

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
03	letter	Komer to Bowles [sanitized 1/02] (dup. #6, this file; #158, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134) <i>Dup #19, Files of Komer, India File, Box 24</i> <i>Dup #122, Papers of Komer, Chron Feb 1966, Box 6</i>	S	2	2/9/66	A
		<i>OPEN 8/21/13 per NLJ 12-245</i>				
04a	cable	Komer to Bowles <i>Dup #115a, Papers of Komer, Chron, Jan 1966, Box 6</i> Same per RAC 5-1-03 same sanitization 8/6/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-364	S	1	1/6/66	A
05	cable	Komer to Bowles Same per RAC 5-1-03 same sanitization 8/6/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-364	S	1	2/18/66	A
06	letter	Komer to Bowles (dup. #3, this file; #158, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134) <i>Dup #19, Files of Komer, India File, Box 24</i>	S	2	2/9/66	A
		<i>OPEN 8/21/13 per NLJ 12-245</i>				
11	letter	Bowles to Komer <i>OPEN 3/3/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-363</i>	S	2	3/3/66	A
12	letter	Bowles to Komer (dup. #12a, this file) <i>OPEN 3/3/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-363</i>	S	1	2/15/66	A
12a	letter	Bowles to Komer (dup. #12, this file) <i>OPEN 3/3/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-363</i>	S	1	2/15/66	A
12b	airgram	A-725 from New Delhi <i>OPEN 3/3/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-363</i>	S	2	2/17/66	A
12c	airgram	A-725, attachment 1 <i>OPEN 3/3/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-363</i>	S	4	2/4/66	A
12d	airgram	A-725, attachment 2 <i>OPEN 3/3/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-363</i>	S	3	2/4/66	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer

Folder Title "Bowles, Chester L. 1966 - "

Box Number 13

Restriction Codes

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12958 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
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9/19/2003

Initials

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13	letter	Bowles to Komer (dup. #13a, this file) <i>open 3/3/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-363</i>	S	1	2/15/66	A
13a	letter	Bowles to Komer (dup. #13, this file) <i>open 3/3/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-363</i>	S	1	2/15/66	A
13b	memo	Must India Choose Between Growth and Justice? <i>open 3/3/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-363</i>	C	13	2/8/66	A
13c	memo	Differing Indo-American Attitudes <i>open 3/3/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-363</i>	C	8	2/12/66	A
16	cable	Bowles to Komer <i>sanitized 8/26/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-365</i>	S-	1	1/24/66	A
16a	note	handwritten note by Komer <i>open 8/14/12</i>	PGI	1	undated	A
20	cable	Bowles to Komer [sanitized 1/02] <i>more info released 4/5/10 per NLJ 12-240</i> (dup. #60, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134)	S-	1	1/8/66	A
21	cable	Bowles to Komer [sanitized 1/02] <i>more info released 4/5/10 per NLJ 12-240</i> (dup. #61, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134)	S-	1	1/11/66	A
22	cable	Komer to Bowles [sanitized 1/02] <i>same sanitization 10/18/13 per NLJ 12-245</i> (dup. #27, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134) <i>dup #69a, Files of Komer, Box 25, India Food Jan-Mar 66</i>	S	1	1/8/66	A

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9/19/2003

Initials

1
Bowles
+ Daniel Muehlen

March 29, 1966

Dear Al:

Enclosed is a copy of a letter from
Ambassador Bowles regarding your trip to
India in April.

R. W. Komer

Dr. Albert Wohlstetter
Professor of Political Science
University of Chicago
1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, Illinois 60637

Letter dated March 18, 1966

cc for RWK SOB office
2
Pawles

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

March 10, 1966

Dear Chet:

Am responding immediately to yours of 3 March, because you'll be returning shortly.

My answer to the points you make is a hearty "amen." By all odds, the real key to a successful meeting of minds between Indira and the President is for her to take a strong affirmative position -- describing in effect how she intends to make India hum and how India is determined to play an increasing role in the containment of China. On this latter point, few could deny that India's larger role in containing China over the mid and longer term is of greater ultimate significance than any symbolic presence in South Vietnam. But, and it is a big but, let no one forget that we are fighting a war, and that in wartime our Congress and electorate are far more influenced by what countries are doing for us today than what such countries can do tomorrow. As a politician, Indira must show comprehension for the President's political problems too.

I am sure that the President would be delighted if Indira took the initiative, and gave him a clear sense of her purpose. Do not hesitate to say, as I am sure the President would wish, that those close to him in the White House see him as eager for the most candid and straightforward private discussion among friends. You might say also that, as a practical man who knows the difference between campaign promises and genuine commitments and as one who is himself wrestling with running a major country, he is most impressed with those who talk in terms of concrete programs, not just visionary goals.

One note of warning. I hope the Indians do not count on us following up this meeting by immediately turning the aid tap full on again. Indeed, I would not envisage aid specifics being discussed much more than they were when Ayub was here. If Indira can convince the President that she is really going to take India somewhere, this may be the critically important ingredient in convincing him that India is worth a big investment. But let's not allow the Indians to expect that they will come home from this visit with X million tons of wheat in their pockets or full-scale "unfreezing" of U. S. aid. To do so is to invite likely disappointment, because I at least see the President as continuing to match response to performance, in the case of India as well as Pakistan.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 8-28-03

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

(page 1 of 2 pages)

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

-2-

March 10, 1966

Finally, I devoutly hope that you can get across to Mrs. Gandhi that mutuality is the key to a sound relationship between two great self-respecting powers. We'll invest in India if we believe in it, but India must in turn show some greater sense of understanding of U. S. interests and concerns. We don't want to see India in a mendicant relationship any more than Indians do, and the best way to avoid this is for the Indians themselves to tell us what common purposes would be served by U. S. aid.

Look forward with pleasure to seeing you quite soon.

All the best,

R. W. Komer

The Honorable Chester Bowles
American Ambassador
New Delhi

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

(page 2 of 2 pages)

SECRET/EYES ONLY FOR
AMBASSADOR VIA
CLASSIFIED POUCH

WA
3
Bowles
February 9, 1966

Dear Chet:

Many thanks for keeping me so well posted on matters Indian -- lack of response does not mean we're standing idly by.

Would that I could catch a ride on one of the many safaris to India. You might chide our good friend the VP for not taking a good liberal Democrat (as well as India-lover) along.

Despite the buffetings of fate, I am confident that our Indian affairs are still on the upgrade. Given our success so far, I see the President is determined to keep playing a reasonably tough game with both Paks and Indians, but easing up gradually in response to their performance. The 3 million tons was entirely his doing -- much more than recommended. But we must get India to badger Pearson, Holt, and de Gaulle -- not just leave it all to Uncle Sugar.

Your 1865 on your talk with Indira was very favorably received here from top to bottom. I hope you can get across to Mrs. Gandhi that there will inevitably be unfavorable references in the US press to past associations, etc., but that as she seizes hold this will all pass into history.

What is most needed is still for the GOI itself to take major new steps and then to come to us saying "look what we have done, now how will you respond?" Incidentally, in giving Indira your three point formula for good relations with the US, you left out China. At a time when Vietnam is so much the preoccupation here, we must get across to the Indians that they cannot expect us to believe they are taking the Chicom threat seriously if they continue to employ a double standard with respect to Vietnam. Nothing would convince the President more of India's bona fides than a more forthright stand on Vietnam. Nor, I am convinced, need such a stand get India into undue trouble with the USSR. The Soviets would be annoyed, but they are India's prisoners much more than we; they simply cannot afford to draw back from India, despite what it says about Vietnam, for fear of leaving Asia's key prize to the US.

By the way, your mention of "covert support activities" in your long cable recommending a new interim aid program caused many raised eyebrows. I am much of your persuasion and am trying to move this forward, but don't let the left hand know what the right hand is doing.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR~~

NLJ 12-245

By UCD

NARA, Date 07-26-2013

SECRET/EYES ONLY FOR
AMBASSADOR VIA
CLASSIFIED POUCH

Page 2

The sooner Indira comes the better, as the President reiterated a half dozen times to BK. Nor was he pleased with BK's comment that we'd already paid for our wheat, so might as well give it away. Nothing will succeed like a little honest gratitude especially with a President who quite rightly believes (as do many of us) that nations like India have come to take US generosity all too much for granted.

I still believe that my 4 January letter to John Lewis, with some changes, would make as good a scenario for India as for Shastri. I enclose another copy just in case. Do get Carol Laise's perceptive thinking too (but I have not told State of our private correspondence).

All the best, and expect to see you in late March.

Warm regards,

R. W. Komer

Honorable Chester Bowles
US Ambassador to India
American Embassy
New Delhi, India

SECRET/EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR

~~SECRET~~

January 6, 1966

4
Brooks
X Index (over)

Mac -

I've generated a dozen prods via State, AID, and Agriculture, but feel that an added side wire to Chet is needed, if you see no objection.

RWK

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-28-03

~~SECRET~~

4a

~~SECRET~~

January 6, 1966

TO NEW DELHI

[Redacted]

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM KOMER

Cannot emphasize too p̄sumptorily urgency of India mounting all out effort to get famine aid from other countries. We recognize that US will have to carry bulk of load, but adequate and timely US response may be critically dependent on our ability convince Congress and people that India not leaning exclusively on US.

All here aware of what Indians doing already and also recognize GOI's domestic political problem in avoiding too much local focus on famine. But from standpoint generating adequate US role, Subramaniam needs to be constantly reminded of what was stressed to him here -- that US wants to move in concert with others not be left to do job alone.

As added incentive to Indians to get shipping contributions from others, we don't want them to count on our paying freight under Title II. You might also get this discreetly into the works.

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 12-364

NARA, Date 08-03-2013

By LCB

SECRET

2/18/66

5 Bowler

SECRET

New Delhi

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

[Redacted]

For Ambassador from Komer

Subramaniam's request to Vice President that US pick up over six million tons India's remaining food deficit most discouraging. As you know, our ability be adequately responsive from here on critically dependent on full international effort which will convince US Congress and others we not being left to foot whole bill.

How do we shake apparent Indian assumption that somehow US will do so? It will be highly uncomfortable for us and for Indians if impasse develops on this issue later. To me, critical element is to get Canada and Australia to put in at least 2-3 million tons. This simply will not happen unless Mrs. Gandhi starts ball rolling by a personal appeal to Pearson and Holt (and perhaps French, Soviets, and Argentines), similar to her appeals to President. Urge you promote these well before she comes here so she can tell President what she's already done.

11:20 AM
Mr Komer took
to Secudip's office -

I believe for despatch

SECRET

sent

SECRET

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 12-364

NARA, Date 08-03-2013

By UCB

~~SECRET~~/EYES ONLY FOR
AMBASSADOR VIA
CLASSIFIED POUCH

6
Boulet
x India
February 9, 1966

Dear Chet:

Many thanks for keeping me so well posted on matters Indian -- lack of response does not mean we're standing idly by.

Would that I could catch a ride on one of the many safaris to India. You might chide our good friend the VP for not taking a good liberal Democrat (as well as India-lover) along.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

~~SECRET~~/EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR

NLJ 12-245

By LLD NARA, Date 07-26-2013

~~SECRET~~/EYES ONLY FOR
AMBASSADOR VIA
CLASSIFIED POUCH

Page 2

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All the best, and expect to see you in late March.

Warm regards,

R. W. Komer

Honorable Chester Bowles
US Ambassador to India
American Embassy
New Delhi, India

~~SECRET~~/EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR



EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Bowles

7

New Delhi - March 21, 1966

Dear Bob:

A number of private Indian citizens have written recently to offer financial assistance or personally to volunteer in support of our efforts in Viet-Nam.

I am enclosing a letter which I have just sent to one of them.

This is one more indication of the strong sense of sympathy which I think most people in India feel for the American position in Viet-Nam.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Enclosure:
letter to K. V. Narayana

Mr. Robert W. Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

7a
1

New Delhi, India
March 15, 1966

Dear Mr. Narayana:

In behalf of my Government, may I express my appreciation for your letter of February 12, for your support of our effort in Viet-Nam, and for the spirit of generosity which prompted your decision to enclose a check for Rs. 1,000 as a contribution to that effort.

Our Secretary of State has several times observed that freedom is indivisible. The freedom of men everywhere is endangered when aggression is allowed to succeed in any quarter. This is why we believe that Indian interests are as much involved as are our own in seeing that aggression does not succeed, whether in Viet-Nam or in the Himalayas.

Much as I appreciate the spirit in which it was given, I am returning your check for Rs. 1,000. My reason for doing so is quite simply a problem of mechanics. The rupee is not freely convertible, and to make use of it in Viet-Nam we should have to ask your government for its conversion into dollars, a request which would raise problems for your Government in view of the present foreign exchange stringency. Since the alternative to returning your check would be to bank it, and thereby add to the very extensive rupee holdings already in the hands of my Government, I am returning it to you. I am sure that, when you decided to present it, you did not intend for it simply to go into a bank account and there lie dormant.

Sri K. V. Narayana,
Barrister-at-Law,
Rajahmundry-1,
South India.

One possibility comes to mind, which you may not have explored: if the Indian Red Cross or some similar society could use the funds for relief work in Viet-Nam (such as for the many refugees who have fled Communist control), or could relay it to the International Red Cross for such use, your contribution might serve a very useful and important purpose.

Again, may I thank you for this expression of support.

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Clearance:PE/TREAS/SCostanzo (in draft)

PE:EX/LGrant/cap



EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

*Flat-track down when Wohlstetter
arr, and mail this to 'em.*

8

Bob

New Delhi, India,
March 18, 1966.

*Pommes
+ Schaefer
Muehlen*

Dear Bob:

Thank you for your letter of March 4, 1966, informing us of the arrival in India of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter in late April. Their proposed itinerary appears to be admirably suited to their purposes.

I want the Embassy to be as helpful as possible to them during their stay in India and, of course, we stand ready to do our best on their behalf. With this thought uppermost in mind, I wish to make the following comments and recommendations about their visit:

It is never easy for writers cum scholars--domestic or foreign--to meet and engage in meaningful and frank discussions with high-level GOI officials about very sensitive areas, as the Wohlstetters previous experience in this respect demonstrates. Even if the appointments can be arranged, the officials concerned have a tendency to be inhibited. Should such appointments be set up as a result of Embassy efforts, the net result could just be even more inhibitions on the part of the Indians.

I believe, therefore, the best way to approach the matter would be for the Wohlstetters to attempt to use Mr. Poplai, Indian Council of World Affairs, as their "programming agent". The Council has considerable prestige as well as good access to senior GOI officials and wide contacts in the non-governmental field, as well. I recommend that you suggest this to them, with the above rationale. We would plan to meet with the Wohlstetters soon after their arrival in Delhi, review their arrangements, and then we could decide how to proceed from there. At any rate, try this out on them and let us know the result.

Mr. Robert W. Komer,
The White House,
Washington.

- 2 -

There is a good chance that I will still be in the United States when the Wohlstetters plan to be in Delhi. In that case, Jerry will see to it that we do all the necessary to assist them.

I am looking forward to seeing you in a few days.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,



Chester Bowles



EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Bowles

9

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL
~~SECRET~~

New Delhi, India,
March 16, 1966.

Dear Bob:

I am enclosing my notes from my last meeting
with Mrs. Gandhi which, as you will see, cover
most of the points you have made in various cables.

Warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Mr. Robert W. Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,
SEC 1.1(a)

BY ju ON 2-17-93

9a

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL
SECRET

New Delhi, India,
March 16, 1966.

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Warmest regards,

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The White House,
Washington, D. C.

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,
SEC 1.1(o)

BY ju ON 2-17-93

9b

- 1) Food situation: a) The problem of public relations abroad.
b) The need for pressing other governments -- letters from Mrs. G. to Pearson, Holt, DeGualle, etc.
- 2) Agenda for talks with President --
 - a) Indo-Pak: need for India to take initiative and be forthcoming short of the impossible on Kashmir.
 - b) Southeast Asia: need for private expression of understanding regarding our position in SVN.
 - - publicly acknowledge broad Chinese threat.
 - - GOI should stop blinking at evidence on ICC
 - - privately GOI should begin frank talks with us about how we both deal with China threat.
 - c) Economic pitch .. with emphasis on World Bank, Indian initiatives, and especially private sector.
- 3) Other aspects of Visit:
 - a) Would she like to bring her sons?
 - b) Who might go? If Dinesh Singh or others who have not seen much of US might one or two like to stay on for two weeks?
 - c) Would she be willing to come to pre-departure tea in her honor?
4. University program as an example of irritant?

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc NARA, Date 8-28-03



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

10



Bowles
(old file)

New Delhi, India,
March 11, 1966.

Dear Bob:

I am enclosing a copy of a speech which Subramaniam gave in the Upper House this week.

It is an unusually strong political statement as well as a forthright defense of his food policy. His political comments were very well received by Congress Party M. P. 's and it may well become the posture which the Congress Party adopts as the election approaches.

I think you will find it interesting.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Do read this!

Mr. Robert W. Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

New Delhi, India,
March 11, 1966.

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With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Mr. Robert W. Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

FOOD DEBATE
IN
RAJYA SABHA

8th March, 1966

Speech
by

(C. SUBRAMANIAM)
Union Minister of Food & Agriculture

PRESERVATION COPY

Mr. Chairman,

At the outset I would like to thank the hon. Mr. Vajpayee for having raised this debate. This is not a formal expression of thanks because I find that there is a good deal of confusion in regard to the food situation in the country and many wrong impressions are going about. I hope to deal with the matter in some detail and I crave your indulgence and also the indulgence of the House to give me some time to deal with some details of the complexities of the situation.

2. Sir, there is a good deal of difference of views with regard to the extent of the scarcity in the country and there is a controversy with regard to the import policy of the Government, the import which has been undertaken to meet the situation. Then there is a controversy with regard to the internal distribution system which we have adopted and finally - and I consider this the least important, perhaps of the least consequence - the personal calumny and political sniping which is going on as far as I am concerned personally. Having been put in the dock, I hope I have the right to plead my cause.

3. With regard to the actual situation in the country, it is necessary for us to understand how this situation has arisen. As a matter of fact, Mr. Nausher Ali, if I understood him aright, said that since independence food has become a problem. Perhaps he forgets that it was during the British regime that there used to be periodical recurrence

of famine followed by outbreaks of epidemics and large-scale deaths. Even though India is still largely an under-fed country, in spite of our failure on the agricultural front and other fronts which the hon. Members may point out, we have the record and we can take credit for it that we have not allowed large-scale famine, outbreak of epidemics and starvation deaths in the country. Sir, that is not important. What is important to realise, particularly with regard to the food situation in the country today is how agricultural production has increased with reference to the increase in the population and also with regard to the increase in demand. Why we failed on the agricultural front is another matter about which I shall deal later on after dealing with the food situation. I wish to refer to the production pattern which has led to the present crisis in the country today.

4. Sir, even for the Second plan period we fixed a target to be reached by the end of the Second Plan period. That target was not reached; there was a slight shortfall even during the Second plan period. Even if we take the Third plan period we find from 1961-62 onwards the production which reached the level of about 80 million tons by the end of the Second Plan period hovered round about 80 million tons, 79 millions tons and 78 millions in the first three years of the Third Plan period, the only increase in production taking place in the fourth year when it rose to 88.5 million tons. And when that happened we thought we were turning the corner and as a

matter of fact we were planning to reach a target of 92 to 93 million tons during the current year, that is, 1965-66, and arrangements were made on that basis. But unfortunately the monsoon failure came. I shall deal with the extent of the monsoon failure a little later but what is important is this year we estimate our production to be only 75 to 76 million tons. Therefore if we take the average for the Third Plan period, it is roundabout 79 million tons against which we had reached the target production of about 80 million tons by the end of the Second Plan. The production has stagnated at this level but it is not as if population has stagnated. Even in these five years there is an increase of at least five crores of people if not six crores. Therefore there is a long gap between the falling production and the demand which has been building up, firstly due to the rise in population and secondly, as has been explained by my Planning colleague, due to increase in demand because of the various economic developments taking place in the country. This is the picture. Therefore to think that there is sufficient production in the country and without any imports whatsoever it should be possible to manage the situation is to leave out of account what has taken place with regard to agricultural production in the country. And naturally we have to analyse why we have failed and draw up programmes for the purpose of seeing that this does not repeat itself during the Fourth Plan but that is quite a different thing. It is in this context we have to

look into what happened during this year. In September-October when we were thinking of formulating the distribution plan for the next year, that is, for 1966, we found there was widespread failure of the monsoon. Now, I have been blamed by some people that I have been exaggerating this scarcity. As a matter of fact there are a few papers which have made it a practice to accuse me saying that the Food Minister for the purpose of getting food under PL 480 is exaggerating the scarcity as if anybody ^{is} pleased to get foodgrains from outside! not only exaggerating with regard to the extent of the failure of the monsoon but also with regard to the estimates in regard to internal production. Now I would like to point what has been published in "The Times of India" with regard to the failure of the rains in India:

"The failure of the rains in India this year has been unprecedented. According to some experts perhaps nothing like this has been experienced since 1899 and the great famine that followed. But India's plight this year is not unique....."

He mentions that other countries also are undergoing a similar experience.

5. It is a global feature this year. We are concerned with our own situation. That was the report in the "Times of India" but there is another paper which takes the line today that there is absolutely no scarcity but it is the Food Minister - who has produced this artificial scarcity and is directing political sniping at me. But here is "Blitz" dated 27th November 1965. Under the heading "Forsaken by God, forgotten

by Government 10 millions face Famine" it says here:

" A famine more terrible than any experienced during the present century is today rapidly tightening its deadly tentacles round the State of Maharashtra....Of the twentysix districts in the State there is not a single one which has not been at least partly gripped by famine. More than 10 million people in the countryside out of a total population of 40 million in the State have been directly and severely hit. Not a single cereal crop has escaped famine's ravages, crops of pulses, oilseeds and vegetable plantations have also shrivelled up for want of water. As a result prices of pulses, vegetables and edible oils are shooting up day by day all over the State. There is no fodder for cattle. This has led to an abnormal rise in the price of milk."

This was what was published on the 27th November and I think later on of course as usual "Blitz" has changed its side as it always changes to suit its own inclinations and depending on whomsoever it wants to attack but that is quite a different thing. It is not only publications in newspapers but we have been receiving reports from the various State Governments that the traditional reservoirs which used to get filled up during the monsoon season were almost dry; right from the Mettur Dam in the south to Bhakra -Nangal we are receiving reports that because of this abnormal failure sufficient quantities of water have not been stored up. Not only sufficient quantities have not been stored up but there are only insignificant quantities in them. Not only the reservoirs are like this but even in the great rivers starting from the Cauvery in the south to the Sutlej in the north the flow of water has considerably decreased. Even Punjab in spite of its having the best water supply system has complained that there is not even 50 per cent

of the usual water supply which is required for agricultural purposes. When there is so much failure of monsoon, when the great reservoirs are almost empty, naturally the tanks dependant on surface flow and the wells dependant on surface percolation have also become dry. In my own farm which is situated in the Coimbatore District during the monsoon the wells used to get filled and water used to overflow. But I have been recently there - not only recently but during the monsoon season - and I could see the bottom of the well and the electric pumps and other things were lying idle. Therefore it is not a question of fiction or imagination of the Food Minister that a catastrophe like this has developed but it is a fact. Three days back I was in Gujarat State and I drove about 200 miles across the roads to find out the conditions there, and in the tanks which used to get filled up I saw only parched earth. And the Mabe river which used to have a good flow during the season had become almost a streamlet. This is the position. The monsoon has failed and everywhere it is parched, even Chhatisgarh which is the rice bowl of India and Madhya Pradesh, because there has been absolutely no rain whatsoever - Members coming from there would know how Raipur and other districts are faring. In the past they used to export four to five lakh tons of rice from that area to Maharashtra, Gujarat and other areas.

6. It is not that any State has escaped but comparatively Bengal is better than other states. So this was the state of affairs in October-November and then we had this conflict with

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Pakistan and this led justifiably or unjustifiably to a pause in assistance from the various countries and for the purpose of meeting this situation we were not in a position to allocate foreign exchange to import on a commercial basis foodgrains in considerable quantities, rice or wheat from any source whatsoever. And as hon. Members are aware, even with regard to PL 480 imports from the U.S.A. there was a good deal of uncertainty. Therefore this was the developing situation, or I should say, the deteriorating situation with which the Government was confronted in October-November when the harvest was to come and we had to make an estimate of what would be the availability.

7. But what could we do at that time?

Were we to sit tight and wait, watch the situation develop, or act as a responsible Government? As a Minister responsible for the supply of foodgrains, was it not my duty at that time to find out whether it would be possible to supplement the supplies within the country from outside sources? Or should I say: 'No', let me sit tight and see. With whatever is produced within the country let us try to manage as best as possible.' Some people theoretically calculate, after all, even in spite of every thing there is this production of 75 million tonnes, out of which about 50 to 55 million tonnes would be cereals. If we make an equitable distribution, take all this 55 million tonnes and then calculate the per capita availability, then we will be able to distribute 12 ounces or 13 ounces to everybody. That is more than enough. If I had taken that theoretical view, then I would have been in the position of a person

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who tried to cross a river on the basis of its average depth. To say that it would be possible for the State Governments and the Central Government to absorb the entire thing from the producers and then distribute it on an equitable basis--from the experience I have had as Food Minister now for eighteen or twenty months and also having regard to my experience in an administratively very efficient State, in Madras, for two years I have no doubt in my mind it is an administratively impossible task. It is an impossible task to take over the entire production and then say: I shall equitably distribute it throughout the country, in the urban areas and the rural areas, on the basis of 13 ounces or 14 ounces each. Therefore, the only way to meet the situation was to supplement the availability here by imports and what was the order of that was also a matter to be noted, because it was not merely a million tonnes or two million tonnes. On the basis of the estimates we made with regard to production, because of this failure, we found that a minimum quantity of ten to twelve million tonnes would be required. Where was this available? Were the foodgrains available anywhere in the World? Fortunately or unfortunately for Mr. Bhupesh Gupta and his group, the only country which could think of giving this ten million tonnes or twelve million tonnes or a little more than that was the United States of America. Therefore, was it not my duty, as a responsible Minister, to find out whether it would be possible to get these ten million or twelve million tonnes from the only source from which it was available in order to avert this disaster? And that was why I took up the matter and it was not as if I

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personally took up the matter. With the concurrence of the entire Cabinet I took up the matter with the United States administration to find out whether they would be willing to help us, in spite of the Pakistan conflict, in spite of everything else, in the face of the natural calamity, which had befallen us, whether it would be possible for us to get this quantity made available to us to meet the situation.

8. Not only that. A little background will have to be given with regard to this, because people seem to think as if something is being forced on us. As a matter of fact, this very same "Blitz", from which I quoted this, when I anticipated that 12 million tonnes would be imported, published it saying that 12 million tonnes of poison is being imported. I will come to that, how this "poison" is acting, what it does for us, but that is quite a different thing. This question of PL 480 was taken up even in March 1965 to find out whether they would be able to enter into an agreement with us for supplying it on a long-term basis, because with all the best efforts, my calculation was that for the next two, three or four years, we will have to import some quantities of wheat or rice. Therefore, we had taken it up with them for the purpose of finding out whether they would be prepared to enter into a long-term agreement. Then, they sent a mission here for the purpose of finding out what the agricultural situation in the country was because they also found that every year our requirement was increasing, from two million tonnes it went up to four million tonnes. Then, it went up from four million tonnes to five million tonnes and then it went up to

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six million tonnes. Now, we are faced with the situation of a natural disaster where the order of requirements would be ten or eleven million tonnes. That team came over here and reported that on the basis of the formulation of the Fourth Plan, which we have attempted, even if the entire funds are made available and the entire funds are used economically, efficiently and effectively, the target we would be reaching by the end of the Fourth Plan would be only 97 million tonnes, against a projected estimate of demand of about 122 million tonnes. Naturally they said that even if the U.S.A. wanted to help us, this order of requirement would not be available. Therefore, they cautioned us by saying that this dependence on PL-480 would be a dangerous risk for India. Unless we tightened up our agricultural programme for increased production to reach a production of 110 or 120 million tonnes, this continued dependence on PL-480 was going to be the biggest danger for India. It is not communists alone who have been pointing it out. The USA also says that this dependence will have to cease. And, therefore, they wanted to examine our programme to find out whether there was any possibility of reaching the higher target.

9. Apart from that, we were also examining our agricultural production programme to find out whether, on the basis of the experience we have had for the last three Plan periods, any deviation from the traditional policy was required for the purpose of reaching the targets, or whether we should continue to think in the same old way. Therefore, we have also formulated a new-production programme, to which I shall come later on. We have also formulated a new programme using certain improved varieties—and they are on a package basis—and it should be possible for us to

reach the targeted production of 125 million tonnes. Therefore, we informed the U.S. administration that it is not as if we are going to follow the same old tradition. We have another programme which we have evolved for the purpose of seeing that during the Fourth Plan we make a new approach to the problem of agricultural production and reach the figure of 120 or 125 million tonnes. We had it vetted by our own scientists, by our own experts. We had it vetted by the FAO experts and then we indicated to the USA that it is not as if we are going to continually depend on them. With our new programme we are going to reach self-sufficiency within a reasonable period. It is on that basis we had to impress upon them the necessity for imports, that it is not as if we are going to continue to depend upon it. We have a programme, a positive programme, a feasible programme, which will take us to self-sufficiency. I had talks with Secretary, Freeman, when I visited Rome. All along they had talked about it. Of course, I was not going to the USA for the purpose of discussing PL-480. For the purpose of discussing the agricultural programme I would be prepared to go I said, but not for the purpose of getting PL-480. But they made it possible for us to discuss at Rome where Secretary Freeman was also attending the same conference which I was attending. We had a full discussion. After the full discussion, his experts and he himself were fully convinced that this was a programme which had meaning, which was purposeful and which would take us, if properly implemented, to the goal of self-sufficiency.

Therefore, Secretary Freeman went back and then had discussions with the President, informing the President the gist of the discussion he had. It was on that basis, when a worth-while agricultural programme had been evolved and they were convinced, that President Johnson invited me to go to the United States to discuss this agricultural programme and also PL-480. It is not as if anybody was against this, my going in for PL-480, because there is an impression that over the head of the Cabinet, I had bulldozed every Cabinet Minister, including the Prime Minister, that I had bulldozed the President. I am sorry they credit me with a capacity which I do not possess. Frankly I do not possess that. It was said that it was over the head of everybody, above the opinion of everybody, that I went to the U.S.A. for the purpose of negotiating this. Sometimes the Congress President's view, the leader of my Party, is quoted for the purpose of showing that the Congress President had a different view and in spite of that the Food Minister went, and flouted his view. I have an article before me, and extract from it, and I would like to read it for the benefit of Mr. Bhupesh Gupta.

