

# LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
002	memo	Komer to McGeorge Bundy [Dup. #15, NSF, Files of Komer, "INDIA-Nuclear 1964-1965-March 1966," Box 25--sanitized] <i>Dup. #178, Papers of Komer, Chron July-Dec. 64, Box 4</i>	S	1	10/20/64	A
006	memo	Komer to McGeorge Bundy [Dup. #17, NSF, Files of Komer, "INDIA-Nuclear 1964-1965-March 1966," Box 25] <i>Dup. #265, Papers of Komer, Chron, July-Dec. 64, Box 4</i>	S	1	9/23/64	A
010a	draft	Draft NSAM [Dup. #35, this file]	S	5	1/24/64	A
010b	letter	Walt Rostow to McNamara [Dup. #36, this file]	S	3	1/21/64	A
011b	report	Some "Unorthodox" Approaches to the Problem of Nuclear Proliferation [Dup. #26, NSF, Agency File, State Department, "Policy Planning, Volume 3," Box 51]	S	11	5/28/64	A
016	report	Research Memorandum, RES-29	S	3	11/2/64	A
021	report	Intelligence report [sanitized per RAC 12/6/04]	S	2	10/19/64	A
022a	memo	Attachment: JCS Changes...	S	1	[1964]	A

**Collection Title** National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer  
**Folder Title** "CHINA (CPR) - Nuclear Explosion Capability 1964-1965-1966"  
**Box Number** 14

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*Sj*  
Initials

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024	report	Intelligence report [sanitized per RAC 9/12/02]	S	3	10/23/64	A
028	report	Intelligence Note	S	3	9/25/64	A
030a	report	Program of Action <i>Sanitized 7.23.08 NLJ 07.167</i>	S	15	5/25/64	A
<del>030c</del>	<del>report</del>	<del>Tab B: Pacific Defense College</del> <i>open 7.23.08 NLJ 07.167</i>	<del>C</del>	<del>8</del>	<del>5/7/64</del>	A
035	draft	Draft NSAM [Dup. #10a, this file]	S	5	1/24/64	A
036	letter	Walt Rostow to McNamara [Dup. #10b, this file]	S	3	1/21/64	A
<del>037</del>	<del>report</del>	<del>Major Conclusions and Key Issues</del> [executive summary of document #37a, this file] <i>open 7.23.08 NLJ 07.167</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>10</del>	<del>10/15/63</del>	A
<del>037a</del>	<del>report</del>	<del>Draft Policy Planning Statement</del> ↓	<del>S</del>	<del>107</del>	<del>10/15/63</del>	A

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5/3/2007

Initials

Executive Office Building  
Washington, D. C.  
February 3, 1965

*See Schlesinger  
& Landon  
2/5/65*

*cp nuclear*

Dear Arthur,

It's true that Soviets at least have given a soft answer to the Chicoms, but probably only because they thought it was a non-starter and didn't want to give the Chicoms a stick with which to beat them. The Soviets sent a favorable reply to Peiping on December 28, more than two months after Chinese proposal. The French, however, wrote a polite, standoff answer, indicating only willingness to discuss disarmament in a "constructive" way.

Our position is based on our 99% conviction that this is a Peiping propaganda ploy. There's no reason to believe the Chicoms are serious--they declare their intention to develop a nuclear capability, they announce willingness to confer only after intransigent acts (test ban spurning in 1963 and explosion in 1964) and they have said "Disarmament can be realized only after imperialism, capitalism, and all systems of exploitation have been eliminated." Last but not least the proposal is militarily disadvantageous to the US:

a. It leaves untouched the vast Chinese conventional establishment; and

b. As to nuclear weapons, it is clearly asymmetrical. As the President said on 18 October, "It (China) fools no one when it offers to trade away its first small accumulation of nuclear power against the mighty arsenals of those who limit Communist Chinese ambitions."

Ergo, it would be embarrassing if Governor Landon took this seriously, and I hope you can turn him off. No objection to your giving him the above arguments, but it would be better not to send him this letter. Enjoyed luncheon immensely the other day.

All the best,

R. W. Komer

Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.  
1180 18th Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C. 20036

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By: *sj/rq*, NARA, Date 4-4-07

file  
3

SECRET

Mac -

October 19, 1964

As to reassuring Asians, Japs and Indians in particular, about Chicom nuclear problem, I doubt that LBJ having ambassadors in here would add much to his statement and fireside chat (or get much press play).

*Op - nuclear*

So better to act through our ambassadors in Delhi, Tokyo etc (who can get at top level too). In fact, I see such private reassurances as adding cachet to our public statements. A pitch like this is called for in India paper cleared by Thompson committee, and now before Principals. Why don't we lift this out and move on it in Delhi (and other key places as well).

RWK

~~SECRET~~

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By sj/ra NARA, Date 4.4.07

~~SECRET~~

October 13, 1964

4

*File  
for nuclear*

Mac -

My planning conferees are harassing me on Rostow's Action Program to Deal with Chicom Nuclear Test, which has been on your desk since 25 Sept. You did tell Walt you'd consider it in Standing Group when it was ready, and the urgency of the matter is greater every day.

While ISA at least is all stirred up about short-circuiting the Chicoms (as you know, it argues that longer term consequences could be horrendous), the accepted wisdom goes much more in direction of Rostow paper. It has some good things in it, too, such as beefing up our Indian Ocean naval presence.

Beyond this, I offer no great brief for the paper, but it is the only staffed-out inter-agency paper available. As such, why couldn't it serve as the basis for some sub-Cabinet discussion (with Thompson present as the link to his group).

RWK

*By #63*

(Attach. Memo from RHJohnson to Interdepartmental BNSP Task Group on "A Chinese Communist Nuclear Capability", subj. Draft Program of Action

←

*By D Keary w/ of  
By 64*

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By sjrg, NARA, Date 4-4-07

~~SECRET~~

October 2, 1964

Mac -

This standby hits the right themes; i. e. we deplore and it won't make any difference anyway. However, it's not very felicitous and will need re-working.

*Opr - nuclear*

I'd highlight a bit more our determination to stick by our commitments. We needn't be defensive about this.

As counterpoint, I'd also (like Spurgeon) highlight more that we'll stick to disarmament road. We will neither be deterred from protecting Free Asians nor from continuing the search for safeguarded peace.

Personally, I see private reassurances to key governments (India, Pak, Thai, GRC, ROK, Japan, Taiwan, etc.) perhaps even an LBJ letter, as more compelling than a statement (though we should do both).

*Sent back to Keeny via Charles Johnson*

RWK

~~SECRET~~

Att. Memo Read to Bundy 9/30/64, subj. Standby Statement for Chinese Communist Nuclear Test; also memo Keeny to McGB 10/1/64

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *sj/ra*, NARA, Date 4-4-07

Chicom Nuclear <sup>7</sup>

~~TOP SECRET~~

*✓, Sup. 2. 2nd.  
Very interesting  
7/10/64*

Mac -

September 18, 1964

September 17 Planning Lunch (regular members only) again took up question of how to cope with Chicom nuclear explosion. Rowen gave a powerful counter-argument to the "temperate" approach proposed by the interdepartmental planning group chaired by Bob Johnson. Rowen saw many people taking an "excessively cheery" view, primarily because they were thinking too much in short-run terms. True, the Chicoms wouldn't have much of a nuclear capability for a long time; true, they wouldn't suddenly launch new aggressions simply because they had a rudimentary capability; true, there might not be any profound panic reactions from other Asians.

But the longer term implications, say over a 15-year period, were horrendous. Harry noted that the first Soviet nuclear explosion had occurred 15 years ago this month; look at the growth in Soviet power in the following 15 years. Even the first Soviet test might have affected Stalin's decision to launch the Korean war. In any event, the staggering growth in Soviet capabilities over the last 15 years had had an immense effect on our policies, postures, defense budget, etc. Granted that China today has a much feebler resource base than the USSR had in 1949; on the other hand the Chicoms might be even more adventuresome once they went nuclear than the Soviets had been. There was no reason why the Chicoms could not develop even crude ICBMs in 15 years. As for the external effects of Peiping's going nuclear, these would entail greatly increased pressure on us for new aid commitments, and major counter-efforts on the part of those Asians who felt themselves menaced. Most immediately, India could probably go nuclear in a year. As for the US, a growing Chicom capability might be the deciding factor driving us into a \$30 billion AICBM program or a huge civil defense effort. Yet another risk was that the Chicoms might be freer than we or the Russians in handing around nuclear technology; they had already hinted at this to Nasser.

What could we do? Rowen thought it technically feasible to destroy the two key Chicom installations by a limited non-nuclear air attack. We could (a) handle this as a completely open matter and justify it at the time; or (b) seize on any opportunity created, say by a major blow-up in SEA; or (c) make a secret attack. In the latter case, it was quite possible that Peiping would prefer to say nothing about it. Such a spoiling operation would gain us a 2-5 year delay, and also deter Chicom rebuilding. How valuable were 2-5 years? To Rowen they could be quite important.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: FRAS, '64-'68, W1.XXX, #51  
By: Sj, NARA, Date: 3-2-07

~~TOP SECRET~~

What about reactions? The Soviets would approve privately, but might have to raise a to-do publicly. However, there was a chance we could bring them around in advance. The Chicoms might go for a tit-for-tat response, though it wasn't clear where they could do so effectively. In the rest of the world there would be considerable fear-- also some feeling that the US was punishing a smaller power for getting into the nuclear business. Was this necessarily bad, however? Moreover, initial fears might quickly turn to relief once the crisis seemed to pass.

Rostow suggested that if we and the Soviets had just moved toward some big arms control agreement (say an unlimited test ban), the fact that we were going in this direction would create an optimum atmosphere for US pre-emption to forestall nuclear proliferation by Peiping.

Bob Johnson's rebuttal was that the Soviet-Chicom analogy was weak; the Chicoms were a lot less further along today than the Soviets were 15 years ago. Moreover, the Chicom explosion wouldn't change much, except psychologically. The US would still have great nuclear superiority as a deterrent, and perhaps an effective counter-force capability. The Chicoms would have to take into account possible pre-emptive US action if they brandished missiles in a crisis or at the least assume a disproportionate US retaliation if Chicoms used nucs. He queried whether US decisions on civil defense or AICBMs were so sensitive to a Chicom capability as Rowen indicated (I commented that the more likely problem was that a Chicom capability might trigger Soviet CD or AICBM programs, which in turn might trigger us).

Johnson found the stimulus to proliferation the strongest argument for pre-empting the Chicoms. But we should look at what other options we had besides pre-emption. Various arms control and propaganda programs, as well as new US commitments, could greatly limit the Chicom impact. Moreover, would pre-empting the Chicoms prevent proliferation by other powers? Countries such as Israel would have their own reasons for going nuclear regardless of what China did. Finally, a one-time attack wouldn't do the job. It would only buy us some delay. To repeat the performance two or three times would be very difficult for the US.

Harriman's contribution was that we ought to have serious discussions with the Soviets on the Chicom nuclear problem right after the election.

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 3 -

It was also brought out that the Chicoms already have overwhelming conventional superiority over their neighbors. So would other Asians be materially more scared of Chicom power than they are already? Rostow and I mentioned the "precedent" problem. Would pre-emption of Chicoms encourage Nasser to take out Israeli nuclear facilities? Would it encourage the Soviets to play similar games?

Rostow questioned Rowen's proposition that the Chicoms might become much more aggressive once they had A-bombs. With nuclear weapons comes caution. The Soviets advanced less after they had gone nuclear than before. They were more cautious in the 1959-61 Berlin crisis than in 1948-49. As soon as the Chicoms got nuclear weapons, they'd have to worry lest we might be more inclined to use nucs against them in a local conflict. So a Chicom nuclear capability might actually operate to make the Chicoms more cautious. Others present thought Rowen had taken the best case for our pre-emptive capability, and the worst case for what the Chicoms would do if we didn't pre-empt. Rowen gladly conceded the point.

Rostow summed up by saying that if the Chicoms attacked in SEA, then we had an overwhelming case for pre-emption. As to the other case, we should keep looking at it, particularly in the context of whether we could arrive at a broader modus vivendi with the Soviets about Germany, arms control, etc. If we and the Soviets could isolate the Chicoms in this way, by getting world opinion on our side, then the reaction to pre-emption would be considerably less. However, WWR didn't see Khrushchev prepared to go this far for quite a while yet.

There was an interesting aside when WWR asked Helms his view. Dick said he had raised this question several times at the White House and had been told to "keep his mouth shut." He pointed the finger at me and I said that I'd in effect been shut up too, but that you seemed to have no objection to PG discussion. I suspect that several of those present concluded that some planning was probably afoot on this matter. If so, or if there ought to be, the best cover for it might be simply to put out the word that we've taken a negative decision on the matter.

RWK

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

March 24, 1964

8

*Chicom  
nuclear*

Mac -

WWR has been agitating again on Chicom nuclear issue. However he recognizes at my urging advisability of settling for something less than Presidential review and NSAM.

He suggests redoing the NSAM as a set of action points and then discussing these in Standing Group to give them some status at this level. Subsequently, he would reactivate an ad hoc committee for follow through.

This makes sense to me and I undertook to get your nod. Since Chicoms may just have their first explosion in 1964, it makes sense to keep up some planning momentum.

Approve        ✓

*Very good plot*

Disapprove       

*No thinked*

*No bomb*

*Trag.*

See Me       

RWK

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *sj/cg*, NARA, Date 4-4-07

~~SECRET~~

February 26, 1964

*for nuclear*

Mac -

I've been sitting on attached Chicom nuclear paper, on assumption you'd hardly find it urgent business.

Walt's first hope is that LBJ will look at the conclusions (at my suggestion he summarized them in letters to McNamara, McCone, etc.). LBJ really should be told about these, because they reduce the problem to proper perspective, i.e. not much of a military threat but of some political "scare" potential. If you agree I'll do a one-pager for weekend reading.

Walt also wants a NSAM. This seems quite unnecessary at this point, and you'll agree when you see horrendous draft attached. Paper is mostly of educational value, and has already largely served its purpose. If a high level ad hoc group is really needed for follow-up action (I'm of two minds), why couldn't this be discussed in SG and then set up by Rusk (with WWR as chairman).

JCS have done some comments, which further complicate picture.

WWR is also poking around in pre-emptive action field. Do we want this?

RWK

Attach. Ltr Rostow to Bundy dtd 1/24/64 w/attachs.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, # 14  
By *lf* NARA, Date 6-12-05

*Mrs Komer*  
*Copy Nuclear* 10

January 24, 1964

*[Signature]*

~~SECRET~~

Dear Mac:

Following a discussion in the Tuesday Planning Group last October of the paper on the implications of a Chinese nuclear capability we have been considering, in consultation with Bob Komer, what further action might be taken upon it. The paper, as I believe you know, was prepared pursuant to one of the Basic National Security Policy Planning Tasks and was drafted by Bob Johnson on the basis of contributions and extensive discussion in an inter-departmental group which he chaired. It has the general concurrence of that group.

It seemed generally agreed that one of the important values of the paper was the educational value of the analysis contained in it. I have therefore sent it to various high-level government officials with a letter (copy attached) in the hope that they may read it. I am also enclosing a copy of the paper in the hope that you might pass it along to the President for his reading of at least the ten page summary on top.

I am concerned about the means by which the recommendations contained in the report will receive consideration. It seems to me that the ultimate objective should be approval of a NSAM on this subject. I understand that the JCS have, in views we will be receiving soon, indicated that they favor

ultimate

Honorable McGeorge Bundy  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3A

By *sj/rq*, NARA, Date 4-4-07

~~SECRET~~

JAN 27 1964

SECRET

2

ultimate issuance of a NSAM. To illustrate the possible character of such a NSAM we have prepared the attached draft. The draft has had the benefit of informal comment by various offices in State, but is not at this stage a formally agreed State proposal.

What would you think of having such a NSAM considered in the NSC Standing Group? Secretary Rusk would support such a procedure. If this approach were taken, the NSAM probably ought to be considered first in the interdepartmental group that worked on the subject under the BNSP Planning Task. It would also be desirable to take account of (without necessarily fully accepting) views on the paper of the JCS. I hope that we can discuss this subject soon at some mutually convenient time.

Finally, it should perhaps be noted that Bob Johnson has been working in consultation with State, DOD and CIA, on a separate paper which discusses the pros and cons of various forms of direct action against the Chinese Communist nuclear facilities and I plan to have this subject separately discussed in a more limited group in the near future.

Sincerely yours,

W. W. Rostow

Copy to: Mr. Komer ✓

SECRET

PG-10 Sep

# Call Batall

Jessup -

Let Capron see F.

PV temperat approach led  
 to counter-arg by Rowen. He  
 thinks people excessively chery  
 these they bring to short run a  
 view. True, CC won't have much of  
 a new caprol for a long time, but  
 longer term implications on heterodox.  
 True CC won't suddenly launch new agg  
 True, no profound panic reactions by others

Over 15yr. period, however looked  
 much. Low had led expls. 15 yrs ago this  
 mo. Might have affected status because  
 in how low what low did in

15% vs. Look at staggering  
effect it's had on our pressures,  
our budget, etc. True, CC has much  
leakier base! But CC might be  
more venturesome. Also, Asians will  
come to us for increased commitments  
or do things themselves CC can get  
missiles even ICBMs in time etc  
may drive us into AICBM (30 bill.)  
or huge CO prog.

Ends & go weber!

CC cd. hand around weber trains  
They've already hinted at this to Nasser

What cd. we do?

1. Cd. destroy by limited non-<sup>at the</sup> use air
2. a. Cd. handle a open matter.  
b. Cd. sug or report of something  
happening in SEA.  
c. In its secrecy, CC might prefer  
say nothing abt it themselves.

How long a delay 2-5 yrs. - but also  
deterrent.

How valuable is 2-5 yrs. Who knows.

~~agot~~ ~~why~~ for pr-empt But  
what else can we do? Other  
powers (e.g. de) will have their  
own reasons for going nuclear

Finally, hard to see US  
do pr-empting not just once  
but 2-3 times. This is rather  
one-time att. would do it.

WAF - thinks we ought to  
have serious discussions w Sovs.

CC already has overwhelming  
conv. capt. It will decisions be  
made soon.

WAF - Sovs advanced bc when  
they had nuc. weapons, then when  
they didn't. As soon as CC gets  
nuc weapons, they must warn that  
we might use nuc against them - a  
local crisis. So CC nuc capt. might  
make CC more cautious.

What are the reactions

PL  
9/17/6

1. Sovs wd. approve previously  
We might be able to bring  
them around

2. CC - they might go for that sort of  
response

3. Eisenhower seems for US punishment  
smaller power for getting into more  
business. But is this bad

in Asia, just for their relief

WWP - if we and Sovs moved at  
same time to some big arms  
control move, it wd. create optimism in  
atmosphere.

Johnson rebuttal.

Sov - CC analogy weak.

US will still have to experiment  
as a deterrent. An effective force  
capd. Risk of pre-emptive action

Decisions on D or A-100  
not as sensitive to CC capd. Force,  
it might trigger Sov surge  
which might in turn trigger us

~~PL~~ Prob. Strongly arg

Ford - Rawlin take best case,  
for an pre-empt case and  
moved case for what ~~is~~ CC  
will do if we don't pre-empt.

WASP - if CC att in SFK then  
we shd pre-empt. Then we have  
overwhelming case.

As to other case, we shd discuss  
it in context of whether laws, arms  
control, etc. If we  
can isolate the CC this way, we get  
world opinion on our side. WASP not  
optimistic but will play ball.

Helms - keep mouth shut

11a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Counselor and Chairman  
Policy Planning Council  
Washington

*Mr Robert Komer*

*[Handwritten signature]*  
*Sp. Nuclear*

CONFIDENTIAL

September 11, 1964

TO: Planning Group Members  
SUBJECT: Planning Group Meeting  
Thursday, September 17, 1964, 12:00 noon.

Discussion at our Planning Group meeting next week will be on further issues regarding China and nuclear proliferation. ~~A paper will be circulated by Henry Rowen.~~ *20*

We should like to restrict this meeting to the regular members of the Planning Group. In addition, I intend to invite Marshall Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, and Robert Johnson of S/P.

*[Handwritten signature]*  
W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *sj/rq* NARA, Date 4-4-07

CONFIDENTIAL

Group 3 -- Downgraded at 12 year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

SEP 14 1964

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER

12  
/

February 15, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. ROBERT KOMER

For your information.

*ASj*

FEB 17 1965

ALF M. LANDON  
TOPEKA

February 9, 1965

Dr. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.  
1180 18th Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C. 20036

*file  
mccall*

My dear Arthur:

As busy as you are, I greatly appreciate your informing letter of February 5th on the Chinese nuclear weapons proposal.

Even if nothing came of it, I think we should have handled it in the same way as the Russians did and the French did - to keep the Chinese from using it "as another stick with which to beat us."

The possibility of a "vast Chinese conventional establishment untouched" would, of course, have to have been dealt with in a general disarmament proposal covering all weapons, including nuclear. I think the Test Ban Treaty has been over-sold, when it applies to only three of the Nuclear Club. Of course, China now has only a small nuclear establishment, but it's there and won't go away and is going to grow.

I expect we may well now come up with a treaty like India wants guaranteeing protection by nuclear powers against attack by another nuclear power. That's the age-old way of meeting the problems of spreading new weapons.

I sent the President a telegram early Sunday morning of support on his Vietnam decision. I'm not so sure that it was wise, but now is no time to question the play and I'll not be any Monday morning quarterback after it's over.

I'm back on the job again - cutting down on my rations and cigarettes. Nothing serious, I'm happy to report.

with all good wishes to you and the family -

/s/ Alf M. Landon

AHL:j

PRESERVATION COPY

ARTHUR SCHLESING, jr.

13

February 5, 1965

Bob:

For your information.

+ Thanks!

Arthur

Chinese  
nuclear  
Program

FEB 8 1965

13a

February 5, 1965

Dear Governor:

I have been checking around about the Chinese proposal and this is what I come up with.

It is true that Moscow has given a soft answer to Peking but probably only because the Russians thought the proposal a non-starter and didn't want to give the Chinese another stick with which to beat them. Their favorable reply, you will remember, didn't come until December 28 -- more than two months after the original proposal. The French sent a polite stand-off answer indicating no more than willingness to discuss disarmament in a "constructive" way.

Our position is based on a 99% conviction that this is a Peking propaganda ploy. The substantial evidence would suggest that the Chinese are not serious. They have declared their intention to develop a nuclear capability; they rejected the test ban treaty in 1963 and achieved a nuclear explosion in 1964; and they have said "Disarmament can be realized only after imperialism, capitalism, and all systems of exploitation have been eliminated." In addition, the proposal would leave the vast Chinese conventional establishment untouched. As President Johnson said on October 18: "It (China) fools no one when it offers to trade away its first small accumulation of nuclear power against the mighty arsenals of those who limit Communist Chinese ambitions."

I must confess that, after talking with people in the Administration who are not automatically opposed to proposals simply because they come from Moscow or Peking, I am inclined to give these arguments great weight. The trouble is that our official reactions are sometimes so mechanical that it is hard to distinguish between a serious judgment and a conditioned reflex.

I hope that all goes well with you and that by the time you receive this letter you are out of the hospital and back at your desk.

Ever sincerely yours,

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.

The Honorable Alf Landon  
1001 Fillmore Street  
Topeka, Kansas

cc: Mr. Robert Komer ✓

EB 8 1965

*Spitz - could you just jot down what I might tell Arthur.*

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, jr.

1180 18th Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20036

Telephone  
202-338-5788

*for nuclear*

January 23, 1965

*See Raw K to Schlesinger on 2/3/65 and Schlesinger to Landon 2/5/65*


*Bob K 14*

Dear Bob:

I have another letter from my friend Governor Landon about Chou En Lai's proposal for a conference on the control of nuclear weapons. He wants to know (a) whether it is true that Russia and France have agreed to the Chinese proposal, and (b) whether there is "some basic reason" for the opposition of the United States Government; "if so, I certainly don't want to engage in any campaign that might embarrass it".

Could you let me know what I should tell the old man about these points?

Yours ever,



Arthur Schlesinger, jr.

Mr. Robert Komer  
National Security Council  
Executive Office of the President  
Washington, D. C.

JAN 25 1965

~~SECRET~~

GENERAL

*Cfu nuclear 15  
11/4/64*CHICOM NUCLEAR EXPLOSION AND THE TEST BAN TREATY

The absence of general world-wide condemnation of the ChiCom nuclear explosion (CCNE) -- and in some cases expressions of approval -- are particularly regrettable given the widespread adherence to the limited Test Ban Treaty which the ChiComs flagrantly continue to reject. Accordingly, we have instructed certain of our posts to stress additional points to their host governments. (See CFR No. 40, Sept. 30)

Guidance - These following points cover our own reaction to the CCNE and our position relating to the signatories and non-signatories of the Test Ban Treaty:

1. The signing of the Test Ban Treaty was a significant step toward preventing the poisoning of the atmosphere and opening the door to additional steps toward peace. Though subsequent progress, as represented by the UN resolution banning the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction in outer space and the announced limitations in the production of fissionable materials, has been painfully slow and frustrating, the groundwork has been laid for further progress in such vital matters as stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and the arms race.

Countries, large and small, wherever located and of whatever race, have the same stake in continued progress in arms control and disarmament. Consequently, the CCNE was a grave blow to worldwide hopes for such progress and it is therefore the responsibility of all to condemn the Chinese Communists for flagrantly obstructing this course, especially since the latter have repeatedly demonstrated their expansionist aims in East, Southeast, and South Asia.

2. We are unable to understand the application of a double standard of morality and justice in judging the ChiCom test as against the tests of other countries, especially those of the United States. We believe that it is in the long-term interest of all states to recognize the CCNE as the act of obstruction that it was, and not conceive of it as an opportunity to score points off the West, the Soviet Union, and the developed world in general.

3. We are urging most of those governments which have signed the Test Ban Treaty but have not yet ratified it to do so at the earliest opportunity as a demonstration of the way in which they wish to support world peace. (Certain of these governments are not being approached for various reasons.) There have been helpful responses from several countries.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *sj/rq* NARA, Date 4.4.07

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and might well renew earlier offers for an improvement of economic relations, including economic assistance. The Soviets might also suggest renewal of bilateral talks, perhaps to cover both party and state matters.

However, the issues on which the interests of the two communist powers conflict are too numerous and basic to allow more than a temporary easing of Sino-Soviet tensions. Indeed, the issues are already cropping up. So far, Moscow has refrained from comment on Peiping's nuclear explosion. However, in the case of its policy toward Yugoslavia, the new Soviet leadership made its intentions clear when it dispatched a second high-ranking military delegation to participate in Belgrade's liberation anniversary celebration. (A plane crash killed the members of the first delegation.)

Innumerable other contentions and basic issues block the way to a meaningful Sino-Soviet accommodation. These include Moscow's military assistance program to Peiping's arch-enemy, India; the USSR's and Communist China's relations with the US; Communist strategy in Indochina; Sino-Soviet rivalry in the underdeveloped areas; and the already existent bifurcation of foreign communist parties along pro-Moscow or pro-Peiping lines.

The new Soviet leadership undoubtedly has in mind some modification of Khrushchev's policies. But it is highly unlikely that the Soviets would or could yield sufficiently on enough major issues to satisfy Peiping. Indeed, the new Soviet leadership's strong reaffirmation of basic Soviet goals and policies has made it amply clear that no basic Soviet concession to Chinese demands will be forthcoming.

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E.O. 13526, 13527, 13528  
DATE 08-14-2014

4. We are urging those governments which are not yet signatories to sign the limited Test Ban Treaty.

5. We are authorizing our Embassies in the NATO capitals (except Paris) to inform host governments of the above and, if they deem it advisable, to stimulate action by our allies in urging selected governments (e.g., British in Nigeria, etc.) to accede to the Test Ban Treaty or to deposit their instruments of ratification without further delay.

--Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 45, 11/4/64

INITIAL WORLD REACTION TO CCNE

*Opinion needed*

World reactions thus far to the ChiCom nuclear explosion (CCNE) have been less emotional and fearful than we had reason to expect, but the relatively apathetic response has meant also that the condemnation of the ChiComs has been less general than we might have hoped. The CCNE has not provoked any reversals of other nations' policies toward the ChiCom regime.

