

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	Komer to Bundy C 1 p <i>open 5-25-95 NLS 94-304</i>	4/6/65	A
#2 memcon	"Dinner Conversation with French Foreign Minister" C 4 p <i>sanitized 1-24-95 NLS 94-305</i> <i>Open 3/29/19 per RAC</i>	9/27/65	A
#3 memo	Research Memorandum REU-50 S 15 p <i>open 1-24-95 NLS 94-305</i>	9/2/64	A
#4 report	Intelligence Report S 7 p <i>open 3-17-95 NLS 94-306</i>	7/31/64	A
#5 report	Intelligence Report <i>open 3-17-95 NLS 94-306</i> S 8 p [Duplicate of #41, NSF, CF, France, Vol. 3, Box 170]	7/17/64	A
#6 memo	Read to Bundy C 1 p <i>open 1-24-95 NLS 94-305</i>	undated	A
#6a letter	De Gaulle to President PCI 1 p <i>open 5-25-95 NLS 94-305</i>	7/3/64	A
#7 cable	Bonn 42 <i>open 1-24-95 NLS 94-305</i> C 10 p [Duplicate of #95, NSF, CF, Germany, Vol. 4, Box 184]	7/6/64	A
#9 cable	Intelligence Information Cable <i>sanitized NLS 98-91 5-21-99</i> S 9 p <i>sanitized 3-17-95 NLS 94-306</i> [Duplicate of #41, NSF, CF, France, Vol. 2, Box 169]	5/15/64	A
#10 report	Intelligence Report <i>open 3-17-95 NLS 94-306</i> S 9 p [Duplicate of #56, NSF, CF, France, Vol. 2, Box 169]	5/1/64	A
#11 cable	Intelligence Information Cable <i>sanitized 3-17-95 NLS 94-306</i> S 4 p <i>same sanitization NLS 98-92 5-21-99</i> [Duplicate of #94, NSF, CF, France, Vol. 1, Box 169] <i>more info released 10-7-11 NLS/RAC 10-158(N94)</i>	3/4/64	A
#12 cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 4 p <i>sanitized 3-17-95 NLS 94-306</i> <i>same sanitization NLS 98-92 5-21-99</i>	2/27/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Files of Robert W. Komer, "France-1964-1966 (March)"

Box 20

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April 6, 1965

Mac -

Just in case you all missed Paris 5574 attached, French effort to buy 50,000 tons of uranium from Canada without safeguards seems worrisome. I gather we've been trying to thwart this deal for years, but French sound awfully optimistic.

RWK

cc: Spurgeon Keeny
Chuck Johnson

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-304
By ing, NARA, Date 5-9-95

(Drafting Office and Officer)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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SecDel/MC 9

October 7, 1965

Part I of VI

RECEIVED
MCGEORGE

Memorandum of Conversation

Secretary's Suite

Waldorf Towers

Approved in S 10/6/65

1965 OCT 8 PM 4 40

Ret'd BKS
10/11/65

DATE: September 27, 1965

8:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Dinner Conversation with French Foreign Minister (Algeria)

French Side:

PARTICIPANTS: Couve de Murville
Ambassador Alphand
Claude Lebel,
F.O. Press Spokesman
Jacques de Beaumarchais,
Director of Cabinet
for Foreign Minister

COPIES TO:

U.S. Side

The Secretary
Ambassador Thompson
Ambassador Bohlen
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.,
Dep. Asst. Sec., EUR

1 - to Mr. [unclear]
2 - [unclear]

S/S

AF

White House.

FE

G

S/P

Amembassy PARIS

S/AL

INR

Amembassy MOSCOW

EUR

CIA

Amembassy ALGIERS

The conversation at dinner was general and discussion of substantive matters was limited. Couve seemed relatively relaxed and affable, but he was not disposed to get into political questions. The following subject was touched upon.

Algeria

The Secretary asked Couve for his assessment of Boumedienne's position. Couve said he found it difficult to answer this question since there is really no political life, as such, in Algeria. At least it appears that Boumedienne is firmly anti-Communist. Couve mentioned that the Foreign Minister, Bouteflika, is close to Boumedienne and seems to be a reasonable person. His main interest at the moment is in pushing for the Afro-Asian Conference, scheduled to be held in Algiers this fall. Couve doubted that the conference actually would be held and saw little purpose in it in view of the divisions in the Afro-Asian world. If it does take place, he thought it would be primarily an arena for a clash between the Soviets and the Chinese Communists.

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Authority PAC 0324-20-2-12

By Jpw VARA Date 2-9-18

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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SecDel/MC 9
October 7, 1965

Part II of VI

Memorandum of Conversation
McGEORGE LUNDY'S OFFICE

Secretary's Suite
Waldorf Towers

Approved in S 10/6/65

1965 OCT 8 PM 4 40

DATE: September 27, 1965
8:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Dinner Conversation with French Foreign Minister (Pakistan-India)

French Side:

U.S. Side

PARTICIPANTS: Couve de Murville
Ambassador Alphand
Claude Lebel,
F.O. Press Spokesman
Jacques de Beaumarchais,
Director of Cabinet
for Foreign Minister

The Secretary
Ambassador Thompson
Ambassador Bohlen
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.
Dep. Asst. Sec., EUR

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The conversation at dinner was general and discussion of substantive matters was limited. Couve seemed relatively relaxed and affable, but he was not disposed to get into political questions. The following subject was touched upon.

Pakistan-India

The Secretary indicated that we were giving consideration to the problem of resuming aid to Pakistan and India, but he stressed the difficult mood of the U.S. Congress in this regard. In response to a query for French views, Couve merely said he thought the matter might well be postponed for a few months until the situation became clearer.

On the subject of Kashmir itself, the Secretary speculated whether it would be useful to think in terms of the four Security Council powers (U.S., France, U.K., and the Soviet Union) undertaking some kind of a joint effort. Couve avoided a direct response. He commented that, in general, he felt that the most preferable solution might be an independent Kashmir, but he doubted if the Indians could be brought to accept this. He found that the

Indians

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Indians were unwilling to discuss anything implying a change in the status quo and he complained that the French have been unable to find any Indians at the UN with whom to talk regarding the problem. Couve was pessimistic about finding a solution to Kashmir and said that if there is no action on the problem he anticipated that the war between Pakistan and India might resume.

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October 7, 1965

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation
Part III OF VICE GEORGE CONDY'S OFFICE
Secretary's Suite
Waldorf Towers

Approved in S 10/6/65

1965 OCT 8 PM 4 40

DATE: September 27, 1965
8:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Dinner Conversation with French Foreign Minister (Maldives Islands)

French Side:

U.S. Side

PARTICIPANTS: Couve de Murville
Ambassador Alphand
Claude Lebel,
F.O. Press Spokesman
Jacques de Beaumarchais,
Director of Cabinet
for Foreign Minister

The Secretary
Ambassador Thompson
Ambassador Bohlen
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.,
Dep. Asst. Sec., EUR

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NEA

The conversation at dinner was general and discussion of substantive matters was limited. Couve seemed relatively relaxed and affable, but he was not disposed to get into political questions. The following subject was touched upon.

Maldives Islands

Couve said that the French agreed with U.S. reservations concerning the admission of small units to the UN, like the Maldives Islands. He noted that the French and the U.S. were the only two countries to adopt such a position. In discussing future problems in this area, Couve remarked that if present trends continue, the two French island groups of Maritius and Seychelles could be candidates for membership.

Alphand commented jokingly that the more tiny members admitted to the UN, the greater would be the power of the Security Council.

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

NDY-SMITH

ALEXANDER

BATOR

BELK

BRUBECK

CHAMBERLAIN

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JEFFREY

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KENNEDY

LENN

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MOODY

REEDY

SAUNDERS

SAYRE

SMITH, WM.

13



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Director of Intelligence
and Research

Research
Memorandum

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes

Thomas L. Hughes

Subject: De Gaulle at Bay?

REL-50, September 2, 1964

"And the light shineth in darkness and
the darkness comprehended it not."

John, I, 5.

President de Gaulle's press conference of July 23 contained no startling policy strokes (which are, in fact, much more the exception than the rule in these semi-annual performances) and no important shifts in policy line. The statement, nevertheless, provides clues to the mood in which de Gaulle views both the state of the world today and the progress which he has made in bringing his own policies to realization.

ABSTRACT

President de Gaulle's main foreign policies remain unchanged. He continues to work for a French-led Western European bloc, based on a close Franco-West German entente, which will become an equal partner with the United States within the Western alliance and will remain a part of that alliance for as long as the Soviet menace makes American military support indispensable to Europe. Later, this grouping is intended to serve as the Western entity which will engage in negotiations with Moscow for the settlement of European problems, including those related to Germany, deriving from the post-World War II split between East and West.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-305

By ijp, NARA, Date 1-20-95

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GROUP 3

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SEP 8 1964

In contrast to the reasonably confident and satisfied tone of his earlier statements, de Gaulle on July 23 publicly enumerated some of the difficulties he has met in implementing these policies. Above all, having put all of his European eggs into the German basket, he explicitly recognized that he has not yet succeeded in getting Bonn to follow his lead, especially in the supremely important sphere of European relations with the United States. While this complaint was made with the purpose of helping Erhard's "Gaullist" critics in Germany and putting pressure on the German government to move more closely toward France, it also revealed both de Gaulle's willingness to acknowledge a degree of French isolation and his impatience at the failure of the Germans and other Europeans to accept his reading of and leadership in world affairs.

These and other passages of this press conference seem not only like attempts to convert people but also, and perhaps even more, like the repetition of a lecture by an exasperated teacher to unheeding pupils. The tone and content of this statement raise the question of whether de Gaulle may not, if his initiatives remain frustrated, move toward still greater isolation, either in the expectation that history will soon confirm his judgments and vindicate his fundamental lines of policy or in the resigned belief that the world is beyond saving. In either case, since much (though not all) of de Gaulle's interest in the Atlantic alliance and the European communities is related to the needs of his present German policy, this trend might lead to increasing and possibly abrupt disengagements from or curtailments of French commitments.

Such a development might or might not include a more positive component, a politique de rechange or search for an alternative course. Improvement of

relations with the United States and the United Kingdom would seem to be excluded, virtually by definition. A more plausible possibility would be some kind of rapprochement with the Soviet Union. The success of this policy would depend, of course, on Moscow. But any such moves by de Gaulle would be more a sign of failure than a real policy success since, in his own analysis, the continued division of Western Europe, which the abandonment of his German policy would imply, would perpetuate the domination of the continent by the two superpowers.

At the moment it would seem that de Gaulle is far from having reached this point of desperate choice, and he may never reach it. There are many fluid factors in the German, European and world situations which, in his view, no doubt offer promise for the success of his established policies. Yet it cannot be assumed that he will pursue the same policies indefinitely if they meet insuperable opposition. In particular, it is possible, though not yet probable, that the crisis of Franco-West German relations will come sooner rather than later (as, for example, in the general period highlighted by the establishment of the Multilateral Force). Therefore, it will be critically important henceforth to try to recognize the signs within de Gaulle's statements and actions which point to the abandonment rather than the reaffirmation of his established policies.

De Gaulle's Foreign Policy. Since this paper deals less with policy initiatives or shifts than with moods and tones, it will be useful to review the main lines of Gaullist foreign policy as they have evolved since 1958 and as they stand today.* Overall, de Gaulle finds that the continued existence of two great blocs dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union is no longer necessary for the security of the other members of those blocs or favorable to their interests. The French, and European, need for American protection against the Soviet threat is thus diminishing (or, at any rate, changing form, for de Gaulle believes that Europe can continue to enjoy American guarantees against Soviet aggression--such as they are in a period of the "balance of terror"--without accepting what he considers to be American political domination). The European states, once again stable, wealthy and productive, can therefore again play a major independent role in world affairs; indeed, they must do so if their interests and their very identities are to be preserved.**

De Gaulle's present primary purpose is, therefore, to organize a Western European bloc which, while remaining allied with the United States for as long as the Soviet threat persists, will nevertheless be an equal and not a dependent ally and which will pursue its own policies throughout the world. This grouping is not to include Great Britain, which has consistently chosen (not to de Gaulle's surprise) to maintain its "special tie" with the United States. The indispensable core of the bloc consists for de Gaulle, in fact, of France and West Germany--the two real European power centers which together have the wherewithal to play a world power role. For many reasons which de Gaulle sees as self-evident--among others the division of Germany and its recent history--only France, a "world", as well as a nuclear power, can lead this European bloc.

In de Gaulle's thinking this powerful Western European bloc is to be a confederation of sovereign states loosely grouped around France. He rejects the "integration" of Europe into a new federal state for several reasons: because he is opposed to what he feels would amount to the concomitant destruction both of the existing nation states and of the strong, morale-building national sentiments of their peoples; because he thinks an "integrated" Europe would not create a new European nationalism, but only an apatride technocracy prey to "outside" (American) control; because he believes the nation states will not, in any case, abandon political sovereignty in the foreseeable future;

* Our most recent overall analysis of these policies remains, in our judgment, valid (see RM-REU-28, "De Gaulle's Foreign Policy: 1964," April 20, 1964).

** De Gaulle's ambitions for Europe are not modest. In 1960 he said that "Europe...by confederating its nations, can and must--for the sake of mankind--become the greatest political, economic, military and cultural power that has ever existed."

and because he hopes that a loosely organized, autonomous Western Europe will eventually be able to establish close ties with the Communist states of Eastern Europe, which the Soviet Union would never allow to enter into a tight Western grouping closely linked to the United States.

This last point is particularly important, for de Gaulle looks forward to a time when the Soviet Union will be disposed to settle outstanding problems in Europe. At that time he wants Western Europe itself and not the United States to be the principal interlocutor of Moscow. If Europe and the world are physically threatened, he would say, by Soviet-American conflict, they are threatened hardly less, in a political sense, by a future Soviet-American settlement--a "new Yalta"--which would divide the world, and Europe, between the two superpowers.

The heart of Gaullist foreign policy is thus in Europe. But, in addition to the traditional French interest in Africa, another element has been emphasized in the last 18 months or so. De Gaulle has rather suddenly reasserted France's interest in Southeast Asia and has undertaken new activity in Latin America and other areas for which he had hitherto shown little concern. In principle, de Gaulle has aimed at, and to some extent succeeded in assuming, a sort of moral leadership of the "third world," which he encourages to disassociate itself from the two "blocs" and "to be itself." This element of his policy fits well with his European views, for the gradual "subtraction" of successive areas of the world from cold war competition (a process called "neutralization" in some cases) can be seen as leading eventually to the removal of Europe itself from this competition and, thereby, to the end of the cold war (inasmuch as the US and the USSR would then have nothing to fight over and nothing which they could hope to divide between themselves and to dominate). At the same time, the added emphasis placed on this policy line since mid-1963 probably arises from a certain disappointment with the lack of progress of the Gaullist policies in Europe and, particularly, with the failure of the Franco-German ties to develop as planned. On the one hand, de Gaulle may hope to earn laurels on distant fields and return reinforced to Europe; on the other, he may not be unwilling to try to conceal his lack of success near to home by exotic journeyings.

Against the background of this foreign policy, of which, as observed above, the main lines remain intact, the press conference of July 23 was notable in two respects: 1) the acceptance and even advertisement of the lack of French success in Europe, hitherto glossed over; and 2) the sharp and hortatory tone in which de Gaulle presented his ideas including, in particular, his by now familiar analysis of the relations between Western Europe and the United States.

France and West Germany. De Gaulle's European policy has been open and above board as compared to his tortuous maneuverings on the Algerian problem between 1958 and 1962. He has set forth what he thinks and wants and has gone after it directly. He has, in effect, tried to end what he considers American management of European political affairs. He has aimed at excluding Great Britain from close continental associations as disqualified, by self-choice, if not by nature, to participate. He has maintained, at the same time, that the Soviet Union has not yet demonstrated a willingness to engage in serious political talks on European problems and that attempts to deal with the USSR on such matters now could only weaken the Western alliance. At the same time, he has disparaged the smaller European states on many occasions and personally affronted their leaders. In this way he has openly denied himself maneuverability and ended up with all of his European eggs in the West German basket.

This policy, frank but without finesse, has led de Gaulle to his present predicament of finding France to a considerable extent isolated in Europe now that the Germans have failed to align their policies with his. It has never been quite clear how he expected to succeed in Germany, particularly after Adenauer left office. However, since it is self-evident to him that France and Germany, for geographical and historical reasons, have more in common with each other than either has with the United States and that, therefore, their defense and foreign policies should coincide, he probably overestimated the degree to which this would also be self-evident to the Germans. Probably, too, he overestimated the real political value of his triumphant tour of the Federal Republic in September 1962. In addition, he most likely thought that the Germans would be more alarmed at the evolution of Soviet-American relations toward a lessening of tensions than they have in fact been.

At any rate, after blandly praising the state of Franco-German relations as late as his January 1964 press conference, he openly admitted on July 23 that they were not what they should be and that the French and German governments, for all their many meetings and consultations, had not reached common policies in major problems. Indeed, he even emphasized this fact by cataloguing the issues, large and small, on which the two governments do not agree. These charges boil down finally to the complaint that the Federal Republic does not believe that its policy should be "European and independent"---independent, that is, of the United States.

