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MESSAGE

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Group 4

By *jc* NARA. Date *12/4/02* U. S. INFORMATION SERVICE

FROM: USIS INDIA

TO: USIA WASHINGTON

REF:

#118
MESSAGE NO.

April 15, 1965

DATE

SUBJECT: Objectives, policy guidance and requested coverage
in connection with the U.S. visit of Prime Minister Shastri.BUNDY
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JOINT USIS-EMBASSY MESSAGE

SUMMARY: IN JUNE PM SHASTRI WILL VISIT THE US FOR ABOUT ONE WEEK. ITINERARY IS NOT YET DEFINITE. USIS INDIA OUTLINES OUR OBJECTIVES IN REGARD TO THE VISIT, SUGGESTS POLICY GUIDANCE AND REQUESTS COVERAGE. COVERAGE IS BROKEN INTO ADVANCE NEEDS, VISIT AND FOLLOW-UP. SPECIFIC REQUESTS WILL FOLLOW AS ITINERARY BECOMES FIRM.

I. Policy Discussion

A. Relating coverage to policy.

USIS India requests that all Agency personnel who will participate in any way in the assigning, coverage, editing, producing or handling of media operations and material connected with the Shastri visit read this section carefully. We recognize that in the hurly-burly of covering the actual visit the getting of the story is a tough, demanding task. Therefore, the policy element has to be built-in in advance. This can make the difference between a good job of covering a news event, and the advancement of specific U.S. objectives in India.

B. Objectives.

1. To reflect U.S. respect for and confidence in Mr. Shastri as the leader of his country by presenting the degree of attention he receives from the American people and the U.S. Government.

2. To present to our Indian audience aspects of President Johnson's concept of the "Great Society", in terms of America's conscientious and continuing drive to correct social inequities and build opportunities for all our citizens through pragmatic, non-dogmatic methods.

(Point here is to prove that a pragmatic approach within a democratic framework is a format which India can follow. Not the complete pattern, just the method behind it, the dynamic force. And to prove that change takes place rapidly, not necessarily in 150 years of trial and error but in a generation or two. The proof is what has happened in social and economic development since the depression, the civil rights movement in 10 years and in urbanization since World War Two.)

Concurrences: WH/Weathersby/CPA/Jabell/POI

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3. To demonstrate at every turn the tremendous sense of responsibility which President Johnson has vis-a-vis the safety of the world and to overlay this with the serious attention he pays to (the views of) India's Prime Minister.

4. To make clear to our Indian audience the mutual respect existing between the United States and India, the world's two largest democracies.

C. Suggested Guidance for Coverage.

1. Try to compensate visually for Shastri's short stature. He is four feet ten inches tall. Alongside of President Johnson and Secretary Rusk he can easily look rather ridiculous. Indian film audiences frequently titter when he is shown on the screen in the company of a tall person. This is a prime point of Indian sensitivity and failure to compensate for it can render useless much of our efforts.

2. Show the American public reacting to Shastri, not just in visual media but in words as well. Families watching him on TV news; crowds in public places watching him on TV; crowds watching electric newsboard signs when his name appears; Americans reading about him on the front pages of their newspapers; packed press conference rooms, batteries of photographers taking his picture. Mention the numbers of the American viewing audience, the listening audience, the newspaper and magazine readership. Show the crowds on the streets at public appearances, smiling, waving, holding Indian flags. Interview private citizens and officials who have seen or come in contact with Shastri to try to demonstrate the respect for his ideas and his country which resulted (at least in part) from his visit. Union members, TVA farmers, mayors, educators, students.

3. When they are together, show the President listening intently to Shastri. Show the President's seriousness of purpose as he responds. Show the President's respect for Shastri. Also show any indications of personal friendship between the two men, the pleasure and ease they have in each other's company.

4. Avoid references and comparisons to Nehru or play down where they are necessary for accurate reporting. The Nehru mantle does not fit Shastri. Each pressure group in India has tried to invoke the Nehru legend whenever it wants to limit Shastri's freedom of action. For every instance we could use to show Shastri following Nehru's footsteps on a path advantageous to us, opponents in India could find ten examples to disprove our point. The wiser course will be to help Shastri create his own image.

5. The memory of John F. Kennedy has much magic in India. By itself, it is and will be a positive force for us. However, it is too often invoked in Indian minds as a symbol of what might have been in terms of world peace. President Johnson's pursuit of peace now should be emphasized.

6. The symbols of our democratic heritage are less important to Indian minds than the living evidences of how we carry it on today. Indians accept the greatness of Washington, Lincoln and Jefferson. The questions in Indian minds concerns what we are doing right now in fields that are important to India's development. Thus, our revolutionary developments in education are of prime interest and importance

especially our emphasis on educating for creativity and productiveness instead of for status. Our sense of community and how we apply it to solve social problems is important. The various ways in which we create new and productive opportunities for our depressed groups are vital.

7. Our scientific and technological prowess are important in Indian minds since they relate to our military capacity as well as our ability to provide our people and the world with needed goods and machines.

8. Look for opportunities to point up the inter-mixture of government controls, consumer and trade union demands and management responsibilities which make up our "private sector". And in that context demonstrate the dynamism of private initiative, the speed and efficiency with which plants are erected and begin operating and the beneficial relationships of such plants to the community. Avoid using the word "capitalism"; use "responsible private initiative" instead where necessary.

9. If the itinerary includes a visit to a defense installation, show but do not dwell on our awesome might but also inject in so far as possible the profound sense of responsibility we have toward the use of that might.

10. In referring to U.S. aid to India, point up its advantages to both countries. Say that along with our humanitarian motives we Americans have a deep sense of the interdependence of all peoples and a vested interest in supporting genuinely democratic growth. (See Ambassador Bowles address January 24, 1965, at the dedication of the Sharavathi Hydroelectric project for a full treatment of this theme.) Point out that India has used outside assistance wisely and well. Pay tribute to the Indian planners, Indian engineers and Indian labor which not only applies assistance well but is also skillfully making use of its own resources in the interest of the Indian people. Avoid casting Indians in the role of the learners and we, the teachers. Pay tribute to Indian skill and endeavor wherever possible.

11. Where opportunity presents (especially if Shastri should visit an atomic research center) point up the ambitious efforts underway in India by Indian scientists. Pay tribute to India's decision to devote her scientific skills to the peaceful application of atomic science rather than to take the relatively easy (recognize her capacity for this) but enormously wasteful step of creating atomic weapons. If Shastri visits any Indian scientists working in the U.S., show the degree of admiration which his American colleagues have for the scientist's skill. While this runs some risks on the score of "brain drain" criticism, on balance it serves our end of trying to engender self-confidence in India. If you can say the scientist is looking forward to returning to India in umpteen months to apply his talents to her development, all the better.

II. Advance Requirements

A. Press

During the next sixty days, whenever there is a public announcement on the U.S. side concerning the Prime Minister's visit, give such matters priority news treatment. Try to give USIS India 24 hours advance notice so we may control release with appropriate background materials of our own.

Follow press announcements with feature^{material} and photo stories concerning the cities and institutions which the Prime Minister will visit. The features and photo stories should, wherever possible, be presented in terms of supporting the objectives and guidances outlined in Policy Discussion.

If the announcement concerns a visit to a University, try to indicate how many Indian students are or have been at that University. The names of outstanding Indian students or instructors in previous years will be helpful. Recent or current activities of that institution in providing visitors, specialists, or lecturers to India will be useful.

Likewise, in cities to be visited, the advance feature stories should, if possible, be related to U.S. assistance to India and any other aspects of Indo-U.S. cooperation, especially in the area of peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Feature stories should run from 300 to 1,400 words. Picture coverage should be multiple. There is a vast range of Indian placement opportunities provided the same story can be rewritten in two or three ways, or if accompanied with a wide enough variety of photos to make multi-placement possible.

B. Exhibits.

Advance materials in connection with the institutions and localities to be visited by the Prime Minister will be useful for photo displays and window displays.

C. MOFILM.

The Agency has been asked to plan a 2-reel color film of the visit. A separate message on this subject is being prepared.

D. Radio.

Advance spots and feeds featuring interviews by prominent individuals connected with the institutions to be visited will have high placement value.

E. Publications.

SPAN: Separate communications have already gone to the Agency with specific requests for materials for SPAN magazine so as to make possible a June issue which will provide several direct tie-ins with the Prime Minister's visit. In view of the unusually long lead time required for SPAN magazine, there will be no direct mention in the June issue of the specifics of the itinerary. A number of articles will feature locales to be visited, however. In the June issue, SPAN readers will, in many instances, find feature articles about people, places and things being covered in news items of the PM's visit. There will be, for example, an article on Blair House, and another article on the TVA.

American Reporter: Plans for the American Reporter include a number of advance features which can probably be prepared from the materials requested under

Press (II,a) above. There will be features and centerspreads on the specific itinerary items in two or three issues.

F. Other.

The Post can place a variety of cartographic materials, particularly maps suitable for newspaper and magazine reproduction which show the elements of the itinerary, for instance the area around Blair House, a map of TV4 and the UNGA seating arrangements.

If the Prime Minister receives any degrees or awards, the Post requests the usual coverage. Advance photo features on the institution concerned would be useful.

III. During the Visit

A. Press.

The handling of the news of the Prime Minister's arrival in America (his first visit) may help determine the kind of press attention paid to the entire visit. USIS India and all Branch posts will be prepared to issue daily press releases, texts of statements, sidebars, press reactions, color stories and photos. The language press as well as the major English language papers will be generously serviced on a daily basis.

We are considering issuing a special daily newsletter to about 50,000 selected Indians subject to the availability of sufficient useful material.

We would like to receive up to four wirephotos daily each from AP and UPI for non-competitive use. These would go into our own publications only and would also be used for exhibit purposes. The Agency is asked to arrange this through the main offices of AP and UPI in the U.S. The India bureau chiefs have been informed of our interest and both believe the project to be feasible. Additionally airmail photo servicing will be needed. We can use as many good quality 8 by 10 prints and copy negatives as the Agency can provide up to about 25 daily. We request that identical print packages be sent daily to all 10 USIS outlets in India (Mission post, three branch posts, four sub-posts and two American Cultural Centers). Copy negatives of all prints should be included in packages sent to New Delhi, Bombay, Madras and Calcutta. (See separate reference to color photo needs.)

USIS India requests a short term clipping service from 25 major U.S. dailies beginning one week in advance of the PM's arrival and continuing through 3 or 4 days following his departure from the U.S. In addition to Agency needs, USIS will want four copies of the clips, to be sent air mail, one for USIS India, the others for Bombay, Calcutta and Madras. The clips will be useful display items, and they might be reproduced by some of the major Indian press. One set should be held at the Agency for inclusion in the presentation book described in Section IV below.

The post requests that an effort be made to provide a rather unusual type of interview coverage. (This also applies to radio coverage.) As the Prime _____

Minister finishes his appearance in one city or institution, the Agency attempt to find a suitable individual for a reaction interview. Thus, after an appearance at a University, a leading member of the faculty might be interviewed or even a qualified student in some instances. The same is true of labor leaders, public officials, farmers, scientists or others -- always of course where there is a good chance of the individual making significant comments which will tend to illustrate the good reaction Americans have toward the Prime Minister's visit and toward India.

B. Exhibits.

Window displays and photo exhibits will be changed daily in an effort to show specifically what the Prime Minister did on previous days and what he is probably doing on that very day. There will be heavy reliance, of course, on the advance materials mentioned in (II) above.

C. MOPIX.

See separate message.

In addition newsreel type coverage will be required. The materials should be sent to MOPIX Officer, USIS Bombay for placement in the GOI weekly newsreel. The GOI deadline for its weekly reel is Tuesday a.m., and USIS India can use up to 1,500 ft. per week of 35 mm cut black and white developed camera negative with dope sheets.

D. Radio-TV

USIS India understands that All India Radio (AIR) will book lines to the U.S. during the Prime Minister's visit for the filing of the reports of the AIR correspondents. They will seek facilitative assistance from VOA, and the Post requests all possible cooperation be extended to the AIR correspondents.

Daily feeds will be ordered by USIS India to receive radio spots and other materials (see Press (A) above) for placement with All India Radio. (See also special interviews note under "Press".)

TV news clips, as available, should be sent by air to USIS India for placement on AIR-TV.

E. Publications.

The American Reporter issues for the periods immediately prior to and during the Prime Minister's visit will be largely devoted to the points to be visited. Heavy reliance will be placed on the advance materials requested in II above.

F. Other.

Every effort should be made to tape and otherwise record all statements made by the Prime Minister and members of his party, by President Johnson and other prominent American officials hosting the Prime Minister and accompanying him

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FROM USIS INDIA

on his tour of the United States. Photographic coverage should be as extensive as the situation permits and should be both in black and white and color.

Since the Agency will make a color film on the Prime Minister's U.S. visit, the Post plans a special photo and feature story on the production of the film itself. The details of this request will go forward in a separate message.

USIS India plans a special pamphlet on the Prime Minister's U.S. visit. While there is no specific request for support materials involved, it might be helpful to the Agency to know of this project in connection with the other requests contained in this message, specifically, for feature and photo coverage, both color and black and white, the tapes of all tapeable messages and conversations and anecdotal material.

IV. Aftermath and Follow Up.

A separate message will be prepared on the aftermath and follow up aspects of the PM's visit. It should be noted now, however, that a good photo album record of the visit should be prepared, with each photo expressly captioned to explain time, place and people. (If it can be handsome without being ornate, it will be in keeping with the PM's tastes.) It is hoped that it can carry on the cover either the Great Seal or the President's seal and be made an item for presentation to the PM a few weeks after his return to New Delhi.

For the Country Public Affairs Officer:



Lawrence J. Hall
Deputy Country Public Affairs Officer

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ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI

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APR 15 6 57 PM '65

Info

INFO: Amembassy KARACHI

IMMEDIATE 1150

NODIS

As indicated in immediately preceeding instructions, there follows Presidential message to Shastri which you may deliver in your discretion:

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

You know how much I have been looking forward to your visit here as an opportunity for the two of us to share our thoughts on the efforts we are making to give our peoples a better life. As the date approaches, I have realized that circumstances have combined to deprive us of the atmosphere in which we could most profitably do this. The Viet-Nam crisis has focused the attentions of my Government, as I am sure it has yours, on immediate issues related to our security in the Far East. Ambassador Lodge will give you my views on this and I hope you will speak to him most frankly regarding yours.

Furthermore, the future of the United States aid program has been called into question in the Congress and the coming weeks

Drafted by:

NEA:SOA:DTSchneider:apr/14/15/65

Telegraphic transmission and

S/S - Blaine G. Tueller

Classification approved by:

/XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Clearances:

NEA - Mr. Handley

The Secretary (in substance)

White House - Mr. Bundy

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

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Authority

FRUS 64-68, vol. 25, #102

By

NARA. Date 12-18-03

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Shastri
4/15/65

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promise to be ones of intense debate. In these circumstances the long-term interests of our two countries, and our ability to pursue them jointly, would be better served in my judgment if you came in the fall after the Congress has adjourned than in June. I have, therefore, reluctantly come to the conclusion that the next month or two would not be the right time for us to exchange thoughts on our long-range plans and aspirations. I hope that you will not find it too inconvenient to defer your visit here until early this fall.

Our countries have long been closely associated in many common endeavors. In this association I believe we have developed the confidence in each other which allows me to suggest a new time for us to meet.

With warm regards.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

END

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Origin
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Info

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI 2165
Amembassy KARACHI 1152

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SUMMARY

APR 15 11 04 PM '65

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Since postponement Ayub/Shastri visit leaking heavily here, we believe no more than twelve hours available achieve agreed announcement.

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Therefore, imperative both countries agree quickest on proposed press statements. For speed sake, urge they accept one of two following versions for use here. We would expect announcement of similar nature to be made in Delhi and Karachi but will leave specifics of announcement for clearance with you at your discretion.

QUOTE:

The pressure of events has lead the President to review his schedule of State Visits and reluctantly to seek postponement of those in the immediate future which could, by mutual agreement, be rescheduled at a later date.

The Governments of Pakistan and India have graciously agreed to the postponement of the prospective visits of

BURROUGHS
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KLEIN
KOMER
MOODY
REEDY
SAYRE
THOMSON

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

White House:RKomer:P:MWright:van

Classification approved by:

S/S - Blaine C. Tueller

4/15/65

NEA - Mr. Handley

P - Mr. Greenfield

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FORM DS-322
8-63

Authority

Group 4

By

jc

NARA. Date

12-19-03

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President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri. It is hoped that these visits can be rescheduled during the fall of 1965. END QUOTE.

If host governments wish downplay US initiative in postponement, following alternative could be suggested at Embassy's initiative:

QUOTE:

Because of the heavy schedules of the principals involved a joint decision has been reached by the Governments of ~~XXX~~ Pakistan and the United States on the one hand, and ~~XXX~~ India and the United States on the other, to postpone the visits to the United States of President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri. It is hoped that these visits can be rescheduled for the fall of 1965. END QUOTE.

In view of time pressure we propose release at 11:00 a.m. Washington time unless you regard further postponement as imperative.

