expressed is not the obligation specified in the Treaty, but it may presumably be regarded as the reciprocal obligation which the French Government would in the future construe as existing between France and her allies.

Even a firm commitment to fight together when one should be attacked--a conventional alliance for war--has not been regarded by the United States and its allies, including prior French Governments, as adequate to achieve the purposes and commitments of the Treaty. Deterrence of war has been regarded as essential to the maintenance of peace and security in the North Atlantic area.

I regret that the French Government proposes to undo the major part that France has played in creating an effective deterrent for war. As made clear by the
French

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French Government it proposes:

"to recover in French territory the complete exercise of its sovereignty" by refusing to permit the continuance of any foreign units, installations or bases on French territory;

"to withdraw all of its forces from NATO assignment and not to assign any others;

"to terminate her participation in the integrated commands of NATO and to insist on the transfer from French territory of the two integrated headquarters."

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It would not have occurred to the United States Government that the presence of allied military elements on French soil, at French invitation, and in pursuance of a common plan to further the peace and security of the French nation and her allies was an impairment of French sovereignty, but rather a wise and far-seeing exercise of it. But, of course, sovereignty, by its very nature, may be exercised in ways that are not wise and may even be destructive of the best interests of the sovereign and its allies.

The United States Government holds strong views on the need for an integrated command and for placing forces at the disposal of NATO. We intend to continue not only our past policies of full participation and cooperation but to urge extension of these principles of common and joint preparation wherever they can be usefully applied in the Atlantic Alliance. We do not consider that those principles and policies are in any sense an impairment of our sovereignty. We would consider their abandonment as a dereliction of our duty to look to the defense of the United States and of those with whom we are joined by treaty in an effective security arrangement.

It seems

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It seems elemental that the command structures, strategic and tactical plans, the creation and designation of forces in being--steps taken in advance of any crisis--and for use in a crisis--are essential if the treaty is to have force and reality in time of crisis." The Treaty fully commits its members to come to the aid of any of them who are subjected to an armed attack within the areas specified in the Treaty. Governments fulfill their commitments in accordance with their own constitutional procedure. The vital point is that these commitments should be honored effectively and not ineffectively. Therefore, it seems to us essential that all members of the alliance must be prepared against any emergency to act in common through their common organization and in accordance with its plans.

But we understand the proposals now advanced by the French Government as meaning that whatever further action France may take in fulfilling what it conceives to be its Treaty obligations will be taken unilaterally, by independent French forces, in accordance with French plans and with, at most, only limited coordination with the joint common plans and forces. Such a course of action can only weaken the Alliance.

We find

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-8-

We find it difficult to believe that France, which has made a unique contribution to Western security and development in the two past fruitful decades, will stay long withdrawn from the common affairs and responsibilities of the Atlantic. At this moment we dedicate ourselves not only to the preservation of the whole deterrent system we call NATO but to the creative task of strengthening it so that it will continue to serve even more effectively the great common purposes of the Western nations in their pursuit of security and peace.

~~SECRET~~

©: RWR

4

AGENDA FOR NATO-FRANCE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT
11:05 A.M., Wednesday, March 16, 1966

I. Report on Diplomatic Situation (Secretary/Under Secretary)

II. Discussion of Major Issues

1. Relocation of Military Facilities (U.S. and SHAPE)
2. French Forces in Germany -- what line should we take on a possible French-German bilateral arrangement?
3. U.S. Nuclear Support for French Forces in Germany
4. France and the Treaty
 - a. French membership in the Treaty and the security guarantee
 - b. French participation in NATO technical arrangements (infrastructure, etc.)
 - c. How should we manage bilateral military relations with the French (re-entry rights, etc.)?
5. General U.S. Attitude Towards France -- what line to take in Europe? with the Congress?

17 Mar: 66

Johnson
Clifford

NATO Session

1. Declaration. no change in substance.

2. Timing of Release. Sun. for Mon. papers strongly preferred, but will go along w. majority.

3. Ltr. - Rusk will handle w. colleagues.

4. Relocation. Vance described

Can move out by 1 May '67:

a. complete pullout

b. re-entry rights.

We've told 'em another guess 3-400m.

Can consolidate Hqs. save 3-4000 people.

cut down S&A&E; put in Belgium.

Rusk - let's get Fr. to pay relocation costs.

5. Fr. Forces in Ger. Will cause trouble to get them out. Hope Gers. will be brave. But at this point let's explore.

6. Nuclear support for Fr. forces - out.

7. Fr. and the Treaty.

8. New initiatives. (smaller group). burden sharing, etc.

9. Lt ahead w/o Portugal.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, March 16, 1966,

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your 11:15 a.m. Meeting on NATO-France

After a brief report from the Secretary of State (or George Ball) on the diplomatic state-of-play, you might wish to turn this into a preliminary discussion of some of the tough underlying issues:

- (1) Relocation of military facilities (U.S. and SHAPE) -- can we relocate in a way which will be sensible in military terms, help cement the Alliance, and not cost a great deal of extra money?

The Joint Staff has a \$700 million (plus or minus) plan, which involves reproducing the present setup (more or less) in Belgium-Holland. I doubt if this makes sense, and McNamara will probably push for a much cheaper arrangement, which will involve some doubling up at existing bases in Germany. But this might involve a fight with the Chiefs.

- (2) French forces in Germany -- where do we stand on a possible French-German bilateral deal to keep them there?

This is the toughest problem on the table -- and we run the danger of being caught in the middle. Militarily, the two French divisions don't much matter. But the terms on which they remain, or are withdrawn, will deeply affect French-German relations, and might become a hot political issue in Germany. The Germans will, as usual, look to us for guidance. Our natural tendency will be to discourage any special bilateral arrangement, for fear of setting a bad precedent in further fragmenting the Alliance. But there is a danger that if we discourage them from trying to work out a deal with the French, we will get the blame in Germany and the rest of Europe for driving the French out. On this one, there are no easy answers. A signal from you that we should tread very carefully would be useful.

~~SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-33
By plp, NARA, Date 3/3/94

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

(3) U.S. Nuclear support for French forces in Germany

This is straightforward -- when they withdraw French forces from NATO, we will certainly want to withdraw U.S. nuclear support. But you might wish to have a report on timing, public relations, etc.

(4) France and the Treaty

(i) Do we accept the French view that they are still party to the Treaty, or do we bring into question the security guarantee (Article V)? Is there a credible middle way? (As you know my view is that -- in part because the threat to abandon them is geographical nonsense -- we must tread softly on this. You might want to hear especially from Dean Acheson.

(ii) What about French participation in NATO technical arrangements: infrastructure, air defense, liaison officers?

(iii) What about U.S. - French military relations? Should we work out a bilateral deal for wartime reentry rights? (This is linked with an economical relocation arrangement.)

(5) General U.S. attitude towards France -- what line to take in Europe? with the Congress?

You might wish to give us your mind about the appropriate blend of tough dealing with the French on real issues, and maintaining meticulous good manners in public and private. (A signal from you that we don't want to engage in deGaulle-baiting at third and fourth levels -- especially in Europe -- might be very useful.)

(6) How do we react to a Paris-Moscow non-aggression pact?

Francis M. Bator

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

Wednesday, March 16, 1966, 9:10 p.m.

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your NATO-France Meeting at 6:30 P. M.
Tomorrow (Thursday)

By tomorrow, the State contingent will have a revised version of the letter. Mr. Acheson has proposed that the letter itself should not be published but that you should use virtually the entire text in a press conference voluntary (without revealing that the text is from a Presidential letter to deGaulle.)

I am afraid the entire business of the letter is at least premature. Before we decide whether we should send any letter, and what it should say, your advisors owe it to the President to present the basic policy issues and choices in dealing with deGaulle. Management of our relations with other senior politicians -- even those with 18th century inclinations -- is clearly Presidential business. Our job is to present you with options and not canned tactical solutions. (The fact that the deGaulle challenge poses some dilemmas in our relations not only with France but also Erhard, Harold Wilson, etc., only lends force to the point.)

The following is a short list of the basic policy issues on which you might want to get a sense of your advisors' views, and on which eventually we will need your thinking and guidance. (It is, by and large, the list which I sent in this morning.) If you agree that tomorrow we need first to focus on basic questions of objectives and strategy, this list provides the elements of an agenda. (In any case, I think we should wait with the letter until after the weekend -- after the Fourteen Nation Declaration of Friday has played itself out.)

These are, I believe, the basic issues:

(1) Relocation of military facilities (U.S. and SHAPE) -- can we relocate in a way which will be sensible in military terms, help cement the Alliance, and not cost a great deal of extra money?

The Joint Staff has a \$700 million (plus or minus) plan, which involves reproducing the present setup (more or

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5 - NLS 91-229

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By cbm/jw, NARA, Date 8-16-02

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less) in Belgium-Holland. I doubt if this makes sense, and McNamara will probably push for a much cheaper arrangement, which will involve some doubling up at existing bases in Germany. But this might involve a fight with the Chiefs.

(2) French forces in Germany -- where do we stand on a possible French-German bilateral deal to keep them there?

This is the toughest problem on the table -- and we run the danger of being caught in the middle. Militarily, the two French divisions don't much matter. But the terms on which they remain, or are withdrawn, will deeply affect French-German relations, and might become a hot political issue in Germany. The Germans will, as usual, look to us for guidance. Our natural tendency will be to discourage any special bilateral arrangement, for fear of setting a bad precedent in further fragmenting the Alliance. But there is a danger that if we discourage them from trying to work out a deal with the French, we will get the blame in Germany and the rest of Europe for driving the French out. On this one, there are no easy answers. A signal from you that we should tread very carefully would be useful.

(3) U.S. Nuclear support for French forces in Germany

This is straightforward -- when they withdraw French forces from NATO, we will certainly want to withdraw U.S. nuclear support. But you might wish to have a report on timing, public relations, etc.

(4) France and the Treaty

(i) Do we accept the French view that they are still party to the Treaty, or do we bring into question the security guarantee (Article V)? Is there a credible middle way? (As you know my view is that -- in part because the threat to abandon them is geographical nonsense -- we must tread softly on this. You might want to hear especially from Dean Acheson. (A memo of mine on this subject is at Tab A)

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(ii) What about French participation in NATO technical arrangements: infrastructure, air defense, liaison officers?

(iii) What about U.S. - French military relations? Should we work out a bilateral deal for wartime reentry rights?
(This is linked with an economical relocation arrangement.)

(5) General U.S. attitude towards France -- what line to take in Europe? with the Congress?

You might wish to give us your mind about the appropriate blend of tough dealing with the French on real issues, and maintaining meticulous good manners in public and private. (A signal from you that we don't want to engage in deGaulle-baiting at third and fourth levels -- especially in Europe -- might be very useful.)

(6) New initiatives to strengthen NATO

There are a number of positive things we can and probably should do: more intensive joint planning, burden sharing, systematized multilateral offset arrangements, etc. But I am very much afraid that the MLF-ites will once again start pushing for some form of nuclear sharing involving hardware. They will argue that French objections are no longer relevant, and that it is even more important now, following deGaulle's attack, to give the Germans a sense of security. You have heard the arguments on this many times. I am afraid that nothing will increase deGaulle's support more, throughout Europe (Germany included) than an American initiative to push some kind of a hardware solution down reluctant European throats -- and nothing would be more divisive of the Alliance. (You will probably not want to get into this issue tomorrow, unless it is raised by George Ball. But your staff will have to keep a close watch, if we are to avoid letting this issue get out of hand. The last thing we want is to get the Germans all excited once again, only in the end to face a "no" because none of the other Europeans really want to play.)

(7) How do we react to a Paris-Moscow non-aggression pact?

* * * * *

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One last point: while it hurts me to agree with any close friend and colleague, I think Bob Komer's memo of this afternoon on this subject, which I have just read, is excellent.

Francis M. Bator

FMB:mst

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

8

44-S

~~SECRET~~

Action

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2825

INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 811

RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 984

RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 62

RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 41

RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 330

ZEN/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 33

ZEN/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 197

RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY LISBON 27

ZEN/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 116

RUDMSO/AMEMBASSY OSLO 28

RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 32 ✓

RUDIHS/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 18

RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 290

RUFHJA/USMISSION BERLIN 685

BT

~~SECRET~~ MARCH 15

SUBJ: CARSTENS ON NATO AND FRANCE

NATUS

STATE SEC CARSTENS RECEIVED PUHAN FOR A COURTESY CALL YESTERDAY AND FOLLOWING GENERAL AMENITIES, TURNED THE CONVERSATION TO THE FRANCE-NATO PROBLEM. AFTER NOTING THAT FRANCE HAD NOW GIVEN NOTIFICATION OF ITS INTENT TO ALL NATO MEMBERS, CARSTENS STATED, WITH UNUSUAL EMPHASIS, THAT THE FRG WOULD NOT CAPITULATE IN THE FACE OF FRENCH PRESSURE. WE COULD RELY ON THAT. LIKE RUETE LAST WEEK (EMBTTEL 2802) CARSTENS STRESSED THAT THE FRG WAS FOLLOWING

PAGE TWO RUFHOL 650 ~~SECRET~~

TWO BASIC PRINCIPLES IN DEALING WITH THE FRENCH THREAT: (1) INSISTENCE ON THE NECESSITY OF MILITARY INTEGRATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, (2) CLOSE COORDINATION WITH THE OTHER NATO MEMBERS-- PARTICULARLY THE US AND UK--IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE ALLIANCE INTACT.

CARSETNS THEN REFERRED TO THE ISSUE OF FRENCH TROOPS IN GERMANY. THE FRENCH CLEARLY WISHED TO KEEP THEM HERE "AS A FAVOR TO THE

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1966 MAR 15 AM 10 46

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 02-233

By us, NARA, Date 6-6-03

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-2- 2825, March 15 from Bonn

GERMANS" OR IF THE GERMANS PROVED UNCOOPERATIVE, ON THE BASIS OF FRENCH RIGHTS. THIS WOULD INVOLVE A WHOLE ROW OF DIFFICULT QUESTIONS. SPEAKING PERSONALLY--BUT AGAIN EMPHATICALLY--CARSTENS SAID HE THOUGHT THAT THE FRG WOULD NOT AGREE TO A MORE PRIVILEGED STATUS FOR FRENCH TROOPS IN GERMANY THAN THAT ENJOYED BY GERMAN TROOPS IN FRANCE. THERE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE SOME KIND OF UNDERSTANDING ON FRENCH COOPERATION WITH OTHER FORCES IN GERMANY IN MEETING AN ATTACK. IN THIS CONNECTION CARSTENS REMARKED THAT IN NONE OF THE FRENCH MEMORANDA OR LETTERS WAS ANY MENTION MADE OF AIR DEFENSE. THIS WAS PERHAPS THE MOST ESSENTIAL ASPECT OF MEETING THE SOVIET THREAT AND FRANCE WAS DEPENDENT ON THE NATO EARLY WARNING SYSTEM CENTERED IN GERMANY. THIS WAS SOMETHING TO BEAR IN MIND.

PAGE THREE RUFHOL 650 ~~SECRET~~

CARSTENS FELT THAT IT WOULD BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE TO COUNTER THE FRENCH MOVE BY SOME NOTABLE PROGRESS IN ALLIANCE INTEGRATION. THE MOST LIKELY AREA, IN HIS VIEW, WAS NUCLEAR SHARING. THE PREVIOUS PROBLEM OF THE FRENCH REACTION NO LONGER EXISTED SINCE DEGAULLE HAD NOW TAKEN THE THREATENED ACTION AGAINST NATO WITHOUT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ALLIANCE NUCLEAR FORCE. THE GERMANS HAD BEEN QUITE ENCOURAGED BY THEIR RECENT TALKS WITH LORD CHALFONT WHO HAD MADE CLEAR: (1) THAT WHILE HE PERSONALLY FAVORED UTILIZATION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR ALL NECESSARY NUCLEAR COOPERATION, THE BRITISH GOVT REMAINED READY TO GO AHEAD WITH AN ANF; AND (2) THAT, IN THE BRITISH VIEW, THE NUCLEAR QUESTION MUST BE RESOLVED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE BEFORE AN AGREEMENT ON

NON-PROLIFERATION COULD BE REACHED WITH THE SOVIETS. AS LONG AS ONE NEGOTIATED WITH THE SOVIETS WHILE THE QUESTION WAS UP IN THE AIR WITHIN NATO, THE SOVS WOULD SEEK TO UTILIZE THE NEGOTIATIONS TO PREVENT A NATO SOLUTION.

CARSTENS SAID THAT THE FRG HAD ALSO BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE POSITIVE REMARKS MADE TO ERHARD BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE GERMAN NUCLEAR SHARING PAPER DURING THEIR SECOND PRIVATE MEETING AT THE WHITE HOUSE. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE BRITISH HAD NOT YET PURSUED

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-3- 2825, March 15 from Bonn

PAGE FOUR RUFHOL 650 ~~SECRET~~
CONSULTATIONS WITH THE FRG ON THE SUBJECT BEYOND SUGGESTING THAT IT BE DISCUSSED BY THE DEFENSE MINISTERS DURING THE FEB SPECIAL COMMITTEE MEETING, WHICH DID NOT COINCIDE WITH GERMAN VIEWS. THE SUBJECT COULD BE DISCUSSED AGAIN DURING ERHARD'S LONDON VISIT WHICH CARSTENS SAID IN CONFIDENCE HAD NOW BEEN SET FOR MAY. IN CLOSING THE SUBJECT, CARSTENS SAID THAT IN ORDER TO UNDERLINE THE GERMAN SUPPORT FOR THE ALLIANCE, HE HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED TO INFORM THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR THAT THE FRG WOULD BE GLAD TO ACCEPT ON GERMAN TERRITORY THE CANADIAN FACILITY WHICH DE GAULLE INSISTED MUST BE REMOVED FROM FRANCE. THE FRG HOPED THIS MOVE MIGHT ALSO ENCOURAGE A POSITIVE CANADIAN POSITION ON THE PROPOSED DECLARATION OF THE 14.

