

## LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
023	cable	Bundy and Komer to the Ambassador, New Delhi [sanitized 9/11/00] <i>Dep. 225 Papers of Komer, Chron. Oct-Dec. 65, Box 6</i>	S	1	11/3/65	A
<del>041</del>	<del>memo</del>	<del>Komer to Bundy</del> <i>open 1-25-11 NLJ 10-4/8 L# 118</i> <i>[dup #118, Name File, Komer Memos, vol. 1 Box 6]</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>4/20/65</del>	<del>A</del>
048	cable	Bowles to Komer	S/	1	1/17/66	A
048a	cable	Komer to Bowles	S/	1	1/15/66	A
<del>080</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>New Delhi 1285</del> <i>open 3/29/19 per RAC</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>5</del>	<del>11/16/65</del>	<del>A</del>
117	cable	Bundy to Ambassador Bowles [sanitized 9/11/00]	S	1	4/16/65	A
<del>126a</del>	<del>letter</del>	<del>Bowles to the President [exempted 1977]</del> <i>(duplicate #204, NSF, Country File, India, Vol. 4, box 129)</i> <i>open 12-14-04 NW 04-150</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>16</del>	<del>4/14/65</del>	<del>A</del>
126c	report	Military Assistance Program	S	6	[4/65]	A
<del>127c</del>	<del>report</del>	<del>General Scenario for Ayub and Shastri Visits</del> <i>open 3/29/19 per RAC</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>11</del>	<del>3/25/65</del>	<del>A</del>
133	cable	deftel 1970 to New Delhi <i>open 3/29/19 per RAC</i>	S	3	3/20/65	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer

Folder Title "SHASTRI VISIT (Proposed)"

Box Number 22

## Restriction Codes

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1/2/2004

Initials

January 4, 1966  
Tuesday, 10:30 a. m.

Mr. President,

Attached for signature is a copy of the letter inviting Shastri which you approved and we sent by cable. State says that following up with a signed original is customary.

R. W. Komer

*Sh Vinit  
X India*

*file  
1*

file  
1a

1/4/66

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am very pleased that you and Mrs. Shastri will visit Washington early in February and am looking forward with much anticipation to meeting you both then. Your visit comes at a most appropriate moment in the history of our two countries and will give us a valuable opportunity to get to know each other and learn more about the problems we both face. Our two countries have much in common, and we shall have much to discuss.

Secretary Freeman and I were very pleased with our discussions about your short and long-term agricultural problems with Food Minister Subramaniam. While firm commitments were neither asked nor given, he has enhanced our confidence in your determination to cope not only with India's grave agricultural difficulties but with its larger development needs. We are glad that you sent him here.

I should also like to take this occasion to thank you for your thoughtful message at the time of my recent illness. I do appreciate your kind wishes and warm expression of concern.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending season's greetings to you and Mrs. Shastri.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Lal Bahadur Shastri  
Prime Minister of India  
New Delhi, India

14 LBJ

LBJ:State:RWK:tmt 1/4/66



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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By           , NARA, Date 12-18-03

*Shastri*  
*x Shastri*

SECRET - PERSONAL

January 4, 1966

Dear John,

Your 28 December memo was just what the doctor ordered. I am sending it to the President as a measure of the opportunity now before us -- if we'll only seize it.

Much will depend on what Shastri says to the President. If he makes a solid impression, then it will be up to us to make an adequate response.

Therefore, my own sense is that Shastri ought to take the initiative in telling the President such things as:

(1) India is serious about the Chicom threat in Asia, and intends increasingly to broaden its response -- indeed we have a community of interest here;

(2) India also understands the US problem in Vietnam (an ambulance corps offer here would be worth its weight in greenbacks), though it must not lean too far away from the Soviets who are India's second biggest benefactors;

(3) nonetheless, despite non-alignment, Shastri regards India as unreservedly pro-Western and is determined to preserve the democratic way;

(4) India also wants peace with Pakistan and has no intention of gobbling it up;

(5) India cannot give up Kashmir, but can and will do everything short of this to promote a reconciliation with Pakistan;

(6) Indeed India recognizes that US help in keeping Pakistan from an unholy alliance with China serves India's interests too;

(7) he, Shastri, is determined to make India's economy go (here he should outline a whole series of measures to this end -- and say these are responsive to US advice);

(8) India recognizes that the US has no obligation to provide massive aid, but is hopeful that if India on its own takes the self-help measures the US and Bank think essential, they in turn will provide the minimum external capital without which the effort cannot succeed;

SECRET - PERSONAL



~~SECRET~~ - PERSONAL

(9) on agriculture, Shastri is deeply grateful for US PL-480; he grants that it has been used as a crutch in the past, but is determined to use it only as a transitional device once the famine is licked;

(10) in particular he favors decontrol and new encouragement to private foreign investment;

(11) in sum, he is here to convince the President that it is worth betting on India--he, Shastri, is prepared to state categorically that so long as he is in power India will pursue vigorously the political and economic policies outlined above. He doesn't want to put the President on the spot by asking for aid any more than Ayub did, but what are the President's own views?

If Shastri can thus convince us that India is serious about both its domestic problems and the external threat, I believe that the President is prepared to be equally serious about India.

Nonetheless, I want to highlight one fact of life about Washington in 1966--Vietnam. It will not only be a competitor for foreign aid as well as domestic resources, but it is inevitably becoming a test of whether other countries are serious about the Chicom threat. India is in a conspicuously important spot in this respect, not only because of its own problem with China but because of the risk of US disillusionment over India's double standard, i. e. the Chicom threat to India is real so India should be helped but the Chicom threat to SEA isn't real so the US needn't be helped. This is why Shastri's statement and actions on Vietnam will be just as important as his economic promises.

However much one may deplore the way in which increasing US preoccupation with Vietnam might distort our response to other situations of comparable or even greater long term interest, it is a fact of life which neither the President nor the Indians can ignore. So I hope that you and Chet will preach this gospel wherever it will count, because the Indians must try harder to grasp our problems if they want us to grasp theirs.

Indians will reply that they can't afford to antagonize the USSR. By the time this reaches you Tashkent may have proven that Moscow is really Indian at heart. Even if not, however, we should argue strongly that the Sino-Soviet split is so fundamental as to minimize any risk that the USSR would shift away from India regardless of what stand it took on Vietnam.

~~SECRET~~ - PERSONAL

SECRET-PERSONAL

- 3 -

In fact the sooner world opinion joins the US in its effort to defend Free Asia, the sooner Hanoi and Peking will retreat--thus limiting the risks of escalation which would create the only circumstances under which the USSR might conceivably help China at India's and our expense.

This letter has turned out to be more political than developmental, but this is the measure of the problem. Our aid strategy is now reasonably clear, but that strategy (insofar as the chief contributor is concerned) will be powerfully influenced by India's international political responses--on Kashmir, on China, but most immediately on Vietnam. It's really up to Shastri to convince LBJ.

So do show this letter to Chet and Jerry Greene--and all of you work hard on LK, Darma Vira, and the PM too. Shastri's performance before he comes and when he gets here is now the key variable in a South Asian design which is otherwise slowly shaping up the way the President wants.

Happy New Year.

Sincerely,

R. W. Komer

Mr. John P. Lewis  
American Embassy  
New Delhi, India

Chet - This is my best advice. It's up to you and John now. In fact, I'd see far less point in your returning as early as 19 January than in your being on hand to work on our client up till practically the time he leaves.

SECRET-PERSONAL



~~SECRET~~

Sh Visit  
x India (and)  
x P.D.  
January 3, 1966  
Monday, 4:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached memo on the Indian economy is well worth scanning in anticipation of Shastri's visit. John Lewis, the author was a member of the CEA and is now one of AID's best mission directors. He's so much more sober than Bowles that I listen hard when he speaks.

He confirms that our aid strategy has really moved the Indians, and argues that by using our money more wisely we can force an economic breakthrough without spending any more in 1966-68 than we have in recent years. Since George Woods is also an advocate of this school, the World Bank would be a natural ally in this endeavor. Incidentally, Lewis' memo is along precisely the same lines as the India strategy paper approved by both your cabinet committee and non-committee (which Lewis has never seen).

If--and only if--Shastri says the right things when here, would you entertain an aid bargain along the lines Lewis plugs? I do not envisage any firm commitments, but rather a gentlemen's understanding that if he actually does all the things we think we can get him to promise, he will find us equally responsive in providing economic backing. India-lover or no, I see a big league opportunity shaping up here along the lines we want. If you like this concept, I'd favor getting word discreetly to Shastri beforehand (not through Bowles) on what we expect of him.

R. W. Komer

OK for pre-visit planning purposes \_\_\_\_\_

Show me what you'd tell Shastri beforehand \_\_\_\_\_

Let's hold off a while longer \_\_\_\_\_

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 12-18-03

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

January 3, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR DON HORNIG

Would the idea in last para of the attached be a useful Shastri dinner gesture? Ensminger tells me that an actual survey of Indian underground water resources would be a truly major and expensive undertaking. But what he has in mind is a high level team which would help the Indians to plan and lay out such a survey rather than do the job itself.

R. W. Komer

Att: Cy, Ensminger ltr to RWK, 12/31/65

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-18-03*



~~SECRET~~

January 3, 1966

Mac -

Here's an absolutely first-class memo from John Lewis. When you read it, you'll agree that LBJ should too but this may be the wrong week. On other hand, if we can get an OK now it will help powerfully to get the Shastri visit set up right (and we really only have three weeks).

RWK

~~SECRET~~

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-18-03*

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Shastri  
6  
file  
December 23, 1965

FOR PRESIDENT

FROM KOMER

State proposes following formal letter of invite to Shastri . You did same for Ayub.

QUOTE Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am very pleased that you and Mrs. Shastri will visit Washington early in February and am looking forward with much anticipation to meeting you both then. Your visit comes at a most appropriate moment in the history of our two countries and will give us a valuable opportunity to get to know each other and learn more about the problems we both face. Our two countries have much in common, and we shall have much to discuss.

I should also like to take this occasion to thank you for your thoughtful message at the time of my recent illness. I do appreciate your kind wishes and warm expression of concern.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending season's greetings to you and Mrs. Shastri.

Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

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SECRET

Shastri 1 file  
December 8, 1965

FOR MOYERS FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM KOMER

Shastri Visit. We now have word back from Shastri that he would like to come to the US 31 January and begin his meeting with you Tuesday 1 February. He asks if he may announce this in his Parliament on Friday 10 December at 4:30 PM Delhi time, which is 0530 AM EST. His office has appealed to us to time our announcement so that it would not come out in India beforehand.

Since Delhi announcement will be too late to hit our morning papers anyway (though it will hit radio/TV), would you see objection to our letting Shastri have first crack, and then confirming it Saturday AM along following lines:

QUOTE In response to the President's longstanding invitation  
END QUOTE PM Shastri will visit the US to meet with President Johnson on 1 and 2 February.

Alternative would be for us to release Friday with an embargo. Bill Moyers would be best judge of whether this would hold. We here see advantage in accommodating Shastri, if no disadvantage to us.

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By jc, NARA, Date 12-18-03

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-18-03

SECRET

December 8, 1965

~~FOR MEMO~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM KOMER

Shastri Visit. We now have word back from Shastri that he would like to come to the US 31 January and begin his meeting with you Tuesday 1 February. He asks if he may announce this in his Parliament on Friday 10 December at 4:30 PM Delhi time, which is 0530 AM EST. *Friday* His office has appealed to us to time our announcement so that it would not come out in India beforehand.

Since Delhi announcement will be too late to hit our morning papers anyway (though it will hit radio/TV), would you see objection to our letting Shastri have first crack, and then confirming it <sup>Friday</sup> ~~Saturday~~ AM along following lines:

QUOTE In response to the President's longstanding invitation  
END QUOTE PM Shastri will visit the US to meet with President Johnson on 1 and 2 February.

Alternative would be for us to release <sup>Thursday</sup> ~~Friday~~ with an embargo. Bill Moyers would be best judge of whether this would hold. We here see advantage in accommodating Shastri, if no disadvantage to us. /

Bob — I'm sorry but we're a day off here. I rechecked with State this morning and above is right. Same procedures apply but if we released with embargo it would have to be this afternoon + we'll have to get word to Delhi this pm.

SECRET



Phoned by Mr. Hagey

9 file

From Mr. Handley

12/9/65

CONFIDENTIAL

PROPOSED WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT  
FOR RELEASE SOMETIME AFTER 7 AM  
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 10.

Sh Visit

"The White House confirmed today that Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri of India will make an official visit to the United States in February 1966. The Indian Prime Minister is expected in Washington for talks with the President on February 1 and 2. Further details of the visit will be made available later.

"Mr. Johnson welcomes the opportunity this visit will provide for him to get to know Mr. Shastri, the leader of the world's largest democracy. This will be Mr. Shastri's first visit to this country and the President hopes that the Prime Minister's schedule will permit him to see something of the United States after he and the Prime Minister have had a chance to exchange views in Washington."

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc NARA, Date 12-18-03



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10  
*Shastri (Ind)  
x Lodha*  
December 3, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

B. K. Nehru called to say that first we had talked with him through the newspapers (an allusion to my earlier complaint about Shastri's public remarks on MAP to Pakistan), and now were talking to him through Indian ministers. This last was a reference to Law Minister Sen's talk with Arthur Goldberg, in which Arthur asked him to have India come up with some kind of formula for Kashmir talks before Ayub arrived. What did this mean?

I gave him the party line--movement toward withdrawal and some kind of negotiating process was most important. I recalled to BK his own contention that India was more willing to talk than we seemed to recognize. The more we could reassure Ayub that there was hope for constructive discussion, the better the chance of keeping Ayub from going off the deep end. This (as we kept insisting) would create greater dangers for India than for us.

BK asked why the Tashkent meeting wouldn't take care of this problem. We could simply tell Ayub that since he and Shastri were going to talk at Tashkent, there was no need for other negotiating tracks as yet. I countered that the more candor his government were able to show in assuring us that they meant to talk seriously, whether at Tashkent or elsewhere, the easier it would be for us to buy this line. I added that Shastri's recent public remarks seemed to betoken more flexibility. He agreed, but again warned of the domestic political limits within which Shastri had to operate. My counter was to say "tell us privately and we'll keep the faith."

I then reminded Nehru that his government as well as ours was beginning to see signs of possible increased Chicom obstreperousness (e. g. L. K. Jha's recent pitch to Bowles). It would be tragic if India were caught in a three-front squeeze--a domestic war on food at the same time as it faced pressures from Pakistan and China. Despite whatever help we could give in such a three-front "war," it would be a terrible strain on India. Thus we greatly hoped that the Indians would take seriously the risk of Pakistan going off on an even more dangerous bent.

BK asked about the results of the Freeman meeting with the President. I referred him to the Baltimore Sun. He asked what might now be in prospect? I told him that I was encouraged at the way in which our governments seemed to be moving closer together on agriculture but could say no more just then.

Distribution:

Mr. Bundy  
Amb. Hare

R. W. Komer



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~~SECRET~~

Authority FRUS 64-68, Vol. 25 # 256

By jc NARA, Date 12-18-03

*Shastri Visit 11*  
*E on*  
December 1, 1965

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNDY AND KOMER

We've landed Shastri too. His private secretary has asked Bowles if the first week in February is convenient to you. This is in response to our suggestion that mid-January, as he earlier proposed, was bad for you but that any time after the 20th would be fine.

Shastri has apparently been maneuvered (by Ayub's acceptance) into going to Tashkent at the end of the year. This is an added reason for his eagerness to sign up with you first lest we misunderstand. In fact, however, Tashkent may prove a blessing in disguise. When Ayub hits you on Kashmir, you can say work it out with Shastri at Tashkent. If (remote chance) the Soviets do work out a Kashmir deal, we'll gain as much from it as the Soviets. More likely, the Soviets will find themselves in the same box we've been in.

We suggest you take up Shastri visit with Rusk tomorrow, and decide on a firm date.

On Indian food, it looks as though a combination of the short rein strategy, Freeman's recent prods, and India's own desperate straits have finally made them think big. We like Freeman's strategy, but suspect that you'll want to keep Indians on a short rein tactically till you and Shastri strike the bargain. This is do-able, provided that our monthly interim shipments are big enough to keep India afloat till then. So we'd again argue for a quick monthly OK of as much as Freeman thinks desirable (plus the interim fertilizer loan--which we'd see as shrewd but not essential).



CONFIDENTIAL

12  
November 30, 1965  
*Shastri Visit*  
*X Ayub visit*  
*X Suhrawardy*

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

I called B. K. Nehru today to make sure he had read the President's message in the daily prints. He seemed quite impressed. I stressed that it was important not to misinterpret the statements about "peace" and "settlement" as prerequisites to resumption of aid. We regarded a settlement as highly desirable in the interests of both countries. We stood firmly behind the UN process, as he knew. But he should note that the word "Kashmir" was not highlighted in the backgrounder. He got the point.

BK came back at me again on the importance of prior discussions to clarify the issues for the Shastri/Johnson meeting. He expected to leave for Delhi at the end of December. My response was that first things must come first. Our focus now would have to be on the Ayub visit. Once this was over, however, I personally hoped that some kind of preliminary sorting out process could be arranged before he went to India.

Nehru said he had a cable from Delhi citing the Subramaniam/Freeman discussions and expressing the hope that if we were able to act on any of Freeman's "recommendations" we do so before the Lok Sabha took up the food problem on 3 or 4 December. Not being sure what he was referring to, I told him that I personally doubted any action would be taken that quickly on anything Secretary Freeman had in mind, simply because there would not be time for the necessary discussions here.