"Immediately there is no alternative but to import whatever foodgrains we can from wherever we can in order to stave off the present crisis. Therefore, while it is true....."

SHRI BHUPESH GUPTA: What is the date?

SHRI C. SUBRAMANIAM: This was published in the Congress

Souvenir for the Jaipur Session. Therefore, it is not as if anybody was against it. As a matter of fact, I had discussed it with the Congress President before I left for the U.S.A. and I can inform the House that I went with his blessings even when I visited the U.S.A. Therefore, this is just this kind of particularly communist tactics, of dividing us within the Congress, as if the Congress President is on their side and all the others are on this side. The communist tactics always are to divide the party, of calling one as progressive and another as always reactionary. I think the Party should realise how the Communist Party is playing this trick of dividing the Party. The same thing happened when Jawaharlalji was there, they would say, Jawaharlalji was good, but all the other Ministers were bad. They can deceive a few persons for a long time and perhaps deceive all persons for some time, but they cannot deceive all the people all the time. That should be realised by the Communist Party. Their tactics have got to be exposed in this way.

10. Therefore, there is no question of any different view as far as the Cabinet is concerned.

It was a Cabinet decision, and it was on the basis of

the Cabinet decision including the present Prime Minister, that I went to the U.S.A. for the purpose of negotiating this. Fortunately when I went there, it was not as if it was our own assessment; they had also made an independent assessment of the short fall in production which was likely to arise during this year due to the failure of the monsoon. Fortunately there was good response from the President and also the U.S. Administration there, and apart from the commitment they gave an assurance that whatever quantities would be required for the purpose of meeting the present situation would be made available. In that connection they also suggested from the political point of view even for India whether we should depend solely on the U.S.A. or in the present context this aid should be internationalised. Therefore, the suggestion was made whether instead of saying that we would solely depend upon the U.S.A. for the purpose of meeting the situation, other countries who were in a position to help us should not be brought into the picture. I said that I would certainly consider this aspect of the matter and place it before the Prime Minister and the Cabinet and on the basis of that we would intimate to them what action we proposed to take. After coming over here this question was considered and we came to the conclusion that even politically from our own point of view sole dependence on the U.S.A. was not good and that therefore it was better

in the present context to find out whether other countries also would help us. That is why we issued an appeal to various countries that in the present context we would welcome aid from those countries to meet the situation. This is how it came about that we approached the other countries also and it was on a Government-to-Government basis, and it was on that basis that some aid was flowing. At this time came the crisis in Kerala, the "Kerala Bundh" and all the attendant publicity on the basis of that "Kerala Bundh", seventeen or eighteen countries responded; Canada, Australia, the U.S.S.R., and various other countries. We never intended that we should make an approach to private individuals or any such thing. But this "Kerala Bundh" attracted the attention of the world that there was hunger and starvation and famine going in this country, and the Pope made an appeal on the basis of this "Kerala Bundh" that there was a very difficult situation in the country and therefore everyone should come forward to help. It was on that basis that some private collections were organised in Italy and Holland. Should we be churlish when the Pope himself came forward and because of the situation developing here made an appeal, not at our instance, but on his own initiative and some people came forward to help? I respectfully submit that this only shows the extent of friendship that exists between the international communities today, and there is nothing to be ashamed about this, and it is not a question of one going about a begging. I have no doubt that if such a situation had arisen in any part of

the world, India also would have responded in the same way and we would have asked our people to save as much as possible, as even Delhi people came forward to save rice and hand it over to Kerala as much as possible, even small quantities. Not that it would save the situation, but it is a psychological factor that there are others coming forward to help in the present difficult context.

11. Unfortunately in the process of our own difficulties here, in the process of our own functioning here in Parliament with regard to various things with the opposition Parties and our own Party putting forward certain points of view, an impression had got round that there was a large-scale starvation in the country and that millions of people would die. This was being publicised in the newspapers, and I do not think Government should be held responsible for it. That is why we had a meeting of all Ambassadors and I told them that there was no question of famine in the old sense in our country occurring again, in the old sense of famine leading to starvation leading to an outbreak of epidemics and thousands of people dying; that such a thing we were not going to allow to happen particularly in the present context of the international community functioning and this much of aid also coming forward. Therefore, I requested them that this scare-mongering should stop - this is the word I used - in the foreign press, and they also understood the situation and wrote back to their respective countries where this was happening that there was no basis for this, that every possible step was being taken by the Government of India

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to meet the situation, that even though there were likely to be difficulties, there were likely to be scarcities there was no question of a large-scale famine occurring as of old and millions of people dying on that basis. That was scotched. This was the pattern.

12. I would now like to say how we are meeting the present situation. No doubt we have till now tided over the crisis, but on what basis? As I said, in February we pumped into the market this "poison" which we have imported to the extent of 800,000 tonnes. Assuming that with one tonne 125 people could be sustained for a month, if we take 800,000 tonnes which we are pumping into the system, this is feeding with regard to the adult population about 10 crores of people. For this month, for March, it is going to be 900,000 tonnes, and in the coming months, which the Prime Minister characterised as going to be very critical, we are contemplating a supply at the rate of 1 million tonnes or a little more. Therefore, while the situation is really critical, the situation is really difficult, what is important is that we anticipated these difficulties and took anticipatory action. Not merely dependent upon imports alone, as I already stated on another occasion we organised extra additional production, wherever water resources were available, by mobile pumping systems, by having new

pumping systems installed, by having kutchra wells immediately dug, etc, and immediately brought under cultivation additional acres to the extent of 3.5 million. Fortunately with the steps we have taken it has increased to 4 million. Even with this, even with the best of efforts, this could give only 2 or 3 million tonnes. Therefore, it is not as if we were mainly depending upon imports alone. Other actions we have taken. For distribution also we realised the difficulties. We called a conference of Chief Ministers and impressed upon them the necessity of controlled distribution and restraint on consumption. On that basis we issued various instructions and asked the State Governments to undertake statutory rationing in as many areas as possible. But statutory rationing has not been undertaken to the full extent programmed, and it was mainly because of the uncertainty of supplies at that time and also till recently; and because of the decreasing production internal procurement became difficult. External supplies were uncertain till January or so, and therefore they were not in a position to take up the rationing, and particularly the rice position became a little more difficult. This is how in rationing there has been

a little hesitancy. In spite of that one by one the cities are now coming under statutory rationing, controlled distribution and restrained consumption as far as possible. It is for this I am maligned, I am accused, by the leftist, by the so-called progressive papers that I have sold the country. Let this House and let the Parliament take the responsibility to decide today that we will not have any import, that we shall have to starve and die. (Interruption) I would ask the House to vote on this issue that we do not want any import and we are prepared to get along, that despite this situation we shall not import, I am prepared to abide by that and starve with all others and take the consequences also. No, Sir, I have no doubt whatsoever in my mind that posterity will say that this Government took anticipatory steps and avoided the greatest human catastrophe which could have happened but for these steps. Even with all the distribution of 800,000 tonnes, what is the situation in the country today which is created by the various political parties?

13. What would have been the situation if this quantity was not being made available to the people today - eight hundred thousand or nine hundred thousand tonnes? I have no doubt in my mind that as hungry people, they would not have any respect for law,

they would not have any sentiment, they would not have any sense of law or sense of security whatsoever. I do not think that Shri Bhupesh Gupta would have made his speech or I would have made the reply here. The whole structure would have broken down. I have no doubt about it in my mind. I am sure, posterity would say,---in spite of all the maligning which is going on today, that this Government saved the country from a critical situation by their timely action, by anticipatory action. I have no doubt about it in my mind. Therefore, I would request the hon. Members, particularly the Members belonging to the Communist Party, whatever might be their prejudice with regard to America, whatever might be their prejudice with regard to other countries, to set it aside, see the situation within the country today and see that the people are saved instead of creating a good deal of confusion - saying, "This is poison. This should not be got. Even without this, we can manage." In a critical situation, it is absolutely necessary, particularly for political parties, to take a responsible attitude with regard to this and see that this situation is lided over. And admittedly, it is going to be a very difficult situation. And if people think that the food problem can be solved by processions or by slogans or by setting fire to the buses or by setting fire to trains or to public offices, it is not going to solve the problem.

14. On the other hand, it is going to make the position a little more difficult and it will not be possible for us even to move food to the areas where we have got to move, if this sort of lawlessness, if this sort of violence, takes place. Therefore, there is a great responsibility upon every political party represented in this Parliament to feel the seriousness of the situation and function in a responsible way so that we are able to infuse confidence among the people. More than anything else, it is not scarcity which creates difficulties, it is scare which creates difficulties, and it is this scare which these people are trying to create everywhere unfortunately, and to exploit the situation, particularly in a pre-election year. This is the real difficulty.

15. My conscience is absolutely quite clear that I have done my duty by the country in going to America and getting this PL-480 grains. I am prepared to say this before any man or God. It is not a question of selling the interest of the country. Or the other hand, it is saving the country at a critical juncture. For that, I do not want appreciation, I do not want praise. After all, a Food Minister, particularly in the Central Government, has got to be a karma yogi, Sir. Whatever he does in a difficult situation is likely to have some difficulties or other. There is no perfect solution for that. That could be taken advantage of. But, unfortunately, I have not yet attained that mental poise. But in spite of that, I shall try my best as long as this

Government is there and as long as I have the privilege of being a part of this Government, and we shall continue to do our duty to see that this critical situation is tided over. And I hope that in that task I will have the co-operation of all the responsible Members of this House.

16. Now, the question which arises is this. We have failed, so far as agriculture is concerned, during the Third Plan period. That we have to admit. We have to go into this and find out what has been done or achieved with regard to the physical targets during the Third Plan period and why, in spite of that, the results have not been achieved will have to be fully analysed. For example, with regard to major and medium irrigation, in spite of the shortfalls and all those things, the achievements are like this. In the First Plan, our target was 8.5 million acres; our achievement was only 3.1 million acres. In the Second Plan the target was 10.4 million acres and the achievement was 5.5 million acres. In the Third Plan the target was 12.8 million acres and the achievement is likely to be 6.00 million acres. A total of 14.6 million acres have been brought under irrigation during these three Plan periods. In regard to minor irrigation, the First Plan target was 11.2 million acres and the achievement was 9.5 million acres. During the Second Plan the target was 9.0 million acres and that target was achieved. We find that the target under minor irrigation during the Third Plan to be 12.8 million acres and the achievement

likely to be made is 13.1 million acres. So, according to statistics, a total of 31.6 million acres of additional areas has been brought under cultivation under minor irrigation. It is not only in regard to irrigation. About compost and other things, Shri Bhupesh Gupta was waxing eloquent and asked why we should go in for fertilisers, why we should not depend upon compost. In rural compost (production) the level reached at the end of the Second Plan was 67 million tonnes and in the Third Plan 139 million tonnes. With regard to urban compost (distribution) the level reached at the end of the Second Plan was 2.4 million tonnes and at the end of the Third Plan it was 4.2 million tonnes. And about green manure (area), the level reached at the end of the Second Plan was 11.0 million acres and at the Third Plan it was 26.1 million acres. In regard to soil conservation, the benefits accrued, in the First Plan, to the extent of 0.7 million acres, in the Second Plan two million acres and in the Third Plan 11.8 million acres. But this may be short by one million tonnes. Even then it will come to 10.8 million acres. In regard to land reclamation, the achievement in the First Plan was 5.0 million acres, in the Second Plan 2.3 million acres and in the Third Plan of 3.0 million acres. About areas under improved seeds - that is, of the traditional varieties - the level reached at the end of the First Plan was of 33 million acres, 55 million acres in the Second Plan and 164 million acres in the Third Plan. Plant protection in the First Plan was given to 6 million acres, 16 million acres in the Second Plan and it went to 40 million

acres in the Third Plan. About short and medium-term loans, from Rs. 50 crores in the First Plan it has gone up to Rs.380 in the Third Plan. In the long-term loans, the outstanding reached from Rs.13 crores from the First Plan to Rs.150 crores in the Third Plan.

17. It is not as if we are keeping quiet. In spite of all this why this has happened, will have to be gone into and analysed and ways found for improvement; otherwise, we will again be repeating the same mistake.

18. Sir, in this connection, I would like to point out what a famous economist, after studying the conditions in developing countries with regard to agriculture, had to say as the first paragraph in his book 'Transforming Traditional Agriculture'. He is Theodore W. Schultz. He studied India and various other developing countries. This is what he said--

"The man who farms as his forefathers did cannot produce much food, no matter how rich the land or how hard he works. The farmer who has access to and knows how to use what science knows about soils, plants, animals, and the machines can produce an abundance of food though the land be poor. Nor need he work nearly so hard and long. He can produce so much that his brothers and some of his neighbours will move to town to earn their living. Enough farm products can be produced without them. The knowledge that makes this transformation possible is a form of capital whenever it is an integral part of their material inputs farmers use and whenever it is a part of their skills and what they know."

19. If we think that we can reach the level of production to meet the requirements on the basis of a traditional agriculture we will be committing the same mistake. That is what

we did during the first three Plan periods. Therefore, unless we have a programme of modernising agriculture on the basis of science and technology, merely going on saying that we will bring all virgin lands under cultivation, as Shri Bhupesh Gupta said, will not work, Shri Bhupesh Gupta said, let us bring all virgin lands under cultivation and immediately we will be able to solve the problem. That was what Mr. Khrushchev did in Russia saying that he would bring all the virgin lands under cultivation and that by that he would solve the food problem of Russia. Now, they are saying that the investment required to be put in the virgin land reclamation has gone waste and that they should have some other method for tackling the situation. I quote about Russia because only mention of Russia will satisfy him.

20. Therefore, Sir, this is the thing which we will have to take into consideration. Therefore, when we say "introduction of science & technology", it is not a slogan. This is a positive programme of action which will have to be thought out and which will have to be evolved. Whether the new development of science and technology will give us a break-through in agricultural production is a matter which will have to be considered in all seriousness.

Sir, in all humility I would like to submit that the one field in which development has taken place, which alone will solve the food problem of India and which will solve the food problem of the humanity as a whole is the science of genetics. It is the science of genetics which has given

us the facility, which has given us the capacity to evolve new strains with whatever characteristics we want, and it is by using these new varieties alone that we would be able to solve the food problem of India and the world food problem of the coming years, and of the coming centuries too.

These new varieties are capable of yielding three to four times whatever traditional varieties yield. And it is not, Sir, as if it requires a long time of seven or eight years to have to evolve all these varieties. Fortunately, atomic energy, which is being used for peaceful purposes today gives us the facility to have varieties, hundreds and thousands of varieties in one stroke, and the selection can be made out of those irradiated varieties and we can have cross-breed of any one variety with another and we can evolve any characteristic in a plant whatever we want.

