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Page 1 of 3

Doc#	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
01	memo	Komer to Bundy Dup + ti, Rapersol Korner, Chro	n, lly-sept	£65.8	9/22/65	А
06	memo	Saunders to Bundy Oppul 51, Lorner, BX 3	FI WISHMITTS	2/63-3	/66 9/17/65	А
07	memo	Saunders to Bundy Dy +56, Kaner, By	37 Kashmir	12/63-	3/64 9/16/65	А
08	cable	for Bowles from Komer [sanitized 8/24/01] Dup +420, Papers of Korrer, C	hron San-	June 6	2/4/65 5 By	5 A
12a	-letter	Bowles to Ray Hare Open 3/29/19 Per PATC	-8	4	11/12/65	;—_A_
13a	memo	intelligence memorandum [exempted 9/11.	/00] S	6	9/30/65	A
14	report	Research Memorandum, RFE-37.10 Districtly of per RAC, 12-1-05	S	2	9/24/65	A
15-	cable	Tel. No. 7434 from Foreign Office Open 3/29/19 per RAC	8	3	9/23/65	
16-	report	Research Memorandum, RFE-37.9 Then per KAC 12-1-05	S	2	9/23/65	
17	report	Research Memorandum, RFE-37.8 SW11726d 3/29/19	s	3	9/22/65	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer

Folder Title "India - CPR 1964-1965-March 1966

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Doc#	DocType	<u>Doc Info</u>	Classification	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	Restriction
18	report	Research Memorandum, RFE-37.7 [sanitize 8/24/01]	d S	5	9/21/65	А
		[dup. #207, NSF, CF, India, vol. 5, box 129]				
19	report	Research Memorandum, RFE-37.6 [dup. #201, NSF, CF, India, Vol. 5, box 129]	s	7	9/20/65	А
		sanitized 3/29/19	100			
20	cable	Tel. No. 1150 from Peking	-	2	9/19/65	A_
		open 3/29/19 per RAC	-			
21	cable	Tel. No. 1142 from Peking	С	2	9/17/65	А
25	memo	R.C. Bowman to Bundy and Komer	тѕ	1	9/16/65	А
26	report	Research Memorandum RFE-37.3	s	3	9/16/65	Α
27	report	Research Memorandum RFE-37.2 Danityd per RHC 12-1-05	s	2	9/15/65	A
27a	report	Research Memorandum INR-25.2 SMITTLE (1 3/29/19	S	9	9/15/65	A
28	report	Research Memorandum RFE-37.1 [sanitize 3/10/02]	d S	2	9/14/65	А
		[dup. #190, NSF, CF, India, Vol. 5, box 129; #14, NSF, Files of Komer, Kashmir-Chron. (Events, box 38]				

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29	memo	for the Members of the Kashmir Working Group	S	2	9/9/65	А

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12/17/2003 JC

Initials



9/21/65 Tuesday/5:30 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We have a press flash that the Chicom radio announces the Indians have dismantled the offending fortifications and withdrawn from Chinese soil. This may mean they won't act when their ultimatum expires at 1:30 EST tonight.

Rusk has instructed Goldberg to stick to the pitch you approved last night when Goldberg talks with Bhutto.

Bhutto is seeing Gromyko at 10 p.m. and Goldberg at II. He wants an SC meeting tonight, reportedly to seek changes in the SC resolution. It's hard to see how this could be done (the Soviets would hardly comply). There may be pressure, however, for extension of the SC deadline of 2 a.m. tonight.

R. W. Komer

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines By C NARA, Bate 12-7-03

3

SECRET

September 17, 1965

NEED FOR IMMEDIATE WARNING AND REASSURANCE TO AYUB

While we can afford to wait a bit before responding to the latest Indian appeal, looming Chicom involvement makes it urgent that we warn Ayub about the consequences if Peiping enters the fray.

- 1. The main point to get across to Ayub himself is that Chicom involvement would inevitably convert the Pak/Indian war into a Chicom/Western confrontation in which US policy would be dictated by our overriding strategic interest in containing Red China. Thus in effect if Ayub acts in collusion with Peiping he will be cutting himself off from the West. This might influence Ayub to disengage from the Chicoms by accepting a cease-fire promptly. At the minimum it would give Ayub pause lest he lose all Pakistan's aid from the West.
- We may also want to suggest to Ayub the importance of publicly disassociating himself from the Chicoms (Pickard's suggestion for Wilson letter).
- 3. At the same time, we need to reassure Ayub that if he does act sensibly he can expect renewed US aid. We have many reports that Ayub thinks we've opted for sacrificing Pakistan. If he really does think so, or is being so advised, it will only increase his willingness to gamble even more desperately by joining the Chicoms in squeezing India.
- 4. Ayub of course wants more than renewed US aid (though by this time it must seem more at risk than it did three weeks ago). He'll come back saying get me a Kashmir settlement and I'll play ball. Thus, should we now indicate to Ayub what kind of negotiation we might be prepared to back if he would cease fire? However, this question raises many issues, e.g. how much we would compromise coarselves with India, the edge we might give the Soviets, etc. So it seems better for us to stick with a vague UN resolution till we have a better sense of how malleable Delhi will become now that it faces a major Chicom threat.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By NARA, Date 10-703

R. W. Komer





September 17, 1965

Mac -

Shastri letter delivered by BK to Rusk is almost all on Pak/Indian aspect not Chicom. It must have been drafted before yesterday's Chicom ultimatum. So BK, after talking with Swaran Singh on the phone, added three points orally: (1) request for formal US statement interdicting interference, on grounds this action might forestall a Chicom attack; (2) if Chicoms do come in india wants help; (3) US must modify its neutrality between India and Pakistan, in and out of SC.

Thus Indians are trying to force our hand. NEA thinks they're implying that if we don't help, they'll have to settle with Chicoms so they can deal with the Paks. She notes Shastri told his parliament today that India rejected the Chicom protest, but accepted idea of joint inspection in Sikkim (a decided shift in previous Indian position that they wouldn't deal bilaterally with the Chicoms). I doubt this interpretation; it would be very hard for India to get any decent deal from the Chicoms.

RWK



DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidalines By ... NARA, Date 12-7-03

5



September 17, 1965

AGENDA POINTS

- A. How Grave is this Mess? It's prudent to assume that Chicoms will do some shooting, but how much is the issue.
- B. What is our Basic Interest? If it's containing the Chicoms, then clearly our primary interest is to back India. But we want to do so if possible (1) without losing the Paks; and (2) perhaps even get Kashmir settled.
- C. What Signals should the President Give?
 - Immediate warning plus reassurance to Ayub to dissuade him from aligning with Peiping.
 - Delay in responding to Indian request (BK Nehru to Rusk) till we see picture more clearly.
 - State to prepare interim response on assumption (a) Chicoms escalate slowly; and (b) rapid escalation to 1962 scale of attack.
 - Security Council. Back resolution along lines SYG wants (i. e. stay in step with SYG).
 - US Public Stance. Concern over Chicom threat, but no need to overreact. India much better prepared against Chicoms than it was in 1962.
 - DOD to step up contingency planning for (a) resumption of MAP only
 against Chicoms; (b) US intervention in air only.
 - Consult with UK. Let's try to bring them along with us. Possible message to Wilson (before he hits us).

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By C., NARA, Date 2-7-03

SECRET

February 4, 1965

051//

ro: NEW DELHI

25X1A

VIA CHANNEL

FOR BOWLES FROM KOMER

See every reason why you entitled to have Nehru message

of 19 November 1962. Message follows:

(See Attached)

Authority NLJ: 032.021.004/1

Byc NARA, Date 2-703

Approved For Release 2001/08/24 : NLJ-032-021-4-1-1

06950

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State _BUNDY SMITH

INDICATE: COLLECT

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ACTION: Amembassy NEW DEERL

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BOWDLER BOWMAN -CHASE COOPER -IESSUP -IOHDEON DEC 13 7 07 PH %55

- 1. Indian Ambassador Nehre, on instructions, called on Assistant Secretary

 Have December 13 to discuss Sino-Indian border situation and related matters.
- 2. Nehru began with reference to latest Chicom intrusions south of Thagla
 Ridge in NEFA. Noted that Chicom forces, which hed intruded earlier but had
 withdrawn last week, now back as again 350 strong, 3 miles south of ridge in
 intrusions.
 undisputed Indian territory. Stressed deep 60% concern at such intrusions.
- 3. In subsequent discussion and apparently speaking on own initiative "impossible"

 Nehru said GOI failure to evict Chicoms would eventually develop domestic and external problems, whereas action to evict them could lead to war. Noted also that in Thagla Ridge area it would be physically difficult evict Chicoms without resorting to air power which in turn would risk Chinese air attacks against Indian cities; thus problem would be similar to that which India faced in 1962, reiterated

 In reply questions he auditermined opinion that he and other GOI representatives namely to had earlier expressed that Chicom motivations appeared to be/harass Indians and disrupt pending negotiations involving Rek, USSR, US, etc.
- 4. Nehre them cited various indications of possible collusion between Communist China and Pakistan, drawing on message just received from New Delhi

which

NEA: SOA: CS Coon: phr 12-13-65

Tel. Es

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - Ambassador Hare

NEA/SOA - Mr. Schneider DECLASSIFIED

Authority AVJ 93.244 (*83)

By JC/W. NARA, Date 2.403

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FORM DS-322

Page 2 of telegram to NEW NEWH DELHI; INFO KARACHI, HONG KONG, LONDON, USUN, New York

COMPRESENTAL

Classification

which evidently based mainly on input from Indian Embassy Peiping. According to this information:

- a. Chicoms have recently given GOP foreign exchange credit of \$67.5 million. This extended since cease-fire, additional to earlier \$60 million credit for \$200 million credit is for arms.
- b. Chicom ship recently unloaded 6,000 tons cargo Karachi under security blackout.
- c. Indian intelligence indicates buildup of aircraft and spares in
 Pass
 Hotien (Khotan) airfield north east of Karakoram Errors.
- d. Pak military attache in Peiping has been making frequent trips in
 Rawalpindi
 various parts of China and will shortly visit Ra Rawai.
 - e. PAF officers seen recently at Shangsha AFB in Central China.
- f. About 70 Pakistanis (possibly PAF personnel) seem to have arrived recently in Peiping.
- g. GOI believes it safe to assume exploratory talks between Chicom may and GOP have occurred, although GOP MMW be waiting outcome of various pending talks before deciding whether to go ahead with major acquisition of military supplies from China.
- 5. Nehru noted that in me view imminence Ayub visit his government wanted merkinsk foregoing conveyed to us promptly. Askedkikhhekhkunskakhkun

goodsxxtonex

CORP THE MAN TEAL

Page 3 of telegram to DELMI, INFO, RARACHI, HONG KONG, LONDON, USUN, New York

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COMPANIENT BOOM

6. In subsequent conversation Nehru noted he was returning to India after Christmas and hoped before departure to be able to discuss arrangements for Shastri visit in at least a preliminary way. He also said he understood that Minister Subramuniam would be coming "Christmas week".

CP - 3

EID

BALL.

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State BUILDY-SMITH BATOR 47 CONFIDENTIAL Action NNNNVV QSA926SBA559 RR RUE HCRUFHDN DE RUSBAE 1288 3341310 NEA ZNY CCCCC Info R 301300Z FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI TO RUE HC/ SECSTATE WASHDC 1379 SS INFO RUQVKR/AMEMBASSY KARACHI 566 RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON 438 G STATE GRNC SP BT SAH CON NOV 30 L H ON MONDAY, AT THE REQUEST OF C. J. JHA, I CALLED AT MEA. PIURPOSE OF VISIT WAS APPARENTLY TO BRING ME UPTO-DATE REGARDING EUR CHINESE PRESSURE ALONG THE BORDER AND TO EMPHASIZE THAT GOL FE REGARDS THIS OPERATION WITH INCREASING ALARM. IO NSC SPECIFICALLY JHA REPORTED THAT ON WESTERN END OF BORDER CHINESE TROOPS HAVE "PRACTICALLY DEMILITARIZED THE 20 KILOMETERS INR DEMILITARIZED ZONE IN VIOLATION OF CHINA'S OWN DECLARATION". CIA IN ADDITION AT CERTAIN OTHER POINTS THEY HAVE CROSSED "SO NSA CALLED LINE OF ACTUAL CONTROL" AND INTRUDED AS MUCH AS TWO DOD NIC PAGE TWO RUSBAE 1288 C O N F I D E N T I A L RSR MILES INTO INDIAN TERRITORY. IN EASTERN SECTOR CHINESE HAVE ALSO CROSSED THE LINE AT SEVERAL POINTS PENETRATING A MILE OR MORE INTO INDIAN TERRITORY. THESE INTRUSIONS WERE CONDUCTED BY GROUPS OF BETWEEN ONE HUNDRED AND THREE HUNDRED TROOPS. IF THEY CONTINUE, HE SAID, THE INDIANS WILL HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO PUSH THEM BACK. JHA POINTED OUT THAT FOLLOWING COLLAPSE OF THEIR ULTIMATUM IN SEPTEMBER THE CHINESE EMBARKED ON PROGRAM OF RESTRAINT, PROBABLY BECAUSE OF THEIR CONCERN ABOUT IMPENDING ALGIERS CONFERENCE. HOWEVER. SINCE THEN THEIR ACTIVITIES HAVE STEPPED UP STEADILY. JHA EXPRESSED PERSONAL VIEW THAT CHINA'S PROVOCATIVE MILITARY ACTIVITIES REFLECT SINOTPAK COLLUSION AND THAT TONE OF NOTES RECEIVED BY GOI FROM PEIPING SUGGESTS THAT CHINESE ARE PUTTING

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AND WITH SOVIETS.'

CONFIDENTIAL

THEM SELVES IN POSITION FROM WHICH IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO

BACK DOWN. JHA FELT THAT PRESENT EXERCISE IS AIMED AT BOLSTER!
ING PAKISTANI WILLINGNESS TO "TAKE A FIRM POSITION WITH WASHINGTON

Authority NLJ 90-95 (*37)
By CMP. NARA. Date [2-403

CONFIDENTIAL

2- 1379 November 30 from New Delhi

DE HATELING TELE 220121A

PAGE THREE RUSBAE 1288 C O N F I D E N T I A L
I STATED I DID NOT ACCEPT VIEW THAT CHIN AND PAKISTAN WERE
NECESSARILY WORKING IN CLOSE COOPERATION BUT AGREED THAT IT
MIGHT BE CHINESE DEVICE TO BRING PRESSURE ON SOVIETS., INDIANS,
AND OURSELVES.

