

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Komer
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Action
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Info

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DE RUSBAE 867 3230815
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Shastri visit

1965 NOV 19 AM 3 31

O 190759Z
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1309
INFO RUESUA/AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO IMMEDIATE TWO
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ NOVEMBER 19

RIO FOR THE SECRETARY

// EXDIS //

AMBASSADOR BOWLES IS DUE BACK IN DELHI FROM WEST INDIA FRIDAY EVENING. WE ARE SURE THAT IF TIME PERMITS, HE WOULD PREFER TO DEAL WITH JHA HIMSELF ON SATURDAY. IF, HOWEVER, THERE IS ANY PROSPECT ANNOUNCEMENT AYUB VISIT BEFORE THEN, PLEASE SEND FLASH SO DCM CAN MOVE FAST.

MEANWHILE, RE PROSPECT OF SHASTRI VISIT AFTER JANUARY 20, WE NOTE THAT HIS PUBLIC COMMITMENTS IN INDIA FOLLOWING ADJOURNMENT PARLIAMENT DECEMBER 10 ARE AS FOLLOWS:

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 867 ~~SECRET~~
AICC MEETING JANUARY 18-21 (THIS AMENDS EMBTEL 1247).

→ REPUBLIC DAY JANUARY 26; BUDGET SESSION PARLIAMENT BEGINNING NORMALLY SECOND WEEK FEBRUARY. THIS SEEMS TO SUGGEST TIME FRAME FOR WASHINGTON VISIT BETWEEN JANUARY 28 AND FEBRUARY 14, ASSUMING, AS WE DO, THAT TASHKENT EXERCISE IS NOT REPEAT NOT REAL PROSPECT. IF THERE IS ANYTHING AT YOUR END THAT MILITATES AGAINST THAT TIMING, PLEASE LET US KNOW SOONEST.

BOWLES
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 3:41 A.M. NOVEMBER 19, 1965
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, 11/19/65 - 3:57 A.M. (PER S/S-O)

NOV 19 1965

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 12-18-03

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

09503

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Shastri visit Kanner

77

40
Origin
SS
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI ~~URGENT~~ 895 IMMEDIATE
" RIO DE JANEIRO TOSEC 41"

Nov 18 10 27 AM '65

EXDIS FOR AMEASSADOR

1. Your 1247 has been discussed with highest authority. You are requested to inform L.K.Jha that while the President fully understands Prime Minister's feeling that a December visit is not workable, and while the President would very much like to have the Prime Minister at any convenient time thereafter, there is a real problem here with dates in the first three weeks of January. Congress meets here on January 10. The 10 days before that time will necessarily be heavily occupied with the preparation of the State of the Union message and other elements of legislative program, and first 10 days of session will be equally filled with the submission of these basic legislative messages. The President therefore hopes that it may be practicable for the Prime Minister to consider a visit at any time after the All-India Congress Committee meeting.

2. In the interim the President approves of your suggestion that Subramaniam be invited to come here for discussions with Freeman on Indian agricultural outlook. Of course, it is possible that Subramaniam himself will not be eager to come unless there is a reasonable prospect that discussions here would in fact allow us to give him something concrete to

Drafted by: White House:McGeorge Bundy:NEA:

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

The Acting Secretary

Clearance: WJHandley:eee 11/17/65

S/S - Mr. Walsh

NEA - Amb. Hare

Agriculture - Mr. Schnittker (substance)

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date 12-18-03

NOV 18 1965

~~SECRET~~

take home in the way of interim aid decisions supporting Indian agricultural efforts. We would hope this is not so but Freeman is actively exploring the case that can be made for such help and will explore it further with Subramaniam in Rome. Freeman is authorized to make his own judgment on a Subramaniam invitation in the light of these studies and conversations, and nothing repeat nothing should be said to Indians until after Freeman decision, which will be promptly reported to you.

3. As you know from Deptel 894, Ayub has proposed mid-December for visit Washington. This schedule now under review here and therefore should not repeat not be revealed to Indians. At same time, it seems most desirable that you inform L. K. Jha soonest of the President's thinking about timing of Shastri's visit. In this way Shastri would know, prior to public announcement of Ayub visit, that President hopes see him in Washington after January 20th.

GP-

END

BALL.

~~SECRET~~

78
—
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 17, 1965

To: Mr. Komer

From: McG. B.

Will you please clear this
with State Department as
amended.

*Shastin
J. J. J.*

NOV 17 1965

SECRET

I did say and cleared w. Schnitzer
98a (11/17/65)

To: New Delhi for Bowles

Ask Kerner to clear when State Dept is amended.

From: McGeorge Bundy

1. Your 1247 has been discussed with highest authority. You are requested to inform L. K. Jha that while the President fully understands Prime Minister's feeling that a December visit is not workable, and while the President would very much like to have the Prime Minister at any convenient time thereafter, there is a real problem here with dates in the first three weeks of January. Congress meets here on January 10. The 10 days before that time will necessarily be heavily occupied with the preparation of the State of the Union message and other elements of legislative program, and first 10 days of session will be equally filled with the submission of these basic legislative messages. The President therefore hopes that it may be practicable for the Prime Minister to consider a visit at any time after the All-India Congress Committee meeting.

2. In the interim the President approves of your suggestion that Subramaniam be invited to come here for discussions with Freeman on Indian agricultural outlook. *Of course it is possible that Subramaniam himself*
~~Our only reservation is that we probably will not~~
~~wish to invite Subramaniam~~ *would not be eager to come* unless there is a reasonable prospect that discussions here would in fact allow us to give him something *concrete* to take home in the way of interim aid decisions supporting Indian agricultural efforts. *We*

would hope this is not so but
1 Freeman is actively exploring the case that can be made for such help and will explore it further with Subramaniam in Rome. Freeman is authorized to make his own judgment on a Subramaniam invitation in the light of these studies and conversations, and nothing repeat nothing should be

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-18-03*

NOV 17 1965

SECRET

-2-

said to Indians until after Freeman decision, which will be promptly reported to you.

FYI. You should know that Ayub has now proposed himself urgently for December and that the terms of our understandings with both countries will not permit us to reject this proposal if he persists in it. We would welcome your advice as to the best way of arranging and announcing an Ayub visit in December and Shastri visit in late January or early February. Our current inclination is to get the Shastri date settled and announced just before any announcement of an earlier Ayub visit. Your comments welcome. End FYI.

~~We would also be prepared to have you tell Shastri privately that the order of visits bears no relationship in our minds to the order of strategic priority in our minds. is entirely unrelated~~

SECRET

Rec'd
Nov 15 9 30 AM
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

786
Sunday, November 14, 1965
2 p.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Telegram from Bowles

1. I attach an important telegram from Bowles which reports a definite proposal by the Indians that Shastri come here sometime in the first half of January. If I understand your desires correctly, I assume that we should reply that these dates are difficult for us because of the opening days of Congress and the urgent business that goes with it, and that you would be glad if Shastri could propose himself for any time after the 20th of January.

Have Bowles answer this way _____

Speak to me _____

2. Bowles goes on to recommend that the pro-American Agricultural Minister Subramaniam should be invited here before Shastri for agricultural discussions. All the Indian experts here are in favor of this idea, but I think you may wish to defer decision until you can talk with Arthur Dean this week.

Let Bowles invite Subramaniam ✓ _____

Wait for Dean's advice _____

3. Finally, Bowles asks for authority to begin preliminary discussions with the Indians. I am sure this is not what you will want him to do until you are ready to give him much more explicit guidance yourself. *DL*

4. One advantage of getting Shastri to pin himself down by proposing a date at the end of January or early February is that then you are in a clear position to have Ayub earlier if he presses and if that is your choice. *DL*

SECRET Attachment

incl. B.
McG. B.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-18-03*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONSECRETSunday, November 14, 1965
2 p. m.

79
Shastri Visit
X P.D.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 12-18-03

Inf. B.
McG. B.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action ANNQSA881SBA284
PP RUEHCR RUEHDT RUFHDN
NEA DE RUSBAE 713A 201515
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Info P 161430Z

SS FM ANEMBASSY NEW DELHI
G TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE PRIORITY 1285
SP INFO RUFHDN/ANEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4 1965 NOV 16 PM 3 19
SAH RUQVKR/ANEMBASSY KARACHI PRIORITY 528
L RUEHDT/USUN NY PRIORITY 3.1
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SAL ~~SECRET~~ NOV 16 SECTION ONE OF TWO

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IN VIEW OF PROBABILITY THAT BOTH AYUB AND SHASTRI MAY BE VISITING U.S. IN NEXT 60 DAYS WE BELIEVE A BALANCE SHEET OF THE ECONOMIC, MILITARY AND POLITICAL MOVES WHICH GOI MAY MAKE ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE OR BE PERSUADED TO MAKE, AND THOSE ON WHICH IT IS LIKELY TO BE STICKY, MAY BE HELPFUL.

1. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS:

A. CEASE FIRE: INDIA GENUINELY WISHES TO STABILIZE THE CEASE-FIRE AND CAN BE HELD TO THIS COURSE BY FIRM UN SUPERVISION WHICH WE SHOULD CONTINUE VIGOROUSLY TO SUPPORT.

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 713A ~~SECRET~~

B. WITHDRAWAL: GOI ACCEPTS NEED FOR WITHDRAWAL TO PRE-HOSTILITY BOUNDARIES AS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR IN AN EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE. IN KASHMIR MAJOR POTENTIAL STUMBLING BLOCK REGARDING WITHDRAWAL WILL BE ABILITY OF UN TO RESOLVE MATTER OF PAST AND THREATENED PAK INFILTRATIONS WHICH INDIA WILL UNDER PRESSURE TRADE FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ITS OWN FORCES TO CEASE-FIRE LINE.

WE BELIEVE THAT A CONTINUED STRONG UN PUSH BUTTRESSED BY PRESSURES CREATED BY PROSPECTS OF AYUB KHAN AND SHASTRI'S VISITS MAY LEAD TO AGREEMENT ON LINKED CEASE FIRE AND WITHDRAWAL AFTER FURTHER PERIOD OF RHETORICAL TOUGHNESS AT LEAST WHILE PRESENT SESSION OF PARLIAMENT IS IN SESSION.

C. POLITICAL SETTLEMENT: GOI WILL NOT REPEAT NOT DISCUSS STATUS OF KASHMIR VALLEY WITH PAKISTAN. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE INDIA CAN BE PERSUADED TO UNDERTAKE WIDE-RANGING TALKS WITH PAKISTAN ON

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Authority PAC 032R-22-2-9

By JON *ARA Date 2-2-8

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-2- -285, NOVEMBER 16 (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM: NEW DELHI

NUMBER OF OTHER POLITICAL ISSUES SUCH AS ENCLAVES, UNDEMARCATED BORDERS, REFUGEES, REPATRIATION OF CITIZENS, TRADE, JOINT WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT, ETC., WHICH COULD VERY SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVE INDO-PAK RELATIONS.

INDIA IS ALSO PREPARED TO ACCEPT THROUGH SUCH NEGOTIATION PAKISTAN'S PERMANENT RIGHTS TO THE 5 PERCENT OF KASHMIR NOW

PAGE THREE RUSBAE 713A ~~SECRET~~

OCCUPIED BY PAKISTAN. IN ADDITION, THERE IS INCREASING POSSIBILITY THAT INDIA MAY MOVE UNILATERALLY TO ALTER STATUS OF KASHMIR WITHIN INDIAN UNION TO GIVE GREATER SCOPE AND SPECIAL STATUS TO KASHMIRIS THEMSELVES. ALTHOUGH THIS WOULD NOT SATISFY PAKS IT WOULD UNDERCUT A MAJOR ELEMENT OF PAK CASE, I.E., THAT PEOPLE OF INDIAN-HELD KASHMIR HAVE NO VOICE IN THEIR GOVERNMENT.

2. INDIAN MILITARY POSTURE:

A. DEFENSE EXPENDITURE: GOI HAS TOLD US REPEATEDLY THAT OVER ALL DEFENSE BUDGET OVER NEXT THREE TO FIVE YEARS WILL NOT INCREASE. ALTHOUGH IT MAY GO UP SOMEWHAT IN THE NEXT YEAR DUE TO PROCESS OF REPLACING ARMS LOST IN RECENT HOSTILITIES, THERE WILL BE EQUIVALENT REDUCTION IN THE FOLLOWING YEAR OR TWO. FACT IS THAT MUCH INDIAN EQUIPMENT LOST WAS SCHEDULED FOR REPLACEMENT DURING NEXT YEAR OR TWO IN ANY CASE AND EXISTING BUDGET PROVIDES FOR THIS. WE BELIEVE INDIANS WILL BE PREPARED TO UNDERSCORE WITH PRESIDENT THAT THEIR PRIMARY FOCUS IS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

RESUMPTION OF US ARMS AID TO PAKISTAN OR NEW PAK AND/OR CHINESE MILITARY MOVE WOULD LEAD TO INCREASED INDIAN DEFENSE SLRNDING, ALTHOUGH INDIA COULD HARDLY DENY PAKISTAN'S RIGHT AS A SOVEREIGN NATION TO PURCHASE FROM SOME SOURCE THE MILITARY EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO DEFEND ITSELF.

PAGE FOUR RUSBAE 713A ~~SECRET~~

B. CHINA: INDIA STANDS READY TO DEFEND ITS VAST LAND BORDER AGAINST CHINESE ATTACK, AS WELL AS TO ASSIST IN SIKKIM, NEPAL AND BHUTAN IF NECESSARY AND WILL SO STATE TO PRESIDENT. IN GENERALLY AFFIRMATIVE ATMOSPHERE GOI MAY BE AMENABLE TO COVERT JOINT MILITARY STUDIES WITH US AGAINST CONTINGENCY OF CHINESE MOVES WHICH MIGHT EXTEND TO INCLUDE BURMA.

~~SECRET~~

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-3- 1285, NOVEMBER 16 (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM: NEW DELHI

C. PAKISTAN: ALTHOUGH INDIA WOULD PREFER A TWO WAY "NO WAR PACT" IT CAN BE PERSUADED TO GIVE A STRONG UNILATERAL PLEDGE THAT IT WILL NOT INITIATE ANY MILITARY ACTION AGAINST PAKISTAN. THIS WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH PRESENT DEFENSIVE POSITION OF INDIA TROOPS FACING PAKISTAN.

D. NUCLEAR WEAPONS: IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE INDIA MAY BE EXPECTED TO STAND BY ITS COMMITMENT NOT TO BUILD NUCLEAR BOMB. HOWEVER, GROWTH OF CHINESE NUCLEAR CAPACITY WITHOUT CONCLUSION OF NON PROLIFERATION TREATY SATISFACTORY TO INDIA WOULD EVENTUALLY LEAD TO A CHANGE IN POLICY.

3. INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:

A. AGRICULTURE: INDIA HAS AGREED AND IS GENERALLY COMMITTED TO GIVE AGRICULTURE TOP PRIORITY. HOWEVER, PRESSURES SHOULD BE MAINTAINED TO ASSURE IMPLEMENTATION OF RECENT EXCELLENT POLICY

PAGE FIVE RUSBAE 713A ~~SECRET~~
DECISIONS AND REVISED TARGETS. SEED, FERTILIZER, WATER AND PRICE SUPPORT EFFORTS REQUIRE MAXIMUM SUPPORT AND COORDINATION. ABANDONMENT OF FOOD ZONES WILL NOT BE AGREED TO BY GOI DUE TO GENUINE FEAR OF OUTCOME UNTIL ITS BUFFER STOCKS ARE BUILT UP SUBSTANTIALLY.

B. FAMILY PLANNING: GOI WILL AGREE TO REDOUBLE AND REORIENT PRESENT MASSIVE EFFORT IN FAMILY PLANNING. TECHNOLOGICAL BREAKTHROUGHS OPEN POSSIBILITY OF REAL SUCCESS BUT CONCERTED ADMINISTRATIVE EFFORT IS REQUIRED AND HERE AGAIN PRESSURE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED.

C. IMPORT CONTROLS AND LICENSING: FOLLOWING CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION GOI THINKING HAS BECOME MUCH MORE FLEXIBLE REGARDING CUTTING DOWN DRASTICALLY ON IMPORT CONTROLS. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT MAINTAIN THAT BATTLE IS COMPLETELY WON, MAJOR OBSTACLE NOW IS ACUTE FOREIGN EXCHANGE BIND. IF THIS CAN BE RELIEVED WE BELIEVE PATTERN OF CONTROLS COULD IN TURN BE VERY SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED, AND A PORTION OF OUR AID CONDITIONED ON SUCH ACTION. BOWLES

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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1965 NOV 16 PM 2 45

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~~SECRET~~ NOV 16 SECTION TWO OF TWO

IO

D. ENCOURAGEMENT OF FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT: THIS IS THE MOST IMPORTANT GOAL THAT IS YET TO BE ACHIEVED ON ECONOMIC FRONT. GOI EXPRESSIONS OF REAL DESIRE FOR FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT STILL REMAIN LARGELY RHETORICAL AND GOI BARGAINING POSITION WITH PRIVATE INVESTORS IS OFTEN DOCTRINAIRE. WHILE NOT ALL FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTORS PRESENT EQUITABLE OFFERS, GOI MUST TACTFULLY BUT FIRMLY BE ENCOURAGED TO ASSIST AND EXPEDITE REASONABLE SCHEMES.

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PAGE TWO RUSBAE 713B ~~SECRET~~

VIETNAM AGAINST CHINA. AS A RESULT WE BELIEVE SHASTRI CAN BE EXPECTED TO SILENCE OFFICIAL INDIAN CRITICS OF US POSITION IN VIETNAM, TO ACT AS HONEST BROKER IN PURSUING NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, AND IN A MORE FAVORABLE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT TO ESTABLISH AN INDIAN NON-MILITARY PRESENCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM WITH MEDICAL TEAMS, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, ETC.

LIMITING FACTOR ON INDIAN POSITION REGARDING VIETNAM IS AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE FEAR THAT VIETNAM HOSTILITIES ARMY PUSH CHINA AND THE USSR TOGETHER WITH DISASTROUS RESULTS TO INDIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH SOVIET UNION, PRESENTLY INDIA'S MAJOR SOURCE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT ON KASHMIR ISSUE.

B. CHINA: IN A FAVORABLE US-INDIA ATMOSPHERE GOI CAN BE PERSUADED STEP BY STEP TO SHOULDER STEADILY INCREASING RESPONSIBILITY AS COUNTER WEIGHT TO CHINA IN ASIA.

C. AFRO-ASIAN WORLD: INDIA CAN BE PERSUADED TO ACT AS FORCE FOR REASON AND MODERATION IN AFRO-ASIAN COUNCILS.

~~SECRET~~

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-2- 1285, NOV 16, FROM NEW DELHI (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

D. SOVIET UNION: UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, INDIA WILL NOT REPEAT NOT ABANDON OR JEOPARDIZE ITS EFFORT TO CULTIVATE FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION. USSR IS NOW MAJOR ASSURED SOURCE OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT ON KASHMIR.

INAGE THREE RUSBAE 713B S E C R E T

IN ADDITION INDIA IS PROFOUNDLY ANXIOUS TO FORESTALL POSSIBILITY OF FACING HOSTILE CHINA WITH A NEUTRAL OR ANTAGONISTIC SOVIET UNION.

BEST WE CAN EXPECT RIGHT NOW IS FOR INDIA TO CONTINUE EFFORTS TO MODERATE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOVIET UNION AND WEST. FOR LONGER HAUL WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE DEEPLY ROOTED INDIAN SUSPICIONS THAT SOVIETS MAY AT SOME POINT REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH MAO'S SUCCESSORS.

E. JAPAN: INDIA IS EAGER FOR CLOSE RELATIONS WITH JAPAN BUT FINDS THE JAPANESE DIFFICULT TO COMMUNICATE WITH IN REGARD TO CHINA. INDIA WOULD WELCOME OUR DISCREET HELP IN CREATING CLOSER TIES WITH JAPAN.

F. UNITED STATES: ON MANY IF NOT MOST INTERNATIONAL ISSUES GOI AND US WILL AGREE. WHERE AGREEMENT IS IMPOSSIBLE GOI SHOULD BE EXPECTED TO EXPRESS ITS DIFFERENCES PRIVATELY. GOI CAN AND SHOULD MUTE GRATUITOUS PUBLIC CRITICISM OF US POLICY.

THIS BALANCE SHEET IS NOT COMPLETE. WE WILL WELCOME SUGGESTIONS FROM THE DEPARTMENT AS TO ADDITIONAL POINTS WHICH SHOULD BE INCLUDED FOR DISCUSSION OR EXPLORATION NYRE.

WITH PTIENT AND SENSITIVE HANDLING WE BELIEVE SHASTRI MAY BE EXPECTED TO REVIEW FRANKLY POINTS OUTLINED ABOVE DURING WASHINGTON VISIT.

PAGE FOUR RUSBAE 713B S E C R E T

INDIA'S RIGID AND TO SOME EXTENT ANTAGONISTIC MOOD OF SEPTEMBER HAS NOW MELLOWED VERY SIGNIFICANTLY. AT PRESENT KEY INDIAN

LEADERS APPEAR GENUINELY ANXIOUS TO EXPLORE POINTS OF DIFFERENCE WITH US AND TO ARRIVE AT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE POSITIONS.

ON TWO SUBJECTS HOWEVER WE SHOULD HAVE NO ILLUSION FOR THE PRESENT ABOUT PROSPECT OF INDIA MODERATING HER VIEWS. THE FIRST IS POLITICAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF ACCEPTING A PAKISTAN ROLE IN THE VALLEY OF KASHMIR. THE SECOND IS ADVERSE INDIAN REACTION TO RESUMPTION OF US MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN EXCEPT IN CONTEXT OF A PAK-INDIA-US FRONT IN OPPOSITION TO CHINA WHICH FOR THE TIME BEING AT LEAST APPEARS UNREALISTIC.

GP-3 BOWLES
BT

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

W/8
Komer

6

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION:

Amembassy NEW DELHI

PRIORITY SO

Shastri visit

12 2

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

1. Embassy's reporting on attitudes of GOI leaders regarding next steps in Indo-US relations, and particularly on Shastri's visit to USA, suggests that message we want to get across to them is just not getting through. Consequently believe you should know how we see things here as background for your negotiations re visit.

2. It appears that GOI leadership, in its present militant and go-it-alone mood, may have developed mistaken notion of relative weight of elements in equation of our relationship. While we do not discount either intrinsic importance of India to us or importance at this juncture in our

relations

Origin by:

NEA:WJH:andley
NEA:SCA:CCLaise:atm

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearance:

S/S - Mr. Walsh
White House - Mr. Bundy

The Under Secretary

W. 30 - Ambassador Haro

~~SECRET~~

Classification

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Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 25, 244

By NARA, Date 12-18-03

NOV 12 1965

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Page 2 of telegram to NEW DELHI~~SECRET~~*Classification*

relations that Shastri come here, we are not prepared to make overtures to get him here or to bargain with Shastri over conditions under which ^{he} ~~we~~ will come. Given purpose of visit, it seems to us that it is of greater importance to Indians than to us that it takes place, and it is going to be a long, cold winter in our relationship unless he gets over here to sort things out with the President. We do not wish to encourage Indians to delude themselves regarding this basic point by our posture and our actions in period before meeting takes place. Moreover, while we recognize Shastri's narrow writ on Kashmir, it would seem from your reporting that he does have enough additional political strength these days to cope with any domestic political risks which he feels he may run in visiting US without prior understandings.