COMMENT:

CARSTENS' REMARKS WOULD INDICATE THAT FAR FROM LOSING INTEREST IN AN ALLIANCE NUCLEAR FORCE, HE AND SCHROEDER, WHOSE VIEWS HE INVARIABLY REFLECTS IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, MAY NOW WISH TO PURSUE THE OBJECTIVE MORE VIGOROUSLY, FREE FROM THE THREAT OF FRENCH REPRISALS AGAINST NATO. NEITHER SCHROEDER NOR VON HASSEL HAS EVER BACKED AWAY FROM THE IDEA, AND ERHARD REFERRED TO IT IN POSITIVE TERMS IN A RECENT STATEMENT (EMBTel 1604). THE GERMANS ARE,

PAGE FIVE RUFHOL 650 ~~SECRET~~
OF COURSE, NOT UNMINDFUL OF THE ENHANCEMENT GIVEN THEIR POSITION IN THE ALLIANCE AS A RESULT OF DE GAULLE'S ACTIONS, WHICH WILL BE COMMENTED ON IN A FOLLOWING TELEGRAM. PROGRESS ON NUCLEAR SHARING STILL FACES, HOWEVER, GREAT PROBLEMS IN GERMANY.

THE QUICK AND VOLUNTARY GERMAN INVITATION TO THE CANADIANS SHOULD HAVE A POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE 14 AND GIVE PAUSE TO THE FRENCH.

GP-3

MCGHEE

~~SECRET~~

Gr - D.G. want recapture full freedom of action.
 Pragmatist - hasn't decided how far go - maybe
 France Sov. treaty renewal.

R. 2 - memos 1. Reply to memo, coord. w. / X
 2. Public reply

9. Really a prop. battle. You, as leader
 of coalition, must capture propaganda
 initiative.

Center of attr. in all. will be UK and Ger.
 As Fr. attempt to weaken all, our pitch
 must be to strengthen it by something
 new, so end result won't be same old
 NATO slightly weaker but a revived NATO
 rather stronger.

→ This letter flings down the gauntlet
 to De Gaulle and commits us in effect to an
 opposite course. Perhaps this is right, but
 let's think about it first.

Pres. favors pub. ltr. and then press
 conf. statement. Let's not give D.G.
 Ach - one pub. is to reach French people.

Ltr. f. Pres. will reach all Frenchmen. If we
 reply w/o release will be distorted by Fr.

Pres - of course we want to reach Fr. people, but
 question is how. Let's avoid appearance of
 saying "you're another" right back. Let's explore
 using other means.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 11, 1966

FOR MR. KOMER

Bob:

This is for your personal background information only. Needless to say, it is still very tentative and rough.

As I told you, my preferred option is to get McNamara to adopt a platform of this sort vis-a-vis Rusk and Ball.

If that fails, I will convert it into a paper of my own and will put it on the agenda for the Leddy/McNaughton/Bator group, and perhaps float it with George -- without telling them whether or not I have sent it upstairs.

(f)

Francis M. Bator

Attachment

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-184

By ip, NARA, Date 12-8-94

10a

I. General Attitude

(All "tough" positions preferably to be articulated first by our allies.)
(All positions same in public as in private except where noted.)

- a. Undramatic but firm. Cold and polite, but not interested in obtaining favors from him.
- b. French have right to withdraw from "organization" of NATO and don't sacrifice Treaty status, but can't have cake and eat it; lost the benefits that go with responsibilities of full cooperation in NATO. We were and are willing to discuss reform, but clear that de Gaulle not interested. No point in wooing him in response to his increasing snubs. Therefore we are drawing necessary consequences.
- c. We intend to consult with our allies with view to relocation of NATO organization and U.S. forces from France to extent required by new circumstances. Appreciate General de Gaulle's offer to facilitate relocation without inconveniencing allies. Actual problems not anticipated in view of alternative facilities in Germany, and growing sea and airlift capabilities. SHAPE being required to leave France, we expect that NAC will also leave France.
- d. As to continued French participation, we expect French will wish to continue in NAC and have the right to do so; however, we do not believe that Allies can accept continued French presures in Military Committee or Standing Group, or other integrated military activities, after withdrawal of French forces from NATO assignment. The fourteen will make necessary adjustments in procedure. In military commands and headquarters, no special liaison status for French which would allow them to keep advantages of integration without meeting responsibilities seems equitable to other

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members who are doing fair share. Therefore assume Alliance will entertain only minimal contacts with French required for possible wartime cooperation and wartime re-entry rights to reactivate LOC and other facilities. U.S. LOC and dispersal bases to be on caretaker status, if acceptable to French.

Continued French membership in technical arrangements (e.g., NADGE, INFRASTRUCTURE, etc.) perfectly possible, to extent French willing to participate on equal basis with others.

e. Any departure from the principle of no special status within NATO by means of bilateral agreements, e.g., with Germans, only for vital national interests and at the option of country affected. [For Germans and other allies only, not in public statements, and in Congress only in response to questions: Germans should accept French bilaterals if they desire to do so to avoid Franco-German division. However, before accepting such relationship, should weigh carefully possible Gaullist nationalist play on new status and potential German domestic response, and should accept such special arrangements only if prepared to live with it for substantial period of time. We believe that such an arrangement subject to constant internal German pressures for renegotiation worse than not having two French divisions in Germany.

Caveat: Hard German line may force into open controversy over occupation rights of French. This would be profoundly disruptive in Europe and might set back German International rehabilitation and raise German fears regarding Allied abandonment of occupation responsibilities for Berlin and reunification.]

Note for Congress: French losing peacetime benefits of cooperative and integrated Alliance:

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(a) His officers no longer present in Allied headquarters and staffs; liaison "special" status denied him, so can't get previous benefits under new description.

(b) Peacetime expenditures in France (\$_____) lost.

(c) NAC leaves France, despite de Gaulle's obvious attempt to keep it there as political symbol; isolation of de Gaulle thus becomes starkly visible to French public; political costs of de Gaulle's behavior will be apparent to French; however, only on condition we remain temperate, polite, do not seem to be retaliating.

(d) French also immediately losing U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in support of their aircraft and launchers, because these deployed only in context NATO assigned forces. Thus de Gaulle already paying price.

(e) French officer now at Omaha working on nuclear coordination will have to be removed with other French personnel from NATO staffs. De Gaulle thus loses benefit of nuclear coordination with SAC.

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Re: I. Article 5 and Treaty MMBSHP of France as Abstract Proposition

- I. Don't even question membership or Article 5 benefits. To do so would be highly counter-productive to our whole posture vis-a-vis de Gaulle as the guilty party, and our general political position in Europe and the world.

II. French Forces in Germany - Basis of Bilateral Agreements

This should depend on German and other Allied willingness to see French enjoy special status in Alliance, with attendant dangers of provoking German nationalism, rather than danger of alternative, i.e., French provoking discussion of occupation rights in Germany, with attendant danger of European-wide political strains emerging. We feel this is primarily European problem and such responsibility for such major reorientation should not be borne by US, which will be blamed if US sponsored course backfires. This is too hot a European issue for the US to seek to tell its Allies what to do. (US nuclear weapons support of course withdrawn from French forces no longer assigned to NATO).

III. France Continuation in NATO Activities -

Participation in NAC - Yes, except as to matters in which no longer active. Other 14 will arrange to do business as required w/o French.

Participation in NADGE, etc. OK if on equal basis with other participants.

French status in Military Committee/SG. Out, because no more forces assigned. Have German and Italian go on SG plus rotating membership for smaller powers.

Liaison & Cooperation and Coordination for War-time Minimal -- visibly less than desired by de Gaulle. Drop some existing liaison officers from Navy commands.

IV. US Forces Relocation from France -

- (1) EUCOM -- To Germany to merge with USAREUR and USAFE. ^{+ Gsm Z}
- (2) LOC -- Continue to rely on LOC through Germany for peacetime and place LOC in France on minimal mothball status for war-time security.
- (3) Aircraft -- Dual base to CONUS or shift to existing German and UK bases. No extra construction required.
- (4) Dispersal bases in France -- Mothball. War-time re-entry rights only.

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V. War-Time Re-Entry Rights for US in France -

LOC -- If France willing, delighted to have it.

AIR -- If France willing, delighted to have it.

Character of modern war has decreased requirement of large rear area, and LOC for long, large-scale conventional war may not fit character of any potential hostilities.

VI. NATO Relocations -

NAC and SHAPE - (1) To UK -- Too Anglo-Saxon and Insular?

(2) To Brussels -- Belgium too wobbly

(3) To Holland -- Best solution

Standing Group -

To be beefed up? Yes. To take over planning and review function from SHAPE, and ultimately nuclear coordination and McNamara committee functions.

FRG membership? Yes.

Italian membership? Yes.

Other? One small power, on rotating basis.
This makes total of five.

VII. Discussions with French or Other Follow-Up to de Gaulle's Initiative -- Negotiations. (Tactics)

We should take position of icy if polite indifference. His attitude clear. Our agreements in force till actually denounced. No point in approaching French bat in hand begging for coordination, or other unequal treatment for France. We are not prepared to guard them. We should therefore wait him out on all further approaches, and not hold our breath in any respect.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mar. 11, 1966

NOTE FOR MR. BATON **DECLASSIFIED**

Francis --

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-179

By isg, NARA, Date 6-22-94

Attached for your information is a memorandum from Jack Howard summarizing the status of our nuclear weapons cooperation with France and the methods available (together with some of the associated problems) for withdrawing these weapons from French forces.

Att.

Spurgeon Keeny

cc: RWKomer/BKSmith - w/att.
CEJohnson - w/att.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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March 11, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

THROUGH: U - The Under Secretary
S/S -

FROM: S - Mr. Acheson

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-180
By CG, NARA, Date 9-23-94

Our group wishes to submit to you a matter of policy on which your instruction will facilitate our work. It concerns the best way of developing the statement in the President's reply to General de Gaulle that his "action raises grave questions regarding the whole relationship between the responsibilities and benefits of the Alliance."

As we understand it the purpose of this sentence was to begin creating an uneasiness in France that the General's policies were isolating her.

One way of developing the theme stated in the President's letter is through the legal argument that commitments to France under Article V may be diminished by France's default on arrangements made under Article III to make mutual aid under V possible and effective. We recommend an alternative approach for the following reasons:

1. The precise terms of Article V do not provide for much protection. This, indeed, was the European complaint against the Treaty - led by France - in 1950. It was the U. S. troop commitment under the Unified Command and U. S. and Soviet nuclear capability which created the reality of "automatic response" to armed attack. We warn against turning the searchlight of argument upon what Article V was thought to mean in 1949 and what it has become thought to mean over the intervening years.

2.

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- 2 -

2. The threat - expressed or implied - to deny France the "protection" of Article V lacks credibility. If the danger of attack is thought of as coming from the USSR, the protection of our other allies carries with it the protection of France. If it is thought of as a possible future danger from Germany, should NATO decay, we can hardly say, or even suggest, that now.

Our alternative proposal is to create a possible two-pronged worry in the French mind, one relating to meeting actual trouble, the other to effective participation in the deterrence of trouble.

Regarding the first, our position would be that if the French view of their obligation as a party to the NATO is that France "would be found fighting beside the other members if one of them was the victim of unprovoked aggression," she would readily understand it if the other members construed their obligation to France in the same way. If asked what this meant we could answer that it seemed to mean that the likelihood of trouble was not sufficient to justify joint planning and preparation and that if and when France might make a claim of unprovoked aggression against her that would be the proper time to consider it on the facts.

We should go on to the second point by saying that we regretted such a narrow conception of the purpose of the Treaty. It was at the instance of an earlier French Government that the allies concluded that to meet armed attack when it occurred was not enough, even if it were successfully accomplished. What was even more essential was to deter the making of such an attack. To achieve both purposes the allies established the unified command and unified forces in being with their essential supports. The same subject inspires current efforts to extend the same principles to all armaments. It is hard for us to believe that the French Government will for long deprive itself of participation in so vital a part of the defense of France, no matter how unlikely danger may seem.

In short,

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- 3 -

In short, the position recommended is that we should not argue about the legal position of France under Article V, but rather focus attention on the de facto second-class position which de Gaulle has chosen for France in the actual operation of the Alliance. This second-class position will be dramatized if we can demonstrate, after French obstructionism has been removed from NATO, that the organization will move vigorously forward to become an effective instrument of military security and play an important role in developing a common European policy for the Alliance -- France being absent from these important decisions and endeavors by her own decision.

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DE RUEHC 8107 0681730
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO WHITE HOUSE
O 091610Z

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1966 MAR 9 17 37

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5628 IMMEDIATE
INFO RUQMGR/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 126
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 167
RUFKC/AMEMBASSY BONN 762
RUFJER/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 517
RUFDDH/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 116
RUFJEB/AMEMBASSY HAGUE 475
RUFJCX/AMEMBASSY LISBON 102
RUDSC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1005
RUFKLU/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 376F
RUFKCC/AMEMBASSY OSLO 91
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 116
RUDIHS/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 59
RUFJAB/AMEMBASSY ROME 659
STATE GRNC
BT
UNCLAS MARCH 9

SUBJ: NATO-FRANCE

FOLLOWING COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING TODAY, FRENCH MININFO
BOURGES MADE FOLLOWING POINTS TO PRESS:

1. SINCE NOT FEASIBLE DISCUSS EFFECTIVE REFORM OF NATO,
"FRANCE INTENDS ITSELF TO TAKE MEASURES IT CONSIDERS INDISPENSABLE,
TAKING ACCOUNT AT SAME TIME OF INTERNATIONAL SITUATION OF ITS
RESOLUTION TO REESTABLISH ON ITS TERRITORY ITS FULL SOVERIGNTY."
THIS CONCERNS ASSIGNMENT OF FRENCH FORCES TO NATO, FRENCH PARTICIPATION
IN NATO COMMANDS, AND ALLIED FORCES STATIONED ON FRENCH TERRITORY.

PAGE 2 RUFJC 514 UNCLAS

2. GENERAL DE GAULLE SENT LETTER MARCH 7 TO US PRESIDENT, O
SIMILAR LETTERS WILL BE SENT MARCH 9 TO "OTHER CHIEFS OF ALLIED GOVTS,"
AND ALL MEMBERS OF NATO WILL SHORTLY RECEIVZ DETAILED AND SPECIFIC
NOTE.

3. FRENCH GOVT IS READY TO ENGAGE IN ALL USEFUL DISCUSSIONS
WITH ALLIED GOVTS REGARDING PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF MEASURES
IT PROPOSES TO TAKE AND OF DISPOSITIONS TO BE PROVIDED FOR IN
CASE OF CONFLICT.

4. "FRANCE DOES NOT REPEAT NOT INTEND TO MAKE USE OF CLAUSE OF
NATO TREATY WHICH AUTHORIZES DENUNCIATION OF TREATY ON APRIL 4,
1969. ATLANTIC ALLIANCE WILL THEREFORE CONTINUE AS FAR AS FRANCE
IS CONCERNED.

5. IN SPITE OF WHAT SOME MAY THINK, TIMING OF THIS MOVE IN NO
WAY RELATED TO PAST EVENTS SUCH AS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
NOR TO FUTURE EVZNTS SUCH AS GENERAL DE GAULLE'S TRIP TO RUSSIA.

BOHLEN
BT

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Action

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NNNNVV FHE265VV OLA627
PP RUEHC RUEHCR RUQMGU RUQMAT RUDIHS
DE RUFHOL 338/1 0671435
ZNY SSSSS
P R 081400Z
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC (2731) PRIORITY
INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 780
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 942
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 271
ZEN/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 1055
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 312
ZEN/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 183
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 51
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 33
ZEN/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 22
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY LISBON 16
RUDMSO/AMEMBASSY OSLO 20
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 25
RUDIHS/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 10
BT

006973
1966 MAR 8 AM 11 39

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-96
By inf, NARA, Date 8-12-94

~~SECRET~~ MAR 8. SECTION ONE OF TWO

PARIS FOR NATUS, CRAWFORD AND JAMES

EXDIS

SUBJ: POLICY TOWARD FRENCH-NATO MOVES

REF: EMBTEL 2726

FROM FRG ACTING FONMIN CARSTENS' REMARKS REPORTED IN THE REFTTEL, IT IS APPARENT THAT THE FRG SHARES WITH THE US A STRONG BASIC INTEREST IN PRESERVING AN INTEGRATED NATO WITH OR WITHOUT FRANCE. THEY DO NOT WISH TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE FRENCH MOVE TO CREATE A NATIONAL ARMY. AT THE SAME TIME, AS SUGGESTED IN EMBTEL 2692,

PAGE TWO RUFHOL 338/1 ~~SECRET~~

THERE ARE LIKELY TO BE DIFFERENCES OF EMPHASIS BETWEEN THE GERMANS AND OURSELVES ON SPECIFIC ISSUES PRECIPITATE BY DE GAULLE'S ACTIONS.