With regard to wheat, I would request the hon'ble Members to come to the Pusa Institute here and try to find out what is happening there. Now almost by a magic wand we have evolved something to protect the corns from the birds just like horns for the purpose of protecting animals. And, therefore, it is this new science, science of genetics alone which can give us this breakthrough, which can give us higher production per acre. Productivity can be increased only on that basis. We are moving forward thus after a good deal of consideration, good deal of consultations; our scientists, our agricultural officers, they were all concerned with this programme. During the last three Plan-period, in spite of our best efforts, we have not achieved

results. Therefore, can we not introduce this new science of genetics for the purpose of improving our production? And they came to the conclusion that it is possible because we have been having trials for the last three years. And during the last 18 months it has produced results. It is not as if this is something which is being achieved in the other parts of the world and we have not done it. Our own farmers have achieved this level of production. As I said, only three days back I was in Gujarat, in Dohad, the birth place of Aurangzeb. I visited a farm there. A Mexican variety of wheat, which is grown there not in half an acre or one acre but in 11 or 12 acres or so, was cut in my presence. One acre yielded the phenomenal quantity of 102 maunds. This was achieved by a farmer. This is the yield potential of this new variety of wheat we are getting.

21. It is not an individual performance. It is happening in U.P. It is happening in Bihar. It is happening in Madhya Pradesh. It is happening in Maharashtra. Therefore, it is not as if some miracle is happening far away from us. This has been achieved by our ordinary farmers by using the new varieties and modern practices. In the same way about paddy, instead of 3,000 to 5,000 -- even in the best of circumstances -- their performance ranges from 6,000 to 8,500, and in some cases it goes even to 12,000 lbs. Therefore, we are identifying these varieties

and adapting these to our conditions. That is the programme.

22. In the same way, hybrid wheat is a well-known thing, hybrid sorghum, hybrid bajra, ragi. These are the six major grains which we have selected for improved high-yielding varieties. This is the programme which we want to put forward.

23. Sir, I want to tell hon. Members, particularly Mr. Bhupesh Gupta, he is mistaken if he should think that by mobilising all our manpower forces, by digging the earth again and again, we can have increased production. Maybe, there might be some marginal increase. But we need significant increase which alone would save India, which alone would save the two-thirds of the population which is suffering from malnutrition and hunger today. It is not on the basis of traditional agriculture, it is only on the basis of modern agriculture and the application of the new science and technology alone that we can go forward. (interruption by Shri Bhupesh Gupta)
Kindly wait. I will come to that. What are the implications of this utilisation of these new varieties? It is not as if these new varieties yield something out of nothing. They have to be given plant nutrition to this level of production. That is where the fertiliser comes. My hon. friend thinks that chemicalisation of agriculture is not suited to our country. But our country, unfortunately, increases in population much more than any other country. Therefore, I say if chemicalisation is the only process through which this increased production and the

use of these new varieties are possible, then we have to somehow get it. How we can do that, on that there may be difference of views. But fertiliser is a must in this process. Not only it is a must in this process, along with this fertiliser, as I have already said, plant protection measures will be coming forward, and with all this comes water. This is a package.

24. Mr. Bhupesh Gupta has a grievance against me, that I am taking the country to a package deal. It is not a package deal of giving something to other countries. It is a package deal of practices to our farmers which alone will give us this increased production.

25. Then how do we get this fertiliser of this order required for this purpose? About this we can have a difference in views. But what is important is fertiliser. It can be made available by imports. But is it good for our country to import it? No, I do not think we will be able to have that much of exchange every year made available for this purpose. Instead of that, it has got to be produced within the country. I can tell you, Sir, whatever might be the commercial terms and conditions under which we enter into a contract with foreign capital for the production of fertilisers within the country, it is much more advantageous than getting fertiliser imported into the country. But I do agree that as far as possible we should see that our

own investments come in. That should come in only when we are in a position to fabricate this equipment within the country. Therefore, we are attaching the greatest importance to the machine-building industry which would give us the facility to fabricate these machines for the purpose of the fertiliser industry. But can we ask the people to wait? "I am going to develop the fertiliser and the fabrication machinery, till then the country should wait". Should I tell then, "Till then starve"? No. We have to put up factories as quickly as possible, and as quickly as possible we have to move to a position where it should be possible for us to use indigenous machinery for the purpose of producing the factory. This is the policy decision which we have taken. A difference of opinion is possible. But in the best interests of the country, we are trying to see that we reach the stage of self-sufficiency as quickly as possible. And this is the only course, Sir, which all the other countries also are adopting today. It is not only India. Russia, after a good deal of trial and error, what is the conclusion they have come to? I would read out because that would impress my hon. friend. This is the speech of Mr. Brezhnev dated 1.1.65:

"While on the subject of measures to advance farming production, it is necessary to emphasise the importance of the chemical industry in this respect. It must be made absolutely clear that all envisaged measures become far

more effective as the chemicals are introduced into agriculture on a large scale. The chemical industry has to improve its work, increase the rate of production and supply of high-quality mineral fertilizer, pesticides, herbicides and defoliants."

26. I do not claim, Sir, that I have found out a new mystery, a new secret or I have invented some new plan of action for this purpose. This is on the basis of world community experience, whether it be capitalist, socialist or communist. It is based on the basis of the experience, gained, by the world community, by the human community, Sir. It is not an invention or a figment of the imagination of the United Nations or the Food Minister of India. This is the programme. It is necessary if we have to move forward and if we have to have a break-through and have an order of production of this sort, I have absolutely no doubt in my mind that these new things are necessary.

27. But, Mr. Chairman, tradition dies hard. Not only the extreme right is traditional, I find in this country even the Marxist, even those who claim to be rationalists, they are more tradition-ridden than even the rightist. (Interruption by some hon. Members) I will give you a chance later. I would ask the Communist Party, which claims to be a progressive Party, what is their attitude with regard to the number of cattle in our country? Are they prepared to say that the cattle will have to be killed and their number reduced if we have got to make progress? They would not do it. What is their attitude with regard to

monkeys? They would not kill them. Sir, everything, unfortunately, turns round politics - how to become popular? Therefore, I tell you, today the tragedy of India is that even those who claim to be progressive, rationalists, Marxist, they are more tradition-bound. Therefore, they would not like any changes to be made. On the basis of status quo, on the basis of what we have already done, on the basis of practices that we have been practising for centuries we want to make progress which is an impossible task.

28. Therefore this is the thing that if today the country has got to survive, if the country has to produce enough, we have to utilise the science and technology. I want to go on emphasising it, repeating it, till I fall down because I see that this is the only salvation for our country and if not this year--we have saved ourselves this year--in the very near future, the greatest tragedy will be enacted here--the starvation deaths by millions. The Malthusian theory will come true. That is why it is on this basis we have to go forward. Naturally when we think in terms of this high investment in seeds, high investment in fertilisers, high investment in plant protection, the person who undertakes the task should be able to get back what he invests and make a profit out of it. That is where land reforms come in. As far as land reforms are concerned, I look at it from this rational point of view, pragmatic point of view, from the economic point of view, not merely from the basis of ideology,

but do the Communist Party believe in this peasant ownership? No, their philosophy is completely different. They shed crocodile tears for the farmers. Do they believe in small farmers? No, their idea is collective farming. Their philosophy is this. They believe in collective or large-scale farming and State undertakings, not private enterprise either in agriculture or industry. That is their philosophy but it suits them for political purposes to-day to say 'we are on the side of the small farmers or the agricultural labourers and let them be given lands.' But land reforms are important because it is a question of a tenant, particularly a crop-sharer, if he has to invest and if a major share is taken away by the landlord, then he has no interest in it. On the other hand he would lose. Therefore it becomes necessary that this tenancy will have to be on the basis of advantageous terms to the tenant. His terms also should be secured because it is not merely on the basis of one year, it is only on a long-term basis that he can make an investment of this sort.

29. With regard to ceilings, we have already made a law with regard to it. If it is not implemented what happens? There is uncertainty with regard to the ownership of the land. Therefore investment in lands does not take place. Therefore it becomes absolutely necessary that if we have to take to modern agriculture, we have to see that there are certainties with regard to the rights in the land, and if we keep and if

we keep hanging over the head of everybody the ceiling, enact the laws but do not implement it, it will be a Damocle's.

Sword hanging. No body cares to develop by investing in land because he does not know which part of the land he would get. That is why we are insisting that whatever laws we have passed will have to be implemented as quickly as possible.

Unfortunately I do agree that there is a little amount of tardiness or lethargy with regard to the implementation of it.

30. If we have to progress, we have to do it.

I would like to place before the Members the other aspect also, that if it is a question of small sizeable farms of five to ten acres where the peasant is the owner, that will produce results by itself? At least fifty per cent of our farms are of this size, owned and cultivated by the farmers. Have we had increased production there? So all this is only for creating an environment or circumstance in which they would be able to function effectively and invest profitably. Therefore it is not merely peasant ownership or small sized farms which are important for intensive cultivation but transformation of that agriculture, as I stated already, and the utilisation of this new science and technology which is important which alone would give this order of production. Therefore while all the other measures are important for enabling this, even if we take all the measures necessary, if we still continue to have the old traditional agricultural method, I have no doubt in my mind or on my part to declare that we are not going to solve the food problem at any time whatsoever. Therefore

I humbly submit that this is the answer to that. Naturally with regard to this, the distribution problem also has been brought into it. Particularly in a deficit economy and when there is a large gap between demand and supply, any system which we evolve is bound to meet, with some difficulty or the other. A painless operation is impossible in this task. It is not as if I am wedded to the State Zones but even taking the State Zones, why have they failed? The State Zones have led to difficulties because of the propensity or inclination of the surplus States not to part with the surplus of sufficient order and even when there is difficulty with regard to production-- there has been decrease in production-- when equitable sharing has to come about. Suppose I make this into a larger zone, will human tendency be simply changed to say that there should be free movement? I have no doubt in my mind that in a period of shortage, even if the Government had permitted foodgrains to move, even as the people in Kerala agitated, I am sure the people of the other States also would have started an agitation that in times of scarcity the foodgrains shall not move from one place to another. Now at least when there was difficulty in Kerala because we had cordoned off each State, we at least tell the Governments, 'Now it is your responsibility, having cordoned off the State and taking the responsibility for procurement, you have to deliver so much for the benefit of the deficit States. I am able to impress on them and bring pressure on them. In a bigger zone the States' responsibility will not be there.

On the other hand there would be informal restrictions by the people or by the district authorities or by somebody else and we would not have known where the scarcity would have developed and we would have had to take unplanned action everywhere and we would not have been able to meet the situation of this sort. I am not saying that this is a perfect system. I am prepared to consider alternatives. That is why I have circulated a paper giving all the other alternatives and I will try to find out and I am prepared to sit with anybody to see which alternative is the best but once having chosen that alternative, you cannot say: 'I will have this alternative but also some elements of the other alternatives also.' Each alternative has its own implications. If I have to undertake the responsibility of controlled distribution by the Government, to that extent I have to get by procurement those quantities for distribution and if that is not possible, I have to get it by imports. As far as rice is concerned, unfortunately rice is not available in the world market for love or for money. That is the real difficulty and even with regard to Bengal, the situation is, there has been a shortfall of 6.7 million tonnes of rice during this year but if you take the pattern of production, we will find that Bengal is much better-placed as compared to the production in many other States because fortunately the rains did not fail to the same extent in Bengal, as in the other areas. In this context, therefore, they have to do with whatever is possible, with whatever they have been

able to produce and whatever is possible in the present context to get from outside sources. If they think that all the other States should deliver more to them, all the other States also are in difficulties. This is the situation which should be realised. Even in Bengal to-day we are delivering during this month 110,000 tonnes of wheat and it is being consumed. It is not as if it is not being consumed. Next month also 110,000 or 120,000 tonnes could be given. Therefore we have to deal with the situation as it exists. I cannot, even as the Food Minister, create an ideal situation in which every food preference could be catered to. This is the real difficulty.

31. There has been a little bit of profiteering, as I said, and we are trying our best to see that this does not take place, particularly in a period like this, and that is why we are insisting that, instead of the State Governments functioning, the Food Corporation should come into the picture so that they may trade in and procure them on a commercial basis and distribute them on a commercial basis. Fortunately the State Governments are veering round to this viewpoint that probably in the long run it would be better to entrust this task to a commercial organisation rather than the State Governments undertaking this. But I want to plead with

this House that yet the situation is difficult, and it is going to be, as said by the Prime Minister, a lot more difficult in the coming summer months. If only we co-operate with each other and evolve methods for the purpose of tackling the situation, I have no doubt in my mind that we shall be and we will be able to prevent starvation deaths. We shall prevent famine occurring in this country. We shall prevent any starvation deaths happening in this country. I am confident about it because of the aid, because of the aid which we are getting and which we hope to get, and we hope to tide over the difficult food situation. And our endeavour would be not to rely upon this external assistance. Our endeavour would be, on the basis of this new programme, to reach self-sufficiency as early as possible. In that task also I crave the indulgence and co-operation of this hon. House and the country as a whole.

(Ends)

~~SECRET~~

New Delhi, India,
March 3, 1966.

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Bowles

Dear Bob:

I have been working steadily along the line of your letter of January 4 to John Lewis, as you could see from the two very private memoranda I prepared to further Mrs. Gandhi's education. Subramaniam tells me that she has read the memoranda carefully and that they have helped to give her a larger measure of understanding of our point of view as well as a guide for the future. If this is in fact true, it is encouraging.

I think we all view the approaching visit of Mrs. Gandhi with the President with uncertainty. Mrs. Gandhi right now is in an uneasy mood, keenly aware of her unsophistication on economic matters and with an eye cocked toward the rapidly fluctuating political forces and her still fragile political position within the Congress Party.

If in this mood she sits back and waits for us to take the initiative the President will naturally ask her to do some things which may cause her to take fright, not because the requests are unreasonable but because they are coming from us and therefore expose her to the charge that "she is bowing to U.S. pressure." In this situation she may reply negatively, and the fat will be in the fire.

The best answer is for her to take an affirmative position, describing her hopes for stepping up India's growth rate, her commitment to critical economic reforms including a better break for the private sector, her desire to become independent

of

Mr. Robert W. Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ / RAC 12-363

By LLD NARA, Date 02-19-2014

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of foreign aid within, say, a ten year period, and the role a stable responsible India might begin to play in the containment of China.

Such a presentation would give her the feeling that she is taking the initiative. If she says all the things I would like her to say there would be no need for us to pressure her; rather we can simply endorse and support her commitments.

Whether I can persuade her and her associates to adopt this forward strategy rather than a "let's wait and see approach" is an open question, but I can assure you I shall do my best. I will be most grateful for any suggestions you may have for these talks with her.

Steb and I are planning to return on the 18th, arriving in Washington the night of the 20th which will give us a solid week before her arrival. Although I would like to come earlier to take care of some personal business I feel my time will be better spent here in Delhi in the next two or three weeks.

As a result I am putting my personal and family business at the end of my stay with the hope that I can get back to India by the 12th or 13th of April.

With my warmest regards to you and Gerry,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

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EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

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Bowles
New Delhi, India,
February 15, 1966.

Dear Bob:

I hope you will take a few minutes to read the enclosed records of recent conversations which Ambassador Reischauer had here in New Delhi with the Foreign Secretary and Minister of External Affairs.

The Ambassador, as I think you know, came at my request to explore the feasibility of a closer relationship between Japan and India as the starting point of a non-Communist counterweight to China (see my memorandum to Secretary Rusk of December 21.)