At 3:30 I had an hour's talk with Iftikhar Ali, the Pak Charge. We discussed the Ayub visit. I emphasized the importance of avoiding any recriminations; these would simply cast a pall over the meeting. We had nothing to apologize for in our policy--I dealt with such concerns as the betrayal of allies; Pakistan the aggrieved party, massive military aid to India, and Hindu treachery. Ali agreed that there was no point whatsoever in raking over old coals. We should see whether a new start was possible.

I then emphasized that for this crucial meeting to be productive, neither President could ask the other the impossible. If Pakistan's real fear was larger India, we could give Pakistan something no one else could--sheer viability and security. We had proved this. No one else could provide it. The Soviets wouldn't, The Chicoms couldn't. In fact, if the Paks got into bed with China, it would simply force us, and the Soviets to boot, to give greater support to India. This made no sense. We favored a peaceful settlement over Kashmir

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By jc, NARA, Date 12-18-03



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but we couldn't buy or bully India into giving it up. The only answer was a process of reconciliation. At the minimum there must be peace. The Paks could not ask us to be tacit allies of the Chicoms in squeezing India, at the very time when we were fighting the Chicoms by proxy in Vietnam.

Iftikar understood all of these points. His one strong rebuttal was that if we were insisting that Pakistan subordinate itself to India and "become a satellite" in return for US aid, this was impossible. I assured him that we recognized it as impossible, and had no such intention. Indeed we thought we were giving Pakistan the very sinews to maintain its independence. If, however, he meant that we must equate Pakistan with India in the sense of giving a Pakistan of 100 million exactly what we gave an India of 485 million, this flew in the face of simple facts of life. He agreed. Indeed, I think Iftikar got the message I was trying to deliver. I twitted him about previous misquotation of what I said, or rather that Karachi had tried to put two and two together and get five.

R. W. Komer

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

Shastri Visit  
+ Ayub Visit  
Free  
12 Nov  
13  
November 27, 1965

FOR MOYERS FROM KOMER

Following talking points are designed help President create right atmosphere for Shastri and Ayub visits. They will cause some reactions in Delhi and Pindi, even if camouflaged, but this outweighed by desirability softening up visitors and warning them in advance what to expect. Since backgrounder will take place shortly after Ayub visit announced, thus highlighting Pak problem, have included this as well as India.

1. President has taken special interest in South Asia because: (a) he sees it as most populous and--with Japan--strategically important area in Free Asia; (b) US has already invested around \$10 billion in food and other aid, with equivocal results; (c) difficulties between India and Pakistan--both good friends--have grown and finally erupted last August/September in open war, disrupting our programs there and causing us to re-examine our policies and programs.

2. Events over the past eight months have made President painfully aware that our policy in South Asia badly needs sorting out. New circumstances demand a new look at old answers. These circumstances have forced us to hold up any major new aid commitments to either country, and to take a new look at where we go from here. America cannot and will not ignore the dire poverty and vast needs of one-sixth of the world's people--as our past performance amply demonstrates--but President has obligation to US taxpayer to see that our assistance is used wisely and well.

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By jc, NARA, Date 12-18-03



3. In case of Pakistan, Administration and Congress have been increasingly discouraged by Pakistan's steady drift toward closer relations with Communist China, at very time when US carrying chief burden of curbing Chicom expansionism in Asia--and despite fact Pakistan formally allied with US against this very type of threat. Indeed, US confronted with strange irony of allied Pakistan moving away from US toward China, while non-aligned India becoming more alert to Chicom pressures. There is also growing resentment in US over public Pak criticisms which ignore fact that US alliance with Pakistan was against Communist threat, not against India, and that attempt to make US scapegoat for Pakistan's own current difficulties.

4. In case of India, big question for US is whether massive Western economic aid can be justified to US taxpayer if all it does is keep India's head above water instead of moving forward. India's staggering agricultural problem is best example. Growth in Indian food output has kept barely ahead of population growth, and Indian needs for PL 480 grain have been steadily mounting.

5. President initially wanted to discuss these problems with Ayub and Shastri last spring but then decided time not ripe for such discussions until after foreign aid bill passed and he had firm idea of what Congress prepared to make available. Many of our friends somehow fail to appreciate that under American system it is Congress which holds the power of the purse. President has no regrets over postponement, which both Ayub and Shastri accepted gracefully, though he is sorry that a press leak made it necessary to announce the Shastri postponement prematurely.

~~SECRET~~

Page Three

6. Subsequent events, especially growing Pak/Indian friction, led to August/September hostilities. This further delayed any summit talks, and led to suspension of any new US military and economic aid until peace could be restored and US confident that its aid would not merely be fuelling fratricidal conflict. Current US policy is to fully support UN effort to bring about firm ceasefire and withdrawal and then steps toward longer term settlement of issues between India and Pakistan.

7. President now looks forward to seeing Ayub and Shastri, because in his view US needs a clear understanding of directions in which India and Pakistan are each going before it possible to make solid decisions on future US policy. He feels that best way to get this understanding is by face-to-face discussion at the top.

8. High on President's agenda with both is his increasingly strong conviction that massive US aid is little more than palliative unless matched by comparable effort at self-help. He made this crystal clear when he signed the FY 1966 foreign aid bill, "Our assistance must and will go to those nations that will most use it. . . . Action, not promises will be the standard of our assistance."

9. Since India has been by far the largest single recipient of total US aid, the Administration wants to take a hard look at what India proposes to do in the critical fourth Five Year Plan period which begins next year. India has done respectably in the past, but still faces staggering problems--especially



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Page Four

in agriculture. The President has been struck by India's steadily growing demand for US surplus foods, which has already risen from 3 million tons in 1960/61 to over 6 million tons this year (20% of US wheat crop). If present trends continue, India within a decade could be short of food by an amount equivalent to the whole US wheat crop. So the President has felt that long term PL 480 agreements like that signed with India in 1960 have operated as a crutch rather than an incentive. As a result the US has held off any new agreement, though continuing massive food shipments, until we could get a clear picture of how US help could be most effectively tied into an all-out Indian effort to feed themselves.

10. So the problem is not that the US doesn't want to help India--the sheer fact that we've invested around \$6 billion to date belies that notion. The President has clearly in mind India's key role in Free Asia, its democratic institutions, and the growing pressure it is under from Peiping. But he feels that simply shovelling in food and dollars is not the answer--in India's own interest or in ours.

11. Aside from his interest in the Indian Government's economic intentions, he wants to be sure that peace has returned between India and Pakistan. We don't want to find ourselves any longer in a situation where each side accuses us of arming the other against it, or one where US aid provided for economic

SECRET

Page Five

development simply frees India and Pakistan to use their own resources to buy arms. In this case, the US is simply indirectly subsidizing another arms race between them.

12. The President understands the deep sensitivities on both sides, now exacerbated by the recent fighting. He feels that the US alone cannot be the arbiter of those bilateral issues which must ultimately be settled by the Indians and Pakistanis themselves. But it is no disservice to either India or Pakistan for the US to contend that reconciliation and cooperation instead of conflict would be a great boon to both--and to the most effective use of US aid. India and Pakistan must learn to live together on the same subcontinent, and the President is hopeful that out of the crucible of recent conflict will come a new order of statesmanship which will build on this simple fact.

13. Nor does the President expect any nation to agree 100% with us on all issues as the price for US aid. He believes that, despite certain divergencies, there is a basic community of interest between the US and both India and Pakistan. He does feel, however, that when the US is carrying such a heavy burden for the defense of Free Asia, it is naturally sensitive to apparent lack of understanding if not support from those Asian nations whose ultimate security is also at stake. For example, Americans are baffled when Indians call on US to support them against Chicom encroachment, yet seem unable to fathom necessity of US helping beleaguered nations like South Vietnam.



14. Whereas an understanding of India's economic course is crucial to where we go in India, Pakistan has performed well economically--with massive US aid. This only sharpens our disappointment with Pakistan that Pak foreign policy has made it increasingly difficult to defend such massive aid before Congress just at a time when that aid was really beginning to show results. While we in no way expect to dictate Pakistan's foreign policy, we do hope that Pakistan will weigh its own real interests and give us some notion of what course it plans to take. The US cannot cavil at normal Pak relations with Red China, but it can hardly be expected to support--however indirectly--any Pak/Chicom alignment to squeeze India. To do so would be flatly inconsistent with the longstanding US effort to build up free Asian countries which can stand on their own feet against the encroachments of Peiping.

15. In sum, President regards the common purposes of US with both India and Pakistan as far outweighing differences. He looks forward to meeting with Ayub and then Shastri as best way of confirming whether this also their view. If so, though specifics obviously cannot be worked out in such brief encounters, he is confident that the broad understandings reached can subsequently be translated into renewed concrete collaboration--on a new and more constructive basis than before.

~~SECRET~~

November 22, 1965

Mac:

As you'll see from attached, there's a job to be done in clearing the air prior to a Shastri visit. In my judgment this can best be carried on by us with BK, rather than by Bowles in Delhi or the Department here. But I'm easy on the matter. The important thing is to get the President's OK for certain exploratory discussions, after the Ayub visit but before BK returns to Delhi. What say?

RWK

*Let's raise it when he  
talks to us about Shastri.  
NegB.*

Attach. RWK/Nehru Memo for Record 11/22/65

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-8-03*

14  
Free  
Shastri Visit  
X India



SECRET

14a  
November 22, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

I invited myself to lunch with B. K. Nehru today and made clear to him the risks in such GOI-inspired press stories as the Harrison article in Monday's Post ("Shastri Objects to New US Military Aid to Pakistan") and the Keats' article in Friday's Sun ("US Must Give Fertilizer Loan and Six Months PL 480 Before Shastri Can Come"). We recognize the GOI's difficulty (like ours) in dealing with a democratic press, but for high Indian officials to negotiate with us through the press before a visit was simply no way to do business, and could not help but obscure the prospects for fruitful summit talks.

BK understood fully; in fact, he's worried about how Shastri might be quoted in tomorrow's Harrison article on Vietnam. He granted the importance of utmost discretion on both sides in the crucial period before the two leaders got together. I believe that he will so indicate to Delhi.

On the other hand, BK gave me the same pitch as that of L. K. Jha to Bowles, i. e. it is most important that we work out in advance--and in confidence--the right agenda and issues for the summit. This was more than a fishing expedition; I got the impression that BK is genuinely fearful lest Shastri's visit end in failure because he's unprepared for what might transpire in Washington. He agreed that advance consultations obviously could not commit principals, but pleaded for some clearer signals as to what we had in mind. He said he'd be returning to Delhi about three weeks before a Shastri visit, in order to prepare the way, and almost pathetically hoped that we could give him as much of a picture as possible to take back.

I agreed in principle that prior consultation would be useful to a meeting of such critical importance, but stressed the even greater importance of creating the proper atmosphere for such a visit by avoidance of public statements which would tend to freeze issues and cause unnecessary frictions. We left it that I would look into the matter of if, when and how preliminary discussions might be useful.

Since we had already informed Delhi about the preferred timing for Shastri, I told BK. I also mentioned that Ayub might be coming earlier, since he apparently wanted to visit the UN (to avoid a leak I did not mention dates). I repeated to BK the point made in our outgoing to Bowles that whatever the

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By *jc*, NARA, Date 12-18-03

~~SECRET~~

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order of the visits, it bore no necessary relationship to their importance. He assured me that the GOI would be very relaxed should Ayub come first; this would not cause undue pain in Delhi.

Nehru and I had an uneventful discussion of various substantive matters, especially India's food problem. He objected to the spate of press articles on this matter, so I told him that the US press was highly interested. I pointed out inter alia our discouragement over Shastri's attitude on Vietnam, our longstanding concern over India's failure to face up to the problem of Pakistan, and our increasing emphasis on self-help across the board.

R. W. Komer

*Cy to Komer 11/23/65*



SECRET

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
FOR AMBASSADOR

15  
11/22/65  
*Shastri Visit*

Period between now and Shastri visit will be made infinitely more difficult and prospects for fruitful talks much the poorer, by press coverage such as in Harrison interview with Shastri frontpages in Monday Washington Post (Deptel \_\_\_\_).

We confident you have already made clear in proper quarters that negotiating with the US through the newspapers in advance of talks is hardly the best way to reach meeting of minds. All here recognize that India, like US, is a democracy that cannot control press. But this is different from fueling the press with gratuitous criticisms US policy or telling US how to conduct its policy, e. g. not to resume military aid to Pakistan.

One of key frustrations of US relations with India is that our underlying common purposes are so often obscured by essentially surface differences. But this is a fact of life which GOI must take more fully into account if it wants the scale of support from us which it has enjoyed in the recent past. Thus it is most important that key Indian officials, including Shastri, help during the coming pre-visit period to minimize surface frictions and thus create optimum atmosphere for Shastri visit. We of course will attempt to do the same from our end.

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date 2-18-03

November 17, 1965

MEMO FOR RAY HARE

Here's a cable drafted by McGeorge Bundy following his discussion with the President which I think you will agree should go out right away. It overtakes your earlier cable to Delhi about Shastri visit which came over this morning.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-8-03



**SECRET**

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By je, NARA, Date 12-18-03

16a  
11/17/65

To: New Delhi

1. Your 1247 has been discussed with highest authority. You are requested to inform L. K. Jha that while the President fully understands Prime Minister's feeling that a December visit is not workable, and while the President would very much like to have the Prime Minister at any convenient time thereafter, there is a real problem here with dates in the first three weeks of January. Congress meets here on January 10. The 10 days before that time will necessarily be heavily occupied with the preparation of the State of the Union message and other elements of legislative program, and first 10 days of session will be equally filled with the submission of these basic legislative messages. The President therefore hopes that it may be practicable for the Prime Minister to consider a visit at any time after the All-India Congress Committee meeting.

2. In the interim the President approves of your suggestion that Subramaniam be invited to come here for discussions with Freeman on Indian agricultural outlook. Of course, it is possible that Subramaniam himself will not be eager to come unless there is a reasonable prospect that discussions here would in fact allow us to give him something concrete to take home in the way of interim aid decisions supporting Indian agricultural efforts. We would hope this is not so but Freeman is actively exploring the case that can be made for such help and will explore it further with Subramaniam in Rome. Freeman is authorized to make his own judgment on a Subramaniam invitation in the light of these studies and

SECRET

Page Two

conversations, and nothing repeat nothing should be said to Indians until after Freeman decision, which will be promptly reported to you.

FYI. You should know that Ayub has now proposed himself urgently for December and that the terms of our understandings with both countries will not permit us to reject this proposal if he persists in it. We would welcome your advice as to the best way of arranging and announcing an Ayub visit in December and Shastri visit in late January or early February. Our current inclination is to get the Shastri date settled and announced just before any announcement of an earlier Ayub visit. Your comments welcome. End FYI.



17  
Mr. Bundy says: "No, let's send mine."

X

SECRET

November 17, 1965

Mac -

Here's a State cable on Shastri visit, cleared by Ball, which parallels yours. My instinct is to let it go, since it is not in conflict, and to send your own by sidewire.

RWK

Read/Bundy Memo 11/16/65 att.  
draft cable to Delhi on Shastri visit

RWK: Why not suggest to Orville that he ought to chat with me at some point before he goes - to get the big picture.

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-18-03



*Shastri Visit  
+ India Econ  
+ India*

*file*

*18*

November 15, 1965  
7:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The squib you sent me from the San Antonio Express on how Shastri said no aid with conditions just ain't so. In fact, it took us two days to figure out how it could have happened.

It was based on wire service stories sparked by a working committee of Shastri's Congress Party, which passed a resolution on 7 November defending India's austerity program and several other reforms to meet the food crisis. The Indian press said Shastri had expressed gratitude for US food but fended off opposition by saying in effect that he would not compromise India's stand on Kashmir to get aid. The background of that remark--and the omitted half of the story--is that the Communists sponsored a resolution calling for termination of PL 480 imports, accusing us of using PL 480 as leverage to pry Kashmir loose. When the Congress executive committee unanimously rejected the Communist resolution, Shastri assured members that he himself would favor ending PL 480 if "political strings" were attached but he was categorical in stating there was no likelihood of this happening.

Shastri has had to tread the difficult line between looking politically independent while knowing he is economically dependent. He's pushing hard now for programs that would make India self-sufficient in food. It's quite clear that Shastri is not talking about economic conditions when he rejects "political strings". In fact, his food minister said in Parliament 8 November that he did not consider it "interference in India's affairs for the USA to insist on scrutiny of India's agricultural programs which would make India independent of PL 480." Not bad.

R. W. Komer



~~SECRET~~

McGB:

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By je, NARA, Date 12-18-03

November 15, 1965

Here's the record of our minuet on the Shastri visit. As Komer said, Shastri's Mac Bundy has now suggested no less than four possible dates. I'd also agree that the Indians probably backed away from mid-December because we haven't responded in over a month and they fear being bracketed with Ayub. Specifically:

1. Way back on 9 August L. K. Jha began sounding Bowles out on an October visit. Shastri confirmed these feelers on 15 August, saying he looked forward to a visit as soon as he got parliament and Kashmir (then only in infiltration stage) settled. Then Kashmir exploded.

2. On 24 September Bowles reported that Shastri was considering a visit before 15 October. The President authorized Mann and RWK to encourage this. But announcement of the President's operation killed this.

3. Shastri tried again in his 7 October get well message hoping it would still be possible for him to come "at a later date." L. K. Jha told Bowles that Shastri had been prepared to come in late October. When we did not respond, late October possibility gradually slipped by.