It is improbable that these words mean that de Gaulle is already writing off West Germany. He cannot afford to accept such a defeat lightly. Without the Federal Republic he cannot build the Western European bloc which he needs to reinforce France's world power role. There is no real substitute for Bonn. A French-led bloc of all the smaller countries of Western Europe, even if it were conceivable, would not match the power potential of France and West Germany together. A Franco-Russian alliance against Germany has historic roots in French thinking and might appeal to de Gaulle. But, even if the Russians were willing, this would not serve de Gaulle's basic purposes very well. In his eyes a Franco-Soviet alliance confronting an Anglo-American-German alliance would mean, not the independence of Europe from the "blocs" but its continued division between them and hence its continued political impotence.

This would be a defeat, not a success, for Gaullist policy, and at best a screen behind which to hide his failure and isolation.

De Gaulle thus has most compelling reasons for avoiding any step which would go beyond the mere exertion of pressure on the Bonn government to the point of embroiling him seriously with the Germans (such as withdrawing the two French divisions from Germany or recognizing the East German regime). It is most probable that his actions in the immediate future will be aimed at bringing Germany to his side rather than at liquidating his pro-German policy and seeking some kind of substitute for it.

It must still be recognized that this is easier said than done, and one of the General's problems is to analyze domestic German political trends accurately so that he may choose the most appropriate tactical approach to serve his ends in the Federal Republic. Earlier this year there seemed to be signs that de Gaulle had decided that those in Germany who advocated a "hard" line toward the Soviet Union (Adenauer, Strauss, etc.) were not going to prevail. Therefore he seemed to consider adopting a more "flexible" approach to the USSR, toward which his attitude is, of course, in large part, a function of his needs in Germany. If, in effect, the Germans wanted "movement," even at some risk to their own interests (regarding, e.g., Berlin or unification), why should he, de Gaulle, be more German than they?

There is reason to think, however, that de Gaulle may have concluded after his last trip to Bonn, if not earlier, that the "party of movement" is not necessarily going to win after all.* He may believe that the offensive of the so-called German "Gaullists" within the CDU/CSU--the limited extent of whose "Gaullism," incidentally, he may well not understand--against Chancellor Erhard's foreign policy may at the least force the latter to modify his line, after the German national elections of September 1965 if not before. In this context his strictures on July 23 against current German policy would have been aimed in large part at helping this along.

Nevertheless, a more sinister note in the press conference, which implies a threat as much as it reflects pressure, cannot be overlooked. De Gaulle said that if Franco-German relations do not go forward, there is a risk that "doubt" will arise among the French and "uneasiness" among the Germans. Further, he said that while France was sufficiently strong and solid today to be able to be patient in pursuit of its policies, there might occur "great external changes which would put everything into question and could lead her, thereby, to modify her orientation." This seems to be a blunt admonition to the Germans not to

* De Gaulle must also consider whether the Soviet Union seems disposed to deal with him on behalf of Western Europe. The creation of the Western European bloc would oblige it to do so, but the failure of this bloc to come into being so far raises an impediment. De Gaulle would gain little by countenancing "movement" when nothing was to be had from the Russians or, even worse for him, if they preferred to deal directly with Bonn (in addition to Washington), but not Paris.

take France for granted and a warning that, in circumstances to be defined by de Gaulle as the occasion suits him, France's basic orientation--her membership in the Western alliance against the Soviet Union--might be re-examined. This threat, like the one mentioned above, is no doubt meant primarily to have its effect in Bonn. But it obliges us to consider the circumstances in which de Gaulle might finally wash his hands of the West Germans, and thereby of his present European policy which is based on them.

Certainly de Gaulle cannot be expected to cling to his present German line indefinitely in the face of constant public rebuffs from Bonn--rebuffs which, however, he risks inviting by his own recent attitude. He is probably inclined not to make any major change in his German policy at least until after the next German elections, a year hence, in the hope that once Erhard has won power for his party its need for him as Chancellor will be diminished and his opponents will be able either to oust him or to modify his foreign policy. His own re-election strategy in December 1965 could also be a restraining factor in scheduling his actions. Nevertheless, continued, systematic German denunciation of French policies might push de Gaulle near to or over the brink of tolerance.

Continued, systematic German endorsement of American policies might also do as much. In particular, the question of the Multilateral Force might become critical in this connection. The French have said officially that they understand Germany's reasons for wanting to join the M.L.F. But these statements may have been based on the assumption that the force would never come into being. If this expectation is not borne out, de Gaulle might come to consider the birth of the M.L.F. as the symbolic culmination of West Germany's incorrigible pro-American orientation. Although this itself might lead him to reformulate basic French policies, it would seem improbable that the immediate effect would be so drastic, since much opportunity for maneuvering among European countries and the United States would still remain open in the politico-military field.*

* Indeed, while German participation in the M.L.F. would provide key evidence of the non-Gaullist state of mind of German policymakers, it need not by itself mark an end to all hopes in Paris of eventual success for intimate Franco-German collaboration. De Gaulle would note that the M.L.F. does not resolve the basic problems in the relationship of the nations of Western Europe and the United States. He might reason that its existence might show the Germans and others sooner than otherwise would be the case that they are not being given a real nuclear role by the Americans. By that time the French force de dissuasion would be more of a reality than at present and could be "offered" in some form to France's European partners, whose nuclear appetites would have been whetted but still not satisfied. We are not aware, incidentally, that any such offer has yet been made. But whatever the hints which French officials may have heretofore given to the Germans about technical and financial collaboration in building the French nuclear force, these were probably intended more to consolidate French-German political ties and to divert Bonn from joining the M.L.F. than to gain additional resources for the French effort (which is not in urgent need of such help). The French can play this card again and in varying forms, even after the M.L.F. is created. (See RM-REU-46, "France, Europe and the United States: Five Months Later," June 19, 1963).

How Might French Policy be Reoriented? Even though it is probably safe to anticipate no early reorientation of de Gaulle's basic policies, the prospect is not so remote as to make it unnecessary to consider what the nature of such a reorientation might be if it were ever to be undertaken. In this respect, France's relations with NATO, the European Communities and the Soviet Union merit some attention.

Much, though not all, of de Gaulle's interest in the Atlantic alliance and the European Communities since he resumed power in 1958 has stemmed from his realization of the fact that these organizations were of crucial importance to the Germans. The Communities, in particular, offered him a ready-made opportunity to attempt to develop a Western European political grouping of the same six states. If, however, he decides that the Germans are not going to enter into his plans, what attitude will he then assume towards these organizations? French cooperation with and even membership in them would undergo serious strain.

In NATO, de Gaulle might reduce French military participation yet farther (e.g., withdraw some or all of his troops in Germany). He might, of course, do no less in any case, since he is apparently following a tactic of "Chinese water torture" on the United States with the aim, among others, of bringing the latter to negotiate the reorganization of the alliance on terms favorable to France.* But under the hypothesis being considered here, de Gaulle would be likely to drastically reduce or terminate France's ties to NATO only if he went on from the political rupture with Bonn to reach the conclusion (however he justified it) that the Soviet danger had passed. De Gaulle, who has continued to maintain the contrary, would hesitate to leave an alliance the necessity for which he still frequently proclaims. Under this "catastrophic" hypothesis such a reversal cannot be excluded, but it does not necessarily follow from the breakdown of Franco-German ties. The line de Gaulle would choose to follow or be able to develop in these circumstances vis-a-vis Moscow (see below) could be critical in determining the attitude he would take toward NATO.

Similarly, France has a great economic stake in the European Communities and strong pressures would be brought to bear on de Gaulle not to tamper with them, whatever happens to his German policy. He has, of course, no intrinsic love for these organizations, and such interest as he has taken in them has been closely linked to his German policy. Would he risk weakening France's economy, on which, he has often said, its grandeur rests, by trying to break up the Communities in order to "punish" the Germans? More probably, he would try to stop the forward progress of the EEC (including, perhaps, the advent of qualified majority voting in 1966), fight hard for French interests within it, but not attempt to go backward. (Again, it should be noted, he may embark on this course of harassment no matter what his attitude to Bonn.)

Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded that de Gaulle might relish some kind of crisis with and within the EEC. He might think that there is political mileage for him at home (especially prior to the December 1965 Presidential election)

* See RM REU-31, "French Military Participation in NATO," May 31, 1964.

in an all-out nationalist and "anti-European" campaign, for most of the opposition parties and leaders are or claim to be staunch "Europeans." De Gaulle likes to choose the ground for competition with his opponents, and the European Communities could fall victim to his politics. This would be risky on his part, and might create a political crisis in France which he would not be able to master. But this is no argument against his judging the contrary and proceeding accordingly. To repeat, this does not seem to be his more likely course, but it is in the realm of possibility and, at the least, it is certain that de Gaulle would feel more uninhibited in his dealings with the EEC without the preoccupation of German attitudes weighing on him, if he had by then abandoned his courtship of Bonn.

Whatever de Gaulle's attitude and actions toward NATO and the EEC following the collapse of his hopes for an entente with Bonn, France would be in effect politically isolated in Europe. The general tendency of its policy would be toward disengagement and a retrenchment of commitments. This might--or might not--be accompanied by an attempt to reach some kind of understanding with the Soviet Union.

It is important to distinguish in principle between two sets of circumstances in which de Gaulle might make an approach to Moscow (distinguishing them in fact may not be simple). As discussed above in relation to his German policy, he might at some point decide to establish a closer and more active political contact with the USSR because 1) he had accepted the fact that he could attempt to lead West Germany only by encouraging it in its policy of "movement" toward the East; and 2) he had decided that the Soviet government would not rebuff his approach. An "opening" toward Moscow of this type certainly cannot be excluded from the possibilities of Gaullist diplomacy, but it would not signal any major overall shift away from his German-oriented policy. A trip to the USSR in this context might seem to de Gaulle a useful buttress to his European policy by recovering for France some of the maneuverability in Europe which he has so calmly given up hitherto.*

But de Gaulle might also approach Moscow in a very different spirit. If he were finally to conclude that he could not organize Western Europe as he wished because the Germans would not concur, it is possible, to put the matter in an extreme and schematic form, that he would wish to cover his isolation in Western Europe and his disengagement from Western organizations by some kind of arrangement with the Soviet Union, which would ostensibly reestablish France's entire independence of action.

For whatever reason he approached Moscow, de Gaulle would have to be careful not to expose himself to a Soviet rebuff. To de Gaulle the Soviet signature of the test ban treaty in 1963 signified that the USSR wishes to deal with Washington and not Paris on European problems. It is one thing for the General to hope finally to force the Russians to come to terms with an organized, independent Western Europe which would no longer allow Washington to negotiate for it. This presupposes the success of his German and European policies. It

* Such a trip, or even the announcement of it, would also be useful for his reelection campaign in 1965 by maintaining his domestic image as a mover in foreign policy and, incidentally, undercutting Communist opposition to him.

is another thing to go alone to Moscow because of the evident failure of these policies. What reception would he meet? Does he think that he might persuade the Russians that a French-led Europe is after all more compatible with Russia's real interests than an American-led Europe?

He would probably count on an abiding Soviet dislike, if not indeed fear, of a united Western Europe linked to the United States, and he might judge that the USSR would be tempted to pay a substantial price in terms of accommodating French interests and enhancing France's status as a world power if the quid pro quo were a massive breakup of Western solidarity. This would be particularly true, he might think, if he ever made up his mind to recognize the East German regime and, thereby, to promote the more or less permanent division of Germany.

There is no present indication that de Gaulle is willing now to pay such a price for some kind of arrangement with the Soviet Union or indeed, as discussed above, that he feels any need to do so.* Despite his jabs at the Germans and his warnings, de Gaulle probably does not consider the alternatives to his present policies to be sufficiently inviting--or the difficulties in the way of their realization sufficiently overwhelming--to lead him to abandon them without further struggle. He knows that without German concurrence his present European policy collapses, but he still gives no sign that he will try to widen his area of maneuver vis-a-vis the Federal Republic by early approaches to London, Washington or Moscow. Pending Bonn's concurrence or, alternatively, pending his own decision that this concurrence is not to be had, de Gaulle seems prepared to wait, to continue to proclaim the verities of political life--even though no European government agrees--and to pursue lively but basically secondary diversions or side channels in Latin America, Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe.

A channel to Eastern Europe has opened up only in recent weeks with the visit of the Rumanian delegation to Paris. It was striking that throughout 1963 and early 1964, when France was developing interest in remote areas of the globe, nothing was being done about Eastern Europe, even though the French have traditionally considered it a major sphere of interest and even though, as noted above, it plays an important part in de Gaulle's European vision. While exhorting Asians, Africans and Latin Americans to emancipate themselves from the two blocs, de Gaulle has seemed much more reserved in approaching the actual members of the Soviet bloc in Europe. Perhaps this restraint has arisen from a feeling that the liberation of the Eastern European states and their "return to Europe" could be accomplished only with the consent of the Soviet Union and not against it. De Gaulle no doubt thinks that the inherent facts of nationalistic pressures will finally oblige the USSR to release these states from its control, but he probably also believes that he can do little to speed that day--except to build the kind of Western European grouping, free of American control, with which the Russians, in due course, will not fear to

* In fact, a recent report indicates that the General sees no point in entering into serious explorations with Moscow as long as the USSR clings to such unreasonable objectives as an all-Communist Germany.

see their erstwhile satellites eventually associate themselves. It is as if de Gaulle believed that Latin America, for example, has the ability to "free" itself from American "hegemony" if only it had the will, whereas the Eastern European states have the will but not yet the ability to escape Soviet domination.

At any rate, the visit of the Rumanian government delegation to Paris opens a new chapter in French relations with Eastern Europe. The two sides in these talks were careful to keep them within prudent bounds, and the results were not sensational. But more of the same seems probable in the months to come. These states are important to de Gaulle and, without challenging or frightening the Soviet Union, he will do what he can to encourage their looking Westward. In this modest way, at least, de Gaulle may seek to build up a certain leverage vis-a-vis West Germany, inasmuch as Franco-Polish meetings, for example, will touch closely upon certain problems of interest to Bonn in a way that Franco-Rumanian talks can hardly do.

If all goes well and if, particularly, the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe weakens, de Gaulle may hope to develop by means of the Eastern European states a degree of the maneuverability which he has, seemingly, chosen to neglect in Western Europe. Only if the Paris-Bonn link should founder entirely would a politique de rechange, i.e. a reorientation of a much more traditional and fundamental kind, loom up behind it in the form of an entente between France and Germany's eastern neighbors, including the USSR itself. But this, it must be repeated, would mark the failure of de Gaulle's attempt to organize Western Europe under French leadership. A Europe in which France and Germany are at odds cannot, in de Gaulle's own analysis, play the world role which he seeks for the continent. Hence, he is not likely to abandon his present policy without further struggle.

The Prophet Scorned. The July 23 press conference contains much material which de Gaulle has set forth many times before. Discussions of the need for Europe to organize itself, to develop its own policies and to shake off what he calls the "domination" or "hegemony" of the United States, have provided much of the subject matter of his past speeches and press conferences. What is striking now is the sharpness of language de Gaulle uses. Thus, while calling for continued alliance between Europe and America against the Soviet threat, de Gaulle seems to equate the two "superpowers" when he castigates those Frenchmen who desire the "effacement of France under the hegemony of one or another foreign state," by which he means the Communists on the one hand and the pro-Atlantic French "integrationists" on the other. He speaks plainly of an American "protectorate" of Europe, charges the US with intervening in Korea and the Congo behind a United Nations facade; mockingly cites the aversion which the US feels "to all colonial activity which is not its own;" notes the "natural desire of so powerful a people [the Americans] to gain new positions for themselves" and their decision "to take our place in Indochina;" and presents a tendentious and anti-American account of events in that country since 1954.

It has been noted elsewhere that de Gaulle, in his desire to reinflate French morale and self-reliance after the disaster of 1940, has tended in his speeches to harp on French nationalism and independence to a point which he

must know to be exaggerated and somewhat at odds with the facts of today's interdependent world.* Since France happens to be an ally of the United States, it is obvious why de Gaulle, with these motives, centers his attacks on French relations with the US. The July 23 press conference, not for the first time, but with the form perhaps sharpened because the content has been so often repeated, carries this hortatory approach to a European as well as to a French audience. One has the feeling that much of this press conference, even more than its predecessors, is less an act to advance policy than it is the latest version of a well-worn lecture or sermon addressed to audiences that are not paying the proper attention. De Gaulle seems to be presenting a case here to stir the West Europeans from a lethargy and dependence on the United States which he considers dangerous not only for their interests but for their independence and self-identity. His sharp tone reflects both the depth of his feeling and his realization that his efforts to remedy this situation have not succeeded very well to date.

This press conference, indeed, perhaps signifies that, balked for the time as a man of action in Europe, de Gaulle is increasingly assuming another role, that of pater et magister, the teacher and preacher to an unheeding world. One has a vision of him, standing before a blackboard and attempting to show, for the hundredth time, that two and two make four, to pupils who are happily engaged in watching flashy new cars drive by on the street outside the classroom windows.

Citation has already been made of de Gaulle's comment on relations with Germany to the effect that France could afford to be patient in the pursuit of its goals. Perhaps his present mood is best summed up in these words from the press conference: "...across the world the force of things does its work." De Gaulle has certainly never been a man to doubt the rightness of his positions. Does he believe that history will in fact work out as he foresees and that the world will evolve as he wishes? Does he believe, on the contrary, that, though this would happen if the people would listen to him, they will in fact not listen and will therefore go down to perdition in blindness? Does he see himself as a prophet who rightly foretells times to come or as prophet of a salvation to which he can point but to which he will not, in the end, be able to lead a recalcitrant world? No answer is yet possible.

