



EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

New Delhi, India,
December 22, 1965.

Bowles

Dear Bob:

I am enclosing a photostat of a recent essay by Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times in which he analyzes the forces which are shaping Asia and comes up with some conclusions which many of us share.

I think you will find it worth reading.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Enclosure:

Excerpt from Vital Issues,
December 1965.

Mr. Robert W. Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEC 29 1965

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Vital Issues

(REG. U.S. PAT. OFF.)

A service of the
CENTER FOR INFORMATION ON AMERICA
WASHINGTON, CONNECTICUT
Volume XV, Number 4



—ings by C. P. Meier

Asia And The Communist Challenge: What Is The Background?

The text of this essay is by Harrison E. Salisbury, Assistant Managing Editor of The New York Times. Originally given as a talk, it has kindly been made available by him to The Center, and is published as a Vital Issue because there is so great a need for an understanding of the backgrounds of the present situation in Asia. Mr. Salisbury is an acknowledged and foremost observer and expert in this area. The opinions expressed are his own, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Editorial Advisory Committee.

It is only recently that we have begun to appreciate the role of Asia in world affairs. It was only a little more than half a century ago that Sir Halpert MacKINDER, who evolved the doctrine of Geopolitics, made the statement that he who rules the heartland rules Asia and he who rules Asia rules the world.

In 1904 that seemed rather pretentious rhetoric. The world was still essentially a 19th Century world — a European world — a world dominated by the great powers of Europe, England, France, Germany, Russia. India was still a colony, a jewel in the British diadem. China lay prostrate, a dying empire.

In between were remnants of ancient kingdoms and empires, some of them being picked up by the new vigorous European powers, others merely left in a kind of innocuous desuetude.

In the new world there was the United States, a brash, new power after the victories of the Spanish-American war, still playing no real role on the world's stage.

So far as could be determined in London or in Paris or in Berlin, or in St. Petersburg, the 19th Century was

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to be followed by a 20th Century which would, like its predecessor be a European Century. The fate of Asia, of Africa, would be made by this small group of great powers. In that context what meaning did MacKinder's words have? What was he talking about? What was this heartland of which he spoke? Did he mean Tibet?

If so, Tibet was teeter-tottering toward the British side. Did he mean Mongolia, about to be grasped to the bosom of Czarist Russia? Or, perhaps, it was the heartland of Central Asia, whose satrapies had already fallen into the power of the Czar of Russia.

But at this very moment of 1904, history stood at the doorstep of change. Within a year there would occur an event which would cast a shadow down through the 20th Century, 1905 was an epic year — the year which marked Japan's defeat of Russia on land at Port Arthur, on the sea with the sinking of the Russian fleet at Tsushima.

An Indian friend recently said to the writer, "You know, from the Asian standpoint there have been two great events in the 20th Century." The first was Russia's defeat at the hands of Japan. Then for the first time, the peoples of Asia began to lift up their heads. They began to see that the white man's power was not necessarily supreme, that Asia might yet play her own role on the world stage.

After 1905, every Asian, every intellectual of Asia, every thinking person of India or China, began to see that Asians could take the inventions of Europe and turn them against the Europeans. They saw that although time moved slowly it moved in Asia's direction.

The second event that the Asians regard as in the same category is the testing in 1964 by China of a nuclear device. This showed to the peoples of India, of China, of Japan or Persia, that they could match the most sophisticated achievements of western technology.

Sixty years have passed since MacKinder made his prelection. Two great wars have swept the world. No longer are the policies of the world laid down in London, in Paris, in Berlin. St. Petersburg no longer is even a capital. Where are the capitals where today's history is made?

Washington, the capital of that bright, brash nation, no longer on the outskirts of World Power but now the very center of it. Moscow, no longer a provincial city in a half-awakened giant empire; Moscow, today the capital of an advanced, industrial state, powerful in its might. Peking no longer a walled forbidden city, a relic of a dead empire; Peking, today a powerful, aggressive, vigorous capital, leader of the world's largest nation in population. Peking, the capital of a State whose shadow steadily lengthens over the whole world.

And the fourth capital, not recognized as quickly either in the East or in the West, but emerging swiftly, New Delhi India.

The weight of the world has shifted to the East in this century. This is no longer a European Century. There were Americans at the end of World War II who felt that an American century had dawned. Today that seems doubtful, at least in the concept of an America all powerful, all dominant, able to lay down the law in any part of the world. There were those who thought it was going to be a bi-polar century in which power was divided between

Moscow and Washington. But today there are doubts as to that, for a third force is clearly rising — the force of Asia.

What do we see in Asia today as contrasted with the turn of the century? We find China risen, independent and Communist. We find India independent and non-communist. Both these events occurred in the two decades since

the end of World War II. The pace is quickening. Probably not in the thousands of years of Asia's history has there been a reversal as quick, as sudden, and as little apprehended.

The crises of the moment are in Asia. There are many reasons for this. It is not alone the rise of two new powerful nations, it is also the fact that on the Asian continent is concentrated something like two-thirds of the world's population. Mere numbers are no answer. Mere numbers do not mean power. But when you have the numbers, when you have the population and you begin to harness this to modern systems of government, whether they be Democratic or totalitarian Communist, then you begin to build power. The reservoir of population and the rapidly advancing technology of the Asian nations is the reason why the world's attention is shifting inexorably to the east.

We saw it happen in the inter-war years in the Soviet Union. We must remember that, at the end of World War I, Soviet Russia was a feeble, weak country. In the 20 years that followed, Russia built up her strength and moved steadily over to a position of power. This was a shift of power to the east because Russia is an Asian nation and a European one as well. Almost unnoticed by the West the center of power moved one step towards Asia with Russia's rise. Now the same thing is happening again in the case of China and India. What is the answer?

Essentially China is a great problem because of population. Her population today can be estimated at about 750 million people. This is almost equal to the population of Russia, the United States, and India put together.

Not only is it vast today, it is growing with unequalled rapidity. Each year adds 20 to 25 million Chinese to the world's number. By 1970, or shortly thereafter, there will be one billion Chinese in the world. A staggering number, particularly when we consider that they will have at their command not only these numbers but an increasingly advanced technology, one which will soon be backed by an arsenal of nuclear weapons.

This is power. There is no other problem in the world today to equal that of the Chinese population. With 25

million more mouths to feed each year you must have an inexorably increasing food supply. China has had intense difficulty for the last four or five years in maintaining food production sufficient to feed her present population. It is unreasonable, I suspect, to assume that there can be any possible expansion of agricultural area or output which

will keep pace with the population increase. And it is this factor which feeds into Chinese politics giving it the aggressive characteristic so pronounced in recent years. It is no accident that each of China's neighbors has felt the pressure of China's population against their frontiers. It is no accident that in 1954 when Mr. Khrushchev first went to Peking he was confronted by Mao Tse-tung with a demand for discussion of the rectification of the Soviet/Chinese frontiers.

What rectification? A small matter of restoring to China a few areas the Russians had picked up over the 100 years previous, the Maritime Provinces, Eastern Siberia, the whole region as far west as Lake Baikal, the Amur River area, more than half of Central Soviet Asia, not to mention the Russian Protectorate of Mongolia.

This was not brash arrogance on Mao's part. It stemmed from his understanding of China's food position, of her need for land on which to settle her population, land on which food could be grown. The Russians, of course, rejected the demand and thus arose the increasingly tense situation between Russia and China.

Every one of China's neighbors has felt such pressure. It will not become easier as the years go by. And here is where India's role arises.

In the world there is only one other population comparable to that of China. This is India's. India today has

a population of roughly 450 million. By 1970 she will have 600 million people. This is smaller than China, but it is second to China. India has a food problem, just as China does. But India occupies a special position on the Asian continent, a position which America has not yet recognized but which has been long perceived by both the Chinese and the Russians, possibly because they are closer, possibly because they tend to be guided more by long range considerations and by national necessity and less by vagrant currents of emotion.

In 1953, when Stalin disappeared from the scene, one of the very first moves of his successors in Moscow was to reverse Stalin's policy for India.

Stalin's line was to treat Gandhi and Nehru and the Indian Nationalist movement as a mere extension of British Imperialism in another guise — a clever British trick by which they gave up India to the Indians, but continued to hold it for themselves. A neat bit of dialectic!

Stalin apparently believed this, for it is incorporated in the official Encyclopaedia where you can find it today. This line made any genuine rapprochement between Moscow and New Delhi impossible. This was changed overnight by Mr. Khrushchev and his companions in 1953. They began seductively to court India's favor.

The world had become accustomed to a bond of friendship between India and China, and thought, perhaps, that the Russians were merely attempting to keep pace with the Chinese. The world did not know that in actuality Russia and China already secretly were moving on different rails. The world did not know that the Russians envisaged India as the only counterweight on the Asian continent to development of a Chinese hegemony.

It was not long before Soviet Indian friendship began to blossom. In the United States this development was not understood. It seemed to many that India which had been

dancing to China's tune was doing the same for the Russians.

Many felt that India was on the other side; that we should penalize her, cast her out, shun her, because she was not playing the game. The game being to develop a world wide coalition against Communism. It was not seen that Russia was playing old-fashioned power politics, the Russians knowing very well that China was emerging as

an aggressive threat, ready to compete for leadership of Asia, and viewed India as the one possible competitor of China's.

It surprised many people, five years ago, when China attacked the Indian frontier. Why did the Chinese do that? What possible motivation did they have? It seemed an act of reckless provocation, certain to bring down upon them the indignation and moral anger of Asian and western peoples. But the Chinese knew quite well what they were doing.

What they embarked on was a three-fold operation. They thought first to gain an excellent strategic position, from which further incursions against India might readily be made. They sought to divert India from her vast task of economic rehabilitation.

They sought to compel India to divert to National Defense, resources which ill could be spared and thus stall the development of a national economy, and they thought it possible to shake India from a position of Asian neutrality. They sought to drive India out of a position from which she could appeal to other Asians.

The Chinese also sought to unify their own country with a demonstration of ability to restore ancient Chinese frontiers. It was a clever move, a powerful move. It did not achieve all of its objectives, but it achieved some major ones.

It caused both the United States and Russia to come to India's aid. In this, perhaps, the Chinese move back-fired. It caused India to rally as she never had before around her national leadership. This, perhaps, the Chinese did not anticipate. But on the third count, on the goal of causing India to divert wealth, men, talent, energy, and resources to military channels, instead of the building up of the economy — there the Chinese succeeded.

This was an important victory because, as China knows, as India knows, as Russia knows, and as we should know,

in Asia there is today a great competition for leadership of the continent and with it the leadership of the depressed and newly emerged colonial peoples throughout the world. He who wins that race may well win the race for world domination.

China is in that race with her totalitarian structure. She is there with her Marxian ideology. She is there with a doctrine of force. With an iron discipline. With the brute

force of the police. With the force of public opinion and brain-washing. With the force of the all-pervasive party. She's out to show Asia and Africa — if you organize, if your discipline is tight enough, you can build your country from the low Asian/African level to modern industrial technological power. She is out to show that this can be done, that the sacrifices, though great, are no greater than those under Colonialism, and that the price is worth it. The game is worth the candle.

You can lift yourself by your bootstraps — China believes — if you are tough enough and strong enough. She carries this forward with revolutionary propaganda and a revolutionary apparatus that is rapidly spreading throughout the colonial world, spreading in opposition to, in competition with, the Russians. She is building her own Communist apparatus, pure Communist, Maoist Communist, in every Asian and African country.

Against this stands India, a great nation, and the only nation in the world which can challenge China for antiquity of history, of custom, of learning, of knowledge, of scholarship, of philosophy.

A civilization which has endured as long as China's is not longer. A civilization which has throughout history been in a kind of dialectical opposition to China's. A great moral civilization, a nation with moral authority throughout the world. A nation today reborn through independence, striving to utilize the best of western democracy, of western parliamentarianism, and coupling with this what she finds useful from the social thought and the socialistic development so widely experimented with in Europe; taking freely from west and east and creating there an amalgam which she hopes will demonstrate to the world that a backward, oppressed nation can, without the iron discipline, without the thought control, without the police, without the party, develop economically, educationally, technologically, and with the military power to back it up, at a pace rapid enough to show not only China, but the other nations of the world that this can be done, that men do not have to give up their heritage for the sake of a steel mill.

It is a mighty social and political experiment. Its like has not been tried anywhere in the world. It is not certain that it will be a successful experiment, but in all probability only the success of the Indian experiment will prevent a growing Chinese domination of Asia and of these backward areas of the world where peoples are ready to trade quick loss of freedom for tomorrow's stability.

This is why India is important. This is why India has clearly been important to the Soviet Union every year since Stalin's death. This is why the Chinese have been unable to drive the Russians out of collaboration with India. This is why Indians are so important to us.

These two great Asian nations, rivals down through history, have entered upon the world stage in the latter half of the 20th Century. Not only in Asia is leadership an issue. When we consider the power that is concentrated in these two countries, when we consider the power that will fall that nation which is able to organize and take

the leadership of that part of the world, we can see what the stakes are. We can see that the stake is survival of the world today. This is why it is so important for us as Americans to understand the actual strategic importance of India. This is why we must understand its ideological importance.

Sometimes we are diverted by petty issues. Our headlines today and our national interest are focused on Southeast Asia, on Vietnam. They are focused there because the United States is deeply involved in South Vietnam.

There was a time in the past when our attention was deeply focused on Taiwan, on Nationalist China. Before that, on Korea. Each one of these areas is important. Don't mistake that. The issues are important in Vietnam, but it is a question of relative importance. In this present year the U.S. will pour a billion and a half dollars into Vietnam, into the effort to maintain a military position in Vietnam. In this present year the U.S. will spend a fraction of that amount in India. This is not the first year that figures of this kind could be cited.

Year in and year out our major expenditure of resources, of money, of time, attention and of talent, has gone to what in all reality are relatively minor military operations.

Important as Vietnam is, were I the ruler in Peking, I would thank God for an American policy that poured men and money into Vietnam and paid little attention to India.

If we were to play international relations and world politics as it is played in Peking, as it is played in Moscow, were we to play it on a chess board as they play it, were we to calculate on each move where we are going to stand 10 years hence, I venture to say that our interest, our attention would be reversed.

We would not in the first place have made the commitment to Vietnam. We would not be so concerned with Vietnam. We would put our money and our time and attention where the game will be won or lost — in India. Without India, Asia will be lost. Today that heartland of which MacKinder spoke 60 years ago is the crux of world power.

It makes little difference where you draw the line. It stands today somewhere between Russia on the north, China on the east, and India on the south. This is the fulcrum. This is the heartland of Asia and the entry we have in that competition is not China, not Russia, it can only be India. This should be the heart of American policy.

In the 20th Century, those prophetic words of MacKinder have come true — that, indeed, he who rules the heartland will rule Asia and will rule the world. Our policy today is not calculated to hold the heartland. It is calculated to hold a peripheral position. That position may be important but if it is worth a billion and a half dollars to hold Vietnam today, it should be worth three billion dollars a year to hold India tomorrow.

There could be no greater investment in American democracy than such aid as we give to India to make sure that democracy survives there, and by surviving there, survives throughout the world.

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EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

*Me - I'm embarrassed,
but that still sends
something just about
every week. PWT*

New Delhi - December 17, 1965
Bowles

Dear Bob:

I am enclosing copies of today's edition of Delhi's four major papers to give you a feeling of how thoughtful Indians presently view themselves, the United States and the world generally.

I am also enclosing several articles which I think the President might find interesting. The Indian Express, in which the PL 480 article appeared, is the largest English language newspaper in India. The two Statesman editorials were almost certainly written by Pran Chopra, the "culprit" of the AP piece.

I appreciate your personal cables giving me a first-hand view of the President's thoughts. Although on occasion your tone has been a bit peremptory I am sure that this reflects the immense personal pressures under which you must be operating, and which I thoroughly understand.

We are all pleased that the food situation is beginning to move and deeply appreciate the key role I know you have played.

I look forward to having a good visit when I return before Prime Minister Shastri's visit.

Steb joins me in sending warmest regards,

Sincerely,

CBT

Chester Bowles

*Have a good Christmas -
you deserve it!*

Mr. Robert W. Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

*a good
lesson, cheap.
The point, which
I have had to
learn the
hard way,
is that we
get more
them enough
power just by
being the
King's man.
a hint is
enough to
take them
on order
from such
as we do
such as
that*

DEC 27 1965

New Delhi-December 17, 1965

Bowles

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Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Mr. Robert W. Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.



70

EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

This document consists of 1
pages. No. 1 of 5 copies.
Series A.

New Delhi, India,
December 10, 1965.

Bowles

~~SECRET~~
OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Dear Bob:

I am enclosing a copy of a letter I have just written to
the Secretary which refers to my November 10 memorandum
to him. I think you may find it interesting.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

CB

Chester Bowles

Mr. Robert W. Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

~~SECRET~~

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This document consists of 4 pages. No 3 of 6 copies. Series A.

~~SECRET~~
OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

New Delhi, India,
December 10, 1965.

Dear Dean:

Many thanks for your thoughtful response to my memorandum on the future of our Asia policy. As you point out, the approach which I suggest opens up many difficult questions to which none of us have ready answers.

India with one-seventh of the world's population, a functioning democracy, a deeply-rooted antagonism towards China, and a friendly attitude towards the United States is a logical place from which to start. There are however several formidable obstacles in the way, among which are the following:

1. Can we find some way to de-fuse the India-Pakistan conflict? (Although I do not think we can solve this issue in the near future any more than we can solve the Berlin issue in Europe or the Israeli issue in the Middle East, it may be possible to dampen it down so that both nations can go about their business.)
2. Can India generate the capital savings necessary to make it self-reliant with the assurance of an expanding economy within say a ten year period?
3. Can India muster the bold political leadership which will be required if it is to follow a more affirmative and imaginative Asian policy?
4. Can the non-communist Asian nations shake off their present narrow concepts of national security and learn to work together for development and defense?

Although these obstacles are substantial, they are not, in my
opinion,

The Honorable
Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

~~SECRET~~

DEC 14 1965

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ / RAC 12-361
By LVJ NARA, Date 02-19-2014

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opinion, insurmountable. And as I think about the very real problems in the way, I am reminded of the limited choices now available to us; in the next five to ten years there are only three realistic positions that we can take in regard to Asia:

1. We can get out - leaving China and/or Russia to organize Asia against us - which seems to me unthinkable.
2. We can continue to expand our military inputs in order to bolster our present grossly inadequate Asian political position.
3. We can work in a variety of ways to encourage an association of non-communist Asian nations which are prepared to take more initiative not only for their own development but also for their own defense vis-a-vis China leaving the United States in a support position.

Admittedly such a political balance is unlikely to come into being quickly enough to relieve us of our burden in South Viet Nam. However under present circumstances we are forced to devote our major energies to putting out fires; we must embark soon on the process of building more solidly for the future.

With a little luck and good management I believe that there is a reasonable chance that such a development may take shape in the next five years. And these five years will go faster than we think; five years ago you were still President of the Rockefeller Foundation.

There is one specific point in your letter on which I would like to comment. As you properly state there seem to be far more Americans worrying about what India thinks of the United States than there are Indians worrying about what the United States thinks of India. This factor plus the tendency of the Indians to strike self-righteous postures and to overlook the power realities plus the arrogance of which many Indians are capable, have combined to make them rather unpopular in many circles in Washington and elsewhere in America.

As one who has worked closely with the Indians over the years, I am at least as conscious of these profoundly irritating tendencies as anyone; I can assure you I have more than my share of them to deal with here in New Delhi.

However,

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However, I know you will agree that we cannot allow our irritations over the personality traits of certain Indian leaders to blind us to the primary importance of the massive geo-political fact that is India.

I can assure you I have been emphasizing in my talks with Indian leaders including many M.P.'s that Indian neutralism between the USSR and the USA has become heavily loaded towards the Soviets and that in many situations what Russia thinks seems to be more important to the Indian Government than what we think.

Almost all Indian leaders frankly accept this criticism as valid but stress that it grows out of their own obsession with keeping China and the USSR apart. However, I think I have made considerable progress on this point in the last few weeks.

One final thought. The kind of formal or informal Asian development and defense organization which I believe should be our major political-military objective in Asia will not mean that the Asian components will necessarily agree with our views on all issues affecting Asia.

If such an organization is to develop a really adequate political base it will be deeply Asian in outlook and views. I for one will cheerfully settle for an association of Asian nations which is clearly anti-Chinese, pragmatic in regard to economic development, and oriented towards democracy.

Moreover, our own ability to help bring this more advantageous political balance into being will depend not only on our commitment of resources and our diplomatic skills but also on our determination to orchestrate into a single comprehensive plan the various activities of State, USIS, AID, [redacted] Pentagon. Right now for instance one part of the U.S.G. is urging the Indians to worry more about China (rather than about Pakistan) while another downgrades the Chinese danger and points out to the Indians that Chinese troops have been withdrawn from Tibet.

