

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

| Doc # | DocType | Doc Info | Classification | Pages | Date | Restriction |
|-------|---------|---|----------------|--------------|---------------------|--------------|
| 11 | memo | Komer to Bundy re the Congo [sanitized 2000] (dup. #16 this file; #131, NSF, CF, Congo, Vol. 12, box 85) <i>open 2-8-11 NLJ 10353</i> | S | 1 | 10/29/65 | A |
| 15a | memo | Komer to Hare and Rostow re Kashmir (dup. #18, this file) <i>open 11/14/06</i> | S | 3 | 10/28/65 | A |
| 16 | memo | Komer to Bundy re the Congo (dup. #11, this file; #131, NSF, CF, Congo, Vol. 12, box 85) <i>open 2-8-11 NLJ 10353</i> | S | 1 | 10/29/65 | A |
| 18 | memo | Komer to Hare and Rostow re Kashmir (dup. #15a, this file) <i>open 11/14/06</i> | S | 3 | 10/28/65 | A |
| 20 | memo | Komer to Bundy re India | S | 1 | 10/25/65 | A |
| 20a | memo | Bundy to Secretaries of State and Defense re India | S | 1 | undated | A |
| 21 | memo | Komer to Bundy re India [exempted 3/02] <i>open 7-23-08 NLJ 07-7</i> | S | 1 | 10/14/65 | A |

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer

Folder Title "Bundy, McG. - Decisions 1965-1966"

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9/19/2003

rc
Initials

file

December 6, 1965

Mildred--

zayac

mc SB

Here's a clean transcript of Mr. Bundy's talk to the ICY conference. I'm also attaching the question period transcript, though it's impossible and unnecessary to make that look any better. Your files might as well hold the complete story.

I've sent a clean transcript to the State Department Bulletin for publication there.

HHS

1a
file

**McGEORGE BUNDY'S TALK TO WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
November 29, 1965**

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen:

It's a great pleasure to have a chance to meet with you here in the first day of the White House Conference on International Cooperation and to have the opportunity to cut my remarks short in obvious deference to your desire to hear from yourselves and not from the rest of us.

You're absolutely right; that's the purpose of this meeting. It's only in universities that you can get people to pay to come and hear a lecture. You have paid for this lunch--not for the purpose of hearing me but for the purpose of continuing this three-day effort to straighten the government out.

That's what the meeting is for. That's why the President called this Conference in 1964. That is what the very impressive collection of reports is about. It is also true that, the reports having been prepared by panels, they will now be improved by the rest of you in the three days of this meeting. Some of them will be advantaged by that discussion, I think, just as we have been advantaged already in the government by the work that you have done.

The first thing I would like to say to you, all fooling aside, is that it is very good for us that you are here, very good for us as we try to go about your business, that you are willing to take the time to express your convictions, to organize your thinking, to frame recommendations, as comprehensive and as varied, and yet as often interlocking, as those which

already appear in the preliminary papers.

I think it's very easy to forget, when one is outside of government, and even when one is inside government, how much the process of the framing of policy in the United States is inevitably a process which must engage not only those who work in any given Administration, not only the professionals who work from one Administration to another, but the American public as a whole. It remains true, complex and recondite as some of our problems are, immediate and urgent as some of our decisions may be, that the actions of the United States in the world depend upon the understanding and support of the American people.

It is also true that there is no way in which government alone can undertake to express of its own initiative and of its own insight alone the thinking of a country as rich and varied in human resources as our own. So it has always been true--either in organized or relatively organized fashions, like this one, or in the constant back and forth of communication and exchange, and comment and criticism and complaint--it has always been true that the process of government, as a democratic process, depends upon the kind of thing that you have been doing.

It is already clear to me from a hasty reading of all of the recommendations and of some of the reports, that you have done your job. Many of your recommendations, I think it is fair to say, have already been in the "In-Box" of the government. And that is not surprising, for the problems we work on

and the problems with which you have concerned yourselves are the same problems. There ought to be a reasonable overlap between the next items on our agenda and those which you recommend to our attention. Some of the things in some of the reports had already found their way to the "Out-Box" of government. But they will get another look because you have called them again to our attention. A few of the recommendations seem to me at least to be quite wrong, but I can assure you that the Government is no monolith and I know of no recommendation that will not find its advocate somewhere within the vast and varied forces of the Executive Branch. In fact, from time to time it has appeared to me that some one whose idea was not fully accepted within the process of government might conceivably have been communicating with some citizen in the private sector so as to ensure that the follies of higher authority were corrected by the appeal to public opinion. I do not at all mean to question the perfect discipline and internal security of the government, but only to point out that there are these means of communication and that we expect it to be so.

The circles of cooperation to which your panel reports are addressed are varied in size, and perhaps in a sense varied in their importance. We cannot claim that every change which we would like to make ⁱⁿ the process of commerce or in the advancement of this or that new industry compares in overall importance with the questions of peace and of human survival to which

some of the panel reports are quite explicitly addressed. That variation in importance is not a variation in immediacy or a variation in the usefulness of what each participant has done.

One of the things I hope that you may have a chance to do--that I would wish to do if I were able to participate in your sessions continuously--would be to look at the work, and perhaps listen to the discussion in one or more of the panels not related to the line of your own immediate professional or personal interest. I at least have had my attention drawn once again to the breadth of the concerns of the people of this nation, as they look to the question of international cooperation in all its forms.

Some of the things which are recommended are really internal recommendations from one group of private citizens to another. That also is as it should be. Cooperation is very much of that nature--in our history and in our present--a process of people-to-people and of citizen-to-citizen communication and of branches of human activity communicating with their counterparts in other countries. Some of it is at least implicitly recommendation to other governments. And that also is important. But centrally what you are doing is producing the kind of counsel to your own government which is in the great tradition of our country. And we are deeply grateful to you. Indeed, as we review your work and as we think of what this conference means we can only be struck by the fact that there are not many nations in which this kind of process can be carried forward. And we must hope that

the example which you set will be followed in as many other nations as possible.