IN OUR JUDGEMENT, THE FRG WILL DESIRE TO RETAIN THE TWO FRENCH DIVISIONS NOW ON GERMAN TERRITORY, IF THIS CAN BE DONE ON A NON-OCCUPATION BASIS WHICH OFFERS TANGIBLE SECURITY BENEFITS FOR GERMANY AND THE ALLIANCE, INCLUDING BERLIN. WE, IN TURN,

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-2- 2731, MARCH 8 (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM BONN

WOULD APPEAR TO HAVE AN INTEREST IN RETAINING AS MANY OF OUR PRESENT INSTALLATIONS IN FRANCE AS POSSIBLE -- ASSUMING THIS CAN BE DONE UNDER CONDITIONS WHICH MEET OUR MINIMUM OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS. ON THESE TWO KEY ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM, OUR TWO COUNTRIES PRESUMABLY WILL, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH EACH OTHER AND OUR OTHER KEY ALLIES, WISH TO WORK OUT SOLUTIONS WHICH MEET OUR RESPECTIVE NATIONAL NEEDS. WE BOTH SHARE A VITAL INTEREST IN DOING THIS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO AVOID PREJUDICING THE FUTURE OF AN INTEGRATED NATO.

AFTER CONSIDERING GERMAN INTERESTS AND OUR OWN, AND STUDYING THE POINTS MADE BY AMB BOHLEN AND AMB BRUCE, I WOULD LIKE TO SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS. FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF BONN, I BELIEVE THEY SHOULD PROVIDE A MEANS OF COUNTERACTING THE FRENCH

PAGE THREE RUFHOL 338/1 ~~SECRET~~
MOVES WHILE MAINTAINING US-GERMAN UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION -- THE SINE QUA NON IN PRESERVING A STRONG NATO.

A. BILATERAL US-FRENCH ARRANGEMENTS - I AM PERSUADED THAT THE GERMANS, AND PROBABLY OUR OTHER ALLIES, WOULD WISH US TO SETTLE OUR BILATERAL BASE PROBLEM WITH THE FRENCH ON A PRAGMATIC BASIS, PROVIDED THERE IS ADEQUATE ADVANCE CONSULTATION WITH THEM ON THE BROADER NATO ASPECTS. OUR OBJECTIVE SHOULD, I BELIEVE, BE TO PRESERVE AS MUCH OF WHAT WE NOW HAVE AS POSSIBLE -- BY NOT STANDING TOO UNYIELDINGLY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF US COMMAND OF FACILITIES SUCH AS THE LOC PIPELINE, RELATIVELY STATIC SUPPLY DEPOTS, OR OF OTHER INSTALLATIONS WHERE OPERATIONAL CONTROL IN PEACETIME IS NOT VITAL. CONSIDERING DE GAULLE'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT I BELIEVE WE CAN ASSUME THESE CAN BE USED IN TIME OF WAR. THOSE FACILITIES OVER WHICH WE MUST RETAIN CONTROL -- THAT ARE STILL NEEDED -- WE MUST OF COURSE BE PREPARED TO MOVE. THE GERMANS ALREADY HAVE ACCEPTED IN THEIR DEPOTS IN FRANCE MANY OF THE CONDITIONS WHICH THE FRENCH NOW WISH TO IMPOSE ON US. I THINK THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT OUR JUDGEMENT IN DETERMINING HOW FAR WE CAN GO IN MEETING FRENCH DEMANDS IN OUR BILATERAL AGREEMENTS, PARTICULARLY AS THEY AFFECT OPERATIONAL

PAGE FOUR RUFHOL 338/1 ~~SECRET~~
UNITS.

B. FRENCH TROOPS IN GERMANY - THE QUESTION OF THE TWO FRENCH DIVISIONS IN THE FRG IS MORE COMPLEX SINCE THE BASIS OF THEIR PRESENCE IS MULTILATERAL RATHER THAN BILATERAL. WE AND THE

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-3- 2731, MARCH 8 (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM BONN

BRITISH WILL WISH TO STUDY, TOGETHER WITH THE GERMANS, THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ANY FRENCH TAMPERING WITH THE PARIS AGREEMENTS OF 1954. AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE, HOWEVER, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE SHOULD VIEW THE QUESTION OF THE CONTINUED STATIONING OF FRENCH TROOPS IN GERMANY AS A MATTER FOR THE GERMANS TO DECIDE IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR NATIONAL INTEREST, SO LONG AS THEY CONTINUE TO ADHERE TO THE LONDON AND PARIS AGREEMENTS WHICH, CARSTENS MADE CLEAR, THEY FULLY INTEND TO DO. IF THE FRG, AS WE EXPECT, ELECTS TO PERMIT THE FRENCH TO REMAIN, WE SHOULD URGE THE GERMANS, USING THE RELATIVELY STRONG LEVERAGE THEY SHOULD HAVE ARISING OUT OF THE APPARENT FRENCH DESIRE TO STAY. TO ASSURE THAT THE FRENCH MAINTAIN THEIR LIVE OAK COMMITMENTS, UNDERTAKE WHATEVER SPECIFIC DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITIES SEEM DESIREABLE, AND, AS DE GAULLE INTIMATED IN HIS LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT, ENGAGE IN CONTINGENCY PLANNING WITH NATO OR AT LEAST CONSISTENT WITH NATO PLANNING. WE SHALL WISH TO STRESS THAT REGARDLESS OF

PAGE FIVE RUFHOL 338/1 ~~SECRET~~

THE STATUS OF FRENCH TROOPS, THE STATUS OF US AND BRITISH TROOPS IN GERMANY WILL REMAIN UNCHANGED, AS WILL OUR ADHERENCE TO THE SAME AGREEMENTS.

C. INTEGRATED HEADQUARTERS IN FRANCE- NOW THAT THE FRENCH INTENTION TO WITHDRAW FROM INTEGRATED MILITARY OPERATIONS IS CONFIRMED, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD MAKE PLANS TO REMOVE SHAPE AND OTHER INTEGRATED HEADQUARTERS FROM FRENCH SOIL AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE, PREFERABLY TO THE LOW COUNTRIES.

(I ASSUME THAT THIS, IN ANY EVENT, WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE FRENCH DEMANDS WHEN THEY ARE SPELLED OUT.) GERMANY WOULD PROBABLY NOT WISH TO ACT AS HOST AT THE PRESENT SINCE SUCH AN IMPLICATION OF GERMAN LEADERSHIP WOULD MAKE ITS RELATIONS WITH THE OTHER NATO COUNTRIES MORE DIFFICULT. AS LONG AS SUCH HEADQUARTERS REMAIN IN FRANCE, THE ALLIANCE REMAINS SUBJECT TO FRENCH PRESSURE AND THREATS.

GP-3 MCGHEE

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

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1966 MAR 8 AM 11 55

VV FHE267VV OLA628
PP RUEHC RUEHCR RUQMGU RUQMAT RUDIHS
DE RUFHOL 338/2 0671435
ZNY SSSSS
P R 081400Z
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2731 PRIORITY
INFO RUDICR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 780
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 942
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 271
ZEN/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 1055
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 312
ZEN/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 183
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 51
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 33
ZEN/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 22
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY LISBON 16
RUDMSO/AMEMBASSY OSLO 20
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 25
RUDIHS/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 10
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~~SECRET~~ MAR 8. /SECTION TWO OF TWO/

PARIS FOR NATUS, CRAWFORD AND JAMES

EXDIS

D. FRANCE AND NATO - IN REACTION TO DE GAULLE'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF MARCH 7 WE SHOULD, I BELIEVE, AS HAS BEEN SUGGESTED BY THE DEPT IN DEPCIRTEL 1644 AND EMPHASIZED BY AMB BRUCE IN LONDON TEL 4194, DRAW A LINE BETWEEN OUR TRADITIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FRENCH PEOPLE AND ACTIONS WHICH STEM FROM THE UNIQUE PERSONALITY OF DE GAULLE. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD FORECLOSE THE POSSIBILITY OF THESE ACTIONS BEING REVERSIBLE

PAGE TWO RUFHOL 338/2 ~~SECRET~~

ONCE DE GAULLE HAS RETIRED FROM THE SCENE. ON THE OTHER HAND I AGREE HEATILY WITH AMB BOHLEN THAT WE SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO SHIELD DE GAULLE FROM THE FULL IMPACT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS ACTIONS. WE MUST NOT ONLY TELL HIM PRIVATELY BUT MAKE CLEAR TO THE WORLD THE GRAVE DISSERVICE HE DOES WESTERN DEFENSE AND ATLANTIC UNITY BY HIS FAR-REACHING ACTIONS. THIS IS DESIRABLE NOT ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF IMPRESSING ON THE FRENCH PEOPLE THE ENORMITY OF WHAT DE GAULLE HAS DONE AS BACKGROUND FOR THEIR OWN ELECTIONS BUT FOR OTHER EUROPEANS, PARTICULARLY THE

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-2- 2731, MARCH 8 (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM BONN

GERMANS. THIS WILL TAKE AWAY THE AMMUNITION OF GERMAN GAULLISTS SUCH AS ADENAUER, WHO HAVE IN THE PAST TENDED TO ACT AS APOLOGISTS FOR DE GAULLE AND BLAME THE LACK OF UNDERSTANDING BY GERMANY, THE US, AND OTHER WESTERN NATIONS FOR HIS ACTIONS.

ON THE OTHER HAND, WE SHALL WISH TO LEAVE THE DOOR OPEN FOR FRANCE TO RESUME ITS FULL ALLIANCE ROLE. WE SHOULD NOT SEEK TO ISOLATE FRANCE POLITICALLY. IT WOULD NOT BE IN OUR INTEREST TO PERMIT THE DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS WHICH MUST NOW ENSUE TO PARALYZE THE COMMON MARKET OR DESTROY WHAT EUROPEAN AND ATLANTIC UNITY HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN OTHER AREAS. IN PARTICULAR,

PAGE THREE RUFHOL 338/2 ~~SECRET~~

IT SEEMS TO ME EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT WE MINIMIZE THE DAMAGE THAT MIGHT BE DONE TO THE FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONSHIP (EMBTTEL 2266), APART FROM GEN DE GAULLE'S OWN PERSONAL ROLE IN IT.

I ASSUME THAT WE WOULD NOT WISH TO EXPELL FRANCE FROM NATO. CERTAINLY THE GERMANS WOULD NOT. IF WE SOUGHT LEGALLY TO EXCLUDE FRANCE FROM THE QUALIFIED PROTECTION OFFERED BY ARTICLE V WHILE FRANCE REMAINED TECHNICALLY A MEMBER OF THE ALLIANCE, IT WOULD, IN MY OPINION, AMOUNT TO EXPULSION. INSTEAD, WE MIGHT OFFICIALLY INFORM FRANCE THAT THE ACTION IT PROPOSES RAISES A QUESTION AS TO OUR ABILITY, IN THE ABSENCE OF FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN ALLIANCE PLANNING, TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE ARTICLE V PROTECTION IN FRANCE. WE SHOULD, HOWEVER, KEEP IN MIND THAT THERE ARE DISADVANTAGES TO DOING THIS, WHICH MAY BE SIGNIFICANT:

(1) IT MAY APPEAR NOT ONLY TO THE FRENCH BUT TO OUR OTHER ALLIES AS WELL THAT THE FACTS OF GEOGRAPHY WOULD RENDER THIS POSITION VIRTUALLY MEANINGLESS IF RESTRICTED TO FRANCE; (2) TO THE DEGREE THAT IT WOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY ALLIES OTHER THAN THE FRENCH WOULD FEAR THE CONSEQUENCES OF ITS DECLARATION FOR THEIR OWN INTERESTS.

E. CONSULTATIONS - OUR DECISION AS TO THE INTENSITY AND LEVEL

PAGE FOUR RUFHOL 338/2 ~~SECRET~~

OF THE CONSULTATIONS WHICH MUST NOW BE UNDERTAKEN SHOULD, IT IS BELIEVED, BE BASED ON A JUDGMENT AS TO WHETHER WE SEE MORE ADVANTAGE FROM DRAMATIZATION OF THE NATO REACTION -- OR FROM PLAYING IT IN LOW KEY. SINCE WE CAN NO LONGER EXPECT TO DISSUADE

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-3- 2731, MARCH 8 (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM BONN

DE GAULLE FROM MAKING HIS MOVE, WE MUST SEEK NOW TO MINIMIZE THE DAMAGE -- WHICH WILL REQUIRE THE MAINTENANCE OF WORKING RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH. ON THE OTHER HAND WE MUST BE REALISTIC IN PUBLICLY ASSESSING THE DAMAGE. A PROGRAM SUCH AS SUGGESTED BY THE BRITISH WOULD MAKE FOR MAXIMUM DRAMATIZATION AND WOULD, I TAKE IT, BE CONSISTENT WITH THE SUGGESTIONS MADE BY AMBS BOHLEN AND BRUCE THAT DE GAULLE'S ACTIONS NOT BE MINIMIZED. I WOULD THINK, HOWEVER, THAT WE SHOULD FIRST MAKE SURE, THROUGH BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND TOP LEVELS OF OTHER NATO COUNTRIES, THAT A CONSENSUS FAVORS THIS APPROACH, AND THAT THERE IS, AS WELL, AN AREA OF BROAD AGREEMENT ON SUBSTANCE.

GP-3. MCGHEE

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

MAR 8 6 40 PM '66

~~SECRET~~

04957

87
Origin
Info

ACTION: CIRCULAR 1696
Ambassy PARIS IMMEDIATE

INFO: All NATO Capitals

002

~~ENDIS~~ DELIVER AMB, CLEVELAND by 8 AM, MARCH 9

~~STATUS~~

REF: Paris 5541

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-96

By W8, NARA, Date 8-12-94

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

1. Formal receipt de Gaulle letter to President requires US take cognizance in NAC of French position on NATO and on US installations in France. De Gaulle letter itself is not bill of particulars, but general declaration of policy and intentions putting US on notice of French terms of reference for discussions to come rather than initiating those discussions. Immediate focus must therefore be on tone and content President's reply rather than premature implementation specific contingency plans.

2. In dealing with situation, US objectives are:

- a. Communicate seriousness with which US views potentialities of situation.
- b. Leave no doubt as to our view that entire Alliance involved.
- c. Make clear that Alliance business can proceed regardless of ~~France~~ France.
- d. Retain maximum flexibility to deal with specifics of situation as they may later ~~develop~~ develop.

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

EUR/RPM:RWE:cbm:pk:3/7/66

4683

classification approved by:

The Under Secretary

Clearances:

EUR/RPM - Mr. Spiers

S/S- Mr. Thompson

EUR - ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Mr. Leddy

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

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~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

to make statements. When such statements have been made, ~~Robert~~ ^{Roberts} would propose that Council move on to formal agenda, including Vietnam briefing, thus preserving the appearance of business as usual.

5. FYI. We do not wish to take a decision to make NAC the ^{immediate} focus of further consultations on the developing French/NATO problem, particularly since France itself is a participant in the NAC. At the present point, this subject is a matter of communications and discussions at highest levels among capitals and for time being we wish to retain option of proceeding in this manner. End FYI.

6. With respect to meeting, we understand ~~Robert~~ ^{de Staerke} has called for Friday to discuss UK draft declaration, you should be aware of our strong desire to let the British take the lead on this question. As you know, we are prepared to accept the declaration as it stands.

7. Foregoing instructions ~~will~~ ^{take} account of Cleveland telcons with ~~Secretary~~ ^{Secretary and Under Secretary}.

END.

RUSK

GP-3.

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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04952

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Origin
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Info:

ACTION: Circular 1697 IMMEDIATE
All NATO Capitals

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-96

MAR 8 6 42 PM '66

By ing, NARA, Date 8-12-94

EXDIS

Following is FYI summary of developments yesterday on France and NATO problem:

to Eohlen, March 7

1) Couve delivered/de Gaulle letter to President Johnson. Letter contained no surprises and did not deal in specifics. It stated France expects remain, when time comes, UNQTE ~~French QTE~~ ~~French QTE~~ party to NATO Treaty but that France considers changes which have taken place since 1949 no longer justified military arrangements adopted after conclusion QTE of the Alliance UNQTE, whether in form of multi-lateral conventions or agreements between US and France. For this reason France QTE proposes to recover the entire exercise of her sovereignty UNQTE which is presently impaired by permanent presence allied military elements or by constant utilization which is made of her air space, to terminate her participation in QTE integrated commands UNQTE and no longer to place her forces at disposal of NATO. France is ready to have understandings as to military facilities to be mutually accorded in case of conflict and as to conditions of cooperation in event of common action QTE especially in Germany UNQTE. Letter stated France would be in touch with US on all these points

2) President made text of letter available to Wilson, Moro, and Erhard, informing them that he was telling General de Gaulle that his letter raised

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Drafted by: EUR:RPM:RISpiers:gw.3/8/66	Tel. Ext. 4307	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: U- George W. Ball
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Clearances:

EUR - Mr. Laddy

S/S - Mr. Thompson

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most serious questions for all of us and that US was promptly consulting our partners in Alliance. President's letter to de Gaulle, which was delivered by Under Secretary evening of March 7 to Amb. Lucet, stated that since de Gaulle's letter raised serious questions affecting not only French and American people but all people of NATO alliance, he must, therefore, ask Allies for comments. Also said letter raised far-reaching questions about relations between responsibilities and benefits of Alliance but did not rpt not as reported in today's Washington Post, get into substantive questions. Copies of de Gaulle's letter also made available to Belgian and Dutch FonMins with oral message from Secretary, making same points as President's letters to Erhard, Moro and Wilson.