THE EARL SHED DESCRIPTION AND LINE SHOW HAD SHED THE REPORT OF THE PARTY OF THE PAR

IF THE TWO POWERS WERE REALLY WORKING IN CLOSE COOPERATION CHINESE WOULD NOT HAVE DELIVERED AN ULTIMATUM ON THE 16TH OF SEPTEMBER ONLY TO WITHDRAW IN CONFUSION A FEW DAYS LATER WHEN THE PAKISTANIS AGREED TO CEASEFIRE. HOWEVER, I AGREED THAT PRESENT CHINESE PROVOKATIONS ARE BOTH WORRISOME AND UNPREDICTABLE. BOWLES

O LIVE OF APT DAY DOWNERS AND THINDD AS MUCH AS THOSE

CHAILTTAN AL CENTAIN OF THE POINTS THAT CROSED TOWN

SECURDS INTO OFFICE DECREES THE SOLOTE VENETA ALANGED THAT SOL

CA NOWENTS AS THE REQUEST OF C. J. DAM. I CALLED AT MEA.

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of Stave

85 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE Action RR RUEHC NEA DE RUSBAE 1298A 3341600 ZNY CCCCC Info 1965 NOV 30 PM 7 46 (FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI) SS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC (1383) G INFO RUMJDH/AMCONGEN HONG KONG 110 BUNDY-SMITH SP ZEN/AMCONGEN CALCUTTA UNN BOWDLER SAH STATE GRNC BOWMAN L H LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SAL EUR REF: EMBTEL 1379 KOMER FE IO VERBATIM TEXT P

P VERBAITM TEXT

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AIDE-MEMOIRE ENTITLED "CHINESE MOVES AND PROVOCATIONS ON THE INDIA BORDER" PASSED BY FOREIGN SECRETARY C.S. JHA TO AMBASSADOR ON NOV 29.

SINCE THE MIDDLE OF SEPTEMBER, FOLLOWING THE FAILURE OF THEIR ULTIMATUM TO INDIA, THE CHINESE HAD BEEN CREATING INCIDENTS ON OUR BORDER AND KEEPING THE TENSION ALIVE. THE SITUATION + HAS NOW FLARED UP AGAIN AND CHINESE MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND INTRUSIONS COVER SIKKIM AS WELL AS THE WESTERN AND EASTERN

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PAGE TWO RUSBAE 1298A
SECTORS OF OUR NORTHERN BORDER. ON NOVEMBER 13TH THERE WAS
A SERIOUS INCURSION ACROSS THE DONGCHUI LA IN SIKKIM RESULTING
IN THE DEATH OF ONE INDIAN SOLDIER. DURING THE LAST FEW DAYS
THE INTRUSIONS ON THE SIKKIM BORDER HAVE BECOME ALMOST A DAILY
OCCURRENCE.

IN THE WESTERN SECTOR THE CHINESE TROOPS HAVE PRACTICALLY REMILITARIZED THE 20 KM DEMILITARIZED ZONE THEREBY VIOLATING THE PROVISIONS OF THE COLOMBO PROPOSALS AS WELL AS CHINA'S OWN UNILATERAL DECLARATION; THE CHINESE HAVE ALSO, AT CERTAIN POINTS, CROSSED THE 'LINE OF ACTUAL CONTROL' AND INTRUDED INTO UNDISPUTED INDIAN TERRITORY LIKE TSASKUR AND THE TRACK JUNCTION AT DUALAT BEG OLDI.

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-2 - 1383, NOVEMBER 30, FROM NEW DELHI.

IN THE EASTERN SECTOR THE CHINESE TROOPS HAVE CROSSED THE MAC MAHONE LINE AT CERTAIN POINTS. ON NOVEMBER 20TH ABOUT 200 CHINESE CROSSED ZANGLA, EAST OF THAGLA AND PENETRATED ABOUT ONEMILE INTO INDIAN TERRITORY. ON NOVEMBER 23 RD ANOTHER PARTY OF CHINESE TROOPS CROSSED THE THAGLA RIDGE AND ENTERED THE NANKACHU VALLEY AND ALSO LEFT BANK OF THE NAMJANGCHU RIVER. THE THAGLA RIDGE AREA IS ONE OF THE PLACES WHICH UNDER THE

COLOMBO PROPOSALS WAS TO BE KEPT EMPTY OF BOTH INDIAN AND CHINESE TROOPS. IN ENTERING THIS AREA THE CHINESE HAVE NOT

PAGE THREE RUSBAE 1298A
ONLY VIOLATED INDIA'S INTERNATIONAL BORDER BUT THE PROVISIONS OF
THE COLOMBO PROPOSALS AND ALSO GONE BACK UPON CHINA'S OWN
DECLARATION THAT SHE WILL NOT SEND TROOPS TO THE SO-CALLED
DISPUTED AREAS LIKE THAGLA RIDGE, LONGJU AND BARAHOTI. IN THE SIANG
DIVISION OF NEFA THE CHINESE HAVE AMBUSHED AND KILLED THREE
INDIAN SOLDIERS ON PATROL DUTY ON THE INDIAN SIDE OF DOMLA
PASS AND AT KARBO A PARTY OF 300 CHINESE TROOPS CROSSED THE BORDER
AND ADVANCED ABOUT 200 YARDS INTO INDIAN TERRITORY. ON NOV 27
AN INDIAN POLICE PARTY PATROLLING IN THE VICINITY OF GILLING
IN THE SIANG DISTRICT OF NEFA WAS FIRED UPON BY INTRUDING CHINESE
SOLDIERS, WOUNDING/ONE CONSTALBLE IN THE ARM.

THESE VIOLATIONS ARE ACCOMPANIED BY UNUSUAL MILITARY ACTIVITY AND TROOP CONCENTRATIONS BY THE CHINESE ON THE TIBETAN SIDE OF THE BORDER AND BY FABRICATED ALLEGATIONS AND THREATS AGAINST INDIA. THE THREATS HAVE BEEN REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES SINCE NOV 13TH. IN THEIR NOTE OF NOV 24TH THE CHINESE WARNED THAT "SHOULD INDIAN TROOPS AGAIN MAKE ARMED PROVOCATIVE INTRUSIONS, THE CHINESE SIDE WILL RESOLUTELY FIGHT BACK WITHOUT FAIL," AND THE CHINESE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE ISSUED A STATEMENT ADVISING INDIA TO "REIN IN ON THE BRINK OF THE PRECIPICE" AND THEATENING THAT "IF YOU REFUSE TO COME TO YOUR SENSES AND PERSIST IN PROVOCATIONS AND ATTACKS YOU WILL NOT COME TO GOOD END."

PAGE FOUR RUSBAE 1298A
THESE CHINESE THREATS AND VIOLATIONS OF THE BORDER HAVE TO
BE SEEN IN THE BACKGROUND OF THE INCREASED AGGRESSIVENESS OF
CHINESE POLICIES IN GENERAL SINCE SEPT-OCT ESPECIALLY AFTER THE
CHINESE RETREAT FROM THE ALGIERS CONFERENCE. INDIAN LEADERSHIP,
INDIAN POLICIES, AND CONDITIONS OF LIFE IN INDIA HAVE BECOME
MAJOR TARGETS OF VEHEMENT CRITICISM AND ATTACK IN THE CHINESE

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-3- 1383, NOVEMBER 30, FROM NEW DELHI.

PRESS. THE COLLUSION BETWEEN CHINA AND PAKISTAN HAS ALSO REACHED A MORE ADVANCED STAGE. THE VISITS OF AIR MARSHAL ASHGAR KHAN AND GHULAM FAROOQUE (PRESIDENT AYUB'S DEFENSE ADVISERS) TO PEKING IN OCTOBERAND THE FREQUENT JOURNEYS OF THE PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR IN PEKING TO KARACHI AND BACK IN OCTOBER POINT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF CLOSE AND CONTINUOUS POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

CHINA'S PROVOCATIVE MILITARY ACTIVIES ON OUR BORDER ARE INTIMATELY CONNECTED WITH SINO-PAK COLLUSION. PAKISTAN IS CONTINUING TO VIOLATE THE CEASEFIRE BECAUSE IT IS NOT PREPARED TO LET THE PRESENT CONDITIONS IN J AND K AND IN THE PUNJAB BECOME FROZEN AS ANY FREEZING OF THE POSITIONS WILL DRIVE HOME TO THE PAKISTANI PEOPLE THE UTTER FAILURE OF THEIR GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES. THE CHINESE HAVE, EVIDENTLY, DECIDED TO IDENTIFY THEMSELVES WITH THIS PAKISTANI STAND. BY CREATING INCIDENTS ACROSS THE INDIAN BORDER THEY WANT TO BRING HOME TO PAKISTAN

PAGE FIVE RUSBAE 1298A
AND TO INDIA THAT THE AREA OF CONFLICT IS NOT MERELY
JAMMU AND KASHMIR AND THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY BETWEEN
INDIA AND PAKISTAN, BUT ALSO INDIA'S ENTIRE BORDER WITH CHINA.
WHILE PAKISTAN IS KEEPING THE FLAME OF WAR ALIVE ON THE INDIAWEST PAKISTAN FRONT AND IN KASHMIR, THE CHINESE ARE CREATING A
PARALLEL SITUATION ON THE INDIA-TIBET BORDER.

WHILE THE CURRENT VIOLATIONS AND SKIRMISHES ACROSS THE BORDER AND THREATS TO INDIA MAY NOT PRESTIGE AN IMMEDIATE LARGE SCALE ATTACK ON INDIA, THEY ARE INTENDED TO HARASS INDIA AND TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR A FUTURE CONFLICT IN COLLUSION WITH PAKISTAN. IN THIS CONNECTION INTRUSIONS ACROSS THE MAC MAHONE LINE ARE PARTICULARLY OMINOUS. ONE OF THE CHINESE OBJECTIVES, AT PRESENT. MIGHT BE TO FORCE THE INDIAN TROOPS TO MOVE AWAY FROM THE BORDER. THEY ARE ALSO INTENDED TO RESURRECT IN AN ACTIVE FORM CHINA'S TERRITORIAL CLAIMS IN NEFA AND OTHER SECTORS OF THE BORDER. IN THE TIMING OF THE CHINESE MOVES ONE ALSO SEES AN ATTEMPT TO PREVENT THE PROJECTED PASHKENT MEETING BETWEEN OUR PRIMIN AND THE PRES OF PAKISTAN. THE CHINESE WANT ALSO TO CREATE IMPEDIMENTS IN PAKISTAN'S EFFORTS TO PATCH UP WITH THE US. IN SUM, THE CHINESE AIMS AT PRESENT ARE TO KEEP THE INDO-PAK CONFLICT SIMMERING, TO HARASS INDIA CONTINUALLY ALONG THE ENTIRE BORDER, AND TO REASSERT CHINA'S CLAIMS TO FURTHER INDIAN TERRITORY. BOWLES



This document consists of I pages. No. / of 6 copies. Series A.

OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

New Delhi - November 16, 1965

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL SECRET

Dear Bob:

I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I sent recently to Ray Hare regarding a pledge of US assistance to India in the event of a Chinese attack. I believe you may find it interesting.

I think that this approach might be a constructive way to relieve some of the pressure to resume military assistance to the Subcontinent quickly. We might build our future military assistance programs around joint military studies with India and Pakistan to meet the Chinese threat.

I would appreciate any thoughts you may have regarding such an approach.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely

Chester Bowles

Enclosure:

Letter to Raymond A. Hare

Mr. Robert Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By NARA, Date/2-703

120

SECRET.

New Delhi, India, November 12, 1965.

Dear Ray:

At the moment I realize we are in a state of suspended animation in regard to most United States military and developmental activities in the subcontinent. However, it may not be too early to explore some of the possibilities which we may want to place on our agenda when the time comes for action.

One move that might be considered is a statement by the President following his discussions with Shastri that "should India again become the victim of Chinese Communist armed aggression, I will use all appropriate means constitutionally available to me to render adequate assistance to India."

The top GOI political-military leaders would be aware that although such a statement places the United States on record where they want it, it does not really guarantee any specific assistance. However, we could suggest joint defense planning as an indication of the seriousness with which we regard the President's statement.

Among the advantages of such an offer are the following:

- It would make it much easier for us to persuade the Indians to stick to their present defense budgets or at least to stretch out any additional defense spending over a large period of years.
- 2. A clear assurance of U.S. aid against Chinese attack would be warmly welcomed by the Indian army and air force which are concerned with the defense of a long and difficult frontier of nearly 3,000 miles and were seriously shaken by the fact that we

The Honorable

Raymond A. Hare,

Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED

By JON WARA Date 19-18

armed Pakistan with superior weapons which we denied to them and were unable to prevent their use.

- 3. By including Burma in our covert defense planning vis-avis China, we will help draw the thinking of Indian political and
 military leaders towards the over-all Chinese threat to Southeast
 Asia. Once Indian political and military leaders start worrying about
 the defense of Burma they will eventually become concerned about
 the defense of Thailand, Laos and finally Viet Nam itself.
- 4. An assurance of this kind would focus the attention of Indian leaders on the Soviet's greatest political weakness in India, i.e., the suspicion that the USSR is less than wholehearted in its opposition to China in Asia. (Note: At the time of the recent Chinese ultimatum, the Indians were obviously upset by Soviet unwillingness even privately to take a firmer position in their behalf.)
- Conversely, a U. S. pledge to India against China would help switch the Indian military and political focus away from Pakistan:
- a. The Indian left which prefers to make Pakistan its primary political target would be weakened;
- b. The many dedicated moderates would be given some elbow room in which to press for a Pakistan settlement on the ground that India cannot afford two enemies.
- 6. A U. S. pledge to support India in the event of another Chinese attack would relieve the widespread fear of China in North India and eventually restore much of the public good will that we lost during the recent conflict.
- 7. A U. S. pledge to support India against China would encourage prudence among Chinese leaders and lessen the likelihood that they will attack. It will also help quiet the hotheads within the

Pak military by demonstrating that Pak-Chinese military cooperation against India could not succeed.

- 8. A U. S. assurance against China could provide a political standard by which to judge Pakistan's future military intentions and commitment. The Paks could be told that the United States is prepared to give them military support only if they are prepared to join India and the U. S. in the joint defense of South Asia against Chinese aggression. (Note: Since this would require an abrupt switch of Pak policies, acceptance is unlikely. However, when and if such a refocus becomes possible Pak-Indian tensions will be greatly eased and a settlement would be within reach).
- 9. A U. S. pledge of assistance to India against China would in fact involve a very limited military commitment by the U. S. The Indians have substantial numbers of excellent ground troops and if conditions require it, their numbers can be readily increased. Thus, the U. S. commitment would be limited to equipment and air power.

In return we would be getting Indian cooperation in the defense of a large stretch of free world border with China while seeking gradually to draw her into the containment of China in South and Southeast Asia.

10. A U. S. assurance to India would reduce the pressure on the U. S. to resume large-scale military assistance before we are ready to do so. Further assistance could be predicated on the needs as they are spelled out in the joint planning.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

A major objection to such an approach might be that a U. S. pledge of assistance in the event of Chinese aggression would free the Indian Army to concentrate on Pakistan. However, I do believe that the reverse would be true.

Our assurance (with joint preliminary planning) would point the Indians back toward China, particularly since their fear of Pakistan derives in large measure from the conviction that the Pakistanis are operating in collusion with China. At the same time, the pledge would foster an atmosphere in India in which the more moderate voices could make themselves heard.