3. Our central concern will be to develop understanding of what constitutes workable relationship between aid donor and recipient. Aid is not a state of nature which US bound to respect. We have obligation to our citizens to demonstrate our aid is achieving concrete results in terms of objectives aid is designed to serve. In India's case, what needs to be demonstrated to our satisfaction includes following:

a. Actions to turn swords into plowshares. Present twilight state of no-war, no-peace threatens progress of economic development. Since India is larger country, special responsibility falls upon it to make every effort to restore peace and maintain security of subcontinent, along lines of SC Resolution of September 20. While movement toward reconciling Indo/Pak differences may be extremely difficult at this juncture, nevertheless there is in present situation an unparalleled

opportunity

Page 3 of telegram to NEW DELHI~~SECRET~~
Classification

[opportunity for India to steer Indo/Pak relations into new and more hopeful direction.]

At present time Pakistan is facing up to kind of hard realities and choices that would dispose it to come to terms with India on something less than plebiscite on Kashmir if India could provide way out. This means an honorable retreat for Pakistan into negotiations that will hold promise of easing its fears of Indian threat to Pakistan's security. Clearly this will involve Kashmir as well as other outstanding issues, and sorting out may take a long time. However, what is at stake is security of subcontinent and India's own larger interests vis-a-vis China. A serious and sustained process to find solutions to issues that divide India and Pakistan and to minimize thereby prospect of future war or exploitation by China is not too much for a friend interested in India's future to ask. And we intend to ask for such an effort while recognizing that settlement may be a long way off.

b. Actions to translate economic promises to Indian people and to US into economic performance. Most critical issue here is question of food production. My 800 and other messages have already spelled out nature of our concern over India's record to date and how this relates to future of PL 480 assistance.

4. On broader subject of aid resumption, etc. we want it to be unmistakably clear to the Indians that regardless of the actual and as yet unknown economic costs of their recent bout of warfare, it is widely accepted here by public, as reflected on the Hill and in the journals, that two nations we have helped considerably are frittering away scarce resources, both economic and military, as they bicker and fight. [~~HOW~~ Aid resumption, is going to be possible only if we can convince the Congress and the public at large that this is not going to happen again, and by

QUOTE —

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Page 4 of telegram to Amembassy NEW DELHI

~~SECRET~~

Classification

QUOTE we UNQUOTE I include the Indians as well. As I told S. K. Patil when he came to see me, it was only by my assurances to the Congress that I was able to prevent legislative prohibitions on aid to South Asia.

5. As great Asian country, now alert to threat of expansionist Communist China, we believe India should be able understand and, indeed, give more support to efforts US and others making in Vietnam to thwart China's ambitions. We recognize GOI's difficulties, particularly with Soviet Union, in taking strong public position on this and that privately it does not wish see US pull out of Southeast Asia. But we consider that India's position and actions to date fall considerably short of what is possible.

6. In sum, Shastri should understand that President is interested in talking to him on wide variety of subjects in order to develop a personal sense of what kind of relationship between our two countries will best serve our mutual interests in years ahead, and that until this is accomplished we will not commit ourselves on numerous operational problems our two countries face. We do not intend to start out on journey until we know where we are going.

END

GP-3

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*~~SECRET~~CORRECTION ISSUED:
11/12/65; 5:10 AM mm

Action

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Info

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P 120330Z

FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI - CORRECTED COPY

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1247

STATE GRNC

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~~SECRET~~ NOVEMBER 11 SET ONE OF TWO

EXDIS

1965 NOV 11 PM 11 53

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YESTERDAY AT HIS REQUEST I CALLED ON L.K. JHA WHO SAID HE WISHED TO DISCUSS THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES.

AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION IT HAD BEEN DECIDED THAT ANY THOUGHT OF A DECEMBER VISIT SHOULD BE ABANDONED. PARLIAMENT WILL NOT ADJOURN UNTIL THE 10TH OF DECEMBER AND WITH THE HEAVY AGENDA THE SESSION MAY DRAG ON BEYOND THAT DATE WHICH WOULD LEAVE ALMOST NO TIME BEFORE CHRISTMAS.

THEREFORE, THE MOST CONVENIENT TIMING FROM THE STANDPOINT OF

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 496A ~~SECRET~~
THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE THE FIRST HALF OF JANUARY, EARLY ENOUGH TO ENABLE HIM TO RETURN BY JANUARY 15 FOR THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ALL INDIA CONGRESS COMMITTEE IN JAIPUR ON THE 16, 17 AND 18 OF JANUARY.

JHA ADDED THAT WHILE THE PRIME MINISTER WAS ANXIOUS AT SOME FUTURE DATE TO SPEND MORE TIME IN THE US, HE FELT THE CURRENT SITUATION IN INDIA PLACED HEAVY DEMANDS ON THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE VISIT SHOULD BE A PURELY BUSINESS OCCASION; HE CONTEMPLATED STAYING TWO OR THREE DAYS IN WASHINGTON WITH POSSIBLY A DAY IN NEW YORK. THIS WOULD SUGGEST THE PRIME MINISTER'S ARRIVAL IN WASHINGTON AROUND THE 10TH OF JANUARY AND HIS RETURN TO INDIA AROUND THE 14TH, PROVIDED OF COURSE THIS FITS THE PRESIDENT'S CONVENIENCE. THE PRIME MINISTER WAS ANXIOUS THAT THERE NOT BE ANY ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE SUGGESTED VISIT UNTIL A MUTUALLY AGREED TIME IN THE FUTURE.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68 vol. 25 #246

NOV 12 1965

By K NARA, Date 12-18-03

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1247, NOVEMBER 11, FROM NEW DELHI (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

JHA THEN RATHER HESITANTLY STATED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND INDEED THE WHOLE CABINET WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE VISIT. INDIA BADLY NEEDED THE US AND IF THERE IS TO BE AN INDEPENDENT NON-COMMUNIST ASIA WITH AN EFFECTIVE BLOCK ON CHINESE EXPANSIONISM THE US ALSO NEEDED INDIA.

PAGE THREE RUSBAE 496A ~~SECRET~~
WITH SO MUCH AT STAKE, JHA POINTED OUT THAT THE FAILURE OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING WOULD HAVE A CATASTROPHIC EFFECT ON THE POLITICS NOT ONLY OF INDIA BUT OF ASIA AT A VERY CRITICAL HISTORIC MOMENT.

THEREFORE, DID I SEE ANY DISCREET WAY OF EXPLORING ON A PRELIMINARY BASIS THE KEY QUESTIONS THAT MIGHT ARISE AND THUS DETERMINE IN SOME MEASURE TO WHAT EXTENT A MEETING OF THE MINDS IN WASHINGTON WAS LIKELY? I SAID THAT I FULLY UNDERSTOOD HIS CONCERN BUT THAT I FELT THAT WITH GOOD WILL ON BOTH SIDES WE CAN APPROACH THE MEETING WITH CONFIDENCE.

INDIA'S BASIC OBJECTIVES AND OURS ARE VERY SIMILAR, I.E., INDIA AND AMERICA ARE EQUALLY ANXIOUS TO BLOCK CHINESE EXPANSIONISM, AND HELP MAINTAIN STABILITY IN ASIA AND AFRICA, TO STRENGTHEN THE UN, ETC. THE US ALSO RECOGNIZES THAT A STABLE ECONOMICALLY VIABLE, AND DEMOCRATIC INDIA WITH ONE SEVENTH OF THE WORLD'S POPULATION IS ABSOLUTELY BASIC TO A STABLE AND PEACEFUL ASIA.

FOR NEARLY TWENTY YEARS WE HAVE BEEN STRIVING TO CREATE AN ASIAN BALANCE OF POWER WITH ALMOST NO HELP FROM THE MAJOR NATIONS OF ASIA SUCH AS JAPAN, INDONESIA, INDIA AND PAKISTAN.

PAGE FOUR RUSBAE 496A ~~SECRET~~
THIS SUGGESTED A VERY KEY POINT OF CRITICAL INTEREST TO US ALL: BECAUSE WE HAD NO MASS SUPPORT FOR THIS ESSENTIAL EFFORT WE HAVE BEEN FORCED TO FALL BACK ON RELATIVELY MINOR ASIAN POWERS SUCH AS SOUTH KOREA, SOUTH VIET NAM AND TAIWAN AND BECAUSE THESE NATIONS REPRESENTED ONLY 5 PER CENT OF ASIAN PEOPLES THERE HAS BEEN NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO INTRODUCE MASSIVE AMERICAN MILITARY POWER INTO THE EQUATION.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 1247, NOVEMBER 11, FROM NEW DELHI (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

ONE OF THE FIRST QUESTIONS THE PRESIDENT MIGHT ASK WOULD BE INDIA'S WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO WORK TOWARDS A MORE EFFECTIVE BALANCE OF POWER VIS-A-VIS CHINA AND THUS TO RELIEVE SOME OF THE PRESENT PRESSURES ON THE USA. TO THIS JHA RESPONDED IN A GENERALLY AFFIRMATIVELY ALTHOUGH QUITE NATURALLY NON-COMMITTAL MANNER.

COMMENT: WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT THIS MEETING GO FORWARD AND I HOPE THAT THE DATES MENTIONED WILL BE GENERALLY ACCEPTED. WE ALSO ASSUME THAT WE ARE AS KEENLY AWARE AS ARE THE INDIANS THAT THE FAILURE OF THESE DISCUSSIONS WOULD HAVE A PROFOUNDLY ADVERSE EFFECT ON US AS WELL AS INDIAN INTERESTS. IT IS MY BELIEF THAT IN ORDER TO CREATE A FAVORABLE AND RECEPTIVE MOOD THE FOLLOWING STEPS ARE IMPORTANT:

PAGE FIVE RUSBAE 496A ~~SECRET~~

1. AS MUCH AS OUR POLICY WILL PERMIT WE SHOULD SEEK TO RELIEVE INDIA OF ANY REASONABLE SUSPICIONS THAT WE ARE TRYING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THEIR FOOD DILEMMA. WE HAVE MADE A VIGOROUS REBUTTAL TO THESE SUSPICIONS AND IN THE EFFORT WE HAVE HAD THE POWERFUL AND EFFECTIVE SUPPORT OF SUBRAMANIAM.

IT WOULD BE A MASTER STROKE FOR THE USG TO INVITE SUBRAMANIAM IN THE NEXT 2 OR 3 WEEKS TO COME TO THE US TO DISCUSS THE INDIAN AGRICULTURE PROGRAM AND OUTLOOK. THIS SUGGESTION WOULD BE RECEIVED WITH WARM APPROVAL IN INDIA AND WOULD PUT THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT IN A RECEPTIVE MOOD FOR THE KIND OF DISCUSSION WHICH I AM SURE THE PRESIDENT HAS IN MIND. IF AT THE SAME TIME, WE COULD RELEASE THE NON-PROJECT FERTILIZER LOANS SO THAT INDIA COULD ORDER THE FERTILIZER URGENTLY NEEDED FOR THE SPRING PLANTING. INDIAN APPRECIATE WOULD BE PROFOUND.

2. HERE IN INDIA WE COULD CONTINUE TO IMPRESS ON THE INDIANS THE NEED FOR CURBING THE CARELESS AND SOMETIMES IRRESPONSIBLE STATEMENTS OF SUCH INDIAN LEADERS AS INDIRA GANDHI, CHAGLA, ETC.
BOWLES
BT

~~SECRET~~

8/27-11/1/65

Excerpts from Bowles/L. K. Jha Dialogue*
re Shastri Visit - RWK comments on visit

SECRET

August 1965

8/27/65 - Delhi 400. Jha suggests setting aside 2-3 days in early October which wld ensure availability both Shastri/LBJ if PM cld leave country then. Bowles suggested visit could be in context UN speech. It Bowles' view Jha not reflecting PM view but merely exploring .

September 1965

9/24/65 - Delhi 779 (Exdis). Bowles has impression from Jha that Shastri giving serious consideration to visiting UN sometime before 10/15/65. Bowles asks for authorization to encourage Shastri to make trip which he likely to make anyway and indicate President invites him to come down to Washington.

9/24/65 - RWK to President. Passing on Bowles request Delhi 779. Suggesting that since Ayub may come early in October, Shastri come a week or so later. Or we could simply wait and see "who signs up first." President approved. (RWK talked to Pak Min 9/25/65 and inquired).

9/29/65 - RWK to McGB. RWK told BK Nehru (1) we had no fixed view as to type of Shastri visit (i. e. official or in context UN); asumed that with aid bill passed President wld be happy to see Shastri; that matter of a formal invite no problem once mutually convenient date worked out; that it his understanding PM wanted to come at a time when he cld spend several days seeing US.

October 1965

10/8/65 - RWK to President. Urging reply to Shastri's get well message as means firming up visit since Shastri probing and angling for reply. RWK draft response suggests last week in October; leaves open question of official visit or in conjunction UN.

10/11/65 - Delhi 941. Jha implies PM anxious go to US; was prepared to go late in October if it had not been for LBJ illness. If President not able see him before 11/3 he could come second or third week in December. Bowles hopes President can write Shastri letter expressing ... "hope PM will come to US soon as parliamentary duties permit". Bowles feels it important mtg be held soon as feasible. 'Our position in India will grow increasingly difficult...'

*Including Bowles/Shastri dialogue 10/18/65 (Delhi 1025)

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 12-18-03

BRIEF
PENDING
JH A

SECRET

Page Two

10/15/65 - RWK to McGB. Attaching reply (cleared by Rusk) to Shastri Oct. 7 get well message saying "let's get together soon." We can either waltz around this way or force Shastri's hand by proposing a date... real question is whether the President should reply saying 'come on in mid-December.' RWK for this course and would assume President is too... "The sooner we firm up matter the more we limit risk of further misunderstanding and further drift in our Pak/Indian affairs. RWK also attached Memo to President setting forth these options.

10/18/65 - Delhi 1025. Bowles sees Shastri. PM cannot go to US in Nov. because of Parliament... he considering visit immediately after adjournment provided President really wants to see him; does not want primarily to make UN speech (wants any UN speech to appear as by-product), is anxious to avoid impression he competing with Ayub for US favors; therefore hopes his own visit can take place before Ayub's. He also concerned with kind of personal reception he will get in US. Shastri sensitivity probably due (a) his disappointment over postponement visit last spring; (b) negative reporting from BK Nehru; (c) anti-Indian News stories in US press. Shastri feels India is in US doghouse but not clear why. Bowles urged visit, said doubts were unfounded, that he wld be received warmly not only from WH but from all agencies USG.

10/20/65 - Delhi 1050. PM will not be free to leave India until after Parl session (11/3-12/10). Could be ready for discussions in Washington on 12/13. He anxious avoid any appearance confrontation /with Ayub/ or a trading of accusations. If Ayub coming late Nov/early Dec Shastri will postpone until middle/late January. If Ayub not coming until late December or until Jan. there good chance Shastri will accept for mid-December. Bowles wants authorization to say (to be followed by letter) LBJ will see him during week 12/13 in Washington and thinks PM will be delighted to accept--barring any interim emergency.

10/21/65 - RWK to McGB. "I strongly believe that Shastri shld be first (a) because he was willing to come when Ayub wasn't; but (b)... if India is our main concern we ought to act that way."

10/22/65 - RWK to Bowles. "If Ayub gets here first, ... it's crucial that Shastri neither pout nor misunderstand. Mac and I hope you'll drive this home to L. K. Jha in spades if the ball bounces that way."

10/22/65 - RWK to McGB. "If Shastri comes second, he'll be on the defensive; if he comes first we can better urge him to think big."

SECRET

Page Three

10/28/65 - RWK Memo to President. Suggesting we "answer Shastri's get well note along lines of attached (?) which in effect invites him to pick a date after mid-December. Best guess is he'd like to come promptly."

10/30/65 - RWK to President. "My own reading is that this mood ⁻⁻inflexibility on Kashmir/ will last until Shastri can hear from you personally where we stand. According to recent envoys, he's still eager to come around 10 December."

November 1965

11/1/65 - Delhi 1157. Jha says Shastri not ready to fix any particular date, feels "imperatives of Indian political life" wld not permit him to go either as supplicant or in bracket with Ayub. PM wants visit to appear in context mainstream of constructive relationship... not a "make or break" proposition; thus may not want to decide for perhaps another month when to go. Jha acknowledged visit cld not take place during precarious ceasefire or hostilities. Indian Parliament, in session beginning 11/3/65, may solidify pressures on Shastri but he cld handle if he has some clear signal of our position. Bowles comments this clear signal (defined by Mehta) would involve: (1) pause in ⁽²⁾US assistance is not directed to forcing any particular settlement and that no resumption of US MAP to Pakistan is in the offing.

11/1/65 - RWK to McGB: "...latest word from Delhi is that Shastri might be able to come a little before the 10 December end of Lok Sabha session."

84

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

6

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Shastri Virel

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE NOV 3

FOLG TEL RPTD YOUR INFO

QUOTE

CONTEL 230 FROM CALCUTTA TO DELHI NOV 2

REPRODUCED BELOW IS EXCERPT TAKEN FROM A TAPE OF
PRIMIN'S SHASTRI'S PRESS CONFERENCE HELD AT CALCUTTA NOV 1, 1965
THE EXCERPT RELATES TO SHASTRI'S PROSPECTIVE US VISIT.

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 136

Q. SIR, ONE POINT- THERE IS CONSIDERABLE SPECULATION IN THE US
ABOUT YOUR VISIT TO THE USA. THE POLITICAL CLIMATE HAS CON-
SIDERABLY CHANGED IN FAVOR OF YOUR VISIT. DO YOU CONSIDER
IT FAVORABLE OR WHAT'S YOUR REACTION.

A. I HAVE NOT SAID THAT I SHALL NOT GO THERE, GO THE US, BUT
AS YOU ARE ALL AWARE THAT THE PRESIDENT IS STILL CON-
VALESCING, AND I DO NOT KNOW.

Q. INAUDIBLE.

A. I SAID I HAVE NOT SAID THAT I SHALL NOT GO TO THE US.
BUT, PERHAPS IT WILL TAKE SOMETIME FOR THE PRESIDENT TO RESUME
HIS NORMAL DUTY AND NORMAL WORK, AND THEREFORE IT IS DIF-
FICULT FOR ME TO SAY AS TO WHEN I WILL BE ABLE TO GO THERE.

Q. DOES IT MEAN AN INVITATION HAS COME- FORMALLY?

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-2- 1173, November 3, from New Delhi

A. THERE IS. I HAVE RECEIVED LETTERS FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON-
OF COURSE, IT WAS RECEIVED SOMEWHAT, SOMETIME BACK. ANOTHER
LETTER IN WHICH HE MADE A SPECIAL THAT I SHOULD GO TO, I
SHOULD VISIT, WASHINGTON AS EARLY AS IT WAS
CONVENIENT - TO ME.

Q. THIS IS AFTER THE AGGRESSION?

A. NO, A LITTLE BEFORE THE AGGRESSION.

Q. DOES IT MEAN, SIR, WHEN THIS VISIT TO THE US TAKES PLACE,
THE ENTIRE POLITICAL QUESTION WOULD BE COMING UP FOR DIS-
CUSSION ON KASHMIR?

A. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ME TO SAY WHAT QUESTION WILL COME UP
THERE. THERE WILL BE SO MANY THINGS TO BE DISCUSSED. IT
IS RATHER A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION. HITCHCOCK
BT

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 1157

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RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON 378

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~~SECRET~~ NOVEMBER 1

//L I M D I S//

ATMOSPHERICS AND DETAILS EMERGING FROM DCM CONVERSATION WITH L. V. JHA OCTOBER 30 CONFIRM AND IN SOME RESPECTS ELABORATE ON WHAT WE ALREADY KNOW ABOUT STATUS AND PROSPECTS INDO-AMERICAL RELATIONSHIPS.

JHA ACCEPTED DCM'S POINTS THAT STABILIZATION OF CEASEFIRE IS PRIME OBJECTIVE AND PREREQUISITE AS FAR AS USG IS CONCERNED AND THAT SINCE IT TAKES TWO TO STOP A FIGHT AS WELL AS TO START IT, GOI MUST NOT ONLY BE, BUT BE SEEN TO BE RESTRAINED. JHA ALSO ACCPETED CONCEPT THAT US WILL CONTINUE OPERATE WITHIN SECURITY COUNCIL TO ACHIEVE AT LEAST FIRST STEP. PRESENT PHASE MAY LAST

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 60 ~~SECRET~~
SOME TIME, AND WHAT HAPPENS DURING IT WILL AFFECT FLEXIBILITY BOTH GOVERNMENTS HAVE LEFT AT THE END OF IT.

WHETHER OR NOT JUSTIFIED, JHA SAID (AS HAVE OTHERS) THERE IS GROWING BELIEF IN INDIA, INCLUDING GOI, THAT US PROPOSES USE SUSPENSION ECONOMIC AID AS LEVER GOING BEYOND ISSUE OF CEASE-FIRE AND WITHDRAWAL. HE ACCEPTED POINT THAT AMERICAN GOVT IS CONSTRAINED BY FEELING OF AMERICAN PUBLIC AND CONGRESS THAT EVIDENCE OF STABILITY IN INDO-PAK RELATIONS IS ESSENTIAL TO CONTINUING AMERICAN AID, AND HE ALSO ACCEPTED POINTS THAT CON-

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By *fc*, NARA, Date 12-18-03

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1157, NOVEMBER 1, FROM: NEW DELHI

TINUANCE PEACE CORPS AND PL 480 IN ADDITION AID PIPELINE RATIONALLY BELIE INDIAN BELIEF HE HAD DESCRIBED. NEVERTHELESS, BELIEF IS THERE AND HE VOLUNTEERED STEPS WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN TO AMELIORATE IT.

ONE IS TO EXTEND "HUMAN" CONCEPT OF CONTINING PROGRAMS (PEACE CORPS AND FOOD) TO INCLUDE ASSISTANCE FOR FERTILIZER IMPORTS AND FERTILIZER PRODUCTION. (COMMENT: THIS KIND OF APPROACH SEEMS CONSISTENT WITH CONCEPTS IN USITO 154, WHICH WE ARE ASSUMING REPRESENTS CONSIDERED VIEWS OF USG.)

