

## LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
003a	cable	Bundy and Komer to Bowles [sanitized 9/11/00]  (near dup. #36a, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134; near dup. #110, 23a, Files of Komer, Bowles 11/3/63-1964, box 13) <i>Dup. #49a, Papers of Komer, Box 4, Chron July-Dec. 64</i>	S	1	12/11/64	A
<del>008</del>	<del>memo</del>	<del>Komer to Bundy [sanitized 1976]</del>  <del>[duplicate #26, NSF, CF, Komer, box 13, 11/3/63-1965"; #96, NSF, CF, India, Vol. 3, box 128</del> <i>Dup. #70, Papers of Komer, Box 4, Chron July-Dec. 64</i> <i>open 3/29/19 per RAC</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>11/27/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>012</del>	<del>letter</del>	<del>Komer to Bowles</del>  <del>[duplicate #28, NSF, Komer, box 13, "Bowles 11/3/63-1965"]</del> <i>Dup. #156, Papers of Komer, Box 4, Chron, July-Dec. 64</i> <i>open 3/29/19 per RAC</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>10/28/64</del>	<del>A</del>
016	letter	Komer to Bowles  (duplicate #29, Komer, Box 13, "Bowles 11/3/63-1965") <i>Dup. #197, Papers of Komer, Box 4, Chron, July-Dec. 64 (sanitized)</i> <i>Sanitized 3/29/19</i>	S	2	10/09/64	A
<del>021</del>	<del>letter</del>	<del>Komer to Bowles</del>  <del>[duplicate #30, NSF, Komer, box 13, "Bowles 11/3/63-1965"]</del> <i>Dup. #326, Papers of Komer, Box 4, Chron, July-Dec. 64</i> <i>Open 3/29/19 per RAC</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>9/1/64</del>	<del>A</del>
026	cable	Komer to Bowles [sanitized 8/14/01]  (near dup. #38, 38a, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134; near dup. #118, Files of Komer, Bowles 11/3/63-1964, box 13) <i>Dup. #449, Papers of Komer, Box 4, Chron, July-Dec. 64</i>	S	1	7/23/64	A
043	cable	Bundy to Bowles [sanitized 9/11/00]  (dup. #41, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134) <i>Dup. #244, Papers of Komer, Box 4, Chron, Jan-June 64</i>	S	1	4/13/64	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer

Folder Title "INDIA - December 1963-1964"

Box Number 23

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3/9/2004

  
 Initials

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
049	memo	Komer to Peter [sanitized 8/14/01]	S	1	3/20/64	A
053	cable	Bundy to Bowles [sanitized 9/11/00] (duplicate #43, Komer, box 13, "Bowles, 11/3/63-1965"; #154a, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges with Bowles, Box 134) <i>Dup - 364 Papers of Komer, Box 4, Chron Jan-June 64</i>	S	1	3/9/64	A
<del>054</del>	<del>memo</del>	<del>Komer to Bundy</del> <i>sanitized 5-18-05 NLJ/RAC 04 #8</i> <i>open 01/11/19</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>4</del>	<del>3/6/64</del>	<del>A</del>
071	memo	Komer to the President [sanitized 2003] (dup. #16c, NSF, NSC History, So. Asia, Box 24; #4, NSF, IMTF, Taylor Trip to India and Pakistan)	S	1	12/23/63	A
087	cable	Bombay 32 [sanitized 8/16/00] (duplicate #18, NSF, CF, India, Volume 3, box 128)	S	1	7/22/64	A
097	list	Indian Defense Visits <i>open 9-24-07</i>	C	2	5/64	A
<del>106</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>deptel 2397 to New Delhi</del> <i>open 8/14/12</i>	<del>C</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>5/22/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>110</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>New Delhi 3355</del> <i>open 8/14/12</i>	<del>C</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>5/14/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>113</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>New Delhi 3304</del> <i>open 8/14/12</i>	<del>C</del>	<del>4</del>	<del>5/7/64</del>	<del>A</del>

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<del>130</del>	<del>airgram</del>	<del>A-1214 from New Delhi</del> <i>open 3/29/19 per RAC</i>	<del>C</del>	<del>9</del>	<del>5/22/64</del>	<del>A</del>
131	cable	to White House for Bundy [sanitized 2002] (dup. #90, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134)	S/	1	5/21/64	A
<del>132</del>	<del>memo</del>	<del>Komer to Bundy</del> <i>open 3/29/19 per RAC</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>5/18/64</del>	<del>A</del>
132a	cable	Bundy to Bowles [sanitized 9/11/00] (dup. #39, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134)	S	1	5/18/64	A
133	cable	to White House for Bundy (near dup. #92, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134)	S/	4	5/15/64	A
<del>135</del>	<del>memo</del>	<del>Laise to Talbot</del> <i>open 3/29/19 per RAC</i>	<del>E</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>4/17/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>135a</del>	<del>report</del>	<del>Embassy of India</del> <i>open 11/19/04 NWJ 04.142</i> (duplicate #211a, this file; #73b, NSF, CF, India, Volume 2, box 128)	<del>S</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>3/16/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>135c</del>	<del>memcon</del>	<del>with Sudhir Ghosh and Ellsworth Bunker</del> <i>open 3/29/19 per RAC</i>	<del>E</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>4/9/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>135d</del>	<del>letter</del>	<del>Surendra Mohan Ghose to Shri Sudhir Ghosh</del> (duplicate #214, this file) <i>open 3/29/19 per RAC</i>	<del>E</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>3/11/64</del>	<del>A</del>

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
<del>136</del>	<del>report</del>	<del>Proposals of Sudhir Ghosh</del> (duplicate #137, this file) <i>open 3/29/19 per RAC</i>	<del>G</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>4/17/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>137</del>	<del>report</del>	<del>Proposals of Sudhir Ghosh</del> (duplicate #136, this file) <i>open 3/29/19 per RAC</i>	<del>G</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>4/17/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>145</del>	<del>letter</del>	<del>Bowles to Komer</del> (duplicate #112, Komer, Box 13, "Bowles 11/3/63-1965") <i>open 3/29/19 per RAC</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>11/12/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>153</del>	<del>report</del>	<del>Near East and South Asia</del> <i>open 3/29/19 per RAC</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>10/14/64</del>	<del>A</del>
154	letter	Bowles to Komer [sanitized 9/11/00]	C	2	9/21/64	A
167	report	Current Intelligence Digest <i>Sanitized 9-24-07</i>	S	2	7/20/64	A
<del>174a</del>	<del>report</del>	<del>Lal Bahadur Shastri - Nehru's Successor</del> <i>open 3/29/19 per RAC</i>	<del>C</del>	<del>4</del>	<del>6/11/64</del>	<del>A</del>
184	report	Current Intelligence Digest <i>sanitized 9-24-07</i>	S	2	5/28/64	A
200	letter	to Solbert [exempted 9/11/00] <i>exempt 8/21/13 per NLS/RAC 12-349</i>	S	2	5/11/64	A
<del>205</del>	<del>letter</del>	<del>J.K. Mansfield to Robert McNamara</del> <i>open 5/5/15 per NLS/RAC 12-348</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>4/10/64</del>	<del>A</del>

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
205a	report	Communications for India	S	1	11/29/63	A
<del>206</del>	<del>maps</del>	<del>maps of India</del> open 3/29/19 per RAC	<del>C</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>[1964]</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>211a</del>	<del>report</del>	<del>Embassy of India</del> (duplicate of #135a, this file) open 11/19/09 NW04-142	<del>S</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>3/16/64</del>	<del>A</del>
213	report	Current Intelligence Digest [sanitized 9/11/00]	S	2	3/13/64	A
<del>214</del>	<del>letter</del>	<del>Surendra Mohan Ghose to Shri Sudhir Ghosh</del> (duplicate #135d, this file) open 3/29/19 per RAC	<del>G</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>3/11/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>217</del>	<del>report</del>	<del>Intelligence Summary</del> open 3/29/19 per RAC	<del>S</del>	<del>7</del>	<del>2/19/64</del>	<del>A</del>
221	report	Current Intelligence Weekly Summary [sanitized 9/11/00]	S	1	1/17/64	A

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3/9/2004

Initials

**AIRGRAM**

POL 6-2 BHU

RM, R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
E	P	IO
L	FBO	AID
4/PR	5/5	
1	27	
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA

17

FOR RM USE ONLY

AR POL 15-1 BHU

A-165

UNCLASSIFIED

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO NEW DELHI

FROM : Amconsul CALCUTTA

DATE: May 19, 1964

SUBJECT : Message for President Johnson from the King of Bhutan

REF : Deptel 121 and New Delhi's 538 to Calcutta

Under instructions from the Embassy in New Delhi, I transmitted, through appropriate channels, the text of the President's message of condolence to the King of Bhutan on the occasion of the assassination of Jigme Dorji, Prime Minister of Bhutan. I have now received a letter from the Chief Secretary of the Government of Bhutan requesting me to forward to the President a message of acknowledgement from his Majesty the King of Bhutan. The originals are enclosed as attachments.

*William O. Baxter*

William O. Baxter  
American Consul General

Enclosures: *CH*

1. Letter to William O. Baxter from T. Dorji.
2. Message to the President from his Majesty the King of Bhutan.

FORM DS-323  
4-62

UNCLASSIFIED

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted : by WOBaxter:dmg

Contents and Classification Approved by :

Clearances :

MAY 30 1964

BUNDY/SMITH  
ALEXANDER  
BRUBECK  
CHASE  
DUNGAN  
FORRESTAL  
JESSUP  
JOHNSON  
KLEIN  
KROMER  
LAUNDERS  
COL. W.Y. SMITH

Bhutan  
to  
12/25/64



Page 1 of 1  
Encl. No. 1  
Airgram No.             
From CALCUTTA

UNCLASSIFIED

Dechencholing,  
Thimphu,  
25th April, 1964.

William O. Baxter, Esq.,  
American Consul General,  
5/1 Harrington Street,  
Calcutta - 16,  
India.

Dear Sir,

I am desired by His Majesty to acknowledge receipt  
of your letter dated 8th April, 1964, and to request you kindly  
to transmit the enclosed message to the President of the United  
States.

Yours faithfully,

/signed/

(T. Dorji)  
Chief Secretary  
to the Government of  
Bhutan.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1a

Page 1 of  
Encl. No. 2  
Airgram No. \_\_\_\_\_  
From CALCUTTA

YOUR EXCELLENCY:

I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR EXCELLENCY'S KIND MESSAGE  
OF CONDOLENCES ON THE DEATH OF MY PRIME MINISTER,  
MR. JIGME DORJI, AND AM DEEPLY GRATEFUL TO YOUR  
EXCELLENCY FOR YOUR EXPRESSION OF SYMPATHY IN OUR  
GREAT LOSS.

JIGME DORJI WANGCHUCK  
KING OF BHUTAN.

HIS EXCELLENCY MR. LYNDON JOHNSON,  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

UNCLASSIFIED



16  
11

~~SECRET~~

*Bhutan*

BHUTANESE PRIME MINISTER ASSASSINATED

In the absence of hard information on the identity of Bhutanese Prime Minister Jigme Dorji's assassin or his motives, the full implications of the assassination of April 5 are unclear. The attack could have been an isolated personal act of vengeance, or it may have had political motivation from such groups as conservative elements or the monastic Buddhist clergy which opposed the modernization program, the Nepalese minority (representing 35 percent of the population), or dissatisfied isolated Tibetan refugees. Although there is the possibility of Chinese Communist involvement, nothing thus far points to it.

Internal Impact Measured - Our Embassy at New Delhi doubts that Dorji's death will have serious repercussions on the internal political scene. At least until recently, his principal function, despite his designation as Prime Minister, was to serve as the main intermediary between Bhutan and the Indians and other foreigners. Inside Bhutan, real power lay with the Maharajah who received advice from a council of prominent feudal landlords, lamas and regional governors. However, the Maharajah suffered a heart attack a year ago and since then has been out of Bhutan much of the time for medical treatment. (The Maharajah is now expected to return to Bhutan April 10) It is not clear whether Jigme Dorji's role in internal Bhutanese affairs increased in the Maharajah's absence. In any event, Dorji was an important adviser to the Maharajah, and his demise removes one of a handful of experienced Bhutanese officials.

Strategic Import Noted - We have no evidence that the Chinese Communists are exploiting Dorji's assassination. Trouble could ensue, however, if the Maharajah, perhaps because of his poor health or of developments during his absence, proved incapable of reasserting himself, leaving Bhutan politically unstable. Given Bhutan's location, its backwardness and the fragile nature of its internal security forces, such a situation could present the Chinese with an exploitable opportunity. Chinese Communist agents can move readily across the loosely guarded frontier. We presume some agents have already infiltrated into Bhutan among Tibetan refugees.

However, we feel the Indians are well aware of the strategic importance of Bhutan and are watching events extremely closely. If matters seemed to be getting out of hand, we would expect at least Indian political intervention and, under certain circumstances, military intervention as well. The Indians would probably not be deterred from this by the provisions of the 1949 Indo-Bhutan Treaty which grant full internal autonomy to Bhutan, but leave "guidance" of the kingdom's "external relations" to India.

\*

--Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 15, 4/8/64

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date 2-10-04



~~SECRET~~NEA NOTEIran Denies Arab Charges Re Abu Musa

The Iranian Government has issued a sharply worded denial of the allegation by the Middle Eastern News Agency (MENA) that Iranian forces had landed on Abu Musa Island (claimed both by Iran and by Sharja, one of the UK-protected Trucial Sheikhdoms). The official denial at the same time re-emphasized Iranian claims in the Persian Gulf, which it says will be pushed "by reason and logic and with due regard to positive documentary evidence" but not by force. The Iranian Prime Minister told our Ambassador he is persuaded the MENA report was inspired by the UAR as part of their continuing attack on Iran.

The British Foreign Office has confirmed that there is no substance to recent Arab charges of an Iranian landing on Abu Musa. An Iranian naval vessel reportedly placed a buoy near Abu Musa a few weeks ago, about which the Ruler of Sharja and the Foreign Office have been in correspondence. The Ruler has requested that the British remove the buoy and a UK Naval vessel probably will do so shortly.

~~SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

33

Origin

NEA

Info

SS

G

PR

P

USIA

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI  
INFO: Amconsul CALCUTTA

PRIORITY

121

2029

BUNDY-03363  
ALEXANDER  
BELK  
BRUBECK  
CHASE  
DINGEMAN  
DUNGAN  
FORRESTAL  
JESSE  
JOHNSON  
KLEIN  
KOMER

SAUNDERS

SMITH, WM. T

239 to  
Maharajah  
of Bhutan  
4/7/64

Embassy should transmit in appropriate manner following message  
of condolence from the President to the Maharajah of Bhutan. Presume  
Embassy will coordinate as it believes proper with GOI:

QUOTE: Your Highness:

I was shocked and grieved to learn of the untimely  
passing of your Prime Minister. You and your people have my  
deepest sympathy in this hour of sorrow and loss. Please  
convey my personal condolences to the members of the late  
Prime Minister's family.

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Highness

The Druk Gyalpo of Bhutan

UNQUOTE

Have no objection to publication but do not plan release here.

End

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA: SOA: DKux: dln 4/6/64

Clearances:

NEA - James P. Grant

SOA - Mr. Cameron  
NEA/P - Mr. Fisk  
U/PR - Mrs. Williams

S/S - Mr. Mills  
White House - Mr. Komer

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

APR 13 1964

*India*

Dec. 12, 1964

Mr. Komer -

Dave Schneider gave me the following message:

"Regret we can not at present give you any guidance beyond what we indicated in REFTEL."

This relates to message to New Delhi 2627 of 6/18.

The Ambassador sent it from Washington to New Delhi when he was on consultation here last June. What he said was it wasn't possible to invite the Prime Minister to come to the US at this time. However, FYI, he had been authorized by the President to express a warm ~~welk~~ welcome to the Prime Minister to visit after the elections, assuming he was still President.

T.



~~SECRET~~

Mac -

December 11, 1964

*India  
x Bowles*

A little side wire message like this  
might help spur Bowles to make a try.  
No harm in trying either, though I doubt  
he'll succeed.