Before you get this letter, I hope to have a cable in your hands suggesting some steps we might take [redacted] to promote the broad concept which I have in mind. In the meantime,

thanks

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50X6

SECRET

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thanks again for your thoughtful and stimulating letter.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,


Chester Bowles

CBowles:nj

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TO: ROBERT KOMER, WHITE HOUSE
FROM: AMBASSADOR BOWLES

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR LETTER WHICH CONFIRMS MY FEELING THAT THE SITUATION IS DEVELOPING IN A GENERALLY SATISFACTORY WAY. THE PRESIDENT'S BACKGROUNDER STRUCK RESPONSIVE CHORD HERE AND HAS BEEN MOST HELPFUL IN FURTHER CLARIFYING OUR INTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO INDIA; ONLY REAL CRITICISM IS THE FAMILIAR ONE OF EQUATING THE TWO COUNTRIES. ALTHOUGH FACED WITH VERY GREAT DIFFICULTIES, INDIA IS NOW IN A HEALTHY SOUL-SEARCHING MOOD. HOPE YOU HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO READ MY TWO RECENT SPEECHES.

REGARDS."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 12-362

By ch NARA, Date 6-27-13

72



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Bowles

New Delhi, India,
December 3, 1965.

Dear Bob:

I am enclosing two speeches on US-Indian relationships,
which I gave recently.

Although they both dealt with politically sensitive
situations, they were well received, which I think reflects
the healthy soul searching which is going on in India.

With my warmest regards.

Sincerely,

Please read them!

Bowles


Chester Bowles
American Ambassador

Mr. Robert Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

DEC 13 1965

72a

Indian-American Relations— A Current View



Ambassador Chester Bowles outlines
American support to India through the years
and calls for continuing close ties
between the two great democracies.

***Indian-American
Relations—
A Current View***

Although there will always be some differences between India and America, the goals we have in common are vastly more important.



By Chester Bowles
U.S. Ambassador to India

Full text of Mr. Bowles' address
at the Laski Institute, Ahmedabad,
on November 17, 1965.

Viewpoint U.S.A.

*Number thirty-one in a continuing series of
American policy statements.*

Indian-American Relations— A Current View

I COME HERE today as a friend of India who has known India's leaders and many thousands of her people since the early days of your independence.

I emphasize this long personal relationship because I think it is important that I speak to you today frankly and fully.

It is inevitable that the Pakistan-India crisis would have caused considerable rethinking of old policies and relationships in New Delhi and in Rawalpindi. It is also understandable that major nations such as my own whose interests and relationships have been affected by this tragic conflict would await the results of this re-evaluation to adjust their own policies and commitments to whatever new positions and attitudes may emerge.

During this period of groping for new policies to fit new situations, I believe it behoves the spokesmen of all nations to avoid hasty statements or acts which may jeopardize, in the heat and confusion of the moment, friendships which they have built up in the past and the hopes of still better relations in the future.

Against that background let us briefly consider a few historical facts which affect the relationships of our two countries.

I submit that in the 18 years since independence India has had no better or more consistent friend than the United States. Throughout your long struggle for independence, the great majority of Americans stood solidly behind India. During World War II successive special representatives whom President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent to India were so outspokenly sympathetic to Gandhi and to the Indian freedom cause that their withdrawal was requested by the Viceroy.

After independence America was the first nation to offer technical assistance to the Indian Government. In 1951, during my earlier service here as U.S. Ambassador, I signed the first capital grant or loan agreement with any Asian or African nation. These particular funds helped to finance India's massive programme to eradicate malaria and to launch the community-development programme which now embraces all of India's 550,000 villages.

Since then the United States has loaned or given to India Rs. 1,200 crores (\$2.5 billion) worth of capital goods and technical assistance. These funds have constituted 58 per cent of all the foreign assistance which India has utilized during this period.

More specifically, United States assistance has provided the foreign exchange for 56 per cent of India's electric power development; it has helped to

modernize India's transportation, to finance the irrigation of millions of acres of Indian farm land, to establish seven modern agricultural universities, to cut roads through the mountains, and to equip the Indian Army and Air Force.

In addition to these capital loans and grants, the United States in the past 14 years has delivered to India 35 million tons of food grains; right now these shipments amount to about 7 per cent of your total annual food grain supply, which is roughly 18 per cent of all the wheat produced in America. Milk from America is now being drunk each day by 10 million Indian school children.

Having mentioned America's massive commitments to Indian economic development, let us consider with total frankness some of the political questions which have divided us and also those which have helped pull us together.

In 1950, in collaboration with Joseph Stalin, the Chinese mounted a major attack on the U.N. forces which were defending South Korea. The ultimate target of this aggression was unarmed Japan which, as the most advanced industrial nation in Asia, was a tempting target for Chinese ambitions. In the crucial struggle which followed, India assumed a neutral position, as it did in the periods when free Berlin has been under heavy pressure.

On numerous occasions during the following years the United States Government warned India and our other Asian friends that the Chinese Commu-

nist leadership had massive expansionist ambitions. However, war-weary Japan held itself aloof, as did the other three major Asian nations—India, Indonesia, and Pakistan.

Five years after Tibet fell to China's aggressiveness, many Indians were still chanting "Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai" in the vain, although understandable hope, that China might somehow be persuaded to live in peace.

During this long, difficult period the responsibility of containing Chinese aggression and pinning down some 100 tough, well-trained Chinese army divisions rested almost entirely on the United States. Although our efforts to contain China were not particularly popular in India, I wonder what kind of Asia we would have today if the United States had decided during those crucial years to sacrifice its convictions for your approval.

In the late 1950s, as we had predicted, China began to build its case against India as an "aggressor" along the Himalayan borders. Because these claims were blatant falsehoods, India under Jawaharlal Nehru courageously rejected them, at the same time working patiently for a peaceful settlement.

In October 1962, when the Chinese forces suddenly attacked along your northern frontier, the United States responded firmly and promptly to your call for assistance. Within two days giant U.S. Air Force C-130 cargo planes were disgorging massive quantities of machine guns, rifles, mountain

artillery, radios, ammunition, and other military supplies on Indian airfields for the support of the jawans who were defending India's borders against the Chinese onslaught.

But, you may ask, what about America's military relationship with Pakistan?

In early 1954 the United States offered both Pakistan and India military equipment and support for the defence of South Asia and the Middle East, which were then under increasingly heavy political pressure from the Communist forces.

Although Pakistan accepted the offer, India refused in the hope that your government could be a more effective force for peace by attempting to moderate Chinese aggressiveness—admittedly a worthy objective.

When the U.S. arms and equipment which we gave Pakistan were used against you, there was inevitable resentment. Under the circumstances, we felt that the most effective contribution we could make toward a cease-fire was to cut off all American military aid to both nations. This we promptly did.

Since August we have worked patiently within the Security Council to end the conflict between your two countries, which together contain one-fifth of the world's population. Although we have proposed no specific plan, we deeply believe that some basis for better relations must be found. We also believe that the final achievement of peace must eventually come from the two nations themselves;

it cannot be imposed by an outside power, however well intentioned.

Speaking for the United States, let me say that we intend to make the same sincere attempt to bridge the differences between Pakistan and India that India has made over the years to bridge the gap between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Millions of Americans, and I am sure millions of Russians as well, wish you well in your own bridge-building effort. I am equally confident that in their hearts millions of Indians are equally hopeful for the success of our efforts to create more neighbourly relationships here on the subcontinent.

The primary concern which all of us share is whether or not India and Pakistan can solve their individual problems of more rapid economic development.

Here in India it is not a question of survival. India has survived for thousands of years and, come what may, will survive for many thousands more to come. The key question is: can India expand her economy fast enough and by democratic methods to permit the maximum freedom and dignity to each citizen?

You know that you can achieve this objective and so do *we*. More specifically, we believe that you can grow enough food to free yourself of foreign imports within five or six years.

Within *ten* years, through your own determined efforts and with the help of your friends, we believe

India can generate the necessary capital savings to do without foreign economic assistance altogether.

We Americans not only *believe* these things; we have been *betting* on them and betting *heavily* with the economic assistance which has been steadily flowing into Indian ports from the United States for so many years.

Now what is the purpose of this American aid?

Certainly our objective, as some here have charged, has *not* been to exert political pressure on the Indian Government. On some of the key questions which most directly affect American interests, India has on occasion taken a position quite different from our own.

For instance, on the question of Vietnam, I have yet to meet an Indian leader who was not concerned over the Chinese threat to overrun Southeast Asia. Yet some have criticized our efforts to cut Hanoi's supply lines to the North Vietnamese-directed forces in South Vietnam. It is ironic that North Vietnam was one of the first nations to support the Chinese ultimatum against India last September.

I have also read in some Indian newspapers that the United States has been using our PL-480 food grains to somehow shape Indian political thinking. Let me say with great emphasis that this charge is utter, unadulterated nonsense.

In September, when the fighting between Pakistan and India reached its peak, 34 ships with 537,300 metric tons of grain arrived in Indian ports. In

October, 35 ships brought 586,000 metric tons. In November, the wheat imports from the United States are running at the same rate. And so they will continue in the months to come.

To be sure, we have placed our food grain agreements on a 30-day basis. But this has nothing whatsoever to do with the Pakistan-India conflict.

This policy was put into effect months before the fighting began, for one simple reason: because rightly or wrongly, many of our agricultural experts were not persuaded that India had been doing all that it should and could to raise its food grain output.

In regard to the development loans, grants, and technical assistance on which we have previously reached agreement, there has been no interruption. India is now scheduled to receive Rs. 256.2 crores (\$528 million) of assistance under such agreements.

What we have held up is agreements in regard to *future* loans both to India and Pakistan. We have taken this position because we have no desire directly or indirectly to finance a continuing conflict on the subcontinent. We deeply believe that the primary problem which must be tackled is economic development.

Living standards must be rapidly increased and the basis laid for expanding agricultural production and the development of modern self-sufficient industrial establishments. Future assistance can only be effective when the public focus returns decisively to development.

Now let me emphasize one additional point. Although there have been no political strings on U.S. aid to India, my country has gained considerable experience in some 60 developing countries in regard to the developmental policies which are likely to be most effective.

The American people and the American Congress need to be convinced that our aid money is well used. It is our responsibility to continue carefully to examine developmental plans on which American money is spent.

India's economic performance in the last ten years has been generally good and in some areas outstanding. But in all frankness, we agree with those Indian economists and political leaders who think it can and must be better.

For instance, we agree that agriculture must be given the very highest priority and India's efforts to control the growth of her population intensified and expanded so that each Indian citizen can be assured the improved living standard which modern technology now makes possible.

We also agree with those Indian experts who believe that it is essential to facilitate the import of spare parts and raw materials, the lack of which are now causing thousands of plants in India to run far below their capacity.

Finally, we are convinced that the Indian economy will grow faster if India borrows from the experience of Japan, Italy, and other fast-growing

democratic countries which give greater encouragement to private industries, large and small, domestic and foreign.

As India and America consider the interrelated question of mutual objectives, self-sufficiency, and assistance, it is useful to remember that almost every prosperous nation has relied in large measure on foreign capital and foreign technicians for its own development.

America's railways, in large measure, were financed by British capital. The French helped us to build our chemical industry. Thousands of foreign-born engineers, scientists, and technicians helped lay the basis for America's sweeping modern new industry. Today foreign investment in America totals close to \$10 billion.

Western Europe was largely rebuilt after the war by American capital. And so was Japan. During the last war we gave or loaned almost \$12 billion to the USSR; after the war we sent Russia another \$250 million for food and relief.

There is no evidence that this flow of foreign capital and technicians has subverted the United States, or Europe, or Japan. There need be no fear that it will subvert free India.

Now, in closing, let me stress what I believe to be a basic truth. Although we cannot expect to agree on all the many complex problems which now confront Indians and Americans throughout the world, we should never underestimate the strong

ties which unite our two peoples, citizens of the two largest democracies in the world.

In the last 15 years thousands of Americans have come to India to teach at your universities, to help build your dams, to work in your hospitals, and to assist in your rural development.

For instance, these include some 542 U.S. Peace Corps volunteers, most of whom right now are working side-by-side with Indian cultivators in the rural areas raising poultry, teaching school, and working in health clinics.

Almost all of these thousands of Americans return to the U.S. with a deep feeling of respect and friendship for the Indian people.

During the same period more than 55,000 Indian citizens have travelled to the United States for technical training or education. At this moment there are some 8,000 Indian students in American universities—far more than the number who are studying in any other foreign country. Moreover, more than 1,000 Indian professors are now teaching in our universities.

At the same time, in America, Gandhi's concepts of nonviolent action serve as an inspiration for the massive peaceful revolutionary effort by American whites and Negroes to provide the American Negro with increased opportunity and dignity.

Yet even with all the good will in the world, a truly sympathetic relationship between great nations is not easily achieved. Different cultural back-

grounds, different languages, experience and viewpoints often create barriers which can be broken down only by a vigorous effort at understanding and occasionally by some frank talk on both sides.

This is especially true of democratic societies like those of India and the United States where everyone speaks his mind, not always with full regard for the consequences. In totalitarian nations, where governments are able to stifle criticism and public expression and thereby cover up differences, a *facade* of agreement can often be created which masks rather than solves the basic differences.

Although there will always be some differences between India and America, the goals we have in common are vastly more important. Here in India I feel a deep realization of this fact; and it is rare that you meet an Indian visitor to the United States who does not sense in my own country a similar warmth of feeling among Americans for India.

We deeply believe that a free, prosperous, and peaceful India is a primary requirement for a stable and free Asia and that a *democratic* India will constitute a long step forward toward a democratic and free world society. We also believe that the basic good will and mutual interest exist to achieve this objective.

That is why we Americans have been helping India over the last 15 years; that is why we expect to continue our assistance.

We are facing troubled times when all nations

are dealing with complex and unfamiliar problems. Inevitably, we shall sometimes see this turbulent new world from somewhat different perspectives.

But as we seek common ground, let us never forget that America and India are working for precisely the same objectives: The right to live in a free society, the right of each individual to a full measure of dignity and economic justice and the opportunity for all people to live in a peaceful world.

In October 1962, when the Chinese forces suddenly attacked along your northern frontier, the United States responded firmly and promptly to your call for assistance.

We deeply believe that a free, prosperous and peaceful India is a primary requirement for a stable and free Asia and that a democratic India will constitute a long step forward toward a democratic and free world society.



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December 2, 1965

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN ASIA

Following is the text of Ambassador Chester Bowles' speech prepared for delivery at the Fourth Conference of Asian and Pacific Accountants, New Delhi, December 2, 1965

I welcome this opportunity to discuss American foreign policy in Asia before this distinguished gathering. I shall speak frankly in terms of the past, the current situation and the future.

Let us first consider where we stand today.

When the great war in the Pacific ended in August 1945 the peoples of Asia, exhilarated by the new fresh air of liberty, set themselves on a course of independence, reconstruction, and peace.

From Suez to Seoul hopes ran high. Everywhere there was profound confidence that for Asia and for Asians a new era of opportunity and plenty lay just ahead.

Twenty

Twenty years later many of these hopes have been realized; others are yet to be achieved.

High on the plus side of the balance sheet is the virtual elimination of western colonialism from Asia. In 1945 as the Japanese armies were forced from China, Formosa, South Korea, Southeast Asia, and Indonesia, the United States in accordance with its promise made to the Philippine people ten years earlier began its voluntary withdrawal from the Philippines.

Two years later, under the towering leadership of Mohandas K. Gandhi, India and Pakistan won their independence from the British. Burma, Ceylon, Malaya, and Indonesia soon followed India's lead.

In 1948 the governments of most of these new nations were profoundly tested by premeditated and carefully coordinated Communist uprisings. In India, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines Communist-led movements were crushed and the commitment of the people of Asia to independence was again underscored.

Only in parts of Indo-China, where the Communist leaders managed to associate themselves with the cause of anti-colonialism, did they gain the upper hand.

At the same time immense progress was being made in repairing the war damage in Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and elsewhere, while

new

new developmental organizations, such as the Colombo Plan, ECAFE, the United Nations specialized agencies UNICEF, WHO, and FAO, the World Bank, and various United States assistance programmes were organized to speed the efforts of the non-Communist Asian Governments to create a better life for their people.

Japan, Australia, and New Zealand pushed their growth rate to record levels while India embarked on a series of bold five year plans, and Malaya, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, and Taiwan registered significant economic gains.

In many respects the most dramatic development achievements have been in Japan. Sharp increases in agricultural output were assured by a sweeping land reform programme which gave 94 per cent of all Japanese rural families ownership of their own land, by greatly increased fertilizer production, and by low interest loans for all cultivators.

At the same time massive new programme provided Japanese boys and girls with all the education which they could individually absorb.

On this solid agricultural and educational base generous incentives were introduced to promote the rapid expansion of Japanese industry. The result has been steadily increasing living standards for

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the Japanese people both rural and urban, and the emergence of a stable democratic society.

The extraordinary success story should provide encouragement and confidence for all who believe in a democratic approach to Asia's problems. What Japan is today all free Asian nations can become tomorrow.

Taken as a whole, the political and economic progress of the independent Asian nations since the war has been unprecedented. Yet, today, thoughtful Asians and their foreign friends are conscious not only of the unfinished business which remains on the agenda but also of some tragic setbacks.

For instance, on the economic side, much of Asia is still unable to grow enough food for its people; population growth continues to absorb much of the increased production, living standards remain generally low, and slum areas infest many of the larger cities.

Moreover, much of Asia is not only faced with inadequate national growth rate but also with widespread economic and social injustice resulting from unequal distribution of new wealth.

In the political field the dramatic breakthrough made possible by the demise of western colonialism has been offset by freedom's tragic setback in China and by costly wars, first in Korea, then along India's Himalayan frontier and now in Viet-Nam where the Chinese hope to prove

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that Asia not only should but can be Communized by violence.

It is against this background of soaring hopes, spectacular accomplishments and still unresolved problems that American foreign policy toward Asia is conceived and carried out today.

In order to understand our objectives and how we are striving to accomplish them, let us briefly review America's relations with Asia over a somewhat longer time span.

America's interest in Asia -- and indeed its commitment to the ideal of a free Asia -- goes back for many generations. Throughout the 19th Century American traders, scholars, doctors, and missionaries visited Asia in large numbers.

America's relationship to China was particularly close. By the turn of the century, when Indian students were going to Britain to study, Chinese students in large numbers were beginning to appear in American universities. In my class at Yale University the largest group of foreign students were Chinese.

This was also the period of Japan's rapid entry into the industrial age when thousands of young Japanese students came to America to study our technology and in the process opened the minds of Americans to the potential dynamism of the steadily evolving new Asia.

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In the meantime our commitment to a free Asia continued to grow. For instance, when the Manchu Dynasty was in a state of near collapse several European powers reached an agreement to partition China among themselves.

The United States promptly countered in 1899 with its so-called Open Door policy in support of a free and independent China, and the territorial integrity of China was thereby preserved.

Following World War I a resurgent Japan pressed for a special power position in China and again we threw our weight and influence behind China's independence. In the late 1930s, when Japan persisted in its effort, we once more made clear that we would not allow China to go under.

As a result in December 1941, the Japanese sought to remove the United States as an obstacle to their ambition by suddenly striking at the United States fleet at Pearl Harbour, thereby launching the Pacific War.

It was America's hope that a prosperous, free, democratic China would emerge from the war and join with India, Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the other free Asian nations, and with a rebuilt and reorientated Japan, not only to create political stability but also to cooperate in organizing Asia's massive economic resources.

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We saw America's relations to this new Asia in terms of trade, developmental, and political policies dedicated to peace, prosperity and freedom.

However, our hopes that a reborn China and her recently freed neighbours would associate themselves in a common effort for development and defence were soon doomed to disappointment.

By 1949 Mao tse-Tung's armies had gained control of mainland China. Then, in the following year, the North Koreans and Chinese attempted to overrun South Korea.

This left my country in a difficult dilemma. Japan was war weary; most of the other major nations of Asia -- India, Indonesia, and Pakistan -- adopted a policy of neutrality.

Should we retreat into a new America-first isolationism or work as best we could with those remaining nations which recognized the Chinese threat and were prepared to meet it?

In June 1950 our stand was made clear by our decision to give all out US military support to the United Nations defence of South Korea. This decision was underscored in 1958 by our support to Taiwan and again in 1962 by our prompt response to India's call for help.

Our present major military and economic commitments in South and Southeast Asia are further manifestations of our determination

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to help the people of this part of the world preserve their freedom, promote their national welfare, and achieve a full measure of dignity.

In other words, the United States Government has chosen to back an affirmative Asian policy with a continuing heavy investment in U.S. resources.

The present testing ground of that policy is in South Viet-Nam.

I have already referred to the success in 1954 of the Communist-led revolution in parts of former French Indo-China. In 1959 the Communists again took the offensive, but this time against the independent government of South Viet-Nam. Step-by-step tens of thousands of Communist-led guerrillas, often supported by organized North Vietnamese military units, embarked on the now familiar tactic of sabotage, infiltration, intimidation and murder.

On such occasions all of us -- Asians and Americans alike -- are tempted to turn our faces away from the grim reality of war. It is easier and less complicated spiritually and mentally to assume that the aggression does not exist, or that through reason and good will we can somehow turn back the grenade fragments and the machine gun bullets.

As for we Americans, we would greatly prefer to build dams, and universities, and fertilizer plants, as we are doing here in India,

than

than to sacrifice our lives and expend our energies and our resources to blunt this latest Chinese effort to dominate Asia.

But if we had chosen to run away from the challenge, what would Asia's future be like? I think it would be a grim prospect.