The Indian Government people were surprisingly affirmative and forthright in their reaction. This rather encouraging impression is strengthened by recent reports in Indian newspapers and comments by Indian officials whose minds seem to be moving in this direction.

Although it will be rightly said such a development will not solve our present problems in Viet-Nam it may begin to provide the basis for a much less vulnerable US position in Asia a few years from now, and that should be worth some effort and thought now.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Enclosure:

As stated.

Mr. Robert Komer,
The White House.

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NLJ/RAC 12-363
By L110 NARA, Date 02-19-2014

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 12-363
By LLLD NARA, Date 02-19-2014

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : TOKYO, SAIGON, VIENTIANE, BANGKOK, KUALA LUMPUR,
DJAKARTA, RANGOON

Amembassy NEW DELHI

February 17, 1966

Visit of Ambassador Reischauer to India

In response to my long standing invitation, Ambassador Reischauer paid an informal and productive personal visit to India January 30/February 6. From our standpoint it was a very great success.

- AMB 1
- DCM 1
- MINPE 1
- PE:EX 4
- PE:IN 2
- PRESS 1
- USIS 1
- USAID 1
- ARMA 1
- NAVA 1
- AIRA 1
- USMSMI 1
- CRU 2

He was briefed by the Country Team, spent two days in the Punjab (visiting Amritsar, the Agricultural University and the Advanced Agricultural Development Program operation at Ludhiana, the Bakhra Nangal Dam and the Nangal Fertilizer and Heavy Water Factory), participated in seminars at the Indian School of International Studies and at Delhi University, and engaged in discussions with a wide range of officials, politicians, journalists and Asian diplomats at a series of dinners and lunches given by me and DCM Greene.

Foreign Secretary C. S. Jha entertained him at lunch on February 5th. He called upon the Japanese Ambassador, and was entertained at lunch by him.

Norma Jager - 12

Although Ambassador Reischauer described his purpose as being his own education, the visit was highly effective in focussing high-level Indian attention upon the question of Indian-Japanese relations, the opportunities for a fruitful increase of economic and political intercourse between the two countries, and the possibility of developing

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By UUB NARA, Date 02-19-2014

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A-725 from NEW DELHI
Page two

a broader cooperation among the Free World countries of Asia as a counterweight to Communist China as suggested in my memorandum of December 23 to the Secretary.

From our standpoint, the most effective of Ambassador Reischauer's activities were two meetings held on February 4th with Foreign Secretary C. S. Jha and Foreign Minister Swaran Singh. Memoranda of those conversations are attached. (They have not been cleared by Ambassador Reischauer.) Perhaps the most important parts of those conversations were these:

a. Ambassador Reischauer forcefully presented the rationale for the belief that now is a particularly crucial time for India to make a move toward closer relations with Japan.

b. The Government of India was encouraged to promote reciprocal Prime Ministerial visits with Japan, and Swaran Singh authorized Ambassador Reischauer to quote him as "anxious" for a visit by Prime Minister Sato.

c. Common Japanese and Indian interests in resisting Chinese Communist expansionism were explored. Both Swaran Singh and C. S. Jha were particularly forthcoming as to the Indian interest in taking an active role in such an effort, and in the case of Burma C. S. Jha stated flatly that India would support Burma militarily in case of a Chinese intrusion or threat to Burma's independence.

We found Ambassador Reischauer's trip most useful, and we are appreciative of his taking this time to broaden his personal acquaintance with India.

We believe that, if India and Japan come to see their common interest in supporting and developing a sense of regional cooperation within non-Communist Asia, it would provide a strong base for the encouragement of similar cooperation among all Free World countries in the region.

Others among our Asian Ambassadors may find a look at India useful, and if so we shall welcome their visits.

Chester Bowles

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT : Japan and India

TIME AND PLACE : Ministry of External Affairs, February 4, 1966

PARTICIPANTS : Mr. C. S. Jha, Foreign Secretary, Ministry of
External Affairs
Ambassador Bowles
Ambassador Reischauer
Mr. Lindsey Grant, First Secretary

Ambassador Bowles remarked upon the importance of Japanese and India at the two ends of Asia, noting their crucial roles in dealing with the problem of China, and added that he believed the Government of India (GOI) saw the situation in somewhat similar terms.

Mr. Jha remarked upon Japanese post-war economic drive but "shyness to venture into the political world."

Ambassador Reischauer said that this shyness is changing drastically now. Japanese realize that Japan is large and important, and they are looking around to see what the Japanese role in the world should be. They may begin to show increased interest in India. He had made this trip to educate himself, in preparation for this eventuality.

Mr. Jha noted that there are differences in policy, that India is non-aligned and that Japan has limitations upon its freedom to cooperate with India. Ambassador Reischauer assured him that Japan does not seek a military alignment but looks to economic cooperation, and that their interest in political cooperation may increase. He expressed surprise at the smallness of India/Japan trade and at the lack of Japanese press interest in India.

Mr. Jha agreed that evidence of Japanese interest in broader political relations already exists. Vice Minister Ushiba is to arrive on March 3 for consultations, and the Japanese had indicated that he is more interested in political than in economic discussions (perhaps because they fear an Indian request for assistance.) The GOI has reassured them that it wishes to discuss multilateral relations and Southeast Asia.

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Ambassador Bowles asked what are the differences between Indian and Japan concerning Southeast Asia. Mr. Jha replied that, although they have a common problem, Japan has a "romantic attachment" to China. On Viet-Nam, although the Government of Japan has taken an outspoken line in support of the American position, Japanese public opinion pushes it toward an "unattached" line.

To this point, Ambassador Bowles observed that the situation here is precisely the opposite. Public opinion does not pose the problems that it does in Japan, but the Government of India has not taken so favorable a position as has the Japanese Government. Mr. Jha replied that the GOI cannot go so far because of the limitations of its traditional policies, but he wished to assure us that the GOI is not hostile to our policy.

Ambassador Reischauer noted that Japanese public opinion has become less hostile in recent months, especially since the U.S. peace efforts this winter.

Mr. Jha interjected that there is an increasing realization that Viet-Nam represents a problem with China and that perhaps North Viet-Nam can not get out.

Ambassador Reischauer said that Japan tends to see the Chinese as "Confucian scholars" rather than as a threat, but that the Chinese nuclear explosions have helped to show the Chinese as they are, and that even the Leftists have had increasing difficulty in arguing that there are "bad and good" nuclear explosions.

Mr. Jha said that it is widely recognized in India that in ten or fifteen years it will be very important that there exist "not an alliance but some sort of axis between Japan and India". He stated that even West Germany is becoming concerned that India be strengthened, since it has the manpower to withstand China. He cited the "great strides in Chinese military power", to which Ambassador Reischauer remarked that he could foresee China as comparable to the U.S. and USSR in ground power, but not in nuclear armaments.

Ambassador Bowles asked whether the nuclear proliferation question might bring Japan and India together. He noted the pressures on the U.S. and USSR to get together because of it. He asked whether India could accept guarantees only if they are joint guarantees, to which Mr. Jha said: "Yes."

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Ambassador Reischauer said that the Japanese tend to see Russia as their principal enemy and as the object of their treaty with the U.S., but he agreed that this attitude is softening.

Mr. Jha said that both India and Japan must think of the future, but that he did not know whether the Japanese are ready to give up their emotional attitude towards China. Ambassador Reischauer said that this may be a problem right now, but that there is a ferment in Japan and that this is the key time to establish contacts, since the new attitude patterns are presently being set.

In response to a question, Ambassador Reischauer observed that Pakistan did not pose a problem for improved GOI/Japanese relations. There is no strong image of Pakistan, and there is a favorable image of India.

There ensued a discussion of Pakistan, in which Mr. Jha noted that President Ayub would like to improve his relations with the USSR and get back to better relations with the USA, but there is strong internal opposition in Pakistan which seems to be reviving at present. If the Pakistanis can convert their problems with India from an "obsession" into a normal political problem, then there is hope.

Ambassador Reischauer noted that Japan and India have the same interest in South East Asia; both want stable and healthy countries. He asked about India's relations with Southeast Asia. Mr. Jha replied that they are good and that trade is increasing.

There followed a discussion of individual countries, the focus being upon Burma. Mr. Jha noted that relations appear steady, that Ne Win had rejected GOI overtures concerning aid, but that the GOI recognized that it is unwise to show too much interest. They would be happy if Burma could remain a buffer, but they do not want it to fall to Chinese domination.

Ambassador Bowles asked what India would do if the policy failed. Mr. Jha said that India would offer whatever help it could if there was a danger/Burma coming under Chinese domination. Ambassador Reischauer suggested that events might move too rapidly for India to be of much help and that there might not even be an appeal for help. Mr. Jha remarked that Chinese eyes are on Burma as a long term objective, and that they are interested in its rice. Ambassador Bowles remarked that they are interested also in access to the Bay of Bengal, to which Mr. Jha nodded assent.

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Ambassador Reischauer remarked that, when strong, the Chinese tend to press for dominance in Viet-Nam, Korea, and Burma.

Ambassador Bowles quoted Nehru as to the existence in Southeast Asia of a traditional line between Chinese and Indian influence. Mr. Jha said there is much to say for the theory, and that the Chinese are presently trying to disturb that balance.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT : India and Japan

TIME AND PLACE: Ministry of External Affairs, February 4, 1966

PARTICIPANTS : Sardar Swaran Singh, Minister for External Affairs
Ambassador Bowles
Ambassador Reischauer
Mr. Lindsey Grant, First Secretary

Ambassador Reischauer observed that he had come to India because Japan is beginning to look outward, toward other Asian states, and he felt that he should understand India in order to carry out his responsibilities. Swaran Singh welcomed him, agreed that Japan is taking a broader look at Asian problems, and added that its present role in the Security Council will force Japan to concern itself with world affairs and to take positions.

Swaran Singh then noted that the Japanese seem to have "two minds" regarding China. They are not sure whether China is a traditional neighbor or a serious threat. India does not know which view will win out. If the former, it will cloud the Japanese position on political issues; but the Japanese cannot be unaffected if China succeeds, and "we think there is an increasing awareness of this". He asked for Ambassador Reischauer's assessment.

Ambassador Reischauer reviewed Japanese interest in international trade and its growing interest in international political affairs. He noted the "romantic attachment" to China, and the cultural affinities. He thought that Japan would look increasingly outwards in the next two or three years, and that it would become increasingly conscious of the threat posed by China. This is a crucial period in which it is important for India to develop a closer relationship with Japan.

Swaran Singh asked whether the Japanese had made an effort to erase the memories of World War II in Asia. Ambassador Reischauer said that they are trying, and noted their efforts to regularize relations with Korea and the Philippines. Swaran Singh noted that the Germans have tried to erase the memories through economic aid relations, and wished he could say the same for Japan. Ambassador Reischauer observed that economic aid for long term stability is beginning to develop an appeal in Japan.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 12-363

By UCD NARA, Date 02-19-2014

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Ambassador Reischauer referred to the forthcoming Japan/India Vice-Ministerial meeting and expressed his hope that these meetings could move to the Ministerial level. Swaran Singh said that they would be glad to do so, that they had invited the Foreign Minister to pay a visit. Ambassador Reischauer noted that Shiina would probably not stay in his position beyond June and asked whether they had thought of inviting Prime Minister Sato. He noted also the impression that Mr. Nehru had made in Japan in 1956, and pointed out the impact of such a visit in a country where most households have television.

Ambassador Bowles noted that an exchange of Prime Ministerial visits would be ideal. Swaran Singh said that it should be at least at the Foreign Minister level. He said that they had invited Prime Minister Sato and would welcome such a visit. Ambassador Reischauer said: "May I say in Tokyo that you are anxious for Mr. Sato to come to India?" Swaran Singh said he would be pleased if the Ambassador would do so.

There followed a discussion of Japanese defense policy and of its policy toward Russia. Swaran Singh asked whether Japan would not develop defense industries for sales of military equipment to other countries; but Ambassador Reischauer played down this aspect. He noted that the recent visit of Shiina to Moscow represented an evolution in Japanese thinking about Russia.

Swaran Singh asked whether Japan would not want increased military strength if it is to take a larger role in external affairs. Ambassador Reischauer replied that he expected that Japan eventually would go instead whole-heartedly for its defense arrangements with the U.S. Japan may well take a more active economic role in Asia, but it would probably not find it productive to expand its military role. Japan is an island and the collective security arrangement works well for it. It is perhaps wiser for the world that Japan not revert to a policy of unilateral military strength. The principal present stumbling block in Japan's relying upon its collective security arrangement with the U.S. is the disparity in U.S./Japanese views on China. Adjustments may be required on both sides, and India could be of help in bringing Japan to a more balanced judgment of the problems posed by China.

Ambassador Bowles asked whether Japan wanted to avoid taking sides between the U.S. and the USSR. Ambassador Reischauer replied that the Japanese have a basic anti-Russian prejudice, exacerbated by the Kurile Island issue. Their normal contacts are completely oriented towards the U.S.

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Attachment 2, Page 3
A-15 from New Delhi

In the following discussion of the U.S./Japanese relationship, Ambassador Bowles remarked that the termination of aid is a boon to the bilateral relationship and that that is one reason we are working towards the time when India will no longer need U.S. aid. Swaran Singh suggested that perhaps the U.S. should increase the speed of providing aid so as to hasten that time, and Ambassador Bowles observed that this is one of the subjects that Mrs. Gandhi will undoubtedly discuss in Washington.

Swaran Singh asked whether Japan has a role in mitigating the Indonesian/Malaysian confrontation. Ambassador Reischauer said that the Japanese had been rebuffed but might be helpful if the Government of Indonesia should improve. He noted that Japanese influence is limited in Indonesia, stories as to the influence of Sukarno's Japanese wife notwithstanding.

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

13

~~SECRET~~

New Delhi, India,
February 15, 1966.

Dear Bob:

I am enclosing a copy of two "personal and private" memoranda which I have sent in confidence to Mrs. Gandhi; they are part of my effort to educate her for the forthcoming visit with the Vice President and later with President Johnson.

I shall have a full-blown discussion with her and some of her close associates on each of these papers before she takes off for Washington. Please give me your comments or suggestions.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

P. S. Because of the nature of this somewhat covert enterprise, I would appreciate your handling it with discretion.

Mr. Robert Komer,
The White House.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By _____, NARA, Date _____

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/rhc 12-363
By UC12, NARA, Date 02-19-2014

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SECRET

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SECRET

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ / RAC 12-363

By LCB NARA, Date 02-19-2014

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MEMORANDUM

February 8, 1966

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: Chester Bowles

SUBJECT: Must India Choose Between Growth and Justice?

Political "rightists" who downgrade individual human dignity see the economic process largely in terms of the profits it can produce for the few.

At the other end of the political spectrum are the "leftists" who, in an effort to bring everyone down to the level of everyone else, would totally eliminate private incentives and inevitably bring the expansion of the economy to a grinding halt.

In effect these extremists are saying that India must choose between rapid economic growth and social justice. This, I believe, is a false dilemma.

While it is possible to have growth without justice, no nation can secure even a modest measure of economic and social justice without rapid growth. Clearly, democratic India must have both.