RWK

Att: Draft msg. to New Delhi

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 2-10-06

~~SECRET~~

December 11, 1964

25X1A

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI



FOR AMBASSADOR ONLY FROM BUNDY AND KOMER

We wish to underline President's view, as expressed to you, that he sets great store on more flags for Vietnam. While he and we realize all the problems involved in getting Indians to ante up even a hospital unit, you should know our judgment that nothing would more solidify Shastri's position in White House esteem. We can argue that Soviets have really opted out of Vietnam situation, so that in helping us Indians would be striking blow at their real enemy the Chicoms. In point of fact, we are fighting India's battle in Southeast Asia even more than we're fighting our own. Moreover, even if Shastri had to turn down such an approach (best made to him personally and informally), it would make him realize more fully our strong feelings on Vietnam.

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ-032-023-001/1By jc NARA, Date 3-2-04~~SECRET~~



LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RWK:

December 10, 1964

Gaud bought Macomber's recommendation (attached) on the tactics of freeing rupees for the Indian foundation. However, he agreed that LBJ himself should have final say, so he's preparing a memo for the President to come over through Kermit Gordon.

The issue is whether (1) to try the waiver route in hopes it would be easier but in knowledge that necessary consultations on the Hill may force us into seeking legislation or (2) to assume we're likely to end up on the legislative route anyway and figure we'd be better off taking that course right off rather than trying the back door first. AID and State generally favor trying the waiver; BOB (though quite willing to consider the waiver) thinks it would be more straightforward and profitable to shoot for legislation with a big Presidential fanfare. However, Gaud feels the margin between these two approaches is so slim that the President should make the choice on his own grounds.

The President's choice is essentially this. If his new-program cupboard is pretty bare and he's casting around for bold, new initiatives, he might welcome making a splash of this one. If his plate is full enough already, he may want to let it slip through with as little fuss as possible. Even in the latter case, he'll probably have to make a few phone calls at the right time.

There is still another dimension on the bold-new-initiative side which we won't have a clear fix on till next Monday. Kermit Gordon is considering recommending that the President ask Congress for broad authority to use, say, \$100 million in local currencies at his discretion. He hopes this might be an incentive to departments from HEW to AID to come up with imaginative new ideas for using foreign currencies. If he decides to go ahead with something like this, then the President would want to tie in the India foundation to show that he's already busy developing new ways to tap these idle resources. Linking this to Food-for-Peace might expand that popular program's image and take advantage of it at the same time.

This is obviously one for the politicians to settle. My own feeling from listening to them talk is that we're asking for a lot of nasty backlash if we try the back door first. If we succeed, carping will continue and may even affect attitudes toward the aid program. If we fail, we look like the kid caught with his hand in the cookie jar. There's apparently lots of support for putting our excess currencies to work, and I should think the President would enhance his prestige by recommending striking ways to do it.

HHS

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

India  
x Rupees <sup>file</sup>  
5  
December 8, 1964

RWK:

AID is trying to make up its mind this week about how to handle the Indian binational foundation in the FY 66 budget. Gaud will hold a meeting at 10:00 a.m. Thursday (I've been invited, but you may want to go).

Two questions have to be settled:

1. Should we fund this under existing legislation (by a BOB waiver) or seek a special foreign currency appropriation?
2. Should we be content with setting up the foundation in India, or should we in the process try to establish bold new worldwide framework for this kind of activity?

Part of the answers depends on whether the President wants to get personally behind this. Nick Farr's reading is that this won't amount to a fight, since the idea has a good deal of support in Congress. In fact, he thinks the President could reap considerable credit for an imaginative new departure at small cost.

AID will probably come out for not seeking special legislation and for limiting its effort to India--partly because they don't know whether the President would invest the necessary effort to do more. Before they make up their minds, they'll want to ask WH its sense of the President's availability.

Do you have any sense of LBJ's possible interest? Can we give AID any feel for this?

HHS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 2-10-04

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



December 7, 1964

6  
Indira

Dear Mr. Singh:

The President has asked me to thank you for your most forthcoming letter of congratulations to him on his election. I showed him the pictures you enclosed and he recalled the occasion with a great deal of pleasure. He looks forward to a continuing close relationship between our two great countries--India and the United States.

Sincerely,

R. W. Komer

R. K. Singh, Director  
Balwant Vidyapeeth Rural Higher Institute  
P. O. Bichpuri, Agra (India)

~~SECRET~~

December 5, 1964

India  
X Bowles

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The main reason Chet Bowles wants to see you is simply to be reassured that you want him to stay on in India. As he put it to me, he's quite happy and would be delighted to stay on for another full tour, if you so desire; the one thing he doesn't want is just to stay for another six months or so.

The general feeling in State and here is that Bowles has done a good job. The Indians like him, and if he bids high for Washington backing, this is controllable.

A few key points you might make to him are:

1. You're squarely behind him and want him to stay on as long as he feels able.

2. You've done quite well by India: (a) the \$50 million MAP and \$50 million military sales package for FY'65; (b) continued large development aid at around \$450 million per annum; (c) massive extra shipments of PL 480 wheat and rice to meet current food crisis. In turn we want India to be a little more helpful on the political side, on such issues as Article 19, Chirep, etc.

3. You also want to discourage Indians from a defense spending spree (which could siphon off money we give them for development and also cause extra trouble with the Paks). We should keep telling Indians that their development program must have top priority.

4. You look forward to seeing Shastri in the spring (you told Bowles to give him a general invite earlier, and he'll probably want to come here when he goes to the UK next May).

5. You admire India's wise decision not to go nuclear in the wake of the Chicom test.

6. Moyers and Goodwin have asked him for ideas on inaugural address. You'll want to thank him.

R. W. Komer

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By *jef* NARA, Date 2-10-04

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Mac -

November 27, 1964

Bowles scratched lunch with me today because of illness, though he did see Rusk briefly.

When he sees you, one query will be "when can I see LBJ?" (Chet plans to leave around 10 December, but would certainly stay over for this purpose).

Aside from illness, he's in a good mood and anxious to tape down as much as he can for his clients now that US election is over.

For perspective's sake, let's tell that we've done mighty well by India in LBJ's first year. Besides all the emergency PL 480 we've just donated to meet food crisis, the \$100 million FY 65 MAP package (50/50 grant and sales) was a real coup. It took an uphill fight too. While LBJ wouldn't sign on to a five-year commitment at this level, we have accepted it for planning purposes if Indians perform in turn. I've gotten same figure accepted for next year too.

We're especially pleased with \$1.4 billion 5-year foreign exchange ceiling, which is designed to keep Indians from going hog wild on defense kick (and to prevent our economic aid from being siphoned off for this purpose).

Fact of matter is that the Indian military are on a defense spree, and Defmin Chavan is backing them for his own political purposes. Trouble is that Chet himself has gotten the fever and is spending far more in cable tolls plugging MAP than on the main chance.

Chet feels strongly that we missed the boat on pre-empting the MIG deal (I don't think we had the option, although you and I tried to get an offer made even so.) In any case he's now arguing that we can't permit the same thing to happen to the Indian navy. Fortunately, this risk seems to have dropped sharply since UK came through with a pretty good naval package.

We want to use such leverage as we have to dampen Indian military appetites (especially those we can't feed), and to get Indian thinking back onto their new 5-year Plan 1965-69 which calls for more external capital than anything now in sight. Indian performance is lamentable on the self-help side, and we should side Dave Bell is goosing Chet on this score. Their

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Authority AC032R-23-1-1-0  
By JPL VARA Date 2-12-18

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- 2 -

agriculture is a mess, and the Paks are walking away from them in terms of freeing up the private sector (with excellent results).

Chet is also hopped up about nuclear assurances to India, to forestall proliferation. We're for this in general but don't want to charge in and offer all sorts of inducements to the Indians. Talbot makes good sense in urging that we let them come to us. Our best guess is that Shastri means it, at least for the short term when he says that India won't go nuclear. So we have turnaround time.

As to the Soviets, they aren't going to invest so much more risk capital in India than they are already. They're more strapped these days than we are too. No need for us to be too jumpy about Soviets stealing a march on us. If anything, the problem is with the Indians, who seem to be much more worried about their lack of leverage on the Soviets than they need be. Chet might plug this line.

Above is to give you some ammo for talk with Chet (I'll sit in if you want but am not aching). You might ask him about Shastri's performance, risk of Kerala going Communist again, Indo-Pak relations. He wants a thorough-going review of Indian policy (remember LBJ's remark to McConaughy) but I'm dubious that now's the time.

RWK

~~SECRET~~



November 16, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR CARL ROWAN

Attached from Chet Bowles might interest you. Our old advertising friend and his USIS colleagues appear to have done quite a job in publicizing our election process.

It strikes me that this might be worth a story in your house organ (or State's); in fact there might be merit in all USIS posts doing this sort of thing. Good to see you the other night.

R. W. Komer

Attach. Bowles ltr to Komer dtd 11/9/64

*India*  
*Bowles*  
X

LIMITED OFFICIAL  
USE

November 12, 1964

*India*

Mac -

You might glance at these, simply because  
India is one of our key clients.

RWK

Att. Read/Bundy Memo 11/10/64 att. draft  
cables to Delhi w/LBJ msgs to Shastri  
and Rad. re election



~~SECRET~~

Mac -

October 29, 1964

*file*  
*India Navy*  
*11*

You should know that Bowles is mounting a big campaign to get US/UK aid for Indian navy on grounds that if we do not preempt in this manner, Indians will go to Soviets. Alleging that we let Soviets buy into Indian air force because of our failure to offer air package, he argues against making the same mistake twice. UK has offered a modest naval package to Delhi, but Chet regards it as inadequate. He wants us both to prod UK and contribute ourselves.

We've mildly needled London, but are most reluctant to invest in by far the lowest priority Indian defense arm. There is no Chicom naval threat in Indian Ocean and Indians know it. For them to waste money on their navy is not only silly but will generate all sorts of compensatory requests from the Paks. I've written Chet several times on this matter and am urging State and Pentagon to join me in telling him to make every effort to turn Delhi aside from this naval folly, instead of acquiescing in it. Bowles will be down here 27 November for a week; I hope you will join me in this enterprise then.

RWK

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *2-10-04*

~~SECRET~~

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR ONLY  
VIA CLASSIFIED DIPLOMATIC POUCH

12  
October 28, 1964

Dear Chet:

Hope this reaches you before you depart. My face is red over your letter of September 4 enclosing Subramaniam's warm encomium on our PL 480 help. This got clipped to the bottom of some Israeli stuff and not even read by me until today. So I'm afraid I muffed this ball, though the letter should still be useful in terms of follow-up publicity on how much PL 480 is helping India.

To show you that my heart was in the right place, however, it was I who tried to get a lot of WH publicity for signing of new PL 480 agreement. I got mousetrapped, however, in the last minute hassle over whether we would get any kind of new PL 480 law at all. So I had to drop any gambits which entailed even a marginal risk of adverse Hill reaction.

Jim Greenfield tells me that you are going to recock on the Foreign Affairs article, so I've laid off. Jim Thomson is back in business now and, in all the candor which you have come to expect from us, it was not one of your best efforts. Not that it wasn't better than anything I could have written, mind you.

Met your friends the Ginsburgs the other evening at the Kuwaiti Ambassador's. She was delightful; I had little chance to talk with him.

Dave Bell, Chenery and Macomber are quite concerned lest your clients have failed to realize their opportunity to pick up an extra \$100 million in program money if they liberalize. Macomber is convinced that, even though we've pledged \$385 million to the consortium, the Indians will not be able to come up with enough satisfactory project to cover even a large portion of this \$100 million. I too am persuaded that we have been far too passive in the management of our Indian aid program; we need to use such incentives as levers to get the kind of performance India needs and we want. I told Dave that once you found out there was a cool \$100 million India could get if it pulled up its socks, you'd certainly turn on the heat in Delhi. If my letter reaches you in time, this might be a useful topic for your round of calls. I might add all here are most impressed by the Pak performance in liberalizing, and inclined to make increasingly invidious comparisons to India.

DECLASSIFIED

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Authority RAc 032A-23-1-2.9  
By SPW vARA Date 2-12-88



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- 2 -

Chet, I'm most depressed by the evident Indian pressure for a big naval program, with the obvious inference that if the US/UK don't come through, the Soviets will. The Indians are going through the same ridiculous business that we did in the 50's, when each of the three services got a roughly equal slice of the defense budget pie. My own sense is that, if the Brits come through with a minimal program, we should simultaneously tell the Indians quietly that we regard their naval program as a test of their seriousness. They agree with us that the navy is by far the lowest priority. If they use our military and economic aid to meet higher priority requirements and then spend their own foreign exchange on such frou-frou, they are in effect forcing us to subsidize something which is militarily incomprehensible and politically marginal. Can't we make this point to Shastri and TTK? The shame of it is that if India uses our money indirectly to build up a useless submarine arm we'll have to turn around and spend more useless money to provide the Paks with a compensatory capability. Thus, the net gain to the Indians will be nil, while it's we who will be out of pocket twice. Can't we put these propositions quite candidly to our Indian friends?

An added worrier is that most of the Pentagonians, including McNamara, still feel strongly that India's defense build-up is grossly excessive. I spend a good deal of my time trying to stem proposed cut-backs. If you want McNamara and company on your side for things that count, it would be wise not to expose the naval flank. Maybe this argument would be persuasive to the Indians too.

Was fascinated by your letter to Shastri on mobilizing India's own resources. To my untutored eye, you're on to something big here.

Hollis Chenery has made a strong pitch, based on the work of a summer study group of his, that greatly increased capital input would save money in the long run by bringing India to the stage of self-sustaining growth much earlier than otherwise. Dave Bell seemed particularly struck with his thesis. You will want to spend an hour with Hollis yourself on this matter.

Greatly look forward to seeing you. The papers are now talking about a 20-point spread between LBJ and Barry, which is a most auspicious omen for your return.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Chester Bowles  
U. S. Ambassador to India  
American Embassy  
New Delhi, India

R. W. Komer

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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

October 19, 1964

Mr. Bell opened AID's long-term review of the India program on 14 October by saying that we are being forced to revise our assessment of it. We are realizing that it has not been as successful as we hoped it would be. Major defense expenditures and other problems trouble us.

We used to think of the Indians as effective and thought that all we needed to do was put in resources. Today we are less certain of their abilities and want to play a stronger role in Indian planning.

However, the existence of a new Government makes this an appropriate time to lay out the dimensions of our future effort. Also, we have new leadership in our AID Mission which has not had a chance yet to report its reflections on the proposed program. Also, the IBRD has begun to devote more resources to an analysis of the India program and will possibly provide greater intellectual leadership. So we can look forward to a series of meetings over the next few months leading to a new consensus as to how we regard the Indian problem.

Mr. Macomber agreed that Bell's assessment was the proper starting point for the day's discussions. He underscored Bell's mild pessimism by pointing out the decline in Indian performance under its three development plans. Whereas India had enjoyed a 1.6% per capita growth rate during its first Five-year Plan, that rate had fallen to almost zero in the first two years of the Third Plan. This he suggested is a dramatic illustration that things are bogging down. He rejected the notion that bad weather in the agricultural sector was primarily responsible for this performance. He pointed out that agricultural yield per acre is about the lowest in the world, so the problem is much greater than the weather. He also cited the increasing debt service burden and the fact that rising population is eating up whatever growth there is.

Mr. Chenery said he thought it was time to raise the two major alternatives we have in India. He prefaced his discussion of these by saying that we have experimented in small countries like Israel, Greece and Taiwan with the consequences of large infusions of capital. While admitting that we can't afford aid on such a per capita scale in countries as large as India, he felt there were some lessons to be learned.

He posed the two alternatives this way: Either we can shoot for a self-sustaining growth rate of about 5% in 20-30 years, or we can add the goal of a minimum increase in per capita income with a somewhat higher growth rate. He felt that it would make more sense and be cheaper in the long run

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- 2 -

to mount a bigger program in the next few years with the hope of getting out of the aid business sooner than we would if we contented ourselves with a lower growth rate over a longer period of time. He admitted there might be less efficient use of capital under the faster higher program, but he felt we should accept this for the sake of getting out sooner. He also felt that achieving a higher standard of living quickly would provide the only social context that would encourage a decline in population growth.

Mr. Gaud made a point, short of debating Chenery's argument, to the effect that we would undoubtedly require more capital for India to offset the rising debt service burden. He made a plea for finding other tools than straight dollar aid for doing this job. This need, he said, was particularly urgent if one accepted Chenery's recommendation for a larger program.