END

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Authority FRUS 6468, vol 25, #99

By jc NARA, Date 12-18-03

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| Origin | ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI | IMMEDIATE 2155 |
| Info: | Rptd: Amembassy KARACHI | IMMEDIATE 1144 |
| | <u>NODIS</u> | |

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

Because of the delicate and pressing situation in Viet Nam the President feels strongly that both the Ayub and Shastri visits should be postponed. The President was ~~making~~ looking forward to a fruitful talk with Shastri but he thinks it likely that early in June he will be preoccupied with Southeast Asia as well as with the legislative program that is likely to reach a crunch about that time. With these thoughts in mind he is reviewing his entire schedule to see how the load can be lightened. Thus he is planning to postpone a visit from Kenyatta as well as Ayub and Shastri.

In view of the fact that the Ayub visit is scheduled to take place in less than a fortnight the President is sending a letter to Ayub that is being repeated to you. If you feel a Presidential letter to Shastri should follow up your initial approach such a letter can be sent.

| | |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Drafted by: <u>U:GWB</u> | Telegraphic transmission and classification approved: <u>The Secretary</u> |
| Clearances: S/S - Mr. Mills | White House - Mr. Bundy |

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I hope that you can approach Shastri in such a way as to lead him to feel that a postponement of his visit until fall is in the interests of India. In our view it would ~~be~~ not be useful for him to come while the aid bill is pending in spite of the fact that the Indian attitude regarding South Viet Nam has been generally ~~helpful~~ helpful. There are still substantial differences of emphasis between us regarding sensitive issues, including Southeast Asia, and Shastri would almost certainly find it necessary to make statements that could lead to adverse comment in the press and in Congress.

You should also be aware that the continuing failure of India and Pakistan to resolve their differences has been picked up and referred to most critically in executive sessions of congressional committees.

I would appreciate it if you would coordinate your appointment with Shastri so that you and Ambassador McConaughy will be going in at approximately the same time. We are anxious to avoid having news of action in one ~~cap~~ capital reach the other before the appropriate approach has been made. You are of course at liberty to tell Shastri that we are suggesting to Ayub that his visit also be ~~postponed~~.
RUSK

END

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EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

New Delhi - April 14, 1965.

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125
Shastri Visit
Bowles
India
(X)

Dear Bob:

I am enclosing a copy of a letter I have sent to the President regarding the forthcoming visit of Prime Minister Shastri to the United States.

In it I try to convey something of the atmosphere here as well as my specific thoughts concerning the substance of their meetings. I hope that this will serve as a useful companion piece to the briefing materials you will be preparing in Washington.

Everyone is looking forward to the visit with keen anticipation.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Enclosure:

Copy of Letter to President

Mr. Robert Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Declassified when
separated from attachment.

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APR 19 1965

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This document consists of 15 pages.
Copy No. 7 of 10 copies, Series A.

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New Delhi, India,
April 14, 1965.

Dear Mr. President:

The discussions you will be having this month and in June with President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri may affect the course of events in South Asia for many years to come.

In regard to India, after many years of effort we are approaching a watershed: either this vast and friendly nation with its already impressive economic and political structure will continue to grow in importance as a counterweight to Chinese power in Asia or we shall witness its gradual deterioration and estrangement from the United States.

Assuming adequate resources, some wise decisions by the Indian Government and sensitive handling by us the outlook is favorable. The Shastri visit gives us an opportunity further to improve it.

Because he has been in office for only one year--a particularly difficult year--and because he is a newcomer to big league world affairs, the success of our efforts will depend as much on how we handle Shastri as an individual as on what actual decisions may come out of your meetings.

Although he is a modest, quiet man, any individual who over a period of thirty years could fight his way to the leadership of the vast, tough, and often brawling Congress Party political organization is no weakling.

However, like the other earthy Indian leaders who are now coming forward throughout the country, Shastri lacks the sophistication and self-confidence that characterized the British-educated

The President,
The White House.

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elite of which Nehru and his associates were a part.

It is important therefore that he leaves Washington with the impression that the President of the United States genuinely likes him and respects him, that he understands his problems both at home and abroad, and that he is prepared to work with Shastri and his colleagues on terms of mutual respect and confidence. In this regard, your letter of invitation struck just the right note and sets a constructive context for your meetings.

I

I suggest that the discussions be confined to a few major points of substance which are of obvious interest to both our governments and that these be handled as an informal exchange of thoughts between friends, rather than in terms of trying to reach explicit agreements. Because Shastri is inexperienced in international affairs he is temperamentally allergic to becoming committed without due reflection and consultation. He can, however, be quite articulate and forthcoming on matters which are important to him in an atmosphere which he feels is sympathetic to his problems and purposes.

I suggest the following subjects:

1. Casual subjects that will help you and him to establish a community of personal interests:

A. Questions involving India: How is the Congress Party organized? How does the Indian state political party system relate to the local and central Congress Party organization? What are his major current legislative problems? Does the language question worry him for the future?

B. Matters involving the United States: A brief review of our struggle with the old time "malefactors of great wealth". Your grandfather's Populist Party battles in Texas (land, water, low interest rates, freedom from exploitation by the railroads, etc.); your own political beginnings under Roosevelt's New Deal; the extraordinary changes in the last thirty years (i. e., labor-management relations in which our once irresponsible tycoons have now evolved into a creative

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force in American development; social welfare legislation; and the dramatic changes on our farms (rural electrification, roads, credit cooperatives, etc.).

2. Substantive subjects:

A. United States interests in India: Our objective in India is not simply to win gratitude or the acceptance willy nilly of our views on world affairs but rather to help insure the success of India as an expanding, stable democratic society whose security is assured and which is able increasingly to pull its full constructive weight in world affairs.

We believe that the success of the Fourth Five Year Plan is crucial, and we are prepared--if we feel India is adopting realistic developmental policies--to help in a major way. (There is no need at this time to go beyond this assurance conditioned on India's own performance. The Five Year Plan will not be ready for detailed study and negotiation before September.)

We continue to be concerned with assuring India's security, both in the short term and over the uncertain years ahead. We applaud and support India's forbearance in regard to nuclear weapons production, but we also recognize that this forbearance requires effective assurances of support in the event of nuclear attack on India.

We further understand India's position among the non-aligned nations, which inhibits India from accepting nuclear security arrangements not open to others in a similar position. We are prepared to consider any Indian proposals for international action to achieve these ends.

B. United States relations with the USSR: A major goal of United States policy is to establish the basis for cooperation with the USSR. Does Shastri, based on his recent visit to Moscow, think we will be able to make faster progress? How can we do so? (He will be gratified to be told that there is room in our thinking for a useful Indian relationship with both the United States and the Soviet Union.)

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C. Relations with Southeast Asia: Your discussion will inevitably reflect the situation as it exists at that time. You will, of course, want to stress America's desire to reduce its military involvement in Asia as soon as we can safely do so. Japan has already assumed a more positive role in the area; we hope India will be able to do likewise.

D. Relations with China: Shastri will be pleased to hear that we stand solidly behind India in her conflict with an aggressive China. But what does he think of China's future? Is there any reasonable hope that the successor to Mao will settle down? Could India defend herself now from a Chinese attack? Under what conditions would or could India help in the defense of Southeast Asia? (Following your recent talks with Ayub Khan Shastri will want to explore our analysis of and reactions to Sino-Pak relations.)

E. Relations with Africa: What does Shastri think about Africa? How can both India and America deal effectively with the often irresponsible forces evident there?

F. India-Pakistan relations: The India-Pakistan impasse is extremely costly to both countries and those who want to help them. The security of the subcontinent will never be fully assured until India and Pakistan resolve their differences. While we recognize that this is not easy, we feel that it ought to be the first priority in Indian foreign policy.

What prospect does Shastri see for the development of better relations with this key neighbor? What role, if any, can the United States play in promoting better relations? Could Puerto Rico be a model for a Kashmir settlement?

G. The future of nonalignment: What does India mean when it describes itself as "unaligned"? Certainly the phrase does not apply to India's position vis-a-vis the United States and China. Should it not therefore be redefined in the light of new circumstances? We understand and accept India's desire to bring the United States and the USSR together and to keep the USSR and China apart, and we think that in this context a policy of dynamic, positive unalignment in regard to the United States and the USSR may be a useful global influence at this time.

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What is the particular role which Shastri sees the unaligned nations playing in the present international situation? What concretely does he hope to see happen at Algiers? In this context we deeply appreciated the constructive position which India took with the seventeen nations at Belgrade regarding Vietnam and your proposals for Southeast Asia.

II

As background for these discussions, here in brief are my thoughts about the present situation in India:

1. The Political and Economic Significance of India.

There is no need to belabor this point. India has a population greater than the fifty-five nations of Latin America and Africa combined. Its government is democratic, its antagonism towards Communist China runs deep and its people have a genuinely high regard for the United States.

This warmth of feeling is rooted in appreciation of President Roosevelt's support for the Indian freedom movement in the 1940s, our substantial contribution of economic assistance to India over a period of years, our prompt support when the Chinese attacked in 1962, and their liking for Americans generally.

If India's steady economic development can be assured and if we handle our political relations skillfully and sensitively, this vast and sometimes frustrating nation can become a decisively important area of political stability and an effective counterweight to China in Asia in the next five to ten years.

If, however, India with her massive population, her commitment to democratic government, and her industrial potential should fail or even flounder for a sustained period, we may expect to see the steady erosion of the political structures in the vast arc between Japan and the west coast of Africa, with a highly detrimental impact on the United States' national interests.

I believe we are now in a position to reduce the risk of such a development and to help assure India's success.

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2. India's Present International Outlook.

In its first fifteen years of independence, the Indian Government under the firm direction of Nehru adopted an attitude toward foreign affairs which was similar in some respects to that of the United States between the War of 1812 and World War I.

Nehru was persuaded that India's future would be determined primarily by her ability to organize her political and economic resources. At the same time, he recognized that India, surrounded on three sides by oceans and on a fourth by what was believed to be the impenetrable barrier of the Himalayas, possessed major defensive advantages.

The Indian neutralism which grew out of these two factors was particularly frustrating to many Americans because it coincided with the most worrisome years of the Stalinist Cold War and the Korea confrontation. It was intensified by the jarring personality and bitter anti-Western prejudices of Krishna Menon.

Before Nehru's death the situation began to change sharply and since the Shastri Government took over last June the trend has been even more striking. Following a recent visit to India, Averell Harriman cabled to you and Secretary Rusk from Manila: "I felt in India a new attitude towards us and the world situation. I almost felt I was in a different country than on my last visit two years ago."

In regard to China, India's position is loud and clear. China is recognized as an aggressive nation and an avowed enemy.

India is determined to defend her borders against China, she deplores the loans and exports given to China by Japan, Britain, Germany and others, and even questions the massive wheat shipments provided by Australia and Canada.

India has persistently refused to discuss a border settlement with China in respect to her northern borders until China agrees to a twenty kilometer No Man's Land in the northern areas.

India has no illusions about China's long-range intentions and the necessity for a strong Indian defense. Even at the most critical

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moments in the Pakistan-India conflict public opinion polls in Indian cities have consistently shown that a substantial majority of Indians look on China as "the enemy".

In regard to Pakistan the Indians face grave internal conflicts. In some quarters there has been a strong belief that India cannot afford two adversaries on her northern flank and that some solution to the Pakistan conflict must be found.

Indian leaders however are fearful that if the Kashmir Valley should join Pakistan or become independent, a precedent will be set that may enable other states to breakaway from the Indian Union under left wing or right wing anti-Congress governments. There is also a genuine concern that the division of Kashmir along religious lines would dangerously increase tensions in India between the Hindu majority and the fifty-five million Muslim minority.

These concerns have been compounded by the recent border incidents which the Indians firmly believe were created by the Pakistanis as a backdrop for Ayub Khan's forthcoming visit with you in Washington.

Indian reactions to the problem are further complicated by the realization among most thoughtful Indians that the central government has handled the Kashmir Valley ineptly. For more than a decade a semi-corrupt and unrepresentative government was tolerated by Nehru and his associates. The present government, although free of corruption and until recently at least, much more liberal in regard to civil rights, has but little public support.

At present I can see no immediate solution to this impasse; nor in spite of the recent border conflicts do I see any basis for abject hopelessness.

It is comforting in this respect to remember that the India-Pakistan relationship contains what psychologists might describe as a "love-hate" element which under the impetus of some favorable development may some day quite unexpectedly lead to a solution. In any event, the present situation although difficult and dangerous is no more so than the Yugoslav-Italian impasse on Trieste which suddenly succumbed to secret negotiations.

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In regard to India's relations with her other neighbors we see significant improvement. Largely because of their common fear of increasing Chinese influence, a settlement has been reached between India and Nepal out of which has developed considerable political, economic and military cooperation.

A settlement has been reached between India and Burma where the numerous Indian expatriates have for many years created difficulties for both governments. The recent agreement with Ceylon represents a major political decision by the Indian Government to allow the repatriation of some 600,000 Tamil speaking Ceylonese to India.

In regard to Africa the Indian position is increasingly marked with a frustration and impatience which in many ways resembles our own.

When the Chinese attacked in 1962, the Indians were deeply resentful of the failure of most African governments to support them. When the Chinese exploded a nuclear device and India announced her decision not to follow down the nuclear road, the African reaction ranged from indifference to applause for the Chinese feat with almost no kudos for Indian restraint.

At the recent Cairo Conference India's experience was an unhappy one and she anticipates even greater difficulties at the Algiers Conference in June.

In regard to the Soviet Union India's policy is designed to moderate Soviet relationships to the United States, to assure the continued flow of economic and military assistance from Moscow, and above all else to discourage a rapprochement between China and Russia.

However, since the fall of Khrushchev the Indians have felt an increasing sense of uncertainty about Soviet policies and attitudes. More recently, Soviet political support for the Chinese and North Vietnamese, despite vicious attacks by Peking against the Soviet "revisionists", has persuaded many Indians that in the event of a recurring conflict between China and India the USSR might at best remain neutral.

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Yet the Indians are dependent on the Soviets for much of their heavy industrial development, including Bokaro which we refused to build, and also for certain military equipment, which we have refused to provide for fear of upsetting the Pakistanis.

In regard to Southeast Asia Indian officials recognize that a Chinese victory on their eastern flank would be a threat to India's own security and that a United States political and military withdrawal from the area would assure such a victory.

At the same time they have been genuinely and deeply fearful that our effort to force Hanoi to negotiate by bombing north of the 17th parallel will tend to bring China and the Soviet Union together, a development which the Indians consider to be the greatest single disaster which could befall them and the world.

As a result of these complex and often contradictory concepts and pressures, the Indians--prior to your speech at Johns Hopkins--were inclined to give us strong support in private (as at the Belgrade Conference) while remaining uncommitted publicly. Since you so clearly laid out both our objectives and our willingness to negotiate the general reaction here has been favorable to our position.

3. Indian Progress and Prospects.

The Indian internal political and economic situation today represents something of a paradox. On the one hand it is fair to say that no nation in the world has successfully accomplished more profound changes in a similar period; on the other hand an appalling array of difficulties remain to be overcome.

On the affirmative side India can take great pride in the fact that, following the withdrawal of the British in 1947, the 562 princely states of colonial days were successfully integrated with the old British India to form a federal union; that three orderly, honest major elections have been held with over fifty-five percent of all Indians over 21 years of age voting; that the Congress Party after nearly eighty years of activity still holds the confidence of a substantial majority of the electorate; that in spite of India's poverty the Communist movement is still closely contained and virtually ineffective; and that

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in the face of vigorous democratic give and take of India's politics there have been only two national governments in the seventeen years since independence.

Indian economic progress has been equally dramatic: a five-fold increase in electric power, the major expansion and modernization of India's railroads, the rapid growth of steel and other heavy industries, the growth of food grain production from 53 million tons annually to 87 million tons in twelve years, the elimination of malaria, the massive expansion and improvement in education at all levels, the graduation each year of thousands of well-trained engineers and doctors, etc.

However, on the negative side of the ledger it must be said that India still faces some appalling problems. Here are some examples:

Although a good start has been made on increasing agricultural production, there is still some uncertainty over Indian planning and commitments in this critical area.

Although a determined program of population control is under way it is an open question as to whether it is organized in a manner that will assure its success within a reasonable time span.

Although considerable progress has been made in opening the way for an expanding private sector, doctrinaire economic habits of mind still linger in many parts of the government.

Although India's economic and social progress has been substantial, there is still a debilitating lack of confidence among many Indian leaders.

III

The New Shastri Government

It is now nearly ten months since Nehru's death and the Nehru legend is constantly expanding. It would be difficult for anyone, no matter how talented or impressive, to fill his shoes in the eyes of the Nehru-worshipping Indian public. It is particularly difficult for an incumbent only four feet ten inches tall, weighing less than one hundred pounds.

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Nevertheless we believe the ten-month record of the Shastri Government on balance is a good record. This record includes the following:

1. A determined, comprehensive, and realistic attack on the food problem, the first since independence.
2. The first serious approach on the problem of population control.
3. The prosecutions of charges against the leaders of three state governments where corruption had been tolerated for many years under Nehru.
4. The freeing of Cabinet members from the ideological strait jacket imposed by Nehru.
5. The decision not to proceed with the atomic bomb in response to the Chinese challenge and in the face of substantial public pressure for "action".
6. The negotiation of greatly improved relations with three of India's neighbors.
7. The rebuilding of India's defenses.
8. The freeing of the economy to an increasing degree from the sterile concepts of Fabian socialism.
9. The containment, at least for the time being, of the language issue.

IV

Recommendations for United States Policy Action

In regard to economic assistance we are presently giving India \$435 million in loans and an additional annual contribution in surplus wheat and rice priced at close to half a billion dollars.