The sort of assurance I have suggested does not go beyond the pledge we have already made to Pakistan and our other SEATO allies. And in return in this case we could properly expect the initiation of joint planning which would substantially take us off the military assistance hook, except perhaps in the defense production field. Thus, I believe it can be persuasively argued that such an approach to India would be in Pakistan's own interest.

Although there is no certainty that India would accept such an association at this time, it is my guess that with skilled handling it is an achievable goal. Right now India is acutely conscious of China as a major enemy; Pakistan is considered, in contrast, as a worrisome headache.

There is no doubt that over the long haul, China is the primary threat to peace and stability in Asia. However, in the present time span the Soviet Union may represent a significantly greater political threat to U. S. interests.

By building up China in India's eyes as the primary danger, we hit directly at the weakest point in the Soviet-Indian relationship. In this sense, China's threatening posture may be employed as a political instrument to further the new Asia power balance (based primarily on non-Communist Asians) which should be our major strategic objective.

With warmest regards,

Sim erely,

Chester Bowles

P. S. --I realize that we are not yet ready for decisions on such questions but I believe it may be worthwhile to throw these suggestions into the hopper.

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

10/15/65

RWK:

But this this must wait until LBJ has a whack at whole problem.

McG B

See go med Bolistos

OCT 1 5 1965

Approved For Release 2003/05/01: NLJ-032-021-4-4-8, ESECTION 19

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Memorandum

RFE-37.10 September 24, 1965

: The Secretary

Through: S/S

From

: INR - Thomas L. Hughes Haul. Hylis

012

Subject: Summary of Chinese Communist Activities Related

Listed below are selected press statements and intelligence reports, received during the past twenty-four hours, on Chinese Communist activities and announcements regarding the Indian-Pakistan conflict. This list is published daily and covers information received up to 2:00 P.M. on the date of issue.

FBIS 33, September 23

NCNA reports Shastri's speech of September 22, accuses him of wanting to "whip-up an anti-China hysteria" and notes his remark that Indian armed forces have clear instructions to repel the aggressor and that Indians will remain vigilant all along the frontier.

2. FBIS 92, September 23

Peking NCNA: "US President Johnson indicated yesterday that he would insist on settling the Pakistan-Indian dispute over Kashmir through the instruments of the US-controlled United Nations, according to Washington reports. Johnson made another effort to bring pressure to bear upon Pakistan."

FBIS 105, September 23

NCNA reports that Pravda covered today for the first time the recent exchange of notes between Communist China and India. According to NCNA, the Pravda story "was carefully written to give one the false impression that it is objective, but it slants in India's favor and quotes sentence after sentence from Indian notes to slander and attack China." NCNA adds: "What should be particularly pointed out is that Pravda shouts loudly about 'anxiety' after it, quoting a 'foreign news agency' report, publicizes the alleged 'transfer and concentration of Chinese . armed forces' on the border with India. Pravda has never expressed any anxiety when India repeatedly committed aggression against China."

4. FBIS 118, September 23

NCNA carries a report from Yatung, Tibet describing the "flight" of Indian troops from the four mountain passes at the Sikkim-Tibet border. The report, dispatched on September 23, concludes: "At present Indian troops are still close to the China-Sikkim boundary and are stepping-up the building of military works and concentrating heavy armed forces with the aim of intruding into Chinese territory. On September 23, at noon, 30 and more Indian troops once

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FBIS 24, September 24	
atung, Tibet, which describe atu La on Chinese soil fled chind ample evidence of the the dispatch as warning that boundary and are stepping-up	ing papers today frontpage an NCNA dispatch from the best how the intruding Indian soldiers entrenched at in discord on the night of September 20 and left air crime. In its headline, People's Daily quotes Indian troops are still close to the China-Sikkim the building of military works and concentrating aim of intruding into Chinese territory."
eavy armed forces with the	

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE

TO

WASHINGTON

TEL NO 7434

23RD SEPT 1965.

D. 10.05 PM 23/9 R. 6.12 PM 23/9

IMMEDIATE

SECRET.

ADDRESSED WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 7434 OF 23/9 REPEATED DELHI

DELHI NO 3343 PARA 2.

RAWALPINDI KARACHI AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

ARMS

WE THINK WE MIGHT REPLY TO JHANS QUESTION BY REPEATING MR SANDYS STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT ON 3 DECEMBER 1962 TO THE EFFECT THAT WHEN A FELLOW MEMBER OF THE COMMONWEALTH IS ATTACKED AND ASKS FOR ASSISTANCE IT IS OUR NATURAL INSTINCT TO DO WHATEVER WE CAN AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO HELP IN THE EMERGENCY. WE MIGHT TELL INDIANS HOWEVER THAT WE HAD HOPED MILITARY AID WE HAD SINCE SUPPLIED WOULD ENABLE THEM TO STAND UP TO MODERATE SCALE CHINESE ATTACK, IF CHINESE MAKE FULL SCALE ATTACK WE WOULD OF COURSE CONSIDER SYMPATHETICALLY WHAT FURTHER HELP WE NEEDED TO GIVE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN PREVAILING, INCLUDING MOST IMPORTANTLY INDIANS RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN.

- 2. JHA DOUBTLESS PUT SIMILAR QUESTION TO CHESTER BOWLES. WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE COMMENTS OF STATE DEPARTMENT ON OUR PROPOSED REPLY AND TO KNOW WHAT ANSWER THEY CONTEMPLATE.
- 3. WOULD ALSO LIKE TO HAVE VIEWS OF STATE DEPARTMENT ON CAD DELIVERY OF MILITARY AID ITEMS IN PIPELINE FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN.
- (B) NEW COMMITMENTS OF MILITARY AID TO BOTH INDIA AND PAKISTAN
 BOTH ON ASSUMPTION THAT THERE IS NO FULL-SCALE CHINESE ATTACK.

CHANCERY RESTRICTED Chancery Action 619: CMO:nl,

Mr. Gilmore

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SECRET

Surhodity RAC 032R+14-4-3-7

By WARA Date 2-7-18

9/24/65

- 4. SHIPMENTS UNDER OUR MILITARY AID PROGRAMME TO INDIA WERE STOPPED ON 7 SEPTEMBER AND IT SEEMS REASONABLE THAT THEY SHOULD BE RESUMED ONCE INDIAN AND PAKISTAN PORCES HAVE RETURNED TO POSITIONS THEY OCCUPIED ON 5 AUGUST. TOTAL VALUE OF MILITARY AID WHICH WE HAVE PROMISED BUT NOT YET SHIPPED TO INDIA IS £11.7 MILLION. WE ARE CONSIDERING POSSIBILITY OF SEEKING FORMAL AND CATEGORICAL ASSURANCE FROM INDIANS THAT ALL GOODS ALREADY PROVIDED OR PROMISED WILL IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES BE USED AGAINST PAKISTAN.
- 5. ARE AMERICANS PLANNING TO DO MUCH THE SAME AND ARE THEY CONSIDERING POSSIBILITY OF SEEKING SIMILAR ASSURANCE FROM INDIANS? UNDERSTAND AMERICAN MILITARY AID IS AT PRESENT PROVIDED UNDER TERMS OF B. K. NEHRU-PHILLIPS TALBOT EXCHANGE OF 14 DECEMBER 1962 WHICH IS TO SAME EFFECT AS SANDYS-CHAVAN LETTERS OF 27 NOVEMBER 1962 I.E. ARMS ARE PROVIDED FOR DEFENCE AGAINST CHINESE AGRESSION.
- 6. THERE IS FURTHER QUESTION WHETHER IF INDIANS PROVE UNWILLING
 TO ENGAGE IN PURPOSEFUL NEGOTIATIONS ON KASHMIR AMERICANS AND
 OURSELVES SHOULD WITHHOLD MILITARY SUPPLIES ALREADY UNDER
 REQUISITION. OUR OWN SUPPLIES ARE TOO LIMITED TO GIVE US
 ALONE ANY LEVERAGE, AND SUCH ACTION JOINT OR SEVERAL WOULD
 RESULT IN MAJOR ROW BETWEEN INDIA AND WEST.
- 7. WE PLAN AT PRESENT TO CONTINUE BAN ON RELEASE OF GOVERNMENT STOCKS FOR PURCHASE BY BOTH INDIA AND PAKISTAN UNTIL THEIR FORCES HAVE RETURNED TO 5 AUGUST POSITIONS. WHAT ARE AMERICANS DOING?
- 8. SINCE 7 SEPTEMBER WE HAVE ISSUED NO NEW LICENCES FOR MILITARY SUPPLIES SUBJECT TO LICENCE. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO DO THIS UNTIL WE HAVE DECIDED WHAT TO DO ABOUT MILITARY AID ITEMS ALREADY UNDER ORDER.
- 9. FINALLY THERE IS LONG TERM PROBLEM OF NEW COMMITMENTS UNDER MILITARY AID AND INDEED THE EFFECT OF

/LARGE

- CHORET

-3-

LARGE SCALE NON-PROJECT ECONOMIC AID IN RELEASING FREE FOREIGN
EXCHANGE FOR MILITARY PURCHASES BY INDIA AND PAKISTAN.
THERE IS RISK THAT IF WE AND UNITED STATES WITHHOLD NEW
COMMITMENTS OF MILITARY AID SOVIET MAY FILL THE GAP.

10. WE WOULD ALSO LIKE COMMENTS FROM DELHI AND RAWALPINDI
ON THESE POINTS.

-SECRET

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESERVE

N.S.C.

Research V Memorandum

RFE-37.9, September 23, 1965

To : The Secretary

Through: S/S

From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes Talla L. Htyrus

Subject: Summary of Chinese Communist Activities Related to India-Pakistan

Listed below are selected press statements and intelligence reports, received during the past twenty-four hours, on Chinese Communist activities and announcements regarding the Indian-Pakistan conflict. This list is published daily and covers information received up to 2:00 P.M. on the date of issue.

1. FBIS 112, September 22

Peking NCNA: "The Indian Government has evacuated the intruding Indian troops before the deadline set by the CPR in its note of September 19; it has, however grudgingly, done as we said, although without informing us. Of the military works for aggression which the Indian troops built inside Chinese territory, some have been torn down entirely, some partially and some not at all. This may be due to the fact that the Indian troops had to leave in such haste that they had no time to dismantle all these works. This is excusable. However, Mr. Shastri decides to save face at all costs. While secretly ordering the Indian troops to evacuate furtively, he addressed the Parliament in a grandiloquent manner and tried to split hairs.... They _the Indians decide to save face at all costs, but in the end lose all face.

"Mr. Shastri accused us of making a mountain out of a mole-hill. Is this true? No! Your troops would not have left but for the time-limit we set. The Indian Government must not think that the whole matter would end with the evacuation of Indian troops from the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim border. The matter is far from being closed. You have yet to return the Chinese border inhabitants abducted and the cattle seized. You are occupying large areas of Chinese territory in the middle, eastern and western sectors. This is a question still to be solved. All these accounts must be settled."

2. FBIS 116, September 22

Peking NCNA: "Pakistan Foreign Minister Bhutto told the UN Security Council early this morning that cessation of hostilities was not enough. The Security Council must address itself to the heart of the problem, to a fair and honorable solution of the problem of Jammu and Kashmir. Otherwise, Pakistan would withdraw from the United Nations. The Pakistan Foreign Minister arrived at New York late last night. He was beset immediately upon his arrival by the representatives of the US, the Soviet Union, Britain and 'Malaysia' and had intense talks with them."

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By Agricha, NARA, Date 12-1-65

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3. Colombo's 217, September 22

"Permanent Secretary Ministry External Affairs...states that the Chinese Communists have not approached the Government of Ceylon in any manner which constitutes fulfillment of their reported private understanding with Colombo Powers nor in fact in any way." (SECRET)

4. FBIS 03, September 23

Peking NCNA: "Joint US-Soviet efforts to pressure Pakistan into accepting the Security Council 'cease-fire' resolution in favor of India highlighted the opening of the 20th session of the UN General Assembly in New York yesterday."

5. FBIS 19, September 23

Delhi Domestic Service: "United News of India quotes the Defense Ministry spokesman in Gangtok as saying that the Chinese are building a high wall along the Jelep Ia. Chinese military vehicles were seen unloading cement and huge stones in this area. In a dispatch from Gangtok a short while ago our special correspondent says that there has been no report of any incident on the Sikkim-Tibet frontier since our last bulletin. The last official report received in Gangtok yesterday evening says there has been no activity on the border except for patrolling by both sides."

FBIS 21, September 23

Peking NCNA: "Karachi. Pakistan papers have carried commentaries denouncing the US imperialists for using China's note in protest against Indian intrusion of Chinese territory to step up its campaign to aid India and oppose China."

7. FBIS 22, September 23

Peking NCNA: "All Peking papers today carry on their front pages a People's Daily "Observer" article on the flight of the panic-stricken Indian troops who had intruded across the China-Sikkim boundary. Prominently carried is Pakistan Foreign Minister Bhutto's statement at the UN Security Council meeting on September 22. The People's Daily headline says: 'Pakistan Agrees to Cease-Fire But Resolutely Demands Self-Determination for Kashmir; Council Must Fairly Settle Kashmir Problem Otherwise Pakistan Will Withdraw from United Nations.'"

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE N.S.C.

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH 9

To: The Secretary
Through: S/S
From: INR - Thomas L. Rughes Tourish. Higher

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FBIS 99, September 21

NCNA broadcasts a report from Lhasa which begins by recalling the CPR's September 16 and September 19 notes to India and then goes on to state: "Finding no way of denying the cast-iron facts, the Indian Government has resorted in the past few days to various methods in a vain attempt to destroy the evidence of its crimes and to escape responsibility for its intrusions and building of many military works in Chinese territory."

The report describes how the Indians "surreptitiously demolished the military works at Jelep La" where "clear traces of the military works still remain at the sites." Indian troops who had erected another military work at Cho La are reported to have fled, "having no time to demolish the military work." Other Indian troops are said to have fled from Tungchu La and Natu La "after seeing Chinese troops drawing close to the military works to put them under observation."

The report states: "All the intruding Indian troops in these four passes have now fled. Chinese troops are in complete control of the sites of the installations of the Indian troops. Careful checks have verified the accuracy of the /charge/ that Indian troops built 56 large and small military works." After describing the location of these 56 works, the report concludes: "The Indian Government can never evade its responsibility of its crimes of using the territory of Sikkim to make a wanton invasion of the territory of China."

2. FBIS 54, September 21

Delhi Domestic Service: "Chinese troops intruded into Sikkim territory at Nathu La on the Sikkim-Tibet frontier this morning. Our special correspondent in Cangtok says the Chinese withdrew to their side of the border after an exchange of fire. Elsewhere on the border the Chinese continued provocative firing toward our positions. Movement of Chinese troops and vehicles have been seen in the Demchok, Hot Springs and Daulet Beg Oldi areas in Ladakh."