Mr. Macomber also backed off from Chenery's proposal for a bigger program by questioning whether the Indians could absorb any more aid. He said that in his role as an administrator he had difficulty getting the Indians to use the aid we were already providing.

Bell interrupted to ask whether we wouldn't increase the market for our aid by loosening up the Indian controls which now seem to restrict the natural vigor of the economy. Macomber agreed with that point but said he felt there are a number of practical problems to be hurdled first. Bell said he felt that any large scale additional aid would have to be contingent on the Indians loosening restrictions and providing a better framework for the use of aid.

Mr. Zagorin of Treasury said he questioned Chenery's notion that a larger amount of aid would necessarily turn out to be cheaper for us in the long run. He had no statistics but said his intuition led him to suspect propositions of this sort. He felt that faster growth would stimulate import demand and so would cost the Indians more in the end.

The State Department representative said that perhaps we have no alternative to going faster because a stagnant economy amounts to a "slow boat to disaster". Macomber responded by asking whether a one or two percent growth rate would be politically adequate. He felt that our present AID offer of extra program loans in return for loosening of Indian controls was sufficient bait to bring the Indians around without making a significantly higher offer. Mr. Harvey said that perhaps that was the best we could do this year but that we would have to make some decision on Mr. Chenery's proposition before we could determine on what posture to take on the Indians' Fourth Plan.

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- 3 -

Mr. Macomber raised the question of whether we really wanted India to be economically independent in a short period of time. He suggested that perhaps there is some advantage of continuing India's dependence on us. Perhaps all we really need to do is to achieve a general feeling of progress. Mr. Gaud disagreed sharply by saying our prime political objective in India is to make India as strong as possible because it can be tremendously influential in Southeast Asia as well as in other parts of the world. However, he admitted that there is a serious question whether we can change the Indian economic philosophy because of the heavy commitment to economic planning as such. Mr. Komer mentioned the need to look at the Indian program in the context of our world-wide Aid figures. He said we should pick out the important countries and spend our money there rather than trying to spread ourselves in every country where we are in any way involved. This would require our asking ourselves whether we would gain more by putting another \$100 million in India than we would for instance from putting that amount into South Vietnam.

Mr. Bell, changing the subject, asked whether we have any hope of affecting population growth rates. The consensus seemed to be that we can do something now. We could hope for some effect within five years. For instance, Korea and Taiwan expect to cut the birth rate in half within five years.

Turning to the military, Bell felt that we had had only limited success in using our MAP as leverage to effect the Indian defense budget. Defense Department recognized that Defense expenditures were still too high and agreed with AID to make every effort to persuade the Indians to keep them under control.

*H.S.*

Harold H. Saunders

SECRET



Push IB into a  
bigger role. —

Macomber - no larger prog. loan  
yet on Pak. model. Ins. not  
ready.

Chen -

Where we trying to go?

A. Sustaining growth - 5% per yr.  
I get there in 20-30 yrs. But per cap.  
income wd. still be low.

B. Add in doubling of per cap. income.  
Higher growth rate wd. not only do this,  
but gtd. decrease total capital inflow needed  
to reach A. ~~It~~ This wd. be as base birth  
rate wd. slow down at higher incomes. Pop  
control much more likely at higher income levels.

So dramatic savings aid over long run  
if you go faster.

Wells challenges our philosophy which  
in effect gives clnd. least aid per capita  
just because it's a "big" country. So let's not hide  
behind Cong. reluctance. Let's sell case to Cong.

[1]

Land - accepting Chv. thesis, now can  
we help out by other means the ASD?  
"aid won't do it!"

What abt. extended high guarantee  
debt burden.

but enterprise.

So key is finding other means!

Bill - another part of problem is  
self-help. External capital inflow  
alone won't help. Chv. will change their  
own policies, Chv. absorptive capacity wd.  
increase.

Fagorin - pleads for special pref.  
on raw mats. Otherwise will be  
servicing debt repayments to Euro.

Chen - must direct control as to ration  
scale for which larger capital flow will  
lead to liberalization.





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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 2/10/04

14 India

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

October 19, 1964

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We used to think of the Indians as effective and thought that all we needed to do was put in resources. Today we are less certain of their abilities and want to play a stronger role in Indian planning.

However, the existence of a new Government makes this an appropriate time to lay out the dimensions of our future effort. Also, we have new leadership in our AID Mission which has not had a chance yet to report its reflections on the proposed program. Also, the IBRD has begun to devote more resources to an analysis of the India program and will possibly provide greater intellectual leadership. So we can look forward to a series of meetings over the next few months leading to a new consensus as to how we regard the Indian problem.

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He posed the two alternatives this way: Either we can shoot for a self-sustaining growth rate of about 5% in 20-30 years, or we can add the goal of a minimum increase in per capita income with a somewhat higher growth rate. He felt that it would make more sense and be cheaper in the long run

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Mr. Macomber also backed off from Chenery's proposal for a bigger program by questioning whether the Indians could absorb any more aid. He said that in his role as an administrator he had difficulty getting the Indians to use the aid we were already providing.

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- 3 -

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Mr. Bell, changing the subject, asked whether we have any hope of affecting population growth rates. The consensus seemed to be that we can do something now. We could hope for some effect within five years. For instance, Korea and Taiwan expect to cut the birth rate in half within five years.

Turning to the military, Bell felt that we had had only limited success in using our MAP as leverage to effect the Indian defense budget. Defense Department recognized that Defense expenditures were still too high and agreed with AID to make every effort to persuade the Indians to keep them under control.

Harold H. Saunders

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15  
October 15, 1964  
*Included  
+ map/aid*

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVE BELL

Delighted to come to your party Monday on FY'65 MAP. I've been in close touch with our DOD friends on their predicament and might have some useful comments to offer.

By and large, they seem to have taken the only sensible short-term road to dealing with the FY'65 shortfall, i. e. cutting and paring across the board. If the burden falls most heavily on a few "Forward Defense" countries (as it has traditionally) this simply reflects the fact that around 4/5ths of MAP goes to these big clients. It is also symptomatic of a larger problem, however, which is that our MAP programs in almost all of these key countries are no longer realistic. They all call for much bigger outlays than are feasible, so in effect we're asking for trouble by allowing such a big gap between promise and performance.

Therefore, McNaughton and Solbert bought my suggestion for a basic review of these programs in an effort to forestall the same sort of problem coming up year after year. McNamara approved. We simply have to recut the coat to fit the cloth; which hopefully could give us inter alia both a more effective defense and less of a local economic burden. I hope you'll heartily endorse this suggestion, and volunteer AID participation (since the "mix" question is relevant in every case).

You may also know that McNamara has again approved an effort to get MAP into the DOD budget. I'm all for this, first because Congress reacts more to the sheer size of the annual aid figure than to anything else, and second because it would give DOD greater management flexibility. If Bob believes, as he says, that he buys more defense with a MAP dollar than with anything else he gets, let's put him in a position to make the necessary transfers within his own budget. However, McNaughton's recommendation (as OKed by McNamara) also calls for the elimination of AID "supervisory" powers. I'd be as strongly opposed as last year to dropping the present procedures, though I think you'll agree they've been honored more in the breach than in the observance. If this matter is not on the Monday agenda, I suggest you nevertheless bring it up.

Your LAS review of India was so stimulating that I for one would value another session to carry the issues raised closer to a point of decision (I'm speaking here of course only of tentative longer-term policy guidelines

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date 2-11-04

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rather than hard program decisions). Perhaps a good occasion would be when Chet Bowles returns in late November. There is of course some risk that he'd grab this ball and run with it prematurely, but this seems controllable. Moreover, I'd like to get him off his MAP kick and back thinking more about the primary economic focus of our Indian enterprise.

R. W. Komer

SECRET

Presidential Library Review of NSC Equities is Required

Approved For Release 2001/08/24 : NLJ-032-023-1-2-1

~~SECRET~~/VIA CLASSIFIED POUCH

October 9, 1964

PERSONAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR ONLY

Dear Chet:

Have had such a flood of mail from you recently that I hardly know where to begin. So let me say first how much I look forward to seeing you in person late November. We can review all the bidding then.

In the meantime, here are my preliminary reactions on a number of matters. I know you're not coming back with any expectation that we will have sorted out our next steps in our Indian policy by November; Washington simply won't move that fast. In any case, everyone from the President on down will be sorting out a whole series of other problems. Nonetheless, I see merit in our getting an Indian bid in early, and you can do this better than we. However, the later you come down to Washington the more likelihood we'll be able to talk business. Sending a thoughtful wrap-up cable on future policy toward India shortly before you return would be a useful opening gun. I also realize, of course, that your returning at this time is not just connected with Indian matters or medical check-ups; let's get HHH too read into our affairs.

I've heard that Rooney is not at all enthusiastic about your Foundation proposal; in fact, seems to regard it as pie in the sky. I would advise not dealing with Rooney further but working on George Mahon. Phil has some interesting read-out on Rooney's views. Enclosed clipping also of interest. I'm told that BK is still much against Foundation gambit as inflationary; how silly can one get?

You can relax a bit on any cut of \$12 million or so in the FY'65 Indian MAP. DOD policy level agrees that the \$50 million is a firm commitment on which we cannot renege. The cut about which you rightly complained was a staff recommendation to Solbert. However, if we have to cut across the board because of a big shortfall, India might have to take a bit of it for propriety's sake.

25X1

25X1A

Your idea of getting a demonologist for Embassy Delhi is a good one. I happen to know both the people you mention, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is a delightful fellow but definitely not my idea of the kind of articulate analyst who could trade theories with the people you have in mind. Dave Klein, on the other hand, would be well-nigh ideal. You may not realize that he is Mac Bundy's liaison man with EUR. Regrettably,

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Presidential Library review State Dept. equity required

SANITIZED



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Dave is already spoken for and going to Moscow. I can think of several other names but all are doubtless too senior. I'll keep on my thinking cap and may have a few thoughts when you return. Tom Hughes is working on this too.

The Bechtel coup, assuming it comes off, is great news. You and yours apparently did a terrific job of easing the way for Bechtel and Clay. I've asked Bill Gaud and Macomber whether in cases where such crucially important private investment projects are in the wind, AID and other agencies go out of their way to give every facility. There must be any number of things that AID, State, Commerce, etc., not to mention our embassies could do. Neither of my interlocutors knew the answer, but I intend to follow up.

Mac has pursued the Chicom angle you mentioned in your 16 September letter to him. Of course a lot of water has gone over the dam since then. But I am glad to find my own viewpoint (and yours, I believe) vindicated in that the Indians have apparently decided not to go nuclear for the moment at least. We want to seize this moment, and much thinking is going on here.

All the best. See you soon.

Sincerely,

R. W. Kerner

The Honorable  
Chester Bowles  
U.S. Ambassador to India  
New Delhi, India

17

~~SECRET~~

September 25, 1964

Mac -

*India*  
*PL 480*  
*x*

Since PL 480 bill was passed yesterday, I approved going ahead with Indian agreement, just before seeing your note saying OK in principle, but let's look again. Before actual signing I don't think we can cut it this fine.

I had touched base with Henry Wilson, Bell, Macomber, Talbot and his Congressional liaison, Reuter, and most important, Ken Birkhead (Agriculture's great Congressional liaison expert). All felt we should go ahead pronto. So did Ball and Charlie Murphy for Agriculture.

I hit hard the question of possible Congressional backlash. Reuter says we notified both committees two weeks ago about pending Indian agreement, so no problem of bad faith. He also points out that at no time in the debate did India come in for any flak, and he and Birkhead doubted that we would run into any problems.

If we don't go ahead on old basis, we would hit lots of flak with Indians who in turn would accuse us of bad faith. I have also OK'd minor agreement with Iran.

We will drop any plans for WH publicity here on Indian agreement, simply to avoid marginal risk of stirring up the issue.

RWK

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *2-11-09*



~~SECRET~~

September 23, 1964

Mac -

Conference action on PL 480 bill was lousy. House has already passed bill; it is before Senate now with possible delay from Fulbright ploy to hold hearings on Polish-Yugoslav amendment.

Bill has many hookers, but I'll confine myself to immediate Indian problem. Bill has three bad features affecting pending India Title I agreement: (a) it raises interest rate in local currency to US Treasury rate (sic); (b) it raises minimum for US uses from 10% to 20% on Title I; (3) recipient must pay in dollars half of shipping charges, aside from excess of US over international rates.

All these will hit India hardest. We've held up signing new Indian PL 480 agreement to avoid any Congressional backlash. Ball, Talbot, MD, and I all want to go ahead and sign on old basis before new bill becomes law, to avoid bad faith charges. But I've insisted on WH clearance first.

Am checking around to see if we'd be likely to get any Congressional or campaign backlash, but am cluing you ad interim. We'd have to clue the committees but Poage at least knows and didn't object. We'd also scrap any publicity.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 2-11-04

CONFIDENTIAL

RWK:

September 14, 1964

Here is the latest proposal for the Indian-American Foundation. I doubt you want to get into the details of charter writing but if you do have any suggestions, I will be talking to AID this afternoon about this.

I gather that the Indians were less enthusiastic about this idea than we had hoped. Apparently they allow for a degree of GOI control that would not be square with our ideas for this project. The attached proposal makes the foundation far more autonomous than the Indians seemed initially willing to accept. However, Bowles feels that's just a bargaining position and they will come around in further discussions.

The other issue has been the scope of the foundation's activities. As it stands now the foundation would work in the fields of education, science and research, broadly interpreted, but leave cultural and social activities to the AID program. The proposal is very careful to emphasize that the foundation's activities will not interfere with the Indian development effort.

Any comments?

HHS

CONFIDENTIAL

19 file  
India  
DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date 2-11-04

Att: Ltr from Kenneth F. Phillips, Asst. Gen. Counsel  
Bureau for Near East and South Asia, to  
Harold Saunders, 9/12/64, Re: Indian-American  
Foundation



SECRET

Mac -

September 10, 1964

Have been holding open option of President announcing new one-year PL 480 agreement for India, which will probably be signed 16 September (it doesn't depend on new law). Agreement involves \$398 million worth of wheat (4 million tons) and rice (306,000 tons) and vegetable oils. This ain't hay, and could be tied to other US actions to meet Indian food crisis (stepping up wheat shipments from 400,000 tons per month to 600,000 etc.)

Much of this has already been made public by Freeman, Bowles and others, but only NYT has made much of it from what I've seen. So there's still play. All I'd have in mind would be WH statement unless press conference happened to fall that day.

If this doesn't excite you, I'd like to remove block from story now.

RWK

SECRET

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Authority FRHS 64-68, n. 15, #70

By jc NARA, Date 2-11-04

SECRET

21  
September 1, 1964

VIA CLASSIFIED DIPLOMATIC POUCH

EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR

*India  
x Bowles*

Dear Chet:

Cyprus, Vietnam, Yemen, etc. have been so much the order of the day (I inherited most of Mike Forrestal's empire) that I'm afraid I've rather neglected our Indian affairs. Not entirely, however.

To take up personal matters first, I much appreciated your dodge to get me out to India to advise L. K. Jha. Regrettably, Mac felt that all hands were needed here through Election Day--to keep pouring oil on troubled waters is the drill. Do give me a rain check, however.

Have prodded DOD on your attache plane, and am told that the C-47 will be returned to India after only a four month gap. I made point that our Ambassador to India has a greater need than at least half of the generals and admirals who sport their own personal aircraft.

Your dispatch summing up Indian impressions and your recent talks with Shastri and co. were most encouraging. It makes great good sense to keep plugging the theme that they will be a great deal easier to deal with in practice than was Nehru.

For the time being here, the election campaign blankets all. I see little prospect of substantial movement forward in our Indian enterprises until the turn of the year. However much you and I might like to keep up the momentum, we're in a period of consolidation. Indeed the big thing is to preserve what we've got until the time is ripe to push forward again. For example, the President is having to fight hard to kill Ellender's amendments to the PL 480 bill; these would cost India some \$40 million annually in ocean freight, require appropriation for all such PL 480 uses as your foundation, and add interest charges at Treasury rates to all PL 480 loans. In any case, our gains since September 1962 have been so great that I can't complain too much if we rest on a plateau for a while.