Now let me say, before I turn the meeting to those who have questions or comments of their own, let me say finally that in saying all this I am quite confident that I speak in the sense in which the President was thinking when he called this meeting. You have already heard from the Vice President of his message of greeting. But it seemed to me that perhaps I might recall to you the spirit in which he called this conference, if I were to take just a minute to repeat some words which he spoke to many of us -- to many of you and to many of us in the government -- in the meeting in which he first announced in October of 1964 his intention to have a White House Conference.

He was late to that meeting (this was not the only time in which people were not precisely on time in the months of September and October, but the test of the activities of those months was registered a month later) but those of us who waited, I think, felt as I did, that when the President came, it was quite clear that he had come to a place, and to a group, whose purpose in coming to the State Dining Room he shared.

What he said then in part was: "As a great leader said in this room not many years ago, 'If a peaceful revolution is impossible, a violent revolution is inevitable.' So I believe that the true realists in the second half of this twentieth century are those who bear the dream of new ways for new cooperation.

You will be frowned upon. Some will call you an idealist. Some will call you a crackpot and some may even call you worse than that. They may say you are soft or hard or don't understand what it is all about in some of these fields, but what greater ambition could you have and what greater satisfaction could come to you than the knowledge that you had entered a partnership with your government that had provided the leadership in the world that had preserved humanity instead of destroyed it. "

The President went on to say that if he was there in the White House in the following year--he was speaking, he said, politically and not physically--if he was there he intended to call a White House Conference. ". . . And I want all of you to start thinking about it now. I want you to talk to your friends about it. I want to call a White House Conference to search and explore and canvass and thoroughly discuss every conceivable approach and avenue of cooperation that could lead to peace. That five-letter word is the goal of all of us. "

And I think that as we look back on the work that you have done, and the work that you have still to do in these wider sessions of the coming three days, it's fair for me in closing to paraphrase the President and to say in words like his of last October, that I am very proud this morning_x that I am a citizen of a country that can have voluntarily assembled under the auspices of the first house of this land, the quality and quantity of talent that faces me now. To each of you, for the time you've taken and waited, for the money

- 7 -

you've spent in coming here, for the thought that you've given, but more important, for what you are going to do, on behalf of the nation, I say that we are grateful.

Thank you very much.

December 3, 1965

McGB:

We have a request from the State Department Bulletin to print there your talk to the ICY Conference along with the President's message and the talks of the VP and SecState.

Memor. of Bundy

I've cleaned up the attached transcript a little. If you approve, I'll pass it along with any changes you'd like to write in. (I'll take the question-and-answer pages off the copy I send over.)

They'd like to go to press Monday, but I think they probably have a little leeway.

HHS

Att: McGeorge Bundy's remarks at ICY Conference, 11/30/65

Bundy OK

November 23, 1965

*M^cB B P
X RWK + P*

Mac -

Instead of going off Thanksgiving weekend, I am now planning to fly to Memphis on Thursday, 2 December for my father's ear operation and take him back to St. Louis. If no urgent business here, I'd be gone through the weekend. Any problem?

RWK

~~SECRET~~

November 22, 1965

McSB

Mac:

Iran interest rate on arms sales. I've held this up for over 8 weeks now, in order to keep it tied to Peshawar package. But we're going nowhere fast, and heat is mounting (see Tehran 743 attached).

Case for holding up has been that giving away a goodie too long before we ask for something in turn vitiates the leverage. But State and DOD think the Shah would still remember and also argue the case for going ahead now anyway on general grounds of keeping Iranians happy. Also Iran is talking about purchasing arms elsewhere at cost to our balance of payments. Past rate has been 5%. State/DOD want to cut it to 3-1/2-4% (ultimately about \$350 million in sales over next several years may be involved).

Other problem is that McNamara wants to lay off this paper with Ex-Im, thus freeing MAP credit fund for other sales. It will take a WH whip, of course, to get Linder to do this.

I favor going ahead now at 4%, so long as I have your backing in beating up Harold when necessary.

McSB;
OK

RWK

~~SECRET~~

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Authority FRUS 64-68, vol 22, #107

By jc, NARA, Date 8-28-03

~~SECRET~~

November 17, 1965

Mac -

Dick Gilbert. I made very little headway with Gilbert on the Gilbert/Mason proposal (doubtless 90% Gilbert). I am much afraid our development experts see a highly successful example of their wares going down the drain and this colors their thinking. Gilbert is insistent that I pass this proposal on to you and to Arthur Goldberg and that if you both agree we try it out on the President. He and Mason want to see you together before Ed leaves Thursday if possible, and I would endorse your giving them a half-hour.

Gilbert talks about a letter Ed Mason wrote you last spring foreshadowing the Pak/Indian conflict, which he claims you never answered. Carl also mentioned this, because apparently Ed Mason is a bit miffed.

Attached is the proposal and the note I sent to Mason. I still think that any proposal for binding arbitration is a non-starter and that for Gilbert to be allowed to convey to the Paks that we might consider it or take the initiative on it would be dangerously misleading. Gilbert (and Carl) argue that binding arbitration can be construed to mean many things but I doubt that we'd get past the initial two words.

Will you see Gilbert and Mason? Also any objection to my passing this on to Goldberg?

RWK

Attach. Letter Gilbert/Mason 11/15/65 to Rusk

210 Littauer Center
Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-28-03

5
Mason
X
Koch

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 17, 1965

Mac -

It's a pity that the President is harassed by press pick-up of every ambiguous Shastri statement but that no papers pick up such lulu as Bhutto's 12 November press conference statement. Karachi 1085, confirmed by Pindi 176, quotes Bhutto as saying that India used US arms in aggression against Pakistan and "that is why we say US betrayed this nation of 100 million."

