

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
003	letter	Komer to Bowles Dup. #24, Komer, Box 23, "India-1965" Dup. #267, Papers of Komer, Chron. Oct-Dec 65, Box 6 <i>open 6/25/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-360</i>	S	1	10/22/65	A
005	cable	Komer to Bowles [sanitized 8/01] same sanitization 8/6/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-358 (near dup. #31, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134; near dup. #85, this file) Dup. #46, Komer, Box 23, India-1965 Dup. #65, Papers of Komer, Chron. July-Sept 65, Box 5	S	1	9/20/65	A
014	cable	Bundy to Bowles [sanitized 8/01] same sanitization 8/6/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-358 (dup. #34a, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134; near dup. #16a, this file) Dup. #104, Komer, Box 23, India-1965 Dup. #108a	S	3	4/28/65	A
015	letter	Komer to Bowles Dup. #105, Komer, Box 23, India-1965 #62, Saunders, Box 25, "Indian Famine..." #61, NSCH, Indian Famine Vol. 1, Box 25 <i>open 11-9-10</i>	S	2	4/28/65	A
016a	cable	Bundy to Bowles (dup. #14, this file)	S	3	4/27/65	A
018a	memo	to the President <i>open 3/3/14 per NLJ 12-243</i>	S	2	4/21/65	A
022	memo	Saunders to Bundy <i>open 11-9-10</i>	S	1	3/10/65	A
022a	cable	Bundy to Bowles sanitized 10/3/11 per NLJ/RAC 11-11 (#8a)	S-	1	undated	A
023a	cable	Bundy and Komer to Bowles [sanitized 8/01] same sanitization 8/6/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-358 (near dup. #36, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134; near dup. #110, this file) Dup. #49a, Papers of Komer, Chron July-Dec 64, Box 4	S	1	12/11/64	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer

Folder Title "Bowles 11/3/63-1965"

Box Number 13

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9/19/2003

JC
Initials

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
026	memo	Komer to Bundy [sanitized 8/01] (dup. #96, NSF, CF, India, Vol. 3, box 128) Dup. #8, Komer Box 23, India Dec. 63-64 Dup. #70, Papers of Komer, Box 4, Chron July-Dec-64 open 8/14/12	S	2	11/27/64	A
028	letter	Komer to Bowles Dup. #12, Komer, Box 23, India Dec. 63-64 Dup. #156, Papers of Komer, Box 4, Chron July-Dec-64 open 8/14/12	S	2	10/28/64	A
029	letter	Komer to Bowles Dup. #16, Komer, Box 23, India Dec. 63-64 Dup. #17, Papers of Komer, Box 4, Chron July-Dec-64 sanitized 6/25/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-360	S	2	10/9/64	A
030	letter	Komer to Bowles Dup. #21, Komer, Box 23, India Dec 1963-64 Dup. #326, Papers of Komer, Box 4, Chron July-Dec-64 open 8/14/12	S	2	8/1/64	A
031	memo	Komer to Bundy Dup. #399, Papers of Komer, Box 4, Chron July-Dec 64 open 6/25/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-360	S	1	8/11/64	A
032	memo	Komer to Bundy open 11/09/07	S	1	7/30/64	A
039	cable	Bundy and Komer to Bowles [sanitized 8/01] same sanitization 8/6/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-358 (dup. #42a, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134) Dup. #343, Papers of Komer, Chron. Jan-June 64, Box 4	S	1	3/11/64	A
042a	memo	Komer to the President [sanitized 8/01] same sanitization 8/6/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-358	S	1	3/10/64	A
043	cable	Bundy to Bowles [sanitized 8/01] same sanitization 8/6/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-358 (dup. #154a, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134) Dup. #53, Komer, Box 23, India 1963-64 Dup. #364, Papers of Komer, Box 4, Chron Jan-Jun 64	S	1	3/9/64	A
053	letter	Komer to Bowles Dup. #47, Komer, Box 26, India-Pak 12/63-3/66 Dup. #72, Papers of Komer, Chron 7/63-12/63, Box 3 open 6/25/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-360	S	1	12/7/63	A

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054a	memo	Komer to Bundy <i>Dup. #82a, Papers of Komer, Chron 7/63-12/63, Box 3 sanitized 6/25/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-360</i>	S	5	12/5/63	A
055	letter	Komer to Bowles <i>Dup. #101, Papers of Komer, Chron 7/63-12/63, Box 3 open 6/25/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-360</i>	S	2	11/30/63	A
058	memo	for the President <i>Dup. #120 Papers of Komer, Chron. 7/63-12/63, Box 3 open 6/25/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-360</i>	S	4	11/22/63	A
063	cable	Bowles to Bundy [sanitized 2002] (dup. #75a, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134) <i>Same sani 9-12-13 NLJ 12-244</i>	S-	1	undated	A
067	memo	Bowles to Rusk (dup. #67a, this file) <i>exempt 3/3/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-361</i>	S	5	12/21/65	A
067a	memo	Bowles to Rusk (dup. #67, this file) <i>exempt 3/3/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-361</i>	S	5	12/21/65	A
070a	letter	Bowles to Rusk <i>sanitized 3/3/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-361</i>	S	4	12/10/65	A
071	cable	Bowles to Komer <i>sanitized 8/26/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-362</i>	C-	1	12/7/65	A
074	cable	Bowles to Komer [sanitized 1/02] (dup. #70, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134) <i>Same sani 9-12-13 NLJ 12-244</i>	S-	1	11/26/65	A
078	cable	Bowles to Komer <i>sanitized 8/26/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-362</i>	C-	1	11/6/65	A

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079a	airgram	A 392 from New Delhi open 3/3/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-361	C	10	10/22/65	A
080	cable	Bowles to Komer sanitized 8/26/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-362	S-	1	10/2/65	A
083	memo	to Robert Komer [exempted 8/01] open 7/12/17 per NLJ/RAC 12-359	S	1	9/21/65	A
083a	report	intelligence report [exempted 8/01] open 7/12/17 per NLJ/RAC 12-359	S	7	5/10/65	A
084	cable	Bowles to Komer [sanitized 1/02] (dup. #73, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134 Same San 9-12-13 NLJ 12-244	S-	1	9/21/65	A
085	cable	Komer to Bowles [sanitized 8/01] more info released 8/6/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-358 (dup. #31, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/Bowles, box 134; near dup. #5, this file)	S	1	9/20/65	A
093	memo	Bowles to Rusk (dup. #96a, 108a, 109 this file) open 3/3/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-361	S	27	5/20/65	A
096a	memo	Bowles to Rusk (dup. #93, 108a, 109 this file) open 3/3/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-361	S	27	5/20/65	A
097	cable	Bowles to Bundy and Komer [sanitized 1/02] (dup. #79, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134 Same sanitization 9-12-13 NLJ 12-244	S-	1	5/15/65	A

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099	cable	Bowles to Bundy [sanitized 1/02] (dup. #77, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134) <i>Same Sanitization 9-12-13 NLJ 12-244</i>	S-	2	4/29/65	A
100	cable	Bundy to Bowles (near dup. #34a, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134; near dup. #14, this file) <i>Sanitized 8/6/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-358</i>	S	1	4/28/65	A
106	cable	Bowles to Bundy (#80, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134 is a partial duplicate) <i>Sanitized 8/26/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-362</i>	S-	1	3/9/65	A
107	cable	Bowles to Komer [sanitized 1/02] (dup. #85, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134) <i>Same Sanitization 9-12-13 NLJ 12-244</i>	C	1	1/8/65	A
108a	memo	Bowles to Rusk (dup. #93, 96a, 109 this file) <i>Open 3/3/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-361</i>	S	27	5/20/65	A
109	memo	Bowles to Rusk (dup. #93, 96a, 108a this file) <i>Open 3/3/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-361</i>	S	27	5/20/65	A
110	cable	Bundy and Komer to Bowles [sanitized 1/02] <i>Same Sanitization 8/21/13 per NLJ 12-242</i> (dup. #36, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134; near dup. #23a, this file)	S	1	12/12/64	A
111	memo	Wriggins to Talbot <i>Open 3/3/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-361</i>	S	7	11/18/64	A
112	letter	Bowles to Komer <i>Dup. #145, Komer, Box 23, India, Dec. 1963-64</i> <i>Open 8/14/12</i>	S	2	11/12/64	A

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114	cable	Bowles to Komer [sanitized 1/02] (dup. #87, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134) open 9-12-13 NLJ 12-244	S	2	9/30/64	A
115b	letter	Rusk to Bowles open 3/3/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-361	S	2	8/8/64	A
116	cable	Bowles to Komer [sanitized 1/02] (dup. #88, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134) Same sanitization 9-12-13 NLJ 12-244	S-	1	7/23/64	A
118	cable	Komer to Bowles [sanitized 1/02] Same sanitization 8/21/13 per NLJ 12-242 (dup. #38, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134)	S-	1	7/23/64	A
420	letter	Bowles to Komer open 10/3/11 per NLJ 11-75 (#109)	S	4	5/11/64	A
122	cable	Bowles to Bundy [sanitized 1/02] (dup. #96, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134) Same sanitization 9-12-13 NLJ 12-244	TS-	1	4/12/64	A
127	cable	Bowles to Bundy [sanitized 1/02] (dup. #94, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134) Same sanitization 9-12-13 NLJ 12-244	C-	2	3/10/64	A
128	cable	Bowles to Bundy and Komer [sanitized 2/03] (dup. #93, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134) more released 9-12-13 NLJ 12-244	S-	4	3/10/64	A

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130	cable	Bowles to Bundy and Komer [sanitized 1/02] (dup. #95, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134) <i>same sanitization 9-12-13 NLT 12-244</i>	TS-	1	3/9/64	A
135	memo	Komer to Bundy [exempted 8/01] <i>exempt 8/6/13 per NLT/RAC 12-358</i>	S	1	2/3/64	A
136	cable	Bowles to Harriman [sanitized 3/02] (dup. In FRUS, vol. 25, #11) <i>more released 9-12-13 NLT 12-244</i>	S	1	1/30/64	A
137	report	intelligence report [exempted 8/01] <i>exempt 1/2/14 per NLT/RAC 12-359</i>	S	3	undated	A
138a	letter	Bowles to Talbot <i>open 3/3/14 per NLT/RAC 12-361</i>	C	3	1/15/64	A

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JC
Initials

Bowles
X India
December 16, 1965

~~SECRET~~

VIA CLASSIFIED AIR POUCH

EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR

Dear Chet:

Few steps would better serve the national interest or please the President than greater Indian support on Vietnam. As we confront difficult decisions, to know that the largest country in Free Asia (and biggest democracy in the world) was with us would be of immense help.

Shastri must be brought to realize that his pleas to us for help against Chicom pressure are greatly weakened by India's self-centered failure to acknowledge that we are fighting for the same purpose in Vietnam. Some kind of Indian "flag" for Vietnam may be hard to arrange, but even a medical team would be the best investment India ever made. Do your damndest.

Merry Christmas!

R. W. Komer

Hon. Chester Bowles
U.S. Ambassador to India
American Embassy
New Delhi.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *8-26-03*

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR

2
December 1, 1965
Bowles
India

Dear Chet:

Well, the President's backgrounder was certainly good news. So I hope that you and John will stay of good heart while we work painfully and tortuously through our reassessment of South Asian policy. My own hunch is that in perspective the current sorting out period will turn out to be a blessing in disguise--and appear so in time to the Indians as well as ourselves. The President was dead right, in my judgment, in questioning the accepted "wisdom" on South Asia. If nothing else proved it, the folly of the three weeks' war certainly did.

We're nearing the climax with the Ayub and Shastri visits, even though there may well be a subsequent sorting out period lasting months or even years. In other words, it may be unrealistic to count on early full-scale resumption of aid solely because the President and Shastri reach a good meeting of minds. My own sense is that the President would still want to see a parallelism of actual performance and our turning on the spigot again.

We here have had to deploy most of our energies in exorcising devils--an indispensable prerequisite to moving ahead on a more sensible basis than in the past. If this process produces nothing more than a clearer sense of priorities--between India and Pakistan as well as between agriculture and industry--it will provide a better foundation on which to rebuild. We are now well along--although the process is by no means completed--toward removing the past ambivalence of US policy, which contributed in great measure to the present mess. In fact, ever since 1959 or so we have really been engaged in this transitional process--rectifying the strategic error that you warned Dulles against back in the early Fifties.

Just because you don't hear from us about interim fertilizer, or shipping more food, etc. don't think that these matters aren't all

Hon. Chester Bowles
U. S. Ambassador to India
American Embassy
New Delhi

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *8-26-03*

~~SECRET~~

Page 2

being looked at. We're also quite conscious that our Indian affairs (and our Pak affairs as well) could go quite sour if we overdo the tactical pullback. But at least I am convinced that the odds are-- and the evidence is--that the President's strategy is working, and that the overall aims he has in mind are worth the pain and strain.

Sincerely,

R. W. Komer
Deputy Special Assistant
to the President for
National Security Affairs

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

VIA CLASSIFIED POUCH

3
Bowles
x India
October 22, 1965

Dear Chet:

Many thanks for your kind wire. Would that a new shingle which otherwise changes little would really give me more leverage to get the job done.

Depend on it that we are not being idle, as I presume John Lewis will have reported to you by now. The US is clearly at a crossroads, and I for one am determined to clarify for all concerned that we must not fall back into the ambivalence of yesteryear. Settling Kashmir simply is not the ultimate aim of US policy.

Indeed the Paks themselves are helping greatly to clarify our choices, but I can't say the same for the Indians. They want us to treat them as a great power, but the trouble is they don't act like one. Pakistan is essentially their problem, not ours, as I think they'll find out to their cost. Wait till they lose Ayub and have a really irridentist, fully-Chicom oriented Pakistan on their hands--and one on which the US has lost all leverage.

I see no intent at the top here to slip back into the old ways in which even Kennedy treated Pakistan. Indeed the real issue is not India vs. Pakistan, but whether our massive subcontinent investment is worthwhile. The real question is whether it would serve our interests to let both Delhi and Pindi go it alone for a while. You don't have to argue with me about this one--the job to be done is for the Indians to convince us. If Shastri wants what we have to offer, he's going to have to prove it to the President. You can't, and we can't either.

All those here who really know the score fully realize how beautifully you've handled a critical situation. Nor does your performance suffer from the comparison with next door. But more needs to be done if we and India are to cement a new and better tie. So do emphasize both self-help and India's need to come up with a good solution to the Pak problem.

If Ayub gets here first (which is in the lap of the gods), it's crucial that Shastri neither pout nor misunderstand. Mac and I hope you'll drive this home to L. K. Jha in spades if the ball bounces that way. In other words we'd have no intention of treating India like Pakistan, if only the Indians would stop acting almost as jejune as the Paks.

The Honorable
Chester Bowles
U. S. Ambassador to India
New Delhi

All the best,

R. W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ / PAC 12-31-00
By UUD NARA, Date 06-11-2014

~~SECRET~~

September 28, 1965

Mac -

Chet's recent reporting has been right on target--India won't give up Kashmir, so don't force it into Soviet arms. But Chet himself is the worst man to plead the case, especially with LBJ. So I see no point in his coming back now. We need him out there anyway. Hare completely agrees and is so recommending.

Let Chet come back if Shastri comes; we couldn't stop him then anyway. I favor not answering Chet's sidewire to you.

RWK

Attach. Delhi 813 NODIS 9/28/65

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 8-26-03

~~SECRET~~

September 20, 1965

NEW DELHI

FOR AMBASSADOR ONLY FROM KOMER

You can depend on it that your proposals and concerns getting top level attention here. As you have seen, our intention is to move carefully and soberly in what has become major crunch in subcontinent.

As to food in particular, we giving most sober attention to ways and means of keeping food pipeline going, though as you too have recognized major new PL 480 agreement most unlikely this time. Would hope have decision soon.

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ / RAC 12-358

NARA, Date 08-03-2013

By Uld

~~SECRET~~

September 1, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY MANN
ASST. SECRETARY McNAUGHTON

Attached is a memorandum on the question of military aid to India and Pakistan on which the President would like the best analysis he can get. What he has in mind, of course, is less a historical reprise than our best views on the policy choices described by Bowles. I suggest we handle this rather informally.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

Attach. Bowles ltr to President 8/19/65 att.
Memorandum-Observations on MilAid
to Indian Subcontinent

RWK Note to Mann: "Tom-I gather you have this on the side. I keep telling Bowles not to harrass the President but he never seems to stay put long."

RWK Note to McNaughton: "I've talked w/Hoopes about this. I suspect Bob N. got a copy too."

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By PC, NARA, Date 8-26-03

Bowles
+ Pak MAP
+ India map

9/17
Follow up?

~~SECRET~~

July 27, 1965
Tuesday/10:00 am

1
Bowles

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Bowles appointment. Minor nuisance though it is, I really would urge that you give Bowles a few minutes before he leaves Sunday.

Put the blame on me, but in the note you sent him after his operation (I drafted) you told him you looked forward to seeing him, and when I volunteered to go straighten him out (I did) I again told him you wanted to see him (I thought with your OK).

On the merits, if a guy like Chet goes back without having seen you, his ability to work on Shastri will be that much less. His own morale will be shot as well. So I hope you'll make an honest man out of me.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8-12-76 (*235)

By *jc/rj*, NARA, Date 8-26-03

~~SECRET~~

July 26, 1965

8

Bowles

Mac -

Latest problem-- President told Marvin Watson he didn't want to see Bowles and didn't recall having agreed.

I know how much of a nuisance seeing Chet must seem to LBJ but the hard fact is that Chet's credibility would go way down if LBJ didn't see him (he'll have been here 10 days). When LBJ wrote Chet after the operation (attached) he said he looked forward to seeing Chet. I also recall that when I volunteered to go up and straighten Bowles out I asked if the President were willing to see him and the President said yes. Didn't he also mention it to you?

Even at the cost of making ourselves the fall guys again, I think we ought to go back at LBJ. Is it better done by you this time or shall I write him a mash note?

RWK

~~SECRET~~

*You said you'd handle - Thanks.
McG.B.*

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc/mw*, NARA, Date 8-26-03

9
file
Bowles
July 8, 1965

Dear Chet:

Delighted you're in such fine fettle. Gerry and I greatly look forward to coming up on the weekend of the 18th. You said 18th and 19th (Sunday and Monday) in your letter, but I assume you meant 17th and 18th, Saturday and Sunday. I have to be back here for Monday I'm afraid.

Ergo, unless it's bad timing for you, we'll come up on Allegheny Airlines #924, arriving 1:54 p. m. Saturday at Groton and would leave Groton on Allegheny Airlines #929, at 7 p. m. Sunday. OK?

Things are fairly hectic on all fronts here, though mostly Vietnam. The boss showed me your letter to him, which through sheer coincidence he read at a time when the rest of us were pressing him too. All in the day's work, so don't worry about it. I'll give you a fill-in when I see you. But I sense a distinct feeling that we're all pushing too hard so let me urge that you avoid any talk about such matters that might get back to the boss till you have a chance to talk with him yourself. A simple word to the wise.

At least the Rann of Kutch crisis seems to be over. Both Paks and Indians are demobilizing. So there's one big problem that hopefully will be behind you when you get back to Delhi.

All the best,

R. W. Komer

Mr. Chester Bowles
Hayden's Point
Essex, Connecticut

~~SECRET~~

Mac -

June 18, 1965

Here's the one page summary of Bowles' memo to LBJ, which you requested. Since the President will see Bowles when he returns, I see merit in weekend reading.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

Att: RWK memo for the President, 6/17/65,
with Bowles ltr to the President, 6/3/65

10
file
Bowles
X India
X Pina

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 8-26-03

~~SECRET~~

10a
file
June 17, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a letter from Chester Bowles, enclosing a long memorandum which recommends a new look at our India-Pak policy. He fears failure to come to grips now with the forces shaping events there will result in the same kind of loss we suffered in China in the 1940s.

We offer it without prejudice and with the following brief summary of his main points. Bowles argues that the situation in the subcontinent has changed 180 degrees since we launched our present policy in the mid-1950s. Then, in the post-Korea climate, the Soviet military threat to South Asia seemed paramount. China seemed dangerous only as a potentially attractive economic and ideological model. Now the post-Stalin Soviet shift to penetration through economic and military aid, and China's 1962 attack on India, have reversed the picture.