The focus of the moment is more on Pakistan, where Ayub's China policy increasingly clashes with our own strong views at a time of crisis

The Honorable  
Chester Bowles,  
U.S. Ambassador to India  
New Delhi, India

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NA-034R-23-147  
By JDL vARA Date 2/2/18



~~SECRET~~ - 2

in Southeast Asia. Neither LBJ nor Rusk is very well-disposed toward our Pak friends these days, and I see a showdown with the Paks in the offing if they don't tone down. For my part, I remain convinced that only by laying it on the line with Ayub will we be able to preserve our Pak ties without at the same time giving Pakistan the stranglehold on our India policy that it had come during the Fifties to regard as its due. This was a fault of our policy rather than Pakistan's, but whatever the cause a re-balancing is long overdue (and is in fact in process, painful though it may be).

While we're willing to bide our time and allow Shastri to find his footing, you know better than I that any Indian gestures toward reconciliation with Pakistan or support in SEA would be well received here. We'll all be watching India's role at the Cairo Non-Aligned Conference in October too.

As to food, you already know that we'll do our damndest.

All in all, keeping a discreet lid on the Indian defense program is likely to be the most troublesome bilateral issue of the next few years. One already sees signs of Indian resentment, and I presume that we'll court just this every time we raise an eyebrow at foolish naval outlays or anything else. Nor do the Chicoms seem likely to oblige by stepping up tensions again.

So be of good cheer. Once the new Administration takes shape (my guess is that there'll be many changes) will be the time to suggest whatever bold new initiatives we can devise.

All the best,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

July 30, 1964

22

Mac -

S. K. Patil has requested session with you 2-7 August. I've told State to sit on request, so that if LBJ won't see him we can then go back and say LBJ terribly sorry but has asked you to see Patil. You can then give Patil some kind of oral word from on high. Thus we'd soften blow of LBJ refusal.

I still think, however, that Patil is well worth ten minutes of Presidential time (he's got a letter from Shastri too, though I doubt much in it). Only valid reason I see for turning him down would be risk of adding to any anti-Indian sentiments presently nurtured.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 2-11-04



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 28, 1964

*India*  
*23*

Mac -

Press Conference Voluntary on Indian Food Needs. This was p.1 news in NYT today, and everyone thinks it would make a good story. I have State preparing a possible voluntary; so is Reuter (with Agriculture help).

According to Reuter, however, Agriculture feels strongly we should hold up story at least week until they get Rep. Poage under control on PL-480 renewal act. They say Freeman will call LBJ on this if necessary. Reuter says they have a point, though overdone.

If a query highly likely this week, we might as well go ahead. If not (and I'd doubt it), what harm in waiting a week?

*No harm, but what is  
the Poage issue?  
MegB.*

RWK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *2-11-04*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

24  
file  
India

RWK:

July 27, 1964

Any voluntary press conference statement by LBJ on food aid to India would have to be geared to Congressional deliberations on extending PL 480 (may act next 2-3 weeks). Reuter will have a feel for this. Agriculture has told Bowles (to New Delhi 196) not to say anything about new PL 480 agreements lest he rock the Congressional boat. Bowles is planning a press conference too (New Delhi 228).

To meet the immediate Indian problem, we authorized Shastri and Subramanian to say 24 June that we intended to supply 300,000 tons (about same as this year) of rice from our next crop and to speed up wheat deliveries (though rice is the real problem). Present plan is to sign an interim FY 65 rice agreement as soon as Congress acts and then to work on a new multi-year agreement to succeed the 1960 4-year agreement which just ran out.

India has been our #1 PL 480 recipient--about \$2.3 billion (CCC costs are even higher--\$3.8 billion). Most of this has been Title I sale (1 billion bushels of wheat, 33 million bushels of feed grains, 31 million bags of rice, 1.6 million bales of cotton). However, we've also given about \$200 million worth under Title III to feed 9.9 million people, including school lunches for 8.1 million children. FY 64 program was about \$300 million.

HHS

Att: New Delhi 228, 7/22/64  
To New Delhi 196, 7/25/64

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 2-11-04

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~SECRET~~

25  
July 24, 1964  
*Indira*  
*Memo to Mr. LBJ*

Mac -

Bowles' side wire proposal that I go educate L. K. Jha on how to set up a White House staff for India strikes a responsive chord. Even if I accomplished nothing, it would be a good, cheap gesture.

Question of course is whether you'd let me take time off from here (though two weeks away lowered even my confidence that I'm indispensable). More to the point, there is some other fence-mending which might make such a trip worthwhile.

(1) There's no doubt that for many reasons our Arab enterprises are sliding downhill. In the atmosphere of uncertainty about real US intentions, even Israeli propaganda (like Jon Kimche's recent piece in highly regarded Jewish Observer and Middle East Review alleging that Luke Battle is coming to drastically alter US/UAR policies) causes flutters among the Arabs. But along with reassurance, someone needs to say quietly but authoritatively to Nasser that his fiddling around in Cyprus, Libya, Jordan, Yemen, etc. is causing us to wonder whether he really wants to get along. We can't send anybody visible to Cairo before the election, but were I to go along with Jack McCloy on his next arms probe in mid-August, I might be a useful mouthpiece--junior enough to be invisible but well-known to the UAR as the President's Middle East man.

(2) We may have to say some mighty tough words nicely to Hussein if we want to turn him aside from accepting Soviet arms. I met him with LBJ, so could carry a message here too.

(3) We don't want to massage Ayub, but were someone like myself to stop off and talk to Shoaib, I could quite informally cite my personal sense that Pak policies have now succeeded in alienating two Presidents; if the Paks aren't careful, they may kill the goose that lays the golden egg (we have reports that Shoaib has been saying just this to Ayub).

All of the above adds up to no more than a two week trip (and no vacation either). I don't know how Talbot would feel, but think I could bring him and Averell on board. Does this sound interesting?

RWK

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *2-11-04*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

July 23, 1964/4:30 pm

25X1A

[REDACTED]

*India*  
*x India*  
*Pak*

25X1A

[REDACTED]

FOR BOWLES FROM KOMER

We fully sympathize your point that classified data given us by GOI not be bandied about with Paks. However, almost all of info mentioned in refs you give seems to deal with our own MAP intentions, about which we did undertake to keep Paks generally informed. Moreover, what we've told Paks recently was not in response to Pak pressure. It resulted rather from our own desire to help short-circuit if possible distorted Pak reactions to "massive" US aid to India which, as they reverberate here, do tend to create apprehensions.

Nonetheless, we've gently reminded State and DOD to watch carefully all future disclosures. Now that we're in a MAP relationship with India as well as Pakistan greater circumspection obviously in order.

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ-032-023-1/3

By jc NARA, Date 3-2-04



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 6, 1964

27

India

McGB:

I gather you have reservations about the President's sending a get-well note to Shastri. I tried to discourage Grant, but State has recommended one anyway.

Disadvantages lie in blowing up Shastri's illness and in seeming to get too close too soon. However, as a thoughtful gesture it would cost us little. Shastri has already seen Mikoyan and reportedly discussed an August visit to Moscow. We share his disappointment over not getting together with Ayub in London and encourage their trying again as soon as he's back on his feet.

If we wanted to send something, I'd propose something a little more optimistic rather than State's fatalistic draft, so I've pencilled alternative wording on attached copy.

HHS

Attach. Read/Bundy Memo  
7/3/64 w/cable to Delhi

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 2-11-04

~~SECRET~~

RWK:

June 18, 1964

The India policy paper is better than the Turkey paper partly because it looks at India in motion and tries to dope out what role we can play in its growing. Each paper portrays a country on the brink of a new political era, but the India paper does a far clearer job of laying out where we want to go.

Another reason the India paper looks better, however, is that we find the Indian system more understandable. It assumes that India is already headed in the right direction and that our job is helping it. Whereas the Indian job is to justify and maintain the consensus arrived at since independence, the more difficult problem in Turkey is to achieve a national consensus. Some people would disagree with this comment, but this is my reading.

The danger in a paper on India, where we have a pretty good idea of our goals, is that it may merely codify our present judgments and not test basic assumptions.

For instance, the paper does not ask where we could go if we were able and willing to treble our aid. It notes that our aid level might increase if technical assistance could improve absorptive capacity. But it doesn't discuss whether we should increase technical assistance or what overall effect that would have (though it does recommend an attack on agriculture).

In a similar vein, the paper intimates our aid isn't enough to achieve substantial leverage. But it doesn't raise the questions of how much aid would buy us leverage and whether we'd want to give that much if we could.

Moreover, it speaks of leverage chiefly in terms of withholding and giving aid. Seems to me our real leverage is based on our ability to get results--our ability to show the Indians how to get where they want to go. In this sense, our leverage should be greater now because of India's disappointing economic performance. So we should find ways to influence their institutions and practices by showing that our methods work.

Also, the paper just assumes India's present posture is OK with us since we don't have enough leverage to bring about any change. It doesn't address the question of whether, in the long run, we'd rather have India as an ally or as a neutral if we could influence this.

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By pc, NARA, Date 2-11-04



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- 2 -

Similarly, it says Indians consider themselves a major power and don't want to be just another Turkey or Pakistan. It recommends India rely on collective Free World action for defense against major Chicom attack. Should we push this reliance for political reasons, for economic reasons, for military reasons? Or is this just what we tell all our friends?

The paper does make an effort to examine what effect economic modernization is having on the political machinery. For example, it discusses the political consequences of land reform; the effect of economic progress on the castes, the entrepreneurs and organized labor; the relative effect of economic progress and stagnation on the Congress and on regional parties. It concludes, probably correctly, that we can't do much to influence the evolution of these local political forces; all we can do is to "contribute to the environment in which politics takes place." However, this analysis ignores some basic questions:

1. How will a successful private sector affect the political balance? The paper says we should "foster growth of the private sector in politically tolerable fashion." What is politically tolerable? Will a new entrepreneurial class strengthen the Congress (the paper assumes US interest in a thriving Congress)? Should we push the private sector for political reasons, or just because it offers an economically efficient way to attract more investment into India? Do we or don't we have a long-range political stake in a strong private sector?

2. How can specific economic development programs help India overcome divisive forces and promote national cohesion? The paper does say that general modernization will create overlapping economic ties across state, religious and caste boundaries. It also says that progress supports the Congress' program for a secular state against Hindu orthodoxy and Dravidian revivalism. It says economic progress may be more important politically as post-Nehru leaders consolidate their control. It says resource allocation from New Delhi undercuts regionalism. However, it does not suggest any role for the US other than general development support. Can we trust in an automatic relationship between development and cohesion? Or should we gear specific projects to promote cohesion?

3. How can we affect the quality of Indian government? The paper says one of our goals is "to promote at best a workable democracy and at least a politically effective government." It further says one of the

SECRET

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- 3 -

key issues is, "What US policies will contribute most to orderly political processes?" But it ends up saying there's not much we can do in the way of specific programs.

4. What kind of party system would we like to see evolve? This is obviously crucial to "promoting a workable democracy." The paper favors the Congress to regional parties but again gives no prescription for influencing this development, if we could. If the paper concludes that we can't do anything, then it shouldn't suggest this as a goal.

5. The paper doesn't plot out sectors where we feel Soviet activity would be especially dangerous; it only says we should prevent Soviet domination of any major area. Our experience with the MIGs shows how easily we blow hot and cold on pre-empting Soviet aid when we can't decide whether it's really dangerous. Should we hope for clearer criteria?

Much of my comment adds up to this: The paper's prescription for political influence is increased person-to-person contacts. Perhaps this is the answer. However, it says very little about how our programs might build or guide lasting institutional arrangements. Perhaps we can't do much in this field, but it does recommend an Indian Council for Economic Development. How about others?

The paper highlights the forces at work in a changing India and takes a long step toward mapping how we begin working with them. Perhaps the fact that it doesn't go farther just indicates the beginners' level of our knowledge of the modernization process.

HHS

SECRET



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Authority FRUS 64-68 vol. 25, #57  
By JC NARA, Date 2-11-04

June 16, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Chet Bowles is back full of vim and vigor. He's quite optimistic about the new Shastri cabinet, which he sees as more practical and less woolly-minded than Nehru's. You should get his slant.

The chief pending item of Indian business is whether we should include in our longer term military program an air defense package designed to preempt their MIG deal with Moscow. Proposal is that we offer to sell or grant India (within proposed MAP ceilings--so no added cost to us): (a) 72 surplus F-6As; (b) help in making their own homegrown HF-24 supersonic; and (c) if HF-24 doesn't pan out, we'd provide 24-36 F-104s a few years from now; all this only on condition that India give up MIG-21 production.

Most of us are convinced that India is much too far down the road to renege on MIG deal (only Bowles differs--and he's climbing down now too). Thus we'd get all the political benefit of showing the Indians they're not second-class citizens (i.e. we're willing to give F-104s to them as well as Paks) without ever having our offer taken up. Or, if we were all wrong, and Indians bit, then we have the great plus of getting non-aligned India to reject MIGs. This would also protect the Paks, since a few squadrons of Indian F-104s would be less dangerous than a whole MIG production line.

McNamara has come around to buying this deal. He says let's offer F-104s to both India and Pakistan or to neither. State, however, is more equivocal; it sees an air offer to India as upsetting the Paks just when Ayub is coming around to a conciliatory policy. So State says let's hold off awhile (see their brief attached).

But one of the factors bringing Paks around (aside from Nehru's death) is that we're finally getting through to them that they can't have a veto on our Indian policy. Also this air offer is a non-starter anyway, so why all the worry? At any rate, you might hear argument from Bowles, and then take issue up at lunch if you see a case.

Only other issue is State's proposal you give Shastri an open-ended visit invite. I told them you couldn't do this before election, but suggest instead you allow Bowles to tell Shastri this, and to say that if elected you'd much look forward to seeing him at some mutually convenient time thereafter.

Attach. Rusk Memo to President 6/15/64

R. W. Komer

subj. Apptmt w/Amb. Bowles Tuesday SECRET

SECRET

June 8, 1964

Peter -

Here's the chit of mine that Mac sent to Bob McN. It's privileged, of course, so use with discretion.

RWK

Attach. RWK Memo to McGB dtd 5/27/64 re F-104s for India

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 2-1-04

29a  
File

India  
x India map



296  
Attach. Tab A - Memo of Understanding Rev. Draft dtd 5/27/64

Tab B - Ltr McNamara to Chavan and Press Release  
~~SECRET~~ June 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

McNamara's talks with Indian Defense Minister Chavan went quite well, until interrupted by Nehru's death. Indians had produced a 5-Year Defense Plan at our request, and we managed to squeeze the key foreign exchange component down \$332 million (about 20%) on grounds deleted items were militarily unnecessary and too great a burden on the economy.

In turn McNamara has agreed to \$50 million MAP in FY'65 for mountain warfare equipment, communications, and defense production. He has withheld any 5-year MAP promises until he can work over their plan some more, especially on the air side. We did, however, tell Indians they could assume for planning purposes roughly same level in future years.

McNamara also agreed to sell on credit terms up to \$10 million in FY'64 and \$50 million FY'65 certain items to be agreed. Since the Indians intend to spend some of their own hard currency anyway, this neat device meant that much of it will flow to us rather than to the Soviets or UK.

Both we and Indians regard this exercise to date as successful and want to tape it down in a Memorandum of Understanding (Tab A), which McNamara has OKed. Chavan has himself appealed to us to OK it, so that he can run it through Indian cabinet, and we can put out a brief announcement on success of talks, a good gesture in India just now.

The Memo, and proposed bland press release (Tab B), fall far short of what Bowles wants (but will be a plus in India even so). For example, it does not include any US jet offer designed to pre-empt Indian MIG deal with Soviets. Bundy and I hope you'll hear argument on this separately later

We simply want to give you the final word on this before going ahead. It's only an early stage in a long and painful dialogue with the Indians but both sides are happy with progress to date. Nor will Paks be too unhappy, because we haven't given much (we've kept them clued).

Recommend your early approval. Indians hope to get it so their cabinet can act before it goes Saturday to bury Nehru's ashes.

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Authority FRUS 64-68, vol 25, #53

By jc NARA. Date 2-1-04

R. W. Komer

Approve ✓

McG. Bundy

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

India 29c  
+ Chavan  
+ Indian map  
June 3, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

McNamara has approved attached US/Indian Memorandum of Understanding on military aid to India resulting from the Chavan visit. We merely want to check it (and accompanying press release) with you before sending it out.

It falls far short of what Bowles wants, but will still be a plus noise in India at a time when we want one. In fact, Shastri has already described Chavan's visit as "successful." Nor will the Paks be too unhappy because we haven't given much yet.