4. On 11 October Jha said that, if a visit before the 3 November Lok Sabha session was out, Shastri could come in early December after Parliament adjourned. On 18 October Shastri himself told Bowles he could come then if the President really wanted to see him. After talking with Jha again, Bowles boiled this down to mean that Shastri would come mid-December if Ayub came late December or January but would prefer mid-January if Ayub came earlier. We didn't answer.

5. On 12 November, Jha said a December visit looked unlikely now but asked about 10 January.

One factor RWK and I have underemphasized in all this is Shastri's political problem in arranging this visit. His opposition and the critical press have made an increasingly big thing of US pressures--original postponement, aid slowdown, MAP suspension, PL 480 holdups, press on new conditions for long-range PL 480--as arm-twisting on Kashmir. His military victory gave him a boost, but it also heightened the go-it-alone spirit in New Delhi, so it's doubly hard for him to appear to come begging now. Moreover, announcing a date while Parliament is in session makes it harder for him to keep the visit out of debate right now. Admittedly, the stakes are big, but he's not bidding from strength.

~~SECRET~~

HHS



SECRET

Mac -

November 12, 1965

Delhi 1247 indicates that Shastri won't come in December after all (unless we twist his arm). I suspect this is just as much a device to protect him against our lack of answer as anything else. He has his political problems too.

Nonetheless, it would greatly help to mitigate the adverse affect of Ayub coming first if we invited Shastri now for mid-January before Ayub replied. We could do so by either:

(1) A brief LBJ note saying he understands that Shastri would prefer to come around 10 January and would be delighted to see him then; or

(2) An instruction to Bowles telling him to tell Jha (or Shastri) the same thing, adding that Ayub has not yet decided when to come but that he might come in December and reassuring Shastri that this should not be read as pro/Pak.

If you agree, how do we go about setting this up pronto? Should I do a wire to the ranch (draft attached), or should we check it out with Rusk first?

RWK

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-18-03

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SECRET

November 12, 1965

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BONDY AND KOMER

It now looks as though Shastri can't come till January after all, which better suits your current thinking. His secretary told Bowles that December visit seems difficult because of heavy Parliamentary agenda and asked what we would think about 10 January or so, provided this met your convenience. To forestall any Indian resentment lest Ayub come first when it was Indians who were by all odds the most eager to come when you wanted, we suggest replying to latest Shastri probe before Ayub answers. Then at least Shastri will know privately that we didn't make him take second place. Shastri has now made several offers to come over the past few months, which is an additional reason for picking up this latest direct probe.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-18-03

21  
Free  
Shastri Visit  
+ Ayub Visit  
November 10, 1965

Mac -

Ben Read tells me that Rusk this morning seemed definitely to prefer Ayub first, and letting Shastri revolve around this. Ben, on the other hand, was much more in favor of Shastri first and said that the Secretary seemed to have forgotten the Mann/BK Nehru conversations (at LBJ's instruction) in which we passed the word that Shastri ought to come and the response that Shastri was interested but wanted to know when.

Ben is calling these facts to Rusk's attention but I feel it well worthwhile if you'd sort them out with Rusk on the plane. I may be wrong but the order of these visits seems even more important than the timing. As you will recall from my 3 November memo to the President, the facts are these:

Shastri began making feelers in early August, Ayub not. With LBJ's OK Bowles and Mann told BK Nehru that a visit in October would be welcome. BK got word this might be feasible. Then the Pak/Indian fracas intervened.

Then in the famous late September Ayub phone call LBJ gave him first refusal. But Ayub replied coolly later that he couldn't come for at least 6-8 weeks.

Then LBJ's operation was announced. Shastri wrote him 7 Oct. a get-well letter saying he'd hoped to come early but now hoped he could come later. BK amplified this to mean either before or after his 3 November-10 December parliamentary session. Since then he's been probing, even sending S. K. Patil, but we've been stonewalling.

Now Ayub, having finally gotten it through his skull, is eager to come and is passing out word on all circuits.

Thus it seems to me that, having given Ayub first refusal and his refusing, and then Shastri being quite responsive, we have no obligation to have Ayub first.

But the case for having Shastri first rests even more on the ground that it would make both visits more successful from LBJ's viewpoint. He can drive a better bargain with Shastri if he receives Shastri in the order owing to India's greater importance than if he has to deal with a resentful Shastri who's worried about what Ayub managed to say first. Ayub, on the other hand, will be much more malleable--and much more likely to be responsive--

~~SECRET~~

page two

if he's required to wait in line. If we are eager to promote Pak/Indian reconciliation, it's much better to be able to answer Ayub's complaint that Delhi's attitude makes this impossible by LBJ saying that Shastri told him personally it could be done over time.

Sorry to keep worrying this matter. Perhaps best way to get a sense of LBJ's thinking would be to put attached draft cable in front of him tomorrow.

RWK



~~SECRET~~/DRAFT CABLE

November 10, 1965

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
AMEMBASSY KARACHI

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR BOWLES

You should see Shastri and tell him that the President has asked you to say he is now fully on the mend and would be delighted to see Shastri either a week before the Erhard visit on 6-7 December or perhaps a week later, if this is convenient to the PM.

If Shastri asks whether an Ayub visit has been laid on, you should say that because of Shastri's expressed interest in coming early, the President would be happy to see him first. However, Ayub is now quite interested in coming; therefore, if Shastri finds the above timing inconvenient we would probably invite Ayub for that period. However, we would hope that, should Shastri decide to come later and Ayub earlier, Shastri would take measures to dampen any mistaken Indian resentment that we were showing favoritism to Pakistan.

For Ambassador McConaughy. As you will see from above, we believe that Shastri's willingness to come, whereas Ayub did not pick up his prior option, together with our larger interest in India, leads us to invite Shastri first. We also believe that Ayub is under strong compulsion to come in any case so that delaying his visit will not be critical. Once we have Shastri's

~~SECRET~~

Page 2

reply we will instruct you to see Ayub and invite him for a suitable date.

If Shastri cannot come either a week before or after the Erhard visit, when the President plans to invite Ayub. If Shastri does come in early or mid-December, then President's current thinking is to invite Ayub for early January.



~~SECRET~~

Free  
Shastri  
Visit  
November 10, 1965

22

Mac -

Items for the Ranch. The following really are worth at least mentioning:

(1) Shastri/Ayub Visits. Rostow called me yesterday to urge the case for Shastri before Ayub. I urged him to put the case to Rusk--who had a vote. We will simply be able to get more from both Shastri and Ayub if they come in that order. If Ayub comes first he'll try to re-establish the old "special relationship" or at any rate the Indians will suspect just this. Therefore Shastri would be less inclined to follow right on Ayub's heels even if it cost him plenty. On the other hand, if Ayub is forced to wait for Shastri, he'll be the more contrite; in fact, by having Shastri first we just might be able to get some hint of Indian desire for reconciliation which would be a nice bone to give Ayub.

(2) Agreement we can't settle Kashmir. If you could only slip this into the talk, and get LBJ to say so, it would stop State wasting a lot of time on chimeras.

(3) UAR food. I presume this memo has been sent to the Ranch. If no answer yet, urge you tickle. If LBJ still won't buy, I suggest cutting the duration from one year to six months and halving all the sums involved.

RWK

You should read attached cables. I'd have written them somewhat differently, but they'll do in present form. They'd be highly useful reminders to our ambassadors. The only change I'd make--but an important one--is on p. 3 of Delhi draft. I'm sure you'll agree.

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-18-03

**SECRET**

25X1A

VIA SPECIAL

*Shastri Visit*  
23  
November 3, 1965

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM BUNDY AND KOMER

Because of President's convalescence, he desires to retain flexibility on matter of early Shastri visit. We may not know for at least a few weeks when President will be prepared have Shastri here. Therefore important, now that Shastri is nibbling, that we not encourage him to count on early visit, absence of which may further complicate our Indian affairs. Our aim still is to let Shastri come to us.

While we also realize that Shastri has his own problem in conditioning his public opinion for a visit, remarks such as that about a QUOTE special plea UNQUOTE from President do not go down well here. We do not wish place Indians in position of openly running after us; nor do we wish, however, to have it appear that we are chasing them.

*Send ?*  
**SECRET**

Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : NLJ-032-022-2-1-2

**SANITIZED**

Authority NLJ. 032.022.002/1

By jc NARA, Date 12-18-03



~~SECRET~~

Shastri Visit  
+ P. J.  
November 3, 1965  
Wednesday/7:00 pm

24

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Shastri Visit Matter. The current state of play is that Shastri seems quite interested in coming here, but is uncertain as to when you'd be ready to receive him. The sense of his 7 October letter to you, as amplified by his own chief aide in Delhi and by BK Nehru here, is that he was ready to come before his parliament session began 3 November but, since you would probably be convalescing through that period, could come next after 10 December when his parliament ends. So he probably regards the ball as in your court.

This whole enterprise sorts out into three phases:

Phase I beginning with the April postponement was signaled by our saying that he had an open invite after the aid bill passed, and the wounded Shastri saying he might not be able to make it this year after all.

Phase II began in early August with feelers from Shastri about an October visit. At your instruction, we authorized Bowles to reply (To Delhi 217 of 13 August) that we regarded Shastri's having cordial standing offer visit here in fall, once aid bill behind us. We told Bowles you were highly receptive but didn't wish to decide finally or issue formal invitation unless there was clear indication Shastri would accept. Mann and then I followed up with BK Nehru that a visit in October rather than later would be most welcome (To Delhi 257, 20 August). BK replied to Mann that it might be possible. But the Pak/Indian fracas then intervened.

Bowles seems to have stayed well within his instructions, though as soon as the cease-fire came he started urging us to authorize him to encourage a Shastri visit, perhaps ostensibly to the UN. Ayub was also nibbling, so you sent me word to find out from his Embassy when he wanted to come, adding that "if the Indians want to come, and I understand that they do, tell them that I would like them to come before the 15th." We duly passed this word.

Phase III began when your operation intervened. Shastri wrote you a get-well letter on 7 October saying he had been looking forward to discussing many problems with you at an early date but that he now hoped that at a later date he could come in response to your invitation. His people amplified this

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to mean that he could come either before his parliament convened on 3 November or after it closed on 10 December. Since then he's been probing through several channels, including a cabinet minister sent here, to find out when you might be ready to receive him.

We here have kept very cool all during this third phase (and so has Bowles), to preserve your flexibility. No one is pleading with Shastri to come. In fact we've merely replied when asked that the matter would obviously have to await your recovery. Meanwhile Shastri, besides nibbling hard, has made a few statements to his own domestic audience apparently designed to make it easier for him to come here without appearing to have begging bowl in hand (both he and Ayub seem worried over the possibility that their visits would be a failure, and affect their own domestic position). Natural press speculation here has also been keeping the question alive, to which we've been responding only by saying that the door is still open.

In sum, Shastri and co. are talking up a visit, while we are keeping mum without appearing to reverse course and say "no." Shastri seems to be waiting for some indication as to when you'd be willing to see him, and trying to keep open his option to come (see attached on his press conference). A possible Ayub visit also complicates matters, since neither would feel able to come hard on the heels of the other.

R. W. Komer

Dechi 1173

SECRET



SECRET

November 1, 1965

25  
Shastri Visit

Mac -

Visitology. If Erhard is reluctant to come early and we aren't ready to talk yet anyway, any chance of putting Shastri first?

Having told Erhard of the Shastri/Ayub problem, it seems to me we have discharged obligation to have him first. Moreover, latest word from Delhi is that Shastri might be able to come a little before the 10 December end of Lok Sabha session.

I'm not pushing. simply trying to firm up this matter. Clearly there is growing speculation which will create growing annoyance in turn--until this matter is sawed off.

RWK

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-18-03

SECRET

November 1, 1965

FOR JACOBSEN FOR THE PRESIDENT  
FROM BUNDY AND KOMER

Shastri's unfortunate statement that you had made a "special plea" in a letter to him that he come to Washington probably refers to your 5 June letter to him, mostly on Vietnam. At the end of it, you wrote "I deeply regret that your parliamentary and other commitments may not permit an autumn visit. I assure you we would welcome a visit at any future date you should conclude would be desirable and convenient to you." This was hardly a special plea.

The AP version made this worse by omitting Shastri's own qualifier that your letter was prior to the recent Pakistan aggression, "i. e. before 5 August. State believes that Shastri was clearly trying to justify to the home audience his own eagerness to come here as soon as you want him.

Selig Harrison's Post reference to quarterly PL 480 wheat allocations is one-shot speculation. It wasn't picked up in other media. We're getting word out that a month is it, which will end such speculation.

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-18-03



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file

*Shaw's Visit*  
*X Ayala Visit*  
*X C.D.*

~~SECRET~~

October 28, 1965

Mac -

How about this to focus thinking.  
You could just attach the draft letter I  
did on green two weeks ago.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-18-03*

SECRET

October 28, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Organizing the Shastri/Ayub visits.

If you want to get this enterprise rolling for December/January, we'd suggest the following scenario to firm it up. Since Shastri has been much more specific and forthcoming about a date, we'd settle with him first.

1. Answer Shastri's get well note along lines of attached, which in effect invites him to pick a date after mid-December. Best guess is he'd like to come promptly.

2. Then tell Ayub when Shastri is coming and leave it up to Ayub as to whether he'd propose to come before or after. We think it's a toss-up, but if he did propose coming early you'd still have the option of replying that you'd prefer to spread out your visitors just now, so would propose late December or early January.

There are many signs that Ayub is coming our way (and even that he plans to sack Bhutto). This suggests that you can play him on a longer line than Shastri (and can get more response from Shastri if the larger country doesn't have to take second place).

R. W. Komer

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

SECRET

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12/8/03



SECRET

October 22, 1965

Mac -

If you get a chance to say a word about Shastri first, or to write it in as extra para. in food memo, it's well worthwhile.

I'm not just trying to prove to the Paks (and this town) that it's India first--though this too is useful.

Rather it is the tactical advantage we get. If Shastri comes second he'll be on the defensive; if he comes first we can better urge him to think big. This in turn will better enable us to tell Ayub the limits of the possible. Also, by being forced to wait, Ayub will be more malleable when he comes; if he got the first shot, he'd be far more inclined to con or pressure LBJ.

RWK

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-18-03*

28

*Shastri Visit*  
*X India*

*Shastri Visit  
x Ayub Visit*

SECRET

Mac -

October 21, 1965

Ayub/Shastri Visits (painful as subject might be). Bhutto told Rusk today that Ayub would like to come here in late November or December if convenient to the President (State is putting this in night reading). As predicted, both our fish are nibbling furiously.

So now we have the problem of whom to invite first once LBJ is ready. He told Ayub on the phone he had first refusal, but I regard Ayub as having refused. I strongly believe that Shastri should be first (a) because he was willing to come when Ayub wasn't; but (b) far more important, if India is our big concern we ought to act that way. Having Shastri first will also make Ayub more malleable, and he's the tougher nut.

Having said this, I don't feel bright about how to convince the President. Could we enlist Rusk on our side quickly. Shall I do a chit to LBJ?

RWK

SECRET

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-19-03*



SECRET

October 15, 1965

Mac -

Shastri Visit. Attached is a proposed friendly reply to Shastri's 7 October get well message (note it's cleared by Rusk). It says let's get together soon.

We can either keep waltzing around this way or force Shastri's hand by proposing a date. Before 3 November is clearly out, if only because it is already 15 October. So the real question is whether the President should reply now saying "come on in mid-December."

I'm strongly for this course, and would assume the Boss is too. The sooner we firm up matters the more we limit the risk of further misunderstanding and further drift in our Pak/Indian affairs.

I'm also convinced that once Shastri is signed on, it will powerfully whet Ayub's appetite. In late September he said he couldn't come for 6-8 weeks, so he might even seek to come before Shastri.

Attached memo is designed to present these options to the President.

RWK

SECRET

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-8-03

*Shastri Visit*  
*Y India*  
*X P.D.*

~~SECRET~~

October 15, 1965  
Friday/6:30 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is Rusk's proposed reply to Shastri's get-well message (also in draft cable). Other reports make clear that Shastri is nibbling hard, and that he was probably even willing to come before his next parliament session 3 November-10 December.

Rusk proposes merely replying that you too look forward to seeing Shastri at an early date. My own instinct is that if you wish to firm up this visit, you need merely say instead that you'd be delighted to have him come in mid-December. Shastri's in effect asking you to do just this.

Once Shastri's visit is arranged, this will be powerful medicine to get Ayub here, perhaps even before Shastri. You'll recall he said on 29 Sept. that he didn't see how he could come for 6-8 weeks.

Approve Rusk version \_\_\_\_\_

Approve mid-December \_\_\_\_\_

R. W. Komer

Attach. Read/Bundy Memo encl. draft tel to Delhi msg  
LBJ to Shastri ~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-18-03



SECRET

October 8, 1965-4:45 p.m

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

If you want to get Shastri here, a good way to encourage it would be a quick reply to his message of solicitude. The last paragraph of his message suggests that he's probing as to when you might be in business again, and angling for a reply. Our latest soundings with B. K. Nehru also suggest that Shastri is nibbling, but no doubt wonders now when you'll be ready to receive him.

The attached response suggests the last week in October, and deliberately leaves open the question of whether it ought to be an official visit or a trip to the UN with a stopover in Washington. I strongly suspect he'll opt for the latter.

R. W. Komer

SECRET

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-18-03

*31*  
*file*  
*Shastri Visit*  
*X B.D.*

*Log: "Hood up on  
this advice 10/12/65  
8:30/pm"*

DRAFT

31a  
file  
October 8, 1965

Dear Prime Minister:

I greatly appreciate your solicitous message. Let me assure you that my operation was a complete success, and that I am champing at the bit to get back to my desk.