As a gentle warning to Ayub and a reminder to LBJ, why couldn't I leak a Periscope squib to Weintal:

"High Washington quarters are quite annoyed at Pak Foreign Minister Bhutto's continued antics, especially his recent press conference statement on 12 November that the US "betrayed" Pakistan by letting India use US arms to aggress against it. Washington sources point out that the Paks used a great many more US arms against India than vice versa and that the war began through Pakistani infiltration of Kashmir."

RWK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Authority NLS 88-143 (#20)

By JK/isp NARA. Date 8-28-03

21
me
X Kish

1

no - let's send mine

~~SECRET~~

November 17, 1965

*McSB - D.
X Shastri Unit*

Mac -

Here's a State cable on Shastri visit, cleared by Ball, which parallels yours. My instinct is to let it go, since it is not in conflict, and to send your own by sidewire.

RWK

RWK

Mac - why not suggest to Craville that he ought to chat with me at some point before he goes -- to get the big picture.

11/17/65

McSB: "No, let's send mine"

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-28-03

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~
CLASSIFICATION

5001

7a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

1- Komer
2-Rit.

RECEIVED
MCGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

Nov. 16, 1965

1965 NOV 17 AM 8 30

Date

Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

The enclosed is for White House
clearance prior to transmission.

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Cable to AmEmbassy NEW DELHI

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~
CLASSIFICATION

NOV 17 1965

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY JW ON 2-17-93

76

~~SECRET~~

Ambassy NEW DELHI

ENDIS

Your 1247

1. Would not rpt not be convenient for President to receive Shastri during first half of January in view reconvening of Congress, State of Union message, etc. Mutually convenient date in latter part of January (presumably after conclusion AICC meeting) or during month February would be satisfactory.
2. In discussions with GOI regarding timing, we know you will keep in mind fact that President sees visit as offering opportunity for general discussion, leading to identification of common interests and elimination of misunderstandings, which can provide durable basis for moving ahead in our relationship. We do not rpt not wish to oversell visit by permitting Indians to develop unrealistic expectations of extent to which visit likely to produce immediate and tangible results. At same time we continue believe it ^{much} important to both our countries, and particularly to India, that visit take place. In this connection we are encouraged by L.K. Jha statements reported reftel suggesting increasing Indian awareness of extent to which India needs US.
3. Separate message will following regarding your proposal for Subramanian visit.

GP-3.

End

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jk, NARA, Date 8-28-03

NEA:SOA:HSRogerty:CSGoon:dmm 11/15/65

The Acting Secretary

AMB O/CPR - Mr. King

S/S -

NEA - Amb. Hare

White House -

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

WJHandley

~~SECRET~~FORM DS-322
8-63
NOV 17 1965

Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other
flimsy work copies before delivery to Telecommunications Operations Division

You've already covered this, though not as positively as I would have. Here's the argument if BT queried. RWK.

~~SECRET~~

November 15, 1965

Mac -

Do you think LBJ would mind if Freeman invited Subramaniam to Washington? Bowles has now proposed this twice (see Delhi 1274) and I think it makes great good sense.

*McJ.D
X Subra Visit
India*

If we can't have Shastri until February, why not have Subramaniam in November as an indication of US interest? It would also be the Indians coming to us, and would also focus attention on India's agricultural problem instead of Kashmir. Finally, Subramaniam is the best guy in the Indian cabinet and thus a good channel for getting back a few signals too.

Nor do I think we would have to give him anything at the time. His visit would merely help focus our attention on the coming food crisis, need for a little higher monthly PL 480, and maybe an interim fertilizer loan.

If this makes sense I'd like to ask an early Presidential OK after checking with Orville (am sure he'd be enthusiastic, but we're all scared of the BOMB).

RWK

~~SECRET~~

I cheated & asked LBJ without your approval - see attached carbon. McJP.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc/jw, NARA, Date 8-28-03

~~SECRET~~

Mac -

November 12, 1965

Delhi 1247 indicates that Shastri won't come in December after all (unless we twist his arm). I suspect this is just as much a device to protect him against our lack of answer as anything else. He has his political problems too.

Nonetheless, it would greatly help to mitigate the adverse affect of Ayub coming first if we invited Shastri now for mid-January before Ayub replied. We could do so by either:

(1) A brief LBJ note saying he understands that Shastri would prefer to come around 10 January and would be delighted to see him then; or

(2) An instruction to Bowles telling him to tell Jha (or Shastri) the same thing, adding that Ayub has not yet decided when to come but that he might come in December and reassuring Shastri that this should not be read as pro/Pak.

If you agree, how do we go about setting this up pronto? Should I do a wire to the ranch (draft attached) or should we check it out with Rusk first?

RWK

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-28-03

9
MAGB
X Shastri

~~SECRET~~

November 12, 1965

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNDY AND KOMER

It now looks as though Shastri can't come till January after all, which better suits your current thinking. His secretary told Bowles that December visit seems difficult because of heavy Parliamentary agenda and asked what we would think about 10 January or so, provided this met your convenience. To forestall any Indian resentment lest Ayub come first when it was Indians who were by all odds the most eager to come when you wanted, we suggest replying to latest Shastri probe before Ayub answers. Then at least Shastri will know privately that we didn't make him take second place. Shastri has now made several offers to come over the past few months, which is an additional reason for picking up this latest direct probe.

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 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
 NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
 By jc, NARA, Date 8-28-03

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

November 1, 1965

Mac -

Visitology. If Erhard is reluctant to come early and we aren't ready to talk yet anyway, any chance of putting Shastri first?