So, when my country once again found itself faced with the now familiar decision to look the other way and allow Free Asia to be nibbled to death country by country, or once more to commit our manpower and our resources in support of Asian independence -- we chose to stand by our friends.

Immediately after the first Chinese nuclear explosion in October 1964 President Johnson laid down our policy in the clearest possible terms.

"The U.S. reaffirms its defence commitments in Asia," he said, "Even if Communist China should eventually develop an effective nuclear capability, that capability would have no effect upon the readiness of the U.S. to respond to requests from Asian nations to help in dealing with Communist Chinese aggression. The U.S. will not be diverted from its efforts to help the nations of Asia to defend themselves and to advance the welfare of their people."

Six months later, in April of this year, the President added the following comments on America's specific objectives in Viet-Nam.

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"Over this war -- and all of Asia --," he said, "is the deepening shadow of Communist China. This is a regime which has destroyed freedom in Tibet, attacked India, and been condemned by the United Nations of aggression in Korea. It is a nation which is helping the forces of violence in almost every continent.

"The contest in Viet-Nam is part of a wider pattern of China's aggressive purpose.

"Our objective is the independence of South Viet-Nam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves -- only that the people of South Viet-Nam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way. We will do everything necessary to reach that objective. And we will do only what is necessary."

On many occasions since then President Johnson, Secretary Rusk and other American leaders have stressed that our primary objectives is not a sterile military victory over North Viet-Nam and China but to open the way for negotiations that will assure the right of the people of Viet-Nam to develop their resources in peace and to allow all foreign forces to withdraw.

We have specifically emphasized our willingness to negotiate on the basis of the 1954 Geneva Agreement, which included guarantees of free elections in both North and South Viet-Nam under international supervision.

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In regard to the future development of Asia, President Johnson has stressed American willingness to help assure a prosperous, as well as peaceful, future:

"There must also be a much more massive effort," he said in April, "to improve the life of man in this conflict-torn corner of the world."

"The first step is for the countries of Southeast Asia to associate themselves in a greatly expanded cooperative effort for development. We would hope that North Viet-Nam will take its place in the common effort just as soon as peaceful cooperation is possible."

"I will ask the Congress to join in a billion dollar American investment in this effort when it is under way. And I hope all other industrialized countries -- including the Soviet Union -- will join in this effort to replace despair with hope, and terror with progress."

"The ordinary men and women of North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam -- of China and India -- of Russia and America -- are brave people. They are filled with the same proportions of hate and fear, of love and hope. Most of them want the same things for themselves and their families. Most of them do not want their sons to die in battle, or see the homes of others destroyed."

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"This will be a disorderly planet for a long time", the President said. In Asia, as elsewhere, the forces of the modern world are shaking old ways and uprooting ancient civilizations. There will be turbulence and struggle and even violence. Great social change -- as we see in our own country -- does not always come without conflict."

We recognize the forces of change as vital and constructive forces which will speed the day when all men may live in dignity, prosperity, and peace. But we will continue to oppose those who would divert those forces from the process of constructive change in order to harness them to the ruthless totalitarian objective of a China dominated Asia.

We Americans have paid a heavy price for our support for the cause of Asian freedom. In the last 25 years the armed forces of the United States have suffered close to 400,000 dead, wounded and missing, first in defeating the Japanese aggression against China and Southeast Asia, and later in the defence of Korea and Viet-Nam.

In material terms these wars have cost over \$300 billion, enough to ensure the basic industrial development of the entire Asian continent.

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In addition, the United States invested \$10 billion in the historically unprecedented reconstruction of its former adversary Japan, and in repairing the extensive war damage suffered by the Philippines, Korea, and Taiwan.

Since 1945, to speed Asia's economic development and to help feed tens of millions of Asian people we have spent \$18 billion in loans and grants, in addition to providing the services of many thousands of technicians.

These figures offer a massive testimony to America's commitment to our concern for a free and prosperous Asia; and let me say once again that this is a continuing commitment.

On occasion, the steps we have been forced to take have displeased those of our Asian friends who cling to the hope that the objectives of the Chinese Government are not really what Chinese leaders assert them to be. But I think it is reasonable for us to ask a simple question: What would Asia be like today if in the last twenty years my country had abandoned its principles and retreated each time we had faced a common danger in an effort to gain short-term approval of those Asians who failed to recognize the threat?

The United States is keenly aware that in the long run free Asia cannot be developed and defended by foreigners. The responsibility rests with the people.....

people of Asia themselves.

The sixty-three per cent of the Asian people who now live under non-Communist governments are now enjoying on the average significantly higher standards than the oppressed and regimented people of the three Communist countries -- China, North Viet-Nam, and North Korea.

Once this non-Communist majority fully commit themselves and their resources to the development and to the defence of Asia there need be no doubt about their capacity to balance Chinese economic, political and, if necessary, military power and to assure for themselves a peaceful and prosperous future.

When these non-Communist Asians sometimes chose to divert their energies from this essential effort to belabour "western imperialism" which in fact has long since departed from this part of the world, many of my countrymen feel profoundly frustrated.

Although I appreciate -- and on occasion share this frustration -- I must frankly admit that this reaction is one which we Americans, above all other people on earth, should understand. In this regard let me take a moment to tell you an anecdote.

One hundred forty six years after the last British soldier left American soil following our successful Revolution, "Big Bill" Thompson, candidate
for.....

for mayor of Chicago announced that if elected he would forbid the British Navy from sailing the waters of nearby Lake Michigan. On the eve of his election, he promised an enthusiastic crowd that if King George himself should attempt to enter Chicago, he would personally order him to depart.

When someone from the crowd shouted "which King George do you mean -- George the Third, or George the Fifth," the mayor replied, "Good heavens, don't tell me there are two of them!"

Although Mayor Thompson was an extreme representative of our old American isolationism, the fact of the matter is that for the first 150 years of our existence as an independent nation we Americans flatly refused to take any responsibility whatsoever for the political stability or military defence of those areas of the world on which our own security depended.

It took two tragic world wars and vast losses of people and property before my country freely recognized its responsibility to help maintain the stable world on which our own national security depended.

We Americans can see no valid reason why the nations of free Asia should repeat in the years ahead the mistakes that our country has made in the past. Although we stand ready to help, free Asia can be successfully built and defended only by Asians.

That.....

That is why we fervently hope that the nations of non-Communist Asia will seek and find the common political, economic, and security ground that is necessary to assure their freedom and prosperity.

The future of Asia, and in large measures of the world, rests on the willingness of Asian leaders and peoples to come to grips with the great challenge that now confronts them, and to act with wisdom, vision and courage in their own behalf.

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

New Delhi, India,
December 2, 1965.

Bowles

Dear Bob:

I am enclosing recent articles, by three of India's half dozen top political commentators, which I think you may find interesting.

With warm personal regards.

At the moment the situation is looking up!

Sincerely,

Cut

Chester Bowles
American Ambassador

Mr. Robert Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

DEC 7 1965

COMMENTARY

Over To Washington

By N.J.N.

WHEN Mr. Shastri meets President Johnson in the near future it should be, in the truest sense of the word, a confrontation. Superficially nothing could be more improbable than a meaningful dialogue between two personalities as widely divergent as those of the U.S. President and the Indian Prime Minister. Each represents a country but also a certain attitude or posture in Asian affairs and it is in these attitudes that there is the possibility of a fruitful confrontation. When two sets of convictions are exposed to each other not in a spirit of hostility but in an attempt at constructive effort much that is mutually beneficial can undoubtedly be achieved. Yet in everything that the Government and the Opposition have said there appears to be little or no awareness of how fundamental and vital a Shastri-Johnson confrontation could turn out to be.

Each section of Indian opinion from the so-called Leftists to the so-called Rightists has interpreted Mr. Shastri's U.S. mission in the light of its own particular inclinations, denouncing it on the one hand as a surrender to the United States and on the other as an opportunity once and for all to join the American "camp". Since the visit is to take place in the context of the recent Pakistani aggression there are a considerable number of those who place themselves somewhere between these two extreme and oppose an early visit on tactical grounds. There is here little appreciation of the need to define the proposed visit in terms that reach beyond Kashmir and the question of economic and military aid. Mr. Shastri is consequently seen as a supplicant for aid or as the most effective advocate India has to prove that Pakistan is in the wrong. Mr. Shastri himself has chosen rather inadequately to describe his mission as one of goodwill in fulfilment of the earlier arrangements to visit the United States.

ECONOMIC AID

In the result there is neither here nor in the United States a wider appreciation of the immense potential for good inherent in what could be transformed into a turning point in Indo-U.S. relations. One of the least happy aspects of these relations in the past has been an overemphasis on aid with New Delhi's policy shaped primarily to extract as much such aid as possible consistent with India's non-alignment. The U.S. response has been one of suspicion or reluctant acceptance of non-alignment combined with the apprehension that despite New Delhi's rejection of alignment India had to be kept a "going concern" if a non-Communist stability were to be established in this part of the world. Within such a framework of relations there could not be any positive collaboration for the achievement of the larger policy objectives which India and the United States fully share—those of peace and stability, economic development, the promotion of democracy and the containment of Communism.

Any economic aid unsupported by a basis of political collaboration tends to lose much of the value which it would otherwise have. Unsecured to a programme of mutual co-operation it is exposed to the hazards of changing situations and sudden crises of which the latest example is Pakistani aggression over an issue that has nothing to do with containing Communism, with democracy or with the peace and stability of the region. Economic aid has thus been suspended because India chose to defend itself against aggression and as though to suggest that the validity of such aid in the past has ceased to be valid overnight. It is difficult to believe that the United States is allowing itself to be manoeuvred into the position of negating its own policy of aid simply because of what Rawalpindi has irrationally chosen to do. To appreciate that any prolonged suspension of aid will be to write off the substantial aid that has already been given is nevertheless to understand only a negative aspect of Indo-U.S. relations.

A more helpful perspective can be gained by asking what the United States needs in Asia. It is difficult to relate so powerful and prosperous a country to a need but the political need from which Washington suffers is surely as acute as India's economic need. The tragedy of U.S. policy in Asia has precisely been that it has ignored its own urgent and compelling need for a genuinely independent democratic Asian ally. Over the years, Washington per-

with disappointing results that are open for all to see. If Pakistani aggression has demonstrated anything with emphatic clarity it is the failure of America's Asian policies. This, it must be conceded, is of far greater import to the future of Asia than Rawalpindi's contemptible ambitions in Kashmir and its equally dismal attempt to fulfil them by force. Yet the United States chose in the past, despite Mr. Nehru's warning, to strengthen Pakistan with military aid the misuse of which has now weakened the sub-continent, increased the region's instability, invited Communist Chinese exploitation and compelled the United States itself to suspend economic aid against its own interests.

A STIMULUS

This is hardly from any point of view a certificate of success. It is, however, or could be a stimulus for change in relation not only to the Indian sub-continent but to South-East Asia as a whole. In a recent speech Mr. Chester Bowles, the U.S. Ambassador, pointed out that U.S. economic aid was given despite India's criticism of America's Viet Nam policy. It is surely very necessary to realise that America's policy in Pakistan was an essential part of an overall policy which included Viet Nam and that events have shown its ineffectiveness in both Pakistan and Viet Nam. The U.S. Ambassador also suggested that his Government would await a re-evaluation of policies in New Delhi and Rawalpindi before adjusting its own. Yet the truth is surely that any re-evaluation must take place in Washington itself in the light of what has happened and what India is in a position to offer to achieve the very objectives America has been trying to achieve fruitlessly through "collaboration" with Asian "allies" whose qualifications are open to question. Self-seeking, undemocratic, illiberal, autocratic, inefficient and non-progressive, these Asian Powers have shown themselves to be the most unsuitable instruments of U.S. policy. Washington could have chosen. If, as there is reason to believe, there is now some hesitant awareness of this in the United States, Mr. Shastri has the opportunity by marshalling the evidence of the past and of what has happened, thanks to Rawalpindi, to reforge Indo-U.S. relations on a basis of equality and realism. This can be done not by asking for aid or by expressions of goodwill or by proving that Pakistan is wrong but by firstly, pointing out the ineffectiveness of U.S. policy in Asia today and secondly, by clarifying India's willingness to collaborate for common objectives provided the United States seeks collaboration from the "other Asia" with which the regimes of Rawalpindi, South Viet Nam and Formosa have nothing in common. There is here the possibility of an alliance, not to be sure of the kind which Mr. Dulles had in mind, but involving political co-operation with independent non-aligned Asia in which the vast potential of Asian nationalism is to be found and can be mobilised for democracy and stability in this part of the world.

POSITIVE ROLE

An absolute recognition of this by Washington will enable non-aligned India to play a more vigorously positive role in solving the problems of Asia and to participate, if necessary, with the United States in the military defence of South-East Asia against aggression from any quarter. The further opportunity will then arise of Indian economic and technical collaboration with fellow Asian Powers in this part of the world, thus building up an Asian counter-weight to Chinese Communism without rejecting the ultimate objective of co-existence. It has often been agreed rather defensively, by U.S. official spokesmen, that U.S. aid is stringless and disinterested. It would be more to the point to realise that aid with strings openly acknowledged in the form of an agreed political programme between India and the United States would be far more meaningful than economic aid given in a sort of political vacuum—an aid, moreover, which is liable to be negated by America's "collaboration" with the kind of Asia represented by Pakistan.

Mr. Shastri's purpose in Washington can, therefore, be described as one of giving the United States the choice of two courses with all that they imply for the future of Asia and world peace. In every conventional sense India in relation to the United States is a weak and insignificant Power but those who give aid are not always in a position of strength as compared to those who receive it. Con-

Each section of Indian opinion from the so-called Leftists to the so-called Rightists has interpreted Mr. Shastri's U.S. mission in the light of its own particular inclinations, denouncing it on the one hand as a surrender to the United States and on the other as an opportunity once and for all to join the American "camp". Since the visit is to take place in the context of the recent Pakistani aggression there are a considerable number of those who place themselves somewhere between these two extreme and oppose an early visit on tactical grounds. There is here little appreciation of the need to define the proposed visit in terms that reach beyond Kashmir and the question of economic and military aid. Mr. Shastri is consequently seen as a supplicant for aid or as the most effective advocate India has to prove that Pakistan is in the wrong. Mr. Shastri himself has chosen rather inadequately to describe his mission as one of goodwill in fulfilment of the earlier arrangements to visit the United States.

ECONOMIC AID

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A more helpful perspective can be gained by asking what the United States needs in Asia. It is difficult to relate so powerful and prosperous a country to a need but the political need from which Washington suffers is surely as acute as India's economic need. The tragedy of U.S. policy in Asia has precisely been that it has ignored its own urgent and compelling need for a genuinely independent democratic Asian ally. Over the years Washington persuaded itself that such an ally could be found in South Korea, in Formosa, in South Viet Nam and in Pakistan and in the process it has involved itself in military commitments of one kind or another

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ON VISITING FRIENDS—1

INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS WILL BE TESTED AT SUMMIT

THERE IS GOODWILL IN THE TIES BUT NO ROOM FOR ILLUSIONS

By PRAN CHOPRA

MR SHASTRI'S visits to the USA and the Soviet Union, the one a certainty now, the other at least a lively possibility, are an exploration of the most critical importance for India. The soundings he takes will have an abiding bearing on a great deal more than the future of Kashmir; they should not be influenced by ideological bias or passing vexations, as some recent pronouncements by some of our leaders have been.

What is at stake is not only the security of our frontiers or our relations with either or both the super-Powers, though these would make the mission crucial enough; the whole range of foreign policy, and India's rôle as a Power of some potential importance, will be under review. The results will become an element in the foreign policy calculations not only of India but both the super-Powers and all other countries which have an interest, whether benign or hostile, in the stability of southern Asia.

It is not yet known in what order the visits will take place, if both do, and whether the interval between them will be short or long. But they are closely linked by the context. At Mr Shastri's meeting with President Johnson the Soviet Premier will be an invisible presence, as surely as Mr Johnson will be looking over their shoulders when Mr Shastri and Mr Kosygin meet, regardless of whether President Ayub is present or not. Indo-Soviet relations have always been interwoven with the Indo-American. Now they are even more so, because Moscow and Washington have an equal interest in the New Delhi-Peking triangle, and because Moscow's economic and political influence is taking giant strides on the Indian subcontinent, partly alongside and partly at the expense of Washington's. Therefore it is absolutely necessary that India, observing everything in the cold light of reality, should assess the possibilities of one set of relations in the context of the possibilities of the other.

A VALUABLE FRIENDSHIP

Soviet friendship has always been of great value to India; now it has become more valuable still (which means the price of miscalculation is also higher). It has been a useful support to lean on when pressures came from China or Pakistan, or from the Western Powers (whether they acted on behalf of Pakistan or their own global ambitions). Now it has become still more useful, as a card for Mr Shastri to have up his sleeve when he is disturbed by fears—whether these are justified or not is immaterial in this context—that moves inimical to India might be afoot in one Western capital or another. Mr Shastri rightly makes the maximum use of this advantage, sometimes extolling Russian help even more than facts warrant, and the contrast between the feelings he expresses for the Soviet Union and the USA (Britain he treats as undeserving of reference) must have been noticed in Washington. But apart from this game of diplomatic poker, the Russian view of the differences between India and Pakistan offers advantages to India which the Western view so far does not, or not to the same extent.

A good deal more than either Washington or London, Moscow places the problem of Kashmir clearly and firmly in the overall context of Indo-Pakistan relations, and Moscow would more willingly leave it to the two countries themselves, Mr Kosygin's offer of good offices notwithstanding, to resolve their differences as best they may. Its insistence is only that they should do something, and soon, instead of perpetually threatening the stability of the region, in which Soviet interest now is as great as the USA's. The USA is also coming round to this view, as the resolutions in the Security Council testify and more recently the speech by Mr Bowles in Ahmedabad. But traces persist of habits formed over the years

of false expectations: illusions, whether Indian or Russian, can destroy it. It is right to shower praise upon Soviet help, right as tactics and right because gratitude is due for the size of Soviet economic and military assistance and for its continuance throughout the conflicts with China and Pakistan. But other facts are also relevant; ignoring them would strain not only India's relations with other countries, but also with the Soviet Union itself. For example it would be crazy, and an unnecessary affront to other friends of India, to overlook the contrast, as in our enthusiasm for the Soviet Union we sometimes do, between the magnitude and importance of the Soviet Union's help and the USA's. Apart from bad mathematics it would be very bad politics. It would be equally wrong in fact and diplomatically foolish to believe that aid from one source is entirely without motives and a purpose, or to attribute to aid from another source harsher political motives than it has in fact.

KOSYGIN'S VIEWS

But the most dangerous of all mistakes would be to ignore the very obvious fact that Moscow's views are no longer as different as they used to be from Washington's about what India and Pakistan should do about their quarrels; forgetting this would be a short-cut to disillusionment and to loss of such advantage as we still have in Moscow. The Soviet Government has refrained, as much as any other, from calling Pakistan the aggressor in the recent fighting—a point which even Mr Shastri overlooked when he chided the Security Council for not apportioning blame. In one of his letters Mr Kosygin argued in rather chilling tones that "in the present serious situation one should hardly put questions concerning the reasons or causes for the developments of the conflict in the foreground, or seek to know who is in the right and who in the wrong". Mr Mikoyan, quoted widely with much satisfaction in India, wrote regretfully of the difficulties of reaching "a reasonable compromise on the Kashmir question".

This suggests that hesitant acceptance of Soviet good offices, or attempts to limit the discussions to this subject or that, or to exclude any subject from their scope, cannot cause much pleasure in Moscow. It is just as well, therefore, from the point of view of Indo-Soviet relations, that Mr Shastri has removed any impression there might have been that he is either unwilling to go to the proposed summit or to discuss Kashmir once he is there. The impression might not have been created by anything directly said by him: it might have been fed by nothing more than his manner of saying things or the interpretations put upon them by others. But it was strong—and harmful.

Equally harmful and wrong, however, would be the parallel impression, and the sooner that too is removed the better, that Mr Kosygin will not try as hard as he can to make the discussions serious and substantial—whether we call them negotiations or something else is immaterial. No less at Tashkent than in Washington, a serious effort will be needed to carry conviction with others. At both places India will have to show, and of course Pakistan too, convincing readiness to consider everything which is not demonstrably incompatible with her essential interests. Much more than mere inflexibility will be needed if neither the goodwill of friends is to be

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A good deal more than either Washington or London, Moscow places the problem of Kashmir clearly and firmly in the overall context of Indo-Pakistan relations, and Moscow would more willingly leave it to the two countries themselves. Mr Kosygin's offer of good offices notwithstanding, to resolve their differences as best they may. Its insistence is only that they should do something, and soon, instead of perpetually threatening the stability of the region, in which Soviet interest now is as great as the USA's. The USA is also coming round to this view, as the resolutions in the Security Council testify and more recently the speech by Mr Bowles in Ahmedabad. But traces persist of habits formed over the years when Britain and the USA, in that order, were busy inventing various formulae for Kashmir, most of them unrelated to India's interests and the realities of the subcontinent.