In such fast growing economies as Japan, Italy and Mexico there is deep consciousness of this dual requirement. For instance, Japan has gone far beyond the present program in India in regard to land reform, has successfully freed its economy from the grip of a few large monopolies, and has enacted (and effectively enforced) measures designed to protect the consumer and wage earner.

Far from interfering with the process of rapid growth these efforts to achieve a greater measure of social justice have led to greatly increased dynamism and individual initiative and thus have contributed significantly to Japan's higher growth rate.

Against this background I would like to suggest on an unofficial, off-the-record basis, some measures which I believe would foster both increased social justice and economic growth in India and which, incidentally, would be vigorously applauded in my country, which doctrinaire Communists still like to describe as "reactionary America."

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ / RAC 12-363
By LUK NARA, Date 08-19-2014

I. Measures to Foster Social Justice:

1. Land Reform

It is no coincidence that the two Asian nations which have produced the largest foodgrain output per acre have been those which have established the strictest controls over individual land holdings in rural areas.

In 1946 the United States military government in Japan established a 7 1/2 acre limitation on land ownership. This ceiling, which is still in effect, resulted in 94% of all rural families owning their own land and by increasing incentives led to a substantial increase in production. Japan's output of rice per acre is now more than 4 1/2 times that of India; indeed it is the highest in the world.

Similarly in Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek, at our strong urging, did what his government had persistently refused to do on the mainland, i.e., established a low ceiling on the amount of land that could be held by each rural family (in this case ten acres.) Again the increased incentives, supplemented by fertilizer, better seeds and rural credit, caused Taiwanese foodgrain output per acre to soar; it is now second only to that of Japan in Asia.

Although Indian land reforms have been a major step in the right direction, I believe they should be much closer to those in Japan and Taiwan if India is to increase its food output sufficiently and at the same time establish the kind of economic dynamism and political stability which characterize rural Japan.

2. Urban Planning and Improvement

Four years ago at the request of the late Dr. B.C. Roy, the Ford Foundation agreed to contribute to the creation of an overall plan to develop Calcutta and to improve the lot of its millions of underprivileged people. The Foundation has to date contributed a total of \$4 million towards this plan.

Evolving from the studies of some of the world's ablest urban planning experts, the plan calls for the removal of the slums, the building of massive quantities of low cost housing, an improved water supply to eliminate cholera, the establishment of a modern transport system, and the creation of medium-sized "magnet" industrial cities forty or fifty miles outside Calcutta to draw away a sizeable fraction of Calcutta's over-concentrated population.

It was inevitable that this revolutionary proposal in behalf of the masses of Calcutta should run head on into reactionary real estate and landlord interests who were in a position to slow down or even to block the necessary legislation.

Although some new legislation is now going through, the prospects are still murky. A bold decision and a comprehensive, dynamic administrative follow-through could turn Calcutta into a model for all Asian cities instead of the depressed, crowded and politically explosive area that it is now.

3. Housing Priorities for Those Who Need Housing Most

In 1965 it is estimated that some 300,000 new homes were built in India -- a large proportion of them for middle and upper income families

When we ask why more low income housing is not built for the crowded slum dwellers, the answer is "shortages of cement, lumber and other building materials." This response poses a question which in my view is basic to the pursuit of social justice.

If building materials are short, why should they not be concentrated in the creation of a much larger number of smaller low rental housing units for the millions who need housing most? It has been estimated that with the same amount of building materials now being used, three or four times the present number of units could be built each year for low-income families.

4. Monopoly Control

During the last 50 years in America we have had some sharp political battles over the misuse of economic power in ways contrary to the public interest. First, under Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, later under Franklin Roosevelt, and now under Lyndon Johnson, these concentrations of wealth have been brought under control and focussed not simply on earning profits but on the vigorous promotion of the public welfare.

In the process we have learned that it is not bigness per se that is the central evil but the misuse of the power that may stem from bigness.

5. Government Regulation of the Economy to Protect the Public

Through the process of democratic debate, legislation and adjustment we have gradually established a system of regulatory laws and agencies

which police the activities of almost every segment of our private sector. In large measure we have succeeded in this delicate task of regulation without stifling the initiative of our entrepreneurs.

The Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton Antitrust Act were designed to assure competition in regard to quality and price so that the market can act more effectively as the public's instrument for regulating the flow of goods. These are only two of several laws prohibiting price fixing monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade with heavy penalties for violations.

Certain legislation prohibits mislabelling of products as well as deceptive packaging, adulteration and false advertising claims. All the ingredients that go into every package of food, every box of pills, and every tin of cooking oil must be clearly stated on the label. These laws are rigorously enforced.

In addition there are minimum wage laws, legislation guaranteeing the right of labor unions and individual workers within those unions, social security tax laws, workmen's compensation for workers who suffer an injury on the job, and many more which serve to make private enterprise responsive to the public interest.

The Scandanavian nations have carried this approach to social justice to even greater lengths. I believe a study of their experiences would suggest many measures which could be effectively introduced here in India.

6. Cheaper Credit

A. For Housing Low Income Families

Lower interest rates, longer mortgage terms, and mortgages insured by the Government can make home financing much less expensive thereby assuring decent homes for millions of families and creating millions of additional jobs. Today with the help of such governmental measures nearly three out of every four American families own their homes.

A variety of Government subsidies for low-income families which are unable to afford the full cost of privately-financed housing will bring better housing within reach of the poorest families.

Special government assistance for housing the elderly, for housing at colleges and universities, for cooperative housing for families of moderate income, and for those displaced by slum clearance and urban

renewal, can also contribute to the improved housing and more rapid community development in urban areas.

B. For Agricultural Development and Small Industries

Many people have pointed out that interest rates in India are high and rising. While rates of 10 percent may conceivably be justified in some cases, especially for large borrowers, rates of 20 to 40 percent and more for the small businessman, farmer and consumer represent a raw exploitation.

Cooperatives have brought a substantial amount of low-cost credit to the countryside and state finance corporations, the State Bank and others have been supplying increasing amounts for small industry. But much remains to be done.

During the next few years agricultural credit requirements will amount rapidly as the availability of fertilizers, pesticides, seed and machinery grows, and as more farmers want to use these inputs in the important task of increasing India's food supply. Much thought and effort will have to be given to ways and means of providing adequate credit to these farmers at reasonable rates so that they can improve their own lot and provide more food for others.

I am heartened to learn of the several experiments now underway -- the entrance of commercial banks into the field, the work of the Food Corporation, the proposal to establish an agricultural credit corporation.

7. Tax Reforms, Particularly Closing of Tax Loopholes

Attempts to curb concentration of wealth and income with high income tax rates are common in democratic countries, including the United States.

However, if carried past a certain point the effect may be to erode the tax base, undermine confidence in the fiscal system, divert enormous amounts of legal talent and energy to the creation of devices for tax avoidance and outright evasion, and thus generate inequities, cynicism and disrespect for the law which can undermine the body politic.

We are told that in India today there are only about a million individual income tax assessees, and only 20,000 have assessed incomes in excess of Rs. 40,000. At the same time there are massive sums of "black" money which have escaped the tax system.

As experience in other countries shows, it is almost impossible to enforce taxes when rates are unrealistically high, and it is not surprising that India faces a similar problem.

Conversely, with proper attention to administration, a more realistic schedule of rates makes it easier to plug loopholes, actually to collect far more revenue, and to encourage investment in constructive new enterprise. Only when this has been achieved can the legitimate purposes of progressive taxation be realized, while at the same time it becomes possible vigorously to stamp out the corrupting side effects.

Although India has been moving in the direction of a more effective tax system, there is much to be accomplished. I understand that a comprehensive study has not been made for over a decade. Within this period many important economic and social changes have taken place, and many more will be forthcoming.

To assure that the tax system really works towards the goal of growth with social justice, a new study may be indicated. The objective should be to establish a realistic balance between the more equitable sharing of the national income on the one hand and the maximum stimulus to more dynamic growth on the other.

8. Need for More Consumer Goods

In all fast growing economies there is now a recognition of the need for incentives to increase output. Even in the relatively rigid Soviet system there is a new awareness of the need for greatly expanded supplies of consumer goods to encourage people to work harder to produce more.

Yet many economists still insist that India must choose between building a modern infrastructure or producing a greater abundance of consumer goods. I seriously question whether this is a choice you have to make.

With so many potentially skilled people out of work and with the vast amount of available raw materials such as lumber and bricks which do not require foreign exchange, India could bring about a massive increase in her consumer goods output and at the same time continue to step up her output of power, steel and other heavy industries, and build more roads, hospitals and schools.

An increased measure of social justice and a stimulus to more rapid growth can best be provided by making available much larger quantities

of products (which do not require imported materials or parts) for the rural as well as urban consumer.

In the field of agriculture, for instance, the government has recently taken a number of bold policy decisions to assure increased output. Rightly these have primarily emphasized the importance of fertilizer, pesticides, seeds, and incentive prices.

If, in addition, an increased supply of "consumer goods" were made available on which the cultivators could spend their added incomes, prices in the village bazaars would be held down and the cultivators encouraged to greater effort.

Some of these consumer goods can provide an immediate feedback into the growth process. One example is the transistor radio which requires only an insignificant amount of foreign exchange. A nationwide radio system of small stations carrying programs beamed at local audiences, offers almost unlimited scope for public service and private entertainment in addition to some major incentives for a greater production effort in the villages.

In other cases products that can be produced with domestic resources by small industries will meet deeply-felt needs -- tile roofing made from local clay is one example or smokeless chulas, which could have a major impact on the lives of India's women is another.

As literacy increases, it is imperative that adequate resources be devoted to providing the public with books, magazines, newspapers. Otherwise, as has so often happened in other countries, the results of literacy campaigns will rapidly be dissipated.

Many more examples of consumer goods which serve multiple ends will occur to you. The main point is to use them constructively as an integral stimulating factor with which to promote expansionist social and economic policies. Unless they require imports that must be paid for by foreign exchange they are not in competition with heavy industries or power development; indeed they will help to encourage such development.

II. Measures to Foster Economic Growth

1. Incentive and Disincentive Taxation as a Substitute for Item-by-Item Bureaucratic Direction

In the Government's effort to direct India's development towards the

most essential objectives, Indian producers are now smothered by a system of bureaucratic controls which attempt to direct almost every move in the complex production process.

This system often slows down decision-making, discourages able people from taking the risks that are an essential part of every dynamic economy, creates widespread corruption and increases production costs.

In large measure these direct controls could be replaced by a tax system which sets low rates on those activities which are judged to be in the public interest and significantly increases taxes on those with a lower priority, thereby stimulating growth where you need it most.

For instance, a sharply progressive tax on all rural land holdings of more than ten acres would discourage large holdings and enable many millions more of rural families to own their own farms.

At the same time very low tax rates on new small rural industries would rapidly increase investment in job-creating enterprises and thus help provide millions of new jobs for the landless as well as part-time employment for millions of cultivators in the slack season.

Such a program, in other words, would direct the flow of capital from rural land speculation into productive rural industry. Coupled with cheap credit, such a program would enable many more cultivators to own their own land and increase their earning power without increasing the government bureaucracy or adding to the number of forms people have to fill out.

A sharp progressive tax increase on urban land, most of which is now grossly inflated in value, would also have a stimulating effect on factory production. It would discourage speculators and divert more savings to industrial investment.

2. The Competition for Foreign Capital

All over the world governments are striving to increase the flow of capital investment to step up their growth rates.

It would seem that if India is to grow industrially as other nations are growing, it must go much farther in attracting additional private capital and in directing this dynamic creative force towards the benefit of the common man.

Since I returned to India in 1963, I have persuaded nearly one hundred American companies to consider the investment of major funds in India. Unfortunately, the great majority went away discouraged by the red tape and in many cases, convinced that they weren't really welcome. Since then many have invested substantially in other countries, where perhaps the needs for their energy, resources, and skills is less than in India.

In this era of rapid technological development capital is a highly prized international commodity. The demand for it worldwide substantially exceeds the supply. To get more capital India has to compete against other countries avidly seeking investment, including countries such as my own in which the capital originates and in which there are many attractive possibilities for its investment.

India has a very great potential appeal for responsible foreign investors. It offers a vast potential market for all kinds of goods; if India succeeds, the market is almost unlimited.

But if India is to get its full share of available foreign private capital, it must provide a more congenial climate for investment. It must cut away the mountain of red tape which now besets the potential investor and greatly simplify present procedures.

It must also permit an adequate degree of managerial control. It must provide additional inducements in the form of tax incentives and other measures comparable to those afforded by other countries.

I am confident that all this can be done not only without prejudice to social justice but indeed in furtherance of it. The only industrial nation which has succeeded without massive inputs of foreign capital is the USSR. In this case rigid control and prolonged sacrifice among the people enabled a totalitarian government to squeak by.

In contrast to Russia's grim experience foreign capital greatly eased the process of growth in Japan, Germany, France, Italy, Mexico, etc. Even in America it was foreign capital (largely British) which built many of our key industries.

3. Decentralization of the Public Sector

When Mr. Subramaniam as Minister for Steel and Heavy Industry announced the notable experiment in increased autonomy for management for the public sector steel industry, he said:

"The idea that public sector management can be so hedged about with checks and balances that mistakes cannot occur is mistaken. Mistakes are the price of progress. It is the end result that counts."

Around the world, in mixed economies and increasingly even in Communist nations this lesson has been learned, often at heavy cost. Tight central controls on the operation of enterprises handicap the achievement of the very basic objectives for which they may have been created.

It is my hope that the good work begun in India in this sphere can be carried farther. Greater autonomy for managers, more flexibility in hiring, and better career opportunities will greatly enhance the productivity of public sector firms. Further experimentation with mixed public-private ventures also holds promise for improving efficiency and maximizing government's real contribution to economic development.

4. Modern Approach to Agriculture

Provided India follows through with the program already announced for increasing agricultural output, I am confident this fundamental problem will be mastered. But implementation will require the greatest determination and concerted energies of your best people.

To meet fertilizer targets, adequate foreign exchange for imports must be allocated, long-term arrangements for provision of materials must be worked out, faults in existing facilities must be corrected, construction expedited, new investment actively sought, promotion and distribution organized.

Seeds, pesticides, credit, machinery and implements need the same concentrated attention, and progress in these areas is less, perhaps, than in the case of fertilizers. Detailed plans must be spelled out, disseminated to all levels, and put into effect quickly.

Research and extension must be wedded more closely and related to the urgent requirements of the cultivators, who will be facing new problems as modern technology takes root.

At times in U. S. history there was a widely held sentiment among people living in our great agricultural regions that industry, trade and

finances were their natural enemies. One lesson we have learned is that industry, trade, agriculture and finance can move forward only when they march in step.

Again this is a case where social justice and economic growth are bound together. The cultivators must have an incentive return to buy the industrial products needed to increase output. Industrial producers will not have an adequate market for production or consumption goods or sufficient raw materials if agricultural output and incomes do not rise. Serving them both are finance and trade, which, because their contributions are less tangible, are often and incorrectly thought of as predators and parasites.

That anti-social practices exist in these (and other) fields cannot be gainsaid, and they must be guarded against. But we must also guard against destroying the positive and productive along with the undesirable elements.

The concept of the Food Corporation as a buffer stock agency has always seemed to me an appropriate solution to an important part of the trader problem. Well staffed and permitted sufficient operational scope, it holds great promise for the future.