None of this should be taken to mean that de Gaulle is desisting from pressing his foreign policy goals. On the contrary, it can be expected that he will continue to pursue them vigorously in the months to come. He may hope to get something like the "Fouchet plan" for European confederation back on the rails if, after the British elections, the smaller European states decide that the new British government will not give much support to their hopes for closer British political ties with the continent. The French game in Bonn is

* See RM REU-31, "French Military Participation in NATO," May 31, 1964.

More broadly, de Gaulle sees an active foreign policy and vigorous description of it to his fellow countrymen as a major basis of French national unity. In the first volume of his War Memoirs he writes of France that "only vast enterprises can compensate the ferments of dispersion which her people carry in themselves..."

far from being played out, since de Gaulle probably thinks that even if the German "Gaullists" do not force Erhard from office, they will at least be able to get him to draw his foreign policy closer to that desired by France. In Italy also, important political elements whose influence may increase in the future subscribe, in general, to Gaullist foreign policy theses. Moreover, various groups in all of the Western European countries are in favor of certain Gaullist policies, such as the recognition of Communist China and the neutralization of Southeast Asia (though with the curious result that his extra-European policies seem to be more popular than his broad program for Europe).

At the same time, de Gaulle's activities outside Western Europe are expanding. His contacts with Eastern Europe are just getting under way. His ties with and influence on the leaders of Francophone Africa remain great, and his diplomacy in regard to Indo-China is busy. Then there is also his impending visit (in September and October) to ten Latin American countries, and other visits are rumored. In any event, there is no likelihood that de Gaulle will neglect foreign policy initiatives as a part of his reelection campaign in 1965, and a triumphant reelection may, in turn, reinvigorate him in the same way as did his political victory in the autumn of 1962.

But all this does not conceal the lack of success of de Gaulle's principal policies, which he himself acknowledges in his seeming willingness to accept a certain degree of French isolation pending a more favorable atmosphere for his policies in Europe and in the increasing irritation with which he explains his version of the obvious to his European audience. De Gaulle is highly exasperated to find, after six years of effort on his part, that most of the European governments and, apparently, peoples do not seem to want to follow his lead in Europe's "declaration of independence" from the United States. He is not likely to admit to himself that his own tactics have had something to do with his failure, that many Europeans see little to be gained from replacing American leadership in Europe, not to mention American military protection, with French, and that the actual policies which he has so far offered to carry out for an "independent" Europe are less attractive to most Europeans than are those that the United States is now pursuing.

Insofar as he would not lay the blame for his difficulties on American manipulations, he would probably ascribe them to a "failure of nerve" on the part of his European contemporaries, to a kind of secession from history involving the pursuit of material well-being at the expense of higher values and interests. No doubt he fears that this virus may come to affect the French as well if, indeed, it has not already done so.

In this mood may de Gaulle conclude at some point that his main goals will never be reached, or at least not in the reasonable future? Will he not be tempted, in this case, to retire yet farther into a kind of isolation, to set forth his ideas with less and less hope of their being realized in his lifetime and, consequently, to attempt less and less actually to carry them out? Yet, if he acts with less and less diplomacy, and preaches with more and more stridency, his chances of success will decline even more, so that the process will become something of a downward spiral. One wonders how far this spiral might eventually carry him. Would he, for example, continue the

flirtation with the "third world" on which large sums are now being expended? To what end?

The idea of "la France seule" which lies at the end of this trail probably has a psychological attraction for de Gaulle, who is the antithesis of a team player. Certainly isolation must seem more desirable to him than falling in with other people's designs and policies that are contradictory to his own. A man who knows he is right, but who realizes that he is not being heeded, might well, particularly as he ages, assign himself the role of a prophet crying in the wilderness. Such an attitude could, if it developed, have wide policy implications, implying, at the least, successive disengagements and retrenchments, but also, perhaps, far-reaching and radical initiatives, little meshed to finite and at least theoretically realizable policies, though highly dangerous to other leading Western countries.

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SPECIAL REPORT

THE SUCCESSION PROBLEM IN FRANCE

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-306
By lip, NARA, Date 3-13-95

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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31 July 1964

THE SUCCESSION PROBLEM IN FRANCE

De Gaulle's speedy recovery from his prostate operation in April makes it more likely than ever that he will seek another term as president of France. Moreover, he may show greater interest than before in taking legal steps to guarantee the succession to a man of his own choice. Speculation on his successor has centered increasingly on Premier Georges Pompidou, although De Gaulle has long had a sympathetic attitude toward Henri d'Orleans, Count of Paris, the pretender to the French throne. If De Gaulle were to decide not to run again, Pompidou is the more likely choice to face the electorate in his own right.

De Gaulle's Plans

De Gaulle recently told his cabinet that, if health permits, he would seek re-election at the end of his present term in 1965. He will probably make a final decision to run again only if he thinks he will be able to serve a substantial part of the new term.

If this is his decision, De Gaulle may wish to sponsor new provisions in the constitution which would enable him to ensure that the man he wants takes over if he himself were to die or be incapacitated during his term of office. Under present law the president of the Senate, Gaston Monnerville, would succeed on an interim basis and be required to hold a presidential election within 35 days. Despite his dislike for Monnerville, De Gaulle's reluctance to consider the succession problem has prevented any move to change the present system.

Now, however, De Gaulle might be ready to propose a widely discussed constitutional amendment making the premier the immediate successor if the president dies or resigns. Such an amendment could be made by referendum in 1965 and would have the effect of reserving the premiership for De Gaulle's chosen heir.

The Count of Paris

If De Gaulle is actually grooming the present premier as his successor, there is strong reason to believe that Pompidou is his second choice, after the Count of Paris. De Gaulle and the pretender have a striking similarity of views and outlook. In particular the count is favored in De Gaulle's eyes by his aloofness from the "old parties." Like De Gaulle, moreover, the count believes in the importance of "national legitimacy" and feels that institutions count for more than personalities.

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The 56-year-old pretender is a direct descendant of Louis Philippe, France's last reigning king (1830-1848). Until 1950, when claimants to the French throne were allowed to return to France, he spent most of his time in Belgium, Portugal, and Morocco. During World War II Henri apparently approached both Marshal Petain and De Gaulle in an effort to win recognition as head of the French Government. After the war, he made a brief effort to organize the French monarchists but broke with them when they opposed his relatively liberal ideas.

Since his return to France, the count has not actively engaged in politics, but he has been a frequent commentator on French policy. His views on many aspects of national and international policy seem to parallel closely those of De Gaulle. In 1953 and 1954, for example, he opposed the European Defense Community on the grounds that the treaty would entail the loss of French sovereignty. He also has criticized the US on several occasions for putting undue pressure on France. The major theme of the monthly political bulletins which the count publishes in Paris is usually the need for French unity and a stable government.

In his other writings the count has stressed the importance of solving social problems in France, attacked all

forms of totalitarianism and racism, and insisted that in France the republican form of government has failed to achieve the objectives of social democracy. In the past, he has asserted that the aim of monarchy is "to express the will of the common people" and has called for the reintegration of the French working class into the nation.

The count has carefully maintained good relations in all political circles, especially with the trade unions. He is convinced that the historical political parties in France have no public appeal and therefore feels that the successor to De Gaulle, like De Gaulle himself, must be above the parties and independent of them. The count thinks that the president of France should be an arbitrator, a role he considers admirably suited to his talents.

The count's acceptability to the French people might suffer from his status as pretender to the throne. What would militate most against him if he ran for election as president--or moved into the office in some other fashion--would be the example of Napoleon III. Napoleon, who also posed as a champion of social justice and the proletariat, was elected president of the Second Republic in 1848 but made himself emperor in 1851 by a coup d'etat. Many Frenchmen would probably fear that if the pretender became

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chief of state the next step would be a return to the monarchy.

There is no bar in law to the count's accession to the presidency. The constitution of the Fifth Republic is the first republican constitution since the Revolution of 1789 to omit a ban on the presidential candidacies of members of former reigning families of France. Shortly before De Gaulle returned to power in 1958, he wired the count, on the occasion of the marriage of one of the pretender's sons, saying that "your future, that of Prince Henri, that of your kin, are integrated with the hopes of France." Several weeks before his recent operation, De Gaulle reportedly promised to "name the count as his successor" if he were subsequently unable to continue in public office.

However, what seems to be a well-documented case of personal admiration and ideological support does not assure that De Gaulle, as an astute practical politician, would risk backing the count in a national popular election. Such a candidacy could hardly expect the enthusiastic support of even the Gaullist Union for the New Republic (UNR), and certainly the other parties would be opposed.

Premier Pompidou

Georges Pompidou, a scholarly ex-banker, now 53 years

old, has been a Gaullist since 1944 and was a close associate of De Gaulle during the latter's period of retirement before 1958. Pompidou is a graduate of the prestigious Ecole Normale Supérieure as well as the Ecole des Sciences Politiques. He began his career as a teacher but in 1944 became a special assistant in General de Gaulle's cabinet. Although he left that position in 1946, he was probably De Gaulle's closest adviser and counselor for the next seven or eight years.

In 1954 Pompidou became director general of the House of Rothschild, which provided experience for his later service as one of De Gaulle's expert advisers on business and administrative problems. From June 1958 Pompidou served as De Gaulle's cabinet director until the general became president. Although Pompidou returned to the business world, De Gaulle called upon him to perform the delicate function of "undercover" man in the preliminary Franco-Algerian exchanges which led to the Evian Conference. Pompidou was picked for this job as a man who could talk, explain, and listen without losing patience or laying himself open to deceptive maneuvers.

Pompidou's public pronouncements faithfully reflect the Gaullist line. He supports De Gaulle's concept of European political integration, shares his antipathy toward international organizations, justifies the nuclear strike force as less

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expensive than increased conventional forces, and says he will never countenance the return to "assembly government." In commenting on the government's stabilization program last year during an interview with Paris-Match, Pompidou remarked in true Gaullist fashion: "I do not think that the objective of this regime and De Gaulle's action is to bring prosperity to Frenchmen. The first objective, in my opinion, is to return their dignity to them."

Pompidou is rumored to be one of the few insiders who is permitted to dispute De Gaulle's views, but there is no record of instances in which Pompidou has acted as a moderating influence. In 1958, he asserted that an "independent premier" could emerge "only after the major problems of France have been solved." "At that time," he said, "the government could become either a right-center or a left-center one." Since his accession to the premiership Pompidou has made no further comments on the future role of that office.

Although derided by his opponents as a "technician," Pompidou showed his ability as an administrator and majority leader during De Gaulle's recent illness. Subsequently he undertook a brief tour of the provinces of central France,

reportedly at De Gaulle's insistence, to let himself be known to the people. Judging from the popular reception, the tour, the first of its kind undertaken by a French premier, was a success and strengthened the impression that he is being groomed as De Gaulle's political heir. In a recent public opinion poll, Pompidou outstripped Socialist Gaston Defferre for the first time as a candidate for the succession. Defferre is the principal candidate put forth by the opposition to face De Gaulle in the next election.

Transition to Pompidou

Pompidou's major liability appears to be his lack of a political base. This could probably be overcome if De Gaulle singled him out as his choice for UNR nomination and personally took active steps to encourage his election.

A surer way for Pompidou to succeed De Gaulle would be open if the proposed constitutional amendment were put through placing the premier in succession to the president. In this case, De Gaulle might serve part of a new term and withdraw, possibly on grounds of ill health, leaving Pompidou to complete the term or, depending on the provisions of the amendment, to

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serve as interim president until new elections could be held. If the term could be served out by the immediate successor, the detrimental effect on governmental stability might not be as great, but he would not have the public endorsement De Gaulle holds so necessary.

This problem could be overcome if new elections were called for after about a month, and the incumbent would have a considerable advantage in going before the electorate in the capacity of acting president.
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SPECIAL REPORT

DE GAULLE'S EASTERN EUROPEAN POLICY

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NJ 94-306
By lig, NARA, Date 3-13-95

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17 July 1964

DE GAULLE'S EASTERN EUROPEAN POLICY

President de Gaulle seems to be accelerating and broadening his efforts to develop France's relations with Eastern Europe. He reportedly intends to devote a major portion of his 23 July press conference to Eastern European affairs. Further moves to increase cultural, economic, and technical ties with the bloc countries can be expected. De Gaulle is seeking to win support from various Eastern European leaders for some of his diplomatic initiatives elsewhere on the globe, and he may hope to gain their ultimate acceptance of his concept of a Europe from the "Atlantic to the Urals." He is motivated partly by a desire to encourage diversity among the Communist bloc nations, but he is also intent on a larger role for France in Western attempts to develop new relationships with Eastern Europe.

De Gaulle's View Of Eastern Europe

De Gaulle, firmly believing that national interests transcend ideological considerations, has consistently maintained that resurgent nationalism would eventually disrupt Communist bloc unity. He probably views the current Soviet-Rumanian rift as only one manifestation, albeit a dramatic one, of a continuing evolution of the Eastern European states away from "Russian" domination. De Gaulle is convinced that the Eastern European states will ultimately gain their independence even though "national Communist" regimes friendly to the USSR could well remain in power.

The French President probably anticipates that the loosening of bloc ties would produce a politically fluid situation

similar to that which prevailed in Europe before World War II. Diverse competing national interests would be curbed, however, by developing political unity on a confederal basis broader than the "Six," and France's geographic position and diplomatic skill, abetted by its nuclear force, would magnify its voice in European councils. The increasing possibility that resurgent German expansionism could be held in check through a European political union would, in De Gaulle's eyes, eventually induce the Eastern European countries to seek close ties with Western Europe.

Such ties would not involve the complete estrangement of the Eastern European states from the USSR, in De Gaulle's view. For the longer term, De Gaulle expects a continued

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Sino-Soviet split to produce a changed attitude in Moscow, leading it also to draw closer to Western Europe. His concept of a Europe extending from the Atlantic to the Urals is ill defined, and his assessment of Moscow's basic orientation appears influenced by his view that there is serious racial enmity between the Russians and the Chinese. He seems to hold that Russia has traditionally been Western oriented and that the pressure of Chinese imperialism along "the world's longest frontier" will force Moscow to seek its own place in a larger European context.

De Gaulle probably feels the change is "in the very nature of things," but would hesitate to predict any timetable. He is not averse to hastening events along their "inevitable" course, however, and he may feel that it is in France's interest to give them a push in Eastern Europe now. Rumania's recent efforts to expand its contacts with the West, coupled with De Gaulle's fears of a US-Soviet understanding at the expense of Western Europe's interests, have heightened his desire to strengthen ties with Eastern Europe before any swift-moving events limit his flexibility in the area.

French Initiatives

Paris apparently is campaigning to impress its overall foreign policy goals on various Eastern European governments and to remind them that, except for the USSR, France is

the only continental power with world-wide responsibilities and interests. Minister of State Louis Joxe, for example, discussed Southeast Asia and Cyprus with Tito in late June, and reportedly secured his approval of De Gaulle's proposal to neutralize Indochina. The French are probably encouraging Poland to prod the Chinese into supporting French views on South Vietnam, although there is no evidence that the Poles are responding.

A Rumanian delegation including Premier Maurer and Foreign Minister Manescu, will arrive in France on 26 July to discuss "economic questions and other matters of mutual interest." The talks are likely to touch on credits, trade, and East-West relations, and Maurer may meet De Gaulle.

France also is devoting considerable effort to promoting cultural exchanges with Eastern Europe. The importance which De Gaulle attaches to this cultural drive was evidenced last December when Paris pointed to its cultural interests in Eastern Europe as a partial justification for raising to embassy rank its diplomatic missions in Budapest, Sofia, and Bucharest. Provisions for French-language instruction in universities, the export of French books, periodicals, and newspapers, and wider contacts with Eastern European intellectuals are part of Paris' attempt at a cultural re-entry into

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Eastern Europe. The French-Yugoslav cultural accord signed in June is the first concluded by France with a Communist country as contrasted with its 2-year "protocols" with all other Eastern European countries except Czechoslovakia.

France plans to allocate more funds to Eastern Europe under its "Second Five-Year Plan for Overseas Cultural Expansion" (1965-69) and French action in the cultural sphere will be increasingly directed at Eastern European youth. In this connection Paris probably will raise the number of scholarships awarded to bloc students (288 in 1963).

Paris has signed bilateral technical and scientific exchange agreements with the USSR and all Eastern European countries except Czechoslovakia. More than 80 scientists, none of them atomic specialists, were exchanged between the USSR and France during 1963. Last month Francis Perrin, French Atomic Energy Commission director, visited Bucharest and predicted a "big development" in French-Rumanian scientific relations, particularly "in the field of nuclear physics." On 1 July, a delegation of scientists led by Andre Marechal, Paris' delegate general for scientific and technical research, toured Rumanian oil and petrochemical facilities and was received by Deputy Premier Gaston-Marin.

The French have trade agreements with the USSR and all the Eastern European states except East Germany. France maintains a favorable balance with Eastern Europe, excluding the USSR, and French exports to the area have increased more rapidly than those of all other NATO countries. Paris would like to sell more machinery, electrical equipment, and chemicals to Eastern Europe, but it is hampered by its adherence to the Berne Union Agreement restricting credits to the bloc to 5 years. French officials, however, repeatedly assert that if the common Western front on credits is broken, France will follow suit; in fact, the issue of credit repayment terms has been under intensive study in the French Foreign and Finance ministries for over a year.