Even the specific dispute about Kashmir is seen in clearer perspective by Moscow than by most other capitals. The latest document which proves it is the article by S. Mikoyan in the Litteraturnaya Gazetta; such articles are not written in the Soviet Union without some official backing. It discounts the relevance of claims based on religion, clearly records that juridically India has an undoubted right to Kashmir, blames many complications, especially Pakistan's wilder ambitions, on the pactomania of Mr Dulles, deplors the political degradation of "Azad Kashmir" and, unlike Mr Wilson, it clearly recognizes that in the recent fighting India had no alternative but to attack in the Lahore sector.

PAKISTAN'S INTERESTS

The support for India's juridical rights, which Mr Nehru once offered to place before an international tribunal, is of particular relevance to the basic causes of the conflict. If India is right in law, Pakistan's actions become aggression, placing limits within which India can be expected (at least by her friends) to discuss Pakistan's "claims". Within these limits, Pakistan can have no rights in Kashmir; she can only have interests—a few days ago Mr Bhutto made an interesting reference to one of them, rivers—which India can be expected to try to accommodate if the context is good neighbourly relations.

Precisely because Soviet support is important, however, it should be spared the burden

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New York to Tashkent

UNLESS his compulsive hatred for India prompts Mr Bhutto to impose during his current visit to Moscow some new and wholly impossible preconditions in respect of the proposed Shastri-Ayub talks, the chances of the Tashkent meeting being held should be rated as reasonable.

From all accounts Mr Bhutto has been despatched to the Soviet Union to mend the political fences damaged by Pakistan's earlier rejection of Mr Kosygin's invitation and to assure him of President Ayub Khan's willingness to suspend the "1,000-year" war long enough to visit Tashkent.

The reported change in Pakistan's mood apart, Mr Shastri himself is probably more willing now than he was a few days ago to meet President Ayub. In cold print, his Rajya Sabha reference to the Soviet invitation might have seemed no different from what he had said on the subject last week in the Lok Sabha, but sensitive ears detected in it a distinct softening of his attitude since his earlier pronouncement.

Also, Mr Kosygin would not have reminded Mr Shastri of his invitation and thereby publicly demonstrated the keenness of his interest in the venture if he were not reasonably sure of a favourable response. Probably fairly soon Mr Shastri and President Ayub will hear from him again suggesting a specific time for the proposed meeting.

IF the Prime Minister flies to Tashkent in the near future for talks with the Pakistani leader, it should cause no tremors of anxiety in this country. Even those of Mr Shastri's colleagues who favoured the hard line in respect of Pakistan and were known to have set themselves firmly against any parleys with one who had waged war on this country are now believed to have mellowed sufficiently to accept the impending meeting. Stubborn refusal to meet President Ayub, however, strong and valid India's resentment against him, would have given the Indian posture an air of unreasonableness which, placed as we are diplomatically, would be a serious disadvantage.

India's unwillingness to hold talks with Pakistan would have appeared not only unreasonable but also irrational. After the Chinese invasion in 1962, India accepted Mrs Bandaranaike's Colombo proposals which envisaged direct talks with Peking. It a humiliated India could agree to talk to the Chinese aggressor why should a proud and victorious India hesitate to face the Pakistani adversary across the negotiation table?

Should the Tashkent meeting be held, the Kashmir question is bound to be discussed at considerable length. Mr Bhutto's tantrums in New York having failed to lead to political discussions on Kashmir, Pakistan is hoping now to achieve this end through the Soviet Premier's good offices. That, in fact, is the real reason why it has belatedly accepted Mr Kosygin's invitation. In this Mr Kosygin, whose Government is currently bending over backwards to win Pakistani goodwill, will no doubt gladly help.

In any event it is puerile for anyone in this country to believe seriously that the Pakistani leader will travel all the way to the Soviet Union in the fond hope of discussing trade, supply of canal waters and refugee rehabilitation or that India would be able to refuse to talk about Kashmir. In fact, the recent public pronouncements by senior leaders vowing not to discuss Kashmir should not be taken too literally. Three years ago, for example, when Mr Duncan Sardys dragged a reluctant India to the conference table everyone in authority here then solemnly declared that Mr Swaran Singh and Mr Bhutto would discuss the Indo-Pakistan problems in their entirety. The importance of canal waters and refugee rehabilitation was duly emphasized in all announcements. But in actual fact even though they held five lengthy rounds, nothing but Kashmir was discussed.

However, there is no reason to believe that Mr Shastri may be overawed by President Ayub's military bearings into making any

Political Note-book

by Krishan Bhatia

undue concessions on Kashmir. The Prime Minister was unimpressed by him in the past and there is no reason why he should be particularly susceptible now. Earlier this year, during the Kutch conflict and at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, Mr Shastri displayed admirable capacity to withstand pressure from common friends. He has since gained in experience and self-confidence and there should be no danger of Mr Kosygin brow-beating him into accepting something in Tashkent that he could not have accepted in Delhi. Also, even abroad he will be constantly watching the public mood at home and is unlikely to take any unpopular decisions.

IF it is naive to believe that India can avoid discussing Kashmir at Tashkent, it is equally naive to expect the proposed meeting to produce a solution of the problem.

Neither Mr Shastri nor President Ayub have the political strength to sell in their respective countries any solution which may even remotely look like a compromise. The coveted valley apart, should the Pakistani leader demand the return of the Tithwal and Haji Pir posts Mr Shastri would have no option but to reject it immediately. Mr Swaran Singh and Mr Bhutto had battled through several rounds of talks at a time when circumstances were decidedly more favourable than today, but had found no meeting ground. The going at Tashkent should be rougher and, as far as Kashmir is concerned, even less rewarding.

Yet, the meeting, should it take place, will serve a useful purpose. It may, for example, lead to a lowering of tension between India and Pakistan. Meeting away from the inflamed atmosphere of their countries, it should enable each of them to appreciate the difficulties that the other is faced with at home. When they met briefly in Karachi last year, President Ayub seemed to sympathize with Mr Shastri's political problems and even indicated his willingness to make allowances for them. The forthcoming direct talks may reveal to Mr Shastri the reasons why he changed his attitude and made his army ribble pointlessly at the Rann of Kutch and later ordered a blatant aggression in Kashmir.

Perhaps, by talking frankly and realistically the two leaders would be able to reduce the possibility of the ominous "second round" of conflict. At present, the two countries are glaring at each other with hatred and deep suspicion. Each side expects the other to begin another round of hostilities at a time of its choosing. This is a dangerous situation because even if neither side has any desire for further fighting, their suspicious fear—in fact hysteria—might drive them to war again.

When Mr Kosygin offered his good offices to resolve the Indo-Pakistan dispute he was not unaware of the complexities of the Kashmir problem and had no illusions about the impossibility of finding a solution at Tashkent. In inviting them to Tashkent his primary purpose obviously was to try to freeze the conflict and prevent the situation from worsening. The Soviet Union's worry is that another round of fighting with India might push Pakistan irretrievably into Peking's arm. Moscow's fears on this point may not be baseless. The recent Chinese intrusions into Sikkim and Ladakh are patently intended to attract Pakistan's attention and goodwill. India may not care much. Mr Kosygin's concern about Pakistan's susceptibility to Peking's blandishments, but it no doubt realizes that the implications of another military bout may be grim.

Even if the Tashkent meeting achieves nothing except to ward off the "second round," it shall have served its purpose.

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TO ROBERT KOMER, WHITE HOUSE
FROM AMBASSADOR BOWLES

IN VIEW OF IMPENDING VISIT OF AYUB KHAN AND THE MEETING WITH SHASTRI TWO MONTHS FROM NOW THE FOLLOWING WASHINGTON EXERCISE MIGHT BE USEFUL.

EACH OF THE TWO COUNTRIES, INDIA AND PAKISTAN, IS EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTEMPLATING AN ALTERNATIVE RELATIONSHIP AND POLICY IN REGARD TO THE UNITED STATES. THE PAKS ARE SAYING THAT IF WE FAIL TO SUPPORT THEM REGARDING KASHMIR AND CONTINUE TO AID INDIA THEY WILL BE FORCED TO EXERCISE WHAT IS GENERALLY REFERRED TO AS THEIR "CHINESE OPTION." THE INDIANS MAINTAIN THAT IF THE U.S. AGAIN ARMS PAKISTAN AND ATTEMPTS TO AFFIX POLITICAL CONDITIONS SUCH AS THE GIVING UP OF THE KASHMIR VALLEY TO OUR AID, THERE WILL BE NO POLITICAL ALTERNATIVE BUT TO ATTEMPT TO GET BY WITH WHATEVER HELP THEY CAN GET FROM THE USSR AND OTHERS EVEN THOUGH THIS MAY PLUNGE INDIA INTO ECONOMIC STAGNATION.

WHY NOT ASK THE POLICY PLANNING PEOPLE IN STATE, THE TOM HUGHES OPERATION, AND OTHER GROUPS WHICH MAY BE CONCERNED TO EXPLORE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THESE TWO POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS?

SINCE THE SO-CALLED "CHINESE OPTION" SEEMS TO ME UNREALISTIC, I AM INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT WHEN THE CHIPS ARE DOWN THE PAKS WILL PULL BACK FROM BREAKING THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH US; IN OTHER WORDS THAT THEY WILL NOT CARRY OUT THEIR THREAT.

BUT SUPPOSE THIS ASSUMPTION IS WRONG, WHAT WOULD BE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US, FOR INDIA, AND FOR ASIA? WHAT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO FRUSTRATE A COMBINED PAK-CHINA ATTACK ON INDIA? WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF AN EXPANDED PAK GUERRILLA OPERATION IN COOPERATION WITH CHINA?

SIMILARLY, WHAT COULD INDIA ACCOMPLISH IF IT WERE FORCED BACK ON SOVIETS PLUS THE WORLD BANK AND A FEW OTHERS FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE? WHAT KIND OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STEPS WOULD INDIA BE FORCED TO TAKE? WHAT WOULD BE THE EFFECT ON INDIAN DEMOCRACY? ON INDIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA, PAKISTAN, THE USSR, ETC.?

SUCH A STUDY MIGHT HELP CLEAR AWAY SOME OF THE CONFUSION THAT HAS BEEN BUILT UP AROUND OUR STRATEGY TOWARD THE SUBCONTINENT AND ENABLE US TO BRING THE APPROACHING TALKS INTO CLEARER FOCUS. IT WOULD HAVE TO BE A CRASH OPERATION."

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New Delhi - November 16, 1965

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*Bowles
Sino India
+*

Dear Bob:

I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I sent recently to Ray Hare regarding a pledge of US assistance to India in the event of a Chinese attack. I believe you may find it interesting.

I think that this approach might be a constructive way to relieve some of the pressure to resume military assistance to the Subcontinent quickly. We might build our future military assistance programs around joint military studies with India and Pakistan to meet the Chinese threat.

I would appreciate any thoughts you may have regarding such an approach.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Enclosure:

Letter to Raymond A. Hare

Mr. Robert Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jk*, NARA, Date 8-27-03

NOV 22 1965

76

This document consists of 1 pages. No 2 of 6 copies. Series A.

~~SECRET~~
OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

New Delhi, India,
November 12, 1965

*Bowles
x India*

Dear Bob:

I am enclosing a memorandum which offers a point of view in regard to Asia which I hope may interest you. Although it is not new (much of it has been included in our cables during the past two years), it focuses on a central point which I believe is of primary importance i. e., we have been forced in the last 15 years by the neutralist attitudes of the larger Asian nations to attempt to balance the power of Communist China with something like 5% of the Asian peoples (Taiwan, South Viet Nam, South Korea, etc.).

Our present experience in Viet Nam makes it decidedly clear that such a balance can be achieved only by introducing massive amounts of American armed force. Now the deep bitterness of India (with 1/7 of the human race) towards China offers us an opportunity to build a more effective power balance which, once the Viet Nam situation is behind us, will require a much smaller American military commitment.

I am conscious that such a proposal runs contrary to many habits of mind developed over the years. Nevertheless, I think there is a good chance that India will go at least 60% of the way with us.

With my warm regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Enclosure:
As Stated.

*Lee
G. ...*

Mr. Robert Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 8-27-03

DV 16 1965



EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

STRICTLY PERSONAL
AND PRIVATE

77
New Delhi, India,
November 10, 1965.

Bob
Boyer

Dear Bob:

This morning I had an extraordinary experience with Tony Lukas of the New York Times. Since I think you met him before he came out to Delhi, I thought it might be a good idea if you had the background in case there are repercussions.

As you know there was some difficulty concerning Lukas' operations in the Congo and I believe he had some problems with the Embassy there. However, I happened to know several mutual friends who liked him and since I knew he was bright I was pleased to hear he was coming out to India.

I still think he is a good reporter, hard-working, conscientious and, as far as I know, accurate on factual matters. My one professional criticism would be his near fixation on "key hole" stories instead of articles which deal with the major forces which are shaping events in this part of the world.

In any event, in spite of my own best efforts since his arrival, he has been increasingly antagonistic in regard to the Embassy which he charges with not telling him everything he would like to know. Because he has been difficult, I have been particularly careful to see him whenever he wanted to see me and he has at no time misused any background material which I have given him.

When I met him yesterday morning he was acting in a particularly strange and unstable manner. First he demanded in an emotional way that I tell him precisely what we have done to keep the Indians from using American military equipment in order to beef up a story he wants to write supporting Wayne Morse's recent attack on military aid. I told him off-the-record that since this only included some radios and perhaps some ammunition (we are not sure of the latter) and possibly some C-119's (which Chavan flatly denies), and because of the much heavier use of our equipment by the Paks (which we had no way of stopping) we had made no strong complaint to the Indian Government.

Tony

Mr. Robert Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Tony then suddenly demanded why I had "invited" Scotty Reston to come to India "to check up on my reporting?" I replied I had known Scotty and Sally Reston for 20-odd years and have corresponded with him ever since I can remember; on many occasions I have expressed the hope he would some time come out here. Indeed a year ago when Scotty got as far as Moscow, he wrote and said he would like to fly down to spend a week with me here. Because I was preparing to go to the U.S. for consultation, he postponed the visit.

More recently I proposed he come out as an American Specialist to lecture at Indian Universities (as we invited Mark Childs, Ken Crawford and others a year ago) and I supposed that it was this "invitation" to which he was referring. In spite of my most soothing efforts he continued to behave in a rude and immature manner. Jock Shirley, our able new press man whom I always have present as a precaution during press conversations, was as mystified as I.

I am sure that the way to handle this is do nothing and say nothing. Above all, I would appreciate it if you would not discuss this with Reston. I am sure the New York Times people would think it strange indeed to hear that a junior correspondent resents the possible visit of their most senior reporter and editor and I have no desire to hurt Lukas.


However, I thought you should know about this.

We are doing our utmost to keep the situation here under control and so far we have been getting by quite well. Subramaniam made a courageous and extremely helpful speech yesterday in the Lok Sabha in which he defended the U.S. in the most vigorous terms against charges of political pressures with PL 480. The problem may come down to how long we can continue in this present exercise without beginning to lose ground. For instance, I doubt that Subramaniam would make such a speech in February if there were no break in the meantime.

In any event I know you are doing your utmost and we are doing ours under difficult circumstances and we shall continue to do so.

With my warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,



Chester Bowles

P.S.

STRICTLY PERSONAL AND PRIVATE

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P.S. I would not discuss the Tony Lukas incident with anyone because I don't want to have it gossiped around. I have no desire to hurt him; but I worry about anyone as unstable as him.

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Bowles

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TO WHITE HOUSE

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FOLLOWING MESSAGE RECEIVED
*TO ROBERT KOMER, WHITE HOUSE
FROM: AMBASSADOR BOWLES

HAVE JUST COMPLETED COMPREHENSIVE CABLE (EMBTTEL 1201) SPELLING
OUT PROBLEMS OF MAKING CONVINCING CASE FOR PL 480 SLOWDOWN AND
WILL BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WILL READ IT CAREFULLY.

UNDERSTAND DILEMMA YOU FACE; HOWEVER, I BADLY NEED YOUR
GUIDANCE.

BOWLES"

100

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NOV 3 1965

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 12-362

By ch NARA, Date 6-27-13

PRESERVATION COPY



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

79
/

New Delhi, India,
November 4, 1965.

Dear Bob:

I am enclosing a copy of an airgram we prepared recently analysing Prime Minister Shastri's position at the conclusion of his first year in office. I think that it provides an excellent insight into the direction of India's political leadership. I believe you will find it most interesting.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Mr. Robert Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

NOV 12 1965

A-392

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Department of State

Info : Bombay, Calcutta, Karachi, Madras

October 22, 1965

AmEmbassy NEW DELHI

Shastri Strengthens His Position

Airgram A-169, August 5, 1965

SUMMARY

DIST:

- AMB - 6
- DCM
- MINPE
- PE/EX-2
- PE/IN-2
- PE/COMCL
- PE/AGRI
- PE/TREAS
- PE/LAB
- PE/SCI
- USAID-10
- SCHAFFER-2
- CRU-2

India's war with Pakistan has added a whole new dimension to Prime Minister Shastri's prestige and political standing. Shastri's political position had been growing rapidly since May, when he began a series of successful international visits with a trip to the Soviet Union. Although the Rann of Kutch affair was a difficult one for the Prime Minister, criticism of his handling of it has been overtaken by praise for his resolute action in meeting the Pakistani challenge in Kashmir.

Shastri's adroit handling of the Kashmir crisis both in his dealings with Parliament and in his projection of GOI policy to the public balancing firmness with moderation has served to maximize the gains which would ordinarily have accrued to any Prime Minister who had taken the popular and seemingly successful countermeasures he did. As a result, for the first time he has achieved mass popular appeal.

The improvement in Shastri's position in the Congress Party before the Indo-Pakistan war stemmed from his strengthening of his relations with the regional and state leaders who initially brought him to office. Shastri's conduct of the office of Prime Minister in the pre-war period strengthened the leadership's impression that he was the man who from their point of view was most suited to hold the job.

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PE/IN:HBSchaffer:tg 10/19/65

PE/IN:HDSpivack

Cleared by Ambassador in draft

NOV 12 1965

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 12-361

By UCA NARA, Date 62-19-2014

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Although domestic political activity has not yet fully resumed following the cease-fire, it is certain that Shastri's newly achieved mass appeal can only have solidified this impression. However, Shastri's popularity could be considerably reduced by economic and, more importantly, diplomatic or military setbacks.

Shastri appears to be well aware of his stronger position and is displaying an increasing degree of poise and confidence. Yet even in his stronger position he will in all likelihood continue to move with a careful eye to popular and party opinion. He must consider the election scheduled early in 1967 and it is unlikely that he will try to force any important measure on the party and the country without first winning a consensus of the Congress leadership. (End SUMMARY)

INTRODUCTION

The war with Pakistan has had a great impact on the prestige and political standing of Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri. Coming as the dramatic climax of a series of events and circumstances which had substantially boosted both Shastri's political position and his confidence in himself, it has added a whole new dimension to the Prime Minister's public image and stature.

This airgram traces the gains Shastri had won before the outbreak of hostilities, and assesses the manner in which the war has raised to a new high his standing both in the Congress Party and the nation itself.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The rapid growth in Shastri's political standing, now developing into an impressive consolidation of the Prime Minister's power, began in May with his visit to the Soviet Union, a successful venture which took place immediately after the long and (for the Government) difficult Budget session of Parliament.

It is a paradox of Indian politics that Shastri's activities as his country's advocate in the capitals of the world have been a major element in strengthening his prestige at home. He came to office largely unaware of international relations and personally ignorant of the outside world.

His sole venture abroad before he became Prime Minister had been a short visit to Nepal, and it was widely predicted that under his leadership India would in large measure renounce that strong interest in world affairs which had typified the Nehru era, concentrating instead on the country's many homefront problems.

There was some concern that should Shastri seek to emulate Nehru and endeavor to play a role on the world stage, the results might well be unfortunate, not only for the Prime Minister himself but for the nation as well. The regret evoked by Shastri's inability to attend the July 1964 Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference (he was suffering from a recurrence of his heart ailment) was not unmingled with a sense of relief on the part of Indians who believed that it might be advantageous for the Prime Minister to become more seasoned in office before taking on world statesmen.

Shastri's overseas activities, and particularly his concentrated travels in the summer -- to the Soviet Union (May 12-19), Canada (June 10-14), the Commonwealth Conference (June 15-25), the United Arab Republic (June 26), and Yugoslavia (July 28-31) -- calmed these apprehensions.

The visits had a profound impact in India. Indian leaders and the Indian public generally were impressed and gratified by glowing press accounts of their Prime Minister's poise and of the honor afforded him as the nation's representative. Eager for the world's regard after their humiliation by the Chinese and their troubles at home, they began to look to Shastri with greater respect as a man able to speak for India and win plaudits for her.

SHASTRI TAKES ADVANTAGE

Shastri moved to maximize the gains he had scored through his foreign travels. He broadcast to the nation about his visits, focussed on them in a lengthy, well-reported presentation at the Bangalore session of the All-India Congress Committee in late July, and mentioned them effectively in his Independence Day speech at the Red Fort in August. Consequently in Congress Party meetings, he found it possible to speak with much greater authority on foreign affairs than before he undertook his travels, and even came to be recognized as something of an "expert" on world affairs. His extensive travels may also have contributed to a new maturity in his approach to foreign policy problems. In assessing the Vietnam situation, for example, the Prime Minister moved away from his earlier "stop the bombing" position and adopted a much more balanced appraisal of what he came to recognize was a complex problem in the outcome of which India has a major stake.