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FBIS 79, September 21

Delhi Domestic Service: "Chinese patrols have been noticed at Cho La and Dongchui La southwest of Jelep La. An official spokesman in New Delhi has said that some movement of Chinese troops has also been seen in the Barahoti area in the middle sector of the India-Tibet border. Replying to questions, the spokesman said that the Chinese have been using small arms on the borders with Sikkim and Ladakh."

4. Reuters 63, 68 September 21

"Indian troops on the Sikkim frontier today returned fire from the Chinese side, a Defense Ministry spokesman said. The incident took place in the Natu La area. The spokesman said the firing of the Chinese was 'not very much more than a war of nerves at the moment. The spokesman described the situation as not at all serious."

25X1

New Delhi's 719, September 21

"Surendra Sinh indicated to acting DCM the concern of the Indian Government that the Chinese will launch their main attack against the Indians through the Karakoram Pass to assist the Pakistani forces. He added that if the Paks accept the cease-fire the Chinese would work directly with infiltrators for Which he noted the Paks still refuse to accept responsibility. He speculated that the Paks in fact would be in a better position if they accepted the cease fire and the Chinese then attacked. Disavowing responsibility for the infiltrators, the Paks could also argue that they had nothing to do with the Chinese." (SECRET)

25X1

FBIS 103, September 21

Peking NCNA: "Aleksey Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, has suggested that the Indian and Pakistani leaders meet in Moscow for the restoration of peace, according to a Moscow report. Kosygin's message 183

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shows that the Soviet leaders are anxious to lay their interfering hand on the Indo-Pakistan conflict."

9. FBIS 108, September 21

Peking NCNA: "An Indian general commanding the Indian troops in Sikkim admitted that Indian troops had crossed the China-Sikkim boundary and 'had set up defenses 800 yards beyond the Nathula Pass,' according to a New Delhi report."

10. FBIS 03, September 22

Peking Domestic Service: "Peking newspapers of September 22 carry a number of photographs showing the crimes of Indian troops who intruded into Chinese border areas to construct military works. From these photographs one can see the ruins of military works dismantled by the intruding Indian troops in Jelep La and Cho La passes after they fled."

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH 43 AH 165

Memorandum

RFE-37.7, September 21, 1965

: The Secretary

Through: S/S

: INR - Thomas L. Hughes Hames L. Hayles

Subject: Summary of Chinese Communist Activities Related to India-Pakistan

Listed below are press statements and intelligence reports, received during the past twenty-four hours, on Chinese Communist activities and announcements regarding the Indian-Pakistan conflict. This list is published daily and covers information received up to 2:00 P.M. on the date of issue.

Calcutta's 64, September 19

"General Manekshaw, General Officer Commanding in Chief, Eastern Command, gave me the following situation report as of 1130 September 19: (1) North Sikkim. No evidence of a significant Chinese buildup or activity north of the northern Sikkim border is known to him. (2) Chumbi Valley. Beginning September 17, small groups of Chinese soldiers began approaching Indian border control posts at Natu La and Jelep La. Numbers increased through the morning to high at noon of about one battalion (800 Chinese troops). Most came no closer than 100 yards although a small group came within two feet of Indian sentries at the border. They withdrew last night and are engaging in a similar buildup this morning. The Chinese have three regiments in the Chumbi Valley. (3) Bhutan. There were no unusual Chinese movements north of the Bhutan border. (4) NEFA. There was no notable Chinese troop action as yet on the NEFA borders. Possible exception is in area of Rima where he said the Chinese have division strength immediately available. (5) Ladakh. He said that as a former corps commander in Ladakh he would consider Chinese military action in the Demchok area unlikely because of the strength of the Indian forces in the Indus Valley." (SECRET)

Rawalpindi's 89, September 19

"Shoaib this afternoon told me with some relish that Bhutto had been stood-up by Chen Yi yesterday. Bhutto made a special one day trip to Karachi to meet Chen Yi who was to stop over there en route home from Africa. But Chen Yi by-passed Pakistan and Bhutto's trip was fruitless. Shoaib thought that Chen Yi's revised itinerary plus the three-day postponement of the Chinese Communist ultimatum to India might indicate some Chinese Communist loss of zest for sub-continental brinksmanship." (SECRET) 25X1

25X1A 3.

September 20 (Source:

On September 14 a number of olive-colored Chinese military jeeps arrived at Sakya (N 28-53, E 88-03) carrying what appeared to be British 303 type rifles and bandoliers. A Chinese military official on the scene stated the rifles and GROUP 1

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ammunition were to be distributed to Tibetan "local forces." This is the first known instance of the Chinese arming Tibetans who are not in military service. At noon on September 14, one Chinese army truck-mounted crane arrived in Sakya. (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

25X1

25X1A 4. (Source:

During late August, Chinese officials at Chudu (N 28-34, E 87-50) informed local citizens that males inducted into the army would be brought in in three stages, dividing the ages from 18-40. The official stated that conscription of all age groups had to be finished by the end of September 1965. (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

5. UPI 44, September 20

"Gangtok, Sikkim. More Chinese Communist troops moved toward the border of Sikkim today. The reinforcements moved up from Yatung, about five miles from the border, where the Chinese have an estimated 17,600 man-division. More than 400 Red Chinese soldiers approached to within 200 yards of Indian positions along the border yesterday."

6. FBIS 82, September 20


Peking NCNA: "Djakarta. A rally of 500,000 people from all walks of life in Surabaya, Indonesia, was held last Saturday strongly denouncing India for its barbarous aggression under the instigation of US imperialism against the Kashmir and Pakistan people."

FBIS 111, September 20

Delhi Domestic Service: "A Press Trust of India message from Cairo says the UAR Government is understood to have conveyed its concern to Peking over the Chinese ultimatum to India. UAR Premier Sabri summoned the Chinese Ambassador last night and conveyed to him his Government's views."

8. FBIS 112, September 20

Peking NCNA: "T.N. Kaul, Indian Ambassador to the Soviet Union, met Foreign Minister Gromyko and First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov separately on September 18 after the publication of the Chinese Government's note to India dated September 16, according to reports from Moscow. The dispatch added that the Premier and Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union have shown appreciation for an understanding in India's position."



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9. FBIS 120, September 20

Peking NCNA: "British Prime Minister Wilson said yesterday his government viewed the Chinese note to India 'pretty seriously' and could not consider it a 'bluff,' according to a London report."

FBIS 125, September 20

Peking NCNA: "A statement issued by the Yugoslav Tito group in connection with the Indo-Pakistan conflict openly shields the Indian aggressor, according to a report from Belgrade."

11. FBIS 127, September 20

Cairo Domestic Service: "UAR Foreign Minister Mahmud Riyd tonight met for one hour with the CPR Ambassador in Cairo at the Foreign Minister's request."

UPI 96, September 20

London. Diplomatic sources said today it is becoming increasingly clear that Communist China is playing for 'small stakes' in the current dispute with India and that a major military assault is now unlikely."

13. Hong Kong's 450, September 20

"The Chinese Communist move in extending the ultimatum to India another three days strikes us as an effort to emulate Chu-Ko Liang, the scholar general of the past famed for winning battles without cost by confusing and confounding his adversary. We here are inclined to the view that Peking's failure to act on the first ultimatum takes some steam out of the threat and increases doubts that the regime has a fixed determination to use military force. Indeed, the tone of the new Chinese Communist note to India suggests that the Chinese Communists consider they have already won a great moral victory over the Indians through the Indian response to the Chinese Communist note of September 16. Alongside this tone of Chinese moral victory, we detect in the note a degree of sensitivity toward Indian efforts to arouse international opinion regarding the regime's bullying tactics against an adversary who is clearly at a disadvantage. The thought also occurs to us that one of the major Chinese Communist goals in the unfolding exercise on India is to bring about overt, unmistakable US-Soviet support for India which could be taken as 'collusion' between 'imperialists' and 'modern revisionists.'" (CONFIDENTIAL)

14. Hong Kong's 452, September 20

"The People's Daily September 18 editorial entitled 'Who Are Backing the Indian Aggressors?' represents the fiercest Chinese Communist attack thus far on

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the Soviet attitude toward the Indian-Pakistani conflict. Dropping the term 'modern revisionists,' the editorial directly charges the 'Soviet leaders' with collusion with US imperialism. Current Chinese Communist attacks against the Soviets are moving in intensity toward those of mid-1963 and appear almost designed to goad Moscow into an anti-Chinese, pro-Indian move. We wonder if the Pakistanis can appreciate this Chinese Communist effort to score ideological points which runs the risk of moving the Soviets further toward the Indians." (SONFIDENTIAL)

15. FBIS 104, September 20

Bombay PTI: "New Delhi. Chinese troops fired a few provocative shots in Dumchele in the Demchok area in Ladakh and in the Nathula Pass and Dongchuila Pass areas in Sikkim. According to an official spokesman here, Indian forces did not return the fire. The spokesman said that the Chinese had moved right up to the border in Ladakh and in Tibet facing Sikkim and their concentration was sizeable. The spokesman said that neither the Indian nor the Chinese forces were in strength quite close to the border in Ladakh or in Sikkim. He added that he had no news of the Chinese forces having done anything more than indulging in a few provocative shots. According to the latest reports received by the Defense Headquarters here, Chinese troops have come quite close to all the passes on the Sikkim border. Apart from Daulet Beg Oldi, Chinese troops have also been sent in the hot springs areas 40 miles northeast of Chisul. Fifty Chinese on horse-back were also seen in the Fuckhe area 24 miles northwest of Demchuk."

16. FBIS 107, September 20

NCNA reports that at 0330 hours on September 21, a CPR Foreign Ministry official handed the Indian Charge a note protesting an incident on September 19 when a group of Indian soldiers allegedly intruded into Dumchele in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border. The note charges that the Indians opened fire on a group of Chinese civilians working in the area and that the latter had to "strike back" and thus repulsed the "invaders." The note states: "This incident is the gravest armed provocation India has made on the Sino-Indian border since its massive armed attack against China in October 1962 was checked. The CPR hereby lodges the strongest protest with the Indian Government." The note further terms the Indian intrusion "an act of serious encroachment upon Chinese territory and a deliberate provocation of armed conflict." The note concludes with a demand that the Indian Government stop all intrusions and provocations on the Sino-Indian border, absolutely guarantee that it will not again invade and occupy Dumchele and that similar incidents will not recur. Otherwise, the note adds, "India must bear full responsibility for all the consequences that may arise therefrom."

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STATES OF FOREIGN DISSEM

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17. FBIS 04, September 21

Peking NCNA: "Karachi. Pakistan papers yesterday made it clear that any forcible "cease fire" resolution by the UN Security Council without providing for the right of self-determination for the Kashmir people would chime in with the tune of Indian aggression. They declared that Pakistan would continue its struggle for the Kashmir people's right of self-determination and for defeating Indian aggression."

18. FBIS 22, September 21

Peking NCNA: "Frontpaged on Peking newspapers today is the Chinese Foreign Ministry's note of September 20 to the Indian Government lodging the strongest protest against India's armed intrusion. All papers carry news of the armed provocation by Indian soldiers on the Chinese side of the Sino-Indian boundary in the western sector on September 19."

19. FBIS 23, September 21

Delhi Domestic Service: "Official circles in New Delhi have described the latest Chinese allegation of intrusions and provocations by Indian soldiers as false and trumped-up, calculated to raise tensions. These circles said categorically that India has not made any intrusion as alleged by the Chinese. All India Radio's special correspondent points out that the fact of the matter is that it is the Chinese who resorted to provocative firing at Dumchele in the Demchok area of Ladakh, 50 miles southeast of Chisul. They have also fired toward our positions at Dongchuila, south of Jelep La. The India troops did not fire back. Our correspondent adds that there are no Chinese civilians in this area but only Chinese military personnel. The statement in the note which said the Chinese civilian personnel had to strike back and repel the intruders exposes the hollowness of the charge and also Chinese intentions to stir up tension on some pretext or other."

20. FBIS 38, September 21

Delhi Domestic Service: "In Sikkim and Ladakh Chinese troops continued to indulge in provocative firing toward our positions. Chinese troops have been seen in the Chisul area of Ladakh and at Barahoti in the middle section. In Sikkim, Chinese patrols have been seen at Chu La and Dongchuila east of Jelep La. An authoritative source said in Gangtok that the Chinese are probably trying to push back our forces from Nathula so that our troops are not in a position to observe Chinese activities in the Chumbi Valley."

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

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FE-37.6, September 20, 1965 JESSUP

JOHNSON KEENY

MODDY

To The Secretary

Through: s/s

INR - Thomas L. Hughes Thanks L. Hugh

Subject: Summary of Chinese Communist Activities Related to

Misted below are press statements and intelligence reports, received during the past twenty-four hours, on Chinese Communist activities and appr regarding the Indian-Pakistan conflict. This list is pur information received up to 2:00 P.M. on the dates STREET

Karachi's 538, September 18

We believe the Chinese Communists now have a special additional motive to move promptly to increased involvement in the Indo-Pak conflict. This motive, as we see it, is to deter the Government of Pakistan from its current tendency to turn anew to the US, as evidenced most dramatically in Ayub's September 15 press conference statement. The Chinese Communists may conclude that their best chance to curb this tendency is to undertake some military activity against India. We take special note of the timing and substance of the CPR note to the Indian Government. The Indian Charge in Peking was handed the CPR note on the night of September 16, i.e., after the Ayub press conference on the morning of September 15. (SECRET)

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4. AFP, September 13

Nationalist Chinese intelligence authorities today claimed that they had received information that the Chinese Communists were moving two divisions of troops from the border areas of Bhutan and Sikkim southward to the boundary of India. These troops, the sources said, consisted of some 28,000 men, including armored and artillery forces. Nationalist Chinese sources also reported that the CPR had dispatched some 500 military advisers to Pakistan and more than 20 tons of weapons.

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FBIS 121, September 18

NCNA reports that after receiving the CPR Foreign Ministry's Note of September 16, the Indian Government leaders immediately conferred with the US and Soviet diplomatic envoys in New Delhi according to a New Delhi report.

7. USUN 813, September 18

Chagla, Jha and Partasarathi (of India) called on Goldberg at 0900 to stress the seriousness of Chinese Communist military moves which in conjunction with Pak moves threatened to cut off Indian access to Kashmir. Besides the threat in Sikkim, Chagla mentioned specifically Chinese moves in Demchok in Ladakh which seemed coordinated with Pak moves on the Kashmir front. The Indians reiterated that Pakistan would never have moved without Chinese assurances. (CONFIDENTIAL)

8. Karachi's 543, September 18

On two successive days the afternoon <u>Leader</u> has carried front page editorials addressed to the broad question of Chinese involvement in the current conflict. The tenor of these items has been that the US should exercise its leadership to bring about a reconciliation on the subcontinent but that if it does not it should not stop "others" from helping Pak victims of Indian aggression. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

9. FBIS 120, September 18

NCNA reports that Secretary Rusk yesterday received the Indian Ambassador. After their meeting the Indian Ambassador told newsmen the two had discussed the

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CPR note of September 16. The Ambassador defended India's crime of aggression and unscrupulously vilified China by asserting that its aim was to disrupt India.