Praise - Peiping has won loud praise in Asia from North Korea, North Vietnam, the Pathet Lao, the pro-Peiping Laotian neutralists, the South Vietnam "Liberation Front", and Cambodia. Pakistan and Indonesia also evidenced varying degrees of approval. At the same time, however, Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio was not enthusiastic and expressed concern about fall-out. Burma and Afghanistan have remained non-committal. In Africa, reactions sympathetic to Peiping have been registered in Ghana and Guinea and by officials of Mali, of Congo (Brazzaville), and of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Elsewhere in the world, Cuba, Albania, and the pro-Peiping factions of non-bloc communist parties have reacted favorably.

Criticisms - Except for the United States and the Republic of China, the sharpest condemnation has come from India and Japan, although the Japanese Communist Party has as might be expected approved the ChiCom explosion as a "necessary defensive measure." East Germany and Yugoslavia have criticized the Chinese and the Czechoslovak papers have reprinted this criticism without comment. Other Eastern European states carried the ChiCom announcement without comment; the Soviets had only a one-sentence notice on the back page of their press. The pro-Moscow Western European Communist parties meanwhile criticized Peiping for flouting the Test Ban Treaty. Some Free World and Communist governments have stated or implied that the ChiComs should adhere to the Test Ban Treaty.

--Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 45, 11/4/64

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Peiping and the UN - The ChiCom nuclear explosion has brought some renewed calls for the admission of Peiping to the United Nations and for their participation in arms control and disarmament discussions. On the other hand, none of the governments which previously leaned toward Peiping's admission to the United Nations have indicated that Peiping should now be kept out.

Military Implications Played Down - Public minimization of the military significance of the CCNE has come mainly from strongly anti-communist governments. Aside from the United States and Western European countries, these have included the small peripheral nations menaced by Peiping, namely, Thailand, South Vietnam, South Korea, Malaysia and the Republic of China. It is possible, however, that the efforts of the latter group to play down the explosion have had the effect of limiting the force and international impact of their expressions of protest and outrage over the ChiCom act. Moreover, subsequent confirmation that the bomb was a fission device using uranium has increased its military significance. Japanese commentators, for example, have now expressed fears that Communist China may be closer than initially supposed to perfecting nuclear bombs and the means for their delivery.

Inspiration and Pride Increased - There has been comment from various areas of the world expressive either of alarm or satisfaction that the CCNE is an inspiration to communist movements everywhere. In addition, newspapers in Cambodia, Indonesia, Pakistan, and several African nations have expressed a sense of pride in this achievement by a fellow Afro-Asian nation.

Timing Fortunate for Peiping - The timing, whether calculated or fortuitous, of the CCNE has been to Peiping's advantage. When the device was exploded, the Cairo Nonaligned Conference had already closed, the UNGA was not in session, and there was thus no important international forum immediately available for Peiping's critics. The Soviet Union was caught during the change of leadership, and the East European regimes were preoccupied with new uncertainties.

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Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 45, 11/4/64

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Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 45, 11/4/64

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

*M. Komer*  
*Intelligence*  
*Note* 17  
BUNDY SMITH  
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To : The Secretary  
Through: S/S  
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes

*TH*

Subject: Initial World Reaction to the Chinese Communists' Nuclear Detonation

Although Peiping's announcement of its detonation of a nuclear device had a slightly apprehensive tone, the "bomb" has not provoked any reversals of other nations' policies toward the Chinese Communist regime. Instead initial reactions have highlighted previous attitudes and accelerated earlier trends. Subsequent realization that the Chinese Communist bomb was a fission device employing uranium has, however, caused new anxieties about Peiping's nuclear capabilities.

Praise. Peiping has won loud praise in Asia from North Korea, North Vietnam, the Pathet Lao, the pro-Peiping Laotian neutralists, the South Vietnam "Liberation Front" and Cambodia. North Vietnam in particular went to the greatest lengths in lauding Peiping through mass rallies and official pronouncements. Pakistan and Indonesia also evidenced varying degrees of approval. (At the same time, however, Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio was not enthusiastic and expressed concern about fall-out.) Burma and Afghanistan have remained non-committal. In Africa, reactions sympathetic to Peiping have been registered in Ghana and Guinea and by officials of Mali, Congo (Brazzaville), and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Elsewhere in the world, Cuba, Albania, and the pro-Peiping factions of non-bloc communist parties have reacted favorably.

Criticism. Except for the United States and the Republic of China, sharpest condemnation has come from India and Japan, although the Communist Party of Japan has stood out by approving the Chinese Communists' detonation as a "necessary

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State Dept. Guidelines  
OCT 29 1964 By *sj/rq*, NARA, Date 4-4-07

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defensive measure." East Germany and Yugoslavia have criticized the Chinese and the Czechoslovakians have reprinted this criticism without comment of their own. Other Eastern European states have carried the NCNA announcement without comment. The pro-Moscow Western European communist parties have criticized Peiping for flouting the Test Ban Treaty. There has been no Soviet comment on the event, but it was reported in a slighting way in a one-sentence notice on the back page of the Soviet press.

Peiping's Admission to World Community Urged. Throughout the world, the Chinese Communists' nuclear explosion brought renewed calls for admitting Peiping to the United Nations and having Communist China participate in arms control arrangements and conferences. These calls often hint that the Free World, and particularly the United States, must now take the initiative in trying to bring Communist China "into the community of nations." On the other hand, none of the governments that previously leaned toward Peiping's admission to the United Nations has indicated that Peiping now should be kept out. A number of Free World and Communist governments have stated or implied that Communist China should adhere to the Test Ban treaty, but only pro-Peiping communist regimes have specifically endorsed the Chinese proposal for a summit meeting on nuclear disarmament.

Military Implications Played Down. Public minimization of the military significance of the Chinese Communists' nuclear explosion has come mainly from strongly anti-communist governments. Aside from the United States and Western European countries, these have included the small peripheral nations menaced by Peiping: Thailand, South Vietnam, South Korea, Malaysia, and the Republic of China. It is possible however, that the efforts of the latter group to play down the explosion have had the effect of limiting the force and international impact of

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- 3 -

their expressions of protest and outrage over the Chinese Communist move. Moreover, subsequent confirmation that the bomb was a fission device using uranium has made its military implications seem greater. Japanese commentators, for example, have now expressed fears that Communist China may not be as far away as initially expected from perfecting nuclear bombs and the means for their delivery.

Inspiration and Pride Increased. There has been comment from various areas of the world expressive of either alarm or satisfaction that the Chinese Communist "bomb" is an inspiration to communist movements everywhere. In addition, newspapers in Cambodia, Indonesia, Pakistan, and several African nations have expressed a sense of pride in this achievement of a fellow Afro-Asian nation.

Timing Fortunate for Peiping. The calculated or fortuitous timing of the Chinese Communist detonation has been of advantage to Peiping. When the device was exploded, the Cairo Non-Aligned Conference had already closed. The United Nations General Assembly was not in session, and there was thus no important international forum immediately available for Peiping's critics. The Soviet Union was caught at the time of a transition in its leadership and the Eastern European regimes were preoccupied by new uncertainties in their relations with Moscow and in Moscow's relations with Peiping. At the same time, leaders and officials from Cambodia, Mali, and Congo (Brazzaville) had just departed from Communist China in a flattered mood and could be expected to raise their voices in praise of the Chinese achievement.

With respect to anticipated criticism, the Chinese Communists may have assumed that strongly adverse reactions produced in the United States and India would lose international impact through being regarded by many nations as no more

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- 4 -

than a reflection of old enmities. In Japan, the Chinese Communists probably anticipated that their "bomb" would initially arouse criticism. Nevertheless, Communist China may hope to exploit the considerable Sino-Japanese trade and cultural exchanges as well as the presence of a Japanese Socialist Party delegation now in Peiping to soften and manipulate Japanese reaction.

In sum, the Chinese Communists seem to have encountered no unpleasant surprises in initial world reaction and have reason for some satisfaction about it.

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*Intelligence Note*

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

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To : The Secretary  
 Through: S/S  
 From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *THL*  
 Subject: Peiping's Propaganda Treatment of Its Bomb

OCT 27 1964

Praise from Various Sources Highlighted. Communist China's press and radio have replayed the praise for detonating a nuclear device that Peiping predictably received from North Korea, North Vietnam, the Pathet Lao, the South Vietnam Liberation Front, Cuba, and Albania. Formal or semi-official expressions of approval from Pakistan, Cambodia, Indonesia, Guinea, Ghana, Mali, and the Secretary General of the OAU have also been featured. Indian and Japanese criticism have been briefly noted without comment, but Peiping has not mentioned foreign concern about nuclear fall-out. Peiping has not reported the critical and guarded reactions of European communist states and parties nor has it drawn attention to the minimum publicity and total absence of comment on its bomb in Moscow.

Little Comment Originated by Peiping. Since the original government declaration Peiping has said rather little on its own. It had seemed somewhat defensive in its declaration, yet it had bluntly called its device a "bomb" and it had given the event great prominence in all Chicom media. Its principal subsequent comment has been an editorial in the October 22 People's Daily. This editorial responds sharply and extensively to US criticisms while carefully avoiding any direct mention of Moscow. Nevertheless, most of its attacks on the US, notably regarding the Test Ban Treaty, could be applied equally to Soviet positions and sensitive readers in Moscow will no doubt feel the point of these barbs.

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OCT 28 1964

By *sj/rq* NARA, Date 4.4.07

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Response to American Comments. Apparently deciding that attack is the best form of defense, Peiping has accused the United States of (1) trying to disparage "China's great achievement," (2) not being at all interested in the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, (3) "peddling" the Test Ban Treaty in order to maintain "its nuclear monopoly," and (4) spreading nuclear weapons to the West German "revanchists." Peiping replied to American comments that Communist China produced her nuclear device at the cost of the well-being of the Chinese people by arguing that "imperialists" have compelled the Chinese people to rely on themselves and work hard in the interest of self-defense.

Chicom Restraints. Peiping has featured expressions of praise and approval from Afro-Asian states and claimed that these demonstrate that the morale of revolutionary peoples the world over has been boosted by the Chinese Communist "bomb." In this context, however, Peiping has reiterated that Communist China can be "trusted" with nuclear weapons and will not prove "adventurist." Moreover, Peiping has not begun calling on the revolutionary peoples of the world or even of Southeast Asia to rise up under the umbrella of Chinese Communist nuclear power. Finally, Peiping has devoted scant attention to expressions of support for Communist China's admission to the United Nations. Peiping's own statements have refrained from portraying possession of nuclear weapons as an added argument for admission.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

S/S-14,729

October 24, 1964

FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

*SHR*  
*[Signature]*

*[Handwritten signature]*

You expressed concern on Thursday about the adequacy of our follow through on Walt Rostow's "Program of action to deal with effects of a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation and nuclear capability."

I have discussed this matter with Ambassador Thompson, Butch Fisher and Rollie White.

White's Interdepartmental Committee met yesterday to consider further steps to take in the post-detonation period, and the suggestions of the Committee are set forth in the attached memorandum, in the third section.

Tommy Thompson's Committee on Non-Proliferation will review the recommendations of the White group at a meeting next Tuesday morning and determine whether additional initiatives are called for at this time. Consideration will be given to appointing a senior officer to follow through on the various recommendations coming from both committees.

Attachment:

Memorandum stated above.

cc: G - Ambassador Thompson  
ACDA - Mr. Fisher  
S/P - Mr. Rostow

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State Dept. Guidelines  
By *sj/rq*, NARA, Date 4-4-07

OCT 26 1964

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Interdepartmental Psychological-Political  
Working Group

SUBJECT: AD HOC MEETING RE POST-DETONATION TREATMENT OF  
CHICOM NUCLEAR DEVICE. Friday, October 23, 1964

PARTICIPANTS:

DOD/ISA	- Mr. Barber
USIA	- Mr. Anderson
ACDA	- Mr. Freund
CIA	- representative present
INR	- Mr. Evans
P	- Mr. Lisle
IO	- Mr. Siscoe
M	- Mr. Jordan
M	- Mr. White (Chairman)
S/P	- Mr. Johnson (sick)

1. Ad hoc meeting called to discuss various aspects of Chicom detonation of a nuclear device, in particular the following:
  - public position and rationale
  - background briefing of selected foreign governments
  - backgrounders for press in U.S. and abroad
  - educative program "Nuclear Facts of Life" in post-detonation period
  - informational programs - overt and covert.
  
2. In the immediate post-detonation period the following are considered the main problem areas:
  - Chicom call for world summit meeting to consider abolition nuclear weapons.
  - AEC announcement that detonation involved enriched uranium rather than plutonium

U Thant

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Authority NWJ-032-014-4-5  
By sj/rq NARA, Date 3-14-07

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OCT 26 1964

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- U Thant reference to dialogue in 1965 of five nuclear powers
  - worldwide reaction to detonation - no element of panic due to pre-emptive steps taken during pre-detonation period; by same token condemnation also less strong than anticipated.
  - reaction that Chicoms should be included in some body community of nations (U.N., ENDC talks in Geneva) which would control possible irresponsible activities.
3. As result discussion above subject, following procedural steps proposed:
- A.- U Thant Statement: Mr. McCloskey to make statement at noon briefing along line set forth in attached draft. Statement to be sent over USIA Wireless File for information and guidance overseas posts.
  - B.- Details of Chicom Nuclear Device: DOD to prepare summary of primary considerations involved in detonation of uranium vis-a-vis plutonium device. Also references to possible nuclear short-cuts, etc. along lines mentioned by Secretary McNamara yesterday. This material will be coupled with guidance for use in the field and for background purposes with the press.
  - C.- Chicom Summit Proposal: Guidance set forth in Department Circular Telegrams No. 674 of October 16, and No. 698 of October 21 considered appropriate for present. Latter circular stresses Chicom detonation as "Offense to Humanity". Period of time needed for true reading of world opinion on subject. Policy decisions may be involved. In interim onus must remain on Chicoms and condemnation increased in event of subsequent detonations - overt and covert methods.

D. DOD

D.- DOD to examine possibility of Team of Experts to visit selected Far East posts re "Nuclear Facts of Life" now that Chicoms have detonated a device. Pre-detonation teams well received in certain areas.

E.- S/P will review various considerations For Action in S/P Paper prepared by Robert Johnson. Included in this is subject of "reassurances".

F.- Miscellaneous: Next meeting with Chicoms at Warsaw - November 25.

Question of deliverable weapon for Chicom nuclear device.

4. Objective of future deliberations is to cast Chicom device in a realistic light. We must guard against inclinations either to dismiss significance or making the Chicoms 12 feet tall. We must also tailor our guidance so that the public position and rationale will be consistent with press backgrounders and educative diplomacy activities.

Addendum: USIA Wireless File October 22 included article explaining difference between uranium and plutonium nuclear device.

*RW*  
M - Rollie White  
10/23/64

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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*Chow...  
to ZBJ  
10/19/64*

FROM: Warsaw  
ACTION: Secstate 885 Priority  
DATE: October 19, 5 PM

*Open - nuclear  
X cable*

VERBATIM TEXT

Following are full texts of letter dated October 19 from Chinese Ambassador to me and its enclosed message dated October 17 from Chou En-Lai to President Johnson:

Dear Mr. Ambassador, I am directed by my government to forward a message from Premier Chou En-Lai to President Lyndon B. Johnson dated October 17, 1964 and enclose the text of the statement of the Chinese Government dated October 16, 1964. You are requested to kindly transmit them directly. Yours sincerely, (signed) Wang Kuo-Chuan, Representative of the People's Republic of China at the Sino-US Ambassadorial talks.

Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States of America, Washington, D.C. (no salutation).

On October 16, 1964 China exploded an atom bomb, thus successfully making its first nuclear test. On the same day, the Chinese Government issued a statement on this event, setting forth in detail China's position on the question of nuclear weapons.

The Chinese Government consistently stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. China has been compelled to conduct nuclear testing and develop nuclear weapons. China's mastering of nuclear weapons is entirely for defense and for protecting the Chinese people from the US nuclear threat.

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-2- 885, October 19, 5 PM from Warsaw.

The Chinese Government solemnly declares that at no time and in no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons.

The Chinese Government will continue to work for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons through international consultations and, for this purpose, has put forward in its statement the following proposal:

"That a summit conference of all the countries of the world be convened to discuss the question of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and that, as the first step, the summit conference should reach an agreement to the effect that the nuclear powers and those countries which may soon become nuclear powers undertake not to use nuclear weapons, neither to use them against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones, nor against each other."

It is the common aspiration of all peace-loving countries and people of the world to prevent a nuclear war and eliminate nuclear weapons. The Chinese Government sincerely hopes that its proposal will be given favourable consideration and positive response by your government.

Please accept the assurance of my highest consideration.

Chou En-Lai.

Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China.

Annex: Text of the statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China dated October 16, 1964.

END VERBATIM TEXT.

I Assume Department already has text of Chinese statement dated October 16 so am sending it by pouch.

CABOT

JMH/14

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COMMUNIST ASIA

7. Communist China Explodes Nuclear Device

A low-yield nuclear device was exploded in the atmosphere on 16 October at the Lop Nor Test Site in Western China.

Signals have been reported from acoustic and electromagnetic stations. A preliminary estimate of the yield is in the range of 5 to 50 KT with the most probable value being about 15 KT. Collection of nuclear debris was not expected prior to 18 October.

Eight hours after the test Peiping jubilantly announced its success, calling it a major achievement of strengthening China's defenses and a "major contribution to the cause of world peace." Peiping made no acknowledgment of the USSR's substantial help in providing a foundation for China's nuclear program. Success was at-

tributed to the skill and hard work of Chinese scientists who "displayed a spirit of relying on their own efforts."

Peiping's first political move to exploit the test and to counter adverse reaction abroad was to call for a summit conference of all nations to discuss "complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons."

The Chinese made a similar proposal in August 1963 in an attempt to blunt criticism of their refusal to sign the nuclear test ban treaty. The government statement, broadcast on 16 October, declared that Communist China would never "at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons."

33(b)(1)

SANITIZED

Authority NLS-032-014-4-b  
By sj, NARA, Date 3-15-07

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3. Czechoslovak Economic Changes

The long-awaited changes to be introduced gradually into the Czechoslovak economy will probably be revealed at a November party central committee plenum. Czechoslovak sources appear reasonably optimistic that the changes will in the long run mark a significant "reorientation" of the economic system.

A national meeting of party officials was held on 9 October to hear reports on the draft principles of management of the economy, which had been approved by the party presidium in September. The broad outlines of reform are contained in a recent article by party economist Ota Sik published in a central committee monthly.

Sik indicates that the new measures to be put into effect are the result of a long debate between liberals and conservatives. The measures include the replacement of detailed di-

rectives by broader guidelines given to factories by central authorities. More flexibility is to be introduced into the price system, especially for consumer goods, so that market forces can play a role in determining output. Czechoslovak producers are to be induced to improve quality and reduce costs so as to make Czechoslovak products competitive with foreign products. Sik indicated that these reforms will be introduced gradually, beginning in January, and warned of initial problems in introducing them.

A final assessment of the extent of these changes and of the degree to which the liberals have been successful in pressing their program must await the release of more information by the regime. There is widespread opposition to the proposals of many liberals that Czechoslovakia should introduce market socialism, but the seriousness of the country's economic difficulties may force the regime to introduce some sweeping reforms.

33(b)(1)

*Mr. Tamm*

22



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

October 1, 1964

*Handwritten initials/signature*

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MEMORANDUM

TO: The Interdepartmental BNSP Task Group on a "Chinese Communist Nuclear Capability"

FROM: S/P - Robert H. Johnson

SUBJECT: Draft Program of Action of September 25, 1964

Attached is a statement of "JCS Changes not Accepted or Accepted Only in Part" which was transmitted to Mr. Bundy as an attachment to Mr. Rostow's memo of September 25 forwarding our draft Program of Action. It was inadvertently omitted from the papers transmitted by my memo of September 25. It should be inserted immediately following the Rostow memo which is the first enclosure to my memo.

*To Mr. Bundy  
w/KwK memo  
10/3/64*

GROUP 3  
Downgraded at 12-year intervals  
Not automatically declassified

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *g/rj*, NARA, Date 4-4-07

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


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10/2/64

NOTE FOR MR. KOMER

Bob --

This is my redraft of the  
contingency statement.

  
CEJohnson

OCT 2 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Copy - nuclear*  
23a

Draft Presidential Standby Statement for Use in Event of ChiCom  
Detonation of a Nuclear Device

I can announce that we have detected the long-anticipated detonation of a nuclear device by the Chinese Communists. Of course, this comes as no surprise and no one should be misled as to the small military significance of this development. There is a long, long period of development and the expenditure of vast financial and human resources between the detonation of a first nuclear device and the acquisition of a stockpile of reliable nuclear weapons and appropriate delivery systems that would importantly affect the world military balance. If and when the Chicoms ever attain a true nuclear weapon capability, the Free World will still be and will continue to be enormously stronger. The possibility that the Chicoms could ever catch up with the Free World is indeed small.

Nevertheless, this is a sad moment for the Chinese people and indeed for all mankind. The Chinese people under the yoke of a callous and brutal tyranny have had to devote their meager resources in this wild pursuit of the nuclear weapon instead of devoting their intelligence and resources to meeting their minimum civilian requirements, or to contribute to scientific and industrial progress through the peaceful use of the atom.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *sj/rq*, NARA, Date 4.4.07

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OCT 2 1964

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

Last year the Chinese Communist regime refused to become signatories to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Now by a flagrant and conscienceless act it has asserted its sovereign right to pollute the atmosphere by the radioactive fallout from its weapons tests. It is indeed deplorable that the Chinese Communists could not see their way clear to join with most of the rest of the world in halting atmospheric pollution and discouraging the spread of nuclear weapons.

This sad event brings home to all of us the overriding importance of finding practical concrete steps that will lead us away from the specious security of nuclear weapons and the whole arsenal of hellish armaments toward a new era of peace and cooperation among all men in a great effort to achieve the shining goal of the great society that has been the dream of the philosophers throughout the ages. This is the goal to which we and all the world shall become dedicated.


CONFIDENTIAL

deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations. Gesturing toward the Soviet presidium members at the cosmonaut reception, the ambassador said, "they are all responsible."

One of the most difficult problems facing the new regime was underlined by the generally negative reaction to the coup by parties in both Eastern and Western Europe. While the Eastern European governments, except Albania, sent pro forma

congratulations to the new leaders, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, and Yugoslavia pointedly praised Khrushchev's merits. This reaction clearly served notice that they will resist any Soviet efforts to reverse Khrushchev's policy of accommodation to Eastern European desires for greater autonomy. Several Western parties publicly dissociated themselves from the action against Khrushchev and called for a fuller explanation.

3.3(b)(1)




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CPR

**SANITIZED**  
Authority MLJ-032-014-4-8  
By g, NARA, Date 3-15-07

3.3(b)(2)



Although the successful test registers progress in nuclear technology and points the way to future growth in military strength, the immediate gain has been political. Despite the competing story of Khrushchev's downfall, China's nuclear explosion has had a major psychological impact.

A preliminary evaluation of reaction around the world based mainly on news coverage indicates that on balance the test has probably raised Communist China's international standing by dramatically underscoring Peiping's claim to great power status.

Chinese efforts to neutralize the inevitable adverse reaction began shortly before the test. Sometime during the first week in October Peiping apparently began quietly to advise some of its friends abroad that a test was coming fairly soon and solicited backing for China's "right" to test. Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon and perhaps some African countries seem to have been approached in this way.

After the test, the main thrust of Peiping's propaganda was defensive. Although the jubilant official announcement played up the magnitude of the Chinese achievement, it stressed Peiping's peaceful intentions and sought to justify the development of a nuclear capability as a response to US "threats." Peiping followed up its call on 16 October for a summit meeting of all nations by sending formal messages to the heads of all governments proposing a conference to discuss "complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons."

Since then the Chinese have relied largely on selective quotes from statements by Afro-Asian sources to support their case except for a major editorial attack on the US published on 22 October. Avoiding any suggestion of public sabre-rattling, Peiping is apparently employing private channels to "explain" the growth of Chinese power.

Peiping's gains are most evident in Asia. China's Communist allies--North Korea and North Vietnam--have applauded vigorously and may now be closer to Peiping than before. Government spokesmen in Indonesia and Cambodia have given warm support to the Chinese. The press response in Pakistan has been favorable and officials have expressed the view privately that the case for seating Peiping in the UN has been strengthened. Ceylonese newspapers have taken the same line.

~~SECRET~~

The Communist World

African response to the test has been scanty but the reaction thus far suggests that Chinese prestige has gone up, and support for seating Peiping in the UN may grow even though there has also been criticism of the nuclear proliferation. The prime minister of Northern Rhodesia announced on 18 October that his country would vote to seat the Chinese Communists. A Nigerian radiobroadcast on 19 October called on all members of the Organization of African Unity to recognize Peiping and to join in an effort to "reopen" the UN representation question.

Initial reaction in the European Communist states--important factors in the Sino-Soviet struggle--has been unfavorable. The press in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia has been critical. Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria have thus far withheld comment. Over-all, the Chinese nuclear test appears to have added another element of uncertainty to a situation already confused by the power shift in Moscow. This seems likely to confer a temporary advantage on Peiping in the Sino-Soviet conflict. [redacted] [redacted] 33(b)(1)

\* \* \*

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 1, 1964

*Open Nuclear*

Mac,

I am concerned about the final sentence in this statement. It introduces an essentially new thought (disarmament) that is not adequately related to the rest of the text and might even appear contradictory to the rest of the message. I believe that this subject should be treated as a new penultimate paragraph explaining that this action places greater urgency on the achievement of a non-proliferation agreement and does not in itself effect the efforts of the major powers to take steps to control the arms race in view of the limited military capabilities of the Chinese military force. The last sentence should also be modified to eliminate the idea that this Chinese action will not "interfere" with our efforts toward disarmament, peace, etc. I am afraid that this will sound a little like whistling in the dark to the man in the street.

Spurgeon Keeny

*This copy sent to  
Keeny (via Charles  
Johnson) w/ RWT  
memo to me 86  
10/2/64*

OCT 2 1964



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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new staff

September 30, 1964

J. Let.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

SUBJECT: Standby Statement for Chinese Communist  
Nuclear Test

Attached is the current draft of a public statement in the event that the Chinese Communists should test a nuclear device. It has been cleared in draft within the Department and by DOD, USIA, ACDA, and CIA. It has not as yet been cleared by the Secretary and should therefore not be cleared with the President in its present form. It will need to be reviewed and revised as necessary in the light of any Chinese Communist announcement.

*Benjamin H. Read*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Public Statement Draft re  
ChiCom Nuclear Device.

OCT 2 1964

✓

CONFIDENTIAL

Draft Standby Statement for Use in Event of ChiCom Detonation  
of a Nuclear Device

(The length and desired emphasis of such a statement will depend on the nature of the detonation, the international situation at the time, and the manner of issuance.)

1. As Secretary Rusk noted on September 29, we have long known that the Chinese Communists had a nuclear development program which was approaching the point of a first detonation of a test device. By our own means of detection we can today confirm that such an explosion has in fact taken place. (State when and where, and any available details on size, type, and effects.)

2. This is a sad moment for the hopes of mankind. Just a year ago a first step towards the control of nuclear weapons was taken with the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which has been signed by over 100 nations. Communist China strongly opposed the treaty and refused to sign it. It was hoped that this treaty would halt the spread of nuclear weapons to additional nations, and would put an end once and for all time to the pollution of the atmosphere by radioactive fallout. This act by Communist China runs contrary to those hopes.

3. In

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By sj/rq, NARA, Date 4-4-07

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- 2 -

3. In view of our foreknowledge of the likelihood of this event the fact of this explosion comes as no surprise. It has long been taken into account in the planning of our own defense program and nuclear capability. Nor should its military significance be over-estimated. The initial testing of a first nuclear device is a long way from the acquisition of a stockpile of reliable weapons, with appropriate delivery systems.

4. More basic, however, is the fact that if and when the Chicomso develop nuclear weapons systems, Free World nuclear strength will continue to be enormously greater. Even the most casual calculation should demonstrate to Peiping that possible direct military gains that might result from use of nuclear weapons would be far outweighed by the potential costs to Communist China of such use.

5. The United States will continue to remain firm in its defense commitments in Asia. Even if Communist China should develop an effective nuclear capability, that capability would have no effect upon the willingness of the United States

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- 3 -

States to respond to requests from Asian nations for help in dealing with Communist Chinese aggression. The United States will also continue its current efforts to support Asian nations in developing their ability to meet the continuing threats to their independent existence which arise not out of Communist China's eventual token nuclear capability, but from its support of wars of insurgency and more limited non-nuclear aggression. The United States will also not be diverted by this nuclear test from its long-term efforts to help the nations of Asia develop their basic strength and improve the welfare of their people through economic development.