Against this new backdrop, Bowles thinks that our economic policy still makes sense but that our military policy has become "irrelevant." Whereas we once looked to Pakistan as the one sure holdout against Communism in the subcontinent, he argues that now "India's domestic objective of a viable democratic state and her foreign policy objective of resisting Chinese aggression coincide more closely with our own interests than do those of any other major emerging nation."

Continued Free World economic aid to both Indians and Paks is still justified because it alone can produce the economic and political systems needed to build the strong counter-weight to China we want. Both are using our aid effectively, and he foresees a chance for a major breakthrough to a sustained high rate of Indian growth in the next 5-7 years, provided aid continues.

But we ought to ease out of our Pak alliance (which is an empty one) and gear our military aid more frankly to our chief strategic objective in Asia--containing China. We should give both India and Pakistan only the weapons they'd need against China. We'd get out of the box we're in now by now guaranteeing to protect one against the other and by trying gradually to draw the two together in joint defense. Bowles doesn't see any serious risk of driving Ayub into Peiping's arms.

Dave Bell will send you shortly a memo on the second subject Bowles raises in his covering letter--our mounting hoard of surplus rupees.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 8-26-03

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

June 16, 1965

Bowles 11

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Chester Bowles found out last November he had Parkinson's disease, usually fatal over time. Without telling anyone (except Rusk at the last minute), he opted for a fancy experimental brain operation in New York. This was the real reason why he was so eager to come home.

The doctor says the operation was wholly successful and cured his growing paralysis. We'll get fuller medical word later, but I thought you might want to write or call him. He's at St. Barnabas Hospital for Incurable Disease in New York under name of John Chester (he's kept it all very quiet). Possible note is attached.

*See LBJ
to Bowles
June 1965*

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

June 10, 1965

12
Bowles
X India

Mac -

Chet Bowles' attached letter to the President creates a dilemma. It's thought-provoking and worth reading, especially at this time. On the other hand, everything we said LBJ on this subject doubtless raises his suspicion that the India lovers are feeding him more propaganda.

My hunch is just to put it cold in weekend reading without endorsement. What say?

RWK

Attach. Bowles ltr to President 6/2/65 w/att
Bowles Memo to SecState 5/20/65

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-26-03

~~SECRET~~

McGB:

Bowles x India Aid
13
May 8, 1965

I recommend you clear the attached, which is designed to give Bowles something to say to Shastri before he leaves for Moscow (night of 11 May EDT). It lets him reassure Shastri quite confidentially that we're thinking in terms of a PL 480 program that will meet India's needs, though we can't commit ourselves yet.

I've told State that the question of whether we'll make a one-year or two-year commitment is moot until State-AID-Agriculture can make a recommendation to us reflecting a full round of congressional soundings. They'll begin this process next week. Meanwhile, I've penciled in on p.2 words to give Bowles a little more of the carrot. (No one here disagrees on the merits of an eventual two-year commitment if Congress buys; our only debate is over timing.)

I also told State very clearly we don't object to Bowles passing this confidential word to Shastri provided (1) he make no commitment now and (2) he generate no publicity. Cable reflects these prohibitions.

Bowles has also asked (most recently in 3164 attached) permission to announce the first \$100 million non-project loan under our new consortium pledge, but RWK has already told Gaud the President doesn't want to do this now. However, Bowles could say something about one power (\$32.3 million) and one education (\$11.5 million) project which we'll soon be processing loans for if the President has approved (Mildred checking) our request for blanket approval on projects like this or if you feel you have leeway to approve. Yes? No?

HHS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 8-26-03

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

April 28, 1965 - 11:00 a.m.

TO NEW DELHI

x India

14

EYES ONLY FOR BOWLES FROM BUNDY

Have just seen your 3057 asking help on pending matters before you return here mid-May. We are fully and sympathetically aware of hectic situation in subcontinent and will do our best to push some of these matters forward. However, with all the candor you have come to expect via this channel, let me warn against great expectations just now. With Vietnam in the forefront of all minds, there is simply not likely to be the kind of constructive focus on the issues you raise which is necessary to push them through.

Moreover, while tactical considerations may argue for early gestures before Shastri goes to Moscow, we still see merit in reserving some of the items you propose till we can fit them better into package approach being considered here, rather than dishing them out piecemeal. Two-year PL 480 commitment now, for example, might deprive us of major leverage before we have fully worked out what we want Indians to do in return, at least in agriculture sector. A one-year, frankly interim, agreement might suffice for our immediate purpose.

As for F-5A, we see little chance of promising aircraft now when Paks and perhaps Indians are using our MAP for purposes far afield from what we intended.

~~SECRET~~

Sent 24/15 52 Z

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ / RAC 12-358

NARA, Date 08-03-2013

By LUK

SECRET

- 2 -

In sum, my reading of Washington end is that the way of wisdom is not to push too hard on big new programs till we can revalidate our Indian enterprise and get the aid bill through. Here we must grant the President's own unparalleled sense of the rocky road the aid bill is travelling and his strong desire not to rock the boat till he knows what's in his pocket. Nor does Vietnam, where the course we have to take will not win us many short term plaudits overseas, ease the problem.

So timing is everything just now. On this score, Komer and I strongly urge that you postpone your home leave for six weeks or so. When we heard you were coming, we thought it wise on your behalf to check with the President, and this is his own distinct preference. Aside from the value of having you at the helm in Delhi during a ticklish period in US/Indian relations, we may need your guiding hand in handling Vietnam affairs with the Indians. Equally important, you could not come back now without talking India and it is simply not a propitious time to do so. You would inevitably be caught in the backwash of the Shastri affair, and have to answer embarrassing queries. Even strictly home leave might be misconstrued, and you couldn't really come back without a Washington leg.

These are difficult times, not least for you, and we all appreciate your gallant handling of affairs at your end. I also realize how difficult

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

It is in Delhi to get the full flavor of the situation here. However, I'm sure you will understand the President's own judgment as to why the timing would be better, and your presence here more productive, when our own affairs on the Hill and in Vietnam are more fully sorted out.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NWJ.032R.023.002/5

By jc NARA. Date 11-4-10

file

*Boonles
x India*

15

SECRET/EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR
VIA CLASSIFIED DIPLOMATIC POUCH

Chet:

April 28, 1965

Your note of the 21st (received today) deserves an immediate explanation. Your friends in the know here all appreciate the way in which you took a bolt from the blue, without unduly fighting the problem. As you can imagine, our personal cable (it was Mac's as well as mine) was first and foremost a hasty effort to give you most privately the full flavor.

Let me add that I largely share your disappointment over the setback to our Indian enterprise, which has been proceeding remarkably well (all things considered) since October 1962. But longer term impact is often less adverse than initial pained reactions would suggest. Without seeking to minimize the problem, I've seen a lot of these flaps come and pass away.

This said, I'll confess that the initial press emphasis on Vietnam, together with the bracketing of India and Pakistan, did tend to point the finger more than was justified on the record. The fact of the matter is that the President was far more exercised about Pak misbehavior than Indian. Also we simply couldn't in the initial public statements talk about the aid problem, lest we clue our Hill critics. In all private fence-mending, however, we've pointed essentially and quite legitimately to the aid angle (as the President did in his letter to Shastri).

Bundy and I are distressed that our private comment about an enterprise that "isn't going anywhere fast" should have been so painful. However, we were referring not only to the "appalling" domestic problems cited in your own letter to the President but to our political relations. Let's face it on both scores. In the economic field per capita growth is painfully slow (which is precisely why some of us are trying to argue for a larger scale joint effort to get India moving). And politically, the high point reached in November 1962 has receded. For many reasons (most of them quite understandable) Washington and Delhi are not working as well in harness as they should. This is by no means your fault (or mine), but it is a fact of life. If it weren't, you and I wouldn't be trying so hard to get some new momentum into the enterprise.

In any case, I can assure you that whether or not India is going anywhere fast, this was not a factor in the postponement of the visit. So misinformation--gross or otherwise--was not at issue.

SECRET/EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR

SECRET/EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR

- 2 -

I might add that I'm not as pessimistic about Washington's views as its recent cables (or lack of them) may suggest. I also doubt that the recent painful episode will sweep away very much of what we--you foremost--have been trying to build. Let's reserve judgment over the ultimate results till at least some of the dust has settled.

But we do have a terrible problem in getting adequate focus on South Asia at a time when all thought and energy is focussed on Vietnam. This is inevitable, I suspect, but don't think we aren't trying. Mac and I are doing our best. But we--and most of all the President face an added hurdle in that foreign aid is the one piece of major legislation on which there's no consensus--and on which the Congress may vent its frustrations as a result. We're trying quiet diplomacy, but this isn't easy. On the bright side, however, the billion for SEA is the President's first use of a major aid tool to help settle new problems. If we can't do it for Vietnam, why not for intrinsically more important places?

You'll have received Mac's well meant suggestions on home leave. Please, please bear in mind that we're trying to protect your flank--and preserve your maneuverability--by keeping you properly clued. It's painful for us too to have to tell you not to come, but this is what friends are for. And no personal slight from on high is involved!

All the best, and I'm hopeful it is all for the best. We're doing well overall, and I'm confident that affairs which are lagging will get the treatment too, as soon as the time is ripe. But even LBJ can't do everything simultaneously, even though that's what the job description demands.

Sincerely,

R. W. Komer

Honorable Chester Bowles
U.S. Ambassador to India
U.S. Ambassador
New Delhi, India

SECRET/EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR

~~SECRET~~

Mac -

April 27, 1965

Here's most artful way I could devise to break the word gently to Chet.

It could stand a lot of improvement, but I also see urgency in turning Chet around before his plans get too set. He's already sending in cables (and I suspect writing people).

To edge into a painful subject, I took advantage of his new 3057 (attached), which is also addressed to you. Chet is overbidding here in his desperate effort to salvage something from Shastri affair and forestall an Indian/Soviet love affair at our expense when Shastri gets the red carpet in Moscow. I'm worried here too, largely because the Kutch affair may give the Sovs a golden opportunity to offer all sorts of new hardware (since now it would appear to be against the Paks, not the Chicoms).

LBJ's press conference statement was first class, but I still see a good letter indicated, and will do draft before I go. Even if we seem to be running after Shastri just before he goes to Moscow, I'd swallow my pride to help avert risk of a real setback. I'd even like to see LBJ lift the veil a bit as a teaser on the big things we'd like to talk about in the fall (big new multi-year PL 480 solid help for Fourth Five Year Plan, etc), but this may be shorting too high.

Side wire to Bowles attached.

RWK

*See Rev 4/26/65
11:00 am*

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By pc, NARA, Date 8-26-03

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

April 26, 1965

17

Bowles

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Bowles' Itinerary. On checking, I find that he's not suddenly decided to come back and straighten Washington out, but had been planning for some time to come back on home leave around 17 May (before the Shastri visit) and then stay on for the visit. He of course sent the State desk man a request to set up appointments with Rusk, McNamara, Freeman, various people on the Hill, etc. This is a normal practice with Chet.

Given the bad timing of an inevitable attempt by Chet to explain India to all and sundry, I see two ways of turning this aside:

- this* → (1) Mac or I could tell him gently and privately that May isn't a propitious time to come back and stir things up. The best intentioned efforts might have an adverse effect on the aid bill. So better to postpone a month or so.
- as this?* → (2) We could let Chet come along in mid-May but caution him to make it strictly home leave.

Which would you prefer? I suspect that Bowles is feeling a little bruised just now, and that too rough a spur might lead him to make noises about resigning. I doubt this (and he likes the job so much that you could easily turn him off), but if he did resign it would inevitably be tied to the disinviting of Shastri, which we don't want now.

McAB R. W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *8-26-03*

RWK asked
(at McGB's request)
for a 1-page
 précis of Bowles'
letter. So it's
up to him what
he does with it.

It.

~~SECRET/DRAFT~~

18a
Bowles
April 21, 1965
file
(HHS draft)
not sent

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This is the latest in a series of letters from Chet Bowles telling us that we're approaching a watershed in India--either India will jump ahead with new vigor as an impressive economic and political counterweight to Chinese power in Asia or it will begin to stagnate and draw away from us. In this one to you, he sketched this situation as the background for your then planned talk with Shastri.

Bowles feels that India's success will depend on a combination of bold economic decisions by its government and increased aid. Although Shastri is politically tough and willing to tackle difficult policy questions, he still lacks the assurance and sophistication of a Nehru. So Bowles believed your big job would be to bolster Shastri's self-confidence for these hard decisions and to send him away with the impression that you personally respect him and are prepared to back him up.

Bowles suggested you establish rapport by talking domestic politics (his and yours) with him and then move on to explain forthrightly what we want in India--not gratitude or kowtowing to our views but a vigorously democratic India. He hoped you would indirectly bargain major help for India's Fourth Plan in return for more realistic Indian economic policies. He expected you would broach India's decision not to go nuclear now and ask for Shastri's views on how to tackle the proliferation problem.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 12-243

By 6448

NARA, Date 62-04-2014

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

He also expected you would want to range over Soviet relations (Shastri would have come here after a Moscow visit), Southeast Asia, China, India-Pakistan relations, Africa and the future of "nonalignment" as a policy.

In developing the background on these points, Bowles pointed out that India's international outlook has changed markedly since 1962. India is now an avowed enemy of China, has improved relations with all its neighbors but Pakistan, is increasingly disillusioned with the neutrals and is at least suspicious of Soviet support. In Southeast Asia, Indians honestly fear both US withdrawal which would endanger them and a Soviet-Chicom rapprochement forced by escalation.

Bowles recommends specifically that (1) we be ready to increase aid in return for Indian policy shifts and (2) we sell at least three squadrons of F-5 aircraft to strengthen India against China.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Mac -

April 15, 1965

Here's a proposed side wire to calm down Bowles. I've tried to hit the right pitch.

We'll definitely need an LBJ letter. State and I are drafting to be ready.

The right press guidance to dampen speculation is also essential. Gil Harrison phoned Greenfield to ask if we had any repercussions yet on cancellation both visits. He thought we were cancelling Shastri because of his stand on Vietnam. Jim was floored at leak, but told Harrison story partly off, and appealed to him not to spread it. Harrison said he had story from "a loyal American pretty high up." We doubt he got it from his brother in Delhi (Bowles isn't that dumb).

RWK

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By pc, NARA, Date 8-26-03

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 9-20-79; NSC 9-581
By fc/isp NARA. Date 8-26-03

20
file
Bowers
X India

~~SECRET~~/PERSONAL

March 20, 1965

Dear Chet,

I realize how distressing you must find our deafening silence in response to your many recent efforts. However, I am sure you know (and I asked Averell to tell you) that it is only because of the fire brigade exercises Mad and I have been involved in here. He has been spending most of his time on Vietnam and I on the Congo, Cyprus and Arab-Israel. It's a pity but our other interests (perhaps even more important in the long run) inevitably get shunted aside by the immediate flaps.

Let me say, however, that we haven't been neglecting our Indian enterprise. On the F-5 matter we are getting a JCS study next week. We had to go through this phase, but even if the Chiefs are reluctant the rest of us realize that military aid to India is as much a political as a military matter. I don't want to hold out too much hope, unless you can actually engineer a tradeoff between F-5s and MIGs. But I can assure you that we will insist on a hard look at substituting F-5s for other MAP or MAP sales under present ceilings.

The concept of a substantial add-on to our investment in Indian development is gaining currency here, particularly since we might be able to tie it in some fashion to some highly important things we want: (a) non-proliferation; (b) significant economic changes which would permit our money to be used more efficiently; and even (c) some progress toward Pak-Indian reconciliation. I just read the report of the latest pre-pledging session in Paris. We are finally getting the IB to take more leadership in insisting on reciprocal Indian economic reforms in return for consortium input. Bill Gaud tells me that we plan a much greater effort next year, when we must come to grips with the Indian Fourth Plan.

Am also taking a hard look at your wheat/cotton substitution idea for the UAR, although I suspect that it's more imaginative than practical at this point (given Hill reluctance to let us do even this much for Nasser). Incidentally, we can find no written reference here to the point you make about your talk with Nasser in 1962, i.e. that Nasser agreed to lay off subversive activities in return for our major PL 480 input.

~~SECRET~~/PERSONAL

~~SECRET~~/PERSONAL

- 2 -

Your stimulating 2 March letter reminded both Mac and myself that the Administration cannot afford to neglect its Indian enterprise. We are getting a number of things underway heading up toward Shastri visit.

Am off to London now to side Averell in our confab with the Laborites on Africa. Was terribly disappointed when our bosses made me stay on in Tel Aviv to mop up, rather than letting me come on out and see you. You can imagine how eager I was to come. However, I'll end with a promise to take up our Indian affairs again as soon as I return. Averell reports you are in fine fettle, which is always good to hear.

Fond regards,

R. W. Komer

Ambassador Chester Bowles
U. S. Ambassador to India
New Delhi, India

cy: me g/b

~~SECRET~~/PERSONAL

~~SECRET~~

RWK:

March 15, 1965

Bowles
x India
may

Bowles argues that we're dealing with a new situation on supersonics for India. Chavan admits his mistake in concentrating on F-104's last spring and also worries about depending on Soviets. So he has officially asked for 6 squadrons of F-5A's 1966-70 (16 aircraft per squadron plus spares) and for support to improve the HF-24 Mark I. Bowles sees this as a second chance to establish a good relationship with the Indian Air Force and "some measure of control over its use vis-a-vis Pakistan."

Indian rationale for the F-5A is to complement HF-24 Mark I for close ground support (MIG-21 doesn't fill this role). However, Bowles points out it could also take the place of the MIG's as an interceptor. The HF-24 Mark I subsonic, and the Indians now admit it will have no intercept capability.

Bowles proposes a package including: (1) 3 squadrons of F-5A's over next 24 months (or F-104C as alternative) until we see whether climate is ripe for other 3; (2) feasibility study (would take 3 months) of HF-24 as a weapons system before we go beyond \$1.25 million (FY 64) to which we're currently committed. (He thinks it won't pass the test.) The Indians are asking for machine tools (\$4million credit sale) to raise HF-24 production to 6 aircraft per month by about 1968. They hope to add 2 squadrons of Mark I in FY 66-67 and 8 more by FY 70. This might eventually require another \$6 million for materials and another \$4-5 million in flight and fatigue testing equipment.

He feels the Indians can't openly reverse their position on MIG-21's (36 from Soviets expected FY 66-67) or on the MIG assembly line (5 more squadrons of 12 planes each by 1972) since this would look too much like a policy switch and might jeopardize \$175 million in yearly Soviet aid. Although L. K. Jha, M. J. Desai and Arjan Singh have hinted that the MIG program may come apart, Chavan has been unwilling officially to give us any hope that they'll kill it. So Bowles says it's unrealistic for us to make abandoning MIG's a condition for F-5's unless we're ready to pick up the check for economic aid which Soviets might drop. However, he does feel our stepping up with F-5's and help for HF-24 might encourage GOI eventually to drop MIG assembly. At least it would dilute Indian dependence on MIG's and put us in a position to move in if MIG production folds.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *plc*, NARA, Date *8-26-03*

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Bowles rejects McConaughy's argument that giving F-5's to India will necessarily exacerbate our relations with Pakistan. He argues that we've gained a substantial voice in the size and shape of the Indian defense budget to Pakistan's advantage. He argues Soviets would have stepped in in a big way if we'd left the door open. The other side of the argument is that if we give F-104's to Ayub and nothing to India, we'll hurt ourselves in India.

DOD's problem is that F-5A would overlap the roles of both the HF-24 and the MIG-21 and waste precious Indian resources. However, new info which DOD has just received on Indian plans to retire aging aircraft may clarify the problem. I'll have more on this after I see Stoddart Wednesday.

HHS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET with COMINT attachment~~

Bowles
x India Map
22

McGB:

March 10, 1965

1. Bowles' long plaint to RWK is something he might best answer after he settles down since this involves sensitive relationships he is much closer to than I. Bowles is referring chiefly to his F-5 proposal, since the economic program is going in the right direction. However, if you want to be nice you might send something like the attached (BKS answered his first cable simply saying you and Komer were away and would be in touch when you returned.).