Since, as you say, there are many short and longer term problems which I too have been looking forward to discussing with you, I am delighted to hear that you hope to be able to come to Washington soon. In fact, I would suggest the last week in October, when I expect to be at work full-time again.

Sincerely,

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-18-03



SECRET

September 29, 1965

Mac -

When I called BK Nehru to invite him for lunch with us Friday, he raised the question of a visit by the PM. Did we have in mind the same kind of quick visit to Washington as had been under discussion before the fighting or were we now proposing that if the PM went to the UN the President would be delighted to see him in Washington? I told BK that (1) we had no fixed view; (2) I couldn't speak for the President, but assumed that with the aid bill now by us, the President would be happy to see the PM under either circumstance--it was a matter of working things out to their mutual convenience; (3) I had personally rather thought that with the issue before the UN, the PM would want to appear and if he came to the US.

BK asked whether our feelers constituted a formal invitation. I replied that the situation was rather one of trying to work things out informally to the mutual convenience of the two leaders but that once this was done I was sure a formal re-invite was no problem. However, I recalled that BK himself had suggested the PM would like to make any formal visit to the US at a time when he could spend several days seeing the country, which of course was not possible during the present interregnum between Lok Sabha sessions. BK said he understood.

Mac, my understanding (particularly from the latest note from the President) is that he'd be happy to see Shastri here in any way and any time that can be mutually worked out. Correct?

RWK

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 25, #229

By jc NARA, Date 12-18-03

316  
Shastri Visit  
x India

yes  
Me 9 B.

SECRET

September 29, 1965

Mac -

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RWK

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 25, #229

By jc NARA, Date 12/8/03



~~SECRET~~

TO NEW DELHI

September 25, 1965

In response to your 779, you may say that, if Shastri decides to come to UN sometime before 15 October, President would be delighted to see him in Washington.

You may indicate in your discretion that you understand Ayub may repeat may also be coming to UN, though we don't know when. We will certainly be happy to separate suitably the Washington part of any two such visits.

TO KARACHI

We desire you to try again to firm up dates on when President Ayub can come to US. You might tell him that White House is inquiring in light of phone talk between the two Presidents.

You are also authorized to indicate in your discretion that Shastri may repeat may be coming to the UN too. However, we do not know when, and will of course separate suitably the Washington portions of any Ayub and Shastri visits.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-18-03

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

August 30, 1965

*Shastri Visit*

Mac -

At lunch today with the Indian Minister he again probed as to whether it was really the President who wanted Shastri soonest. I repeated all the necessary, tying it again to our bilateral affairs rather than anything else.

Bannerjee then asked whether Ayub was coming, saying that it would naturally cause Shastri some political embarrassment if he came within a short time of an Ayub visit. I assured him that we regarded the two as quite separate enterprises, but did feel constrained to add that of course Ayub had the same kind of standing invite for early fall ~~as~~ Shastri did though we had no indication that Ayub was coming. My point was both to protect us in event our plans work out and to sow the seed that Shastri had better get here first.

As chance would have it I'm seeing B. K. Nehru at dinner tonight. If he raises the question I propose to take the same line unless you see objection.

*McL  
says OK*

RWK

SECRET



~~SECRET~~

August 25, 1965

McGB:

Here's Bowles' report on his talk with Shastri (New Delhi 371 attached). Bowles just couldn't pin him down on a date, though Shastri seemed interested in coming.

The day's other interesting development on the Pak-Indian front is Moscow's neutral stand on Kashmir (Moscow 572 attached). The Soviets are anxious to be in a position to pick up any ripe apples that may fall from the Pak tree as a result of the current US-Pak blow, so they obviously don't want to be put in a position to back down on previous support for India. However, they may welcome the chance to show the Indians they can't take Moscow for granted (a familiar tune!)

This will be a blow to India and may further improve (as did the Chicom attack) our position in New Delhi. Unfortunately, it may harden Ayub's position because he'll see this as his policy paying off. Of course, that all depends on how far events push Moscow. Right now, the Soviets can risk a Pravda article to exploit the situation without committing themselves too far.

HHS

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-18-03

*Shastri Visit*  
*X Kashmir*  
35

CONFIDENTIAL

August 19, 1965

Mac -

Liz Carpenter told me Mrs. Johnson would appear at the opening of the Nehru Memorial Exhibition, October 14th at the Smithsonian. When I passed the word to B. K. Nehru, I stuck in "and if you can produce your PM for it, we even think we can produce the President."

He asked me if Mann's words to him yesterday about WH interest were Mann's and mine or the President's? I told him flatly that the top was interested. While I knew all the problems, I'd add my own personal view that the way of wisdom was for the two men to establish a personal relationship soonest. Nuff said.

RWK

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-18-03



SECRET - DRAFT #2

37 file  
August 12, 1965

NEW DELHI

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR

*Shastri Visit*

Given L. K. Jha's feeler to you, and groundwork laid by B. K. Nehru, we quite agree it desirable get Shastri's temperature reading on possible visit here in October.

FYI President receptive to Shastri visit once aid bill passed, but does not wish to decide finally or issue formal invitation unless clear indication Shastri will accept. END FYI.

Therefore suggest you take line that we regard Shastri as having standing offer visit here in fall, once aid bill behind us, as President clearly indicated in April letter. You might state as your own opinion that such meeting clearly desirable and mutually beneficial in view of number of US/Indian issues which could be profitably discussed. However, there is natural concern in Washington lest issuing new invitation before exploring whether visit mutually convenient might result in embarrassment both sides.

You should also be sure to note that rescheduling Ayub visit sometime in fall also under consideration, but that we regard Shastri visit as entirely separate enterprise.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date 12-18-03

~~SECRET~~

38  
August 11, 1965  
*Shastri  
x Ayub Khan*

Mac -

I see every merit in an October Shastri visit (between his parliament sessions), both because he can't get the aid he needs without coming and because this would give us a lever to get Ayub here too.

Why not sell this to the President as a two-stage proposition? Let's tell both informally that LBJ would be happy to formally reinvite them if they were interested:

- A. We could authorize Bowles quickly to do so, as he's asked to see Shastri ~~shortly~~ (alternatively we could wait and see if Shastri himself is as interested as LK Jha was).
- B. Then we could tell Ayub privately that Shastri had picked up earlier postponed invite and was coming sometime in October. We'd be happy to re-invite Ayub too; in fact, since he was originally invited first, we'd be glad to have him first. Best time would be early September before pledging session.

However, my favorite India expert cavils at using a Shastri visit so explicitly as leverage on Ayub. She favors treating Paks and Indians quite separately, as sound policy both in this case and in general. Let's not be too clever, she says. But I worry lest actual announcement of a Shastri visit hit Ayub the wrong way, simply convincing him even more that we've switched to a straight pro-India policy, and thus leading him to dig in harder.

At any rate, why not try this on the President? Shall I do a memo? This gambit would also serve to discourage trips to Pakistan, which on past performance have all been flops (Ayub ends up convincing us more than we convince him).

RWK

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date 12-18-03



SECRET

Mac -

April 27, 1965

Since Lodge's visit may be an excellent chance to do a quick repair job, I've gone overboard on a friendly private pitch.

I've focussed almost wholly on the aid argument, not just because Lodge can handle it best but because it's the best one for Shastri. It also indirectly reminds him of how important US aid really is to India.

Unless Lodge can say something that sounds like the inside story he won't be credible. So I've tossed in the press leak and Bokaro angles.

RWK

SECRET

*RWK draft reviewed  
& sent 4/28/65*

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *g*, NARA, Date *12-19-03*

*Shastri Visit  
X India*

39  
—

~~SECRET~~

April 21, 1965

Mac -

I thought I could be more candid if I wrote the visit post-mortem to you, for passing on. It's hard to write directly "Mr. President, we weren't exactly wise."

RWK

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-18-03

40

file

Shastri Visit  
Khyak Visit



40a

~~SECRET~~

Mac -

April 21, 1965

Since the inevitable furor over postponing Ayub and Shastri now seems to be dying down, here's a post mortem on the exercise.

I may be a pollyanna, but I still see more smoke than fire here. It was inevitable that the simple fact of disinviting Ayub and Shastri simultaneously would cause a to-do, especially in India, because it necessarily bracketed the Indians with the misbehaving Paks.

But the real question is whether the exercise will leave lasting scars. We won't really know for months, perhaps. However, disinviting Ayub seems to have shaken him (though the Indian stink about disinviting Shastri too softens the blow and mutes the lesson). The Paks, who probably see the blow as directed mainly at them, are lying low and letting the Indians get themselves in trouble.

The Indians are showing their injured pride in many ways. Shastri is saying nice things about the Soviets (but partly because he's going to Moscow shortly). We've suffered a setback here, though I doubt it's as serious as Bowles thinks in his 2970 (attached). But there may also be longer term merit in letting the Indians know we can't be taken for granted either.

Could we have softened the blow by handling things a bit differently? Frankly, and with the wisdom of hindsight--yes but not much:

a. We could have dampened the Indian reaction by not disinviting both simultaneously. Because we worried mostly about Ayub, we ended up hitting Shastri harder and with, as Indians saw it, far less cause. This also muted the signal to Ayub, and obscured our case to the US press. Finally, Ayub got a day more notice than Shastri (and may even have been tipped off by Rusk's talk with Shoaib on 8 April). I honestly underestimated the Indian sense of bewilderment and hurt, and State and I should have argued harder for delaying a while (if we didn't tell Ayub we'd disinvite Shastri too, there would have been no risk of leak).

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 12-18-03

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

b. We didn't have time to work out a graceful joint pitch that would stick. The nine day delay deprived us of maneuver room. The President gave us the word on 5 April, but Rusk asked delay till he could get back from Tehran. He returned 10 April, but didn't hit the President till after the weekend. We didn't get the Ayub letter out till late 14 April; then waited on Shastri till we heard from Ayub. See Tab B for the bidding.

c. The leak on 15 April then forced our hand. We simply had to get agreed announcements cleared in three capitals before disaster hit. This added to the impression of haste and was extra hard on the Indians.

Given all the circumstances, however, I don't think we were more brusque than necessary. The letters were frank and friendly. Our Ambassadors said the right thing. It was really the timing which hurt, plus the fact that we couldn't publicize our worry lest their coming now could cost them plenty on the Hill. So everybody focussed on our sensitivity about Vietnam.

Now that we've taken our short term lumps, the best thing is to let the issue die and focus on the longer run impact. This affair can still end up a net plus if we play it right: (a) it reminds our friends that we too have feelings--especially about Vietnam; (b) Ayub got the signal, though we may need to remind him; and (c) the Indians too will end up a bit worried. But we do have a problem here. Unseemly haste or new aid gestures would be bad, but a friendly LBJ letter designed to smooth Shastri's ruffled feathers might be useful in a week or so (enough before he goes to Moscow on 12 May that we don't look forced).

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~



406

~~SECRET~~

Tab B

1. The final instructions disinviting Ayub and then Shastri are seriatim at Tab B. Of course, I don't know what the President finally told Rusk, but his 1143 told McConaughy we were going to approach Shastri along the same lines too, and that Ayub could be told. As to reconsideration Rusk said "if Ayub is badly upset. . . and takes a very hard line, you should advise him that you will report his views to Washington. But you should give him no encouragement that Washington will be persuaded to reverse its position."

2. Ayub's one big concern was whether Shastri was being postponed too. McConaughy naturally told him and commented that this was what saved the day.

3. Rusk's first cable, 2155, to Bowles did not give leeway for reconsideration if Shastri balked. Bowles urgently pled for a new brief in his 2920. Rusk held up a day till we saw whether Ayub balked, but when McConaughy reported Ayub's acceptance, the die was cast. Rusk told Bowles to go ahead without delay.

Relevant cables are attached.

Att: To Karachi 1143  
To Karachi 1145  
To New Delhi 2155  
To New Delhi 2161  
To New Delhi 2162

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By g, NARA, Date 12-18-03

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

41  
April 20, 1965  
*Shastri Ayub*

Mac -

Tuesday lunch. While the Paks are lying reasonably low (probably because postponement of visit shook them), the delayed Indian reaction has set in. The Indians, initially baffled at the bolt from the blue, have all too quickly grasped that our real reason was to chasten Ayub and that we threw Shastri in for balance. Naturally, they resent this. Playing to the galleries, Foreign Minister Swaran Singh (a fool) has said that Shastri might not come at all, or at any rate only at his convenience.

But without being too defensive, I persist in thinking these short-term reactions will pass quickly, while the residual feeling that neither Pakistan nor India can take us for granted will net out a plus.

Much will depend on the line we take now. I'd like to see us quietly clue the Paks that US unhappiness with them was actually a large factor (we have very reliable evidence that certain key Paks think it really was Vietnam). As for the Indians, I'd urge we use the line you and I put in side wire to Chet, i.e. that time isn't ripe because a lot of homework needs to be done first.

RWK

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 10-418 (#118)  
By id, NARA, Date 11-17-10



*Shastri Visit*  
*X Ayub Visit*

~~SECRET~~

42

MEMORANDUM FOR

April 16, 1965

THE PRESIDENT

All things considered, deferral of Ayub/Shastri visits went off quite well. We're inclined to feel Ayub got the word, and was quite big league about it. Naturally Ayub's main concern was that we disinvite Shastri too, and at the same time. Bowles didn't connect with Shastri, but latter's chief assistant was unhappy chiefly about the bracketing of India with Pakistan.

Fortunately, we got the public statements organized just in time to offset the unfortunate last minute leak. The Washington Post had the story yesterday but Jim Greenfield got them to hold off. The NY Times got it too late last night to confirm for today's papers. Rusk is most distressed about the leak and investigating, but no good leads yet.

We can expect plenty of press attention and some hostile editorials on lateness of postponement and speculation as to why. Were we sore because of Pak and Indian behavior? We're lying low, not talking to press, and letting the story blow over, but there may even be some good in the inevitable press speculation about Pakistan's recent behavior (so long as it can't be tied directly to the USG). We don't intend to be apologetic in any way.

It will take a bit longer before we can tell whether our Pak and Indian friends absorbed the lesson. We're looking at later ways to insure they do, and to soften both up before they come in the fall. At risk of being tabbed again an Indian-lover, I'll say that Shastri got the short end of the stick, since India necessarily seems to be lumped with Pakistan as a bad boy. But both will hopefully reflect on the moral that Uncle Sam should not just be regarded as a cornucopia of goodies, regardless of what they do or say.

R. W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-8-03*

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

April 5, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE PRESIDENT

Mac Bundy asked me, as a fresh mind not involved in the Pearson exercise, to have a hard private look at how we could turn off the Ayub and Shastri visits if necessary. Since he is away briefly and because time presses if we do want to turn off Ayub, I am sending it to you directly.

R. W. Komer

SECRET

43  
1) ~~Shastri~~  
2) Shastri Visit  
+ Ayub Visit



43a

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 12-18-03

SECRET

April 5, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Postponing Ayub and Shastri Visits. We could construct a fairly good case for "postponing" (to "cancel" would be too rude) the Ayub and Shastri visits, and even turning this to our diplomatic advantage. There seem to be three alternatives:

A. Postpone both visits indefinitely. By far the tougher problem is Ayub's 25-30 April visit, mainly because it's less than three weeks away and most arrangements are already laid on.

The only means of getting Ayub to live with postponement would be a personal message from you as his host, either by letter or special emissary. One trouble is that Ayub is in Moscow till 11 April and we don't want to rub him the wrong way while he's in the enemy camp.

You could give Ayub several cogent reasons why a visit is better held off (perhaps until fall). Most compelling might be to tell him frankly that April seems more and more unpropitious because it is precisely the time of the big annual fight over our aid bill. Ayub might not realize how much trouble you will have in trying to get aid for Pakistan, given its recent behavior. The very fact of his coming to Washington so soon after his Peking and Moscow trips would lead to a flurry of press attention, which would inevitably spotlight the differences between US and Pak policies. Moreover, Ayub once here would have to answer a lot of hostile public questions about Pak policies, e. g. Pak views on Vietnam, which would only add to the difficulty. So an April visit here would simply highlight that the US is still paying the bills while Pakistan goes its merry way. It might lead to restrictive amendments in the aid bill, as it already has with Nasser and Sukarno. You still want a friendly relationship with Pakistan, but must feel your way very carefully. Thus, all things considered, you feel it wiser to postpone visit till a more propitious time. You are saying the same to Shastri.

Even with the above explanation, a last minute postponement would be recognized by Ayub as an unfriendly noise unless we accompanied it by enough reassurances and concrete gestures (i. e. a promise of the 24 F-104s the Paks want, or assurances of continued aid). But such gestures at this time would convey precisely the wrong signal.

SECRET

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2.

To buy Ayub off would only convince him that Bhutto is right and that Pakistan can both play the Chicom game and keep getting all it needs from Uncle Sugar. So I'd let Ayub ponder the thinness of our excuse; he isn't going to cut off a \$500 million nose to spite his face.

A second difficulty is that, whether or not Ayub personally could live with our story, the press of both countries would inevitably speculate. They'd talk up bad relations, even if we worked out an agreed cover story that both Presidents agreed to postponement because of the press of other urgent business. We at least could live with this, however.

Shastri would be easier to handle, because he isn't coming till June anyway. You could use the same aid bill argument, and also plead subsequent US need to rethink the problem of aid to India. Thus a visit sometime later, perhaps in the fall, would be more profitable. Shastri would be unhappy (he doesn't like to travel and was counting on coming here at same time he went to London for the annual Commonwealth session), but he'd be manageable so long as Ayub was disinvited too.