The Memorandum commits us only on FY'65 MAP (\$50 million). In accord with your NSAM 279, we reserve on any 5-year promise till Indians have revised their plan (though we say that for planning purposes only they can assume continuation at same level). We had considerable success in getting Indians to cut \$332 million in foreign exchange out of their plan, and McNamara intends to keep working for more cuts, especially on air side. However, to meet Indian political sensibilities, he has at Chavan's request put his reservations in a separate letter to Chavan (also attached).

Only new feature is our willingness to provide credit for sales up to \$10 million in FY'64 and \$50 million in FY'65, if Indian plan is satisfactory. This means in effect that we'll get a fair share of the hard currency the Indians intend to spend anyway, instead of it flowing to the Soviets, UK, or someone else.

Air package which Bowles badly wants is not included in attached, but Bundy and I hope you'll hear argument on this shortly. We see some real political mileage to be gained at little cost.

Recommend your early approval, as Chavan has urged we make press release Saturday before new Indian cabinet leaves to scatter Nehru's ashes.

R. W. Komer

Rw by Rwk  
See 6/4/64  
memo

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 2-11-04



SECRET

June 3, 1964

Mac -

Here's the kind of memo you might want to put in LBJ's night reading as a teaser. I'll confess I've gotten discouraged but I'm always game for another try.

*No.  
mcgB*

RWK

*30*  
*India map*  
*X India*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *2-11-04*

~~SECRET~~

June 3, 1964

Mac -

I reread Delhi 3572 after talking with you, and must admit it's persuasive, even if a bit overdrawn. However, you and I are among the few people in this town who read Bowles' epistles for sense. He's so drawn down his credit that neither DOD nor the Seventh Floor in State really focus on his mail any more. Even the President seems to react adversely to Chet's over-bidding. This is Chet's fatal flaw and it's tragic in a way because India is big business, more so than all of SEA. LBJ knows this, but the inability of the top level in State or DOD to show statesmanship prevents us from putting up any firm recommendations to him.

So the real issue is not whether Bowles is right but whether we can sell his wares to a harassed President over the niggling objections of Rusk and Defense.

I'm more convinced than ever that India is so firmly committed to MIGs (see flat admission in Delhi 3569) that we get an absolute free ride by offering a pre-emptive package of surplus F-6As, help on HF-24 engine, and prospect of 104s if HF-24 doesn't pan out. But if Bowles is right and new Shastri regime actually rejects MIGs in favor of our package, it's an even bigger breakthrough for us. We win either way, at no extra cost to us.

So I've put DOD and State on notice to buck the issue up to the President pronto. It's worth the try, though I'm not optimistic because Rusk and McNamara just haven't focussed on Indian affairs. If only they would stop playing for peanuts in a really big game. After all, it's India's 450 million we're bidding for, and at a crucial break-point too.

RWK

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 2-11-04



June 1, 1964

*file*  
*India*  
*31*

RWK:

The Indian Embassy will keep open its register of condolences on Nehru's death from 11 to 5:30 each day till June 5, both at the Ambassador's residence (2700 Macomb Street) and at the Chancery (2107 Massachusetts Ave.).

Should we tell McGB or other members of the staff?

HHS

*McGB informed*

UNCLASSIFIED

*India* 32  
May 28, 1964/6:00 pm

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2478

Please deliver following message from President to Chavan:

I too am sorry we did not have the opportunity to meet, and I deeply regret the tragic circumstances which caused its postponement. However, I too look forward to close and friendly association between our two countries. I am sure that your discussions here made clear our continuing desire to help India in the military as well as economic field.

Lyndon B. Johnson

This message not for release.

*Sent as is*

RWK/jk



Phoned from Secretary Rusk's plane - 12:30 p.m. May 27

33

May 27, 1964

MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM INDIAN DEFENSE  
MINISTER CHAVAN

*Indira Chavan*

I deeply regret that I have to return to India in such tragic circumstances without meeting you. I was looking forward to meeting you and conveying the greetings and good wishes of the Prime Minister to you, Mr. President, and to the American people. We look forward to close and continued association between our two countries and I am confident your friendly interest in our country would continue. I am most grateful for the courtesies and assistance extended to me personally while I have been in your country.

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

McGB:

34  
India x Bowles  
May 21, 1964

Here's the status of Bowles' proposals for using excess Indian rupees:

1. Administrative expenses: Crockett studied the possibility of using more local currency for these costs in all excess currency countries, decided it makes sense, but also decided State doesn't dare this year to ask Congress for more, even in funny money. Crockett plans to put it into FY 66 budget. So State would back Bowles' suggestion if someone else would stick his neck out for it in Congress. As Bowles says, WH might move this.

2. USIA program: USIA Washington disagrees with Bowles that our information program in India could be bigger without spending more dollars. For instance, USIA here says there's already a large unused pot of rupees allocated to the book program. Expanding would require more Americans and more imported paper--in short, more dollars, which we'd rather spend on other programs. But USIA has asked its people in India to resolve these differences of opinion, so we're waiting for their second look. (English language training may be covered by the binational foundation.)

3. Binational foundation: AID has finally signed up Herman Wells (former president of Indiana U., now doing foundation work in New York) to oversee this project. He'll be here in time to talk with Bowles about how to set it up, how to manage it in Congress, how to broach it to the Indians. AID wrote Bowles this last week after he wrote you.

HHS

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By *jc/pw*, NARA, Date 2-11-04

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RWK:

May 15, 1964

35  
file  
India

Here's the status of Bowles' proposals for using our surplus rupees:

1. Plans to set up a foundation for cultural purposes are grinding ahead slowly. AID has finally found a top-lever promoter and organizer to honcho the project (Herman Wells of Indiana U.) this summer. He'll work on Congressional strategy as well as organizational details. AID is telling Bowles this today.

2. The idea of using raw materials from our stockpile to prime Indian industry is dead. About 70% of Bowles' proposal was copper, which OEP says is no longer surplus in the stockpile. On top of this, the mechanical difficulties in using stockpile surplus this way seem insurmountable until new legislation is passed.

3. Believe Crockett told Bowles during his last visit that it was too late to put rupees into this year's budget request to cover embassy travel and other admin. expenses.

HHS

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc NARA, Date 2-11-04

CONFIDENTIAL

May 13, 1964

36  
India  
X India  
Chavan  
Lisil

Mac -

I'm in a quandary about McNamara/Rusk request LBJ see Chavan. From foreign policy viewpoint I'd say unquestionably yes. Of the six (repeat six) Indian ministers probably coming in next five months, State is right in saying Chavan clearly most important. We could scrub others, but Chavan is a key politico who'll count for much after Nehru. Also inarticulate, he could be given quick treatment and would only take ten minutes. And LBJ saw Bhutto thrice.

But timing couldn't be worse, with Indira just in. If President were to think we "pro-Indians" were trying to press our clients, his negative reaction could far outweigh plus of his seeing Chavan. I think LBJ is joshing us, and I know he sees India's importance as we do, but even marginal risk of annoying him just isn't worth it. What do you think?

RWK

Attach. Memo C. Vance to President  
dtd 5/9/64, subj. Visit of the Indian  
MinDef

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 2-11-04



31  
India  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RWK:

May 12, 1964

Schneider rates the six possible Indian visitors this summer:

Highest Priority

Def. Min. Chavan--definitely coming 19-21 May.

Fin. Min. TTK--may come in fall but not at all certain

State wouldn't initiate request for appointment with LBJ but would back request from another Department.

Food & Agr. Min. Swaran Singh--no date but may return Freeman's visit in connection with new PL 480 deal. Freeman might want LBJ to see him.

Steel Min. Subramanian--Embassy New Delhi trying to get him here July-August. Commerce might urge appointment.

No question of seeing LBJ

Min. Trade Manubhai Shah--no date

S. K. Patil--private visit end of May.

This adds up to only one definitely foreseeable LBJ appointment soon, possibly one request during the summer and maybe one in the fall.

HHS

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 2/1/04

~~SECRET DRAFT~~

38  
April 27, 1964

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting of President with Mrs. Indira Gandhi

PARTICIPANTS: Mrs. Indira Gandhi                      The President  
                    Ambassador B. K. Nehru                      Asst. Secretary Phillips Talbot  
   R. W. Komer

The President greeted Mrs. Gandhi cordially, remarking on his previous meetings with her and with her father. It was because he regarded himself as such a strong friend of India that he was surprised at Mrs. Gandhi's referring to US favoritism toward Pakistan on Kashmir as she had in a recent interview with the New York Times. The President stressed that we were firm in our determination to have the most friendly relations with India so, he said smilingly, he could not accept any implication of partisanship.

Mrs. Gandhi reassured the President that India understood and appreciated US policy and US help. She and her father personally knew of the President's strong friendship for India and she had merely been referring to one part of US policy, that toward Kashmir, on which we did not seem sympathetic to the Indian point of view. Ambassador Nehru interjected that two great powers could certainly disagree on one among many questions without their being any diminution in the overall friendly relations between them.

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 2-11-04  
FRUS 64-68, vol. 25, \*39



SECRET

2.

The President came back again on the issue of US friendship for India and decried any suggestion of partisanship on any issue between us. As for the Indians being disturbed at our relations with Pakistan, they should realize that the Pakistani were far more angry with us. The Paks were far more unhappy about our policy toward India than India seemed to be about our policy toward Pakistan.

The President went on to describe how the US was not only seeking to help nations abroad develop themselves but to deal with the problems of poverty and discrimination in the US. He outlined his own recent efforts to this end citing various statistics. He mentioned, for example, that 49% of draft-age Americans failed to meet minimum physical standards for the draft. Ambassador Nehru was shocked that this figure should be so high but Mrs. Gandhi pointed out that India had had similar difficulties in recruitment after the Chinese attack.

Mrs. Gandhi then presented a letter from Prime Minister Nehru to the President. The latter read it carefully and commented on how much he appreciated the friendly sentiments it contained. India could count on US friendship and on continued US help.

The President remarked on how many friends India had in his Administration. We sent ambassadors to India who seemed to spend every day thinking of new ways in which we could be helpful. Indeed the Pakistani kept complaining that we did not send outstanding ambassadors to Pakistan of the sort we consistently sent to India. They pleaded that just once we

SECRET

3.

send somebody who could represent them so effectively here as Bowles or Galbraith.

Mentioning his particular affection for Mr. Nehru, the President asked about his current health. Mrs. Gandhi replied that he was better and up and around a bit more. The President remarked upon how people had counted him out at the time of his own heart attack but two months later he was back in shape again and had been ever since. No one should count Mr. Nehru out either. He urged Mrs. Gandhi to carry this message back to Prime Minister Nehru and to give him the President's affectionate regards.

After pictures were taken, the President showed Mrs. Gandhi and the Ambassador the Rose Garden.

R. W. Komer

SECRET



~~SECRET~~

April 27, 1964

38a

*Indira*  
*Indira*  
*Verit*  
*(2)*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Your short session with Indira Gandhi (she goes on to tea with Mrs. Johnson) will still give time to read Nehru's letter and make one or two points.

A. She will be fascinated by your economic program, attack on poverty, civil rights drive, etc. Alluding to them will remind her that America is on the move.

B. But to avoid any impression you're preoccupied with domestic affairs, you might take polite exception to Indira's remark about US "favoritism toward Pakistan" on Kashmir (attached). Our only interest is in a peaceful settlement of the 17-year old issue, so both India and Pakistan can get on with their wars on poverty too. Nor does our current help to India jibe with such remarks. In fact the Paks are quite unhappy with our policy.

Indira is going straight back to India tonight, so can carry your good wishes to Nehru (her line is that he's much better but we think not, even though he's said he's going to annual Commonwealth Conference in July).

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *je*, NARA, Date *2-11-04*



# U.S. Losing India's Goodwill, Mrs. Gandhi Says

By ROBERT TRUMBULL

The United States is losing much goodwill in India because of Washington's "favoritism toward Pakistan" in India's dispute with that country over Kashmir, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, daughter and political confidant of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, said here yesterday.

"We have no doubt that if China should attack India again, Pakistan would attack too," she declared in an interview. Communist Chinese troops seized areas of Ladakh Province, in the Indian-controlled part of Kashmir, and part of India's northeastern frontier area in 1962 after a prolonged border dispute.

Mrs. Gandhi, a political confidant of her father, said that India had "definite" knowledge that Pakistan had assured the Chinese Communists that she would not take up arms against them. Pakistan would use arms supplied by the United States only "to hold the balance against India and not for containment of Communism," she asserted.

## Relations to Both Strained

United States relations with both India and Pakistan have suffered from time to time because of the animosity between those neighboring countries since they divided over the Hindu-Moslem religious issue in 1947, when the former British rulers departed.

India has repeatedly expressed concern over United States military aid to Pakistan and has decried Pakistan's membership in the Central Treaty Organization and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. American policy favoring a plebiscite in Kashmir, which Pakistan wants, has also irritated relations with New Delhi.

## Nehru's Daughter, Here for Fair, Sees 'Favoritism' to Pakistan on Kashmir

When Washington gave arms and other assistance to India to bolster her defense against the attacking Chinese, it was Pakistan's turn to complain that the United States was arming her enemy. It was during this period that Pakistan entered into warmer relations with Communist China.

## Border Accord Attacked

Mrs. Gandhi complained that Pakistan, which holds a third of Kashmir, had "handed large chunks of Kashmir to China" in a demarcation of borders in the area last year. Peking subsequently endorsed Pakistan's position on Kashmir.

"We feel that the West is on Pakistan's side no matter what," Mrs. Gandhi said.

Mrs. Gandhi has been mentioned as a possible successor to her ailing father. She was credited with doing much to revitalize the governing Congress party as its president in 1959 and 1960.

She is in New York to inaugurate the Indian Pavilion at the World's Fair.

"There can be no major change in India's policy on Kashmir," Mrs. Gandhi said. "The whole stability of India depends upon it. A change would mean that the Government, any government, would go out."

The Kashmir question has been before the United Nations Security Council since 1947, when India and Pakistan fought over the state.

Islamic Pakistan demands a plebiscite of the predominantly Moslem population. India con-

tends that the territory legally belongs to her because of an act of accession by its Maharaja, later approved by an assembly in the Indian-held part of the territory and written into its Constitution.

The state has been divided along an uneasy cease-fire line since the fighting was ended by a cease-fire arranged by the United Nations on Jan. 1, 1949.

Mrs. Gandhi took a reserved view of statements attributed to Sheik Mohammed Abdullah, the former Kashmiri Premier, who was released April 8 after 10 years' imprisonment, the last six on charges of conspiring against the state and collusion with Pakistan. Since his release he has been demanding that the state's future be settled by "self-determination of the people."

"It is better to wait to talk to him," Mrs. Gandhi said, alluding to the Sheik's plan to confer with Mr. Nehru in New Delhi next week. She suggested that some of his statements, interpreted as anti-Indian in New Delhi, might have been reported "out of context."

Mrs. Gandhi declined to comment on possible successors to her father, whose activities have been curtailed since he suffered a stroke in January.

"For years," she said, "my father has been trying to distribute responsibility. He has always tried to consider a large area of opinion, for which he has sometimes been criticized."

Mrs. Gandhi said that the Indian Government's main interest was in "making a success of democracy."

India's progress under a democratic system will affect all of South and Southeast Asia, she declared. "If we fail, there is no doubt that many will look for another method," she said.



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Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 25, # 38

By jc NARA. Date 2-11-04

380

*file*  
*India*  
*X Soules*

~~SECRET~~

VIA CLASSIFIED POUCH  
EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR

April 24, 1964

Dear Chet:

I'm concerned by a number of developments, or the lack of them, which have tended to cloud the highly favorable atmosphere upon your departure.

First is the lack, to my knowledge, of a major effort to get across to the GOI as yet about the grossly inflated size of their five-year plan. Any program of this magnitude would inevitably be at the expense of economic development and we've got to get across as soon as possible that this would be robbing Peter to pay Paul. AID is quite unhappy, and will become more so when the extent of diversion contemplated sinks in. Moreover, pressure against undue diversion of foreign exchange from the development program is a good indirect means of getting the Indians to focus on the need to cut down their elaborate hardware demands, especially in the air defense field.