Paris feels that long-term credits, if selectively extended, should be a valuable tool in relations with the Eastern European countries, such as Rumania, which are seeking to assert their independence from Moscow. The French are less enthusiastic about long-term credits to the USSR even though it cut purchases from France sharply in 1963. Moscow has asserted that it can do nothing to improve the trade balance until it received better credit terms. A Soviet delegation now in France to negotiate for a \$3.75-million petrochemical project is seeking 10-year credits.

~~SECRET~~

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Some Eastern European Reactions

Eastern European reactions to recent French initiatives have been mixed. Hungary, for example, has been cautious but has responded favorably to French overtures to extend cultural agreements and is interested in expanding trade and technical relations with France. In recent months there has been a lively exchange of delegations, including the "first official visit in this century" by a French cabinet official. At the French Communist Party Congress in May, Hungary's Deputy Premier Kallai spoke favorably of De Gaulle's "sensible foreign policy steps" while condemning his "personal concepts."

France's relations with Czechoslovakia have improved somewhat over the past two years --probably on Czech initiative. Prague's greatest interest is in commercial relations. A 2-year trade agreement signed in January has probably paved the way for immediate expanded trade.

French-Yugoslav relations deteriorated during the Algerian war, but since it ended Yugoslav officials have clearly indicated a desire for better relations and encouraged the recent visit of the French minister of state to Belgrade.

France is one of the few Western European countries maintaining diplomatic ties (at legation level) with Albania. In his New Year's Eve address to

the French people, De Gaulle included Albania among those Communist countries whose assertion of greater national independence offered long-range advantages to the West. Neither country, however, has made any move to further improve relations, and no immediate change is expected.

The deterioration in French-Bulgarian relations in recent months is consistent with the over-all hardening of Sofia's line toward Western nations. France will participate, for the first time, in the Plovdiv International Trade Fair this September but the outlook for better French-Bulgarian relations is dim.

The Soviet Union

Contacts between Paris and Moscow have been increasing since De Gaulle recognized Communist China in January. Recent examples include French Finance Minister Giscard d'Estaing's trip to Moscow, ex-Premier Edgar Faure's private interview with Khrushchev, Nikolai Podgorny's talk with De Gaulle, and the Paris visit of Khrushchev's son-in-law. No major developments have resulted and De Gaulle has refused to set a date for complying with Khrushchev's long-standing invitation to Moscow.

De Gaulle continues to be cautious of Moscow's demarches, especially over Berlin, but his assessment of the nature of the Soviet threat appears to be

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changing. He may believe that Soviet policy is evolving to the point where the basis might be established for eventual negotiations on European questions in a new context. De Gaulle, meanwhile, seems ready to exploit the greater flexibility that an appearance of improved relations with the USSR would give him. One of his purposes could be to present more active French contacts with Moscow as supplementing and balancing his recognition of Peiping.

His objectives are long range but he fears events may move too fast. One fear, central to his entire foreign policy, is the possibility of a German-Russian agreement from which France would be excluded. He wants to be able to deal with the Russians after they have drawn closer to Western Europe and after the need for new global political balances becomes apparent.

Outlook

De Gaulle could seek, in several ways, to foster developments he expects to occur regardless of Moscow's policies. He could move to ease credit terms to bloc countries, particularly those demonstrating a desire for greater economic independence from Moscow. He

also could attempt to encourage the Eastern European states, perhaps starting with Rumania and Poland, to take steps toward closer commercial and economic ties with the EEC. De Gaulle would be unconcerned about Moscow's reaction since he is convinced the Russians will be eventually obliged to adapt themselves to new conditions.

De Gaulle might also make some dramatic gesture toward further disengaging France from NATO, partly with the motive of encouraging by example some of the Eastern Europeans to work toward some form of disengagement--over the long term--from the Warsaw Pact. De Gaulle's initial goal in such an exercise probably would be to demonstrate that "Europeans" can pursue courses of action and maintain interests without the sanction of the major power blocs. By arguing that NATO is disintegrating, he might hope eventually to persuade Moscow to act on the assumption that the *raison d'etre* for the Warsaw Pact had disappeared and that the Soviets could serve their interests equally well with a series of looser defense agreements with the Eastern European states.

The underlying purposes of any new French initiatives in the Communist bloc would be

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linked to De Gaulle's conception of the future of Europe. He probably feels that his idea of European unity associating all nations "from the Atlantic to the Urals," will become increasingly appealing to the Eastern Europeans and eventually to Moscow as the non-European races exert increasing pressure.

De Gaulle may also hope that a perceptible movement in Eastern Europe toward his version of European unity will help him win the support of his EEC partners--now adamantly with-

held--for his confederal scheme for Western Europe. In his New Year's address to the nation this year he said: "We must ...visualize the day when perhaps in Warsaw, Prague, Pankow, Budapest, Bucharest, Sofia, Belgrade, Tirana, and Moscow, the totalitarian Communist regime, which still manages to restrain imprisoned people, will step by step arrive at a conciliatory evolution together with our own transformation. At such time, prospects would be opened for all of Europe commensurate with its resources and capacities." (SECRET)

* * *

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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EXDIS - TUG

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

France
x Cyprus

Subject: President de Gaulle's letter to the
President dated July 3

Attache
T. B.
7.2.44

On July 4 we sent you an official translation of
a letter to the President from President de Gaulle
dated July 3. As President de Gaulle's letter is
simply a reply to the President's letter of June 29,
the Department does not believe that a reply is
necessary. The signed original of the de Gaulle
letter still has not been received by the Department.

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Letter from President de Gaulle dated
July 3 with translation.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-305

By lib, NARA, Date 1-20-95

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(TRANSLATION)

EMBASSY OF FRANCE
IN THE UNITED STATES

LS NO.

Washington, July 3, 1964

Dear Mr. President:

You were good enough to inform me of the tenor of the talks that you have had with the Prime Minister of Turkey and the Prime Minister of Greece regarding the Cyprus affair.

I thank you for this very interesting information.

As you know, I have, in my turn, just had conversations with Mr. Papandreou and Mr. Inonu. They said the same thing to me, on the whole, that they said to you. For my part, I emphasised, in particular, that the maintenance of peace was a duty and a necessity over which no special consideration could prevail and for which the two governments were responsible. Everything should therefore be done by them to put a stop to the disturbances in the island and, a fortiori, to prevent an armed conflict from occurring between Greece and Turkey.

I think, as you do, that this affair requires great vigilance. I intend to observe carefully its developments during the coming weeks.

Madame de Gaulle joins me in sending you and Mrs. Johnson our most cordial regards.

C. de Gaulle

His Excellency Lyndon B. Johnson

President of the United States of America

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-304
By lig, NARA, Date 5-5-95

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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BUNDY-SMITH

ALEXANDER

BATOR

BELK

BRUBECK

CHASE

FORRESTAL

JESSUP

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KEENEY

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SMITH, WM. Y.

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ZEN/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
ZEN/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
RUFHJA/USMISSION BERLIN
RUFHAG/USAREUR
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ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 42 INFO PRIORITY PARIS 12 LONDON
13 ROME 3 BRUSSELS 5 THE HAGUE 4 LUXEMBOURG 4 BERLIN 20
USAREUR JULY 6, 5 PM

PARIS ALSO FOR USRO

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC

PART 1 OF 3

IN EVALUATING THE RESULTS OF THE DE GAULLE VISIT TO
BONN ON JULY 3 AND 4 IT IS CLEAR THAT IF ANYONE
EXPECTED MAJOR NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN ANY FIELD HE WOULD
BE DISAPPOINTED. THIS LET-DOWN REACTION IS REFLECTED
IN GERMAN POLITICAL AND PRESS CIRCLES, AND APPARENTLY

PAGE 2 RUFHOL 737 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ALSO IN REPORTS FROM PARIS. THE GERMAN FONOFF AND FRENCH
EMBASSY, HOWEVER, HAVE BEEN AT PAINS ALL ALONG TO KEEP
THEIR TREATMENT OF THE VISIT IN LOW-KEY. THEY HAVE BILLED
IT AS A WORKING-MEETING IN WHICH THE MAIN OBJECTIVE WAS TO
EXPLAIN RESPECTIVE POINTS OF VIEW AND REGISTER STEP BY
STEP PROGRESS IN THE BROAD SCOPE OF EVERYDAY PROBLEMS
WITH WHICH THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ARE CONCERNED. FROM THIS
PERSPECTIVE, THE FRENCH EMBASSY (MINISTER D'AUMALE) SAID
THAT THE FRENCH REGARDED THE VISIT AS A SUCCESS, AND THAT
DE GAULLE DEPARTED IN GOOD SPIRITS, SATISFIED WITH THE
USEFULNESS OF THE MEETING.

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NEJ 94-305
By 113, NARA, Date 1-20-95

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-2- 42, JULY 6, 5 P. M. FROM BONN.

D'AUMALE SAID THAT THE FRENCH CONSIDER THE ONE MOST SIGNIFICANT ASPECT OF SUCH VISITS THE FACT OF WHAT IS IN EFFECT A BI-ANNUAL CABINET MEETING OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. THIS PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY FOR SEVEN MINISTERIES TO EXPLAIN THEIR PROBLEMS AND OBTAIN THEIR OPPOSITE NUMBER'S POINT OF VIEW. OF SECONDARY SIGNIFICANCE IN THE FRENCH JUDGEMENT IS THE FACT THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE REGISTERED SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN THE BROAD "UNDER-STRUCTURE" OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP. HE MENTIONED

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IN THIS RESPECT THE PARTICULARLY GOOD DISCUSSIONS IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD (FRENCH CONCERN AT HOLDING PRICES WHERE THEY ARE, AGREEMENT ON FURTHER AID MEASURES FOR UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS), AND IN THE CULTURAL AND INFORMATION FIELD, WHICH THEY REGARD AS BASIS.

WITH REGARD TO THE POINT FEATURED AS THE SINGLE NEW DEVELOPMENT EMERGING FROM THE MEETING -- THE GERMAN PROPOSAL TO PRESENT SUGGESTIONS TO THE QUAI ON FURTHER STEPS TOWARD EUROPEAN UNITY -- D'AUMALE SAID THAT THE FRENCH WOULD AWAIT THIS WITH INTEREST, BUT HIS PERSONAL IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE GERMANS DID NOT YET KNOW PRECISELY WHAT OR HOW IT WAS TO BE DONE ("HOW TO TAKE HOLD OF THE NATION")

ALTHOUGH HE HAD NOT ATTENDED THE MILITARY SESSIONS, D'AUMALE THOUGHT THAT MESSMER'S AND VON HASSEL'S TALKS HAD BEEN FRUITFUL RE JOINT-TRAINING AND EXCHANGE PROJECTS. THE FRENCH WOULD WELCOME MORE COLLABORATION ON WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, BUT APPRECIATED THE FACT THAT THIS WAS A COMPLICATED MATTER, IN WHICH THE GERMANS WERE ALREADY MUCH INVOLVED WITH THE UNITED STATES. HE WAS NOT INFORMED WHETHER THEREHAD BEEN ANY DISCUSSION OF

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FRENCH READINESS TO MOVE THEIR DIVISIONS FORWARD IN BAVARIA OF THE US FORCES WERE RE-STATIONED. HE COMMENTED THAT RELATIONS ON THE TECHNICAL LEVEL BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND GERMAN STAFFS WERE CLOSER THAT AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL AND THE SUBJECT MIGHT HAVE BEEN TOUCHED UPON THERE.

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-3- 42, JULY 6, 5 P.M. FROM BONN.

SINCE COUVE DE MURVILLE AND SCHROEDER HAD MET ONLY A COUPLE OF WEEKS EARLIER, THERE WAS NOT MUCH NEW IN THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS FIELD FOR THEM TO DISCUSS. THE FRENCH HAD REAFFIRMED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE GERMAN POSITIONS RE BERLIN AND THE USSR. WITH REGARD TO CHINA AND SOUTH EAST ASIA, THE FRENCH WERE NOT "IRRITATED", AS SOME SUGGESTED, THAT THE GERMANS WERE UNRECEPTIVE. THE FRENCH WERE INTERESTED IN INFORMING THE GERMANS OF WHAT THEY KNEW, AND OF THEIR IDEAS AS TO THE BEST WAY TO PROCEED IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD (AS DE GAULLE HAD EXPLAINED TO UNDER SECRETARY BALL, THEY AGREED WITH US AS TO OBJECTIVES, BUT DIFFERED AS TO METHODS), BUT IT WAS FOR THE GERMANS TO REACH THEIR OWN DECISIONS.

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A SUMMARY OF REPORTS ON THE RESPECTIVE MINISTERIAL SESSIONS, BONN REACTIONS, AND THE EMBASSY'S GENERAL ASSESSMENT, FOLLOW IN THE IMMEDIATELY SUCCEEDING TELEGRAMS. GP-4

MCGHEE

BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O at 1:10 p.m. JULY 6, 1964
PASSED WHITE HOUSE at 1:35 P.M., JULY 6, 1964

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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AF ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION ONE OF TWO

ARA ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 42 INFO PRIORITY PARIS 12 LONDON
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SMF USAREUR BREMEN DUSSELDORF FRANKFURT HAMBURG MUNICH
DAC STUTGART UNN JULY 6, 5 PM.

STR PARIS RE BUFLO-BROWN TELECON. PLEASE PASS ALL SECTIONS THIS
E MESSAGE (OUR 12 TO YOU) TO LUXEMBOURG IN THE MORNING POUCH.

AID USAREUR FOR POLAD; BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC; PARIS ALSO
P FOR USRO
CU

USIA SUBJECT: DEGAULLE VISIT

NSC
INR PART 2 OF 3

CIA IN ADDITION TO THE STATEMENT ON POLITICAL UNION (TEXT
NSA OF WHICH IS CARRIED IN THE EMBASSY'S SUMMARY OF PRESS
OSD REACTIONS TO THE VISIT) GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN VON HASE
ARMY LISTED THE "CONCRETE RESULTS" OF THE VISIT AS FOLLOWS:

NAVY 1. COMMON FRANCO-GERMAN AID PROJECTS IN AFRICA AND
AIR SOUTH AMERICA WILL BE DEVELOPED;
CEA

TRSY

RMR PAGE 2 RUFHOL 737 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. NEGOTIATIONS ARE TAKING PLACE FOR THE PURCHASE OF
FRENCH ARMS VALUED AT DM 900 MILLION;

3. 250,000 FRENCH AND GERMAN STUDENTS WILL BE EXCHANGED
THIS YEAR UNDER THE FRANCO-GERMAN YOUTH EXCHANGE;

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-2- 42, JULY 6, 5 PM FROM BONN (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

4. INSTRUCTION IN GERMAN AND FRENCH AND EXCHANGE OF TEACHERS WILL BE EXTENDED IN BOTH COUNTRIES; AND

5. FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION IN THE RADIO AND TV FIELDS WILL BE EXTENDED AND A JOINTLY SPONSORED TV PROGRAMS WILL BE DEVELOPED.

THIS TELEGRAM SUMMARIZES THE RESULTS OF THE VARIOUS SIDE TALKS DURING THE VISIT, ON THE BASIS OF THE INFORMATION THUS FAR AVAILABLE, WHICH PUTS VON HASE'S SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS IN SOME PERSPECTIVE.

1. SCHROEDER - COUVE DE MURVILLE,

SCHROEDER REPORTED ON THE CHANCELLOR'S TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES; THE MOSCOW PROTEST ON THE BUNDESVERSAMMLUNG AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATO WERE DISCUSSED. COUVE DE MURVILLE REPORTED ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS AGREED THAT THE 3-POWER DECLARATION ON THE MOSCOW-CDR FRIENDSHIP TREATY WOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE OFFICIAL ATTENTION OF A "LARGE NUMBER OF GOVERNMENTS"

PAGE 3 RUFHOL 737 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. SCHROEDER THANKED THE FRENCH FOR THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE SUPPORT OF THE FRG REUNIFICATION POLICY.

THE MAIN SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION WAS THE POSSIBILITIES FOR FURTHER STEPS FOR EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNION. THERE WAS AN ASSESSMENT BY BOTH MINISTERS THAT THERE WAS LITTLE PRACTICAL ROOM FOR PROGRESS AT THIS TIME GIVEN THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN ITALY, THE PENDING BRITISH ELECTIONS, AND THE POSITIONS OF THE ITALIAN, BELGIAN, AND DUTCH GOVERNMENTS. FOREIGN MINISTER SCHROEDER PUT FORWARD A PROPOSAL THAT, WITHIN THE FRANCO-GERMAN TREATY FRAMEWORK, OFFICIAL OF THE FRENCH AND GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTERIES MEET TO STUDY THE QUESTION. SCHROEDER UNDERTOOK TO PUT FORWARD CONCRETE PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER ACTION WHICH MIGHT COMMAND THE SUPPORT OF ALL 6 COUNTRIES.

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-3- 42, JULY 6, 5 PM FROM BONN (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM AND THE PROBLEM OF RELATIONS WITH CHINA WERE NOT DISCUSSED IN DETAIL. IT WAS RECOGNIZED THAT NEITHER GOVERNMENT HAD SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY IN ITS POSITIONS TO WARRANT DETAILED DISCUSSION.