Shastri's successful exploitation of foreign policy making as an instrument for domestic political gain was facilitated by his predecessor's long domination of the direction of Indian foreign affairs. Nehru's pre-eminence in this field had effectively closed international affairs to other politicians, creating a vacuum which his successor adroitly filled. When Shastri spoke confidently of his meetings with Kosygin, Nasser, and Tito, there were few in the Congress leadership who could cross swords with

him, for the others were in most cases as inexperienced in this sphere as he had himself been a year earlier.

Perhaps only two senior Congress politicians could make any serious pretensions to international expertise. Of these, one, V. K. Krishna MENON, is still largely discredited; the other, Mrs. Vijayalakshmi PANDIT, has with one notable exception desisted from challenging the Prime Minister's direction of foreign policy. And it is clear that no such challenge can come to him from the office of the Foreign Minister, which is filled by a man whose unfitness for the post has now come to be generally recognized by the Diplomatic Corps, Parliament, and his own subordinates in the Ministry of External Affairs.*

The great latitude which Shastri has enjoyed in the political direction of foreign policy has not extended to the conduct of India's relations with Pakistan. In this sphere he has shared authority with the five other members of the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet -- Home Minister NANDA, Finance Minister KRISHNAMACHARI, Information Minister Indira GANDHI, Foreign Minister SWARAN SINGH, and Defense Minister CHAVAN.

Nevertheless, it has inevitably been the Prime Minister himself who has been the primary target of criticism of alleged shortcomings in India's policies vis-a-vis Pakistan. It has also been the Prime Minister who has won the lion's share of the praise and plaudits when these policies proved popular and seemingly successful.

THE RANN OF KUTCH

Breaking as it did in the final month of one of the most hectic and eventful parliamentary sessions in recent years, the Rann of Kutch affair was a particularly difficult one for Shastri. GOI efforts to work out a cease-fire agreement with Pakistan through British mediation were viewed with deep suspicion by both Opposition and Congress MPs, and the Prime Minister himself was accused of being insufficiently resolute and too willing to compromise away the "national honor".

* Shastri's unwillingness to dismiss the weaker members of his Cabinet remains one of his most serious failings. His Cabinet contains deadwood, inherited from Nehru, who serve no purpose either as administrators or as representatives of major political forces. At the same time Shastri has acted more forcefully in state affairs than did Nehru. In the Punjab, Orissa, and Kashmir he has cracked down on situations which his predecessor had swept under the rug.

It is a tribute to Shastri's courage and inherent moderation that he did not allow himself to be hustled into taking drastic steps by the bellicose Parliamentarians, but his persistence in seeking a peaceful solution to the Kutch imbroglio did not improve his political standing.

Like most compromise settlements, the Kutch Agreement was not a popular one, and it was probably easier for critics to assail some of its less attractive features than for those who recognize the dangers involved to champion it as the best solution available.

Shastri moved skillfully to defend the Agreement, particularly at the Bangalore AICC session, where he succeeded in avoiding a potentially embarrassing debate on the matter. But his task was made immeasurably more difficult by the mass Pakistan-directed infiltration into Indian-held Kashmir which began just as Parliament met to consider the pact. Once again the Prime Minister was subjected to pressure to adopt an immoderate course, this time to scrap or at least suspend the Kutch Agreement.

He withstood this pressure, and, though the GOI called off the Bhutto-Swaran Singh discussions scheduled (with no real hope of success) in accordance with the Agreement timetable, it continued to honor the Agreement and to call for its implementation. This, too, took some political courage.

While the immediate effect of the Pak moves in Kashmir was to embarrass Shastri's efforts to implement the Kutch Agreement by making the Agreement even more unpalatable to Indians than it had been considered earlier, their longer run effect has been all to Shastri's political advantage.

The charge that Shastri had encouraged Pakistan's adventure by his allegedly weak reaction to her incursions in Kutch, and the allegation that the GOI had been insufficiently alert in maintaining a proper posture of security in the Valley were both quickly drowned out in the increasingly widespread applause for the Prime Minister's resolute handling of the situation.

Indeed, there has even been some retrospective tendency to turn the Kutch Agreement to Shastri's credit since (it is argued) Pakistan's cynical action in signing the agreement while preparing her massive Kashmir infiltration succeeded in bringing home to moderate Indians as nothing else could have the depths of Pak duplicity.

SHASTRI AND THE WAR

The political gains which Shastri has made since Indian troops crossed the cease-fire line in the Kargil sector in late August have accrued

primarily because the strong countermeasures which the GOI has taken have been very popular and because they have been considered highly successful. The moves across the cease-fire line, notably at Haji Pir pass (accomplished with small units totaling less than 200 men), relieved the widespread apprehension among Indians that their country had become the passive victim of continued indignities from neighboring states, unwilling or unable herself to strike back. The achievements scored subsequently by the Indian armed forces in the Pakistan Punjab as popularly regarded in India, and the new-found unity and sense of purpose of the nation itself which developed in the course of the escalated conflict, largely restored the sense of self-assurance which had been lost in the Chinese debacle three years earlier.

In the euphoria born of seeming success Shastri has become for the first time something of a popular hero. In another one of the ironies which appear to have marked his career, the man of peace, almost the arch-type of the meek and mild Hindu, proved the principal political beneficiary of war.

It is likely that any Indian Prime Minister who had sent his troops across the cease-fire line after the Pak infiltration and ordered them into West Pakistan after the Pak drive came close to cutting the Kashmir communications line at Akhnur would have won considerable popular esteem, provided, of course, that the Indian countermoves could be represented as successful ones.

It is evident, however, that Shastri's adroit handling of the crisis both in his dealings with Parliament and in his projection of GOI policy to the Indian public has served to maximize the gains which would ordinarily have accrued.

SHASTRI AND PARLIAMENT

In the best tradition of western democracy, Shastri was punctilious in keeping Parliament advised about the developing situation and in listening to the suggestions of leading Parliamentarians. He (and, following his instructions, his key ministers) were in frequent touch with the Congress Parliamentary Party Executive Committee, a 30-man body comprising a broad geographical and ideological cross-section of Congress opinion.

Members of the committee have told the Reporting Officer that at no other time in the past have they been so closely consulted on matters of policy, and they were obviously pleased to have been afforded such unparalleled consideration.

By meeting frequently with the Executive Shastri succeeded in keeping informed about Parliamentary opinion and in turn was able to bring his own

influence to bear in molding that opinion. The Congress MPs' confidence in him has been considerably enhanced, and his relations with them have probably never been better.

Although a few members took a somewhat more aggressive approach than Shastri was willing to assume (some, for example, favored Pak evacuation of Azad Kashmir as a sine qua non of a cease-fire), there was for the most part a broad identity of views between him and the Executive. There is no evidence to suggest that Shastri was at any time obliged by the Executive or any other instrument of Parliamentary opinion to adopt a line he did not favor. The decision-making process remained firmly in his own hands and those of his ministerial colleagues on the Cabinet Emergency Committee.

THE OPPOSITION

Shastri was also solicitous of the feelings of Opposition leaders. He met with them at a number of crucial points, and through his forthright explanations of the GOI position and his willingness to take their own views into account was able to promote a considerable sense of all-party cooperation and participation. He deferred to the suggestion of Oppositionists on at least one occasion, when on September 14 he agreed not to make any public announcement of the Indian position on U Thant's cease-fire proposal until the Pak response became known.

Oppositionists of all stripes concur in lauding Shastri for his attention to what is after all a relatively small and badly divided minority. His care in keeping the Opposition informed has helped it to understand the GOI position, and has been important in bringing about the near-unanimous acceptance of the key elements of his position.

Such care may also have longer-run political dividends in reducing friction between Shastri and the Opposition both within and outside Parliament. The principal element in sparing Shastri from bitter attack by the Oppositionists in months to come will be their awareness that he has become a popular figure, but their high personal regard for him will also play some part in the process.

Aside from more or less formal consultations, Shastri also took the time to confer with members individually or in groups. (He also met periodically with the Congress Parliamentary Party itself, but this body is too large for effective give-and-take and Shastri has obviously found the Party Executive meetings much more useful.)

Shastri has gone out of his way to praise the role Parliament has played during the crisis, and Parliament, where vanity is well established, has warmly responded. Finally, Shastri has apparently decided to make greater

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Page 8, A-392 from NEW DELHI

use of Parliamentary envoys to present India's case abroad, and this too is going down well.

THE PUBLIC

Shastri's public presentation to domestic audiences of India's position in face of the challenge of Pakistan and of China has also proved very effective. His approach has been dignified and restrained, and he has projected the telling image of a quiet man, provoked beyond any reasonable limit, determined to safeguard the nation's honor and integrity.

He has broadcast frequently, and his talks, delivered in firm and at times even ringing tones, have contributed to the creation of India's present mood of national determination, unity, and purposefulness. Newsreel recasts of his talks, which in earlier days provoked ripples of laughter in Delhi movie houses, are now winning cheers.

It is possible that in a nation given to hero-worship Shastri has achieved unexpected mass appeal as the symbol of the national will to resist and of the resurgence of its self-respect.

In his customary modest fashion, Shastri has at the same time been careful not to hog the stage. Statements to Parliament on the progress of the war, including the dramatic September 6 announcement of the move towards Lahore to relieve pressure on Jammu have been delivered by the Defense Minister or his deputy, not by the Prime Minister himself.

Broadcasts on the national hookup have been made by a wide variety of ministerial talent, and even by some political leaders outside of the ministry including Morarji DESAI. Shastri has spoken at the crucial points, but he has not stood in the way of others taking advantage of the large audiences made available by war-time interest.

IN THE PARTY

Shastri's careful handling of Congress MPs has smoothed his tasks in Parliament and may be expected to stand the Prime Minister in good stead in the future. However, the major source of power in Congress does not lie in the Parliamentary Party or in its Executive but elsewhere, particularly in the network of state and regional leaders and organizations. This has been the really crucial area for Shastri in his efforts to consolidate his position.

Shastri has been making such efforts, with considerable success, almost from the moment he first took office as Prime Minister. The consolidation

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Page 9, A-392 from NEW DELHI

of his political position had, at least until recently, been a quiet and fairly unobtrusive affair, but it was substantial nonetheless. (The most obvious evidence of his success was the Bangalore session of the AICC in July. The session, by providing an opportunity for the collective leadership under Shastri and Kamaraj to turn back a challenge by Morarji Desai also contributed to Shastri's standing. See Embassy Airgram 169.)

It had not, contrary to the expectation of some political observers, taken the form of the building by Shastri of a powerful regional political base of his own. The condition of the Congress in his own state of Uttar Pradesh is now almost chaotic, and while the factional leaders of the party there generally (some of them grudgingly) recognize Shastri's leadership on the national level, the state hardly provides him the same powerful, bloc backing such as that enjoyed by Kamaraj in Madras, Chavan in Maharashtra, or Steel Minister Sanjiva Reddy in Andhra.

Nor is the position very much better from Shastri's point of view in neighboring Punjab, where his hand-picked Chief Minister has been unable to establish his leadership either of the Provincial Congress organization or of his own cabinet.

The improvement in Shastri's position before the Indo-Pakistan war stemmed from his strengthening of his relations with the regional and state leaders who initially brought him to office. One of the key elements in this process was Shastri's demonstration to the leadership of the Party that he would not try to run roughshod over them, but was willing to consider their views and recognize their own special areas of interest. This was, of course, only what they had expected and was why they supported him in June 1964 over his domineering and reputedly inflexible rival, former Finance Minister Morarji Desai.

On issues of overriding national concern, most notably food and language policy, Shastri has permitted the political leaders of the states to bring their influence to bear. In party matters he has established an excellent relationship with Congress President Kamaraj and respects the latter's sphere of operation.

He has also given a significant voice in policy-making, particularly in the economic area, to key Cabinet Ministers who have enjoyed greater independence than they did when Nehru was Prime Minister.

Shastri's conduct of the office of Prime Minister in the pre-war period strengthened the Leadership's impression that he was the man who from their own point of view was most suited to hold the job. Although domestic political activity has not yet fully resumed following the cease-fire (the Congress organizational elections have remained postponed,

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Page 10, A-392 from NEW DELHI

and the winter session of the All-India Congress Committee has been cancelled), it is certain that Shastri's newly achieved mass appeal can only have solidified this impression.

The earlier sentiment, entertained by some, that Shastri was only an interim figure to be replaced by some more attractive leader (the usual time given was the 1967 General Elections) had faded away before the Indo-Pakistan conflict. It has now probably been replaced by the more positive belief that Shastri's national leadership can be a very valuable asset for Congress when that election takes place sixteen months from now.

POSSIBLE CHANGES

This present assessment is, of course, subject to change. Shastri's popularity could be considerably reduced were he to adopt any policies vis-a-vis Pakistan and Kashmir which could be successfully represented as a weakening of India's position, and such moves would also bring an outcry in Parliament and in Congress Party circles.

A resumption of hostilities followed by a serious setback at the hands of the Pakistanis or Chinese might also gravely affect his popular image and his political standing.

Economic problems have been a consistent source of difficulty for him, and should there be a significant deterioration of the food/price situation or a deepening of the foreign exchange crisis occasioning a breakdown of industrial production he would also be damaged. He might be able to cut his losses in an economic crisis, however, by blaming the troubles on the requirements of military preparedness and/or the unsympathetic attitude of the big powers towards assistance to India.

Another possibility, aside from this, is that Shastri's popularity, if sustained for some months, will permit him personally to escape the full brunt of criticism for later economic failures. In Nehru's day these were often blamed on Cabinet ministers and "their" policies, and the pattern could reoccur at least to some extent. The same possibilities do not exist in the politico-military field. Successes here were assigned to Shastri and he will be held to account for setbacks and shortcomings.

GREATER CONFIDENCE

Shastri appears to be well aware of his stronger position. He is displaying an increasing degree of poise and confidence and those who know him well call attention to what appears to be his calm self-assurance.

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packet on Park's desk
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Bowles

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TO WHITE HOUSE FOR ROBERT KOMER
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FOLLOWING FROM NEW DELHI

TO ROBERT KOMER WHITE HOUSE FROM AMBASSADOR BOWLES

ALTHOUGH I HAD HOPED TO GET BACK BRIEFLY FOR POLICY DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT AND OTHERS I RECOGNIZE THE DANGER OF LEAVING HERE DURING THIS CRITICAL PERIOD. HOWEVER I BELIEVE IT'S ESSENTIAL THAT THE PRESIDENT HAVE MY ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. THEREFORE I HAVE OUTLINED BY VIEWS IN A PERSONAL LETTER WHICH SHOULD REACH HIM BY TUESDAY.

SINCE MY RETURN IN EARLY AUGUST I HAVE HAD NO COMMUNICATION FROM ANYONE ABOUT THE EVOLUTION OF US VOLCANBQING TOWARD SOUTH ASIA. BECAUSE ROUTINE CABLES ON SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ARE INADEQUATE WE ARE OPERATING MORE OR LESS IN THE DARK.

I HAVE BEEN DOING MY BEST TO SIT ON THE LID HERE AND I THINK WE HAVE BEEN DOING SO WITH CONSIDERABLE EFFECTIVENESS UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. HOWEVER, BECAUSE I HAVE NO IDEA WHERE THE WASHINGTON BALL IS LIKELY TO BOUNCE AND BEAUSE I DEEPLY BELIEVE FROM MY LONG EXPERIENCE IN THIS AREA THAT WE ARE FACING A TEST COMPARABLE IN IMPORTANCE TO THE ONE WE FACED IN CHINA IN THE 1940'S, I MUST BE SURE THAT FACTS AND OPPORTUNITIES AS WW SEE THEM HAVE FULLY REGISTERED.

I WILL BE MOST GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR WHATEVER BACKGROUND YOU CAN GIVE ME. REGARDS.

GP-1
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By ch NARA, Date 6-27-13

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FM AMEMBASSY NEWDELHI
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 779
RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
BT

Bowles

~~SECRET~~ SEPT 24

EXDIS

IN CONVERSATION WITH L.K. JHA THIS MORN I HAD STRONG IM-
PRESSION THAT PRIMIN SHASTRI IS GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION
TO VISITING UN SOMETIME BEFORE OCT 15. IF HE DOES DECIDE TO
GO GOI WILL SURELY SAY THAT WOULD WELCOME OPPORTUNITY TO
TALK TO PRES JOHNSON DURING UNDOUBTEDLY BRIEF VISIT.

I STRONGLY URGE THAT I BE AUTHORIZED TO ENCOURAGE SHASTRI

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 966 ~~SECRET~~
TO MAKE THE TRIP WHICH HE IS LIKELY TO MAKE ANYWAY, AND INDICATE
THAT THE PRES INVITES HIM TO COME DOWN WASHINGTON.

PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST.
GP-3 BOWLES
BT

DECLASSIFIED

NNNN Authority Stak. Hr. 10/28/76; NSC Ltr. 5/6/77
By crmg NARA. Date 8-27-03

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SORRY DIDN'T USE SDB WILL DO SO X

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Bowles' gripe is that McCloskey has made PL 480 subject to Mahon statement, and he didn't think it was.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

("no new economic loans or grants")

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SEPT 22

MEF 64 RECEIVED TODAY CONTAINS REF TO APPLICATION OF SECRETARY'S COMMITMENT TO CONGRESSMAN MAHON (DEPTEL 379) TO PL 480 SHIPMENTS TO INDIA AS FOLLOWS: "WITH RESPECT TO ANY NEW COMMITMENTS, I WOULD REMIND YOU THAT THE SECY HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT NONE TO BE UNDERTAKEN WITHOUT CONSULTATION WITH APPROPRIATE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS."

Mahon statement does not technically cover Title I sales agreement. However, ~~At that~~ no one knows for sure what was in Rusk's mind. McCloskey was probably off base in making quoted statement.

WHILE EMBASSY HAD NOTED REF IN AID TO A-1842 TO LEGISLATIVE CONSULTATIONS AS PRECONDITION TO REQUESTING EXECUTIVE BRANCH APPROVAL OF PROPOSED PL 480 AGREEMENT WITH INDIA,

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 887 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IT HAD NOT RPT NOT UP TO NOW BEEN OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT SUCH CONSULTATIONS WERE OF TYPE WITH WHICH SECY'S NUZITMENT WAS CONCERNED, SINCE THAT COMMITMENT CLEARLY RELATED TO AID APPROPRIATIONS AND WAS MADE AGAINST BACKGROUND OF INDO-PAK HOSTILITIES.

However, neither SOA nor McCloskey wants to make any clarifying statement because that will just open the door to more questions we don't want to answer.

AN EFFECT OF DEPT SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENT ABOVE QUOTED (WHICH INDIANS WILL BE QUICK TO RECOGNIZE) IS TO INCLUDE FOOD SHIPMENTS TO INDIA WITH OTHER CATEGORIES OF AID BEING SUSPENDED BECAUSE OF INDO-PAK FIGHTING.

I ASSUME STATEMENT IS INCORRECT. PLEASE CONFIRM. IF STATEMENT IS INCORRECT, I SUGGEST CLARIFYING STATEMENT BE MADE.

SOA agrees with Bowles that the best way to answer is to tell GOI what kind of agreement we will or won't negotiate. SOA waiting to reply until it has word on PL 480 decision, which it understands will be soon.

BEST WAY TO CORRECT THE RECORD IS FOR US PROMPTLY TO CONCLUDE, AS I HAVE PREVIOUSLY URGED, AT LEAST INTERIM PL 480 AGREEMENT FOR ADDITIONAL ONE MILLION TONS WHEAT (PLUS AVAILABLE QUANTITIES RICE AND DRY MILK). ASIDE FROM BASIC NEED THIS ACTION AS POINTED OUT IN NUMEROUS EMBASSY MESSAGES, IT IS NOW MORE THAN EVER ESSENTIAL TO AVOID GIVING INDIAN PUBLIC THE IMPRESSION WE ARE PREPARED AS MATTER US POLICY WITHHOLD ESSENTIALS OF LIFE UNLESS THEY CONFORM TO OUR WISHES.

GP-3 BOWLES 9/22
BT

4 + RWK's request
Told SOA (sober) to cable Bowles:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Confirm Bowles' understanding
Mahon statement does not technically cover PL 480. We don't want to issue clarifying statement because it would just open the door to unwanted questions. We hope to have an answer shortly.

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: Stat. Hr. 10-28-76 (178);
SI/WH guidelines
NARA Date 8-27-03

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~~SECRET~~

83
/

EYES ONLY

21 September 1965

Bowles

Mr. Robert W. Komer
The White House
Room 372
Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C.

Dear Robert:

Tucked away in my file of missiles that never got off the pad is the one which we prepared some months ago in response to a proposal by Ambassador Bowles. Our purpose was to break the whole Chicom/Pakistan affair out into the open and precipitate something of a showdown between the "Good President Ayub" and "Bad Mr. Bhutto".

It was to have hit the press in Paris 48 hours before Shastri arrived in Moscow ... a French newsman just back from Moscow.

Do you see any possibility of using an updated version of this one?