6. The Chinese Communist nuclear weapons program is also a tragedy for the Chinese people who have suffered so much under the Communist regime. Instead of utilizing its scarce technical and industrial resources to improve the well-being of the Chinese people, the regime has used these valuable resources to produce a crude nuclear device which can only increase rather than decrease the sense of insecurity  
of the

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- 4 -

of the Chinese people. Other Asian nations would also be capable of developing nuclear weapons, but they have wisely chosen not to use their scientific and industrial resources for this purpose. Instead they have chosen to use their resources to promote the well-being of their people through economic development and peaceful use of the atom. By so doing they have also made an important contribution to the peace and security of the world.

7. While the Chinese Communist nuclear detonation is symbolic of policies which do not serve the cause of peace, there is no reason to fear that it will itself lead to new and immediate dangers of war provided that the nations of the Free World recognize its true significance and persevere in their determination to preserve their independence. [Nor will it interfere with] our efforts to [take] concrete practical steps down the road that leads away from nuclear armaments and war and toward a world of disarmament, cooperation, development and peace.

Cleared in substance October 1963  
" " " May 1964  
" " draft September 30, 1964.

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GENERAL

GUIDANCE ON CHICOM BOMB

26  
Cpr nuclear  
9/30/64

In anticipation that the Chinese Communists possibly may detonate a nuclear device or make an important announcement concerning their nuclear capability on October 1 -- the 15th anniversary of their accession to power -- a Department spokesman on September 29 released the Secretary's statement on this subject. The evidence is still somewhat speculative that such ChiCom action will occur, but it is our assessment that the ChiComs are in a better relative position this year for a nuclear detonation and would welcome a memorable anniversary announcement. The potential for a dramatic announcement on such occasions is always present.

The Secretary's Statement was as follows: "For some time it has been known that the Chinese Communists were approaching the point where they might be able to detonate a first nuclear device. Such an explosion might occur in the near future. If it does occur, we shall know about it and will make the information public.

"It has been known since the 1950's that the Chinese Communists have been working to develop a nuclear device. They not only failed to sign but strongly opposed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty which has been signed by over 100 countries. The detonation of a first device does not mean a stockpile of nuclear weapons and the presence of modern delivery systems. The United States has fully anticipated the possibility of Peiping's entry into the nuclear weapons field and has taken it into full account in determining our military posture and our own nuclear weapons program. We would deplore atmospheric testing in the face of serious efforts made by almost all other nations to protect the atmosphere from further contamination and to begin to put limitations upon a spiraling arms race."

ChiCom Reasons - Assuming that the ChiComs possess the capability for a nuclear detonation, we believe Peiping has the following reasons for immediate testing: 1) Apart from its hoped-for demoralizing impact on South Viet-Nam and other free countries, testing could raise the morale among the Viet Cong, in Hanoi, and within Communist China itself by making the threat of US escalation in Indo-China seem less ominous; 2) Free World public opinion, conscious of the possible ultimate consequences of broadened conflict, could help deter such an escalation; 3) The nuclear test would give the forthcoming People's Congress (to be held probably in November) and the possibly forthcoming Party Congress (now three years overdue) a tangible success with great psychological ramifications; and 4) In the context of the Sino-Soviet rift, the test could have a definite influence favorable for Peiping on the Moscow meeting of Communist parties. Even if the ChiComs are still short of the actual capability of detonating a nuclear bomb, the above reasons might persuade them to claim such a capability on October 1.

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By sj/rq, NARA, Date 4-4-07

S E C R E T

Guidance on Actual Detonation - In the event of a ChiCom nuclear explosion, the following points have been included in a draft standby statement for use here and our posts abroad: 1) The Chicoms have once again flouted the majority of mankind's interests; the universal hope that the spread of nuclear weapons might be halted and the health of the population of the world would not be endangered by further radioactive contamination, was reflected by the fact that over 100 nations signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty last year. 2) The ChiCom nuclear explosion has been expected for some time; the ChiComs have been concentrating a significant portion of their scientific and material resources on this program and presumably have drawn on considerable information now in the public domain. 3) The United States will remain firm in its defense commitments in Asia and the detonation will have no effect on our willingness to respond to requests from Asian nations for help in dealing with ChiCom aggression. 4) The military significance of this test should not be overestimated; it will make no change by itself in the basic military situation in Asia; a first test is a long way from acquiring a stockpile of weapons; the development and production of an effective delivery system also is much more complex than simple delivery means; if and when the ChiComs develop a nuclear weapons system, the nuclear strength of the Free World will continue to be enormously greater.

5) The Chicom nuclear weapons program underlines the tragedy of the Chinese people who have suffered much under the Communist regime. 6) The ChiCom nuclear detonation is an achievement of which other Asian nations would also be capable if they chose to use their scientific and industrial resources for this purpose, rather than in promoting the well-being of their people through economic development and the peaceful use of the atom. 7) The event does not serve the cause of peace, but there is no reason to fear that it will itself lead to new and immediate dangers of war, provided the Free World recognizes its true significance and stands firm. 8) The event should not deter concrete practical steps towards a world of disarmament, cooperation, development, and peace.

Effect on Test Ban Treaty - There is no reason to expect that the explosion of one nuclear device by the ChiComs will affect the Test Ban Treaty. It was anticipated when the Treaty was drafted that France and Communist China probably would continue in their efforts to develop their nuclear bomb capability.

--Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 40, 9/30/64

US-UK INDIAN OCEAN FACILITIES AND CEYLON NUCLEAR FREE ZONE PLAN  
RE NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE

Because of the press play in London and Washington on a joint US-UK exploration of possible island bases in the Indian Ocean, the stories have been picked up and embroidered to the point where we see

S E C R E T

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*Koster* 27

SEPTEMBER 29, 1964

FOR THE PRESS

NO. 423

*Opp  
nuclear*

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK

For some time it has been known that the Chinese Communists were approaching the point where they might be able to detonate a first nuclear device. Such an explosion might occur in the near future. If it does occur, we shall know about it and will make the information public.

It has been known since the 1950's that the Chinese Communists have been working to develop a nuclear device. They not only failed to sign but strongly opposed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty which has been signed by over 100 countries. The detonation of a first device does not mean a stockpile of nuclear weapons and the presence of modern delivery systems. The United States has fully anticipated the possibility of Peiping's entry into the nuclear weapons field and has taken it into full account in determining our military posture and our own nuclear weapons program. We would deplore atmospheric testing in the face of serious efforts made by almost all other nations to protect the atmosphere from further contamination and to begin to put limitations upon a spiraling arms race.

\* \* \*

~~SECRET~~

*for nuclear #3 29*

MEMORANDUM

May 26, 1964

TO: White House - Mr. Bundy  
FROM: S/P - W. W. Rostow  
SUBJECT: Draft Program of Action to Deal with a Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation and Capability

You will recall that several weeks ago we discussed the question of disposition of the recommendations developed in the interdepartmental planning exercise Bob Johnson has directed on a Chinese Communist nuclear capability. You agreed to give serious consideration to the possibility that these recommendations might be considered by the NSC Standing Group. (The JCS, in their review of the paper, recommended that a NSAM be promulgated on the subject.)

Since I talked with you, Bob Johnson has gone ahead with his group and developed the attached action paper. It is now in the final stages of clearance. While it is in this final stage I thought it would be appropriate to send it to you for your reaction to the feasibility of NSC Standing Group consideration. If you agreed to such consideration we would then send you the cleared paper through formal channels.

I believe that the subject matter and the substance of the recommendations are of sufficient importance to merit high-level consideration.

The JCS representative in the interdepartmental group that worked on the paper is quite concerned that the Joint

Chiefs

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *sjlrg*, NARA, Date 4-4-07

MAY 27 1964

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Chiefs have a chance to review the paper prior to NSC Standing Group consideration. I would suppose that this could be handled by sending the paper to the Chiefs for review when it goes to the Standing Group. In their earlier review of the longer paper the JCS did not address the recommendations.

Copy to: White House - Mr. Komer ✓  
Mr. Forrestal

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL

78

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MEMORANDUM

May 25, 1964

TO: The Interdepartmental BNSP Task Group on  
"A Chinese Communist Nuclear Capability"

FROM: S/P - Robert H. Johnson *RHJ*

SUBJECT: Draft Program of Action: Chinese Communist Nuclear  
Detonation and Capability

Attached is the revision of the draft program of action to which we agreed on Thursday, May 21, Please advise me by phone no later than noon on Monday, June 1 of your clearance of this paper for submission for NSC Standing Group consideration.

MAY 25 PM 2 32

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and declassification

**DECLASSIFIED**  
Authority NWJ-032-014-4-9  
By SJ, NARA, Date 9-11-07

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DRAFT

May 25, 1964


Program of Action

A Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation and Capability

I. Purpose and Scope

It is the purpose of this program of action to propose policies and courses of action which will help minimize the adverse impact of the first Chinese Communist nuclear test and the development by Communist China of a nuclear capability and which will, so far as possible, turn these developments to U.S. advantage. Primary, but not exclusive, focus is upon the continental and sea periphery of Communist China. The following recommendations are based generally on the analysis contained in an October 15, 1963 draft "Policy Planning Statement" and related supporting papers.\*

In general



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(b)(1)

GROUP 1  
 Excluded from automatic  
 downgrading and declassification

**SANITIZED**  
 E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.6  
 NLJ 07-167 and RAC  
 By id, NARA, Date 4-25-08

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2

In general, Chinese Communist nuclear development will not, so far as can now be predicted, call for major policy changes. (A possible exception may be the development of additional approaches to dealing with the problem of further nuclear proliferation.) Therefore, while some combination of action is required to reassure other nations, and to reduce the likelihood of further nuclear proliferation and to help insure that the Chinese do not miscalculate the value of their capability, there are relatively few actions that are so distinctively related to the problems posed by a Chinese nuclear capability that they do not involve other considerations as well. Accordingly, few of the actions below relate exclusively to dealing with the Chinese nuclear problem, but all are considered to have some short-term or longer-term relevance to it.

An apparent dilemma is also posed by the fact that, on the one hand, it has been concluded that it is both realistic and desirable to play down the real military significance of a Chinese nuclear capability, while on the other it is felt that, for reasons already mentioned, a number of US actions would be desirable. There is, therefore, some danger that sheer


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
volume of activity may appear to contradict our effort to place this development in perspective. This dilemma, however, is more apparent than real for the following principal reasons: (a) the fact, already cited, that a majority of the actions proposed can be justified on their own merits; (b) the related fact that it will be possible to initiate many of the proposed actions now or at some future time in a way that can be quite unrelated to Chinese Communist nuclear events; and (c) the minor character of many of the actions when considered individually.

II. General Policy Guidance

1. The US Government's reaction to a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation should not suggest that the event is more important than is in fact the case. A particular effort should, however, be made to make clear to the American public and press that the US Government has thought out, and is acting upon, a well-defined program of measures appropriate to the character of the problem.



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


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(b)(6)

3. In dealing with the political effects of a Chinese nuclear capability the US should:

- a. In response to ChiCom efforts to induce increased fear and respect, offer reassurances.
- b. In response to ChiCom efforts to suggest that US hostility and the US nuclear presence are the primary sources of the threat of nuclear war in Asia and efforts to present Communist China as the protector of Asian nations, underline the peaceful and constructive purposes of the US and its willingness to discuss problems bearing on peace with any nation, and its interest in the independence of all Asian nations.

4. After the ChiComs have an operational nuclear capability the US should recognize, in responding to Communist aggression, that aggressive military action by the Chinese may be



may be designed in part to test the value of their capability as a deterrent to US response. (In particular, that the ChiComs may hope, by deterring US attack upon mainland China, to provide somewhat greater scope for ChiCom non-nuclear military initiatives.)

5. From the perspective of the political and military implications of a Chinese Communist nuclear capability, in considering future US nuclear deployments to Asia particular emphasis should be given to seaborne and dual-capable weapons systems.

6. The US should recognize that the Chinese Communist nuclear capability will increase pressure for expanded international communications with Peiping.

7. The U.S. should recognize and take account of the possibility that a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation and nuclear capability may increase military assistance demands from some countries of Asia.

8. In responding to proposals for an Asian denuclearized zone, the US should make clear that it is prepared to consider such a zone under the following circumstances: (1) where the

zone

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zone is initiated by the countries in the area and is acceptable to them; (2) where the zone includes as many countries in the area as possible, in particular countries whose failure to participate might render a proposed arrangement infeasible; (3) where adequate provision is made for verification; and (4) under circumstances in which the zone would not upset the existing military balance or security arrangements in the area.\* We should also point out that in the case of an Asian denuclearized zone, consideration would have to be given to the question of Soviet nuclear power in Asia as well as to the participation of Communist China.

### III. Proposed Actions

#### A. Actions to be Initiated Now

1. Positively discourage development of independent nuclear capabilities by non-Communist Asian states. Argue, in this connection, the very limited significance and considerable

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\*In the event serious negotiations actually take place, the US would need to take appropriate action, as feasible to preserve its base and transit rights.

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siderable cost of a ChiCom nuclear capability.\* (Action:  
State/DOD)

2. Examine the feasibility of deployments of the "Concord Squadron" in the Indian Ocean so as to maintain a military presence in the area a majority of the time (e.g., six or seven months of the year). (Action: DOD/State)

3. Except where such visits would be politically self-defeating, increase good will visits of US seaborne nuclear-capable forces to friendly ports in Asia. (Action: State/DOD)

4. Take

\*The following additional actions contained in the paper are designed, in part, to reduce the incentives to the development of independent nuclear capabilities by additional countries in Asia (in the first instance, [redacted] (a) additional deployments of the "Concord Squadron" (par A-2); (b) broad public assurance of nuclear defense (pars A-7, C-1 and Tab A); (c) specific assurances to allies and neutrals (par C-2); (d) offers of consultation and planning for nuclear defense (par C-3); and (e) [redacted]

3.3  
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[redacted] (par C-4). Other actions intended to have reassuring effect (e.g., proposals on air defense) should also have some marginal effect in reducing incentives to nuclear proliferation. In recognition of the fact that actions such as these may not provide adequate disincentives to the development of a national nuclear capability [redacted] the Policy Planning Council is examining other possible approaches to that problem.

4. Take advantage of command post and other exercises designed to make evident to Communist China and the USSR, in a quiet way, the fact that

[Redacted]

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5. Make deployment to advance bases in Asia of currently available mobile air defense units which can subsequently be moved quickly into areas under potential or actual threat of air attack in order to provide reassurance to the country concerned. To the extent politically desirable make demonstrations of the US ability to move such units quickly into threatened areas. More generally, publicize our capability to make rapid deployment of air defense units to Asian countries. (Action: DOD with USIA support as appropriate)

6. Undertake contingency planning which would assume restrictions on use of US bases in Japan following a Chinese Communist nuclear test. (Action: DOD/State)


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
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estimates of the probability

bility that Communist China will develop missiles as well as nuclear devices. Make a special effort, in cooperation with the governments concerned, to reach the populations on Taiwan and in South Korea with our views as to the limited significance of a ChiCom capability. Also, seek to reduce the sense of threat in Asia by suggesting in our psychological programs that an important motive of Communist China in developing a nuclear device may now be as a means of asserting its right to leadership in the world Communist movement. Seek to coordinate the educative efforts of allied countries with US efforts.



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3.3  
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8. To help develop an increased sense of mutuality of interest and outlook on security problems and a reduced sense of isolation among the nations of Asia:

- a. Privately reiterate on a regular basis the general theme that nations of the area share a common security problem which could be met more effectively if they would cooperate.
- b. Expand employment of the third country training technique (including appropriate use of MAP) to support intra-regional military training.
- c. Give early active consideration to the development of a Pacific Defense College (See Tab B).
- d. Give particular emphasis in CINCPAC weapons demonstrations to the limited implications of a Chinese nuclear capability.

(Action: State/DOD)

9. Seek wherever feasible to encourage greater effort by Japan, India and Australia to support the independence of other

nations of Asia, primarily through non-military means.

(Action: State/DOD/AID/USIA and others as appropriate)


10. Undertake a State-AID study of experience to date in the field of non-military regional cooperation in Asia and of the advantages of and possibilities for seeking through US initiatives to expand such cooperation. The study should make appropriate use of prior studies and should be begun promptly with a view to early submission of a report to the Secretary and the Administrator. (Action: State/AID)

11. Publicly reiterate our position that at an appropriate time Communist China should be brought into arms control and disarmament arrangements. Within the US Government develop a position as to the conditions and procedures under which such participation would come about. Develop applications for Asia of US arms control and disarmament proposals; such applications to be drawn upon either in response to Communist Chinese proposals or in any disarmament discussions with Communist China. (Action: State/ACDA)

12. As partial offsets to the psychological effect of a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation and to demonstrate US cooperation in sharing of advanced technology with countries  
of Asia


of Asia, continue such activities as: full and active cooperation with the Japanese in such outer space endeavors as space communications and the launching of a Japanese space satellite; encouragement to the Indians to increase their commitment to peaceful uses of atomic energies and to increase publicity concerning their capabilities in peaceful uses (including the making of offers of technical assistance to other Asian countries); and expeditious provision of technical assistance for the proposed Japanese nuclear-powered ship; and the examination with Asian nations of the potentials of PLOWSHARE for Asian economic development. (Action: State/SCI in cooperation with AEC and NASA)

13. Incorporate in appropriate background materials a specific,



3.3(b)(1)

cases



14. In consultation with our NATO allies, take advantage of future discussions with the Soviets on non-dissemination to explore, through a rather open-ended discussion, whether there are bases for development of common views and common or parallel approaches to any aspect of the problem of Chinese Communist nuclear capabilities. (Action: State/ACDA)

15. Circulate, with appropriate caveats as to its status, the paper prepared for the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group on this subject to selected US missions abroad for their background information and provide it on a selective basis to Asian nations, appropriately revised as necessary. (Action: State)

B. Actions to be Taken Immediately Following the First ChiCom Nuclear Test

1. Review and issue the standby statement already prepared and make the longer supporting study available (par 7 above). (Action: Interdepartmental Psychological-Political Group)

2. Take other actions under C below as appropriate and necessary.

C. Actions


C. Actions to be Taken Subsequent to the First Chinese Communist Nuclear Test as Necessary

1. Make a broad public assurance of nuclear defense along the lines of Tab A.
2. In response to requests or evident need:
  - a. To allies: affirm that our existing defense commitments specifically cover defense against nuclear threats or nuclear attack as well as against conventional threat or attack.
  - b. To neutrals: indicate that our general public assurance applies to the particular country concerned. Indicate a willingness to make joint or unilateral statements with one or more neutrals committing the US to "consult" with the nation(s) concerned if it comes under threat of Chinese Communist nuclear attack. Also be prepared to indicate a willingness to consider more formal unilateral US assurances while point out that such assurances are likely to require formal US legislative action.

(Action: State/DOD)

3. Seek to satisfy requests for other forms of nuclear cooperation with proposals for consultation and planning for  
defense

defense and retaliation against nuclear attack upon the country concerned. (Action: State/DOD)



5. Make a particular effort in the early post-detonation period to demonstrate US rapid reaction capabilities through well-publicized military exercises. (Action: DOD)

6. In response to any renewed Thai request for a bilateral defense agreement, continue to argue that existing bilateral assurances under the SEATO treaty are adequate, but if Thai confidence appears significantly shaken by Chinese nuclear developments and other events, be prepared to agree to a bilateral. (Action: State)

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Tab A

Proposed Public Statement with Respect to Defense of  
Asian States Against Nuclear Attack

(Note: The statement below is intended to serve as the basis for a public statement on this subject which would be made at an appropriate time following a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation. It might be made as a part of the initial reaction to the first ChiCom nuclear test in the (unlikely) event that the Chinese accompanied their test with bellicose statements. Alternatively, it might be made at some later time - for example, as an introductory statement at a press conference by the Secretary of State in the period following the ChiCom test after there had been sufficient time for our general reaction of calm to have become evident. Issuance should not, however, be unduly delayed if the statement is to have its desired effect of reassurance and of reducing incentives to the development of national nuclear capabilities.

The statement might be prefaced with material designed to restate the limited meaning of a ChiCom nuclear test and initial nuclear capability. The statement as a whole would, of course, need to be reviewed in the light of the situation at the time it was made.)

The United States is prepared to assist Asian nations preserve their independence against Communist aggression and pressures.

The United States possesses the ability to respond in a flexible manner to Communist aggression in Asia. The vast nuclear

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Authority NLJ-032-014-4-9  
By Sj, NARA, Date 4-11-07

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not automatically declassified

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nuclear power which the United States possesses and will continue to possess should demonstrate to Peiping the futility and great danger to it involved in engaging in the use of nuclear weapons. If Communist China should, however, be tempted to use nuclear weapons against another Asian state, it can expect a prompt US response.

The United States is not only prepared to use its nuclear power when essential, but is also prepared, as its actions have many times demonstrated, to assist countries to meet non-nuclear aggression by non-nuclear means. The existence of a Chinese Communist nuclear weapons capability, when such a capability is eventually developed, will have no effect upon our willingness to act in such circumstances nor upon our ability to provide such assistance.

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30c  
May 7, 1964.

TAB B

Pacific Defense College

Background

A SEATO Defense College, or alternatively a Pacific Defense College, has been under consideration over the years since 1956. In March of that year a proposal for establishment of a SEATO Defense College was first introduced by the Military Advisers to the SEATO Council. Subsequently, in 1958, this proposal became the subject of bilateral exploration as to the possibilities of establishing in the Philippines a regional Military Staff College under joint United States-Philippine sponsorship. The SEATO Council of Ministers formally noted these bilateral discussions and discontinued action within SEATO, the project subsequently became known as the Pacific Defense College. Over the next year and a half as the problem was explored it became evident that the Philippine Government was unable or unwilling to come to a satisfactory agreement with the United States on several important problems concerning the establishment and operation of the proposed college, most important being an equitable arrangement for its financial support. Although the US tried repeatedly to resolve the points at issue, it was made quite clear that the Philippines wanted the US not only to pay the whole cost of building the necessary facilities but to also bear practically all of the operating expenses as well--with the Philippines maintaining effective control of the operation of the college without making more than a token contribution to its financial support.

As a result of the impasse that developed the project was returned to the SEATO Military Advisers for consideration again from a multilateral, SEATO viewpoint. In March of 1963 the Military Planning office of SEATO forwarded a study to the Military Advisers concluding that there was a need for a SEATO Defense College. In December of 1963 the Military Advisers responded to this study indicating that while the Asian members all agreed to the desirability of establishment of such a college, the others found no national requirement for such a college. The reversal in the long standing US position favoring the project was

undoubtedly

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

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By isl, NARA, Date 4-25-08

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undoubtedly partially due to the frustration of trying to achieve agreement over the more than seven years of negotiation. The final conclusion was that no further action should be taken until a specific proposal might be put forward by a member nation.

On 13 February 1964 the SEATO Council acted on these recommendations, providing that in view of national comments on the study it was considered there would be no advantage in proceeding further with the project at that time.

#### Need for Regional Military Cooperation

An important aspect of the security problem that we face in Asia, which will tend to be accentuated by the development of nuclear capabilities by Communist China, is the feeling that Communist China is the pre-eminent power in Asia and is likely to become increasingly powerful over time; that the US will ultimately withdraw; and that some kind of political-military accommodation by Asian nations with Communist China is therefore inevitable.

We can combat such attitudes in part by continuing indications of our intention to remain in Asia and to defend the independence of Asian nations. But an important part of the problem is the creation of a different vision of the future. An important means of helping create such a new vision is to reduce the sense of isolation of individual Asian nations. A Pacific Defense College could contribute importantly to this objective by creating some sense of the prospect of possible future cooperation even among nations that are now antagonistic; by developing a realization that the US is concretely involved in the problems of insuring the independence of Asian nations; by creating a psychological sense that they do not stand alone in dealing with those problems; by developing an increased sense of mutuality of interest and commonality of outlook; and by helping create a more realistic sense of the threat and perhaps, thereby, to make it seem more manageable.

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The foregoing history of efforts to establish a regional Military Staff College for the Far Eastern area is discouraging. However, recognizing that our security arrangements in the Western Pacific are piecemeal and tenuous in their nature, involving ANZUS, SEATO and various bilateral pacts, positive action to establish such a college would certainly appear to be in the long-range national interest. Because of inherent political problems in the area the prospects of expanding or combining the present multilateral defense organizations, i.e., SEATO and ANZUS, into a workable, coherent military alliance along the lines of NATO is considered infeasible and undesirable. Accepting this the courses open to us are necessarily limited.

The role of the military in these countries varies. In many Far East nations they represent the strongest force opposed ideologically as well as physically to the threat of Communist aggression or subversion. The recognition within the leadership of these military forces of the need for socio-economic reforms in their countries, paralleling the need for military strength to combat Communism, has gradually evolved and been evidenced in recent years. It would seem that this evolution could be strengthened and expedited by a training institution particularly configured to answer this problem -- designed to give its officer students a full appreciation of the political, social and economic problems of the area.

At the same time such an institution could inculcate and encourage the principle of professionalism among these Military officers, designed to focus their attention, interests and ambitions in the military field as against the political arena.

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It is true that certain progress has been made in the strictly military field of cooperation through the conduct of military training exercises, with US forces participating on both a bilateral and multilateral basis with our Asian allies. However, essential to the practical success of such exercises is the common adoption of standard operating procedures, practices and doctrine. Much more obviously could be achieved in this area by a training institution particularly designed to focus on this problem.

Lacking any over-all area military organization such as NATO, with its SHAPE, Military Committee, Standing Group, etc., such an institution could become the "mecca" or major forum for military officers of the many countries of the Far East, with substantial participation and influence by US military personnel. It could provide a ready-made center around which a variety of activities (e.g., conferences, bilateral military cooperation) might be organized as opportunities arose. In particular regard to the threat posed and reactions to the attainment of a nuclear capability by the Chinese Communists, such an institution might well provide an effective "sounding board", on a continuing basis, to offer the necessary reassurances as to the limited and primary political/psychological character of the threat and the vast US capabilities to counter such a threat.

The US position has been and continues to be to take steps as practicable to improve the effectiveness of our current multilateral and bilateral defense agreements so as to provide an effective framework for the defense of free Far Eastern areas. Within the limitations imposed, establishment of a Pacific Defense College would appear to offer a positive measure in this direction.

#### Feasibility of a Pacific Defense College

While the difficulty of obtaining multilateral or even bilateral agreement, as in the case of the Philippines, to obtaining agreement for the establishment of a Pacific Defense College is a matter of past record, this need not preclude any further consideration of the project. With the limited avenues open to the US in strengthening our Far East military arrangements it might well be desirable to consider

the establishment

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the establishment of such a college under US auspices and support. Even though from a political-psychological viewpoint this would be generally less attractive than a bilateral or multilateral arrangement for such establishment, it might well be the only answer under the circumstances existing. Alternatively, recognizing Australia's long-term security interests in the area, an effort to work with that country on a bilateral basis to establish a Pacific Defense College might offer reasonable possibilities. On the other hand Australia's involvement in the Malaysia problem, her historical attitude towards immigration of Asians and the special status enjoyed by the US, as a non-indigenous power with massive capabilities for the defense of the area, might make a US sponsored institution on US territory more acceptable and desirable in the eyes of the countries concerned.

Even though such a course of action would place the major cost of a Pacific Defense College on the US, it would offer certain practical advantages. Country participation could extend beyond SEATO, including neutral nations, and be at US invitation. Being unilaterally sponsored, the curriculum content and particularly the handling of politico-military aspects of the course would be under US guidance. The location of the college, most logically on US territory and preferably Hawaii, would provide a background where officer students from the many countries represented could be introduced to and acquainted with the American way of life. Hawaii, with its population including wide and well visible representation from many Asian countries, would appear to be particularly desirable. The Commander-in-Chief Pacific with his responsibilities in connection with the security of the Asia theater, and direct concern with the multilateral and bilateral military planning for the area, would be nearby and in a position to provide direct guidance to the operation of the school. His Political Adviser might well act for him in connection with political aspects of the courses to be provided. In this latter regard State Department representation on the staff of the college might well be desirable.

The costs

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The costs of such a college would depend on a number of factors, i.e., availability of existing facilities which could be refurbished to make them suitable, size of the staff and classes to attend, length of course, etc. After the initial capital investment for facilities and allowing for the personnel costs for U.S. military personnel on the staff, annual operating dollar costs might vary from \$100,000 to \$500,000, with the per-student course cost ranging from \$1000 to \$4000. (When one considers that the cost of a grant aid tank for Korea runs about \$200,000, these cost figures seem quite reasonable.)