AT HEART OF GOI'S, AND PARTICULARLY SHASTRI'S POSITION, JHA SAID, IS DOUBT ABOUT OUR POSITION ON SUBSTANCE OF KASHMIR ISSUE. SHASTRI HAS NO REPEAT NO DIFFICULTY WITH CONCEPT OF SEEKING LONG TERM RAPPROCHEMENT WITH PAKISTAN, BUT DOES NOT FEEL HE CAN MOVE

PAGE THREE RUSBAE 60 ~~SECRET~~

UNLESS HE GETS SIGNAL "AT HIGHEST LEVEL" THAT USG DOES NOT INSIST ON PLEBISCITE IN KASHMIR AND ACCEPTS THAT FROM STRATEGIC VIEWPOINT RE CHICOMS, KASHMIR VALLEY MUST REMAIN WITH INDIA.

HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT USG HAS NOT HELD OUT FOR PLEBISCITE, BUT INSISTED THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT DOUBT ON OUR POSITION NOW THAT IT NEEDS TO BE CLARIFIED. (ALTHOUGH HE DREW ATTENTION TO SHASTRI'S APPROVING REMARKS ABOUT AMB GOLDBERG'S PRESS CONFERENCE, JHA SEEMED TO FEEL LATTER NOT ENOUGH.)

JHA GAVE AS HIS ASSESSMENT OF MOVEMENT OF FORCES SINCE BEGINNING OF THIS YEAR THAT SOVIET SUPPORT FOR INDIA ON KASHMIR (WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS KEYSTONE OF ENTIRE INDO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP) HAS BECOME AT LEAST LESS PRO-INDIAN, IF NOT MORE PRO-PAKISTAN; UK, AND TO SOME EXTENT US, HAVE TENDED MOVE AWAY FROM PAKISTAN, IF NOT ALL THE WAY TO SUPPORT OF INDIA. JUDGMENT GOI HAS TO MAKE IS AT WHAT POINT AND IN WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES THESE MOVEMENTS BECOME DECISIVE, AND IT IS IN THIS SENSE THAT SIGNAL OF OUR POSITION PREVIOUSLY NOTED ASSUMES MAJOR IMPORTANCE.

DISCUSSING PROSPECT OF SHASTRI VISIT TO PRES JOHNSON IN THIS CONTEXT, JHA SAID THAT

W V READS SHASTRI'S MIND, SHASTRI IS NOT YET READY TO FIX ANY PARTICULAR DATE; AS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY RE-

PAGE FOUR RUSBAE 60 ~~SECRET~~

PORTED, HE FEELS THAT IMPERATIVES OF INDIAN POLITICAL LIFE WOULD

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 1157, NOVEMBER 1, FROM: NEW DELHI

NOT PERMIT HIM TO GO EITHER AS SUPPLICANT OR IN BRACKET WITH AYUB. (HENCE, S.K. PATIL'S PUBLIC SPECULATIONS ABOUT MID-DECEMBER VISIT ARE EMBARRASSING AND IT IS HOPED HE WILL NOT REPEAT THEM.)

JHA SAID PM WANTS HIS MEETING WITH PRES JOHNSON V APPEAR IN CONTEXT OF MAINSTREAM OF CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BOTH COUNTRIES, NOT A "MAKE OR BREAK" PROPOSITION; THUS HE HIMSELF MAY NOT WANT TO DECIDE FOR PERHAPS ANOTHER MONTH WHEN TO GO. DURING THAT TIME, MAJOR PROBLEM WILL BE TO RETAIN SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY TO OFFSET GROWING "ANTI-PRESSURE" SENTIMENT. JHA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT TIME IS NEEDED ALSO ON US SIDE TO ASSURE THAT AT LEAST VISIT DOES NOT TAKE PLACE DURING HOSTILITIES OR PRECARIOUS CEASEFIRE. FACT THAT INDIAN PARLIAMENT WILL BE IN SESSION BEGINNING NOV 3 EXPOSES SHAWBORI TO PROSPECT PRESSURES ON HIM COULD SOLIDIFY, BUT JHA THOUGHT PRIMIN CAN AND WILL HANDLE THESE, THE BETTER IF HE HAS SOME CLEAR SIGNAL OF OUR POSITION.

(COMMENT: DURING THIS CONVERSATION, JHA WAS LESS IMMERSED THAN MANY OF HIS COLLEAGUES TO DOMESTIC IMPERATIVES OF USG'S POSITION. CONVERSATION WAS IN TONE OF COOL ANALYSIS OF HOW TO RECONCILE THE TWO SETS OF IMPERATIVES IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND TIME AVAIL-

PAGE FIVE RUSBAZ YP ~~SECRET~~
ABLE.)M

COMMENTS A DAY EARLIER BY ASOKA MEHTA TO USAID DIRECTOR SHED ADDITIONAL LIGHT ON GOI VIEWS. DISCUSSING PROBLEM OF PRESSURES DURING FORTHCOMING PARLIAMENTARY SESSION, MEHTA SAID GOI FEELS THAT WITH PRIVATE REPEAT PRIVATE ASSURANCES FROM US ON TWO POINTS IT CAN COPE. POINTS AS HE DESCRIBED THEM WERE THAN PAUSE IN US ASSISTANCE IS NOT DIRECTED TO FORCING ANY PARTICULAR KASHMIR SETTLEMENT AND THAT NO RESUMPTION OF USMAP TO PAKISTAN IS IN NEAR OFFING. HIS RATIONALE WAS GENERALLY SIMILAR TO JHA'S, ALTHOUGH LATTER DID NOT MENTION MAP.

GP-3.

BOWLES
BT

~~SECRET~~

86
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I greatly appreciate your thoughtful message of October 7 in connection with my recent visit to the hospital. I am glad to say that I am safely at home and gradually getting back to work.

I agree with you that there are many short and long-range problems that the two of us need to discuss together, and I am glad to hear that you hope to come to Washington soon. I understand that your Parliament will be in session until December 10, but if you wish to propose an early date after that time, I can assure you of a warm welcome here.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Lal Bahadur Shastri
Prime Minister of India
New Delhi

10/28/65
This is the letter
dictated by Mr. Bundy
which is going to the
President

SECRET

81
October 28, 1965

Mac -

How about this to focus thinking.
You could just attach the draft letter I
did on green two weeks ago.

RWK
RWK

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 12-18-03

87a

SECRET

October 28, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Organizing the Shastri/Ayub visits.

If you want to get this enterprise rolling for December/January, we'd suggest the following scenario to firm it up. Since Shastri has been much more specific and forthcoming about a date, we'd settle with him first.

1. Answer Shastri's get well note along lines of attached, which in effect invites him to pick a date after mid-December. Best guess is he'd like to come promptly.

2. Then tell Ayub when Shastri is coming and leave it up to Ayub as to whether he'd propose to come before or after. We think it's a toss-up, but if he did propose coming early you'd still have the option of replying that you'd prefer to spread out your visitors just now, so would propose late December or early January.

There are many signs that Ayub is coming our way (and even that he plans to sack Bhutto). This suggests that you can play him on a longer line than Shastri (and can get more response from Shastri if the larger country doesn't have to take second place).

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By J, NARA, Date 12-18-03

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

Approve

Disapprove -

SECRET

Mr. Brandy

876

Staff only Mon

~~SECRET~~

October 28, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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There are many signs that Ayub is coming our way (and even that he plans to sack Bhutto). This suggests that you can play him on a longer line than Shastri (and can get more response from Shastri if the larger country doesn't have to take second place).

R. W. Komer

Approve _____
Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-18-03*

87C

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I greatly appreciate your solicitous message. Let me assure you that my operation was a complete success, and that I am champing at the bit to get back to my desk.

Since, as you say, there are many short and longer term problems which I too have been looking forward to discussing with you, I am delighted to hear that you hope to be able to come to Washington soon. In fact, I would suggest the last week in October, when I expect to be at work full-time again.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Lal Bahadur Shastri
Prime Minister of India
New Delhi

*Received
See Mr. Brennan
version*

Friday, October 22, 1965
1:35 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Status of Foreign Visitors

*All bases
in "hold for"
Pres. action
Shastri Sh. visit
x Ayub Uncl
cy 88*

The only agreed visitor in the near future is Princess Margaret, for a White House party on November 17. I myself do not see why this should be a requirement for you -- though it would certainly be a pleasure if you feel like it.

The next would-be visitor is Chancellor Erhard. He has made it clear informally and very politely that if you are ready for him, he would like to come either just before or just after the Thanksgiving Holidays -- that would be about November 22 and 23 or about November 29 and 30. I have told his people that you will need a little while before making this decision, and they are most understanding. As I see it, your choice now is to pick a tentative date, or wait a a week or so, whichever you prefer. Your letter to Erhard (Tab A) carefully does not commit you.

Let's wait _____

Aim at November 22-23 _____

Aim at November 29-30 _____

The next candidate is Shastri. I attach at Tab B a copy of the letter which he wrote on October 7. At your request, we have held up on an answer, but probably we should acknowledge it soon in whatever form you prefer. In his letter, Shastri says he would like to come at a later date. In diplomatic channels, his people have been much more explicit and have made it clear he would like to come right after December 10, when his Parliamentary session ends.

Shastri's people have been hinting at one reservation -- namely, that he does not want to come hard on the heels of a visit by Ayub or immediately before such a visit. I do not think his people should be making conditions like this, and I suggest we have Bowles tell them, as his own conclusion,

that it would be a great mistake for the Prime Minister's people to suggest any conditions surrounding a visit to President Johnson. Then after doing that, if you want Shastri, it seems to me that you could reply to his letter saying that you hope he will propose any date that suits him after the Parliamentary session. This will make him invite himself, and keep your position clear. I attach a draft of such a letter at Tab C. I'm not sure it fits your tactics, but it gives you something to redraft, at least.

Ayub also has now told us (Bhutto to Rusk, yesterday) that he would like to come, "in late November or December." You told him on the phone that you would see him first, but there is a real question whether you now want him before Shastri. Ray Hare and Bob Komer think Shastri first is better, both because India is more important and because if you see Ayub first, he is bound to press you to mediate Kashmir -- and that is something we can't do in 1966. Bob's view is stated briefly at Annex D.

My own feeling is that just because we have very little to offer Ayub we probably ought to give him the small comfort of seeing him first. So my recommendation would be to get Ayub to propose himself definitely for late November and Shastri for mid-December, and then agree to receive them both.

These decisions can all wait a few days if you wish.

McG. B.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

89
BUNDY-SMITH
BATOR
BOWDLER
BOWMAN
COOPER
JESSUP
JOHNSON
KERRY
KROMER
MOODY

50-46

~~SECRET~~

Action
NEA

Info

SS
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NNNNQSA042SBA997
RR RUEHCR RUEHDT
DE RUSBAE 831 2931425
ZNY SSSSS
R 201409Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY NEWDELHI
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 1050
INFO RUEHDT/USUN 288
RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LOONDON 348
RUQVVR/AMEMBASSY KAAACHI 446
ZEN/AMCONGEN BOMBAY UNN
ZEN/AMCONGEN CALCUTTA UNN
ZEN/AMCONGEN MADRAS UNN
STATE GRNC
BT
SECRET OCT 20

078 15781

1965 OCT 20 AM 11 43

Shastri Visit

RSR

THIS MORNING I AGAIN DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM OF SHASTRI'S VISIT TO THE US WITH L.K. JHA. AS FAR AS I CAN NOW MAKE OUT THE SITUATION I S AS FOLLOWS:

THE PRIMIN WILL NOT BE FREE TO LEAVE INDIA UNTIL AFTER THE NEXT PARLIAMENT SESSION WHICH STARTS NOV 3 AND ENDS DEC 10. HE COULD FLY TO NEW YORK THE WEEKEND OF DEC 11 AND BE READY FOR DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON ON DEC 13.

HOWEVER, HE HAS HEARD REPORTS THAT AYUB KHAN IS COMING

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 831 ~~SECRET~~
AT ABOUT THAT TIME, AND HE IS ANXIOUS TO AVOID ANY APPEARANCE OF A CONFRONTATION OR A TRADING OF ACCUSATIONS.

THEREFORE, IF AYUB KHAN IS COMING TO THE US IN LATE NOV OR EARLY DEC AS REPORTED IN DELHI NEWSPAPERS THIS WEEK, SHASTRI WILL PROBABLY POSTPONE HIS OWN VISIT UNTIL THE MIDDLE OF JANUARY OR LATER. IF ON THE OTHER HAND AYUB KHAN IS NOT COMING UNTIL LATE DEC OR UNTIL JAN, THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THAT SHASTRI WILL ACCEPT FOR MID-DECEMBER.

I BELIEVE SHASTRI'S CONCERN REFLECTS GENUINE DESIRE TO AVOID ADDITIONAL RECRIMINATIONS WHICH COULD FURTHER HARDEN AN ALREADY DIFFICULT SITUATION AMONG THE THREE COUNTRIES.

IF IT FITS IN WITH THE PRESIDENT'S PLANS AND IF AYUB KHAN IS NOT EXPECTED UNTIL SOME LATER DATE I SUGGEST THAT I BE AUTHORIZED TO TELL SHASTRI THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE PLEASED TO

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 12-18-03

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1050, OCTOBER 20, FROM NEW DELHI

SEE HIM DURING THE WEEK OF DEC 13 IN WASHINGTON. IT IS MY GUESS THAT HE WILL BE DELIGHTED TO ACCEPT -- BARRING ANY NEW EMERGENCY IN THE MEANTIME.

MY VERBAL SUGGESTION MIGHT BE FOLLOWED BY A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT SAYING HE WAS HAPPY TO GET SHASTRI'S LETTER, CONCERNED ABOUT RECENT EVENTS, AND ANXIOUS TO BE HELPFUL IF POSSIBLE; THEREFORE HE WOULD BE GRATIFIED IF SHASTRI COULD COME TO WASHINGTON AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME, ETC.

THE SOONER THIS VISIT CAN BE ARRANGED, THE QUICKER WE CAN CLEAR THE AIR AND BEGIN TO GET THIS SITUATION BACK ON THE TRACK. GP-3 BOWLES
BT

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

90
October 15, 1965

Mac -

Shastri Visit. Attached is a proposed friendly reply to Shastri's 7 October get well message (note it's cleared by Rusk). It says let's get together soon.

We can either keep waltzing around this way or force Shastri's hand by proposing a date. Before 3 November is clearly out, if only because it is already 15 October. So the real question is whether the President should reply now saying "come on in mid-December."

I'm strongly for this course, and would assume the Boss is too. The sooner we firm up matters the more we limit the risk of further misunderstanding and further drift in our Pak/Indian affairs.

I'm also convinced that once Shastri is signed on, it will powerfully whet Ayub's appetite. In late September he said he couldn't come for 6-8 weeks, so he might even seek to come before Shastri.

Attached memo is designed to present these options to the President.

RWK
RWK

This is not urgent business, but you'll know better than I when to spring it.

SECRET

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By: *jc*, NARA, Date: *12-18-05*

SECRET

91
October 15, 1965
Friday/6:30 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is Rusk's proposed reply to Shastri's get-well message (also in draft cable). Other reports make clear that Shastri is nibbling hard, and that he was probably even willing to come before his next parliament session 3 November-10 December.

Rusk proposes merely replying that you too look forward to seeing Shastri at an early date. My own instinct is that if you wish to firm up this visit, you need merely say instead that you'd be delighted to have him come in mid-December. Shastri's in effect asking you to do just this.

Once Shastri's visit is arranged, this will be powerful medicine to get Ayub here, perhaps even before Shastri. You'll recall he said on 29 Sept. that he didn't see how he could come for 6-8 weeks.

Approve Rusk version _____

Approve mid-December _____

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

SECRET

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *jc* NARA, Date *12-18-03*

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~
~~CLASSIFICATION~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

91a
Romer

October 13, 1965

Date

Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

The enclosed is for White House
clearance prior to transmission.

Shostak for
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Draft telegrams to New Delhi.

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY ju ON 2-18-93

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~
~~CLASSIFICATION~~

OCT 15 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

Ambassy NEW DELHI

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 12-18-03

LIMDIS

Please deliver soonest following message from the President to
Prime Minister Shastri:

QUOTE ~~Thank you for your thoughtful letter.~~ I am grateful for
your kind wishes and deeply appreciate your warm expression of concern.
An interruption such as this is an inconvenience at a time when world
events are moving so rapidly. For this reason I am glad to be able to
report that I expect to be back to a full schedule at an early date.

I, too, am looking forward to discussing with you soon the many
problems which we both face. UNQUOTE

White House does not plan release of reply and presumes CUI will
feel likewise.

Above message is in reply to following message from Prime Minister
Shastri delivered by Indian Embassy to President:

QUOTE I am sorry to learn of your indisposition necessitating
hospitalisation for surgical treatment. I want to convey to you my
sincerest good wishes for your full and speedy recovery. In the world
of today, you have to carry a very heavy responsibility and it is my
earnest hope that you are soon restored to normal health to meet the
many challenges of our time.

There

The

~~XXXXXX~~ Secretary ~~XXXXXX~~

NEA:SCA:EGWing:dum 10/11/65

S/S -

NEA - Mr. Handley
M - Mr. Mann~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~
~~White House - Mr. Mann~~
White House -~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

OCT 15 1965

FORM 8-63 DS-322

Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other
flimsy work copies before delivery to Telecommunications Operations Division

2

New Delhi

~~SECRET~~
~~XXXXXX~~

CONFIDENTIAL

There are many problems, short-term and long-term, which I have been looking forward to discussing with you personally at an early date. It is my hope that ^{at} a later date, it should be possible for me to come and meet you in Washington in response to your invitation.

With warmest personal regards. UNQUOTE.

GP-3.

End

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other flimsy work copies before delivery to Telecommunications Operations Division

TELECOMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS DIVISION

2nd 572 telr.
WORK COPY
912

SECRET

Ambassy NEW DELHI

EXDIS
Your 941.

Last para SHASTRI's letter to President (see immediately preceding message) seems open to two interpretations: that PrMin desires early meeting with President or that he sees President's operation as legitimate basis for deferring consideration Washington visit. For purposes discussions with Shastri and those close to him we prefer assume former is valid interpretation.

You will note President's reply leaves way open for visit QUOTE at an early date. UNQUOTE. We understand President would be able to receive Shastri in time for PrMin's return New Delhi for Parliament session, ~~November 3~~ ~~November 3~~. You should therefore supplement letter by making clear to L. K. JHA and, if appropriate, PrMin himself, that you understand visit permitting kind of discussion of problems both Shastri and President desire opening of Parliament November 3. could be arranged prior to ~~November 3~~. You should indicate your view such visit highly desirable.

GP-3.

END

NEA/SOA:DTSchneider:bld/dam 10/11/65

NEA - Mr. Handley
M - Mr. MannWhite House -
S/S -The
~~XXXXXX~~ Secretary

-SECRET-

Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other flimsy work copies before delivery to Telecommunications Operations Division

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 12-19-03OCT 15 1965
FORM 8-63 DS-322

- ~~BUNDY-SM~~
- ~~BATOR~~
- ~~BOWDLER~~
- ~~BOWMAN~~
- ~~CRANE~~
- ~~DEWITT~~
- ~~JESSIE~~
- ~~JACKSON~~
- ~~KENT~~
- ~~KUMER~~
- ~~MOODY~~

08187

84
Action

85
Info

~~SECRET~~

QSA 708SBA940

RR RUEHCR
DE RUSBAE 77 2841330
ZNY SSSSS
R 111320Z
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 941
INFO RUFDND/AMEMBASSY LONDON 304
RUQVKR/AMEMBASSY KARACHI 92
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ OCT 11

1965 OCT 11 PM 2 47

7
304
Shastri Vaidya

028

L I M D I S

FOLLOWING TWO RECENT TALKS L.K. JHA STRONGLY IMPLIED THAT SHASTRI IS ANXIOUS TO GO TO US AND INDEED WAS PREPARED TO GO LATE IN OCTOBER IF IT WERE NOT FOR PRES. JOHNSON'S ILLNESS. IF, AS SHASTRI ASSUMES, PRESIDENT WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SEE HIM BEFORE PARLIAMENT MEETS NOV 3 HE COULD COME SECOND OR THIRD WEEK IN DECEMBER AFTER PARLIAMENT ADJOURNS ON DECEMBER 10.

PAGE TWO RUSDAE 377 ~~SECRET~~
I WOULD HOPE THAT PRESIDENT CAN WRITE PRIMIN LETTER AS SOON
AS HE FEELS BETTER EXPRESSING HIS APPRECIATION FOR SHASTRI'S
LETTER, HIS CONCERN ABOUT SUBCONTINENT, AND HIS HOPE THAT
PRIMIN WILL COME TO U.S. AS SOON AS HIS PARLIAMENTARY DUTIES
PERMIT.

I FEEL IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THIS MEETING BE HELD AS SOON AS IT IS FEASIBLE. OUR POSITION IN INDIA WILL GROW INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT AS LONG AS COMMUNISTS AND OTHER LEFT WINGERS ARE ALLOWED FREE REIN FOR SPECULATION AND CHARGES WHICH THEY ENJOY IN PRESENT UNCERTAIN SITUATION GP-3. BOWLES

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By pc, NARA, Date 12-18-03

~~SECRET~~

93
SECRET

October 8, 1965-4:45 p.m

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

If you want to get Shastri here, a good way to encourage it would be a quick reply to his message of solicitude. The last paragraph of his message suggests that he's probing as to when you might be in business again, and angling for a reply. Our latest soundings with B. K. Nehru also suggest that Shastri is nibbling, but no doubt wonders now when you'll be ready to receive him.

The attached response suggests the last week in October, and deliberately leaves open the question of whether it ought to be an official visit or a trip to the UN with a stopover in Washington. I strongly suspect he'll opt for the latter.

R. W. Komer

R. W. Komer

McP. B.

SECRET

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-18-03*

94
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I greatly appreciate your solicitous message. Let me assure you that my operation was a complete success, and that I am champing at the bit to get back to my desk.

Since, as you say, there are many short and longer term problems which I too have been looking forward to discussing with you, I am delighted to hear that you hope to be able to come to Washington soon. In fact, I would suggest the last week in October, when I expect to be at work full-time again.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Lal Bahadur Shastri
Prime Minister of India
New Delhi

"Hold up on this awhile."

LBJ/vm
10-12-65
8:30 pm

95
New Delhi,
October 7, 1965. *Unil*

Shastri
X India

My dear Mr President:

I am sorry to learn of your indisposition necessitating hospitalisation for surgical treatment. I want to convey to you my sincerest good wishes for your full and speedy recovery. In the world of today, you have to carry a very heavy responsibility and it is my earnest hope that you are soon restored to normal health to meet the many challenges of our time.

There are many problems, short-term and long-term, which I have been looking forward to discussing with you personally at an early date. It is my hope that at a later date, it should be possible for me to come and meet you in Washington in response to your invitation.