1) ~~HHG~~
2) B.N

Having told Erhard of the Shastri/Ayub problem, it seems to me we have discharged obligation to have him first. Moreover, latest word from Delhi is that Shastri might be able to come a little before the 10 December end of Lok Sabha session.

I'm not pushing, simply trying to firm up this matter. Clearly there is growing speculation which will create growing annoyance in turn--until this matter is sawed off.

RWK

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jk, NARA, Date 8-28-03

~~SECRET~~

October 29, 1965

11
B.J.
X Congo L

McGB:

Congo Air Force. I don't want to be chintzy again but \$6 million for this blarney for FY 66 is for the birds. The war is probably over in the Congo. There is a point in keeping the air option open a few months longer, perhaps at a reduced scale, but not at 6 mil.

Wayne Fredericks and Glenn Fields shamefacedly agree. Glenn recalls that the Minutes were to show this as up for review / 1 February. So I've confirmed this ad referendum to you.

Bye the bye, these project statements are atrocious. They go on for pages about precedents and background, but never explain much about why the new dough is needed. Ye Gods.

RWK

cc: P. Jessup

~~SECRET~~

You are right in this case -- but I don't want an issue of it in November with current troubles.
McGB.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 10-353
By cbm NARA, Date 1-21-2011

~~SECRET~~

October 29, 1965

Mac -

We're getting into the usual flap over whether to recommend an LBJ message to Afro-Asian Conference, if held. FE as usual is being conventionally cold-war, and opposing one if S. Vietnam is not seated (even if we get Malaysia and S. Korea in--and Chicoms don't come).

B
9
X
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A
C
II

I'm vigorously taking opposite tack. Let's act as if Afro-Asians are mostly our friends (which they are). If Soviets show, let's not ~~leave~~ the arena entirely to them. An LBJ message would be admittedly marginal, but better than nothing. We did send them to Belgrade 1961 and Cairo 1963. Are you behind me?

RWK

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-28-03

13/

~~SECRET~~

February 4, 1966

Mac -

LBJ wanted these figures, and I'd like to try belling the cat on our formula at the same time.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-28-03

RWK
RWK

~~SECRET~~

OK

Mr. Bundy

13a

~~SECRET~~

February 4, 1966
Friday, 12:00 noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here are Agriculture's quick figures on significant world wheat supplies (includes carryovers as well as output), and on estimated export availabilities.

| | <u>Total Supply</u> 1965-66 <u>Million Metric Tons</u> | <u>Estimated</u> <u>Uncommitted Availability</u> <u>Million Metric Tons</u> |
|-----------|--|---|
| Canada | 28.2 | 4.0 |
| France | 7.4 | 1.0 |
| Argentina | 8.7 | 0.5 |
| Australia | 7.9 | 0.5 |
| Italy | 9.0 | 0.2 |
| Greece | 2.5 | 0.5 |
| US | 58 | 10-15 |

Agriculture says that all other countries are either net importers (like the USSR or Red China), self-sufficient, or insignificant.

Even though 6.7 million tons are theoretically available elsewhere, much of it is virtually unusable. The experts think we'll be doing mighty well if India, the UN and we could liberate one or two million tons of it. Canada's 4 million tons is virtually unavailable because of ice-frozen parts and extremely tight shipping through end July. Greece's is extremely poor quality and port facilities aren't equipped for sizeable exports. France has never cooperated in food for famine ventures (though we're pressing India to try).

The Indians could eat rice, but the world rice market is far tighter than that for wheat.

The chart at Tab shows where the wheat from the four major export producers other than ourselves is going in FY 1966. They plan to export about 34 million tons (Canada 16.3, Australia 6.1, Argentina 7.1, France 4.5). So only Canada (and to a minor extent France) still have any substantial wheat not already sold or earmarked for traditional markets and Communist countries.

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~~SECRET~~

Authority NLS 89-135 (#96)
By slip NARA. Date 8-29-03

The best bet is Canada, especially for later in the year when ports are open and more shipping available, and Canada is sensitive to Indian needs. So more Indian appeals to Canada are in order (Pearson has already allocated 150,000 tons). At some point we also ought to put the blocks to Pearson ourselves.

The second best target may be the USSR. It is importing about 9 million tons in 1965/66. But India might be able to put pressure on Moscow to stretch out its imports and thus free stocks for India.

But the blunt fact is that of a total Indian need running at least 11 million tons, it will be terribly difficult as a practical matter to get more than two million tons from other sources. This is the town's best judgment, though I hope we're wrong.

Sensible guidelines. So the guts of the matter is to devise guidelines which will be equitable -- in terms of getting the most from others -- but also practicable -- in terms of meeting a critical need. If we calculate on the basis of a formula covering all 11 million tons, then it would take about a 5 to 1 (or even higher) ratio of US to other contributions to come near the target. Will the Hill be receptive to such a one-sided ratio? But if we stick to a 50/50 or even 2 to 1 formula, can we come within a country mile of preventing mass famine? This is our dilemma.

Though your first reaction to our proposed solution was sulphurous, let me explain why we all came to it. The only way to avoid an impossible ratio was to separate out India's "normal" need assuming no famine (e. g. the 6 million tons we allocated last year -- which it's hard for us to ask other countries to share all of a sudden), and treat the remaining 5 million tons as the emergency, one-time need.