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Everywhere you go in India you see evidence of what this program of American assistance, raised to the present levels by Chris Herter and Doug Dillon in 1958, has enabled India to achieve. If it had not been for this assistance most Indian planners and administrators believe the economy would now either be retrograde or in total disarray.

The Fourth Five Year Plan will be the crucial test of democratic India's capacity to offer an increasingly better life for her people and at the same time to establish a strong industrial base. However, a realistic study of the Indian economy indicates that the Fourth Five Year Plan cannot succeed unless there is a considerable increase in India's present foreign exchange resources.

I believe that this assistance should be forthcoming. However, our agreement to help provide it, in cooperation with the World Bank and other members of the Consortium, should be conditioned on prior commitments from the Indian Government that it will:

1. Eliminate many of the cumbersome economic controls which are now holding back development,
2. Press a massive effort at population control,
3. Offer increased incentives to private investors both foreign and domestic,
4. Provide a continuing high priority for agriculture, and
5. In other ways move towards a kind of free and more dynamic economy modelled on the experience of Japan, Mexico and elsewhere.

In regard to military assistance India has an urgent need of modern aircraft suitable for the support of her ground forces in the Himalayas and the eastern frontier. Even Indian infantry commanders assert that under existing conditions they would rather have half a dozen more squadrons of ground support aircraft than an equal number of divisions.

With appropriate limited military assistance our military staff are convinced that we can create an Indian defense establishment which can hold the Chinese on the other side of the Himalayas, and eventually

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enable the Indian military to assume a more vigorous posture vis-a-vis the Chinese threat to Burma and Southeast Asia.

We should, therefore, carry out the agreement which we made with the Indian Government last June which calls for \$50 million in loans and \$50 million in credit sales per year until 1969. Assuming that we intend to give additional planes to Pakistan I have recommended that I be authorized privately to inform top Indian officials in advance of the Ayub Khan visit to Washington that their request for F-5 ground support planes has been favorably acted upon.

We suggest a minimum of three squadrons of F-5s at the outset to be delivered in the next two fiscal years, with three squadrons to be delivered thereafter, provided the Indians maintain their end of the bargain.

We also think it is essential that the Indians not be denied sophisticated weapons such as Hawk ground-to-air missiles which they need badly. It would be a mistake by a policy of too little or too late either to leave the Soviets free to establish a close relationship to the Indian military, or to invite a Chinese breakthrough into Assam which as in Vietnam could be met only with a massive commitment of American power.

In regard to United States diplomacy we feel that we are presently working along generally effective lines. Although the Indians have been developing a creeping distrust of the Soviets, it is neither in our interest nor in India's that this situation develop too rapidly. A withdrawal of the Soviets entirely would put an increasing economic burden on India and on us and there are advantages in India maintaining publicly her unaligned posture.

Therefore we suggest that we continue our effort to bring India into closer relationship with Western Europe, Japan, ourselves, while not attempting to disrupt Indo-Soviet relations. (This assumes, of course, that the latter moves increasingly away from China.)

A closer relationship between India and Japan is of particular importance and everything possible should be done to develop it, looking forward to the time when India, Japan, Australia, Malaysia and

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Thailand might become members in an Asian political, economic and perhaps defense association.

V

Implications for United States Policy

With wise handling and the commitment of adequate resources, I believe we can achieve the following objectives in India during the next five years:

1. Push India's rate of economic growth to a relatively steady six or seven percent. This would produce an average annual rate of increase in per capita income of around 3.5 percent. As the present population control program becomes more effective this could be increased within a ten or fifteen year time span to 4.5 percent which compounded would more than double the income of the average Indian in twenty years.
2. Bring India significantly closer to global United States policy objectives without causing her to break her relationship with the Soviets.
3. Encourage India to work more closely with Japan in indigenous Asian development and defense efforts which we could support.
4. Create in eastern India an area of significant military strength on the flank of Southeast Asia and commit India increasingly to the defense of that area.

Although this vast and friendly nation only rarely makes the headlines, its future, in my opinion, will be decisive in determining the shape of Asia and Africa as well in the years ahead.

After many years spent in this part of the world I believe that a determined and wisely planned effort can establish India as a vital democratic success which will be a lasting credit to your Administration.

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I have an excellent staff here in New Delhi. Given the necessary resources and support from Washington, I believe we can successfully fulfill the role which I have outlined.

With my warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles



EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

New Delhi, India
April 8, 1965

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

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Dear Bob:

We are already beginning here to focus on the Shastri visit and are preparing a series of papers on various problems which may come up. Enclosed are copies of these papers which we have done well in advance since the subjects relate to the Ayub visit as well. We plan to complete the rest of the papers by May 1 and hope they will be useful in preparations for the Shastri visit.

I have sent the papers to Bill Handley who is control officer for the Ayub visit.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Cet
Chester Bowles

Enclosures

Mr. Robert W. Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-19-03*

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

With a population equal to that of the 55 nations of Africa and Latin America combined, a sophisticated democratic form of government, and a geographic position that makes it a potential counterweight to China in Asia, India is an important factor in world affairs and of crucial importance to US interests.

Nehru, who articulated India's policies on the world scene for nearly a generation, sought to avoid entangling alliances to permit India to preserve and develop its independent position while serving as a bridge between the free world and the Communist Bloc. He believed that if the conflict between these two forces should get out of hand, India's chances for political, social and economic development under a democratic government would be destroyed.

For a number of years this policy of non-alignment more or less successfully served India's needs and today non-alignment still remains the declared policy of the Shastri government. However, the impact of Chicom aggression in 1962, together with new and different leadership in India, have caused a narrowing of the concept to cover relations between the USSR and the USA while it is assumed that in regard to China Indian and American interests are generally similar.

In regard to foreign affairs in general Shastri and his associates are less doctrinaire than Nehru. They are more concerned with problems and policies bearing directly on India's security and interests and intrinsically they have more of an affinity for the US than for the Communist Bloc.

Under the Shastri administration we expect to see a non-aligned India which will lean closer to the United States than to the USSR, even though at times India adopts unhelpful and unrealistic positions that are not to our liking.

Determinants in India's foreign policy include a reliance on US support and friendship, a deep concern over the long-range confrontation with the Chicom, a desire to promote a detente between the US and USSR, a recognition of the need to improve relations with India's neighbors including but not some stage Pakistan, and an overriding fear that Sino-Soviet differences may be remediable.

With regard to the Chinese Communists, the GOI now clearly recognizes the threat they pose throughout Asia. India is committed to a military defense adequate to deter or defeat an attack similar to the Chicom aggression in 1962 and to a political confrontation with the Chinese Communists wherever Sino-Indian interests clash.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 1-2-04

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With regard to the Soviet Union, India looks upon it as a major contributor to India's development, as the guarantor of India's position on Kashmir and as an Asian counterweight to Chicom aggression. Because of its profound fears that Sino-Soviet differences may somehow be patched up the GOI seeks above all else to keep the split alive even though the cost may be high in regard to other of its interests.

The downfall of Khrushchev and the USSR's enigmatic attitude towards the Chicom nuclear development have served to heighten India's concern about the dependability of USSR support against China. As a result India often appears less willing to criticize the USSR, than it is the US. Indian officials assert, probably with considerable truth that this is because the GOI recognizes the US to be more dependable and reliable than the USSR.

India has embarked on a policy of improving its relations with its neighbors. In regard to Nepal, Burma and Ceylon this has met with some success. We believe Shastri is genuinely interested in improving relations with Pakistan and in finding a way to tackle the Kashmir problem, but in the face of the hard line now evident in Rawalpindi he lacks the political support to risk the concessions that India would have to make in any settlement of these problems.

India has become increasingly disillusioned with the fragmented and radically nationalistic new African states. At the same time India finds itself in competition both with the Chicom and the Pakistanis in dealing with various African nations.

While India should be encouraged to play a constructive role particularly among the more moderate African nations, it would not be in our interests to encourage the GOI to expand its influence with the more radical African leaders, since Indian bona fides with this group could be established only by taking an anti-Western and anti-US stance on specific issues.

With regard to international affairs in general, India will continue to play a moderating but less active role. In private meetings it will work for positions more acceptable to the US. In public it can usually be expected to join the majority. On specific issues between the US and USSR, where Indian interests are not directly involved, it may often and with due apologies to us, support the latter.

Shastri's visit gives us the opportunity:

To confirm the mutuality of our interests in Asia against the Chinese Communists;

To commend the GOI's efforts on behalf of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;

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To reassure Shastri that we have no quarrel with India's policy of non-alignment in regard to the US and the USSR while pointing out that the USSR clearly places a higher priority on its relations with China and international Communism than with India or the US;

To commend the GOI's efforts to improve its relations with its neighbors;

To remind him in this context of the cost of Indo-Pak controversies to sub-continental peace and security;

To suggest to him India need not be restrained by the many conflicting and interested voices of Asia and Africa; rather that India can provide leadership for the many moderates of both continents who are looking for a rallying point for constructive purposes.

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INDO-PAK RELATIONS

Statement of Problem

The easing of Indo-Pak tensions which became evident a year ago and which continued after Prime Minister Nehru's death has given way during the past several months to a deterioration in relations between the two countries.

With Pakistan's elections now completed and India's next national elections almost two years away there had been a considerable hope and even some expectation among moderate Indians that the stage might be set for a serious effort on both sides to settle outstanding differences, including Kashmir. However, for a variety of reasons the outlook once again has become cloudy.

First, India and Pakistan continue to have fundamentally divergent views on how to approach a solution to the problems which divide them. India continues to believe that the smaller issues such as refugees, border disputes, and the many other problems which arose from partition, should be settled first in order to create a more favorable climate for the discussion of the major problem of Kashmir. Pakistan, on the other hand, asserts that once the central issue of Kashmir is satisfactorily settled, the smaller issues will virtually solve themselves.

Second, the Pakistanis, in pursuit of their conviction that only sustained pressure will force India to make major concessions on Kashmir, can be expected to continue their tactic of "leaning" on India by trying to isolate India in the Afro-Asian world, by presenting to India the prospect of a Pak-ChiCom united front, and by exploiting Kashmiri discontent with Indian rule.

The next few months appear to offer the Pakistanis several inviting opportunities for such activity. They may be expected in particular to utilize the Algiers Conference in late June to step up these pressures in conjunction with the Chinese and Indonesians.

Third, there is the continuing Pakistani campaign against United States military assistance to India. This campaign appears to be based on the assumption that India has no source but the United States for military assistance and overlooks the fact that "controlled" United States assistance distasteful as it may be has clear advantages over "uncontrolled" assistance from the USSR similar to that already granted in massive quantities to the UAR and Indonesia.

Fourth, India has recently taken steps providing for further integration of Jammu and Kashmir into India. Depending upon developments involving Sheikh Abdullah in the next few weeks, India may take further repressive measures against Abdullah's followers in Kashmir.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ By pc, NARA, Date 1-2-04

Fifth, Prime Minister Shastri, in spite of his good intentions, is not likely to improve his domestic political strength to such an extent as would allow him to take significant initiatives to ease the impasse in the face of a continuing intransigent posture in Rawalpindi.

Despite these impediments a significant improvement of atmosphere which could lead to a major breakthrough is not impossible of achievement. Opportunities for creating such a climate were lost in 1959 when Nehru rejected out of hand Ayub's joint defense offer and again in 1962 when the Pakistanis, instead of proclaiming their sympathy for India, sought to take advantage of India's difficulties in the face of the Chinese Communist attack.

Nevertheless on balance the situation is not more bleak than were such "impossible" impasses as the Saar and Trieste. India and Pakistan in spite of their widely publicized differences have much in common. In a sense their relationship has a certain love-hate quality that under pressure of some new development could suddenly open the door wide to a rapprochement.

Discussion

Prime Minister Shastri is genuinely committed to a policy of relaxing tensions and to a settlement of Indo-Pak issues. He has, however, consistently tied the problem of relations with Pakistan to the issues of China and of pressing domestic problems.

In pursuance of his interest in promoting better relations, Shastri stopped off briefly on his way back from Cairo last October to visit with Ayub in Karachi. Although this meeting produced no concrete results it might have served, the Indians believe, as a basis for gradual detente following projected talks on reduction of Kashmir ceasefire line tensions and on the problems of minorities. Instead, Pakistan postponed indefinitely the scheduled Home Ministers and ceasefire line talks which India had proposed as first steps.

In addition, in India's view, the Pakistanis for domestic political reasons connected with the election campaign, intensified incidents along the ceasefire line and the East Pakistan border and made various accusations of bad faith against India, while simultaneously continuing to collaborate with Communist China against India, e.g., in finalizing the Sino-Pakistan border agreement which the Indians allege gave a significant part of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to China.

In these circumstances, and taking into account Shastri's limited field of political maneuver, India is likely to insist on

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clear evidence of a more conciliatory Pakistani stance before being willing to make any significant conciliatory gesture of its own.

Even in the present atmosphere, however, we believe India would be willing to enter into talks for the purpose of reducing ceasefire line and border incidents and also enter into a second round of Home Ministers talks.

Home Minister Manda has expressed India's willingness to make significant concessions on the evictions issue, i.e., improved procedures, including a joint Indo-Pak Commission, for determining nationality and allowing persons found to be foreigners to be given some special status in India.

But major steps towards reducing tensions would probably require a more conciliatory Pakistani stance and some concrete Pakistani concession, such as for example, a willingness to reduce ceasefire line and border tensions.

Indian actions which would help to set the stage for a major improvement include the transfer of Berubari enclave to Pakistan. The Pakistanis have attached special importance to this as an earnest of India's good faith and it could lead to the final settlement of the troublesome enclaves problem. In an ensuing improved climate, Indian initiatives in regard to expanded trade, joint development and use of the Ganges-Brahmaputra water system and other Assamese problems would be a distinct possibility.

On the central issue of Kashmir there remain firm limits on the extent to which India under present political conditions can depart from the status quo. Under no circumstances, for instance, could India accept Pakistani possession of the Kashmir Valley that would block India's access to Ladakh. However, under optimum conditions it is conceivable that India could offer the Valley a choice between (a) independence which would subject Kashmir to the normal visa, trade and tariff barriers (this would place Kashmir at a serious trade disadvantage) or (b) some form of autonomy for the Kashmir Valley within the Indian Union (perhaps similar to the relationship of Puerto Rico to the United States) which will give Kashmir continuing free access to the Indian market and continuing economic assistance. If this latter offer were accompanied by assurances of a further reference to the people of Kashmir after say, 10 years, it would be difficult for Pakistan to maintain that the principle of self-determination had not been honored.

However, if Pakistani pressures are maintained they will serve to increase the influence of the most inflexible extremist elements on both the Left and Right of Indian politics and make the political

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and psychological preparations for any changes in the status quo virtually impossible. They will also serve to increase India's reliance on Soviet support on Kashmir.

Shastri's ability to deal constructively with the general problem of Indo-Pakistan relations and the particular problem of a Kashmir settlement has been further reduced by the recent activities of Sheikh Abdullah, the dominant political figure in Kashmir.

Since his release from jail last April Abdullah has stressed the need for a Kashmir settlement which would be agreeable to India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri people. A small but articulate and influential group of Indian moderates looked to him to help bring a solution to the problem. Unfortunately his March 31 meeting in Algiers with Chou En-lai outraged a broad spectrum of Indian opinion and dismayed his most moderate sympathizers.

This meeting, and some of Abdullah's other purportedly anti-Indian activities abroad, have made it politically impossible for the foreseeable future for the Shastri Government to work with him for a Kashmir settlement. By reinforcing Indian fears of Sino-Pak collusion in Kashmir, Abdullah's activities have substantially weakened Indian sentiment in favor of a more flexible approach to the Kashmir issue. They have also increased the likelihood of the Indian Government reversing the significant political liberalization which has taken place over the past year.

The prospect of an outbreak of violence in Kashmir remains the imponderable in the situation. The forces in Kashmir favoring self-determination are pledged to non-violent methods, but in the wake of a hardening of Indian attitudes they may conclude that an agitation is the only method left open to them; Pakistan will almost certainly encourage them in this direction.

Recommendations

In view of the continuing wide divergence of GOI and GOP views on approaches to and content of an acceptable Kashmir settlement, attempts to pressure either party towards settlement are not likely to be productive at this time. Probably the best that can be hoped for at the present is that the lines of communication can be left open and that relations are not aggravated. We believe the United States should therefore limit itself for the present to a low key effort to prevent the atmosphere between the two countries from deteriorating, while remaining alert to a political break that might lead to a breakthrough. Attention should also be given to the role which other countries might play in achieving these goals.

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Meanwhile, the visits of Ayub and Shastri might be used to make the following specific low-key suggestions:

Both countries should be urged to avoid conduct at the Algiers Conference which would deepen the wedge between them and to avoid encouragement to violence in the Kashmir Valley.

Ayub should also be reminded that India has responded with considerable restraint to Pakistan's anti-Indian stance and actions during the Pakistan election campaign. Indeed, the great majority of Indians welcomed Ayub's election as a continuing stabilizing element in Pakistan and as a demonstration of Ayub's strength which it was hoped might be used to promote better Indo-Pak relations.

Shastri should be urged to initiate measures which would enable both countries to complete without delay the transfer of enclaves. This action is being held up because of cases pending in the Indian courts in effectuating the transfer of Berubari. Speedy transfer of Berubari would reduce Pakistan's suspicions of India's good intentions.

Shastri should also be tactfully urged to avoid repressive measures in Kashmir and encouraged to enlarge the political liberalization begun there a year ago.