Though postponing Shastri would cause less public speculation here or in India than postponing Ayub, simply because the visit is further away, key Indians would worry lest the US were retreating to neo-isolationism or shifting to a "plague on both your houses" attitude. There's also risk in not talking nuclear proliferation with Shastri soon. If the Indians think US support is cooling, this could powerfully reinforce their incentive to go nuclear.

B. Have Ayub but postpone Shastri. In theory this would suit our real purposes, assuming that we want to blow the whistle on Ayub but are not yet ready to talk turkey with Shastri. The trouble is that we couldn't explain to the Indians how we planned to lower the boom on Ayub; to do so might lead Shastri to get overconfident and expect too much. Also, the Indians might leak to discomfit the Paks. But postponing Shastri while seeing Ayub would sit very poorly with the Indians unless we could tell them the real reasons. They would conclude that we were shifting back to our old pro-Pak policy at the very time when the Paks were misbehaving most. India would all too likely

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3.

draw the conclusion that the way to get along with the US was to do the same.

As for Ayub, he'd draw precisely the same conclusion unless we gave him the business while he was here. If we did, and if it leaked (as is all too likely and in some ways desirable) then it would be easier to postpone the Shastri visit right afterwards.

C. Stick with both visitors, but get word to both of the dim view we'd take of misbehavior while here. We could do a lot to make sure neither pulled a Pearson. Ayub is our immediate problem; we have more time with Shastri.

Rusk is en route now to Teheran CENTO meeting (7-8 April). While there, he could privately tell our best Pak friend, Finance Minister Shoaib: (1) how poorly we viewed Pearson's undiplomatic behavior; (2) how unhappy you are with Pakistan's drift from its alliances at the very time when it's asking even more aid from us; (3) how Ayub's visit could really end up a disaster if he came here and lectured you on Vietnam and the peaceloving Chicoms as well as on India's perfidy, or made any public noises to this effect; therefore, (4) you asked Rusk to get Shoaib's personal advice on whether postponement might not be wise. Shoaib would almost certainly advise against, but even more certainly pass the word to Ayub to behave. If this worked, we could use the same line on Shastri later (telling him gently that Ayub behaved and we expected the same from him).

There are other ways of getting the word to Ayub, for use if the Rusk gambit didn't work (or to reinforce it). In fact, I see merit in such a signal in any event, to soften up Ayub before he comes. A little discreet press backgrounding about our disillusionment with Pak antics would also help.

-----

My own parochial instinct is to favor going ahead with the Ayub visit while holding up till then on whether to postpone Shastri. We're probably too close to 25 April (when Ayub arrives in NY) to permit graceful postponement.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

4.

But I'm operating on the assumption that we're going to use the occasion for a forthright confrontation, which is long overdue. Unless we convince Ayub that he can't have his cake and eat it too, we're going to lose Pakistan (attached is a note on my concerns). If your own sense is that the time is not yet ripe for this, given all our other problems of the moment, then I'd vote for postponement. In this case Rusk could pass a stronger message via Shoaib (Ayub doesn't get back from Moscow till 12 April, or Rusk could deliver it himself while out in the area). It could be followed up by a letter delivered by a special emissary (though I worry lest an emissary merely draw undue attention to what we'd prefer to keep low key).

This could be an effective, though blunt and risky, way of letting Ayub know we can't be trifled with and softening him up for a later session, while putting him on good behavior in the interim.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~



March 18, 1965

McGB:

Here's my re-write of LBJ's invitation to Shastri. RWK approved, and we checked it out with State.

State's caveat against release can be handled by Ambassador Bowles when he gives this letter to Shastri.

HHS

44 *file*  
*Shastri*  
*Visit*  
*X India*

44a  
file

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am happy to learn from Ambassador Bowles that you have accepted my invitation to visit the United States. Mrs. Johnson and I are looking forward to seeing you and Mrs. Shastri in Washington on June 2 and 3.

Anticipation of your visit revives fond memories of our journey to India in 1961. But it also underscores how markedly conditions have changed both for us personally and for our nations since then.

I have embarked on a program here to make America's promise a reality for all her people. I am deeply aware that our own hard work to solve our problems is a crucial ingredient in our continuing effort to help others with theirs. You too are engrossed in planning the next chapter of your program to bring Indians hope for a better life. We both feel the challenge of reaching to meet a nation's most pressing needs and to fulfill its highest aspirations, while providing for its essential security.

So we have much in common, and I look forward to sharing thoughts with you on these and other important problems we both face.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Lal Bahadur Shastri  
Prime Minister of India  
New Delhi, India

LBJ:State:HHS:tmt 3/18/65



CONFIDENTIAL

Mac -

2/ Shastri Visit 45  
x India  
x Pak  
x Ayub Visit  
January 11, 1965

Here are cables authorizing Ayub and Shastri visits, which State anxious to get out in time for McConaughy to clue Ayub when he sees him on 14th. Since Ayub is going to Peiping and Moscow (dates still unspecified), we also don't want to appear to be making a last minute counter-effort. If we invite Ayub, we have to get word to Shastri too. LBJ has of course OKed both.

The only problem of substance lies in last para. of Ayub cable, which is too fruity for me. I don't want to spook Ayub, but I do think we have to get across discreetly that it's up to him to revalidate our association if he expects to keep getting \$350-500 million per annum. We can use other channels to get this over before he comes, but we shouldn't start off by implying we intend to keep giving him everything he asks for. This will only encourage him to think he can come bore our leader with his complaints. My surgery on cable reduces this risk.

RWK

CONFIDENTIAL

Att: WH-123  
WH-124

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-18-03

SECRET

46  
June 16, 1964  
*Shastri Visit*  
*X Cyprus - I/P*

Mac -

I cautioned Chet not to push India air package, since my memo carried it. My thought was to let LBJ raise it, so Chet wouldn't appear as special pleader. But LBJ seemed pre-occupied with other matters. I do hope you can raise it at lunch.

LBJ said of course he couldn't invite Shastri before election but Chet could say President would look forward to seeing Shastri afterward if he got re-elected (sic).

On Inonu, Rusk's brief is as follows:

1. Inonu's proposal to stay around Wednesday and Thursday impossible. Papandreou would buck.

2. Next alternative is compressed schedule. Let Inonu arrive WH at 4 p.m. Monday for honors, then Turk reception 6-8. On Tuesday 9:30 meeting with LBJ (but he has Congress breakfast and YMCA), 11:00 with Rusk, 12:30 WH lunch, 4:30 communique meeting, 6:00 or so Inonu goes to NY to be out of way and can stay there a few days at UN.

3. Better alternative is send LBJ plane so Inonu can sleep on board. Must we then do same for Papandreou?

4. Postpone to following Monday. Ball strongly agin, however, because he thinks better to get Inonu tied down to Greek-Turk talks first, so we can then tell Papandreou Turks signed on, and not let him use that argument to stall. My own sense is that Turks already want talks, and Greeks are ones to beat up first but I could be very wrong.

If you'll clue me after lunch I'll work out details with State.

RWK

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By ja, NARA, Date 12-18-03

SECRET

*Shastri Visit  
Indo Pak*

47

Mac -

June 12, 1964

You should be aware that Indo-Pak relations have entered new period of maneuver with release of Abdullah and Nehru's death. Both Ayub and now Shastri have made very conciliatory public noises. They'll get together at London Commonwealth Conference in July, and then may meet together with Abdullah in August.

We want to help nurse this along, but quietly for a while. If LBJ weighed in just now, Paks would promptly try to push us out in front again (in fact our "cool" treatment may have been a major factor in bringing Ayub around).

So I see as best holding our fire for a while (not inviting Shastri or Ayub). If and when situation warrants, then is time to jump in. But so far both sides are doing well without our help.

RWK

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-18-03



To: RWK

1/15/66

48<sup>b</sup>

What are our views?

*Left*

McG B



MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

In a previous memorandum, I recommended that we give to the Government of India a national library to be built in New Delhi primarily from the accumulated fund of rupees arising from PL-480 transactions.

With the death of Prime Minister Shastri, I would like to urge that this offer be made as soon as possible as a memorial to the late Prime Minister. This offer, consistent with your State of the Union stress on international education, would receive considerable approval in India at this time.

Léonard H. Marks

To Mr. Thorne & Rand.

Give me your news

49  
Shastri Vasil

Shastri Dind

January 10, 19 66  
at

Tashkent (USSR)



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

43

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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G ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ JAN 6

P  
GU SUBJ: SHASTRI VISIT

USIA REF EMBTEL 1668

NSC  
O WE SUGGEST LEONARD MARKS AND CHARLES FRANKEL SHOULD MEET  
CPR SHASTRI ESPECIALLY VIEW IMPORTANCE ENTIRE USIS COMPLEX OF  
SY INFORMATIONAL-CULTURAL AND EDUCATION PROGRAMS HERE AND PROXIMITY OF  
VISITS  
TO TIMING OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S OVERSEAS EDUCATION PROPOSALS.

RSR  
AMONG JOURNALISTS WE SUGGEST WALTER LIPPMAN, JAMES RSTON,  
MARQUIS CHILDS, KENNETH CRAWFORD, ALFRED FRIENDLY AND PHILLIP  
POTTER. CHILDS AND CRAWFORD WERE BOTH AMERICAN SPECIALISTS HERE  
ABOUT YEAR AGO.  
BOWLES

003827

966 JAN 6 AM 9 38

BUNDY-SMITH  
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JOHNSON  
KEENE  
KROMER  
MOODY

8

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines

By pc, NARA, Date 12-19-03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1/4/66 51

January 4, 1966

Sh Visit

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am very pleased that you and Mrs. Shastri will visit Washington early in February and am looking forward with much anticipation to meeting you both then. Your visit comes at a most appropriate moment in the history of our two countries and will give us a valuable opportunity to get to know each other and learn more about the problems we both face. Our two countries have much in common, and we shall have much to discuss.

Secretary Freeman and I were very pleased with our discussions about your short and long-term agricultural problems with Food Minister Subramaniam. While firm commitments were neither asked nor given, he has enhanced our confidence in your determination to cope not only with India's grave agricultural difficulties but with its larger development needs. We are glad that you sent him here.

I should also like to take this occasion to thank you for your thoughtful message at the time of my recent illness. I do appreciate your kind wishes and warm expression of concern.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending season's greetings to you and Mrs. Shastri.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Lal Bahadur Shastri  
Prime Minister of India  
New Delhi, India

LBJ:State:RWK:mtt 1/4/66

JAN 5 1966

LBJ  
To  
Shastri  
1/5/66

Copy to Freeman & Delivers  
to Subramaniam



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

52

January 3, 1965

TO: Mr. Komer

FROM: Bromley Smith

The attached is for your immediate attention. Please have your secretary keep Miss Simpson of my staff (145-697) informed of all action taken.

JAN 3 1966

*Shirley Vasil*





S/S 20908

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

RECEIVED  
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

1965 <sup>Jan 1</sup> 1 11 53  
December 31, 1965

1. Log 52a  
2. Kowal  
3. Act.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Invitation to Indian Prime  
Minister Shastri for U.S.  
Visit from the President

Enclosed is the text of the letter of invitation from the President to Prime Minister Shastri of India which for reasons of timing was transmitted telegraphically to our Embassy in New Delhi for delivery to the Prime Minister. We believe it desirable that a signed letter be sent through the pouch for delivery by the Embassy to the Prime Minister.

*John P. Walsh*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Draft letter to  
Minister Shastri.
2. Deptel 1133 to New Delhi.

JAN 3 1966

52<sup>b</sup>

DRAFT LETTER

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am very pleased that you and Mrs. Shastri will visit Washington early in February and am looking forward with much anticipation to meeting you both then. Your visit comes at a most appropriate moment in the history of our two countries and will give us a valuable opportunity to get to know each other and learn more about the problems we both face. Our two countries have much in common, and we shall have much to discuss.

Secretary Freeman and I were very pleased with our discussions about your short- and long-term agricultural problems with Food Minister Subramaniam. While firm commitments were neither asked nor given, he has enhanced our confidence in your determination to cope not only with India's grave agricultural difficulties but with its larger development needs. We are glad that you sent him here.

His Excellency

Lal Bahadur Shastri,

Prime Minister of India.



I should also like to take this occasion to thank you for your thoughtful message at the time of my recent illness. I do appreciate your kind wishes and warm expression of concern.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending season's greetings to you and Mrs. Shastri.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
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AGR

Embassy should deliver soonest following message from

President to Prime Minister Shastri:

QUOTE Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am very pleased that you and Mrs. Shastri will visit Wash-  
ington early in February and am looking forward with much anticipa-  
tion to meeting/~~you~~ both then. Your visit comes at a most appro-  
priate moment in the history of our two countries and will give us  
a valuable opportunity to get to know each other and learn more  
about the problems we both face. Our two countries have much in  
common, and we shall have much to discuss.

Secretary Freeman and I were very pleased with our discussions  
about your short and long term agricultural problems with Food  
Minister Subramaniam. While ~~few~~ firm commitments were neither  
asked nor given, he has enhanced our confidence in your determination  
to cope not only with India's grave agricultural difficulties but  
with its larger development needs. We are glad that you sent him  
here.

/I should

Drafted by:

NEA:SOA:HG Wing:dnm 12/22/65

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances:

SOA - Miss Laise  
S/CPR - Amb. Hand

P - Mr. Sieverts  
NEA/P - Mr. Brown

White House - Mr. Komer  
S/S - Mr. Gordon

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I ~~am~~ should also like to take this occasion to thank you for your thoughtful message at the time of my recent illness. I do appreciate your kind wishes and warm expression of concern.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending season's greetings to you and Mrs. Shastri.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

White House does not plan release of text of message.

Exempt.

END

RUSK

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



To: *Bess Abell* 1/4/66  
*mess - some of these names might be useful for dinner. Phil R*

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

10-4

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1668  
STATE GRNC  
BT

*Shastri*

~~BUNDICK~~  
~~BATOR~~  
~~BOWLER~~  
~~BOWMAN~~  
~~CHASE~~  
~~COOPER~~  
~~LESSUP~~  
~~JOHNSON~~  
~~KIRBY~~  
~~KROMER~~  
~~MOODY~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE JANUARY 3.

REF: DEPT A-247, DEPTELS 1113 AND 1145  
EMBTELS 1606 AND 1626

SHASTRI VISIT

1. SCHEDULE OUTLINED IN DEPTTEL 114 SOUNDS FINE.
2. FOLLOWING ARE ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS:
  - A. WE SUGGEST POSSIBILITY OF SHASTRI APPEARING ON TELEVISION. OUR FIRST CHOICE WOULD BE "FACE THE NATION". ALSO SUGGEST INCLUSION JAMES RESTON ON PANEL.
  - B. VISIT TO BELTSVILLE AS MEANS OF HIGHLIGHTING U.S.-SUPPORTED INDIAN EFFORTS TO OVERHAUL INDIAN AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM.
  - C. PARTICIPATION SOME APPROPRIATE DOCKSIDE CEREMONY IN BALTIMORE IN CONNECTION WITH ACCELERATED FOOD GRAIN SHIPMENTS TO INDIA, SUCH AS COMMISSIONING OR RE-NAMING OF SHIP CARRYING P.L. 480 WHEAT.
  - D. EXPLORE POSSIBILITY OF HONORARY DEGREE FOR SHASTRI FROM COLUMBIA OR IF THIS NOT POSSIBLE FROM OTHER DISTINGUISHED UNIVERSITY NEW YORK AREA. WE WOULD HOPE CEREMONY WOULD HIGHLIGHT SALIENT FEATURES OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S PROGRAM ASSIST DEVELOPING NATIONS IN EDUCATION.
3. WILL SEND ASAP SUGGESTION ON PROGRAM FOR MRS. SHASTRI. SHE WILL NEED INTERPRETER AND MEA IS LOOKING INTO MATTER. SUGGEST POSSIBILITY OF MRS. HEIMSATH, AN INDIAN LADY MARRIED TO AMERICAN PROFESSOR BELIEVED TO BE TEACHING AT A WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY.

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-2- 1668, JANUARY 3, FROM NEW DELHI

4. LIST OF TOPICS LIKELY TO BE RAISED IN DISCUSSIONS WILL BE SUBMITTED IN SEPARATE MESSAGE.

5. FOLLOWING IS LIST OF OFFICIALS AND PROMINENT PERSONS PRIMIN MIGHT USEFULLY MEET:

A. OFFICIALS OTHER THAN APPROPRIATE OFFICERS IN DEPT.

VICE PRESIDENT. HUMPHREY

PAGE 3 RUSBAE 3

SECRETARY FREEMAN

SECRETARY MCNAMARA

SECRETARY FOWLER

AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG

SARGENT SHRIVER

GLENN T. SEABORG

DAVID BELL

WILLIAM FOSTER

B. OTHERS WHOM PRIMIN MIGHT MEET INFORMALLY OR AT SOCIAL FUNCTIONS:

APPROPRIATE MEMBERS OF SENATE AND HOUSE, INCLUDING KEY MEMBERS OF RECENT CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS TO INDIA.

APPROPRIATE MEMBERS OF AID ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE.

SENATOR COOPER, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO INDIA

AMBASSADOR ELLSWORTH BUNKER

AMBASSADOR GEORGE V. ALLEN

AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH

APPROPRIATE TOP LEVEL REPRESENTATIVES FROM BUSINESS COMMUNITY.