6. Rapid Extension of Rural Electrification

It is my personal view that a very high priority needs to be given to rural electrification. Its potential for transforming rural society as well as for spurring economic development is enormous.

Electric power is directly needed for the expansion of agricultural production. It is required, for example, to enable the rapid expansion of pump irrigation and thus provide the water essential for agricultural growth.

Power can also contribute to the rapid development of small industries in rural areas to meet the needs of the cultivators and to help them to process their products. With such development and with the amenities which electricity makes possible, dynamic small towns can develop in the countryside which will sharply reduce the current migration of younger people to the over-crowded and over-burdened big cities.

As you know, in America rural electricity cooperatives have been credited with some extraordinary accomplishments. The experiences of these institutions may be of value to India in planning for rural

electrification.

7. Encouragement of Free Collective Bargaining Based on Increasing Productivity

A vigorous effort to increase social justice and expand production must include steadily increasing wages for the working people. In the United States, it is estimated that on the average each worker is able to produce 3 1/2 percent more each year and this figure is the basis for an economically acceptable annual average increase in wages.

The democratic way is to divide up the increasing economic pie by the give-and-take of free collective bargaining between workers and management. Although our comprehensive American system of labor laws and regulations has grown out of difficult and sometimes bitter experience, it is not yet all that it should be. It does, however, protect the basic rights of workers and management and has greatly strengthened the democratic functioning of our society.

I believe that the development of labor unions and free collective bargaining can make a similar contribution in India. Under a legislative and administrative framework established by government, labor and management can work out their problems, and in the process democratic institutions generally in India will grow and become even more deeply rooted.

The list of measures I have suggested above both to increase output and to assure that the benefits from this output go to the people as a whole and not just to the favored few could easily be expanded. But it should serve to illustrate the essential point, i. e. that far from being in conflict, increased production on the one hand and increased dignity and opportunity for each individual citizen on the other are in large measure dependent on each other.

Let me emphasize once again: We can achieve growth without justice, but not justice without growth. Therefore, we should commit ourselves fully and with open minds to finding socially constructive ways to promote rather than retard economic growth.

My own personal opinion is that one of the major obstacles to more rapid economic growth in the developing nations has been a nostalgic commitment to outmoded ways of thinking such as "public sector versus private sector," "welfare rather than profits," etc.

For example, in my own country it is now far more relevant to think in terms of "government operated" and "government regulated" sectors of the economy. Moreover, we are beginning to realize that government operated enterprises which do not "make a profit" are, in fact, betraying the public welfare by using everyone's resources inefficiently.

In our dynamic new world of limitless technology, economic growth and social justice can be advanced only by a hard-headed pragmatism which judges each step of the process of development, not on how it fits the outdated teachings of Adam Smith or Karl Marx but by the simple standard: what does it accomplish for the people and how well?

MEMORANDUM

130
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February 12, 1966

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: Chester Bowles

SUBJECT: Differing Indo-American Attitudes on Key Foreign Policy Questions.

It is often remarked that India and America share a common faith in democracy, in religious secularism, in increased opportunity and dignity for the individual, and in the cause of world peace.

These common convictions and objectives provide an extraordinarily solid base for American and Indian understanding. Yet it is inevitable that the foreign policy of each nation should also reflect its differing geographic position, its past experience, and its stage of economic development.

Since the breakup of the all-European power balance and the emergence of the USSR as a world force the United States has assumed global responsibilities for political stability and economic development which have not only strained our resources but also created many frustrations.

India, in turn, primarily occupied with the political challenge of molding a united new democratic nation out of 480 million diverse people speaking 14 major languages, has often seemed indifferent to the problems which most concern us and sometimes sharply critical of our efforts to solve them.

The purpose of this memorandum is briefly to consider the reaction of both nations to current issues against the background of our common goals. It is written with the deep conviction that the ability of India and America to understand each other and to cooperate in the cause of development and peace may be a decisive factor in shaping the history of our times.

I. Attitudes Towards the USSR

Between 1918 and 1945 the Russian revolution developed a dynamic appeal to African and Asian peoples who were struggling against European colonialism.

The ruthlessness of the Stalinist techniques was obscured by the dramatic image of a long exploited people working courageously to create a new political structure from the wreckage of the Tsarist state.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ / 12AC 12-363

By UUI NARA, Date 02-19-2014

During the war the dogged courage of the Soviets was also greatly admired by most Americans. However, immediately after the war, the United States suddenly found itself face-to-face, not with the friendly ally with which we had hoped to cooperate in building a stable world, but a powerfully expansionist nation under the direction of Stalin which was moving vigorously to fill the vacuums left by the withdrawal of German power from central Europe and to take over Korea in what we believed to be a first step towards overrunning Japan.

At a time when the views of most Americans were being shaped by this direct experience the energies of the Indian leaders were focused on winning their freedom and the welding together of the new nation. Because India had very little direct contact with the far away events which were conditioning American attitudes, most Indians understandably developed a somewhat different interpretation of what had occurred.

Because of these differing experiences, most Americans in the 1950's were impatient with India's policy of neutrality between the USSR and the USA. How, they would ask, can Indians fail to distinguish between an expansionist totalitarian state like the Soviet Union and democratic America which seeks peace and opportunity for all people?

But India's leaders saw their country's role as that of a bridge between the USSR and the USA. Although they freely expressed their personal concern about lack of political freedom within the USSR, they were convinced that to take sides in the cold war struggle would be to forego their political contribution as peace makers and mediators. Since Khrushchev began to open the windows and doors of the Soviet Union and America's attitudes have relaxed there has been increasing acceptance in the US of India's role as bridge builder.

In recent months, however, most American leaders have been persuaded that in practice India's stated policy of non-alignment has been increasingly oriented away from the US and towards the USSR. This leads them to fear that India is being gradually drawn into the Soviet Bloc and that American economic aid to India may become the means of helping to build India into a more effective and dynamic associate of the USSR.

In this context, most American leaders believe the following to be true:

1. India's sudden withdrawal from the VOA agreement in July 1963 (which India herself had proposed) was the result of Soviet pressure;

2. In the councils of the Asia-African group, Indo-Soviet positions are indistinguishable;

3. On key issues in the UN where the USSR and the US have differed, India in the last two years has almost always sided with the Soviets;

4. In regard to Vietnam (a particularly emotional subject in America) the Indian view has also seemed to coincide with that of the USSR (as an indication of this common posture Americans point to India's hesitancy in taking a firmer position in the ICC, the apparent reversal of India's earlier intention to send a bloodmobile to work with the South Vietnamese people, and their failure to mention President Johnson's 37 day interruption of the bombing of North Vietnam in the recent Indian official statement.)

5. There appears to be a gap between the privately stated opinions of India's leaders on international questions and what they say in public.

II. Attitudes Towards Colonialism

Americans believe that their anti-colonial credentials are beyond reasonable challenge.

140 years ago, Foreign Minister Metternich of Austria, referring to the role of young American volunteers in the Greek rebellion against the Turks, remarked bitterly "wherever there is revolution, there you will find Americans, bemoaning those which fail and cheering on those which succeed."

It was in this tradition that America vigorously supported India in her long struggle for freedom. Indeed two representatives of President Roosevelt were ordered by the British authorities to leave India on the grounds that they were aiding and abetting the Gandhi-led movement for independence.

However in dealing with many aspects of colonialism in Africa and elsewhere, differing perspectives and commitments have on occasion caused America and India to assume somewhat different positions.

During the 1940's and 1950's, for instance, the primary issue for America was the defense of western Europe against Stalin's massive ground forces poised in Eastern Europe. In dealing with the anti-colonialist movement in Africa, this central urgency occasionally led us to soft pedal our criticism of the European colonial powers with which we were associated in NATO.

Indian leaders who were inclined, for reasons stated above, to downgrade our fears of the USSR in Europe were critical of our tendency to compromise on colonial issues that involved our European partners.

However this particular difference has been steadily deflated by time and events. India's efforts to maintain a close working relationship with the African and Asian powers are now much better understood within the American government; and India is increasingly credited with being a moderating influence on critical colonial questions. Indeed many Americans wish that India would take a somewhat bolder leadership role in the Afro-Asian councils.

No reasonable man doubts the deep-seated opposition to colonial rule in both India and America. However, on specific questions, differing experiences and fears have led us to apply different priorities and different judgments, and to some extent we shall probably continue to do so.

III. Attitude Towards China

America and India traditionally share a romantic view of China. For years India saw China as a great Asian nation which had been mistreated by the West and which at long last had aroused itself in a massive show of independence and strength.

Americans are also conscious of the long exploitation of China by the European powers and proud of their role in opposing it. However during the war when the political power struggle was at its peak American forces were deep inside China and consequently Americans saw at first hand the ruthless quality of Mao Tse-tung and the Communist grab for control.

Although Jawaharlal Nehru had no illusions about the long-term implications of China's growing power, he was cautiously hopeful that Mao, faced with China's awesome internal problems, would follow Stalin's example of the 1920's and 1930's and make at least a temporary accommodation with his neighbors. (In an effort to buy time with which to strengthen and unify Russia, Stalin even attempted to strike a bargain with Hitler.)

As a result from 1950 to 1962, America was faced with the lonely task of containing China with no help whatsoever from the four major non-Communist Asian nations (Japan, Indonesia, Pakistan and India.) Not only did the US effort receive no support but it was often subject to

scathing criticism by non-Communist Asian leaders on the grounds that we were supporting right wing governments against the "forces of the future."

To harried Americans who were expending their resources and often their blood in a struggle to keep China from overrunning all of Asia, this reaction seemed unfair and in view of Mao's threatening posture even irresponsible.

In 1962 when India's patient effort to co-exist peacefully with China collapsed under the onslaught of Chinese forces along the Himalayan border America came quickly to India's support. Since then the American and Indian views of China have coincided much more closely.

Nevertheless some marginal differences remain. Americans see the struggle in Vietnam primarily as a Chinese-organized and controlled movement to take over a vast rich area reaching from the South China Sea to the borders of India. Right now they are bitter over China's role in blocking President Johnson's efforts for peace, and uneasy about India's reluctance to criticize not only North Vietnam but China itself.

Why, they ask, does India fear China as a deadly menace between Ladakh and Assam but accept it as a normal fact of life from Assam to the South China Sea? If the United States is prepared to help defend India's northern borders against China, why should India not provide the U. S. with moral and political support in its effort to contain the self same China in Southeast Asia?

Since the depth of India's mistrust of China is clear Americans argue that India's policy in this area can be explained only in terms of India's overriding desire not to upset Moscow.

India's imprecise and continuing use of the word non-alignment in respect to Asia further adds to the uncertainty of many American government leaders.

As I have pointed out above there is now widespread acceptance in the U. S. of India's policy of non-alignment in regard to the USSR and the USA. But Americans cannot understand why India does not specifically state that the phrase "non-alignment" does not apply to India's policy in regard to China and the U. S. Again the accepted explanation among many Americans is that India's hesitation in making this distinction reflects the wishes of the USSR.

If India should express its determination to cooperate with America or any other free nation in the containment of China's aggression, Americans would feel that India had adopted an independent and realistic position.

IV. Attitudes Towards Pakistan

Indians are impatient with Westerners who do not understand the nature of their differences with Pakistan. On this score they have often been critical of the positions taken by the American Government.

While Pakistan describes the basis of the partition in 1947 in religious terms, Indians point out that there are more Muslims in India than in all of West Pakistan.

How, they ask, can America which like India is a secular state accept the argument that Kashmir belongs to Pakistan because it is Muslim? If this reasoning were accepted generally what would happen to the 55 million Muslims who choose to live in India?

Further to complicate the situation, many Americans are inclined to accept the phrase "self-determination" as a generally desirable objective without examining its full world-wide implications. Therefore when Pakistanis apply this concept to Karachi it receives a favorable response in the American press. This causes Indians to bristle.

Why, they ask, if you believe in self-determination, did you fight a Civil War to deny this right to the eleven Confederate States? What would happen right now if the principle of self determination were widely applied to Africa?

And then the broader questions: Why, when the UN observers' record is clear that Pakistan attacked India on August 5, did you not say so? Why did you give military equipment to the Pakistanis on the assumption that they would use it only against the Chinese and Soviets when the Pakistanis themselves stated it was for use only against India? And why after you assured us that no Pak arms would be used against us did you not at least denounce their use when the Pakistanis struck on September 1?

America's responses to these deeply felt questions are rather similar to India's answers to the questions Americans have asked about the Soviet Union and India, i. e. why did you Indians fail to distinguish between democratic America and totalitarian Russia in Budapest, Berlin

and elsewhere?

Each nation's response is based on a common conviction: namely that building a bridge between nations in deep conflict is an important foreign policy goal.

For instance Americans believe that if we had politically denounced Pakistan as an aggressor the US would have destroyed the leverage which enabled us to persuade the Pakistanis to downgrade their Chinese relationship, to agree to a cease fire, and to adopt a more moderate course.

The Tashkent agreement has gone far to ease the India-Pakistan-Kashmir issue in American eyes. It is clear that India is making a genuine effort to find a base for a peaceful coexistence with Pakistan.

The American Government in turn has abandoned its former attempt to explore specific solutions to Kashmir and other issues; it is our present policy to stress the heavy cost of continuing conflict and to press both nations to reach a genuine lasting settlement.

V. Attitudes Towards Foreign Economic Assistance

Both India and the United States recognize the need for foreign economic assistance to insure an adequate growth rate in the developing countries. Both also recognize that economic assistance creates political and psychological difficulties for the recipient and the donor alike and that the sooner India and other developing countries can generate their own capital savings and stand on their own feet the better it will be for all concerned.

Nevertheless, the criteria by which the U. S. Government determines the distribution of its economic assistance are often misunderstood.

In the last twenty years the U. S. has invested \$81 billion (exclusive of military assistance) to promote economic and social development in Europe, Asia, Latin America and Africa. This massive effort has been totally unprecedented and it is not surprising that the results should be very uneven. In some countries large sums have been wasted while in others American aid has been a decisive factor in building the foundations for dynamic expanding economies with greatly increased opportunities for the individual citizen.

In the last few years the U. S. Government and the Congress have made continuing studies of both the successes and the failures and have reached certain conclusions in regard to the developmental principles which promise the best results.

The most basic of these principles is that no developing nation can succeed unless it gives the very highest priority to education, agriculture, and in the case of the more heavily populated nations, to population control.

There is also persuasive evidence that good national planning and adequate public investment in electric power development, heavy industry and transportation is essential. However, we have emerged from this experience with the deep conviction that no democratic nation can achieve an acceptable growth rate with a reasonable measure of economic justice for its citizens unless it vigorously encourages individual initiative to play a dynamic role in the development process. This calls for a forthright effort to encourage responsible domestic and foreign private investment.

In our view this is not a matter of ideological theory. The record of nations which have succeeded in developing a rapid growth rate and those which have remained relatively stagnate primarily underscores the validity of these principles.

In each case where dynamic economic expansion is taking place there has been a skilled mixture of national planning and adequate public sector investment backed by a determined effort to encourage the private sector operating responsibly and in the public interest. Japan, Mexico and Italy are dramatic cases in point.

The American Government believes that in working closely with some 75 different nations over a period of years it has developed a greater depth of practical down-to-earth experience in the economic growth process than has any other nation. Therefore it does not feel that it is being unreasonable when it states that it is unprepared to invest major sums of its money in nations clinging to doctrinaire policies which experience indicates will almost certainly fail.