Chavan's visit and then TTK's will simply be a flop if we have to spend all our time pressing them to squeeze the water out of their plan. If we let this issue become later a major bone of contention between the US and India it will do neither country any good. By all odds the best thing, therefore, is to get the Indian Finance Ministry to do our dirty work for us. We're relying on you for this.

I don't know what you did to General Adams (all to the good nonetheless), but it's highly premature to start plugging 104s. We barely got an F6A plus HF-24 engine program going, with a few squadrons of F5s as a possible alternative, when you come back changing the bidding again. Mind you, I think it makes political sense to give India 104s if necessary, but this must emerge as the logical outcome of a prolonged discussion in which we successively discard other options. Again, we here have seen nothing firm about whether you have ever even tried out the original package on the Indians yet.

I hate to badger you like this, but we scored rather a breakthrough when you were here and it's dangerous to attempt to improve on what we got without even trying it out. As I know you realize, there are strong suspicions here that indeed you did try out the package and got nowhere, so are coming back for more. If this is the case, tell us so because only if you tried and failed will we be able to argue effectively for trying something else.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

I've just heard you have the amoebic bug. All best wishes for a quick recovery. It's also best for cosmetic reasons that you postpone your return in May as late as possible.

Meanwhile, do try to warn off Chavan and others from coming with any exaggerated expectations of the US cornucopia. Big ideas which are then disappointed will only set back our Indian enterprise at a time when we finally got it moving forward again.

Once again my apologies for these admonitory words. But you know they come from a friend. All the best for an early recovery.

Sincerely,

R. W. Komer

The Honorable  
Chester Bowles  
U.S. Ambassador  
New Delhi, India

P.S. Since writing this, I just saw your talk with TTK.  
Good stuff!

*cc: Mr. G. Bundy*

~~SECRET~~



SECRET

April 22, 1964

39

*Indira*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Bundy and I join State in strongly recommending that you see Nehru's daughter Indira Gandhi for at least a few minutes. We've been valiantly keeping Indians off your calendar for months now, and they're beginning to get edgy.

Also, Indira is a special case. Though out of government now, taking care of her father, she's a political wheel in her own right and could well be the next foreign minister or even PM. She also has a message to you from Nehru.

Mrs. Johnson is seeing her at 11:00 a.m. Monday. We could bring Indira to your office first to deliver her letter, and then take her right over to the Mansion.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

R. W. Komer

Attach. Read/Bundy Memo dtd 4/21/64, subj.  
Apptmt w/Pres. SECRET  
for Mrs. Indira Gandhi

*Cy to Mrs. Abele*

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *je*, NARA, Date *2-11-04*

SECRET

April 20, 1964

Mac -

If Humphrey hasn't hit LBJ yet, attached seems a useful precaution.

RWK

RWK Memo to President dtd 4/20/64 subj.  
on Ghosh proposal

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 2-11-04

40  
File  
India  
(Shook)



40a  
~~SECRET~~

April 20, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You may be hit by Humphrey or Cooper on a proposal by Indian Senator Sudhir Ghosh for a joint US/Soviet statement favoring a Pak/India settlement.

Ghosh proposes that the US and USSR jointly appeal for a peaceful settlement of Indo/Pak differences, and offer to associate themselves with and guarantee any deal which is reached. He got what he claims was a positive reaction from Gromyko in Moscow.

We'd urge a non-committal response. Ghosh is a great self-promotor who is speaking only for himself not the Indian Government. Though superficially attractive, the idea wouldn't actually move things along very much, while the appearance of US/Soviet collusion would be highly offensive to the Paks. And we don't think the Soviets would help much in settling Kashmir--they much prefer the issue. So we're inclined to see the Soviets as merely trying to put the onus for refusal on us.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 2-11-04

~~SECRET~~

April 16, 1964

Mac -

Ghosh proposal for joint US/USSR statement may just get some steam behind it. Ghosh called to say Cooper and Humphrey asked Ghosh to stay on a few days because they're interested in his project. Also, Mundt has written Fulbright suggesting his committee ask Rusk up informally to discuss Ghosh proposal. Ghosh further claims Stevenson likes the idea (they talked in New York). Ghosh is going back through Moscow too (and will no doubt expand polite interest into US receptivity).

There might just be something in new Ghosh idea. Take a look at my 8 April memo.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 2-11-04



CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR

April 14, 1964

THE PRESIDENT

I urge you do find a moment for Mrs. Gandhi. She'd bring the Ambassador here along, but she's more worth listening to on Indian domestic politics.

Alternatively, Mrs. Johnson could invite Mrs. Gandhi (who is out of government now) for tea, and you could drop in.

R. W. Komer

CONFIDENTIAL

Att: Memo for President from  
George Ball, 4/11/64 re:  
Appointment for Prime  
Minister Nehru's Daughter.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 2-11-04

43

~~SECRET~~

*[Handwritten signature]*

April 13, 1964/11:00 am

25X1A



TO DELHI FOR BOWLES FROM BUNDY

Lewis idea a very good one. Unfortunately, there overriding need for him here till January, because he's key man on wage-price guidelines. No chance of breaking him loose. If you can wait till February that may be another matter, but Komer and I suggest going ahead on Killen. Sorry.

*[Handwritten: Proposed by Bundy]*

SANTIZED

Authority NW-032-023-001/4

By jc NARA, Date 3-2-04



SECRET

44  
File  
India  
April 8, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

The peripatetic Sudhir Ghosh came in today about his latest project. He now proposes that the US and USSR issue a joint statement (text attached) calling for restoration of an atmosphere conducive to a peaceful settlement of all Pak/Indian differences, including Kashmir. The US and USSR would further appeal to India and Pakistan to enter into direct negotiations to this end, and would offer to guarantee any settlement arrived at.

This time Mr. Ghosh went to Moscow first. He talked with Gromyko and Kuznetsov (memcon attached). Gromyko implied that the USSR could accept his proposal and suggested that he try it out in Washington; however, Gromyko felt there was no chance we'd agree to it. Incidentally, Gromyko rejected as infeasible the Ghosh proposal of last year for a joint US/USSR statement calling on China and India to compose their differences without war, on the grounds that it wasn't feasible in the present delicate state of Sino-Soviet relations.

The virtue of his new proposal, Ghosh said, lay in the obligation Mr. Nehru felt to consult the USSR on any Kashmir settlement. After all, the USSR had fully supported the Indian position, not only through vetoes in the UN but even going so far as to argue that the Pak-held portions of Kashmir should be restored to India. For these reasons Nehru felt he had to seek Soviet support of any settlement; Nehru also thought Soviets might be unwilling to back down from favoring India whole hog (since they're more interested in the issue than a settlement). Therefore, Ghosh argues, his proposed joint US/USSR statement would demonstrate to Nehru that the Soviets would in fact buy any negotiated settlement which could be worked out.

Ghosh had already shown his proposed statement to Senators Humphrey and Sparkman. According to Ghosh, they said they liked it and suggested that he take it up with Fulbright as well. They also said that they'd talk with the President about it.

I confined myself to saying that we'd take a hard look at his proposal, which seemed "interesting."

Ghosh then explained, with the aid of a map, his ideas on a Kashmir settlement, essentially partition along the present cease-fire line with certain "adjustments" in favor of Pakistan. He said that since Nehru had

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By           , NARA, Date 2-11-07

SECRET

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2.

publicly agreed to such a solution, it should be possible to hold him to his word (Ghosh was quite frank in describing Nehru as the chief obstacle to a settlement). Ghosh's idea of partition gave the Paks several enclaves, such as Punch and the area northwest of Wular Lake, including the headwaters of the Jhelum (as I recall it was less generous than the concessions Galbraith thought at one point India might make).

Ghosh made much of his role as an unofficial diplomat with full access to all important people in India, Britain, the US, and USSR. He dropped more names in the course of 45 minutes than I could have read in the same period in Who's Who. This made it easier to give him a friendly, if non-committal, hearing--I simply couldn't get much of a word in edgewise.

R. W. Komer

McSB  
Talcott



~~SECRET~~

April 3, 1964

45  
*India*

Mac -

Old "never say die" Linder went hard at McNamara on arms credits. Latter finally promised he'd turn over \$70 million of Austrian and Australian deals (since these were at zero interest Bob told Kuss to reprice them lower to absorb Harold's interest charge). It's a great world if you're willing to operate.

LBJ was quite sympathetic to Bowles pitch on rupees. I'll clue Crockett. President was happy Chet is happy, and we have managed to move a few things along.

RWK

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *2-11-04*

~~SECRET~~

46  
March 30, 1964  
*India*  
*Bowles*

Mac -

As background for dinner with Bowles, read status report I had prepared for LBJ/Bowles talk.

In two hours with Chet, who's in good spirits, I urged following injunctions for his talks with LBJ, Rusk, and McNamara: (1) stress the critical importance of the succession crisis in India--this makes 1964 a year of great risk as well as opportunity; (2) while India is so weak and Nehru still alive, no Kashmir solution is possible--therefore, our tactic must be to buy time; (3) do not talk Pakistan; and (4) don't ask for more aid that we can't give you just now.

I told Chet he'd make the best impression on the President if he stressed he was asking for nothing.

As I see it, the optimum we can get out of Chet's visit is (1) necessary laying on of hands; (2) some kind of tentative package to counter MIG deal--we're currently thinking of a new UK engine for HF-24 plus some 75 Navy surplus interceptors which we could give or sell cheaply and which, though not supersonic, would meet Indian needs; (3) some kind of standstill strategy on Kashmir, to signal the Paks that we won't join them in leaning on India this year; and (4) some forward movement on Chet's cherished bi-national foundation. I've been pushing latter hard on grounds that it costs us nothing and has real possibilities.

Chet regards us as his best friends in the Establishment (he's right). But he deserves more than sympathy; in the larger sense his prescription for our Indian policy is the right one--the trouble is that his timing is off, in terms of Washington receptivity. Yet to the extent that he can educate the top echelon to the importance of our Indian and Pak affairs, his trip should be a net plus.

RWK

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *g/p*, NARA, Date *2-11-04*

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Mac -

March 27, 1964

Suggest we pouch attached as a good way of gently cluing LBJ for Bowles encounter. I've deliberately kept number of cables to minimum.

I've arranged for a more detailed list of items Chet will raise, which we can give LBJ (with brief comment) the night before.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

47  
India  
X Bowles

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 2-11-07

47a  
~~SECRET~~

March 27, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Here are a few key cables which give useful background for your chat with Bowles next week.

Shastri (Tab A) will probably replace Nehru, who seems on his last legs. On present billing, Shastri is sensible and moderate. His advent will no doubt mean the effective end of Menonism as a political force. Thus, once the succession has taken place we'll probably be dealing with a more reasonable Indian Government, even on Kashmir.

Tab B is a savvy analysis of India/Pak by Talbot, who's just back from the area too. Bundy and I find it generally persuasive, except on how to handle the Paks. Both of us favor keeping up the cool treatment a bit longer, in order to make sure we really are bringing Ayub around.

We'll arm you with an agenda of points Bowles will raise. Though he's really coming back chiefly to be reassured he's your Ambassador, his visit may be a good occasion to move forward some policy matters too.

I might add that, even though Bowles keeps asking more than traffic will bear from Washington, he's doing a whale of a sales job in India. Would that we had more such live wires abroad.

R. W. Komer

Att: New Delhi 2819, 3/25  
London 4705, 3/25

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By *gpc*, NARA, Date 2-1-01

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

March 25, 1964

Mac -

Dillon may call you this afternoon on perennial problem of loosening up Ex-Im to handle arms credits.

At State/DOD urging Dillon tried to sell Linder, but Harold is still balking. Dillon simply wants WH blessing to go back at Linder.

Immediate issues are arms credits for Saudi Arabian jets and various sales to India. Since \$50 million MAP ceiling won't meet Indian needs, we favor using credit route (this also helps to blank out Sovs). Behind these two issues is larger one of freeing up Ex-Im money. I'm sure you will say the right thing.

RWK

Attach. Grant Memo for Komer dtd 3/25/64

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 2-11-01

SECRET

March 20, 1964

49  
India

Peter -

Many thanks for attached. Since the CP seems to be coming back in Kerala and may again capture the state in next election, I've suggested to [REDACTED] another look at this matter. My thought is of course that the Agency might want to put a proposition up to State and the Group.

25X1

RWK

25X1C

[REDACTED]

SANITIZED

Authority NLS-032-023-001/5

By je NARA, Date 3-2-04



~~SECRET~~

March 11, 1964

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I wish you'd look at this file. Chester Bowles is most anxious to come back briefly to touch base with you, Rusk, and McNamara. As you know, Bowles sees big things as cooking in India/Pakistan and reportedly feels the top echelon in State is not paying enough attention to his repeated warnings. Komer, who watches these matters closely for us, thinks he's more right than wrong.

You'll see that we tried pointedly to sidetrack Bowles, but didn't succeed. Our own instinct is still to keep him on the job, although if you would like to have a top level review of Indian policy it would be useful to call him back.

Bowles also poses a bit of a morale problem, largely of his own making. He's obviously worried as to his standing back here. Since he's done a good defensive job and is probably the best man we could have in India now, we might cheer him up by a message from you if you don't want him back just now.

McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Hr. 11-2-78  
By jd/isp NARA. Date 2-11-04

61  
~~HN~~  
Mc GB

Mac - Delhi 2644 and Bowles private wire on Kashmir are genuinely compelling. Suggest we at least send them to LBJ per attached. They're good reading (briefer than most) and will help prep LBJ for Chet if he comes back.

Judva  
x Bowles

RWK

Alice-pls attach today's private wire

3/10/64



51a  
SECRET

March 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached two cables from Bowles are worth reading. He fears (as many do here) that we're heading into a Kashmir crisis which (a) won't force a settlement but merely set Paks and Indians at each other's throats again; (b) will catch us in the middle, blamed on both sides, while only the Soviets gain; and (c) will strengthen left-wing Menonite forces in India, while smothering the more positive post-Nehru leaders who might be constructive on Kashmir.

The problem is how to convince Ayub that all Hindus aren't the same, and that a conciliatory line would achieve more than constant pressure. The Paks have been burned on this before. Nonetheless, leaning on India is surely futile, whereas the Bowles approach might offer at least a chance of a settlement over time.

R. W. KOMER

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 00-288 (#153)  
By jc/crm NARA, Date 2-11-04

SECRET

March 10, 1964

52  
India  
Bowles  
X

Mac -

It's a pity Chet can't take a clear hint. If he'd read our cable he'd realize there's little possibility of getting "better idea of what people in Washington are planning, saying and thinking."

So real risk is he'll go back more unhappy than before, even if he gets high level message. On other hand, just possible his presence might force ideas he's so repeatedly (and cogently) argued by cable on people who seemingly haven't read them (especially 7th Floor in State, which simply hasn't reacted at all). You're a better judge here than I, but I'd suggest two options:

1. Tell Chet bluntly it would be mistake to come.
2. Show LBJ exchange of cables, perhaps saying Chet's presence might just galvanize State and DOD, which have ignored his concerns.

RWK

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By pc/ag, NARA, Date 2-1-04



~~SECRET~~

March 9, 1964/2:45 pm

25X1A  
*Lucy  
Bowles*

EYES ONLY FOR BOWLES FROM BUNDY

Just wrote you long letter which must have crossed your cable. We've talked with President, who always happy to see you but inclined to think it more important you be johnny-on-the spot during these trying days in Delhi.

Komer and I feel strongly that personally convincing President and others of merits your case is the lesser problem. Your eloquent cables have more than served here. But we do not see any far-reaching decisions on Kashmir, aid to India, or pre-empting Soviets being made quite yet, and frankly doubt whether your return just now would prove especially satisfying. Better to wait until things get further sorted out here. Preferable timing might be just before TTK comes.

Hate to reply in such disappointing fashion, and your judgment should be controlling. But when all is said and done I think you realize that this is not yet a time for major new movement forward, when many other problems necessarily take precedence in an election year.