Then we could quite equitably insist that this latter be met on a matching basis (or even 2 for 1, since the US has roughly two-thirds of the world's uncommitted food reserves). We could announce that we'd contribute a ton of wheat for each ton of wheat equivalent others put in. The arithmetic works out as follows:

~~SECRET~~

Page 3

| | |
|--|-------------------------|
| <u>India's total 1966 import needs</u> | 11 million tons |
| Less regular US Title I program | <u>6 million tons</u> |
| <u>Remaining Emergency Need</u> | 5 million tons |
| Less matching contribution from others | <u>2.5 million tons</u> |
| Matching US Pledge | 2.5 million tons |

We'd ask the Congress to endorse our full contribution, not just the matching formula. But the formula proposed would protect us from press and other accusations that we were drawing back, at the very time when India faced its worst food crisis. No one could criticize us for trying to shift an old burden to others, and we'd then be in a very strong position to make India and the UN get others to match whatever emergency aid we gave. If they didn't, we wouldn't. So I'd still urge that this formula is the most ingenious way of getting what we want--a formula fully understandable and defensible to Congress, the press, the Indians, and the world--yet one which forces others to cough up more than they ever have before.

R. W. Kone r

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 89-135 (496)

By jc/isp. NARA. Date 8-29-03

February 3, 1966

WHEAT SUPPLY
July 1965 - June 1966
In the Four Major Producers Other Than US
(Million Metric tons)

| | <u>Canada</u> | <u>France</u> | <u>Argentina</u> | <u>Australia</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|--|---------------------|---------------|------------------|---------------------|--------------|
| Total supply for export or carryover | 28.2 | 7.4 | 8.7 | 7.9 | 52.2 |
| Minus exports already planned or committed: | | | | | |
| To Communist countries | (8.6) | (2.0) | (4.5) | (2.6) | (17.7) |
| To Free World markets | (7.7 ^a) | (2.5) | (2.6) | (3.5 ^a) | (16.3) |
| Total | 16.3 | 4.5 | 7.1 | 6.1 | 34.0 |
| Minus desirable stocks as of 1 July 1966 | <u>8.2</u> | <u>1.9</u> | <u>1.1</u> | <u>1.3</u> | <u>13.6</u> |
| Balance theoretically available for additional shipments | 3.7 ^b | 1.0 | .5 | .5 | 4.6 |

a. Estimate includes 0.2 from Canada and 0.1 from Australia for India under Colombo Plan.

b. Canadian rail and port facilities cannot move much (if any) more than the 16.3 million tons already planned for export.

Available from Minor Producers

These are the best USDA guesses at the moment, subject to minor revision as we update marketing information:

| | |
|----------------|---|
| Greece | 0.5 (ports probably unable to move that much) |
| Italy | 0.2 |
| United Kingdom | 0.2 |
| Sweden | 0.1 |
| Syria | 0.1 |
| Mexico | --- (very small amount possible) |

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 16, 1965

B.D.
14

Mac -

We've held off for years on requesting mess privileges for Saunders and Haynes, and Hamilton and Thompson. Does this make sense when McCafferty, Chase and now DeLuca have them? Francis feels as I do. Will you entertain the attached?

no

RWK
RWK

They don't work in this
bldg. and they aren't
with fellows.
(me & B statement
per Mitchell
11/17/65)

14a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 16, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR COL. JAMES CROSS

May I request that Messrs. Harold H. Saunders, Ulric S. Haynes, Jr., Edward Hamilton, and James Thompson of the NSC Staff be added to the Junior Mess List for the sitting beginning at twelve o'clock. These men have seniority over others of my staff and others in the White House of comparable grade who already have Mess privileges. Under the circumstances I think it only right that they should not be discriminated against. They will not abuse the privilege.

McGeorge Bundy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

15

10/30/65

Dear Robert:

This is a damned good try --
but doesn't it violate Komer's first law:
the Indians won the war. Can you shave
it down some in favor of Indians?

McG. B.

NOV 1 1965

Dear Robert:

This is a damned good try - but
doesn't it violate Kerner's first law:
the Indians won the war.

~~SECRET~~

Can you show it down some in
favor of Indians? *mjb*

October 28, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR RAY HARE
WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: A Quasi-Realistic Kashmir Solution

As you know, I believe it unrealistic to expect that anyone can force India to disgorge enough of Kashmir to satisfy the Paks in the foreseeable future. The Indians believe that they just won a war on the issue; to force the far larger power to disgorge the fruits of victory on behalf of the defeated smaller one would be an undertaking beyond even our means. Leaving aside the cost to us in India, I doubt that even extreme Western pressure would suffice; more likely it would only drive the Indians into an attempt to go it alone (or rather to go it with only Soviet help).

However, it may just be possible to work something out if we can convince the Indians that their own larger interests demand some kind of modus vivendi with Pakistan. So we ought to be prepared to seize any opportunity which presents itself.

But to do so requires a realistic proposal--one which has at least some chance of being bought. Such a proposal must, it seems to me, meet three criteria; (a) help to defuse the present crisis by substituting a negotiating process for the current impasse; (b) leave the bulk of Kashmir in Indian hands--the only solution the Indians would conceivably buy; yet (c) give the Paks minimum satisfaction. Such a plan might consist of the following four components:

A. Rectification of the Cease-Fire Line. Because both sides now hold territory beyond the 1949 CFL, there may be an opportunity for a de facto partition under the guise of reworking the CFL. In spring 1963 both sides evinced willingness to make some concessions toward partition of this sort. In fact, we had indications that both were prepared to go further than the positions they revealed to each other. Ayub said at the time, for example, that he was more interested in protecting the headwaters of such rivers as the Jhelum and perhaps the Indus than in real estate per se. Similarly, the Indians are quite interested in rectifying the CFL to protect the road to Leh. It is barely possible that in the process of negotiating a withdrawal to the CFL, this CFL itself could be altered to create a de facto partition along the lines the US and UK were pushing for in the 1963 exercise. But this

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By *NS/cbm*, NARA, Date 10-31-06

~~SECRET~~

NOV 1 1965

would be acceptable to the Paks only if it were termed an "interim" solution and there was at least an apparent chance at a larger settlement later. Therefore, I would propose the following corollary steps.