This, as American Government leaders see it, is not a matter of economic theology, but of realistic common sense.

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

TYPE OF DOCUMENT Cable _____
 Letter ✓
 Memo _____
 Other _____

DATE 2/14/66

FROM Chester Bowles

TO Robert Komer NUMBER _____

SUBJECT India Food

Att: Character of the New Indian
Agricultural Program and its
Implications for U.S. Policy - Jan. 1966

SEE India Food

Bowles X India

New Delhi - January 27, 1966

Dear Bob:

Last night Mrs. Gandhi delivered her first nation-wide address on the occasion of Republic Day. I am enclosing a copy of her remarks.

As you will see she makes a point of thanking the United States for our assistance in meeting the food crisis. More importantly the whole tone and direction of her comments are, I believe, very much in line with our own hopes for this key nation.

I am convinced that this is one more manifestation of the opportunity for a real breakthrough in our relations with India which we face in the next few weeks.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Enclosure:
As stated.

Mr. Robert Komer,
The White House.

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TO ROBERT W. KOMER, WHITE HOUSE
FROM: AMBASSADOR BOWLES

EMBTel 1883 WHICH I SENT IMMEDIATELY AFTER MY VISIT WITH
SUBRAMANIAM ON SUNDAY AFTERNOON SIGNIFICANTLY UNDERSTATES THE
UNCERTAINTY AND DEEP CONCERN WHICH HE EXPRESSED ABOUT US FOODGRAIN
SHIPMENTS. I PLAYED IT DOWN BECAUSE I DID NOT WANT TO SEE HIS
HEARTFELT PLEA WRITTEN OFF IN WASHINGTON AS OVERLY DRAMATIC.

HOWEVER, IF YOU PERSONALLY COULD SEE THE SITUATION HERE AT
FIRST HAND I BELIEVE YOU WOULD AGREE THAT OUR RECOMMENDATIONS
ARE FULLY JUSTIFIED BY THE FACTS.

DURING THE LAST 20 MONTHS INDIA HAS WITHSTOOD A SERIES OF
POLITICAL SHOCKS WHICH WOULD HAVE CHALLENGED THE COMPETENCE AND
DEMOCRATIC FAITH OF EVEN THE MOST SOPHISTICATED GOVERNMENTS OF THE
WEST.

ALTHOUGH SHASTRI'S SUDDEN DEATH HAD A SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER
IMPACT ON INDIA THAN DID NEHRU'S, THE INDIAN DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL
SYSTEM HAS COME UP IN LESS THAN TWO WEEKS WITH A NEW PRIME MINISTER
AND WITH A CABINET WHICH VIGOROUSLY REAFFIRMS THE FAVORABLE TENDS
THAT HAVE BECOME ESTABLISHED HERE IN THE LAST TWO OR THREE MONTHS.
BY ANY STANDARD IT HAS BEEN A MOST IMPRESSIVE PERFORMANCE.

HOWEVER, EVEN AMERICA'S BEST FRIENDS WITHIN THE INDIAN GOVERN-
MENT ARE NOW UNCERTAIN AS TO WHAT THEY CAN REALLY EXPECT FROM US IN
REGARD TO FOOD. SEVERAL WEEKS AFTER BANNER HEADLINES BOTH HERE
AND IN WASHINGTON PROCLAIMED THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT ALLOW ANY
INDIAN TO GO HUNGRY THEY STILL FIND THEMSELVES HANGING ONTO A
POLITICAL CLIFF BY THEIR FINGERTIPS UNABLE TO PLAN AND UNCERTAIN ABOUT
WHAT WE WILL DO.

IT IS MY GUESS THAT INDIRA GANDHI WILL BE READY TO COME TO THE
UNITED STATES SOME TIME BETWEEN THE 10TH AND 20TH OF MARCH; IF I
CAN PERSUADE HER TO COME ANY SOONER, I SHALL CERTAINLY DO SO.
DELAYS IN REGARD TO THE INDIA-U.S. SUMMIT MEETING IN RESPECT FIRST
TO SHASTRI AND NOW TO HER HAVE BEEN BEYOND ANYONE'S CONTROL, AND
I AM HOPEFUL THEY WILL NOT PREVENT US FROM COMING THROUGH ON
PL 480 AND AN INTERIM ECONOMIC PROGRAM FOR THE REST OF THIS FISCAL
YEAR WHICH INCLUDES THE URGENTLY NEEDED NON-PROJECT LOAN.

I KNOW, BOB, THAT YOU HAVE YOUR HANDS FULL ON MANY FRONTS AND
YOU HAVE ALREADY PERFORMED SOME HERCULEAN TASKS ON THIS PARTICULAR
FRONT. HOWEVER, I WILL BE ABLE TO REPRESENT THE PRESIDENT MUCH
MORE EFFECTIVELY HERE IF YOU CAN GIVE ME YOUR PERSONAL OFF-THE-RECORD
GUIDANCE AS TO WHAT SEEMS POSSIBLE, WHAT IS NOT POSSIBLE AND WHAT
I CAN REALISTICALLY DO FURTHER TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION HERE IN INDIA
FROM THE PRESIDENT'S STANDPOINT. RIGHT NOW WE ARE UNEASILY
PLAYING IT BY EAR."

BT

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By *ch* NARA, Date 6-27-13

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Pres. mad at reading stories in Times

1. Put together right bargaining package for special trip of Freeman and Humphrey to take to India almost immediately / week.

2. What is real world wheat sit.

A. 3 mo. agmt.

B. Not enough wheat to go around

Met at 1 p.m. today

3. Does Humph. go to see Ayub
Yes ~~or~~ No. I'd suggest we'd get away

5 Pak bans

C-130s for Ayub

New jivies for Ayub



EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

17
Bowles

New Delhi - January 24, 1966

Dear Bob:

I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I have just sent to Paul Hoffman regarding the establishment of an organization similar to the Committee for Economic Development here in India.

I think that such an organization could make an important contribution to the present course of Indian development (a) by educating Indian businessmen in a constructive economic and social outlook and (b) by educating Indian leaders and the Indian people generally to appreciate the essential contribution which responsible private businessmen can make.

I would be very grateful for any thoughts you might have on how we can encourage such an approach here.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Enclosure:
As stated.

Mr. Robert Komer,
The White House.

17a

New Delhi, India,
January 22, 1966.

Dear Paul:

I am sorry that I have not answered sooner your letter of December 22 concerning the organization of a Committee for Economic Development in India. However, we have had a pretty busy month out here with Tashkent, Shastri's tragic death and now a new Prime Minister.

I think this is a very timely moment to consider the formation of a CED here. I am convinced that both the Indian Government and the business community of India would like to work more closely together in attempting to solve some of the problems of economic development. Now is a good time to attempt to stimulate the formation of an organization which can help bring about this closer cooperation.

The initiative for any such effort should, of course, come from the Indian business community itself and not from any American source. We have discussed the matter informally with several leading Indian businessmen including S.L. Kirloskar, President of the Indian Chambers of Commerce, Charat Ram of the Delhi Cloth Mills and H.P. Nanda of Escorts Limited. They have all expressed keen interest in meeting representatives of the CED with a view to the possibility of establishing a CED-type organization here. Obviously, such an organization would have to be tailored to meet Indian conditions.

Therefore,

Mr. Paul G. Hoffman,
Managing Director,
Special Fund,
United Nations,
New York, N.Y.

Therefore, I think that your idea of having a staff member of CED come to India accompanied by one or more members of the Board is an excellent one.

It would be wonderful if you yourself could come and I would hope that Al Neal might be in the group. If this is possible, we would arrange firstly to bring the CED representatives together with ten or twelve of the leading businessmen in India and then bow out. I am attaching a list of the kind of people whom we would include.

I shall await further word from you as to the CED's decision on sending representatives out here and when they and, hopefully, you might arrive. We shall then do the needful at this end.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Attachment:
List of Indian
businessmen.

18

Orig/ to
P. K.
with enclosure
Bowles

New Delhi - January 24, 1966

Dear Bob:

I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I have just sent to Paul Hoffman regarding the establishment of an organization similar to the Committee for Economic Development here in India.

I think that such an organization could make an important contribution to the present course of Indian development (a) by educating Indian businessmen in a constructive economic and social outlook and (b) by educating Indian leaders and the Indian people generally to appreciate the essential contribution which responsible private businessmen can make.

I would be very grateful for any thoughts you might have on how we can encourage such an approach here.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Enclosure:

As stated.

Mr. Robert Komer,
The White House.

19

orig
to RWR

Bowles

New Delhi, India,
January 21, 1966.

Dear Bob:

I think I have mentioned to you from time-to-time Ed Lindblom the Yale economics professor whom I brought to India with me two years ago. Ed had made an outstanding contribution to our efforts here and we were all deeply disappointed when Yale insisted on his return to resume his teaching role last summer. On his return to the United States, Ed wrote an article for Foreign Affairs (January issue) on the outlook for the Indian economy in which he outlines some of the grim problems but on the whole comes out with a rather cautiously favorable view.

Ed has just recently returned to India on a two week's special assignment and has been able to have a fresh look at the economy. He told me just last night that now he wished he could rewrite the article almost completely. He is an extraordinarily competent person whom you would like and I would be grateful if you could have a talk with him when he visits Washington late in the week of January 24 or shortly thereafter.

I have taken the liberty of suggesting that Ed call your secretary two or three days before he comes to Washington.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Mr. Robert W. Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

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PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING TO THE WHITE HOUSE FOR ROBERT W.
KOMER, WHITE HOUSE FROM BOWLES:
" TO: ROBERT W. KOMER, WHITE HOUSE
FROM: CHESTER BOWLES

I HAVE JUST SENT CABLE THROUGH DEPARTMENT CHANNELS WHICH
YOU AND MAC WILL SEE RECOMMENDING A SHORT TERM AID PROGRAM
TO CARRY US THROUGH THE REMAINDER OF THIS FISCAL YEAR LEAVING
THE BROADER ISSUES OF OUR RELATIONS WITH INDIA FOR A LATER
DISCUSSION WITH THE NEW PRIME MINISTER IF SHE OR HE FINDS IT
DIFFICULT TO ADHERE TO THE SHASTRI VISIT SCHEDULE.

INDIAN DEMOCRACY HAS SUFFERED A SERIES OF INCREDIBLE BLOWS
IN THE LAST NINETEEN MONTHS (THE DEATH OF TWO PRIME
MINISTERS, A WAR AND THE WORST DOUGHT IN 65 YEARS.)

ALTHOUGH IT MAY BE TEMPTING NOW AS AFTER MEHRU'S DEATH TO
"WAIT FOR THE DUST TO SETTLE", I BELIEVE THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS
MUCH TO GAIN FROM MOVING PROMPTLY, VIGOROUSLY AND GENEROUSLY
TO ESTABLISH A RELATIONSHIP OF MUTUAL TRUST WITH THE HARASSED
NEW INDIAN GOVERNMENT. SUCH A RELATIONSHIP MAY BE OF ENORMOUS
IMPORTANCE TO US IN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS AND WILL SURELY MAKE OUR
BROADER ASIAN TASKS MORE MANAGEABLE.

THEREFORE, I HAVE FRANKLY RECOMMENDED A COURSE OF ACTION
WHICH WILL ENABLE US TO SEIZE A KEY OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE INDIAN
ECONOMY BADLY NEEDED SHOT IN THE ARM AND WIN THE HEARTFELT
APPRECIATION OF THIS DEMOCRATIC NATION.

PLEASE GIVE ME YOUR EVALUATION AND REACTION AS SOON AS
YOU PROPERLY CAN.

WITH REGARDS AND APPRECIATION."

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By ch NARA, Date 4-27-13

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Bowles

TO WHITE HOUSE
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FOLLOWING MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM [redacted] NEW DELHI
"TO: ROBERT W. KOMER, WHITE HOUSE
FROM: CHESTER BOWLES

"APPRECIATE YOUR CABLE [redacted]. IT IS MY GUESS THAT THE OBJECTIVES WHICH YOU LAID DOWN WOULD HAVE BEEN ACHIEVABLE IF SHASTRI HAD LIVED; WITH GOOD MANAGEMENT THEY MAY BE SOMEWHAT EASIER NOW. ALTHOUGH IT MAY NOT BE FEASIBLE I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS IF WE COULD PERSUADE THE NEW PRIME MINISTER TO COME TO THE U.S. BEFORE THE BUDGET SESSION WHICH STARTS IN MID-FEBRUARY. I WILL CABLE MORE FULLY AS THE DUST BEGINS TO SETTLE."

125

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FOR AMBASSADOR FROM KOMER.

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3.4(b)(1)(6)

MIGHT BE HELPFUL IF I UNDERLINE PRIVATELY THAT FAILURE GOI AS YET TO MOUNT ALL-OUT EFFORT TO GET FAMINE AID FROM OTHER COUNTRIES IS IMPEDING OUR OWN RESPONSE. WE RECOGNIZE THAT US WILL HAVE TO CARRY MUCH OF LOAD, BUT ADEQUATE AND TIMELY US RESPONSE MAY BE CRITICALLY DEPENDENT ON OUR ABILITY CONVINCING CONGRESS AND PEOPLE THAT INDIA NOT LEANING EXCLUSIVELY ON US.

ALL HERE AWARE OF WHAT INDIANS DOING ALREADY AND ALSO OF GOI'S DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEM IN AVOIDING TOO MUCH LOCAL FOCUS

PAGE 2 YEAYADS 47 ~~SECRET~~
ON FAMINE. BUT FROM STANDPOINT GENERATING ADEQUATE US ROLE, HOPE YOU CAN KEEP CONSTANTLY BEFORE SUBRAMANIAM WHAT WAS STRESSED TO HIM HERE--THAT US WANTS IT MOVE IN CONCERT WITH OTHERS, NOT BE LEFT TO DO JOB ALONE.

AS ADDED INCENTIVE TO INDIANS TO GET SHIPPING CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHERS, WE DON'T WANT THEM TO COUNT ON OUR PAYING FREIGHT UNDER TITLE II. MIGHT BE WORTHWHILE GET THIS DISCREETLY INTO THE WORKS.

AM STRONGLY OF VIEW THAT SUCCESS OF SHASTRI VISIT WILL CRITICALLY DEPEND ON SHASTRI'S OWN ABILITY TAKE INITIATIVE AND CONVINCING PRESIDENT THAT INDIA HAS POSITIVE POLICIES ON DEVELOPMENT, AGRICULTURE, CHINA, PAKISTAN, NON-PROLIFERATION, ETC. IS IT TOO OUT OF CHARACTER FOR SHASTRI TO COME PREPARED MAKE STRONG INITIAL PRESENTATION SUCH POINTS, THUS HELPING REASSURE US THAT INDIA HAS VIGOROUS, SENSIBLE LEADERSHIP? NOTE MY LETTER TO JOHN LEWIS 4 JANUARY. IF RETURN FROM TASHKENT DELAYED, LITTLE TIME WILL BE LEFT FOR YOU TO BRIEF HIM. IN THIS CASE, MIGHT BE POINT IN DELAYING YOUR RETURN HERE. IN EITHER CASE, CAN WE GET YOU FOR DINNER 27TH TO TALK WITH FREEMAN?

BT

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By llw NARA, Date 07-26-2013