10. FBIS 122, September 18

NCNA reports that the UK weekly <u>Time and Tide</u> yesterday exposed US agents' part in instigating India's aggression against Pakistan.

11. FBIS 124, September 18

NCNA reports that the CPR note of September 16 has thrown US officials into intense activities in an atmosphere of tension, according to Washington reports. The officials hurriedly made statements voicing support of India.

12. FBIS 128, September 18

NCNA reports that Shastri, in a September 17 statement to both Houses of the Indian Parliament, tried to deny the criminal Indian intrusions and provocations across the Sino-Indian and the Sino-Sikkim boundary. He even talked of being ready to fight China.

13. FBIS 103, September 18

Reuters reports from Gangtok, Sikkim, that the General commanding the Indian forces in Sikkim said today that three Chinese Communist infantry companies moved to within 500 yards of the Indian-guarded natural probably error for Natula pass on the Sikkim-Tibet border.

14. FBIS 99, September 18

NCNA reports that with US help India has set up a "Tarun Press India" to conduct anti-Chinese and anti-Pakistan propaganda.

15. FBIS 45, September 18

Reuters reports that the Indian Defense Ministry today announced that Chinese Communist troops have moved to positions near the frontier of Sikkim. The Ministry said Chinese troops had also moved into the Demchok area of Ladakh, at the western end of the Himalayan frontier.

16. FBIS 125, September 18

NCNA reports that UN Secretary General U Thant proposed that the Security Council be authorized to compel Pakistan with high handed measures to accept the cease-fire formula in favor of India. U Thant's speech made the Indian aggressors more overbearing. Indian delegate Chagla in his speech falsely accused Pakistan

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
of committing aggression. Chagla made a vicious attack on China and even asserted that India was threatened with a Chinese invasion.

17. New Delhi's 698, September 18

L.K. Jha states that Chinese movements in battalion strength on the eastern border of Ladakh and in the Chumbi Valley indicate that Peking is getting ready for military action. (SECRET)

18. FBIS 77, September 19

NCNA reports that UK Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart indicated on September 17 that he took seriously the CPR note to the Indian Government on September 16. It was reported that after the delivery of the note the UK Government sents its Minister of State to Washington to discuss with the US the possibility of lifting the ban on arms shipments to India.



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23. FBIS 64, September 19

NCNA reports that a spokesman of the French Foreign Ministry said on September 17 that the French Government was studying "with concern" the CPR September 16 note to India.

24. FBIS 102, September 19

Bombay PTI broadcasts a report from its Moscow correspondent that the Soviet Union has made diplomatic approaches to both China and India not to intervene in the India-Pakistan conflict. This information reportedly became known from Soviet circles, although no official announcement was made.

25. FBIS 59, September 19

According to a New Delhi broadcast evidence is now available that Pakistan has used Chinese equipment in the present conflict. A part of a double-action time fuse with Chinese markings was picked up by Indian troops in the Chumb area of Jammu and Kashmir.

26. FBIS 112, September 19

Reuters reports from the Nathu La pass, Sikkim: "Indian troops watched and waited at an observation post over the valley below. As he watched their Chinese

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movements, the Indian commanding officer said: 'If they cross the border, we fire.' There was nothing stealthy about the Chinese approach. Some Chinese troops were about 200 yards away, down the valley. At another point, some Chinese were resting on a ledge while others scaled a cliff leading to the border."

A Melbourne overseas broadcast quotes a report from a special correspondent in New Delhi that it has been officially announced in the Indian capital that there has so far been no encroachment into Indian territory by Chinese troops.

27. FBIS 118, September 19

NCNA reports that the US, USSR and Indian delegates in almost one voice praised U Thant's proposal, exerted pressure on Pakistan, and made every effort for the immediate implementation of a cease-fire in favor of India at the afternoon session of the UN Security Council on September 18.

28. FBIS 85, September 18

NCNA reports that at about 1 PM September 17 three Indian soldiers crossed the Den Cho River from Parigas, a place in Tibet illegally occupied by India, and intruded into the village of Demchok on the Chinese side of the 1959 line of actual control. They reconnoitred and harrassed the area. The Chinese authorities concerned are closely watching and are on greater guard against the intensified Indian acts of aggression in defiance of the numerous protests of the Chinese Government.

29. FBIS 25, September 19

NCNA reports that hundreds of Pakistani college students came to the CPR Embassy in Karachi in a procession on September 19 to express their gratitude for the support given by China to Pakistan's struggle against Indian aggression.

30. FBIS 20, September 19

NCNA reports that the Peking press today devotes considerable space to reports exposing the role of the US and the Soviet Union in backing Indian aggression against Pakistan.

31. FBIS 24, September 19

NCNA reports that Indian newspapers confirmed that India had received support and blessing from the United States and the Soviet Union in its present aggression against Pakistan.

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32. FBIS 104, September 19

NCNA reports that Moscow newspapers have so far not published the CPR note of September 16 to the Indian Government. Prompted by ulterior motives, the paper Izvestiya, however, reported briefly the coverage of the news of the note in western newspapers and their reactions to it. The paper alleged that the CPR note was an ultimatum.

33. FBIS 113, September 19

NCNA reports that the US, India, the Soviet Union and Britain have been in constant touch since the publication of the CPR note to India on September 16.

34. FBIS 15, September 20

NCNA reports that at 1450 hours on September 19, the Tumchele outpost, illegally set up on Chinese territory in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border by Indian troops in June 1964, dispatched five Indian troops to carry out harrassment on Chinese territory four kilometers east of the outpost and opened fire on the personnel of a Chinese civil work station on duty there. After warning the Indian troops repeatedly without response, our side was compelled to carry out self defense and repulsed the Indian troops. According to our responsible personnel concerned, our frontier troops are paying close attention to this serious provocation.

35. FBIS 75, September 20

Delhi domestic service reports that an official spokesman said in New Delhi this evening that the Chinese have come in some areas almost up to the border in both Sikkim and Ladakh. The Chinese firing in Sikkim was directed toward Dongko La. The firing in Ladakh was at Tumphele in the Demchok area. He added that the Chinese in Ladakh seem to have disregarded the 20-kilometer zone from where they had themselves said they would withdraw their troops.

36. FBIS 38, September 20

reports

Delhi domestic service reports that it is authoritatively learned in New Delhi that there is no truth in the reports put out by the Associated Press quoting NCNA that there has been a skirmish on the Sikkim-Tibet border.

37. FBIS 23, September 20

According to NCNA, all Peking papers of September 20 carry under banner headlines the CPR note of September 19 to the Indian Government. Prominently front paged is the Indian soldiers! intrusion and harrassment of Chinese territory in the western sector of the Sino-Indian frontier on September 18. People's Daily reports that the western press is shocked by China's note to India.

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CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/OTP

FROM PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TEL NO 1150 D. 3.26 PM 19 SEP

19 SEPTEMBER, 1965. R. 12.28 PM 19 SEP

ROUTINE

CONFIDENTIAL

Jud Jud

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO 1150 OF 19 SEPTEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION DELHI KARACHI WASHINGTON 381 MOSCOW UKMIS
NEW YORK POLAD SINGAPORE AND RAWALPINDI
MY TEL NO 1142 CHINESE NOTE TO INDIA.
FOLLOWING IMPRESSIONS AND POINTS WHICH EMERGED FROM RECENT
CONVERSATIONS WITH INDIAN CHARGE AND MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF
MAY BE OF INTEREST.

2. INDIANS ARE CONVINCED THAT CHINESE CHARGES ARE TRUMPED UP TO PAVE WAY FOR EXECUTION OF PLANS FORMULATED SHORTLY AFTER OUTBREAK OF INDO PAKISTAN CONFLICT. SEQUENCE OF CHINESE NOTES APPEARS TO FOLLOW PREDETERMINED PATTERN; CHINESE ULTIMATUM WAS DELIVERED IN ARROGANT BULLYING FASHION BY A COMPARATIVELY JUNIOR OFFICIAL. INDIANS TAKE SOME COMFORT FROM FACT THAT THEY HAVE SWIFTLY RETURNED BALL TO CHINESE COURT ON IMMEDIATE ISSUE OF SIKKIM BOUNDARY BY OFFERING TO ACCEPT JOINT INSPECTION. 3. AMONG CHINESE MOTIVES CHARGE INCLUDED RELENTLESS HOSTILITY TOWARDS INDIA CA DIPLOMATIC STUMBLING BLOCK IN THE WAY OF CHINESE AMBITIONS AND A SOURCE OF IRRITATION AS SPOKESMAN FOR THE "REVISIONISTS"), AN ATTEMPT TO WIN PAKISTANIS OVER BY POSING AS THEIR SOLE WHOLEHEARTED CHAMPION AND A CAREFUL CALCULATION THAT NEITHER THE REVISIONISTS NOR IMPERIALISTS WD WISH TO INTERFERE. IN EFFECT, CHINESE HAD ALREADY SHOWN DISREGARD OF DIPLOMATIC RISKS (E.G. DAMAGE TO THEIR IMAGE AS ADVOCATES OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AMONG AFRO ASIANS) AND SEEMED IN MOOD TO GO AS FAR

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BL JON VARA Date 2-7-18

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AS THEY SAFELY CO WITHOUT INCURRING RISK OF RETALIATION FROM FOR EXAMPLE THE UNITED STATES.

- COLLUSION, BUT CHARGE HIMSELF IS INCLINED TO SEE MAINLY CHINESE
 INITIATIVE DESIGNED TO EXPLOIT SITUATION AND EXERT CONTROL OVER
 FUTURE PAKISTAN POLICY. IN THIS, CHINESE ARE SAID TO BE
 MOTIVATED BY ACUTE AWARENESS OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF PAKISTAN.

 KASHMIR GIVES THEM HANDLE TO TWIST PAKISTAN IN CHINESE DIRECTION.

 5. INDIANS ARE UNABLE TO PREDICT LIKELY CHINESE INTENTIONS. NOTE
 OF 16 SEPT TOUCHED ON ALL SECTORS OF SINO/INDIAN BORDER AND INDIANS
 DO NOT EXCLUDE MILITARY PRESSURE ANYWHERE ALONG IT. THEY ARE
 GLOOMILY PREPARED FOR WORST, INCLUDING CHINESE DRIVE OVER SIKKIM
 FRONTIER TOWARDS EAST PAKISTAN TO NIP OFF ASSAM. RUPTURE OF
 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WD DEPEND, IN INDIAN VIEW, ON SO MANY FACTORS
 THAT THEY WD HESITATE TO MAKE ANY PREDICTIONS.
- 6. THERE ARE SIGNS THAT INDIANS HERE AT ANY RATE WD BE THANKFUL IF SOME SETTLEMENT CD BE REACHED WITH PAKISTAN BEFORE SITUATION DEVELOPS DANGEROUSLY.

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CYPHER/OTP

FROM PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TEL NO. 1142

D. 6.49 PM 18 SEPTEMBER

17 SEPTEMBER 1965

R. 3.39 PM 18 SEPTEMBER

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ADDSD TO FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO.1142 OF 17 SEPTEMBER

RFI TO NEW DELHI KARACHI RAWALPINDI WASHINGTON 378 POLAD SINGAPORE

UKMIS NEW YORK AND MOSCOW

MY TELS NOS.1137 AND 1141: CHINESE NOTE TO INDIA.

CHINESE ULTIMATUM DOES NOT SPECIFY WHAT "GRAVE CONSEQUENCES"

ARE LIKELY TO FOLLOW IF THEIR DEMANDS ARE NOT MET BY INDIANS.

THIS VAGUENESS ADDS, OF COURSE, TO SENSE OF MENACE. BUT INCLUSION

OF TIME LIMIT AND HUMILIATING NATURE OF DEMANDS (WHICH THEY MUST

KNOW WILL BE UNACCEPTABLE) SUGGEST THAT CHINESE HAVE ALREADY

DECIDED ON A COURSE OF ACTION AND THAT NOTE IS MERELY PREPARATION

OF PROPAGANDA POSN.

- 2. THERE CD NOT BE BETTER TIME FROM CHINESE ANGLE FOR PUTTING PRESSURE ON INDIANS (SEE MYTEL NO. 1110). WHETHER PAKISTANIS LIKE IT OR NOT, THEY WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO AVOID EXPRESSING SYMPATHY WITH CHINESE ALLEGATIONS OF INDIAN AGGRESSIVENESS.
- 3. IN THESE CIRCS CHINESE ACTION MIGHT TAKE ONE OF THE FOLLG FORMS
 (A) SEVERING DIP RELTNS WITH INDIA.
- (B) IF THEY ARE CONTEMPLATING MILITARY MEASURES, THESE MIGHT BE CONFINED TO KNOCKING DOWN ANY FORTIFICATIONS WHICH EXIST ON SIKKIM BOUNDARY, OR TO SAYING THAT THEY HAD DONE SO IF

/NONE

CHANCERY GENERAL Chancery Action 342:CHY:jml

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surhority RAC 032R-21-4-6-4
By JON WARA Date 2-9-18

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- 2 -

NONE EXIST.

CC) THE MOST EXTREME FORM OF ACTION WD BE MILITARY OPERATIONS
THROUGH SIKKIM DESIGNED TO CUT OFF N.E. INDIA.

EVEN AT THE HEIGHT OF MILITARY ACTION IN 1962 THEY DID NOT
BREAK RELTNS AND THEY PROBABLY REGARD A LINK HOWEVER TENUOUS AS
DESIRABLE IF DISCUSSIONS ARE LATER TO BE RESUMED. I FIND IT
HARD TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WD RISK COURSE (C) AT A MOMENT WHEN THEIR
HANDS ARE PRETTY FULL ELSEWHERE AND WHEN TO DO SO MIGHT SPOIL THEIR
IMAGE AT THE ALGIERS CONFCE IF IT COMES OFF. I FEEL SURE THAT
PAKAISTAN WD NOT ENCOURAGE THEM, ON BALANCE I WD EXPECT THEM TO
ADOPT COURSE (B) CONFIDENT THAT INDIAN PREOCCUPATION WITH PAKISTAN
WD SAVE THEM FROM REPRISALS AND HOPING THAT THE IMAGE OF AN
AGGRESSIVE INDIA WD HAVE BEEN FURTHER PROPAGATED.

-COMPITEDITION-

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Intelligence Note 3

SEP 1 7 1965

BOWDLER

BOWMAN

CHASE

JESSUP

JOHNSO!

To :

The Secretary

Through:

S/S

From :

INR - Thomas L. Hughes 100

Subject:

Chinese Threat May Bring Stronger Soviet

COMPTE

Support for India

Moscow may respond to Peking's ultimatum to India with a series of moves which will preserve the peacemaker image that the USSR has sought to cultivate but bring the weight of Soviet support more heavily than hitherto in favor of India. Moscow may feel that the Chinese move is one which it cannot match in any contest for influence in Pakistan and that more substantial support for India is in order to preserve the Soviet position on the subcontinent. Moscow may see Soviet moves in behalf of India as a necessity if the US steps in or as an opportunity for the Soviet Union to strengthen its position significantly at US expense if the US equivocates.