FYI, before he left, Bob asked me to stir people up on Bowles' aircraft proposal. JCS will have a position ready next Monday. At that point, we should be able to get State and Defense together, though Bowles probably won't end up with all he hopes for.

2. Have you ever heard from McCloy (see New Delhi 2385 attached)? If not, would you prefer to wait for him to make the first move or let State set something up? Would you encourage his seeing the President? I'd like to give State some feel if you haven't already.

HHS

Att: Proposed message to Bowles
Cy, ltr from Bowles to Komer, 3/2/65
COMINT Msg. from Bowles to Bundy, 3/9/65 #10564
New Delhi 2383, 2/24/65

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS.140.003.036/1
jc NARA. Date 11-5-10

~~SECRET with COMINT attachment~~

~~SECRET~~

22a
1.4(c)

TO: AMBASSADOR BOWLES
Ambassy New Delhi VIA CAS

FROM: McGeorge Bundy

Bob Komer and I are not ignoring your wires on the F-5 problem. However, as you know from Gov. Harriman, Bob has been involved in ticklish business elsewhere and will be returning only this weekend. In his absence, we have started wheels turning to get a Defense position by early next week, so we have not been wasting time. Also, when he and I have had a chance to chat, we will want to answer your long letter.

[You might add a sentence about McCloy if you have seen or intend to see him.]

~~SECRET~~

1.4(c)

SANITIZED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 11-11 (#8a)
By ish NARA, Date 9-21-11

~~SECRET~~

Mac -

December 11, 1964

A little side wire message like this
might help spur Bowles to make a try.
No harm in trying either, though I doubt
he'll succeed.

Bowles
X India

RWK

Att: Draft msg. to New Delhi

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-26-03

23^u~~SECRET~~

December 11, 1964

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

FOR AMBASSADOR ONLY FROM BUNDY AND KOMER

We wish to underline President's view, as expressed to you, that he sets great store on more flags for Vietnam. While he and we realize all the problems involved in getting Indians to ante up even a hospital unit, you should know our judgment that nothing would more solidify Shastri's position in White House esteem. We can argue that Soviets have really opted out of Vietnam situation, so that in helping us Indians would be striking blow at their real enemy the Chicomms. In point of fact, we are fighting India's battle in Southeast Asia even more than we're fighting our own. Moreover, even if Shastri had to turn down such an approach (best made to him personally and informally), it would make him realize more fully our strong feelings on Vietnam.

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.3

NLJ/RAE 12-358

By UUB

NARA, Date 08-03-2013

~~SECRET~~

24
December 5, 1964
Bowles
x India

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The main reason Chat Bowles wants to see you is simply to be re-assured that you want him to stay on in India. As he put it to me, he's quite happy and would be delighted to stay on for another full tour, if you so desire; the one thing he doesn't want is just to stay for another six months or so.

The general feeling in State and here is that Bowles has done a good job. The Indians like him, and if he bids high for Washington backing, this is controllable.

A few key points you might make to him are:

1. You're squarely behind him and want him to stay on as long as he feels able.

2. You've done quite well by India: (a) the \$50 million MAP and \$50 million military sales package for FY'65; (b) continued large development aid at around \$450 million per annum; (c) massive extra shipments of PL 480 wheat and rice to meet current food crisis. In turn we want India to be a little more helpful on the political side, on such issues as Article 19, Chirep, etc.

3. You also want to discourage Indians from a defense spending spree (which could siphon off money we give them for development and also cause extra trouble with the Paks). We should keep telling Indians that their development program must have top priority.

4. You look forward to seeing Shastri in the spring (you told Bowles to give him a general invite earlier, and he'll probably want to come here when he goes to the UK next May).

5. You admire India's wise decision not to go nuclear in the wake of the Chicom test.

6. Moyers and Goodwin have asked him for ideas on inaugural address. You'll want to thank him.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date 8-28-03

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

11/30/64

Mac -

You will know better than I how to handle this in light of your talk with LBJ Saturday morning.

Bowles

RWK

Att. Rusk Memo to President 11/28/64, subj.
Apptmt for Amb. Bowles

~~SECRET~~

Mac -

November 27, 1964

Bowles scratched lunch with me today because of illness, though he did see Rusk briefly.

When he sees you, one query will be "when can I see LBJ?" (Chet plans to leave around 10 December, but would certainly stay over for this purpose).

Aside from illness, he's in a good mood and anxious to tape down as much as he can for his clients now that US election is over.

For perspective's sake, let's tell that we've done mighty well by India in LBJ's first year. Besides all the emergency PL 480 we've just donated to meet food crisis, the \$100 million FY 65 MAP package (50/50 grant and sales) was a real coup. It took an uphill fight too. While LBJ wouldn't sign on to a five-year commitment at this level, we have accepted it for planning purposes if Indians perform in turn. I've gotten same figure accepted for next year too.

We're especially pleased with \$1.4 billion 5-year foreign exchange ceiling, which is designed to keep Indians from going hog wild on defense kick (and to prevent our economic aid from being siphoned off for this purpose).

Fact of matter is that the Indian military are on a defense spree, and Defmin Chavan is backing them for his own political purposes. Trouble is that Chet himself has gotten the fever and is spending far more in cable tolls plugging MAP than on the main chance.

Chet feels strongly that we missed the boat on pre-empting the MIG deal (I don't think we had the option, although you and I tried to get an offer made even so.) In any case he's now arguing that we can't permit the same thing to happen to the Indian navy. Fortunately, this risk seems to have dropped sharply since UK came through with a pretty good naval package.

We want to use such leverage as we have to dampen Indian military appetites (especially those we can't feed), and to get Indian thinking back onto their new 5-year Plan 1965-69 which calls for more external capital than anything now in sight. Indian performance is lamentable on the self-help side, and we should side Dave Bell is goosing Chet on this score. Their

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ.032R.023.00Y1
By jc NARA, Date 6/29/12

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

agriculture is a mess, and the Paks are walking away from them in terms of freeing up the private sector (with excellent results).

Chet is also hopped up about nuclear assurances to India, to forestall proliferation. We're for this in general but don't want to charge in and offer all sorts of inducements to the Indians. Talbot makes good sense in urging that we let them come to us. Our best guess is that Shastri means it, at least for the short term when he says that India won't go nuclear. So we have turnaround time.

As to the Soviets, they aren't going to invest so much more risk capital in India than they are already. They're more strapped these days than we are too. No need for us to be too jumpy about Soviets stealing a march on us. If anything, the problem is with the Indians, who seem to be much more worried about their lack of leverage on the Soviets than they need be. Chet might plug this line.

Above is to give you some ammo for talk with Chet (I'll sit in if you want but am not aching). You might ask him about Shastri's performance, risk of Kerala going Communist again, Indo-Pak relations. He wants a thorough-going review of Indian policy (remember LBJ's remark to McConaughy) but I'm dubious that now's the time.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

November 16, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR CARL ROWAN

Attached from Chet Bowles might interest you. Our old advertising friend and his USIS colleagues appear to have done quite a job in publicizing our election process.

It strikes me that this might be worth a story in your house organ (or State's); in fact there might be merit in all USIS posts doing this sort of thing. Good to see you the other night.

R. W. Komer

Attach. Bowles ltr to Komer dtd 11/9/64

27

Bowles
X India

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NJ 032R.023.001/2
By jc, NARA, Date 6/29/12

SECRET

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR ONLY
VIA CLASSIFIED DIPLOMATIC POUCH

October 28, 1964

Dear Chet:

Hope this reaches you before you depart. My face is red over your letter of September 4 enclosing Subramaniam's warm encomium on our PL 480 help. This got clipped to the bottom of some Israeli stuff and not even read by me until today. So I'm afraid I muffed this ball, though the letter should still be useful in terms of follow-up publicity on how much PL 480 is helping India.

To show you that my heart was in the right place, however, it was I who tried to get a lot of WH publicity for signing of new PL 480 agreement. I got mousetrapped, however, in the last minute hassle over whether we would get any kind of new PL 480 law at all. So I had to drop any gambits which entailed even a marginal risk of adverse Hill reaction.

Jim Greenfield tells me that you are going to recock on the Foreign Affairs article, so I've laid off. Jim Thomson is back in business now and, in all the candor which you have come to expect from us, it was not one of your best efforts. Not that it wasn't better than anything I could have written, mind you.

Met your friends the Ginsburgs the other evening at the Kuwaiti Ambassador's. She was delightful; I had little chance to talk with him.

Dave Bell, Chenery and Macomber are quite concerned lest your clients have failed to realize their opportunity to pick up an extra \$100 million in program money if they liberalize. Macomber is convinced that, even though we've pledged \$385 million to the consortium, the Indians will not be able to come up with enough satisfactory project to cover even a large portion of this \$100 million. I too am persuaded that we have been far too passive in the management of our Indian aid program; we need to use such incentives as levers to get the kind of performance India needs and we want. I told Dave that once you found out there was a cool \$100 million India could get if it pulled up its socks, you'd certainly turn on the heat in Delhi. If my letter reaches you in time, this might be a useful topic for your round of calls. I might add all here are most impressed by the Pak performance in liberalizing, and inclined to make increasingly invidious comparisons to India.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Chet, I'm most depressed by the evident Indian pressure for a big naval program, with the obvious inference that if the US/UK don't come through, the Soviets will. The Indians are going through the same ridiculous business that we did in the 50's, when each of the three services got a roughly equal slice of the defense budget pie. My own sense is that, if the Brits come through with a minimal program, we should simultaneously tell the Indians quietly that we regard their naval program as a test of their seriousness. They agree with us that the navy is by far the lowest priority. If they use our military and economic aid to meet higher priority requirements and then spend their own foreign exchange on such frou-frou, they are in effect forcing us to subsidize something which is militarily incomprehensible and politically marginal. Can't we make this point to Shastri and TTK? The shame of it is that if India uses our money indirectly to build up a useless submarine arm we'll have to turn around and spend more useless money to provide the Paks with a compensatory capability. Thus, the net gain to the Indians will be nil, while it's we who will be out of pocket twice. Can't we put these propositions quite candidly to our Indian friends?

An added worrier is that most of the Pentagonians, including McNamara, still feel strongly that India's defense build-up is grossly excessive. I spend a good deal of my time trying to stem proposed cut-backs. If you want McNamara and company on your side for things that count, it would be wise not to expose the naval flank. Maybe this argument would be persuasive to the Indians too.

Was fascinated by your letter to Shastri on mobilizing India's own resources. To my untutored eye, you're on to something big here.

Hollis Chenery has made a strong pitch, based on the work of a summer study group of his, that greatly increased capital input would save money in the long run by bringing India to the stage of self-sustaining growth much earlier than otherwise. Dave Bell seemed particularly struck with his thesis. You will want to spend an hour with Hollis yourself on this matter.

Greatly look forward to seeing you. The papers are now talking about a 20-point spread between LBJ and Barry, which is a most auspicious omen for your return.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Chester Bowles
U. S. Ambassador to India
American Embassy
New Delhi, India

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~/VIA CLASSIFIED POUCH

October 9, 1964

PERSONAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR ONLY

Dear Chet:

Have had such a flood of mail from you recently that I hardly know where to begin. So let me say first how much I look forward to seeing you in person late November. We can review all the bidding then.

In the meantime, here are my preliminary reactions on a number of matters. I know you're not coming back with any expectation that we will have sorted out our next steps in our Indian policy by November; Washington simply won't move that fast. In any case, everyone from the President on down will be sorting out a whole series of other problems. Nonetheless, I see merit in our getting an Indian bid in early, and you can do this better than we. However, the later you come down to Washington the more likelihood we'll be able to talk business. Sending a thoughtful wrap-up cable on future policy toward India shortly before you return would be a useful opening gun. I also realize, of course, that your returning at this time is not just connected with Indian matters or medical check-ups; let's get HHH too read into our affairs.

I've heard that Rooney is not at all enthusiastic about your Foundation proposal; in fact, seems to regard it as pie in the sky. I would advise not dealing with Rooney further but working on George Mahon. Phil has some interesting read-out on Rooney's views. Enclosed clipping also of interest. I'm told that BK is still much against Foundation gambit as inflationary; how silly can one get?

You can relax a bit on any cut of \$12 million or so in the FY'65 Indian MAP. DOD policy level agrees that the \$50 million ~~is~~ a firm commitment on which we cannot renege. The cut about which you rightly complained was a staff recommendation to Solbert. However, if we have to cut across the board because of a big shortfall, India might have to take a bit of it for propriety's sake.

Your idea of getting a demonologist for Embassy Delhi is a good one. I happen to know both the people you mention. [redacted] is a delightful fellow but definitely not my idea of the kind of articulate analyst who could trade theories with the people you have in mind. Dave Klein, on the other hand, would be well-nigh ideal. You may not realize that he is Mac Bundy's liaison man with EUR. Regrettably,

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ / PAC 12-360

NARA, Date 06-11-2014

By Uld

~~SECRET~~

2.

Dave is already spoken for and going to Moscow. I can think of several other names but all are doubtless too senior. I'll keep on my thinking cap and may have a few thoughts when you return. Tom Hughes is working on this too.

The Bechtel coup, assuming it comes off, is great news. You and yours apparently did a terrific job of easing the way for Bechtel and Clay. I've asked Bill Gaud and Macomber whether in cases where such crucially important private investment projects are in the wind, AID and other agencies go out of their way to give every facility. There must be any number of things that AID, State, Commerce, etc., not to mention our embassies could do. Neither of my interlocutors knew the answer, but I intend to follow up.

Mac has pursued the Chicom angle you mentioned in your 16 September letter to him. Of course a lot of water has gone over the dam since then. But I am glad to find my own viewpoint (and yours, I believe) vindicated in that the Indians have apparently decided not to go nuclear for the moment at least. We want to seize this moment, and much thinking is going on here.

All the best. See you soon.

Sincerely,

R. W. Komer

The Honorable
Chester Bowles
U.S. Ambassador to India
New Delhi, India

SECRET

30
September 1, 1964

VIA CLASSIFIED DIPLOMATIC POUCH

EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR

Dear Chet:

Cyprus, Vietnam, Yemen, etc. have been so much the order of the day (I inherited most of Mike Forrestal's empire) that I'm afraid I've rather neglected our Indian affairs. Not entirely, however.

To take up personal matters first, I much appreciated your dodge to get me out to India to advise L. K. Jha. Regrettably, Mac felt that all hands were needed here through Election Day--to keep pouring oil on troubled waters is the drill. Do give me a rain check, however.

Have prodded DOD on your attache plane, and am told that the C-47 will be returned to India after only a four month gap. I made point that our Ambassador to India has a greater need than at least half of the generals and admirals who sport their own personal aircraft.

Your dispatch summing up Indian impressions and your recent talks with Shastri and co. were most encouraging. It makes great good sense to keep plugging the theme that they will be a great deal easier to deal with in practice than was Nehru.

For the time being here, the election campaign blankets all. I see little prospect of substantial movement forward in our Indian enterprises until the turn of the year. However much you and I might like to keep up the momentum, we're in a period of consolidation. Indeed the big thing is to preserve what we've got until the time is ripe to push forward again. For example, the President is having to fight hard to kill Ellender's amendments to the PL 480 bill; these would cost India some \$40 million annually in ocean freight, require appropriation for all such PL 480 uses as your foundation, and add interest charges at Treasury rates to all PL 480 loans. In any case, our gains since September 1962 have been so great that I can't complain too much if we rest on a plateau for a while.

The focus of the moment is more on Pakistan, where Ayub's China policy increasingly clashes with our own strong views at a time of crisis

The Honorable
Chester Bowles,
U.S. Ambassador to India
New Delhi, India

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS.032R.023.001/4
By pc, NARA, Date 6/29/12

~~SECRET~~ - 2

in Southeast Asia. Neither LBJ nor Rusk is very well-disposed toward our Pak friends these days, and I see a showdown with the Paks in the offing if they don't tone down. For my part, I remain convinced that only by laying it on the line with Ayub will we be able to preserve our Pak ties without at the same time giving Pakistan the stranglehold on our India policy that it had come during the Fifties to regard as its due. This was a fault of our policy rather than Pakistan's, but whatever the cause a re-balancing is long overdue (and is in fact in process, painful though it may be).

While we're willing to bide our time and allow Shastri to find his footing, you know better than I that any Indian gestures toward reconciliation with Pakistan or support in SEA would be well received here. We'll all be watching India's role at the Cairo Non-Aligned Conference in October too.

As to food, you already know that we'll do our damndest.

All in all, keeping a discreet lid on the Indian defense program is likely to be the most troublesome bilateral issue of the next few years. One already sees signs of Indian resentment, and I presume that we'll court just this every time we raise an eyebrow at foolish naval outlays or anything else. Nor do the Chicoms seem likely to oblige by stepping up tensions again.

So be of good cheer. Once the new Administration takes shape (my guess is that there'll be many changes) will be the time to suggest whatever bold new initiatives we can devise.

All the best,

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

August 11, 1964

Mac -

Here is Rusk's soft answer to Bowles' complaint that we were passing Indian military info to Paks. It says same thing as my side wire cable two weeks ago. We did not pass any dope on Indian plans or forces, only on US aid.

RWK

Attach. Read/Bundy Memo 8/10/64, subj.
Reply to Amb. Bowles' Ltr re Furnishing
Paks w/Indian MilDefInfo.

31
Bowles
X India - Pak Map

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 12-360

By Uld

NARA, Date 06-11-2014

~~SECRET~~

July 30, 1964

Mac -

Chet is grossly overdoing this. We did not tell Paks anything like what he alleges in his best "react before reading" mood. I told him so in polite side wire answer (which I didn't feel I needed to bother you about).

Chet has fallen into the habit of a private reclama to us every time he doesn't get what he wants from State. However understandable, this can be a nuisance; it could also be embarrassing (McCone no doubt reads this mail). Chet's 18 July letter to you is in reclama category. I'll do up a short answer from you (and a longer one from me) which will gently tell him to relax till the election.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

Attach. Ltr Bowles to McGB 7/21/64 att.
cys Bowles ltrs to Rusk and McNamara re
passing Indian mil info to Pak and Turkey

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLT 93-243 (#140)
By jsa/ug/cba NARA, Date 8-3-07

~~SECRET~~

Bowles

33

VIA CLASSIFIED POUCH

June 2, 1964

PERSONAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR

Dear Chet:

Just a note to say we're still counting on you for dinner the 15th. Talbot says you'll be back by then. Mac and Mary et al are coming (all but Averell who gets a degree that day).

We'll keep trying on air package because now's the time.

Now is not the time to push Shastri on Kashmir, or anything else, would be my guess. Phil Potter called to say the same.

Ralph just got G. D. Birla in to shake hands with LBJ (one minute). An Edgar Kaiser promotion.

All the best,

The Honorable
Chester Bowles,
American Embassy
New Delhi, India

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-26-03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

McGB:

May 21, 1964

Here's the status of Bowles' proposals for using excess Indian rupees:

1. Administrative expenses: Crockett studied the possibility of using more local currency for these costs in all excess currency countries, decided it makes sense, but also decided State doesn't dare this year to ask Congress for more, even in funny money. Crockett plans to put it into FY 66 budget. So State would back Bowles' suggestion if someone else would stick his neck out for it in Congress. As Bowles says, WH might move this.

2. USIA program: USIA Washington disagrees with Bowles that our information program in India could be bigger without spending more dollars. For instance, USIA here says there's already a large unused pot of rupees allocated to the book program. Expanding would require more Americans and more imported paper--in short, more dollars, which we'd rather spend on other programs. But USIA has asked its people in India to resolve these differences of opinion, so we're waiting for their second look. (English language training may be covered by the binational foundation.)

3. Binational foundation: AID has finally signed up Herman Wells (former president of Indiana U., now doing foundation work in New York) to oversee this project. He'll be here in time to talk with Bowles about how to set it up, how to manage it in Congress, how to broach it to the Indians. AID wrote Bowles this last week after he wrote you.