B. A 3-5 standstill agreement on the Kashmir issue. This would involve an Indian undertaking to make no new moves toward incorporation of Kashmir in India (though India could say that this in no way meant a retreat from its position that Kashmir is a part of India--merely that it would be treated with a degree of local autonomy during the standstill). The Paks would undertake to exert no new diplomatic or subversive pressures on Indian-held Kashmir.

C. Pak/Indian agreement to hold formal talks within 3-5 years on the Kashmir issue, either bilaterally or under some third party auspices. I suspect the Indians would prefer to keep third parties out, despite Pak eagerness that it be a feature of any deal. In any case, the most we could get from the Indians would be agreement to discuss the issue. India could not be expected to agree that there must be a definitive solution then (otherwise we would never get Indian acceptance).

D. The final part of the package would be a tacit understanding (perhaps enshrined in a side agreement) that both parties would undertake to work for Pak/Indian reconciliation during the intervening 3-5 year period, on the understanding that only if a high degree of reconciliation had been achieved would the problem of Kashmir be ripe for definitive compromise settlement at the end of the period. In other words, the Paks would have to prove to the Indians (and the Indians to the Paks) that they genuinely desired to collaborate as the necessary precursor to any sensible compromise. It would be understood that if this process did not take place, the Kashmir talks would be pro forma only.

I see such a solution as meeting the basic criteria outlined in my second paragraph. If accepted, it would defuse the crisis. It would leave the bulk of Kashmir in Indian hands. It would give Pakistan a little real estate (the 1963 partition exercise contemplated that Pakistan would get more territory than India).

India could argue that this deal was no more than a rectification of the CFL, and involved no commitment whatsoever on India's part to give up Kashmir--merely to seek a reconciliation with Pakistan and to talk about Kashmir again after 3-5 years. Even this would be hard to sell to the Indians, but it might be possible if we gave the Indians a side undertaking that we would understand why no final settlement was possible unless the reconciliation process had been significantly advanced; in other words we would tell the Indians that this wasn't just a scheme for taking Kashmir away from them by delayed action.

~~SECRET~~

Page Three

As for the Paks, it gives them something immediately, plus a chance at something more. It should be evident to the Paks that this is the most they can realistically expect whether or not they tie up with the Chicoms. Also important, acceptance of this scheme would commit the Paks to a process of reconciliation with India as the price for even a fair shot at a final agreement after 3-5 years. So in effect we commit the Paks to a course of behavior in the US interest as the price for any US support.

In sum, the proposal envisages a de facto partition in the guise of an interim settlement; but one also designed to be the opening stage in a process which might lead to an ultimate solution. The odds are poor that such an ultimate solution would ever be realized (I suspect that Kashmir is settled right now), but it's worth the try to commit the Paks to a different line of policy, i. e. one of reconciliation with India if they are ever to get more than rectification of the CFL.

This is only a broad brush outline. Nor do I feel wise about how to float such a package; I have great reservations as to whether the US should propose it--the SYG or perhaps the UK would be best. Moreover, I would regard it as a pro-Pak solution, which means it would be mighty hard to get India to buy.

R. W. Komer

cc: McG. Bundy
Joe Bisco

~~SECRET~~

16/
McGB file

~~SECRET~~

October 29, 1965

McGB:

Congo Air Force. I don't want to be chintzy again, but \$6 million for this blarney for FY 66 is for the birds. The war is probably over in the Congo. There is a point in keeping the air option open a few months longer, perhaps at a reduced scale, but not at 6 mil.

Wayne Fredericks and Glenn Fields shamefacedly agree. Glenn recalls that the Minutes were to show this as up for review 1 February. So I've confirmed this ad referendum to you.

Bye the bye, these project statements are atrocious. They go on for pages about precedents and background, but never explain much about why the new dough is needed. Ye Gods.

✓ You are right in this case - but I don't want an issue of it in November
RWK
cc: P. Jessup with current troubles
mjb

~~SECRET~~

11/1/65

RWK

You are right in this case -- but I don't want an issue of it in November with current troubles.

McG B

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 10-353
By cbm NARA, Date 1-21-2011

~~SECRET~~

October 29, 1965

Mac -

Rhodesia and UDI. Somehow, we haven't gotten across the underlying idea that UDI will create a mess 10-20 times worse than we've got now. How George Ball can say it wouldn't create much of a problem for us passes understanding. It could be worse than the Congo, with heavy UN and African pressure on us to get in (plus domestic pressure from the civil rights lobby here).

Ergo, deterrence is our best hope, and every private or public deterrent gesture cheap at the price. It's just better to run scared than to have to help pick up the pieces (a la Congo) afterwards. This is the argument I keep making to State, and I hope we make to the President.

Would a chit from me be useful?

That might work.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *je/w*, NARA, Date 8-29-03

~~SECRET~~

18
7
October 28, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR RAY HARE
WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: A Quasi-Realistic Kashmir Solution

*This is a damned good try -- but
doesn't it violate Komer's first law:
the Indians won the war. Can
you shove it down some in
favor of the Indians? meqB.*

As you know, I believe it unrealistic to expect that anyone can force India to disgorge enough of Kashmir to satisfy the Paks in the foreseeable future. The Indians believe that they just won a war on the issue; to force the far larger power to disgorge the fruits of victory on behalf of the defeated smaller one would be an undertaking beyond even our means. Leaving aside the cost to us in India, I doubt that even extreme Western pressure would suffice; more likely it would only drive the Indians into an attempt to go it alone (or rather to go it with only Soviet help).

However, it may just be possible to work something out if we can convince the Indians that their own larger interests demand some kind of modus vivendi with Pakistan. So we ought to be prepared to seize any opportunity which presents itself.