2. VON HASSEL - MESSMER:

GUMBEL REPLACED VON HASSEL MOST OF THE BILATERAL WORKING SESSION. THE AGENDA WAS ONLY PARTIALLY COMPLETED. THERE WAS IN FACT NO DISCUSSION IN THIS MEETING OF THE FRG PURCHASE OF FRENCH ARMS AMOUNTING TO DM 900 MILLION. THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE TELLS US THAT THIS FIGURE OF DM 900 MILLION WAS MENTIONED AT THE PLENARY MEETING BY SCHROEDER AS THE AMOUNT OF FRENCH WEAPONS WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN ORDERED. THERE WERE NO NEW PROJECTS INVOLVED. SCHROEDER ALSO STATED THAT HE WAS SATISFIED THAT THE GREATEST PART OF THESE ORDERS WERE BASED ON JOINT RESEARCH AND CO-PRODUCTION AND INCLUDED AIRCRAFT, MISSILES, AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. THE EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT THIS FIGURE IS MADE UP LARGELY BY ORDERS FOR TRANSALLS AND AS-30 AND FOLLOW-ON MISSILES, ALL OF WHICH HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY AGREED.

THE OTHER SUBJECTS DISCUSSED, NADGE, THE MOVEMENT OF A FRENCH UNIT FORWARD TO REPLACE THE 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT, AND THE COMMAND PROBLEMS ENGENDERED BY THE PRESENCE OF FRG TROOPS IN FRANCE, SHOWED NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE FROM THE RESPECTIVE POSITIONS TAKEN ON THIS SUBJECT IN THE MESSMER-VON HASSEL TALKS REPORTED IN A-2224, JUNE 11.

3. FOUCHET - KIESINGER (EDUCATION):

KIESINGER, MINISTER PRESIDENT OF WURTEMBERG-BADEN, IS COORDINATOR FOR THE LAENDER (STATES) IN DEALING WITH THE FRENCH IN EDUCATION MATTERS UNDER THE FRANCO-GERMAN TREATY. KIESINGER WAS JOINED BY SATTLER (CULTURAL AFFAIRS, FOREIGN OFFICE) IN ORDER TO GIVE A COORDINATED GERMAN POSITION. KIESINGER PRESENTED FIGURES TO SHOW THAT MORE GERMAN STUDENTS ARE STUDYING FRENCH THAN VICE VERSA. THIS WAS DIRECTED AT CONTINUED FRENCH PRESSURE FOR INCREASED FRENCH INSTRUCTION IN THE GERMAN SCHOOLS WHICH THE VARIOUS LAENDER MINISTERIES OF EDUCATION HAVE RESISTED. IT WAS

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-4- 42, JULY 6, 5 PM FROM BONN (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

IT WAS AGREED THAT FRG STATES (LAENDER) WHICH OFFER ENGLISH AS THE FIRST LANGUAGE SHOULD ALSO OFFER FRENCH AS A FIRST LANGUAGE WHERE THERE ARE SUFFICIENT STUDENTS WHO WANT FRENCH. IN SCHOOLS WHERE CHILDREN ELECT TO TAKE ENGLISH AS THE FIRST LANGUAGE, FRENCH IS TO OFFERED AS A SECOND LANGUAGE, WITH STUDENTS GIVEN THE PREFERENCE BETWEEN FRENCH AND LATIN. THE STATES WILL ALSO BE ASKED TO OFFER FRENCH IN SCHOOLS ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS, AND RADIO STATIONS AND ADULT EDUCATION CENTERS ARE TO BE ENCOURAGED TO INCREASE THE TIME GIVEN TO THE TEACHING OF FRENCH.

4. HECK - HERZOU:

SINCE DECISIONS IN FRANCO GERMAN YOUTH EXCHANGE MUST BE MADE BY AN AUTONOMOUS COUNCIL, THE MINISTERS TOOK NOTE OF THE DECISION OF THE COUNCIL LAST MARCH THAT 150,000 YOUTH EXCHANGED 700,000 FRENCH; 150,000 GERMAN) WOULD TAKE PLACE THIS YEAR. THE MINISTERS AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE A LARGE INCREASE IN THE EXCHANGE OF TEACHING ASSISTANTS. ABOUT 430 YOUNG GERMAN TEACHER ASSISTANTS AS AGAINST 370 LAST YEAR WHILE 230 FRENCH WILL COME TO GERMANY AS AGAINST 170 LAST YEAR. THE EXCHANGE OF FULLY QUALIFIED HIGH SCHOOL TEACHERS WILL BE INCREASED FROM 30 EXCHANGES TO 38.

GP-4
MCGHEE
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ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O - 7/6/64 - 3:53 PM.

NOTE: WHITE HOUSE - 7/6/64 - 4:08 PM.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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RUDTBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION TWO OF TWO

SMF

PARIS RE BUFLO-BROWN TELECON. PLEASE PASS ALL SECTIONS

DAC

THIS MESSAGE (OUR 12 TO YOU) TO LUXEMBOURG IN THE

STR

MORNING POUCH.

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BREMEN DUSSELDORF FRANKFURT HAMBURG MUNICH STUTGART UNN JULY 6, 5 PM

CU

USAREUR FOR POLAD; BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC; PARIS ALSO

USIA

FOR USRO

NSC

SUBJECT: DEGAULLE VISIT

INR

CIA

NSA

PART 2 OF 3

OSD

5. SCHWATZ-PISANI:

ARMY

NAVY

PISANI HAD NOT INITIALLY WISHED TO COME AND WAS APPARENTLY

AIR

ORDERED TO COME BY PRESIDENT DE GAULLE AT THE LAST

CEA

MINUTE. THE MAIN SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION WAS THE GRAIN

TRSY

PRICE ISSUE. BOTH THE FOREIGN OFFICE (JANSEN) AND THE

AGRICULTURE MINISTRY (HUETTEBRAUCKER) INDICATE THAT

SCHWATZ EXPLAINED THAT DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS

RULED OUT THEIR AGREEMENT TO GRAIN PRICE UNIFICATION

AT THIS TIME. THE FRENCH WERE DISSAPOINTED BY THE

GERMAN POSITION BUT EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING. THUS, IN

JANSEN'S WORDS, "NOTHING HAPPENED" ON THE GRAIN PRICE.

THE FRENCH RAISED THE QUESTION OF INCREASING INTRA-EEC

PREFERENCES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, ESPECIALLY GRAIN.

THE GERMANS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO AN INCREASE WITHOUT,

HOWEVER, COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO ANY SPECIFIC MEASURES.

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-2- 42, JULY 6, 5 PM FROM BONN (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

PISANI AND SCHWARTZ DISCUSSED THE DETAILS OF THE EEC DAIRY REGULATION AND AGREED THAT THIS AS WELL AS THE BEEF AND RICE REGULATION SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

6. SCHMUECKER-GISCARD D'ESTAING:

SCHMUECKER RAISED THE QUESTION OF GERMAN PROPOSALS FOR A PRELIMINARY 25 PER CENT REDUCTION IN THE COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF OF THE EEC. THE FRENCH INDICATED THEIR LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR THIS PROPOSAL. SCHMUECKER THEN STRESSED THE NECESSITY FOR A VERY LOW EEC EXTERNAL TARIFF AS AN ANTI-INFLATIONARY DEVICE AND THE IMPORTANCE THE GERMANS ATTACHED TO THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE KENNEDY ROUND. GISCARD D'ESTAING AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THAT THIS WAS IMPORTANT BUT STRESSED THE NEED FOR APPROPRIATE CONCESSIONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY THE UNITED STATES, AND MADE NO COMMITMENTS ON THE OUTCOME OF THE KENNEDY ROUND. THE TWO MINISTERS DISCUSSED THE

PAGE 3 RUFHOL 737 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
INFLATIONARY PROBLEM IN THE EEC. GISCARD D'ESTAING STATED THAT THE MEASURES WHICH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT IS NOW TAKING SHOULD SUFFICE TO STABILIZE PRICES IN FRANCE AND INDICATED THE FRENCH PRICE LEVEL IS ALREADY LEVELING OFF. THEY FURTHER DISCUSSED WHAT STEPS MIGHT BE TAKEN TO STABILIZE THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN ITALY WITHOUT COMING TO ANY DEFINITE CONCLUSIONS. THE ECONOMICS MINISTRY HAS TOLD US THAT "GROUP OF TEN" MATTERS WERE NOT DISCUSSED. DETAILS OF DISCUSSION OF SOVIET BLOC CREDITS ARE BEING REPORTED IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE.

7. VON HASE-PEYREFITTE:

PEYREFITTE PRESSED FOR THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE CONTACT BETWEEN GERMAN AND FRENCH WORKING LEVELS IN THE INFORMATION FIELD. THERE WERE FEW REAL RESULTS MAINLY BECAUSE OF STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GERMAN AND FRENCH INFORMATION MEDIA. THERE WAS, HOWEVER, AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON INCREASING CONTACTS AS FAR AS FEASIBLE AND RECOGNITION THAT COOPERATION HAS ALREADY ACHIEVED A HIGH LEVEL.

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-3- 42, JULY 6, 5 PM FROM BONN (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

THE MINISTERS IN PARTICULAR AGREED ON GERMAN AID AND FRENCH RTF CO-PRODUCTION OF FIVE FILMS FOR TV PROGRAMS ON THE CAUSES OF WORLD WAR I. THIS IS ALREADY BEING DONE IN PARIS WITH GERMAN ON-THE-SPOT ASSISTANCE. THESE TWO FILMS ARE TO BE TELECAST IN GERMANY LATER THIS YEAR. THE MINISTERS ALSO AGREE TO WORK FURTHER ON A JOINT TV SERIES FOR PRODUCTION OF A "PAUL-MARIAN" FAMILY TELEVISION SERIES, DESIGNED TO REFLECT FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION FOR POPULAR CONSUMPTION.

8. SCHEEL-TRIBOULET:

THE FRENCH DOMINATED THE DISCUSSIONS ON AID MATTERS, PRESSING HARD FOR GERMAN-FRENCH PROJECT COLLABORATION IN LATIN AMERICA BUT WERE COOL TO THE ONE MAJOR POINT ADVANCED BY THE GERMANS, I.E., FRENCH AID TO TURKEY. APART FROM THESE TWO SUBJECTS, THE AID TALKS WERE CONSIDERED LARGELY SUPERFICIAL OR ELSE DEALT WITH RELATIVELY MINOR PROBLEMS.

THE GERMANS STRESSED THE DIFFICULTIES ENTAILED IN FINDING AND FUNDING MUTUAL PROJECTS IN LATIN AMERICA BUT AGREE TO AN EXPERTS' MEETING BEFORE DE GAULLE'S LATIN AMERICAN TRIP TO DRAW UP SUCH A LIST. THE FRENCH HAD NO SPECIFIC PROJECTS IN MIND BUT THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT FOR DE GAULLE TO HAVE THE ASSURANCE OF GERMAN FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR AT LEAST SOME OF THE AID HE MIGHT PLEDGE DURING HIS FORTH-COMING TRIP.

COUVE DE MURVILLE, IN RESPONSE TO GERMAN URGING, STATED THAT FRANCE HAD NO AID RESOURCES TO SPARE FOR TURKEY.

THE FRENCH ALSO BROUGHT UP ALLEGED DIFFICULTIES ARISING FROM GERMAN AID FINANCING IN CAMEROON, CHAD AND SENEAL AND THE DISCUSSION OF THIE COMPLAINTS EXHAUSTED MOST OF THE TIME AVAILABLE FOR THE ONE MEETING ON AID.

DE GAULLE MEETING WITH ADENAUER:

DR. ADENAUER, WHO HAD A PRIVATE TALK WITH DE GAULLE, HAS INFORMED US THAT HIS PRIMARY CONCERN WAS TO OBTAIN A PERSONAL IMPRESSION OF THE FRENCH PRESIDENT'S STATE OF HEALTH. ADENAUER SAID THAT HE WAS VERY REASSURED AND THAT HE FELT DE GAULLE HAD EFFECTIVELY RECOVERED FROM HIS

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-4- 42, JULY 6, 5 PM FROM BONN (SECTION TWO OF TWO)
OPERATION. THE MAIN SUBJECT DISCUSSED BETWEEN THE TWO WAS
EUROPE AND THE CONTINUING SOVIET THREAT. ADENAUER APPARENTLY

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DID MOST OF THE TALKING AND STRESSED HIS FAVORITE THESIS THAT
SOVIET POLICY CONTINUES TO AIM AT ABSORPTION INTO THE COMMUNIST
BLOC OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES, THUS CREATING THE NECESSARY POWER BASE FOR
WORLD DOMINATION. ADENAUER NOTED THAT HE HAD REMINDED
DE GAULLE THAT DURING THE FORMER CHANCELLOR'S MOSCOW TALKS
IN 1955, KHRUSHCHEV HAD IMploRED "HELP ME AGAINST THE
CHINESE AND THE AMERICANS." (AN EARLIER VERSION OF THIS
CONVERSATION HAS KHRUSHCHEV ASKING FOR HELP AGAINST
ONLY THE CHINESE.)

ADENAUER ADDED THAT DE GAULLE HAS INVITED HIM TO VISIT
PARIS EITHER IN NOVEMBER OR DECEMBER TO RECEIVE SOME
"VERY GREAT HONOR", AND THAT HE HAD, OF COURSE, ACCEPTED.

EMBASSY COMMENT:

ON THE BASIS OF THIS PRELIMINARY INFORMATION, THE EMBASSY
WOULD JUDGE THAT THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THIS MEETING
WERE EVEN MORE MEAGER THAN HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED. VON HASE'S
"SUMMARY OF RESULTS" INCLUDED TWO ITEMS WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY
BEEN AGREED BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. THE ONLY NEW ITEMS
ARE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE FOR MODEST JOINT AID PROJECTS
IN LATIN AMERICA, AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO INCREASE
FRENCH AND GERMAN LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION WHERE THIS IS
POSSIBLE, AND JOINT PRODUCTION OF SEVERAL TV FILMS.

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NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE - 7/6/64 - 4:32 PM.

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Action

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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WAHSDC
INFO RUDTBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
RUFGWP/AMEMBASSY PARIS
ZEN/AMEMBASSY ROME
RUFGWP/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
ZEN/AMEMBASSY THEHAGUE
RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUFPAJ/USAREUR
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PARIS RE BULO-BROWN TELECON PLEASE BE SURE ALL PARTS-
OF THIS MESSAGE ARE IN THE MORNING POUCH TO LUXEMBOURG

ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 42 INFO PRIORITY BRISSELS 5 PARIS 12
ROME 3 LUXEMBOURG 4 THE HAGUE 4 LONDON 13 BERLIN 20 USAREUR
BREMEN DUSSELDORF FRANKFURT HAMBURG MUNICH STARTGART UNN
JULY 6, 9 PM

USAREUR FOR POLAD; PARIS ALSO FOR USRO; BRUSSELS FOR USEC

SUBJECT: DEGAULLE VISIT

PART 3 OF 3

GERMAN POLITICAL REACTION TO THE DE GAULLE VISIT MIGHT PERHAPS
BEST BE CHARACTERIZED AS "RESTRAINED".

THE ACTING PRESS SPOKESMAN OF THE CDU (ROESING) STATED THAT
THE CDU IS "SATISFIED" WITH THE RESULTS OF THE TALKS. ALTHOUGH

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AGREEMENT WAS NOT REACHED ON ALL SUBJECTS, A LIST OF IMPORTANT
PROJECTS WAS STARTED THAT WILL BEAR FRUIT IN THE FUTURE.
ROESING SAID THAT NO DATE WAS SET FOR THE GERMAN PROPOSALS TO
BE PUT FORWARD ON POLITICAL UNION BUT THAT IT WAS LIKELY
THAT THE CSU WOULD MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO THESE PROPOSALS.
DUFHUES HAD ALREADY ISSUED A STATEMENT GREETING THE PROPOSALS
FOR TALKS ON POLITICAL UNION, AND HOPED THAT THE GERMAN
PROPOSALS WOULD BE QUICKLY FORTHCOMING.

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-2- 42, JULY 6, 9 PM FROM BONN

BARSIG, THE SPD SPOKESMAN, COMMENTS THAT EVEN THE MOST SYMPATHETIC POLITICAL OBSERVER COULD HARDLY SPEAK OF PROGRESS OR AGREEMENT AFTER THE FRANCO-GERMAN TALKS.

THE CSU SPOKESMAN (DONAT) SAID THAT HE EXPECTED THE CSU PARTITAG IN MUNICH MIGHT VOICE DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE LACK OF RESULTS OF THE DE GAULLE VISIT. HIS PERSONAL OPINION WAS THAT STRAUSS AND THE CSU FAVORED A COURSE SOMEWHERE IN BETWEEN THAT OF ADENAUER (CONFIDENCE WITH FRANCE NOW) AND THE ERHARD/SCHROEDER LINE (OF NOT GETTING TOO FAR AHEAD OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SIX). HE FELT THAT SOMETHING IN THE NATURE OF THE DUFHUES PROPOSAL (EMBTEL 12) OFFERS PROMISE. DONAT DISBELIEVED THAT THE CSU WOULD FORMULATE A POSITION ON ITS OWN; IT WILL SEEK A COMMON POSITION WITH THE CDU. STRAUSS AND THE LEADERSHIP MIGHT REST WITH EXPRESSING THEIR DISAPPOINTMENT OVER THE RESULTS OF THE VISIT AND LET THE CONVENTION MAKE SUGGESTIONS. THE CSU WOULD NOT BE CONTENT WITH HINGING EVERYTHING UPON BRITAIN EVENTUALLY MAKING UP ITS MIND. THEY FEEL SOMETHING MUST BE DONE, IF NECESSARY, WITHOUT BRITAIN.