More generally, Ayub should be advised that Shastri's domestic political position is not yet strong enough to allow him to take significant policy initiatives on Kashmir. Without evidence of a more conciliatory Pakistani stance, he is probably not in a position to make significant concessions on other Indo-Pak areas of dispute.

While this position does not promise immediate major results for Pakistan (assuming that the Paks want a settlement and not an issue) it does hold out some hope for the future. On the other hand, Shastri will probably have no alternative, under Pakistani pressure, to adopting inflexible positions from which a return to a more accommodating stance will become increasingly difficult.

Both Ayub and Shastri should also be urged to take steps towards removing tensions along the Indo-Pak border and the Kashmir ceasefire line. Both should be urged to give priority to holding the previously scheduled talks on this subject.

In order to assist the emergence of a more conciliatory atmosphere, Shastri should be urged to avoid steps beyond those now in process aimed at the further integration of Jammu and Kashmir with India.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Secret

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TO : Mr. Homer

DATE: 3/28

FROM : Carol Lavin

SUBJECT:

As you requested,
Here are the papers Phil Talbot cleared
off on. The scope + aircraft papers are
being revised in accordance with his suggestions and
will be sent as soon as finished

MAR 29 1965

~~SECRET~~

CCL Chan
This document consists of 8 pages
No. 8 of 8 Copies, Series A

127a

To: The Secretary
Through: S/S
From: NEA - Phillips Talbot
Subject: Visits of President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri
ACTION MEMORANDUM

Here is an outline giving our thinking on the handling of the Ayub and Shastri visits. As you know, U.S./India/Pakistan relations are so interrelated it seemed to us wise to develop a general framework for both visits before preparing the individual papers for each visit. The outline summarizes a more detailed scenario which has been cleared in the interested offices in the Department, but not yet in AID or Defense.

We should like to know whether you agree with our general approach before proceeding further.

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Attachment:

Outline for Ayub and
Shastri Visits.

Shastri Visit
Ayub Visit

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By *pc*, NARA, Date *1-2-04*

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MAR 29 1965

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OUTLINE FOR AYUB AND SHASTRI VISITS

1. Why of the Visits

We have invited President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri here in April and June respectively because of the importance to our position in Asia of maintaining a mutually beneficial relationship with the two largest free world countries in Asia.

Our alliance relationship with Pakistan has been coming apart since the Chinese attack on India in 1962 when we initiated our military aid to India. Now that both Presidents have been elected by large majorities, a Presidential meeting is essential to reach an accommodation to halt the drift in our relations with Pakistan.

India, under new, more traditionally Indian, and not immediately impressive leadership, is in the midst of the traumatic experience of dealing with the aggressive power of a nuclear China. Our relationship with India requires that Prime Minister Shastri get acquainted with us and we with him to ground our relations in the realities of India today.

We would visualize the Presidential talks being primarily directed toward reordering our bilateral relations with Pakistan and establishing a personal relationship with Prime Minister Shastri that will assure him of our sympathetic understanding of the problems India faces and our willingness to work together with him in meeting them. All other matters could be dealt with at the Cabinet level.

2. Visitors and Their Aims

- President Ayub - comes on his third Presidential visit with confidence in his strengthened position at home and ambitious for an enlarged role in the Afro-Asian world. He will seek to convince us that Pakistan attaches prime importance to U.S. relationship; that its independent foreign policy has been conducted to avoid hurting basic U.S. objectives, while offsetting the adverse effect of U.S. military aid to India on Pakistan's national interest.

- Prime Minister Shastri - comes as a stranger, lacking the prestige of a Nehru at home and abroad, but showing political skill and tenacity in dealing with multiplying problems inherited from Nehru. He will seek to give and get reassurance regarding the importance of maintaining a close and understanding U.S.-Indian relationship. He will hope to "reason together" about problems we face.

3. Our

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By JCR/NARA Date 1-20-04

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3. Our Aims

(a) To tell President Ayub that his efforts to enlarge Pakistan's circle of friends to support it against India have led him to actions in regard to Communist China that exceed the speed limits as far as our relationship is concerned; to find out whether and how this can be stopped and to adjust our relationship accordingly.

(b) To reinforce India's confidence in our intention to support its economic development and its efforts to resist Chinese Communist pressures.

(c) To emphasize to both that their ultimate strength and security rests upon their own efforts to resolve their internal problems and the differences between their countries.

(d) To express to both our desire to launch a common effort dedicated to creating and enjoying the blessings of a great society for us all.

4. Principal Factors Affecting Pakistan, India and U.S. Relationship

Although the dependence of Pakistan and India on U.S. assistance is substantial, the leverage which this gives us to alter those policies of Pakistan and India which diverge from ours is limited by the following factors: the threat from Communist China, the Soviet role, India's and Pakistan's differing assessment of the threats to their security, uncertainty about the U.S. stake in Asia, Indo-Pak competition for an Afro-Asian role, the barriers to Indo-Pak compromises, the provision of facilities important to our security interests, and the economic assets of both countries.

5. Courses of Action to Advance U.S. Interests

(a) In the political field:

- (1) We should use the visits to review whether our commitments to them are in line with their commitments to our objectives. President Ayub should go away with a clear appreciation of the relationship of our present aid levels to a tolerable, if somewhat watered-down, alliance relationship. Prime Minister Shastri should be assured about the dependability of our support so long as the Indian Government continues to challenge Communist Chinese dominance in Asia.

(2) We

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(2) We should emphasize that the primary responsibility for improving the relations between the two countries lies with themselves and we hope they will resume their dialogue as a means of working at the settlement of their differences. What we say about Kashmir should be within the limits of what a friendly relationship with Pakistan requires and what a friendly relationship with India will tolerate.

(3) We should make clear that our mutual interests would be harmed by any action at the Afro-Asian Conference or elsewhere that undermines the U.N.

(b) In the security field:

We should be prepared to reaffirm and to reinforce the credibility of our past assurances against aggression, including nuclear aggression.

(c) In the military field:

While we wish to avoid an arms race between the two countries, we should be prepared to indicate continued support for modernization both on the ground and in the air within acceptable force levels and expenditure ceilings as long as both signify their willingness to: 1) rely on the West as their defense supplier in key areas; 2) remain individually committed to resisting major power (e.g., Communist) aggression in the area; 3) seek to resolve their differences through peaceful negotiations without resorting to force; and 4) refrain from overt actions which clearly conflict with U.S. actions to contain Chinese Communist aggressiveness.

(d) In the economic field:

We should not hesitate to indicate that the amount of economic aid we are prepared to support is related to the degree to which economic policies and performance are directed toward agreed "requisites for development in each country."
and political requisites in the case.

(e) In the psychological field:

We should be reasonably candid with each visitor as to what we are doing in the other's country, particularly in sensitive fields such as military assistance and nuclear research.

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GENERAL SCENARIO FOR AYUB AND SHASTRI VISITS

1. Purpose of the Visits

We have invited President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri here in April and June respectively because of the importance to our position in Asia of maintaining a mutually beneficial relationship with the two largest free world countries in Asia.

Our alliance relationship with Pakistan has been drifting apart since the Chinese attack on India in 1962 when we initiated our military aid to India. Now that both Presidents have been re-elected by large majorities, a Presidential meeting is essential to reach an accommodation to halt the drift in our relations with Pakistan.

India, under new, more traditionally Indian, and not immediately impressive leadership, is in the midst of the traumatic experience of dealing with the aggressive power of a nuclear China. Our relationship with India requires that Prime Minister Shastri get acquainted with us and we with him to ground our relations in the realities of India today.

2. The Visitors and Their Aims

President Ayub is a veteran at meetings and negotiations with the U.S.; he was last here in 1962. His position at home has never been more secure-- he has been re-elected by a 62% margin, he controls a 4/5 majority in the newly elected National Assembly, economic progress is marked, and his independent foreign policy has increased the pressure on India and appears

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Pakistan to
to be winning a larger role for Pakistan on the international scene. He will be seeking to demonstrate that Pakistan's independent policy with respect to China, the Soviet Union and Afro-Asian countries does not run counter to basic U.S. policy objectives, yet is necessary to offset the liabilities to Pakistan which result from the U.S. India policy. He will also try to get us to see that U.S. policy of meeting the Chinese threat with increased military strength in India and Vietnam is the wrong way to deal with Communist China and has the important side effect of injuring Pakistan's national interests. He may raise such specifics as supersonic aircraft, Kashmir, and perhaps the U.S. facilities in Pakistan.

Prime Minister Shastri, on the other hand, comes as a stranger, leading an India in a transitional phase of its history and beset by multiplying problems inherited from Nehru. Diminutive, and lacking the prestige of a Nehru, he nevertheless appears to have the political tenacity and capacity to develop, in Indian style and time, the necessary consensus to deal with these problems, provided sufficient internal and external resources are available. In doing so, he will draw upon the reserves of political and economic strength which India has built up during its seventeen years of political stability and economic growth since independence. Mr. Shastri will be primarily interested in reaffirming and strengthening the mutually friendly relationship that exists between India and the U.S. and in reasoning together about some of the problems we both face.

3. U.S. Aims

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3. U.S. Aims

With Ayub, our aim is: to let him know that his actions with China have exceeded what our relationship can tolerate, to halt the current drift in our relations and work out an accommodation that will make continued cooperation possible despite our differences. For Pakistan, this means that ~~at a minimum~~ it should not push its relations with Communist China and with the radical Afro-Asians to the point of interfering with our policies of making clear to Communist China that its external adventures are risky and expensive. For us, this means that we can live with Pakistan's independent foreign policy so long as this does not lead to conflict and subversion in the subcontinent or threaten our basic objectives in Asia and in the U.N. We must be prepared to exploit our economic and military assistance as leverage to strike this kind of bargain, keeping in mind that we also want to assure the continued availability of our facilities and that we consider orderly economic development in Pakistan to be essential to the stability of the whole subcontinent.

With Shastri, our aim is to reinforce Shastri's confidence in our intention to continue substantial aid to India's economic development and to support Indian resistance to Communist China in the context of India's nonalignment.

To both leaders we wish to emphasize that:

- (a) the major thrust for their development and security rests with Pakistan and India, themselves. No amount of U.S. support--and it is not unlimited--can provide the essential level of development and security unless the two governments make the necessary decisions

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concerning economic development, accept the common and mutual nature of the problems besetting them and make a determined effort to resolve them.

- (b) with cooperation from the two leaders, we are prepared to do our share to help all three of us realize a great society.

4. Principal Factors Affecting Pakistan, India and U.S. Relationship:

- (a) Threat from Communist China. The Communist Chinese have made it plain they will attempt to dominate Asia. In South Asia this is evidenced in the attack upon India ^{IN} and Chinese efforts to undermine Indian leadership in the Afro-Asian world, poison relations between South Asian countries on the one hand and the U.S. and U.S.S.R. on the other, and by ^{CHINA'S} projecting an image of growing power and influence internationally. While it is unlikely that China will in the short run renew hostilities against India, China is now engaged in isolating India diplomatically (a by-product of which has been to reduce U.S. influence in Pakistan) and generally feeding the friction which has traditionally kept the subcontinent weak.
- (b) Soviet Role. As a means of maintaining an influential role in subcontinental affairs, the U.S.S.R. has been a supplier of India's development, a source of military equipment, a supporter of India's cause in Kashmir; it has also exerted a deterrent effect on China. The U.S.S.R. is responsive to overtures from Pakistan, so long as this does not jeopardize the Soviet position in India.

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- (c) India and Pakistan Differ in Assessment of Threats. India and Pakistan see the threat to their security quite differently. For India, China is the chief threat both in immediate and long-run terms. Pakistan sees India as the prime threat, U.S.S.R. as secondary, and the Communist Chinese as a much longer run threat. This order of priorities has led Pakistan to exploit the short-run opportunities afforded by China's India policy and the U.S.S.R.-Chinese split in order to add to the pressure upon India.
- (d) Indo-Pak Competition for Afro-Asian Role. Both countries are vying for support in the Afro-Asian world. The death of Nehru and India's dependence on the major Western powers have reduced India's ability to exercise leadership among the underdeveloped countries. Pakistan on the other hand sees its more independent foreign policy as admitting it into a relationship it has long and unsuccessfully sought with fellow Afro-Asians who have previously rejected Pakistan as an ally and agent of the Western colonial powers. This helps to balance its position in relation to India.
- (e) Uncertainty About U.S. Stake in Asia. There is an underlying uncertainty in Pakistan and to a lesser extent in India as to whether Communist China and the U.S. will reach an accommodation or whether there will be hostilities between them. For our part, we need Pakistan's and India's help to maintain our present role. In the case of Pakistan, there is a commitment in the form of CENTO and SEATO, although this commitment now has relatively little

content so

content so far as a possible Pakistan ~~extension~~ contribution in Southeast Asia is concerned. In the case of India, we need continuation of its posture of explicit resistance to Chicom pressures on India and tacit cooperation in meeting Chicom expansionism elsewhere in Asia.

- (f) Impediments to Indo-Pak Compromises. The divisive forces in both countries make it difficult for either regime to make the compromises required to settle regional disputes, and Kashmir in particular--although Ayub is in a stronger position to do so than is Shastri. Sufficient power and will, however, exist in both governments to prevent renewal of large-scale communal hostilities.
- (g) Provision of Facilities to U.S. Both countries are cooperating with the U.S. in providing facilities important to U.S. national security, though this is more extensive in the case of Pakistan due to our alliance relationship.
- (h) Economic Situation. Both India and Pakistan are deeply committed to economic programs aimed at economic modernization, expansion of output, and improvement of living standards. We and they consider that reasonable success in these programs is an essential condition of healthy political growth.
- (i) Dependence on U.S. Assistance. The present regimes in Pakistan and India are heavily dependent on Western assistance to maintain an acceptable pace of economic and military modernization

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and confidence in present political institutions. Bloc assistance to India Supplements the West's efforts, but not to the extent of providing a complete alternative. Pakistan presently has no alternatives on the economic side.

- (j) Limitations on U.S. Leverage. Factors (a) through (h) limit the extent to which (i) can be manipulated to achieve those U.S. objectives which are not shared by India and Pakistan.

5.
H.

Courses of Action to Advance U.S. Interests:

- (a) In the political field:

U.S. interests have to be pursued at several levels--in our bilateral relationships, in subcontinental terms and in global terms.

- (1) The result of the Chinese pressure on India and consequent U.S. military aid to India has been a drift in U.S.-Pakistan relations amounting to the creation of a semi-alliance and an improvement in the Indian relationship with the U.S. amounting to dual alignment (the U.S. and U.S.S.R.) instead of nonalignment. Despite its cost, the loosening of the alliance ties gives us greater flexibility in pursuing our broader interests in the subcontinent.

Consequently, we should use these visits to review whether our commitments to the two countries are in line with theirs to us. In the case of Pakistan, we are fulfilling the obligations undertaken under the conditions of an alliance. We need to clarify what Pakistan in the future is prepared to

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do or not to do to make the continuation of some form of mutually beneficial relationship possible. In the case of India, our written commitments of 1962-63 are related to the previously unwritten commitment to secure the independence of India against the inroads of the Communist powers, either overtly or covertly, and to contribute to peace and freedom in Asia. We need to review with the new Prime Minister the extent to which his government's policies are also directed toward these ends.

- (2) Since the ultimate strength of the subcontinent essentially hinges on the state of Pakistan--India relations, we must be prepared to emphasize this to both visitors and to emphasize their primary responsibility for these relations. Our object should be to stimulate them to resume their dialogue in lieu of the present diatribes and to demonstrate our willingness to be of assistance in finding compromises when both sides deem such a course to be of overriding national interest. What we say about Kashmir should be within the limits of what a friendly relationship with Pakistan requires and what a friendly relationship with India will tolerate.
- (3) The Afro-Asian meeting in Algiers will follow the two visits here and will come at a time when the U.N. is at an impasse. We should make clear to both Ayub and Shastri the mutuality of our interests in steering the United Nations through its present troubled waters and in avoiding actions at the Afro-Asian meeting or elsewhere that would undermine the U.N.

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(b) In the general security field:

- (1) Since Pakistan's chief preoccupation is the long-term threat they see in India, and, since our present limited military aid to India is necessary in the context of our India policy and the Chinese threat, we should be prepared to reaffirm our past assurances to Pakistan regarding Indian or any other aggression. We should make clear that the President's general statement of assurance against any Chinese nuclear threats or blackmail applies equally to Pakistan and be prepared, as appropriate, to extend to Pakistan any additional assurance that may be developed for India with regard to the Chinese nuclear threat. Since we do not accept India as a current threat to Pakistan, we cannot meet Pakistan's desire for joint planning against the Indian threat in CENTO and SEATO. The credibility of our assurances will have to rest on the GOP's confidence in our bonafides as demonstrated by past responses to aggression in Asia, continuation of our assistance program, and our willingness to participate in joint exercises.
- (2) We should, to the extent possible, reassure India of our intention to cooperate with it to meet the threat from Communist China. In order to meet Indian concerns about Chinese progress toward a nuclear weapons capability and about

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our position in Southeast Asia, we should reinforce the credibility of our assurances by stressing our willingness to discuss ways in which we might further assist India to meet any Chinese nuclear threat while maintaining its policy of using atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. As a means of reinforcing the Indian decision to refrain from producing nuclear weapons, we should affirm our desire to continue our discussions of ways and means to further India's scientific progress and to enhance its prestige.