Such a US investment could be particularly profitable if the projected college might attract as students officers of the highest calibre in their armed services, those who show promise of going on to future military leadership roles and who may be in a position to exert influence toward the future orderly socio-economic development of their countries. Therefore, the course should be at a sufficiently high level and be so recognized in order to achieve this goal.

Finally, in order to achieve a sense of multilateral participation in the administration of the course, which might be desirable from a political/psychological viewpoint, outstanding graduate foreign students might be invited to continue on and serve as officers on the staff. This could also serve the additional purpose of reducing US personnel costs involved.

#### Experience in Other Comparable Institutions

One question that inevitably arises in connection with area military training institutions, as in the case of the Inter-American Defense College, has been the expected difficulties of bringing officers together from countries of areas plagued by internal dissensions and historical differences and then achieving a common harmonious result. Such concerns contributed to the delay of years in the establishment of such courses as that provided by the IADC and the course for Senior Free World Naval officers at the US Naval War College. These concerns were proven completely unfounded.

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While it could be argued that the Far Eastern area presents a unique problem in this regard, and is not comparable to the Latin American area, the experience at the Naval War College does not support this thesis. There, senior naval officers from the European, Latin American, Middle East and Far Eastern areas sit as equals and despite their diverse backgrounds of culture, language and professional experience achieve a common appreciation of the problems, both military and political, challenging their countries as a whole in the defense against worldwide Communist aggression and subversion. South Korean, Chinese Nationalist, Japanese, Indonesian, Burmese and South Vietnamese officers study, work and live harmoniously together with their compatriots of not only SEATO, but ANZUS, CENTO and NATO. This course has additionally and very importantly generated strong bonds of friendship and understanding between individual foreign officers and with their US contemporaries that have continued long after their graduation and their return home.

Many senior captains and flag officers of Far Eastern navies today maintain close personal and unofficial professional communication on a continuing basis as a result of the bonds established in this course. Visualizing this well-proven fact alone - as applied to army, navy and air force officers of the countries of the Far East area who might attend a Pacific Defense College - US investment in such a project might prove profitable.

#### Conclusions

a. The establishment of a Pacific Defense College, under US auspices, might well be feasible and would be in the US national interest;

b. Its establishment would be a clear signal to the countries of the area that the US was exerting its leadership in resolving a problem that has defied solution on a multi-lateral and bilateral basis over the last eight years; and

c. Its establishment would be directly responsive to the problems presented by the advent of a Chinese Communist nuclear capability.

Recommendation:

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Recommendation:

That the Defense and State Departments actively explore the feasibility of establishment of a Pacific Defense College under US auspices, including an examination of practical aspects from a US viewpoint as well as reception to this initiative by countries aligned with the US in the Asia area.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL

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MEMORANDUM

Copy # 16

April 22, 1964

TO: White House - Mr. Komer  
FROM: S/P - *WR* W. Rostow  
SUBJECT: The Bases for Direct Action Against Chinese  
Communist Nuclear Facilities

The attached paper on the possibilities of direct action against the Chinese Communist nuclear capability was prepared by Robert Johnson of the Policy Planning Council. It benefited from informal comments of offices in State, CIA and DOD and was discussed at an interdepartmental meeting in February which I chaired. The agencies and offices represented at that meeting included State (FE, INR, G/PM, S/P), ACDA, DOD (ISA and JCS) and CIA. It has been revised in the light of that discussion and represents, I believe, the broad consensus of the group that discussed it.

I am sending it to you for your information. It was agreed that it should be a part of the background for any subsequent consideration that might be given to this subject - for example, in connection with any further consideration of covert action.

Distribution:

State

The Secretary  
M - Gov. Harriman  
G - Mr. Johnson  
G/PM - Mr. Kitchen  
FE - Mr. Bundy  
Mr. Green  
INR - Mr. Hughes  
Mr. Whiting

Other

DOD - Secretary McNamara  
General Taylor  
Mr. McNaughton  
Mr. Rowen  
CIA - Mr. McCone  
Mr. Cline  
WH - Mr. Bundy  
Mr. Komer  
Mr. Forrestal  
ACDA - Mr. Foster  
Amb. Timberlake

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NLJ 04-283

By *sj*, NARA, Date 4-11-07

APR 23 1964

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Copy # 16

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Policy Planning Council

An Exploration of the Possible Bases for Action  
Against the Chinese Communist Nuclear Facilities

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April 14, 1964

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NLJ 04-283  
By SJ, NARA, Date 4-11-07

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Against the Chinese Communist Nuclear Facilities

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An Exploration of the Possible Bases for Action  
Against the Chinese Communist Nuclear Facilities

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I. Conclusions

1. It is evident on the basis of analysis in this paper and the basic paper on the implications of a ChiCom nuclear capability\* that the significance of such a capability is not such as to justify the undertaking of actions which would involve great political costs or high military risks.

2. Direct action against the Chinese Communist nuclear facilities would, at best, put them out of operation for a few years (perhaps four to five).

3. A general threat of overt U.S. action to destroy the ChiCom nuclear production facilities in the event of major Chinese aggression would probably not be desirable. Threat of action in response to a specific instance of actual or threatened Chinese aggression would be preferable to a general threat, but would also have significant disadvantages. Whether it would be desirable would depend a good deal upon  
the circumstances

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\*See Draft Policy Planning Statement on "A Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation and Nuclear Capability", October 15, 1963

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the circumstances surrounding a particular situation. If, for example, the ChiComs were threatening nuclear action, a threatened response limited initially to nuclear production facilities might be desirable.

4. Action against the ChiCom nuclear facilities which was incidental to other military actions taken against Communist China in response to Chinese aggression would generally be preferable to actions directed against nuclear facilities alone. Similarly, threats designed to deter ChiCom action should probably not be directed solely against nuclear facilities. (However, as stated in par. 3 there may be circumstances in which action limited to nuclear facilities may be preferred.)

5. It seems most unlikely that we can develop, through negotiations in the arms control field, a politically viable basis for action against the ChiCom nuclear facilities. The USSR is also most unlikely to agree explicitly or implicitly to U.S. action against ChiCom facilities or to cooperate in helping lay the political basis for such action. But arms control negotiations can further isolate the Chinese on this issue and can thus help prepare the way for possible action  
taken in other

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taken in other ways and on other grounds against the ChiCom facilities.

6. Covert action seems to offer the politically most feasible form of action. Such action would present least problems if undertaken as part of a reaction to Chinese Communist aggression. Political costs of action in the absence of ChiCom aggression are difficult to estimate. They could be considerable if Peiping reacts strongly; small, if it does not. Assuming that the Chinese Nationalists were involved we would also have to be prepared to take the limited risks of some kind of ChiCom retaliation against Taiwan. Technical feasibility continues to be a real question and requires continued analysis.

7. There are a number of technical and technical-related questions which would require an answer before a decision for any of the possible forms of action were made. These include the following:

- a. It is doubtful whether, even with completion of initial photographic coverage of the mainland, we will have anything like complete assurance that we will have identified all significant nuclear installations

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installations. Thus, even "successful" action may not necessarily prevent the ChiComs from detonating a nuclear device in the next few years. If an attack should be made, some installations are missed and Communist China subsequently demonstrates that it is continuing to produce nuclear weapons, what is likely to be the reaction to the half-finished U.S. effort?

- b. It seems to be the case that a relatively heavy non-nuclear air attack would be required to put installations "permanently" out of business (i.e., destroy them so completely that any rebuilding effort would have to start virtually from scratch). If complete destruction is unattainable without a large attack, how effective a job could be done with various alternative levels of attack?
- c. Could the U.S. mount an effective counterforce operation, should that prove necessary, without employing nuclear weapons?

## II. Alternative Modes of Action and General U.S. Capabilities

This paper explores the possible bases for military  
action

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action against the Chinese Communist nuclear facilities, discussing the problems and advantages of each. It examines what appear to be the principal alternative modes of action, but is not an exhaustive study. Drafts of this paper have benefited from informal comments of offices in State, CIA and DOD and the paper represents the broad consensus of the views of representatives of those agencies and of ACDA.

Broadly speaking, three possible modes of action against the Chinese Communist nuclear facilities are conceivable:

- (a) overt U.S. action (preceded by threat of action) in response to potential or actual Chinese Communist aggression;
- (b) overt U.S. action which is justified by the development of a case against nuclear weapons production and testing by actions in the disarmament field; and (c) covert action by the U.S. or the Republic of China. In defining these modes of action it has been assumed that overt action must be based upon some form of political justification. Action that was simply a power play by either the U.S. alone or by the U.S. jointly with the USSR (assuming cooperation would be possible) is ruled out as being too costly politically.

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Action against the Chinese nuclear facilities might be undertaken either in advance of the first Chinese nuclear test or after such a test. After a test, however, Communist China will tend increasingly to be viewed as a legitimate holder of nuclear power and this will complicate the problem of justification of action, particularly in the absence of overt Chinese aggression.

It is assumed that the U.S. would have the capability to launch an air attack which could put out of action the nuclear production sites known to it without using nuclear weapons (i.e., at present, the plutonium production reactor at Pao-T'ou and the incomplete gaseous diffusion plant at Lan-Chou). There may, moreover, be other facilities which we have so far not identified. (There are, for example, two other areas in Communist China that very possibly may contain, or be related to, plutonium facilities.) It is therefore impossible to assume at present that the U.S. could knock out all nuclear material production. Within a year or less, we should have completed analysis of photos covering all of Communist China and should have somewhat greater assurance that we will have identified Communist China's nuclear installations. However, even then

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even then we will not have recent coverage of all areas and the identification of facilities as small as plutonium reactors will continue to present significant difficulty. We will therefore continue to be uncertain that we have identified all facilities.

Once the Chinese Communists have a stockpile of nuclear weapons it would also be impossible to assume that all of these would be destroyed. In this situation probably the only tactic that would offer assurance of destruction of most of the Chinese capability for nuclear retaliation would be a full counterforce operation which attacked Communist Chinese delivery means - airfields, any surface-to-surface missile sites, etc. From this point of view early action is to be preferred over later action. As noted just above, it will also become difficult to justify action against Communist China's nuclear facilities as the evolution of its capability makes it an increasingly "accepted" holder of nuclear power. At the same time, however, as the argument below suggests, it may be some time, if ever, before we are provided with a politically acceptable basis for direct action.

Any action against the Chinese Communist nuclear facilities would, at best, put them out of operation for a few  
years

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years (perhaps four to five years). Unless we could use the interim period thus provided to produce basic changes in the environment we would be faced by the question of whether we should repeat our attack under less favorable circumstances once the facilities had been rebuilt. It is not obvious what kinds of action might promise such basic change. We might, perhaps, hope to so strengthen the non-Communist forces in Asia in the interim as to reduce the political dangers involved in ChiCom exploitation of their nuclear capability. Perhaps actions in the disarmament field could put Communist China more clearly on the political defensive in the interim, although it is difficult to see how such actions could by themselves preclude Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons. In order to have a more permanent effect upon Communist China's ability to become a nuclear power we would have to somehow destroy Chinese research facilities and probably also her relevant research and engineering personnel. Identification of research facilities, which do not necessarily have any distinguishing physical characteristics, is impossible through photographic means. Direct action against such facilities and personnel would, even if possible, be obviously even more diffi-

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cult to justify politically than action against nuclear production facilities.

III. Overt U.S. Action Related to ChiCom Aggression

A. Assumed Situation and Tactics

Alternative One. A non-Communist Asian country is under the threat or actuality of major Communist Chinese attack and the U.S. comes to the country's defense.\* As a  
deterrent

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\*The situation envisaged is one of major Communist Chinese border-crossing aggression such as a general attack along the 38th parallel in Korea, a major attack on the Sino-Indian border or attack upon Taiwan. It does not include ChiCom support for guerrilla warfare in Southeast Asia, and probably not an attack upon the offshores. The situations dealt with are, of course, the least likely forms of Communist Chinese military action. If the U.S. were to embark upon a program of military pressures against North Vietnam, it would face very serious problems of justifying such pressures in a way which avoided a broad-scale adverse international political reaction. To take action against the ChiCom nuclear facilities as part of such a program of military pressures would greatly complicate an already difficult problem by broadening the area of action and thus clouding further the rationale for the primary U.S. actions against the DRV as well as arousing additional fears of escalation. Present evidence of ChiCom support of the war in South Vietnam would be far from adequate to support such a response. If action were taken against ChiCom facilities in the event of overt Chinese military intervention following U.S. action against NVN, the discussion below would apply.

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deterrent to further Communist Chinese military action, the U.S. threatens non-nuclear attack against Communist China's nuclear production facilities. The U.S. threat could be made explicit or it might take the form of an official "leak".

Alternative Two. The U.S. might make known by similar means, in advance of any specific ChiCom threat to a particular country its intent to take such action in the event of major Chinese Communist aggression. If the threat of U.S. action were made well in advance of any ChiCom aggressive action (perhaps as a part of the U.S. reaction to the first Chinese nuclear test), it would be difficult to define officially and publicly the circumstances in which we might consider such action. This consideration and others would tend to favor a "leak" rather than an official statement as the mode of approach.

A general difficulty with the "leak" approach is that it would immediately raise questions to which an official response of some kind would have to be made. It is not therefore necessarily a true substitute for an official statement.

Alternative Three. A third possibility, which would not have the potential deterrent advantage but which would result in the destruction of nuclear facilities, would be  
incidental

incidental, perhaps "accidental", attack on those facilities as a part of general conventional air attacks against Communist China in response to Chinese aggression.

B. Assumed Advantages

If deterrence succeeded, Chinese aggression would be stopped or prevented at minimum cost. If deterrence failed and an attack were necessary, the ChiCom ability to produce nuclear weapons might be destroyed for some time to come.

C. General Problems of Justification of Action Under All Alternatives

Broadly speaking, ultimate U.S. interests are consistent with the interests of other countries of the area. Both we and they would much prefer that Communist China not become a nuclear power. On the other hand, in view of our estimates of the probable limited utility of a nuclear capability to the ChiComs, we face the problem of whether we can justify to ourselves and others the initiation of military action against ChiCom nuclear production facilities. The other Asian countries (and European nations as well) will weigh their interest in not having Communist China become a nuclear power against their interest in avoiding actions which will threaten the possibility of broadened hostilities in Asia.

If Peiping

If Peiping were actually brandishing its nuclear capability, the relationship between the U.S. deterrent threat (and, if it became necessary, U.S. military action) and the ChiCom threat would be evident and the problem of justification would be less than if the Chinese nuclear threat were implicit. (If the Chinese had not yet even detonated a device, the problem of justification would, of course, be still more difficult.) However, its concern with the possibility of attack on the mainland will generally cause Communist China, in situations where its action might otherwise provoke such a response, to avoid explicit threat of nuclear attack on other nations.

Action, or the threat of action, of this kind by the U.S. will be particularly difficult to justify if the Chinese not only avoid explicit nuclear threats but if the U.S. had also, up to then, been de-emphasizing the significance of a Chinese Communist nuclear capability. We are already engaged in an effort to do just that and that effort would be further strengthened if actions proposed in the basic paper on the subject are approved and implemented. The reasons why we realistically can and should minimize the significance of the ChiCom capability are developed in that paper.

It may

It may be argued that this inconsistency will be less if the action is justified to ourselves and others in terms of the longer-term problems we shall face if Communist China goes on to develop a major nuclear capability. But what are those problems? A limited intercontinental capability would, in hypothesis, put the U.S. under more serious threat of nuclear attack by Communist China. The Chinese might consider that such a capability would have greater deterrent value than a non-intercontinental capability because of the possible unwillingness of the U.S. to accept even the marginal risks, on issues of marginal importance, of the absolute level of damage the ChiComs could inflict. However, the relative ability of the U.S. to devastate Communist China in a second strike would be very much greater than that of Communist China to devastate the U.S. in a first-strike. Communist China would continue to be unwilling to accept its destruction and therefore most unlikely to engage in first-use of nuclear weapons. This unlikelihood would greatly weaken the credibility of the ChiCom deterrent.

To become a Class A nuclear power with an effective pre-emptive counterforce capability or second-strike capability against all possible hostile nuclear powers, Communist  
China

China would have to become a major industrial power. Even such industrial development will not assure Class A nuclear status since such status is defined in relative terms and Communist China begins the advanced weapons race far behind the U.S. and the USSR. Moreover, when it achieves major industrial status, its interest in avoiding attack upon itself, which is already great, should further increase.

While the more general approach of Alternative Two would avoid some of the particular problems of justification, it would not avoid inconsistency with the general arguments we will be developing with respect to the limited significance of the ChiCom capability and its irrelevance to real military situations that might develop in Asia. While we might more successfully justify such a general threat in punitive and deterrent terms, a general warning of this sort could play into the hands of the Chinese by lending credence to the picture they will attempt to paint of the U.S. as aggressive and warlike and predisposed to military action against Communist China. The painting of such a picture will be part of their own effort to justify their development of a nuclear capability. The ChiComs may, in fact, follow their first nuclear test with a general "peace" campaign. They may also be expected to emphasize the "racialist" character of the U.S. threat.

Warnings of either a general or specific sort which threatened a specific form of retaliation for ChiCom aggression would have the disadvantage of limiting our freedom of action. They would suggest that we intended action only against nuclear installations whereas a threat that was either broad enough to include both nuclear installations and other industrial facilities or one which was limited only to the latter might be both more desirable politically and more effective as a deterrent in particular situations. This would be a particular problem in the case of Alternative Two. A general advance warning would appear to cover cases where we would find it difficult to follow through because of problems of justification that would be posed or for other reasons (e.g., a ChiCom attack on the offshore islands). Finally, either general or specific warnings would certainly lead to Chinese action to provide air defense for their nuclear facilities, thus increasing greatly the problem of making a successful attack.

D. Specific Problems of Alternative One

Asian and Other International Reaction. Reactions would depend in part upon the characteristics of the particular situation. Since such action by the U.S. in a crisis situation

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ation would represent a basic change in the character of the conflict and would project the U.S. into direct confrontation with Communist China, it would raise the possibility of escalation and Soviet involvement as well as the possibility of stopping the Chinese aggression ("de-escalation"). There would be increased concern in Asia and elsewhere that the U.S. action would lead to spreading the conflict. There would be political pressures on both the U.S. and Communist China but these are likely to be much greater on us than on the Chinese. Whether the net effect of these pressures would be beneficial to U.S. interests would depend upon the total situation, including the extent, if any, of the ChiCom military advance. If the U.S. threat were made in response to ChiCom threat, preservation of the status quo would be in the U.S. interest, but action which leads to pressures for an end to actual hostilities without restoration of the status quo ante would generally not be in our interests except where the military situation was deteriorating very seriously.

Communist Chinese Reaction. A threat of attack against its nuclear production facilities is likely to increase ChiCom caution in the prosecution of aggression against which the U.S. warning is addressed. At the same time the ChiComs

may be

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may be expected to mount a major propaganda and diplomatic campaign designed to convince the world of the dangers of the U.S. action (including the implicit threat of ChiCom nuclear retaliation) and to shift responsibility to the U.S. for creating a dangerous situation.

Whether the ChiComs would persist in their military course would depend importantly on Soviet reaction but also upon their estimate of the extent to which they believed that their diplomatic and propaganda campaign had reduced the possibility of U.S. action. However, there would be a strong possibility that the warning would serve its immediate purpose of causing the Chinese to stop their military action. It is probably unlikely, however, that they would consider it necessary to return to the status quo ante.

If the U.S. should actually attack the ChiCom nuclear production facilities when Communist China had a limited nuclear capability, the Chinese would be exceedingly unlikely to retaliate against U.S. forces with nuclear weapons for a non-nuclear attack. It would probably see retention of its nuclear capability as a deterrent to further, more extensive, attacks. It might, however, search for military responses of a non-nuclear sort which would create parallel destruction  
on the

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on the non-Communist side, hoping that its nuclear capability would serve as a deterrent to extensive counter-retaliation (e.g., attack on an Indian nuclear reactor in a Sino-Indian conflict situation?). However, the most probable reaction would be to stop its aggression and to mount a political campaign against the U.S., also perhaps calling publicly for Soviet help. Peiping might also claim that the U.S. had not destroyed Communist China's ability to produce nuclear weapons, seeking to demonstrate the futility as well as the riskiness of the U.S. action.

E. Specific Problems of Alternative Two

Chinese Communist Reaction. The Chinese would see such gratuitous U.S. warnings as further evidence of unwavering U.S. hostility to Communist China and perhaps of an intent to destroy Communist China if an opportunity were afforded. It is in U.S. long-term interests that we make evident to the leadership in Peiping that, in appropriate circumstances, we would be prepared to see an improvement in U.S.-Communist Chinese relations. A warning of this kind would have the effect of appearing to the Chinese leadership to foreclose such a possibility indefinitely. Moreover, as noted above,

the ChiComs

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the ChiComs would use such a U.S. warning to justify their development of a ChiCom nuclear capability as a defensive measure and to argue the dangers of a continued U.S. nuclear presence in Asia.

The ChiComs would probably, even without an explicit warning, estimate that there was some danger of such U.S. action in a military crisis. The warning would have the effect of underlining existing ChiCom military caution. The Chinese would consider it even more important that they disperse and protect their nuclear weapons stockpile and delivery capability as it develops in order to make them less vulnerable to attack and more likely to survive as a deterrent to further U.S. attacks following upon U.S. action against nuclear production facilities.

Asian Reaction. Asian reaction would be likely to be a mixture of public concern about the dangers of the U.S. course and some private satisfaction that the U.S. warning would reduce the prospects for major ChiCom aggression. There would probably be some confusion between the nuclear objective and the non-nuclear means and therefore a tendency to assume that, contrary to actual U.S. intent, we planned  
to use

to use nuclear weapons. Accordingly, there would probably be some accentuation of the fear created by a ChiCom nuclear test that future wars on Asian soil would become nuclear.

As the ChiComs move toward even a modest nuclear weapons stockpile it would become evident to other Asian governments that action against production facilities would not eliminate all threat of Chinese Communist nuclear retaliation. In fact, there might be concern that action against production facilities would have to be accompanied by action against the Chinese stockpile through attacks on airfields, missile sites, etc., with resulting increased danger of escalation including ChiCom nuclear response.

F. Specific Problems of Alternative Three

A general air attack against Communist China, to which an attack upon its nuclear installations would be "incidental" would in most circumstances be at least as difficult to justify as attacks directed specifically against its nuclear installations. However, a more selective, very limited, attack, which included nuclear and non-nuclear industrial installations would avoid the problems of justification for an attack directed solely against nuclear installations.

The fact

The fact that nuclear production facilities are located in the interior of China would, however, make it difficult to relate such attacks to action against local mainland targets which were nearby and related to the immediate theater of operations. It would be difficult to present such an attack as an incidental or accidental aspect of local operations. The attack, even if selective, would therefore have to involve other interior targets if it was to be presented as a general response to ChiCom aggression rather than as an action directed primarily against nuclear production facilities.

G. Soviet Reaction.

While the Soviets would probably react strongly on the propaganda plane to a general and official U.S. warning, they might let "leaked" warnings pass without specific comment. In either case they would perhaps take some private satisfaction from the U.S. action on the grounds that it would reduce the possibility of ChiCom miscalculation leading to possible Soviet involvement. In a conflict situation (Alternatives One or Three), the Soviets might feel compelled to threaten retaliation for U.S. implementation of its warning, particularly if North Vietnam or North Korea was also involved in the conflict on the Communist side. It is very unlikely that the USSR would retaliate against U.S. forces or bases

or bases for a U.S. non-nuclear attack confined to ChiCom nuclear production facilities, though the USSR would certainly react politically and would probably threaten Soviet response to more extensive U.S. attacks. The Soviet response to actual U.S. attack would depend so much upon the circumstances at the time, however, that prediction is most difficult. It would obviously be desirable, in order to minimize danger of Soviet misunderstanding, that the attacking forces keep as far as possible from Soviet borders.

IV. Overt Action Based Upon a Disarmament Case

The essence of such a strategy would be an effort to create an explicit or implicit presumption that no nation which is not now a nuclear power has a right to become one. On the basis of this presumption, which we would seek to establish through international agreements on nuclear weapons, sanctions would be applied to countries which nonetheless went ahead and developed a nuclear capability.

While the principal objective of such a strategy would perhaps be the justification of action against Communist China, it would have broader non-proliferation objectives as well. It is presumably based upon the estimate that, while additional nuclear powers, including Communist China, are most unlikely to engage in first-use of nuclear weapons

or to initiate

or to initiate significantly more aggressive policies because they possess a limited nuclear capability and while proliferation is not likely to lead to escalation of local conflicts or to result in nuclear accidents which would produce a nuclear exchange among the major nuclear powers, proliferation will introduce a new element of uncertainty into international calculations on all such questions.\*

The diplomatic track designed to establish the basis for such action might include, in addition to the test-ban treaty, at least three aspects of the U.S. proposals submitted to the Geneva Conference: (a) a non-dissemination agreement which would also include self-denying provisions with respect to production or acceptance of nuclear weapons under national control by present non-nuclear powers; (b) an inspected agreement to cease production of nuclear material for weapons purposes; and (c) tighter controls by donors and recipients over transfers of nuclear materials and equipment to ensure their use for peaceful purposes. The last of these elements is of somewhat less direct importance for present purposes than the first two. It is also likely to encounter the same difficulties as similar past efforts through IAEA.

The proposed

\*See NIE 4-63 (28 June 1963) "Likelihood and consequences of a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Systems", pars. 47-53.

The proposed freeze on strategic delivery vehicles could also be relevant if U.S. denial efforts were extended to Chinese delivery capabilities as well as to nuclear production and if the definition of "strategic" vehicles is such as to cover Chinese delivery vehicles, including in particular, missiles of the range most likely to be developed by the ChiComs (600-1000 n.m.).

Assuming we can overcome the considerable present obstacles to an agreement on non-dissemination involving the present nuclear powers (or alternatively, a non-acquisition agreement involving only the non-nuclear powers)\*, such an agreement would in itself hardly provide the basis for action against Communist China if we and the other nuclear powers continued production of nuclear weapons material.

A verified cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes - difficult to achieve at best -  
is unlikely

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\*An agreement limited to the present non-nuclear powers would certainly provide less of a basis for action against Communist China than one that included the nuclear powers. U.S. action would then be even more open to the charge that it represented an effort by an "imperialist" white nation to keep the underdeveloped non-white nations in a state of permanent military inferiority.

is unlikely if the French do not participate. Obtaining French adherence to a non-production agreement will probably be even harder to achieve than obtaining their adherence to a non-dissemination agreement although some believe that the French could be persuaded through the offer of U.S. nuclear assistance. It would, however, be difficult to justify proliferation to France in order to prevent proliferation to Communist China. Recent French movement toward Communist China further reduces the possibility that France would be disposed to accept such international agreements if a principal objective is to provide the basis for action against Communist China. An agreement which did not include the French would probably not be accepted by the USSR, and would hardly in any event provide a basis for action against Communist China alone.

Present proposals on non-dissemination, non-production, and transfers contain no provision for sanctions. International agreement on military sanctions against non-participant powers for non-compliance seems impossible. Assuming that the other obstacles to agreement might be surmounted, it is just possible, though still unlikely, that agreement

might

might be achieved on economic sanctions.

But even if the unlikely occurred and agreement were achieved on all of these steps, up to and including economic sanctions, there would still be a very wide logical, legal and political gap between this agreement and sanction for unilateral U.S. military enforcement action against a non-participant Communist China. It is most unlikely that such agreements would be accepted internationally as justifying such unilateral U.S. action. Indeed, an agreement to impose economic sanctions would even create strong presumptions against the undertaking of military action.

It seems unlikely that the U.S. will succeed in negotiating the necessary agreements before the ChiComs have detonated a first device and produced several weapons. By that time Communist China will probably be accepted as being, like France, an existing nuclear power. This will make action more difficult on political grounds and long-term military effects will be less certain. It would still be desirable to ensure that Communist China remained a minor nuclear power. The Chinese would, however, have mastered the nuclear art and would be in a position to rebuild their nuclear facilities.

Actual

Actual U.S. non-nuclear action against nuclear installations in circumstances where international support was weak or altogether lacking might very well provoke ChiCom non-nuclear retaliation against, e.g., Taiwan. The U.S. would then be placed in a very difficult dilemma. Should it counterattack and take further political damage or should it react only politically with probable great cost to its relationship to the GRC?