3) In delivering de Gaulle letter to Amb. Bohlen, Couve indicated that similar letters would be written to certain others (British, Germans and Italians) during this week, and that next week all fourteen governments would receive diplomatic note which would spell out French plans in more detail. Couve gave no direct and clear answer to Bohlen's query whether de Gaulle's letter represented denunciation of agreements or proposal for negotiation.

4) British Ambassador saw Secretary, leaving text of draft declaration of fourteen Heads of Govt (Circular 1692). Secretary said US could accept

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accept British draft declaration as it stands and suggested British circulate it to others and get their reactions. US would become formally involved in process only later in order to avoid implications of Anglo-US initiative. Secretary suggested best timing for issuance would be after all Heads of Govt had received communication from de Gaulle.

All addressees will recognize extreme sensitivity of foregoing info and need to handle it with great care.

GP-3.

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RUSK

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Origin
SS
Info

ACTION: CIRCULAR 1692
All NATO Capitals
AmEmbassy MOSCOW

PRIORITY

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-96

By 100, NARA, Date 8-12-94

MAR 8 2 42 PM '66

REF: Circular 1691

EXDIS

There follows text of draft declaration of the fourteen Heads of Government proposed by UK for Allied consideration:

QTE We, the Heads of Government of fourteen countries, parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, make the following solemn declaration on behalf of our Governments and peoples:

QTE The North Atlantic Treaty and the Organization established under it are both alike essential to the safety and security of our countries.

QTE The Atlantic Alliance, unlike any previous alliance in history, has ensured its efficacy as an instrument of defense and deterrence by the maintenance in peace-time of an integrated and interdependent military organization, in which the efforts and resources of each are combined for the common security of all. No substitute for this Organization can be found in bilateral arrangements between national Governments.

QTE We are convinced that this Organization is essential and will continue. To this end we affirm that we regard and shall continue to regard the North Atlantic Treaty as being of indefinite duration.

Drafted by: EUR:RFM:RPGilman:bje 3/7/66	Tel. Ext. 3434	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Secretary
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EUR - Mr. Schaetzel

U - Mr. Ball

S/S - Mr. Thompson

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QTE The North Atlantic Treaty and the Organization are not merely instruments of the common defense. They express the shared political interests of the member countries of the North Atlantic community and their readiness and determination to consult and act together wherever possible in the furtherance of international peace, progress and prosperity.

UNQTE.

GP-3 END

RUSK

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

18

~~SECRET~~

Action

EUF CONTROL: 6682
info RECEIVED: MARCH 08 7:55AM
FROM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
SS
G ACTION: DEPARTMENT 2691
SP
SAH
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SECRET MAR 8

NSC REF DEPTTEL 2085

1. SOVIETS STARTED DOWN ROAD OF BILATERAL EXPLOITATION OF DE GAULLE'S DISRUPTIVE VALUE OVER A YEAR AGO. I BELIEVE BASIS CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING VALUE THEIR APPROACH TO HIM EXPRESSED IN EMBTEL.

2283 OF FEBRUARY 6, 1965 REMAIN VALID. IF DE GAULLE SHOULD IN FACT PROCEED, ALONG LINES ENVISAGED DEPTTEL 2081 SOVIETS WILL CONSIDER THEY ARE HITTING EVEN LARGER VEIN OF PAY DIRT THAN THEY INITIALLY EXPECTED AND WILL ATTEMPT DERIVE EVERY POSSIBLE ADVANTAGE THEREFROM.

RSR

2. AS DEPARTEMENT AWARE, SOVIET EFFORTS TO WEAKEN NATO HAVE BEEN EVIDENT FOR YEARS. NOT ONLY HAVE SOVIETS CONTINUOUSLY DWELT ON DIVISIVE SUBJECTS, NOTABLY THOSE ON WHICH THEIR AND DE GAULLE'S VIEWS COINCIDE, BUT THEY HAVE ALSO CLEARLY RECONFIRMED, AS RECENTLY AS TWO WEEKS AGO IN CONVERSATIONS WITH WILSON (EMBTEL 2662), THAT REDUCTIONS OF US PRESENCE IN EUROPE IS ONE OF BASIC AIMS THEIR FOREIGN POLICY. THUS THEY WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PLAY GAME WITH DE GAULLE AS FAR AS THEY PROFITABLY CAN TOWARD THIS END.

3. AT SAME TIME, I BELIEVE THAT SOVIETS CONTINUE HAVE NO ILLUSION THAT MAJOR PROBLEMS CAN BE SETTLED WITH FRANCE ALONE. THEREFORE/ THEY WILL DESIGN THEIR TACTICS WITH DE GAULLE IN SUCH WAY AS WOULD IN THEIR VIEW PROFITABLY ADVANCE THEIR BROADER OBJECTIVES.

4. IN PARTICULAR, I BELIEVE THAT SOVIET REACTION TO ANY PROPOSAL BY DE GAULLE FOR A NAP WOULD BE CONDITIONED BY REACTION OF OTHER 14 MEMBERS OF NATO TO DE GAULLE'S MOVES. IN REAL SENSE, SOVIET INTEREST IS BROADER THAT ESTABLISHING BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH FRANCE AND I INCLINED BELIEVE THAT, AT LEAST INITIALLY, SOVIETS WOULD SEEK COUNTER SUCH PROPOSAL BY BROADER PROPOSAL DEALING WITH EUROPEAN SECURITY IN WHICH THEY MIGHT THINK FRENCH POSITION COULD INFLUENCE A MORE GENERAL MOVEMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE AWAY FROM PURELY NATO ARRANGEMENTS.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 92-502

By *pl/gw*, NARA, Date 3/25/94

-2- 2691, MARCH 8. FROM MOSCOW.

5. ONE OF BASIC REASONS WHY SOVIETS WISH SEE NATO DISRUPTED IS OF COURSE THEIR PREOCCUPATION WITH GERMAN PROBLEM. CONSEQUENTLY IF THEY SHOULD DETECT ANY MOVE WITHIN ALLIANCE TO BUILD UP FRG IN ORDER TO HAVE IT FILL GAP LEFT BY FRANCE, THEY WILL PROBABLY THINK TWICE BEFORE MAKING ANY DEAL WITH DE GUALLE THAT WOULD PROMOTE SUCH NET RESULT.

6. IN SUM, I BELIEVE THAT STRONG MANIFESTATION BY OTHER NATO MEMBERS OF UNITY AND OF DETERMINATION TO PURSUE THEIR BASIC OBJECTIVES DESPITE FRENCH MOVES, ABOVE ALL UNANIMOUS REFUSAL TO ENTER INTO BILATERAL DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS WITH FRANCE, WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT DETERRENT FACTOR IN SOVIET THINKING AS TO HOW FAR THEY SHOULD GO WITH DE GUALLE. KOHLE

ADD 3 CHINA, WASHINGTON

BARNETT URGED THAT THE U.S. "TAKE THE INITIATIVE" IN BRINGING RED CHINA INTO THE UNITED NATIONS AND PERMIT U.S. TRADE WITH CHINA ON NON-STRATEGIC ITEMS. HE FORECAST THE PROSPECT OF MORE MODERATE COMMUNIST POLICIES AFTER THE DEATH OF MAO TSE TUNG AND HIS ELDERLY FELLOW-CHINESE LEADERS.

CHAIRMAN J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, D-ARK., A SHARP CRITIC OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S VIET NAM MILITARY POLICY, CALLED BARNETT'S LENGTHY STATEMENT A "VERY BEAUTIFUL INTRODUCTION" TO THE HEARINGS. BUT HE FOUND THE WITNESS, IN QUESTIONING, NOT IN AGREEMENT WITH SOME OF HIS OWN ASSUMPTIONS.

BARNETT TOLD FULBRIGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT WESTERN INFLUENCE IN PRE-COMMUNIST CHINA WAS "NOT COLONIAL." WHEN THE CHAIRMAN SUGGESTED IT HAD BEEN DESCRIBED AS "MUCH WORSE" BECAUSE WESTERN POWERS USED CHINA WITHOUT ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT, THE WITNESS REPLIED:

"I DON'T THINK I'D AGREE WITH THAT--I THINK CHINA WOULD HAVE OPPOSED A GREATER TAKEOVER."

HE ALSO TOLD THE CHAIRMAN THAT CONTROL OF EARLY CHINA'S TARIFFS BY WESTERN NATIONS WAS "THE PATTERN OF THE 19TH CENTURY AND WAS CARRIED OUT IN MUCH MORE EXTREME MANNER IN OTHER AREAS."

WHILE BARNETT REGISTERED FULBRIGHT'S OWN CONCERN ABOUT ESCALATING THE VIET NAM WAR, HE SAID JOHNSON'S PROMISE OF "MEASURED USE OF FORCE" AND AN ABSENCE OF "MINDLESS ESCALATION" WAS A "WISE POSTURE FOR US TO ADOPT."

"THIS STAND IS EXCELLENT, AS FAR AS IT GOES," HE SAID. "BUT IN MY OPINION WE SHOULD GO STILL FURTHER, ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO POLICY TOWARD CHINA, AND...WE SHOULD ALTER OUR BASIC POSTURE TOWARD THE CHINESE COMMUNIST REGIME FROM ONE OF CONTAINMENT PLUS ISOLATION TO ONE OF CONTAINMENT WITHOUT ISOLATION."

THAT POLICY, HE SAID, "WOULD AIM ON THE ONE HAND AT CHECKING MILITARY OR SUBVERSIVE THREATS AND PRESSURES EMANATING FROM PEKING BUT AT THE SAME TIME WOULD AIM AT MAXIMUM CONTACTS WITH AND MAXIMUM INVOLVEMENT OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY."

QUESTIONED BY SEN. JOHN SPARKMAN, D-ALA., HE SAID HE BELIEVES RED CHINA REGARDS INDIA AS NEITHER AN "ACTUAL THREAT TO CHINA" OR AS A POTENTIAL THREAT--BUT AS A "COMPETITOR IN THE BROAD POLITICAL SENSE." HE SAID HE DOES NOT THINK CHINA IS MOTIVATED BY A NEED FOR GREATER "LIVING ROOM"--BUT THAT IF SHE WERE, SHE WOULD MOVE SOUTH RATHER THAN NORTH."

3/8--GE&DP1216PES

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

WH 20
#9

~~SECRET~~

Action

CONTROL: 6694
RECD: MARCH 8, 1966, 8:24 AM

Info

FROM: BRUSSELS
ACTION: SECSTATE PRIORITY 1069

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-233
By us NARA, Date 6-6-03

~~SECRET~~ MAR 08

N O D I S

1. SAW SPAAK 9:30 A.M. MARCH 08. AFTER HE HAD READ DE GAULLE'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT HE COMMENTED THAT IT WAS NOW NO LONGER POSSIBLE TO DOUBT FACT THAT GENERAL IS MENTALLY ABNORMAL. HE THEN EXPRESSED IMPATIENCE AND REGRET OVER LIMITATIONS PLACED ON HIM BY CURRENT BELGIAN GOVT CRISIS. SPAAK EXPRESSED WARM APPRECIATION FOR AND AGREEMENT WITH SECRETARY'S ORAL MESSAGE.
2. SPAAK SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE 24 HOURS FOR REFLECTION BEFORE GIVING ME HIS CONSIDERED REACTION. NEVERTHELESS HE MADE FOLLOWING POINTS IN COURSE OF HALF HOUR EXCHANGE.
3. USG IS "100 PERCENT CORRECT AND WISE" IN TAKING POSITION THAT PROBLEM AND CRISIS ARE BETWEEN FRANCE AND OTHER 14 NATO NATIONS AND NOT RPT BETWEEN FRANCE AND US. IT IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT USG ADHERE TO THIS POSITION.
4. SPAAK SAID DE GAULLE'S MESSAGE IS CRYSTAL CLEAR AND TIME HAS COME WHEN "14" MUST STAND UP AND CONFRONT GENERAL. HE EXPRESSED VIEW THAT ONCE CONTENTS OF GENERAL'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BECOME GENERALLY KNOWN, GOVERNMENTS OF 14 SHOULD INDIVIDUALLY AND PUBLICLY MAKE THEIR POSITION KNOWN EXPRESSING THEIR CONVICTION THAT NATO AND MILITARY INTEGRATION OF THEIR FORCES REMAIN ESSENTIAL TO THEIR SECURITY. DECLARATIONS SHOULD ALSO STATE EACH GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION TO CONSULT AND ACT IN CONCERT WITH OTHER 13.
5. SPAAK OBSERVED THAT SITUATION HAD NOW GONE BEYOND STAGE WHEN IT WOULD HAVE BEEN APPROPRIATE TO CONFRONT FRENCH IN NAC ASKING FOR THEIR POSITION. WHEN I ASKED HIM IF THIS MEANT THAT HE HAD IN MIND A MEETING OF 14 FOREIGN MINISTERS HE ANSWERED AFFIRMATIVELY SAYING THAT WHILE SUCH A MEETING OUTSIDE OF PARIS WOULD BE OPEN CHALLENGE OF DE GAULLE, THIS IS WHAT SITUATION CALLED FOR. HE THOUGHT SUCH MANIFESTATION OF UNITY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- 6694, MARCH 8, FROM BRUSSELS

BETWEEN 14 WOULD NOT ONLY HAVE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ON OUR PUBLIC OPINIONS BUT ALSO ON FRENCH OPINION. SIMULTANEOUSLY SPAAK MADE CLEAR THAT OUR ULTIMATE AIM SHOULD BE TO REINTEGRATE FRANCE INTO NATO AFTER DE GAULLE WILL HAVE DISAPPEARED FROM THE SCENE.

6. IN COURSE OF CONVERSATION SPAAK ASKED ME HOW FAR ALONG WERE US STUDIES CONCERNING MILITARY PROBLEMS CAUSED BY DE GAULLE'S MOVE. HE ASSUMED THAT CONSIDERABLE WORK MUST ALREADY HAVE BEEN DONE. I TOLD HIM THAT THERE HAD INDEED BEEN STAFF WORK IN TERMS OF POSSIBLE CONTINGENCIES BUT THAT THESE STUDIES HAD ALL BEEN PRELIMINARY IN NATURE. I WENT ON TO MENTION THAT HE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED TO HEAR THAT PRELIMINARY STAFF WORK TENDED TO GIVE BENELUX IN GENERAL AND BELGIUM IN PARTICULAR LARGE ROLE IN CONNECTION WITH ANY RELOCATION OF COMMON NATO FACILITIES. SPAAK WAS NOT SURPRISED BUT DID NOT WANT TO COMMENT NOW. GP-1.

KNIGHT

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

W/d 21/8

~~SECRET~~

Action

CONTROL : 6796

Info

RECD : 03 MARCH 1956, 3:14 A.M.

FROM : PARIS

ACTION : SECSTATE 5577

~~SECRET~~ MARCH 8

FOR UNDER SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

MODIS

I WOULD SUGGEST THAT WE ADD TO THE BRITISH DECLARATION A SENTENCE EXPRESSING THE JOINT REGRET OF THE OTHER MEMBERS AT THE FRENCH WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ATLANTIC DEFENSE COMMUNITY. I THINK THE TERM OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE DEFENSE COMMUNITY HAS CERTAIN ADVANTAGES SINCE IT DOES NOT IMMEDIATELY RAISE THE QUESTION OF FRENCH VIOLATION OF THE TREATY PER SE. I BELIEVE THAT THIS ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM, I.E., THE TREATY ITSELF, MUST BE HANDLED WITH THE UTMOST CARE. IT IS MY STRONG BELIEF THAT DE GAULLE'S REAL POSITION IS THE DESIRE TO CUT HIMSELF LOOSE FROM EVERYTHING WHICH BINDS HIM LEGALLY TO THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AND THIS WOULD INVOLVE OF COURSE THE TREATY ITSELF. IN THIS CONNECTION I WOULD REFER TO ENBTET 5422.

YOU WILL HAVE NOTICED THAT IN THE LETTER DE GAULLE RATHER SERIOUSLY QUALIFIES THE COMMITMENT UNDER ARTICLE V WHICH SPEAKS ONLY OF AN "ATTACK" WHEREAS DE GAULLE SAYS THAT HE WOULD BE AT THE SIDE OF HIS ALLIES IN CASE ONE AMONG THEM WAS THE OBJECT OF AN AGGRESSION WHICH HAD NOT BEEN PROVOKED. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT WHAT HE HOPES TO DO IS TO PROVOKE FROM THE REST OF US A POSITION IN REGARD TO THE FURTHER VALIDITY OF THE TREATY WHICH WOULD OFFER HIM AN EXCUSE TO SAY THAT HE HAD BEEN EXCLUDED. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE OF COURSE CANNOT, AS I HAVE ALREADY POINTED OUT, AFFORD TO TREAT THIS BY TURNING THE OTHER CHEEK. IT IS FOR THESE REASONS THAT I WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE FRENCH WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ATLANTIC DEFENSE COMMUNITY SEEMS TO SET FORTH A GOOD SOUND POSITION. IF I RETURN HOME I SHALL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THIS WITH YOU AT MUCH GREATER LENGTH IN WASHINGTON.