Sincerely,

JH

James H. Critchfield

Attachment - 1

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
By CTS NLI 19AC 12-359
NARA D- 6/13/17

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SEP 28 1965

83a

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

10 MAY 1965

HEADING -- "SOVIETS TO REVEAL CHICOM ASIAN STRATEGY TO INDIA'S PRIME MINISTER SHASTRI." A SOVIET OFFICIAL IN MOSCOW REVEALED TO DAY TO A WESTERN OFFICIAL SOVIET INTENTIONS TO USE THE VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER SHASTRI TO WARN HIM OF A CHICOM PLOT TO EMBROIL PAKISTAN AND INDIA IN AN ASIAN SUBCONTINENTAL WAR AS A MEANS OF EMBARRASSING THE SOVIETS AND INCREASING THE PRESSURES OF THE UNITED STATES AS THE SHOWDOWN OVER VIETNAM APPROACHES.

MR. KOSYGIN HINTED AT THIS IN THE PAST FEW DAYS WHEN HE CALLED IN THE INDIAN AMBASSADOR AND STATED THE SOVIET UNION STRONGLY URGED THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA NOT PERMIT ITSELF TO BE PUSHED INTO A WAR WITH PAKISTAN OUT OF THE CURRENT FEUD OVER THE DISPUTED RANN OF KUTCH. AT THE OUTSET MR. KOSYGIN WILL HAVE TO PERSUADE MR. SHASTRI THAT AN EFFECTIVE MILITARY COLLABORATION BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND CHINA IS NOT REALISTIC AND THAT THE PAKS AND INDIANS ARE BOTH BEING MANIPULATED BY THE CHINESE.

EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

By CTS NLJ/RAC 12-25-91
NARA, Date 6/13/17

SEP 28 1965

~~SECRET~~

-2-

EYES ONLY

THE SOVIET OFFICIAL NOTED THAT THE USSR HAS BEEN ATTEMPTING FOR MANY MONTHS TO OBTAIN HARD EVIDENCE ON AN ALLEGED CHINESE/PAKISTAN SECRET AGREEMENT, NEGOTIATED BY AYUB AND CHOU EN LAI DURING THE LATTERS 1964 VISIT, BUT THEY HAD ACQUIRED NO RELIABLE INFORMATION TO SUBSTANTIATE THESE ALLEGATIONS AND DOUBTED THAT AN OPERATIVE AGREEMENT EXISTS. THE SOVIETS HAD RECEIVED REPORTS AT THE TIME OF CHOU EN LAI'S VISIT TO PAKISTAN IN FEBRUARY 1964 THAT HE HAD GIVEN AYUB ASSURANCE THAT THE CHICOMS WOULD THREATEN A CHINESE MILITARY OFFENSIVE ON INDIA'S HIMALAYAN FRONTIER TO TIE DOWN INDIAN FORCES IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND INDIA. THE SOVIETS KNOW THAT THE MILITARILY SOPHISTICATED AYUB HAS LONG DEPRECATED THE REAL MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF A CHICOM CONVENTIONAL MILITARY THRUST INTO THE SUBCONTINENT OVER THE HIGH HIMALAYAS AND IS AWARE THAT THE CHICOMS HAVE IN RECENT MONTHS, FACED WITH THE GROWING VIET NAM CRISIS, BEEN QUIETLY REDUCING THE CHINESE MILITARY GARRISON IN TIBET THE MAINTENANCE OF WHICH PLACES DISPORPORTIONATELY HIGH DEMANDS ON THE CHINESE SUPPLY SYSTEM. THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THAT UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE CHINESE ACTUALLY

EYES ONLY

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-3-

EYES ONLY

ACHIEVE AN OPERATIONAL MEDIUM RANGE MISSILE WITH
NUCLEAR WARHEADS -- AND THIS IS AT LEAST TWO TO
THREE YEARS OFF -- AYUB WOULD REGARD ANY PAK/CHINESE
AGREEMENT AS ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY OF POLITICAL VALUE.
THE SOVIETS SAID THEY WERE LESS SANGUINE THAT AYUB'S
IMMEDIATE FOREIGN POLICY ADVISORS, INCLUDING FOREIGN
MINISTER BHUTTO -- THE ARCHITECT OF PAKISTAN'S DETENTE
WITH THE CHINESE -- FULLY APPRECIATE THE REAL MILITARY
LIMITATIONS OF A CHINESE COMMITMENT -- EVEN IF ONE REALLY
EXISTED. UNTIL RECENTLY -- AND THE DANGERS OF THE
GROWING PAKISTANI INVOLVEMENT -- THE SOVIETS HAD
CONSIDERED THAT AYUB'S DOMINANT POSITION AND POLITICAL
ORIENTATION WOULD OFFSET THE INCLINATION OF BHUTTO TO
MOVE FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD OF COLLABORATION WITH THE
CHINESE. INDEED, WHEN THE SOVIETS GENTLY SUGGESTED TO
AYUB DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW THAT HE REMAIN
SKEPTICAL OF THE CHINESE, HIS RESPONSE HAD LEFT THE SOVIET
GOVERNMENT CONVINCED THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THE
DANGEROUS GAME HE WAS PLAYING. MORE RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS HAVE CAUSED THE SOVIETS TO HAVE SECOND

EYES ONLY

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-4-

EYES ONLY

THOUGHTS ON THIS MATTER. THE CRISIS IN THE RANN OF KUTCH AND EVIDENCE THAT BHUTTO IS PRESSING FOR THE OPENING OF A COVERTLY SUPPORTED "WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION" IN KASHMIR AND THINKING IN TERMS OF A PARTITION WITH CHINA OF THE KASHMIR-LADAKH AREAS HAS INCREASED SOVIET CONCERN WITH THE EXTENT OF WHICH BOTH THE PAKISTANIS AND INDIANS ARE BEING MANIPULATED TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE CHINESE.

THE SOVIETS HAVE GAINED ADDITIONAL INSIGHT INTO THE ATTITUDE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA THROUGH THE CONVERSATIONS THE USSR IS CURRENTLY HOLDING WITH AN INDIAN DEFENSE DELEGATION IN MOSCOW HEADED BY MR. SARIN. MR. SARIN IS URGING EXPEDITIOUS DELIVERIES OF SOVIET TANKS AND OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO DELHI AND AN INCREASE IN THE LEVEL OF SOVIET DELIVERIES IN CRITICAL ARMORED EQUIPMENT -- AN ITEM WHICH HAS LITTLE USE IN MEETING THE CHINESE IN THE HIGH MOUNTAINS BUT WOULD BE DECISIVE IN A MAJOR PAKISTAN-INDIAN CONFLICT.

THE SOVIETS HAVE LONG BEEN AWARE -- AND ASSUME THIS INFORMATION IS EQUALLY AVAILABLE TO THE CHINESE AND WESTERN GOVERNMENTS -- THAT THE ASTUTE AND COOL-HEADED AYUB IS NOT PREPARED TO ENGAGE INDIA IN WARFARE

EYES ONLY

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~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

-5-

TO SETTLE THE KASHMIR DISPUTE UNTIL CERTAIN CONDITIONS FAVORABLE TO THE PAKISTAN EFFORT HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED. IN A SECRET SPEECH IN NOVEMBER, 1962, AYUB IDENTIFIED THESE AS: (1) AN INTERNALLY WEAKENED AND DISORGANIZED INDIA. (2) A VIABLE AND COHESIVE PAKISTAN STATE. (3) A WORLD SITUATION IN WHICH WORLD PUBLIC OPINION WOULD CONDONE THE USE OF ARMED FORCE TO SETTLE AN INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SUCH AS KASHMIR.

RECENT EVENTS HAVE LARGELY BROUGHT ABOUT THESE CONDITIONS, DUE PARTLY TO THE SUCCESS OF CHINESE POLICIES IN ASIA. REACTING TO THE LIMITED CHINESE MILITARY ACTIONS IN 1962, INDIA HAS EMBARKED ON A MILITARIZATION PROGRAM THAT HAS ALREADY HAD A MARKED INFLATIONARY EFFECT AND THREATENS INDIA'S BASIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. THE NOTE OF UNCERTAINTY THAT PREVAILS IN INDIA TODAY AND THE POLITICAL FRAILTY IN THE GOI HANDLING OF THE CURRENT RANN OF KUTCH CRISIS PROVIDE FURTHER EVIDENCE OF POTENTIAL INSTABILITY IN DELHI. IN PAKISTAN, BY CONTRAST, AYUB'S SUCCESS IN THE RECENT ELECTIONS AND THE DRAMATIC UPSURGE IN THE PAKISTAN ECONOMY HAVE GIVEN PAKISTAN A SENSE OF CONFIDENCE THAT HAS EMBOLDENED ITS

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EYES ONLY

-6-

LEADERSHIP TO SUNDRY ADVENTURES IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN POLICY. FINALLY, AYUB MAY REGARD THE INCREASING FREQUENCY WITH WHICH ARMED FORCE IS BEING USED TO ACHIEVE POLITICAL ENDS AS PRODUCING A CLIMATE OF WORLD OPINION FAVORABLE TO THE USE BY PAKISTAN OF ARMED FORCE IN KASHMIR.

WHAT THE SOVIETS KNOW AND WILL PRESS UPON SHASTRI WHEN HE VISITS MOSCOW THIS WEEK IS THAT THE CHINESE, CONFRONTED WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF ARMED CONFLICT WITH THE AMERICANS OVER VIETNAM, ARE DESPERATELY SEARCHING FOR PRESSURE POINTS WHICH WILL WEAKEN THE AMERICAN POSTURE IN ASIA AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AS A WHOLE.

ACCORDING TO THE SOVIET OFFICIAL, PAKISTAN'S BATTLE-FIELD VICTORIES IN THE RANN OF KUTCH HAVE PLACED THE INDIANS EXACTLY WHERE THE CHINESE WANT THEM -- CONFUSED AND DIVIDED INTERNALLY, BUT COMPELLED TO RESTORE THE PRESTIGE OF THEIR MILITARY BY SOME SUCCESSFUL DISPLAY OF FORCE. IF THE INDIAN FORCES NOW POISED ON PAKISTAN'S BORDER SHOULD ATTACK, THE RESULTING WAR WITH PAKISTAN WOULD BE ONLY TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE CHINESE. MERELY BY TAKING A THREATENING STANCE ON INDIA'S NORTHERN BORDERS, THE CHINESE COULD TIE DOWN MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE INDIAN ARMY, DEMAND AN INDIAN CEASE FIRE AND AGAIN

EYES ONLY

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-7-

ATTEMPT TO HUMILIATE INDIA IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD AS IT DID IN 1962. THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION, FIRMLY COMMITTED TO SUPPORT THE INDIAN POSITION IN KASHMIR AND, BY IMPLICATION OF ITS ARMS AID, TO SUPPORT INDIA AGAINST CHINA, WOULD BE COMPLETELY UNTENABLE.

CONCLUDING HIS COMMENTS ON SHASTRI'S FORTHCOMING VISIT, THE SOVIET OFFICIAL SAID THAT THEY WILL IMPRESS UPON SHASTRI THEIR OWN PEACEFUL INTENTIONS IN SOUTH ASIA, WILL PLACE HEAVY EMPHASIS ON PEKING'S CAREFULLY DEVELOPED STRATEGEM TO PROVOKE CONFLICT, AND WILL EMPLOY EVERY DEVICE IN THEIR POSSESSION TO DISSUADE INDIA FROM ANY DISPLAYS OF BELLIGERENCE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION.

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Bowles

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EYES ONLY

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FOLLOWING MESSAGE RECEIVED
TO ROBERT KOMER, WHITE HOUSE - EYES ONLY
FROM AMBASSADOR BOWLES

APPRECIATE YOUR CABLE AND ALSO WHAT I BELIEVE TO BE SKILLFUL WASHINGTON HANDLING OF EXTRAORDINARILY COMPLEX SITUATION WHICH, ALTHOUGH FULL OF DANGERS, MAY OFFER CERTAIN OPPORTUNITIES FOR USG TO PROMOTE ITS LONG-TERM INTERESTS IN THIS AREA.

IN REGARD TO FOOD SITUATION I BELIEVE IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ANYONE NOT ACTUALLY ON GROUND FULLY TO COMPREHEND RISKS INVOLVED IN FURTHER DELAY IN AUTHORIZING SHIPMENTS.

RIGHT NOW 40 MILLION INDIANS, MOST OF THEM LOW INCOME PEOPLE LIVING IN LARGE CITIES, ARE WHOLLY DEPENDENT UPON US FOODGRAINS. IN CALCUTTA IN ORDER TO SPREAD DWINDLING SUPPLIES DAILY RATIONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN CUT FROM TWELVE OUNCES TO TEN OUNCES. INEVITABLY STORY IS SPREADING THAT THIS HAS BEEN DUE TO US DE ISON TO PUT SQUEEZE ON INDIAN PEOPLE TO FORCE THEM TO GIVE IN TO PAKS.

GOI AND OURSELVES ARE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO KEEP SIT TION UNDER WRAPS. HOWEVER FOREIGN AND US PRESS AS WELL AS INDIAN PRESS ARE BECOMING AWARE THAT USG IS STALLING AND SERIOUS GAP IN FOODGRAIN SUPPLIES WILL SOON RESULT. QUESTION HAS BECOME NOT "WILL THIS SITUATION BLOW UP?" BUT "HOW SOON".

WHEN IT DOES, IMPACT HERE WOULD CONSTITUTE EXTREMELY SERIOUS BLOW TO US INFLUENCE AT MOMENT OF GREAT OPPORTUNITY. IMAGE IN WORLD PRESS AS WELL AS IN INDIA OF USG LOADED WITH WHEAT PUTTING SQUEEZE ON 40 MILLION INDIAN SLUM DWELLERS IN ORDER TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON INDIAN GOVT WHICH IS FACED WITH POTENTIAL TWO-FRONT WAR (WHILE SHIPMENTS CONTINUE TO PAKISTAN) WOULD BE PROFOUNDLY HARMFUL; COMMUNISTS WILL HAVE A FIELD DAY.

VERY LEAST WE SHOULD DO IS TO TELL INDIAN GOVT, HOPEFULLY WITHIN NEXT 24-48 HOURS, THAT WE ARE PROVIDING ONE MILLION TONS OF GRAIN AND THAT WE WILL DO EVERYTHING IN OUR POWER TO SEE THAT THERE IS NO BREAK IN ARRIVAL OF FOOD SHIPS WHICH NOW ARE SCHEDULED TO RUN OUT IN LATE OCT. THIS ARRANGEMENT DOES NOT HAVE TO BE HIGHLY PUBLICIZED. GOI WOULD SEE ADVANTAGE IN TREATING IT AS ROUTINE MATTER.

MANY THANKS FOR ALL YOU HAVE DONE AND ARE DOING.
BOWLES

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

By ch NARA, Date 8-23-13

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Bowles

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TO AMEMB NEW DELHI
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SECRET EYES ONLY CITE CAP65571
VIA SPECIAL CHANNEL
NEW DELHI

FOR AMBASSADOR ONLY FROM KOMER SEPTEMBER 20, 1965

YOU CAN DEPEND ON IT THAT YOUR PROPOSALS AND CONCERNS
GETTING TOP LEVEL ATTENTION HERE. AS YOU HAVE SEEN, OUR
INTENTION IS TO MOVE CAREFULLY AND SOBERLY IN WHAT COULD
BECOME MAJOR CRUNCH IN SUBCONTINENT.

AS TO FOOD IN PARTICULAR, WE GIVING MOST SOBER
ATTENTION TO WAYS AND MEANS OF KEEPING FOOD PIPELINE
GOING, THOUGH AS YOU TOO HAVE RECONIZED MAJOR NEW
PL 480 AGREEMENT MOST UNLIKELY THIS TIME. WOULD HOPE
HAVE DECISION SOON

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PRESERVATION COPY

8/30/65

To: Mr. Komer

From: McGeorge Bundy

Per our conversation.

Bowles
+ India map
+ Pak map

86

Mr. Bundy, Mr. Smith:

I have read Chester Bowles memo and I would like the best analysis I can get. In my judgment we ought to get out of military aid to both Pakistan and India.

I want to see Rusk about it.

LBJ/JJ/mf
8-28-65
11:00a

to Rusk
for info in
paper



EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

86a

New Delhi - August 19, 1965

Dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing a memorandum on the question of military aid to India and Pakistan, which we must all agree is one of the most complex and difficult problems on our Asian agenda.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

The President,

The White House.

Bowles
2280
8/19/65

8/30/65

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86b

Authority NLJ 93-244 (436c)

By jc/jw. NARA. Date 8-26-03

August 19, 1965

MEMORANDUM

OBSERVATIONS ON MILITARY AID TO THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT

by Chester Bowles

During my recent consultations in Washington I was told that basic decisions in regard to United States military aid to the subcontinent would be forthcoming once the foreign aid program gets through Congress and the President's desk is reasonably cleared of more urgent business.

This memorandum briefly describes the development of the US military aid program in India, analyzes the present problems and opportunities and suggests a specific course of action.

Background to the Present Situation

In the fall of 1962 our prompt response to India's defense needs following the Chinese attack, contrasted with Soviet ambivalence, set the stage for a wholly new and favorable political and military relationship between the United States and the largest and potentially the most influential of the non-Communist unaligned nations.

As the actual fighting came to a halt the Indians with a belated understanding of the inadequacies of their national security system began to think in terms of a five year military defense plan. In the early spring of 1963 an Indian delegation visited the United States to seek our assistance in carrying out this plan. For three reasons we failed to respond:

1. Reluctance to upset US-Pak relations with particular concern for our installations at Peshawar;

2. The widely held assumption (which turned out to be erroneous) that because of ideological ties with Communist China the Soviets would refuse to assist India in building her defenses in any significant degree, and that consequently the Indians had no source of military equipment but the United States;

3. The assumption that we could use India's urgent need for modern military equipment as a lever to force the Indians to settle

the

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the Kashmir dispute.

The possibility of assistance to India's Five Year Defense Plan at some future time was, however, not ruled out. In a final meeting before coming to India in June 1963 President Kennedy requested me to explore privately and informally what we could expect from the Indian Government in return for a moderate United States five year commitment to Indian defenses (conditioned on the availability of funds from Congress).

A few days before President Kennedy died in November 1963 I reported my findings which were based on extensive talks with all key members of the Indian Government including the defense establishment and Prime Minister Nehru. If the United States were prepared to provide India with \$75 million of military assistance annually for five years, it was my belief that the Indian Government could be expected at that time to:

- (a) place a moderate ceiling on their army and air force levels;
- (b) agree to a similar ceiling on their foreign exchange expenditures for defense purposes;
- (c) restrict their military purchases in the USSR and other Communist countries to a limited assortment of unsophisticated and undramatic weapons; and
- (d) consult with us informally on the political and military implications of a Chinese takeover in Southeast Asia and in particular on how India might cooperate in the defense of Burma.

In March 1964, we received word from Washington that \$50 million in grant aid and \$50 million in loans would be made available for military equipment to India on a tentative five year basis subject to negotiations on the specific items.

This budget in our opinion was fully adequate to India's needs. However it soon became clear that we had not yet fully come to grips with the key questions, i.e., the kind of equipment which India needed most and our willingness to provide it, in view of the probable reactions in Pakistan. Inevitably, there were further delays as these questions were explored in Washington, Karachi and New Delhi.

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In the meantime the Indians, concerned over their inability after sixteen months of discussion to secure a clear response to their requests for long term assistance (particularly in air defense), had become convinced that the Pakistanis possessed some kind of veto power over the size and character of U.S. military aid to India. The GOI had therefore undertaken serious negotiations with the Soviets who, contrary to our earlier assumption, were now showing a major interest in India's military defense.

By late May 1964 after the most intensive discussions the State Department and the Pentagon reached tentative agreement on what I believe to be a fully adequate Indian military aid program. In spite of these delays and the more forthcoming attitude of the Soviets it would in my opinion enable us in large measure to achieve the political-military objectives in India which had appeared to be within our grasp the previous November. However, the day before the key decision was to be made in regard to aircraft, Nehru died and it was decided to postpone a full discussion with the Indians until we got a clear sense of the attitude of the new Indian Government.

In August when no further word was forthcoming from us, Defense Minister Chavan went to Moscow with a lengthy shopping list which included a final request for the MIG 21s to which the Soviets predictably responded in a forthright manner.

Once again in January 1965 the Indians came to us with an urgent request for six squadrons of F-5s, a request to which we have thus far not reacted. If we are unwilling to provide these planes under our military assistance program, I believe that the GOI will first attempt to buy them directly from Northrup; failing this, they will seek the more advanced longer range MIG 21s from the USSR which they seem to believe will be forthcoming.

In the meantime, after a long effort to persuade us and the British to support the Indian navy, the GOI has sent a delegation to Moscow to complete negotiations for Soviet submarines and patrol craft.

Implications

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Implications of the Present India-USSR Military Relationship

In considering the advancement of US interests in South Asia two points seem to me particularly relevant:

(1) for the long haul the major political threat to U.S. interests in the Subcontinent may not come from China but from Russia, and

(2) with skilled political handling, a reasonable commitment of U.S. resources, and a bit of luck China's aggressive posture in regard to India can become an important element in bringing about a close and highly advantageous association between India and the U.S.A.