Although Moscow has not yet commented on, or even reported, Peking's ultimatum to India, it cannot long delay an authoritative reaction. The Indian Ambassador in Moscow has already discussed the Chinese action with Premier Kosygin and Foreign Minister Gromyko. Press accounts of the meeting quote "well-informed sources" that the Soviet Union has decided to continue its military aid program to India.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By NARA, Date 12-7-03

More Open Attack on China. Moscow undoubtedly regards the Chinese ultimatum as a direct reply to the TASS statement of September 13 urging third party restraint, and this may accordingly well be the issue which will cause Moscow to abandon the post-Khrushchev attempt to avoid open attacks against Peking. Moscow can still put its position in a pacific light by comparing its own urgings for a settlement with Peking's effort to inflame the situation, but the impact of such a statement will necessarily strongly favor India over Pakistan.

There are several signs that Moscow may be preparing such an open attack on Peking. The Soviet press on September 11 and 12 informed its readers of Chinese criticism of the Soviet position on the India-Pakistan conflict. TASS on September 13 and Mikoyan at a reception on September 16 refrained from direct references to the Chinese, but the Soviet army newspaper Red Star on September 16 specifically contrasted Soviet and Chinese attitudes toward the conflict.

Continuance of Soviet Aid. Moscow appears privately to be giving the Indians assurances that it intends to continue military aid shipments to India. The TASS statement of September 13 kept the door open for such an eventuality by warning that third power intervention might lead to the involvement of still other states "one by one." In contrast to the suspension of US aid to

both India and Pakistan, the Soviets did not, apparently, interrupt their shipments of military equipment to India, although the quantities involved are small. Moscow has also surreptitiously provided the Indians with advice, assistance, and other private evidences of good will during the period of conflict. As during the Sino-Indian fracas in 1962, Moscow will probably be circumspect in doling out its aid, and much will depend on the course of military operations both on the Pakistani and Chinese fronts.

In any case, the Chinese move probably sharply reduces the likelihood that the Soviet Union will agree to any suggestion that all third parties emulate the US in withholding aid to both parties on the subcontinent. A proposal to this effect might present some difficulties for Moscow which might, however, agree in principle on the condition that all other parties comply as well.

As in 1962, Moscow would have to be prepared for Peking's charges that, in collusion with the US, the USSR was aiding a bourgeois country against a socialist power (China) and the victim of aggression (Pakistan). However, Moscow would probably reply with the same arguments it used before to the effect that China was jeopardizing world communist policy toward India.

Approval of Indian Cease-Fire Position. Moscow may alter its current neutral stand to the extent of publicly approving

CONTRACTAL

India's response to U Thant's appeal. The Soviet press has in fact noted the Indian action with tacit approval and called attention to Pakistan's rejection. On the surface, Indian acceptance of a simple cease-fire appears to accord with Soviet appeals that both parties agree to such action. Moscow could take the position in the UN that India had responded favorably to U Thant and that it now was up to Pakistan to do likewise.

At the same time, Moscow could preserve some leverage with Pakistan by taking the position -- rejected by India -- that the Kashmir issue is still negotiable. All recent Soviet statements have implied as much by calling on the two sides to cease hostilities and negotiate their differences. Moreover, Kosygin's September 4 letters to Shastri and Ayub referred specifically to Kashmir, and it may be significant in this regard that Fedorenko circulated these letters as official documents to the Security Council on September 17.

Avoidance of Collusion with US. Moscow must also be aware that the Indo-Pakistani conflict provides the Chinese with an opportunity to try to maneuver the Soviets into the compromising position of acting jointly with the US, and that the Chinese may have had this in mind when they presented their ultimatum to India. Even apart from this, however, the exigencies of Moscow's Vietnam policy make it likely that Moscow will strive determinedly

to avoid any appearance of cooperation with the US. Soviet media in the last few days have reported the argument made in earlier Soviet pronouncements that the India-Pakistan question is diverting attention from the main front -- Vietnam -- in the world communist struggle against the US. Indeed, Moscow may be encouraged to pursue this line by Hanoi's circumspect attitude on the India-Pakistan question.

Future Soviet Course. How firmly Moscow lines up with India will probably depend both on the prospects for peace and on the course of military operations. Moscow may hope that the Chinese move will generate increased pressure for a cessation of the conflict. This, indeed, would be one of the major motives behind any Soviet warning against Peking's incendiarism in the conflict. On balance, an early cessation of the conflict still represents the optimum outcome of the situation from Moscow's viewpoint, but if this is not feasible Moscow will probably go to considerable lengths to preserve its political and economic investment in India.



NO FOREIGN DISSEM

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

To

From

Through:

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

The Secretary

Intelligen

BATOR BOWDLER

BOWMAN CHASE

JESSUP

JOHNSON

SEP 17 1965

INR - Thomas L. Hughes 114

India Replies to Peking's Ultimatum

Shastri Replies to Chinese Note. Prime Minister Shastri announced in Parliament today India's rejection of the allegations made in the Chinese Communist note of September 16th. He reaffirmed India's readiness to defend itself, but at the same time moved to undercut the basis of the Chinese ultimatum. Previously, India had offered to allow neutral observers to establish whether or not it was committing border violations in the Sikkim area, while the Chinese had pressed for a joint inspection. Shastri now has stated, however, that India would be willing to engage in a joint inspection "as an earnest of our desire for peace and to give no grounds to the Chinese to make it a pretext for aggression." The inspection could be arranged "at an appropriate level and at a mutually convenient date."

Shastri's move is designed to provide the Chinese with grounds for withdrawing their ultimatum should they so desire, and at the same time to cast Peking in a clearly untenable position in case it should resort to military action after the expiration of the ultimatum.

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contraction



Peking's Next Move. The Chinese note of September 16 is unclear concerning Peking's present attitude on its past proposals for joint inspection of the Sikkim border. By referencing these proposals, Peking would seem to have left itself no choice but to accept, at least conditionally, Shastri's response. However, on the one hand this would not provide effective support to Rawalpindi since an actual defuzing of the Sikkim problem through joint inspections would leave Pakistan even worse off then it was before this particular issue was resolved. On the other hand, an outright rejection would open Peking to the charge of all its political oppenents -- Moscow, Washington, and New Delhi -- that Chinese aggressive expansionism lay at the heart of Sino-Indian tensions. This charge would certainly receive a sympathetic hearing in much of the Afro-Asian world under these circumstances.

Given this dilemma, Peking is likely to choose a two-tracked course. It will probably use Shastri's acceptance of the joint inspection proposal to establish another time-limit for inspection and enlarge its demands on the joint group, including an expansion of its competence to include Peking's allegations of kidnapping of two Tibetan women and the seizure of sheep, included as outstanding issues in the September 16 note. Elsewhere Peking may well focus fresh attention on allegations of Indian illegal occupation of disputed territory in the middle and western sectors, also mentioned yesterday. Aggressive Chinese patrols will seek to hamper Indian intelligence and reconnaissance activities and to "punish" Indian patrols which might be overrun in less clearly defined





-3-

areas than exist in Sikkim. Chinese Communist military deployments throughout Tibet will increase as a means of keeping Indian nerves on edge. Fresh Chinese charges are certain to keep coming from Peking so long as the Indian-Pakistan conflict continues. However the sum total of Chinese activity still does not presage any deep penetration by Chinese forces of Indian territory.

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TATE

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Intelligence

The Secretary

Through: S/S

INR - Thomas L. Hughes

SEP 1 6 1965

Subject: Chicom Pressure On India Along Sikkim Border

On September 16 Communist China formally warned India to dismantle all military installations on or over the China-Sikkim boundary within three days or face "serious consequences."

Peking's Previous Charges. Since September 1964, Peking has intermittently charged India with building "military structures" on and across the Sikkim border. On October 4, 1964, Peking claimed that "up to August 1964 Indian troops built up to eighteen aggressive military structures (dugouts, shelters, bulwarks, etc.) on the Chinese side of the Natu La (pass) or on the boundary line (eleven on the Chinese side and seven on the boundary line)." On January 3, 1965, Peking amplified and updated its charges to a total of thirty-one "structures" all within five kilometers of the Natu La. This in turn was increased to "fifty aggressive structures and posted guards" by January 18, 1965. Peking's subsequent note of July 29, 1965 noted that New Delhi failed to "dismantle" the alleged structures as "urged" by Peking.

Indian Denials. Both in public and private, responsible Indian officials have steadfastly denied all of the Chinese charges concerning the Sikkim border. These officials expressed concern in 1964-65 that the accusations were intentional fabrications designed to "justify" renewed Chinese military advances in the area. In its September 12, 1965 reply to

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 State Dept. Guidelines By NARA, Date 12.703 Peking's September 8 note, New Delhi proposed that neutral observers inspect the Sikkim border to ascertain the fact that no Indian encroachment had occurred.


Border Established, Possibly Undemarcated. The 110-mile border separating Sikkim from China is one of the few sectors whose legal status and location is not in dispute between New Delhi and Peking. Established by agreements of 1895 and 1904, the boundary line runs along the crest of the watershed and at one time was demarcated. Over the years border markers have reportedly been moved, by whom is not known, or disappeared. While conceivably ambiguity could arise over sectors in extremely remote regions, it is improbable that any uncertainty exists on either side as to where the boundary line runs in the key passes.

Peking's Intentions. It is possible, but unlikely, that Peking intends merely to increase its psychological pressure on New Delhi. The repeated nature and expanded content of Peking's accusations over the past year suggests that some more tangible move will ensue. At the least, this would involve aggressive Chinese Communist patrols right up to the established border at each of the passes on the Sikkim border overlooking the Chumbi Valley. Should any Indian presence actually exist in this area, it would almost certainly be eliminated by Chinese troops. Peking may also move against Indian outposts across the border which provide vantage points for observing Chinese troop movements in Tibet, alleging afterwards that these outposts were "on or across the Chinese border."



- 3 -

Likely Indian Reaction. The Chinese note will cause grave concern in New Delhi. The Chumbi valley is the best invasion route into India and a successful Chinese attack through it could carry into East Pakistan, thus isolating the Indian forces in Assam to the East. Although the Chinese are not specifically threatening such an attack, the Indians are prone to over-reaction, and the mere implication of an attack in this sensitive area confronts them with the dilemma of reinforcing their already sizeable forces in the area by drawing forces away from the Pakistan frontier, or taking the chance that any Chinese action will be limited in scope and pose no serious threat. The immediate Indian reaction to the Chinese ultimatum is likely to be an urgent appeal for assurances from the US, the UK and the USSR. Should military action actually materialize, the Indian pleas for direct assistance, especially from the US, will become desperate.



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By NARA, Date 13-703

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Amembassy LONDON - IMMEDIATE

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CINCMEAFSA - IMMEDIATE

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- 1. We are deeply concerned by combination of recent Chicom actions and evidence of growing sense isolation and frustration on part of AXVB and possibility that in this mode inexactably tourned mood he may turn more decisively to Chicoms.
- 3. When you deliver letter it is essential that Ayub also understand that we are not repeat not prepared to play in same ball park as Chicoms. Any direct intervention by Chicoms, such as threatened in Sikkim today and a series

their earlier actions, possibly Ladakh tomorrow, will drastically change the terms of reference of Indo-Pak conflict and make any support by U.S. of Pak aspirations most unlikely. Ayub should understand this is not threat but reality.

4. Choice is Ayub's between support U.S. is prepared to NATIONAL GOALS give to Pakistan's objectives once halt in fighting is achieved and in our view highly dubitable long-term advantage of further involvement with Chicoms.

GP-2

NEA/SOA:RLSneider:9/16/65



Dear Mr. President;

Thank you for your letter of September 15 concerning the current conflict facing Pakistan and India. Your letter, particularly when read in the context of the report brought back by XXX Secretary General U. Thant after his visit to Pakistan and India, underscores the gravity of the crisis facing us and the urgency, and indeed the necessity, of positive actions by all of us in the cause of peace.

We are joined in common objectives, not merely a ceasefire but an enduring and durable peace between Pakistan and
India. More than that the U.S. shares with Pakistan its
aspirations for national survival and development and an
independent standing among the free nations of the world.
In the past, we have contributed freely to the attainment
of Pakistan's aspirations. We stand ready to do so in the
future.

The tragedy of the current conflict with India is less
that it will destroy the past efforts that you and the Pakistan
people have already made to build your nation than that it may
well sweep away in its wake your hopes and vision for the future.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By C., NARA, Date 2.703

SECRET

This must not come to pass but I fear that only vigorous actions now may prevent this development.

I urge you then to agree to an immediate halt in the is fighting. This/of course not enough but it's the essential first step. It must be followed by steps to bring a durable peace between Pakistan and India and solve the issues dividing your countries, including of course the Kashmir question.

Only Pakistan and India can halt the current fighting.

Steps

For our part, we are prepared to support an immediate action in the UN Security Council acking toward the negotiation of a durable political solution of your differences with India.

We stand ready as always to lend diplomatic and material the factor of securing peace in your area.

When the fighting is over, I stand ready, at your convenience, to discuss with you in Washington the nature of the new relationship which we can build between Pakistan and the U.S. I speak with no preconceptions; we can wipe the old slate clean and start anew. For my part, I am confident we can find ways to cooperate closely in areas which interest us both without affecting that freedom of action which we both must reserve for our countries.

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on part of AYUB and possibility that in this/RANN he may turn-more-decisively to Chicoms. We therefore feel urgent approach to Ayub is required.

- 2. You may inform Ayub that the President has read with understanding and concern his letter of September 15. In response, we wish to make three major points clear to Ayub:
 - a) We continue to see an urgent necessity for immediate halt in fighting and consider Ayub's reply of September 16 to U THANT's third appeal a forward step in this direction but not enough.
- b) We wish to demonstrate to Ayub that there are free world options

 Nemonopen to him as preferable alternatives to Chicoms and we are

 prepared to be as forthcoming as possible in present circumstances
 on crucial question of Kashmir negotiations.
 - c) Ayub should at same time understand that we are not repeat not prepared to play in same ball park as Chicoms. Any direct intervention by Chicoms, such as threatened in Sikkim today, will drastically change the terms of reference of Indo-Pak conflict and make any support by U.S. of Pak aspirations most unlikely.

 Ayub should understand this is not threat but reality.
- , 3. In detailing free world options open to Ayub, following points should be stressed:
 - a) U.S. and Pakistan joined in common objectives, not merely for cease fire but enduring and durable peace between Pakistan and India. **X** U.S. also shares with Pakistan its aspirations for national survival and development and an independent standing

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By ..., NARA, Date 12:1-93

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among free nations. In past, we contributed freely to attainment of Pakistan's aspirations and stand ready to do so in future.