GP-3. BOHLEN

BT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 94-83 (#78)
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-16-02

20

WASHINGTON--ADD U.S.-DESGAULLE (10)

IN PARIS A FOREIGN OFFICE SPOKESMAN SAID JOHNSON HAD REPLIED TO DE GAULLE, BUT ADDED THAT THE RESPONSE WAS ONLY A PROVISIONAL ONE NOT GOING INTO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DISPUTE.

DE GAULLE'S DEADLINE OF 1969 FOR A FRENCH TAKE-OVER COINCIDES WITH THE DATE WHEN MEMBERS MAY QUIT THE NATO ORGANIZATION. THE FRENCH PRESIDENT'S LETTER WAS CONSIDERED IN PARIS AS THE OPENING GAMBIT IN HIS DIPLOMATIC CONFRONTATION WITH THE UNITED STATES OVER NATO'S FUTURE.

LT1012AES 3/8

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

wh 23
9

~~SECRET~~

Action

Info

CONTROL: 6699
RECD: MARCH 8, 1966, 8:14 AM

FROM: PARIS
ACTION: SECSTATE IMMEDIATE 5580

~~SECRET~~ MARCH 8.

N O D I S

NATUS

PERSONAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

1. THANKS FOR YOUR 4357. PROMPTNESS, TIME AND SUBSTANCE OF INTERIM REPLY TO DE GAULLE STRIKE ME AS WELL CALCULATED TO STIFFEN ALLIED BACKS. I THOROUGHLY AGREE THAT BRITISH DRAFT DECLARATION IS SO CLOSE TO THE MARK THAT IT IS A GOOD STARTING BASIS. MY SUGGESTED ADDITIONS - ESPECIALLY THE ONE ON GERMANY, ON WHICH SMALLER ALLIES WILL WANT REASSURANCES -- CAN WELL BE DISCUSSED IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATING THE FINAL DRAFT DURING NEXT FEW DAYS.

2. WHAT REACTION, IF ANY, HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE BRITISH ON THEIR SUGGESTION OF A FOREIGN MINISTER'S MEETING IN LONDON THIS WEEK?

3. I HAVE TWO IMMEDIATE CONCERNS:

(A) THAT THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS INCLUDE ALL THE ALLIES IN THE OPENING STAGES TO AVOID THE IMPRESSION OF AN INNER CLUB OF MAJOR POWERS. IT IS IN FACT THE SMALLER MEMBERS WHO MIGHT WAFFLE IF LEFT ON THE OUTSIDE EVEN FOR A FEW DAYS. REQUEST I BE INSTRUCTED TO INFORM OTHER PERMREPS IN COURSE OF TODAY THE GENERAL CONTENT OF DE GAULLE'S LETTER (AS OUTLINED IN PARA 2 OF OURTEL 5567.) UK, FRG, AND ITALY, PLUS BROSCIO ARE ALREADY COVERED BY PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLT 94-83 (#75)
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-16-02

~~SECRET~~

-2- 5580, MARCH 8, FROM PARIS

cn-6699

(B) THAT THE INTEGRITY OF THE COUNCIL AS AN INTERNATIONAL FORUM WITH AN SYG AND INTERNATIONAL STAFF NOT BE COMPROMISED BY BYPASSING THIS FORUM TOO MUCH AS THE SCENARIO UNFOLDS IN NEXT FEW DAYS. I UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT WE SHOULD BE THOROUGHLY FLEXIBLE IN THE EMPLOYMENT FORMALLY AND INFORMALLY OF ANY AND ALL CHANNELS FOR CONSULTATION AND THAT IT WILL BE MORE EFFECTIVE AT MOST STAGES TO WORK WITH SMALLER GROUPS. IT IS ALSO CLEARLY INADVISABLE TO CONDUCT INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE FOURTEEN IN THE PRESENCE OF THE FRENCH DELEGATION. BUT NAC IS THE ESTABLISHED FORUM FOR NATO CONSULTATION AND IT WOULD BE AWKWARD INDEED FOR NAC TO MEET ON MARCH 9 WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE MOST DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENT IN ITS HISTORY WHICH ALREADY IS ON THE FRONT PAGES OF THE LOCAL NEWSPAPERS. THEREFORE REQUEST THAT I BE AUTHORIZED TO NOTIFY THE COUNCIL AS SUCH OF THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS.

4. BELIEVE ABOVE TWO MOVES WOULD PUT US IN POSITION OF MEETING IN FULL OUR OBLIGATIONS TO ALL ALLIES AND TO THE ORGANIZATION ITSELF WHILE MAJOR CONSULTATIONS PROCEED THROUGH A VARIETY OF CHANNELS. IF YOU WOULD PREFER POSTPONING NAC FOR A DAY OR SO WE CAN PROBABLY ARRANGE IT. BUT IT WOULD BE BEST TO GO AHEAD TOMORROW. CLEVELAND
BT

~~SECRET~~

FBIS 51 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FRENCH PRESS

PARIS AFP IN FRENCH 0732Z 8 MAR 66 E

(TEXT) PARIS--THE PARIS MORNING PRESS PLACES EMPHASIS ON THE MESSAGE SENT BY GENERAL DE GAULLE YESTERDAY, MONDAY, TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON. OFFICIAL CIRCLES, LA NATION EMPHASIZES, HAVE NOT REVEALED THE CONTENTS OF THE LETTER FROM THE HEAD OF THE STATE, BUT IT CAN BE SUPPOSED THAT IT CONCERNS THE NATO PROBLEM.

"GENERAL DE GAULLE," PARIS-JOUR DECLARES, "IS ASKING THE AMERICANS TO ACCEPT CONTROL BY FRENCH AUTHORITIES OF THE VARIOUS BASES AND INSTALLATIONS THEY HAVE IN FRANCE...WHY?...BECAUSE WHILE DE GAULLE CONSENTS TO HAVING AMERICANS PARTICIPATE ON OUR TERRITORY IN THE DEFENSE OF THE WEST, HE REFUSES TO PERMIT THEIR PRESENCE EVENTUALLY TO SERVE OTHER ENDS."

LE FIGARO COMMENTS: "IT IS THE DESIRE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC NOT TO ALLOW THINGS TO DRAG ON. BUT THE PROCEDURE MAY NOT BE SO SIMPLE AS IS GENERALLY IMAGINED. THE CAPITALS INVOLVED MIGHT ARGUE THAT THE AGREEMENTS NOW CHALLENGED WERE CONCLUDED INSIDE NATO AND THAT THEY CANNOT BE REVERSED WITHOUT CONSULTATION ON ALL THE PROBLEMS OF THE ALLIANCE....THE PROBLEM POSED BY FRANCE IS NOT, THEREFORE, ABOUT TO BE RESOLVED."

L'AUREORE REMARKS: "THE GENERAL THINKS PERHAPS THAT THERE IS NO LONGER ANY DANGER OF COMMUNIST ABSORPTION FOR EUROPE? GOOD. HE MEANS THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD LEAVE NOW? SO BEIT. THEY WILL GO....THE QUESTION ARISES THEN: TOWARD WHAT OTHER SECURITY FORMULA IS THE MAN NOW GOVERNING US GOING TO TURN? TO WHAT ALTERNATE ALLIANCES? TO WHAT FRIENDSHIPS?"

COMBAT COMMENTS: "DE GAU

LE HAS BEGUN THE PROCEDURE WHICH IS EXPECTED TO LEAD TO A REVISION OF THE TIES BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE....THE GENERAL APPEARS TO BE IN A HURRY, PERHAPS WITH THE INTENTION OF CREATING THE BEST POSSIBLE CONDITIONS DURING HIS VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION."

8 MAR 1431Z CF/GY

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday Lunch Agenda
8 March 1966
1:30 pm

- 25
1. De Gaulle and NATO -- handling of press, consultation with Allies, etc.
 2. Vietnam: a. Civil czar (I am not clear where this stands).
b. Flurry over mining Haiphong.
 3. China Hearings in Senate Foreign Relations -- are we fully prepared?
 4. Guatemala Elections. Rusk may give a brief progress report.
 5. Yemen compromise. Nasser's reply to Feisal.
 6. Copper problem. Ways and Means has Tariff Commission report saying Anaconda is behind import proposals.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By lg, NARA, Date 5-7-90

I. US Domin. of Eur. a figment of
Imagination. History of last 5-8
years hardly suggest US runs Eur.
Included at any time Euro want
US to withdraw from parties in Eur. af.
etc. US happy to do so.

II. It is De Gaulle - not US - who's creating
issue.

III. De G. seems to want all of the benefits
of collective defense with none of the
obligations.

Mr. Komer

Tuesday, March 8, 1966, 11:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

For my money, the attached short cable from Bill Tyler makes a good deal of sense.

I will be in touch with Bill Moyers about your instructions on press handling of the deGaulle problem. So far I have told reporters who are calling in that your interim answer did not say "no" to anything but simply indicated that you regard this as a most serious matter and would be consulting with the other allies.

Francis M. Bator

cc: Messrs. Komer/Moyers

FMB:mst

27a

SECRET

March 7, 1966

CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR TYLER TO SECRETARY RUSK

SUBJECT: FRANCE-NATO

1. I assume that it is in our interest to downgrade importance de Gaulle's role whenever appropriate and possible, so as to make it clear that he cannot call the tune for the Alliance to follow; and that his outmoded ideas are empty posturings insofar as other countries are concerned.
2. With this in mind I question whether it is wise for the fourteen other foreign ministers to rush into a huddle in response to de Gaulle's demarche, as though what he has to say were of critical importance to the prospects of survival of the Alliance.
3. Would it not be better for public consumption to ring the changes on a quote Ho-Hum, ~~We've~~ heard it all before Unquote theme, while of course moving on all together with required consultation both on multilateral and bilateral basis?

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-502
By *fw* NARA, Date 3/25/94

ENR343
OO RUEHEX
DE RUEHC 5999 0661959
ZNY SSSSS
O 071957Z
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE
DE RUENCR 396 0661900
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~~SECRET~~ MARCH 07

66 MAR 7 20 08
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28
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-377
By *g/yw*, NARA, Date 3/25/94

EXDIS - PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING
FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

THERE FOLLOWS EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF GENERAL DE GAULLE'S
HANDWRITTEN LETTER TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON OF MARCH 7, 1966.
ENVELOPE CONTAINING LETTER IS ADDRESSED "HIS EXCELLENCY
MR. LYNDON B. JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA."

"GENERAL DE GAULLE" (EMBOSSSED LETTERHEAD "7 MARCH 1966."

"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

"IN THREE YEARS OUR ATLANTIC ALLIANCE WILL COMPLETE ITS

PAGE 2 RUENCR 396 ~~SECRET~~

FIRST TERM. I AM ANXIOUS TO TELL YOU THAT FRANCE APPRECIATES
THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE SOLIDARITY OF DEFENSE THUS ESTABLISHED
BETWEEN 15 FREE PEOPLES OF THE WEST CONTRIBUTES TO ASSURING
THEIR SECURITY AND, ESPECIALLY WHAT ESSENTIAL ROLE THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA PLAYS IN THIS RESPECT. ACCORDINGLY,
FRANCE INTENDS FROM NOW ON TO REMAIN PARTY TO THE TREATY
SIGNED AT WASHINGTON ON APRIL 4, 1949. THIS MEANS THAT
EXCEPT IN THE EVENT OF DEVELOPMENTS WHICH MIGHT OCCUR IN THE
COURSE OF THE NEXT THREE YEARS TO CHANGE THE FUNDAMENTAL
FACTORS OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, SHE WILL BE IN 1969 AND THERE-
AFTER DETERMINED EVEN AS TODAY TO FIGHT AT THE SIDE OF HER
ALLIES IN CASE ONE OF THEM WILL BE THE OBJECT OF UNPRO-
VOKED AGGRESSION.

"HOWEVER, FRANCE CONSIDERS THE CHANGES WHICH HAVE TAKEN
PLACE OR IN PROCESS OF OCCURRING SINCE 1949 IN EUROPE, ASIA,
AND ELSEWHERE, AS WELL AS EVOLUTION OF HER OWN SITUATION AND
HER OWN FORCES NO LONGER JUSTIFY INSOFAR AS THAT CONCERNS
HER THE ARRANGEMENTS OF A MILITARY NATURE ADOPTED AFTER THE
CONCLUSION OF THE ALLIANCE, WHETHER IN COMMON UNDER THE FORM
OF MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS OR WHETEHR BY SPECIAL AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT.

"IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT FRANCE PROPOSES TO RECOVER THE
ENTIRE EXERCISE OF HER SOVEREIGNTY OVER HER TERRITORY,
PRESENTLY IMPAIRED BY THE PERMANENT PRESENCE OF ALLIED MILITARY

PAGE 3 RUENCR 396 ~~SECRET~~

ELEMENTS OR BY CONSTANT UTILIZATION WHICH IS MADE OF HER AIR SPACE, TO TERMINATE HER PARTICIPATION IN 'INTEGRATED' COMMANDS AND NO LONGER TO PLACE HER FORCES AT THE DISPOSAL OF NATO. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT FOR THE APPLICATION OF THESE DECISIONS SHE IS READY TO ARRANGE WITH (REGLER AVEC) THE GOVERNMENTS AND IN PARTICULAR WITH THAT OF THE UNITED STATES, PRACTICAL MEASURES WHICH CONCERN THEM. IN ADDITION, SHE IS DISPOSED TO HAVE UNDERSTANDING WITH THEM AS TO MILITARY FACILITIES TO BE MUTUALLY ACCORDED IN THE CASE OF A CONFLICT IN WHICH SHE WOULD BE ENGAGED AT THEIR SIDES AND AS TO CONDITIONS OF COOPERATION OF HER FORCES AND THEIRS IN THE EVENT OF COMMON ACTION, ESPECIALLY IN GERMANY.

"ON ALL THESE POINTS, DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, MY GOVERNMENT WILL THEREFORE BE IN TOUCH WITH YOURS. BUT IN ORDER TO RESPOND TO THE SPIRIT OF FRIENDLY CANDOR WHICH MUST INSPIRE THE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND, PERMIT ME TO ADD BETWEEN YOU AND ME, I HAVE BEEN DESIROUS FIRSTLY TO INDICATE PERSONALLY TO YOU FOR WHAT REASONS, FOR WHAT PURPOSE AND WITHIN WHAT LIMITS FRANCE FROM ITS VIEWPOINT BELIEVES THE FORM OF OUR ALLIANCE SHOULD BE MODIFIED WITHOUT ALTERING ITS BASIS.

"I BEG YOU TO ACCEPT, DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION AND THE EXPRESSION OF MY MOST CORDIAL SENTIMENTS. C. DE GAULLE"

COMMENTS FOLLOW. GP-3. BOHLEN
BT

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

NNNN

29

Monday, March 7, 1966
5:00 P. M.

~~SECRET~~

FROM AMBASSADOR BOHLEN IN PARIS

From Couve de Murville's comments it is perfectly clear that this letter represents the harder line under discussion within the French Government.

It amounts to a denunciation of all the agreements, both bilateral and multilateral, concerning French participation in any collective military defense arrangement.

It also pulls out the remaining French forces from NATO and French officers and personnel from the integrated headquarters, i. e., SHAPE and Fontainebleau.

The conversation Ball had with Lucet was utilized by Couve in an attempt to put the onus on us of stating unilaterally that the treaty would not apply to France, and he also seemed to be aware of Leddy's conversation with the other NATO Ambassadors in Washington. I endeavored to counter this assertion to the best of my ability.

The next steps are as reported, a similar letter this week to Wilson, Erhard and the Italian (whether Saragat or Moro is not clear).

This will be followed by notes of a more detailed character to all NATO signatories and presumably an additional one to the U. S. will also contain the equivalent of denunciation of bilateral accords.

I do not believe that these notes will change in the slightest degree the character of French action.

It would seem to me the phrase in the letter "no longer to put forces at the disposition of NATO" is sufficient justification for an immediate communication to the French Government withdrawing the nuclear warheads from the French squadrons and units in Germany. This would I think set the tone of our reaction to the French action.

For further and more specific reaction we will probably have to await the implementing note which should be received next week.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 94-83 (#81)
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-16-02

*Released Secy
Office 05:06*

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

You will notice of course that the French are trying to preserve the facade and appearance of the Alliance while destroying it in practice. I do not know what the legal opinion will be but I think this is a question we should approach with great care in order to be absolutely certain that we have a solid, legal foundation under our feet before moving.

While Couve dutifully carried out his mission it was apparent that it was very distasteful to him and he looked definitely unhappy at the close.

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED
WHCA

1966 MAR 7 22 42

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 08-115 (#86)
By isl, NARA, Date 5-22-08

EHB352
OO RUEHEX
DE RUEHC 6074 0662229
ZNY SSSSS
O 072147Z
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO WHITE HOUSE
O P 071835Z
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5553 IMMEDIATE
INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 988 IMMEDIATE
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 504 PRIORITY
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 108 PRIORITY
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 752 PRIORITY
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 159 PRIORITY
RUDIHS/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 51 PRIORITY
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 649 PRIORITY
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 366 PRIORITY
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 464 PRIORITY
RUDMSO/AMEMBASSY OSLO 82 PRIORITY
ZEN/AMEMBASSY LISBON 94 PRIORITY
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 118 PRIORITY
RUEKDA/OSD WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ MARCH 07 SEONE OF TWO

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NATUS

OSD FOR OASD (ISA)

SUBJECT: NATO AND FRANCE: BRITISH PROPOSALS.