HHS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By pc/jw, NARA, Date 8-26-03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRS 64-68, vol 25*38

By jkcm, NARA, Date 8-26-03

~~SECRET~~

VIA CLASSIFIED POUCH
EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR

April 24, 1964

35

Dear Chet:

I'm concerned by a number of developments, or the lack of them, which have tended to cloud the highly favorable atmosphere upon your departure.

First is the lack, to my knowledge, of a major effort to get across to the GOI as yet about the grossly inflated size of their five-year plan. Any program of this magnitude would inevitably be at the expense of economic development and we've got to get across as soon as possible that this would be robbing Peter to pay Paul. AID is quite unhappy, and will become more so when the extent of diversion contemplated sinks in. Moreover, pressure against undue diversion of foreign exchange from the development program is a good indirect means of getting the Indians to focus on the need to cut down their elaborate hardware demands, especially in the air defense field.

Chavan's visit and then TTK's will simply be a flop if we have to spend all our time pressing them to squeeze the water out of their plan. If we let this issue become later a major bone of contention between the US and India it will do neither country any good. By all odds the best thing, therefore, is to get the Indian Finance Ministry to do our dirty work for us. We're relying on you for this.

I don't know what you did to General Adams (all to the good nonetheless), but it's highly premature to start plugging 104s. We barely got an F6A plus HF-24 engine program going, with a few squadrons of F5s as a possible alternative, when you come back changing the bidding again. Mind you, I think it makes political sense to give India 104s if necessary, but this must emerge as the logical outcome of a prolonged discussion in which we successively discard other options. Again, we here have seen nothing firm about whether you have ever even tried out the original package on the Indians yet.

I hate to badger you like this, but we scored rather a breakthrough when you were here and it's dangerous to attempt to improve on what we got without even trying it out. As I know you realize, there are strong suspicions here that indeed you did try out the package and got nowhere, so are coming back for more. If this is the case, tell us so because only if you tried and failed will we be able to argue effectively for trying something else.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

I've just heard you have the amoebic bug. All best wishes for a quick recovery. It's also best for cosmetic reasons that you postpone your return in May as late as possible.

Meanwhile, do try to warn off Chavan and others from coming with any exaggerated expectations of the US cornucopia. Big ideas which are then disappointed will only set back our Indian enterprise at a time when we finally got it moving forward again.

Once again my apologies for these admonitory words. But you know they come from a friend. All the best for an early recovery.

Sincerely,

R. W. Komer

P. S. Since writing this, I just saw your talk with TTK.
Good stuff!

The Honorable
Chester Bowles
U.S. Ambassador
New Delhi, India

cc: Mc G Bundy

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FEW 64-68, vol. 25, #33
By jc NARA, Date 8-26-03

36
Bowles
x India map
April 2, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Chester Bowles, whom you're seeing at 5:30, is in good spirits and should be no problem. We've met his immediate needs within the guidelines you laid down earlier, and he's not asking for anything more. So a friendly hearing and reassurance you're backing him will fill the bill.

The Navy's current phasing out of the old F-6A interceptor has fortuitously permitted McNamara to put together a minimal air package as a means of at least partly pre-empting Soviet SAM and MIG offers. It involves mainly 75 surplus F-6As. While not as good as the F-104s the Paks have (which will mute their reaction), the F-6 is plenty good enough to meet the Chicom air threat. Total cost with spares, etc. would be only \$15-25 million out of planned MAP (not extra). Alternatively, Indians can have two squadrons of F-5As, but not till 1965-67. We and UK will also try to find an engine to power India's homegrown HF-24 fighter, as an alternative to their producing MIG-21s in India.

Bowles is happy; he thinks this package good enough to show the Indians we genuinely want to help, though there's only a fighting chance they'll actually bite. Beyond this, he's made three points back here:

1. With Nehru on his last legs, this is a time of maximum weakness and indecision in Delhi. The emerging leadership, especially Shastri--the heir apparent, looks good from our viewpoint. Now is the time to encourage them, and to minimize the risk of a swing back toward Menonism.
2. It's also no time for the Paks to lean on India over Kashmir. First, this tactic won't work, because Indians will just crawl into their shells. Second, it diverts Indian eyes from the Chicom threat and back toward Pakistan as Enemy No. 1, which is just what we don't want.
3. The Indians feel we drew back after our first spurt of help to them when the Chicoms attacked. But our new MAP program should help recapture lost ground.

The first draft of the Indian five year defense plan we asked for is, as expected, grossly inflated. But it's an asking price, not a final one, and Bowles will go back hard to get it trimmed. Even if cut back to what we think reasonable, however, it will entail more foreign exchange outlays than we and UK are willing to cover under military aid. So to pick up some of this business and help our gold flow, we'll offer reasonable credit terms for some dollar sales.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2.

Bowles has a scheme for using a large chunk of the over \$300 million in surplus rupees we're holding to set up a bi-national foundation for all sorts of people-to-people programs. Since these rupees are valueless to us, we can't lose. The only real problem is to shepherd this through Congress, on which a friendly word from you may be needed.

Attached is a State background piece. I'll sit in, if you've no objection, as the usual precaution against visitors overstating what is said.

R. W. KOMER

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

37
March 30, 1964
Bowles
X India

Mac -

As background for dinner with Bowles, read status report I had prepared for LBJ/Bowles talk.

In two hours with Chet, who's in good spirits, I urged following injunctions for his talks with LBJ, Rusk, and McNamara: (1) stress the critical importance of the succession crisis in India--this makes 1964 a year of great risk as well as opportunity; (2) while India is so weak and Nehru still alive, no Kashmir solution is possible--therefore, our tactic must be to buy time; (3) do not talk Pakistan; and (4) don't ask for more aid that we can't give you just now.

I told Chet he'd make the best impression on the President if he stressed he was asking for nothing.

As I see it, the optimum we can get out of Chet's visit is (1) necessary laying on of hands; (2) some kind of tentative package to counter MIG deal--we're currently thinking of a new UK engine for HF-24 plus some 75 Navy surplus interceptors which we could give or sell cheaply and which, though not supersonic, would meet Indian needs; (3) some kind of standstill strategy on Kashmir, to signal the Paks that we won't join them in leaning on India this year; and (4) some forward movement on Chet's cherished bi-national foundation. I've been pushing latter hard on grounds that it costs us nothing and has real possibilities.

Chet regards us as his best friends in the Establishment (he's right). But he deserves more than sympathy; in the larger sense his prescription for our Indian policy is the right one--the trouble is that his timing is off, in terms of Washington receptivity. Yet to the extent that he can educate the top echelon to the importance of our Indian and Pak affairs, his trip should be a net plus.

RWK

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 8-27-03

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Mac -

March 27, 1964

Suggest we pouch attached as a good way of gently cluing LBJ for Bowles encounter. I've deliberately kept number of cables to minimum.

I've arranged for a more detailed list of items Chet will raise, which we can give LBJ (with brief comment) the night before.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-27-03

38

file

Bowles
X India

~~SECRET~~

38a
file
March 27, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Here are a few key cables which give useful background for your chat with Bowles next week.

Shastri (Tab A) will probably replace Nehru, who seems on his last legs. On present billing, Shastri is sensible and moderate. His advent will no doubt mean the effective end of Menonism as a political force. Thus, once the succession has taken place we'll probably be dealing with a more reasonable Indian Government, even on Kashmir.

Tab B is a savvy analysis of India/Pak by Talbot, who's just back from the area too. Bundy and I find it generally persuasive, except on how to handle the Paks. Both of us favor keeping up the cool treatment a bit longer, in order to make sure we really are bringing Ayub around.

We'll arm you with an agenda of points Bowles will raise. Though he's really coming back chiefly to be reassured he's your Ambassador, his visit may be a good occasion to move forward some policy matters too.

I might add that, even though Bowles keeps asking more than traffic will bear from Washington, he's doing a whale of a sales job in India. Would that we had more such live wires abroad.

R. W. Komer

Att: New Delhi 2819, 3/25
London 4705, 3/25

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-27-03

Bowles

SECRET

March 11, 1964/6:00 pm

[Redacted]

TO DELHI EYES ONLY FOR BOWLES FROM BUNDY AND KOMER

President feels your judgment controlling and quite happy see you. Quite naturally, however, neither he nor we wish to usurp SecState's prerogatives. If you wish come, therefore, suggest you so propose in regular manner. We will support request from here. Of course, Indians should not get impression that you're coming at President's request.

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ / RAC 12-358

By Uld

NARA, Date 08-03-2013

~~SECRET~~

March 11, 1964

40
file
Bowles
X India

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I wish you'd look at this file. Chester Bowles is most anxious to come back briefly to touch base with you, Rusk, and McNamara. As you know, Bowles sees big things as cooking in India/Pakistan and reportedly feels the top echelon in State is not paying enough attention to his repeated warnings. Komer, who watches these matters closely for us, thinks he's more right than wrong.

You'll see that we tried pointedly to sidetrack Bowles, but didn't succeed. Our own instinct is still to keep him on the job, although if you would like to have a top level review of Indian policy it would be useful to call him back.

Bowles also poses a bit of a morale problem, largely of his own making. He's obviously worried as to his standing back here. Since he's done a good defensive job and is probably the best man we could have in India now, we might cheer him up by a message from you if you don't want him back just now.

McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Hr. 11-2-78

By clap NARA, Date 8-26-03

~~SECRET~~

March 10, 1964

41
Bowles
x Lucia

Mac -

It's a pity Chet can't take a clear hint. If he'd read our cable he'd realize there's little possibility of getting "better idea of what people in Washington are planning, saying and thinking."

So real risk is he'll go back more unhappy than before, even if he gets high level message. On other hand, just possible his presence might force ideas he's so repeatedly (and cogently) argued by cable on people who seemingly haven't read them (especially 7th Floor in State, which simply hasn't reacted at all). You're a better judge here than I, but I'd suggest two options:

1. Tell Chet bluntly it would be mistake to come.
2. Show LBJ exchange of cables, perhaps saying Chet's presence might just galvanize State and DOD, which have ignored his concerns.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By g/m, NARA, Date 8-26-03

~~SECRET~~

March 10, 1964

42

Bowles
x India

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached two cables from Bowles are worth reading. He fears (as many do here) that we're heading into a Kashmir crisis which (a) won't force a settlement but merely set Paks and Indians at each other's throats again; (b) will catch us in the middle, blamed on both sides, while only the Soviets gain; and (c) will strengthen left-wing Menonite forces in India, while smothering the more positive post-Nehru leaders who might be constructive on Kashmir.

The problem is how to convince Ayub that all Hindus aren't the same, and that a conciliatory line would achieve more than constant pressure. The Paks have been burned on this before. Nonetheless, leaning on India is surely futile, whereas the Bowles approach might offer at least a chance of a settlement over time.

R. W. KOMER

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 00-288 (#153)

By jc/cbm NARA. Date 8-26-03

~~SECRET~~

EO 13526
3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

42a

~~SECRET~~

March 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached two cables from Bowles are worth reading. He fears (as many of us do here) that we're heading into a Kashmir crisis which won't force a settlement but merely set Paks and Indians at each others throats again.

And as Bowles says, we'll be caught in the middle and only the Soviets will gain. Bowles is also probably right that Pak pressure just now will strengthen left-wing Menonite forces in India, while smothering more positive post-Nehru leadership which might be more constructive on Kashmir.

The trouble is convincing Ayub that all Hindus aren't the same, and that a conciliatory line would achieve more than constant pressure. Paks have been burned on this before. Nonetheless, leaning on India is surely futile, whereas Bowles approach might offer at least a chance of Kashmir settlement over time.

R. W. KOMER

Attach. (1) [] DTG 101140Z for Bundy and Komer
from Bowles (2) Delhi 2644

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ / RAC 12-358

By Uk NARA, Date 08-03-2013

~~SECRET~~

EO 13526
3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

43

SECRET

March 9, 1964/4:45 pm

Bowles
✓ India

EYES ONLY FOR BOWLES FROM BUNDY

Just wrote you long letter which must have crossed your cable. We've talked with President, who always happy to see you but inclined to think it more important you be johnny-on-the spot during these trying days in Delhi.

Komer and I feel strongly that personally convincing President and others of merits your case is the lesser problem. Your eloquent cables have more than served here. But we do not see any far-reaching decisions on Kashmir, aid to India, or pre-empting Soviets being made quite yet, and frankly doubt whether your return just now would prove especially satisfying. Better to wait until things get further sorted out here. Preferable timing might be just before TTK comes.

Hate to reply in such disappointing fashion, and your judgment should be controlling. But when all is said and done I think you realize that this is not yet a time for major new movement forward, when many other problems necessarily take precedence in an election year.

*Notified
By Post*

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 12-358

NARA, Date 08-03-2013

By *UUB*

*Bowles
India*

March 4, 1964

Dear Mr. Voorhis:

The President has passed to me your letter of 24 February on freeing up our rupee reserves in ways which will help India. I can assure you that we are doing everything we can to support Ambassador Bowles' efforts and to assure India's development as a strong democratic power. The sheer size of our economic, and now military aid to India speaks for itself.

As to the rupee problem, we have several agencies now working on the Bowles proposals for putting part of our large stock of rupees to work in non-inflationary ways. We realize their potential for making our program in India more imaginative and flexible and we already have promising projects on the drawing board. However, we have found that the Presidential waiver authority is not as elastic as might have been thought. Moreover, the Congress has always preferred, as I understand it, that such foreign currencies be appropriated according to regular procedures which have been set up for this purpose. The Congress has rarely, if ever, rejected sensible proposals for the use of such currencies, so we expect to go forward through the regular appropriations channel. The important thing is the result, rather than the method, as I'm sure you'll agree.

We appreciate your strong interest in India and the effective work The Cooperative League and other private organizations are doing there to further American and humanitarian interests.

Sincerely,

Mr. Jerry Voorhis
Executive Director
The Cooperative League of the USA
59 East Van Buren Street
Chicago 5, Illinois

R. W. Komer

cc: Mr. David E. Bell, Administrator, AID
Hon. Chester Bowles, US Ambassador to India

Bowles
x India Map

INSERT FOR LETTER TO Bowles:

February 29, 1964

Incidentally, we were rather non-plussed by Jerry Green's response to our private query on the Orpheus XII engine. If he'd simply digested our message, he would have realized that we had obviously read all of your cables and were asking for another strong needle from you. We were the ones who stimulated the queries to London and, of course, we had already asked Talbot to push. But to move the Brits and our bureaucracy here takes repeated strong prods as you realize so well. So I was quite disappointed that Jerry missed the bus and, worse yet, suggested that we go back and read your previous mail. I like Jerry a lot and so would prefer your not taking this up with him, but it was a waste of government time.

~~SECRET~~

February 24, 1964

Bowles
+ India
46

McGB -

Francis Pickens Miller, grand old man of the anti-Byrd Virginia Democrats, is just back from Delhi. He came over urgently to say that Bowles is in a very depressed frame of mind. Bowles feels strongly (as one can see from recent cables) that our Indian affairs are going badly and that we are not doing much about them. He's also frustrated because State doesn't seem to answer his mail (a fair hit). Miller fears that Bowles may resign, and urges that the President call him back for the LBJ treatment.

Of course, Chet is a special problem, and there isn't a great deal we can or should do. He just doesn't seem to grasp that even maintaining existing programs is a lot--a cool \$450 million in economic aid and \$50 million in MAP. Nonetheless, he's a distinct asset where he is. If Chet in his frustration becomes seriously disaffected, it would be bad for several reasons: (1) he's precisely the kind of "soft" ambassador we need in Delhi at a time when there is not much new that we can do for India--and his leaving would be misread by the Indians; (2) I see no suitable replacement before November; and (3) it certainly wouldn't help with the liberal Democrats for one of their heroes to resign before the election; the obvious inference would be that Chet lacked confidence in LBJ or vice versa--either way it would be bad.

The President wrote Chet on 21 January in an effort to keep him happy. I doubt that he need call back Bowles for a laying on of hands (he's due back in June as is). But I do think he'd agree we ought to study how to keep Bowles happy within reason. I've been doing what I can; how about attached letter from you? A little soft soap goes a long way with Chet.

RWK

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *plg*, NARA, Date *8-26-03*

~~SECRET~~

SECRET/DRAFT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 00-288 (4156a)
By jc/cbm NARA. Date 8-26-03

Dear Chet:

We here have reacted with lively sympathy to your paeans of woe from Delhi, and have been doing all we can to help.

For what it's worth, my feeling (and Bob Komer's too) is that we're the victims of an inevitable falling off in US/Indian relations from the high point of Winter 1962. There's no use blaming ourselves unduly that neither Washington nor Delhi can sustain the high pitch of collaboration which emerged from the Chicom attack. True, we've had trouble on our side sustaining the momentum of our relationship, but the Indian slate is by no means clean either. VOA was a fiasco, Bokaro failed at least partly because of Indian stickiness, and Delhi's handling of its military program has been so tediously slow as to damp much of our enthusiasm here. These are facts with which we must live.

As I see it we're also going through the painful transition of disengaging from the out-and-out pro-Pak policy of the 1950s, and shifting to one more consonant with our real strategic interests in both parties. This is not an easy process at best, and I must say that neither our Pak nor our Indian friends make it any easier.

Of one thing you may be sure--the President too sees your problem with lively sympathy. Our experience with him to date should lay to rest any unfounded Indian (or Pak) suspicions that he sees matters differently from his predecessor. His authorization of five-year approaches (which

~~SECRET~~

2.

marks much more of a departure in the case of India than in that of Pakistan) is ample evidence of this fact.

But you in turn will understand that the Hill revolt on aid is critical. The President cannot expose his flank right now by promising amounts on which he may be unable to perform. I'm sure you realize this. And I know from what he's said that he counts on you to get this across in Delhi as no one else really could .

In a broader frame, we're still in the transition period from one Administration to another. It has problems for all of us, not least the President, who on top of the tax cut and civil rights must now contend with the ridiculous assertion that he's responsible for every minor league flap that arises to plague us. It's an election year.

From where I sit, however, there's a lot more smoke than fire. With the election not far off, and the moratorium on politics long since over, we're going to have to steel ourselves for a lot worse. If we're a little slow in answering your mail or in responding to the wisdom you so eloquently purvey, bear with us. Once every four years Washington is the firing line and we're going to have to get through November before we can turn as fully to our foreign concerns as our far-flung viceroys would like. So be of good cheer.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Bowles
India
x

47

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

February 21, 1964

Thompson's Col. Francis Pickens Miller came in to see me today at Jim Grant's suggestion. He's just back from an inspection of CU affairs in Karachi, but he stopped in New Delhi to see Bowles on the way.

He found Chet in a very negative frame of mind about his role in the Johnson administration. Distance has dimmed his perception of the magnitude of the aid fight here, and he's apparently blaming declining aid appropriations on LBJ's lack of interest. He sees similar indications of disinterest in the delay in approving his proposal for a long-range MAP in India. Whereas he felt he had JFK's support, he fears LBJ is cool.

I explained that neither JFK nor LBJ could give Bowles all he wants; money is too scarce. I also explained that Chet arrived in India just as US-Indian relations were settling back to normal after the sudden rush into each other's arms following the Chicom attack. So it's natural for Bowles to feel a bit discouraged.

Col. Miller felt it imperative that LBJ act now to bring Bowles into the fold. He thought this important in winning intellectual Democratic votes next fall. He also felt it important in keeping Bowles on the job in New Delhi where he's the best man we could find. He recommended calling Bowles back in March for a face-to-face reassurance of support.

I told Col. Miller his report bore out my own feelings about Bowles' frame of mind, and I agreed with his suggestion that the President act quickly to forestall Bowles' possible resignation. When he asked whether I thought he should see Walter Jenkins, I said a phone call would be very useful.

R. W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *8-27-03*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Bowles
India 48

RWK:

February 19, 1964

BOB sympathizes with Bowles' desire to put excess rupees to work but it can't approve the method he proposes for end-running regular appropriations channels. So Gordon is inviting State (Crockett) to package Bowles' plan and run it through regular channels; he has promised BOB support. State hopes to convoke interested parties next week.