EDWARD MASON, PROFESSOR HARVARD

PAGE 4 RUSBAE 3

MARTIN LUTHER KING, WHO MIGHT DISCUSS CIVIL RIGHTS PROGRESS AND DISCUSS THE GANDHIAN INFLUENCE ON HIS MOVEMENT.

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-3- 1668, JANUARY 3, FROM NEW DELHI

DR. NORMAN BROWN, CHAIRMAN OF THE DEPT. OF SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF PENN. AND CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INDIAN STUDIES.

NORMAN COUSINS, EDITOR, SATURDAY REVIEW WHO HAS LONG HAD AN INTEREST IN INDIA.

PAUL SHERBERT, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, INDIA COUNCIL OF THE ASIAN SOCIETY.

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, III, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION.

HENRY T. HEALD PRESIDENT, FORD FOUNDATION

MCGEORGE BUNDY, PRESIDENT-DESIGNATE, FORD FOUNDATION

VERA M. DEAN, PROFESSOR AND WRITER

J.R. WIGGINS, EDITOR, WASHINGTON POST

DAVID LILIENTHAL

JAMES PATTON, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL FARMERS UNION

ALBERT MAYER, ARCHITECT AND PIONEER IN INDIAN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF NEHRU) FORMERLY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT ADVISOR TO GOVT. OF UP.

MRS. JOHN F. KENNEDY

FREDERICK SEITZ, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE

JAMES WEBB, NASA

LELAND J. HAWORTH NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

DONALD F. HORNIG, PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISOR

JEROME WIESNER, MIT

WALTER CISLER, DETROIT EDISON

KERMIT GORDON, BROOKINGS

DILLON RIPLEY

WALTER AND/OR VICTOR REUTHER

BOWLES  
ST

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54

DEPARTMENT OF STATE REFERENCE SLIP				DATE		
TO:	Name or Title	Organ. Symbol	Room No.	Bldg.	Initials	Date
1.	Mr. Komer	White House	Rm. 372			
2.						
3.						
4.						
5.						
	Approval	Initial for Clearance		Per Conversation		
	As Requested	Necessary Action		Prepare Reply		
	Comment	Note and Forward		See Me		
	For Your Information	Note and Return		Signature		
<p>REMARKS OR ADDITIONAL ROUTING</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">As per your conversation with Amb. Hare, attached is the paper which we had prepared for yesterday's meeting which was not held.</p>						
<b>FROM:</b> (Name and Org. Symbol) David T. Schneider    NEA:SOA				<b>ROOM NO. &amp; BLDG.</b> 5251    NS	<b>PHONE NO.</b> 182x3730	



54a  
~~SECRET~~

SHASTRI VISIT

*Shastri  
Visit*

POSSIBLE SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION IN WASHINGTON

1. The Political Relationship Between India and the United States

The natural tie between the world's two largest democracies - problems and progress in each country - what constitutes a sound basis for mutual co-operation.

2. India's Food Situation

Current status - the international relief effort - prospects for achieving the goal of self-sufficiency - achievements to date - the Subramaniam talks reviewed - the population problem.

3. Economic Development

Our global aid policy - Indian self-help measures.

4. The Chinese Threat in Asia

China's intentions toward India - China's relations with Pakistan - the situation in southeast Asia - India's role in containing Communist Chinese expansionism - the general questions of India's security.

5. Peace on the Subcontinent

Progress at Tashkent and subsequently - Indian steps to secure the peace - Pakistan's security problem - the question of troop withdrawals - Kashmir.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By pc, NARA, Date 12-18-03

~~SECRET~~

DEC 28 1965

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

65

41

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Action

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*Shanti unit*

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BATOR  
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CHASE  
COOPER  
JESSUP  
JOHNSON  
KEENE  
KOMER  
MOODY*

ZNY CCCCC

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P FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

USIA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1601

NSC INFO ZEN/AMCONCUL BOMBAY UNN

INR ZEN/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA UNN

CIA ZEN/AMCONSUL MADRAS UNN

NSA STATE GRNC

BT

RSR LIMITED OFFICIAL USE DEC 27

AT ITS DECEMBER 26 MEETING, CONGRESS WORKING COMMITTEE DECIDED HOLD ANNUAL CONGRESS SESSION AT JAIPUR FEB 10-12 INSTEAD OF JAN 18-21 AS FIXED EARLIER. SESSION WILL BE PRECEDED BY MEETING OF WORKING COMMITTEE ON FEB 09. IN BREAK WITH CUSTOMARY PRACTICE, THIS TO TAKE PLACE IN DELHI RATHER THAN AT CONGRESS SESSION SITE. CONGRESS GENERAL SECRETARY EXPLAINED TO EMBOFF THIS HAD BEEN DECIDED UPON ORDER SUIT PRIMIN'S CONVENIENCE "AS HE WILL JUST HAVE RETURNED FROM US DAY OR SO EARLIER."

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 1242

COMMENT: BOTH WORKING COMMITTEE MEETING AND CONGRESS SESSION FOLLOWING IT ARE "MUSTS" FOR PRIMIN AND WILL PROVIDE HIM OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ACCOUNT OF HIS WASHINGTON VISIT TO PARTY BEFORE OPENING OF PARLIAMENT SCHEDULED FOR FEB 14. BOWLES  
BT

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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KORNER  
MOORE

87

CONFIDENTIAL

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*Shastri visit*

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1965 DEC 27 PM 3 46

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date 12-18-03

INR REF: DEPTTEL 1115

NSA 1. DURING MY VISIT WITH SHASTRI ON CHRISTMAS EVE I WAS  
CPR UNSUCCESSFUL IN PERSUADING HIM TO EXTEND HIS VISIT. HE ARRIVES  
SY IN NEW YORK THE EVENING OF MONDAY THE 31ST, GOES TO WASHINGTON  
ON THE MORNING OF FEBRUARY FIRST, EXPECTS TO RETURN TO NEW YORK  
RSR LATE THURSDAY AFTERNOON, FEBRUARY 3RD, AND TAKE OFF FOR INDIA  
THE EVENING OF FEBRUARY 4TH.

HE EXPRESSED GENUINE DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE SHORTNESS OF  
HIS STAY BUT EXPLAINED THAT THE ANNUAL SESSION OF CONGRESS PARTY  
NOW MEETS FEBRUARY 10-12 AND PARLIAMENT MEETS ON FEBRUARY 14TH  
FOR THE CRUCIAL BUDGET SESSION FOR WHICH CONSIDERABLE PREPARATION  
BY HIM WILL BE NECESSARY.

2. EARLIER IN THE DAY L. K. JHA ASKED MY VIEWS ON THE  
ADVISABILITY OF ACCEPTING A PRESS CLUB LUNCHEON INVITATION ON  
ONE OF THE THREE NOONS SHASTRI WILL BE IN WASHINGTON AND ON A  
DINNER TO BE GIVEN BY THE ECONOMIC CLUB OF NEW YORK ON THURSDAY  
THE THIRD.N

A. I ENCOURAGED HIM TO ACCEPT THE PRESS CLUB LUNCHEON  
BUT SAID I REALLY DIDN'T KNOW MUCH ABOUT THE ECONOMIC CLUB.

B. OTHER INVITATIONS IN NEW YORK ARE THE COUNCIL ON  
FOREIGN RELATIONS. THE INDIA BRANCH OF THE ASIA SOCIETY AND THE  
BUSINESS COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING, WHICH IS ANXIOUS  
TO BRING SHASTRI TOGETHER WITH BUSINESS FIRMS INTERESTED IN  
INVESTING IN INDIA. I ASSUME B.K. NEHRU WHO RETURNS HERE THIS  
WEEK WILL WORK THESE THINGS OUT. ADVICE FROM THE DEPARTMENT WILL  
I AM SURE BE WELCOME. PLEASE GIVE ME YOUR THOUGHTS.

3. MRS. SHASTRI TO WHOM MRS. BOWLES TALKED WHILE I SAW THE  
PRIME MINISTER, WANTS TO GO ALONG BUT SHASTRI ENCOURAGED HER TO  
WAIT UNTIL SHE CAN GO FOR A LONGER STAY. WE URGED HER TO COME;  
ITS A 50-50 CHANCE. BOWLES  
BT

*Bob - What do  
you think of this?  
There may be a  
good chance to say  
he might want to  
about Vietnam  
might want to  
negotiate to B.K.  
that this could be  
his crucial test  
if he goes  
through with it.*

CONFIDENTIAL



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

44-S

Origin

NEA

Info

SS

G

P

USIA

NSC

CPR

AGR

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE

1133

DEC 24

12 20 PM '65

Embassy should deliver soonest following message from

President to Prime Minister Shastri:

QUOTE Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am very pleased that you and Mrs. Shastri will visit Washington early in February and am looking forward with much anticipation to meeting/~~you~~ both then. Your visit comes at a most appropriate moment in the history of our two countries and will give us a valuable opportunity to get to know each other and learn more about the problems we both face. Our two countries have much in common, and we shall have much to discuss.

Secretary Freeman and I were very pleased with our discussions about your short and long term agricultural problems with Food Minister Subramaniam. While ~~for~~ firm commitments were neither asked nor given, he has enhanced our confidence in your determination to cope not only with India's grave agricultural difficulties but with its larger development needs. We are glad that you sent him here.

/I should

Drafted by:

NEA:SOA:HGWin:dnm 12/22/65

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances:

SOA - Miss Laise

P - Mr. Sieverts

White House - Mr. Komer

S/CPR - Amb. Hand

NEA/P - Mr. Brown

S/S - Mr. Gordon

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LBJ  
to  
Shastri  
12/24/65

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I ~~am~~ should also like to take this occasion to thank you for your thoughtful message at the time of my recent illness. I do appreciate your kind wishes and warm expression of concern.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending season's greetings to you and Mrs. Shastri.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

White House does not plan release of text of message.

Exempt.

END

RUSK

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Shastri  
visitSENT  
WHCAEEA491  
PP WTE10  
DE WTE 745

DEC 24 03 48

TO : THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: KOMER  
CITE: CAP65899~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

HEREWITH REVISED LETTER TO SHASTRI WITH ADDED SECOND  
PARAGRAPH ON SUBRAMANIAM VISIT. ONE OF THESE DAYS I HOPE  
TO THINK OF THESE THINGS MYSELF. MESSAGE FOLLOWS.

QUOTE DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

I AM VERY PLEASED THAT YOU AND MRS. SHASTRI WILL VISIT  
WASHINGTON EARLY IN FEBRUARY AND AM LOOKING FORWARD WITH  
MUCH ANTICIPATION TO MEETING YOU BOTH THEN. YOUR VISIT  
COMES AT A MOST APPROPRIATE MOMENT IN THE HISTORY OF OUR  
TWO COUNTRIES AND WILL GIVE US A VALUABLE OPPORTUNITY TO  
GET TO KNOW EACH OTHER AND LEARN MORE ABOUT THE PROBLEMS  
WE BOTH FACE. OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE MUCH IN COMMON, AND  
WE SHALL HAVE MUCH TO DISCUSS.

SECRETARY FREEMAN AND I WERE VERY PLEASED WITH OUR DISCUSSIONS  
ABOUT YOUR SHORT AND LONG TERM AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS WITH  
FOOD MINISTER SUBRAMANIAM. WHILE FIRM COMMITMENTS WERE  
NEITHER ASKED NOR GIVEN, HE HAS ENHANCED OUR CONFIDENCE  
IN YOUR DETERMINATION TO COPE NOT ONLY WITH INDIA'S GRAVE  
AGRICULTURAL DIFFICULTIES BUT WITH ITS LARGER DEVELOPMENT  
NEEDS. WE ARE GLAD THAT YOU SENT HIM HERE.

I SHOULD ALSO LIKE TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR THOUGHTFUL  
MESSAGE AT THE TIME OF MY RECENT ILLNESS. I DO APPRECIATE  
YOUR KIND WISHES AND WARM EXPRESSION OF CONCERN.

MRS. JOHNSON JOINS ME IN SENDING SEASON'S GREETINGS TO  
YOU AND MRS. SHASTRI.

SINCERELY, LYNDON B. JOHNSON  
UNQUOTE

DTG: 24/0315Z DEC 1965

- OPR NOTE: 1. CHANGE IN FORMAT (REVERSAL OF FM AND TO LINE)  
WAS PER REQUEST WHSR  
2. HOLD MSG FOR MORNING DELIVERY

PRESERVATION COPY

SENT  
WHCA

DEC 23 23 54

EEB017  
00 WTE10  
DE WTE 741

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FROM KOMER  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP65897

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

STATE PROPOSES FOLLOWING FORMAL LETTER OF INVITE TO SHASTRI.  
YOU DID SAME FOR AYUB.

QUOTE DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

I AM VERY PLEASED THAT YOU AND MRS. SHASTRI WILL VISIT WASHINGTON  
EARLY IN FEBRUARY AND AM LOOKING FORWARD WITH MUCH ANTICIPATION  
TO MEETING YOU BOTH THEN. YOUR VISIT COMES AT A MOST APPROPRIATE  
MOMENT IN THE HISTORY OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND WILL GIVE US  
A VALUABLE OPPORTUNITY TO GET TO KNOW EACH OTHER AND LEARN MORE  
ABOUT THE PROBLEMS WE BOTH FACE. OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE MUCH  
IN COMMON, AND WE SHALL HAVE MUCH TO DISCUSS.

I SHOULD ALSO LIKE TO TAKE THIS OCCASION TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR  
THOUGHTFUL MESSAGE AT THE TIME OF MY RECENT ILLNESS. I DO  
APPRECIATE YOUR KIND WISHES AND WARM EXPRESSION OF CONCERN.

MRS. JOHNSON JOINS ME IN SENDING SEASON'S GREETINGS TO YOU AND  
MRS. SHASTRI.

SINCERELY, LYNDON B. JOHNSON UNQUOTE

DTG: 23/2345Z DEC 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

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86

Origin  
NEA

ACTION: American Embassy NEW DELHI

IMMEDIATE

Info:

Dec 23 4 11 PM '65

SS  
G  
P  
USIA  
NSC  
INR  
CIA  
NSA  
CPR  
SY

In preliminary talk with Ambassador Nehru today re tentative plans for Shastri visit, Ambassador told Dept Shastri could come for only four days. We used opportunity strongly urge he stay in US for longer period. Know you will want take same line when you see Shastri December 24.

We will report fully on meeting in later message.

GR  
Exempt.

End

RUSK

BUNDY-SMITH  
BATOR  
BOWLER  
BOWMAN  
CHASE  
COOPER  
JESSUP  
JOHNSON  
KENNY  
KORNER  
MOODY

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: NEA - William J. Handley

NEA:SOA:RCWing:dms 12/23/65 2625

Clearances:

S/CPR - Mr. King

SOA - Mr. Schneider

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60

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December 23, 1965

FOR PRESIDENT

FROM KOMER

*Revised  
later  
and sent*

State proposes following formal letter of invite to Shastri . You did same for Ayub.

QUOTE Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am very pleased that you and Mrs. Shastri will visit Washington early in February and am looking forward with much anticipation to meeting you both then. Your visit comes at a most appropriate moment in the history of our two countries and will give us a valuable opportunity to get to know each other and learn more about the problems we both face. Our two countries have much in common, and we shall have much to discuss.

I should also like to take this occasion to thank you for your thoughtful message at the time of my recent illness. I do appreciate your kind wishes and warm expression of concern.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending season's greetings to you and Mrs. Shastri.

Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

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Bess Abell

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

12/21

48  
Action

CPR

Info

SS  
NEA  
NSC

RSR

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NNNNVV MJB208A352

RR RUEHC

DE RUSBAE 947 3541105

ZNY CCCCC

R 201030Z

FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC (1546)

STATE GRNC

BT

01.53.43

1965 DEC 20 AM 6 32

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE DECEMBER 20

REF: DEPTEL 1010

1. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING RECEIPT REFTEL EMBOFF DISCUSSED EXCHANGE OF GIFTS DURING FORTHCOMING SHASTRI VISIT WITH SJRENDRA SINH, POINTING OUT DESIRABILITY AVOIDING EXTRAVAGANT EXCHANGE. SINH INDICATED HE WOULD CHECK INTO MATTER.
  2. TODAY SINH SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED MATTER WITH L.K. JHA WHO HAD NOT BEEN VERY INFORMATIVE. MATTER WILL BE RAISED FURTHER WITH AMBASSADOR B.K. NEHRU WHO IS RETURNING NEW DELHI ON CONSULTATION END DECEMBER.
  3. IN GENERAL DISCUSSION OF MATTER WITH SINH, HE DECLINED MAKE ANY SUGGESTION OF SPECIFIC PERSONALIZED TOKEN THAT WOULD HAVE PARTICULAR APPEAL TO SHASTRI. HE SAID HOWEVER THAT MRS. SHASTRI NOW PLANS ACCOMPANY HER HUSBAND AND HE THOUGHT SHE WOULD MOST ENJOY SOMETHING FOR HOUSEHOLD.
  4. WE BELIEVE BOTH SHASTRIS MOST LIKELY BE TOUCHED BY GIFT FOR THEIR CHILDREN WHO RANGE FROM 17 TO 5 YEARS IN AGE. ELECTRIC TRAIN SET FOR ALL CHILDREN COLLECTIVELY, AND WHICH COULD BE ENJOYED BY ALL AGES, WOULD MAKE BIG HIT.
  5. FOR SHASTRI HIMSELF WE SUGGEST BUST OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN AND FOR MRS. SHASTRI SOME ITEM FOR THE HOUSEHOLD OR KNICK KNACK.
  6. SINH REQUESTED ADVICE ON SUITABLE GIFTS TO BE OFFERED AIDES. WE WOULD WELCOME DEPARTMENT'S SUGGESTIONS.
  7. WE WILL REPORT FURTHER AS SOON AS WE CAN ESTABLISH PRECISELY WHAT GIFTS SHASTRI INTENDS TO BRING.
- BOWLES

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

2-S

UNCLASSIFIED

Action

QSA427SBA884

NEA

\*\*\*\*\*ZZRUEHC RUEHEX  
DE RUSBAE 510 3441140

Info

ZNR UUUUU

SS

Z 101132Z

G

FM AMEMBASSY **NEW DELHI**

SP

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC **FLASH 1465**

SAH

RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE FLASH UNN  
INFO RUFHON/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 456

H

RUQVXR/AMEMBASSY KARACHI IMMEDIATE 608

P

RUEHDT/USUN IMMEDIATE 360

USIA

STATE GRNC

NSC

BT

INR

UNCLASSIFIED DEC 10

CIA

REF: 1449.