A major question about this strategy is, of course, the probable Soviet reaction. Since the Soviets would anticipate that actual U.S. military action would place them in a difficult dilemma within the international Communist movement, they would be likely to attempt to head off a development of U.S. policy which was clearly directed toward such action against Communist China. This they could do, for example, by refusing to enter into the necessary agreements on non-diffusion and non-production, or by accepting such agreements while making clear that military action was unacceptable or that the Sino-Soviet alliance would apply in the event of U.S. military action. At a minimum, the U.S. would require, as a condition to action, quite clear indications that the Soviets would stand aside if we took action.

Despite

Despite the fact that, in the event of actual U.S. attack, the USSR would be unlikely to undertake major military reaction, the Soviets are very unlikely to give clear advance indication of such intent.

Many considerations not relating to Communist China are involved in such proposals. They cannot be discussed here. The basic question in the present context is whether the limited consequences of a ChiCom nuclear capability justify acceptance of the probable political costs of such a strategy. In my view they certainly do not.

#### V. Covert Action

Covert action against the ChiCom facilities might be undertaken either without specific reference to other developments or as part of a response to Chinese aggression. Covert action on the ground seems out of the question because of the lack of covert assets on the ground. Unattributed bombing by GRC planes and crews would be most difficult to disassociate from the U.S. and is therefore ruled out on political grounds. It would have the disadvantages of overt U.S. action without the support of an overt political case. The GRC presently lacks any significant aerial bombardment  
capability

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capability. A bombing attack by the GRC would therefore be a clear indication of direct U.S. complicity.

The belief that the U.S. would have approved any GRC military action against the ChiCom facilities makes any such action difficult to disassociate more than formally from the U.S. But GRC action which was within present GRC capabilities would minimize this problem. The one possibility that seems worth considering is the air drop of sabotage teams. This possibility is, in fact, receiving serious analysis. The discussion here can only suggest the problems.

The Chinese Communist reaction to covert action is a matter requiring careful examination before a decision is made to undertake such action. The Chinese Communists might prefer not to acknowledge a successful attack involving an air-dropped team. Their objective might be to leave us in doubt as to the effect of our action; they might even make superficial repairs which would make it difficult to determine on the basis of photographic follow-up whether a reactor had been put out of action.

At the other extreme they might choose to undertake retaliatory attack upon Taiwan. While this would be less likely than if the GRC launched an overt or nominally covert

bombing

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bombing attack, it would be a possibility. If such retaliation were strictly limited in character, perhaps we would, in the end, be prepared to accept the damage without further riposte, but such retaliation by Communist China would certainly face us with a difficult dilemma. The possibility of retaliation as well as the general difficulty of dissociating the U.S. from the enterprise would argue in favor of undertaking such action only in response to ChiCom aggression. It seems probable that the ChiComs would, at a minimum, react to covert attack by mounting a major propaganda campaign.

For the Soviets, action of this kind would present the fewest problems. While they would probably give some support to a ChiCom political campaign against the action, they would be most unlikely to feel compelled to take other action. They would, however, be concerned with the possibilities of escalation growing out of any ChiCom retaliation against Taiwan.

A principal question is that of feasibility. As noted, the question is being examined. While there is no certainty about such matters, it is considered possible that a one-hundred man team could temporarily overwhelm the security forces at a ChiCom nuclear installation and take some kind of destructive action before itself being destroyed. GRC landing

teams

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teams customarily undertake missions where chances of survival are next to nil. Nuclear facilities constitute a more useful objective than the usual objectives of these landing teams.

An airborne team would have great difficulty completely destroying a nuclear installation. It could only put key elements out of commission. Because of their built-in safeguard devices, it is not easy to knock out such nuclear facilities. If, upon examination, it should appear necessary to destroy the ChiCom ability to manufacture nuclear weapons, it would presumably be necessary to launch simultaneous attacks since the initial reaction to an attack would obviously include greatly expanded security measures at remaining facilities.

Lesser covert or semi-covert actions with lesser objectives are also conceivable. These would include the forecasting of possible future action for deterrent effect by letting the ChiComs become aware of the fact that GRC pilots were being trained for a bombing mission against nuclear

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nuclear facilities. It may also be possible to inhibit the ongoing ChiCom nuclear effort through economic warfare actions that would require only limited forms of foreign cooperation. Study of such possibilities is going forward.

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To sum up briefly, any political "justification" the U.S. might develop for overt action against the Chinese Communist nuclear production facilities in the absence of major ChiCom aggression, is likely to appear very inadequate to ourselves and others. The Chinese are unlikely to undertake aggression of a level which would provide justification for such a response. In the absence of such a basis for action, U.S. attack is likely to be viewed as provocative and dangerous and will play into the hands of efforts by Peiping to picture U.S. hostility to Communist China as the source of tensions and the principal threat to the peace in Asia. It is also likely to be viewed, with the help of Peiping's propaganda, as a racialist effort by the U.S. to keep non-white countries in a state of permanent military inferiority. Covert action would not entirely avoid such difficulties since it will be viewed as U.S.-inspired and supported. It would therefore be easier to undertake as part of a response to ChiCom aggression.

S/P:RHJohnson  
April 14, 1964

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February 26, 1964

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Mac -

I've been sitting on attached Chicom nuclear paper, on assumption you'd hardly find it urgent business.

Walt's first hope is that LBJ will look at the conclusions (at my suggestion he summarized them in letters to McNamara, McCone, etc.). LBJ really should be told about these, because they reduce the problem to proper perspective, i.e. not much of a military threat but of some political "scare" potential. If you agree I'll do a one-pager for weekend reading.

yes  
↓

mjhr

Not  
needed  
yet

Walt also wants a NSAM. This seems quite unnecessary at this point, and you'll agree when you see horrendous draft attached. Paper is mostly of educational value, and has already largely served its purpose. If a high level ad hoc group is really needed for follow-up action (I'm of two minds), why couldn't this be discussed in SG and then set up by Rusk (with WWR as chairman).

JCS have done some comments, which further complicate picture.

WWR is also poking around in pre-emptive action field. Do we want this?

RWK  
RWK

I'm for this

not needed in my view  
ad hoc group  
are over employed  
on main report stuff

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Authority FRUS, Vol 144, # 14

By lg NARA, Date 6-15-05

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Counselor and Chairman  
Policy Planning Council  
Washington

*Komer*

January 24, 1964

*for nuclear*

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Dear Mac:

Following a discussion in the Tuesday Planning Group last October of the paper on the implications of a Chinese nuclear capability we have been considering, in consultation with Bob Komer, what further action might be taken upon it. The paper, as I believe you know, was prepared pursuant to one of the Basic National Security Policy Planning Tasks and was drafted by Bob Johnson on the basis of contributions and extensive discussion in an inter-departmental group which he chaired. It has the general concurrence of that group.

It seemed generally agreed that one of the important values of the paper was the educational value of the analysis contained in it. I have therefore sent it to various high-level government officials with a letter (copy attached) in the hope that they may read it. I am also enclosing a copy of the paper in the hope that you might pass it along to the President for his reading of at least the ten page summary on top.

I am concerned about the means by which the recommendations contained in the report will receive consideration. It seems to me that the ultimate objective should be approval of a NSAM on this subject. I understand that the JCS have, in views we will be receiving soon, indicated that they favor

ultimate

Honorable McGeorge Bundy  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *sjrg*, NARA, Date 4-4-07

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ultimate issuance of a NSAM. To illustrate the possible character of such a NSAM we have prepared the attached draft. The draft has had the benefit of informal comment by various offices in State, but is not at this stage a formally agreed State proposal.

What would you think of having such a NSAM considered in the NSC Standing Group? Secretary Rusk would support such a procedure. If this approach were taken, the NSAM probably ought to be considered first in the interdepartmental group that worked on the subject under the BNSP Planning Task. It would also be desirable to take account of (without necessarily fully accepting) views on the paper of the JCS. I hope that we can discuss this subject soon at some mutually convenient time.

Finally, it should perhaps be noted that Bob Johnson has been working in consultation with State, DOD and CIA, on a separate paper which discusses the pros and cons of various forms of direct action against the Chinese Communist nuclear facilities and I plan to have this subject separately discussed in a more limited group in the near future.

Sincerely yours,

  
W. W. Rostow

Copy to: Mr. Komer

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A Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation and Nuclear Capability: Major Conclusions and Key Issues  
(References are to pages in the basic paper.)

I. Major Conclusions

1. The great asymmetry in Chinese Communist and U.S. nuclear capabilities and vulnerabilities makes Chinese Communist first-use of nuclear weapons highly unlikely except in the event of an attack upon the mainland which threatened the existence of the regime. Apart from serving as an additional inhibition on some levels of U.S. attack upon the mainland, a Chinese nuclear capability need impose no new military restrictions on the U.S. response to aggression in Asia (e.g., on amphibious operations). A limited ChiCom intercontinental capability, when and if achieved, would not eliminate this basic asymmetry. But the Chinese Communists (and non-Communist Asians) might believe that such a capability would have increased effect as a deterrent because of an unwillingness by the U.S. to assume the risks, in situations in which its interests were marginally engaged, of the absolute level of damage which the ChiComs could inflict. (pp 5-11)

2. Whatever actual U.S. intentions, so long as the ChiComs have only soft, vulnerable delivery means, they will have to take account of the danger of a U.S. nuclear or non-nuclear counterforce attack as a possible U.S. response to major ChiCom aggression. This could increase ChiCom caution. (p 6)

3. Chinese prudence in the use of military force reinforces conclusions emerging from military logic. The basic military problems we will face are likely to be much like those we face now: military probing operations designed to test the level of the U.S. commitment and response; relatively low-level border wars; and "revolutionary" wars supported by the ChiComs. To the extent that there is danger of miscalculation by Peiping it is less likely to arise from overestimation of its military strength than from optimistic estimates of the psychological situation in Asia, and with respect to

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By iel, NARA, Date 4-25-08

the reactions of the U.S., or possibly, U.S. European allies. Miscalculation is less likely to express itself in high-risk military actions than in somewhat increased willingness to accept risks in a process of gradual escalation. (pp 11-14, 18-19)

4. The ChiComs will value their nuclear capability as a deterrent to attack on the mainland and for its psychological effects in weakening the will of countries resisting insurgency, in inhibiting their requests for U.S. assistance and in stimulating and exploiting divisions within Asia and between Asian countries and the West. It will be used to put political pressure on the U.S. military presence and to obtain support for Chinese acknowledgment of claims to preeminence in Asia and status as a world power. (pp 12-13)

5. Peiping's tactics are likely to have two broad strands: (a) seeking to instill fear of its power; and (b) emphasizing its peaceful and protective intentions and attempting to demonstrate that it is U.S. nuclear power that brings the danger of nuclear war to Asia. (pp 19-21)

6. Asian countries will seek (or at least welcome) U.S. actions of reassurance. At the same time neutrals particularly may push harder for an Asian nuclear free zone, Chinese Communist membership in the U.N., participation in disarmament negotiations, etc. A ChiCom nuclear capability will have some effect in undermining remaining belief in return to the mainland on Taiwan and in eroding international support for the GRC. Large-scale raids by the GRC against the mainland would tend to accentuate this latter process. A ChiCom nuclear capability does not make a serious military effort to take the offshores more likely, but might be exploited for politically divisive effect in an offshores crisis although this, too, while possible, is not considered likely. (pp 11-14, 21-26)

7. A ChiCom capability is likely initially to confirm both aligned and non-aligned in their present policies. Longer-term effects will depend upon U.S. action and upon the general evolution of the Asian situation. A ChiCom capability in itself seems unlikely to stimulate a significant increase

in willingness

in willingness of Asians to cooperate in defense or non-defense matters but may have marginal reenforcing effect upon such tendencies as exist, particularly if the U.S. takes appropriate action to strengthen these tendencies. (pp 22-23)

8. Desires for reassurance are likely to express themselves in requests for (a) new or confirmation of existing defense guarantees and specific application of these to nuclear defense; (b) various forms of nuclear cooperation; and (c) increased conventional military assistance, particularly air defense. With the U.S. nuclear deterrent in the background, an evident U.S. will and ability to respond rapidly to Communist aggression without undue reliance upon nuclear weapons will be an important form of reassurance to Asian nations and a deterrent to ChiCom miscalculation. (pp 26-28, 37-40)

9. Of the three potential non-Communist nuclear powers in Asia (Australia, India and Japan), only India might in the foreseeable future seek a nuclear capability. (pp 27-28)

10. Availability of Korean and Philippine bases does not seem likely to be affected nor does access to Thai bases, provided U.S. words and actions provide evidence of a continuing strong commitment to Thai defense. Dramatic effects on access to Japanese bases are not likely, though there will be some increased tendency toward restriction. (pp 28-29)

11. The USSR will be concerned that a nuclear capability will increase Peiping's prestige and influence in the Communist world and among the developing countries. While it very probably realizes that the ChiComs are unlikely to be reckless, the USSR will fear Chinese miscalculation that could lead to situations in which it would be forced to choose between coming to the aid of a Communist state or failing to perform its role as protector of the Communist world. Ultimate ChiCom dependence upon the Soviet nuclear umbrella will give the USSR some residual influence over Peiping in crisis situations. Soviet cooperation with the U.S. in containing Communist China is more likely to be tacit than explicit. (pp 31-32, 93)

## II. Key Issues

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## II. Key Issues

Introduction. Since, in general, a Chinese Communist nuclear capability will affect existing problems at the margins rather than create wholly new ones, most actions to deal with it represent adjustments in, or projections of, existing U.S. policies and programs rather than wholly new approaches. Accordingly, while actions proposed in the report can be justified on the basis of implications of a Chinese Communist nuclear capability, decisions on them must often take account of other considerations. (The list of proposed actions below does not include all actions recommended in the report.)

Issue No. 1: Against the background of a ChiCom nuclear capability and the requirements for reassurance which it will generate, what kind of U.S. military strategy, posture and programs would be most appropriate in Asia?

General Purpose Forces Studies, prepared last year in the Joint Staff (but not formally approved by the JCS), indicated that U.S. and allied conventional forces could deal successfully with Communist aggression in Southeast Asia, Korea or Taiwan provided construction, pre-positioning and preparatory actions and improvement in sea and air-lift were undertaken for Southeast Asia and deficiencies in support capabilities remedied in Korea.

Nevertheless, military thinking and planning for the Far East has tended to prefer a relatively low nuclear threshold. General Taylor's report on his trip to the Far East in the fall of 1962, JCS studies and the recent recommendations by Secretary McNamara on redeployments involving withdrawals of conventional forces from the area have all posed this issue. How is the issue related to a Chinese Communist nuclear capability?

It is evident that effective strategy for Asia must find an appropriate blend between an implicit nuclear threat and an evident visible ability to deal conventionally with

Communist

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Communist aggression. When the ChiComs have a nuclear capability there will be increased fear in Asia of the possibility of a nuclear war on Asian soil. An evident (declared or undeclared) U.S. policy of major reliance upon nuclear weapons will in this circumstance make Asian states more reluctant, if not afraid, to seek U.S. assistance, more concerned that the U.S. would not respond adequately to lower levels of aggression that would not justify nuclear weapons use, and less likely to give the U.S. continued access to bases and facilities (particularly in Japan). Willingness to resist the political and military pressures of a nuclear-armed Communist China would therefore tend to be reduced. Moreover, the more evident the U.S. dependence upon nuclear weapons, the greater is likely to be the appeal of Peiping's proposals for removing the danger of nuclear war from Asia through nuclear free zones, etc. and the greater the acceptance of its claims that its nuclear program is defensive in character.

Not only the improvement in U.S. conventional capabilities, but also the decline in ChiCom capabilities, in part as a result of the Sino-Soviet split, make it practical to consider a relatively high nuclear threshold. For example, the General Purpose Forces Study on Korea concluded that resumption of Korean hostilities by the Communists would require extensive Soviet technical and logistic support and that without such support it was questionable whether the ChiComs and/or North Koreans could launch a sustained offensive. Since that study was prepared, it has become more evident both that such Soviet support will not be forthcoming and that the cut-off of Soviet military aid will have increasingly serious effects upon Communist China's conventional capabilities.

On the other hand, it is not safe to assume that the Sino-Soviet dispute will preclude Soviet nuclear support to third country Communist regimes (North Korea or North Vietnam) if they are placed under actual or threatened nuclear attack (or even to Communist China, if it is threatened with nuclear destruction).

destruction). The USSR would be under great pressure precisely because of the issues involved in the Sino-Soviet dispute, to provide assistance. Even if provided initially only on the verbal and political level, such assistance could make it very difficult for the U.S. to initiate, or when initiated to continue, use of nuclear weapons.

(Actions Proposed: no increase in the apparent or real U.S. dependence upon nuclear weapons; a decision that nuclear weapons will be used in responding to non-nuclear attack only in situations in which U.S. and allied conventional forces are not sufficient to contain a major Communist aggressive action which jeopardizes vital U.S. interests -- U.S. and allied forces should, at a minimum, be able to enforce a pause in the event of major ChiCom attack; avoidance of redeployments which will (or which will appear to) significantly reduce the U.S. non-nuclear presence and, so far as possible, avoidance of timing of redeployments to follow close after a ChiCom nuclear detonation; dispatch of one POLARIS submarine to the Pacific in advance of detonation, but in continued and subsequent deployments particular emphasis to dual-capable seaborne forces such as carrier task forces (e.g. proposed Indian Ocean Task Force); various actions to improve and make visible conventional rapid reaction capabilities; for primarily psychological reasons and as necessary, air defense for U.S. bases on territories of allies, deployment of mobile air defense units to Asia and responsiveness to the likely increased sense of air threat without, however, proliferating major new air defense programs. Actions rejected: creation of a specifically identified standing counter-China nuclear deterrent force; deployment of land based MRBMs to Asian territory; extensive refinement of measures for increasing survivability of U.S. nuclear forces in Asia.) (pp 34-46, 53-58, 63-71)

Issue No. 2: How can Asian states best be offered assurance of U.S. deterrence of, and defense against, nuclear attack in a form that (a) will be reassuring rather than

alarming to

alarming to countries with a wide range of attitudes toward nuclear weapons and toward relations with the West; (b) will reduce the possibility of development of national nuclear capabilities (particularly by India); while (c) avoiding entanglement of the U.S. in undesirable commitments or arrangements?

(Actions proposed: a general unilateral U.S. declaration on nuclear defense, and, as needed: private assurances to allies under existing security commitments; offers to neutrals of a declaratory commitment to consult; offers of bilateral planning for nuclear defense; in the event of actual ChiCom nuclear threat and in response to request, emplacement on an ad hoc basis of nuclear weapons under U.S. control on Asian territory or nearby. Actions rejected: more formal clear-cut U.S. commitments to neutrals; emplacement of nuclear weapons under joint control; and, for the present at least, an effort to obtain a UK guarantee of nuclear defense for India and Pakistan.) (pp 46-52, 58-63)

Issue No. 3: How can the U.S. meet probable Chinese Communist efforts to demonstrate its peaceful and protective intentions through proposals for Asian nuclear free zones, etc. with positive U.S. initiatives without acting in a way that will be seriously unsettling to U.S. Asian allies or inconsistent with other major U.S. policies?

(Actions proposed: continued exploitation of the test ban to isolate Communist China politically on this issue; in advance of a ChiCom detonation statement of a willingness and desire to negotiate with Communist China on arms control and disarmament when it demonstrates a willingness to negotiate seriously, while at the same time pointing out that Communist China's present views make it evident that such negotiations would not now be meaningful; development of the Asian components of the U.S. Outline Treaty; continued exploration through such forums as the Warsaw meetings of the extent to which basis exists for reaching understanding on arms control; response to proposals for nuclear free zones which, while not

rejecting

rejecting the proposals outright, would state the qualifications that such proposals would need to meet for serious U.S. consideration; a public U.S. policy statement soon after the ChiCom nuclear detonation which would respond to both strands of probable ChiCom exploitation - to this element as well as to the element of threat. Actions rejected: for the immediate future, bringing Communist China into the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Commission.) (pp 73-75, 86-89)

Issue No. 4: Many considerations besides a Chinese nuclear capability bear upon general U.S. policy toward the Republic of China. However, by helping to undermine the raison d'etre of the Nationalist Regime and by tending to erode its international support, a ChiCom nuclear capability could enhance Peiping's opportunities for political subversion of the GRC through offshore islands crises or otherwise. While the Chinese nuclear detonation and capability may have some longer term effects in eroding GRC support on the UN membership question, other factors are likely to be of greater importance and the more immediate effect is likely to be to confirm present attitudes. Other nations can be expected to argue for improved means of communication with Peiping once it has nuclear arms.

These and other considerations raise three interrelated questions: (a) What can be done to improve prospects for continued international support of the GRC and to reduce prospects for effective subversion by Communist China? (b) Would it be desirable to apply pressure on the GRC for withdrawal from the offshores? (c) Is it necessary to change our position on the UN membership question?

(Actions proposed: In general it is considered that, in this context, present policies require no change. We should discourage major raids on the mainland; continue present long-term efforts to lay the basis for a different vision of the future on Taiwan than return to the mainland through political reform and diversion of resources from military to economic

development

development purposes; make no serious effort or effort "for the record" to effect change in the offshores (through careful review of the pros and cons as discussed in the basic paper and review of existing military plans for possible U.S. first-use of nuclear weapons is suggested); make no change for this reason in the U.S. position on UN membership while recognizing the probable international political need to find other particular means of communication with Peiping (in addition to the Warsaw talks). (pp 14-18, 23-25, 84-86, 96-105) )

Issue No. 5: Peiping can be expected to use its nuclear capability in exploiting existing divisions within Asia. What can be done to stimulate greater intra-regional cooperation in defense and non-defense matters, given the marginal effects of a Chinese nuclear capability in this respect?

(Actions proposed: private reiteration against the background of the ChiCom capability of the importance of settlement of intra-regional disputes and assumption of a greater measure of defense responsibility through cooperative action to meet a common threat; establishment of informal joint committees or study groups of representatives of U.S. missions and local governments in allied and some non-allied countries for continuing discussion of the implications of a developing ChiCom nuclear capability against the background of the general Chinese situation and similar use of SEATO and ANZUS; greatly expanded employment of the third country training technique under MAP to increase military training exchange within Asia; active U.S. support for a Pacific Defense College; emphasis upon implications of a ChiCom capability in CINCPAC weapons demonstrations; identification of specific measures by which Japan, India and Australia can play a larger role in the area; assignment of responsibility within AID for giving impetus to regional possibilities within existing aid programs and arranging feasibility studies of possible binational or multinational projects; and creation of a field office in South and Southeast Asia to provide staff assistance to U.S. missions in dealing with intra-

regional

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regional problems and in identifying means of fostering limited bilateral or multilateral forms of non-military and military cooperation. (pp 23, 76-84)

Issue No. 6: A Chinese Communist nuclear detonation and capability is likely to generate additional requests for military assistance, particularly air defense. These requests will reflect in part a desire for general reassurance with respect to the U.S. commitment, in part a more particular sense of air threat (despite the fact that the real air threat will not be significantly increased). Yet MAP levels are declining and this decline will particularly effect Asia because of the large proportion of MAP already going to Asia. How can demands for this kind of reassurance be met?

(Actions proposed: anticipation of this contingent requirement in present aid planning; in the event, without permanently reversing the general downward trend in MAP, provision of temporary limited increases in military assistance to Asian countries as a form of reassurance, obtaining funds initially by diversions to be replenished in the following appropriations cycle. Action rejected: special request to Congress for additional MAP based upon the needs generated by a ChiCom detonation and capability.) (pp 43-44, 71-72)

S/P:R.H.Johnson  
October 15, 1963

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL

Room 7517

DRAFT

Policy Planning Statement

on

A Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation and Nuclear Capability

October 15, 1963

GROUP 1

Excluded from Automatic Down-Grading and Declassification.

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Policy Planning Statement

on

A Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation and Nuclear Capability

I. Purpose and Scope

It is the purpose of this policy statement (a) to analyze the probable political and military consequences of a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation and regional (non-intercontinental) nuclear capability; and (b) to propose courses of action to minimize the adverse impact of these developments upon U.S. interests and maximize opportunities for turning them to U.S. advantage. Primary focus is upon the area on the continental and sea periphery of Communist China.

Work on the problem of advance preparation of world opinion for a nuclear detonation has been going forward separately under the leadership of the Office of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. If the recommendations of this paper are accepted, they would be appropriately reflected in that program. The planning of military programs has for some time included consideration of future development by Communist China of a nuclear capability.

II. The Development

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II. The Development of Communist China's  
Advanced Weapons Capabilities\*

Although our information on the status of Communist China's advanced weapons program is improving, gaps are substantial and uncertainties therefore considerable. Communist China has given high priority to the development of nuclear weapons and missiles. If it has only the one identified plutonium production reactor, and assuming that reactor became critical in early 1962, the earliest possible date for a first test would be early 1964, but with normal difficulties a test might be postponed to late 1964 or 1965. With this reactor it could produce only one or two crude weapons a year. If the Chinese have another reactor, a first test could, of course, occur at any time. (There have been recent reports suggesting the possibility of a test this fall.) Peiping selected a type of production reactor which is of relatively simple design and which entails the least stringent purity requirements, presumably because it offers the quickest and surest way of achieving a nuclear detonation and a token capability.

\*See SNIE 13-2-63, "Communist China's Advanced Weapons Program," (24 July 1963)

capability. For a more substantial program for production of weapons containing both U-235 and plutonium it will need both additional plutonium production reactors and a gaseous diffusion plant. It will take until at least 1966, and more probably until 1968-69 or later to complete the gaseous diffusion plant at Lanchou and to get it into production. (There are many uncertainties about the exact status of this enterprise and the technological capability of the Chinese to complete it.)

A possible force of 15 TU-4 (BULL) medium piston bombers (B-29 type) and, if operational, two TU-16 (BADGER) medium jet bombers might provide initial delivery means. The approximately 315 IL-28 (BEAGLE) jet light bombers would be useable as more sophisticated weapons are developed. However, the Chinese appear to be concentrating upon missiles - initially it is believed, upon a medium-range (630 or 1020 n.m.) missile. Even if the Chinese concentrate upon a single system and give the program continued top priority, deployment before 1967 is unlikely. (Limited production would be possible at the known research and development facility.) At best the Chinese could develop a compatible fission warhead for such a missile three to four years after detonation of a first device. If they

have

have only the one known plutonium reactor it would take longer.

The Chinese have not begun development of submarine missile systems, ICBM's or anti-missile systems. The most likely possibility is that Peiping will attempt to move toward both a major nuclear arsenal and intercontinental delivery means although it is likely to be a very long time indeed before it has either in any quantity. It is also possible that, when it faces the very high economic costs (and effects on other aspects of its power) and the unlikelihood that it will ever catch up with the weapons technology of the U.S. and the USSR, and when it compares these costs with the very marginal political and military utility of such additional capabilities, Peiping will be reconciled for the indefinite future to a limited regional capability.

The Chinese will for some time face difficult targeting problems since geodetic data for most of China is poor or lacking, mobile targets will be as important as fixed ones and initial missiles will be quite inaccurate. Their initial capability will also be highly vulnerable to counterforce operations.

In the light of these uncertainties it is impossible to

state

state exactly the beginning and terminal dates of the period when Communist China will be a regional, but only a regional nuclear power. Roughly speaking, it will begin some time in the mid-to-late sixties and will continue into the 1970's and perhaps well beyond. While this paper is intended to cover this entire period, analysis of developments beyond the next five-to-ten years is most hazardous and the actions proposed herein must obviously be adjusted to the changing political and military situation.

III. The Implications of a Detonation and Nuclear Capability

A. Effects on the Basic Military Situation

The acquisition by Communist China of nuclear weapons will not, for the indefinite future, alter the real relations of power among the major states or the balance of military power in Asia. Communist China is now the strongest Asian military power and is likely to continue to be so. The basic deterrents to Chinese military action will continue to have to come from outside as will much of the basic military power for dealing with Communist aggression should deterrence fail.

The most important single fact about the military

situation

situation will be the great asymmetry in Chinese Communist and U.S. capabilities and vulnerabilities. Communist China is now and will continue to be, accessible to U.S. nuclear striking forces while the United States will, for many years, be inaccessible to Chinese attack. The Chinese will, as their regional capability develops, be able to do significant, but hardly crippling, damage to the United States by attacking U.S. forces and installations in Asia, but the United States will have the ability to destroy Communist China as a modern governmental and war-making entity. The U.S. will possess this capability for a very long time even with the nuclear forces presently deployed and planned for deployment to Asia, to say nothing of the capability provided by its general strategic nuclear capability.