Bowles suggests using a presidential waiver of normal procedures for appropriating US-held foreign currencies. He wants to avoid asking Congress for new appropriations (dollars to State to buy rupees from Treasury) because he fears Rooney will cut the regular State budget commensurately. However, BOB went to considerable trouble in 1961 to work out with Congress a budget category called "Special Foreign Currency Program Appropriations" whereby agencies can fund low priority programs with excess foreign currencies to cut our holdings. This subjects these programs to desirable budgetary and appropriations controls, hopefully without jeopardizing regular programs. BOB says it would have to tell Congress informally about the waiver anyway and thinks staying in channels would cut the likelihood of a retaliatory Congressional whack at State's budget.

Now that the ball is in State's court, we risk another Alphonse-Gaston act. Cameron's office shows signs of picking it up, but Crockett and the "E" area are also interested. However, I've asked to be included in whatever meetings are called, and I know who to prod now.

There may be a minor economic issue here. In 1961 Galbraith recommended we not draw down our rupee holdings for small projects, and Ken Hansen found that some on the embassy staff still agree. Galbraith felt proliferation of projects might tie up Indian resources that could be better used on higher priority projects. Bowles thinks proper supervision would eliminate this danger.

Gordon is writing Bowles to explain BOB position and is urging Crockett send over a proposal. I keep in touch with SOA.

HHS

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 00-288 (457)

By xcam NARA, Date 8-26-02

49

file
Bowles
x India

~~SECRET~~

VIA CLASSIFIED POUCH
EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR

February 19, 1964

Dear Chet:

Let me start out again by apologizing for being a poor correspondent. However, it's the results that count rather than the responses so I've been applying my energies to moving your ideas forward here.

As you have probably heard, we finally got the President's approval of the principle of long-term MAP for India (and Pakistan). In a sense this falls far short of your original proposal, and all here recognize that you cannot exert the same leverage with it that you could have with a commitment of \$75-100 million per annum. But the facts of life are that we simply couldn't get either the Executive Branch or the Congress to sign on to such figures when aid prospects are so murky. So we settled for the do-able, which in itself took some doing. I am personally convinced that the principle of long-term military assistance is more important than the amount. Once we are settled into the new groove of regular dealings with India in the military as well as the economic fields, we can then, depending on circumstance, talk about orders of magnitude. So I would by no means deprecate the success we have achieved. Note we also got supersonics into the realm of consideration.

I hope you will accentuate the positive in talking to the Indians too, since this does represent a fairly substantial departure in US policy. After all, in almost every other case MAP is going down; in the case of India, on the other hand, we are prepared to take on a major new account. While I fully share your view that we could spend MAP more effectively, in terms of our overall political interests, in India than in a half-dozen other places, it is still like pulling teeth to bring the bureaucracy around. Even in State there is some lack of full understanding that long-term investment in India is rather more important than in Gabon, Syria, or even Zanzibar.

With Mac's blessing, I am also actively pushing your other requests. As to freeing some rupees, we've got Kermit Gordon's support and will have no problem with BOB so long as we can get State and others to put up the necessary requests. I share Kermit's view, however, that we must really go the appropriation rather than the waiver route.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Freeing surplus materials from our stockpile is going to be a much trickier exercise. I simply can't promise much here. Your logic is impeccable but there is just not much prospect of getting the Congress to come through at an early date. Here too, we need an educational effort to gradually bring people around to understanding that there is no out-of-pocket cost involved.

I am also pushing the other item which you left with me. Your recent prod was most useful. State had simply dropped the ball, but as a result has picked it up again. My God, but the wheels of the bureaucracy grind exceedingly slow.

One thing that concerns me is the growing possibility that Pakistan, in its frustration, may unleash trouble in Kashmir. The signs are at present inconclusive, but sufficient cause for worry. I well realize the domestic political problem the GOI faces in being statesman-like under current Pak pressures, but we ^{badly} ~~hardly~~ need a safety valve on Kashmir. I will tell you frankly that a new Pak/Indian crisis over Kashmir, coming on the heels of all our other problems (Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Panama, Cuba), would gravely risk leading to a plague on both your houses attitude in an election year. A remarkably high percentage of our foreign aid goes to the subcontinent, yet this has been notably free from challenge to date. However all the Congress needs is a good excuse, I fear. I hope our Indian and Pak friends realize this.

It does little good for us to keep urging moderation on the Paks in the absence of any concrete signs of reciprocal willingness on the Indian side. True, the Indians have been more restrained than the Paks (at least until Chagla's recent performance), but they have no real policy of seeking to achieve the better relationship with Ayub which would serve India's long term interests so well. I realize that this degree of statesmanship is too much to ask in the midst of a succession crisis. Yet I dare to hope that India will not leave entirely to us the burden of restraining Pakistan.

Forgive this hectoring. To me, you're doing a great job without much new ammunition from here. In fact, the very absence of such ammo makes your role all the more indispensable to me. I'd very much like to get out and exchange ideas with you and hope to be able to manage it by late Spring.

The Honorable Chester Bowles
U. S. Ambassador to India
American Embassy
New Delhi, India

All the best,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

February 19, 1964

Bowles 50
X India

MEMORANDUM FOR BILL CROCKETT

Bill, we over here heartily endorse Chet Bowles' request for more Indian rupees. As you may know, we got Kermit Gordon stirred up enough about this to talk with you.

In general, at a time when regular foreign aid is much harder to come by we really ought to look at every other device which will give us substitute forms of leverage. Our holdings of excess currencies for at least seven countries are one example. Why not make these work for us more effectively, since the net cost to the US taxpayer is nil? In India in particular we face a tough series of foreign policy problems, having reneged on Bokaro and being hard put to it to find much military aid. Since we can't help Chet out much on the big things, we at least ought to do whatever else we can.

If you need any help from me on this matter, I'm with you.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 8-27-03

~~SECRET~~

January 18, 1964

Bill,

I've redone the reply to Chet Bowles, changing the part which was bothersome. I'm still not clear what the problem was, but hope everyone noticed that it was slugged "Secret". Classified correspondence of this sort between a President and his ambassadors has so little chance of leaking that the virtues of candor far outweigh the risks of publication.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By pc, NARA, Date 8-27-03

~~SECRET~~

51a
file
January 21, 1964.

Dear Chat:

I appreciate both your good wishes and your thoughtful words on India and Pakistan. Depend on it that I am fully aware of the importance of consolidating the gains we have made vis-a-vis India. You in turn will agree, I am sure, that we must do so in ways which will minimize the risks to our relationship with Pakistan.

Thus I share your feeling that we must move ahead with "the building of a new relationship with India which will bring her growing industrial and military potential into focus against the Chinese Communists." But you--and all of our key ambassadors--must bear with the limits of the possible in terms of what I can get the Congress to do back here. The attack on foreign aid restricts our freedom of maneuver until we can get the aid tangle straightened out. In fact, the problem of the moment is as much that of protecting the sizable aid investment we already make in India--by far the largest anywhere--as that of getting new military aid on the scale you suggest. We will simply have to stretch the resources of diplomacy to restrain Indian appetites, while still getting the forward movement we seek.

For this, I count heavily on you. With your experience, you are the right man in the right spot at the right time. So I look to you to carry on the crucially important task of maintaining and strengthening our ties with India at a time when we may be temporarily unable to meet many justifiable needs. I shall expect you to let me know personally any time you feel our affairs are badly off the rails.

With all good wishes,

Lyndon

The Honorable
Chester Bowles,
U. S. Ambassador to India,
New Delhi, India

~~SECRET~~

LBJ:RWK:tmt

1/18/64

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MLJ 93-243 (4159a)
By JK/pw NARA. Date 8-26-03

52
Full
Bowles

SECRET/VIA CLASSIFIED POUCH
AIR MAIL

EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR

January 7, 1964

Dear Chet:

All best wishes for a productive '64. I've been looking actively into the subjects raised in your recent letters to Mac and me, and will be in touch with you further shortly. Don't take lack of response for lack of energy.

My preliminary impression is that getting the Congress to free up some rupees for you will be an easier job than that of prying loose some so-called strategic materials. The bureaucratic complexities and Hill inhibitions about the latter simply appear too great at first glance. However, don't take this for the final word.

We have now converted the Bowles Plan to the Taylor Plan. Not that it's any better (or really much different), but getting Taylor and others signed on is indispensable to top-level approval for going ahead with long-term aid to India. Half a loaf is a lot better than none in this case; ergo, it's the principle upon which I've been operating.

The leak in Delhi about the IOTF caused great pain here. I would dearly appreciate any private guesses as to how Sig Harrison got the story. As you might imagine, most here jumped to the conclusion that you were injudicious. At any rate, Selig deserves a good wiggling; his blowing the story meant that the inevitable reaction gathered more force than otherwise, because we had not finished our protective soundings. Most here are determined to go ahead with the project, and to make the force permanent if possible. So anything you can do to turn the GOI aside from unnecessary agitation will be money in the bank. On this score, I hope the Indians realize that we had many other aims in mind than just bucking up India. Iran, Malaysia, Burma, etc. spring to mind.

Your 1975 was fascinating. The Indians still seem hot on that HF-24 of theirs, so I've asked DOD to look into the proposition that we and the UK offer to finance development of the improved Orpheus engine (\$12 million as I recall), in return for GOI agreement to: (1) limit number of HF-24s built; (2) not produce MIG's. It would be cheap at the price.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By je, NARA, Date 8-27-03

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

2.

But the main purpose of this letter is to commend to you again Jack Fishwick. Dave and Bill Gaud thought so highly of him that they offered him a free trip to scout out the land. This guy is most impressive, and he is quite well connected in the Party (including the Johnson circle). So I'd urge you give him the full treatment, whether or not your final judgment is favorable. I think you'll like him as much as we do and will want to make a real effort to sign him on. He's your kind of guy, and at the same time a prominent businessman, which is a good combination in any man's lingo.

I can well imagine your own uncertainties and frustrations at this time of transition. We all have them, and some are more worried than others, but I'm personally sold that LBJ is going to be quite a President, whatever the inevitable differences in style. All here are most impressed with the way he's taken charge.

All best wishes to you and Mrs. Bowles, and count on me to find some way of getting out to Delhi before too long.

Yours,

The Honorable
Chester Bowles,
U.S. Ambassador
New Delhi, India

Bowles
X India Map
X India Pak

December 7, 1963

53

~~SECRET~~
Dear Chet,

Just a note to say that your cable slugged for President and everyone else came at very good time. We're inching your proposal forward and I'm optimistic (I believe Mac is too) that we'll get something negotiable for you before Christmas. It won't be all you want, but it should be enough to give you a fighting chance.

At the same time, however, I want to tell you candidly that I regard raising the Navy proposal again (your 1800) as terribly counter productive. Let's keep our eye on the main chance. I might say that Mac and I fully share McNamara's strong view that naval requirements for most of these countries are very low priority, duplicate more precisely than anything else our own naval capabilities, and have very little to do with the Soviet or Chicom threat. The Indian Navy is a good case in point. It is of no value to our affairs in the north and raises a red flag to the Paks. They gave Paul Adams a real horror story on this when he was out there. As Ken Galbraith told me, he had a hypothyroid naval type on his staff who simply couldn't grasp the facts of life. Do you have the same guy?

On reading your cable a second time, I see that I shot from the hip a bit. If we can hold the line at a little advice and training, your case is valid, but I'll send this letter to you anyway as a generalized warning not to let any would-be Admirals start you down the slippery slope of naval MAP. In the larger sense, we want to encourage the Indians not to waste their own resources on Navy either, even if this is painful to the smallest and weakest of the Indian services.

All the best,

R. W. Komer

The Honorable Chester Bowles
U. S. Ambassador to India
New Delhi, India

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ / RAC 12-360

By UCL NARA, Date 06-11-2013

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

December 5, 1963

54

File
Bowles
X India
map

McGB -

I do hope you'll have a good chance to mull this Bowles "package" before SG tomorrow. Much will depend on you.

I'll have a Yemen paper over in the morning, plus a few notes on Taylor briefs for India/Pakistan. Fortunately latter item can be quite brief.

RWK

Attach.

- (1) RWK Memo to McGB dtd 12/5/63
- (2) Talbot Memo for ExCte/NSC dtd ?
subj. Next Steps on MilAid to India
attach. copy of Bowles proposal dtd 11/12/63
subj. "Toward a Balance of Political and Military Forces in South Asia"
- (3) Proposed Programs for MAP, India

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 8-27-03

~~SECRET~~

December 5, 1963

*Full Bowles
X Indian Map
54a*

MAC -

Here is the revised and modified "Bowles proposal", which SG will consider Friday. I hope you can read it early, since you'll have Vietnam meeting just before SG. Your firm hand is needed if we're to push this forward.

Where people stand. So far no one at top agency level is signed on, except perhaps Dave Bell. At DOD Solbert had OK'd but WFB reversed him, expressing great skepticism over multi-year commitments, and over annual Indian MAP level beyond \$50 million (let's protect old MAP clients at expense of new). Bill is reluctant to commit beyond year by year basis, and doubts we'd get much for it. McNamara view unclear.

JCS have contributed mostly confusion--JCSM 912-63 says (a) we should meet major Chicom attack on India by applying force elsewhere; (b) India doesn't need supersonics, and if it gets new planes UK should supply them. Both points are militarily sensible but don't make practical sense.

At State Rusk is non-committal, and Ball is unhappy about high Indian force ceilings. He prefers 12 division ceiling as most needed against China, but what he and JCS don't get is that we can't tell Indians they can't have 4 more divisions to face Pakistan. As I see it, we'd support 12 against Chicoms, if India would hold total ceiling to 16. Harriman at least seems to like Bowles plan, but has focussed so far on reassurances to Pakistan, i. e. Ninth Fleet and "combined planning."

So it's really up to us if we're going to push this project forward. It is incredible to me that DOD and State top level don't seem to grasp the case for moving forward on our long term effort to "corrupt" the most populous and most important country in Free Asia. JFK saw this so clearly, you see it, I see it--but how can we sell the country if we can't sell our own team?

I see a multi-year MAP "commitment" as the best tool available in the long term effort to inch India our way. This will be the most important decision we may make in the next few years on India. We're going to spend the MAP money anyway, so why not try out Chat's idea of getting some extra mileage out of it.

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLI / RAC 12-360

NARA, Date 04-11-2014

By UUS

~~SECRET~~

2.

This isn't really a MAP question--we have primarily political goals in mind. We don't really think the Chicoms will attack India again. But if we beef up India's military, they might be pugnacious to keep things tense along the frontier--this serves our interest and keeps Indian focus from reverting to Pakistan. We're also in midst of a crucial transition, from Nehru to a hopefully more pragmatic successor regime. The Indian military may play a key role here; in any case we want a friendly India at the time Nehru goes.

The proposition. In essence Chet wants to give some new momentum to our India enterprise, which has stalled as the Chicom attack of last fall receded, and the Paks pre-empted center stage. Meanwhile the Indians have begun to complain about our stalling on further military aid. So Bowles thinks the big card we have left (since Bokaro is out), is to tell them our plans to go ahead with long term MAP, including some super-sonics later on. If we'll package this in the form of a five year program, he thinks that in return we can secure an informal understanding that India will (1) reduce its own overall buildup from 21 divisions to the 16 we consider reasonable; (2) limit its own foreign exchange outlays for defense, thus forestalling diversion of our economic aid; (3) agree not to buy too much from the Russians; and (4) be more reasonable about the Paks and more helpful about China.

We would not shoot for any firm five-year Iran-type arrangement, both to protect ourselves (in case the money is not available) and because Indian non-alignment is still such as to make them reluctant to enter into de facto alliance. Instead we'd seek a tacit understanding, in which we would simply exchange our declaration of intent with respect to what we intended to provide over five years or so in return for their declared intent to stay within certain limits.

The advantages of Bowles' proposal are impressive: (1) if we want to keep India in an anti-China mood, a firm sense we're with it over the long term (and not quaking because of the Paks) is the best means of doing so; (2) indeed, it's the only major card we have left to play to keep up our momentum with India over the next year; (3) we'd only be taking advantage of about what we'll end up giving the Indians anyway, i. e. around \$50+ million MAP a year; (4) ergo, why not get the maximum mileage out of what we are going to do in any case, by attempting to use it as leverage to get a commonsense Indian program; (5) finally, if we get the conditions we want, the resulting limitations on India's buildup should ease our problems with Pakistan, which fears most an open-ended US commitment to its foe.

~~SECRET~~

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However, there are some equally serious questions about this proposal: (1) as Bowles himself says, we probably have no more than a 50-50 chance of signing the Indians on to even an informal package deal; (2) the Indians might not stick to the terms even if they did sign; (3) on the other hand, the financial pressures on the GOI might well lead it to cut back its current plans anyway; and (4) we risk a violent Pak reaction when the dimensions of our Indian program became clear to them.

The likely Pak reaction is no doubt the greatest risk. Up to now our policy has been to dribble out aid to India, largely so we could gradually string along and condition the Paks, without any major move which could trigger an explosion. While the Paks might ultimately be happier with a long term ceiling on Indian forces (and our MAP), a firm US decision right now to back a much larger Indian force could precipitate a convulsion. But much depends on how we handle this revelation; we might be able to string it out in such a way as to minimize this risk (see paragraph on timing below). Moreover, we've been stalling on Pak MAP too, and a similar (perhaps three-year) package offer to Ayub would help mollify them, especially if it appeared to maintain a rough military balance. Once again, I'd argue that we're going to continue a \$30-40 million Pak program unless they kick over the traces, so why not capitalize on this too? Of course, we'd attack conditions (e. g. no alliance with Chicoms) here too.

The attached inter-agency paper represents our best thought on how to seize the Indian opportunity without losing the Paks. It is considerably modified from the Bowles proposals (and he's unhappy), but is more realistic in terms of what's available, and of how to get the Indians and Paks latched on. Aside from the main issue of whether to go ahead, I see three subsidiary issues:

(a) The size of the five-year Indian program. Bowles feels at least \$60-70 million annually is necessary to get the type of Indian response we want. The degree of Soviet preclusion we get in practice will depend largely on how much we pre-empt. The MAAG Chief also claims India could effectively utilize up to \$70 million a year in MAP. DOD, on the other hand, is still in a state of shock over prospective MAP cuts, so would prefer about \$50+ million. But whatever Congress does to us, I'm sure we could squeeze an extra \$10 million or so from what will remain essentially a billion dollar program; our stake in India certainly justifies the marginal shaving in a half-dozen other places which might be necessary to this end. In any case, a marginal \$10 million annually one way or the other seems to me less important than the basic principle of trading a five year program for some real restraints on India's defense effort. So I incline toward going ahead, even if we have to try it on the cheap.

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4.

(b) Supersonics. We have a semi-commitment to modernize the Pak airforce with two more squadrons (24), while the Indians have asked more loudly for jets than anything else. We also hear they're having trouble with the MIG program, so could get some preclusion here. Till now, we've stalled both countries. This new proposal would call for going ahead with both, but in the 1965-67 time frame. Here I'd favor equal treatment from now on--let's give to neither or both.

(c) Tactics and timing. Bowles would naturally like to lay all the cards on the table right now. He says the longer we wait, the more the risk of further Soviet involvement or of the Indians deciding on higher force goals than we think advisable. Talbot feels that if we wait a little longer, the increasing financial strain may lead the Indians themselves to set their sights lower. But his greatest fear is that if the Paks found out prematurely that we planned five-year support of a substantially expanded Indian force, they would react violently before we had time to prepare the ground; however, if we wait awhile they will come around further toward acceptance of our view. Bowles retorts that we've already told the Paks we intend to go ahead with Indian MAP, and that the fact we intend to do so within well-defined limits, plus the compensatory hardware for Pakistan, would mitigate Pak reactions.

My own inclination is to split the difference. I see no reason why Chet and Taylor should not start talking about our desire to enter into some long term MAP planning with India, including the eventual provision of supersonics. Before firming up our own views, however, we want to get a better feel for Indian intentions. Would India, in return for a long term US program limit its own forces to a certain ceiling, limit its own foreign exchange outlays on defense to a certain range, etc. Depending on the response, we could be more precise later in mid-December. Nor do we need to do more than tell the Paks now that we are discussing longer term military aid with India, and intend to do so with Pakistan too at the appropriate time. Another reason for not moving too fast is that we simply haven't worked out all the details of this complex exercise yet.