With warmest personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Lal Bahadur

His Excellency
Lyndon Baines Johnson,
The President of the United States of
America,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Shastri
55
10.7.65

96

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

40

Action

55

Info

~~SECRET~~

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1965 SEP 24 AM 7 53

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DE RUSBAE 966 2671145
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FM AMEMBASSY NEWDELHI
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 779
RUEHCR/WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ SEPT 24

EXDIS

Shastri Visit

03

IN CONVERSATION WITH L.K. JHA THIS MORN I HAD STRONG IMPRESSION THAT PRIMIN SHASTRI IS GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO VISITING UN SOMETIME BEFORE OCT 15. IF HE DOES DECIDE TO GO GOI WILL SURELY SAY THAT WOULD WELCOME OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO PRES JOHNSON DURING UNDOUBTEDLY BRIEF VISIT.

I STRONGLY URGE THAT I BE AUTHORIZED TO ENCOURAGE SHASTRI

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 966 ~~SECRET~~
TO MAKE THE TRIP WHICH HE IS LIKELY TO MAKE ANYWAY, AND INDICATE THAT THE PRES INVITES HIM TO COME DOWN WASHINGTON.

PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST.
GP-3 BOWLES
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/SO 8:01 AM, 9/24/65.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE 8:20 AM, 9/24/65.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 12-18-03

~~SECRET~~

SEP 24 1965

99
"Tell Bob Komer to get in touch with the Pakistani Embassy and find out when they want to come. If the Indians want to come, and I understand that they do, tell them that I would like them to come before the 15th."

LBJ/vm
12:45 pm
9-24-65

Done Shastri X Pak X P.D.
ber 24, 1965, 9:15 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Visits by Ayub and Shastri

As predicted, both Ayub and Shastri are now nibbling furiously at coming here. In the attached, Bowles asks for advice on whether to encourage Shastri. May we do so?

The only problem is your phone invitation to Ayub to come first. We could mention to Shastri that Ayub may come early in October, so we suggest that Shastri come a week or so later. Or we could simply wait and see who signs up first. They'll both be annoyed whichever we do, but this won't stop either from coming.

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer.

Approved ✓

Disapproved _____

Speak to me _____

OK.
and then Pak min & enquired 25 Sept
- 10:00 AM R. W. Komer (not here - in NY)

then Pak Min and enquired 25 Sept. R. W. Komer

99a

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

September 24, 1965
Friday, 10:15

Cable from New Delhi (779)

In conversation with L. K. Jha this morning I had strong impression that Prime Minister Shastri is giving serious consideration to visiting the UN sometime before October 15. If he does decide to go, Government of India will surely say that it would be a welcome opportunity to talk to President Johnson during the undoubtedly brief visit.

I strongly urge that I be authorized to encourage Shastri to make the trip which he is likely to make anyway, and indicate that the President invites him to come down to Washington.

Please advise soonest.

BOWLES

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 12-18-03

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

SECRET EXDIS
CLASSIFICATION

98

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Executive Secretariat

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

September 3, 1965

Date

BY JW ON 2-18-93

FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

For ~~your~~ information and
files. of Mr. Komer.

Enclosures:

Memcon dated 9/2/65 re visit of Amb. Nehru, CY 3

SEP 3 1965

SECRET EXDIS
CLASSIFICATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

This document consists of
2 pages. Copy No. 3
of 6 copies. Series A.

DATE: September 2, 1965
4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Visit of Ambassador Nehru

PARTICIPANTS: c Ambassador B. K. Nehru, India
Thomas C. Mann - M

COPIES TO: The Secretary
W.H. - Mr. Komer
NEA - Mr. Handley

Shastri Visit

Ambassador Nehru called at his request and said that he had instructions that it might be possible for Shastri to visit this fall, provided:

a) If dates were set, they could be kept secret.

On this point the Ambassador said that the Indian people would not understand their Prime Minister making plans to leave the country at this time because of the Kashmir.

b) It were clearly understood the visit might have to be postponed because of developments in the Kashmir.

I thanked the Ambassador for this information and said that we would hold this message very closely and I would be in touch with him.

The Ambassador then said that he had asked for an appointment to see the Secretary tomorrow. He has instructions to protest

SECRET-EXDIS

-2-

the use of U.S. military equipment in Kashmir by the Pakistanis. He said that several Presidents and Secretaries of State had assured India that our MAP equipment to Pakistan would not be used against India and now it was being used. He said his information was that the Pakistanis had driven thirty miles across the line (he was not clear whether this was in Kashmir or in India proper) apparently with the objective of severing the principal road from India into Kashmir.

The Ambassador expressed the personal opinion that India would be agreeable to accepting the Secretary General's call for a cease fire, provided it were clear that this applied to irregulars and infiltrators as well as to the armed forces of both countries.

I made no comment on the Kashmir problem except to say that the Secretary would listen with interest to what he had to say.

The Ambassador asked whether any progress had been made on the Title I PL-480 question. I said we were working on it and I hoped to have some definitive word for him within the next few days. Up to now no decision has been made. We are, however, aware of psychological and other aspects of India's food problem.

Distribution:

Copies 1 and 2 to the Secretary
Copy 3 to Mr. Komer
Copy 4 to Mr. Handley
Copy 5 to Chron
Copy 6 to files

SECRET-EXDIS

SUMMARY

99

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*~~SECRET~~

039

41
ActionSS
Info

RR RUEHCR RUEHDT RUFHON
 DE RUSBAE 1190 2391120
 ZNY SSSSS
 R 271037Z ZEA
 FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
 TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC (400)
 INFO RUSBKP/AMEMBASSY KARACHI 99
 RUFHON/AMEMBASSY LONDON 102
 RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK 46
 ZEN/AMCONGEN BOMBAY UNN
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 S E C R E T AUGUST 27

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 1965 AUG 27 AM 11:46

BUNDY-SMITH
 BATOR
 BOWLER
 BOWMAN
 CHASE
 COOPER
 JESUP
 JOHNSON
 KERRY
 KROMER
 MOODY

*Shastri
 Visit*

REF: EMBTEL 371

BECAUSE OF FUZZY NATURE OF PRIMIN'S USUAL APPROACH TO QUESTIONS AT HAND I HAVE MADE RULE FOLLOWING TALKS WITH SHASTRI TO CALL ON L.K. JHA NEXT DAY TO MAKE SURE THAT EXCHANGE FROM BOTH SIDES WAS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD WITHIN INDIAN GOVT.

ALTHOUGH MY MOST RECENT TALK WITH PRIMIN WAS WELCOME CHANGE FROM THIS PATTERN AND HE WAS BETTER PREPARED AND FAR MORE PRECISE, I STILL DECIDED THAT I SHOULD SEE JHA TO BE SURE THAT THERE WAS NO MISUNDERSTANDING IN REGARD TO PRIMIN'S VISIT TO US.

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 1190 S E C R E T
 JHA TOLD ME ALTHOUGH HE HAD NOT YET TALKED TO PRIMIN FOLLOWING MY VISIT WITH HIM MONDAY HE WOULD DO SO IN DAY OR TWO. STRESSING THAT HE WAS SPEAKING FROM PERSONAL VIEWPOINT HE INQUIRED WHAT I WOULD THINK ABOUT AN AGREEMENT TO SET ASIDE TWO OR THREE DAYS IN EARLY OCT ON CONFIDENTIAL BASIS WHICH WOULD ASSURE AVAILABILITY OF BOTH PRESIDENT AND PRIMIN IF SITUATION HERE ENABLED PRIMIN TO LEAVE COUNTRY. JHA SAID HE THOUGH PRIMIN COULD THEN GIVE US AT LEAST TWO OR THREE WEEKS' WARNING.

JHA ALSO SEEMED FAVORABLY INCLINED TO MY SUGGESTION THAT VISIT OF PRIMIN TO US MIGHT BE MADE OSTENSIBLY FOR A SPEECH AT UN CALLING ON HIGH LEVEL BASIS FOR PEACE, NON-PROLIFERATION AGREEMENT, NEED FOR ALL NATIONS TO IMPROVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS, ETC.

HE AGREED THAT SUCH A SPEECH WOULD NOT ONLY BE HELPFUL ABROAD BUT COULD BE PLAYED BACK EFFECTIVELY IN INDIA. WHATEVER ACCO-

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-18-03*~~SECRET~~

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SECRET

-2- 400, AUGUST 27, FROM NEW DELHI

LADES SHASTRI MIGHT WIN ABROAD WOULD CREATE SENSE OF PRIDE HERE AND ALSO PLACE HIM IN BETTER POSITION TO HANDLE EXTREMISTS IN HIS OWN PARTY AND IN OPPOSITION.

PAGE THREE RUSBAE 1190 ~~S E C R E T~~

ONCE HIS APPEARANCE AT UN WAS ANNOUNCED, PRIMIN COULD ADD THAT HE PLANNED TO GO ON TO WASHINGTON TO MEET PRES JOHNSON AND TALK OVER MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. THIS ROUTINE WOULD GIVE PRIMIN GRACEFUL WAY OUT OF HIS PREVIOUS STATEMENT THAT HE COULD NOT GO TO US IN FALL MONTHS. IT WOULD ALSO PLACE US VISIT IN GENERAL CONTEXT OF HIS DESIRE FOR SOME SOLUTION TO PAK-INDIAN CONFRONTATION AND HIS CONCERN FOR BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF INDIA'S POSITION ABROAD. AT SAME TIME THIS APPROACH WOULD SERVE OUR PURPOSES BY TAKING SOME OF DRAMA OUT OF VISIT AND ALLOWING CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT TO BE HELD IN SOMEWHAT LOWER KEY.

IT IS MY JUDGMENT THAT JHA IN FACT WAS NOT REFLECTING PRIMIN'S VIEW BUT WAS EXPLORING SITUATION WITH ME ON PERSONAL BASIS. HOWEVER, HE HAS AGREED TO DISCUSS IT WITH PRIMIN AND IF, AS I ASSUME, HE WAS LEANING IN THIS DIRECTION, THERE IS FAIR CHANCE THAT PRIMIN MAY RESPOND FAVORABLY.

GP-3

BOWLES

NOTE: HANDLED AS LIMDIS PER S/S-S

SECRET

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

82
Origin
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Info:

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI 257

EXDIS

3

AUG 20 6 47 PM '65

At August 18 meeting with Ambassador Nehru, Under Secretary Mann told him that after careful consideration here, it was USG opinion that a visit by Shastri in October rather than later would be most welcome. Nehru expressed preference for visit next year and Mann emphasized interests of both countries would be served by early visit.

Nehru said it would be impossible for Prime Minister to avoid press during visit and he would surely be asked about divergencies between US and India policies, especially since Shastri was on record as opposed to Viet-Nam bombing. Mann said governments often have different opinions and it was perfectly proper to express them in private. However, there was no more reason for GOI to state to press its opposition to our Viet-Nam policy ^{of bombing} than there would be for US to publicly state, for example, our views about GOI taking Kargil. There are ways to phrase answers to press questions which are

Drafted by:

M: JD Johnston/dp/ps 8/20/65

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

M - Thomas C. Mann T/CU

Clearances:

NEA - ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Mr. Handley

S/S -

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

By: *jc*, NARA, Date: 12-18-03

AUG 21 1965

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consistent with convictions but not offensive to friendly nations.

Nehru said he would report to Delhi immediately and inform
Mann of answer. CP-2 END

RUSK

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

101

Komer

CONFIDENTIAL

82
Action

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Info

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RR RUEHCR RUSBAE
DE RUEHDT 844 2322240
ZNY CCCCC
R-202130Z

FM USUN NEWYORK

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 452
INFO RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 12
STATE GRNC

BT

CONFIDENTIAL AUGUST 20

EXDIS

RE: SHASTRI VISIT

DURING CONURTESY CALL BY AMB PARTHASARATHI (INDIA) GOLDBERG SAID NOW THAT FOREIGN AID BILL WAS ABOUT TO BE ADOPTED PRES VERY MUCH HOPED PRIMIN SHASTRI WOULD BE ABLE MAKE POSTPONED VISIT SO THAT THEY COULD HAVE TALK. SAID HE THOUGHT INDIANS SHOULD KNOW PRES, WHILE STRONG LEADER, CAME FROM CONGRESSIONAL BACKGROUND AND HAD GREAT RESPECT FOR CONGRESSIONAL PRE-ROGATIVES. THERE HAD BEEN TROUBLE WITH AID BILLS IN RECENT YEARS, AS US TAX PAYERS FOR LONG TIME HAD BEEN CARRYING HEAVY BURDEN, AND HE HOPED INDIAN GOVT UNDERSTOOD THAT PRES'S REASON FOR POSTPONING VISIT HAD BEEN THE REAL ONE. PARTHASARATHI SAID HE HAD TALKED TO SHASTRI ON MON. SHASTRI VERY MUCH WANTED TO HAVE VISIT WITH PRES. FACT PARLIAMENT WAS IN SESSION AND CURRENT DIFFICULTIES WITH PAKISTAN IN KASHMIR WOULD AFFECT TIMING.

GP-4
GOLDBERG
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1965 AUG 20 PM 7 17

Shastri Visit

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Authority Group 4

By fc, NARA, Date 12-18-03

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AUG 21 1965

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

Komer 003

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102

Action

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Info

ZNY SSSSS
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FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 327
STATE GRNC
BT

14112

1965 AUG 19 AM 5 59

~~SECRET~~ AUG 19

EXDIS

FOR SECRETARY

DEPTEL 235

FOR SEVERAL REASONS SINCE MY RETURN TO DELHI I HAVE NOT
PRESSED SHASTRI FOR A VISIT: (A) I HAVE HAD EXCELLENT RUNDOWN
ON SITUATION FROM WIDE VARIETY OF SOURCES WITHIN GOI ON
QUESTIONS RELATED TO OUR INTERESTS AND DID NOT WANT TO APPEAR
TO BE PURSUING PRIMIN; IT WOULD BE BETTER IF HE SOUGHT ME OUT.
(B) SINCE SHASTRI HAS BEEN UNDER EXTRAORDINARILY HEAVY PRESSURE
WITH FULLBLOWN PAK INTRUSION INTO KASHMIR COINCIDING WITH
MEETING OF PARLIAMENT I KNEW THAT LEISURELY DISCUSSION AT
MOMENT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE, AND (C) AT PRESIDENT'S RECEPTION
SUNDAY SHASTRI SOUGHT ME OUT TO SAY HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD
TO VISIT AS SOON AS SITUATION QUIETED DOWN.

I THEN HAD MESSAGE FROM SHASTRI THROUGH JHA TO EFFECT THAT ALL
FROM US AMB UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD TRIGGER WIDE
VARIETY OF INQUIRES FROM OPPOSITION IN PARLIAMENT PLUS RUMORS
THAT US WAS PRESSING PRIMIN IN ONE DIRECTION OR ANOTHER, ETC.,
BUT THAT HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING ME NEXT WEEK WHEN
DEBATE WOULD HAVE TURNED TO OTHER QUESTIONS.

THEREFORE I DISCUSSED QUESTION OF SHASTRI'S VISIT TO US IN
OCT WITH L.K. JHA WHO AT FIRST CAME UP WITH FOLLOWING NEGATIVE
REACTION:

1. ALTHOUGH AT FIRST B.K. NEHRU HAD FAVORED OCT VISIT HE
WAS NOW INCLINED TOWARD JANUARY VISIT (A) BECAUSE ANYTHING
PRIMIN SAID ON VIET NAM WOULD BE CRITICIZED, AND (B) BECAUSE
HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE HIM SEE SOMETHING MORE OF US THAN WOULD
BE POSSIBLE IN BRIEF OCT VISIT.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc* NARA, Date 12-18-03

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AUG 19 1966

SECRET

-2- 237, August 19, from New Delhi

2. IF IT BECAME KNOWN HERE IN INDIA THAT SHASTRI WAS PLANNING VISIT TO US AT TIME WHEN INDIA WAS FACING EMERGENCY THREAT IN KASHMIR HE WOULD BE SUBJECT TO CRITICISM.

I TOLD JHA THAT QUESTION, OF COURSE, WAS ENTIRELY UP TO PRIMIN TO DECIDE, THAT PRESIDENT FELT HE HAD ISSUED INVITATION IN APRIL WHICH HE WOULD BE GLAD TO RENEW ONCE HE KNEW PRIMIN'S DESIRES. I THEN MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:

1. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT SHASTRI AND PRES JOHNSON DEVELOP UNDERSTANDING PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP AS SOON AS FEASIBLE; AND SINCE IN ONE SENSE THEIR POLITICAL CAREERS HAVE DEVELOPED ALONG PARALLEL LINES THIS SHOULD BE REASONABLY EASY TO ACHIEVE.

2. WE FACE SEVERAL OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS ON WHICH DECISIONS ARE NEEDED AND ON WHICH PRESIDENT WOULD DEEPLY APPRECIATE GETTING SHASTRI'S VIEWS, I.E., PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN FOURTH FIVE YEAR PLAN AND EXTENT AND DURATION OF INDIA'S NEED FOR ASSISTANCE, HOW SHASTRI VIEWS SITUATION IN REGARD TO PAKISTAN AND ULTIMATE HOPES FOR SETTLEMENT, DANGER FROM CHINESE AGGRESSION, QUESTION OF INDIA'S MILITARY DEFENSE AND OUR RELATION TO IT, ETC. THE SOONER BOTH COUNTRIES COME TO GRIPS WITH SUCH QUESTIONS, THE EASIER IT WILL BE FOR BOTH SIDES.

3. IF SHASTRI PAID BRIEF UNOFFICIAL VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN OCTOBER THIS WOULD NOT PRECLUDE HIS MAKING OFFICIAL VISIT TO US NEXT YEAR DURING WHICH HE MIGHT SEE SOME OF THE COUNTRY. IN ANY EVENT JANUARY WOULD BE POOR MONTH FROM WEATHER POINT OF VIEW FOR EXTENDED VISIT OF THIS KIND.

4. VIET NAM SITUATION SHOULD NOT CAUSE PRIMIN CONCERN. WHILE ADMITTEDLY WE DO NOT WELCOME UNBALANCED CRITICISM OF OUR POSITION FROM FOREIGN HEADS OF STATE (#)

WOULD WELCOME STATEMENT FROM IMPORTANT VISITORS IN INDIA THAT GOI SHOULD SOLVE KASHMIR PROBLEM BY UNILATERALLY ABANDONING ITS OWN POSITION. HOWEVER SHASTRI'S RECENT STATEMENTS ON VIET NAM HAVE BEEN BALANCED AND FAIR AND WE PARTICULARLY WELCOMED HIS RECENT COMMENT THAT CHINA ALONE WISHED FIGHTING TO CONTINUE. THEREFORE VIET NAM SHOULD NOT BE PROBLEM.

5. THERE IS NO NEED FOR PRIMIN TO ANNOUNCE AT THIS MOMENT THAT HE IS GOING TO US. IF HOWEVER HE SHOULD CONFIDENTIALLY AND TENTATIVELY TELL US HE IS PLANNING TO COME, SAY FIRST WEEK IN OCTOBER, WE COULD SET ASIDE NECESSARY TIME AND PLAN ACCORDINGLY. THIS WOULD ALLOW SHASTRI TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH

SECRET

82 INCOMING TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL 14112
CORRECTION ISSUED
8-19-65 7 PM MGG

55 ~~EXDIX~~
-2- 327; August 19, from New Delhi "CORRECTED PAGE 2"

2. IF IT BECAME KNOWN HERE IN INDIA THAT SHASTRI WAS PLANNING VISIT TO US AT TIME WHEN INDIA WAS FACING EMERGENCY THREAT IN KASHMIR HE WOULD BE SUBJECT TO CRITICISM. 003

I TOLD JNA THAT QUESTION, OF COURSE, WAS ENTIRELY UP TO PRIMIN TO DECIDE, THAT PRESIDENT FELT HE HAD ISSUED INVITATION IN APRIL WHICH HE WOULD BE GLAD TO RENEW ONCE HE KNEW PRIMIN'S DESIRES. I THEN MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:

1. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT SHASTRI AND PRES JOHNSON DEVELOP UNDERSTANDING PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP AS SOON AS FEASIBLE: AND SINCE IN ONE SENSE THEIR POLITICAL CAREERS HAVE DEVELOPED ALONG PARALLEL LINES THIS SHOULD BE REASONABLY EASY TO ACHIEVE.

2. WE FACE SEVERAL OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS ON WHICH DECISIONS ARE NEEDED AND ON WHICH PRESIDENT WOULD DEEPLY APPRECIATE GETTING SHASTRI'S VIEWS, I.E., PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN FOURTH FIVE YEAR PLAN AND EXTENT AND DURATION OF INDIA'S NEED FOR ASSISTANCE, HOW SHASTRI VIEWS SITUATION IN REGARD TO PAKISTAN D ULTIMATE HOPES FOR SETTLEMENT, DANGER FROM CHINESE AGGRESSION, QUESTION OF INDIA'S MILITARY DEFENSE AND OUR RELATION TO IT, ETC. THE SOONER BOTH COUNTRIES COME TO GRIPS WITH SUCH QUESTIONS, THE EASIER IT WILL BE FOR BOTH SIDES.

3. IF SHASTRI PAID BRIEF UNOFFICIAL VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN OCTOBER THIS WOULD NOT PRECLUDE HIS MAKING OFFICIAL VISIT TO US NEXT YEAR DURING WHICH HE MIGHT SEE SOME OF THE COUNTRY. IN ANY EVENT JANUARY WOULD BE POOR MONTH FROM WEATHER POINT OF VIEW FOR EXTENDED VISIT OF THIS KIND.

4. VIET NAM SITUATION SHOULD NOT CAUSE PRIMIN CONCERN. WHILE ADMITTEDLY WE DO NOT WELCOME UNBALANCED CRITICISM OF OUR POSITION FROM FOREIGN HEADS OF STATE IN US ANY MORE THAN INDIA WOULD WELCOME STATEMENT FROM IMPORTANT VISITORS IN INDIA THAT GOI SHOULD SOLVE KASHMIR PROBLEM BY UNILATERALLY ABANDONING ITS OWN POSITION. HOWEVER SHASTRI'S RECENT STATEMENTS ON VIET NAM HAVE BEEN BALANCED AND FAIR AND WE PARTICULARLY WELCOMED HIS RECENT COMMENT THAT CHINA ALONE WISHED FIGHTING TO CONTINUE. THEREFORE VIET NAM SHOULD NOT BE PROBLEM.

5. THERE IS NO NEED FOR PRIMIN TO ANNOUNCE AT THIS MOMENT THAT HE IS GOING TO US. IF HOWEVER HE SHOULD CONFIDENTIALLY AND TENTATIVELY TELL US HE IS PLANNING TO COME, SAY FIRST WEEK IN OCTOBER, WE COULD SET ASIDE NECESSARY TIME AND PLAN ACCORDINGLY. THIS WOULD ALLOW SHASTRI TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH

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~~SECRET~~

-3- 237, August 19, from New Delhi

POSSIBLE EMERGENCY DEVELOPMENTS HERE AND THEN AT OPPORTUNE
TIME ANNOUNCE THAT HE WAS GOING TO UN TO DISCUSS PAKISTAN-
INDIA RELATIONS AND PERHAPS ASK FOR UN HELP IN FINDING SOLUTION
TO IMPASSE.