At the moment, however, the situation is in flux. With the steadily worsening relations between the Soviet Union and China in the last two or three years and the failure of Moscow-directed Communist parties to subvert the new post-colonial governments of Asia and Africa, the USSR is now making a determined effort to establish close working relationships with the more strategically-placed non-communist governments regardless of their ideology. Since India is by all odds the most promising Asian counterweight to Chinese expansion and potentially the most important of the nonaligned nations, it has been given a very high priority in the new Soviet strategy.

It is no doubt assumed that if India can be developed into a kind of Asian Yugoslavia with economic and political policies that are generally responsive to the USSR, the Soviets could lay the basis for a major breakthrough in this crucial area. Eventually it might be assumed that this would lead to a greatly expanded Soviet-influenced bloc which could come to exercise a dominant role in the United Nations, create further deep divisions in the western alliance and gradually isolate the U.S.A.

From our vantage point in New Delhi the Soviets appear to be following this strategy with considerable skill, a significant commitment of resources, and at the moment with rather disquieting results.

In pursuit of this policy the Soviet Union has thus far provided India with well over a billion dollars in credits for economic

development

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development. Even more significant from the standpoint of Soviet political objectives may be the increasing amount of military assistance which already totals \$293 million, not counting the new naval equipment which will be announced soon.

However, this sum although substantial is still less than Soviet commitments to either Syria or Iraq (with combined populations little larger than Calcutta's) and a fraction of that given to the UAR (with a population less than half that of the state of Uttar Pradesh). In view of India's key strategic importance to the Soviets we therefore may expect further increases in the availability of Soviet defense funds as opportunities unfold.

According to one intelligence source (NBB-2337 Secret NOFORN), Shastri, during his recent visit to Moscow, became convinced that he could expect very nearly unlimited economic and military assistance from the USSR. Shastri confided to the source that Kosygin, Mikoyan and Brezhnev had promised to fill whatever gap in economic assistance might result from reductions in aid given by the United States and other Western nations, and that the Soviets would render direct assistance in case Pakistan attacked India. Shastri had the impression that a similar assurance applied even to an attack on India by China. Shastri also asserted that the Soviets would agree to train Indian forces in large enough numbers to give India a first-class military machine, although he and the Cabinet would not accept this offer.

Furthermore, Indian officials assert that the Soviets place no political strings on the equipment which they turn over to the GOI. According to L.K. Jha, Kosygin told Shastri in Moscow that India as a major nation is entitled to its own foreign policy and defence establishment and that consequently the military equipment provided by the USSR is India's to use as it sees fit.

Although this green light approval may be considered irresponsible in today's explosive world, it has great public appeal in any newly independent country including India.

There is no way of knowing whether the Soviet leaders actually gave Shastri such assurances. For now it is important, however, that Shastri genuinely thinks they did, an impression which was

clearly

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-6-

clearly conveyed in the secret letter he sent to Chief Ministers of the States upon his return (NBD 7083 Confidential NOFORN).

In the meantime our own position in the three Indian armed forces continues to be steadily eroded because of our inability under the present ground rules to give the Indians what they want and need.

The impact within the Indian Government of the Soviet strategy which combines political support for India, skilled flattery of Indian leaders, and major commitments of the kind of economic and military assistance which India wants most - without strings - is substantial. This is increasingly so within the normally pro-U.S. Indian military which now largely (and not too happily) looks to the USSR for airplanes, naval craft, tanks, SAMs and other sophisticated equipment.

Moreover, this trend is paralleled by a disturbing change in the attitudes of the Indian people. In February 1963, a public opinion poll revealed that 63% of all Indians considered the United States India's "best friend" while only 7% so referred to the Soviets. In June of this year the same question resulted in a stand-off between the United States and the USSR of 32% to 32%.

At the same time, our downgrading of India's defense needs, our rejection or avoidance of her requests for more sophisticated weapons and our minimizing of the Chinese threat to India in the hope that this may slow down India's requests for U.S. equipment appear to have gained us neither influence nor respect in Karachi.

Although this adds up to a worrisome situation, it is important nevertheless to keep our perspective. Almost invariably the Indians have first attempted to procure specific items of military equipment either from the US or other Western nations before turning to the USSR. Even today most senior Indian defence officials and military men would greatly prefer a closer relationship with the United States.

The Indian public generally still feel a deep sense of gratitude for the support we gave them in 1962 and there is a nagging suspicion among thoughtful observers that a shift in Chinese attitudes at some

future

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future time may again bring China and Russia together, possibly at India's expense.

Present Status of U.S. Military Aid to India

At the Nassau meeting in November 1962 we and the British each agreed to give India \$60 million worth of defense equipment, of which 90% has now been delivered.

Since then, in addition, we have agreed to deliver \$260 million worth of equipment of which only 15% has been delivered.

The commitment which we made in June 1964 (contingent upon available appropriations from Congress) calling for \$50 million of grant aid and \$50 million in credit sales for each year of the Indian five year Defense Plan (1964 - 1969) has three more years to run.

However, as a practical matter we are approaching a crossroads in regard to future U.S. military shipments to India. Although we have given a certain amount of equipment to nine Indian mountain divisions, India with some assistance from us has been steadily increasing its own production of such basic army items as artillery, machine guns, rifles, armored cars, tanks, ammunition, etc. With respect to the more sophisticated weapons which the Indians can not yet produce, the Soviets have been willing to provide them while we have thus far refused.

They have been pressing us for fighter aircraft for nearly three years, with a specific outstanding request for six squadrons of F-5s to provide close air support to the Indian army and to interdict Chinese supply lines in Tibet.

Under our present criteria, it is difficult to see any significant continuing role for United States military aid to India. Because India is unable to get the equipment from us that it wants and needs, the GOI will be progressively less inclined to put up with inconveniences and restriction inherent in our present program.

This means that whatever leverage we had hoped to have on

Indian

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Indian military policy, including our control over the foreign exchange which India budgets for military purposes, may be expected to diminish as the Soviet Union emerges as the major supplier of India's equipment while posing openly as a political supporter of India against Pakistan and covertly as a supporter even against China.

Policy Choices Before Us

In this complex situation we have a number of options open to us in regard to military aid to India:

1. We can continue along the present lines, i.e., providing India with the military equipment which is least subject to criticism by Pakistan. This would enable us to postpone a bit longer the basic policy decisions which sooner or later must be made in regard to U.S. priorities in South Asia.

In the context of the Asian confrontation which flows inevitably from the current struggle in Vietnam, it is difficult to see how this postponement can be justified. If we continue along this road we must accept the probability of increased Soviet influence in sensitive political areas here in India with little hope of improving our position in Pakistan.

2. We can decide to get out of the military assistance field both in Pakistan and India as rapidly as our present commitments can be met. This has a certain appeal in that we would appear to be cutting a Gordian knot. However, by pulling out of the military assistance field at this stage we would open the door even wider to an increasingly close military-political association between the USSR and India.

3. We can make the basic political decision which, although difficult, is in my view essential if we are to slow the creeping influence of the Soviets and establish a sound and fruitful relationship with India. Such a decision would include the following elements:

A. China, being the major threat to Asia's political stability, must be contained and our U.S. military aid programs to nations

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-9-

on the periphery of China must be focussed on this objective;

B. In a military sense India is by all odds the greatest source of anti-communist manpower that would be available in the event of a major Asian land war;

C. In a political sense democratic India is at least as important to us as it is to the Soviet Union as a balance to China in Asia, and potentially an increasing source of democratic influence and political stability among the nonaligned countries;

D. India with a reasonable amount of western assistance is politically and economically viable;

E. Our continued refusal adequately to support the Indian military has thus far won us no kudos in Karachi and will win us none in the future;

F. We should therefore continue our present five year \$50 million grant and \$50 million sales assistance to India, subject each year to Congressional approval and appropriations, while at the same time opening the door to India's procurement under this program of the weapons that it genuinely needs for its defense, including F-5s;

G. We should face up to the inevitable adverse reaction from Pakistan, doing everything possible to cushion its resentment through our massive economic assistance program on which the Pakistan economy is largely dependent;

H. We should place a high priority on covert and overt moves that will further India's position against China and thereby associate Indian political and military leaders psychologically and materially with us in the containment of China, switch their focus away from Pakistan and ultimately perhaps create the atmosphere which will make possible the rapprochement which is so important to both countries.

CONCLUSION:

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CONCLUSION:

This enormously complex situation is not subject to simple, painless solutions. We must choose between difficult alternatives.

In my opinion, the overriding consideration should be India's vast size, increasing industrialization, democratic commitment and political weight in Asian and world affairs.

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

87

August 3, 1965

TO BOB KOMER

FROM: Bill Moyers

Boards
(X)

AUG 3 1965

*Komer
to 1-137
7/28/65*

Aug 2 Cooper 8/2/65

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876

MEMORANDUM: The Situation We Now Face in Vietnam and a Proposed Course of Action

FROM: Chester Bowles *CB*

I. Our Predicament:

At this stage it is a waste of time to speculate on how the present difficult situation in Southeast Asia might have been avoided. It may be enough to say that if President Johnson's bold and imaginative proposals of April had been advanced and consistently implemented in the mid-1950's, or even as late as 1962, our present dilemma might have been avoided.

However, our present task is to deal with the realities confronting us today. Here they are as I see them:

1. We are deeply committed to preventing a North Vietnamese-Communist Chinese takeover of South Vietnam.
2. To this end we stand ready to negotiate without preconditions an honorable settlement of the present conflict.
3. In the meantime, we have undertaken to train, supply and assist the South Vietnamese armed forces.
4. We have also committed in their support substantial and increasing military forces of our own.
5. Because the North Vietnamese Government is a primary force behind the effort to subvert the non-Communist Government of South

Vietnam,

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

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By *jc*, NARA, Date 8-27-03

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-2-

Vietnam, we have taken limited but expanding measures to interdict and discourage this effort with indecisive results.

6. The Soviets have made it clear that as leaders of the world Communist movement and in spite of their deep differences with China, they have no alternative but to support North Vietnam. Consequently, we face not only a diminishing opportunity to ease Soviet-U.S. relations but the grave danger that American planes may be forced by the escalating pressures which are at work to attack Soviet missile sites.

7. The Chinese have taken a totally intransigent position and, without yet committing their own forces, have pressed the North Vietnamese towards a similar intransigence. Indeed, the Chinese appear explicitly to welcome our increasing military manpower involvement, and especially the growing possibility of a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

(NOTE: Although some observers are now comparing our position with that at the time of the Korean War, such a parallel seems to me unwarranted. (a) In Korea the aggression was open and the fighting was between field armies. (b) In Korea we were operating in cooperation with a score of other nations under the authority of the United Nations. (c) The Korean front was limited to 150 miles with our flanks protected by naval forces.

(d) Today

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(d) Today the Chinese Army is better armed and more sophisticated and China itself is at a higher stage of economic and military development. (3) Even with our advantages, the Korean War was a frustrating military stalemate for our nation and a political disaster for the Democratic Party, which was held responsible by an electorate which would not sustain its support beyond three years of casualties.)

II. Our Objectives:

1. To carry out our national commitment to prevent a Communist takeover in South Vietnam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

2. To avoid being drawn either into an escalating air war with China or the Soviet Union, or into an escalating land war in which our primary Asian enemy possesses nearly unlimited power to raise the manpower ante to suit its own objectives.

3. To reach a negotiated settlement consistent with our national interests in Southeast Asia which will enable the people of the area to live their lives in peace.

4. To maintain maximum influence among our allies and also among the non-aligned nations, most of whom respect our will to oppose Communist aggression in Southeast Asia but question our

capacity

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capacity to do so without producing a major conflict with China and closer ties between China and the U.S.S.R.

5. To establish with the leaders of the U.S.S.R. an understanding of our areas of common interest not only in Southeast Asia but in other parts of the world.

6. To encourage a major effort in regional economic development and social reform throughout Southeast Asia which will prevent similar Communist threats from developing in the future.

III. A Proposed Course of Action:

1. Establish strong defensive military positions at strategic points throughout South Vietnam including major population centers and areas with easy access to the sea, and limit our land operations to the vigorous defense of these key points. Introduce sufficient troops to hold these positions against any force the North Vietnamese can bring to bear, with the South Vietnamese forces largely assigned to holding nearby rural areas.

2. Quietly continue to reaffirm our desire for negotiations without preconditions, and our intention of leaving Vietnam as soon as peace and stability have been restored, while stressing our unwavering intention not to walk away from or be driven out of Vietnam.

3. Cultivate

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3. Cultivate a public posture of restrained self-assurance.

Avoid dramatic military actions which may prove unnecessarily provocative. Play the whole military effort in the lowest key which our democratic society will permit. Reduce bombing north of the 17th parallel to occasional symbolic raids "for the record." Indicate to both the Soviet Union and leading unaligned nations our willingness to undertake another cessation of bombing for a longer period of time if they believe it will contribute to their efforts to open the door to meaningful negotiations.

4. Launch a massive appeal through every means possible

(leaflets, radio, etc.) to the South Vietnamese people beyond our military protective shield to support the agrarian and other reforms necessary for a stable peaceful non-Communist South Vietnam. Extend as quickly and concretely as possible broad economic and social benefits to these areas, including a credible amnesty program for Viet Cong who lay down their arms. Set up "land bank" offices where each rural family can come to receive valid title to a specific adequate land holding (a Homestead Act). Distribute (perhaps even air-drop) official passes which will entitle the holder or his children to attend government schools and receive medical treatment in government hospitals. Publicize the plans for power, and irrigation development. Use every device to speed the pace of democratic economic and social reform.

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While there is no assurance that this approach will prove effective, it has certain clear advantages: (a) it establishes a practical military defensive position which logically fits the President's stated objectives; (b) it helps to isolate China and the hardliners in North Vietnam; (c) it diminishes the likelihood of a direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation from which only the Chinese could benefit; (d) it encourages the U.S.S.R. to cooperate, however covertly, in pressing for a peaceful settlement; (e) it vastly improves our world position while reducing our actual and potential losses; (f) it would be reasonably invulnerable to political attack here in the United States.

NEA/SOA:CBowles:mac
7/27/65

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

88

July 8, 1965
11:30 a.m. Thursday

MEMORANDUM FOR
ROBERT KOMER

Would you please study this
and be ready to talk with
the President about it today.

Jack Valenti

JUL 8 1965

CHESTER BOWLES
ESSEX, CONNECTICUT

88a
July 6, 1965

Dear Mr. President:

I deeply appreciate the thoughtful letter which you wrote me following my recent session with the surgeons at St. Barnabas' Hospital. I was sent home well ahead of schedule and feel greatly relieved to have this particular problem behind me.

After ten days of consultation in Washington in late July I plan to leave for New Delhi on August 3rd, as I had originally planned. In the meantime, I assume that our policies in regard to India will be under review and since I cannot participate in the discussions I would like to pass on some personal observations for your consideration.

Let me say at the outset that I believe the greatest personal contribution that I can make to you and to your Administration is to keep India off your list of emergency worries, and if possible, to turn this vast and sometimes exasperating nation into a major political asset.

However, this will be possible only if there is a clear understanding at the highest levels of our government, first, of India's absolutely decisive importance to a favorable power balance vis a vis China in Asia and, second, of the very special nature of the Indian situation.

In this respect I think it is pertinent to remind ourselves of the heavy price we paid for not understanding China. Although a wide variety of explanations have been advanced for the loss of China to Communism, I believe it is clear that our inability to effect the final result was not due to any failure of Harry Truman or Secretary Marshall in the late 1940's but rather to our lack of awareness in the late 1930's and early 1940's of the forces which were relentlessly pushing China towards disaster. Because our attention at that time was focussed on domestic economic problems and the growing crises in Europe, it was impossible to bring our influence to bear on the situation in China when an effective and sensitive U. S. policy might have led to a very different outcome. Similarly, if the policies and programs which you have promoted so vigorously in Southeast Asia since you became President had been introduced in the mid 1950's we would have been spared the frightful dilemma which we face there today.

Against this background it seems to me essential that we recognize now while we still have the capacity to influence the course of events, the disastrous effect that the loss of India as a free and independent nation would have on the world balance of power, and that we devise policies which recognize

in a realistic way the obstacles and opportunities which confront us there.

Right now the danger in India is not primarily from China but rather from the Soviets who see in India, with its key geographic position and a population greater than the 55 nations of Africa and Latin America combined, an element of decisive importance in their drive to upset the world political power balance.

Nevertheless even when we accept India's crucial importance it remains for us (and I suspect also for the Russians) a difficult nation with which to deal. For instance, it is very easy to become frustrated with India and to draw some unbalanced conclusions. What most impresses those who do not work directly with India is its vast size, poverty, population growth, the nagging conflict with Pakistan and the irritating self-righteousness of many Indian leaders. What is less apparent but for the long haul vastly more important is the extraordinary expansion of education at all levels, the vigorous new approach to population control, the rapid growth of science and industry with special emphasis on electric power, transportation and heavy industry, the thoughtful new emphasis on rural development, and the continuing commitment to democratic institutions and a free society.

By and large the economic assistance we have given India has been extremely well used and greatly appreciated. Although our aid has been very substantial in absolute terms it is well to remind ourselves that on a per capita basis it is about half what we have given Pakistan and a much smaller percentage of what goes to most Latin American countries.

What we need now as I see it, is a realistic, bold but sensitive approach to the Indian government which will offer the economic and military support necessary to assure India's economic and political success strictly conditioned, first, on India's own willingness to take the initial economic steps in her own behalf (decontrol, continuing emphasis on the rural areas and population control, more initiative for the private sector, etc., perhaps devaluation, etc.) and second, a clear policy by the Indian government not to make our task in world affairs any more difficult than it already is (if they can't overtly support us in a given situation let them at least assume a positive and honest neutrality).

In my opinion an understanding along these lines is feasible provided it is presented to the Indian government with a keen sensitivity to the political climate in which the Shastri


government must work. Although India desperately needs our help, any Indian government which appeared to barter its political independence for capital loans from either the west or the Soviet bloc would not remain long in office.

In my opinion, we should proceed in the next sixty days to achieve the kind of basic understanding which I have in mind. It will take careful planning and the most skillful negotiation in New Delhi and Washington. It is a task which I would personally undertake from my end with confidence, provided our position is a realistic one that fully takes into account the sensibilities of a proud and newly independent nation and the economic, political and military elements that are essential to Indian success.

May I add one final thought: If there are any doubts in your mind about the political and economic analysis of India's potential that has been advanced by me and my associates in New Delhi, I would welcome the assignment by you of an outstanding individual who would visit India for three or four weeks and report directly to you on (a) the effectiveness of our present operation in India, (b) the outlook for India's economy, (c) the depth of India's political and military opposition to Communist China, and (d) the prospects for an independent, viable and friendly India that in cooperation with Japan, Australia and other indigenous nations could take the lead in establishing the foundations of a stable and anti-communist Asia.

With my warmest personal regards and good wishes.

Sincerely,



Chester Bowles

Bowles

239
to
Bowles
7/65

Dear Chet:

I've just been told of your personal travail--and of its highly successful outcome. You've shown true courage, and I admire you for it.

We need you back in India, so accept all my best wishes for a quick return to duty. I also look forward to seeing you before you return to Delhi.

Sincerely,

Chy



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 2, 1965

Rowles

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Bob:

I wrote the President directly about my memorandum to the Secretary and told him that you would send him a copy.

I do hope the President will read this memorandum as I think it is highly important that we give it top level thought and decision within the next few weeks.

In my letter I also included a paragraph about the rupee situation. I do believe that a visit with the President by John Rooney would straighten the whole thing out.

My warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Rowles

Chester Bowles

The Honorable
Robert W. Komer,
The White House.

If there are better ideas - so much the better!

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
with SECRET Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 8-27-03

JUN 7 1965

91
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June 10, 1965

Mac -

Chet Bowles' attached letter to the President creates a dilemma. It's thought-provoking and worth reading, especially at this time. On the other hand, everything we send LBJ on this subject doubtless raises his suspicion that the India lovers are feeding him more propaganda.

Bowles

My hunch is just to put it cold in weekend reading without endorsement. What say?

RWK

Attach. Bowles ltr to President 6/2/65 w/att
Bowles Memo to SecState 5/20/65

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-27-03

92
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

*Copy to me
by RWK memo
6/11/65*

June 3, 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Mr. President:

I have not asked directly to see you during my brief visit to Washington because I know that you are heavily burdened and because I shall be back in Washington following my home leave in New England. However, in the interval, there are two matters to which I should like to direct your attention.

1. I am asking Bob Komer to send you a memorandum to the Secretary which underscores what I believe to be the irrelevance of some of our present military assistance programs in South Asia. Although I do not suggest that my proposals are the final answer, I believe that our present policy which originated in a totally different era under different conditions is becoming increasingly ineffective, contradictory, and potentially dangerous.

I earnestly hope that before my return to Washington a survey of this situation can be conducted at a high level in our Government. Some timely moves now could not only save us a much more serious situation in the future but also help to create the basis for a major political success story in an area which I believe will be decisive in respect to Asia as a whole.