(c) In the military field:

While we wish to avoid an arms race between the two countries, we should be prepared to indicate continued support for modernization both on the ground and in the air within acceptable force levels and expenditure ceilings as long as both signify their willingness to:

- (1) rely on the West as their defense supplier in key areas;
- (2) remain individually committed to resisting major power (e.g., Communist) aggression in the area;
- (3) seek to resolve their differences through peaceful negotiations without resorting to force.
- (4) refrain from overt actions which clearly conflict with U.S. actions to contain Chinese Communist aggressiveness.

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- (d) In the economic field, we should not hesitate to indicate that the amount of economic aid we are prepared to support is related to the degree to which economic policies and performance are directed toward agreed "requisites for development" in each country.
- (e) In the psychological field, we should be quite candid with each visitor as to what we are doing in the other's country, particularly in sensitive fields such as military assistance and nuclear research.

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SAUNDERS
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THOMSON

Mar 26 4 27 PM '65
dated March 23,

LBg
To
Shastri
3/23/65

Signed letter of invitation from President to Prime Minister Shastri/
has been
~~being~~ pouched Embassy for delivery. Text, which White House does not intend
release, follows for your information:

QUOTE Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am happy to learn from Ambassador Bowles that you have accepted my
invitation to visit the United States. Mrs. Johnson and I are looking forward
to seeing you and Mrs. Shastri in Washington on June 2 and 3.

Anticipation of your visit revives fond memories of our journey to India
in 1961. But it also underscores how markedly conditions have changed both
for us personally and for our nations since then.

We are
~~XXXXXX~~ embarked on a program here to make America's promise a reality for
all her people. I am deeply aware that our own hard work to solve our problems
is a crucial ingredient in our continuing effort to help others with theirs.
You too are engrossed in planning the next chapter of your program to bring
Indians hope for a better life. We both feel the challenge of reaching to
meet a nation's most pressing needs and to fulfill its highest aspirations,
while providing for its essential security.

So we have much in common, and I look forward to sharing thoughts with you
on these and other important problems we both face. Sincerely LYNDON B. Johnson
UNQUOTE

RUSK

Drafted by: NEA:SOA:FJCrawford:bts 3/25/65
Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by: NEA/SOA - Turner C. Cameron, Jr.

Clearances: S/S - Mr. Gordon White House - Mr. Saunders
SOA - Miss Laese

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ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI 1989

NEA

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Embtel 2655; Deptel 1925

SHASTRI VISIT

Ambassador Hand has been in touch with Ambassador Nehru again for review tentative plans for Shastri visit prior Nehru's departure March 23 for consultation in Delhi. In addition to plans for Washington stay outlined refdeptel following emerged:

1. Hand offered Presidential plane bring Shastri to Williamsburg from Ottawa June 1. Indians will let us know if they wish accept. FYI.
Regarding your suggestion pick up Shastri in London and possibly return him to Delhi, seemed to us preferable follow usual procedure, as with Pres. Radhakrishnan, of visitors using flag airlines where possible. We will find out from Canadians what plans, if any, they have for getting Shastri from London to Ottawa. End FYI.

2. Nehru informed your suggestions, including emphasis on seeing something of American problems in Connecticut and elsewhere and fact you have talked to Shastri about some of these.

3. Indians seem keen on obtaining maximum exposure among foreign policy groups and information media, particularly in New York.

4. Rough

Drafted by:

NEA:SOA:FJCrawford:bld 3/23/65

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - William J. Handley

~~6/1/65 - William J. Handley~~

Clearances:

SOA - Miss Laise

O/CPR - Mr. King - in draft

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Shastri Visit

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4. Rough shape of program outside Washington which Indians have in mind something like following:

Friday, June 4 - Cape Kennedy; possible fly over TVA.

Saturday, June 5 - NORAD, if this does not raise political problems in India; Agricultural tour also possible in Colorado. Or, alternatively, visit Chicago or Detroit.

Sunday, June 6 - Fly to New York, ~~or, alternatively, visit Chicago or Detroit~~

Monday and Tuesday, June 7 and 8 - New York City to include honorary degree

- Columbia University; luncheon with U Thant
(June 7); Waldorf dinner to serve as forum
for major address; trip around Manhattan
Island; World's Fair visit.

5. Separate program to be developed for Mrs. Shastri to emphasize welfare activities.

We hope while Nehru in Delhi Shastri will weigh various alternatives and reach decision on kind of program which will, to maximum extent possible in very short time available, accomplish objectives we all desire.

End

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ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI 1977

INFO: Amembassy KARACHI 1037-
Amembassy LONDON 5983

LINDIS

March 22

Round-up discussion/ between Ambassador B. K. Nehru and Talbot prior Nehru's

return to Delhi on consultation focussed largely on bi-lateral United States-recent Indian relations. Talbot noted reports he had heard of/para-Consortium meeting in Paris indicated that major interest of participants was in Fourth Plan. Nehru expressed his view that foreign exchange requirements for Third Plan had been underestimated. Much of lack of performance under Third Plan could be traced to foreign exchange shortage, which had been responsible for elaboration of controls. Said he concerned GOI was making same mistake on Fourth Plan which in his view would require substantially more foreign exchange than Third. One of points he planned make in New Delhi was that GOI should make and pass on to "friends" clear estimate of foreign exchange requirements for Fourth Plan regardless of prospects for obtaining such foreign exchange.

Talbot agreed India would face difficult problems regarding financing Fourth Plan. Plan would require some Rs 20,000 crores while five year defense plan would take about Rs 5,000 crores. Recalling earlier discussions with Nehru on this subject, Talbot indicated he wished say once more that if GOI likely within next couple years reexamine resources available for defense and development

Drafted by:

NEA:SOA:DTSchneider:bts 3/22/65

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - Phillips Talbot

Clearances:

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 1-2-04

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*Shastri
visit*

MAR 23

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development and as result cut back military force goals, there would be great advantage in doing this earlier rather than later. Noting 7 to 1 ratio of defense expenditures between India and Pakistan (Nehru claimed ratio is 3 to 1) Talbot expressed concern that if ratio remains great, Paks will be tempted increase their defense expenditures. They are already giving some indication of interest in obtaining military credits and could come close doubling their defense budget without greater strain on Pak economy than current strain on Indian. It our view here early Indian signal of intention cut military budget would increase chances Paks would stand pat.

Nehru agreed check on this question in Delhi; said his impression was Indian defense program not likely be reduced but is levelling off and will represent progressively smaller proportion of budget. Also said mood of India is such that Parliament wants continued defense build-up.

Talbot noted we looking forward Shastri visit and subjects for discussion which Nehru had mentioned to Secretary (Deptel 1970 to New Delhi) are those on our minds.

B. K. then took opportunity raise several questions regarding Pakistan. Recalling US ~~has~~ QUOTE protests UNQUOTE to India over Indian moves integrate Kashmir, Nehru raised Paks QUOTE blatant UNQUOTE disturbance status quo in Kashmir by (a) QUOTE complete absorption UNQUOTE of Azad Kashmir and (b) dropping of provisional concept with regard Pak-Chincom border demarcation. Nehru said he presumed US would protest to Paks about these but he was not requesting that we do so.

Talbot said our concern was that efforts we were all making on subcontinent to preserve stable societies could be protected from ramifications of Indo-Pak disputes.

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Said he wished he could safely assume policies being pursued in Kashmir would preserve peace. Turning to recent troubles in East Pakistan border, Nehru then said he understood Paks had complained to US and British that India had occupied Dahagram enclave. British had asked Indians about this (Nehru had not heard of Berubari Embassy's talk with Jha.) Responding, Talbot asked when ~~Dahagram~~ case would be completed and said everyone concerned hoped this and question of other enclaves could be wound up rapidly so as to eliminate this kind of friction. Talbot said we consider these disputes matters for resolution between India and Pakistan, but in view massive effort being made help India, there is legitimate outside interest in peace on subcontinent. Nehru responded he should hope this interest would exist regardless of assistance effort.

Nehru then turned to inquire what we ~~knew~~ knew of President Ayub's visit to Communist China and character of Pak Chicom relationship which has developed. Pointing out our impressions still not complete and that we would learn more when Ayub visits Washington, Talbot said Ayub given reception which was obviously on large scale. Paks believe they had gained points in communique; in our view, Chicoms also ~~have~~ gained. Paks tell us they held to their positions effectively, e.g., no reference to Viet-Nam. Only new "arrangement" about which we have heard was cultural agreement. In response Nehru's question about character Pak-Indonesia-Chicom relations, Talbot said these three countries seem likely work together at Algiers on some issues. Paks seem to be still in exploratory stage regarding relations with Indonesians. This is most active area of general Pak ~~policy~~ ^{consideration} of expansion relationship with Afro-Asians in search of benefits which Paks see others

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have gained. Pakistan is dissatisfied with US for not having given support on Kashmir and believes it may get more leverage from Afro-Asians. Nehru agreed with this analysis, but went on to make stock analysis of Pak foreign policy as motivated by hatred of India. To this he added theory that nonalignment ^{always would have} ~~has been~~ been most advantageous policy for Pakistan. Paks failed get what they wanted out of alignment with US; therefore, Paks now ~~are~~ turning to nonalignment. Talbot said element of fear was behind Pak attitude toward India; said however key question regarding subcontinent was whether there enough strength and stability in India and Pakistan to provide basis for each country to work out its problems. Our understanding is that Pakistan would like to see Indian government of greater strength than ~~that~~ which now exists. Ayub has told us that he had hoped Shastri could have negotiated with him when Prime Minister came to Karachi, but he now believes Shastri cannot command strong enough political support to enable him enter negotiations with Pakistan.

Talbot concluded, saying that Shastri had been denied year of tranquillity which we had all hoped for after Nehru's death. We hoped second year could be positive and constructive.

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END

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 23, 1965

131
Shastri Visit
X India

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:


I am happy to learn from Ambassador Bowles that you have accepted my invitation to visit the United States. Mrs. Johnson and I are looking forward to seeing you and Mrs. Shastri in Washington on June 2 and 3.

Anticipation of your visit revives fond memories of our journey to India in 1961. But it also underscores how markedly conditions have changed both for us personally and for our nations since then.

We are embarked on a program here to make America's promise a reality for all her people. I am deeply aware that our own hard work to solve our problems is a crucial ingredient in our continuing effort to help others with theirs. You too are engrossed in planning the next chapter of your program to bring Indians hope for a better life. We both feel the challenge of reaching to meet a nation's most pressing needs and to fulfill its highest aspirations, while providing for its essential security.

So we have much in common, and I look forward to sharing thoughts with you on these and other important problems we both face.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Lal Bahadur Shastri
Prime Minister of India
New Delhi, India

PRESERVATION COPY

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Origin
ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI 1971

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INFO: Amembassy SAIGON 2043
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LIMDIS

Following summary FYI only and NOFORN. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review of memcon:

Secretary met with Indian Ambassador B. K. Nehru March 19 for eighty-minute talk prior Nehru's return Delhi on consultation. Discussion principally concerned Viet-Nam; other subjects reported septal.

Secretary started conversation saying it would be helpful if we could compare notes on Communist China. Said Chicoms were harsh and belligerent in statements about Southeast Asia. Yet there were clear signs of their caution, e.g., they had not introduced hostile aircraft into Laos and few Chicoms present in North Viet-Nam. Nehru responded that Indians get little hard information from Peiping. Inquired if US considering QUOTE going farther UNQUOTE U.S. has made do so. As to future north/ in Viet-Nam. Secretary responded/no decision/XXXXX/much depends upon what other side does. It is too early to make conclusions about Soviet and Chicom reaction to raids on North.

Nehru remarked US seemed use excessive force. Also US and Indian readings of internal situation South Viet-Nam differ. If DRV interference stopped

Drafted by:

NEA:SOADTSchneider:mb 3/20/65

Clearance:

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - Phillips Talbot

SVN - Mr. Corcoran

S/S - Mr. Christensen

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 1-20-04

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

stopped, Indians wonder if fighting in South would not continue.

Secretary replied if Viet-Nam returned to condition of 1959 SVN could take care of itself without US troops. Perhaps we would provide economic aid and equipment. We find no significant group in SVN loyal to Viet Cong or DRV aside from limited numbers directly recruited.

Nehru asked what proof US desired of cessation DRV interference. Secretary in which ICC shown 40 departing North Viet-Nameese while some 6,000 remained. replied he hesitated talk about formal proof because of difficult Laos experience. ~~XX~~
Said however if DRV decided stop, US would get first signals in hours and others within days. We would notice termination DRV command and control system, cut-off of infiltration, decline in levels of insurgent activity, etc. We could take corresponding action almost immediately.

Nehru inquired about US communications with Hanoi. Secretary said we hear indirectly through French, Poles, Soviets, etc., but get nothing this way which differs from public statements. Nehru wondered if Indians might probe for information more than they have.

Nehru asked about Soviet attitude. Secretary replied we don't believe Soviets want to get into major fracas with us over Southeast Asia but they have major bloc problem regarding support to other socialist countries. Moscow and Peiping could be drawn together in two ways: If conflict continues build up, Moscow may consider it must support other socialist countries. On other hand, if Peiping demonstrates success its doctrine in Viet-Nam by driving out US, Moscow would have to move toward Peiping. We can't see what Hanoi stands get out of enlarged conflict, however, as it bound to be hurt. We want see Hanoi stop its interference before broader issues play more important role.

When

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When Nehru remonstrated again about Indian concern Viet-Nam conflict will bring Chicoms and Soviets together, Secretary again noted we could not expect rift to continue if Chicoms permitted demonstrate their more militant course is route to success. Nehru tended agree.

Nehru inquired about US rationale that movement north would get cessation DRV interference. After noting that US prefers not get involved in Hanoi area, Secretary responded that we recognize our policy full of risks and danger. We not dealing with simple domino problem however; we are dealing with militant theory of world revolution, harshly preached by Peiping. Seems unlikely anyone will start

While these two types of aggression now seem less likely, Peiping remote, despite attack on India, / ~~QUOTE wars of liberation UNQUOTE~~ confronts us with third in form QUOTE wars of liberation UNQUOTE.

During 1961 debate, Moscow said imperialists would respond to external Communist support to QUOTE wars of liberation UNQUOTE. Peiping, following QUOTE paper tiger UNQUOTE theory, said no. Moscow is of course correct. We must make it clear in Viet-Nam that wars of liberation cannot be fought by sending men and equipment across frontiers from privileged sanctuaries. It is important US commitments from Korea to West Berlin be credible. Even De Gaulle would be first to draw conclusion from US withdrawal Viet-Nam that US cannot be relied upon in Europe. Nehru responded he did not question Secretary on this point. No Indian would suggest US QUOTE scuttle and run UNQUOTE. Question is, what is US commitment and how should it be met.

Nehru asked about prospects for escalation. Secretary said this difficult predict but we are unaware any significant redistribution of military forces in

Communist

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Communist world such as took place six months before Chicom intervention Korea. Much depends upon DRV action in SVN. If infiltration increases, then scale of fighting may build up. If we can block major supply operations, then Viet Cong capabilities will be reduced. We have learned that they have their own problems with shortages food, medicine, etc. Nehru wondered why Hanoi persisted. Secretary speculated DRV may accept Peiping's QUOTE paper tiger UNQUOTE theory or may consider political instability SVN will bring about collapse. Up until recently Hanoi has considered its position improving. Now stakes are ~~increasing~~ being raised.

Discussing diplomatic aspects dispute, Secretary hoped India would continue support of 1954 and 1962 agreements. Said/we could get back to these QUOTE in five minutes UNQUOTE. Agreed existing machinery would require strengthening. Nehru said India trying obtain return to these agreements.

Secretary said we had hoped co-chairmen could be in touch signatories Geneva agreement to get their views on dispute. Assuming Communist nations would call for cessation US action and West for stop to Hanoi's interference, co-chairmen could put statements together and call on both sides stop. Soviets unwilling agree to this however. We have also tried bilateral talks with Soviets several times but we doubt Moscow has influence in Hanoi to do much. Secretary raised question whether since co-chairmen immobilized by Soviet attitude there anything ICC members might do. Said he would explore this further and possibly be in touch with Nehru again.

GP-3

END

RUSK

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Shastri visit

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ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI 1970
INFO: Amembassy KARACHI 1033
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LIMDIS

Following summary FYI only and NOFORN. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review of memcon:

During talk with Ambassador B. K. Nehru March 19 Secretary inquired regarding what Prime Minister Shastri likely raise in Washington talks next June. Nehru said he would discuss this when on consultation in Delhi but presumed Shastri would be interested in wide range matters including Chicom nuclear and conventional threat to India, US military aid (specifically aircraft), Southeast Asia problems, economic aid, and nuclear disarmament.

Later in talk Secretary inquired regarding Nehru's views on Indian nuclear problem. Nehru replied that on psychological side, GOI seemed to have weathered controversy regarding its nuclear policy which followed Chicom detonation, but had suffered great prestige loss among Afro-Asians. As result detonation and 1962 loss to Chicoms, Afro-Asians consider India second-rate military power and dependency of US. India searching for psychological equivalent of Chicom device but so far results have not been promising.

Regarding

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| Drafted by: | Telegraphic transmission and |
| NEA: SOA: DTSchneider:mb 3/20/65 | classification approved by: NEA - Phillips Talbot |
| Clearances: | |

S/S - Mr. Christensen

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Authority: RAC032A-22-2-5-6
By: JDL vARA Date: 2-22-18

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Regarding military aspect nuclear problem, Nehru said Shastri had told Wilson that nonnuclear powers which elect not go for bomb need some kind of protection from nuclear powers. Nehru explained that since any nonproliferation agreement would not include Chicoms, some provision must be made for Indian security. President's statement about nuclear blackmail was good but/ ^{from} QUOTE one-side UNQUOTE. What was needed was joint statement by nuclear powers (including Soviets).