Recommendations. I'd hope we'd end up with following proposals to President:

1. Agreement in principle on trying out a Bowles-type MAP package on India, i.e. seeking to exchange a five-year statement of intent in exchange for certain informal understandings on Indian force levels, defense outlays, etc. (Roughly parallel treatment for Pakistan).
2. Average annual MAP level of \$55-60 million for India (and \$40 million for Pakistan).

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5.

3. Supersonics to be included in both packages for later year delivery.
4. Tactics and timing to be worked out further. First step now is for Taylor/Bowles to feel out whether Indians interested (without mentioning size, etc.). All we tell Paks now is we intend to continue Indian MAP.

- - - - -

If we can get above, we'll be in business.

R. W. KOMER

~~SECRET~~ PERSONAL

November 30, 1963

Bowles
55

VIA DIPLOMATIC CLASSIFIED POUCH

Dear Chet:

Just a quick word to say how stimulating it was to see you, despite the fact that high tragedy interrupted, though I am confident only that, the forward momentum of our Indian enterprise. You should know that President Johnson specifically said "I like that" to the sentence of support I put into the Radhakrishnan message (which I see Sig Harrison has picked up and memorialized). The President also, as you will no doubt have heard by this time, suitably beat up Bhutto, since once again Pak timing in letting us know of the Chou En-lai visit could not have been worse. But I hope that the Indians too will heed the lesson; the more forbearance and restraint they show at this time of transition, and the more effort they make to resolve issues with Pakistan (however footless this may seem), the better impression they will make here.

Considerable feeling has developed (Taylor and Ball as well as Adams) that India's own military build-up ceilings are grossly unrealistic. I myself agree, and worry as you know that they will interfere with the even more crucial development program. The more the political level of the GOI can curb their military's appetite, the better the prospects for long-term aid from here. For obvious reasons, we cannot equip Indian divisions against Pakistan (even though we have long been equipping Pak divisions against India). By the same token, however, we can hardly tell the Indians they can't keep a reasonable defensive force in the Punjab.

Ergo, my sense would be that a 16 division force ceiling, of which we would support the 12 deployed against China, is the rough order of magnitude toward which they and we should shoot. Do not press your luck here. From the standpoint of long-term US interests, a decision in principle is far more important than the particular size of whatever program is initially decided upon.

As a shot in the dark, I have heard that John P. Fishwick, Executive Vice President of the Norfolk and Western might just be available as your aid chief. Do you know him? I don't myself but he looks mighty good in Who's Who--born 1916, Harvard Law 1940, Lt. Cdr 1942-45, President of Virginia Bar, and one of Kennedy's earliest supporters in Virginia. Also worth thinking about as deputy is Bob Oshins, who I believe talked with you briefly. Bob is an able and imaginative old aid hand--in the business ever since he worked with Harriman in Paris. He was research director of the Democratic National Committee in the pre-Kennedy period.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/NAC 12-360

By ULS

NARA, Date 06-11-2014

~~SECRET~~

2.

My best to you and your good wife. However difficult the time, I think all of us feel--President Johnson foremost--that our memorial to John F. Kennedy will be the policies we carry to fruition. This was the real sense of President Johnson's message to the Congress. India is one of these policies and I am determined to help see it through.

All the best,

R. W. KOMER

The Honorable
Chester Bowles
U.S. Ambassador to India
New Delhi, India

~~SECRET~~

Mac -

November 26, 1963

I did my best and I think Chet understands why LBJ can't see him. He's naturally disappointed, however, and fears we will have a real problem unless we make clear soon to Indians that Johnson intends to continue Kennedy policy. If Chet doesn't go back with brief message or something from LBJ, we'll have a rescue operation to perform later.

Chet will just have seen Ball and Harriman on his five-year MAP commitment project. You might ask their reactions.

Most of all, just give Chet ten minutes to recap his project (as modified by us). Attached is my summary.

The minimum needed to send Chet back reasonably happy would be: (1) assurance we'll try to get a Johnson-Nehru message soonest; (2) reaffirmation you as well as I will fight hard for his program, even though he'll just have to leave timing to us.

- - - - -

It's a minor problem now, compared to others, but JFK's loss on top of Chet's other woes will lead to resignation if we're not careful! And he's best man we could have in Delhi just now (except perhaps Ellsworth Bunker).

RWK

~~SECRET~~

Att: cy RWK memo to the President, 11/22/63,
cy Msg for Amb. Bowles, 11/26, conveying
LBJ personal message.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-27-03

57 file
Bowles
X India

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

November 26, 1963

BENJAMIN READ

Here is a memorandum which Mr. Bundy gave to Ambassador Bowles at the President's request, containing a personal message from the President to Nehru.

Bromley Smith

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Att.: Memo, Bundy to Bowles, 11/26/63

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-27-03

57a

Bowles
x India

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

November 26, 1963

AMBASSADOR BOWLES

The President was terribly sorry he could not keep his appointment with you, and asks that you deliver the following personal and private message from him to Prime Minister Nehru:

I wish to assure you that I fully supported President Kennedy's policy of deep interest and concern for India, for her domestic programs and her defense against aggression, and that I intend to continue it.

It is my hope that you and I will establish the same personal relationship of confidence and frank exchange of views as you had with President Kennedy. In the meantime let me also assure you that Ambassador Bowles and I are old and good friends, and you can rely on him just as fully as before, in every way.

McGeorge Bundy

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-27-03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

November 22, 1963

THE PRESIDENT

Here are Washington's preliminary views on the proposals Chet outlined to you on 13 November, and which you were disposed to look at again before he left (we've laid on a Tuesday session). These proposals lead up to the most important decision of the year on India, comparable only to the command decisions we took last fall when Mao attacked.

In essence Chet wants to give some new momentum to our India enterprise, which has stalled as the Chicom attack of last fall receded, and the Paks pre-empted center stage. Meanwhile the Indians have begun to complain about our stalling on further military aid. So Bowles thinks the big card we have left to play with India (since Bokaro is out), is to tell them our plans to go ahead with long term MAP, including some supersonics later on. If we'll package this in the form of a five year program, he thinks that in return we can secure an informal understanding that India will (1) limit its own overall force ceiling from 21 divisions to the 16 we consider reasonable; (2) limit its own foreign exchange outlays for defense, thus forestalling diversion of our economic aid; (3) agree not to buy too much from the Russians; and (4) be more reasonable about the Paks and more helpful about China.

We would not shoot for any firm five-year Iran-type arrangement, both to protect ourselves (in case the money is not available) and because Indian non-alignment is still such as to make them reluctant to enter into de facto alliance. Instead we'd seek a tacit understanding, in which we would simply exchange our declaration of intent with respect to what we intended to provide over five years or so in return for their declared intent to stay within certain limits.

The advantages of Bowles' proposal are impressive: (1) if we want to keep India in an anti-China mood, a firm sense we're with it over the long term (and not quaking because of the Paks) is the best means of doing so; (2) indeed, it's the only major card we have left to play to keep up our momentum with India over the next year; (3) we'd only be taking advantage of about what we'll end up giving the Indians anyway, i. e. around \$50+ million MAP a year; (4) ergo, why not get the maximum mileage out of what we are going to do in any case, by attempting to use

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ / RAC 12-360

By UUD

NARA, Date 06-11-2014

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- 2 -

it as leverage to get a commonsense Indian program; (5) finally, if we get the conditions we want, the resulting limitations on India's buildup should ease our problems with Pakistan, which fears most an open-ended US commitment to its foe.

However, there are some equally serious questions about this proposal: (1) as Bowles himself says, we probably have no more than a 50-50 chance of signing the Indians on to even an informal package deal; (2) the Indians might not stick to the terms even if they did sign; (3) on the other hand, the financial pressures on the GOI might well lead it to cut back its current plans anyway; and (4) we risk a violent Pak reaction when the dimensions of our Indian program became clear to them.

The likely Pak reaction is no doubt the greatest risk. Up to now our policy has been to dribble out aid to India, largely so we could gradually string along and condition the Paks, without any major move which could trigger an explosion. While the Paks might ultimately be happier with a long term ceiling on Indian forces (and our MAP), a firm US decision right now to back a much larger Indian force could precipitate a convulsion. But much depends on how we handle this revelation; we might be able to string it out in such a way as to minimize this risk (see paragraph on timing below). Moreover, we've been stalling on Pak MAP too, and a similar (perhaps three-year) package offer to Ayub would help mollify them, especially if it appeared to maintain a rough military balance. Once again, I'd argue that we're going to continue a \$30-50 million Pak program unless they kick over the traces, so why not capitalize on this too? Of course, we'd attach conditions (e. g. no alliance with Chicom) here too.

The attached inter-agency paper represents our best thought on how to seize the Indian opportunity without losing the Paks. It is considerably modified from the Bowles proposals (and he's unhappy), but is more realistic in terms of what's available, and how to get the Indians and Paks latched on. Three major issues have emerged.

First is the size of the five-year Indian program. Bowles feels at least \$60-70 million annually is necessary to get the type of Indian response we want. The degree of Soviet preclusion we get in practice will depend largely on how much we pre-empt. The MAAG Chief also claims India would effectively utilize up to \$70 million a year in MAP.

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- 3 -

DOD, on the other hand, is still in a state of shock over prospective MAP cuts, so would prefer about \$50+ million. But whatever Congress does to us, I'm sure we could squeeze an extra \$10 million or so from what will remain essentially a billion dollar program; our stake in India certainly justifies the marginal shaving in a half-dozen other places which might be necessary to this end. In any case, a marginal \$10 million annually one way or the other seems to me less important than the basic principle of trading a five year program for some real restraints on India's defense effort. So I incline toward going ahead, even if we have to try it on the cheap.

The second issue is supersonics. We have a semi-commitment to modernize the Pak airforce with two more squadrons (24), while the Indians have asked more loudly for jets than anything else. We also hear they're having trouble with the MIG program, so could get some preclusion here. Till now, we've stalled both. This new proposal would call for going ahead with both, but in the 1965-67 time frame. Here I'd favor equal treatment from now on--let's give to neither or both.

The third issue is one of timing. Bowles would naturally like to go back and lay all the cards on the table right now. He says the longer we wait, the more the risk of further Soviet involvement or of the Indians deciding on higher force goals than we think advisable. Talbot feels that if we wait a little longer, the increasing financial strain may lead the Indians themselves to set their sights lower. But his greatest fear is that if the Paks found out prematurely that we planned five-year support of a substantially expanded Indian force, they would react violently before we had time to prepare the ground; however, if we wait awhile they will come around a bit further toward acceptance of our view. Bowles retorts that we've already told the Paks we intend to go ahead with Indian MAP, and that the fact we intend to do so within well-defined limits, plus the compensatory hardware for Pakistan, would mitigate Pak reactions.

My own inclination is to split the difference. I see no reason why Chet should not go back and start talking about our desire to enter into some long term MAP planning with India, including the eventual provision of supersonics. Before firming up our own views, however,

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- 4 -

we want to get a better feel for Indian intentions. Would India be amenable, in return for a long term US program, to limit its own forces to a certain ceiling, limit its own foreign exchange outlays on defense to a certain range, etc. etc. ? Depending on the response, then Taylor could be more precise when he went out to Delhi in mid-December. Under this scheme, we need to do no more than tell the Paks that we are discussing longer term military aid with India, and intend to do so with Pakistan too at the appropriate time. Another reason for not moving too fast is that we simply haven't worked out all the details of this complex exercise yet. The MAP estimates are ballpark figures at best.

Recommendation. That you decide Tuesday on the following course:

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRS 61-63, vol. 19, #338

By jc, NARA, Date 8-26-03

Bowles + India
November 14, 1963 59

MEMORANDUM FOR BILL BUNDY

When Chet Bowles saw the President 13 November, the latter was favorably impressed in principle with Chet's pitch that it might be possible to trade off a 5-year US military commitment (at \$65-\$75 million or so) for at least a tacit understanding that the Indians would not exceed certain reasonable force goals, would limit their buys from the Soviets, and would take a more active role in our grand strategy against China. Chet thought that such a force ceiling would make continued MAP for India more palatable to the Paks, and would also limit the amount of free foreign exchange India would divert to defense at the expense of development.

The President's view was that Chet might have an interesting proposition even if it had only a 50-50 chance of success or even if we didn't get full performance. I attach the papers which Chet gave the President and the latter read with interest.

Chet mentioned India's desire for defense production aid (further highlighted in Nehru's recent letter, Delhi 1625). I suggested, however, that we might not want to build up too much of an indigenous production base at this time, since it made India less dependent on us and was the facet which most worried the Paks.

The President asked that he be given a preliminary Washington view on this in time to discuss it again with Bowles before the latter left. I've also told Phil Talbot about this and suggested a 22 November deadline for a joint State-Defense memo, so we can give it to the President for weekend reading.

While Chet told the President he would really like something on the order of \$75 million annually, he also presented attached estimate that some \$314 million over five years might do the trick. He noted that these figures would need to be carefully reviewed (I pointed out that DOD's current thinking was more on the order of \$50 million a year, and an 18 division and 39 squadron ceiling). Also, a 5-year commitment a la Iran was hard to make at a time when future aid prospects were so uncertain. However, in response to the President, I did hazard, on the basis of previous talks with you, that if necessary DOD could probably find another \$10-\$12 million a year for Indian MAP.

My own reaction is that if in fact we're now involved in a long term MAP relationship (on the order of \$50 million plus annually), why not see how much we can use this leverage to get some things from Delhi that we really want? If Bowles turns out to be over-optimistic, have we really lost very much?

cc: Phil Talbot
Peter Solbert
Bill Gaud

R. W. KOMER

McGB (Blind)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRVS 61-63, vol. 19, #337

By jc, NARA, Date 8-26-03

November 12, 1963

Bowles
x India
60

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Chet Bowles is very anxious to get some flavor of your current thinking about India-Pakistan tomorrow. He's putting up a brave front but actually feeling a bit low, and wondering whether we're still signed on to moving ahead with India.

We've explained to Chet that it isn't our policy but circumstances that have changed. Neither we nor the Indians could keep up the accelerated pace stimulated by the Chicom attack last October. The Hill revolt against foreign aid in general was another blow. So Ken skimmed off the cream, while Chet got out there just in time for the VOA fiasco and then Bokaro. Finally, the Paks have pre-empted center stage in their major campaign to spike our India program; by being so difficult they have in fact partly achieved their objective.

The important thing to do with Bowles is to reassure him that we intend to go forward with India, while getting him to set his sights a little lower and more realistically:

(1) He argues for a five year \$314 million MAP commitment to India in return for tacit Indian agreement to stay within a reasonable force ceiling (thus mollifying the Paks) and to limit their take from the Soviets (see his memo attached). This is not much more than the \$50 million a year the Pentagon has been thinking about. Chet feels he can sell such a package to Delhi. Query--are we able to make a five year commitment just now?

(2) Chet thinks it foolhardy and counterproductive for us to keep beating the Kashmir drum at this point. We had a good try at settlement under the Chicom gun last winter, but no further movement is likely until another such break comes along. The trouble is the Paks are now whomping up the Kashmir issue as a means of highlighting Pak/Indian differences and thus proving their point that India is really out to get Pakistan, not fight China.

(3) Bokaro and US economic aid. Chet fears the Soviets will come in and get credit for Bokaro by offering much less than the \$500 million we couldn't swallow. He'd dearly love to forestall the Soviets here, but it's hard to see what we can do at this moment without annoying the Congress.

While giving Bowles a friendly hearing, I'd urge holding off on any responses just yet till we can talk further with him. However, it would help greatly if you'd tell him you'd see him again before he goes (he'll be here through Thanksgiving).

R. W. KOMER

MAC -

61
Bowles
x India

When we lunch with Chet, chief objectives are:

(1) To warn him off jousting with too many wind-mills at this unpropitious time;

(2) Buck up his morale, which beneath his affability, is genuinely low. It was his hard luck to get back to Delhi just as the steam went out of our Indian enterprise. Nonetheless, Chet still has big ideas about how we can move ahead with India; while most of these are good, the trouble is we simply cannot finance them at this time. So the problem is how to use Chet's visit to make a few steps forward (e. g. pushing FY 64 MAP up from \$50 to \$65 or so) rather than advancing ideas of 5-year \$500 million MAP commitments even if these would buy us preclusive control over Indian establishment.

For my money, Chet is the right man for India at the present time; the analogy is to Howard Jones in Djakarta. It's precisely when we are unable to be very forthcoming (and may have to sustain some cuts) that we need a pro-Indian in India.

RWK

Attach. Selig Harrison's
article from WASHINGTON
POST 11/9/63

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-27-03

62

CHECK WITH R. W. KOMER BEFORE
TRANSFERRING
TO
JOHNSON ARCHIVES

HERE WITH 925 ONCE AGAIN

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TO WHITE HOUSE (FOR MCGEORGE BUNDY)
ZEM

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

TO WHITE HOUSE FOR MCGEORGE BUNDY FROM BOWLES
AT BEST DIFFICULTY OF COMMUNICATING EFFECTIVELY ACROSS 10,000
MILES IS VERY REAL. AT TIME SUCH AS IT IS ACUTE.

THEREFORE I STRONGLY URGE THAT, YOU OR, IF YOU CANNOT, TOM MANN
PAY US VISIT. IN VIEW OF CRITICAL DECISIONS WHICH MUST BE MADE
SHORTLY AND DEPT FEELING IT WOULD BE BEST FOR ME TO STAY ON HERE
DURING PRESENT TOUCHY SITUATION, I CAN SEE NO OTHER WAY TO PROVIDE
PRESIDENT WITH TRUSTWORTHY, UP-TO-DATE FIRSTHAND READING OF
PROFOUNDLY ALTERED AND POTENTIALLY FAVORABLE SITUATION HERE.

I HOPE YOU WILL NOT REPEAT NOT FEEL THAT PRESENT UNCERTAINTIES
AND LACK OF USG ANSWERS ON OUTSTANDING POLICY ISSUES MAKE VISIT
INOPPORTUNE AT THIS TIME. QUITE THE CONTRARY, THIS IS PRECISELY
WHY VISIT IS SO BADLY NEEDED NOW. INDEED PRESIDENT'S OPERATION
WOULD UNDERLINE FACT THAT YOU ARE NOT COMING TO NEGOTIATE ISSUES
BUT TO GET FULL, FIRSTHAND UNDERSTANDING OF SITUATION.

IF YOU FIND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO GET AWAY, TOM MANN WOULD BE GOOD
ALTERNATIVE. DURING OUR CONSULTATIONS IN EARLY AUGUST WE DISCUSSED
POSSIBILITY OF HIS COMING OUT. HE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CHARGED
WITH PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR REVIEW OF OUR SUBCONTINENTAL
POLICY, AND ECONOMIC QUESTIONS WILL BE AT TOP OF AGENDA IN MONTHS
AHEAD.

IF VISIT BY TO USG OFFICIAL IMPOSSIBLE AT THIS TIME, ANOTHER
ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE "UNOFFICIAL" VISIT BY SOME EXPERIENCED PRIVATE
CITIZEN WHOM PRESIDENT TRUSTS SUCH AS JACK MCCLOY OR DOUG DILLON.
IN ANY CASE, ON-THE-SPOT ASSESSMENT OF BOTH OPPORTUNITIES AND
PITFALLS WE FACE IN INDIA BY SOMEONE WHO CAN PERSONALLY SHARE
RESULTS WITH TOP LEVELS OF OUR GOVT SHOULD BE URGENTLY UNDERTAKEN.

WITHOUT A FRIENDLY, POLITICALLY STABLE, ECONOMICALLY VIABLE
INDIA, FAVORABLE POLITICAL BALANCE IN ASIA WILL BECOME IMPOSSIBLE
AND OUR MASSIVE EFFORT IN VIET NAM WOULD TURN OUT TO BE EMPTY
EXERCISE.

GP-1

210

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

NNNN

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 12-244

By CH NARA, Date 9-4-13

PRESERVATION COPY



EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

64

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

New Delhi, India,
December 27, 1965.

Dear Bob:

I am sending you the enclosed paper describing the Soviet information and cultural programs in India during 1965.