FDP SOURCES (SCHOLLWER) INDICATED THAT THEIR EXPECTATIONS THAT NOTHING WOULD HAPPEN HAD BEEN BORNE OUT. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WERE SO GREAT THAT THE SUGGESTED SOLUTION ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNION AMOUNTS TO "A FIXING OF THE STATUS QUO". SCHOLLWER CONTINUED THAT HE SAW NO

PAGE 3 RUFHOL 737 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CHANGE IN THE FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONSHIP, A SELF-EVIDENT FACT SINCE THERE COULD BE NO CHOICE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE. SCHOLLWER ADDED THAT SINCE THE FRG DOES NOT WANT TO MAKE THE SITUATION MORE DIFFICULT FOR ERHARD, IT PROBABLY WILL NOT ISSUE A FORMAL COMMENTARY OR STATEMENT.

THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT AMONG POLITICAL OBSERVERS AND CORRESPONDENTS WITH WHOM WE HAVE TALKED, BOTH GERMAN AND AMERICAN, THAT THE MEETING BETWEEN DE GAULLE AND ERHARD PRODUCED MEAGER RESULTS AND LEFT UNRESOLVED SUCH MAIN ISSUES AS THE ROAD TO BE TAKEN TOWARD EUROPEAN UNIFICATION AND THE GRAIN PRICE QUESTION IN THE EEC. ALTHOUGH SCHROEDER HAS MADE A COURTEOUS BOW TO THE FRENCH (IN A POLITICAL SPEECH

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ON SUNDAY) FOR THEIR SUPPORT ON BERLIN AND REUNIFICATION, NO ONE REGARDS THIS AS ANYTHING PARTICULARLY NEW ON THE SUBJECT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

THERE IS SOME FEELING, MOSTLY GERMAN BUT ON THE PART OF SOME AMERICAN OBSERVERS TOO, THAT THE TALKS HAVE PUT THE GERMANS RATHER MORE "ON THE SPOT" THAN BEFORE, IN THE SENSE THAT THEY HAVE BEEN HANDED THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR TAKING AN INITIATIVE IN THE FIELD OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION. THIS FEELING IS REFLECTED IN PRESS ACCOUNTS (EMBTTEL 39), AND CORRESPONDENTS EXPRESS IT EVEN MORE FORCEFULLY IN PRIVATE.

THE WORKING LEVEL OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE (LANGE, IN CHARGE OF FRANCO-GERMAN TREATY AFFAIRS) BELIEVES THAT THESE TALKS DEMONSTRATED THAT THE PRACTICAL LIMITS OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN POLICY COORDINATION HAVE BEEN REACHED. THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT REMAINING AREAS FOR WHICH A COMMON POLICY COULD

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BE ENVISAGED.

THROUGHOUT THESE TALKS, LANG SAID, ALL THE MINISTERS, CHANCELLOR ERHARD, AND PRESIDENT DE GAULLE DISPLAYED THE SOBER UNDERSTANDING OF PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES IN AN INTIMATE AND FRIENDLY WORKING RELATIONSHIP THAT "REAL POLITIK" AND HARD POLITICAL REALITIES PLACED LIMITS ON THEIR ABILITY TO GO ANY FURTHER. THIS PROFESSIONAL UNDERSTANDING HELPED TO AVOID ANY FEELINGS OF DISCOURAGEMENT OR DISAPPOINTMENT.

LANG SAID THAT VON HASE'S "CONCRETE" RESULTS REPRESENTED THE MORE SIGNIFICANT ITEMS CULLED FROM THE REPORTS OF BILATERAL MEETINGS BETWEEN MINISTERS, REPRESENTING INTENSIVE DISCUSSION OVER A 6-MONTH PERIOD. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THEY DENOTED RELATIVELY LITTLE PROGRESS.

THE PROPOSAL FOR "PERMANENT CONSULTATION" UNDER THE FRANCO-GERMAN TREATY TO ESTABLISH WHAT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE IN THE POLITICAL AND DEFENSE FIELDS IS BASED ON TWO CONSIDERATIONS: THE CHANCELLOR'S INDEFATIGABLE INSISTANCE THAT SOME WAY MUST BE FOUND TO ESTABLISH "EUROPE" DESPITE THE OBSTACLES; AND THE

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PRESSURES FROM INTERNAL POLITICAL SOURCES. THE PROPOSAL IS ESSENTIALLY THE WORKING GROUP CHAMPIONED BY DUFHUES; THE DIFFERENCES ARE THAT CONTROL IS MAINTAINED IN THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERIES, AND THE PROCEDURE REMAINS IN THE FRANCO-GERMAN TREATY FRAMEWORK. LANG WRITELY NOTED THAT IT IS UNASSAILABLE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF INTERNAL POLITICS SINCE IT CAN BE DEMONSTRATED THAT THE MATTER IS UNDER ACTIVE STUDY.

LANG SAID HE COULD DO NOTHING ON THESE PROPOSALS UNTIL HE HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS. HE DID NOT PERCEIVE, IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THAT HAS PASSED TO DATE, HOW FRANCO-GERMAN DISCUSSIONS COULD RESULT IN ANYTHING WHICH COULD LEAD OUT OF THE PRESENT IMPASSE.

EMBASSY COMMENT:

THE EMBASSY'S GENERAL ASSESSMENT IS THAT, HOWEVER MUCH

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FIRENDLINESS AND RELATIVE GOOD-WILL THERE IS ON BOTH SIDES, AND HOWEVER SUCH IMPATIENCE THERE IS IN CERTAIN FRENCH AND GERMAN CIRCLES TO EDGE CLOSER BILATERALLY, THE PRESENT STATE OF BOTH COUNTRIES' FOREIGN INTERESTS AND POLICIES IN FACT LEAVES LITTLE ROOM FOR MANEUVERING CLOSER.

IN THE ALL-IMPORTANT FIELD OF SECURITY THE FRG DOES NOT CONSIDER FRENCH CAPABILITIES AS EVEN REMOTELY ABLE TO REPLACE THE NATO AND AMERICAN CONNECTIONS. WITH RESPECT TO EUROPEAN UNITY, THE GERMANS DO NOT THINK IT CAN BE BUILT ON A BILATERAL FOUNDATION WITHOUT MAKING SIMULTANEOUS PROVISION FOR OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SIX AND KEEP AT LEAST A GUESTURE TO THE DOOR OPEN FOR BRITIAN. WITH RESPECT TO ECONOMIC INTERESTS, HOWEVER ATTRACTIVE CERTAIN ASPECTS OF FRENCH PROTECTIONISM MAY BE, THE GERMANS WOULD NOT JEOPARDIZE THEIR WORLD-WIDE TRADING POSITION. WITH RESPECT TO THE FAR EAST, THE FRG WOULD NOT WISH TO IMPAR ITS STANDING WITH THE US THROUGH ACQUIESCENCE IN FRENCH POLICIES FOR NEUTRALIZATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA OR BUILDING UP RELATIONS WITH PEKING. IN ANY ISSUE INVOLVING A CHOICE BETWEEN PARIS AND WASHINGTON,

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-5- 42, JULY 6, 9 PM FROM BONN

THE GERMANS WILL STAY OUT. THE FIELD FOR MOVEMENT IS THUS RESTRICTED TO LESS SPECTACULAR AREAS. HERE THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE TRIED TO DO WHAT THEY COULD, WITH RESULTS WHICH ARE EVEN MORE MODEST THAN HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED. THE PRESSURES FROM ADENAUER AND STRAUSS MAY HAVE FORCED CHANCELLOR ERHARD TO MAKE GUESTURE IN THE FIELD OF POLITICAL UNION ON WHICH HE MAY BE UNABLE TO DELIVER AND WHICH MAY CONCEIVABLY REDOUND TO THE CHANCELLOR'S DISADVANTAGE.

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ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O - 7/6/64 - 6:15 PM.

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE - 7/6/64 - 6:45 PM.

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Jun 28 2 56 PM '64

EXDIS - TUG

FOR AMBASSADOR BOHLEN

REFURTEL 6417

St. Louis Courier
France
x Cyprus
x Coated

Please deliver following message from President Johnson to
General de Gaulle: BEGIN VERBATIM TEXT

June 28, 1964

Dear General de Gaulle:

As my friend George Ball has told you, I am greatly concerned that the deterioration of the Cyprus situation may result in a war between Greece and Turkey. Earlier this month the Turks were indeed only a few hours away from military action. It required my most intense efforts to persuade Prime Minister Inonu ~~not~~ to withhold his hand. In the weeks that have followed danger on the Island has not decreased.

I am now convinced that if war is to be averted, we must move urgently toward a permanent solution. The buildup of arms in Cyprus is already so heavy that it seems only a matter of

time

Drafted by:

U:GWBall/vh 6/28/64

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

The Under Secretary

Clearances:

In Draft: NEA - Mr. Talbot
IO - Mr. Sisco
EUR - Mr. Tyler
WH - Mr. Bundy

S/S - Miss Moor

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Authority

State/Tr 3/7/75

By *g/r*

NARA, Date 3/2/94

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time before a major incident will result in civil war all over the Island. If turmoil continues and there appears no serious progress toward settlement, then sooner or later the Turks will feel compelled to resort to what they regard as their treaty right of intervention.

Mr. Tuomioja, the Finn appointed as the UN Mediator, has so far made no progress toward a settlement. Following the events of June 5, he strongly urged us to take a hand with both the Greeks and Turks in an effort to bring the two parties close enough together so that his own work might begin to bear fruit. We received similar encouragement from Secretary General U Thant.

It was against this background that I asked the Prime Minister of Turkey and the Prime Minister of Greece to discuss the question with me in Washington. In these discussions I insisted as forcefully as possible that the two Governments--as the two responsible parties most intimately involved in the problem--must promptly find a way toward solution through negotiation. I offered the assistance of an impartial United States representative to serve as a catalyst.

Prime Minister Inonu was quite ready to undertake talks with the Greeks. Prime Minister Papandreou, however, proved quite resistant to the idea of serious negotiation. Nevertheless, I was able to obtain
his

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his assurance that he would appoint a representative to meet with the UN Mediator and a representative of Turkey.

Whether such meetings will in fact produce progress will depend, of course, upon the existence of a serious will to find a solution. While I think Prime Minister Inonu is eager for a settlement, I regret to say that I found little evidence of such a will on the part of the Greek Government. Prime Minister Papandreou apparently feels that time is working on his side, that the Turkish position is being progressively eroded, and that ultimately he will achieve his heart's desire of a union of Cyprus with Greece without the need to make any concessions to the Turks. This attitude ignores Turkish sensibilities and requirements. Unless the Greek position is modified, the Turks will be left with no hope to avoid humiliation except through military action.

I understand that you are having a talk with Prime Minister Papandreou on Monday, and I am certain that your counsel will greatly influence the course he will follow. The United States has no interest in the shape or form of a Cyprus settlement except to assure that it permanently disposes of the problem. This means that it must take account of the interests of Greece, Turkey, and the people of the Island.

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Island. We have put forward no solution ourselves since it has seemed to us that a lasting solution can be found only by the parties. From what George Ball has told me of your own comments on the question, you and I are in full accord that there must be a permanent solution rather than merely a temporary patching up of the present quite unsatisfactory arrangements.

The first essential step is for Greece as well as Turkey to face up to the hard realities and to recognize that no permanent solution is possible unless efforts are made to make it palatable to the other side. I am sure that you can be of great influence in making this point plain to Prime Minister Papandreou, and also in impressing upon him how vital it is, in his own interest, to assure the avoidance of any actions on the Island that may provoke the Turks to move in the weeks ahead.

I greatly appreciate ~~your greatly appreciated~~ your willingness to receive Ambassador Bohlen on Monday. He has been provided full details of our conversations with the Greeks and Turks during the past week and is at your disposal to elaborate on any of the foregoing points, should you so desire.

I shall, of course, look forward to any suggestions that you may care to make as to how France and the United States--as two nations not
being

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being direct parties to the Cyprus problem but deeply conscious of our world responsibilities--can most fruitfully combine efforts to put an end to this real and present danger to the peace of the world.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending our warmest regards to you and Madame de Gaulle. Sincerely, LBJ. END VERBATIM TEXT

RUSK

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-91

By io, NARA Date 5-21-99DATE OF
INFO.

DISTR. 15 MAY 1964

SUBJECT

SITUATION APPRAISAL AS OF 15 MAY 1964

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SOURCE

FIELD REPORT NO.

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1. THIS [REDACTED] APPRAISAL OF THE CURRENT SITUATION.

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FRENCH POLITICAL SITUATION

2. IF DE GAULLE'S HEALTH PERMITS, HE WILL AGAIN RUN FOR

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PRESIDENT AND BE RE-ELECTED ON THE FIRST BALLOT. HOWEVER, BECAUSE HE HAS LOST SOME POPULAR SUPPORT AND HIS POLITICAL OPPOSITION HAS BECOME MORE EFFECTIVE AND AGGRESSIVE, HIS MAJORITY WILL NOT BE SO GREAT AS IN PREVIOUS ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS. NEVERTHELESS, NATIONAL PROSPERITY, A DRAMATIC INCREASE IN FRENCH INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE, GOVERNMENT STABILITY, AND HIS OWN GREAT PERSONAL APPEAL ARE AN UNBEATABLE POLITICAL COMBINATION.

3. IF DE GAULLE RETIRES BUT ACTIVELY CAMPAIGNS FOR HIS SUCCESSOR, WE BELIEVE HIS SUCCESSOR WILL WIN THE PRESIDENCY BUT VERY POSSIBLY NOT ON FIRST BALLOT, SINCE TOTAL VOTE WOULD PROBABLY BE DISTRIBUTED AMONG A NUMBER OF CANDIDATES, PREVENTING ANY ONE CANDIDATE FROM OBTAINING ABSOLUTE FIRST BALLOT MAJORITY.

4. A CRUCIALLY IMPORTANT FEATURE OF THE NEW PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION PROCEDURE IS THE PROVISION THAT IF NO CANDIDATE RECEIVES ABSOLUTE MAJORITY ON THE FIRST BALLOT, THE ONLY CANDIDATES ELEGIBLE FOR THE SECOND BALLOT WILL BE THE CANDIDATE WHO WAS IN FIRST PLACE ON THE FIRST BALLOT AND THE CANDIDATE WHO WAS IN SECOND PLACE.

5. IN A SECOND BALLOT SITUATION, WE WOULD ANTICIPATE THAT THE LEADING CANDIDATE WOULD BE DE GAULLE'S SUCCESSOR AND THE SECOND PLACE CANDIDATE A COMMUNIST OR A LEFTWING CANDIDATE SUPPORTED BY COMMUNISTS. THE GENERAL FEAR THAT A POPULAR FRONT CANDIDATE MIGHT BECOME PRESIDENT WOULD INSURE ELECTION OF A GAULLIST CANDIDATE ON THE SECOND BALLOT.

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CONSEQUENTLY, WHETHER DE GAULLE RUNS AS PRESIDENT OR ACTIVELY CAMPAIGNS FOR HIS SUCCESSOR, WE ANTICIPATE THAT GAULLISM WILL WIN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

6. WE EQUALLY ANTICIPATE THAT IF DE GAULLE REMAINS AS PRESIDENT, THE UNION FOR A NEW REPUBLIC (UNR) WILL BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN IN THE ASSEMBLY ITS PRESENT MAJORITY POSITION. HOWEVER, IF DE GAULLE LEAVES PUBLIC OFFICE, IT IS VERY PROBABLE THE UNR WOULD LOSE ITS MAJORITY POSITION AS A RESULT OF LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS.

7. ALTHOUGH THEY DO NOT SUBSTANTIALLY LIMIT DE GAULLE'S OWN FREEDOM OF ACTION, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF DEVELOPMENTS ON THE INTERNAL SCENE WHICH HURT AND WILL CONTINUE TO HURT THE UNR ELECTORALLY. THE STABILIZATION PLAN, WITH CONSEQUENT FREEZE ON WAGES OF WORKERS IN PUBLIC AND INDUSTRIAL SECTORS AND PARTICULARLY IN THE CIVIL SERVICE, AS WELL AS TIGHT CONTROL ON FARM PRICES, CAN BE EXPECTED TO PROVOKE CONSIDERABLE UNREST IN THESE SECTORS. FARM AGITATION IS LIKELY LATE SUMMER 1964, FOLLOWED BY STRIKES IN PUBLIC AND INDUSTRIAL SECTORS IN FALL. ADDITIONALLY, THE COST OF NUCLEAR FORCE, LIMITED CREDITS FOR HOUSING AND SCHOOLS, PLUS AUTHORITARIAN NATURE OF REGIME WILL BE INCREASINGLY EXPLOITED POLITICALLY BY LEFT AND GIVE IMPETUS AND POLITICAL SYMBOLISM TO LABOR UNREST. SUCH UNREST IS NOT EXPECTED TO REACH A MAJOR SCALE SO AS TO SERIOUSLY EMBARRASS OR TO LIMIT THE GOVERNMENT WHICH HAS SHOWN IN THE PAST THAT IT HAS STRENGTH, WILL, AND AUTHORITY TO HOLD

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LINE ON ESSENTIALS WHILE MAKING MINIMUM CONCESSIONS TO DISARM OPPOSITION. HOWEVER, THREAT OF INFLATION AND MOUNTING COST OF THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM MAY FORCE GOVERNMENTAL CUTS IN EXPENDITURES IN SECTORS OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE. IF MAJOR COMPRESSION IS NECESSARY, IT WOULD PROBABLY AFFECT NUCLEAR AND FOREIGN AID PROGRAMS, THE LATTER IN PARTICULAR SINCE IT IS UNDER ATTACK BY CONSERVATIVE FORCES.