- b) Tragedy of current conflict is that it not only can destroy past effort but may well dim Pakistan's hopes for future attainment of its objectives.
- Immediate halt in fighting is urgent necessity. is not enough but is essential first step. We recognize need for subsequent steps to seek durable peace between Pakistan and India and solve issues dividing them, including of course Kashmir question.
- d) Only Pakistan and India can halt current fighting. U.S. immediately prepared to support UN Security Council efforts to find basis for a constructive approach to a solution to these Indo-Pak issues. U.S. will do what it can to lend diplomatic and material support to task of securing peace in subcontinent.
- When fighting is over. President stands ready, at Ayub's convenience, discuss in Washington the nature of the new relationship we can build between US and Pakistan. US is confident we can find ways to cooperate closely in areas which interest us both without affecting freedom of action we both must preserve.
- 4. Choice facing Ayub is between looking to U.S. and other friends in furthering its national goals or accepting highly dubious long-term position of deeper involvement with ChiComs.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By ..., NARA, Date 12-7-03



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- b) Tragedy of current conflict is that it not only can destroy past effort but may well dim Pakistan*s hopes for future attainment of its objectives.
- c) Immediate halt in fighting is urgent necessity. It alone is not enough but is essential first step. We recognize need for subsequent steps to seek durable peace between Pakistan and India and solve issues dividing them, including of course Kashmir question.
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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By A. NARA, Date (2-7-03)

Following are instructions regarding U.S. stance with GOI regarding Chicom threat to India as revealed September 16 Note:

- Initiative should lie with GOI. If Indians desire U.S. support they should clearly ask for it.
- 2) At least at outset, you should not be reassuring either regarding nature of threat or prospect for outside assistance. Regarding threat, you we may convey substance of INR estimate, pointing out/WEXMENT unaware of level of activity Chicoms may be planning.
- 3) If GOI inquires regarding prospect for U.S. aid should Chicoms profession, Shocks; attack you should reply at appropriate high level along following lines:
 - a) GOI is aware from U.S. assurances and record in 1962 of U.S.

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 - b) GOI is also aware of heavy and increasing commitment U.S. has ** already taken on in Viet Nam.
 - c) Effective defense of subcontinent against Chicom threat depends primarily on internal strength of India and Pakistan. External support, while important, cannot make up for internal weakness (e.g., Viet Nam).
 - extent to which Indo-Pak conflict has weakened defense of subAnd opened it up to exploitation by Chickens.

 continent. Believe Indians will agree greater threat is from

 North.
 - e) U.S. understands circumstances leading up to unfortunate Indo-Pak conflict and welcomes GOI acceptance SYG's appeal for cease fire.
 - f) U.S. hopes this is first GOI move toward seeking rational solution to problems which divide and weaken subcontinent. We assume GOI's acceptance cease-fire proposal indicates it agrees "solution"

imposed

- imposed by military force would leave subcontinent more exposed to outside threat.
- g) Problem therefore is how to get fighting stopped and wounds healed so subcontinent with help Free World friends can close door to Chicom threat.
- h) USG, for its part, prepared offer GOP full opportunity rebuild ties with West.
- i) Essential element to get Paks agree cease fire and make it possible limit Pak Chicom ties is offer to GOP of some reasonable prospect for resolution problems with India, including Kashmir.
- j) While we have no formula in mind, if fighting is to be ended we believe need for something more than simple SC cease fire proposal is already evident.
- k) It is therefore U.S. new, most XXXXXX important requirement for effective Indian response to new Chicom threat is Indian agreement Stant meaningful to negotiate differences with Pakisan, including these over Kashmir.

While above line may come as shock to GOI, we believe it is soundly based upon valid military and political considerations. U.S. cannot and bligghth.

will not assume allegation for assisting in defense of peoples who unable effectively marshal own resources to defend selves. This is not repeat not tactical ploy designed to impose Kashmir solution on Indians; it is essential strategy designed rebuild subcontinent's strength so that it can defend its independence from Chicoms in long haul ahead.

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Research 🧲 Memorandum

RFE-37.2, September 15, 1965

To The Secretary

S/S Through:

: INR - Thomas L. Hughes Thank L. Hydr

Subject: Summary of Chinese Communist Activities Related to India-Pakistan

Listed below are press statements and intelligence reports, received during the past twenty-four hours, on Chinese Communist activities and announcements regarding the Indian-Pakistan conflict. This list will be published daily and cover information received up to 2:00 P.M. on the date of issue.

25X1

FBIS 11, September 15

An NCNA report, drawing on Pakistan newspaper material, alleged that the Pakistani general public had denounced American residents in Karachi and Mangla for breaking blackout regulations during Indian air raids on those areas.

FBIS 30, September 15

A September 15 Ta Kung Pao editorial labelled the Indian-Pakistan conflict "a question of right or wrong, justice or injustice and aggression or antiaggression" in which India is at fault on all counts. It charged the US and the USSR with trying to confuse the issue in support of the "Indian reactionaries." The Indians for their part in launching their "expansionist designs" were accused of rendering a service to US imperialism and with trying to divert attention from domestic troubles. No mention was made about the Sino-Indian border issue nor about Chinese assistance to Pakistan.

4. FBIS 87, September 14

A NCNA broadcast, reporting the Kosygin mediation offer made to Shastri and Ayub, attempted to discredit the Soviet credentials for such a role by charging that Kosygin who 'pretended to be an impartial arbiter" had taken care to ignore the fact that India was the aggressor. Claiming that Kosygin's bias

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in favor of India was obvious, the broadcast said his message to Shastri had "praised to the skies the Indian expansionists," and was part of a "strenuous effort to help Indian reactionaries out of their predicament."

5. FBIS 89, September 14

A NCNA broadcast reporting various statements by US officials on the Soviet attitude toward the conflict charged Moscow with "pretending to be unbiased, but really siding with India, over India's aggression against Pakistan" and inferred that the US praise proved it.

6. FBIS 88, September 14

The TASS statement of September 13 calling for the end of hostilities drew an NCNA attack that TASS had ignored any distinction between right and wrong, that "in exactly the same tone of official US propaganda," it had besmirched by innuendo "countries which uphold justice and support Pakistan in its resistance to Indian aggression."

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Keseurch ! Memorandum

INR-25.2, September 15, 1965

The Secretary

s/s Through:

INR - Thomas L. Hughes Thurst, Hughes

Subject: Chronology of Indo-Pakistan Conflict

INR is preparing, at the request of S/S, a daily chronology of events pertaining to the Indo-Pakistani conflict. The chronology covers cables, intelligence reports, press reports, meetings held by senior Department officials and significant telephone conversations. This Research Memorandum covers the period September 12-13, 1965, the sixth installment in a continuing series to be issued during the acute stage of the crisis.

Circular 390, Sept 12, CONFIDENTIAL

Circular message contains information on conflict for use by posts abroad including background, UN role, US views and actions and third party postures.

Reuters 83, Karachi, Sept. 12, 1965 UNCLASSIFIED

The Indonesian Ambassador to Pakistan said in Karachi that his country is ready to send a million volunteers to fight for Pakistan against India.

FBIS 16, Sept. 12, 1965

NCNA reports that an article in Ta Kung Pao charges that the US "is behind the current UN moves to aid and abet the Indian aggressor" in the Indo-Pak conflict.

FBIS 100, Sept. 12, 1965

NCNA quotes from a Sept 12 editorial in the Pakistan paper Dawn that "Pakistan's false friends are even helping and encouraging the perfidious Indians who have attacked Pakistan." According to NCNA the editorial said that "Pakistan's best friends in the world today are the fraternal government and people of Indonesia and Pakistan's great.

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northern neighbor, the CPR; the next few days are decisive and those who do not pass this test of friendship must forever be regarded as hypocrites and perfidious." 25X1 The Government of India has taken delivery of six motor torpedo boats from the USSR, for use in the Calcutta area. 25X1 25X1 Pakistani advance in Wagah, Patti, Kasur areas thwarted as of morning September 11. Casualties on both sides continue high. Pakistanis are seriously concerned about their armor and at present pace will have critical problem maintaining armored force in several weeks. Thousands more tribals are being moved through Rawalpindi to Azad Kashmir. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1

Reuters 86, Colombo, Sept. 13, UNCLASSIFIED

The Government of Ceylon announced that it had decided to refuse clearance to aircraft or vessels carrying military equipment or personnel to pass through Ceylon to either India or Pakistan.

Pakistan armed forces are applying pressure on Tripura and Causing viole

Karachi 477, Sept. 13, LOU

in Nagaland State.

ConGen Lahore reports conditions in city creating serious morale problem in private American community.

Reuters 24, Ahmedabad, Sept. 13, UNCIASSIFIE D

A Pakistani plane made two bombing raids on Sept 12 on Jamangar, Gujarat State, according to official sources.

Bub New Delhi Tel 588, Sept. 13, SECRET

A high-ranking official of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs told Ambassador Bowles that the Indian Ambassador to Iran had a trying audience with the Shah, who argued that it was better for all concerned to have Iran assist Pakistan than to have Communist China do so exclusively.

USDAQ New Delhi, C-00108, Sept. 13, SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Parachute activities of the Pakistanis and the Indians, as reported to date, are summarized by ARMA.

FBIS 42, Delhi Domestic Service, Sept 13, UNCLASSIFIED

According to the Press Trust of India, antiaircraft guns were fired at two suspected Pakistani planes flying over Bombay.

Associated Press 5, New Delhi, Sept 13, UNCLASSIFIED

India claimed today that its tanks scored a victory over Pakistani forces in a major battle near Lahore. Pakistan issued a counterclaim on the Lahore fighting, and added that 45 Indian tanks had been destroyed in fighting near Sialkot.

FBIS 38, Delhi Information Service, Sept. 13 UNCLASSIFIED

Text of a Government of India note delivered to the Chinese Communist Embassy in New Delhi on September 12 in response to Paking's note of September 8, rejecting Chinese charges.

Emb Karachi Tel 482, Sept. 13, SECRET/LIMITED: DISTRIBUTION

In a conversation between Ambassador McConaughy and the Iranian Ambassador to Pakistan, the latter recounted the highlights of a private conversation he had with Ayub and Bhutto on September 10. Ayub grateful over expressions of sympathy from Iran. The Pakistani President seemed preoccupied mainly with the state of US-Pakistan relations, and realized necessity of reaching renewed understanding with the US.

Associated Press 9, New Delhi, Sept. 13, UNCLASSIFIED

United Nations Secretary General U Thant met the Chargé d'Affaires of the USSR Embassy in New Delhi to discuss the possibility of returning to the United Nations in New York by way of Moscow.

September 13

At 9:23 a.m. there was a briefing of the Secretary by Assistant Secretar, Talbot including discussion of Daily Telegraph article. At 9:30 Undersecretary Ball and Assistant Secretary Talbot discussed the article.

Reuters 16, Karachi, Sept. 13, UNCIASSIFIED

The Government of Pakistan claimed, in a radio broadcast, that an entire Indian armored division was wiped out near Sialkot and that two Indian infantry divisions were "routed."

Associated Press, New Delhi, Sept. 13, UNCLASSIFIED

The Deputy Home Minister of the Government of India said that some American-made tanks captured from Pakistani forces will be displayed in New Delhi and other Indian cities. Other tanks captured from Pakistan are now being used in combat by the Indian Army.

September 13

At 10:00 a.m. the Secretary met with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and a briefing session on PL 480 aid to India and Pakistan was held. This was followed by press statements including the Secretary's warning to China and that the US "has always felt that self-determination in the disputed state of Kashmir through a UN supervised plebiscite should be part of an Indian-Pakistani settlement."

New Delhi DAO C-00117, Sept. 13, SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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DIA	refitting.						

Emb New Delhi 594, Sept 13, CONFIDENTIAL

Ambassador Bowles called on Defence Minister Y. B. Chavan September 13. Chavan indicated that (1) Pakistan's 1st Armored Division has been severely mauled; (2) Pakistan has not yet committed all of its units; (3) Indians do not want to occupy Lahore; (4) Indians hope to keep from spreading hostilities to East Pakistan; (5) Indians concerned about possible Chinese Communist attack and likely US response to such an eventuality.

Emb New Delhi 593, Sept. 13, CONFIDENTIAL

An official of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs told two Embassy representatives that Indian Ambassador to Turkey had learned Pakistanis asking Turks for 15-25 jet planes, 2-4 submarines, and a wide variety of other military supplies; two Pakistani generals are expected to arrive in Ankara on September 14 and Pakistani Ambassador to Turkey reportedly averred that Communist China would soon take "strong action."

Dept. Outgoing to Bawalpindi 59, Sept. 13, SECRET

Ambassador McConaughy was instructed to make it clear to Foreign Minister Bhutto that the US Government is deeply concerned over the failure to date of the Government of Pakistan to grant clearance for the evacuation of US citizens from Dacca and Lahore.

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Karachi 483, Sept 13, CONFIDENTIAL

Evacuation from Rawalpindi now planned by road to Kabul via Peshawar. Departure scheduled morning September 14.

September 13

At 11:00 a.m. Undersecretary Mann met with George Woods of IBRD to discuss the Pakistani consortium. This was followed by a talk with Mr. Gaud of AID. Mr. Woods also phoned to discuss the consortium with Undersecretary Mann for the September 24 meeting.

Dacca 67, Sept. 13, CONFIDENTIAL

If Dacca evacuation clearance not approved by GOP or is definitely delayed, ConGen suggests alternatives: use of Chittagong airport or evacuation by sea from Chittagong port.

United Press International 57, Washington, Sept. 13, UNCLASSIFIED

The US State Department denied a report that the US was involved in India's decision to attack Pakistan over the Kashmir issue. The London Daily Telegraph report was labelled "arrogant nonsense."

CHUSMSMI New Delhi TNND 3023, Sept 13, CONFIDENTIAL

Problem encountered regarding whether or not to unload MAP cargo in Bombay. Immediate action is requested to disseminate policy on military cargo shipments to all shipping lines.

Emb Karachi Tel 484, Sept. 13, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Additional Foreign Secretary Agha Shahi is scheduled to leave Karachi September 14 to proceed to New York to attend the next UN discussions of the India-Pakistan conflict.

Sept. 13, 1200, SECRET

A joint INR/NFA memorandum was sent to the Undersecretary responding to the various allegations made in the London Daily Telegraph story of Sept. 12. No substance was found for any of the allegations. The memorandum was given to the White House at 12:30.

-6-

September 13.

At noon a cabinet meeting was held at the White House during which a status report on the Indo-Pakistani conflict was given.

September 13

The Secretary attended a meeting at 1 p.m. with the President and McGeorge Bundy during which they discussed PL 480 for India.

FBIS 60, Sept. 13

NCNA quotes a dispatch from London by the <u>Daily Telegraph's</u> Special Correspondent who had been in New Delhi that the war between Pakistan and India "is a direct result of information sent out from Pakistan by the US CIA staff."

FBIS 71, Karachi Domestic Service, Sept. 13, UNCLASSIFIED

Pakistan Air Force bombers conducted a strike against the Indian Air Force base at Jammu, destroying six transport planes and damaging two hangars.