But to do so requires a realistic proposal--one which has at least some chance of being bought. Such a proposal must, it seems to me, meet three criteria; (a) help to defuse the present crisis by substituting a negotiating process for the current impasse; (b) leave the bulk of Kashmir in Indian hands--the only solution the Indians would conceivably buy; yet (c) give the Paks minimum satisfaction. Such a plan might consist of the following four components:

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~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By ag/chem NARA, Date 10-31-06

would be acceptable to the Paks only if it were termed an "interim" solution and there was at least an apparent chance at a larger settlement later. Therefore, I would propose the following corollary steps.

B. A 3-5 standstill agreement on the Kashmir issue. This would involve an Indian undertaking to make no new moves toward incorporation of Kashmir in India (though India could say that this in no way meant a retreat from its position that Kashmir is a part of India--merely that it would be treated with a degree of local autonomy during the standstill). The Paks would undertake to exert no new diplomatic or subversive pressures on Indian-held Kashmir.

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~~SECRET~~

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R. W. Komer

cc: McG. Bundy
Joe Blasco

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

October 25, 1965

RWK
Bot: on advice I
didn't send neg B

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Developments in Africa. Rhodesia's threatened UDI is still the major current problem in Africa. Its reverberations were felt as far away as Ghana where the OAU Summit meeting was being held. [Items in brackets are too sensitive for release.]

Rhodesia. Harold Wilson arrived today to the enthusiastic acclaim of a cheering, banner-waving crowd of some 6,000 Africans. The purpose of his trip is to deter the Smith Government from carrying out UDI, even though it has announced it is already committed. Some observers see a glimmer of hope in Smith's agreeing to the Wilson trip and to Wilson's consulting with jailed African and white opponents of UDI. But Smith's acceptance is more likely for the purpose of pinning the blame on Wilson for any breakdown in negotiations and for the consequences thereof. This week should tell.

[Wilson carried with him the message from Secretary Rusk to Smith advising that the US stands with the UK in opposition to UDI and counselling against it.]

At the OAU Summit meeting the African heads of state and delegations present unanimously passed a hopefully meaningless resolution on UDI. In most unhelpful language, the resolution was a veiled threat to the UK if it failed to prevent UDI.

The OAU Summit meeting. It convened in Ghana last week with only 18 chiefs of state attending, 10 countries represented by lower level delegations and 8 countries not attending at all. The "no-show" group were all members of Ivory Coast President Houphouet Boigny's Entente alliance plus Togo, Gabon, Chad and Malagasy -- all so-called African "moderates". The Entente countries (Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta and Dahomey) are mad at OAU host N'Krumah for harboring subversives from their countries and for failing to live up to his promise to expel these undesirables.

Aside from the resolution against UDI, nothing much is coming from this confab of African leaders in the \$28 million conference setting constructed for the occasion by virtually bankrupt Ghana. [From the US point of view, we're happy that Vietnam was dropped as an agenda item. Yet, we don't want to say anything publicly about it.]

Congo. Politicking has been mostly behind-scenes since Kasavubu fired Tshombe. The new government hasn't been presented to parliament, because Kasavubu has been in Ghana at the OAU Summit.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 02-14 (#66)
By je/af NARA, Date 8-29-03

~~SECRET~~

[The prime minister designate has told Godley he wants to do business with us, but he doesn't have a clue about the tough economic problems he faces. He'll be politically weak, so we don't expect him to make needed economic reforms. Although Tshombe seems to be going along for the moment, he'll almost certainly challenge Kasavubu in the presidential election early next year, and that will provoke a new crisis. While we'll try to work with this government, we may have to face up to the question of taking sides later if we want a more effective government.]

Afro-Asian conference. The odds are now in favor of its meeting on 5 November as scheduled. Chicom heavy-handedness in their effort to postpone it has infuriated many other participants; even if the Chicoms decide not to boycott the conference, they'll face a far less receptive gathering than they would have last June. [We may recommend you exploit their setback by sending a fairly warm message to the conferees.]

Tunisia. Bourguiba in a speech last week reflected on how Tunisian security in the last analysis depends on the big powers and noted that Tunisian leaders would at least have to consider making alliances with them. [This is the first public mention of what Bourguiba, Jr. hinted to us privately in giving Rusk his request for military aid. It is probably a trial balloon.]

Portuguese Africa. With National Assembly elections in the offing, the opposition to the Salazar regime published a 4,000-word anti-Salazar "manifesto" which, in part, called for a settlement of the Overseas Territories (Mozambique, Angola and Portuguese Guinea) problem on the basis of self-determination. It attracted so much attention that the government felt it necessary to organize public demonstrations in Portugal and the Overseas Territories to repudiate the opposition's proposals. For the most part, the government demonstrations fizzled.

[Ambassador Anderson spent two hours with Salazar over the weekend talking mainly about Portugal's African territories. In view of his extreme sensitivity on this subject, Salazar's willingness even to discuss US suggestions for a peaceful settlement of the problem is encouraging. Anderson reports, "I am mildly hopeful our conversation may have stirred some new thinking."]

cc: McGB
RWK
Hal Saunders

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

October 25, 1965

Mac -

Indian Ocean Carrier Visits. This enterprise is limping badly, given Pentagon indifference and requirements elsewhere. Now State and DOD agree again that a winter cruise is no better than was a summer one.

*Bundy
Indian Ocean*

They have a case, but not an overriding one. The political unrest in India/Pakistan is not a bar in my view--indeed it may be a virtue to have a US carrier pass through. What the Navy really worries about is that the crews may not be invited into Karachi or Bombay (so let 'em go to Ceylon). If we want to keep India from going nuclear, visible US power helps. Indonesia is a bit more worrisome--we don't want to let Bung Karno divert his people by a bleat about US carriers in the "Indonesian" Ocean.