NSA

DOD

AID

E

CPR

AGR

FFP

RSR

PRIME MINISTER SHASTRI HAS JUST ANNOUNCED IN THE CLOSING  
SESSION OF PARLIAMENT THAT HE INTENDS TO VISIT UNITED STATES  
FOR TALKS COMMENCING FEBRUARY 1.

HE STATED THAT "HE IS LOOKING FORWARD TO MEETING THE PRESIDENT  
AND THE GREAT AMERICAN PEOPLE." INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES,  
HE SAID, HAVE MANY THINGS IN COMMON AND HE HOPES THAT THESE  
TALKS WILL LEAD TO CLOSER UNDERSTANDING. SHASTRI CONCLUDED BY  
EXPRESSING HIS "SINCERE THANKS TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON FOR THE  
ANNOUNCEMENT OF ADDITIONAL 1.5 MILLION TONS OF PL 480 WHEAT.  
BOWLES  
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 6:53 AM 12/10/65.

UNCLASSIFIED



SENT  
WHCA

1965 DEC 9 01 22

EEA423  
OO WTE10  
DE WTE 635

FROM KOMER  
TO MOYERS FOR THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP65853

**SECRET**

~~SECRET~~

FOR MOYERS FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM KOMER DECEMBER 8, 1965

SHASTRI VISIT. WE NOW HAVE WORD BACK FROM SHASTRI THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO COME TO THE US 31 JANUARY AND BEGIN HIS MEETING WITH YOU TUESDAY 1 FEBRUARY. HE ASKS IF HE MAY ANNOUNCE THIS IN HIS PARLIAMENT ON FRIDAY 10 DECEMBER AT 4:30 PM DELHI TIME, WHICH IS UNFORTUNATELY 0530 AM EST. HIS OFFICE HAS APPEALED TO US TO TIME OUR ANNOUNCEMENT SO THAT IT WOULD NOT COME OUT IN INDIA BEFOREHAND.

SINCE DELHI ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE TOO LATE TO HIT OUR MORNING PAPERS ANYWAY (THOUGH IT WOULD HIT RADIO/TV), WOULD YOU SEE OBJECTION TO OUR LETTING SHASTRI HAVE FIRST CRACK, AND THEN CONFIRMING IT SATURDAY AM ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

QUOTE IN RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S LONGSTANDING INVITATION PM SHASTRI WILL VISIT THE US TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON ON 1 AND 2 FEBRUARY. END QUOTE

ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE FOR US TO RELEASE FRIDAY WITH AN EMBARGO. BILL MOYERS WOULD BE BEST JUDGE OF WHETHER THIS WOULD HOLD. WE WERE SEE ADVANTAGE IN ACCOMMODATING SHASTRI, IF NO DISADVANTAGE TO US.

DTG: 090054Z DECEMBER 1965

**SECRET**

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-18-03

PRESERVATION COPY

WEDNESDAY

DEC 8 PM 8:24

63a  
~~SECRET~~

SECRET

December 8, 1965

FOR MOYERS FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM KOMER

Shastri Visit. We now have word back from Shastri that he would like to come to the US 31 January and begin his meeting with you Tuesday 1 February. He asks if he may announce this in his Parliament on Friday 10 December at 4:30 PM Delhi time, which is <sup>unfortunately</sup> 0530 AM EST. His office has appealed to us to time our announcement so that it would not come out in India beforehand.

Since Delhi announcement <sup>could</sup> will be too late to hit our morning papers anyway (though it <sup>will</sup> hit radio/TV), would you see objection to our letting Shastri have first crack, and then confirming it Saturday AM along following lines:

QUOTE In response to the President's longstanding invitation  
END QUOTE PM Shastri will visit the US to meet with President Johnson on 1 and 2 February.

Alternative would be for us to release Friday with an embargo. Bill Moyers would be best judge of whether this would hold. We here see advantage in accommodating Shastri, if no disadvantage to us.

22 01 6 DEC 1965

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-18-03

~~SECRET~~

WCHM  
SENT

SECRET



64

RECEIVED  
HQA

1965 DEC 9 18 04

EHA455

\*\*\*\*\*ZZ RUEHGX

DE RUEHCR 4805 3431802

ZNY CCCCC

Z 091800Z

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR BUNDY

Z 091755Z

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI FLASH 1017

STATE GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DECEMBER 9

EXDIS

EMBTTEL 1449

YOU MAY TELL L. K. JHA THAT DATES FOR SHASTRI VISIT (I.E. JANUARY 31 NEW YORK) AND PROPOSED TIMING SHASTRI ANNOUNCEMENT FINE. AFTER SHASTRI HAS MADE HIS ANNOUNCEMENT TO LOK SABHA, WHITE HOUSE WILL ISSUE CONFIRMATION RESPONSE. INDIAN EMBASSY HERE NOTIFIED; THEY HAD ALSO RELAYED TO US INFO IN REPTTEL.

GP-3. RUSK

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXDIS

NNNN

DEC 9 1965

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By jk, NARA, Date 12-18-03

PRESERVATION COPY

65  
1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

December 8, 1965

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Robert Komer  
The White House

SUBJECT: Shastri Visit

Late yesterday afternoon the Indian Embassy informed NEA that it had received a cable from L.K. Jha containing the following points:

1. The most convenient timing for the Prime Minister would be to arrive in the U.S. on January 31 and to meet the President on February 1.
2. The Prime Minister would like to announce this in Parliament on December 10 at 4 p.m. New Delhi time (0530 EST 10 December).
3. While recognizing the awkwardness of this timing in terms of a Washington release, the Indian Government urges that the timing of any Washington announcement should preclude any possibility of a press or radio report reaching India prior to the Prime Minister's statement in Parliament.

*John P. Walsh*  
John P. Walsh  
Deputy Executive Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-18-03*

DEC 8 1965



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

04251

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

86

Origin

CPR

Info

SS

NEA

NSC

ACTION: Amembassy NEW ~~DELHI~~ 1010

Dec 8 4 36 PM '63

Regarding the exchange of gifts during the forthcoming visit of Prime Minister Shastri - if at all possible, the visitor should be discouraged from bringing extravagant gifts to the President. Normally the President will give the visitor an autographed ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ book and photograph, as well as some other personalized token.

Please inform Chief of Protocol soonest of all information on gifts principal intends to bring to Washington. Also ~~RM~~ recommend any gifts the President might give in return.

RUSK

Drafted by:

JCNicholas: SLKing;lg

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: Lloyd N. Hand, Chief of Protocol

Clearances:

NEA - Mr. Handley

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-18-03*

~~SECRET~~

BUNDY-SMITH

03879

BOWEN 042

BOWMAN

CHASE

COOPER

JESSUP

JOHNSON

KERRY

ROSEN

SMITH

Dec 7 7 53 PM '63

86

Origin

SS

Info:

ACTION:

Ambassy NEW DELHI

PRIORITY 1004

INFO:

Ambassy KARACHI 929

Ambassy LONDON 3223

USCIB, New York 1434

Ambassy MOSCOW 1448

AmConGen Hong Kong 751

LINDIS

1. Following summary FYI on only and MURKIN. It is unclassified and subject to amendment upon review.

2. Ambassador Mehra, at his request, called on Secretary December 6. Explained he planned return India late December. Highlights of discussion follow:

3. Indian Food Situation: Mehra reviewed current drought and crop failure and prospective 11 million ton foodgrain deficit along generally familiar lines. Secretary suggested problem was too big for just one country, even USA, to handle alone and that India should ask countries like Canada, Australia, Argentina, and possibly France to join the effort. He also suggested countries like Norway might help on shipping. He suggested multi-lateral relief operation desirable both in terms justifying our role to US public and in terms healthier Indo-US bilateral relations. In reply Mehra's query, Secretary agreed USG could give ODI diplomatic support in India's efforts enlist third country participation but stressed that prime mover in such operation should be India. Mehra agreed to let Secretary know how New Delhi reacted to this suggestion.

4. Ambassador

Drafted by:

NEA: SCACSC: dmm 12/7/65

Tel. Ext.

2625

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - Ambassador Hare

Clearances:

FE - Mr. Jacobsen (draft)

SOV - Mr. MacCracken (draft)

S/S - Mr. Shostal

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

4. Ambassador Nehru asked about next tranche PL 480. Secretary said he was unable say anything definite but he hoped we could decide this week and that next amendment would cover more than a month. Secretary said that GOI statements, e.g. to Lok Sabha, could help ~~us~~ in US insofar as they signaled that GOI was giving agricultural problem absolutely top priority. Nehru ~~said~~ said there would be no misunderstanding about this.

5. During foregoing review of food outlook Amb Nehru repeatedly stressed limited port facilities as principal bottleneck. Said last year ports could handle 700,000 tons foodgrain per month maximum but this year capacity raised to maximum of 800,000. Nehru also raised US finance for fertilizers stating that this aspect our economic aid suspension would hurt India badly if we unable come through before end of December. Secy said we aware importance this problem and actively considering it.

6. Shastri Visit: Secretary said we had just sent New Delhi a message on timing of visit. He and Nehru agreed we would probably settle shortly on some time during first few days February. Nehru strongly urged preparatory talks to sort out issues prior to Shastri meeting with President in order ensure "discussion not confrontation." Secretary agreed in principle and thought some of more tangible points for discussion could be thrashed out beforehand, but noted difficulty spelling out in advance exactly how these two leaders might wish handle some broader issues, e.g. fact that each has a political constituency in the <sup>other's</sup> ~~respective~~ country. Nehru noted that President's press backgrounder previous week had "cleared the air." He expressed interest in doing what he could personally to smooth way for meeting, which he considered very important, especially for India, and asked "help" through further consultation, before his departure for India.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

7. Tashkent Talks: Nehru confirmed that Shastri-Ayub summit would take place in Tashkent during first few days in January. Said Kosygin would certainly be there at least to start with. Said agenda included entire range Indo-Pak problems. Shastri willing discuss Kashmir provided it clearly understood Indian sovereignty not rpt not questioned. Secretary said that now talks to be held we hoped they might lead to something; we were not rpt not concerned over possibility USSR might enhance its prestige.

8. Chinese Border Threat: Indicating he was speaking on instructions, Nehru reviewed approaches Delhi and Washington; noted that Chinese not only were creating disturbances almost every day, but had actually moved into and were still physically occupying two formerly undisputed Indian areas (Daulat Bag Oldi in Ladakh and Thagla Ridge area in NEFA). Said GOI uncertain what this portends and noted Chen Yi had recently stated China does not rpt not recognize Sikkim border.

9. Vietnam: Secretary stressed that problem has not been lack of contact with other side. It has been rather that Hanoi and Peiping have apparently consistently misread seriousness of American intentions. Nehru asked for Secretary's forecast for Vietnam. Secretary thought there would be more fighting and more forces. In response question would we bomb Hanoi and Hai phong, Secretary replied that whereas Viet Cong bombs civilians in Saigon we averse this practice. Our estimates indicated civilian losses from our own bombing attacks continue to be remarkably low. Replying to further query Secretary said ~~neither~~ neither Chinese nor Russians are in North Viet Nam in large numbers.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Secretary asked Nehru if India now had Soviet SAM missiles. Nehru replied it did. Secretary noted we had had fair amount of experience with them in Vietnam by now that in good weather they could often be eluded. and our pilots reported ~~they were xxxxxxxx~~. Nehru said he hoped India would not have to use its ~~SAM~~ SAMs.

10. Ambassador Nehru and Secretary agreed that another talk would be desirable prior Nehru's departure for India.

GP - 3

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

02639

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI 994 PRIORITY IMMEDIATE

DEC 6 10 50 AM '65

LIMDIS

Ref: New Delhi's 1389.

031

You may inform L.K. Jha some time in first week in February would be convenient for President to receive Prime Minister Shastri.

We will be in touch with you later regarding specific Washington dates and other details regarding schedule.

End

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By PC, NARA, Date 12-18-03

Drafted by: <b>NEA/SOA-Mr. Schneider</b>	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: <b>NEA-Mr. Handley</b> <b>xxxxxx Secretary</b>	<b>The Secretary</b>
Clearances: <b>S/CPR - Mr. King (draft)</b> <b>S/S - Mr. Gordon</b> <b>NEA-Mr. Handley</b>	<b>NEA-Mr. Handley</b> <b>xxxxxx Borg</b> <b>SECRET</b>	<b>White House -Mr. Komer</b>

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

69

~~SECRET~~

033

Action

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1965 DEC 1 AM 7 01

Info

SEMVV QSA062SBA723V  
PP RUEHC RUEHCR RUEHDT RUFHDN  
DE RUSBAE 21 3351100  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 011030Z  
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1389  
INFO RUQVKR/AMEMBASSY KARACHI PRIORITY 571  
RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 440  
RUEHDT/USUN PRIORITY 351  
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 74  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ DEC 01

L I M D I S

THIS MORNING AT HIS REQUEST I CALLED ON L.K. JHA. HE STATED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER IS GREATLY LOOKING FORWARD TO VISITING THE UNITED STATES AND IS HOPEFUL THAT THE FIRST WEEK IN FEBRUARY WILL BE CONVENIENT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

HE INTIMATED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD IN MIND A VISIT OF NO MORE THAN FOUR OR FIVE DAYS. THIS WOULD INCLUDE THE TIME NECESSARY TO COVER THE PRESIDENT'S AGENDA WHICH I ASSUME IS A DAY AND A HALF OR TWO DAYS FOLLOWED, PERHAPS, BY A DAY OF

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 21 ~~SECRET~~  
RELAXATION AND SIGHTSEEING IN WASHINGTON AND A DAY OR TWO IN NEW YORK. JHA REQUESTED THAT WE MAKE NO PRESS COMMENTS UNTIL DATES ARE FIRMLY DECIDED UPON.

WE WILL APPRECIATE HEARING SOONEST IF THESE DATES FIT PRESIDENT'S PLANS AND HOW SHASTRI MIGHT MOST EFFECTIVELY USE HIS TIME.

NOTE: APPARENTLY WELL-INFORMED NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS SUGGEST THAT THE TASHKENT MEETING IS SET FOR EARLY JANUARY.

GP 3.  
BOWLES

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-18-03



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

10  
1

~~SECRET~~

026

47  
Action

SS

Info

NNNNVV QSA146BA517  
PP RUEHCR  
DE RUSBAE 1118 3281400  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 241350Z  
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1351  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ NOVEMBER 24

*Shastri visit?*

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1965 NOV 24 AM 10 49

HINDY-SMITH  
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JESSUP  
JOHNSON  
PERRY  
WARRER  
WRIGHT

L I M D I S

REF: DEPTTEL 920.

I FULLY SHARE YOUR CONCERN ABOUT INEPT SHASTRI INTERVIEW DESCRIBING INDIA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS POSSIBILITY OF RESUMPTION OF OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN. OBVIOUSLY PRESS INTERVIEWS ARE NOT THE PROPER WAY TO COMMUNICATE WITH A FRIENDLY GOVERNMENT ON DELICATE MATTERS, AND I WILL DO MY BEST AGAIN TO ESTABLISH THIS POINT IN THE VISIT I HOPE TO HAVE WITH SHASTRI IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. I SHALL ALSO CONTINUE TO URGE ON HIM IMPORTANCE BOTH OF MINIMIZING APPEARANCES OF DIFFERENCE AND OF AFFIRMATIVE

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 1118 ~~SECRET~~  
EFFORTS TO CREATE OPTIMUM ATMOSPHERE FOR HIS VISIT.

SHASTRI'S PROBLEM IS THAT HE IS BADGERED BY EXTREMISTS WHO CONFRONT HIM DAILY IN PARLIAMENT; HE OFTEN FEELS HE HAS TO RESPOND PUBLICLY ON SOME OF THE ISSUES WE HOPE TO DISCUSS WITH HIM IN WASHINGTON. IN SPITE OF HIS VAST POPULARITY HE STILL APPEARS STRANGELY UNSURE OF HIS OWN POLITICAL POSITION. WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO OUR BEST TO KEEP HIM STEADY AND TO DESCRIBE WORKING OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, ESPECIALLY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RESPONSES TO PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS AND INTERVIEWS WITH INDIVIDUAL REPORTERS.  
GP-3.  
BOWLES

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date 12-18-03



SUMMARY

71

Shastri visit

BUNDY-SMITH  
BATOR  
BOWLER  
BOWMAN  
CHASE  
COOPER  
JESSUP  
JOHNSON  
KERRY  
KORNER  
MOODY

FBIS 17 (SEE 108 OF 23 NOV)

SHASTRI ON TALKS WITH PAKISTAN

DELHI DOMESTIC SERVICE IN ENGLISH 1530Z 23 NOV 65 B

(EXCERPTS) THE PRIME MINISTER TOLD THE RAJYA SABHA TODAY THAT IN RESPONSE TO A FRESH APPROACH BY THE SOVIET UNION A COUPLE OF DAYS AGO, HE HAS CONVEYED HIS WILLINGNESS TO GO TO TASKHENT FOR TALKS WITH PRESIDENT AYUB ON INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS IN THEIR TOTALITY. BUT ANY PROPOSITION THAT BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES CAN BE HAD ONLY AFTER THE KASHMIR PROBLEM IS SETTLED IS FANTASTIC AND COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE TO INDIA. PAKISTAN MUST REALIZE THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES AS CONSTITUTED AT PRESENT HAVE TO REMAIN INTACT. INDIA DOES NOT DESIRE AN INCH OF PAKISTAN'S TERRITORY AND PAKISTAN SHOULD APPRECIATE THAT IT ALSO CANNOT MAKE ANY CLAIM ON OUR TERRITORY.