Whatever actual U.S. intentions, so long as the Chinese Communists have only soft, vulnerable delivery means, they will have to take account of the danger of a U.S. nuclear or non-nuclear counterforce attack as a possible U.S. response to major ChiCom aggression. They will have created a target that, in their own calculations, they must assume will make it more likely that the U.S. will respond to major aggression by  
counter-attacks

counter-attacks that would involve the mainland. This fact could have the effect of increasing Chinese caution in stimulating or exploiting crises.

A limited Chinese intercontinental capability of either a very crude or more sophisticated variety would slightly reduce, but hardly eliminate this basic asymmetry. The U.S., but not Communist China, would have an effective counterforce capability. If the ChiCom intercontinental delivery capability were confined to cruise missiles, aircraft or similar slow vulnerable means, we would have reasonably effective active defenses whereas Communist China would lack a similar defensive capability against U.S. ballistic missiles. While the relative ability of the U.S. to devastate Communist China would be very much greater than that of China to devastate the U.S., the Chinese might consider a limited intercontinental capability to have some increased deterrent value because of an estimate that the U.S. would be unwilling to accept the risk, on issues of marginal importance, of the absolute level of damage the ChiComs could inflict. The plausibility of the deterrent would, however, be greatly weakened by the continuing very great unlikelihood that the ChiComs would, in fact, engage in first-use of nuclear weapons.

In

In order to become a Class A nuclear power with an effective second strike capability Communist China would have to become a major industrial power. But even such industrial development would not necessarily provide Peiping with the basis for Class A status in view of the fact that such status is defined in relative terms and Communist China begins the nuclear race far behind the U.S. and the USSR. Moreover, when it achieves major industrial status, its interest in avoiding attack upon itself, which is already great, should further increase.

The basic asymmetry in Chinese and U.S. capabilities and vulnerabilities make Chinese first-use of nuclear weapons exceedingly unlikely unless the Chinese mainland were to come under serious attack. The only direct military value\* to Peiping of a regional nuclear capability will be to deter attack upon the mainland.

It is sometimes argued that a Chinese nuclear capability will create significant new restrictions on U.S. freedom of action because we have been able to control the degree of  
escalation

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\*The distinction between direct military and military-related political effects is somewhat arbitrary. By direct military effects are meant the utility of a nuclear capability in actual use or in direct deterrence. They do not include effects upon availability of bases, effects on attitudes toward the Western military presence, etc.

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escalation in defending countries against Communist aggression in Asia through our ultimate ability to engage in unilateral use of nuclear weapons. Thus, for example, it is suggested that it would become much more risky to undertake major amphibious or airborne operations involving large concentrations of troops once the Chinese have nuclear weapons. But since the Chinese would have to assume that first-use of nuclear weapons in such a situation would bring nuclear attack upon Communist China itself, such use is most unlikely. Moreover, the assumption that we now possess the ability to control the ground rules through our ability to engage in unilateral nuclear weapons use ignores the facts: (a) that the political costs of such use are so high as to weaken the plausibility of the threat; (b) that the Communists have largely chosen the ground rules through their utilization of guerrilla warfare which makes some levels of conventional escalation by the U.S., to say nothing of nuclear escalation, militarily irrelevant and difficult to justify politically; and (c) that we have had to take account of the possibility that U.S. nuclear-weapons use could lead to a U.S.-Soviet nuclear confrontation. Moreover, our ability to engage in conventional operations plus

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the severe limitations on Chinese conventional capabilities have served, and will continue to serve, along with the political costs to the Chinese of first-use, as important deterrents, and, therefore, as a means of controlling the ground rules. The freedom we will lose will be the freedom that we might now have in some, but not all, circumstances to attack mainland China with nuclear weapons with minimum risk of nuclear retaliation.

An examination of particular hypothetical military situations confirms the conclusion that a regional Chinese Communist nuclear capability will have direct military value to Peiping only in deterring major attack upon the mainland. Even when the Chinese have a relatively significant nuclear capability (e.g., one hundred weapons) and quite effective delivery means, and even if they initiate nuclear war by attacking first, presently planned U.S. nuclear forces in the Pacific (augmented somewhat in order to deal with a highly improbably medium-range jet bomber capability) would be able to destroy enough of any remaining Chinese nuclear capability to eliminate it as a serious threat to the U.S. posture in the Pacific.\* The

ChiComs

\*This specific conclusion is based upon a RAND study.

ChiComs could not, of course, make their calculations of risk simply on the basis of the capabilities of U.S. Pacific nuclear forces.

B. Effects upon Chinese Communist Actions

Past Chinese Communist prudence in the use of military force reenforces conclusions that emerge from military logic. Peiping is very sensitive to possible indications of a U.S. intent to attack the mainland. It is likely to remain aware of its relative military inferiority though it will attempt to create the impression that the military balance of power in Asia has shifted. However, it sees Communist China's ultimate status as a world power as derived as much from its potential leadership of the world revolutionary movement as from its geopolitical position and its ability to wield the traditional instruments of state power.

Peiping differs from Moscow not in its willingness to assume large military risks by undertaking inter-state aggression, but in estimating lower the danger that active support for "wars of national liberation" or limited military actions on its borders will lead to thermo-nuclear war. The

Chinese

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Chinese also differ from the Soviets in viewing war as ultimately less avoidable. Moreover, there is implicit in the Chinese position a double standard - they appear to be urging greater militancy upon the USSR as the more powerful Communist state while recognizing the limitations of their own power and the risks of too aggressive a Chinese policy.

Peiping will continue to seek its revolutionary objectives in Asia by political pressures, by covert support of armed insurrection, by exploiting divisive tendencies and by limited military actions on its borders where such actions can be used to create fear of Communist China, can be politically "justified" and bear a low risk of a major U.S. military response. To this end it will value a nuclear capability for its psychological effects in weakening the will of countries in resisting insurgency, in inhibiting their requests for U.S. assistance, in pressuring Asian countries to accede to Chinese demands, and in stimulating divisions among Asian nations in responding to local conflicts. It will use its capability as a background for pressures against the U.S. military presence, elimination of which is a major

ChiCom

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policy.

ChiCom objective.

The Chinese will seek to develop and exploit a psychological sense of actual or impending change in world power relations to seek fuller acknowledgment of their claims to preeminence in Asia and to their status as a world power. To this end they will seek to blur distinctions between nuclear tests, an initial operational capability and full nuclear power status.

Not only fear of U.S. attack upon the mainland and serious doubt as to the availability of the Soviet nuclear umbrella, but also a desire to avoid actions which would result in a coalescence of other Asian nations, in a serious Japanese rearmament effort or in endangering its aspirations for leadership of the world revolutionary movement will serve as inhibitions to Peiping's first-use of nuclear weapons against enemy targets. (Demonstration explosions in crisis situations are, however, possible.) These factors and the limited character of the Chinese nuclear capability will also serve as inhibitions on explicit and specific exploitation of its capability for nuclear blackmail purposes although they will obviously not preclude blackmail attempts in situations where such attempts promise political pay-offs.

The

The Chinese Communists can, however, be expected to continue to test from time to time through limited military pressures, the level of the U.S. commitment and response in Asia. It is, in fact, likely that once they have a limited nuclear capability, they will seek to determine whether it can serve as an effective umbrella for new limited actions or escalation in existing situations by deterring an effective U.S. and indigenous response. The Chinese might consider that, if faced even by a marginal possibility of nuclear attack in a place where our commitment was ambiguous and our interests not fully engaged and under circumstances in which our allies were reluctant to back us, we either would not stand fast or, if we did stand fast, that the situation could be played for politically divisive effect. In this connection a brief look at the offshore islands problem may be useful.

A major Chinese Communist military effort to take the offshore islands is probably unlikely because of the disproportionate costs and the risks of involvement with the U.S.; also there is evidence that the ChiComs (like the GRC) realize that a definitive solution to the offshore islands problem would lay the basis for a stable "two Chinas" solution unless it is achieved

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achieved in a manner which significantly advanced prospects for acquisition of Taiwan itself. To both Peiping and Taipei the offshores are a symbol of the continuing Chinese civil war and a point of contact and conflict in that war.

The Chinese Communists could probably successfully attack any of the islands in a conventional war if the U.S. does not provide assistance to the GRC, but costs to Communist China would be heavy. In a situation where the U.S. was providing non-nuclear assistance, the ChiComs would have only a marginal chance of success against the larger islands, but could probably take one of the lesser islands despite the U.S. aid. Actual use of nuclear weapons by Communist China would further increase the disproportion between risks and benefits as well as being politically incongruous as a form of "liberation". It is therefore exceedingly unlikely.

There is, however, reason to consider review of our present posture in the light of a ChiCom nuclear capability. A nuclear capability might be exploited by Peiping for its politically divisive potential. The U.S. commitment to defense of the offshores is ambiguous and lacks the support of many European

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European allies and a significant part of the U.S. public. A nuclear confrontation over territory to the defense of which the U.S. Government has evidently become half-committed against its better judgment is not likely to be viewed with enthusiasm nor is the U.S. position likely to command wide support. The ChiComs might hope to use such a confrontation to undermine international support for the GRC and to exacerbate U.S.-GRC relations. Efforts by the ChiComs so to exploit their nuclear capability could lead, moreover, to some marginal increase in the danger of military miscalculation even though actual military use of nuclear weapons by the ChiComs is exceedingly unlikely. Finally, it should be recognized that, while it will be, at best, exceedingly difficult to get the GRC to withdraw now, it will become more difficult for the U.S. in the post-detonation environment, to seek such withdrawal both because of the aggravated effect upon the GRC itself and because of the international implications of such U.S. action in the post-detonation period. If we become involved in a confrontation with the ChiComs over the offshores in the post-detonation period, we will probably have little choice but to defend them.

While

While it has taken account of these considerations, the interdepartmental group working on this BNSP Task has nonetheless concluded that no attempt should be made to change the present U.S. posture with respect to the offshores. Its conclusion is based upon two basic considerations. First, it is considered unlikely that the ChiComs will in fact generate a major offshores crisis and then seek to exploit their nuclear capability for political effect. Second, it is considered that the GRC could be forced to withdraw only by such drastic threats of elimination of U.S. support as to produce a major crisis in U.S.-GRC relations which would create problems as serious, and in many respects similar to, a nuclear confrontation over the offshores. Even then it is by no means certain that the GRC could be pressured into withdrawal. If it did not withdraw, the ChiComs might be tempted into a military move.

Despite this general conclusion, the interdepartmental group considers this question of sufficient importance that it believes that it warrants particular review in connection with consideration of this paper. As a further basis for discussion the annex to the paper outlines ways in which the

ChiComs

ChiComs might exploit their capability and the advantages and disadvantages of alternative U.S. policies with respect to the offshores.

Present U.S. military contingency planning assumes that use of nuclear weapons against the mainland might become necessary at some stage in the development of a military crisis over the offshores. Given the attitudes of other nations on the offshores, political justification of first-use of nuclear weapons - which will be difficult at best - could become significantly more difficult once the ChiComs have a nuclear capability and use of nuclear weapons will appear to others to involve increased risks of a nuclear response. Depending upon the level of U.S. attack there would, in fact, be some risk of ChiCom nuclear response.

If there are dangers of Chinese miscalculation of the military or political significance of a limited nuclear capability they lie in the direction of (a) ebullience resulting from unexpected successes in its nuclear and missiles programs against a background of accelerated economic progress; (b) over-estimation of U.S. caution or of the caution of non-Communist Asian states; or (c) hope of involving the USSR on the Chinese side.

side. The first seems a quite unlikely eventuality; the second depends upon U.S. and Asian reaction, including a correct assessment of the significance of a Chinese nuclear capability.

While Peiping could even now hope for Soviet help in a situation where the existence of the regime was seriously threatened, it could hardly initiate aggression on the assumption that Soviet help would be forthcoming in less extreme circumstances and is most unlikely to take deliberate action to put itself in a position where its very existence was dependent upon Soviet aid. In any event, any Chinese miscalculation seems less likely to express itself in sudden bold military moves than in a somewhat increased readiness to accept risks in military probing operations.

Peiping's tactics in the exploitation of its nuclear detonation and capability are likely to have two broad strands:

- a. Seeking to instill fear of its power and to create an impression of its present and future preeminence in Asia.
- b. Emphasizing its peaceful and protective intentions and attempting to demonstrate that it is United States nuclear power which is the source of the danger

of the danger of nuclear war to Asia and which makes a Chinese capability necessary as a defensive measure. It may further increase its present emphasis upon the importance of "racial" solidarity.

These themes will be played with varying emphases at different times and to different audiences. Partly because of the position in which it finds itself in the Sino-Soviet dispute and on the nuclear test ban issue, it will be difficult for Peiping in the immediately foreseeable future to mount a convincing general "peace offensive". Tactics will be tailored to particular audiences. As in the past, a threatening mien may be alternated with a peaceful one. Gross public threats are, except possibly in crisis situations, less likely than implicit threats. Peiping will use fear as a lever to induce Asian nations to accept its peaceful protestations and its "friendly" and protective embrace. The threat element will be somewhat clearer in ChiCom dealings with countries allied to the United States while peace themes will be particularly emphasized to Asian neutrals.

If, after comparing the tremendous effort required with the marginal additional value of achieving status as a major  
intercontinental

intercontinental nuclear power, Peiping concludes that the effort would not be worthwhile, it might shift to a primary emphasis upon "peace" themes and disarmament proposals designed to dislodge U.S. military power from Asia. These efforts could emphasize the "self-denying" ChiCom decision not to go for a major capability. While this is necessarily only a speculative possibility it is sufficiently plausible and bears sufficiently close relationship to past ChiCom behavior (e.g., in the Sino-Indian border situation) that it warrants serious attention in U.S. planning. It particularly emphasizes the need to be prepared to meet the ChiCom "peace" proposals with plausible U.S. counter-proposals.

C. Reactions in Asia

Reactions of non-Communist Asian nations will be somewhat parallel to ChiCom exploitation with allies seeking various forms of U.S. reassurance (including additional military assistance) and neutrals pushing harder for Asian nuclear free zones, for Chinese Communist membership in the UN and in disarmament negotiations, etc. However, these distinctions are only roughly accurate. For example, the ChiComs may emphasize peace and de-emphasize threat with allied Japan

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(or alternate between the two) and will, upon occasion, employ reverse tactics with neutral India. Moreover, while neutrals may not seek formal U.S. reassurance or alliance, they are likely to find privately reassuring any evidence of continuing U.S. will to defend countries of the area in a manner which does not threaten nuclear war in Asia. Contrariwise, Chinese efforts to exploit, through peace initiatives or otherwise, fears of nuclear war in Asia are likely to have considerable appeal in allied countries (e.g., Japan, Australia, and New Zealand) even though both aligned and unaligned countries are likely to discount Peiping's claims to peaceful intentions.

The danger that Asian states will gain the impression that the balance of power in Asia is about to change would be accentuated if the ChiComs developed rapidly not only a nuclear capability, but also a concurrent (if not necessarily compatible) missile capability.

Both aligned and unaligned are likely to be confirmed in their present policies with, however, two unaligned states - India and Malaysia - perhaps seeking new forms of assurance.

Development

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Development by Communist China of a nuclear capability does not seem likely in itself to have more than, at best, very limited effects in the foreseeable future in increasing the willingness of Asian countries to cooperate among themselves in defense or non-defense measures. We can expect to see several nations (e.g., Japan, Australia, India and Indonesia) attempt to play a larger role in the area in furtherance of their national security or national ambitions. Out of these efforts, which may be stimulated somewhat by a Chinese nuclear detonation, are likely to come more initiatives for the creation or strengthening of regional organizations (e.g., the recently reported plans of Prime Minister Ikeda to create a Western Pacific Organization). Because of existing intra-regional tensions and weak impulses toward cooperation, these efforts are likely to have significant effect only over a quite long run. We must, however, keep the vision of expanded intra-regional cooperation before the leaders of Asia and where appropriate support specific efforts to dampen tensions and increase cooperation.

While a Chinese nuclear capability will, in strictly  
military

military terms, only underline the existing impossibility of GRC return to the mainland by military means without major U.S. military support, it can have a considerable long-term psychological effect in Taiwan. The leadership in Taiwan can be expected to redouble efforts to preserve its independent identity and to preserve belief in return to the mainland. But once the Chinese Communists have even a token capability there will be a significant possibility that they would retaliate with nuclear weapons against Taiwan (or an invasion force) if the GRC should make a military attempt to return to the mainland which posed a serious threat to the Communist regime. Even relatively large-scale military actions which did not pose such a threat might be met with threats of ChiCom nuclear action. Since the U.S. would presumably be unwilling to use nuclear weapons or to threaten such use to back a mainland recovery effort and since the great unlikelihood of such U.S. assistance must be evident to the GRC and the population on Taiwan, a Chinese nuclear capability is likely to have a corrosive effect on remaining belief in return to the mainland.

The Chinese nuclear capability will also dramatize to other nations the unrealistic nature of GRC hopes and to

underline

underline the general presumption created by a ChiCom capability in favor of acceptance of Communist China's claims to major power status. By helping further to undermine the raison d'etre of the Nationalist regime and by tending to erode its international support, a Chinese Communist nuclear capability could, therefore, enhance Peiping's opportunities for political subversion of the GRC through offshore islands crises or other means.

The danger of such political subversion could increase in the event of a succession crisis or should the GRC lose confidence in U.S. willingness to continue to support its major policy goals. Even though our scope for action in this direction will necessarily be restricted, any steps that would lay the basis for a different vision of Taiwan's future than return to the mainland would help reduce Peiping's opportunities for political subversion. Such actions include diversion of resources from military to economic development purposes and political reform on Taiwan to give a larger role to the native Taiwanese.

Elsewhere in Asia it is more difficult to predict longer-term effects upon morale; these effects will be highly dependent upon

dent upon the general evolution of the situation and upon U.S. actions. For example, Thailand will be more influenced by developments in Laos and South Vietnam, but may seek expanded relations with the USSR as a hedge against Chinese power. In Korea there might be some tendency, particularly if confidence in the U.S. is shaken, to take steps independently of the U.S. to insure survival through settlement with the Communists.

The following general forms of reassurance may be sought from the U.S.: by the GRC, a renewed pledge to defend Taiwan (including a guarantee of use of nuclear weapons against Communist China in retaliation for nuclear attack on Taiwan), frequent statements of strong U.S. support and a definite pledge to defend the offshores; by the ROK, a reaffirmation of the U.S. defense commitment, by India, the Philippines and Thailand, clear assurance of U.S. deterrence of, and defense against, nuclear attack; and also by Thailand, possibly renewed request for a bilateral or for a strengthened SEATO. Cambodia may make renewed efforts to obtain guarantees from both the Communists and the Western powers.

Various forms of nuclear cooperation may be requested. The GRC and South Korea may seek some form of nuclear weapons--  
sharing

sharing. Pakistan has already requested nuclear-capable artillery and joint planning for nuclear weapons use in certain contingencies.

India, Japan and Australia could probably produce a first nuclear device by 1969-70, given a decision to proceed in the next year or so. Only in the case of India is there a significant possibility of a decision in the foreseeable future to seek a capability. Although such a development seems presently unlikely and the test ban treaty has further reduced the immediate likelihood of such action, a Nehru Government might be moved by domestic pressures into a small weapons program while a post-Nehru Government might, if under strong military influence, undertake a more ambitious program. While the Indians have gradually been moving toward a position where independence from safeguards will become possible and could probably produce a device without outside assistance within the period stated, assistance might be sought from the British, which would involve the U.S., or from the French, which would not.

There is some possibility that, as 1970 approaches, Japan would accept, if it did not seek, collaboration with the U.S. in nuclear defensive measures (e.g., installation of nuclear-tipped

nuclear-tipped defense missiles). Japan is most unlikely, for a variety of reasons, to seek an independent nuclear capability for the foreseeable future. However, what Japan will be willing to do in the nuclear field, as in defense generally, will be related less to a Chinese nuclear capability than to the evolution of the Japanese political situation and to the debate over defense and alignment likely to be precipitated by the question of renewal of the security treaty in 1970.

Requests for additional conventional military assistance (including, in particular, air defense) are particularly likely from the Philippines, Thailand, the GRC, the ROK, and India. The latter's desire for an air defense system not dependent upon outside help in an emergency will be increased.

The availability of Korean and Philippine bases to the U.S. does not seem likely to be seriously affected by a ChiCom nuclear capability. Provided our commitment to Thai defense is sufficiently strong and effective (as measured not only by formal commitments but also by the effectiveness of our efforts in Laos and Vietnam), access to Thai bases would probably not be affected. While a Chinese nuclear capability will not have dramatic and drastic effects on availability of Japanese bases, there will be

there will be an increasing tendency, even under a conservative government, to oppose expansion and improvements which would make the bases a more attractive target and a tendency to seek increased control over operations staged through the bases. There will be greater reluctance to permit operations not of prime importance to Japan and a greater sensitivity to the use of bases against Communist China. Over the longer run, availability of Japanese bases will be less affected directly by the ChiCom capability than by domestic political developments (which will be themselves affected marginally by a ChiCom nuclear capability).

In general, a Chinese nuclear capability does not seem likely to reduce significantly existing willingness to seek U.S. military help in an emergency provided the U.S. has an evident will and capability to keep the conflict at a non-nuclear level. It would probably have marginal effects of this kind in Cambodia.

A Chinese Communist capability may further reduce confidence in the efficacy of Indian protection in the Himalayan border states. Nepal may become more inclined to seek an accommodation with China unless the Nepalese Government is convinced

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convinced that it can rely upon prompt and effective help from the U.S. In Bhutan a rapprochement with China might also be considered wise, but because of its closer ties to India the Bhutanese Government has less freedom of action than Nepal. Sikkim as an Indian protectorate would not be able to act on its own, unless the protectorate ties are considerably weakened.

D. Soviet, U.S.

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D. Soviet, U.S. and Other Reactions

The USSR would much prefer that Communist China not become a nuclear power for two interrelated reasons: (a) a detonation and capability will increase Peiping's prestige in the competition for leadership of the international Communist movement and for influence in developing countries; and (b) while it very probably realizes that the Chinese have not been, and are not likely to be, grossly reckless in using or threatening use of force, it will fear that a ChiCom capability will increase the danger of Soviet involvement in nuclear war. The Soviets may fear the possibility of Chinese miscalculation that might precipitate a confrontation requiring Moscow to choose between the risks of coming to Peiping's aid or leaving an ally in the lurch. The dilemma would be heightened in situations involving North Korea and North Vietnam since withholding aid in such cases would be tantamount to abandoning these countries to Peiping's exclusive sphere of influence. The Soviets will probably also be concerned that a Chinese Communist nuclear capability will tend to promote Chinese hegemony in Southeast Asia and lead to

further

further nuclear proliferation. In these respects its concerns will parallel U.S. concerns. The possibility of more or less tacit Soviet cooperation with the U.S. and other Western powers in efforts to contain Communist China will grow.

Since popular understanding in the U.S. of the Sino-Soviet dispute has probably heightened the belief that Communist China is not only aggressive, but also adventurist, the U.S. public is likely to attach greater military importance to a Chinese detonation and capability than sober analysis would justify. In general, the concern and uncertainty that could be produced would be less likely to express itself in pressure for particular policies than in a more diffuse demand for some kind of action by the U.S. Government. Because of the pervasiveness of the U.S. communications network, U.S. reactions are likely to receive wide currency abroad and to add to the danger of misinterpretation of the meaning of these developments in other countries.

Elsewhere, a Chinese nuclear detonation will probably cause dismay, but not surprise, among informed governments. This dismay will often be occasioned as much by the fact of nuclear proliferation as by the fact that Communist China is  
the country

the country involved. It will probably create a sense both of increased urgency and increased pessimism with respect to arms control and disarmament.

#### IV. Alternative Military Strategies

While the direct military significance of a Chinese Communist nuclear capability is limited, it is a factor of sufficient combined politico-military significance to justify a new look at broad U.S. military and political strategy for the area. More particular reasons for such review include the effect of the Chinese nuclear capability on the military credibility of the U.S., on the dangers of Chinese miscalculation, on increased fears of nuclear war in Asia, on the U.S. military presence in Asia, on fears of inevitable Chinese Communist hegemony in the area and in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

##### A. The Military Problem

The basic military problems will be the ones by which we are now faced - the problems of dealing with military probing operations designed to determine the level of U.S. commitment and to obtain political results (e.g., in the Taiwan Straits); relatively low-level border wars in situations where prospects for Chinese political gains are good and risks low; and "revolutionary" wars.

To the extent

To the extent that a Chinese nuclear capability increases the danger of escalation from lower levels to higher levels of threat, that danger is based less upon the possibility that the Chinese will overestimate their relative military strength than that they may make optimistic estimates of the psychological situation. They may believe that Asian countries will give in to increased pressures because of fear of Chinese conventional power and a belief that the Chinese capability will deter effective U.S. counteraction, because of fear of involvement in a Sino-U.S. nuclear war or because of a belief that in the long run Chinese power will be preeminent in Asia and that the U.S. will be forced into withdrawal. There is also some danger that the ChiComs may estimate that the U.S. will not respond adequately to certain levels of threat because of an increased sense of risk, because of an unwillingness to commit U.S. land forces in Asia, or possibly, because of the pressure of U.S. European allies.

2. Alternative Strategies

Two alternatives to existing strategy of flexible response and of keeping hostilities at the lowest possible level need to be considered

to be considered: (a) primary reliance upon nuclear weapons in both deterring and responding to non-nuclear aggression in Asia; and (b) reliance upon conventional air or naval attacks upon the source of aggression.

No one proposes complete reliance from the outset upon nuclear weapons in responding to any level of threat above the level of insurgency nor is the alternative a policy of no reliance upon use of nuclear weapons. The issue relates to the threshold. One definition of a relatively low threshold would make introduction of substantial Chinese Communist troops the trigger. Another might describe it as a conflict situation in which introduction of substantial U.S. ground forces is the only alternative to use of nuclear weapons. A higher threshold might be defined as follows: a situation in which survival of an Asian state or major U.S. or allied forces are seriously endangered and cannot be adequately protected by conventional forces in the area or deployable to the area or can be protected only at such high economic and human cost as to indicate a balance of advantage in favor of nuclear weapons use.

Any definition will be subject to wide interpretation in application to military planning and can, at best, indicate a general

general disposition with respect to use. Quite apart from particular arguments for and against a low threshold, it may be well to bear in mind that, in the actual event, the policy-maker is likely to make a wide search for other alternatives before initiating nuclear weapons use in a conventional war situation, the more so if it should be the first occasion since World War II when such weapons would be used. It is in general desirable that he have as many options as possible at that time.

It is also necessary to bear in mind the effect of appearances with respect to U.S. dependence on nuclear weapons. Whatever the nuclear threshold now, large reductions in present conventional capabilities in the area could have significant effect on the calculations of Asians as to the probability of U.S. nuclear response and of nuclear war in Asia.

The advocates of a policy of very early use of nuclear weapons argue as follows: The situation we face in the Far East is similar to the one we faced in Europe in the immediate post-war period. Communist China will, for many years, be a negligible nuclear threat, but does pose a substantial conventional air and ground threat. To meet this threat conventionally will be

will be very costly. Because of the Sino-Soviet split, the Chinese threat and our response to it can be clearly separated from the Soviet threat and our response to it - there is low risk of Soviet nuclear response to U.S. first-use of nuclear weapons against an Asian Communist state.

Against this view it can be argued as follows: Insofar as the proposed strategy is intended to deal with massive conventional attacks by Communist China, it is directed toward an unreal threat. Serious limitations upon Chinese conventional capabilities as a result of withdrawal of Soviet support, as well as military risks and political costs of such action make it most unlikely. U.S. nuclear response to low-level military activity raises the essentially moral problem of the proportionality of the "punishment" to the aggression. Even if we can satisfy ourselves on this question, our views are unlikely to be widely shared. Political justification of first-use will continue, therefore, to be a most serious problem and actual first-use would involve great political costs.

The dangers of miscalculation by either Communist China or by other Asian states of the significance of a Chinese nuclear capability can best be avoided militarily by prompt, adequate

quate non-nuclear response to Communist non-nuclear military probes. The threat of nuclear response is unlikely to be very credible as a response to the most probable levels of Chinese action.