8. MOREOVER, THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN FRANCE, AFTER THE SHOCK OF HEAVY EARLIER DEFEATS, IS NOW SHOWING MORE EFFECTIVENESS IN COMBATING THE UNR LOCALLY AND CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE OPPOSITION ARE ATTEMPTING TO MERGE INTO NEW AND MORE EFFICIENT BLOCS OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE.

9. IN THE FRENCH LEFT, THERE HAS BEEN NO WEAKENING OF THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY POSITION AND WITH APPROXIMATELY 25 PER CENT OF THE ELECTORATE, IT REMAINS IN A STRONG POSITION TO IMPOSE ON THE FRENCH LEFT A POPULAR FRONT BLOC POTENTIALLY CAPABLE OF CAPTURING 1/3 OF THE ELECTORATE AND DEFEATING THE UNR IN MANY DISTRICTS. ALTHOUGH THE DEFFERRE CAMPAIGN APPEARS TO BE LOSING MUCH OF ITS EARLY APPEAL IN THE CENTER AND CONSERVATIVE AREA AND DEFFERRE IS INCREASINGLY BEING BOXED INTO A STRICTLY SOCIALIST-COMMUNIST CORNER, HE HIMSELF HAS EMERGED AS A STRONG OPPOSITION PERSONALITY.

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10. IN THE CENTER AREA THE MOVEMENT FOR A POPULAR REPUBLIC (MRP) IS ATTEMPTING TO FORM A NEW, BROAD CENTER PARTY ESSENTIALLY BASED ON A MERGER OF THE MRP, A LARGE PART OF THE RADICALS AND CERTAIN INFLUENTIAL INDEPENDENTS. THE PRIMARY POLITICAL TARGET OF THIS ATTEMPTED CENTER REGROUPMENT IS THE UNR, AND WHILE IT IS TOO EARLY TO PREDICT THE OUTCOME OF THIS ATTEMPT, IF THE NEW GROUPING CAN IN FACT EFFECTIVELY CONSOLIDATE VOTING STRENGTH RUNNING FROM THE RADICALS INTO THE INDEPENDENTS, IT WOULD CONSTITUTE A NEW AND SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO THE UNR.

11. THE UNR, AS INDICATED IN THE CANTONAL ELECTIONS, HAS NOT IN GENERAL SUCCEEDED IN EFFECTIVELY IMPLANTING ITSELF LOCALLY IN FRANCE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ESTABLISHED PRE-DE GAULLE PARTIES OF THE CENTER AND LEFT HAVE SHOWN SURPRISING VITALITY IN MAINTAINING THEIR CADRE AND LOCAL POSITIONS.

12. WHILE THERE IS NO APPARENT EFFECTIVE DISSIDENCE WITHIN THE UNR OR OPENLY EXPRESSED DISAPPROVAL OF DE GAULLE'S POLICIES, THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE UNR IS NOT STRONGLY CONFIDENT IT COULD MAINTAIN ITS PRESENT COHESION AND STRENGTH WITHOUT DE GAULLE IN THE ELYSEE AND WITHOUT HIS SUPPORT TO THE UNR AS HIS POLITICAL INSTRUMENT.

13. A FURTHER FACTOR NOW HANDICAPPING THE UNR IS THE FACT THAT THE AUTHORITARIAN CHARACTER OF THE GAULLIST REGIME IS MAKING IT (THE PARTY) INCREASINGLY UNPOPULAR IN MANY INFLUENTIAL SECTORS, PARTICULARLY AMONG FARMERS, LABOR, AND THE PRESS.

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14. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, IF DE GAULLE RETIRED FROM PUBLIC OFFICE PRIOR TO THE NEXT LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS, WE ARE STRONGLY INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT THERE WILL RESULT A NEW PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY, POSSIBLY EVEN INCLUDING ELEMENTS OF THE UNR. IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THIS MAJORITY WOULD DEFINITELY BE MORE INCLINED TOWARD A EUROPEAN AND ATLANTIC ORIENTATION, BUT ON INTERNAL AFFAIRS WOULD NOT DEPART MATERIALLY FROM THE POLICIES OF THE PRESENT REGIME. THE PRINCIPAL ISSUE WHICH MIGHT BRING SUCH A MAJORITY, IN OUR VIEW, INTO SERIOUS CONFLICT WITH A GAULLIST PRESIDENT WOULD BE THE ISSUE OF AUTHORITARIANISM. IF THE PRESIDENT WERE TO ATTEMPT TO EXERCISE PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY IN THE AUTHORITARIAN MANNER OF DE GAULLE, IT COULD BE ANTICIPATED THAT PARLIAMENT WOULD OVERTHROW THE PRESIDENT'S PRIME MINISTER AND MIGHT EVENTUALLY FORCE A PRESIDENTIAL RESIGNATION. HOWEVER, IF THE PRESIDENT DISPLAYED MODERATION AND FLEXIBILITY IN HIS RELATIONS WITH THE ASSEMBLY, IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT THE NEW MAJORITY COULD EXIST IN HARMONY WITH A GAULLIST PRESIDENT.

15. IN SUMMING UP, THEREFORE, WE FORESEE A CONTINUATION OF GAULLIST AUTHORITY AT THE PRESIDENTIAL LEVEL BUT IF DE GAULLE WITHDRAWS FROM PUBLIC OFFICE, WE ALSO FORESEE THE PROBABILITY OF A NEW NON-COMMUNIST OPPOSITION MAJORITY IN THE ASSEMBLY.

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SURVIVAL OF GAULLISM AFTER DE GAULLE

16. CONCERNING THE DEGREE TO WHICH GAULLISM WILL SURVIVE DE GAULLE IN FRANCE, WE BELIEVE THAT DE GAULLE, REGARDLESS OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS, WILL HAVE PROFOUNDLY AFFECTED FRENCH POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES:

A. FROM THE U.S. POINT OF VIEW THE MOST SIGNIFICANT HERITAGE OF GAULLISM IS LIKELY TO BE THE NATIONALIST ORIENTATION DE GAULLE HAS IMPOSED ON FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY. SOME MODIFICATION OR SOFTENING OF NATIONALIST ATTITUDES AMONG FRENCH POLICY MAKERS IS CERTAINLY PROBABLE AFTER DE GAULLE'S DISAPPEARANCE FROM THE POLITICAL SCENE, BUT IT APPEARS IMPROBABLE THERE WILL BE AN IMMEDIATE RETURN TO THE HIGHLY COOPERATIVE AND INTERNATIONALIST OUTLOOK OF THE FOURTH REPUBLIC. IT SEEMS MORE REALISTIC TO ANTICIPATE THAT GAULLIST NATIONALISM WILL SURVIVE IN THREE FORMS:

- (1) AS A DIFFUSE ORIENTATION OF PUBLIC OPINION GENERALLY;
- (2) AS A PATTERN AND TRADITION OF POLICY-MAKING AT WORKING LEVELS IN THE STATE SERVICE;
- (3) AS AN ORGANIZED POLITICAL LOBBY OF THE DIE-HARD GAULLIST RIGHT, EXEMPLIFIED BY THE PRESENT FACTION IN THE UNR HEADED BY MICHEL DEBRE. THE LONGER DE GAULLE REMAINS IN POWER THE MORE DURABLE ALL THREE TRENDS ARE LIKELY TO BECOME. PRESUMABLY THE PRESENT

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ORIENTATION TOWARD A SLOWLY DEVELOPING EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WILL CONTINUE, ALONG WITH THE PRESENT RELUCTANCE TO SPEED THE EVOLUTION TOWARD SUPRANATIONAL PATTERNS. HOWEVER, THESE TRENDS ARE MORE LIKELY TO INDUCE A PROJECTION OF FRENCH NATIONALIST ATTITUDES ON THE EUROPEAN PLANE THAN A DISAPPEARANCE OF THESE ATTITUDES. IN OTHER WORDS, THE FRENCH MAY CEASE BEING CHAUVINISTIC ABOUT FRANCE--IF THEY EVER DO--ONLY TO BECOME CHAUVINISTIC ABOUT EUROPE. TRACES OF SUCH "EUROPEAN" CHAUVINISM ARE ALREADY APPARENT IN FRANCE, NOT ONLY AMONG THE GAULLISTS BUT AMONG CERTAIN FRENCH LEFTISTS. THE NEED TO KEEP ALIVE IN FRANCE THE IDEALS OF ATLANTIC COOPERATION AND OF A MORE LIBERAL EUROPE IS ACUTE AND WILL REMAIN SO IF GAULLIST INFLUENCES CONTINUE TO DOMINATE THE OPINION-MOLDING MACHINERY OF THE NATION FOR SEVERAL YEARS MORE. THE STRUGGLE AGAINST EXTREME NATIONALISM IN FRANCE SHOULD BE VIEWED AS A PERMANENT ONE.

B. THE SURVIVAL OF GAULLIST AUTHORITARIANISM IN FRANCE POSES A MORE COMPLEX PROBLEM. STUDY OF MORE OR LESS ANALOGOUS SITUATIONS IN FRENCH HISTORY SUGGESTS THAT THE DISAPPEARANCE OF DE GAULLE WILL BE FOLLOWED BY A NOTICEABLE REACTION AGAINST AUTHORITARIANISM, CO-EXISTING FOR A WHILE WITH A STRONG NOSTALGIA FOR IT. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY ON THE WHOLE THAT THE MAJOR INSTITUTIONS OF THE FIFTH REPUBLIC WILL DISAPPEAR. IN ANY CASE, THE SURVIVAL OF PRESIDENTIALISM IN SOME FORM MAY WELL MAINTAIN A GREATER DEGREE OF POLITICAL DISCIPLINE AND COHERENCE THAN HAS USUALLY PREVAILED IN THE PAST AFTER THE DISAPPEARANCE OF AN

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AUTHORITARIAN NATIONAL LEADER. HOWEVER, SOME REVERSION TO THE EXCESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM AND EVEN ANARCHY THAT HAS SO OFTEN CHARACTERIZED FRENCH POLITICAL LIFE IN THE PAST CANNOT BE RULED OUT. IF THIS OCCURS, CONDITIONS WILL FAVOR CONSPIRATORIAL OR DEMAGOGIC ATTEMPTS TO RESTORE AUTHORITARIAN DISCIPLINE, PERHAPS IN A MORE DRASTIC FORM THAN AT PRESENT. FRANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY DOOMED TO CHAOS AFTER DE GAULLE DISAPPEARS, BUT THE SURVIVAL OF A STABLE DEMOCRATIC REGIME CANNOT BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED EITHER.

17. [REDACTED]

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
1 May 1964

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The French Foreign Military Aid Program

I. Summary

It is estimated that France in 1963 spent roughly US \$150 million* for foreign military assistance. In contrast to the US program, in which most of the expenditures were for military supplies and equipment and which is worldwide in scope, French military aid consisted mainly of payments to nearly 35,000 French troops and military technicians stationed in former colonies and protectorates. These troops are used mainly as local gendarmerie to preserve public order, while the technicians are engaged in training local forces. Most of these personnel were assigned to the former French dependencies in sub-Saharan Africa. This area received nearly 90 percent of the military aid total, the remainder going to Morocco, Laos, and Cambodia. Transfers of military equipment are believed to have totaled less than \$10 million in 1963. Other military assistance, such as budgetary support to pay for indigenous troops, also was small.

France's foreign military aid has been clearly subordinate to its foreign economic aid program, which in 1963 disbursed about \$1.35 billion mostly to these same areas. In view of the French government's current mood of budgetary stringency and the apparent adequacy of the present program, foreign military aid is not likely to increase significantly beyond present levels for some time.

II. Magnitude

In 1963, total expenditure by France on its military forces in less developed countries together with other military assistance to these

* Francs are converted to dollars at the official exchange rate of 4.937 new francs to US \$1.

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countries is estimated to have been about \$180 million.* This is in contrast to \$1.35 billion spent on its foreign economic aid program.** Of this amount, \$104 million was accounted for by French forces at French military installations abroad, \$46 million represented the cost of French military technicians on loan to local forces, and \$26 million was spent on military equipment, budgetary assistance, etc. In arriving at the military aid estimate of \$150 million, all of the outlays for integrated French military technicians and for military equipment, etc., have been counted as aid, but only 75 percent (\$78 million) of the cost of nonintegrated French forces at French military installations has been considered aid.*** From an analysis of fragmentary data, we believe that the program has declined from a peak level of a little more than \$200 million reached in 1961.

* It should be noted that France does not report military aid to any of the international data collecting organizations such as the UN or the OECD. Moreover, intelligence information on this subject is fragmentary and lacks specificity. Consequently, the military aid figure is an estimate, derived from partial data from various sources. While every effort has been made to estimate military aid separately from economic aid, some military aid may be included in the economic aid figure, which is based essentially on official French data. We believe that if there is any military aid in the economic aid figure, the amount is less than \$10 million.

** French economic aid includes both official and private aid. Official aid includes cash grants (including technical assistance) and grants in kind (excluding transfers of military end use items); sales of commodities against local currencies; government lending for periods exceeding one year (net of repayments of principal); and grants, net purchases of bonds, and capital subscriptions to multilateral agencies. French tax receipts from overseas dependencies have been deducted. Private aid includes private direct investments and reinvestments, portfolio loans and investments, and government-guaranteed private export credits.

*** Certainly more than half of French expenditures on these forces is chargeable to their function to maintain order in these countries. Nevertheless, France may draw upon components of these forces in the event of some domestic emergency; therefore, less than 100 percent of the total seemed to represent aid. We have arbitrarily assigned 75 percent.

III. Geographic Distribution

France disburses military aid to the same areas it disburses economic aid -- namely, to its former colonies, protectorates, and dependencies in Africa and to Laos and Cambodia. In 1963 the states of the Afro-Malagasy Union* received nearly 90 percent of the military aid total, or about \$137 million. Most of this consisted of payments to nearly 35,000 French troops and military technicians stationed at strategic locations across the continent. French forces are concentrated most heavily at Dakar (Senegal) in the West and in the Malagasy Republic in the East, with an airlift capability to move them wherever action is required. Because of these concentrations, the Malagasy Republic and Senegal are estimated to receive the largest amounts of French military assistance.

Only three countries outside the UAM are known to have received significant French military aid in 1963. These were Morocco, which was given \$6 million, and Laos and Cambodia, which together were granted about \$8 million. Early in 1964, France granted Morocco a credit for military equipment in the amount of \$16 million, which is the largest such grant made by France since the transfers of military equipment at the close of the Algerian war. Estimates of French military aid, by country, are summarized in Table 1, and a list of countries that receive minor amounts of such aid is given in the Appendix.

IV. Forms of Military Assistance

Both France and the US use military assistance programs to implement parts of their respective foreign aid policies and to meet certain military needs of recipient countries. Their methods of achieving these objectives are, however, greatly different. France's program is geared largely to the use of French military personnel in former French dependencies for the purpose of maintaining internal security. Nearly 35,000 French troops and military technicians are stationed in the UAM States, some 30,000 of which serve under the French flag -- that is, they are not integrated in local forces. The remainder, consisting of about 3,700 officers and NCO's, either are in French military advisory missions or

* The Afro-Malagasy Union, abbreviated "UAM," consists of Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Togo, Dahomey, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Gabon, Congo (Brazzaville), and the Malagasy Republic. It is almost defunct as an organizational entity but will be used throughout this paper as a convenient way of referring to the group.

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Table 1

Estimated French Foreign Military Aid, by Country
1963

Million US \$

Country	"Personnel" Assistance ^{a/}	Other Aid (Including Military Equipment)	Total
Malagasy Republic	28	10	38
Chad	10	1	11
Cameroon	5	2	7
Congo (Brazzaville)	4	Negl. ^{b/}	4
Gabon	1	Negl.	1
Central African Republic	5	Negl.	5
Niger	7	Negl.	7
Dahomey	4	5	9
Togo	Negl.	Negl.	1
Upper Volta	4	1	5
Ivory Coast	8	1	9
Mali		None or Negl.	
Senegal	19	1	20
Mauritania	10	Negl.	10
Estimated aid component of French costs of maintaining French air force personnel in the 3 overseas air zones of the UAM Area	10	0	10
UAM States ^{c/}	<u>115</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>137</u>
Morocco	4	2	6
Laos	3	Negl.	3
Cambodia	2	3	5
Total	<u>124</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>151</u>

a. "Personnel" assistance includes (1) French troops and other stationed forces under direct French command at French installations; 75 percent of the cost to France of maintaining these forces has been judged as military aid (See section II), (2) French military missions rendering technical and advisory services, and (3) French military personnel "on loan" to local forces.

b. "Negl.": Negligible -- less than US \$1 million.

c. UAM: Afro-Malagasy Union.