SHASTRI WAS INTERVENING IN THE DEBATE ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. HE SAID THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD BE ABLE TO LIVE AS GOOD NEIGHBORS. THERE ARE SEVERAL PROBLEMS BETWEEN THEM, SUCH AS THAT OF BORDER DEMARCATION, BETTER USE OF RIVER WATERS, AND REFUGEES. IT WILL BE GOOD IF THESE ARE DISCUSSED AND THEY CAN COME TO SOME AGREEMENT.

THE PRIME MINISTER ALSO REFERRED TO RECENT INTRUSIONS BY CHINA AND SAID THAT THESE SHOW THAT PEKING IS NOT IN A MOOD TO ARRIVE AT A SETTLEMENT WITH INDIA. ITS HOSTILITY TOWARD INDIA HAS FURTHER INCREASED.

SHASTRI SAID THAT PAKISTAN AND CHINA ARE POWERFUL COUNTRIES WITH TERRIBLE WAR MACHINES. THEIR PRESENT ATTITUDE POSES A DIFFICULT SITUATION FOR INDIA. BUT HE IS CONFIDENT THAT IF CHINA STARTS TROUBLE ON OUR BORDERS, OUR ARMED FORCES WILL MEET THE CHALLENGE WITH THE UTMOST COURAGE.

SPEAKING ABOUT NONALIGNMENT, SHASTRI SAID THAT THE POLICY FORMULATED BY NEHRU HAS PAID DIVIDENDS. INDIA WILL NOT ENTER INTO ANY MILITARY ALLIANCE WITH ANY COUNTRY OR GROUP OF COUNTRIES. DURING THE RECENT CONFLICT WE RECEIVED THE SUPPORT OF A LARGE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, SUCH AS THE SOVIET UNION, YUGOSLAVIA, MALAYSIA, CYPRUS, LAOS, AND THE UAR. EVEN THOUGH THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT SEE EYE TO EYE WITH US ON THE KASHMIR QUESTION, THERE IS NOW SLIGHTLY BETTER APPRECIATION OF OUR STAND IN THAT COUNTRY. IT IS ADMITTED IN AMERICAN WRITINGS AND SPEECHES THAT THE QUESTION OF A PLEBISCITE IN KASHMIR DOES NOT ARISE. THIS, HE SAID, IS A GREAT ADVANCE.

ABOUT HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, HE SAID THAT HE IS NOT GOING THERE FOR ANY SPECIAL PURPOSE--EITHER TO GET ECONOMIC AID OR FOOD. THESE SUBJECTS, HOWEVER, MIGHT COME UP FOR GENERAL DISCUSSION.

24 NOV 0355Z DEW/TN



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

72  
028

SECRET

47  
Action

SS  
Info

NNNNQSA699SBA768  
PP RUEHCR RUEHDT RUFHDN  
DE RUSBAE 981 3261325  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 221316Z

017468

1965 NOV 22 AM 9 07

FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1326  
INFO RUQVKR/AMEMBASSY KARACHI PRIORITY 549  
RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 341  
RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 427  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
SECRET NOVEMBER 22

//L I M D I S//

I HAVE INFORMED L.K. JHA OF AYUB'S PLAN TO ADDRESS UN ON DECEMBER 13 WITH WASHINGTON VISIT SET FOR DECEMBER 15. I ADDED THAT IF QUESTIONS ARE ASKED OF US REGARDING SHASTRI'S VISIT TO THE US WE WOULD SAY THAT A RENEWED INVITATION HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO MR. SHASTRI AND WE EXPECT REPLY SHORTLY IN REGARD TO DATES.

JHA ACCEPTED THIS WORDING AND SAID HE WOULD INFORM SHASTRI TODAY ABOUT THE SUGGESTED TIMING; HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH ME IN A DAY OR TWO. HE FULLY UNDERSTANDS WHY WE COULD NOT SCHEDULE VISIT EARLIER IN JANUARY.

I EXPECT TO SEE SHASTRI IN NEXT FEW DAYS FOR COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION. GP 3.

BOWLES  
BT

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-18-03*

SECRET



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

SUNDY-SMITH  
BATOR  
BOWMAN  
CHASE  
COOPER  
JESSUP  
JOHNSON  
KERRY  
KOMER  
MOODY

73  
11935

*Visit*

*Shastri*

Nov 22 6 59 PM '65

84  
Origin  
Info

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI PRIORITY 92

FOR AMBASSADOR

LIMDIS

Period between now and Shastri visit will be made infinitely more difficult and prospects for fruitful talks much the poorer by press coverage such as Harrison interview with Shastri front paged in Monday Washington Post ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ (USINFO 221945).

022

We confident you have already made clear in proper quarters that negotiating with the US through the newspapers in advance of talks is hardly the best way to reach meeting of minds. All here recognize that India, like US, is a democracy that cannot control press. But this is different from fueling the press with gratuitous criticism US policy or telling US how to conduct its policy, e.g. not to resume military aid to Pakistan.

One of key frustrations of US relations with India is that our underlying common purposes are often obscured by essentially surface differences. But in seeking this is a fact of life which GOI must take more fully into account ~~its~~ renewal large ~~wants the scale of support from us, which is impossible in the recent past~~. Thus it is more important that key Indian officials, including Shastri, help during the coming pre-visit period to minimize surface friction and thus create optimum atmosphere for Shastri visit. We, of course, will attempt to do the same from our end.

GP-3

END

Drafted by: White House:RKomer:eae 11/22/65		Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Raymond A. Hare
Clearances: NEA - Mr. Handley SQA - Miss Laise		S/S - Mr. Kelley BALL

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines

~~SECRET~~

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

11268

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

SUMMARY

44

SS

ACTION: Amembassy Office RAWALPINDI IMMEDIATE 213  
Amembassy KARACHI IMMEDIATE 852  
Amembassy NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE ~~852~~ 914

Nov 20 1 32 PM '65

INFO: Amembassy RIO DE JANEIRO TOSEC <sup>67</sup> IMMEDIATE  
Amembassy LONDON ~~XXXXXXXX~~ PRIORITY 2560  
USUN for Goldberg ~~XXXXXXXX~~ PRIORITY 125

LIMDIS

033

We will inform Pakistan Charge Iftikhar Ali Monday AM (Wash time) Nov 22 that time suggested for Ayub visit convenient to President. We will also suggest that announcement of visit be made Rawalpindi and Washington at time to be mutually agreed upon. Following is text our proposed announcement:

QUOTE The White House today announced that President Ayub Khan of Pakistan, who will deliver an address at the United Nations on December 13, will be visiting with President Johnson on December 15. END QUOTE

ACTION RAWALPINDI: You authorized to make ~~px~~ parallel approach to GOP after Washington notification along foregoing lines and seek agreement on text of announcement and (subject to Washington concurrence) proposed release time.

ACTION NEW DELHI

Drafted by: NEA:WJHandley:sb 11/20/65

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

The Acting Secretary

Clearances

NEA - Amb. Hare  
S/CPR - Mr. Carter

White House - Mr. Bundy  
S/S - Mr. Read P - Mr. Greenfield

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E.O. 13282, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date 12-18-03

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~~SECRET~~

ACTION NEW DELHI: You should inform L.K.Jha or Shastri ~~date~~ soonest of ~~visit~~ of Ayub visit ~~announcement~~ and of plans for announcement. At same time you should indicate that if it agreeable to Shastri we do not intend volunteer anything publicly at this time about possible Shastri visit. If asked, we will say what we have said before: That Prime Minister Shastri has ~~XXXXX~~ an invitation and that President would look forward seeing him ~~any time~~ any time it can be worked out to mutual convenience.

At your discretion you may say that we fully understood Shastri's earlier interest in seeing President ahead of Ayub. But since Shastri has indicated he cannot come until early next year, we will not be able to accommodate his wish since Ayub wants to come here while the United Nations General Assembly is still in session. We trust that there will be no misunderstanding on this score and you are authorized to say that the chronology of the visits has no relationship to their importance or priority.

GP-3

END

BALL

~~SECRET~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

15

~~SECRET~~

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1965 NOV 20 PM 12 13

Action

Info

PP RUEHCR RUEHDT RUEHEX RUFHDN  
DE RUSBAE 920 3241415  
ZNY SSSSS

P R 201353Z

FM AMEMBASSY NEWDELHI

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATEWASHDC PRIORITY 1321

INFO RUEHDT/USUN 340

RUQVXR/AMEMBASSY KARACHI 547

RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON 426

RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ NOV 20

*Shastri Visit  
Cnd.*

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KEENE  
KIMMER  
MOODY

LIMDIS

ON SAT MORN, NOV 20, I CALLED ON L.K. JHA TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE DATES FOR SHASTRI VISIT ONLY TO FIND THAT THE PRIMIN HAD LEFT IN EARLY MORNING FOR MADRAS; HE WILL RETURN SUNDAY EVENING. THE FOLLOWING POINTS WERE DEVELOPED DURING MY TALK WITH JHA:

1. I EXPLAINED OUR TIMING DILEMMA IN VIEW OF OPENING OF U.S. CONGRESS AND RECOGNIZED FACT THAT CONGRESS PARTY MEETING AND INDIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY (JAN 26) WOULD FURTHER POSTPONE PRIME MINISTER'S ARRIVAL IN THE UNITED STATES.

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 920 ~~SECRET~~  
HOWEVER WE HOPED HE COULD COME WELL BEFORE BEGINNING OF THE BUDGET SESSION OF THE INDIAN PARLIAMENT WHICH BEGINS ON FEB 14.

JHA EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT VISIT WHICH WE HOPED FOR IN OCT HAD BEEN SO LONG DELAYED FOR REASONS BEYOND CONTROL OF ALL OF US, BUT AGREED THAT THERE WERE SOME ADVANTAGES IN THAT DELAY HAS GIVEN BOTH COUNTRIES BETTER OPPORTUNITY TO ASSESS THEIR SITUATION.

JHA THEN ASKED HOW LATE IN DEC IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO VISIT WASHINGTON BEFORE THE CHRISTMAS FESTIVITIES TOOK OVER. I REPLIED THAT THE 21ST OF DEC WAS AS LATE AS ANYBODY COULD TALK SERIOUS BUSINESS. AS A RESULT THE LAST TWO WEEKS OF DEC WERE NOT A GOOD TIME.

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date 12-18-03



~~SECRET~~

-2- 1321, NOVEMBER 20, FROM NEW DELHI

2. JHA THEN ASKED IF WE HAD CONSIDERED DEVELOPMENT OF AN AGENDA. I SAID THAT ALTHOUGH I COULD NOT FORECAST PRECISELY WHAT WAS ON THE PRESIDENT'S MIND BASIC SUBJECTS SEEMED TO ME QUITE CLEAR; IN RESPONSE TO HIS FURTHER INQUIRY, I LISTED THEM AS FOLLOWS:

A. IN REGARD TO DEVELOPMENT: ARE WE CORRECT IN ASSUMING THAT INDIA IS GIVING HIGHEST PRIORITY TO AGRICULTURE WITH A GOAL OF FOOD GRAIN SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN A REASONABLE TIME SPAN (I.E. FERTILIZER, WATER, SEEDS, ETC.) HOW VIGOROUSLY

PAGE THREE RUSBAE 920 ~~SECRET~~

IS INDIA PLANNING TO MOVE AHEAD WITH HER POPULATION CONTROL PROGRAM? DOES INDIA HAVE WORKABLE PLANS TO INCREASE HER IMPORTS OF INDUSTRIAL RAW MATERIALS AND SPARE PARTS SO THAT HER PRESENT EQUIPMENT CAN BE PUT TO BETTER USE? IS INDIA READY TO WELCOME RESPONSIBLE FOREIGN INVESTORS WHO IN JAPAN, ITALY, AND ELSEWHERE HAD SO SHARPLY SPEEDED THE RATE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT? ARE WE CORRECT IN OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT INDIA DOES NOT PLAN A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN HER DEFENSE BUDGET?

B. PAK AND INDIA RELATIONSHIPS: WHILE THERE WAS A GENERAL UNDERSTANDING IN THE US THAT PAKS STARTED THE FIGHTING ON AUG 5 WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF INFILTRATORS, THERE WAS ALSO FEELING THAT INDIA CARRIED A FAIR SHARE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONTINUANCE OF FIRING SINCE SEPT 21 CEASE FIRE AGREEMENT.

WHILE INDIAN CHARGES THAT PAKS HAD INTRODUCED TROOPS INTO RAJASTHAN AFTER THIS DATE TO BOLSTER PAKS BARGAINING POSITION IN REGARD TO GENERAL WITHDRAWAL WAS PROBABLY TRUE THEY WERE HARD TO PROVE; INDIA WOULD BE WISE THEREFORE TO ACCEPT A SYG MILITARY REP WHO COULD ESTABLISH THE FACTS AND PRESS FOR WITHDRAWAL. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE FEELING IN THE US RIGHT NOW THAT INDIA AS WELL AS PAKS WAS DRAGGING

PAGE FOUR RUSBAE 920 ~~SECRET~~  
ITS FEET.

JHA SAID THESE QUESTIONS WERE REASONABLE ALTHOUGH HE FELT WE SHOULD ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT IT TAKES TWO TO STOP SHOOTING.

I ADDED THAT THERE WOULD BE EMPHASIS IN WASHINGTON ON NEED FOR EASING RELATIONS BETWEEN PAKS AND INDIA ALTHOUGH WE HAD NO SPECIFIC SOLUTION TO OFFER.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-3- 1321, NOVEMBER 20, FROM NEW DELHI

IN RESPONSE TO JHA'S QUESTION ABOUT PROSPECTS OF U.S. AGAIN ARMING PAKISTAN I STATED WE WERE QUITE AWARE THAT OUR EQUIPMENT HAD PLAYED MAJOR ROLE IN THE PAK MILITARY EFFORT AND THAT WE OBVIOUSLY WERE IN NO HURRY TO REPEAT THE EXERCISE BUT THAT BOTH U.S. AND INDIAN MUST ACCEPT THE FACT THAT PAK AS A SOVEREIGN NATION HAS A RIGHT TO DEFEND HERSELF BY PURCHASING EQUIPMENT SOMEWHERE.

C. CHINESE CONTAINMENT: I STATED THAT A THIRD SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION WOULD BE THE ROLE OF CHINA AS AGGRESSOR IN ASIA AND I WAS SURE THAT OUR GOVT WOULD APPRECIATE A SHOW OF UNDERSTANDING BY THE INDIANS OF OUR OWN EFFORTS TO PIN DOWN THE CHINESE ARMY. REGARDING VIET NAM OUR INDIAN FRIENDS WERE INCLINED TO SAY "PLEASE BE SURE TO KEEP THE CHINESE OUT OF THIS CRITICAL AREA BUT BE CAREFUL NOT TO HURT ANYONE IN THE PROCESS." ANYTHING SHASTRI AND HIS ASSOCIATES COULD DO TO DEMONSTRATE INDIA'S UNDERSTANDING OF OUR PROBLEMS IN THIS AREA WOULD BE WELCOME.

PAGE FIVE RUSBAE 920 ~~SECRET~~

D. INDIA-SOV RELATIONSHIPS: ALTHOUGH USG WELCOMED GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIAN AND SOVS, I SAID THERE WAS A STRONG FEELING THAT INDIA'S NEUTRALISM RIGHT NOW AS BIASED IN FAVOR OF SOVS AND WE SEE THIS ATTITUDE REFLECTED IN MANY UNBALANCED SPEECHES BY INDIAN LEADERS, THE CONTINUED EFFORT OF THE SHASTRI GOVT TO APPEASE THE LEFTIST GROUPS, ETC.

3. JHA EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THIS GENERAL BACKGROUND AND ADDED THAT IF OUR PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON HAVE ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS HE WISHED I WOULD PASS THEM ON SO THAT HIS GOVT WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE THOUGHTFUL RESPONSES TO OUR INQUIRIES. HE EXPRESSED THE SATISFACTION THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF AMERICAN CONGRESSMEN WERE VISITING OR ABOUT TO VISIT INDIAN AND SAID HE HOPED I WOULD LET HIM KNOW HOW TO MAKE THEIR STAY MORE COMFORTABLE AND REWARDING.

I PLAN TO SEE SHASTRI DURING THE NEXT WEEK OR SO AS SOON AS HE HAS TIME FOR RELAXED CONVERSATION AND I WILL BE GRATEFUL IF DEPT WILL SEND ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS IT MAY HAVE ON SUBJECT OF MY DISCUSSION WITH JHA. GP-3 BOWLES  
BT

~~SECRET~~