Secretary commented it difficult see how India could rely upon such a ^{Said} statement. /US constitutional practice was such that this was area in which automatic commitment could be made only by treaty. Many here would consider it asking much of US to provide guarantee without alliance. Nehru replied what he had in mind was not bilateral agreement but general international treaty.

Saying his idea was quite tentative and that he had not discussed it with British, Secretary then asked whether some kind of Commonwealth regional defense committee might provide needed security within existing political framework. Nehru's off-the-cuff opinion of this was that it would not QUOTE satisfy Indian people UNQUOTE. India's relations with UK were not that close. He also wondered if UK would be willing to hand over nuclear weapons to a QUOTE nuclear committee UNQUOTE. Secretary wound up discussion nuclear problem by remarking that we had been thinking over various forms of assurances that might make India feel more secure.

Secretary then asked Nehru to re-examine his earlier remark that dependence upon US had undermined Indian position in Afro-Asian world. He wondered if some of India's troubles were not result of relative inactivity Indian diplomacy among

Afro-Asians

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Afro-Asians for last two-three years. Secretary noted changing mood of Africa and growth of moderate nations. Urged Indians keep in close touch, for example, with Nigeria. Nehru responded it difficult to be active among Afro-Asians without abusing US, which India did not want to do. It was hard to demonstrate that Indian foreign policy was independent in face Afro-Asian claims India was living off US. Secretary maintained some eighty other countries were doing this and pointed out late Prime Minister Nehru had exercised dynamic leadership without attacking US. Concluded saying there was gold mine in opposing what Chicom's doing among Afro-Asians.

GP-3

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

S/S 3937

March 17 , 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Invitation to Indian Prime Minister
Shastri for U.S. Visit from the
President

There is enclosed Mr. Saunder's redraft of a suggested letter of invitation originally forwarded in my memorandum of March 12. The Department concurs with the changes made. Because the tone of the letter is more personal than a formal invitation would require, it is recommended that we not release the letter publicly, in order that we minimize possible unfavorable comparison with the President's letter to President Ayub.

for *Benjamin H. Read*
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Suggested letter to
Prime Minister Shastri.

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MAR 18 1965

SUGGESTED LETTER

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am happy to learn from Ambassador Bowles that you have accepted my invitation to visit the United States. Mrs. Johnson and I are looking forward to seeing you and Mrs. Shastri in Washington on June 2 and 3.

Anticipation of your visit revives fond memories of our journey to India in 1961. But it also underscores how markedly conditions have changed both for us personally and for our nations since then.

I have embarked on a program here to make America's promise a reality for all her people. I am deeply aware that our own hard work to solve our problems is a crucial ingredient in our continuing effort to help others with theirs. You too are engrossed in planning the next chapter of your program to bring Indians hope for a better life. We both feel the challenge of reaching to meet a nation's most pressing needs and to fulfill its highest aspirations, while providing for its essential security.

So we have much in common, and I look forward to sharing thoughts with you on these and other important problems we both face.

Sincerely,



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

March 12, 1965

S/S 3709

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

Subject: Invitation to Indian Prime Minister Shastri
for U.S. Visit from the President

Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri has accepted the President's invitation, extended orally by Ambassador Bowles, to visit the United States in June. Enclosed is a recommended written invitation from the President to Prime Minister Shastri.

BeTuell
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Recommended invitation to
Prime Minister Shastri from
the President.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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by Benjamin H. Read.

MAR 15 1965

135a

SUGGESTED INVITATION

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am happy to learn from Ambassador Bowles that you have accepted my invitation to come to the United States in early June. Mrs. Johnson and I are looking forward to seeing you in Washington on June 2 and 3. The thought of your visit revives the fond memories which both of us have of our journey to India in 1961.

With warm good wishes,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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WEDNESDAY MORNING I TALKED AT LENGTH WITH L. K. JHA ABOUT SHASTRI'S TRIP TO US WHICH HE AND MRS. SHASTRI ARE APPROACHING WITH KEEN ANTICIPATION. FOLLOWING IS HIGHLY TENTATIVE SCHEDULE WE DISCUSSED AND SEVERAL SPECIFIC QUESTIONS TO WHICH I SHALL APPRECIATE ANSWERS:

1. JHA SAID SHASTRI PLANS TO VISIT CANADA BRIEFLY AND ENTER US FROM OTTAWA JUNE 1. MRS. SHASTRI AND SMALL STAFF WILL BE WITH HIM.

HE WOULD LIKE TO KEEP FORMAL ENTERTAINMENT TO REASONABLE LEVELS. HE WOULD WELCOME OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK TO PRESS CLUB AND TO MEET WITH KEY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS IN ADDITION TO HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH PRESIDENT, SECRETARY, ETC.
CFN 2588 1

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 681A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

QUERY: WILL PRESIDENT'S PLANE BE AVAILABLE TO PICK SHASTRI UP IN OTTAWA? WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO GO ONE STEP FURTHER AND FLY HIM FROM LONDON TO OTTAWA? WOULD IT BE FEASIBLE TO FLY DIRECT FROM OTTAWA TO WILLIAMSBURG, VIRGINIA TO PROVIDE HIM WITH RELAXED EVENING AND GLIMPSE OF HISTORIC OLD AMERICAN TOWN BEFORE ARRIVING IN WASHINGTON FIRST THING WEDNESDAY MORNING?

2. SHASTRI WOULD LIKE TO DEPART FOR LONDON AND NEW DELHI EVENING OF MONDAY, JUNE 7. THIS WILL GIVE HIM TOTAL OF ONLY FOUR DAYS IN ADDITION TO HIS TWO DAYS IN WASHINGTON. IN THESE FOUR DAYS IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE PROVIDE HIM WITH SENSE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL CAPACITY AND, EQUALLY IMPORTANT, AMERICA'S DEEP SENSE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE AND FINALLY US MILITARY POWER. IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH THESE OBJECTIVES I SUGGEST FOLLOWING ITINERARY:

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Authority State Ltr. 8/11/76

By 1/19 NARA. Date 1-20-84

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 2588, MARCH 12, 7 P.M. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM NEW DELHI

A. FIRST DAY WOULD BE DEVOTED TO GIVING SHASTRI SOME PERSONAL CONTACT WITH GRASS ROOTS AMERICA, AND PARTICULARLY WITH KIND OF PROBLEMS WHICH OUR STATE GOVERNMENTS ARE COPING WITH. THIS WOULD BE ESPECIALLY EFFECTIVE BECAUSE OF PARALLEL PROBLEMS IN INDIAN FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS.

CFN 2 7

PAGE THREE RUSBAE 681A ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
CONSEQUENTLY I SUGGEST EARLY FRIDAY MORNING SHASTRI'S PLANE SHOULD LEAVE WASHINGTON FOR NEW HAVEN, CONN. ARRIVING BY NINE OR NINE THIRTY. AFTER SHORT TOUR OF YALE UNIVERSITY SHASTRI WOULD BE GIVEN BRIEFING ON IMPRESSCE ANTI-POVERTY PROGRAM WHICH IS NOW UNDER WAY IN NEW HAVEN.

WITH POPULATION OF 160,000 NEW HAVEN HAS NEARLY 20,000 VOLUNTEERS WORKING IN WIDE-RANGE PROGRAMS TO BRING SECURITY, DIGNITY AND OPPORTUNITY TO EACH INDIVIDUAL CITIZEN. AFTER BRIEFING ON PROGRAMS AS WHOLE, SHASTRI WOULD VISIT INTEGRATED SCHOOLS, WELFARE AND RECREATION CENTERS, ETC. I BELIEVE THIS THREE-HOUR VISIT WOULD MAKE DEEP AND LASTING IMPRESSION.

AT 12:30 SHASTRI WOULD BE FLOWN BY HELICOPTER TO HARTFORD CONN, THIRTY MINUTE FLIGHT. WE COULD ARRANGE SMALL LUNCH WITH GOVERNOR AND TOP STATE OFFICIALS FOR DISCUSSION OF SOCIAL WELFARE, MENTAL HEALTH, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, STATE-FEDERAL RELATIONS, BUDGETARY AND TAX PROBLEMS, COMPETITION WITH OTHER STATES FOR OUTSIDE INVESTMENT, ETC.

AT ABOUT 3 PM SHASTRI WOULD VISIT STATE CAPITOL AND MAKE BRIEF REMARKS BEFORE STATE LEGISLATURE WHICH I BELIEVE IS STILL IN SESSION AT THAT TIME. THIS WOULD PROVIDE HIM WITH
CFN 160,000 20,000 12:30 3

PAGE FOUR RUSBAE 681A ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
SOME UNDERSTANDING OF HOW OUR STATE ASSEMBLIES OPERATE.

AT ABOUT 3:30 WE WOULD LEAVE IN HELICOPTER FOR FLIGHTS OVER PRATT WHITNEY AIRCRAFT, STATE UNIVERSITY, A MAJOR MENTAL INSTITUTION, POSSIBLY POLARIS BASE IN NEW LONDON, AND THEN LAND IN FIELD ON MY PROPERTY 200 FEET FROM MY HOUSE IN ESSEX, CONN.

AFTER TEA WE WOULD TAKE BRIEF LOOK AT LOCAL SCHOOLS AND VISIT AROUND TOWN TO SEE HOW SO-CALLED AMERICAN VILLAGE COMMUNITY IS SET UP. WE COULD THEN EITHER LEAVE AROUND 6:30 FOR NEW

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 2588, MARCH 12, 7 P.M., (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM NEW DELHI

YORK BY HELICOPTER WHICH WOULD TAKE ABOUT ONE HOUR, OR IF POSSIBLE SPEND QUIET NIGHT AT MY HOME.

B. SECOND DAY, SATURDAY. EARLY DEPARTURE BY PLANE FROM EITHER NEW HAVEN, HARTFORD OR NEW YORK FOR MAJOR DEFENSE INSTALLATION IN MIDDLE WEST, PERHAPS OMAHA, OR IF IT IS NOT TOO FAR, COLORADO SPRINGS. ALTHOUGH SHASTRI MAY NOT BE ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT SUCH VISIT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT HE GET IDEA OF (1) AMERICAN DEFENSE CAPACITY, (2) VAST COMPLEXITY AND COST OF MEDIA PROGRAMS, AND (3) URGENT NEED FOR REALISTIC EFFORT TO RELIEVE WORLD TENSIONS. LATE THAT AFTERNOON PLANE WOULD TAKE OFF FOR NASHVILLE TENN PERHAPS HAVING DINNER ENROUTE.
CFN 3:30 200 6:30 (1) (2) (3)

PAGE FIVE RUSBAE 681A ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
C. THIRD DAY, SUNDAY. SHASTRI WOULD BE GIVEN BRIEFING ON TVA AND TOUR OF FLOOD CONTROL: RURAL ELECTRICIFICATION PROJECT, LOW COST HOUSING, AMERICAN FARM COMMUNITY, ETC. LATE IN AFTERNOON HE WOULD LEAVE FOR NEW YORK POSSIBLY HAVING RELAXED DINNER ON INLANE.

FOURTH DAY, MONDAY. WOULD BE SPENT IN NEW YORK IN MORNING THERE COULD BE BOAT RIDE AROUND MANHATTAN ISLAND ENDING UP AT INDIAN PAVILION AT WORLD'S FAIR WHICH HE IS ANXIOUS TO SEE. GOV. STEVENSON MIGHT THEN ARRANGE LUNCHEON FOR HIM AT UN WHERE HE WOULD HAVE CHANCE TO MEET U THANT AND OTHERS.

IN AFTERNOON HE MIGHT VISIT LADIES GARMENT WORKERS UNION EDUCATIONAL CENTER AND OTHER COMMUNITY PROJECTS WHILE MRS. SHASTRI IS SHOWN WELFARE WORK WHICH SHE IS MOST INTERESTED.

BOWLES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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SS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SETWO OF TWO 2588 MARCH 12 7PM

G SHASTRI HAS BEEN INVITED TO SPEAK TO COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
 H RELATIONS WHICH MIGHT BE ARRANGED FOR 5:30 IN AFTERNOON. HE
 EUR WOULD LEAVE BY AIR INDIA IN EARLY EVENING FOR LONDON.
 IO

P THIS SCHEDULE IS DESIGNED TO PUT HIM IN CONNECTICUT ON FRIDAY
 USIA WHEN SCHOOLS AND LEGISLATURE ARE IN SESSION AND IN NEW YORK
 NSC ON ANOTHER BUSINESS DAY. SATURDAY AND SUNDAY PROGRAMS COULD
 INR BE SWITCHED ACCORDING TO CONVENIENCE.

CIA CONSIDERED AS WHOLE I BELIEVE THESE FOUR DAYS WOULD GIVE
 NSA HIM BALANCED AND REASONABLY COMPREHENSIVE IMPRESSION OF US.
 DOD IT WOULD APPEAL TO HIS PARTICULAR INTERESTS, CORRECT SOME FALSE
 O CFN 2588 5:30

CPR
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 PAGE TWO RUSBAE 681B ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 IMPRESSIONS, AND GIVE HIM INSIGHT INTO WAY AMERICANS THINK
 AND FEEL. IT WOULD BE MOST IMPRESSIVE EXPERIENCE FOR HIM AND
 MRS. SHASTRI AND IMPACT SHOULD BE SUBSTANTIAL AND LASTING.

IT IS MY PRESENT PLAN TO ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON WITH MRS. BOWLES
 FOR CONSULTATION TEN DAYS BEFORE HIS VISIT. I WOULD THEN PLAN
 TO MEET SHASTRI EITHER IN NEW YORK OR WILLIAMSBURG MONDAY
 JUNE 1 AND ACCOMPANY HIM DURING HIS VISIT.

IT WOULD BE WELCOME GESTURE IF USAF COULD PICK UP SHASTRI IN
 LONDON, FLY HIM TO OTTAWA, THEN NEW YORK, AND THEN FINALLY
 BACK TO LONDON WHERE HE COULD PICK UP AIR INDIAN FLIGHT FIRST
 THING TUESDAY MORNING. IF IT WERE FEASIBLE TO DEPOSIT HIM
 BACK IN DELHI I AM SURE HE WOULD BE DEEPLY APPRECIATIVE IN VIEW
 OF CROWDED SCHEDULE HE HAS UNDERTAKEN DURING MAY AND JUNE.

I PLAN TO WRITE LETTER COVERING THESE ESSENTIAL POINTS WITH
 APPROPRIATE EDITING THAT WOULD GO TO L. K. JHA AND PRIMINISTER
 HERE IN NEW DELHI, AND ALSO TO B. K. NEHRU. IN MEANTIME HOW-
 EVER I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF WHITE HOUSE WOULD CONSIDER THESE
 PROPOSALS AND GIVE ME ITS VIEWS SO THAT WE CAN CONSIDER THEM
 HERE AND THEN TALK TO JHA ON HIS RETURN FROM HIS MOTHER'S
 FUNERAL AT END OF NEXT WEEK.

GP-3. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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BOWLES
 BT
 CFN GP-3

137

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 9, 1965

Shastri Visit

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. VALENTI

SUBJECT: Shastri Visit to the U. S.

1. As you know, Prime Minister Shastri of India will be in Washington on June 2 and 3 to visit with the President. The program which State has in mind and which involves the President's schedule is as follows:

June 2, 1965

| | |
|------------|--|
| 5:00 P. M. | President/Shastri meeting (about one hour) |
| 8:00 P. M. | Black tie dinner at White House |

June 3, 1965

| | |
|------------|--|
| 5:00 P. M. | President/Shastri meeting (joint communique) |
| Evening | President attends Shastri's reception (assuming Shastri has one) |

2. We will ensure that you are informed of any schedule changes which occur as a result of U. S. / Indian discussions which will undoubtedly take place over the next few weeks. However, since Shastri is getting the standard format, the change factor will probably be minimal.

3. As you will note from the above, the President will not have to get involved in an arrival ceremony. Since Shastri is a head of government, plans call for him to be met at the airport by the Vice President.

Gordon Chase

cc: Mr. Bundy
Mr. Komer ✓ (Will you please ensure that #2 happens?)
Mr. Cater
Gen. Clifton
Mrs. Abell
Mr. Saunders
Mrs. Yates

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 12-19-03

MAR 9 1965

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, Vol. 25, #92

By fa NARA, Date 12-18-03

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Presidential visit
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Info

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1965 MAR 7 AM 10 29

~~SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT PRIORITY 1641 INFO NEW DELHI 62 FROM MANILA
MARCH 7, 10 PM

EXDIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECSTATE FROM HARRIMAN

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF MAJOR IMPRESSIONS GAINED IN 3 1/2 DAYS
CONCENTRATED DISCUSSIONS.

I HAVE VISITED INDIA FOUR TIMES IN THE LAST SIX YEARS, THE LAST
TIME IN 1962 IN CONNECTION WITH INDIA'S EMERGENCY ARMS NEEDS.