As you will see, it is most impressive. It is about two to three times the size of ours and covers just about every area of opinion formation.

We feel most frustrated in not being able to do more ourselves to project our own image and counter the Soviets.

We now have about \$650 million of U.S.-use rupees which are sitting here doing nothing and which we could put to effective use for information and cultural purposes if we were only authorized to tap them. As our most renowned log-jam breaker, how about taking this one on next?

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Cher (pub.!)
Chester Bowles

Enclosure:

Highlights of Expansion in Soviet
Information and Cultural Programs
in India during 1965.

Mr. Robert W. Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc* NARA, Date *8-27-03*

JAN 3 1966

FIELD MESSAGE

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From: USIS INDIA, New Delhi (Attn: IRS/IAN)

To : USIA WASHINGTON

44
Message No.

Ref :

December 17, 1965
Date

Subj: Highlights of Expansion in Soviet Information and
Cultural Programs in India During 1965

Authority USIA Guidelines 10-17-95
By jc, NARA, Date 8-27-03

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SUMMARY: 1965 SAW A SUBSTANTIAL INTENSIFICATION OF THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE IN INDIA AS EVIDENCED BY EXPANSION IN PHYSICAL PLANT, PERSONNEL, PRESS RELEASES, SOVIET LAND CIRCULATION, NEW YOUTH JOURNALS, CULTURAL EXCHANGE, TEXTBOOK PROGRAMS AND PROMOTION OF INDO-SOVIET CULTURAL SOCIETIES. LATEST MOVES SEEN AS LEADING TO POTENTIAL INCREASE IN THUS FAR LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS OF SOVIET CULTURAL-INFORMATION PROGRAM IN INDIA.

1965 has witnessed a greater increase in Soviet information and cultural activity in India than has been seen at any time in recent years.

Highlights of Soviet advances in various areas follow:

I. Physical Plant

The Information Department at 25 Barakhamba Road is in the process of doubling its office space through the addition of another story to the present building and the construction of further units on the same grounds. Increased visibility has also been evidenced by the addition of outside exhibit boards under the prominent heading "USSR Today."

The Cultural Division has moved from Travancore House to Ferozshah Road with no evidence of significant physical expansion - but increased visibility through a large neon sign and a lighted exhibit board facing the road.

II. Increase in Staff

Russian personnel in the Embassy's Information Department in Delhi increased from 13 at the end of 1964 to 20 at the end of November 1965.

The editor of Soviet Land, who also directs pamphlet production, has had his mission staff increased from 1 to 4 during the course of 1965.

Indian personnel have also been increased but precise information on the size of this increase is not currently available.

III. Increase in Output

1. Press Items - The total output of news and feature press matter of the Information Department of the Soviet Embassy during the first 11 months of 1965 was up 15% over the corresponding period of 1964.

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2. Periodicals - The print run of the fortnightly Soviet Land, the USSR's single major publication effort in India, printed in 12 Indian languages, English and Nepali, has increased from 400,000 to 511,000 during the last year.

The breakdown of the print run by language edition for the most recent issue for which such information is currently available is as follows:

SOVIET LAND #18 - SEPTEMBER 1965

Hindi.	114,600	Urdu.	20,000
Gujarati	96,000	Malayalam	14,500
Bengali.	58,000	Punjabi	12,500
English.	49,000	Assamese.	12,200
Telegu	40,000	Oriya	7,500
Marathi.	36,000	Nepali.	3,200
Tamil.	27,500		
Kannada.	20,500	TOTAL	511,600

Two new publications are in the final stages of planning and are scheduled to appear shortly.

a. "Youth Review"- a weekly publication directed to teenagers is scheduled to begin on December 25 with an initial press run of 20,000 in English with an ultimate goal of 500,000 circulation in all major Indian languages.

b. "Sputnik Junior"- a monthly children's magazine is similarly in the works as is Bal Sputnik, the Hindi edition of this publication.

3. Pamphlets - The Soviet Review series, which is presently averaging about two pamphlets a week in English only, will soon be published in all 14 Soviet Land languages. Three new sub-series of pamphlets have been introduced during the last year-and-a-half.

a. "Soviet Books"- a monthly which has now had 17 issues released in the Soviet Review series.

b. "Cinema in the Soviet Union"- an irregularly-published series which thus far has had three issues in 1965 in the Soviet Review series.

c. "Questions and Answers"- a series of 21 booklets covering all aspects of life in the Soviet Union of which 9 issues have thus far been released under the Soviet Land booklet series.

4. Films - Soviet film activity in India came to a peak in November 1965 when three separate sources were employed simultaneously to present Soviet films utilizing the 48th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution as the occasion:

a. A commercial Film Festival based on five Soviet fiction films was conducted simultaneously in Delhi, Bombay and Calcutta.

b. A documentary series of films about Russia was shown to the general public at the Cultural Department of the Embassy at Ferozshah Road in New Delhi.

c. Indo-Soviet cultural societies in various parts of India held film festivals sometimes alone and sometimes in collaboration with local film societies during the Indo-Soviet Friendship Month which was declared by ISCUS from November 7 to December 6.

Finally, a new development in the Soviet film offensive in India during 1965 was the publication for the first time of a periodic pamphlet of approximately 60 pages keeping India abreast of developments in Soviet films. Three such pamphlets in a numbered series have thus far been issued.

5. Books - 1965 saw a rise in the import of books from the Soviet Union. 834 Soviet books (all except a few imported) were listed in the catalog issued in India by the Peoples Publishing House as compared to 772 books in the 1964 catalog.

The Indo-Soviet agreement establishing the Institute of Russian Studies signed on October 27, 1965 calls for, among other things, the promotion of translation of books from the Russian language into Indian languages. There has similarly been an increased emphasis by the Soviets in the textbook field. A joint Indo-USSR Board, consisting of 10 members, 5 Indians and 5 Russians, with the Education Secretary of the Ministry of Education as its chairman, has been constituted to work out and implement a scheme under which standard works for higher education in different fields, published in the USSR, will be reproduced in cheap editions for the use of Indian students. The first meeting of the Board was held in January 1965 at which a tentative plan for republication of select Russian books in the fields of sciences, technology, medicine and agriculture was drawn up for early implementation. Following this agreement, a substantial number of Soviet textbooks, chiefly in the physical sciences, have been prescribed or recommended for use in Indian universities and technical institutes.

In 1965 a publication entitled Soviet Books was for the first time issued every month with news of Soviet publishing in general, reviews of particular Soviet books and specific information about the universities prescribing and recommending various Soviet textbooks.

6. Printing - According to available information, the Soviets are in the process of supplying a million rupees' worth of printing machinery to Rajkumal Prakashan, Delhi publishing house which has come completely under the control of Indian Communists. The Soviet contribution is alleged to be made on the agreement that it will be repaid in the guise of printing of Communist publications for at least five or six years.

7. Cultural Exchange - The 85-item 1965-66 Indo-Soviet Cultural and Scientific Exchange Agreement was described as the biggest in the five years since the general agreement was drawn up. (Its provisions have been described in a detailed report sent to the Agency.)

8. Indian Students Studying in the Soviet Union - It has been estimated by Indian students returning from the Soviet Union that there are now about 400 Indian students studying in Moscow.

The chief publicity exploitation on the part of the Soviets during 1965 relating to this area involved news about Indian students at Patrice Lumumba Friendship University which graduated its first Indians during the year. Soviet coverage of Indian students at Lumumba University included a special pamphlet and an article in Soviet Land. Amity, quarterly journal of the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society, also devoted an article to this subject. Fifty scholarships are being offered annually to Indian students at Lumumba University.

9. The Indian Institute of Russian Studies - Perhaps the most significant event in the Soviet cultural thrust in India during 1965 was the establishment of an Indian Institute of Russian Studies (the first of its kind to be established by the Soviet Union in a foreign country) in New Delhi. The agreement was signed in October 1965 and the Institute inaugurated on Nehru's birthday. Details of this agreement were described in a message to the Agency.

10. Russian Language Teaching in India - According to the 1965-66 Cultural and Scientific Exchange Agreement, more than 30 Soviet teachers of the Russian language and of technical subjects will be sent to work at educational establishments in India. The Union Education Minister, Mr. Chagla, told Parliament on 23 December, 1964 that Russian language teaching facilities existed in 9 Indian universities: Agra, Allahabad, Aligarh, Bombay, Delhi, Jadhavpur, Lucknow, Osmania and Rajasthan.

11. Future Educational Collaboration - A number of future projects designed to further Indo-Soviet cooperation in the field of higher and science education at the secondary stage were discussed by Education Minister Chagla of India and Yelutin of the Soviet Union in their mid-November 1965 meetings following the inauguration of the Indian Institute of Russian Studies.

According to press reports, it was expected that substantial aid in the form of technical know-how, training facilities, and production of scientific instruments and equipment for audio-visual education would be forthcoming from the USSR.

12. Radio - A new language, Marathi was added during 1965 to the Radio Moscow service for India which already included English, Hindi, Bengali, Urdu, Tamil and Malayam. A Radio Moscow advertisement in a November 1965 issue of Soviet Land listed 73½ hours of radio broadcasting a week beamed to India in 7 languages. This is not necessarily the complete schedule of broadcasts which reach India from Moscow. Complete data for 1965 are not yet available.

On Sunday, November 7, Soviet Ambassador I. A. Benediktov, according to newspaper accounts, became the first foreign envoy to New Delhi to broadcast to the Indian people from All India Radio. The occasion was the 48th anniversary of the Soviet Revolution.

13. Special Devices

a. Prize Contests - The Soviets, while generally making some use of the prize contest as a promotional device in India, surpassed itself in this respect in 1965 with the major awards being associated with Nehru.

1) Soviet Land Nehru Awards - 44,000 rupees as well as 4 free trips to the Soviet Union were offered to Indians producing the best works of journalism and literature dedicated to the cause of world peace and friendship between India and the Soviet Union. In addition, five free trips to a Soviet summer camp were granted for children's drawings. All of these awards were presented by Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Union Minister of Information and Broadcasting, in the presence of Soviet Minister for Higher Education Yelutin on Monday, November 15. These awards, associated with Nehru's birthday, received considerable press coverage.

2) The Lenin Peace Prize (reported to be 150,000 rupees) was presented in Moscow on August 12 to Mrs. Aruna Asaf Ali, a leading financial supporter of Soviet-oriented "Patriot" and "Link." In a ceremony at a mid-November Nehru memorial meeting she in turn presented 51,000 rupees of this prize to Education Minister Chagla towards the establishment of the Nehru Academy and the Dr. Baliga Memorial Home Fund for the All-India Peace Council and the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee.

3) Free Trip to Russia for Soviet Land Salesmen - In advertisements carried in October and November in various Soviet and Indian Communist journals, an offer of the right to draw for a free trip to the Soviet Union was made to those selling 10 or more subscriptions to Soviet Land.

4) Soviet Land Nehru Commemoration Stamp Contest - Nehru memorial stamps were offered to those who could answer three questions relating to Nehru's role in Indo-Soviet friendship.

b. Exploitation of Anniversaries - Generally ready to exploit anniversaries of significance to Indo-Soviet relations, the Soviets placed greater emphasis than ever on this device to promote ties between the two nations in 1965.

Among the anniversaries exploited through such devices as commemorative pamphlets, articles in Soviet Land, film showings, meetings sponsored by Indo-Soviet Cultural Societies, receptions, contests, stories of celebrations in the Soviet Union and the like were the following:

- 1) January 26 (Indian Republic Day) - 15th anniversary
- 2) February 2 - Economic and technical cooperation agreement for setting up Bhilai Iron and Steel Works - 10th anniversary
- 3) May 3 - Soviet Press Day - 15th anniversary of language editions of Soviet Land
- 4) May 8 - V-E Day - 20th anniversary
- 5) August 15 - Indian Independence Day - 18th anniversary

The two major exploitations of the year, however, followed in close order in November marking the 48th anniversary of the Russian Revolution and Nehru's birthday.

- 6) November 5 - "Great October Socialist Revolution" - 48th anniversary
 - a) Film festivals
 - b) Receptions
 - c) Purchase of supplements in Indian press
 - d) Financing of visits of out-of-town Indian journalists to Delhi
 - e) Establishment of Indo-Soviet Friendship Month, November 7 to December 6, marked by films, meetings and visiting lecturers and performers from USSR.

7) November 14 - Nehru's birthday

- a) Announcing Soviet Land awards
- b) Inauguration of Indian Institute of Russian Studies in Delhi

A Soviet pamphlet issued in January 1965 entitled "1964 One More Year of Soviet Indian Friendship", presenting a day-by-day chronology of significant events in this field, included 330 items compared to only 143 items listed in a similar pamphlet issued in February 1964 covering the period 1963.

IV. Some Observations Relating to Overall Scope of Soviet Propaganda Effort in India

This account has confined itself to highlighting Soviet advances on the propaganda front in India during 1965 rather than presenting a complete spell-out of its activities in this area.

A year-ender detailing all significant known Soviet propaganda activities in India is now in preparation.

Placing a price tag on formal Soviet propaganda activities is a most difficult task to achieve with any precision. However, rough estimates, based on available information, suggest that the Soviet cultural and information program in India in 1965 cost well over \$10,000,000.

The formal activity of the Information and Cultural Departments of the Soviet Embassy, however, tells only part of the story of the Soviet effort in this field. While there are currently about 27 Russians formally identified with Information and Cultural activities in the Soviet Embassy in Delhi, there are about 172 official Russians in all in the capital; there are about 2500 Soviets in all operations, - political, military, economic, technical, and academic - in India all of whom, of course, represent the government in one fashion or another.

Other multiplier factors in the Soviet propaganda effort are as follows:

1) Relatively greater direction and support from Moscow than in the case of USIS and Washington.

2) An indigenous Communist Party and Communist press (consisting of 54 papers with a circulation of 330,000) to serve as a conveyor belt in India.

3) A Leftist press led by Blitz (circulation 200,000 in English, estimated 100,000 in Hindi) with which the Soviets have very close links - sometimes financial.

4) A policy of obtaining press placement, particularly in the smaller language press, through placement of ads and actual bribes.

5) The Indo-Soviet Cultural Society. One of the most significant arms of the Soviet propaganda offensive currently is the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society, a leading Communist front group in India.

This Society takes on added significance since one Cultural Affairs Officer at the Soviet Embassy is given major responsibility for liaison with this group. While official channels of the USSR Information and Cultural programs are relatively weak outside of Delhi, the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society, with its 200 branches throughout India (as compared with 172 a year ago), provides a potential channel for the dissemination of the Soviet cultural as well as political program in many corners of India. While the organization is not as strong as its size might suggest, a serious attempt has been made during the last year to revitalize it under the prestigious presidency of K. P. S. Menon, former Indian Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

Besides housing small libraries, sponsoring film shows, visiting Soviet cultural attractions and publishing a quarterly journal, Amity, its chief function is to provide a major platform for speeches by leading Russian and Indian figures.

In recent weeks it has sponsored meetings which have produced headlines proclaiming the Soviet Union as India's "true friend" by such figures as Dr. V.K.R. V. Rao of the Planning Commission, Finance Minister T. T. Krishnamachari, Foreign Minister Swaran Singh (who "sharply denounced those who were making subtle attempts to deny the Soviet Union's friendship and spread all types of canards") and Deputy Home Minister Mishra, not to mention K. P. S. Menon, who constantly uses it as a pro-Soviet platform.

In one of its major functions during the year, it was addressed by Prime Minister Shastri on the eve of his visit to the Soviet Union.

Plans for the strengthening of the organization were announced at a meeting of the ISCUS National Council in Delhi on November 28, 1965. It was announced that ISCUS has decided on an intensive campaign to enroll new members and affiliate associate organizations during the three months December 1965 to February 1966. Special efforts are to be made to enroll workers, peasants, youth and women, and detailed decisions were taken for improving the work of the Society in universities and among medical men.

Furthermore, an Indo-Soviet Cultural Festival is being organized on a big scale in March and April of 1966. The high point of this festival is expected to be a visit to Delhi in March of the Bolshoi Ballet troupe, according to an announcement made at a public reception held by ISCUS, by Mr. Evgeny Ivanov, Vice Chairman of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries in Delhi on December 13, 1965.

V. Evaluation of Effectiveness of Soviet Efforts

While any evaluation of the effectiveness of an effort as vast as that of the Soviet cultural and informational program in India must be tentative in the absence of intensive surveys in this area, the following points suggest themselves.

It is quite clear that the Soviet effort is aimed to reach a considerably broader segment of the population than is the American effort. While the Soviets do not ignore the elite, they direct most of their cultural and informational activities at less sophisticated audiences.

They make a point of giving the impression that they are interested in identifying with the masses and even the villagers, as evidenced by their claim that some of their Soviet Land readers forums are even conducted in villages.

On the basis of national surveys conducted in the past in rural as well as urban areas, and among the poorly-educated as well as the better-educated, there is some reason for doubting the extent to which they really have been getting across their message to the masses.

If such mass penetration were in fact the case, one would expect that their overall image in relation to that of the U.S. would be relatively more favorable in rural than in urban areas and among the less than among the better-educated. This has not in fact been the case. Furthermore, while as of early December the Soviets are undoubtedly still enjoying a period of relative popularity, at least as reflected in treatment by the Indian press and majority of officialdom, this popularity appears to be related largely to their past role as champions of the Indian position in Kashmir coupled with America's past arms aid to Pakistan, rather than through any solid image of a vital and reliable Soviet society projected by its information program.

Surveys have generally pointed to the much stronger image enjoyed by America as a democratic society and a country which Indian students would much prefer as a place to study than the Soviet Union. It is unlikely that this basic image has been basically affected by recent events. In fact, recent events, such as the release of food by President Johnson and the forthcoming visit of Shastri to the U.S., have already somewhat reduced the recent Soviet advantage.

The Soviets themselves in fact appear to be aware of this past lack of success in really effectively communicating with Indians through the machine gun as opposed to the rifle approach.

While not abandoning by any means their mass approach, they have in the last year given signs of supplementing it with more carefully designed approaches directed at specific audiences - particularly students.

Two particular areas in which the Soviets are likely to become increasingly effective in reaching students are in their newly-stepped-up and tailored textbook program and their new student publication program.

For years the Soviets have been flooding the Indian market with cheap popular science books which they eventually decided were missing significant targets. Thus, their new textbook program, based on close coordination with the Ministry of Education, is starting to show its first signs of success as evidenced by the increasing number of books, largely in the field of science, which are finding their way into the Indian university system either through being prescribed or recommended.

Similarly, in the publication field, the Soviets have long relied on Soviet Land to appeal to the entire family, and now for the first time they have decided that students are sufficiently important to warrant a special effort in the form of the forthcoming Youth Review.

Projecting present trends, therefore, 1966 promises to be both quantitatively and qualitatively a year of increasing effectiveness for the Soviet cultural and informational program in India.

William D. Miller
Country Public Affairs Officer



EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

65
This document consists of
1 pages. No. 1 of 5
copies. Series A.

American Embassy,
New Delhi, India,
December 24, 1965.

~~SECRET~~
OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Dear Bob:

I am enclosing a memorandum I have just written as a supplement to my memorandum of November 10 to Dean Rusk entitled "The Subcontinent's Role in a New Asian Strategy". (A covert supplement follows by separate pouch.)

Since I wrote the first memorandum there has been a marked trend along these general lines within the Indian Government, among members of the Indian press and from sources in other embassies. Souvanna Phoumma's remarks to Ambassador Sullivan pointed in the same direction.

The second enclosure is a letter I have just written to George Ball which suggests a more worriesome interpretation of the Soviet Union's present posture than is currently accepted.

We are working hard to move the Indian Government along the lines that you have suggested and with which I wholly agree. Although it is impossible to judge our success until after the Tashkent meeting, I am increasingly hopeful.

With my warmest holiday good wishes to you both,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Enclosures:
As Stated.

Mr. Robert W. Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-27-03

JAN 3 1966

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As Stated.

Mr. Robert W. Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

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By jc, NARA, Date 8-27-03

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Authority PLJ 89-61

By pc/isp NARA, Date 9-18-03

MEMORANDUM

December 21, 1965

TO: : Secretary Dean Rusk
FROM : Chester Bowles
SUBJECT : Actions to Supplement My Memorandum of November 10.