While the USSR would seek to avoid nuclear involvement, the possibility of its involvement in a situation in which the U.S. initiated a major nuclear attack upon an Asian Communist state is sufficiently significant so that it must be taken seriously into account. In a number of possible military situations in Asia we will be immediately confronting North Vietnam or North Korea rather than Communist China. If the U.S. action threatened the destruction of these regimes, the USSR would be under great pressure, in large part precisely because of the issues involved in the Sino-Soviet dispute, to provide nuclear assistance rather than permit their nuclear destruction. It is also not safe to assume that the USSR would permit the nuclear destruction of Communist China or that, in general, it could stay out of the world-wide crisis which would be created by U.S. first-use of nuclear weapons in Asia. Thus, general arguments on the risks of nuclear weapons use could apply and the question  
of military

of military utility of initiation of nuclear weapons use in a two-sided nuclear exchange would need to be examined.\*

Moreover, whatever the actual Soviet reaction in a particular situation a U.S. policy of primary reliance upon nuclear weapons might cause the Soviets to adopt a declaratory policy of responding to U.S. use of nuclear weapons with threat of Soviet use. At a minimum, the Soviets are likely to play a leading role in a political campaign against U.S. use or threatened use of nuclear weapons which could make initiation or continuation of such use very difficult.

Particularly after the Chinese Communists have a nuclear capability, an evident U.S. policy of nuclear response to non-nuclear aggression will very probably make Asian states increasingly reluctant to seek U.S. military assistance because of fear of being drawn into a nuclear war. There may also be fear that the U.S. will not respond adequately to levels of aggression that would not justify a nuclear response. A nuclear-dependent strategy would greatly increase the pressures  
on U.S. bases

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\*If Soviet involvement cannot be ruled out, distinctions between tactical and strategic use of nuclear weapons, though not wholly irrelevant, become of less importance. Even tactical use will create a situation in which sensitivity to the possibility of a general nuclear attack on Communist China or other Asian Communist state could greatly increase with a resulting general rise in international tensions and danger of miscalculation.

on U.S. bases created by a ChiCom capability, particularly in Japan. The more evident and visible our nuclear posture and our reliance upon nuclear weapons, the greater is likely to be the appeal of Peiping's proposals for removing the danger of nuclear war from Asia as well as support for its efforts to muster Asian "racial" solidarity. European allies will view our nuclear policy in Asia as inconsistent with our policy for Europe and probably highly dangerous.

A policy of greater reliance upon conventional air or naval action against the source of aggression would avoid many of the difficulties of a nuclear strategy, although there is likely to be considerable fear that such action will bring a nuclear response. Air and naval power alone, without U.S. ground forces, will not, moreover, always be an effective means of achieving U.S. objectives. The problem of political justification for such a strategy in low-level military situations continues to be severe. But this may be an appropriate strategy, or part of a strategy, in some circumstances. Graduated air actions against North Vietnam could, for example, be appropriately related to introduction of U.S. ground forces in Laos.

C. Preferred

C. Preferred Strategy and Programs

Both the most probable military developments and political needs underline the necessity to maintain an evident ability to respond rapidly with adequate force to Communist military probes without undue reliance upon nuclear weapons. Such an ability is needed to reassure Asian nations under Communist pressure and to make evident to them that a Chinese nuclear capability will not automatically convert any future war in Asia into a nuclear war with increased danger of their nuclear involvement. It is needed to respond to the most likely forms of Communist military action. It is needed to minimize the danger of miscalculation by Communist China of U.S. slowness to act as an unwillingness to act. It is obvious that no amount of conventional rapid reaction capability will substitute in the final analysis for a U.S. will to act, but such a capability will serve as a symbol of our intent to do so and provide us with means to prevent further miscalculation in the actual event.

U.S. rapid reaction capability is a function of several interrelated factors which are, up to a point, militarily interchangeable: (a) general purpose forces deployed to the  
area;

area; (b) air and sea lift to move combat forces, supplies and equipment to the theater; (c) bases to provide staging areas and logistic support for military operations; (d) pre-positioning on bases or ships of supplies and equipment; and (e) capability for rapid movement within the theater of operations. Forces emplaced in the area are likely to be more reassuring politically than preparatory actions and arrangements. Thus we face a policy dilemma. On the one hand, the political-psychological requirements generated by a Chinese nuclear detonation and capability will give additional emphasis to the need for the presence of U.S. forces in the area. On the other hand, as a result of balance of payments considerations we have had to consider withdrawals of existing conventional forces.\* To some extent we can compensate psychologically for limited withdrawals by emphasizing the other

elements

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\*This statement is not intended to suggest that forces in the area are necessarily more expensive in balance of payments terms than other alternatives. In Korea, for example, balance of payments savings from a reduction in U.S. forces would very probably have to be offset by additional economic aid of comparable amount in order to meet continuing ROK foreign exchange needs.

elements of our rapid-reaction capability - but only to some extent.

It is exceedingly difficult to estimate what level of withdrawal can be accomplished without adverse political consequences within the context of a ChiCom nuclear detonation. A great deal depends upon how the withdrawal is handled and upon the coincidence of events. If, for example, we should be in the midst of implementing even those relatively modest withdrawals which have been approved at the time the Chinese detonate a nuclear device - or, worse, if we should announce and proceed with withdrawals after the detonation of a device - the psychological effects could be quite adverse. Such a coincidence of timing is, of course, possible. If, at the same time, we are unable to respond even modestly to the certain demands for increased military aid in the post-detonation period, the adverse effects would tend to be accentuated.

Accordingly, from the point of view of minimizing the adverse effects of a Chinese Communist nuclear capability upon Asian countries the U.S. should: (a) avoid redeployments of conventional forces which will significantly reduce our military presence or rapid reaction capability; (b) avoid, if possible

possible, timing of redeployments which will increase the likelihood that they will follow a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation; (c) conduct periodic exercises designed to demonstrate our capability for rapid reaction; and (d) without changing the basic downward trend of our military assistance expenditures, make available a modest contingent fund which could be used to meet demands for increased military assistance in the post-detonation period and thus provide reassurance of the U.S. commitment.

Proposals have been made for creation of a separate U.S. counter-China regional nuclear deterrent force and for refinements in defenses designed to increase the survivability of existing or planned nuclear forces in Asia.\* These proposals rest upon two types of argument. The first is an argument on military grounds for maintaining a permanent full U.S. counter-force capability in the Asian region to deal with a ChiCom nuclear capability. The second is an argument for a clearer differentiation between forces directed against the USSR and those directed against Communist China. Although existing and  
planned

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\*Notably by RAND and the Institute for Defense Analyses in their reports on a Chinese Communist nuclear capability.

planned nuclear deployments will, in fact, provide an effective counterforce capability against Communist China for the indefinite future, the argument for refinements designed to increase survivability of that force or for creation of a separate clearly-distinguished counter-China force are not strong.\*

The argument for maintaining a full counterforce capability involves an artificial distinction between theater-based forces and other U.S. forces. So long as we can bring nuclear forces from elsewhere to bear upon Communist China and the Chinese are aware of this fact, their future ability to wreak major destruction upon our theater forces will not be likely to tempt them into pre-emptive attack, nor will it leave us unable to respond if they do attack.\*\*

Nor is it

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\*The argument against major measures to increase survivability of nuclear forces does not take account of the need for such measures to deal with a Soviet threat, a subject outside the scope of this paper. The positive and negative political effects of refinements are likely to be negligible; they are neither likely to impress or to alarm.

\*\*In view of the unlikelihood of actual employment of nuclear weapons by Communist China, we (and the country we are seeking to defend) will prefer to accept these low risks rather than assume the greater risks and political costs that pre-emptive counterforce action would entail.

Nor is it necessary or feasible to create a self-sufficient Asian nuclear force in order to differentiate between forces directed against Communist China and those directed against the USSR. It would be infeasible to limit U.S. strike forces to those which would pose no threat to the USSR. Such action would, for example, rule out any seaborne forces in the area. On the other hand, the United States will not be faced for the indefinite future with the question of employing U.S. intercontinental strike forces in order to deal with a Chinese Communist nuclear threat. If, in the distant future, we are faced by a situation of confrontation with Communist China in which reenforcement of our local nuclear forces seems necessary, it is highly likely that we will have adequate time for reenforcement and that we will not be forced into reliance upon our U.S.-based strategic forces. We should also have adequate time and opportunity to make clear by words and actions that we intend no attack upon the USSR.

V. General Problems of U.S. Response

A. The Problem of Reassurance

The principal requirement created by a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation and capability in Asia will be a need for  
reassurance

reassurance in order to reduce the effectiveness of Chinese politico-military pressures and the possibility of development of independent nuclear capabilities by Asian countries (especially India) and, to a much lesser extent, to deter Chinese military action. Reassurance can take the form of U.S. declaratory policies, U.S. political and military actions and programs, and U.S. actions which give threatened countries a greater self-confidence in their independent ability to protect themselves against ChiCom threats. It can be provided through bilateral actions involving the U.S. and, to some extent, through cooperative activities among Asian countries themselves.

The most difficult problems are posed by the questions of the character of U.S. assurance of defense against nuclear attack and of cooperation in nuclear matters ("nuclear sharing"). It is difficult for the U.S. to make general commitments to defense against nuclear attack because of (a) the danger that an Asian country may, without U.S. concurrence, provoke a situation in which the U.S. would be forced into nuclear response; and (b) the ambivalence which is likely to characterize the attitudes of some Asian nations with respect to nuclear defense. This ambivalence may cause some to prefer not to have  
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a clear-cut public U.S. commitment and others to desire a veto over U.S. use of nuclear weapons in any situation involving them. For such reasons broad public commitments will need to be kept quite general with more specific commitments given to particular countries on a selected basis. Multilaterally-agreed guidelines on use of nuclear weapons comparable to the "Athens Guidelines" for NATO would be infeasible.

The development of national nuclear capabilities does not seem a desirable way to provide reassurance. The general arguments against nuclear proliferation acquire special weight in Asia where local non-Communist enemies are often at least as important as Communist ones, where our relations with countries of the area are very diverse, where the reliability of future governments is more open to question than in Europe and where nuclear arms programs are likely to interfere seriously with the needs of economic development and political stability.

Nuclear-sharing arrangements involving dual control of weapons systems are presently being reviewed in Europe. It is not desirable at this time nor for the foreseeable future to introduce such arrangements in Asia where problems of control and security of information are greater and where the weapons are likely

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are likely to be viewed by local non-Communist neighbors as directed as much against them as against the Communist enemy. Nor will the objectives of Asian countries in seeking or accepting such arrangements necessarily be compatible with U.S. interests. Some may see participation in control arrangements primarily as a means of vetoing U.S. use of nuclear weapons. Others might estimate that their participation will increase marginally the insecurity of control over use in the eyes of Peiping and, therefore, the deterrent effect. Once we start down such a path, it will be difficult to stop short of general proliferation of arrangements of this kind. Once made, such commitments would be very difficult to reverse.

Accordingly, we should prefer forms of nuclear cooperation which are bilateral over those that are multilateral and forms that involve planning over those that involve deployment of nuclear forces under joint control. Probably most requests for various forms of nuclear cooperation can be met by offers of guarantees and of bilateral planning.

Perhaps the most difficult problem that will be posed for U.S. policy over the long term is the possibility of Indian development of a nuclear capability. Adherence by India and  
other

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other potential non-Communist nuclear powers in Asia to the test ban treaty will reduce greatly the likelihood of their early development of nuclear capabilities. At the same time it may mean that a Chinese nuclear detonation will increase pressure on the U.S. by India and other Asian adherents to the treaty for guarantees and forms of nuclear cooperation, particularly the former. Over the longer term it may be very difficult for India, despite the test ban, to forego a nuclear capability indefinitely when its principal enemy possesses such a capability. Finding means of providing India with assurance of its nuclear defense will therefore be important as part of the long-term U.S. effort to prevent nuclear proliferation. The problem of providing India with guarantees or of engaging with it in sharing arrangements is particularly difficult because of the lack of a treaty of alliance within which such guarantees or arrangements might be offered and because of the effects of any arrangements on U.S. allies in the area, including but not limited to Pakistan.

A general U.S. declaratory policy on nuclear defense and other measures of reassurance will help meet the need. A possible additional measure would be to persuade the U.K. to offer

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offer to both India and Pakistan a guarantee of nuclear defense within the Commonwealth framework. As compared with a specific U.S. commitment, such U.K. guarantee might entail fewer political problems for India and less apparent danger of Soviet involvement since the Sino-Soviet Treaty is operable only in military situations involving Japan or a nation allied with Japan, which the U.K. is not. While the Paks would probably reject the offer, they would then be in a poor position to object to such treatment for India.

While this may seem a politically useful employment of the U.K. nuclear capability, it will, in fact, conflict with our efforts to limit the role of independent nuclear capabilities in Europe. It would provide ex post facto justification for the British nuclear force at a time when sentiment in the U.K. is turning against continuance of an independent force. It could be used by the French as an argument for its general position.

It is, moreover, by no means clear whether the Indians would consider such a commitment as useful as a deterrent, given likely British hesitation with respect to actual use of nuclear weapons, as a unilateral, even though general, U.S. declaratory statement. Nonetheless, this idea may warrant  
further

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further consideration as a contingent possibility, in the light of the evolving situation in Europe and India.

B. Problems of Planning and Action

The development of policies and actions to prevent or to deal with the adverse effects of a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation and capability presents procedural issues which are by no means unique to it, but which are of special difficulty and significance in this case. The problem inherently involves all of the difficulties of contingency planning. While it is possible to estimate with considerable assurance the direct military significance of a Chinese nuclear capability, it is not possible to state with absolute certainty the character of a Chinese exploitation or the reaction of other Asian nations.

Since we have concluded that it is both realistic and desirable to play down the real significance of a Chinese nuclear capability, we will wish to avoid a great flurry of activity in the period following a detonation which would tend to contradict our general posture of calm and assurance. A number of actions proposed can be taken routinely either before or after the event and justified without reference to a Chinese nuclear capability. In other cases the content of our actions, even though

though taken after detonation, will itself overcome the effect of activity per se. Insofar as proposed advance actions may involve political difficulties or economic costs, it may be difficult to accept in advance the necessity for action. Yet after the event, action may lose its value.

There is, moreover, the question of the weight that should be given to considerations relating to a Chinese nuclear capability in determining issues that also involve other considerations. An effort has been made to confine recommendations to matters (a) on which a Chinese nuclear capability could have a major bearing (e.g., the offshore islands), or (b) where U.S. action, while not essential in the context of a Chinese Communist nuclear capability, could be very useful in dealing with short or long-term effects (e.g., a Pacific Defense College).

VI. Recommendations: U.S. Military Response and Military Programs

A. General

The U.S. Response to Aggression in Asia. (Discussion:

The following statement is intended partly as a general policy guide to planning, but also as a standard for assurances (outlined below)

lined below) by the U.S. to Asian countries on the U.S. response to aggression - particularly nuclear aggression.)

a. The U.S. will not initiate pre-emptive counter-force operations against the Communist Chinese nuclear capability in the absence of specific Chinese aggressive actions which would clearly justify such action. Whether the U.S. will, as a part of its response, take such action in a situation in which the Chinese had initiated military action which would justify it cannot be determined in advance of the development of the particular situation.

b. The U.S. will respond to an unmistakable nuclear attack upon its forces or bases in Asia with nuclear weapons. Whether the response will be in the form of the use of tactical weapons against local targets or will involve broader attacks upon mainland China will depend upon the circumstances of the attack. In the event that the Chinese Communist attack involves the territory of an Asian state, the U.S. will ordinarily consult with that state before launching a nuclear counterattack, but will not be prevented

prevented from acting because of the non-concurrence of that state. Similarly, if the U.S. response involves nuclear counterattack from the territory of an Asian state, the U.S. will ordinarily\* consult with that state before launching such attack, but will not be prevented from so acting because of the non-concurrence of that state.

- c. In the event of an unmistakable nuclear attack upon the territory of an Asian state which does not significantly involve U.S. forces or bases, the U.S. will, in consultation with the Asian state against which the attack occurs, and, ordinarily only with its acquiescence, retaliate appropriately with nuclear weapons.
- d. The U.S. response to non-nuclear aggression will be flexible and determined by the particular circumstances of the attack. The U.S. will, at the request of the country under attack, respond .  
up to

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\*In some cases we would be committed by existing treaty obligations to so consult.

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up to some level of attack without resort to nuclear weapons. In general, nuclear weapons will be used only in situations in which U.S. and allied conventional forces (whether those available within the area or from outside) are not sufficient to contain a major Communist overt aggressive action against U.S. or Asian forces which jeopardizes U.S. vital interests. Even in the event of major attack, U.S. and/or allied conventional forces should be capable, at a minimum, of holding long enough to provide time for an effort to convince the Communist Chinese (or other Asian Communist regime) of the risks involved in their action and thereby give diplomacy an opportunity to end the conflict. The U.S. should also employ its conventional naval and air power against the source of aggression in response to military actions which would reasonably justify such response. Any first-use of nuclear weapons or the use of naval and air power against the source of aggression will ordinarily take place only after consultation with, and with the concurrence of, the Asian state being defended.

Military Posture

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Military Posture. From the point of view of dealing with the effects of a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation and capability on Asian countries the United States should (a) not increase its apparent or real dependence upon nuclear weapons in deterring or responding to non-nuclear aggression; (b) avoid redeployments from Asia which will significantly reduce the U.S. military presence or non-nuclear rapid reaction capability; (c) avoid timing of redeployments which will increase the likelihood that they will follow close upon a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation; and (d) seek to develop and demonstrate the U.S. will and ability to respond quickly with non-nuclear means to non-nuclear attack. The U.S. should take account of the fact that, particularly initially, its response to aggression will be judged by a somewhat different standard because of fear that a ChiCom nuclear capability will deter U.S. response.

U.S. Public Posture. Our policies and actions should take account of the probable two-sided character of Chinese tactics with their emphasis upon threat and protection, upon force and upon peace. We should accordingly:

- a. Make clear that our existing nuclear capability even in the Far East far exceeds that of Communist China and that

and that the balance of nuclear power has not changed nor is it going to change without, however, so emphasizing our nuclear power as to suggest that future wars in Asia will be nuclear in character. We should, as indicated more specifically below, make clear our intent to come to the aid of nations under threat of nuclear attack.

- b. Particularly emphasize our will and ability to come quickly to the assistance of countries under non-nuclear attack without employing nuclear weapons.

**B. Reassurance through Military Actions and Programs**

1. Defense Guarantees: Broad Public Commitments. The United States should issue, preferably as a part of the proposed policy statement (see par. B-1, p. 73) a public statement on defense against Communist military attack along the following lines. (Because of problems discussed earlier, this statement must necessarily contain explanatory material, as well as declaratory policy):

- a. The United States possesses the will and ability to respond in a flexible, graduated manner to Communist aggression in Asia. The vastly superior nuclear power of the United States can be relied upon to deter

Communist

Communist China from employing nuclear weapons.

Even the most casual calculation should demonstrate to Peiping that possible military gains that might be derived from nuclear weapons use would be far outweighed by the costs to Communist China. If, nonetheless, Communist China should be so foolish as to use nuclear weapons against another Asian state, it can expect a nuclear response. In this connection, it should be noted that the United States has the capability to snuff out immediately any remaining Chinese Communist ability to deliver further nuclear weapons against Asian targets.

- b. While the United States is prepared to use its nuclear power when essential, it is also prepared to assist countries, which have the will and ability to defend themselves and wish our assistance, in meeting non-nuclear aggression by non-nuclear means. The existence of a Chinese nuclear capability, when such a capability develops, will have no effect upon our willingness to act in such circumstances nor upon our ability to come to their assistance.

2. Defense

2. Defense Guarantees: Specific Assurances. The U.S. should take the initiative to reaffirm its existing defense commitments to allies without specific reference to nuclear defense. It is not considered necessary to provide anticipatory commitments, other than the broad public commitments proposed above, to neutrals. However, in response to requests or evident need, the U.S. should be prepared to take the following actions:

- a. With respect to allies: Affirm that our existing defense commitment covers deterrence of and response to a nuclear attack.
- b. With respect to neutrals: Indicate that the general public assurance proposed above applies to the particular country concerned. Indicate a willingness to make joint statements with one or more neutrals committing the U.S. to "consult" with the nation(s) concerned if it comes under threat of Chinese Communist nuclear attack. (Such commitment would be parallel to the commitment already made to India with respect to air defense.) Privately indicate a willingness to consider providing more formal assurances,

assurances, but point out that such assurances are likely to require formal U.S. legislative action and to be inconsistent with neutral status.

- c. With respect to India and Pakistan: Give further consideration, in the light of developments with respect to nuclear forces in Europe and the situation in India, to the desirability of encouraging the U.K. to offer a guarantee of nuclear defense to India and Pakistan.
- d. With respect to either allies or neutrals: Use announcements of consultation or action with respect to concrete measures such as those proposed in paras 3 and 5 below as a form of reassurance. As appropriate, commit the U.S. clearly to consultation prior to use of nuclear weapons in responding to nuclear or non-nuclear attack upon them but do not make such commitment with respect to attacks which are primarily against U.S. forces or bases. Argue against any request for a clear commitment that the U.S. will obtain the concurrence of the state concerned before responding to nuclear  
attack

attack with nuclear weapons on the grounds that such action would reduce the deterrent to ChiCom action.

The U.S. commitment under a and b above should be made subject in appropriate cases (e.g., the GRC and the ROK) to the qualification that we cannot assume responsibility for nuclear defence if the state involved initiates military action against an Asian Communist state without U.S. concurrence.

3. Nuclear Cooperation. The United States should not assist, and should positively discourage, development of independent nuclear capabilities by non-Communist Asian states - in particular, by India. We should seek to satisfy requests for other forms of nuclear cooperation with proposals for bilateral planning for retaliation against nuclear attack, such planning to cover with varying intensity depending upon the country involved, problems of targeting and of nuclear strategy and tactics. Such planning should also be designed to demonstrate the limited value of a Communist Chinese nuclear capability, the unlikelihood of Chinese nuclear attack and the continued primary need for improved conventional and counter-guerrilla capabilities.

We should

We should generally avoid multilateral planning and attempt to satisfy demands for it in SEATO or elsewhere through more general discussion of the implications of a ChiCom nuclear capability.

We should not engage in forms of nuclear-sharing involving nuclear weapons under dual control, as in Europe. If a country, either as a result of an immediate threat or otherwise, would find emplacement of nuclear weapons reassuring, we should be prepared, in response to the country's request, to meet the need for reassurance by temporarily deploying air-mobile missiles, aircraft or sea-mobile nuclear forces which are wholly under U.S. control to its territory or nearby areas.

4. U.S. Theater-Based Nuclear Forces. Since existing and planned U.S. nuclear capabilities are adequate to deal with any foreseeable Chinese Communist nuclear threat, the U.S. should not in order to deal with the ChiCom threat, increase presently-planned deployments of nuclear forces nor undertake such measures as hardening or dispersal of command and control facilities, air defense of retaliatory forces, a high state of alert, larger numbers of bases for dispersal, etc. (In this connection, if  
the U.S.

the U.S. has a choice between withdrawing its nuclear forces from an Asian base and risking total loss of its base rights, it should weigh the latter risk much more heavily than concern about concentrating nuclear forces.) For psychological reasons the U.S. should, however, take the following measures:

- a. Send one POLARIS submarine to the Pacific now, in advance of a ChiCom detonation and in advance of regularly planned deployments due to begin in 1964. Like all nuclear actions such action should be handled with routine publicity. Also give discreet publicity to our existing REGULUS submarine capability in the area. (Discussion: Action with respect to POLARIS would be particularly useful in underlining the limited significance of any Chinese missiles test which might occur at about the same time as a nuclear detonation. Deployment after detonation would tend to suggest that we attach more military significance to the event than is the case but might, nonetheless, be desirable if such action had not been previously taken, depending upon reactions to the

to the detonation.)

- b. In any subsequent deployments particularly emphasize dual-capable systems and seaborne systems which are less vulnerable to political attack. (These considerations, for example, favor aircraft carriers and argue against land-based missile deployments.) In this connection, an Indian Ocean Task Force, built around an attack carrier, would be a particularly desirable counter to a Chinese nuclear capability and a stabilizing influence in the area and from this point of view action to introduce such a task force should be taken as soon as possible - if possible prior to a Chinese nuclear detonation.
- c. While we should not increase Peiping's political target by referring publicly to our theater-based nuclear forces as some kind of "regional deterrent force", we should, in cases where it would be reassuring, refer consistently in private conversations with non-Communist Asian leaders to our nuclear forces as a single entity which has the specific objective of deterring or responding to

ChiCom

ChiCom use of nuclear weapons - i.e., as a "Pacific Deterrent Force".

- d. We should run frequent command post and other exercises designed to make evident, in a quiet way, the fact that Communist China is the primary target of our Pacific nuclear forces. Except where such visits will create significant adverse political reaction and therefore become self-defeating, we should increase good-will visits of U.S. seaborne nuclear forces to friendly ports in Asia.
  - e. The U.S. should initiate now a program under which naval and air observers from allied and other friendly countries are regularly invited to make cruises aboard U.S. aircraft carriers. (Discussion: Such cruises should impress such observers with U.S. conventional rapid reaction capabilities, as well as with U.S. nuclear capabilities and may be marginally helpful in heading off requests for nuclear-sharing arrangements or as part of a U.S. response to such requests.)
5. Air Defense. A Chinese Communist regional nuclear capability

capability should not in itself increase the military requirement for air defense and the U.S. should not undertake expensive measures to increase the refinement of air defense systems because of an assumed new Chinese Communist air threat.

For primarily psychological reasons, the following air defense actions should be undertaken:

- a. Air defense should be provided to defend U.S. bases on the territory of U.S. allies who may be subjected to ChiCom political pressures.
- b. Within the present concept for air defense of India, the U.S. should be as responsive as possible in meeting any increased sense of air threat that India may feel following a Chinese nuclear detonation (e.g., by running more frequent joint exercises or by supplementing the British effort to improve the Indian Air Force).
- c. The U.S. should seriously consider permanent deployment to Asia of mobile air defense units which can be moved quickly into areas under psychological or actual

or actual threat of air attack.\* The U.S. should make regular demonstrations of its ability to move such units quickly into threatened areas and should publicize permanent air defense installations in Asian countries.

- d. The U.S. should not press Asian nations that would not find the introduction of nuclear warheads for air defense missiles reassuring to accept such warheads; to do so contradicts the political purpose these air defense missiles are designed to serve.
- e. Depending upon the situation in the post-detonation period, the U.S. might provide token capability for defense of Asian capital cities that may feel particularly threatened (e.g., Bangkok or Taipeh).

Bearing in mind the primarily psychological purpose of additional air defense measures in the context of a ChiCom nuclear capability, the U.S. should seriously reexamine, and  
where

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\*Whether such action will have significant reassurance value will, obviously, depend upon other accompanying actions. If, for example, such action is taken primarily as either a military or political offset to redeployment of existing fixed air defense or other conventional forces in the area, the net reassurance effect could be nil or negative.

where possible cut back, such programs if it becomes evident that the Chinese Communists have a missile delivery system with compatible nuclear warheads.

6. U.S. Conventional Capabilities: General. The U.S. should continue to develop: (a) a non-nuclear capability which can demonstrate and underline our ability to meet Communist military pressures without very early resort to nuclear weapons; (b) counter-guerrilla capabilities to meet what will, along with border threats, continue to be the principal military problem in Asia; and (c) an evident capability for rapid reaction.

7. Maintaining and Improving the U.S. Capability for Rapid, Non-nuclear Reaction. The United States should:

- a. Increase U.S. air and sea-lift capabilities, particularly for Southeast Asia.
- b. Continue and expand its program for developing stocks of supplies on pre-positioned logistic ships and for pre-positioning of supplies on overseas bases.
- c. Deploy very limited numbers of U.S. troops on an indefinite (but non-permanent) basis to mainland Southeast Asia (presumably Thailand) following  
nuclear

nuclear detonation if such action would seem reassuring in the then existing situation, taking particular account of the effect of developments in Laos and Vietnam on the reaction to the detonation.

- d. Make a particular effort to demonstrate U.S. rapid reaction capability in the early post-detonation period, perhaps through some special, well-publicized military exercise which would emphasize this feature of U.S. non-nuclear capabilities.
- e. Undertake contingency planning which would assume various kinds of restrictions upon U.S. bases in Japan and examine the relative desirability of alternative contingency base arrangements.
- f. Continue and further expand the program for joint use by Japan of U.S. bases in Japan with the clearly-stated intention of movement toward eventual joint control. If it is decided to dispose of a U.S. base in Japan, we should seek to anticipate the possibility as far in advance as possible and to time release for maximum political gain.
- g. Seek to forestall later pressures on U.S. base rights  
in Japan

in Japan through more frequent and explicit exercise now of U.S. rights by such means as military exercises, movement in and out of forces and equipment, etc. At the same time, do this in such a way as to avoid greatly increased public (as opposed to official) notice of our activities.