I FEEL TODAY QUITE A NEW ATTITUDE TOWARDS US AND THE WORLD SITUATION
REFLECTED BY INDIAN OFFICIALS AS WELL AS PRESS. I ALMOST FELT I WAS IN
CFN 1641 62 3 1/2 1962

PAGE TWO RUMJMA 79A ~~SECRET~~

A DIFFERENT COUNTRY. WITH ONE EXCEPTION, DISCUSSIONS WITH INDIAN
MINISTERS AND OFFICIALS WERE RELAXED AND FRANK WITH FULL AGREEMENT ON
SUCH MATTERS AS AGGRESSIVE INTENTS OF RED CHINA, NEED TO PREVENT RED'S
TAKE-OVER IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND SEA, WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER OBJECTIVELY
OUR POLICIES AND WORK WITH US FOR COMMON OBJECTIVES IN OTHER AREAS OF
WORLD. THEY SHOW GREATER CONFIDENCE IN THEIR ABILITY TO SOLVE INDIA'S
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WITH INCREASED PRODUCTION IN AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY
AND HAVE GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF NEED TO DEVELOP PRIVATE SECTOR BY
BOTH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT, ALTHOUGH NOT YET TAKING ALL
NECESSARY ACTIONS.

ON OTHER HAND, INDIANS STILL ARE OVER-HOPEFUL OF SOVIET UNION'S
GOOD INTENTS, FEAR EFFECTS OUR TOUGHER ATTITUDE TOWARDS SOVIETS, AND
ARE CONCERNED THAT OUR POLICIES TOWARDS HANOI WILL BRING MOSCOW AND
PEIPING TOGETHER AGAIN. THEY WANT TO CONTINUE PLAY NON-ALIGNED ROLE
ALTHOUGH THEY ARE CONSIDERABLY DISILLUSIONED WITH SUKARNO AND NASSER.

THEY WANT TO WORK WITH US ON NUCLEAR CONTROLS BUT DON'T WANT
TO SPOIL THEIR NON-ALIGNED IMAGE BY BILATERAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

~~SECRET~~

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MAR 9 1965

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1641, MARCH 7, 10 PM, FROM MANILA

THEY SHOW A MORE PRAGMATIC AND LESS DOCTRINAIRE APPROACH TO POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MATTERS, BUT ARE SOMEWHAT HELD IN CHECK BY LOYALTY TO INTERPRETATIONS OF NEHRU'S PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES.

PAGE THREE RUMJMA 79A ~~SECRET~~

I HAD THE FEELING THAT I COULD TALK FREELY WITH THEM WITHOUT FEAR OF BEING MISUNDERSTOOD AND THAT WE COULD REACH UNDERSTANDINGS ON A MUCH BROADER AREA. THEY ARE, OF COURSE, STILL SUSPICIOUS AND FEARFUL OF SOME OF OUR POLICIES AND METHODS, I.E., THAT WE WILL FAIL TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF WHAT THEY CONSIDER MOSCOW'S WILLINGNESS TO COME TO AGREEMENTS ON NUCLEAR AND ARMS CONTROLS, POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS IN EUROPE, ETC. AND ALTHOUGH THEY DON'T WANT US TO LEAVE SOUTH VIETNAM BEFORE AN EFFECTIVE AGREEMENT, THEY FEAR WE MAY OVERLY REACT AGAINST HANOI AND THEREBY BRING RED CHINA AND SOVIET UNION INTO THE CONFLICT.

I FEEL OUR ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE IS BEGINNING TO PAY OFF, BUT IF WE DON'T CONTINUE, ECONOMY WILL NOT EXPAND TO BREAK-THROUGH TO SELF SUFFICIENCY, AND MILITARY CAPABILITY WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO ACT AS DETERRENT TO RED CHINESE AGGRESSION-FIRST IN NEPAL AND BHUTAN AND LATER ASSAM.

AMBASSADOR'S ABSENCE FIRST TWO DAYS GAVE ME BETTER OPPORTUNITY TO GET TO KNOW COUNTRY TEAM. I WAS FAVORABLY IMPRESSED BY ALL-POLITICAL ECONOMIC, INFORMATION AND MILITARY, AND BY THE COORDINATION UNDER BOWLES' VIGOROUS AND SPIRITED LEADERSHIP. GEN. JOHNSON, WHO WAS WITH ME IN 1962 HAS EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH INDIAN MILITARY. CHIEF OF

PAGE FOUR RUMJMA 79A ~~SECRET~~

STAFF GENERAL CHAUDURI SPOKE HIGHLY OF HIM AND OUR COOPERATION IN GENERAL. THERE IS NO DOUBT ARMY HAS MADE GOOD PROGRESS IN EVERY WAY DURING LAST TWO YEARS BUT AIR FORCE IS DANGEROUSLY WEAK. INDIANS ARE PREPARED TO EMPHASIZE AIR REQUIREMENTS IN NEXT YEAR'S AID PROGRAM REQUESTS AND I HOPE WE CAN FILL THEM.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 1641, MARCH 7, 10 PM, FROM MANILA

INDIANS ARE STILL STUBBORN OVER KASHMIR SETTLEMENT AND RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN ARE MOST UNSATISFACTORY. INDO-PAK SETTLEMENT IS STILL NUMBER ONE PROBLEM AND SHOULD HAVE OUR CONTINUED ATTENTION IN CONCERT WITH BRITISH.

THE ONE EXCEPTION TO MY GENERALLY FAVORABLE REACTION IN TALKS WITH OFFICIALS WAS WITH SWARAN SINGH, MINISTER EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. I FELT I WAS ARGUING WITH KRISHNA MENON AGAIN. NOT THAT HE IS COMMUNIST INCLINED BUT BECAUSE HE TOOK CRITICAL ATTITUDE ON MOST ALL OUR POLICIES. BOWLES TELLS ME SWARAN SINGH HAS LITTLE INFLUENCE AND HOPES HE WILL BE REPLACED. BOWLES DOES HIS BUSINESS WITH PRIME MINISTER AND CAPABLE FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIALS, AS WELL AS OTHER MINISTERS DIRECT.

PRESS REACTION TO MY VISIT WAS GENERALLY GOOD WITH UNDERSTANDING EDITORIALS ON OUR POLICIES IN VIETNAM AND FAIR REPORTING ON MY BLUNT STATEMENTS.

PAGE FIVE RUMJMA 79A ~~SECRET~~

SURVEYS SHOW PUBLIC HAVE INCREASING RESPECT FOR AND CONFIDENCE IN US.

ALL IN ALL, I AM MUCH MORE HOPEFUL OF INDIA AND FEEL WE CAN EXPECT HER TO PLAY MORE EFFECTIVE ROLE TOWARDS FREE WORLD OBJECTIVES.

GP-3.

BLAIR
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 10:50 AM, 3/7/65.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 11:20 AM, 3/7/65.

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

139

SUMMARY

83

~~SECRET~~

05528

Action

TTQSA335SBA677

SS

RR RUEHCR
DE RUSBAE 333A 05/1559Z

Info

R 051523Z ZEA

1965 MAR 5 PM 9 45

FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~(SEONE OF TWO) ACTION DEPT 2504 INFO MOSCOW 226 SAIGON 123
MAR 5 9PM

LIMDIS RPT LIMDIS

047

GOVERNOR HARRIMAN CALLED ON PRIME MINISTER SHASTRI EVENING
MARCH 4. GREENE, L.K. JHA AND MEA NOTE-TAKERS ALSO PRESENT.HARRIMAN CONVEYED CORDIAL GREETINGS FROM PRESIDENT TO PM
AND EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION THAT PRIME MINISTER WILL BE VISIT-
ING PRESIDENT JUNE 1 AND 2 AND ASSURED HIM OF WARM WELCOME.SHASTRI EXPRESSED PLEASURE AT PROSPECT. HARRIMAN OUTLINED
CFN 2504 226/123 4 1 2PAGE TWO RUSBAE 333A ~~SECRET~~
PROGRESSIVE NATURE OF PRESIDENT'S DOMESTIC PROGRAM WITH BENEFIT
TO PEOPLE AND STRENGTH OF U.S. ECONOMY. IN RESPONSE DIRECT
QUESTION BY JHA ON WHETHER PRESIDENT WAS SO PREOCCUPIED WITH
DOMESTIC PROGRAM HE WAS NOT AS CONCERNED WITH FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
HARRIMAN REASSURED HIM THAT, ALTHOUGH PRESIDENT HAD CONCENTRATED
ON GETTING HIS DOMESTIC PROGRAM STARTED IN CONGRESS, HIS
ATTENTION TO AND CONCERN FOR INTERNATIONAL ISSUES HAS HIGH
PRIORITY.HARRIMAN SAID ONE OF PRESIDENT'S MAJOR CONCERNS IS TO PROTECT
AGAINST PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND HE ASKED FOR
SHASTRI'S ASSISTANCE TO THIS END. SHASTRI'S POSITION IS ADMIRER
AND PROBLEMS OF INDIAN SECURITY ARE UNDERSTOOD IN WASHINGTON.
U.S. HAS BEEN GLAD TO SHARE WITH SHASTRI ALL INFORMATION IT
HAS ABOUT CHINESE CAPABILITIES AND HOPES SHASTRI WILL LET US
KNOW IF THERE IS ANY FURTHER INFORMATION HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE.~~SECRET~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
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Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 25, p. 91

By *PC* NARA. Date 12-18-03

~~SECRET~~

-2- 2504 March 5, 9 p.m. from New Delhi (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

GOVERNOR HARRIMAN ALUDED TO PRESIDENT'S OCTOBER 18 STATEMENT, EMPHASIZING OUR DETERMINATION TO REASSURE ASIAN NATIONS WHO MAY BE SUBJECT TO BLACKMAIL.

SHASTRI AGREED NON-PROLIFERATION OF VITAL IMPORTANCE AND SAID MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS MUST FIGURE OUT HOW TO ASSURE IT. HE

PAGE THREE RUSBAE 333A ~~SECRET~~
SAID INDIA IS NOT RPT NOT GOING TO MAKE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND THIS MAKES IT MOST IMPORTANT FOR GOI TO FIGURE OUT HOW TO ASSURE INDIA'S DEFENSES IF INDIA SUBJECT TO NUCLEAR THREAT, ALTHOUGH INDIA CANNOT REPEAT NOT JOIN MILITARY PACT.

HARRIMAN RECALLED THAT AT THE TIME NEGOTIATION OF PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY, KHRUSHCHEV WOULD NOT DISCUSS NONPROLIFERATION AGREEMENT BUT HAD WANTED UNIVERSAL COMMITMENT TO TEST BAN TREATY AND INDICATED DESIRE ISOLATE CHINA. (SHASTRI CONCURRED IN THIS.) U.S. WOULD LIKE TO PROCEED TO COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN AGREEMENT, BUT SOVIETS NOT YET WILLING TO GIVE NECESSARY INSPECTION. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE HOPE FOR RESUMPTION ENDC MEETINGS IN APRIL AND THAT GOI WILL AGREE, BUT SOVIETS HAVE NOT, RPT NOT, RESPONDED TO THIS SUGGESTION.

HARRIMAN EXPRESSED USG WILLINGNESS DISCUSS INDIA'S NUCLEAR SECURITY PROBLEM AT ANY TIME GOI WISHED TO RAISE IT, AND ASKED ABOUT SHASTRI'S TALK WITH WILSON WHICH IT HAD BEEN REPORTED DEALT WITH SHIELD OR UMBRELLA. SHASTRI SAID HE HAD HAD TO DENY PUBLIC REPORTS THAT HE HAD ASKED WILSON FOR ANY SUCH THING; HE HAD TOLD WILSON IT WAS ALLRIGHT WITH HIM IF WILSON DISCUSSED MATTER WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON BUT IT WOULD BE UNWISE FOR INDIA, AS ONLY ONE OF THE NON-NUCLEAR POWERS, TO SEEK A SHIELD FOR ITSELF ALONE. THUS THE PROBLEM IS FOR PRESENT NUCLEAR POWERS TO DEVISE (#) NON-NUCLEAR

STATES AGAINST CHINESE THREAT.

PAGE FOUR RUSBAE 333A ~~SECRET~~
IN REPLY TO QUESTION, SHASTRI SAID HE HAD NO PRECISE FORMULA FOR ACCOMPLISHING THIS; PERHAPS REASSURANCE COULD TAKE THE FORM OF JOINT STATEMENT THAT ANY THREAT FROM ANY NUCLEAR POWER WOULD BE MET, THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO FURTHER PROLIFERATION AND THAT TEST BAN SHOULD BE TOTAL. HE THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE OTHER WAYS, AND GOVERNOR HARRIMAN INVITED HIM TO LET US HAVE ANY IDEAS HE HAD AND IN ANY EVENT TO HELP ASSURE NON-PROLIFERATION NOW.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

-3- 2504 March 5, 9 p.m. from New Delhi (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

IN REPLY QUERY, HARRIMAN SAID WE HAVE NO RPT NO INDICATIONS OF CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY ON DISARMAMENT SINCE KHRUSHCHEV'S OUSTER. WE HOPE, AND BELIEVE NEW SOVIET LEADERS DO TOO, THAT BILATERAL US-SOVIET DIALOGUE WILL CONTINUE. IN THIS CONNECTION IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL TO GET FROM SHASTRI WHEN HE COMES TO WASHINGTON THE INFORMATION HE OBTAINED IN MOSCOW ON SOVIET THINKING ON THESE MATTERS. SHASTRI AGREED.

GP-3

BOWLES

(#) OMISSION, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW

SECRET

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

83
Action

SS
Info

~~SECRET~~

Control: 5256
Rec'd: MARCH 5, 1965
3:20 P.M.

FROM: NEW DELHI

ACTION: SECSTATE 2504

INFO: MOSCOW 226
SAIGON 123

047

DATE: MARCH 5, 10 P.M., (SECTION 2 OF 2)

LIMDIS

SHASTRI ASKED WHAT INDICATIONS WE HAVE OF CHICOM INTENTIONS REGARDING INDIA. HARRIMAN SAID WE HAVE NOTHING SPECIFIC ALTHOUGH CHICOMS ARE GENERALLY MORE AGGRESSIVE AS THEY TRY TO TAKE FROM MOSCOW LEADERSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. THEY APPEAR DETERMINED TO SUPPORT LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND GUERRILLA ACTIONS RATHER THAN OPEN WARFARE AT PRESENT TIME. SHASTRI SAID HE DID NOT ANTICIPATE CHICOM ATTACK ON INDIA IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE BUT THERE HAS BEEN BUILD UP AND LOGISTIC IMPROVEMENT IN BORDER AREAS.

JHA INTERJECTED THAT INDIA IS STILL WEAK IN THE AIR AND SHASTRI SAID HE WOULD ALSO LOOK FORWARD TO TALKING TO THE PRESIDENT ABOUT U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE. HE THOUGHT OUR HELP IN AIRCRAFT HAD NOT BEEN COMING ALONG AS SCHEDULED; JHA CORRECTED THIS TO NOTE THAT AGREEMENT HAS NOT YET BEEN REACHED. IN REPLY TO QUERY, SHASTRI SAID SOVIETS HAD NOT BEEN FULLY COMING THROUGH EITHER. HE AND JHA SAID MIG PRODUCTION PROJECT IS, HOWEVER, GOING AHEAD.

SHASTRI TURNED TO SOUTHEAST ASIA, NOTING THAT DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON WOULD HAVE TO BE IN LIGHT OF CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE TIME. HARRIMAN RECAPITULATED U.S. WHITE PAPER AND STRESSED OUR HOPE ESCALATION BY NORTH VIETNAM WOULD STOP BUT EQUALLY OUR DETERMINATION TO STAY WITH THE JOB UNTIL NORTH VIETNAM LAYS OFF INTERFERENCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM. HE STRESSED OUR

~~SECRET~~

CONVICTION THERE
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~~SECRET~~

-2- 2504, MARCH 5, 10 P.M., (SECTION 2 OF 2), FROM NEW DELHI

CONVICTION THERE IS NOTHING TO TALK ABOUT AT A CONFERENCE UNTIL THEY DO. HE URGED SHASTRI TO GET OUR LATEST VIEWS ON THIS QUESTION JUST BEFORE HE GOES TO MOSCOW, STRESSED WE CONSIDER DEGAULLE'S SUPPORT OF SOVIET CALL FOR CONFERENCE AS UNHELPFUL AND HOPED SHASTRI WOULD NOT JOIN WITH SOVIETS IN THAT APPROACH. SHASTRI INDICATED HE UNDERSTOOD.

IN ANSWER QUERY, SHASTRI THOUGH KOSYGIN HAD GONE TO HANOI AT LEAST TO OFFSET CHICOM INFLUENCE AND POSSIBLY TO SEEK A SOLUTION. HE THOUGHT NEW SOVIET LEADERS WANT TO EXERCISE MODERATING INFLUENCE IN SEA, WHERE DISILLUSIONMENT WITH CHICOMS IS SPREADING, EVEN INCLUDING NE WIN BUT EXCLUDING SUKARNO.

SHASTRI ALSO ANTICIPATED DISCUSSING WITH PRESIDENT INDIA'S ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. HARRIMAN NOTED THERE HAS BEEN GOOD PROGRESS BUT INDIA'S NEEDS WILL DOUBTLESS CONTINUE AND INCREASED INVESTMENT BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, WILL BE IMPORTANT. HE EXPRESSED CERTAINTY GOI COULD GET MORE FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT WITH A LITTLE MORE UNDERSTANDING OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN REGARDING THE INVESTMENT CLIMATE; IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THIS IS U.S. BUSINESSMAN'S RELUCTANCE TO LET GOVERNMENT, ANY GOVERNMENT, CONTROL HIS INVESTMENTS. HE ADDED HE WAS HEARTENED IN THESE RESPECTS BY PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT MARCH 2 (EMBTel 2452).