THIS WOULD BE DRAMATIC AND HELPFUL ANNOUNCEMENT IN ITS OWN
RIGHT HERE IN INDIA AND ELSEWHERE, AND WASHINGTON VISIT,
WHICH NEED TAKE ONLY A DAY OR SO OF DISCUSSIONS, COULD BE ADDED
LATER ON GROUNDS THAT SINCE SHASTRI IS IN US ANYWAY HE WOULD
LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO VISIT WITH PRESIDENT.

L.K. JHA REACTED FAVORABLY TO THESE REBUTTAL POINTS AND I
HAVE FEELING THAT HE WILL RECOMMEND TO SHASTRI THAT HE FOLLOW
MY SUGGESTIONS. JHA STATED HE WOULD TALK FURTHER WITH ME ON
MONDAY OR TUESDAY.

GP-3.

BOWLES

MEC

(#) Omission, correction to follow

~~SECRET~~

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Original
SS
John

IMMEDIATE

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Komer

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AUG 19 12 23 PM '65

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GP-3

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

NEA:WJHandley:White House:RKomer:ea Classification approved by: M - Mr. Mann

Clearance

s/s - Mr. Thompson

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines

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FORM DS-322
8-63

By 10, NARA, Date 12-18-03

AUG 18 1965

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Komer
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Origin
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Info

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI
INFO: Amembassy KARACHI

IMMEDIATE

189

Visit
AUG 13 8 52 PM '65

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EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR

Embtel 232

Given L.K. Jha's feeler to you, and indication here by B. K. Nehru of possibility of an early visit we quite agree it desirable get Shastri's reaction to possible visit here in October.

FYI: President highly receptive to Shastri visit when Aid Bill passed but does not wish to decide finally or issue formal invitation unless clear indication Shastri will accept. END FYI.

Therefore, suggest you take line that we regard Shastri as having cordial standing offer visit here in fall, once Aid Bill behind us, as President clearly indicated in April letter. You might state as your own opinion that such meeting clearly desirable and mutually beneficial in view of number of US/Indian issues which could be profitably discussed. However, there is natural concern in Washington lest issuing new invitation before exploring whether visit mutually convenient might result in embarrassment both sides.

You should also be sure to note that Ayub also has open invite to come sometime in fall, but that we regard Shastri visit as entirely separate enterprise.

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

M - Thomas C. Mann

NEA:WJH:andley:White House:Mr. Komer 8/13/65

Approved by:

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

Clearances:

White House - Mr. Bundy
S/S - Mr. Gordon

M - Mr. Mann

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

AUG 14 1965

By *[Signature]*, NARA, Date 12-18-03

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FYI B.K. Nehru recently said to Mann that Shastri could "squeeze in" three or four day fast visit to Washington in October but that January visit preferred because this would give Shastri time to get real feel of US perhaps by also visiting other cities. He said this desirable since Shastri had not been to US before. Nehru also said he thought it must be assumed that Shastri would be asked questions on Viet-Nam and other delicate issues which Shastri would have to answer. Mann replied this would pose real problem if Shastri felt obliged criticize US policies as distinguished from general expressions such as hope for peaceful solution Viet-Nam crisis. You should endeavor get meeting of minds on this point before formal invitation is issued. END FYI

GP-3

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

105

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

47

Action

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FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 232

INFO/ RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON 47

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ AUG 10 SECTION 1 OF 2

FOR SECRETARY AND MANN

LONG TALKS WITH MEHTA ON SUNDAY AND L.K. JHA ON MONDAY PROVIDED OPPORTUNITY FOR USEFUL EXCHANGE IN REGARD TO KEY QUESTIONS AFFECTING INDO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. BECAUSE BOTH CONVERSATIONS COVERED MUCH SAME GROUND I AM REPORTING THEM IN SINGLE CABLE.

BOTH MEHTA AND JHA EXPRESSED PROFOUND INTEREST IN CURRENT SITUATION IN WASHINGTON AS I HAD SEEN IT DURING MY TEN DAYS OF CONSULTATION THERE; INEVITABLY THEIR MAJOR CONCERN CENTERED

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 354 ~~SECRET~~

ON CONTINUING US WILLINGNESS TO HELP INDIA ECONOMICALLY AND MILITARILY AND WHEN THEY MIGHT EXPECT DECISIONS IN REGARD TO OUR FUTURE PLANS.

I STATE THAT THEY WERE CORRECT IN ASSUMING THAT DECISIONS HAD BEEN POSTPONED AND STRESSED THAT THIS WAS DUE TO COMBINATION OF DEVELOPMENTS: 1. NEED FOR CONCENTRATION BY PRESIDENT ON UNPRECEDENTED PROGRAM OF DOMESTIC REFORM WHICH WAS NOW RAPIDLY GOING THROUGH CONGRESS; 2. DETERMINATION OF PRESIDENT AND HIS ASSOCIATES TO FIND HONORABLE AND MEANINGFUL SOLUTION OF VIET NAM CRISIS; 3. PRESIDENT'S DESIRE TO EXPLORE PERSONALLY AND IN DEPTH US RELATIONS WITH INDIA, AND IN PARTICULAR EFFECTIVENESS OF AID PROGRAM AND OUTLOOK FOR INDIA'S FUTURE DEVELOPMENT, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO TIMING WHEN INDIA MIGHT BE EXPECTED TO BECOME ECONOMICALLY SELF-SUFFICIENT.

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State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 12/9/03

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1955 AUG 10 AM 7 22

SECRET

-2- 232, AUG 10, FROM NEW DELHI (SEC 1 OF 2)

I STATED THAT PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL INTEREST IN INDO-AMERICAN RELATIONS WAS IN MY OPINION A MOST HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT AND AN ESSENTIAL STEP TO CLOSER UNDERSTANDING IN REGARD TO WHOLE WIDE RANGE OF MUTUAL PROBLEMS INVOLVING WORLD PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT.

PAGE THREE RUSBAE 353 ~~SECRET~~
BOTH MEHTA AND JHA EXPRESSED THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF SITUATION AS I HAD DESCRIBED IT. THEY SHOWED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN OUR CURRENT APPROACH TO VIET NAM CRISIS AND EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR PRESIDENT'S DRAMATIC MOVES IN DEALING WITH SUCH US DOMESTIC PROBLEMS AS EDUCATION, MEDICARE, HOUSING, IMMIGRATION, CIVIL RIGHTS, ETC.

HOWEVER AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED THEY PRESSED ME POLITELY BUT PERSISTENTLY TO ESTIMATE WHEN DECISIONS MIGHT BE EXPECTED WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON DELICATE INDIAN FOODGRAIN SITUATION AND FUTURE SHIPMENTS OF PL-481 GRAIN.

MEHTA EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE OF DELAY IN PL-481 AGREEMENT WOULD FURTHER STIMULATE SPECULATIVE TENDENCIES AND HOARDING INHIBITING FLOW OF GRAIN TO MARKET.

IN REGARD TO AID PROGRAM I POINTED OUT THAT WORLD BANK WAS IN PROCESS OF STUDYING INDIAN SITUATION AND THAT US AS WELL AS OTHER MEMBERS OF CONSORTIUM WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY AWAIT ITS FINDINGS BEFORE REACHING DECISIONS THEMSELVES. IN REGARD TO MILITARY PROGRAM WE WERE CONSCIOUS OF FACT THAT INDIA HAD URGENTLY REQUESTED SUPPORT FOR ITS AIR FORCE AND THAT DECISIONS ON FY65 BUDGET HAD NOT BEEN MADE. I EXPLAINED THAT PRESIDENT FELT IT ESSENTIAL TO POSTPONE FINAL DECISION ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE UNTIL CONGRESS ACTS ON THIS BUDGET REQUEST AND HE HAS AN OPPORTUNITY FURTHER TO EVALUATE DEMANDS OF WAR IN VIET NAM.

PAGE FOUR RUSBAE 354 ~~SECRET~~
IN REGARD TO PL-481 WE HAD PROVIDED ASSURANCE OF SIXTY-DAY INTERVAL SUPPLY WHICH PROVIDED CONTINUING FLOW OF WHEAT AND RICE. WE WERE CONSCIOUS OF INDIA'S CONTINUING FLOW OF WHEAT AND RICE. WE WERE CONSCIOUS OF INDIA'S CONTINUING NEEDS, AND PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF VIGOROUS MEASURES GOI IS TAKING TO INCREASE ITS OWN FOOD PRODUCTION I COULD SEE NO BASIS FOR PANICKY REACTION ON PART OF GOI.

SECRET

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-3- 232, AUG 10, FROM NEW DELHI (SEC 1 OF 2)

IN COMMENTING ON FOURTH FIVE YEAR PLAN MEHTA STATED IN LAST THREE WEEKS THAT BANK AND GOI HAD COME MUCH CLOSER TOGETHER IN THEIR VIEWS. INDEED HE THOUGHT THERE WAS NEAR TOTAL AGREEMENT NOW ON STEPS INDIA SHOULD TAKE TO ESTABLISH A MORE RAPID PACE OF DEVELOPMENT. DISCUSSIONS WITH BANK HAD BEEN MOST CONSTRUCTIVE AND HELPFUL TO INDIAN GOVT AND HE HOPED BANK'S RECOMMENDATIONS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE NOT ONLY TO GOI BUT ALSO TO MEMBERS OF CONSORTIUM, PARTICULARLY US.

IN RESPONSE TO MY SUGGESTION THAT GOI MIGHT THEMSELVES TAKE INITIATIVE BY ANNOUNCING THEIR PLANS IN AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO BANK AND CONSORTIUM, MEHTA STATED THAT THIS MIGHT PROVE EMBARRASSING ALL AROUND SINCE DE-CONTROL MEASURES WHICH HE STRONGLY ADVOCATES WOULD BE POSSIBLE ONLY IF FOREIGN EXCHANGE WERE MADE AVAILABLE TO PAY FOR INCREASED IMPORTS OF KEY ITEMS.

PAGE FIVE RUSBAE 354 ~~SECRET~~
THEY CONFIRMED THAT T.T. KRISHNAMACHARI WILL VISIT US IN SEPTEMBER TO TALK WITH BANK PEOPLE AND WITH MEMBERS OF USG FOLLOWED BY VISITS WITH OTHER CONSORTIUM MEMBERS IN EUROPE AND JAPAN. MEHTA STATED THAT TTK WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY BHOOOTHALINGAM AND KRISHNA MOORTHY WHO WOULD PROBABLY PRECEDE HIM TO US. HE ALSO SAID HE WAS HOPEFUL THAT L.K. JHA WOULD BE ASKED TO ACCOMPANY FINANCE MINISTER AND ADDED THATAMB NEHRU WAS ALSO FAVORABLE TO THIS SUGGESTION. HE INTENDED TO SUGGEST THIS ADDITION TO PRIMIN.

WHEN I ASKED L.K. JHA ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF HIS ACCOMPANYING TTK, HE SAID THAT BHOOOTHALINGAM AND KRISHNA MOORTHY AS WELL AS TTK MIGHT FEEL HE WAS INTERFERING. HOWEVER IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO GO. (NOTE: IT MIGHT BE WELL DISCREETLY TO SUGGEST TO B.K. NEHRU WISDOM OF L.K. JHA'S BEING INCLUDED IN PARTY.)

I EXPRESSED MY FRANK CONCERN TO BOTH JHA AND MEHTA ABOUT TTK'S UNPREDICTABLE TURN OF MIND AND ASKED EACH IF HE FELT TTK WAS AS ANXIOUS AS THEY WERE TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE BANK, US AND OTHER CONSORTIUM NATIONS ON FUTURE BASIS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE. EACH WAS EMPHATIC IN SAYING THAT TTK'S VIEWS HAVE CHANGED CONSIDERABLY IN RECENT WEEKS AND THAT HE IS NOW COMING TO GRIPS WITH REALITIES OF INDIA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

BOWLES
GP-3.
BOWLES
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~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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47

Action

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Control:

Rec'd:

6603

AUGUST 10, 1965

7:10 AM

FROM: NEW DELHI

ACTION: SECSTATE 232 PRIORITY

INFO: LONDON 47

DATE: AUGUST 10 (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

FOR SECRETARY AND MANN

L.K. JHA BROUGHT UP QUESTION OF SHASTRI'S VISIT TO US BY REFERENCE TO AMB B.K. NEHRU'S BELIEF THAT VISIT SHOULD OCCUR AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE THIS FALL. JHA STATED THAT MONSOON SESSION OF PARLIAMENT THAT OPENS ON AUG 16 RUNS UNTIL LATTER PART OF SEPT AND THAT NEXT SESSION OF PARLIAMENT OPENS IN NOVEMBER. THIS MEANS THERE WOULD BE RELATIVELY FREE PERIOD OF FIVE TO SIX WEEKS FROM LATE SEPT TO EARLY NOV. ALTHOUGH SHASTRI ALREADY HAD OTHER ENGAGEMENTS OF SOME IMPORTANCE SCHEDULED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO BE POSTPONED.

HOWEVER HE STATED PRIMIN WAS QUITE FRANKLY AT LOSS AS TO HOW TO HANDLE SITUATION. HE REALIZED THAT US WAS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE IN REGARD TO VIET NAM AND CRITICAL OF SOME OF HIS REMARKS, AND ALTHOUGH HE FELT OUR CRITICISM HAD BEEN BASED ON MISINFORMATION HE WAS ANXIOUS NOT TO OFFEND US ANY FURTHER.

I STATED THAT I COULD SEE NO REASON FOR DIFFICULTY ON THIS SCORE PROVIDED PRIMIN STILL ACCEPTED PRES RADHAKRISHNAN'S PROPOSALS AND RESOLUTION OF 17 NONALIGNED NATIONS AT BELGRADE, BOTH OF WHICH HAD IMPRESSED US AS BEING CONSTRUCTIVE.

I ADDED THAT FROM MY PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS I HAD HAD WITH MEMBERS OF INDIAN GOVT I FELT THAT FORTHRIGHT STATEMENT OF INDIA'S VIEWS ON VIET NAM COULD DO MUCH TO REMOVE MISUNDERSTANDINGS IN MINDS OF MANY AMERICANS INCLUDING THOSE HIGH IN OUR GOVT. JHA AGREED WITH THIS AND ADDED THAT MY POINT WAS

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-2- 232 AUGUST 10, (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM NEW DELHI

ILLUSTRATED BY FACT THAT PRES JOHNSON'S RECENT SPEECH OUTLINING US POLICY IN REGARD TO VIET NAM HAD BEEN RECEIVED WITH APPROVAL THROUGHOUT INDIA AND HAD RECEIVED STRONG SUPPORT WITHIN INDIAN CABINET.

IN CLOSING THIS PARTICULAR PART OF DISCUSSION I SAID THAT DECISION IN REGARD TO TIMING OF VISIT WAS UP TO PRIMIN; THAT PRESIDENT FELT HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT INVITATION WAS OPEN AND THAT DECISION AS TO WHEN TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT WAS IN HANDS OF MR. SHASTRI. JHA STATED THAT HE WOULD SET UP DATE FOR ME TO TALK WITH PRIMIN WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT I WOULD COVER FRANKLY AND FULLY GROUND WHICH I HAD ALREADY COVERED WITH HIM.

GP-3

BOWLES

JTC

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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BOWLER
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KLEIN
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MOODY
REEDY
SAUNDERS
THOMSON

84

Origin
NEA
Info

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI

176

Shastri Visit

AUG 7 12 49 PM '65

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Note USINFO 062300Z for James Keat Baltimore Sun story on Shastri

visit. August 6 press conference comment as follows:

"Q. Bob, do you know whether Prime Minister Shastri will be visiting here this winter?

"A. I do not. As you know, it had been suggested that the visit might take place in the fall, and so far as I know that is still an open case."

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

NEA/P:OBellison:lab

8/7/65

Telegraphic transmission and

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NEA/P - Daniel Brown

Clearances:

SOA - Mr. Lakeland

P - Mr. Reap

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वॉशिंग्टन, डी. सी.
EMBASSY OF INDIA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

8531

107

May 28th, 1965

Shastri Visit

My dear Mr President:

I have the honour to transmit to you
the enclosed message from the Prime Minister
of India, which has just been received at this
Embassy.

With my high regard and esteem,

Yours sincerely,

(B.K. NEHRU)
Ambassador of India

The President,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.



107a

PRIME MINISTER.
INDIA.

May 23, 1965.

Dear Mr. President,

Shantel
To 109
6/8/65

On April 16, 1965 Ambassador Chester Bowles conveyed to me your message informing me that for various reasons it would not be convenient for you to receive me in Washington on the 2nd June as previously arranged. In deference to your wishes, I had naturally, and I must confess with some sense of disappointment, to cancel the visit to the United States which was scheduled for early June. You have suggested that I should visit the USA in autumn. I am, however, not able to say at present whether my parliamentary and other commitments will permit me to do so.

You have referred to our close association in many common endeavours. We greatly value this association and trust that it will continue undiminished in a spirit of mutual understanding.

I was happy to meet Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge who also handed me your letter of April 15. I was interested to learn from him about the Vietnam situation. The situation is really depressing and dangerous. I hope that it might be possible for circumstances to arise which will permit of a dialogue and a peaceful solution of the Vietnam problem. I know the same thought must be uppermost in your mind also. In today's situation when China is pursuing an aggressive policy, it is difficult to anticipate with any degree of certainty, the likely course of events. But believe me Mr. President, I do feel sincerely that the more rational elements might possibly respond well if it were possible for you to consider a cessation of the air strikes. In any case it would greatly strengthen the chances of a peaceful solution. Such a decision on your part would be a significant contribution towards the promotion of world peace and would be in keeping with the high statesmanship which the United States has displayed in moments of crisis.

contd.....

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ERN 1468, Vol 25, 423
By 16 NARA Date 12-18-03



PRIME MINISTER,
INDIA.

-2-

We ourselves have been passing through a difficult situation. You are no doubt informed of the recent attack on us by Pakistan in the Kutch-Sind border area. This has roused a great deal of feeling. We are a peaceful nation wedded to the pursuit of peace and economic development but it seems our neighbours China and Pakistan are determined to provoke us. We are exercising a great deal of patience and we have responded positively to Prime Minister Harold Wilson's initiative to bring about a ceasefire and restoration of status quo ante. I am afraid Pakistan has been raising all kinds of difficulties regarding ceasefire and restoration of status quo as on 1st January, 1965 which have prevented an agreement being reached. The fact that Pakistan has been using United States armour and equipment against us has naturally caused much concern in our country. I know, however, that your Government has already taken up this matter with the Government of Pakistan.

With warmest personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

Lal Bahadur

(Lal Bahadur)

His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States of America,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

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2386
1. Home
2. let BKS

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

June 3, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Suggested Reply to Prime Minister Shastri

On May 28, the Indian Ambassador delivered a personal letter for you from Prime Minister Shastri (Tab A attached). Mr. Shastri's letter refers to your own message of April 8 concerning the possibility of a visit in the fall, discusses India's difficulties with Pakistan, but above all returns to Mr. Shastri's favorite notion of our stopping completely the bombing of the north as a prelude to negotiations of some sort on Viet-Nam.

I recommend your signature to the attached draft reply (Tab B), for the following reasons:

- a. It would firm up your personal relation to Shastri.
- b. It would present your position directly to him, on a matter where we have reason to believe that his own harping on cessation of the bombing is not shared by other members of his government.
- c. India has a particularly crucial role to play in the next month on the Viet-Nam front. Shastri visits Canada about June 11 for five days, and thereafter the Indian delegation will be perhaps the leading moderate nation in the Algiers conference of Afro-Asian nations.
- d. It is particularly desirable at this moment both to shoot down the cessation idea and to encourage the Indians to pursue their own proposal. This proposal has bugs in it, but it is the best third-party initiative now in the ring, and it could be the best compromise at Algiers to forestall some hostile resolution.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 12-19-03

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year
interval; not
intentionally declassified

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For all these reasons, we have prepared a draft response for your signature which goes into our position at great length, in the fashion which we believe will be most persuasive with Shastri and with more moderate members of his government. The draft reply is attached as Tab B.

To round out the matter, we would propose to instruct the Embassy in New Delhi to give Shastri a more complete fill-in on our communications to Hanoi at the time of the pause. We believe this is desirable to impress upon Shastri the soundness of our conclusion that the response was negative and fully justified our resumption. A draft cable is attached as Tab C.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

Attachments:

Tab A - Letter from Prime Minister Shastri.

Tab B - Proposed Reply to Prime Minister Shastri.

Tab C - Draft Cable to New Delhi.

SECRET

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Research
Memorandum

34 RNA-16, May 5, 1965

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *Thomas L. Hughes*
Subject: Indian and Pakistani Reactions to the Postponement of the Shastri
and Ayub Visits

Bundy Smith
BUNDY SMITH
BATO
BOWMAN
CHASE
COOPER
HAYNES
JESSUP
JOHNSON
KEENE
KLEIN
MOODY
THOMSON

The postponement of the visits of Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub to Washington has evoked a strong reaction in both India and Pakistan. In the following memorandum we review the reaction from both countries and consider some of the implications of the postponements for future Indian and Pakistani policies.

ABSTRACT

In India, Prime Minister Shastri, his government, and the press, have reacted bitterly to the postponement of the invitation, especially the abruptness with which it took place. Shastri considers that the visit is cancelled, not postponed. There was general disbelief of the reasons set forth by the US for the postponement; most Indians related it to US unhappiness over criticism of its Vietnam policies, and the unwillingness of President Johnson to listen to Asian advice. Indians generally felt that Ayub had been the main target of the postponement and that the Shastri visit was only incidentally postponed; they were particularly bitter at being treated on the same level as Pakistan. The responsible press has ultimately become concerned that the Indian reaction not get out of hand, and a very few papers believe that the postponement was justified in terms of US world-wide responsibilities. However, Indian opinion is almost unanimously critical of the US action.

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~~CONTROLLED DISSEM~~

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
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after 12 years

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4

MAY 7 1965 By pc NARA, Date 12-19-03

Although the postponement has also rankled Pakistan, the official reaction has been restrained. Ayub certainly feels slighted, but he has minimized the impact by adopting an "understanding" pose. The government has instructed the press to dampen its anti-Americanism, and press coverage, while critical, has been mild by Pakistani standards. Pakistan derived considerable pleasure from the Indian discomfiture and probably intends its conduct as a contrast to that of New Delhi.

In addition to a desire to provide a contrast to Shastri, Ayub's reaction is conditioned in part by factors of personal pride. His recognition of the extensive dependence upon the US, that does not permit him the type of outburst that the Indians have indulged in, is probably also involved. In the wake of the postponement, he may even moderate some of his policies that the US has found objectionable; his longer run reaction, however, is likely to be an intensification of his search for alternate sources of support to reduce his great dependence on the US.

The implications for Indian policy are more immediate. Shastri may feel that he must fortify his image by standing up to the US on various issues; over the short range, India may be more difficult to deal with on a variety of subjects, including aid, Vietnam, and the Indo-Soviet relationship. The latter will be particularly important in view of Shastri's visit to Moscow in May. Negative Indian responses will be limited, however, by India's felt need to maintain its equilibrium between the US and the USSR, as well as by the broad range of interests which India and the US share, especially with regard to China.