UK PERMREP SHCUKBURGH NOW HAS INSTRUCTIONS COVERING FIVE POINTS
SUMMARIZED BELOW. TEXTS OF UK DRAFTS ARE INCLUDED IN THIS MESS-
AGE; THEY ARE PROBABLY AVAILABLE TO DEPARTMENT BY NOW BUT PERHAPS
NOT TO SOME OF THE INFO ADDRESSEES.

GENERAL UK PHILOSOPHY, ACCORDING TO SUCKBURGH, IS A LITTLE

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 388/1 ~~SECRET~~

CAUTIOUS: WE SHOULD QTE NOT REPEAT NOT PULL OUT ALL NATO ROOTS IN
FRANCE UNQTE UNTIL AND UNLESS WE HAVE TO. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS
VERY IMPORTANT IN LONDON'S OPINION TO RALLY THE WHOLE ALLIANCE TO
IMMEDIATE ACTION TO COUNTER PRESUMED FRENCH MOVES ON NATO. CONTEMP-
LATED ACTION IS AS FOLLOWS:

1. WE SHOULD WORK TOWARD A DECLARATION BY FOURTEEN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT. UK DRAFT FOR SUCH A DECLARATION FOLLOWS:

QTE. DRAFT DECLARATION.

WE, THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF FOURTEEN COUNTRIES, PARTIES TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY AND MEMBERS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION, MAKE THE FOLLOWING SOLEMN DECLARATION ON BEHALF OF OUR GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY AND THE ORGANISATION ESTABLISHED UNDER IT ARE BOTH ALIKE ESSENTIAL TO THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF OUR COUNTRIES.

THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, UNLIKE ANY PREVIOUS ALLIANCE IN HISTORY, HAS ENSURED ITS EFFICACY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF DEFENCE AND DETERRENCE BY THE MAINTENANCE IN PEACE-TIME OF AN INTEGRATED AND INTERDEPENDENT MILITARY ORGANISATION, IN WHICH THE EFFORTS AND RESOURCES OF EACH ARE COMBINED FOR THE COMMON SECURITY OF ALL. NO SUBSTITUTE

PAGE 3 RUFNCR 388/1 ~~SECRET~~
FOR THIS ORGANISATION CAN BE FOUND IN BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS.

WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THIS ORGANISATION IS ESSENTIAL AND WILL CONTINUE. TO THIS END WE AFFIRM THAT WE REGARD AND SHALL CONTINUE TO REGARD THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY AS BEING OF INDEFINITE DURATION.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY AND THE ORGANISATION ARE NOT MERELY INSTRUMENTS OF THE COMMON DEFENCE. THEY EXPRESS THE SHARED POLITICAL INTERESTS OF THE MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COMMUNITY AND THEIR READINESS AND DETERMINATION TO CONSULT AND ACT TOGETHER WHEREVER POSSIBLE IN THE FURTHERANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE, PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY. UNQTE.

COMMENT: WHEN SHUCKBURGH ASKED ME WHAT I THOUGHT OF THIS DECLARATION, I SAID MY PERSONAL REACTION WAS THAT TWO ELEMENTS MIGHT USEFULLY BE ADDED: (A) A SPECIFIC STATEMENT ON THE ALLIANCE'S ABILITY TO SERVE ITS BASIC PURPOSE WITH OR WITHOUT FRANCE; AND (B) SOME INDICATION THAT ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN FRG AND NATO CANNOT BE UNILATERALLY REVISED BY FRANCE.

2. UK PROPOSES THAT THERE BE ESTABLISHED IN PARIS QTE A PLANNING GROUP UNQTE TO CONSIDER ALL THE ACTIONS ALLIES WILL NEED TO TAKE

BRITISH SEE THIS GROUP AS CONSISTING OF LESS THAN FOURTEEN MEMBERS BUT AT LEAST SIX: US, UK, GERMANY, ITALY, NETHERLANDS AND BELGIUM. IF BROGIO CAN BE INDUCED TO ORGANIZE IT, SO MUCH THE BETTER; IF NOT REPEAT NOT, THEN GOVERNMENTS SHOULD ORGANIZE IT THEMSELVES, PERHAPS ON QTE AN OPEN-ENDED UNQTE PRINCIPLE OF MEMBERSHIP.

UK DRAFT OF TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THIS QTE PLANNING GROUP UNQTE FOLLOWS:

QTE. DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR PLANNING GROUP

- (A) TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ABOUT COMMUNICATIONS RECEIVED FROM THE FRENCH AND TO CO-ORDINATE THE REACTION OF THE REST OF THE ALLIANCE.
- (B) TO CONSIDER ANY NECESSARY REORGANISATION OF THE NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE IN THE LIGHT OF THE FRENCH ACTION AND THE BEST LOCATIONS FOR HEADQUARTERS AND INSTALLATIONS WHICH HAVE TO LEAVE FRANCE.
- (C) TO STUDY, FROM BOTH THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECT, THE RELATIONS WHICH CAN OR SHOULD BE MAINTAINED WITH FRANCE IN THOSE NATO BODIES IN WHICH SHE CONTINUES TO TAKE PART.
- (D) TO REACH AGREED VIEWS ON FRENCH OBLIGATIONS UNDER BILATERAL

PAGE 5 RUFNCR 388/1 ~~SECRET~~
AND MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND THE EFFECT OF THESE ON THE TIME-TABLE AND OUR ABILITY TO PLAY FOR TIME. UNQTE

3. UK IS SUGGESTING A MEETING OF FONMINS OF FOURTEEN, TO BE HELD IN LONDON. PRIMARY OUTCOME EXPECTED FROM THIS MEETING WOULD BE THE DRAFT DECLARATION IN PARA (1) ABOVE. UK VIEW IS THAT IF THERE IS TROUBLE GETTING A FONMINS MEETING ORGANIZED ON SHORT NOTICE, GOVERNMENTS SHOULD PROCEED TO AGREEMENT ON THE DECLARATION ANYWAY.

ON DATES, FOREIGN OFFICE NOTES THAT WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION IS SCHEDULED TO MEET IN LONDON MARCH 15 AND 16. THAT OCCASION OUGHT TO BE QTE CANCELLED OR USED UNQTE, AND THIS SUGGESTS APPROPRIATE DATE FOR MEETING OF FOURTEEN MINISTERS.

4. UK IS CONCERNED ABOUT POSITION OF NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN THE IMMEDIATE SCENARIO. IF FRENCH HAVE MADE FIRST MOVE BEFORE WEDNESDAY OF THIS WEEK (MARCH 9), IT IS IMPORTANT IN UK VIEW FOR COUNCIL NOT TO DUCK. IT COULD PERHAPS BE POSTPONED, BUT IF HELD, NAC MEETING SHOULD TAKE UP FRENCH ISSUE.

COMMENT: USRO SUGGESTIONS ON HANDLING MARCH 9 MEETING, ON SIMILAR ASSUMPTION THAT NAC SHOULD NOT BE AVOIDING FRENCH ISSUE THIS WEEK, ARE CONTAINED IN SEPTTEL. BUT ABSENCE OTHER URGENT BUSINESS THIS WEEK MAKES NAC POSTPONABLE IF WE THINK USEFUL. CLEVELAND.

BT

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INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 988 IMMEDIATE 966 MAR 7 22 35
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 504 PRIORITY
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 108 PRIORITY
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 752 PRIORITY
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 159 PRIORITY
RUDIHS/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 51 PRIORITY
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 649 PRIORITY
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 366 PRIORITY
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 464 PRIORITY
RUDMSO/AMEMBASSY OSLO 82 PRIORITY
ZEN/AMEMBASSY LISBON 94 PRIORITY
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 118 PRIORITY
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~~SECRET~~ MARCH 07 SETWO OF TWO

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NATUS

OSD FOR OASD (ISA)

SUBJECT: NATO AND FRANCE: BRITISH PROPOSALS.

SHUCKBURGH HAS SUGGESTED THAT UK BE READY TO MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT AS SOON AS FRENCH MOVE IS IN PUBLIC DOMAIN. STATEMENT WOULD INCLUDE THREE ELEMENTS: (A) THE ALLIANCE CONTINUES; (B) THERE IS NO PROVISION FOR NON-CONTRIBUTING MEMBERS; (C) THE GERMAN ANGLE IS OF CONCERN TO OTHERS AS WELL AS TO FRANCE. SHUCKBURGH SAYS FOREIGN OFFICE IS STILL STUDYING GERMAN PROBLEM AND UNSURE WHETHER

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 338/2 ~~SECRET~~
IT SHOULD BE PART OF INITIAL PUBLIC STATEMENT.

COMMENT: WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S URGENT GUIDANCE ON THESE UK PROPOSALS. AT FIRST BLUSH THEIR LINE OF THINKING SEEMS VERY CONSISTENT WITH OURS AS CONTAINED IN DEPT'S INSTRUCTIONS OF LAST FEW DAYS, AND WITH SUGGESTIONS IN SEPTEL SNET DEPT IMMEDIATE TODAY. BUT I AGREE WITH DEPT THAT A QUICK MEETING OF FONMINS MAY BE RISKY UNLESS WE ARE ABSOLUTELY SURE THAT THE PROPOSED DECLARATION IS BUTTONED UP WITH ALL FOURTEEN AHEAD OF TIME.

MY RECOMMENDATION IS THAT WE COOPERATE WITH UK ON ALL POINTS EXCEPT FONMIN MEETING, EMPHASIZING EFFORT TO GET BROSIO TO TAKE AS MUCH LEAD AS POSSIBLE AND NEED FOR SPEED IN GETTING A JOINT DECLARATION OF THE FOURTEEN NEGOTIATED AND APPROVED. BRITISH AND WE SHOULD BOTH WORK VERY CLOSELY WITH GERMANS FROM OUTSET TO INSURE THAT GERMANS GIVE NO IMPRESSION THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF FRENCH ACTIONS TO REOPEN 1954 ARRANGEMENTS CONCERNING GERMAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. INDICATIONS FROM GREWE (SEE SEPTEL) ARE ENCOURAGING IN THIS REGARD.

GP-1 CLEVELAND
BT

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INFO WHITE HOUSE
O-R 271726Z MAR 66

AMEMBASSY BONN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2726

INFO RUEHC/AMEMBASSY PARIS 941

RUEHC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 779

RUEHC/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 311

RUEHC/AMEMBASSY OTTOWA 24

ZEN/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 21

RUEHC/AMEMBASSY ROME 270

RUEHC/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 32

RUEHC/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK NINE

ZEN/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 104

ZEN/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 182

RUEHC/AMEMBASSY OSLO 19

RUEHC/AMEMBASSY LISBON 15

RUEHC/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 50

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-96

By ig, NARA, Date 8-12-54

~~SECRET~~ MAR 7 SECTION ONE OF TWO

SUBJ: FRENCH THREAT TO NATO

I CALLED TODAY ON STATE SEC CARSTENS, WHO IS ACTING FONMIN, TO OBTAIN THE GERMAN REACTION TO THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE CURRENT THREAT TO NATO POSED BY GEN DE GAULLE. I ASKED SPECIFICALLY WHAT REACTIONS HE HAD TO THE NOTE WE HAD PRESENTED THE FONOFF ON MARCH 4, GIVING THE BASIC CONSIDERATIONS WHICH WILL GUIDE US POLICY IN THE PRESENT SITUATION, ALSO THE LETTER FROM THE SEC TO THE FONMIN ON THE SAME QUESTION DELIVERED

PAGE TWO RUFHOL 323 ~~SECRET~~

EARLIER TODAY. I NOTED THAT AMB BOHLEN WAS AT THE FRENCH FONOFF AT THE PRESENT MOMENT, PRESUMABLY TO RECEIVE A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON REGARDING NATO.

1) CARSTENS REPLIED THAT A FEW DAYS BEFORE THE MEETING BETWEEN FRENCH NATO PERMREP DE LEUSSE AND CERTAIN OTHER PERMREPS, AT WHICH DE LEUSSE HAD EXPOSED CERTAIN FRENCH INTENTIONS WHICH WE HAD IN TURN PASSED ON TO THE GERMANS, BEAUMARCHAIS OF THE FRENCH FONOFF HAD ADVISED A MEMBER OF THE GERMAN EMB IN PARIS THAT THE FRENCH INTENDED (A) TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS FROM NATO COMMAND, AND B) TO TAKE CERTAIN STEPS "CONCERNING FRENCH TERRITORY." SINCE THEIR WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO WOULD AFFECT FRENCH TROOPS IN GERMANY, WHICH THEY WISHED TO LEAVE THERE UNDER THE PARIS AGREEMENT OF 1954, THEY WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH THE GERMANS. CARSTENS HAD MERELY ASKED THE GERMAN REP INVOLVED TO ADVISE BEAUMARCHAIS THAT THE PARIS AGREEMENT OF 1954 WAS LINKED TO OTHER RELATED AGREEMENTS, INCLUDING THAT OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE OF NOVEMBER 3 AND THE NATO DECISION OF OCTOBER 22, 1954, WHICH STATED, AMONG OTHER THINGS THAT THE EUROPEAN PARTNERS WILL ASSIGN THEIR FORCES IN EUROPE TO NATO COMMAND. CARSTENS DID NOT AUTHORIZE ANY INDICATION TO THE FRENCH AS TO WHAT CONCLUSIONS THE GERMANS WOULD DRAW FROM THIS LINKAGE. SINCE THEN THE GERMANS HAVE HEARD NOTHING FROM THE FRENCH. THEY HAVE HEARD RUMORS THAT

DE GAULLE IS WRITING ERH ⁰ A LETTER; HOWEVER, NONE ⁰S BEEN RECEIVED.

2. CARSTENS SAID THAT THE GERMAN GOVT AGREED COMPLETELY WITH THE POINTS MADE IN OUR POSITION PAPER (DEPTCIRCULAR 1645). THEY BELIEVE THAT NONE OF THE NATO MEMBERS INVOLVED SHOULD BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS OR MAKE COMMITMENTS PURSUANT TO THE FRENCH DEMANDS UNTIL AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON A COMMON POSITION. THE GERMANS UNDERTAKE NOT TO DO THIS, AND NOT TO MAKE ANY STATEMENTS AS TO THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF ANY FRENCH PROPOSAL VIS-A-VIS THE 1954 AGREEMENTS. GERMANY IS 100 PERCENT FOR AN INTEGRATED NATO. THEIR "STRONG DESIRE" IS FOR NATO TO CARRY ON IN ITS PRESENT FORM. THEY HAVE NO DESIRE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY POSSIBLE BREACH OF THE 1954 AGREEMENTS BY THE FRENCH ACTION, EVEN IF THIS WERE JUSTIFIED ON A LEGAL BASIS, AND HOPE THAT THE OTHER COUNTRIES INVOLVED WILL TAKE A SIMILAR VIEW. GERMANY HAS NO DESIRE FOR A NATIONAL ARMY. //

3. IF, AS EXPECTED, THE FRENCH PROPOSE TO THE GERMANS THE CONTINUATION OF THE PRESENCE OF THEIR TROOPS IN GERMANY THE KEY ISSUE, IN CARSTENS VIEW, IS WHAT THEIR PURPOSE WOULD BE -- WHAT OBLIGATIONS THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO ASSUME. IN AN EFFORT TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THIS ISSUE, THE FONOFF IS IN

PAGE FOUR RUFHOL 323 ~~SECRET~~

THE PROCESS OF PREPARING CERTAIN SPECIFIC QUESTIONS WHICH THEY WOULD, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH US AND THE BRITISH, PUT TO THE FRENCH, SUCH AS

A) DO YOU INTEND TO STAY IN BERLIN?

B) WILL YOU CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE ON A NATIONAL BASIS IN CONTINGENCY PLANNING WITH RESPECT TO ACCESS TO BERLIN?

C) WILL YOU CONTINUE TO COOPERATE WITH NATO CONTINGENCY PLANNING WITH RESPECT TO BERLIN?

D) WOULD YOU PLACE YOUR TROOPS UNDER NATO COMMAND IN THE EVENT OF WAR? ONLY AFTER THESE AND OTHER QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN ANSWERED, ACCORDING TO CARSTENS, WILL THE GERMANS BE ABLE TO MAKE UP THEIR MINDS AS TO WHAT THEIR POLICY SHOULD BE.

4) EMPHASIZING THAT HE HAS NOT TALKED ABOUT THIS MATTER WITH THE FONNIN OR THE CHANCELLOR, CARSTENS GAVE ME ON A HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL BASIS (PLEASE PROTECT) HIS OWN PERSONAL VIEWS AS TO WHAT THE GERMAN REACTION MIGHT BE. ALTHOUGH THE GERMANS WOULD PROBABLY BE GLAD TO HAVE THE FRENCH TROOPS STAY IN THE EVENT THEY AHVE SOME GENUINE ROLE TO PLAY, DIFFICULTIES WOULD ARISE IF THEY WISHED TO REMAIN IN GERMANY UNDER THE 1954 RIGHTS, UNITEGRATED AND WITHOUT UNDERTAKING ANY NEW OBLIGATIONS. EVEN IF THE FRENCH OFFERED A NEW TRADITIONAL

BILATERAL TREATY OF ALLIANCE TO GERMANY GERMANY WOULD NOT KNOW HOW TO DEAL WITH IT. THEY HAVE NO FORCES NOT COMMITTED TO NATO TO MAKE GOOD THEIR END OF THE ALLIANCE. THEY HAVE NO GENERAL STAFF WITH WHOM THE FRENCH COULD MAKE JOINT PLANS. THEY WOULD IN FACT HAVE TO ASK THE FRENCH TO TALK TO NATO. CARSTENS DID NOT THINK THAT THE FRENCH OBLIGATION TO COME TO THE ASSISTANCE OF GERMANY UNDER ARTICLE 5 OF THE TREATY WOULD CONSTITUTE A SUFFICIENT OBLIGATION. IF, HOWEVER, THE FRENCH WERE WILLING TO AGREE TO CONTINUE TO STAY IN BERLIN, TO CONTINUE IN LIVE OAK PLANNING, OR TO COMMIT THEIR FORCES TO NATO COMMAND IN THE EVENT OF WAR, PERHAPS SOMETHING COULD BE NEGOTIATED.