SHASTRI AND JHA SAID THAT FOREIGN PRIVATE COLLABORATION WITH DOMESTIC INDIAN PRIVATE SECTOR ALWAYS WELCOME AND POINT GOVERNOR HAD RAISED ONLY RELEVANT IN RESPECT OF COLLABORATION IN PUBLIC SECTOR. SHASTRI SAID VISITING AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN HAD RECENTLY EXPRESSED TO HIM WILLINGNESS TO SELL THEIR EQUITY TO INDIAN PUBLIC AFTER SAY TEN YEARS.

REFERRING TO HIS RECENT VISIT TO ISRAEL, HARRIMAN DESCRIBED IMPORTANCE ISRAELIS ATTACH TO WATER RESOURCES, AKIN TO PROTECTING NATIONAL TERRITORY ITSELF, AND URGED SHASTRI TO KEEP AN EYE ON OUTRAGEOUS AND SPITEFUL ARAB DIVERSION PROJECTS.

/IN BRIEF

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELETYPE TRANSMISSION 2504

~~SECRET~~

-3- 2504, MARCH 5, 10 P.M., (SECTION 2 OF 2), FROM NEW DELHI

IN BRIEF REFERENCE TO UAR, HARRIMAN NOTED NASSER AND BEN BELLA ARE FISHING FOR TROUBLE, E. G., BY PASSING SOVIET EQUIPMENT TO REBELS IN CONGO. SHASTRI SAID HE THOUGHT NASSER HAS "SUCCUMBED TO PRESSURE" AND SEEMED DISENCHANTED WITH HIM.

IN LEAVING, HARRIMAN EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE IN SHASTRI'S LEADERSHIP AND IN EXPANDING COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

GP-3.

BOWLES

PDR/25

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

140
V. Visit 03156

43

Origin

SS

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI ~~XXXXXXXX~~ IMMEDIATE 4848

Info: Amembassy MOSCOW 2371

Re New Delhi's 2487 to Dept; Deptel 1800 to New Delhi

LIMDIS

Shastri Visit

MAR 5 2 57 PM '65

039

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By xc, NARA, Date 12-19-03

Through technical inadvertence, Deptel 1800 sent without last minute changes, which appear in following version as it should have been transmitted initially:

QUOTE Prime Minister Shastri would be most welcome in Washington June 2 and 3 (May 31 is holiday.) Four or five day tour other areas following two days in Washington presents no problem. We would like very much to get firm agreement on dates for Washington visit (i.e., June 2 and 3.)

We have no objection if GOI wishes announce Shastri visits to U.S. and Soviet Union at same time. We would require twenty-four hour advance notice of Indian release so that following brief announcement could be released here simultaneously. ~~Because of VOA broadcasts, best time for announcement in~~

~~Washington now considered be 0900 EST.~~

INNERQUOTE Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri of India has accepted an invitation from President Lyndon B. Johnson to pay an official visit to the United States. Prime Minister Shastri will be in Washington on June 2 and 3,

and

Drafted by:

S/S: LHoffacker:NEA:SOA:AALakeland:bts

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

SOA - Turner C. Cameron, Jr.

Classified:

O/CPI - Mr. King (draft)

P - Mr. Reap

NEA/P - Mr. Baldanza

SOA - Mr. Cameron

S/S - Mr. Hoffacker

White House - Mr. Chase (substance)

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and will then spend several days in other areas of the United States. This will be the Prime Minister's first visit to the United States. President Johnson is looking forward to the opportunity of meeting with Prime Minister Shastri, and the two leaders will use the occasion to discuss matters of mutual interest to the United States and India. END INNERQUOTE END QUOTE

Hope this technical error does not cause undue embarrassment and that Indians will understand. You will note dates proposed for Washington are June 2 and 3 rpt June 2 and 3. As is customary, Shastri would be expected arrive in U.S. on June 1, and begin official visit in Washington on June 2. Written invitation will be pouched following receipt confirmation Washington dates June 2 and 3. We agreeable to substitution of phrase QUOTE spend a few days UNQUOTE for phrase QUOTE spend several days UNQUOTE in our draft. announcement.

GP-3

END

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

March 3, 1965

Visits

141 S

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. VALENTI

SUBJECT: Visit to the U. S. - Prime Minister Shastri

State has been informed that it can try to firm up June 2-3 as the dates for Prime Minister Shastri's visit to the U. S. I will let you know as soon as we hear back from Shastri.

Gordon Chase

cc: Mr. Bundy
Mr. Saunders ✓
Mrs. Gwen King

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 12-19-03

MAR 3 1965

~~SECRET~~

Ayub-Shastri visits
This document consists of 1 page.
No. 4 of 7 Copies, Series A.

142

NEA/SOA - Miss Carol C. Laise

March 1, 1965

INR/RNA - James W. Spain

Scope Paper for Ayub and Shastri Visits

After considerable mulling over your draft Scope Paper for the Ayub and Shastri Visits, I have concluded that the vague unease I feel about it stems less from any neglect of specific problems and issues involved than from my feeling that a somewhat more direct focus on the purpose of the visits and the things which both we and the visitors want to get out of them would be useful in the overall introductory paper.

Trying to achieve this closer focus, I have found, is far from easy. I have come out only with a different kind of approach to the problem, a copy of which is attached. I hardly think it will stand by itself, but there may be something in it which could be helpful to you in subsequent drafts.

Attachment: Draft Scope Paper

INR/RNA:JWSpain:ofw

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4
By jc . NARA. Date 12-19-03

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

~~SECRET~~

MAR 2 1965

~~SECRET~~

142^a

DRAFT

SCOPE PAPER: AYUB AND SHASTRI VISITS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-2-07

1. The Visitors and Their Aims

The two visits will inevitably be interlinked--as is practically everything in US-Indian-Pakistani relations. Their backgrounds, however, are quite different.

Prime Minister Shastri comes to the US for the first time as part of the natural course of his emergence as the leader of the second largest country in the world. Not completely certain of his position at home and personally diffident, he will be trying to avoid rather than to seek commitments while at the same groping for a relationship with the US with which he can be comfortable both within India and on the international scene. While willing to talk about India's relationship with the USSR, its military procurement problems, its nuclear program, and its broader interests in Asia, he is unlikely to take the initiative or to present specific proposals. (Viet Nam may be an exception.)

President Ayub, on the other hand, is a veteran at meetings and negotiations with the US. His position at home has never been more secure. He will have specifics very much on his mind: supersonic aircraft, Kashmir, possible formulae for handling Communist China, and perhaps the US facilities in Pakistan. He will also be seeking to retain as favorable as possible a relationship with the US within the limits of Pakistan's new independent foreign policy and its old grievances against India.

2. Main Issues and Leverage on Them

US leverage in the discussions will be limited by Shastri's devotion to non-alignment and his conviction that the USSR is an invaluable friend in India's troubles with Communist China and with Pakistan. With Ayub our

~~SECRET~~

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- 2 -

ability to exert influence will be inhibited by Pakistan's national pride and the relative success of its recent independent ventures in the Afro-Asian world. Additionally, both leaders are well aware of the global and regional importance of their countries to the US and our strategic investments in them.

At the same time, both are acutely conscious of their countries' dependence on US economic and military aid.

(A) They will take this dependence into account strongly on matters affecting economic development, where we have a virtual identity of interest with both of them.

(B) They will be prepared to give it moderate importance in limiting their relationships with Communist countries, wherein Pakistan does not wish to lose US arms by too close a relationship with Peiping and India places a premium on maintaining military support from both the US and the USSR.

(C) They will be only slightly concerned with US aid in terms of their relations with each other, where old hatreds still dominate and each is convinced that it is too important to the US in its own right to have to make concessions to the other.

3. US Objectives

Since there is unlikely to be any significant disagreement on development problems with either country and since the time is not ripe for another US initiative to seek settlement of the major problems outstanding between the two countries, our fundamental objective will be to clarify and strengthen our relations with India and with Pakistan against the background of their--and our-- overall international positions. We will want to emphasize also our

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

belief that many of the problems of both countries can be solved only by rational utilization of their own resources and wise policy decisions of their own making.

The basic message that we want to convey to Ayub is that we value and respect Pakistan as an old friend whose new policy of independent action in the Afro-Asian world we are prepared to accept, but that we do expect Pakistan to adhere to the fundamentals of our alliance, that we cannot accept its siding against us on major questions between the Communist and Free Worlds, and that we will not tolerate cooperative relations between Pakistan and Communist China in the security field.

We wish to reinforce Shastri's confidence that we support India against Communist China in the context of his non-aligned policy---but only so long as his relations with the USSR do not give Moscow decisive influence on India's policies and so long as his build-up of military strength does not needlessly affect India's development effort.

To both leaders we want to make it clear that continuation of the present high level of US support can be counted on over the long term only if they take positive moves toward compromising their own differences so that the most effective use can be made of their internal and external resources.

It is in this context that we are prepared to discuss any and all specifics of mutual interest: economic and technical aid for their Five Year Plans, supply of military aircraft, negotiation of nuclear guarantees, etc.

~~SECRET~~

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143

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI 1537

FEB 1 1 30 PM '65

LINDIS

Embtel 2097

Shastri Visit

As matters now stand later half May would be most convenient time
for Shastri visit. It would be difficult to work out in June.

GP-3.

End

BALL.

—BUNDY-SMITH
—BATOR
—BELK
—BOWMAN
—CHASE
—COOPER
—JESSUP
—JOHNSON
—KEENEY
—KLEIN
—KUMER
—MOODY
—REEDY
—SAUNDERS
—SAYRE
—THOMSON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 12-19-03

Drafted by:

NEA:SOA:AA Lakeland:bts 1/28/65

Clearance:

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - Phillips Talbot

O/CPR - Mr. King (draft)

S/S - Miss Moor

NEA/SOA - Miss Laise

White House - Mr. Komer

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

144

42

Action

28

Info

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RR RUEHCR
DE RUSBAE 1047 27/1530Z
R 271430Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY NEWDELHI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT

CONFIDENTIAL

2097 JANUARY 27, 8 PM.

L I M D I S

DEPTTEL 1491

1965 JAN 27 AM 10 49

20870

DUNDY-SMITH
BATOR
BELK
BOWMAN
CHASE
COOPER
JESSUP
JOHNSON
KEENE
KLEIN
KOMER
MOODY
REEDY
SAMPERS
SAYRE
THOMSON

HAVE HAD SEVERAL TALKS WITH SHASTRI AND L.K. JHA IN REGARD TO PRIMIN VISIT IN MAY. HE IS DELIGHTED AT INVITATION AND WOULD LIKE TO SPEND WEEK TRAVELLING IN US IN ADDITION TO TWO OFFICIAL DAYS IN WASHINGTON. HOWEVER THERE IS STILL UNCERTAINTY IN REGARD TO HIS SCHEDULE BECAUSE OF ALGIERS CONF WHICH PROBABLY FALLS IN EARLY OR MID-MAY AND COMMONWEALTH CONF, DATES OF WHICH ARE UNSETTLED.

CFN 2097 27 8 1491

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 1047 C O N F I D E N T I A L

SHASTRI SAID HE WOULD TRY TO ARRANGE HIS SCHEDULE TO ENABLE HIM TO BE IN US DURING LAST HALF OF MAY AND IF THIS DID NOT WORK OUT, HE COULD PROBABLY BE AVAILABLE FIRST TWO WEEKS IN JUNE. IN REGARD TO JUNE POSSIBILITY I WAS NON-COMMITTAL AND AM NOW AWAITING FURTHER WORD FROM HIM ON LATE MAY. IN MEANTIME WILL APPRECIATE VIEWS ON POSSIBILITY OF EARLY JUNE IF MAY IS IMPOSSIBLE.

GP-3.
BOWLES
BT

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-19-03*

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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145
04423

49
Origin
SS
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI 1387 ✓

INFO: Amembassy KARACHI 734
" LONDON 4272
CINCPACAFSA

28
Shastri
Jan 12 4 52 PM '65

LIMDIS

Shastri Visit

President has now approved Shastri visit and we have May in mind as preferable time frame. Ambassador therefore authorized use first suitable occasion to extend on behalf President invitation to Shastri to visit Washington in May. Visit would be for two days, followed by up to 6-8 day tour of country if desired. Once we have Shastri's agreement to timing of visit we will send you full guidance on procedures governing such visits, press handling etc. There should be no rpt no publicity about visit until details worked out and simultaneous releases agreed upon. FYI Ayub visit also approved for mid-April

END FYI

GP-3

END

BUNDY SMITH
BATOR
BELK
BOWMAN
COOPER
JESSUP
JOHNSON
KEENE
KLEIN
KOMER
MOODY
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RUISK

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 12-19-03

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

The Secretary

NEA/ SOA: AALakeland:djg 1/9/65

NEA - Phillips Talbot

U/CPR - Mr. King

P - Mr. Phillips

NEA - Mr. Cameron

NEA/P - Mr. Fisk

S/S - Mr. Hoffacker

WHITE HOUSE - Mr. Komer

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ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI 1184 PRIORITY

Dec 12 1 11 PM '64

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LINDIS*Shastri Visit*

New Delhi's 1666

While as President told you, he agreeable in principle to Shastri visit general scheduling of 1965 visits not far enough along to permit going ahead with invitation yet.

END

GP-3

_BUNDY-SMITH
 _BATOR
 _BELK
 _BOWMAN
 _BRUBECK
 _CHASE
 _FORRESTAL
 _JESSUP
 _JOHNSON
 _KEENY
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 State Dept. Guidelines
 By je, NARA, Date 12-19-03

Drafted by:

NEA:SOA:DTSchneider:atm 12/12/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - William J. Handley

Clearances:

SOA - Mr. Cameron

WHITE HOUSE - Mr. Komer

s/s - Mrs. Davis

DEC 14 1964

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P R I O R I T Y

LIMDIS

FOR TALBOT PASS KOMER WHITE HOUSE

LIMDIS

TENTATIVELY PLANNING TO SEE SHASTRI MONDAY AND WILL APPRECIATE MORE DEFINITE INFORMATION ON TIMING OF HIS VISIT TO US. PRIMIN. WOULD LIKE TO COME MID-MAY FOLLOWING BUDGET SESSION. I WOULD LIKE TO OFFER NOT ONLY FIRM INVITATION BUT IF POSSIBLE PROSPECTIVE DATES. PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST.

GP-3

BOWLES

BT

CFN: 1666 11 12

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 12-11-64, 6:35 A.M.

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, 12-11-64, 6:40 A.M.

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State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-19-03*

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Jun 18 1 00 PM '64

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MOODY
REEDY
SAUNDERS
SAYRE
SMITH, WM. Y.

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Origin
Info
ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI 2627

LIMDIS

Embtel 3784

FROM AMBASSADOR

Shastri Visit

Because the traffic of foreign leaders to the US is rather heavy and with the pressure of the political campaigns growing rapidly, it would not be possible to invite Shastri to US at this time. ~~END~~ FYI: President authorized me to express a warm welcome to him to visit us after the election assuming that he is still President. END FYI.

GP-3.

End

RUSK

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State Dept. Guidelines
By *K*, NARA, Date *12-19-03*

Drafted by:

NEA:SOA:CBowles:mac - 6/17/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

Chester Bowles

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. McKesson
White House - Mr. Komer

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149
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Control: 9294
Rec'd: JUNE 10, 1964
8:30 AM

FROM: NEW DELHI

ACTION: SECSTATE 3710, PRIORITY

DATE: JUNE 10, 4 PM

*Shastri
Voice*

030

LIMDIS

I SUGGEST I BE AUTHORIZED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO ISSUE A LOW-KEY INVITATION TO PRIMIN SHASTRI TO VISIT WASHINGTON BRIEFLY FOLLOWING COMMONWEALTH PRIMIN'S CONFERENCE IN LONDON JULY 7-15. I APPRECIATE THAT PRESIDENT'S AND SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS' SCHEDULES FOR LATTER PART OF JULY UNDOUBTEDLY CROWDED ALREADY BUT IF SHASTRI WERE ABLE TO ACCEPT, WE COULD EXPLAIN THAT HIS WELCOME WHILE WARM MIGHT HAVE TO OMIT SOME OF THE CUSTOMARY PANOPLIES OWING TO SHORT NOTICE. INDEED, FACT OF BRIEF APPEARANCE IN U.S. WOULD IN ITSELF BE AS IMPORTANT TO ATMOSPHERE AS ITS SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT.

IN LATTER CONNECTION, I DO NOT BELIEVE THERE WOULD BE ANY MAJOR ISSUES TO BE CONFRONTED (ASSUMING AIR FORCE PACKAGE PRESENTED BEFORE SHASTRI LEAVES DELHI FOR LONDON) BUT IT WOULD BE HIGHLY USEFUL TO OUR OVER-ALL RELATIONSHIPS FOR SHASTRI TO GET FIRST-HAND IMPRESSION OF THE BREADTH AND DEPTH OF OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS.

APART FROM ANYTHING ELSE, I WOULD GUESS THAT OTHER GOVTS AS INTERESTED AS WE IN ESTABLISHING FOOTING WITH SHASTRI GOVT WILL BE INVITING HIM TO STOP OVER IN CONJUNCTION HIS LONDON TRIP, E.G., USSR AND UAR. HE IS MOST UNLIKELY TO ACCEPT ALL THESE, BUT THE GESTURE WILL BE HELPFUL.

GP-3.

RWR:

*I agree - but I don't want
to put to LBS w/o you + Dept. rec'd mps*

BOWLES

BAP

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By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-19-03*

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