2. My second problem involves our steadily increasing rupee reserves. When I saw you six months ago, these reserves amounted to over \$500 million. Since then they have grown by \$50 million, and they will grow by \$100 million more in the coming year. As you know, our use of these rupees is severely restricted by present legislation. As a result, we find ourselves faced with a situation which the normal taxpayer would find difficult to understand, i.e., while the Soviets

proceed to

The President,
The White House.

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State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *8-27-03*

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with SECRET Enclosure

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- 2 -

proceed to expand their informational and educational propaganda programs to the point where they are now three times greater than our own, we are inhibited from meeting the challenge by restrictions which, I am sure, are a result of a Congressional misunderstanding of the situation we face.

I should hate to see another legislative year drift by without some effective action. I would be deeply grateful for whatever you can do.

With my warmest good wishes for all that you are striving to accomplish,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "C. Bowles", written in a cursive style.

Chester Bowles

CONFIDENTIAL

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-2-

scene might become increasingly relevant to India's own development.

In the last few years this strategic situation has been turned upside down. While Chinese political and economic influence in India has sagged to the disappearing point, the Indian army along the 2200 mile border to the north now faces a formidable array of Chinese divisions supported by a vast network of newly constructed roads.

Although the possibility of Soviet armies moving through the Hindu Kush or thrusting south towards the Persian Gulf now seems remote the Soviets in South Asia have come to represent a formidable and growing economic and political challenge.

In the face of these changes, our long-established commitment to the economic development and political stability of the subcontinent remains of crucial importance. However, in view of the drastic switch in the nature of the overall challenge our military-political policies have become increasingly questionable.

The purpose of this confidential memorandum is to explore the implications of this changing situation and to propose a course of

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action to fit it. It deals specifically with five questions:

First, US objectives on the subcontinent within the current framework;

Second, India's political and military relevance to these objectives;

Third, the prospect for India's internal political and economic development as it bears on our objectives;

Fourth, the shortcomings of our present policy in South Asia as underscored by recent events;

Fifth, the steps which we believe necessary if the United States Government is to deal with this situation realistically, effectively, and in time.

I

U.S. Objectives on the Indian Subcontinent

Under current circumstances United States objectives on the Indian subcontinent are fourfold:

1. To secure the subcontinent against Chinese penetration.

Most immediately this calls for the development of South Asian military forces adequate to deter or if necessary to defeat a

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Chinese thrust into South Asia with moderate forces (a massive Chinese attack would require outside assistance).

For the longer haul it calls for the presence of a viable, friendly and militarily effective India on the flank of any Chinese aggression into Southeast Asia, and ultimately the creation of a strictly Asian defense and development organization in cooperation with Japan and perhaps Australia, the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand to assume broader economic, political and military responsibilities.

2. To contain Soviet political, economic and military influence in the subcontinent.

It is important that the Soviets be denied a revolutionary role in any future economic or military emergency in the subcontinent. Consequently the USSR should be kept as far as possible from the South Asian political control levers.

If possible this should be accomplished in a way that will leave the door open for a shift in basic Soviet policy that might ultimately permit some degree of cooperation toward shared objectives (e.g., containing Chinese aggression in Asia).

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In the meantime we should not be overly concerned about Soviet economic assistance in itself. As long as it comes without political obligations it will contribute to our primary objective--a viable and independent India. If strings become evident we should promptly review our position.

3. To achieve dynamic and sustained economic growth in India and Pakistan.

The long-term political stability of the subcontinent will depend in large measure on the degree of economic growth and the manner in which the added production is achieved and shared.

In addition to providing substantial economic assistance we should use our leverage insofar as possible to maintain a reasonable balance in each nation between development and military defense.

4. To reduce tensions between India and Pakistan to the maximum extent possible.

The present embittered confrontation diverts the attention of both nations away from their primary objective of rapid economic growth and consequently threatens their political stability. US policy should be so conceived that it dampens rather than exacerbates Indo-Pakistani tensions.

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II

India's Relevance to US Objectives in Asia

The National Policy Paper for India (October 1964) stressed the critical importance of India to the national interests of the United States in the following terms:

"India is the only non-Communist country on the Asian mainland which by its size and resources may eventually add a substantial independent weight to the Asian power balance. Its loss to Communism would tilt the strategic balance of Asia sharply, if not decisively, against us.

"India shares a disputed 1500 mile frontier with Communist China and, like the United States, it sees China as a long-run security threat.

"India is the largest non-Communist country in Asia. Its 450 million people are more numerous than all Latin Americans and Africans together.

"India's industrial potential is great, while its position at the core of South Asia may give it increased future leverage on Asian politics."

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This statement of America's stake in a free and effective India as a fulcrum for our broader objectives between the Mediterranean and the Pacific is reflected in the substantial and remarkably effective investment in India's economic development we have been making here over the past decade.

The emergence of Communist China as an aggressive military force and our massive commitment to the defense of Southeast Asia further underscores the key importance of India.

III

The Prospects for a Viable, Independent India

It is the opinion of this Mission that India's economic and political progress and prospects are by and large favorable, and that India's policies, domestic and foreign, although often frustrating in their daily manifestations, have been moving in the right direction.

This considered judgment is shared by representatives of the World Bank, the Foundations, the United Kingdom and others.

A. The Indian economy is beginning to move ahead impressively. In the fiscal year ending March 31 the incentives to Indian

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cultivators provided by long overdue price rises plus a good monsoon resulted in a 9.8 percent increase in India's total foodgrain production over the previous all-time high.

The adoption of vigorous new agricultural policies long advocated by our Mission plus the extremely capable leadership of the Agriculture Minister promise to push production steadily higher.

The increase in India's gross national product for the recently completed fiscal year appears to be just under seven percent in real terms.

The prospect for increased private capital investment and a reduction of controls also seems favorable. Standard Oil of Indiana is undertaking a major fertilizer investment (\$60 million) in Madras. Although the proposed agreement between the Bechtel fertilizer consortium and the Indian Government has run into heavy weather the Indians are now pressing for a series of large U.S. built plants in the private sector.

Right now every American economist I know in India (including representatives of the Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, World Bank, etc.) is convinced that with adequate foreign exchange

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-9-

support the Indian economy in the next five to seven years is capable of a major breakthrough to a sustained high rate of growth.

The record is particularly reassuring in view of the fact that India is one of a half dozen countries in the emerging world which are committed to democratic development and by all odds the largest and most important.

B. The Government of India now appears committed to a massive birth control program. With the development of a simple intrauterine device plus a new sense of urgency the matter of population control is beginning to receive the top priority which we have long advocated.

C. The Government of India has been pursuing a foreign policy aimed at blocking the spread of Chinese power or influence and resolving those problems from which the Chinese might stand to gain.

At the recent Belgrade meeting the Indians were instrumental in shaping a resolution on Vietnam that coincided with the United States interests. The Radhakrishnan proposal which also reflects in a general way the American position has been given official GOI sanction as the basis for a negotiated settlement.

At present the Indians are working closely with the Japanese

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-10-

on measures to check China's influence at the Algiers conference in late June, including support for the credentials of Malaysia, encouragement of the presence of South Vietnam, and a vigorous effort to promote a moderate, constructive outcome.

D. The Government of India continues thus far to refrain from building an Indian nuclear arsenal. In view of China's second nuclear explosion and India's current sense of insecurity, the situation is admittedly fragile. Nevertheless India in spite of persistent political pressures to build its own bomb is still committed to a search for an effective way to prevent the proliferation of nuclear powers.

This is not to suggest that India's economic success and political orientation are assured, nor that some serious deviations from America's views of the world are not apparent. But we are convinced that the situation in India is generally favorable to our interests. With appropriate policies, a sensitive diplomacy and a reasonable commitment of resources the United States can go far towards assuring India's economic success and influencing Indian policy in Asia toward a moderate and constructive course.

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-11-

IV

The Relevance of Present U.S. Policy

Right now we are confronted with a disturbing paradox. India's domestic objective of a viable democratic state and her foreign policy objective of resisting Chinese aggression coincide more closely with our own interests than do those of any other major emerging nation.

This mutuality of interest is reflected in our National Policy Paper and in our past record of contributions to Indian national development.

Yet in spite of these advantages the fact remains that we have been losing influence in India to an extent that may soon begin to jeopardize our fundamental interests not only here but throughout Asia.

In the last few weeks even those Indian leaders who have most consistently favored a close relationship with the United States have been caught up in a national wave of insecurity, frustration and uncertainty. This disturbing new mood is compounded of several elements which had been lying just under the surface. If US policy is to deal effectively with India it is

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-12-

essential that we seek to understand them.

To some extent India's present insecurity is the emotional inheritance of two hundred years of subservience to the colonial rule of a white western power. Another factor is the psychological impact of the sudden Chinese attack in 1962.

After India's long, patient effort to cultivate a friendly relationship with China the attack itself was an embarrassing testimony to the misjudgment of India's leaders; the fact that the ill-prepared Indian Army was routed added a sense of national humiliation. Two years later the successful Chinese nuclear test rubbed salt into the wound.

On top of this came the episode of the Rann of Kutch which reinforced India's sense of insecurity and opened the door further to a whole series of illogical fears, suspicions and resentments.

This reaction can best be understood in its psychological setting. Night after night in a period of deep national uncertainty the Pakistan radio in Lahore beamed to north Indian audiences, which included most members of Parliament, stories of "another crushing Indian military defeat", of 350 Indians killed (in fact

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-13-

only fifteen), of Indian troops "running like rabbits", and of Pakistani officers boasting, "We could have advanced all the way to Bombay."

Added to this emotional mixture of frustration and resentment was the widespread charge that this "great Pakistani victory" was made possible by tanks and other military equipment provided by Pakistan's ally, the United States.

For several years Indian fears of the implication of the US-Pakistan alliance have been fed by three factors:

1. The knowledge that the weapons we have given to Pakistan are better suited to a mechanized drive across the plains of the Punjab toward Delhi than to countering a Chinese or Soviet attack in the mountain passes to the North.

2. The frank assertions of many Pakistanis that their alliance with the United States is in fact aimed at India are typified by the assertion that in return for Pakistan's support for America against its enemy Russia, the United States had agreed to support Pakistan against its enemy India.

3. Our inability for security reasons to explain to the Indians

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-14-

the importance of our installation in Peshawar.

In this context the Pakistani admission of the use of United States equipment in Kutch and our reluctance publicly to criticize their use for fear of upsetting the British cease-fire negotiations was skillfully exploited by the articulate left in India to demonstrate that Pakistan's frank interpretation of the United States-Pakistan agreement was essentially correct.

Now even the most moderate Indian newspapers editorialize that the assurances of John Foster Dulles and President Eisenhower (assurances which had been repeated again and again by every American Ambassador, including myself) have been tested and proved empty.

Thus the use of United States equipment by the Pakistanis to win the "crushing victory over the Indian forces" which was vividly described by the Pakistan radio has called into serious question both American intentions in this part of the world and our ability to pursue those intentions effectively.

At the same time, India's focus has shifted from China, which a few weeks ago four out of five Indians (like most Americans) viewed as their most dangerous threat, to Pakistan with which the

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-15-

United States seeks to maintain a friendly relationship.

It is essential, however, that we not lose our perspective. Although India's tense and unreasonable reaction to recent events is disturbing, the results of our labors in India over the last ten years will not easily be washed away. The United States retains a massive reservoir of respect throughout India; with careful handling this can become the basis for a close and constructive future relationship.

Moreover, most thoughtful Indians are deeply uncertain about the future of Soviet policy in Asia; glowing Indian press accounts of Shastri's visit to Moscow may lessen this uncertainty but they will not eliminate it. Nor is there any particular sympathy for the authoritarian Soviet political system.

Most Indians recognize that there is a ceiling on the amount and kind of economic development assistance that the Communist nations can supply. They also know that Soviet interest in India is heavily contingent upon Sino-Soviet relations and that as long as the Russians continue to dream of a future rapprochement with the Chinese they cannot undertake an unrestrained political, economic and military commitment to India.

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-16-

Consequently the most prevalent attitude in India seems to be a compulsive desire for self-sufficiency in everything, and especially in defense. This is accompanied by the realization that commitments between nations are meaningless unless they are rooted in immediate mutual interests that are recognized by both parties.

At this stage no one can accurately predict how the situation will develop. If we fall prey to our frustrations and fail to mend our fences and if the Soviets act with boldness and skill, events in the subcontinent could turn even more sharply to our disadvantage. If, however, we recognize the basis of our dilemma and focus our attention on the many interests which we and the Indians have in common I believe we can almost certainly recover the lost ground and move ahead to a much more solid relationship.

The outcome in any event is not a distant matter. India is approaching a political and economic watershed of the most decisive importance. Within three to five years the shape of things to come will, I believe, begin to become evident.

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-17-

IV

A Suggested New Approach

In dealing with the situation which I have described we have a choice of four courses of action. Although none is easy, three of them, it seems to me, are impossible; the fourth, while requiring some difficult adjustments in our present posture, would enable us to bring our policies in the subcontinent into line with our basic objectives in Asia.

Here are the four choices:

1. We can continue to adhere to our present policies in both Pakistan and India doing the best we can to sweep the recurring conflicts under the rug and to ride out the inevitable storms. This, as experience demonstrates, will result in the continuing erosion of our position on both sides of the border.
2. We can abandon all United States aid to the subcontinent or cut it to a dribble. This would be to abdicate to the Soviets and/or to China our position in this critical nation and to render our present massive efforts in Southeast Asia meaningless.
3. We could maintain economic aid to Pakistan and India while cutting off military assistance to both countries. This

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-18-

would open the door for the Soviets to fill the military equipment gap in India as they have previously done in Indonesia, the UAR and elsewhere. This in turn would enable the Soviets to develop a key political position in the Indian military, and create an even greater military imbalance between India and Pakistan. Ultimately it could maneuver us into supporting the weaker of the two countries against the Soviet-armed stronger power.

In this connection, it is now clear that even during the last two years the United States has consistently underestimated the Soviet willingness to help India militarily.

In April 1963, during the review of our military assistance program just before my return to India, the possibility of Soviet assistance was largely discounted.

Yet since then the Soviets have contracted to supply the Indian Army and Air Force with 93 tanks, three squadrons of MIG 21s, a complex of three separate MIG factories capable of producing six planes a month, 500 air-to-air missiles, 17 surface-to-air missile battalions, and 20 helicopters.

Recent reports indicate that a new agreement is now

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-19-

being negotiated for the delivery of 83 additional tanks and 170 130mm. artillery guns with persistent rumors of sizable Soviet additions to the Indian Navy. Under an earlier agreement 31 AN-12 cargo-troop carrier planes were also provided.

4. We can separate economic from military aid and establish criteria which apply to both countries equally. The following interrelated steps designed to carry out the fourth approach will, I believe, give us a less contradictory and hence stronger position on the subcontinent and enable us to pursue our major objectives in Asia more effectively.

a. Military Assistance

i. We should allow no basis for compromise in regard to the paramount strategic objective of the United States in Asia: the containment of China until such time as China chooses to live peacefully with its neighbors.

As long as India and/or Pakistan is genuinely committed to the defense of the subcontinent against China and has the capacity to play a meaningful role we should provide appropriate United States military support. Such assistance need not exceed existing budget

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-20-

levels under present conditions.

However, a nation failing to subscribe to this objective and to cooperate in achieving it should receive none.

A clear statement of United States policy along these lines will give both India and Pakistan a solid reference point against which each can formulate its own policies and predict the consequences of its own actions.

It will place both nations on the same footing and subject them to the same United States judgments. It will exert pressure on the Pakistanis to abandon their flirtation with China, and to join in the defense of the subcontinent. In regard to India it will give us the advantages of a joint understanding against China without entangling us in defensive alliances and depriving us of the initiative.

ii. The type of weapons which we provide henceforth should be geared solely to the logistical and tactical requirements of a war against China in the northern mountains or on the eastern approaches.

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-21-

iii. While recognizing the right of the recipient country to use United States arms in self-defense we would naturally retain the right to cancel any or all future assistance if in our judgment our arms have been used aggressively.

The present problem of policing the use of United States equipment would remain, although it would be considerably reduced by the more clear-cut diplomatic posture which I have suggested, and hopefully by an effective effort to reduce Indo-Pak tensions.

However, for two reasons it is difficult to implement any sort of assurance that US equipment will not be used improperly by either party. First, there is usually some doubt as to precisely how the trouble started; and second the application of US sanctions, which the aggrieved party had assumed would follow automatically, may appear to us unwise in a particular instance such as the Rann of Kutch.

Consequently we should offer neither India nor Pakistan further guarantees against the use of US arms by the other, but confine ourselves to a commitment to support either in a case of clear aggression through the UN or unilaterally if

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-22-

need be.

If Pakistan is prepared to forego its present political gambit with China and join seriously in the defense of the subcontinent it should be welcomed as a recipient of military assistance, tailored however as in the case of India to defensive action in the mountains of the north, not on the plains of the south.

B. Economic Assistance

We should continue our economic assistance efforts in both countries.

In both Pakistan and India our aid is being used effectively. With continuing support there is every reason to anticipate an increasing rate of growth which will lay a firm basis for political stability.

If increased US funds are clearly needed to speed self-sufficiency, and if the recipient country is prepared to take the steps to assure its own effective performance I believe we should provide them.

The primary purpose of our economic assistance in India and Pakistan is to achieve self-sustaining growth as

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-23-

quickly as possible and ultimately to participate as free nations in the world economy. Our aid, however, constitutes an important lever in both countries. While India at least might go to the Soviet Union for military equipment, as have the UAR and Indonesia, the major inputs of foreign exchange which are essential for economic development in Pakistan and India can only come from the West.

C. The US Alliance with Pakistan

Recent events have demonstrated that our present military alliance with Pakistan has become irrelevant to the present situation in Asia. It seriously weakens our position in India and tempts Pakistan into a whole gamut of diplomatic adventures which undercut United States interests vis-a-vis both China and Russia.

When we give military assistance to India for defense against China we infuriate our so-called ally; when Pakistani pressures cause us to refuse India the tanks and fighter planes that we have already given Pakistan a frustrated India turns to the Soviet Union for the help which the United States has denied her. (India has thus far secured no military equipment

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-24-

from the USSR which has not first been requested from the US.)

United States policy toward each nation should henceforth clearly reflect our national objectives and imply no favoritism or special status except that which may be earned by a common approach to a common danger and the effective use of our assistance in respect to that danger.

History cannot be made to run uphill. It is no more possible for us to underwrite a military power balance between Pakistan and India than it would have been for the European powers to underwrite such a balance between Mexico and the United States at a comparable stage in their development. And just as it would have been folly for Mexico to attempt to hold back the development of the United States, so it is folly for Pakistan to assume it can dampen down the development of India.

Although it may be argued that this approach to military assistance may drive Pakistan into the arms of China, I do not believe the risk is significant.

United States economic aid and PL 480 shipments are

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-25-

the backbone of Pakistan's successful development effort and right now China cannot provide even for her own minimal requirements. Nor could Pakistan conceivably persuade the USSR to switch its support from India with its vast potential to a country one fifth its size.

Some may also be concerned that the proposed policy change may jeopardize our special facilities in Peshawar. However, a decisive stand by the US Government, backed by the massive leverage of our existing economic assistance programs, should insure the continued cooperation of Pakistan in regard to these installations. But even if the risk were far greater than I believe it to be the failure of our present policies and the implications of further erosion of the US position in this crucially important nation would require us to face it.

Admittedly the process of establishing the proposed new relationships may involve us in some painful exchanges. But I believe that the end result will be the creation of a far sounder and more realistic American relationship with

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-26-

both Pakistan and India which with skilled handling may eventually lead to the easing of tensions between the two.

Certainly the effect here in India would be greatly to strengthen our influence. And as India's confidence in the United States increases, this influence can effectively be used to moderate India's relationship to Pakistan.

Indeed the proposed new criteria in regard to military aid could be discreetly conditioned on India's willingness to work towards a reconciliation with Pakistan. Our economic assistance in both countries can also be used as a carrot to draw them into mutually beneficial cooperative economic ventures.

This memorandum addresses itself to one of the most complex and politically costly situations currently facing the US Government. Although it leaves many questions unanswered and possibilities unexplored I hope it may stimulate an urgently needed inquiry into a situation which will refuse to stand still.

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-27-

I am deeply fearful that the US position in South Asia is now being steadily eroded by policies which, however valid in the mid 1950's, no longer address themselves to the political, economic and military realities.

In the 1930's and 1940's those who were close to the situation in China watched the deterioration of our position there with similar forebodings. If America's China policy had been able to come to grips with the forces which were then shaping events in the most important nation in Asia we might presently be living in a different world.

In the coming years we cannot permit ourselves to slide into a similar debacle in the one Asian nation that is potentially capable of providing a counterweight to the challenge that China now poses.

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Bowles India 94

New Delhi - May 24, 1965.

Dear Bob:

I am enclosing two memoranda which I believe you will find rather challenging. One is by Bill Weathersby and the other by Bob Brooks. Together they provide an impressive argument why it is essential for us to find some way to free up our surplus rupee holdings which are now nearly one-half billion dollars and increasing at the rate of \$100 million annually.

By using these rupees skillfully we can outdo the Russians or anyone else in building a solid position here in India where right at the moment this task needs all the support we can give it. The President's proposal for a five percent fund would go far to solve our problem. I earnestly hope we will not lose another session of Congress without some kind of action.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Mr. Rober Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.