*Drafted by  
RWR*

Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : NLJ-032-023-1-6-7

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ-032-023-001/6By J NARA, Date 3-2-09

SECRET

54  
India  
x Pak  
File  
March 6, 1964

Mac -

Tom Hughes is back from a few weeks in India/Pakistan with some worrisome news. He says the dominant mood in Karachi is one of elation. The Paks see themselves as having achieved considerable success in leaning on both Delhi and Washington and in whomping up Kashmir (using the China gambit). They see the communal disturbances, especially in Kashmir, ~~are~~<sup>are</sup> going exactly their way. Some even see the possibility that they and the Chicoms together can bring about the dismemberment of India. Their SC effort is designed to keep the Kashmir pot boiling. In fact, Ayub just told McConaughy (Karachi 1654) they will keep pressing Kashmir relentlessly until they get a settlement. When I countered that our failure to move on MAP must be disconcerting, Tom said that the Paks mentioned this but obviously felt that their success in getting us to stall on MAP for India was far more important. They credited Washington's uncertain stance on MAP for India in the last several months to their own policy of agitation.

Tom found the Paks admirably frank. They acknowledged that their utter dependence on us sets limits of tolerance beyond which they cannot go (exactly what Ayub admitted in that famous 1962 secret speech). Even while Chou was there last month Ayub publicly acknowledged Pakistan's need to adhere to SEATO and CENTO, which adds up to the same thing. But the Paks are very pleased that our limits seem so flexible, and will stretch them as far as they can. Many are frankly non-plussed as to why we haven't caught them up short before. The lesson for us is obvious.

Incidentally, Tom is convinced the Paks will not give us the Peshawar extension unless we make quite a to-do about it. However, he emphatically agrees that we should keep asking, because if they turn us down on the extension they will at least be more willing to renew our existing title. But he emphatically argues against offering more baksheesh (the usual Pentagon/CIA gambit); this merely convinces the Paks they've got us where they want us.

In contrast, India is a mess. Tom found Delhi wallowing in self-pity. Indians were moaning how we had missed a great opportunity in not continuing to support them against China. Now things had slid back to normal, and the Paks ~~were~~ only being encouraged by our failure to take a firm stand. The Indians are acutely conscious of their own

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

SECRET

By CTS  
NARA, Date 4/17/19  
100-44-118-0322-23-1-5



SECRET

- 2 -

weakness at this moment; the government seems rudderless and there is great jockeying for the succession. The shock effect of the Chicom attack is wearing off. Though consciousness of the longer-term threat remains (and M. J. Desai at least is talking of a time of maximum risk in 1966-67 when Chicoms complete their roads to Lhasa and on to Katmandu), Tom feels pessimistically that India is slipping down into the doldrums.

The Indians are also terribly conscious of their eroding international position. Especially with Nehru's passing, India will no longer be the No. 1 neutralist; Nasser, Sukarno, and others are already seeking Nehru's mantle. Meanwhile, the Indians are most chagrined by the success of Chicom and Pak diplomacy among the non-aligned, where India formerly reigned supreme.

The Hughes report, even allowing for exaggeration, adds up to a picture of India in disarray, Pakistan off on a dangerous tangent, and the prospect of a big Kashmir crisis sometime this year. The tragedy is that this will not resolve the issue but make it worse. Moreover, it will play into the hands of the Soviets, who can again come to India's support in contrast to us. In fact, a Kashmir crisis could thoroughly disenchant US opinion, leading to a "plague on both your houses" attitude on aid. In effect, we're not doing as well as we hoped in bringing Ayub around with the cold shoulder treatment, while we've lost more momentum than we may have realized with India. Even more serious, Pak and Chicom pressures on an India in disarray may increase dangerously divisive communal tendencies. A deep political crisis is not inconceivable.

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All this adds up to a grim prospect, and an urgent need. Despite the pressure of other issues, it's quite important not to let US/Indian relations slip back into the status quo ante or to interrupt the necessary readjustment of US/Pak relationships to a more viable long term basis. The two immediate issues before us are: (1) how do we handle Pakistan's renewed Kashmir complaint in the SC; and (2) how do we use our five year MAP carrots in such a way as to get more political mileage out of India and more response from the Paks.

SECRET



SECRET

- 3 -

However slim our resources of preventive diplomacy, we must try to defuse Kashmir for 1964 at least, both to avoid another mess on our plate and to lay a groundwork for moving toward settlement, not conflict. So we need to turn aside the Pak gambit in the SC, as a clear signal to Ayub that we won't dance to his tune. We told him that going to the SC again just now was utterly non-productive, and we have solid evidence he knows it. But he'll keep pressing until we call him off by telling him we'll abstain if he insists on a resolution. However, our UN people will never do this (since we'd be accused of not standing by the previous resolutions) unless they're told.

Second, and even more important, we've got to apply the brakes to Ayub. If after all the reassurances we've given him, we now simply dangle a 5-year MAP carrot before his nose without making clear the price, it will simply confirm his feeling he's got us on the run. And if our policy (or lack of one) thus leads Ayub to speed up, rather than slow down, his pressure on India and us, we'll be on a direct collision course which will set us back years with both India and Pakistan.

In short, I see a hard line with Ayub as the best way to preserve our Pak alliance, and ambivalence as the best way to sacrifice it sooner or later. If Ayub knows full well that there are limits of US tolerance beyond which he cannot go (because of his great dependence on us), our best tack now is to set out these limits coldly and firmly to him. I'd even urge inviting Ayub here for the purpose, if I were confident that we'd really carry out this scenario. But we've never really been up to this. I recall JFK's September comment that "we're being too apologetic with Ayub, aren't we?".

The alternative would be to have Talbot, who talks with Ayub Wednesday, tell him summarily that: (a) if he pushes Kashmir to the point of conflict, we won't be with him; (b) we think his fundamental strategy of leaning on India, and using China to coerce her, is sheer folly--it will lose Kashmir rather than get it; and (c) Pakistan is going to have to choose between playing ball with us and a sharp deterioration in our relationship. Using our five-year MAP as bait gives us the necessary carrot along with the stick.

How to handle Delhi is more of a puzzler, simply because there isn't much of a government on which to operate. But we ought to try in every way to convince Delhi that a strategy of ignoring Pakistan or retaliating against it simply plays into Chinese hands. The time is far from ripe for Kashmir mediation; yet if only we could achieve some

SECRET



~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

clearing of the atmosphere, it would help create the preconditions for a subsequent mediation or acceptance on both sides of an internally generated movement for autonomy in Kashmir itself.

With Talbot due in Pakistan and Bhutto due back in New York, the time is now for a US push along the above lines. But I doubt that we will seize the nettle. I'm just not sanguine on the prospects of getting the subcontinent back on center stage, no matter how much more important it is in any long-term calculation than most other Afro-Asian problems. Yet without some kind of high level prod, we won't grab this ball, and the chance will pass.

RWK

cc: Gov. Hariman

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Governor,

March 6, 1964

Attached is personal for you only, but I want to pass on my fear we're at a critical juncture in Pak/Indian affairs. Grant will be bringing you a draft instruction for Talbot's pitch to Ayub shortly, which is so feeble that I fear it will only convince Ayub he's taking us, rather than helping bring him around.

I'm also much concerned lest the Paks drag us along in the SC again; if they force us to back a resolution we'll gain nothing while the Sovs make hay with India by vetoing it. Perhaps we could talk about these matters tomorrow.

RWK

Att-RWK memo to the SB, 3/6/64.  
re India Pak.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 2-11-04



56  
India  
Bowles  
+  
March 4, 1964

Dear Mr. Voorhis:

The President has passed to me your letter of 24 February on freeing up our rupee reserves in ways which will help India. I can assure you that we are doing everything we can to support Ambassador Bowles' efforts and to assure India's development as a strong democratic power. The sheer size of our economic, and now military aid to India speaks for itself.

As to the rupee problem, we have several agencies now working on the Bowles proposals for putting part of our large stock of rupees to work in non-inflationary ways. We realize their potential for making our program in India more imaginative and flexible and we already have promising projects on the drawing board. However, we have found that the Presidential waiver authority is not as elastic as might have been thought. Moreover, the Congress has always preferred, as I understand it, that such foreign currencies be appropriated according to regular procedures which have been set up for this purpose. The Congress has rarely, if ever, rejected sensible proposals for the use of such currencies, so we expect to go forward through the regular appropriations channel. The important thing is the result, rather than the method, as I'm sure you'll agree.

We appreciate your strong interest in India and the effective work The Cooperative League and other private organizations are doing there to further American and humanitarian interests.

Sincerely,

Mr. Jerry Voorhis  
Executive Director  
The Cooperative League of the USA  
59 East Van Buren Street  
Chicago 5, Illinois

R. W. Komer

cc: Mr. David E. Bell, Administrator, AID  
Hon. Chester Bowles, US Ambassador to India

57/ India <sup>file</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

RWK:

February 28, 1964

Action on Bowles' proposal to send surplus stockpile metals to India shapes up this way:

1. BOB is still working out its position. (Stockpile policy is so complex that 3 divisions are involved.) Staff says Bowles' idea doesn't make much sense judged purely from the stockpile policy point of view but could probably be worked out if foreign policy justification is strong enough.

2. So next step is to find out how far State and AID will back Bowles. They agree that this makes economic development sense; they're not sure it makes sense in terms of US domestic policy. If they decide to push it, BOB is willing to explore strategems for getting congressional approval.

3. We'll have to check with OEP lawyers, but BOB doubts it would be worth trying to work Bowles' idea out under the current legislation. (Three separate laws govern three separate stockpiles, and different congressional committees control each. Only one law permits disposal without specific congressional approval, and there's some question whether sale for blocked foreign currency would satisfy its requirements.) However, Symington now has a bill in the works to consolidate stockpile surplus disposal policy. If it goes through, we could fit in Bowles' idea in several different ways. (BOB, State and OEP would have to devise best congressional tactics.)

It's still too early for you to weigh in. Needless to say, this is unbelievably complex, and working it out will take some time. But there is some possibility of movement IF State-AID are willing to push it. I'll keep you posted. At an appropriate time, if you want to drop Bowles a progress report on this and rupee proposal to show you're backing him, I'll draft you a couple of paragraphs.

HHS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 2-11-04

CONFIDENTIAL



58  
file  
India

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RWK:

February 28, 1964

Response to Bowles' proposals for spending US-Use Rupees has been pretty negative, but there is one big ray of hope--a binational cultural foundation endowed with as much as \$500 million in rupees. This would include at least two of Bowles' proposals (English teaching and binational center). AID is willing to put a senior man on this full time and I said we would help however we can (AID is talking about getting together an advisory board under somebody like Conant).

The only other possibility is using some rupees to increase travel and other administrative funds. Crockett is still exploring this but he wants to look at all seven excess-currency countries together so it will be a couple of weeks before we know how he comes out.

As for Bowles' other suggestions, USIA feels it's running an optimum program now. Its book program is as large as Indian distributors can handle. It feels a large library building program is unrealistic without supporting dollars; besides Congress would hit the ceiling. CU says there's no point bringing more Indian students to the US because dollar scholarships just aren't available. Peace Corps might use a few rupees but isn't excited because it has enough money of its own (see attached draft--now abandoned--for details).

Grant held a meeting Wednesday to sort out agency responses. Since we need more time for staffing, he'll probably suggest that Rusk send Bowles an interim reply to keep him happy. If you want to weigh in, you could tell Grant you are disappointed to hear about the generally negative response but hope we can at least pull the foundation and increased administrative funds out of the fire. You might volunteer to push the foundation if needed. One problem we have to keep in mind is that Bowles probably hasn't staffed out these proposals carefully. He may even have twisted a few arms to get country team coordination. For instance, his USIS chief signed on but USIA here says USIS hasn't even used the money it has now for the book program. Also your friend, Zagorin, isn't sure we should be in a hurry to spend all our rupees. Should PL-480 peter out in 5-10 years, we would have to terminate programs that depend on rupees (the foundation idea is flexible on this point because we could make it as large or small as we want).

HHS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



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*India*  
*X India Map*

*59*

MEMORANDUM FOR BILL BUNDY

February 27, 1964

The President has read Delhi 2457 and is concerned by Bowles' point about how the Soviets are moving in on the Indian military establishment. At the same time we here feel, as I'm sure you do, that the Bowles idea of giving SAMs to India is out (a few supersonics would be difficult enough).

By all odds the best ploy, both to limit or if possible squelch a MIG deal and to reduce any likely demands on us, seems to be the HF-24. An additional virtue in Indian eyes would be that it's a homegrown product. As to the Paks, all concerned seem to feel that in this particular case they wouldn't be too concerned over such a marginal Indian fighter.

But holding up any move on the HF-24 is the old problem of the Orpheus XII engine. We were ready enough to help finance this in mid-1962 when we were trying to block the original MIG deal. Now why shouldn't we exert maximum pressure on the UK to go ahead on its own?

Phil Hilbert tells me that for under \$1 million or so Bristol could put two engines in flyable condition for a test. Bristol is reluctant to do so until the question of the up to \$20 million for further development and tooling up is resolved. But HMC certainly ought to be able to put the blocks to Bristol (I note Gore Booth is also pressing the HF-24 idea). Peter Solbert too is sympathetic.

The potential gains here are so great compared to the minor sums involved that we ought to really push. Time may be of the essence, since the GOI is apparently making up its mind about MIGs. But what seems needed most is a good high level prod to the UK. Inertia on all sides seems to be the enemy. What say?

R. W. Komer

cc: McGeorge Bundy  
Alex Johnson  
*Peter Solbert*  
*James Brant*

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *g*, NARA, Date *2-11-01*



~~SECRET~~

February 25, 1964

*File*  
*India*  
*7 PB*  
*60*

Mac:

PG lunch today focussed exclusively on Indian economic problem. India's economic growth is slowing badly. However, decline of Nehru is bringing more conservative Congress leaders to the fore, and they (Shastri, TTK, etc.) are more likely to free up the private sector, which we see as the best hope for accelerating economic growth.

In the past we have essentially provided external capital to be used in the way the Indian planners wanted. Now Indians may be more receptive to sensible economic advice. Bowles is out in front on this one; part of the problem is inertia in AID.

RWK

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *je*, NARA, Date *2-11-04*

~~SECRET~~

India + Bowles  
February 24, 1964 61

McGB -

Francis Pickens Miller, grand old man of the anti-Byrd Virginia Democrats, is just back from Delhi. He came over urgently to say that Bowles is in a very depressed frame of mind. Bowles feels strongly (as one can see from recent cables) that our Indian affairs are going badly and that we are not doing much about them. He's also frustrated because State doesn't seem to answer his mail (a fair hit). Miller fears that Bowles may resign, and urges that the President call him back for the LBJ treatment.

Of course, Chet is a special problem, and there isn't a great deal we can or should do. He just doesn't seem to grasp that even maintaining existing programs is a lot--a cool \$450 million in economic aid and \$50 million in MAP. Nonetheless, he's a distinct asset where he is. If Chet in his frustration becomes seriously disaffected, it would be bad for several reasons: (1) he's precisely the kind of "soft" ambassador we need in Delhi at a time when there is not much new that we can do for India--and his leaving would be misread by the Indians; (2) I see no suitable replacement before November; and (3) it certainly wouldn't help with the liberal Democrats for one of their heroes to resign before the election; the obvious inference would be that Chet lacked confidence in LBJ or vice versa--either way it would be bad.

The President wrote Chet on 21 January in an effort to keep him happy. I doubt that he need call back Bowles for a laying on of hands (he's due back in June as is). But I do think he'd agree we ought to study how to keep Bowles happy within reason. I've been doing what I can; how about attached letter from you? A little soft soap goes a long way with Chet.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *jalrg*, NARA, Date *2-1-04*



~~SECRET~~/DRAFT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 00-288 (\*15/00)  
By jc/om NARA. Date 2-1-04

Dear Chet:

We here have reacted with lively sympathy to your paeans of woe from Delhi, and have been doing all we can to help.

For what it's worth, my feeling (and Bob Komer's too) is that we're the victims of an inevitable falling off in US/Indian relations from the high point of Winter 1962. There's no use blaming ourselves unduly that neither Washington nor Delhi can sustain the high pitch of collaboration which emerged from the Chicom attack. True, we've had trouble on our side sustaining the momentum of our relationship, but the Indian slate is by no means clean either. VOA was a fiasco, Bokaro failed at least partly because of Indian stickiness, and Delhi's handling of its military program has been so tediously slow as to damp much of our enthusiasm here. These are facts with which we must live.

As I see it we're also going through the painful transition of disengaging from the out-and-out pro-Pak policy of the 1950s, and shifting to one more consonant with our real strategic interests in both parties. This is not an easy process at best, and I must say that neither our Pak nor our Indian friends make it any easier.