NOTE: French personnel aid to the UAM States can be divided into the following categories:

	Number	Million US \$
Forces at French installations:	30,000	78
Military technicians and personnel on loan to local forces:	3,700	37

(to a decreasing extent) are integrated in local police and military forces, where they serve mostly in command positions. Local forces have been formed under French direction and have been trained to use French methods and French equipment. French military influence reaches a maximum in the small local air forces in which all the aircraft, pilots, and other flight personnel and nearly all the maintenance crews are French. The willingness of France to absorb the costs of French military personnel stationed abroad in such a program reflects the priority given its foreign policy objective of preserving French influence in its former colonies.

The US program, however, does not involve the use of US troops as members of, or substitutes for, local police or military forces, nor is it limited to countries formerly tied to the US. Transfers of military equipment comprise the largest expenditure item in the US military aid budget (see Table 2), and the scope of the program is worldwide (see Table 3).

France has established its military aid program in the UAM States by negotiating a series of military agreements with each country. These agreements have taken the form of mutual defense pacts, technical assistance contracts, and secret intervention agreements. Under their terms, France is obligated to provide assistance in terms of money, equipment and supplies, and men. In return, France receives important concessions, such as permission to station troops in the signatory countries, commandeered transportation and communications facilities as needed, use airspace and territorial waters, and recruit native personnel for the French Army. French forces stationed in some of these states have been used in recent years to perpetuate the control of pro-French governments. The extent and nature of Franco-African military assistance agreements are illustrated in Table 4.

V. Outlook

France uses foreign aid both to maintain a privileged position in former colonies and dependencies and to extend its influence in nonaffiliated less developed countries. Heretofore military assistance has been subordinate to economic aid as an instrument for accomplishing these policy objectives, and we expect this relationship to continue. We also believe that there will be no important increases in foreign military aid in the near future. The current program appears to be large enough to satisfy

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Table 2

US Grant Aid for Military Assistance
Fiscal Year 1963

	<u>Percent of Total Grant Aid</u>
Fixed charges (infrastructure, administration, maintenance of assistance facilities, training, etc.)	23
Force maintenance (largely grants of consumable military equipment)	33
Force improvement (mostly transfers of larger items of equipment)	44
Total	<u>100</u>

Table 3

US Grant Aid, by Area
Fiscal Year 1963

	<u>Percent of Total Grant Aid</u>
Europe	18
Africa	2
Near East and South Asia	25
Far East	48
Latin America	4
Nonregional	3
Total	<u>100</u>

both the policy requirements of France and the internal security needs of the aid-receiving countries. Moreover, the high costs of the French nuclear program have caused the French parliament to question the priorities of other items in military budgets, including foreign military aid.

Table 4

Franco-African Military Assistance Agreements

<u>Country</u>	<u>Type of Agreement ^{a/}</u>
Cameroon	M, T
Central African Republic	M, T
Chad	M, T, S
Congo (Brazzaville)	M, T, S
Dahomey	M, T
Gabon	M, T, S
Ivory Coast	M, T, S
Malagasy Republic	M, T, S
Mauritania	M, T
Niger	M, T, S
Senegal	M, T
Togo	M, T
Upper Volta	T

a. M = Mutual defense agreements, T = Technical assistance agreements, and S = Secret intervention agreements.

APPENDIX

For the following countries, sufficient cost data are not available on which to base an estimate of recent military aid. Total aid to these countries probably is not significant in money terms. This appendix completes the description of the French military aid program, including all countries to which French aid is going or is suspected of going.

Algeria

Algeria does not receive any direct military aid from France, but the Algerian government is reported to use a portion of the French economic aid -- not earmarked for specific purposes -- to support its military establishment. The Algerian armed forces inherited or purchased considerable equipment (tanks, artillery, trucks, and communications gear) declared surplus by the French when they pulled their forces out of Algeria. The few Western aircraft in the Algerian Air Force were purchased through private sources in the US and Switzerland.

Tunisia

The French program in Tunisia is growing, although it cannot be quantified. During 1962, France provided training for 250 Tunisian military personnel (in France), including a small number for pilot training. Additional assistance was provided in 1963 with the provision of a civilian French air training mission in Tunisia to instruct helicopter pilots and mechanics on French-provided aircraft. This mission is expected to increase in size and scope. Light transports (3), and trainers (12 AT-6 and 5 Alouette helicopters) have been provided (terms not known), and jet fighters also may be made available if mutually acceptable types and prices can be agreed on. The Commandant of the Tunisian Air Force is to undergo training at the French War College in 1964. One patrol craft and eight motor patrol craft have been donated or purchased. Available evidence suggests that some and possibly all of French military equipment shipments have been provided on a cash or short-term credit (that is, commercial) basis.

Israel

France has acted as a military sponsor to Israel by making available first line aircraft (mostly on commercial terms), by providing jet

training for Israeli pilots, and reportedly by assisting the Israelis in the development of a surface-to-surface short-range missile system. France has also sold raw uranium and received treated product, some of which was returned to Israel for peaceful purposes.

Saudi Arabia

No military aid is specifically identified, but there are rumors that France may be offering such aid in exchange for commercial privileges.

Lebanon

Two Lebanon Air Force officers received helicopter training in France during 1963. France probably also is seeking to sell some Mystere aircraft to Lebanon.

India

In the past, France has provided 24 Brandt 120-mm mortars and 20 Alouette helicopters. The terms are not known.

Indonesia

Recent French offers of training and a 5-year credit for military equipment purchases have been reported. There is no evidence that any aid actually has been dispensed.

Latin America

All assistance takes the form of training and advice. France trains some Argentine students at the French Staff College, and the French Army mission in Argentina (which antedates the US Army mission) continues to provide advisors to the Argentine Superior War School and the General Staff. Three Bolivian Army officers received training in France in 1962. Five Honduran officers are currently receiving training in France.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY FRANCE

DATE OF INFO. FEBRUARY-MARCH 1964

SUBJECT FORRESTAL
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DISTR. 4 MARCH 1964

ALLEGED POLITICAL PLANS OF JOHNSON DE GAULLE
IN REGARD TO GERMANY AND THE USSR

PLACE &
DATE ACQ.

SALINGER
SAUNDERS

REF

IN 31397

SOURCE
AND
APPRAISAL

SMITH, WM. Y

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2. THE PLANNED VISIT BY EDGAR FAURE TO THE USSR, AS WAS THE CASE WITH HIS TRIP TO COMMUNIST CHINA, WILL BE CALLED UNOFFICIAL BUT WILL BE PRECEDED BY MANY CONFERENCES WITH MEMBERS OF THE DE GAULLE ENTOURAGE.

([REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] FAURE,

HOWEVER, LATER MADE A PERSONAL STATEMENT THAT HIS TRIP HAD NO CONNECTION WITH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT. SEE U.S. EMBASSY PARIS TELEGRAM NO. 3934, DATED 18 FEBRUARY). DE GAULLE BELIEVES THAT THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF ANGLO SAXON DIPLOMACY AND THE DIPLOMATIC INACTIVITY WHICH WILL PRECEDE THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS IN BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM MAKE IT A PROPITIOUS TIME FOR FRANCE TO EMBARK ON SPECTACULAR DIPLOMATIC MOVES. IN ADDITION IT IS NECESSARY TO SOUND OUT OFFICIAL SOVIET VIEWS AND TO EXPLAIN THE FRENCH RECOGNITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA. DE GAULLE INTENDS, THROUGH EDGAR FAURE, TO REASSURE THE SOVIETS CONCERNING HIS INTENTIONS TOWARD CHINA AND TO INFORM THEM OF HIS FUTURE PLANS IN THE FAR EAST. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE PRO-GAULLIST PUBLICATION NOUVEAU CANDIDE, IN AN ARTICLE IN ITS 13 TO 20 FEBRUARY EDITION, SUGGESTED THAT FAURE INTENDED TO GO TO THE USSR TO DISCUSS DE GAULLE'S VISIT AND

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[REDACTED]

FRANCO-SOVIET RELATIONS IN GENERAL AND POINTED OUT THE SOVIET HOPE FOR A "SPECTACULAR" RENEWAL OF THE FRANCO-SOVIET POST-WAR ALLIANCE).

3. DE GAULLE IS CONVINCED THAT FRANCE MUST GAIN A FIRM AND RESPECTED PLACE AMONG THE BIG THREE AND TAKE HER PLACE AS THE FOURTH POWER WITH THE UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, AND SOVIET UNION IN ORDER TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE GREAT CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE EAST AND WEST WHICH HE BELIEVES IS IMMINENT.

4. DE GAULLE'S PRIMARY CONCERN, HOWEVER, IS GERMANY. HIS CURRENT THINKING ON GERMANY ENVISIONS EVENTUAL DE FACTO RECOGNITION OF THE EAST GERMAN REPUBLIC WITH THE PROVISIO THAT KHRUSHCHEV WILL AGREE TO THE REMOVAL OF ULBRICHT FROM THE EAST GERMAN POLITICAL SCENE. IF THIS INITIATIVE IS TAKEN, DE GAULLE BELIEVES THAT CHANCELLOR ERHARD CANNOT BUT REGARD IT AS AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD REGULATION OF THE GERMAN QUESTION. IN ANY CASE, WHEN THE MOMENT ARRIVES, DE GAULLE WILL TAKE IT UPON HIMSELF TO EXPLAIN THE BENEFITS OF SUCH A POLICY TO HIS GERMAN ALLIES. THE SOVIETS, FINDING IN DE GAULLE AN ALLY ON THIS POINT, WILL SUPPORT HIS DRIVE TO BECOME AN EQUAL PARTNER IN THE EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS. () COMMENT: IT IS EVIDENT THAT SUCH NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE HANDLED DELICATELY TO AVOID BREAKING THE FRAGILE TIES ESTABLISHED BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY BY THE FRANCO-GERMAN PACT AND THAT DE GAULLE HIMSELF CANNOT BECOME INVOLVED IN LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR SUCH POLITICAL MANEUVERING. EDGAR FAURE, HOWEVER, CAN HANDLE THE NEGOTIATIONS AT

THIS STAGE).

5. () COMMENT:

6. IN FURTHERING FRENCH POLICY, FRANCE PLANS FIRST TO PROPOSE A TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE () "VERSION")* OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE SOMETIME DURING THE SUMMER OF 1964. DE GAULLE WILL THEN USE THIS REFUSAL AS A PRETEXT TO SIGN AN ACCORD WITH THE SOVIETS. () THE TREATY WOULD INCLUDE A PLAN FOR THE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY, WHICH THE GERMANS IN THEIR OVERWHELMING DESIRE FOR REUNIFICATION WOULD ACCEPT DESPITE OTHER UNFAVORABLE TERMS.)

7. () DISSEM: STATE.

8. () COMMENT:

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COUNTRY WEST GERMANY/FRANCE

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INFO.

DISTR. 27 FEBRUARY 196

ERHARD'S RECENT TALKS WITH DE GAULLE

PLACE &
DATE ACQSOURCE
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1. [REDACTED] SHORTLY AFTER HIS RETURN FROM PARIS CHANCELLOR ERHARD REMARKED, IN REPLY TO A QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE EUROPEAN CAUSE HAD BEEN ADVANCED BY HIS TRIP TO PARIS, THAT IT HAD BEEN ADVANCED ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT EUROPEAN UNITY IS BEING DISCUSSED. THERE WERE NO CONCRETE RESULTS TOWARD EUROPEAN UNITY FROM HIS TALKS WITH PRESIDENT DE GAULLE, HE SAID. ERHARD SAID THAT DE GAULLE'S CONCEPTS ON EUROPEAN DEFENSE AND NATO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNITY IMPOSSIBLE AT PRESENT. HE SAID THAT HE AND DE GAULLE HAD SPOKEN FRANKLY TO EACH OTHER AND THAT EACH KNOWS HOW THE OTHER FEELS, ALTHOUGH, SAID ERHARD, THIS IS REALLY NOTHING NEW FOR

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EITHER OF THEM.

2. ERHARD DENIED RECENT STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT HE WAS SOFTPEDALLING THE QUESTION OF BRITISH ENTRY INTO A EUROPEAN UNION, HE SAID THAT IT REMAINED HIS STRONGEST CONVICTION THAT ENGLAND MUST BE PART OF A UNIFIED EUROPE, BUT THAT BRITAIN IS NOT CAPABLE AT THE MOMENT OF MAKING A DECISION ON THIS QUESTION. ERHARD ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT HE WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO PREPARE THE WAY FOR BRITISH ENTRY INTO A EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNION, BUT THAT THERE IS NO REASON WHY THE SIX SHOULD NOT BEGIN TALKING ABOUT THE UNION NOW.

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3.

THE STATE OF FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS IS NOT AS FAVORABLE AS ONE MIGHT GATHER FROM READING THE STATEMENTS ISSUED AT THE END OF THE RECENT TALKS. DE GAULLE REFUSED TO CHANGE HIS ATTITUDE ON ANY OF THE POLICY QUESTIONS ON WHICH THERE HAD BEEN A DIFFERENCE IN OUTLOOK BETWEEN FRANCE AND WEST GERMANY. THE ONLY SUCCESS WHICH THE GERMANS COULD CLAIM FROM THE TALKS, WAS THAT DE GAULLE HAD PROMISED TO DO HIS BEST TO INSURE THE SUCCESS OF THE COMING KENNEDY ROUND OF TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS. THIS AGREEMENT WAS MADE IN RETURN FOR EARLIER PROMISES BY ADENAUER TO DE GAULLE TO THE EFFECT THAT GERMANY WOULD WORK TOWARD THE SETTLEMENT OF FCC AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS.

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4. CONCERNING NATO PROBLEMS, ERHARD HAD

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RETURNED AGAIN AND AGAIN TO THE FRENCH DECISION TO RECOGNIZE COMMUNIST CHINA AND THAT THE CHANCELLOR HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT IN HIS OPINION DE GAULLE'S ACTION WAS DISTURBING TO THE NATO ALLIANCE AND THAT DE GAULLE SHOULD HAVE CONSULTED WITH THE AMERICANS BEFORE TAKING THIS STEP. AFTER SEVERAL SUCH STATEMENTS ABOUT THE DETRIMENTAL EFFECT OF THE FRENCH DECISION ON THE NATO ALLIANCE, DE GAULLE SAID TO ERHARD, "YOU CAME HERE IN NOVEMBER, AND WE BECAME FRIENDS; YOU WENT TO TEXAS AND BECAME FRIENDS WITH JOHNSON; YOU WENT TO ROME AND BECAME FRIENDS WITH THE ITALIANS; YOU ARE HERE NOW AND WE UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER EVEN BETTER - WHAT MORE DO YOU WANT FOR GERMANY?" THIS, [REDACTED] WAS NOTIFICATION THAT THE FRENCH AND THE GERMANS HAVE SEPARATE POLICIES AND THAT THE MATTER SHOULD BE LEFT AT THAT.

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5. DE GAULLE TOLD ERHARD, [REDACTED] THAT HE HAD NO INTENTION OF BREAKING UP NATO BUT THAT HE WANTED RATHER TO CHANGE IT STRUCTURALLY IN ORDER TO BRING MORE EQUALITY AMONG THE PARTNERS INTO THE LEADERSHIP MECHANISM OF THE ORGANIZATION. IN REPLY TO ERHARD'S STATEMENT THAT DE GAULLE GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF WANTING TO CREATE A THIRD FORCE, DE GAULLE SAID THAT ONLY A STRONG EUROPE WITH ITS OWN ATOMIC FORCE CAN ACHIEVE A TRUE PARTNERSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES. DE GAULLE TOLD ERHARD THAT HE AND ERHARD DIFFER ONLY ON THE METHODS TO BE USED IN ACHIEVING PARTNERSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES AND NOT AS TO WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE SUCH A PARTNERSHIP. AS TO THESE METHODS, DE GAULLE MAINTAINED THAT HIS WERE THE MORE REALISTIC ONES.

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6. ON THE ISSUE OF FRANCO-GERMAN AID TO LATIN AMERICA, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] ERHARD WANTS TO CORRECT THE IMPRESSION HELD BY SOME THAT
THIS IS AN EFFORT AIMED AGAINST THE UNITED STATES IN LATIN AMERICA.
AND TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IT IS AN ACCEPTANCE OF PART OF THE AID
BURDEN BY EUROPE - SOMETHING WHICH THE AMERICANS HAVE LONG INSISTED
UPON - IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE AMERICAN EFFORT.

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7. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE PRIMARY SUCCESS OF THE
TALKS WAS THE AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH A FRANCO-GERMAN ECONOMIC
COMMISSION TO COORDINATE THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC POLICY.
AS TO DE GAULLE'S PROMISE TO SUPPORT THE KENNEDY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS,
[REDACTED] THIS CAN ONLY BE EVALUATED
AFTER THE NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN AND THE FRENCH POSITION BECOMES
CLEAR. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE SUBJECT OF THE EFFECT OF THE RECOGNITION
OF COMMUNIST CHINA UPON CHINESE MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS
HAD COME UP, WHEREUPON COUVE DE MURVILLE HAD COMMENTED, "YOU
DON'T HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT THE DISMISSAL OF NATIONALIST CHINA FROM
THE UN. YOU AREN'T IN IT AND DON'T HAVE TO VOTE ONE WAY OR THE
OTHER ON IT".

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8. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE [REDACTED] (END OF MESSAGE)

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