CONTROLLED DISSEM

- iii -

Both the Shastri and Ayub visits were to have been the occasion for sorting out a number of outstanding problems relating to US aid -- particularly in the military field. These problems have assumed an importance that renders them difficult of solution except at the highest levels. The troubled atmosphere resulting from the postponement controversy is likely, for some time at least, to make it more difficult than ever to come to grips with them.

The implications of the postponement have been greatest in India -- in no small part because of New Delhi's inclination to treat the affair as a cause celebre, in contrast to Pakistan's restraint. To a considerable extent, the attention of both countries has been diverted by the outbreak of hostilities in the Rann of Kutch. After this flare-up has subsided, some longer-term implications of the postponement controversy may begin to develop, although it is possible that -- especially in India -- the Kutch events may permanently submerge reaction to the postponements.

CONTROLLED DISSEM

I. INDIA

A. The Reaction

India reacted to the postponement of the Shastri invitation with anger and bitterness. The Prime Minister himself, normally mildmannered, complained to Ambassador Bowles at length; in particular, he was perturbed over the manner of the postponement, which he felt gave him no opportunity to save face. He feels that his position, both at home and abroad, has been badly undermined and that Indo-US relations have been set back sharply. Ambassador B. K. Nehru told Secretary Rusk that he considered the postponement an "act of discourtesy," and Foreign Minister Swaran Singh's statements in the Lok Sabha reflected the anger of most Indian parliamentarians. The Indian government has stated that it considers the visit cancelled, not postponed, and has made clear that any future visit of Shastri to the US will be at Shastri's convenience.

The Indian government -- and particularly Shastri himself -- are sensitive to presumed slights. The present leadership is acutely conscious of living in the shadow of Pandit Nehru, and feels that Shastri can ill afford any diminution of his stature. Indian public reaction has been sympathetic to Shastri, and has praised his firm public response. In fact, there is an outside chance that the affair may have enhanced his domestic popularity.

Indian press reaction to the postponement of the Shastri and Ayub visits has been strongly critical, feeding heavily on rumors and criticisms carried in the US press. The far-left has of course been most outspoken, characterizing the postponement as typical of the manner in which the US deals with Asians. Even the more moderate press, however, has demonstrated great distress at what it considers to be an affront to India and its Prime Minister.

A theme that runs throughout the press commentary is irritation that India has been bracketed together with Pakistan in US treatment. The Indians seem to feel that the action was directed mainly against Ayub, and that the postponement of the Shastri visit was an afterthought. Since India has always resented being equated with the much smaller Pakistan, the parallel postponement of the visits rankles deeply.

The press uniformly rejects the reasons advanced by the US for the postponement; most ascribe it to US preoccupation with Vietnam and unwillingness to tolerate criticism or advice (a point that Moscow has played back). Some papers see the postponements as an exercise of dollar diplomacy to force India and Pakistan to toe the US policy line; they berate the US as "ham-handed" and feel that the quality of US diplomacy is slipping. Several newspapers related the postponement to Indo-Pakistani differences on the subcontinent, noting that President Johnson does not want to be importuned by mutual recriminations between Shastri and Ayub.

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One paper suggested that the postponement might have a beneficial effect, if it forced India and Pakistan to settle their own problems, rather than continually carrying them to the US as a court of appeal. A very few papers criticized Delhi for its sharp reaction to the postponement, and admitted that the US would be justified in putting off Ayub and Shastri, in view of its preoccupation with the defense of Southeast Asia. Such positive responses were, however, rare; the characteristic reaction to the postponement was an overwhelming outpouring of hurt feelings, often reflecting latent anti-American sentiment.

The attention of the press has been generally diverted by Indo-Pakistani hostilities in the Rann of Kutch, although there is a continuing undercurrent of critical comment. Even before the outbreak of hostilities, a number of responsible writers had begun to have second thoughts about the intensity of Indian reaction. Realizing the danger of lasting damage to the US relationship, they had begun to point out the need for a moderate response to what was, in fact, a relatively minor event.

B. Implications

It is still too early to tell whether the emotional outburst over the postponement will fade away with little after-effect, or whether lasting damage has been done to Indo-US relationships. The hostilities in the Rann of Kutch have obscured the reaction of all parties concerned, and may have even submerged the matter permanently. Before the outbreak of the Kutch affair, however, certain trends of reaction were visible and have continued in a low key.

Foreign Aid. Shastri has already pointed up a problem confronting Indo-US aid relationships in the wake of the postponement. He noted that if he now accepted aid it would appear India was being "bought off"; if aid was not forthcoming, it would appear that India was being punished for not following US policy. The press has already -- against all logic -- interpreted US contributions to the Aid to India Consortium as a sop to Indian opinion following the postponement of the Shastri visit. In addition, both the Shastri and Ayub visits were to have been the occasion for sorting out a number of outstanding problems relating to US aid -- particularly in the military field. These problems have assumed an importance that renders them difficult of solution except at the highest levels. The troubled atmosphere resulting from the postponement controversy is likely for some time at least to make it more difficult than ever to come to grips with them.

Indo-Soviet Relations. The postponement of the visit takes on particular significance in view of Prime Minister Shastri's forthcoming trip to the Soviet Union. Indo-Soviet-US relationships are closely intertwined, and any move made by either the US or the USSR inevitably has repercussions on Indian relations with the other. The Soviets will almost certainly attempt to capitalize on the downturn in Indo-US relationships by treating Shastri particularly well and perhaps by offering him additional economic and military assistance. India might grasp at such favors, out of pique at the US and

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perhaps also in fear that the US commitment to India was somehow lessening. On the other hand, India is still vitally concerned with the maintenance of its nonalignment policy, by which it cannot become over-committed to either the US or the USSR. This impels Shastri to limit his ties with the Soviet Union, so as to maintain a balance in his relationships.

Anti-Americanism. The Indian government has recently been under fire both from leftists within the country and from the radicals within the Afro-Asian movement for its "soft" policy toward the US, especially in Southeast Asia. In the wake of the postponement, Shastri may feel inclined to refurbish his image by "standing up" to the US and demonstrating his independence through righteous indignation. This attitude could be particularly evident at the Afro-Asian Conference, scheduled for late June in Algiers, where Shastri will be under the close scrutiny of his Afro-Asian compeers. Various issues impinging upon US interests (e.g., bases in the Indian Ocean) will be raised at Algiers; India will be restricted in the criticism it can voice of the US, however, since its arch-enemy Communist China will be the prime mover of the anti-American forces.

Vietnam. The postponement of the visit could also have repercussions on India's policy toward the US role in Vietnam. Prime Minister Shastri -- speaking before the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society shortly after the postponement was announced -- stated that there was little point in discussing President Johnson's Baltimore proposals until the US stopped bombing raids in the north. Although Shastri had expressed similar sentiments previously, there was little doubt that his forceful restatement resulted from displeasure at the postponement. Indian unhappiness could manifest itself in further adverse comments on US policy; criticism of the US in Afro-Asian forums; closer collaboration with the Soviet Union in Southeast Asian affairs; or even -- within the limitations opposed by Sino-Indian enmity -- Indian obstructionism in the ICC. On the other hand, a well-placed Indian has informed us that an Indian attempt to be helpful to the US position in Vietnam (the proposal for an Afro-Asian police force) was "not unrelated" to a desire to show the US that India was not acting out of pique, and could rise above the bitterness engendered by the visit postponement.

Countervailing Forces. One effect of the postponement has been a sobering effect on Indian thinking. In the newspapers, and undoubtedly also in government circles, Indians have been shocked into a potentially beneficial rethinking of their position with respect to the US, in specifics such as Indo-Pakistani relations and Indian policy toward South Vietnam, but particularly in the overall relationship. The Indo-US relationship, like Topsy, has "just growned," especially over the past three years; it is not what it was in 1962 and certainly not what it was in 1956.

Above all, however, Indian policy proceeds from specifically Indian requirements. A temporary setback in Indo-US relations will not lead India to adopt positions which it regards as inimical to its own national interest.

Since India and the US share a broad range of national interests, especially with regard to Communist China, any Indian policy shifts are not likely to be dangerously harmful to the US. They may, however, be troublesome, and the establishment of close cooperative working arrangements on a number of issues may be more difficult in the near future.

II. PAKISTAN

A. The Reaction

Pakistan, on the other hand, has reacted with relative moderation. Prompted perhaps in part by a desire to adopt a stance sharply distinct from the strongly adverse one of Shastri and his government, Ayub has maintained a posture of dignified and understanding reserve. By the same token, the Pakistan press -- operating on the assumption that if something is distasteful to India there must be merit in it for Pakistan -- has balanced critical editorials and cartoons about "Cowpoke" and "Landlord" Johnson with observations on the necessity for Pakistan-American amity and friendship, i.e., for American military and economic aid.

The press reaction was slow in coming -- reflecting no doubt the absence of early governmental guidance -- and has been milder than might have been anticipated. The government has reportedly instructed newspaper editors to "lay off the harsh criticism" of the postponement and to "take it easy on the Americans." The Pakistan Press Trust-owned Morning News probably reflected the official line by noting India's open anger and by editorializing that "Official Pakistan . . . appears to have taken Washington at its word. At any rate, it has not reacted." The independent, generally anti-Government newspaper, Pakistan Observer, expressed reservations about the timing and handling of the postponement, but observed that it was "pertinent to examine whether we can afford to cut all connections with the American government or to do without foreign aid in the quantities we are now receiving."

The vernacular newspapers have been more outspoken in their criticism, as has Dawn, the largest and perhaps the most influential daily in Pakistan. On April 20, Dawn featured a cartoon labelled "Cowpoke President" which showed an armed and booted Johnson drinking "power potion," resting his spurs on a torn paper on which was written "international diplomatic etiquette" and saying over a telephone: "Dean, who said we need friends anymore?" The cartoon was accompanied by an editorial which was critical of the postponement, but was, for Dawn, quite restrained. After castigating the action and citing pique and ignorance as the cause, the editorial noted widespread American criticism of the postponement, and stated that "this adverse criticism by so many vocal Americans . . . justifies the hope that the rapport which has been established over the years between the people of Pakistan and the US still exists, despite strains, and when the present American leadership has realized its mistakes, the mutual friendship will be fully restored and readjusted on a more realistic basis."

Thus far no important Pakistani official has commented publicly on the postponement of the visit with the exception of President Ayub who has apparently confined his public remarks to an address to senior military officers in Rawalpindi. Ayub told his senior officers that "my friend President Johnson" had asked that the scheduled visit be postponed, and "as a friend I [Ayub] agreed to postpone it" to a more convenient time. Quite significantly, Foreign Minister Bhutto has not reacted publicly to the postponement, and during his recent visit to Djakarta for the Tenth Anniversary of the First Bandung Conference, Bhutto did not join the anti-West, anti-American chorus. Bhutto's restraint in Djakarta and his silence since his return suggest that Ayub has instructed Bhutto to pursue -- at least temporarily -- a moderate approach to the US.

B. Implications

President Ayub's response, thus far restrained, dignified, and understanding, has been motivated by three factors: his feeling of personal and national pride which prevented a public admission that he felt rebuked and snubbed; the fact that India had received equal treatment and had reacted noisily and adversely; and Pakistan's dependence on American aid, which acts to preclude any sharp rejoinder to the American President. Although his actions are in keeping with his "character," Ayub is actually putting the best possible face on what for him is an unpleasant and galling situation.

By accepting the postponement with good grace, Ayub has in effect denied that he has suffered a rebuff and he has to a degree turned aside any implication that he received a "warning" from President Johnson. In addition, Ayub surely is not unaware that his statesmanlike behavior contrasts favorably with the emotional Indian reaction, and he presumably expects that this will be noted in Washington. He is also aware, however, that the sharply different Indian and Pakistani responses illustrate Pakistan's almost total dependence on the US and India's far greater independence.

Ayub will probably continue to behave in a relaxed and dignified manner with respect to the postponement, and he may adopt a "standstill" policy with respect to the Chinese for some time. Ayub is uncertain as to future US military aid, particularly the status of the conditional American commitment to provide Pakistan with two squadrons of F-104's. In common with Shastri, Ayub had expected to discuss future military assistance with the President and other senior American officials. Ayub must now be in something of a quandry and is probably anxiously awaiting some signal of American intentions.

Although Ayub's renewed awareness of his dependence on the US may cause him to proceed with caution in the immediate future, it may also lead him to intensify his efforts to lessen that dependence by developing alternate sources of supply. There have been indications that senior Pakistani officials believe that they could count on receiving Chinese and Soviet economic assistance sufficient to meet Pakistan's minimum needs,

and Ayub may explore the possibility of using more of his own limited resources to purchase military supplies and equipment. Ayub is well aware of his vulnerability, however, and would attempt such a policy only gradually and with considerable caution, and only after concluding that his dependence on the US has become politically unbearable.

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India

SPECIAL REPORT

SHASTRI'S FIRST YEAR AS INDIA'S PRIME MINISTER

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NWJ.032.022.002/2

By je NARA. Date 12-18-03

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
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SHASTRI'S FIRST YEAR AS INDIA'S PRIME MINISTER

A year after Nehru's fatal stroke, the style of the Indian Government and the ruling Congress Party has changed rather markedly. Most striking is the transformation of the office of the prime minister, which used to embody Nehru's imperious, cosmopolitan personality but now reflects the colorless, homespun, consensus-minded character of his successor as leader of 470 million Indians, Lal Bahadur Shastri. Despite moments when it seemed that Shastri might be overwhelmed by the demands and complexities of the office, his position now is at least as strong and possibly a bit stronger than when the party caucus assembled by Congress Party president Kamaraj chose him to be prime minister last June. Yet in the absence of Nehru's commanding personality, the tempo of crises growing out of India's perennial problems--population growth, unemployment, underdevelopment, and disunity--has seemed to quicken.

Nehru's Legacy

The smoothness of the transfer of power during the past year owes much to Nehru's legacy. He left a strong and functioning central government dedicated to popular suffrage, the rule of law, civil supremacy, and the British parliamentary format. He also left a commitment to a secular and to a socialist pattern of society, a system of five-year development plans together with schemes for local self-government and initiative aimed at achieving these ends, and a nonaligned foreign policy intended to allow India to accomplish its urgent domestic labors without the distractions which, he felt, formal ties with one or the other of the world power blocs would bring.

The Nehru legacy was not unalloyed, however. Nehru had done his basic economic and social thinking decades earlier, and he seemed in his later years to be increasingly incapable of adjusting to new situations. His dedication to industrialization slighted progress in the agricultural field, and his preoccupation with grandiose development plans often clouded his vision on more concrete matters of implementation. He was notorious for avoiding difficult decisions but insisted nonetheless on being at the heart of the decision-making process on all matters, large or small.

He prized stability in difficult local situations like the Punjab and Kashmir, while

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
frequently closing his eyes to the rank corruption and bullying which made that stability possible. At the same time, he prevented the development of strong leaders at the national level out of exaggerated concern for potential rivals. Most damning of all, especially to the group which has succeeded him, he avoided use of the consultative aspects of the political processes he had himself created, preferring to rule through the unchallenged strength of his personal prestige rather than indulge in the give-and-take of democratic politics.

Crises For Shastri

Thus most of the difficulties Shastri has faced were Nehru's birds coming home to roost after their warden had left the job.

The biggest and most prolonged of these was the food-price crisis. This was well under way as Shastri assumed the reins of power and became progressively worse through last summer and fall. Although weather and a defense-oriented increase in the supply of money played a big part, the main ingredient appears to have been the Nehru government's failure to come to grips with the basic problems of faltering agricultural production during the two years previous and prolonged mismanagement both of economic planning and food distribution.

Good harvests during the last six months, coupled with increased imports of foodgrains and stopgap measures to improve distribution, have brought considerable relief on the food front. Prices remain relatively



Shastri huddles (left to right) with Defense Minister Chavan, Home Minister Nanda, and External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh during the recent Rann of Kutch crisis.

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high, however, and many of the basic flaws growing out of the Nehru legacy remain to be remedied.

Another major crisis which the Shastri government weathered only with considerable difficulty was the controversy over the spread of the Hindi language. The vagueness of Nehru's promises aimed at protecting regional languages and the people who speak them contributed mightily to Shastri's problem. The language controversy hurt nearly everyone in a position of power, including both Shastri and Congress Party president Kamaraj.

India's touchy relations with Pakistan, most recently brought to the edge of war over the Rann of Kutch dispute, had been aggravated by Nehru's implacable hostility to Pakistan's existence and his obduracy on the question of a settlement of the long-festered Kashmir problem. Relations with Pakistan are now more bitter and more volatile than at any time since 1947, and there are few indicators of any improvement in the near future.

In some areas where Nehru's success was considerable, his heirs have encountered new difficulties. No one in India today enjoys the status Nehru had; Shastri's promises lack Nehru's ring of authority and thus serve less well to reassure the nation during difficult times. This is especially evident on the emotion-charged issues which will for many years threaten the viability of the Indian Union, i.e., Hindu-Muslim rela-

tions, the north-south rivalry, and questions of language. Nehru's successors find themselves under great pressure to produce deeds where Nehru was often able to get by with words, a point to which Kamaraj alluded even before Nehru's funeral pyre had cooled.

Shastri's Style

What then is the style that Shastri has brought to Indian politics? It has been characterized by many critics and some sympathizers as weak, devoid of leadership as that word is commonly understood, and hobbled by indecision. Its main ingredients are a plodding slowness, a propensity to "muddle through," a subtle reversal of the 17-year trend to consolidate power at the center, an attempt to find new forums for achieving consensus, and often an appearance of a lack of coordination.

Shastri is sensitive to these charges and occasionally goes out of his way to cite examples to the contrary. "I do take my own decisions," he told a recent interviewer. "However, it is true that I want to have as much consultation as possible with all shades of opinion before coming to a decision." If others' views are "right," he continued, "I don't hesitate to accept them." This consultative practice takes time, but time seems to count for very little with the present group of Indian leaders.

Compromise and accommodation, the development of a

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SECRET

consensus, and a desire to please everyone have long been Shastri's forte, his hallmark, and indeed the traditional obligation of members of his small subcaste. He has made very few enemies in a 40-year career in politics. Indeed, his diminutive structure--reportedly the subject of audience giggling at Indian newsreels--complements his manner. He quipped once at a ceremonial occasion, "How can a small man like me dare to make enemies?" The essential simplicities about his life and person remain untouched by the office he holds.

The Kamaraj Caucus

Shastri leans heavily for his support on the so-called "syndicate" which party president Kamaraj put together in Nehru's final months and which brought Shastri to power. This caucus--"syndicate" suggests a more formal association than actually exists--is composed of several key figures within the party's all-powerful working committee.

In its essentials the caucus represents an alliance between southern and eastern India, with scattered but influential support from other areas. It is based on a bond between two long-time party wheel horses, Kamaraj, the undisputed party strong man in the south for more than 15 years, and Atulya Ghosh, the tough member of Parliament who bosses Calcutta and dominates the party in the east.

The group also includes Sanjiva Reddy, the relatively young strong man of the north-south "border" state of Andhra and a member of Shastri's cabinet, and, at somewhat greater distance, both geographically and politically, S. K. Patil, blunt-talking boss of Bombay city who is a top fund raiser for the party and Shastri's minister for railways, the nation's largest single employer.

Foremost among those outside the caucus who nonetheless support both the group and Shastri is his excellent defense minister, Y. B. Chavan. He controls Maharashtra State in western India and is a rival of Patil. However, he has higher ambitions of his own and, at 51, finds it prudent to play along.

Shastri and Kamaraj

The key to the success of the caucus in staying together and in working with Shastri is the relationship between Shastri and Kamaraj. They might have engaged in continuous jockeying and infighting. At the state level, the existence of one figure at the top of the ministerial ladder and another heading up the party's organizational apparatus has brought such a result. In Shastri's home state, such infighting between ministerial and organizational wings has virtually immobilized the conduct of state business for more than two years.

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On the other hand, Kamaraj might have tried to run the country through a weak Shastri in the prime ministry.

Neither development has occurred. During the early weeks of Shastri's ministry, the frequency with which their names were paired suggested a duumvirate. During Shastri's incapacitation following a heart attack only a month after assuming office, this was particularly noticeable. Present evidence, however, suggests that the two men have each carved out their own spheres, Kamaraj in the party organization and Shastri in the government and in Parliament, and that while there is some inevitable overlap and occasional strain, there is no basic conflict. Neither poses



Congress Party President Kamaraj with Shastri on the occasion of the prime minister's 60th birthday last fall.

a threat to the other; each needs the other.

Shastri runs the government under a system of collective cabinet responsibility, and cabinet decisions are noticeably more the result of free debate and consensus within the group than they ever were under Nehru. Matters of national security are handled by an Emergency Committee of the cabinet, composed of Shastri and his ministers for defense, finance, external, and home affairs. The cabinet has been noticeably free of interference by the party organization per se. Shastri has thus named new cabinet ministers and reshuffled portfolios without specific recourse to Kamaraj or other members of the inner party caucus. The decision to repatriate some 500,000 Tamil-speaking Madrasis from Ceylon was reportedly taken at the cabinet level without recourse to Kamaraj or his home state of Madras, despite their interest. So it was also with regard to the government's sweeping roundup of more than 1,000 pro-Peiping Communists, who, six months later, remain in jail.

Within the party, Kamaraj, whose luster has dimmed only a little, reigns supreme. He rarely concerns himself with the substance of policy, except in terms of "keeping the party close to the people" and thus making possible the winning of elections. His concerns are mainly on organizational matters, touring the states, organizing for elections, both public and party, and resolving,

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or at least attempting to resolve the bitter intraparty fights that are virtually endemic to the Congress Party at the state level.

A lifelong bachelor, Kamaraj has made the party his whole life. His approach--shared with Atulya Ghosh--is simple: the party counts for all; fight within it for what you believe but never against it for any reason. He never tolerated open dissidence in his own party organization in Madras, and he has shown little patience with it since he became national party president. It was for this reason that he refused to deal with dissident Congress politicians prior to the recent state elections in Kerala.

The refusal probably cost the Congress a chance to form a government in the state and put a few dents in Kamaraj's national prestige. The action made his message unmistakably clear, however, to potential dissidents in other Indian states with deeply divided cabinets.

The roles of Kamaraj and Shastri tend to overlap in top-level factional questions in the states, especially when the issues reverberate on the floor of the Parliament. In the leadership crisis which arose in Punjab, Shastri and Kamaraj worked closely to find a solution. The compromise reached--the appointment of an inoffensive but clean nonentity as chief minister--appears to be intended as no more than a holding action. So also in Orissa

State, where Shastri's Central Bureau of Investigation proved corruption charges against a Congress Party chief minister. Subsequently the agonizing removal of the minister and the problems of replacement were matters on which Kamaraj, Shastri, and a cabinet subcommittee worked together for many months, albeit with occasional signs of lack of coordination.