5) THE FRENCH WOULD PRESUMABLY FACE NO PROBLEM WITH RESPECT TO THE STATUS OF THEIR FORCES AS SUCH, SINCE IT WAS CARSTENS' UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS PERSISTS AS LONG AS FRANCE IS A MEMBER OF THE ALLIANCE, IN WHICH THEY HAVE DECLARED THEIR INTENTION OF REMAINING, AND DOES NOT DENOUNCE THE RELEVANT STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT. IF, HOWEVER, THE FRENCH WISHED TO WITHDRAW FROM ALL THE AGREEMENTS OF 1954 AND TO ATTEMPT TO BASE THEIR RIGHTS IN GERMANY ON OCCUPATION RIGHTS, NO GERMAN GOVT WOULD BE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE A NEW STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT WITH THEM. GP-3 MCGHEE

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copy Mr. Smith

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FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC (IMMEDIATE 2726)
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 941
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 779
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 311
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY OTTOWA 24
ZEN/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 21
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 270
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 32
RUDIHS/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK NINE
ZEN/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 104
ZEN/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 182
RUDMSO/AMEMBASSY OSLO 19
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~~SECRET~~ MAR 7 (SECTWO OF TWO)

6. CARSTENS THOUGHT, CONTRARY TO DE LEUSSE'S STATEMENT THAT THE DECISION AS TO WHETHER FRENCH TROOPS REMAINED IN GERMANY WAS UP TO GERMANY, THAT THE FRENCH IN FACT WOULD WISH THEM TO REMAIN. CONSIDERATIONS WERE THE PRESTIGE INVOLVED, PERHAPS THE SAVING OF CERTAIN EXPENSES IN THE UPKEEP OF THEIR FORCES, AND THE RIGHT IT GAVE THEM TO HAVE A LIAISON MISSION IN EAST GERMANY AND CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIETS. CARSTENS DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENT FRENCH ACTIONS WOULD LEAD TO ANY FURTHER ISOLATION OF FRANCE IN THE EEC, OR ANY CHANGE IN THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD THE EEC OR THE ALLIANCE AS SUCH. THEY ARE

PAGE TWO RUFHOL 323/2 ~~SECRET~~
NOT SO SURE OF THE SOVIETS TO HAZARD A WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ALLIANCE, WHICH WOULD ALSO SACRIFICE EXISTING STATUS OF FORCES RIGHTS. CARSTENS DID NOT BELIEVE THE FRENCH WOULD PRESS THEIR ALLIES FOR QUICK DECISIONS OR ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THEIR PROPOSED MOVES. IN HIS VIEW, INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE ALLIES INVOLVED SHOULD PRECEDE ANY CONFRONTATION WITH THE FRENCH IN A NAC MEETING. GP-3 MCGHEE
BT

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~

Monday, March 7, 1966, at 10:25 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Further Response to deGaulle.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-229

By Wisp, NARA, Date 3/25/94

A further response to deGaulle will raise one central question on which your advisers may disagree. The key to deGaulle's letter is the distinction he draws between (1) his obligation under the treaty to go to war in case of an unprovoked attack on an ally and (2) the organizational and command arrangements which are not strictly a part of the treaty but have grown up since 1949. He says he will support (1): the treaty obligation, but is against (2): the peacetime organizational arrangements.

Everyone is agreed that we must tell deGaulle that we and our other allies are determined to preserve an integrated NATO structure with or without France. The question is whether we should go further and tell him that if he won't play his part in the organization, France will no longer enjoy the protection of the treaty. This would flatly deny his basic distinction between the organization and the treaty.

On its face, this is an appealing line:

- it satisfies one's sense of elementary justice: why should any nation profit from the treaty without sharing in the work?
- it might convince sensible Frenchmen that the General has gone too far, and is risking French security;
- it would provide a strong defense against critics at home who think it is high time we stood up to deGaulle.

But there is another side to the coin. It is a fact of geography that a U.S. threat to deprive France of our protection is at best barely credible and at worst, just plain silly. It is like threatening to abandon Kentucky in the face of a land attack by Canada. It is hard to do unless one is prepared to throw in Ohio. If we are going to defend the Germans against the Russians, we cannot help but defend France too.

The alternative is not to appease deGaulle. He is clearly not appeasable. And there is no question that we must reaffirm our continuing commitment to an integrated NATO, and to do what is necessary to make good on that commitment -- with an empty chair always waiting. But we could by-pass, for the time being, the question of the security guarantee under the treaty, neither reaffirming it nor threatening to withdraw it.

My guess would be that this second approach is more likely to gain us the solid allied support we need. To the other Europeans, relations with France

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- 2 -

are a sensitive political issue. In a confrontation, we will be in trouble unless it is clear, not only that the provocation comes from Paris, but that the U.S. is not over-reacting.

There is no question that a cool approach will draw some fire at home. We will be accused of letting the French get away with murder, and still promising to protect them. But even in terms of domestic politics, I think it as likely as not that we will be safer than if we try to drum France out of the treaty on terms that are legally questionable and militarily meaningless. This would make us vulnerable to the more serious charge that our inflexibility helped to destroy NATO.

Perhaps, in the end, deGaulle will behave so outrageously as to force us to take a hard line even on the treaty. But for the time being, there is a strong case for limiting our response to a positive reaffirmation of our commitment to the organization, and not escalating the argument to the question of treaty commitment. (Even under this option, we will be able to take some very tough steps. For instance, I am inclined to think that we should withdraw our nuclear support from the two French divisions in Germany as soon as deGaulle actually withdraws these divisions from NATO command.)

Before making up your mind, you should hear both sides of the argument in much greater detail. I am afraid that State's entirely natural irritation with deGaulle predisposes them to take a very hard line. If you wish to have the full range of choices spelled out, it will take an instruction from here. You might wish to speak to the Secretary of State yourself. Alternatively, Komer and I can let State know that you want to be given a wide range of choices, especially on the question of the security guarantee under the treaty.

fm

Francis M. Bator

I have called Rusk; you follow up with Ball and Leddy _____

Komer/Bator should instruct State _____

Take no action _____

Speak to me _____

FM 339

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O 071858Z

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE

DE RUEHCR 367/1 0661708

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O P 071730Z ZFF-1

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5541

INFO RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 501

RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 107

RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 107

RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 749

RUEHAI /AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 157

RUEHIS/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK PRIORITY 50

RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 647

RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY 364

RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 461

RUEHISO/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 81

RUEHGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 369

RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 984

ZEN/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 93

STATE GRNC

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~~SECRET~~ MARCH 07 SEONE OF TWO

NATUS

SUBJECT: NATO AND FRANCE : WEDNESDAY COUNCIL MEETING

1. IF AS WE ASSUME, AMBASSADOR BOHLEN'S VISIT TO FOREIGN OFFICE THIS AFTERNOON IS THE FIRST STAGE IN A STRING OF FRENCH DEMARCHES WE NEED TO PUT CONSULTATION AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING AMONG THE FOURTEEN ON SOME ORGANIZED BASIS PROMPTLY. IN THIS PRELIMINARY PERIOD, WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND NATURE OF OUR RESOLVE S SIMULTANEOUSLY IN WASHINGTON, IN PARIS, AND IN CAPITALS.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLT 94-83 (#88)

By ctm, NARA, Date 8-16-02

A SOMEWHAT MORE FORMAL CONSULTATION PROCESS IS REQUIRED FROM NOW ON:

(A) TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE FRENCH CHALLENGE IS ESSENTIALLY TO NATO AND NOT TO THE U.S.

(B) TO PUSH BROSIO INTO TAKING THE LEAD, OR AT LEAST FRONTING THE OPERATION.

(C) TO TAKE OUT INSURANCE AGAINST HIPSHOOTING REACTIONS, SUCH AS SUGGESTION BY FRG DEPUTY PERMREP TO FARLEY THAT FRENCH DEFECTION WOULD FREE FRG FROM ITS POST WAR LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOM OF ACTION IN THE MILITARY FIELD.

(D) TO MAKE SURE THAT NONE OF OUR ALLIES GETS INVOLVED IN SEPARATE BILATERAL BARGAINING WITH THE FRENCH WHICH WILL REQUIRE PARALLEL RESTRAINT ON OUR OWN PART.

(E) TO TRY TO MAKE SURE THAT PUBLIC POSITIONS ON FRENCH ACTIONS ARE COORDINATED TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE.

2. THE BEST FOR A GROUP OF FOURTEEN TO START INFORMALLY OPERATING ON THIS SUBJECT IS OF COURSE HERE IN PARIS. AND THE BEST WAY TO START IS TO START, WITH A SPECIFIC PROJECT. MY SUGGESTION IS THAT WE START HERE FORTHWITH TO TRY TO DEVELOP A COMMONLY

AGREED COLLECTION OF PRINCIPLES, WHICH WE WOULD HOPE WOULD BE USED BY ALL GOVERNMENTS AS PART OF THEIR FIRST PUBLIC REACTION TO FRENCH DEMARCHES.

3. THE CONTENT OF THESE QTE GUIDELINES UNQTE IS PRETTY OBVIOUS:

(A) THE ALLIANCE AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION WILL CONTINUE.

(B) THE FOURTEEN WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARTICLE 5 COMMITMENT OF A FURTHER FRENCH WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PRACTICAL SIDE OF THE ALLIANCE.

(C) IF FRANCE DOES NOT FEEL IT CAN PARTICIPATE, THE OTHER ALLIES WILL ADAPT THE NATO DEFENSE PROGRAM. DEPLOY NATO COMMITTED FORCES, AND RELOCATE NATO AND NATO RELATED FACILITIES, IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO FULFILL THE ORGANIZATION'S PURPOSES, WHICH IS THE MILITARY SECURITY OF EUROPE.

(D) THE RELATIONSHIP OF GERMANY TO NATO AND OF FRENCH DISPOSITIONS IN GERMANY IN SUPPORT OF NATO, ARE THE SUBJECT OF INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS AND AGREEMENTS. THEY CANNOT BE

(E) FRANCE CANNOT CREATE A NEW AND PRIVILEGED CATEGORY OF NATO MEMBERSHIP BY UNILATERAL DENUNCIATION OF AGREEMENTS AND UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES AND COOPERATION. IT IS FOR THE ALLIES AS A GROUP TO DECIDE WHETHER TO CREATE A NEW CATEGORY (EVEN ICELAND CONTRIBUTES ITS REAL ESTATE) OF NON- CONTRIBUTING MEMMERS OF NATO AND TO DECIDE WHETHER SUCH A MEMBER SHOULD SIT ON THE ALLIANCE'S BOARD OF DIRECTORS.

(F) THE FRENCH WITHDRAWAL IS ALREADY SO FAR ADVANCED THAT FOR THEM TO WITHDRAW THE REST OF THE WAY IS NOT A CRUCIAL LOSS TO THE ALLIANCE.

(G) I IF FRANCE DOES NOT WANT NATO MILITARY HEADQUARTERS, AND MILITARY SUPPORT SERVICES FOR TROOPS COMMITTED TO NATO, TO REMAIN IN FRANCE, THEY WILL BE RELOCATED ACCORDINGSPO A SCHEDULE TO BE NEGOTIATED WITH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT.

(H) AS FOR THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AND THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF, THEIR FUTURE LOCATION IS A MATTER FOR THE COUNCIL, THE THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT, TO DECIDE.

(COMMENT: AT THIS INITIAL STAGE, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE GOOD TACTICS TO GIVE IMPRESSION THAT COUNCIL MIGHT WIELL DECIDE TO PACK UP, EVEN IF THIS IS NOT THE WAY IT WORKS OUT LATER ON.)

PAGE 5 - REFNO 36771 ~~SECRET~~

4. THE DOCTRINE ON FRENCH COMMITMENTS TO ALLIES, AND ALLIES' COMMITMENTS TO FRANCE, SEEMS TO ME TO RUN ABOUT AS FOLLOWS:

THE TREATY IS NOT JUST AN EXCHANGE OF PROMISES TO HELP AT THE TIME OF ARMED ATTACK, BUT IS ALSO A MUTUAL PROMISE (AR BUWE 3) TO MAINTAIN AND DEVELOP, SEPARATELY AND JOINTLY, CONTINUOUSLY, THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE CAPACITY TO RESIST. IF THE FRENCH STOP DOING THIS AND STON (IN THE TERMS OF THE PREAMBLE) QTE UNITING THEIR EFFORTS FOR COLLECTIVE DEFENSE UNQTE, A QUESTION ARISES WHETHER THEY ARE FULFILLING THEIR TREATY COMMITMENTS AND REMAIN A PARTY. IN THE SECOND PLACE, THE COUNCIL IS NOT JUST A CLUB: ITS PURPOSE (ARTICLE 9) IS EXPLICITLY QTE TO TREATY UNQTE. THE FRENCH HAVE A RIGHT TO SIT ON THE COUNCIL ONLY AS AND IF THEY ARE PREPARED TO JOIN IN DOING WHAT THE COUNCIL IS THERE FOR. IN THE THIRD PLACE, THE TREATY IS ONLY THE BEGINNING OF THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS TO WHICH THE FRENCH WERE PARTIES. THE GREAT BULK OF THESE ARE COUNCIL DECISIONS - BUT THE FRENCH JOINED IN THEM OF THEIR OWN FREE WILL. THESE IN TURN CREATE THE FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH THE COUNCIL NOW HAS AS TRUSTEES OF A VAST ENTERPRISE, AND AS FORMAL ORGAN OF POLITICAL CONSULTATION. GP-3 CLEVELAND

BT

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(IN AMEMBASSY PARIS)

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5541/
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RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 107
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 749
RUQUAT /AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 157
RUDINS/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK PRIORITY 50
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 647
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY 364
RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 461
RUDUSO/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 81
RUOHGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 369
RUDICR/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 984
ZEU/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 93
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ MARCH 07 SETWO OF TWO

NATUS

SUBJECT: NATO AND FRANCE : WEDNESDAY COUNCIL MEETING

5. I THINK IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE A COMMON LINE OF THIS SORT, WHICH DOES NOT CROSS ANY CONCRETE BRIDGES BUT WHICH ESTABLISHES SOME COMMON ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE FOURTEEN. THIS COULD BE DONE IN A WEEK OR LESS: IF THE FRENCH PROVOCATION IS SUFFICIENTLY RUDE IT COULD BE DONE IN A DAY OR TWO.

6. THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THESE PRINCIPLES WOULD BE FOR USE BY INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS IN THEIR OWN WAY, IN REACTING TO THE FIRST FRENCH DEMARCHE. BUT WE ALSO HAVE TO MOVE VERY EARLY TOWARD A SPECIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL. ONE POSSIBLE SCHEDULE WOULD BE TO HAVE A SPECIAL NAC EARLY NEXT WEEK

~~PAGE 3 RUFHCR 36772 SECRET~~

AT PERHAPS LEVEL, FOR DECLARATIONS TO BE MADE BY GOVERNMENTS ALONG THE ABOVE LINES, AND FOR CLARIFYING QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED OF THE FRENCH DELEGATION. DEPENDING ON DEGREE OF FRENCH AMBIGUITY THIS WOULD LEAD IN TURN TO A SPECIAL MINISTERIAL MEETING WHICH IS ALREADY PARTLY ORGANIZED AROUND THE UNDER SECRETARY S VISIT MARCH 29TH.

7. EVEN BEFORE THAT, WE WILL NEED TO MAKE GOOD THIS WEEK ON OUR REPEATED PROMISE TO BRING INTO NAC FOR CONSULTATION ANY BILATERAL FRENCH COMMUNICATION THAT AFFECTS NATO. AT A MINIMUM, I THINK WE SHOULD REPORT SUBSTANCE OF FRENCH COMMUNICATION AND OUR REACTION TO IT AT NAC MEETING WEDNESDAY MORNING (MARCH 9TH). I RECOGNIZE THAT THIS MAY BE A PROBLEM IF FRENCH COMMUNICATION IS IN FORM OF A LETTER TO PRESIDENT WHICH WILL NEED TO BE ANSWERED AT SAME LEVEL. BUT FOR US TO RECEIVE A FRENCH COMMUNICATION ON THIS SUBJECT, AND FAIL TO RAISE IT AT THE FIRST AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITY IN NAC, COULD HAVE FAR-REACHING EFFECTS IN FRAGMENTING THE RESPONSE OF THE ALLIANCE TO THE FRENCH MOVES WHICH NOW ARE IMMINENT.