USDAO New Delhi, C-00128, Sept. 13, SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Highlights of information

(1) Indians are deeply concerned over the intentions of the Chinese Communists; (2) Indian Army does not plan to attack East Pakistan; (3) official Indian statements about Pakistani losses in tanks and other equipment not exaggerated; (4) the principal effort of the Indian Army is along the Jammu-Sialkot line; (5) the Indian Army has not made a premeditated and coordinated attack in Barmer-Hyderabad sector, and no Indian troops are thought to be in Pakistan territory in that area.

USDAO New Delhi, C-00118, Sept 13 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSE	USDAO	New	Delhi,	c-00118,	Sept.	13	SECRET/NO	FOREIGN	DESSEM
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Highlights of a briefing by the Indian Director of Military Intelligence on September 13: (1) stepup in Pakistanis' infiltration across Kashmir cease-fire line; (2) little doing in Chhamb sector; (3) Pakistani tank losses set at 255 destroyed, 27 captured; (4) no fighting at present on the Indian side of the Punjab boundary; (5) no Indian paratroopers have been dropped into Pakistan.

United Press International 103, Washington, Sept. 13, UNCIASSIFIED

The US is continuing to press Pakistan for permission to evacuate by air American citizens imperiled by the India-Pakistan conflict, a US State Department spokesman said.

FBIS 79, Delhi Domestic Service, Sept. 13, UNCLASSIFIED

U Thant held talks with Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, after lunching with the President, the Vice President, the Prime Minister, and a number of cabinet members.

ConGen Dacca Tel 59, Sept 13, CONFILENTIAL

ConGen anticipates serious trouble if the East Bengalis begin to think Pakistan may be losing in the conflict with India. Anti-US feeling is becoming apparent among the students, refugees, and West Pakistani in Dacca.

FBIS 83, Delhi Domestic Service, Sept. 13, UNCLASSIFIED

A Foreign Office spokesman in Kathmandu denied a Radio Pakistan broadcast that Nepal had asked India not to use Gurkha soldiers in the fighting in Pakistan.

September 13

At 2:30 p.m. Ambassador Handley met with the Afghan Ambassador to discuss Afghan relations with Pakistan.

Emb London Tel 1101, Sept 13, SECRET

The British are seeking to convey reassurance to Pakistan President Ayub according to a Commonwealth Relations Office representative. He added that evacuation plans of the UK are proceeding reasonably well.

September 13

At 3:00 p.m. Assistant Secretary Talbot met with the Secretary and the Pakistani Ambassador.

September 13

At 5:00 p.m. a planning session for South Asian Subcommittee was chaired by Assistant Secretary Talbot; others present were Mr. Rostow, Mr. Hughes, Mr. Spain, Mr. Komer, Mr. Farr, Mr. Hoopes, Mr. Johnson of S/P, Miss Laise, Mr. Wriggins, Mr. Schneider, Elmore Jackson, Mr. Stoddard, DOD and Mr. Barnes, CIA.

Reuters 99, London, Sept. 13, UNCLASSIFIED

The US Embassy in London "categorically denied" a report appearing in a London newspaper that the US had informed India a coup in Pakistan was immainent or that President Ayub Khan would soon be deposed. (Text of Embassy statement included in Reuters item.)

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Belgrade's 517, Sept. 13

Director, Africa Div. Yugoslav Foreign Office speculates that CPR may feel they have more to gain from exacerbation of the India-Pakistan conflict than from concentrating efforts on Bandung.

Moscow's 801, Sept. 13

Indian Amb Kaul claimed Soviets had described latest CPR moves as paper tiger designed to frighten India. He also quoted highly placed Soviet as stating presumably in jest that it might be a good thing if the CPR did come in as this would bring on US bombing of CPR nuclear bases.

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

- Research Hemorandum

RFE-5(.1, September 14, 190)

To : The Secretary

Through: S/S

From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes

Hughes the

Subject: Summary of Chinese Communist Activities Related to India-Pakistan

Listed below are press statements and intelligence reports, received during the past twenty-four hours, on Chinese Communist activities and announcements regarding the Indian-Pakistan conflict. This list will be published daily and cover information received up to 2:00 P.M. on the date of issue.

25X1A



25X1A 2.

Pakistani opposition leaders derived an impression from Ayub on September 6 that the Chinese would give indirect aid to Pakistan via Indonesia and that Pakistan had declined direct CPR aid because of the likely US-UK reaction.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declaration

TROLLED DISSEM

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Authority NLS 032.038.002/13

By C NARA, Date 3-13-03

Approved For Release 2002/03/10: NLJ-032-038-2-13-2 -

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

25X1A-

25X1C on August 13 observed about 1000 Chinese troops at Doshong Latse
25X1C Pass who were not there when he observed again on August 26;

that the most likely place for the troops to go was the Pemako region on the Tibet-Indian frontier.

4. Hong Kong's 390, September 12

Consulate General Hong Kong expresses the opinion that despite Peking's continued extensive comment on the fighting it gives no sign that it will go beyond assisting Pakistan through psychological warfare -- which does not exclude limited and cautious displays of Chinese military power along the Sino-Indian border. The ConGen noted that both a September 11 People's Daily editorial and a September 12 Ta Kung Pao "commentator" article used very mild expressions as compared to those employed before the clash with the Indians in 1962.

5. FBIS 11, September 14

A September 14 People's Daily editorial entitled "The UN is serving as a sanctuary for the Indian aggressor" charges that the US is behind U Thant's current mission to India and Pakistan, that U Thant's September 4 report to the Security Council and the two resolutions passed by the Security Council are pro-India, and that in ignoring Indian aggression the UN has undermined the basis for its own existence. Therefore, the editorial states, "what qualifications do they have to mediate in the India-Pakistan conflict?" The editorial concludes that "The UN is an instrument of US imperialism. It has committed countless evils. It cannot do anything good."

6. FBIS 16, September 14

An NCNA roundup of the Peking press for September 14 states that Indonesian Communist Party Chairman Aidit's September 12 condemnation of the "revisionists" role in the Indian-Pakistan fighting was "prominently reported"; that a People's Daily article exposes the "covetous" designs of the US against Kashmir; that "more than 1000" Pakistanis called at the CPR Embassy on September 12 to express their gratitude for Chinese support; and that a short Ta Kung Pao commentary entitled "The truth is out" stated that US Ambassador. Bowles had revealed US bias on September 10 in admitting that "The US Government was sympathetic to India and accepted that India had been subjected to aggression by Pakistan."

7. FBIS 81, September 14

The Chinese Communist Foreign Ministry in a note to India today again protested the forcible closing, in November 1962, of the Bombay and Calcutta offices of the Bank of China and demanded a "speedy and clear-cut reply." The note did not refer to other current Sino-Indian differences or to the Indian-Pakistan hostilities.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Ligence Note 2 8 1964

The Acting Secretary

S/S

From

INR - Thomas L. Hughes

Friendship

Subject: Chou En-lai Uses Condolence to India to Express Sino-Indian

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MOSNEOL

Chou's message to the Indian President went beyond the perfunctory WM. statement of official condolence to touch upon the restoration of friendly relations between the Chinese and Indian peoples.

At the Indian Embassy in Peiping. Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Marshal Ch'en I cal'ed at the Indian Embassy the morning of May 28 to express Communist China's condolences on the death of the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. They were received by the Indian Charge d'Affaires, Jagat Mehta, signed a condolence book, and left after five minutes.

In the Chinese Newspapers. The Chinese newspapers published on their front page the messages of condolence from Chou En-lai to the Indian President, Radhakrishnan, and to Nehru's daughter, Mrs. Indira Gandhi. A very short account of the death of Nehru and the appointment of Gulzarilal Nanda as interim Prime Minister was carried on an inside page.

Future Sino-Indian Friendship Expression. The message of Chou En-lai to Mrs. Gandhi perfunctorily expressed his "deep condolences" for the "unfortunate death" of Nehru. The one to Radhakrishnan stated that although "certain differences" exist between the two countries, yet "this unfortunate situation cannot but be temporary." He then said that he was "convinced

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- 2 -

that the friendly relations between the Chinese and Indian people will certainly be restored and developed on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence." This message seems to be an opening probe in the direction of the new government for improvement of Sino-Indian relations. It is unlikely, however, that Peiping's softer tone foreshadows substantive concessions on the Sino-Indian border settlement.

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self-determination and even union with Greece (enosis). To Greek Cyprists, these points represent the political facts on which they are willing to stake their lives. Receiving verbal assurances of support from the Soviet Union, Greek Cypriots care nothing about internal or external inconsistencies that might appear in other Soviet statements. This offers a golden opportunity for the Communists, who have few scruples in such matters and who have needed a special loost because their success in non-political matters has been limited in Typrus.

Soviet Aid Offers - The Soviets have been fast to move in with offers of weapons, long term loans, educational and training grants, profitable barter deals of Soviet oil in exchange for otherwise unsaleable Cypriot vintage crops, trips to the Soviet Union and the satellites for nationalists as well as Communists, air agreements, and most important, full support for the Greek Cypriot cause in the United Nations and all other international forums. One development has followed another to reinforce the ties being forged with the East and the "non-aligned" states. Relations with the UAR have improved, despite earlier strains over Arab expulsion of Cyprus citizens from Alexandria, and a Cyprus-UAR Friendship Association has been established. Arms have been received from Cairo.

The dangerous aspect of the above is not so much the individual developments as their cumulative effect on Cyprus and the atmosphere of irrationality to which they contribute. The press speaks of moving ahead without delay to make Cyprus a Mediterranean Cuba if this is necessary to preserve Greek Cypriot independence; if World War III is to start over Cyprus, then let it be.

Gains May Increase - Unless there is a solution to the "Cyprus problem" in keeping with principles of majority rule and the right of self-determination, i.e., a solution favoring the Greek Cypriot cause, the left will likely make additional gains. In this regard the outcome of the Geneva talks will be crucial, but even more so will be the UN General Assembly's consideration of the question which the Cypriot Government hopes to have debated this fall. The Soviets and their supporters, as well as the "non-aligned" nations, will back the Greek Cypriots. In cypical disregard of their actions elsewhere, the Communists will espouse and stridently support the principles that are basic to the West.

-- Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 32, 8/5/64

SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT REVIEWED

On July 30 the Indian Ministry of External Affairs released the texts of two notes transmitted to the Chinese Communists two days rearlier, one drawing Peiping's attention to "certain serious and objectionable activities" of Chinese Communist military personnel Ladakh and the second rejecting the Chinese charge of June 4 that

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By C., NARA, Date 12-7-03

SECRET

Indian aircraft had violated Tibetan airspace May 24. Although the timing and content of the first Indian note suggested it might be a riposte to the Chinese Communist July 7 protest over an alleged border violation by India, an Indian official has denied this. He also told our Embassy at New Delhi that, while the intensification of Chinese military action both above the MacMahon Line (not in Indian territory) and in the "demilitarized" zone in Ladakh could be expected with improved weather, India had to be prepared for any contingency.

Any logistic improvements the Chinese Communists may now be making at the Indian border could be both a response to the continuing Indian defense build-up and Chinese preparedness for a possible spread of hostilities in Indochina. It is also possible that India will seek to exaggerate the evidence of a build-up to propagate its view regarding the border threat, as was done a year ago.

Long Range Threat - Ever since the Chinese Communist attack on India ended with a cease-fire in November 1962, there has been a continuous exchange of notes and charges but little movement towards an improvement in relations between the two countries. Present signs do not suggest an imminent renewal of Sino-Indian fighting, but Communist China nevertheless constitutes a continuing military as well as a long-range political threat to India.

India has received substantial military aid from the West to strengthen her force against China. This aid, notably that from the United States, has been invaluable, but it has also contributed to a worsening of US relations with Pakistan, which fears US-supplied arms might one day be used against it. Reacting to this, Pakistan has moved to "normalize" its relations with Communist China, thus further complicating the security situation in South Asia. India's position vis-a-vis Peiping is given a further twist by Communist encroachments in Southeast Asia. While India shares our aim of containing Chinese aggression in the area, its actions are affected by two considerations: 1) concern that over-identification with Western diplomatic tactics in Southeast Asia will compromise its non-aligned posture and its relations with the Soviets; and 2) reluctance to commit its military resources to the area because of its defensive needs at home.

Economic Development - While giving India military aid to build up its defenses against the Chinese, we are at the same time urging India not to expand its military to the extent that it seriously diverts resources from economic development. In this connection, we are continuing an extensive program of economic development aid in the belief that India's ultimate success against the Chinese will depend as much on the vitality of her economy and the development of free political institutions as on military strength. One problem of immediate concern is that of food scarcity and the accompanying price inflation. This is assuming the dimensions of a political crisis for the new Shastri government.

Colombo Proposals - The Sino-Indian border dispute erupted into large-scale military hostilities in October-November 1962 when the Chinese Communists attacked and overran Indian frontier posts in Ladakh and the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA) in an attempt to impose a unilateral settlement. After a month of attack and continuous advance the Chinese unilaterally declared a cease-fire, and withdrew most of their troops to previously held positions. They continue, however, to occupy thousands of square miles of Indian-claimed territory. In December 1962, six non-aligned nations framed, and through subsequent negotiations clarified, proposals designed to stabilize the conflict and bring India and China to the conference table. These Colombo Proposals, as they were named, called for a withdrawal plan which in effect would reduce the area under Chinese military control to that which existed prior to the November 1962 attack.

The Chinese publicly made a "positive response" but privately questioned details of troop dispositions. The Indians accepted the proposals "as clarified," the clarifications concerning the stationing of troops and civil personnel in certain parts of the disputed areas. Nehru announced publicly that talks could begin if the Chinese also accepted the proposals, as clarified, "in toto." Thus far, the Chinese have not done so. In getting the Indian parliament to agree to the Colombo Proposals, Nehru was forced to make it clear that the proposals would not be accepted as a substantive solution to the border dispute but only as a basis for Sino-Indian talks. In April and May 1964
Nehru reiterated that India was "prepared to negotiate" with the Chinese Communists if the latter accept the proposals. This position was restated by Prime Minister Shastri after taking office in early June.

-- Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 32, 8/5/64

NEA NOTE

Turks Frustrated Over Cyprus Developments

Foreign Minister Erkin has expressed to our Ambassador at Ankara his government's immediate concern over increasing Cypriot Government pressure on the Turk Cypriots. He felt it was a mistake for Turkey not to have carried out its intervention plans in June. Erkin stressed that the time factor is vital and that the Geneva talks must be hastened and not be used as an expedient for Greek delaying tactics. He stated that if Athens continues to discount Turk seriousness, the only recourse will be for the Turkish Government to create an "international crisis" to convince the Greeks that Turkey is serious.

Other Turkish sources have complained of the renewed incidents on Cyprus which they consider frustrating and humiliating but concerning which they find themselves impotent to act except in ultimate terms. They complain also of the failure of others (including the United States, United Nations and NATO) to exert a restraining influence. Our