- h. Continue to encourage the British to maintain, at least on a standby basis, existing base establishments and forces in Singapore, Malaya and the Indian Ocean.

8. Indigenous Conventional Capabilities: The U.S.

should:

- a. Without permanently reversing the present general downward trend of military assistance, be prepared to make temporary limited increases in military aid to countries of the Asian area as a form of reassurance in the period following a nuclear detonation. In order to avoid action which would over-inflate the significance of the Chinese nuclear detonation, funds for this purpose might be obtained initially by diversions within the then existing appropriations with the intent of

replenishing

replenishing those funds by a commensurately increased request in the following appropriations cycle. Present aid planning should also take account of this contingent aid requirement. (Consultation with Congressional leaders explaining such action at the time it is to be taken would be desirable.)

- b. Provided the ChiComs do not appear to be moving very rapidly toward an early nuclear-missile capability, be prepared to provide some limited help for additional indigenously-controlled air defense. However, major military assistance programs of this kind should be resisted and the principal concentration should be upon capabilities to deal with the real guerrilla or limited border threats.

VII. Recommendations: Political Strategy  
and Political Actions

A. Political Strategy

Again, U.S. response must take account of the two broad strands of probable Chinese Communist exploitation:

- a. In response to efforts to induce increased fear and respect, the U.S. must offer reassurance.
- b. In response

- b. In response to efforts to suggest that U.S. hostility and the U.S. nuclear presence are the primary sources of the threat of nuclear war in Asia and to present Communist China as the protector of Asian nations, the U.S. should underline its peaceful and constructive purposes, its willingness to discuss problems bearing on peace with any nation and its interest in the independence of Asian nations.

B. Reassurance through Political Actions

(Discussion: Reassurance can be provided through declaratory policy statements, U.S. responses to aggression, and assistance to countries to increase their ability to protect themselves. It can be provided by alliance or other guarantees, deflation of ideas with respect to the invincibility or invulnerability of Communist China, demonstrations of the basic strength and technical development of other Asian nations, and, to some extent through collective or bilateral forms of mutual self-help. These possibilities are covered below.)

1. A U.S. Policy Statement. The principal themes of our public response to a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation  
and capability

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and capability should be developed through both an immediate statement at the time of detonation and a fuller statement issued soon after. The fuller statement would consist not only of a statement of U.S. policy, but also a kind of brief "white paper" (though not so labeled) containing the government's analysis of the significance of the development.

The policy statement should, inter alia: (a) contain defense pledges along the lines suggested above; (b) emphasize U.S. nuclear power but also U.S. ability to deal with non-nuclear aggression by non-nuclear means; (c) state that the U.S. will not be diverted by a Chinese nuclear capability into an over-emphasis upon military programs to the neglect of economic development; (d) state our belief that the future of the Pacific area lies in the direction of disarmament, cooperation, peace and economic development rather than in the direction of armaments and war and dedicate the U.S. to continued disarmament efforts following up on the test ban; (e) state the U.S. position on Asian nuclear free zones; and (f) indicate our willingness to talk with Communist China  
about any

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about any issue affecting the peace and state our hope that mainland China will one day, too, participate in the peaceful cooperative endeavors of the countries of the area.

(Discussion: It is important that our public response to a Chinese nuclear detonation and capability be developed on a consistent basis both in advance of detonation and after the event. In advance there should be press backgrounders, regular references in speeches of high officials, inspired articles, etc. It can be argued that anything but perhaps a brief White House or State Department statement at the time detonation occurs will in itself over-emphasize its significance. However, if the statement itself de-emphasizes, on the basis of quite thorough analysis, the significance of the event, this danger should be minimal. Such a statement should actually reduce the volume of unattributed and probably otherwise contradictory comment from government agencies. Such a statement should not only be reassuring to foreign audiences but should demonstrate to the American public that the government has in this case (unlike the case of Sputnik) given careful advance thought to the problem and has a policy for dealing

dealing with it.)\*

2. The U.S. Alliance System: (Discussion: Major changes in the U.S. alliance system are not feasible or desirable. A Chinese nuclear capability will further emphasize the need to reduce some forms of differentiation between allies and neutrals and therefore further accentuate present dilemmas.) In addition to reaffirming existing alliance obligations, both in general statements and in specific statements to particular allies, the U.S. should:

a. In response to any renewed Thai request for a bilateral, continue to argue that the bilateral assurances already provided are adequate, but if the Thais are not satisfied and that if Thai confidence appears significantly shaken by Chinese nuclear developments and other events, be prepared to agree to a bilateral.

b. Suggest

\*Some would prefer that the fuller information to be presented should be provided in the form of a backgrounder for the press rather than as an official written analysis. If, contrary to the recommendation above, it should be decided that such an approach should be adopted, it would still be of considerable importance to base the backgrounder on an agreed written analysis. Such a statement will therefore need to be prepared on a contingency basis, whichever technique is adopted.

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\*b. Suggest now in selected Asian allied countries (and some non-aligned countries such as India) creation of informal joint committees or study groups consisting of representatives of the U.S. Mission and the local government to carry on a continuing discussion of the significance of Chinese nuclear developments against the background of a consideration of Communist China's basic weaknesses. Such discussion might also be organized within SEATO and ANZUS. Initial discussion might be based upon a paper tabled by the U.S. (The paper recently prepared for the October meeting of the Atlantic Planning Advisory Group might (with slight modification) serve this purpose.) Such joint committees could serve as a means of discussing information on ChiCom vulnerabilities to nuclear attack and on ChiCom conventional capabilities on which studies are proposed below. They might also be a means of introducing suggestions as to how Japan, India and Australia might play more active roles in the area (para 4 below). Where some existing organizational arrangement

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arrangement could serve this purpose as well, it should be employed.

3. Developing the Basis for Wider Defense Cooperation.

While present prospects for defense cooperation among countries of the area are, at best, very limited, the following actions might lay the basis for future cooperation by increasing common understanding of the security problem:

- a. Regular private reiteration by the U.S. of the general theme that nations of the area share a common security problem which could be met more effectively if they would cooperate. (We should point to the possibility that Chinese Communist nuclear blackmail and intimidation may be used by Peiping to exploit existing divisions in Asia in furtherance of efforts to achieve hegemony. While avoiding self-defeating alarm, we should attempt to use the existence of the ChiCom capability to give a new sense of urgency to the settlement of intra-regional disputes and to expanding intra-regional cooperation. We should make clear that our assumption of responsibility in the new situation

- ation presented by a ChiCom capability must, in this respect, be matched by a comparable sense of responsibility on the part of Asian countries.)
- b. The greatly expanded employment of the third country training technique in MAP to support intra-regional military training. (Discussion: This technique is now used quite extensively in economic aid programs, but is presently little used in MAP.)
  - c. Active support for a Pacific Defense College, consideration of which might take off from a recent revival of this idea by others in SEATO; the concept and sponsorship should, however, be broadened to avoid SEATO identification.
  - d. Particular emphasis in annual CINCPAC weapons demonstrations upon the implications of a Chinese nuclear capability.

4. The Roles of

4. The Roles of Japan, India and Australia. (Discussion:

All three countries have an increased concern and interest in the area, varying degrees of desire for greater involvement and some receptivity to U.S. suggestions. The attitude of each exhibits some ambivalence because of limitations of resources and internal or external restraints on its greater involvement. While further effort is being made to identify specific concrete possibilities for useful supporting activity by the three countries in South and Southeast Asia,\* the following general actions might now be initiated.)

- a. The U.S. should stimulate increased and continuing private consultation between the U.S. and the three countries on South and Southeast Asian problems and bilaterally between each of the countries. In the case of India such consultation must be conducted in a particularly discreet manner in order to avoid

antagonizing

\*See Airgram CA 2021 of August 19, 1963

antagonizing Pakistan.

- b. Japan should be encouraged to see its role in Asia (apart from genuine self-defense) as that of building economic strength and a wider sense of community. It should be encouraged not only to provide technical and economic (and quasi-military) aid, but also to search for ways in which existing intra-regional organizations or new organizations might serve to strengthen the sense of community. Japan should be encouraged to discuss privately and publicly with other Asian nations the need for intra-regional cooperation, with a view to countering Chinese efforts to suggest that acceptance of its protection is the only viable long-term policy. Japan should be encouraged to increase its self-defense effort but not on the basis of a vague assumption of a presently impractical security role in Southeast Asia.
- c. The U.S. should encourage action by India to improve its image in Southeast Asia not only through increasing national strength and evidence of its willingness to face the Communist threat, but also  
by such

by such efforts as seeking ways in which it can learn from unique Southeast Asian experiences (e.g., counterinsurgency); by area studies program on SEA backing up area training for Indian diplomats; by an expanded and improved exchange program for SEA focused particularly on professional people; by provision of technical assistance and limited materiel aid in areas where Indian experience is quite advanced (such as peaceful uses of atomic energy (see below) and community development); and by a constructive effort to strengthen regional organizations such as the Asian Productivity Organization.

- d. The U.S. should employ the effort to develop a joint assessment of the threat in Asia, which was authorized at the recent ANZUS meetings as the starting point for developing an agreed view of the military program implications of a Chinese nuclear capability with the objective of obtaining Australian (and New Zealand) acceptance of the need for improvement in their ability to react rapidly

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rapidly with conventional forces to Communist-probing operations through improvement in the readiness of forces and in lift capabilities. We should encourage Australian military aid and training particularly for the other Asian Commonwealth countries and particularly in guerrilla warfare where a substantially increased effort might be both possible and desirable. (We are already utilizing Australian assistance in our program for educating Asians on the meaning of a Chinese nuclear capability.)

5. Expanding Non-Military Cooperation. The following additional actions should be taken:

a. Creation of a small unit within AID, or specific assignment to an existing unit, of responsibility for giving impetus to regional possibilities latent in existing aid programs, identifying possibilities for useful regional conferences and arranging for feasibility studies of possible binational and multinational projects.

b. Provision

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b. Provision of more funds for travel of U.S. officials within the area and establishment of a small field office in the area of South and Southeast Asia to provide staff assistance to our missions in the area in dealing with intra-regional problems and in identifying through active research, means of fostering limited bilateral or multilateral forms of non-military and military cooperation between Asian nations.

6. The Long-Run Future of the Republic of China. The possible use of its nuclear capability by Peiping in efforts to undermine the domestic and international political position of the GRC provides an additional reason for concerted long-term efforts to lay the basis in the GRC for a different vision of the future than return to the mainland. To this end we should continue to apply persistent pressure for political reform in Taiwan and for reduction in defense expenditures, with resources obtained from such reduction used for an expanded economic development effort.

In view of the likely adverse effects upon the GRC's international support and the additional problems that could be created

be created for the U.S. by such action once the ChiComs have a nuclear capability, the GRC should be discouraged from launching against the mainland more than small-scale raids of the general size of those undertaken in the past. We should, moreover, wherever possible strengthen our efforts to identify in advance (and if necessary take action to preclude) major GRC attacks.

At the same time the U.S. should be prepared to respond favorably in the post-detonation period to GRC requests for public statements of U.S. support of the GRC without, however, committing itself to defense of the offshores or to GRC return to the mainland.

7. UN Membership and Communication with Peiping. We should not

should not change our basic policy on UN membership and should confine any pressure upon the GRC to that necessary to obtain tactical adjustments in response to the changing situation in the UN. At the same time we should recognize that a Chinese nuclear capability will increase international pressure for establishing improved communication with the Peiping regime and should seek particular means of establishing such communication. We should also seek to make the U.S. and the international public more aware of the existence of the Warsaw talks as a means of communication between the U.S. and Communist China.

8. The Offshore Islands. No change in present policy on the offshore islands is recommended. Existing military contingency plans for possible first-use of nuclear weapons in defense of the offshores should be reviewed in the light of the effects of a ChiCom nuclear capability.

9. Test Ban and Disarmament. (Discussion: The three-environment nuclear test ban has strengthened our political position vis-a-vis Communist China and aligns us with a substantial majority of the countries of the world. To exploit this position and to offset the political liabilities of continued  
underground

underground testing and of France's failure to sign the treaty, we shall need to continue to seek a comprehensive test ban, to support additional non-proliferation measures, and to pursue broader approaches to disarmament. While withstanding pressures to admit Communist China to the UN, we shall also need to make clear that we are prepared to negotiate with Communist China on arms control and disarmament issues at such time as it may be inclined to do so on a serious basis.)

The U.S. should:

- a. Exploit the test ban agreement and any subsequent agreement on non-dissemination to isolate Communist China politically. While the U.S. should periodically indicate its interest in Chinese adherence, it should seek to have other nations apply primary pressures on the Chinese.
- b. In advance of a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation, make clear that we are prepared - indeed that we consider it important - to negotiate with Communist China on arms control and disarmament issues whenever it demonstrates a readiness to negotiate seriously. However, we should point out that Communist China's

present views

present views make it evident that such negotiations would not now be meaningful. If necessary, we should refer to our efforts at Warsaw to secure clarification of Communist China's inconsistent positions, and to promote arms control and disarmament objectives. We should stress our willingness to facilitate the adherence of Chinese Communist authorities to international agreements such as the test ban. Privately, we should explore now with other countries the circumstances and arrangements under which Communist China might at some point usefully be engaged in international arms control and disarmament negotiations.

- c. Develop the Asian components of the April 18, 1962 Outline Treaty or other arms control and disarmament arrangements which could be drawn upon in responding to Chinese Communist proposals and which might be used in any discussions of disarmament involving the Chinese.
- d. In channels such as future Warsaw meetings continue to explore the extent to which a basis exists for reaching

reaching understanding on arms control in Asia.

10. An Asian Nuclear Free Zone. The U.S. should not propose such a zone. In responding to proposals for an Asian denuclearized zone, the U.S. should make clear that it is prepared to consider such a denuclearized zone under the following circumstances: (1) where the zone is initiated by the countries in the area and is acceptable to them; (2) where the zone includes as many countries in the area as possible, in particular countries whose failure to participate might render a proposed arrangement infeasible; (3) where adequate provision is made for verification; and (4) under circumstances in which the zone would not upset the existing military balance or security arrangements in the area.\* We should also point out that in the case of an Asian denuclearized zone, consideration would have to be given to the question of Soviet nuclear power in Asia as well as to the participation of Communist China.

11. Asian Scientific Endeavors as Partial Offsets. We should continue to cooperate with the Japanese to the fullest extent

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\*In the event serious negotiations actually take place, the U.S. would need to take appropriate action, as feasible, to preserve its base and transit rights.

extent possible in such outer space endeavors as space communications and scientific exploration through launching of a Japanese satellite. We should discreetly encourage the Indians to give wide publicity in Asia to their planned Tarapur reactor (as well as their present outstanding nuclear research laboratory), and to build up the impression of Indian capabilities in the nuclear field by both general and specific offers of technical assistance in peaceful uses of atomic energy. (The Indian Government should be encouraged to seek ways to dramatize its offer of such assistance through speeches, statements and publications.) We should also press forward as rapidly as possible with provision of technical information and assistance for the proposed Japanese nuclear-powered ship and should continue to explore with Australia the possibilities of PLOWSHARE projects in Australia.\*

More generally, the U.S. should publicize, or support national efforts to publicize, the activities of non-Communist Asian nations in peaceful uses of atomic energy, contrasting them

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\*Earlier active interest in PLOWSHARE by Australia has considerably diminished, in some measure as a result of the nuclear test ban treaty which could inhibit use of PLOWSHARE for harbor development, a principal Australian possibility.

them with ChiCom weapons development. (Support and publicity for peaceful atomic research at Tsing Hua University in Taiwan will be useful in this connection.) Less spectacular efforts to demonstrate non-Communist Asian scientific and technical prowess - such as seaborne fairs demonstrating Japanese science and technology - should be encouraged.

12. Studies of ChiCom Vulnerabilities to Nuclear Attack and Capabilities for Conventional Attack. In order to reduce the possibility that non-Communist Asian leaders will underestimate the vulnerability of Communist China to nuclear attack and therefore tend to credit Peiping with greater willingness to assume military risks than is likely, the U.S. should prepare a quite specific and convincing statement of mainland China's vulnerability to nuclear attack. The statement should be provided confidentially to Asian countries on a selected basis and its substance should be made available to Communist China through intelligence channels. Similarly, a study of Communist China's conventional capability which would take account of economic weaknesses, limited logistics capabilities, effects of obsolescence, etc., should be prepared and made available to selected Asian leaders.

\*13. Japan

\*13. Japan. In order to help create the basis for a wider Japanese role in Asia, special efforts should be directed toward developing Japan's sense of national pride and its assurance of equal partnership. The U.S. should seek to consult with Japan on a wide range of matters not confined to Asia or to requests for Japanese action. The Chinese nuclear capability should be used in efforts to gain greater Japanese access to U.S. and Western markets as a part of a more general argument that such access is essential if Japan is to play, in the long term, a role as a counterweight to Communist China.

14. Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. Based upon the analysis of vulnerabilities and the probable character of Peiping's strategy, planning should be undertaken to determine what can be done to deal with probable Chinese pressures on these weak, hard-to-defend border states.

15. Laos. In determining future U.S. military actions in Laos, account should be taken of the fact that vigorous reaction to significant Communist military moves in the period before and following a nuclear detonation could be important in affecting Asian confidence in the post-detonation period.

16. Communist China

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\*Paragraphs 13-18 cover residual matters not dealt with under functional subject matter headings above.

16. Communist China. Propaganda directed toward the Chinese people should, inter alia, emphasize the futility of the government's advanced weapons program in military terms and its cost in specific terms to economic welfare. Such programs should also seek subtly to point out that Communist China may have exposed itself to additional dangers by developing nuclear arms.

17. The USSR. We should maintain communication with the Soviets in Asian crisis situations in the expectation that the continuing dependence of Communist China on the Soviet nuclear umbrella will give the USSR some residual influence over Peiping. We should, more generally, impress upon the Soviets the importance of seeking to insure that the Chinese do not miscalculate the significance of their limited capability. We should remain alert to the possible ways in which the USSR may cooperate with us to contain Communist China. At the same time we should anticipate that Soviet cooperation is more likely to be tacit than explicit and should ourselves avoid actions which would give significant credence to Chinese racialist arguments and appeals.

18. Program to

18. Program to Influence World Opinion. The effort, which is already proceeding, should be adjusted to take account of this policy statement. When approved, this policy statement, together with supporting analyses, should be widely circulated to U.S. missions abroad for guidance and background.

We should begin immediately to introduce into such educative efforts with Asian leaderships our estimates of the probability that Communist China will develop short or medium range missiles as well as nuclear devices in the foreseeable future. Otherwise this aspect of the Chinese capability may come as more of a shock than the nuclear detonation and the psychological effects may offset our playing down of the significance of a nuclear capability.

A particular effort should be made to make clear to the American people that the U.S. Government has thought out, and is acting upon, a well-defined program of limited measures appropriate to the character of the problem.

The people of certain countries (e.g., South Korea and Nepal) are particularly likely to be poorly informed in advance about the possibility and the significance of a Chinese Communist nuclear capability as well as about Communist China's economic failures. A special effort should therefore be made

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to reach them in U.S. information programs on both these subjects.

The U.S. Government reaction to a Chinese nuclear detonation should be sufficiently low key as not to suggest by sheer volume of activity and comment that the event is more important than is in fact the case. However, the content of our message is ultimately more important than the volume and we should not weigh concern about volume so strongly as to preclude action where a good case can be made on substantive grounds for the usefulness of action.

S/P: R.H. Johnson  
October 15, 1963

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Annex

The Problem of the Offshores Islands

in the Context of a Chinese Communist Nuclear Capability

The discussion that follows obviously falls short of a complete exposition of so complex a problem. It is focused upon the problem as it appears against the background of a Chinese Communist nuclear capability and supplements the discussion of this subject in the main body of the paper.

A. General Considerations

It would be as difficult to predict now the scenario of a possible new offshore islands crisis as it would have been to predict specific characteristics of the 1958 crisis in advance of its development. There are various hypothetical ways in which Peiping might exploit a nuclear capability for politically divisive effects. In the most general sense the very existence of a ChiCom nuclear capability would constitute a new background factor of some political significance however (or even whether) the ChiComs chose specifically to exploit it. For many in and out of the U.S. it will make a serious defense of the offshores seem less desirable than ever.

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More specifically, the Chinese might employ a nuclear weapon for a demonstration explosion in the Taiwan Straits area in the midst of an offshores crisis or they might strike the islands with missiles with HE warheads. Another possibility - although riskier and therefore less likely - might be conquest by Communist China of one of the lesser islands which they already have the ability to take employing only conventional weapons. The latter action, when taken under its alleged "nuclear umbrella" might serve the several purposes of demonstrating that the U.S. was a paper tiger, of producing maximum divisive effects in the U.S.-GRC relationship by attacking an area of least marginal significance and of setting off a major debate in the U.S. and between the U.S. and Europe with respect to our general policy toward the offshores and toward Taiwan itself. While the ChiComs could probably take one of the lesser islands now with some of this effect, effects could be significantly accentuated if taken against the background of a nuclear capability.

An intelligence estimate in 1961 concluded that the U.S. could probably force the GRC into withdrawal only if we convinced the leadership that we were prepared to use whatever

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means were necessary to force compliance - e.g., to curtail drastically, our economic, military and diplomatic support. GRC withdrawal from the offshores could produce profound shock in the GRC and could force evolution toward a different kind of government in Taiwan which was less stable and more corrupt but also more interested in the economic and political development of Taiwan itself. Alternative possible reactions suggested in the estimate were (a) an effort by Taipeh to reach an accommodation with Peiping on the best terms available; or (b) a desperation attack upon the mainland. Both possibilities were considered unlikely although the chances of a significant reaction of the former type may have increased somewhat since 1961.\*

Clearly it will be difficult indeed to effect any change in the present situation in the face of GRC resistance and domestic U.S. reaction. The discussion below summarizes briefly the advantages and disadvantages of alternative U.S. policies.

B. Alternative U.S. Policies with Respect to the Offshores

The discussion that follows puts the case for each of three alternative policies. The statement of the argument for each of the first two cases contains the argument against the opposite policy.

1. The case

\*NIE 43-61, June 20, 1961

1. The case for continuance of the present U.S. policy and posture. As argued in the main body of this paper, it is by no means certain that Communist China will, in fact, promote a new offshores crisis once it has a nuclear capability. As the paper suggests elsewhere, its nuclear capability will in some situations increase Peiping's sense of risk and therefore its caution because of the danger of provoking U.S. military action against the Chinese nuclear capability. This concern seems likely to be most prominent in situations like the offshores where Communist China might confront the U.S. directly. Such concern should also help reduce the risk of ChiCom military miscalculation in the event of an actual offshores crisis.

Realistically, the prospects for withdrawal by the GRC are very poor unless the U.S. is prepared to accept a really major crisis in U.S.-GRC relationships. Such a crisis could produce domestic U.S. counterpressures which would tend to nullify U.S. governmental pressures. The net effect might be to demonstrate U.S. impotence in dealing with a weak ally. Our real hope for change in the offshores must rest in a long-term change in GRC views in the post-Chiang period. Moreover, it is too late to take anticipatory action because general international awareness of the impending ChiCom nuclear detonation will tend to

will tend to cause the U.S. action to be interpreted as a reflection of U.S. concern over the military effects of a ChiCom capability. It is not clear what justification could be offered publicly for choosing the present time to put pressure on the GRC unless it is the Chinese nuclear capability. But to use that justification will create the impression that the U.S. does attribute real military significance to a ChiCom capability and that it recognizes some need to make a military accommodation to this capability. Alternatively, U.S. action might be viewed as an effort, in the "euphoria" of a post-test ban period, to seek a general easing of tensions with Communist China.

If U.S. pressures produce no withdrawal, the net effect may be to increase further the ambiguity of the U.S. commitment and to tempt the ChiComs to exploit the offshores situation.

More positively, it can be argued that, if we must have a nuclear confrontation with Communist China once it acquires a nuclear capability, the offshores are, relatively speaking a favorable place for such a confrontation. The GRC can be expected to stand firm under the nuclear threat and the other nations of Asia will have less reason than in the case of other possible forms of confrontation to fear that the situation will

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involve them in nuclear war. An offshores crisis might offer a better opportunity to the U.S. to demonstrate clearly its firmness and resolve in the period when the Chinese have a nuclear capability than does the U.S. response to the more ambiguous challenges of Communist-supported guerrilla wars. It can also be argued that the offshores, as a bit of Chinese irredenta, are a useful continuing irritant in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Finally, it can be argued that even a ChiCom nuclear capability need not create a political situation in which a failure to assist in defense of at least the lesser islands would significantly affect U.S. military credibility.

2. The case for pressure on the GRC for withdrawal.

Within this alternative there are at least two possible basic strategies. The first is a really serious effort to obtain GRC withdrawal. Such an effort might include withdrawal of U.S. support for GRC forces on the offshores and a request to Congress for a revision of the Congressional resolution on the Formosa Straits clearly to exclude the offshores from the U.S. defense commitment. It might also include proposals to the GRC for internationalization of the offshores or temporary U.S. commitments

U.S. commitments to defense during a period of gradual withdrawal. A second strategy might be premised upon the assumption that, while no U.S. pressure is likely to produce change in the GRC posture, it would be desirable for the U.S. to make a more limited effort with the GRC "for the record". In this case, the pressures on the GRC would consist wholly of a presentation of the politico-military problems that could be involved in staying on the offshores in the period when the ChiComs have a nuclear capability (including the problems involved in using nuclear weapons to defend the offshores should that prove necessary).

The principal advantage of a successful effort with the GRC would be the elimination of a possible source of great future political difficulty, though admittedly with some considerable immediate political costs. The longer-term political effects on Taiwan would not be entirely negative, however, if the intelligence estimate referred to above is correct - a crisis of this kind might produce a government in Taiwan oriented toward the economic and political development of Taiwan itself.

While it is impossible to predict that the ChiComs will  
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seek to exploit the offshores situation for political effect once they have a nuclear capability, to Peiping the divisive possibilities of explicit or implicit nuclear threats must look sufficiently inviting and the ultimate objective (control of Taiwan) sufficiently important that such exploitation is at least a possibility.

GRC withdrawal would eliminate an undesirable long-term military commitment. It can also be argued that, while a nuclear capability may very well increase Communist China's caution with respect to stimulating and exploiting an offshores crisis, there is at least a marginal chance that Peiping might miscalculate U.S. reactions and that an effort to exploit the offshores for political effect might in fact lead to a serious military confrontation involving risks for the U.S. which are disproportionate to the value of U.S. objectives in the offshores. More generally, a situation of close physical contact between hostile powers, one of which has nuclear arms and to both of which local objectives are more important than maintenance of peace and of a stable international order, inherently involves at least some dangers of possible miscalculation and escalation to broader conflict.

The offshores

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The offshores ought not to be viewed as a kind of Asian Berlin where periodic tests of will can demonstrate the West's determination and reduce the likelihood of Communist pressures elsewhere. The international support for the U.S. and GRC position in the offshores is nothing like the support for our basic Berlin position. Moreover, the fact that the U.S. prevails in a test of will in the offshores will obviously not substitute for successful resistance to more ambiguous Communist pressures that will certainly continue in Southeast Asia or elsewhere. Once the ChiComs have a nuclear capability it will be difficult, at least for some time to come, for the U.S. to do anything once a crisis begins, but to defend every island.

While public justification of pressure now may be difficult, it could be explained as an effort to eliminate an ambiguous U.S. commitment long recognized to be undesirable.

An attempt to obtain GRC withdrawal made "for the record" might help improve the U.S. political position both domestically and internationally in a future offshores crisis by making clear that the U.S. Government had anticipated the problem and attempted to avoid it by seeking GRC action. It could also increase somewhat U.S. freedom of action in such a crisis.

3. The case

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3. The case for and against a clear commitment to U.S. defense of the offshores. A request to Congress to clarify the Formosa Straits Resolution would, if successful, reduce such marginal possibilities as may exist for Chinese Communist military miscalculation. It would provide a much firmer U.S. political base for action to defend the offshores in the new political environment created by a ChiCom capability. It would provide reassurance to the GRC in the post-detonation period. It would clarify the U.S. intent to U.S. European allies. It would not wholly eliminate, but would probably reduce further, the possibility of ChiCom use of its nuclear capability for political purposes in the offshores.

On the other hand, such action would, contrary to U.S. interest, commit the U.S. indefinitely to defense of the offshores and eliminate any leverage the U.S. may have with the GRC on this issue. If unsuccessful, the effort might make the U.S. commitment even more ambiguous but might at the same time lay the basis for action some time in the future to eliminate the commitment.

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