8. BEST INITIAL U.S. RESPONSE IN NAC, EVEN IF FRENCH COMMUNICATION IS VAGUE, MIGHT BE THE POSITION THAT WHOLE HOST OF COMPLEX AND

~~PAGE 3 RUFHCR 36772 SECRET~~

INTER-RELATED PROBLEMS ARE RAISED THUS MAKING CLEAR THAT IT IS THE FRENCH WHO RAISED THEM AND FOR FRENCH TO ANSWER. WE WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT NEED TO BE READY BY MARCH 9 TO FORMULATE PRECISE QUESTIONS BUT BY REFERRING TO GENERAL CATEGORIES WE COULD MAKE CLEAR THAT ULTIMATE LIST WILL BE LONG AND QUESTIONS WILL BE TOUGH. APART FROM FACT THAT THIS OBVIOUSLY IS TRUE, POINT WOULD BE TO WARN DE GAULLE THAT IT IS FAR FROM EASY TO EXTRICATE HIMSELF AND THAT BALL WILL SOON BE BACK IN HIS COURT.

9. REDEPTEL 4249. IF WE ARE TO MAKE A REPORT IN NAC MARCH 9TH, IT WOULD PROBABLY BE BEST FOR ME NOT TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON UNTIL WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON.

GF-3. CLEVELAND

BT

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

FILE COPY

34

SUMMARY

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Action

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RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 20

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RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY LISBON 17

CIA

RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 215

NSA

RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 135

DOD

RUDMSO/AMEMBASSY OSLO 19

ACDA

RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 232

RUDIHS/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK NINE

RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 169

RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA SIX ✓

STATE GRNC

RSR

BT

~~SECRET~~ MARCH SEVENTH

PARIS PASS USRO

REF: DEPTTEL 120 TO LONDON

SUBJECT: FRANCE-NATO

1. I ASSUME THAT IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO DOWNGRADE IMPORTANCE DE GAULLE'S ROLE WHENEVER APPROPRIATE AND POSSIBLE, SO AS TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT HE CANNOT CALL THE TUNE FOR THE ALLIANCE TO FOLLOW; AND THAT HIS OUTMODDED IDEAS ARE EMPTY POSTURINGS INSOFAR AS OTHER COUNTRIES ARE CONCERNED.

2. WITH THIS IN MIND I QUESTION WHETHER IT IS WISE FOR THE FOURTEEN OTHER FOREIGN MINISTERS TO RUSH INTO A HUDDLE IN RESPONSE TO DE GAULLE'S DEMARCHE, AS THOUGH WHAT HE HAS TO SAY WERE OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO THE PROSPECTS OF SURVIVAL OF THE ALLIANCE.

3. WOULD IT NOT BE BETTER FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION TO RING THE CHANGES ON A QUOTE HO-HUM, WE'VE HEARD IT ALL BEFORE UNQUOTE THEME, WHILE OF COURSE MOVING ON ALL TOGETHER WITH REQUIRED CONSULTATION BOTH ON MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL BASIS?

GP-4

SECRET

TYLER

BT

BUNDY SMITH
BOWLER
BOWMAN
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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-180

By cb, NARA, Date 9-27-94

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

SUMMARY 35

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1966 MAR 7 PM 4 47

Cleveland

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Action VV FHE165VV HPA872
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SP RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 504 PRIORITY
SAH RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 108 PRIORITY
L RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 752 PRIORITY
H RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 159 PRIORITY
NEA RUDIHS/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 51 PRIORITY
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ACDA ~~SECRET~~ MARCH 07 SEONE OF TWO
RSR

NATUS

OSD FOR OASD (ISA)

SUBJECT: NATO AND FRANCE: BRITISH PROPOSALS.

UK PERMREP SHCUBURGH NOW HAS INSTRUCTIONS COVERING FIVE POINTS SUMMARIZED BELOW. TEXTS OF UK DRAFTS ARE INCLUDED IN THIS MESSAGE; THEY ARE PROBABLY AVAILABLE TO DEPARTMENT BY NOW BUT PERHAPS NOT TO SOME OF THE INFO ADDRESSEES.

GENERAL UK PHILOSOPHY, ACCORDING TO SUCKBURGH, IS A LITTLE

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 388/1 ~~SECRET~~

CAUTIONS: WE SHOULD QTE NOT REPEAT NOT PULL OUT ALL NATO ROOTS IN FRANCE UNQTE UNTIL AND UNLESS WE HAVE TO. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS VERY IMPORTANT IN LONDON'S OPINION TO RALLY THE WHOLE ALLIANCE TO IMMEDIATE ACTION TO COUNTER PRESUMED FRENCH MOVES ON NATO. CONTEMPLATED ACTION IS AS FOLLOWS:

1. WE SHOULD WORK TOWARD A DECLARATION BY FOURTEEN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT. UK DRAFT FOR SUCH A DECLARATION FOLLOWS:

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 08-115 (486)

By *isl* NARA, Date *5-22-08*

REF ID: A66382
E.O. 12858 2008/08/01
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~~SECRET~~

-2- 5553, MARCH 7, FROM PARIS (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

QTE. DRAFT DECLARATION.

WE, THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF FOURTEEN COUNTRIES, PARTIES TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY AND MEMBERS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION, MAKE THE FOLLOWING SOLEMN DECLARATION ON BEHALF OF OUR GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY AND THE ORGANISATION ESTABLISHED UNDER IT ARE BOTH ALIKE ESSENTIAL TO THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF OUR COUNTRIES.

THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, UNLIKE ANY PREVIOUS ALLIANCE IN HISTORY, HAS ENSURED ITS EFFICACY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF DEFENCE AND DETERRENCE BY THE MAINTENANCE IN PEACE-TIME OF AN INTEGRATED AND INTERDEPENDENT MILITARY ORGANISATION, IN WHICH THE EFFORTS AND RESOURCES OF EACH ARE COMBINED FOR THE COMMON SECURITY OF ALL. NO SUBSTITUTE

PAGE 3 RUFNCR 388/1 ~~SECRET~~

FOR THIS ORGANISATION CAN BE FOUND IN BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS.

WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THIS ORGANISATION IS ESSENTIAL AND WILL CONTINUE. TO THIS END WE AFFIRM THAT WE REGARD AND SHALL CONTINUE TO REGARD THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY AS BEING OF INDEFINITE DURATION.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY AND THE ORGANISATION ARE NOT MERELY INSTRUMENTS OF THE COMMON DEFENCE. THEY EXPRESS THE SHARED POLITICAL INTERESTS OF THE MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COMMUNITY AND THEIR READINESS AND DETERMINATION TO CONSULT AND ACT TOGETHER WHEREVER POSSIBLE IN THE FURTHERANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE, PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY. UNQTE.

COMMENT: WHEN SHUCKBURGH ASKED ME WHAT I THOUGHT OF THIS DECLARATION, I SAID MY PERSONAL REACTION WAS THAT TWO ELEMENTS MIGHT USEFULLY BE ADDED: (A) A SPECIFIC STATEMENT ON THE ALLIANCE'S ABILITY TO SERVE ITS BASIC PURPOSE WITH OR WITHOUT FRANCE; AND (B) SOME INDICATION THAT ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN FRG AND NATO CANNOT BE UNILATERALLY REVISED BY FRANCE.

2. UK PROPOSES THAT THERE BE ESTABLISHED IN PARIS QTE A PLANNING GROUP UNQTE TO CONSIDER ALL THE ACTIONS ALLIES WILL NEED TO TAKE

PAGE 4 RUFNCR 388/1 ~~SECRET~~
IN VIEW OF FRENCH MOVES.

BRITISH SEE THIS GROUP AS CONSISTING OF LESS THAN FOURTEEN MEMBERS BUT AT LEAST SIX: US, UK, GERMANY, ITALY, NETHERLANDS AND

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 5553, MARCH 7, FROM PARIS (SECTION ONE OF TWO)
BELGIUM. IF BROGIO CAN BE INDUCED TO ORGANIZE IT, SO MUCH THE
BETTER; IF NOT REPEAT NOT, THEN GOVERNMENTS SHOULD ORGANIZE IT
THEMSELVES, PERHAPS ON QTE AN OPEN-ENDED UNQTE PRINCIPLE OF MEM-
BERSHIP.

UK DRAFT OF TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THIS QTE PLANNING GROUP UNQTE
FOLLOWS:

QTE. DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR PLANNING GROUP

(A) TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ABOUT COMMUNICATIONS RECEIVED FROM
THE FRENCH AND TO CO-ORDINATE THE REACTION OF THE REST OF THE
ALLIANCE.

(B) TO CONSIDER ANY NECESSARY REORGANISATION OF THE NATO COMMAND
STRUCTURE IN THE LIGHT OF THE FRENCH ACTION AND THE BEST LOCATIONS
FOR HEADQUARTERS AND INSTALLATIONS WHICH HAVE TO LEAVE FRANCE.

(C) TO STUDY, FROM BOTH THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECT, THE
RELATIONS WHICH CAN OR SHOULD BE MAINTAINED WITH FRANCE IN THOSE
NATO BODIES IN WHICH SHE CONTINUES TO TAKE PART.

(D) TO REACH AGREED VIEWS ON FRENCH OBLIGATIONS UNDER BILATERAL

PAGE 5 RUFNCR 388/1 ~~SECRET~~

AND MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND THE EFFECT OF THESE ON THE TIME-
TABLE AND OUR ABILITY TO PLAY FOR TIME. UNQTE

3. UK IS SUGGESTING A MEETING OF FONMINS OF FOURTEEN, TO BE HELD
IN LONDON. PRIMARY OUTCOME EXPECTED FROM THIS MEETING WOULD BE THE
DRAFT DECLARATION IN PARA (1) ABOVE. UK VIEW IS THAT IF THERE IS
TROUBLE GETTING A FONMINS MEETING ORGANIZED ON SHORT NOTICE, GOV-
ERNMENTS SHOULD PROCEED TO AGREEMENT ON THE DECLARATION ANYWAY.

ON DATES, FOREIGN OFFICE NOTES THAT WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION IS
SCHEDULED TO MEET IN LONDON MARCH 15 AND 16. THAT OCCASION OUGHT
TO BE QTE CANCELLED OR USED UNQTE, AND THIS SUGGESTS APPROPRIATE
DATE FOR MEETING OF FOURTEEN MINISTERS.

4. UK IS CONCERNED ABOUT POSITION OF NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN
THE IMMEDIATE SCENARIO. IF FRENCH HAVE MADE FIRST MOVE BEFORE
WEDNESDAY OF THIS WEEK (MARCH 9), IT IS IMPORTANT IN UK VIEW FOR
COUNCIL NOT TO DUCK. IT COULD PERHAPS BE POSTPONED, BUT IF HELD,
NAC MEETING SHOULD TAKE UP FRENCH ISSUE.

COMMENT: USRO SUGGESTIONS ON HANDLING MARCH 9 MEETING, ON SIMILAR
ASSUMPTION THAT NAC SHOULD NOT BE AVOIDING FRENCH ISSUE THIS WEEK,
ARE CONTAINED IN SEPTTEL. BUT ABSENCE OTHER URGENT BUSINESS THIS
WEEK MAKES NAC POSTPONABLE IF WE THINK USEFUL. CLEVELAND.

BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 4:54 PM 3-7-66

PASSED WHITE HOUSE 5:29 PM 3-7-66

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

86

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G TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC/5553 IMMEDIATE
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H RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 752 PRIORITY
NEA RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 159 PRIORITY
P RUDIHS/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 51 PRIORITY
USIA RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 649 PRIORITY
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NSA ZEN/AMEMBASSY LISBON 94 PRIORITY
ACDA RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 118 PRIORITY
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RSR ~~SECRET~~ MARCH 07 SETWO OF TWO

NATUS

OSD FOR OASD (ISA)

SUBJECT: NATO AND FRANCE: BRITISH PROPOSALS.

SHUCKBURGH HAS SUGGESTED THAT UK BE READY TO MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT AS SOON AS FRENCH MOVE IS IN PUBLIC DOMAIN. STATEMENT WOULD INCLUDE THREE ELEMENTS: (A) THE ALLIANCE CONTINUES; (B) THERE IS NO PROVISION FOR NON-CONTRIBUTING MEMBERS; (C) THE GERMAN ANGLE IS OF CONCERN TO OTHERS AS WELL AS TO FRANCE. SHUCKBURGH SAYS FOREIGN OFFICE IS STILL STUDYING GERMAN PROBLEM AND UNSURE WHETHER

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 388/2 ~~SECRET~~
IT SHOULD BE PART OF INITIAL PUBLIC STATEMENT.

COMMENT: WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S URGENT GUIDANCE ON THESE UK PROPOSALS. AT FIRST BLUSH THEIR LINE OF THINKING SEEMS VERY CONSISTENT WITH OURS AS CONTAINED IN DEPT'S INSTRUCTIONS OF LAST FEW DAYS, AND WITH SUGGESTIONS IN SEPTEL SNET DEPT IMMEDIATE TODAY. BUT I AGREE WITH DEPT THAT A QUICK MEETING OF FONMINS MAY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- 5553, MARCH 7, FROM PARIS (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

BE RISKY UNLESS WE ARE ABSOLUTELY SURE THAT THE PROPOSED DECLARATION IS BUTTONED UP WITH ALL FOURTEEN AHEAD OF TIME.

MY RECOMMENDATION IS THAT WE COOPERATE WITH UK ON ALL POINTS EXCEPT FONMIN MEETING, EMPHASIZING EFFORT TO GET BROSIQ TO TAKE AS MUCH LEAD AS POSSIBLE AND NEED FOR SPEED IN GETTING A JOINT DECLARATION OF THE FOURTEEN NEGOTIATED AND APPROVED. BRITISH AND WE SHOULD BOTH WORK VERY CLOSELY WITH GERMANS FROM OUTSET TO INSURE THAT GERMANS GIVE NO IMPRESSION THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF FRENCH ACTIONS TO REOPEN 1954 ARRANGEMENTS CONCERNING GERMAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. INDICATIONS FROM GREWE (SEE SEPTTEL) ARE ENCOURAGING IN THIS REGARD.

GP-1 CLEVELAND

BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 5:15 PM 3-7-66
PASSED WHITE HOUSE 5:22 PM 3-7-66

~~SECRET~~

36

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 7, 1966


My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

President de Gaulle has just sent me by way of our Ambassador to France a statement of French policy regarding NATO and particularly the intention of France to withdraw from all military aspects of the Organization. I am enclosing for your information a copy of President de Gaulle's letter.

I am replying to General de Gaulle that I am consulting with other members of the Alliance.

This is a matter upon which you and I must keep in the closest touch. It raises the most serious questions as to the relation of the benefits and responsibilities of the Alliance. I think it important that we make every effort to respond with a common voice to this attack upon our common defense arrangements.

Sincerely yours,



His Excellency
Aldo Moro
President of the Council of Ministers
of the Italian Republic
Rome

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-377
By ju, NARA, Date 3-10-94

March 7, 1966

36a

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have asked David Bruce to give you a copy of the letter which I have just received from General de Gaulle.

I am responding to the General that his proposed actions raise the most serious questions for the Alliance and that I am consulting with the other governments affected.

I know that this comes at a difficult time for you. Germany lies at the heart of the problem of maintaining a safe and healthy Europe. You and I know how delicate questions of international affairs can intrude themselves into the course of a political campaign, as they did into the last German election. I feel that the crisis precipitated by the General should lead both sides in Britain to refrain from any comments in the campaign that might give aid and comfort to the General in his attack upon the great post-war structure of defense which we have all built together.

I understand that you also will be receiving a letter from General de Gaulle. Just as soon as that is received, it is essential that we be in touch so that the key allies can speak with a single voice.

Sincerely yours,

The Right Honorable
Harold Wilson, O.B.E., M.P.
Prime Minister
London

LBJ:RWK:mf

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-377
By ju, NARA, Date 3-10-94

March 7, 1966

36 b

Dear Mr. President:

I have read with care your letter of
March 7, 1966.

I am immediately bringing your views to
the attention of our other allies. Since
the course you propose to take so seriously
affects the security and well being of not
only the French and American people but
all the people of the NATO Alliance, I am
asking for their comment.

I would be less than frank if I did not
inform you that your action raises
grave questions regarding the whole
relationship between the responsibilities
and benefits of the Alliance.

Sincerely yours,

/s/

His Excellency
Charles de Gaulle
President of the French Republic
Paris

LEJ:GWE:mf

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-377
By ju, NARA, Date 3-10-94

36-c

March 7, 1966

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

I have just received a letter from General de Gaulle stating his intentions with regard to NATO and I am asking Ambassador McGhee to give you a copy of it immediately.

I am informing the General that his letter raises the most serious questions for all of us and that I am promptly consulting our partners in the Alliance.

General de Gaulle's decisions will have the most serious and far-reaching consequences for all the members of NATO. In view of the geographical position of the Federal Republic they are peculiarly significant and important to your Government. I want you to know that I am prepared to stand shoulder to shoulder with you in face of the serious problems which they pose. We are in this together and I know that our partners will look to us as nations which are carrying heavy burdens in the common defense to see to it that the Alliance is strengthened rather than weakened in the weeks ahead.

Sincerely,

/s/

His Excellency
Dr. Ludwig Erhard
Chancellor of the Federal Republic
of Germany
Bonn

LBJ/GWK/vm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-377
By , NARA, Date 3-10-94