Shastri as Parliamentary Leader

Shastri has made no basic changes in the political composition of the cabinet which he inherited from Nehru. He has shuffled positions, and added Patil, Reddy, and Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi. No substantial cleavages on ideological grounds have appeared.

Shastri appears to give his ministers wide leeway in managing the affairs of their respective ministries and allows them, to a greater degree than Nehru did, to carry the ball for their portfolios unassisted on the floor of Parliament.

Apart from Defense Minister Chavan, Shastri's key ministers are: Finance Minister T. T. Krishnamachari, a Madras Brahmin with excellent credentials for his job but no political base outside of Kamaraj's pocket; Home Minister Nanda, a left-leaning labor organizer who has had considerable difficulties with Parliament and with the Kamaraj caucus and is totally dependent on Shastri; and Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, a long-time cabinet

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INDIAN CABINET May 1965

PORTFOLIO	INCUMBENT	AGE
Prime Minister, and Minister of Atomic Energy	Lal Bahadur Shastri *	60
Minister of Home Affairs	Gulzarilal Nanda *	66
Minister of Finance	T. T. Krishnamachari	64
Minister of Information and Broadcasting	Indira Gandhi * (Nehru's daughter)	50
Minister of External Affairs	Sardar Swaran Singh	57
Minister of Railways	S. K. Patil *	64
Minister of Law and Social Security	A. K. Sen	51
Minister of Defense	Y. B. Chavan *	51
Minister of Steel and Mines	N. Sanjiva Reddy *	52
Minister of Food and Agriculture	C. Subramaniam	55
Minister of Petroleum and Chemicals	Humayun Kabir	59
Minister of Communications and Parliamentary Affairs	Satya Narain Sinha	64
Minister of Industry and Supply	H. C. Dasappa	70
Minister of Education	M. C. Chagla	64
Minister of Labor and Employment	D. Sanjivayya *	44
Minister of Rehabilitation	Mahavir Tyagi	65

Appointed by Shastri (S.K. Patil had been a member of Nehru's cabinet up to the fall of 1964)

Nehru Appointee but in a new Portfolio

Nehru Appointee retaining previous Portfolio

* Member of the Congress Working Committee

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member new to foreign affairs, a lawyer, and a Sikh who works doggedly at his portfolio but who has his eyes on the chief ministership of Punjab State.

With the Parliament at large, Shastri has had few real difficulties. He has, of course, a dependable 3-to-1 majority, and those who oppose him within his own party as well as the other parties are fragmented. While not a commanding figure, his skills are considerable, and he has emerged from his year as leader of Parliament with more pluses than minuses to his credit. His toughness in dealing with the Communists, his defense of "deviation" from Nehru's policies, and his handling of the stormy debates on the subject of corruption in Orissa, as well as during the height of the recent border crisis with Pakistan have been quite notable, and not a little surprising to many observers.

Nevertheless, Shastri has tended occasionally to be embarrassed by ministerial freewheeling. He also has allowed himself to be goaded into intemperate replies to intemperate questions, such as in the parliamentary discussion of cease-fire terms in the Rann of Kutch which caused Pakistan to withdraw an early bid for talks. He has also lost touch occasionally with currents among the membership in Parliament. He thus was not aware until relatively late of a considerable build-up in feeling and pressure among his colleagues on the recent language agitation in south India and in the case of an

abortive signature campaign against at least one of his cabinet members. He has often had a difficult time with the executive committee of the Congress parliamentary group, which flexed its muscles for the first time in 1962 when it contributed heavily to Krishna Menon's ouster from the cabinet.

Shastri the Policy Maker

By and large, Shastri has kept close to the main guidelines of policy laid down by the Congress Party under Nehru. He is far more pragmatic than Nehru, the London School socialist. Shastri certainly finds Congress policies as written and as implemented a comfortable frame of reference, and his modifications are mainly matters of emphasis; he is a tinkerer, not an innovator.

He is common-man oriented, quotes heavily from Gandhi, and is infinitely more Indian than Nehru. He has shown a strong preference for quick-yield development projects. He is making a major effort to come to grips with India's food problem even at the sacrifice of the pace of industrialization. He seems intent on compiling a record of his own on which to seek a mandate in the general elections due a year and a half hence. He and Kamaraj can already take some measures of satisfaction from the party's by-election record since last June. While experiencing some difficulties among urban voters, the Congress Party has added two seats to its parliamentary majority and eight seats to its

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majorities in the state assemblies, all from rural voters upon whom the Congress has traditionally relied.

On foreign matters, Shastri's policies are virtually indistinguishable from Nehru's, at least the post-1962, post-Chinese invasion Nehru. Although not sharing Nehru's preoccupation with foreign affairs, he has sought quite successfully to improve India's relations with some of its neighbors--Burma, Ceylon, Nepal, and Afghanistan.

He is aware that with Nehru's death and with India's closer association with the US, its influence in Asian-African circles has progressively eroded. Presumably he is concerned that this leaves the field wide open for Pakistan, the radical governments, and the Chinese, and might in time make India's causes somewhat less attractive to Moscow. He will be looking for opportunities to recoup on such occasions as the forthcoming Afro-Asian conference in Algiers.

Toward China, Shastri's policies have remained tough and unyielding, but not militarily provocative. He has continued programs to improve India's defense posture vis-a-vis the Chinese, and new efforts have been made in both the bloc and in the West to obtain additional modern military equipment.

Relations with the United States have been friendly, despite the occasional emotional outbursts of his foreign minis-

ter and Shastri's unhappiness with some aspects of US policy in Southeast Asia. New strains have appeared, however. These have resulted from Washington's postponement of his proposed visit to the United States, his reaction in canceling out altogether, and India's unhappiness with Pakistan's use of American military aid equipment in the recent Rann of Kutch episode.

Moscow was quick to capitalize on these strains, during Shastri's recent visit to the Soviet Union. The visit had long been billed as one in which a new Soviet aid commitment would be made to India's next five-year development plan. For himself, Shastri was able to recoup his pride from the blow suffered by postponement of the Washington visit, while working to ensure that Soviet support, both economic and in the form of military aid, would continue, and perhaps even increase.

The Quality of Leadership

In a sense, India in the post-Nehru period is undergoing its second Indianization since independence was achieved. The first occurred when the British sahibs left, turning over their jobs to the brown sahibs they had trained. A second so-called Indianization refers not only to the replacement of Nehru by a thoroughly home-grown product but also to the stepped-up retirement of the old brown sahibs in the Indian civil service and in the Parliament and their replacement by the Indian-trained element.

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Shastri's form of leadership is not dynamic and will certainly not produce dramatic breakthroughs in the many problem areas he inherited. Lacking a large reservoir of prestige to fall back on, moreover, Shastri's position will retain for some time to come a certain element of fragility in the heat of crisis. The style of his leadership is still evolving. It is the product of the man and of the Indianizing context in which he operates and of which he is a part.

Inherited British forms will continue to be modified or abandoned. The decorum of Indian public life and of the Parliament may decline a bit more in Western eyes, and the latent pent-up violence of Indian society may become a bit more evident. But if the solid accomplishments of the British period in India, as consolidated and redefined by Nehru, are to leave any permanent imprint on twentieth century India, they

have to be Indianized during this generation while the cultural bridges still exist and before the generation which never had any contact with the British raj comes to power.

Shastri, as the product of British India, British jails, Indian poverty, and the independence movement, embodies India's mood and the mood of its ruling party in the immediate post-Nehru period. He is doing a reasonably good job of giving the country the type of leadership it seems to want and the only type of leadership its ruling party would permit at this time, only one year after Nehru. The condition which led to his choice last June--the absence of an alternative candidate acceptable to the party as a whole--remains, and Shastri gives every indication of intending to be more than a mere caretaker prime minister. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

1. BUNDY-SMITH
2. BATOR
3. BOWMAN
4. CHASE
5. COLLIER
6. F. J. MURPHY
7. G. A. NEASE
8. H. R. HARRIS
9. J. E. BROWN
10. K. A. WELLS
11. L. A. BROWN
12. M. A. BROWN
13. N. A. BROWN
14. O. A. BROWN
15. P. A. BROWN
16. Q. A. BROWN
17. R. A. BROWN
18. S. A. BROWN
19. T. A. BROWN
20. U. A. BROWN
21. V. A. BROWN
22. W. A. BROWN
23. X. A. BROWN
24. Y. A. BROWN
25. Z. A. BROWN

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Action

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R 271414Z ZEA

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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 3058
INFO RUSBKP/AMEMBASSY KARACHI 645
RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE UNN
STATE GRNC
BT

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*Mac - support for my hope
things will be better. Also, in
lets did a good job. Also, in
want to get into the power
hard exercise, I'd say.
RWR*

PRES RADHAKRISHNAN OPENED LONG DISCUSSION THIS MORNING WITH
RATHER STRONG COMMENT IN REGARD TO POSTPONEMENT OF SHASTRI VISIT.
PROBLEM, HE SAID, WAS NOT SO MUCH PRES JOHNSON'S DESIRE TO
POSTPONE SHASTRI VISIT WHICH WAS UNDERSTANDABLE BUT RATHER
"RUDE MANNER" IN WHICH CHANGE OF PLANS WAS HANDLED.

HAVING EXPLAINED SITUATION AGAIN TO BEST OF MY ABILITY I SAID
WE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND AMERICAN HAD
SURVIVED SIMILAR CRISES IN PAST NOTABLY WHEN KRISHNA MENON AS
MEMBER OF INDIAN CABINET HAD SO VICIOUSLY ATTACKED US, ETC.

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 1387 **SECRET**

I ONLY HOPED THAT WE WOULD NOT IN THIS CASE DRIFT INTO TIT-FOR-
TAT SITUATION WHICH COULD ONLY CREATE NEEDLESS DIFFICULTIES FOR
US ALL.

THE PRESIDENT AGREED AND ADDED HE HAD MADE THIS POINT TO SHAS-
TRI IN COURSE OF LONG VISIT MONDAY EVENING. HE FELT PRESENT
SENSE OF DISAPPOINTMENT WOULD GRADUALLY DISAPPEAR AS NEW
QUESTIONS AROSE TO ABSORB PRIMIN'S ATTENTION. IN ANY EVENT WE
COULD EPEND ON HIM TO COOPERATE FULLY TOWARDS THIS END.

GP-3.

BOWLES

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date 12-19-03

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American Opinion Summary

Department of State

*Komer
Saunders*

Shostky
April 23 1965 112

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U.S.C.
APR 26 9 03 AM '65

POSTPONEMENT OF SHASTRI, AYUB KHAN VISITS

The U.S. postponement of the visits of the governmental heads of India and Pakistan has drawn both criticism and approval, or acceptance--with the weight of the comment perhaps inclining somewhat toward the critical side.

Criticize The effect which this move would have on our
Postponement friendship, particularly with India, was a source of concern. "If Pakistan has been moving away from the United States, India has been moving into closer alignment," the Boston Herald said. "And the rebuff to Shastri is already causing him political embarrassment. The United States hasn't so many friends in Asia that it can afford to risk undercutting any of them." The Washington Post warned that "to brush off the leaders of both Pakistan and India in one curt sweep can serve to undo the goodwill their visits here were supposed to engender and to weaken Mr. Johnson's persuasive powers with Ayub and Shastri at some future date."

The New York Post said: "With a single curt gesture the U.S. has managed to affront deeply two Asian nations whose goodwill is critically important to American policy." Edward P. Morgan (ABC) suggested that the postponement decision was possibly President Johnson's "first major blunder in diplomacy."

Another point, made by the New York Times, was that a two-way exchange of views would have been helpful. "Both these Asian statesmen could have given Mr. Johnson valuable points of view on Southeast Asia," the Times asserted. "In return they--and any other such visitors--would offer opportunity to present the United States point of view." The Denver Post suggested that Washington's justifiable unhappiness with Ayub, instead of providing justification for not talking with him, seemed "an excellent reason for President Johnson to get together with Ayub for a hard-headed, no-punches-pulled discussion."

Approve More willing to accept the Administration's point
Postponement of view, the Baltimore Sun concluded: "Under present circumstances, and with the course of events in Vietnam still uncertain, Ayub's trip to Washington held little promise of beneficial results. Mr. Johnson may have acted more abruptly in calling off the visit than smooth diplomatic practice

Public Opinion Studies Staff • Bureau of Public Affairs

would indicate, but he obviously had good reason to feel that this is not the right time for a meeting with President Ayub."

A critical attitude toward Pakistan and India was reflected in some comment. Both Ayub and Shastri "represent countries which have been smothered by American largesse and which have repaid the kindness by playing footsie with the opposition," Bill Henry wrote (in Los Angeles Times). Scripps-Howard's Washington News recalled that Indian Foreign Minister Singh not long ago denounced the system of Western defensive alliances as "a sinking ship." The Scripps-Howard editorial added that "one sure way not to compromise India's determination to stay unaligned... is to invite Mr. Shastri not to come to Washington for a while. We see no reason why Indian leaders should be so angry about the postponement."

The New York News was "happy to see President Johnson cancel visits" of the two leaders at this time. It asserted that "too many foreign politicians have been making political hay at home by being photographed with our President," and advocated calling "this stuff off for six months, at least."

<u>Postponement</u>	Various explanations for the postponement of the visits were offered in interpretive news stories and articles.
<u>Explanations</u>	

The postponement was a rebuke to Ayub and Shastri because of their failure to support the U.S. Vietnam policy, some observers suggested. Other explanations by White House sources have not "snuffed out completely the belief here that LBJ deliberately snubbed both India and Pakistan because of their failure to support him in Viet-Nam," Scripps-Howard's Jack Steele wrote. Philip Geyelin drew the conclusion that "the test of good relations with the U.S. is increasingly likely to be a nation's attitude towards Vietnam, and the effect of this, in turn, may be to aggravate U.S. relations with a good part of the world" (in Wall St. Journal).

To Chalmers Roberts, "it seems that a key reason" for postponing the visits "was a fear that they would use the Washington forum to disagree publicly with the United States over Viet-Nam" (in Washington Post).

One of the explanations, reportedly emanating from White House sources, was that the President feared that a visit by the two leaders at a time when Congress was considering foreign aid might encourage Congress to cut aid to India and Pakistan (e.g. Jack Steele). According to William S. White, President Johnson "knew that if they came here to bite at us from the very steps of the White House they would destroy all hope of passing intact through Congress an already endangered foreign aid bill."

Selig S. Harrison's explanation was: "Indecision and unresolved policy conflicts within the American Administration on how to reconcile contradictory U.S. policies in India and Pakistan appear to have been a major factor behind the postponement" of the visits. He went on to say: "Whatever Mr. Johnson's motives in postponing the visits, the action has cast an enormous cloud over U.S. relations with both countries" (in Washington Post).

JOHNSON-INDIA-PAKISTAN

NEW DELHI, (AP)--THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT FEELS PRESIDENT JOHNSON DELIBERATELY SNUBBED PRIME MINISTER LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI WHEN HE ASKED HIM TO POSTPONE HIS SCHEDULED VISIT TO WASHINGTON INDEFINITELY.

MANY INDIAN OFFICIALS FEEL JOHNSON WAS IMPOLITE OR EVEN ARROGANT IN THE ABRUPTNESS OF HIS REQUEST.

SHASTRI IS DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN DISGRACED PUBLICLY AND THUS TO HAVE "LOST FACE"--AND IN ASIA THAT'S SERIOUS.

REPORTS FROM NEIGHBORING PAKISTAN INDICATE THERE WAS MUCH THE SAME REACTION THERE TO JOHNSON'S REQUEST THAT PRESIDENT MOHAMMED AYUB KHAN ALSO PUT OFF HIS VISIT.

AYUB WAS SCHEDULED TO TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON APRIL 25 AND SHASTRI ON JUNE 2.

THE WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCED FRIDAY IT HAD REQUESTED THE POSTPONEMENTS. ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN SAID JOHNSON WOULD BE TOO BUSY WITH THE VIET NAM CRISIS AND A HEAVY CONGRESSIONAL WORKLOAD.

MANY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND ALMOST THE ENTIRE INDIAN PRESS DO NOT BELIEVE THE EXPLANATION.

JK916AES 4/20

NEW DELHI--ADD JOHNSON-INDIA-PAKISTAN (13)

FOREIGN MINISTER SWARAN SINGH TOLD PARLIAMENT TODAY THE GOVERNMENT HAS INFORMED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT THERE IS LIKELY TO BE "MISUNDERSTANDING" IN INDIA OVER THE POSTPONEMENT.

MEMBERS SHOUTED "NONSENSE" AND "SHAME" WHEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER SUGGESTED INDIA SHOULD ACCEPT JOHNSON'S EXPLANATION THAT HE WOULD BE TOO BUSY TO MEET SHASTRI.

IT IS GENERALLY BELIEVED JOHNSON WANTED TO SHOW DISPLEASURE OVER INDIAN CRITICISM OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. INDIAN OFFICIALS, PARTICULARLY FOREIGN MINISTER SINGH, HAVE BEEN HIGHLY CRITICAL OF JOHNSON'S VIET NAM POLICY.

THE BELIEF IS WIDESPREAD HERE THAT JOHNSON TOOK OFFENSE AT INDIAN EFFORTS TO PRESSURE THE UNITED STATES INTO NEGOTIATIONS.

JOHNSON ALSO WAS FELT TO HAVE BEEN OFFENDED BY INDIA'S FREQUENT BUT UNPROVEN CHARGES THAT PAKISTAN IS USING WEAPONS FROM THE AMERICAN MILITARY AID PROGRAM TO KILL INDIAN TROOPS IN BORDER SKIRMISHES.

PAKISTAN HAS BEEN USING WASHINGTON AS ITS DIPLOMATIC WHIPPING BOY IN THE SAME MANNER. IT IS REASONED HERE THAT JOHNSON BECAME ANGRY WITH BOTH NATIONS.

ONE NEWSPAPER, THE INFLUENTIAL TIMES OF INDIA, SAID IT WAS POSSIBLE JOHNSON WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE WHOLE WORLD THAT "HE IS NOT A SORT OF SUGAR DADDY TO DOLE OUT ECONOMIC OR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES WHICH NOT ONLY DO NOT SUPPORT AMERICAN POLICIES BUT OPENLY CRITICIZE THEM."

THE TIMES SAID IN A HEADLINE: "SHASTRI USED BY U.S. AS PAWN IN DIPLOMATIC GAME."

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STATEMENT ON SHASTRI VISIT

DELHI INFORMATION SERVICE OF INDIA IN ENGLISH 1502Z 20 APR 65 B

(OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS IN THE LOK SABHA ON 20 APRIL ON THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES)

(TEXT) THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN INDIA HAD SAID TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS THAT PRESIDENT OF UNITED STATES WAS KEEN TO HAVE THE INDIAN PRIME MINISTER VISIT THE UNITED STATES AND HAD INQUIRED AS TO A CONVENIENT TIME FOR SUCH A VISIT. THE PRIME MINISTER INDICATED THAT HE WOULD BE GLAD TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES BUT THAT HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO LEAVE INDIA UNTIL THE BUDGET SESSION OF PARLIAMENT WAS OVER.

ON 18 JANUARY 1965 AMBASSADOR CHESTER BOWLES WROTE TO THE PRIME MINISTER, UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE PRESIDENT, SUGGESTING A VISIT AROUND 15 MAY. BEFORE GIVING ANY DEFINITE REACTION AS TO THE DATE, THE PRIME MINISTER HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT HIS OTHER COMMITMENTS, NAMELY, A VISIT TO THE USSR FROM WHERE AN EARLIER INVITATION WAS PENDING, THE AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE AT ALGIERS, AND A MEETING OF COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS IN LONDON. AFTER TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE DATES OF THESE VISITS, THE PRIME MINISTER HAD INDICATED THAT THE DATES WOULD HAVE TO BE SOMEWHERE TOWARD THE END OF MAY AND BEGINNING OF JUNE. ON 23 MARCH THE PRESIDENT WROTE TO THE PRIME MINISTER A LETTER OF INVITATION FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO VISIT WASHINGTON ON 2 AND 3 JUNE. THE PRIME MINISTER REPLIED TO THIS LETTER, ACCEPTING THE INVITATION. SUBSEQUENTLY, DISCUSSIONS TOOK PLACE THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS REGARDING THE PROGRAM OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES.

ON FRIDAY, 15 APRIL, THE U.S. AMBASSADOR DELIVERED TO THE SECRETARY TO THE PRIME MINISTER A MESSAGE WHICH HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY CABLE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN WHICH IN WHICH THE PRESIDENT SUGGESTED POSTPONEMENT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT UNTIL EARLY AUTUMN FOR REASONS THAT DURING THE NEXT TWO MONTHS THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE PREOCCUPIED WITH THE VIETNAM SITUATION AND IMPORTANT MEETINGS OF THE U.S. CONGRESS. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS CANCELED HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES.

OUR AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON HAS ALREADY CONVEYED TO THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE THAT THE (UNUSUAL) MANNER IN WHICH THIS STEP HAS BEEN TAKEN IS LIKELY TO CAUSE MISUNDERSTANDING IN INDIA.

20 APR 2026Z HWM/LF

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Shastri
Visit
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THE DIRECTOR

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UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON

April 19, 1965
Shastri Visit
Ayub Visit

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

SUBJECT: Daily Reaction Report

Postponement of the Shastri and Ayub Khan visits occasions voluminous and sharply critical reactions in their respective countries. Press speculation on U.S. motives ranges widely.

Today's Times of India reflects the shock expressed by many Indian papers over the weekend. Its Washington correspondent writes of an "unprovoked snub. . . . The popular reaction in India is bound to be that India's elected Prime Minister of four hundred and seventy million people has been treated with unusual and ill-deserved discourtesy." Calling the postponement "both brazen and ill-conceived," the paper says "the rebuff came at a moment when Indo-U.S. relations had developed unaccustomed harmony."

Shasti and Ayub are getting equal treatment, says the Indian Express in a sarcastic commentary: "Presumably, without consulting a seasoned diplomat like Mr. Rusk, Mr. Johnson, whether on his own or on the advice of his kitchen cabinet, decided to teach President Ayub a lesson, and rudely postponed the invitation to him at this late stage. Then second thoughts may have prevailed, and he matched the rudeness towards President Ayub with crudeness towards the Indian Prime Minister, on the assumption that if an invitation to one is withdrawn, the other must stay in the same boat."

The postponement "may in fact turn out to be a cancellation," the paper continues, "because Mr. Shastri is a busy man like Mr. Johnson, and the fall may not suit the convenience of the Prime Minister of India."

U.S. motives are sought by Indian analysts.

"The hint has been given to India, no less than to Pakistan, that Washington does not consider itself to be a court of appeals for disputes which keep boiling over between India and Pakistan," says the Statesman

of Calcutta. In an article titled "Shock Treatment," the paper says that your preoccupation with Vietnam "surely cannot be the only reason" for the postponement: "He has not asked the President of Korea and the Prime Minister of Italy to leave him alone for the present."