In my memorandum of November 10, "The Subcontinent's Role in a New Asian Strategy" I suggested that we may be moving toward an historic turning point in our relations with Asia, and that in the next few years we shall face a choice among three courses of action:

- (1) Get out of Asia and permit the Chinese and/or the Soviets to organize this vast area against us;
- (2) Continue to increase our military commitments to support our inherently weak Asian political base, with the ultimate probability of a war of unpredictable dimensions with China; or
- (3) Encourage a new and broader Asian political consensus which would be anti-Chinese, pragmatic in regard to economic development, and generally friendly to the United States, although not under U.S. control.

The purpose of this memorandum is to examine the third course in greater depth and to suggest its implications, first for India and then for Asia generally, with some concrete United States policies and actions

This document
consists of 17 pages
Copy 3 of 52 copies.
Series B.

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JAN 3 1966

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that may be appropriate to the challenge.

I. The Potential Role of India in a New Anti-Chinese Consensus

India, with over half of the population of free Asia, is necessarily the cornerstone of the broad new Asian consensus toward which our policy should be directed. Even if we fall short of the consensus I have in mind and do no more than assure a politically stable, anti-Chinese India with a closer working relationship with Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, we would have moved a long way toward creating the non-Communist political counter-balance which is now so dangerously lacking in this part of the world.

From our perspective here in New Delhi there appear to be three immediate U.S. objectives regarding India the achievement of which should help make it possible for India to assume this major new responsibility:

- (1) De-fuse the India-Pakistan conflict;
- (2) Assist democratic India to generate an economic growth rate sufficient to assure political stability and economic self-reliance within a reasonable time span;
- (3) Persuade Indian political leaders to play a more positive and creative role in Asian affairs.

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Let us explore how American policy can most effectively pursue these goals.

A. De-fuse the India-Pakistan conflict.

Although I can see no immediate hope for an outright "solution" of the Pakistan-India conflict, there is a strong possibility that the two nations may see the wisdom of downgrading their differences and concentrating on the primary task of national development.

Because of India's predominance in size, industrial development and military strength its leaders should be persuaded to adopt a more moderate and tolerant view of its weaker neighbor and to take the initiative in trying to deal with the causes of the conflict.

The Pakistan Government on the other hand, must be persuaded to accept the fact that the events following August 5 plus the menacing presence of Chinese troops along the Ladakh border have made it politically and strategically impossible for any Indian Government to turn the Kashmir Valley over to Pakistan. (Nor can the Valley be presented to Pakistan by the USSR, China or the U.S.)

Actions:

1. We should continue to press both Pakistan and India to establish a secure ceasefire and to negotiate a withdrawal to the lines held by the two nations on August 5.

2. As a minimum step toward the implementation of paragraph 4

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of the Security Council's Resolution of September 20 we should seek agreement on a machinery for negotiation which will enable the two nations to come to grips with the whole range of differences (in addition to the Kashmir Valley) which now plague their relationship. I refer to such questions as the restoration of normal diplomatic relations, refugees, enclaves, the Ganges waters, communications, expanded trade, border differences, etc.

3. It is my hope that we will also press Pakistan not only to abandon its present destructive relationship with Communist China, but gradually to agree to cooperative measures for the defense of the subcontinent against Chinese aggression.

Although it would be unrealistic to assume that Pakistan can quickly be persuaded to assume such a role, I find it difficult to believe that Pakistan is politically committed to China. Consequently dramatic shifts in political orientation may be possible once the Karachi Government comes to see the economic advantages of pulling away from Peking.

4. In support of this concept military aid on the subcontinent should be provided only on the basis of each nation demonstrating its determination to oppose Chinese aggression, and it should be carefully shaped to that purpose.

Although there can be no assurances that these steps in themselves

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will de-fuse the India-Pak conflict they should help move events in a more favorable direction. The two essentials of this approach will be our ability to persuade India, as the major power on the subcontinent, to take the initiative in establishing a constructive framework for dealing with Indo-Pak problems, and to persuade Pakistan to accept the reality of a great power neighbor and to learn to live with it.

B. Assist India to generate an economic growth rate sufficient to assure political stability and economic self-reliance within a reasonable time span.

In a sense the Indian economy in its present stage of development may be likened to an iceberg: while the part visible above the surface is not impressive, there is considerable substance which does not show.

Since 1950, India's rate of capital savings has increased from 5% to 11%, and scattered throughout the economy are many situations where an extra push will bring into effect multiplier factors with a significant potential for rapid growth.

Barbara Ward Jackson, who recently spent two weeks here in consultation with the Planning Commission, is among those who believe that with wise policies and timely assistance the Indian economy is capable of self-sufficiency within the foreseeable future.

While India's economic progress has often been compared unfavorably to that of Pakistan, the fact that Pakistan has received

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twice as much U.S. aid per capita as India must be taken into account. Because India contains more than half the people in all the developing nations which we have been assisting the actual magnitude of our assistance is substantial; however, on a per capita basis India is at the bottom of the list of major U.S. aid recipients.

Since the annual increase in our Gross National Product is roughly equal to India's total GNP we can surely afford to give India the necessary boost if the Indians are prepared to do their part. In this connection, it is crucial to India's development that the Indian Government act boldly and wisely to create the conditions under which more rapid growth may become possible.

If they take the necessary internal steps and if we and others respond with adequate foreign exchange inputs we believe India may achieve an annual GNP growth rate of 6% within two years and a higher rate, about 7%, by the end of the Fourth Five Year Plan in 1971. Within ten years this could mean an annual rate of domestic capital savings of 17% and self-sufficiency as far as foreign governmental assistance is concerned.

Actions:

1. In order to qualify for vigorous U.S. economic assistance the Indian Government should be expected to reach agreement with the World Bank on policy emphasis, including the following assurances:

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- (a) the highest priority for agriculture and rural development;
- (b) a vigorous drive to control population growth;
- (c) the freeing-up of "maintenance imports" to enable existing industrial capacity to be used fully, coupled with increased encouragement to Indian exports.
- (d) a major effort to encourage and solicit private capital investment, both domestic and foreign.

2. If the GOI provides persuasive evidence of its intention to move vigorously along these lines, we should quickly release those non-project loans budgeted for the current fiscal year that are needed to help break the present industrial production bottlenecks which have resulted from lack of spare parts and industrial raw materials.

3. In regard to project loans we should concentrate a major portion of our immediate assistance on a vigorous effort to make India self-sufficient in food and to speed the economic and social modernization of the rural areas. These projects would include expanded fertilizer production, irrigation, pesticides, improved seeds, power development with heavy emphasis on rural electrification, small rural industries, education, textbooks, etc.

4. Regarding future economic aid we should assure the GOI, with due regard for Congressional limitations, that if it makes the right

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decisions and implements them forcefully, we are prepared to work with other nations to provide enough assistance to put India on its own feet within the next decade.

5. With regard to military assistance, once we are certain that India is not unreasonably diverting essential resources to defense we should re-establish our military aid program at about the previous rate and designed primarily to make India self-sufficient in defense equipment within a reasonable time span. Such self-sufficiency is the only effective way to keep the Soviets from becoming a controlling factor in Indian defense and to relieve the Indians of a major drain on their foreign exchange.

C. Persuade Indian political leaders to play a more affirmative role in Asian affairs.

With careful handling, I believe that the Indian Government may move generally in a more creative and positive direction with regard to Asian affairs. Indeed there is already significant evidence of this trend in both official and non-official circles in Delhi.

The key factor gradually moving the GOI in this direction is India's deeply-rooted fear of China and a growing recognition of the massive challenge which China poses to Indian interests throughout Asia.

The Chinese attack in 1962, the ultimata of last September, and the persistent Chinese probing along the frontier have convinced most

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Indians that China is the primary long-term threat to India's democratic development and political independence.

More specifically, India is becoming increasingly nervous about the possibility of a Chinese success in Vietnam, and India's fears of a Chinese takeover in neighboring Bhutan, Burma or Nepal are making Indians more conscious of the heavy load the United States is carrying elsewhere in Asia.

The primary obstacle to the development of a more active Indian role throughout Asia is the Soviet Union, which has significantly increased its influence in India in recent months. Nevertheless, deeply-rooted suspicion of the Soviet Union persists among many Indian leaders and opinion makers. With discreet encouragement I believe these suspicions can be increased.

Actions:

1. We should reinforce India's present focus on China as much as possible. The more the Indians can be persuaded to look north and east towards an expansion-minded China the less militant they will be in regard to Pakistan, and consequently the greater the opportunity for the moderates in and around the Indian Government to press for a Pak-India rapprochement.

2. We should mount a quiet campaign to cast doubt on the ultimate aims of the Soviet Union with regard to India and Asia generally.

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For instance, many key Indians are already half convinced that when Mao Tse-tung and his associates pass on, the Soviets will attempt to re-establish their former political relationship with China. A study of the map of Asia often serves to persuade Indian leaders that if faced with a choice between China and India, the Soviets would be forced to choose China.

3. We should embark on an expanded USIS program, drawing on our massive reserves of rupees which now remain largely idle. It would be helpful if we could secure approval for the Bi-National Foundation which we negotiated last winter with the Indian Government.

At present the Soviets are outspending us by at least 2 1/2 to 1 which in no small measure explains the progress they have made in recent months. A skillful operation here in Delhi, backed by wise and sensitive policies in Washington and adequate AID and USIS funds, should enable us to reverse this trend.

4. At the same time we should encourage increased contact in every field between Indians and other Asians, particularly the Japanese. If India wishes to be treated as a major power and to counter Chinese influence it will have to assume a more active and forthcoming role throughout Asia. Japan should be encouraged along parallel lines.

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I am convinced that the achievement of each of these three immediate objectives regarding India, although presenting obvious difficulties, is within the capacity of American policy. If we pursue them with vigor and sensitivity, I believe we can enable India not only to stand on its own feet but also to play a primary role in cooperation with other non-Communist nations in the creation of a more stable Asia.

II. An Asia-wide Effort

The fresh approach to Asia which I suggested in my November 10 memorandum will require a carefully orchestrated U.S. policy throughout Asia which would provide the framework for specific programs in each country and in international and regional organizations. Our broad goals would be to promote the following:

- (1) A common sense of purpose and increased self-confidence throughout free Asia;
- (2) An awareness throughout the region of the grim political, military and economic challenges posed by Mao's China;
- (3) The development of indigenous capital resources to enable the key nations of free Asia to become largely self-sufficient in economic and eventually in conventional military terms;
- (4) Ultimately -- as a maximum -- the formation of an Asian political instrument capable of assuming substantial responsibility for

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the region's development and defense, or -- as a minimum -- the cultivation of an ad hoc political relationship among the major powers of free Asia capable of assuming a major share of this responsibility.

The following are general elements which would be part of an Asia-wide effort of this sort along with suggested actions indicative of how we could concretely pursue this policy.

A. Our Economic Programs

United States policy toward Asia should assist the key nations of free Asia to achieve economic self-sufficiency as quickly as possible and associate the more developed nations of Asia in this effort as fully as possible, both by committing their own economic resources and by sharing their relevant experience with other Asian countries.

Actions:

1. As a target of our PL 480 assistance, seek to help such Asian nations as India, Pakistan, the Philippines and South Korea to become self-sufficient in food within the next seven years.
2. Encourage Australia, Thailand and Burma to take the lead in forming a regional food aid consortium to help meet short term food crises in countries like India and Pakistan.
3. Gear our economic aid programs in key Asian nations to adequate aid levels on the one hand and to determined self-help measures by the recipient nations on the other with realistic target dates for the

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elimination of formal U.S. Government assistance.

4. Support in a substantial way regional economic institutions such as the Asian Development Bank, ECAFE, etc. Encourage Australia to join the India and Pakistan aid consortiums.

5. Promote bilateral relationships among the nations of Asia dealing with specific aspects of economic development (e.g., a high level group of Indian politicians to visit Japan to examine the impact of foreign private investment there; a Japanese fertilizer team to come to India; Indian malaria specialists to work in Thailand, etc.)

B. Programs of Social Progress

The United States Government should clearly and dramatically set forth certain Asia-wide objectives toward which our assistance efforts would be geared, in addition to the fundamental aim of economic self-sufficiency.

Actions:

1. Choose certain aspects of life in Asian countries which the U.S. can most decisively affect in those non-Communist nations which are prepared to do their part. These might include extension of rural electrification, nutrition and education. We could then stress our determination to help the non-Communist nations of Asia to "bring electricity to every village of free Asia," "to free every Asian citizen from malnutrition," and "to provide a basic education for every Asian" "textbooks for all", etc.

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2. As part of such an effort we would focus our Peace Corps, AID and USIS programs throughout Asia on such specific social targets.

3. In conjunction with this program establish an Asian Nutrition Institute to carry out research in nutrition, to share experiences throughout Asia in developing improved diets, and to train people for a massive nutrition education program. Also establish an Asian Center for Literacy Education, which could develop more effective methods for teaching literacy and promote the widespread use of these methods throughout Asia.

4. Encourage regional associations of the professionals working on these activities, and support regional conferences and seminars to promote their work.

C. Psychological Programs:

The United States should overtly and covertly promote a greater sense of common political purpose throughout free Asia, dedicated to rapid and pragmatic economic development and firmly opposed to Chinese expansionism.

Actions:

1. Give all of our USIS output in this part of the world an Asian slant, even in papers and journals appearing in a single country. Stress through every overt and covert means that the two major threats to free Asia -- poverty and Chinese expansionism -- confront all of the non-Communist nations in the region; consequently a common effort to meet

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these threats is required to secure a viable and dynamic free Asia.

2. Publish, with overt or covert support, a top-flight magazine -- with news and comment in English (perhaps republished in local languages) -- which would aim at an Asia-wide audience (e.g., legislators, journalists, professors, etc. from Tokyo to Canberra, Manila to Karachi). Content would stress mutuality of interests, lessons to be shared.

3. Support institutions which will reinforce a regional awareness (e.g., Asian Press Institute).

4. Stress leadership training programs -- especially for talented young politicians and administrators -- which focus on regional problems in a regional context. Help establish regional centers for young leaders (e.g., World Assembly of Youth-supported center planned for Delhi for top young leaders from South and Southeast Asia.)

D. U.S. Political Program.

While the aim of this whole exercise is in large measure to begin to shape a new non-Communist Asian political consensus and eventually even a free Asian political instrument there is little that the United States can or should do overtly in the political realm.

Unless such a consensus emerges as a genuine and deeply-rooted Asian phenomenon it will not gain the widespread support which is required. In our contacts with friendly Asian leaders we should limit ourselves to the discreet encouragement of movement in this direction.

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One point deserves the heaviest possible emphasis: an effective association of the non-Communist nations of Asia, to the extent that it develops, cannot be subject to U.S. control. There will undoubtedly be times when the members of such a consensus will disagree with certain aspects of American foreign policy; when these differences occur we must learn to take them in our stride.

Nevertheless, only by drawing the nations of free Asia together around common interests and common goals such as their concern over Chinese expansionism and desire for more rapid economic development can we hope to develop a workable basis for a realistic long-term U.S. relationship with Asia.

* * * * *

I do not suggest that the task which I have described above is easy or even that it can be fully accomplished. I do say that there is no other US posture in Asia which does not involve steadily expanding inputs of American military power and the ultimate probability of a war with China, the implications of which are almost impossible to foresee.

However there is already a clearly discernible movement in the direction which I have outlined among key officials and observers here in New Delhi. In several Embassies including the Thai, Australian, and Japanese interest is also becoming evident. My speech of

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December 2 in which I discreetly referred to the need for greater Asian initiative was well received. Souvanna Phouma's recent conversation with Ambassador Sullivan points in the same direction.

In any case the alternatives open before us on our present course are not appealing and the time has come to search for a more realistic approach.

Both China and the Soviet Union have adopted long-range strategies which now shape their policies and tactics in Asia.

The Chinese have made no bones about their intention to dominate Asia as a stepping stone to the control of Africa and to the ultimate isolation and destruction of the West.

Lenin prophesied that the final victory of communism would come through a revolutionary alliance between the Soviet Union and "the exploited peoples of Asia and Africa." "In the last analysis," he said, "the issue will be determined by the cold fact that Russia, China and India represent a crushing majority of the people of the world."

To cope effectively with the carefully designed strategies of China and the USSR, the United States now requires broad and far-sighted Asian strategy of its own.

The situation in India is wide open for a fresh American approach. And India, as I have pointed out, could become the central element for a new, constructive and realistic U.S. relationship with Asia; -- a relationship which we urgently need.

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New Delhi,
December 11, 1965.

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OFFICIAL - INFORMAL

Dear George:

I would like to pass on for whatever they may be worth some of my current concerns in regard to the present posture of the Soviet Union in world affairs. Here goes:

From Churchill's Iron Curtain speech in 1946 until the late 1950's the Soviets were interpreted by most Americans in simple terms as ruthless plotters backed by an evil but appealing ideology, with unlimited military power poised for an attack at some future point on the "Free World."

Sometime in the late 1950's and early 1960's this worrisome stereotype evolved into something much more reassuring. The Soviets began to emerge as rather pleasant middle-class people, eager for more washing machines, anxious for peace and with their ideologically cluttered minds steadily being tidied up by a promising new educational system. When the Soviets acted in some way contrary to this comfortable impression, there has been an immediate rash of charitable explanations about revolutionary hangovers which might be expected soon to pass away.

I am beginning to wonder if we are not almost as wrong in the current reassuring interpretation as we were wrong in the earlier one about built-in Soviet military aggressiveness?

The Honorable
George W. Ball,
Under Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By pc, NARA, Date 8-27-03

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As I see the Soviets from our vantage point here in New Delhi, they appear to be immensely well organized, militant and effective in the political and economic fields behind a facade of good will and pleasantries, and with a very clear idea of where they are going and what they want.

For instance here in India the Soviets are moving with great skill and determination to expand their influence in Indian society with the help of a small but well-financed Communist Party backed by an effective but small fellow travelling minority in the Congress Party itself. They have already established a strong position in the Indian military and also in economic development and cultural affairs.

On propaganda work they are spending nearly three times as much as we are, while our massive hoard of \$650 million worth of rupees remains largely idle.

In Europe, the Soviets are giving the impression that if we would drop MLF a new chapter in our relationship might be opened, although they offer no evidence that this would in fact be the case.

As I examine the Southeast Asian situation, I find their posture even more disturbing. Many feel that their policies there can be explained by their desire to keep the Chinese out of the picture and at the same time to prevent the Chinese from running away with the world revolution. It would seem to me equally plausible to argue that the Russians would like nothing better than to see the United States and China involved in an all-out war which would enable them to sit on the sidelines and eventually pick up the pieces, and that their current tactics may be designed to that end.

In regard to the future course of the Sino-Soviet clash, I have similar doubts. A dozen years ago when I pointed out the possibility of an ultimate break between the USSR and Communist China my views were dismissed as visionary. Today many of the people who felt that such a break was impossible maintain that the USSR-Chinese differences are irrevocable and permanent.

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A glance at the map of Asia suggests the Soviet Union's overriding stake in a friendly China and certainly the Russians have taken a great deal of abuse from the Chinese in order to maintain some kind of working relationship.

I would be greatly surprised if after the passing of Mao Tse-tung the Soviet Union did not make a major effort to reestablish their old relationship with Peking. It is a very real possibility that growing economic strains in China itself may make such a relationship acceptable to the Chinese on an expedient basis let us say for a decade or so.

In my opinion we should be prepared to follow either of two courses of action. The first would be based on the assumption that the Soviet Union genuinely wants better relations but somehow is inhibited in moving forward. The second would be based on the more ominous assumption (i.e., that the USSR is pursuing its old aims with better manners and considerably more skill) which would mean that we ^{should} be prepared to take a much tougher position in dealing with the Soviets in such key areas as India.

I am sorry to pass on these rather gruesome thoughts at the holiday season but I believe they deserve consideration. If they make any sense to you, it might be useful to have some of our people explore them in greater detail.

With my warm regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

P.S. I am enclosing an article by Harrison Salisbury on Asia that I strongly urge you to read.

AMB:CBowels:nj:ejr

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