Ergo, would you entertain the attached?

RWK

- Attach. (1) Read/Bundy Memo 10/19/61, subj. Naval Visits to the Indian Ocean
- (2) Draft Bundy Memo/SecState/SecDef, subj. Periodic Naval Visits to Indian Ocean

DECLASSIFIED (#2)
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *jplbm*, NARA, Date 10-30-06

20^a

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Periodic Naval Visits to the Indian Ocean

I gather from the attached that your Departments favor another postponement. However, are we missing a bet by continually postponing further periodic cruises at the very time when continued Chinese muttering at India and the risk of India going nuclear suggest that a quiet show of strength in the Indian Ocean area would be useful? On the other hand, it might be a wrong signal vis-a-vis the Indonesians at this moment.

Would you be willing to take another look at the possibility of scheduling within the next two or three months another carrier run through the area, perhaps en route to or from home station? I shouldn't think that this would involve much distortion of existing priorities.

McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED (#2a)
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By jefbm, NARA, Date 10-30-06

21
file

~~SECRET~~

October 14, 1965

B. J.
x India

Mac -

The latest 303 proposal that we finally give greater backing to India's U/W effort makes a great deal of sense.

Paradoxical as it may seem to provide \$13 million in aid of this sort when we are holding off on far larger sums, it actually makes good sense. A \$13 million investment proves to the Indians that we are serious about China, thus helping to counter their suspicions that we are really Paks at heart. Nor do I see any harm in being helpful under the table at the time when we are being standoffish on top of the table. This will help to reassure the Indians along the same lines as our talk with BK Nehru the other day.

On the specifics of the proposal, the reason for high cost is the provision of aircraft, etc.

RWK

cc: Peter Jessup

~~SECRET~~

But this must wait until
LBJ has a setback at
whole problem.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 07-7
By jol, NARA, Date 4-10-08

B. D.
India
X

~~SECRET~~

Mac -

October 9, 1965

In response to an invitation from the Lok Sabha, a Senate delegation is off to Japan and India. Morse (chairman), Lausche, Dominick, Church, Burdick, perhaps Prokty are planning to be in India 6-13 December (they leave for Japan 24 November).

This is apparently being handled out of the VP's office (Reilly). I'm unimpressed by the calibre of the delegation, but can't see a good reason for saying "no". Any reactions likely upstairs?

RWK

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-29-03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 28, 1965

23
RKR

McGB

This package was prepared in response to a letter sent to the President by a South African journalist, Stephen Mulholland.

He studied journalism at Southern Methodist. In March 1957 the President wrote to congratulate him for winning a scholarship from the Dallas Press Club. His letter reads in part, "if I can ever be of any help or service to you in any way, I do hope that you will let me know".

On the strength of the President's offer, Mulholland -- a firm opponent of his government's official policy of racism -- now asks the President to "give us a few words of advice based on the deep thinking you must have done on this problem".

As an enterprising newsman, Mulholland will surely see that any substantive reply is published in his newspaper. We feel that this is neither the time nor the occasion for Presidential involvement in the problem of our deteriorating relations with South Africa. Therefore, I recommend a pro forma reply for my signature on the President's behalf along the lines of the attached draft.

Draft approved

Draft disapproved

R. W. Komer

CONFIDENTIAL

cc: RWK

Attachments:

Read/Bundy memo dated September 24, 1965

Draft reply

Mulholland letter to the President (copy)

President's 1957 letter to Mulholland (copy)

Copies of Presidential and other US public statements on race relations and on the South African racial situation

*File
McGB
Decisions
X S/H*

*See RWK &
Mulholland 9/28/65
(South Africa)*

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date 8-29-03

24/

B. D.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Mac -

September 14, 1965

I wouldn't bother LBJ with this pro forma appeal from Iranian PM. We'll doubtless have a more substantive message from the Shah shortly, when his PM gets back from Pindi. So far Turks and Iranians are under control.

RWK

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

*Agreed.
Mel B.
Best mention it
in your next roundup.
Mel B.*

Att: Read to Bundy message, 9/13/65,
Subj: Message to the President from
Prime Minister Hoveyda of Iran
(WH-3972)

Alvin

~~SECRET~~

Mac -

June 10, 1965

I see merit in a bull session with you (let's add Francis) on where we go from here on our Pak/Indian enterprise.

We now have a much clearer sense of where the President stands, but this is only the point of departure. Now the problems are: (a) how to revalidate our Pak/Indian policy to the President; (b) how to carry out the policy line he's laid down; and (c) how to prevent a painful and potentially serious deterioration in our Indian affairs. I have ideas on all of this I'd like to check out.

One immediate problem is whether to reargue one last time the case for committing \$140 million rather than asking for reappropriation. Even I hesitate to try, but I think the merits simply haven't been properly put before LBJ.

Second, the net effect of our current stance is to hit India a lot harder than Pakistan, even though one would think we ought to do the reverse. I don't think we've really gotten this across either.

Third, I see great risk of a messy situation developing, in which Indians as well as Paks are sore, resentful, and bewildered; as this comes out it will lead to lots of press play here with overtones of LBJ dismantling yet another policy. And if the Congress scents that LBJ isn't eager to spend so much on India/Pakistan, we may lose the option of doing so. Ergo, all this needs careful handling.

Finally, instead of all the defensive briefs which I fear will be written justifying present policy, we need to get a genuine new look which will give the President some sense we've been responsive. In fact, with skill we might even be able to argue the objectively strong case for more aid to India, if we could couple this with a clearer set of conditions precedent.

There's trouble ahead but also opportunity. And we all agree with McNamara that this is just as central as Southeast Asia. Can we talk?

Yes

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *je/jw*, NARA, Date 8-29-03

RWK
RWK

~~SECRET~~