Jugantar of Calcutta describes a "mystery behind the postponement." Noting that Mr. Shastri recommends that the bombing of North Vietnamese targets "should be stopped without delay," and that President Ayub has said American forces should be withdrawn from the south, the paper concludes that "the slightest criticism, even by a friendly state, is disquieting for him; however, postponement of Shastri's visit will not help Mr. Johnson."

Janasevak of Calcutta, organ of the West Bengal Congress Party, sees trouble ahead: "The U.S. President is fully aware of China's lust for power and its designs. He has not only postponed his invitations to foreign dignitaries to visit the U.S., but he has also cancelled all of his tour programs, and curtailed meetings with foreign diplomats to the minimum. Doesn't all this signify the approach of a storm?"

Pakistani comment is hostile. Hurriyet's editorials yesterday and today speak of an "affront to Pakistan" and "Johnson's folly." Jang writes today of "Political Ignorance" in a piece saying that Ayub "never should have agreed to go to the U.S.," and that your action was undertaken "in frenzy and rage." Anjam discusses your alleged "annoyance" and "indignation at Pakistan's independent foreign policy," and calls your "excuse" for the postponements "unacceptable."

Dawn of Karachi front-pages correspondent articles attributing the postponements to your "anger at Pakistan for not supporting U.S. Vietnam policy, and Pakistan's moves toward closer relations with Peiping."

In Turkey, editors reportedly are theorizing that the "cancellation," as they term the postponement of the visits, is the result of "U.S. displeasure, particularly with Ayub Khan."

In Britain, the Guardian's story is headed, "Critical Guests Unwelcome by President Johnson." The paper argues that "there can be little doubt that personal resentment at President Ayub's flirtations with Peking and Moscow, and Mr. Shastri's criticism of U.S. policies in Vietnam -- particularly over the use of riot gas -- have had a lot to do with the decision." The Times reports "brusque" postponement of the Shastri visit. The Daily Telegraph

says: "There has been concern that the President has been trying to do too much himself, especially in view of his past illnesses."

The Daily Mail, under the head, "LBJ Back-Out," speculates about "four possible reasons in addition to the official one." These are the state of your health, your alleged "belief that few concrete results ever emerge from talks with foreign statesmen," the wish not to be exposed to pressure for "concessions on Vietnam," and "desire to avoid entanglement in disputes between India and Pakistan."

Moscow radio is telling home audiences: "The White House suddenly announced that President Johnson had decided to postpone several official foreign visits to Washington until the autumn. But Johnson has found both the time and the desire for a meeting with the Italian Premier.... Washington's readiness to have talks with Aldo Moro clearly reveals the U.S. desire to influence the Italian position on the Vietnam question."

Peking's NCNA wire service says the postponement of the visits is one reaction to the "impotent fury and anxiety" which you and your "top assistants" have felt at the "fizzling out of their war blackmail and 'peace' swindle over Vietnam."

A Cuban commentator says that since you intend to "escalate" the war in Vietnam, you have decided to "cancel" the visit of "two men who would surely have indicated" to you "the serious risks to which Washington policy is exposing the United States and the world."

Samuel M. Weber for C.T.R.

Carl T. Rowan
Director

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

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10033

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Origin

SS

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI 2175
INFO: " KARACHI 1163
" CAIRO 6412

PRIORITY
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APR 17 5 21 PM '65

CAIRO FOR TALBOT

LIMDIS

BUNDY-SMITH
BATOR
CHASE
COOPER
HAYNES
JESSUP
JOHNSON
KEENE
KILPATRICK
KORNER
MORSE
MURPHY
NEEDY
SANDERS
SAYRE
THOMSON

042

Following summary for info only and noform. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review of memcon.

Secretary invited in Amb B. K. Nehru on April 17 immediately after Nehru's return to Washington to discuss postponement Shastri visit. Told Nehru he wanted provide background postponement and also learn of impressions Nehru had brought back from Delhi. Secretary handed Nehru text of President's letter to Prime Minister Shastri and of press release.

After reading documents Nehru commented with some feeling that "cancellation" of visit on such notice was "act of discourtesy" which will cause provocation in New Delhi. Said it would be difficult understand that President not able spare several hours for Prime Minister.

Secretary explained much more was involved in visits than several hours time. Said other visits not yet announced were being closed out. Said another factor behind postponement was recent discussion by Senate committee of \$115 million cut in military aid which specifically aimed at Pakistan and India. Secretary explained reluctance of Senate committee provide arms to two disputing countries engaged in arms race. Said that

Drafted by:

4/16/65

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA:SOA:DTSchneider:ar:bw

NEA - William J. Handley

s/s - Mr. Christensen

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By jk NARA, Date 12-19-03

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

we are not ~~over~~ this controversy yet and don't want issue to come to surface/~~as~~ it would at time of visits. Secretary then turned to problem of ~~XXXXX~~ South Viet-Nam and time this requires from President. Explained President had already had to divert time and attention from visits because of Viet-Nam. Said for example President had been handed cable on bombing US Embassy Saigon while he was in midst of toast to visiting President Yameogo of Upper Volta.

Secretary said we hoped very much visit could be rescheduled for early fall. Nehru replied that Prime Minister Shastri has his obligations too. Said he under impression early June was about only free time Prime Minister had in his current schedule.

Secretary regretted early fall visit might not be convenient. Said he hoped there would be no misunderstanding as result postponement. Said that/~~many~~ ^{none} of us had ~~not~~ been comfortable about postponement but it had seemed important free up President's time and avoid complicating AID situation. Secretary then described action of Senate committee in recommending study of future of aid program by special commission. Said President after talking to key Senators had wanted go slow on visits.

Nehru asked if it correct conclude there would be no visits between now and fall. Secretary explained Italian Prime Minister Moro would come next Tuesday. Thereafter, we would go ahead with/^{visit} Korean President Park ~~visit~~ because of pressures ^{regarding} on him/~~concerning~~ Korean-Japanese agreement and because Koreans have two thousand military in South Viet-Nam. Otherwise there would be no official visits during this period. Chancellor Erhard coming to US for honorary degree and might

~~SECRET~~

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come to Washington for brief talk but not for visit. UK Prime Minister Wilson had come down for two hours in similar manner.

Nehru commented that postponement would cause very substantial misunderstanding. Governments were expected to act in certain way. GOI had been trying build bridge of understanding with US and increase support to US policies. It not easy carry support of 450 million people in this. Suddenly US had in one act struck blow at what India trying to do.

Nehru concluded this part of talk by saying, as he had at various times during discussions, that he did not wish to hide anything from the Secretary. As Ambassador it was his duty to inform him of effect of postponement.

Secretary said he deeply regretted misunderstanding. Said such misunderstandings can also happen "other way around".

There followed hour long friendly discussion of impressions Nehru brought back from Delhi and situation in South East Asia which will be reported in separate messages.

GP-3

END

RUSK

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SENT
MICA

117

PRAXINE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC

1965 APR 16 00 21

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

AMB BOWLES FROM BUNDY.

PRESIDENT AND ALL REST OF US HERE CAN WELL UNDERSTAND
YOUR DISTRESS AT SHASTRI POSTPONEMENT, BUT I CAN ASSURE YOU
THAT THIS DECISION TAKEN WITH BEST INTERESTS INDIA AS
WELL AS US THOROUGHLY IN MIND. IT IS NOT TO BE CONSTRUED
AS MERELY A CONDITIONED REFLEX TO DECISION DISINVITE AYUB.

IN POINT OF FACT USG, WITH VIETNAM AND HOST OF OTHER PROBLEMS
ON ITS PLATE OVER NEXT FEW MONTHS, AND WITH AID BILL HAVING
ROCKY PASSAGE THROUGH CONGRESS, IS IN NO POSITION TALK TURKEY

PAGE 2 ESI 627F ~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

WITH SHASTRI JUST NOW. NOR FOR THAT MATTER DOES SHASTRI SEEM
FROM HERE TO BE AS YET IN ANY POSITION TO SAY MUCH TO US. SO
RATHER THAN HAVE MERELY A POLITE GET-TOGETHER WITH NEITHER
PARTY YET READY FOR CONSTRUCTIVE PALAVER, THE PRESIDENT
PREFERS THAT WE BOTH DO OUR HOMEWORK AND GET AID BILL PASSED
FIRST.

YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT PRESIDENT FEELS DEEPLY A SHASTRI VISIT
HERE COULD FOCUS UNWELCOME ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT WE'RE
SPENDING BIGGEST SINGLE CHUNK OF OUR AID MONEY ON AN ENTERPRISE
WHICH ISN'T GOING ANYWHERE FAST. ADD TO THIS THE RISK OF UNDUE
FOCUS ON THE FACT THAT OUR TWO LARGEST CLIENTS DON'T SEEM ABLE
TO LIVE ON THE SAME CONTINENT WITH EACH OTHER WITHOUT CONSTANT
BICKERING. REGARDLESS OF THE CAUSES, THIS DOESN'T GO DOWN
WELL HERE.

IT ALSO MAKES THE TIME MOST UNPROFITABLE FOR THOSE HERE
WHO FEEL THAT US INTERESTS DICTATE CONSIDERATION OF A PACKAGE
OF MAJOR HELP FOR INDIA IN RETURN FOR SOME QUITE
FAR-REACHING UNDERSTANDINGS WITH RESPECT TO: (A) NON-PROLIFERATION;
(B) MORE SENSIBLE ECONOMIC POLICIES; AND (C) MOVEMENT TOWARD
PAK/INDIAN RECONCILIATION. AS WE SEE IT, INDIANS ARE NOT READY

PAGE 3 ESF 627F ~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

TO TALK SENSIBLY ABOUT THIS YET.

SO LARGER INTERESTS, AS WELL AS IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS, ARGUE
FORAICENTING ANY SHORT TERM AFFRONT TO INDIAN AMOUR PROPRE
(UNDERLINED) IN THE INTEREST OF A MORE PRODUCTIVE VISIT
LATER. AM SURE YOU SEE THIS LOUD AND CLEAR.

THUS OUR CHORE AT THIS POINT IS TO FIND WAYS AND MEANS
OF SOFTENING THE BLOW. VERY MUCH WILL ALSO DEPEND ON YOUR
OWN ABILITY TO SAY CONVINCINGLY THAT POSTPONEMENT MUST NOT
BE READ AS ANY MORE THAN WHAT IT IS--A FEELING ON THE
PRESIDENT'S OWN PART PLUS THAT OF ALL HIS ADVISERS THAT THE
TIME WOULD SIMPLY BE RIPER IN THE FALL. IN SHORT, THE
PRESIDENT SAYS HE RESPECTS YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE INDIANS
BUT WANTS YOU TO RESPECT HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE
CONGRESS. GOOD LUCK. R W KOMER

BT

NNNN
CC PAGE THREE LINE THREE TO READ - FOR ACCEPTING ANY SHORT ETC~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ.032.022.002/3By _____ NARA, Date 12-18-03

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

SUMMARY

SECRET

6

Action

SS

Info

5" #53\$8 4392:112-987SBA865
*****ZZ RUEHCR
DE RUSBAE 16/1040Z
***** 161030Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASH DC FLASH 2934
INFO ZEN/AMEMBASSY KARACHI FLASH 607
STATE GRNC
BT
SECRET
LIMDIS

EMBTel 2932

APRIL 16 4PM

AFTER TELEPHONING PRIMIN, L.K. JHA SAID SHASTRI WAS DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED. THE GOI LIKELY WOULD MAKE ITS OWN ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT THE POSTPONEMENT.

JHA INDICATED THAT GOI WOULD SAY POSTPONEMENT WAS AGREED UPON AS A RESULT OF THE PRESIDENT'S HEAVY SCHEDULE AND THAT THERE WOULD BE FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE DATE FOR THE VISIT, POSSIBLY IN FALL.
CFN 2934 607 16 4

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 848 SECRET
JHA BELIEVED QUESTIONS PUT TO GOI WOULD CENTER AROUND INDIAN-PAK BORDER TROUBLES. HE WAS ENCOURAGED TO EMPHASIZE THE BURDENS THE PRESIDENT HAS IN CONNECTION WITH SOUTH EAST ASIA.

WE STRONGLY URGE USE OF THE FIRST OF TWO PROPOSED PRESS STATEMENTS IN DEPTel 2165. THE TWO VERSIONS WERE SHOWN TO JHA BEFORE HIS CALL TO PRIMIN. HE PREFERRED THE FIRST, BECAUSE IT EXPLAINED THE REASON AS THE PRESIDENT'S HEAVY SCHEDULE, BUT ASKED THAT WE WAIT UNTIL HE TALKED WITH SHASTRI.

AFTER TELEPHONE CALL JHA SAID GOI AGREED THE FIRST PRESS STATEMENT, BEGINNING "THE PRESSURE OF EVENTS" AND ENDING "DURING THE FALL OF 1965" IS BY FAR THE BETTER.

018
BUNDY
BATCH
BOWMAN
CHASE
COOPER
HAYNES
JESSUP
JOHNSON
KEENE
KLIEN
ROMER
MOODY
REEDY
SAUNDERS
SAYRE
THOMSON

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-19-03*

SECRET

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~~SECRET~~

-2-2934, April 16, 4 p.m. from: New Delhi

JHA INQUIRED WHETHER PAKISTANIS WERE BEING ASKED WHICH STATEMENT WOULD SUIT THEM BEST. INFORMED THAT THEY WERE, HE REMARKED, "I HOPE THAT DOES NOT MEAN THEY HAVE A VETO IN THE MATTER."

WE PLAN TO AWAIT WASHINGTON ANNOUNCEMENT AND WHATEVER ANNOUNCEMENT INDIANS MAKE WITHOUT ISSUING EMBASSY STATEMENT. THEREAFTER, IN ANSWERING QUESTIONS, WE PLAN TO PUT EMPHASIS ON PRESIDENT'S PREOCCUPATIONS, ESPECIALLY SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND HEAVY SCHEDULE.

STRONGLY URGE THAT DEPT BACKGROUND PRESS BEFORE WEEKEND COMMENTATORS TAKE OVER AND THAT EARNEST EFFORT BE MADE TO AVOID "PLAGUE ON BOTH HOUSES" LINE.

IT SHOULD BE STRESSED THAT THE ONLY CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TWO POSTPONEMENTS IS THAT BOTH VISITS HAPPENED TO FALL IN SAME TIME SPAN, AS HAVE OTHER APPOINTMENTS PRESIDENT MUST CANCEL.

PAGE THREE RUSBAE 848 ~~SECRET~~
GREATEST HARM THAT HAS BEEN DONE HERE RESULTED FROM LINKING THESE TWO VISITS TOGETHER, FOLLOWING AYUB'S TRIP TO PEKING.

IN BACKGROUNDING REFERENCE TO FUTURE VISITS OF AYUB AND SHASTRI SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE LINKED TOGETHER IN CLOSE ORDER. SUGGEST THE TIMING WILL BE A MATTER OF CONVENIENCE TO AYUB AND SHASTRI. BOWLES
BT

Note: Advance copy to S/S-O at 6:10 a.m. 4/16/65

Passed to White House at 6:22 a.m. 4/16/65

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*119
SUMMARY~~SECRET~~

13958

1965 APR 16 AM 4 02

☐ BUNDY-SMITH
☐ BATOR
☐ BOWMAN
☐ CHASE
☐ COOPER
☐ HAYNES
☐ JESSUP
☐ JOHNSON
☐ KEENE
☐ KILLEN
☐ KROMER
☐ MOODY
☐ REEDY
☐ SANDERS
☐ SAYRE
☐ THOMSON

6
Action

55

Info

*****ZZ RUEHCR
DE RUSBAE 840 16/0825Z.
Z 160812Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 2932
INFO RUSBKP/AMEMBASSY KARACHI FLASH 605
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ FROM NDELHI APRIL 16

FLASH

LINDIS

DEPTELS 2161, 2165, RAWALPINDI'S 37 TO DEPT

SINCE PRIMIN SHASTRI IS OUT OF TOWN UNTIL SUNDAY EVENING I
DELIVERED PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO L. K. JHA. I ALSO NOTED THAT
POSTPONEMENT OF SHASTRI AND AYUB VISIT HAS LEAKED IN WASHINGTON.

JHA READ LETTER AND EXPRESSED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT AND CONCERN.
HIS CONCERN WAS COMPOUNDED AS WE ASSUMED IT WOULD BE BY LINKING
CFN 2161 2165 37

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 840 ~~SECRET~~
OF WITHDRAWAL OF AYUB KHAN INVITATION WITH THAT OF SHASTRI.

I STRESSED THAT ONLY REASON WHY TWO ACTIONS APPEARED TO BE
COUPLED WAS THAT BOTH VISITS HAPPENED TO FALL IN SAME TIME SPAN
AND PRESIDENT FOUND IT ESSENTIAL TO CLEAR HIS SCHEDULE BECAUSE
OF CRISIS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. INDEED ALL ENGAGEMENTS THAT DID
NOT DEAL DIRECTLY WITH URGENT DOMESTIC QUESTIONS OR SOUTHEAST
ASIA WERE BEING SIMULTANEOUSLY CANCELLED OR POSTPONED.

JHA REPLIED THAT HE COULD READILY UNDERSTAND PRESSURES TO WHICH
PRESIDENT REFERRED. HOWEVER FACT THAT AYUB KHAN AND SHASTRI
VISIT WERE BEING CANCELLED SIMULTANEOUSLY WOULD SURELY LEAD TO
FEELING WITHIN INDIA AND ABROAD THAT SHASTRI, WHO WAS OPPOSING
CHINESE BOTH MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY, HAS BEEN LINKED
WITH AYUB KHAN WHO HAS BEEN COOPERATING WITH CHINESE, AND THAT
AMERICANS ARE INDIFFERENT TO THIS DISTINCTION.

MISUNDERSTANDING IN INDIA WILL BE COMPOUNDED BY LEAK TO WHICH
I REFERRED AND FACT THAT PAKS ARMED WITH AMERICAN WEAPONS ARE
PRESSING IN KUTCH BORDER AREA WILL LEAD FURTHER TO CONFUSION.

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PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"Authority FRUS 64-68, Vol. 25, #104By JR NARA, Date 12-18-03

~~SECRET~~

-2- 2932, APRIL 16, FROM NEW DELHI

PAGE THREE RUSBAE 840 ~~SECRET~~
I ADMITTED THAT THERE ARE BOUND TO BE SOME MISUNDERSTANDINGS
AND CONFUSION IN PRESS. HOWEVER IT IS OUR TASK TO MINIMIZE
THIS CONFUSION AND TO MAKE SURE THAT POSTPONEMENT WHICH I
BELIEVE TO BE WISE UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT LEAD TO UNNECESSARY
DIFFICULTIES FOR ALL OF US.

ALTHOUGH PRESIDENT AND ADMINISTRATION UNDERSTOOD INDIA'S
UNALIGNED POSITION, FACT OF MATTER WAS THAT GOI HAD OFTEN MIS-
HANDLED ITS PUBLIC RELATIONS IN SUCH WAY AS TO CREATE MIS-
UNDERSTANDINGS AND IN SOME CASES RESENTMENT.

FOR INSTANCE, WE KNEW INDIANS HAD WORKED MOST EFFECTIVELY BEHIND
SCENES IN REGARD TO SOUTHEAST ASIA SITUATION AT BELGRADE AND
ELSEWHERE AND WE WERE HOPEFUL THAT THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO DO
SO. HOWEVER THEIR FAILURE PUBLICLY TO RECOGNIZE THAT WE ARE
IN FACT FIGHTING THEIR BATTLES AS WELL AS OUR OWN CREATES A
SENSE OF DISAPPOINTMENT. IN THAT REGARD I WAS HOPEFUL THAT PRIMIN
WOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE STRONG CASE IN MOSCOW FOR MORE FORTHCOMING
SOVIET POSITION IN SUPPORT OF SOME FORM OF JOHNSON PLAN.

JHA PICKED UP MY REFERENCE TO MOSCOW
BY STATING THAT PRIMIN HAD ALWAYS LINKED MOSCOW AND US VISITS
TOGETHER AND HAD DELIBERATELY ARRANGED TO GO TO MOSCOW BEFORE
GOING TO WASHINGTON SO HE COULD REPORT TO PRESIDENT PROGRESS
THAT HE HAD HOPED TO MAKE THERE. UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS
JHA FELT SURE PRIMIN WOULD WISH HE WERE NOT GOING TO MOSCOW.

WE THEN TURNED TO PROBLEM OF HOW BEST TO HANDLE SITUATION
HERE IN INDIA. JHA SAID HE WOULD GET PRIMIN ON TELEPHONE IN
NEXT FEW HOURS. WE AGREED TO COORDINATE WITH GOI AS BEST
WE COULD PRESS HANDLING BOTH IN WASHINGTON AND HERE IN INDIA.
ADMITTEDLY LEAK HAD CREATED SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES FOR US ALL BUT
WE WOULD DO OUR BEST TO EASE PROBLEMS FOR BOTH GOVTS. JHA
PARTICULARLY ASKED USG HOLD ITS ANNOUNCEMENT UNTIL HE HAS TALKED
TO SHASTRI.

BOWLES

BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 4:02 A.M. APRIL 16, 1965

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, 4-16-65 - 4:10 A.M.

~~SECRET~~



FOR MR. KOMER (FOR INFO)

Cy sent to State Department

भारतीय राजदूतावास

वाणिज्य, डी० सी०

EMBASSY OF INDIA

WASHINGTON, D. C.

April 15, 1965

Excellency,

I have the honour to transmit herewith a telegraphic message received for you today from the Prime Minister:-

Begins

"Dear Mr. President,

I thank you sincerely for your letter of 23rd March which was handed over to me by Ambassador Bowles. Mrs. Shastri and I are looking forward with great pleasure to our visit to the United States and to meeting you and Mrs. Johnson.

2. We have the most pleasant recollections of your visit to us in 1961. Since then much has happened. Unprovoked aggression by the People's Republic of China has cast a shadow on this country which threatens our independence and our way of life. To protect this independence and our democratic way of life we are ready for every effort and sacrifice. At the same time, we cannot forget that our main objective is to raise the living standard of our people. These tasks throw a heavy burden on us, in carrying which we have received the most valuable cooperation and assistance from your country, for which we are indeed grateful. I look forward to the opportunity of discussing these and other problems with you personally.

3. I am deeply conscious of the heavy burdens that you are carrying at the present time, both in the internal and international spheres. We are happy to see your statement on Vietnam in respect to the appeal of the 17 non-aligned nations to which we were also a signatory. Your acceptance of the non-aligned nations' appeal for talks without pre-conditions is a constructive contribution towards the solution of the Vietnam problem. I hope and trust that it will lead to positive results.

Yours sincerely,

LAL BHADUR "

Ends.

Accept Excellency, the assurances of my very highest consideration.

The President,
The White House,
WASHINGTON D.C.

(Signature)
(A.K. DAR)
Charge d' Affaires.