Of one thing you may be sure--the President too sees your problem with lively sympathy. Our experience with him to date should lay to rest any unfounded Indian (or Pak) suspicions that he sees matters differently from his predecessor. His authorization of five-year approaches (which

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marks much more of a departure in the case of India than in that of Pakistan) is ample evidence of this fact.

But you in turn will understand that the Hill revolt on aid is critical. The President cannot expose his flank right now by promising amounts on which he may be unable to perform. I'm sure you realize this. And I know from what he's said that he counts on you to get this across in Delhi as no one else really could .

In a broader frame, we're still in the transition period from one Administration to another. It has problems for all of us, not least the President, who on top of the tax cut and civil rights must now contend with the ridiculous assertion that he's responsible for every minor league flap that arises to plague us. It's an election year.

From where I sit, however, there's a lot more smoke than fire. With the election not far off, and the moratorium on politics long since over, we're going to have to steel ourselves for a lot worse. If we're a little slow in answering your mail or in responding to the wisdom you so eloquently purvey, bear with us. Once every four years Washington is the firing line and we're going to have to get through November before we can turn as fully to our foreign concerns as our far-flung viceroys would like. So be of good cheer.



file  
62 India

~~SECRET~~

Mac -

February 24, 1964

Attached doesn't call for any action, but is rather part of continuing education of the President on Pak/Indian realities (on which we've done pretty well so far).

We have some problems looming here over the next several months (Kashmir, MAP aid and supersonics, Sino/Pak shenanigans), so my sense is that we ought gradually to acclimate LBJ to them.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

Att: RWK Memo to the President, 2/24/64  
re India/Pak/Map

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 2-11-04

63  
file

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

February 24, 1964

THE PRESIDENT

You'll want to read attached two cables from Bowles. Despite his wordiness, they bring into sharp relief how our India affairs are sliding backwards from the high point reached as a result of our vigorous response to the Chicom attack in October 1962. This trend is largely inevitable, as the Chicom attack recedes into the background and the more normal factors which plague our relations--Indo/Pak acrimony over Kashmir, Indian non-alignment, etc.--assume their usual place. But as Bowles points out, it is costing us.

The Soviets faltered when Peiping attacked India, while we responded magnificently. But as the Sino-Soviet split widens, Moscow has been making up for lost time. Delhi 2457 makes patently clear that Soviets are now doing more than we to woo the Indian military establishment. Meanwhile, our Pak friends are doing their best to prove their thesis that India isn't serious about China, by forcing India to focus on Pak/Indian issues. The more they distract Delhi from Peking the more they hurt us.

This is not a trend likely to create great complications for us this year, or maybe next. Only if the Paks press Kashmir to the point of open violence is a crisis likely. But it is a trend of great long term significance. India, as the largest and potentially most powerful non-Communist Asian nation, is in fact the major prize for which we, the Soviets, and Chicoms are competing in Asia.

We have already invested \$4.7 billion in the long-term economic buildup of a hopefully democratic power. But our politico-military policy has never been consonant with the size of our economic investment, partly because Pakistan (in one of the shrewdest moves ever made by a less-developed country) signed two alliances with us as a means of reinsurance against India. For this Pakistan has gotten some \$700 million in US military aid, all of which has in fact gone to protect it against India. We can and should protect Pakistan against India, but we cannot permit our ties to stand in the way of a rational Indian policy. This just permits the tail to wag the dog.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 2-11-04

~~SECRET~~



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- 2 -

With India heading into a succession crisis, we have to watch our step. If India falls apart we are the losers. If India goes Communist, it will be a disaster comparable only to the loss of China. Even if India reverts to pro-Soviet neutralism, our policy in Asia will be compromised. These risks are not just Bowlesian hyperbole; and if they prove real, Pakistan loses as well.

As you know, we here don't buy all the Bowles solutions. However, we do feel he makes strategic sense.

R. W. Komer

*Att: New Delhi 2445, 2/20/64  
New Delhi 2457, 2/20/64*

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

64  
file  
India  
Bowles

February 21, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

*Thompson's* Col. Francis Pickens Miller came in to see me today at Jim Grant's suggestion. He's just back from an inspection of CU affairs in Karachi, but he stopped in New Delhi to see Bowles on the way.

He found Chet in a very negative frame of mind about his role in the Johnson administration. Distance has dimmed his perception of the magnitude of the aid fight here, and he's apparently blaming declining aid appropriations on LBJ's lack of interest. He sees similar indications of disinterest in the delay in approving his proposal for a long-range MAP in India. Where's he felt he had JFK's support, he fears LBJ is cool.

I explained that neither JFK nor LBJ could give Bowles all he wants; money is too scarce. I also explained that Chet arrived in India just as US-Indian relations were settling back to normal after the sudden rush into each other's arms following the Chicom attack. So it's natural for Bowles to feel a bit discouraged.

Col. Miller felt it imperative that LBJ act now to bring Bowles into the fold. He thought this important in winning intellectual Democratic votes next fall. He also felt it important in keeping Bowles on the job in New Delhi where he's the best man we could find. He recommended calling Bowles back in March for a face-to-face reassurance of support.

I told Col. Miller his report bore out my own feelings about Bowles' frame of mind, and I agreed with his suggestion that the President act quickly to forestall Bowles' possible resignation. When he asked whether I thought he should see Walter Jenkins, I said a phone call would be very useful.

*RWK*  
R. W. Komer

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *plc*, NARA, Date *2-11-04*

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~~SECRET~~

February 19, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR BILL CROCKETT

Bill, we over here heartily endorse Chet Bowles' request for more Indian rupees. As you may know, we got Kermit Gordon stirred up enough about this to talk with you.

In general, at a time when regular foreign aid is much harder to come by we really ought to look at every other device which will give us substitute forms of leverage. Our holdings of excess currencies for at least seven countries are one example. Why not make these work for us more effectively, since the net cost to the US taxpayer is nil? In India in particular we face a tough series of foreign policy problems, having reneged on Bokaro and being hard put to it to find much military aid. Since we can't help Chet out much on the big things, we at least ought to do whatever else we can.

If you need any help from me on this matter, I'm with you.

R. W. Komer

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<sup>65</sup> file  
India  
X Bowles

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Authority NLS 00-288 (#157)

By pc/cm NARA. Date 2-11-04

~~SECRET~~

VIA CLASSIFIED POUCH

EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR

February 19, 1964

Dear Chet:

Let me start out again by apologizing for being a poor correspondent. However, it's the results that count rather than the responses so I've been applying my energies to moving your ideas forward here.

As you have probably heard, we finally got the President's approval of the principle of long-term MAP for India (and Pakistan). In a sense this falls far short of your original proposal, and all here recognize that you cannot exert the same leverage with it that you could have with a commitment of \$75-100 million per annum. But the facts of life are that we simply couldn't get either the Executive Branch or the Congress to sign on to such figures when aid prospects are so murky. So we settled for the do-able, which in itself took some doing. I am personally convinced that the principle of long-term military assistance is more important than the amount. Once we are settled into the new groove of regular dealings with India in the military as well as the economic fields, we can then, depending on circumstance, talk about orders of magnitude. So I would by no means deprecate the success we have achieved. Note we also got supersonics into the realm of consideration.

I hope you will accentuate the positive in talking to the Indians too, since this does represent a fairly substantial departure in US policy. After all, in almost every other case MAP is going down; in the case of India, on the other hand, we are prepared to take on a major new account. While I fully share your view that we could spend MAP more effectively, in terms of our overall political interests, in India than in a half-dozen other places, it is still like pulling teeth to bring the bureaucracy around. Even in State there is some lack of full understanding that long-term investment in India is rather more important than in Gabon, Syria, or even Zanzibar.

With Mac's blessing, I am also actively pushing your other requests. As to freeing some rupees, we've got Kermit Gordon's support and will have no problem with BOB so long as we can get State and others to put up the necessary requests. I share Kermit's view, however, that we must really go the appropriation rather than the waiver route.

SECRET



SECRET

- 2 -

Freeing surplus materials from our stockpile is going to be a much trickier exercise. I simply can't promise much here. Your logic is impeccable but there is just not much prospect of getting the Congress to come through at an early date. Here too, we need an educational effort to gradually bring people around to understanding that there is no out-of-pocket cost involved.

I am also pushing the other item which you left with me. Your recent prod was most useful. State had simply dropped the ball, but as a result has picked it up again. My God, but the wheels of the bureaucracy grind exceedingly slow.

One thing that concerns me is the growing possibility that Pakistan, in its frustration, may unleash trouble in Kashmir. The signs are at present inconclusive, but sufficient cause for worry. I will realize the domestic political problem the GOI faces in being statesman-like under current Pak pressures, but we <sup>sadly</sup> ~~hardly~~ need a safety valve on Kashmir. I will tell you frankly that a new Pak/Indian crisis over Kashmir, coming on the heels of all our other problems (Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Panama, Cuba), would gravely risk leading to a plague on both your houses attitude in an election year. A remarkably high percentage of our foreign aid goes to the subcontinent, yet this has been notably free from challenge to date. However all the Congress needs is a good excuse, I fear. I hope our Indian and Pak friends realize this.

It does little good for us to keep urging moderation on the Paks in the absence of any concrete signs of reciprocal willingness on the Indian side. True, the Indians have been more restrained than the Paks (at least until Chagla's recent performance), but they have no real policy of seeking to achieve the better relationship with Ayub which would serve India's long term interests so well. I realize that this degree of statesmanship is too much to ask in the midst of a succession crisis. Yet I dare to hope that India will not leave entirely to us the burden of restraining Pakistan.

Forgive this hectoring. To me, you're doing a great job without much new ammunition from here. In fact, the very absence of such ammo makes your role all the more indispensable to me. I'd very much like to get out and exchange ideas with you and hope to be able to manage it by late Spring.

The Honorable Chester Bowles  
U. S. Ambassador to India  
American Embassy  
New Delhi, India

All the best,

SECRET



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67 India  
X Bowles  
file

RWK:

February 19, 1964

BOB sympathizes with Bowles' desire to put excess rupees to work but it can't approve the method he proposes for end-running regular appropriations channels. So Gordon is inviting State (Crockett) to package Bowles' plan and run it through regular channels; he has promised BOB support. State hopes to convoke interested parties next week.

Bowles suggests using a presidential waiver of normal procedures for appropriating US-held foreign currencies. He wants to avoid asking Congress for new appropriations (dollars to State to buy rupees from Treasury) because he fears Rooney will cut the regular State budget commensurately. However, BOB went to considerable trouble in 1961 to work out with Congress a budget category called "Special Foreign Currency Program Appropriations" whereby agencies can fund low priority programs with excess foreign currencies to cut our holdings. This subjects these programs to desirable budgetary and appropriations controls, hopefully without jeopardizing regular programs. BOB says it would have to tell Congress informally about the waiver anyway and thinks staying in channels would cut the likelihood of a retaliatory Congressional whack at State's budget.

Now that the ball is in State's court, we risk another Alphonse-Gaston act. Cameron's office shows signs of picking it up, but Crockett and the "E" area are also interested. However, I've asked to be included in whatever meetings are called, and I know who to prod now.

There may be a minor economic issue here. In 1961 Galbraith recommended we not draw down our rupee holdings for small projects, and Ken Hansen found that some on the embassy staff still agree. Galbraith felt proliferation of projects might tie up Indian resources that could be better used on higher priority projects. Bowles thinks proper supervision would eliminate this danger.

Gordon is writing Bowles to explain BOB position and is urging Crockett send over a proposal. I keep in touch with SOA.

HHS

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February 11, 1964

<sup>68</sup>  
*India*

Kermit -

Here's Chet's wail. All his ideas make sense to me, in view of fact we'd be spending money otherwise sterile.

Mac and I intend to push this, as something we can do for Chet and for India, at a time when there's not much else. We need your help.

R. W. KOMER

Memo Bowles to Bundy dtd 2/1/64 on  
PL480 and Indian rupees

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~~SECRET~~

RWK:

January 7, 1964

In June 1962, we reckoned further development costs of the Orpheus engine for the HF-24 frame at \$8.27 million. They're the latest costs we have. The frame was designed for Mach 2, but the Orpheus 6 engine being used in the first prototype only does about Mach 1. The Russian engine being tried (reportedly with difficulty because of weight and venting) does Mach 1.4. The Orpheus 12 which the UK hopes to have ready by late 1964 would do Mach 1.6-1.8.

HHS

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 2-11-04



~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

January 2, 1964

MR. O'DONNELL

J. J. Singh is a very nice old man, but I see no need to burden the President with him. Mac saw him recently, Arthur saw him, so did I. But when we couldn't even get BKNehru an appointment, no need to ring in Singh--who has no constituency anyway.

Since Singh is going to India after the first week in January, a polite turndown next week (or even a delayed reply) would do the trick.

R. W. Komer

Att: Note, H. Colle to Smith, 12/26;  
Memo, Connell to Jenkins, 12/20;  
Ltr, Sen Hubert H. Humphrey to  
the President, 12/20, with ltr  
from J. J. Singh to Humphrey,  
12/11/63

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By jc, NARA, Date 2-11-04

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

December 23, 1963

THE PRESIDENT

Taylor's trip to India/Pakistan. General Taylor returns agreeing with Bowles that we ought to offer a five-year MAP program to India if it keeps its forces down to reasonable levels, minimize diversion of its scarce foreign exchange to defense, and plays ball on Pakistan and China. But he points out India has no real conception of its own military goals yet. So instead of offering now to trade a MAP program for Indian commitments, he says let's ask India to prepare its own 5-year plan first, and then (if it is satisfactory) reveal our program. Since such plan would take some time to develop, we'd cover this gap with currently planned \$50 million one-year program.

His proposals make great sense. True, we tend to lose the real political advantage of being forthcoming now (which Bowles prizes). Also, do we get more leverage by moving in now or by letting India set its own goals first? Unless we give some clues as to what we might provide (e.g. supersonics) India can't plan efficiently either, and may be tempted to make peace with China or to get more from the Soviets. But these problems can be worked out.

On Pakistan, Taylor is optimistic. While Ayub and his generals talked nothing but India, Taylor feels they're slowly coming around to accept US aid to their rivals. He urges that we buck up Pak confidence by offering a parallel five-year MAP program, conditioned on continued Pak fidelity to its alliance obligations

In both the Pak and Indian cases we are not proposing new MAP programs, but merely packaging them in 5-year rather than year-by-year terms, contingent on appropriations here and performance there. Without firmly committing yourself now, you might simply:

1. Ask for a revised policy recommendation along Taylor's lines for you to look at after New Years.
2. Establish the principle of parallelism between Indians and Paks (e.g. if we give supersonics only to one it will raise hob with the other). Admittedly, Pakistan is an ally and India a neutral; but in fact Pakistan is using our MAP aid entirely against India, whereas India is at least facing the Chinese.

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 01-70

By cbm, NARA, Date 3-24-03

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~



SECRET

December 19, 1963

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File  
India

McGB:

Attached is not a plot. BK requested another appointment on instructions despite our efforts to turn him off.

In light of Taylor visit, LBJ's warm messages to Nehru, Radhakrishnan, etc. I suspect it would not cause critical damage if President couldn't see BK. Among other things, I doubt BK would have much use-ful to say. However, State keeps pointing out that our ability to get in and see foreign chiefs of state depends partly at least on reciprocal treatment.

Possible alternative would be for you to call BK, explain facts of life, say talk would be unpro- fitable until Taylor visit digested, and volunteer to see BK yourself if he desires.

RWK

Attach. Memo Ball to President dtd 12/18/63  
subj. Request for an Appointment with you  
for Amb. Nehru of India

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By jc, NARA, Date 2-11-04

73

*file*  
*India*

December 18, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE PRESIDENT

Attached for signature is a short bread and butter reply to President Radhakrishnan's best wishes. We have cleaned up the State draft a bit.

R. W. Komer



73a

file

Dear Mr. President:

Your letter of November 25 was most thoughtful and considerate. It is a source of great encouragement and satisfaction to me to have your best wishes as I take on the responsibilities of the Presidency.

During your historic visit to this country last June you had occasion to experience the respect and admiration which the people of the United States have for India. During my visit to India in 1961, at a time when you and I were the Vice Presidents of our respective countries, I was deeply impressed by the efforts of the Government and people of India to achieve economic and social betterment. We of like minds must work together toward achievement of honorable peace among men and the eradication of poverty and injustice. Rest assured that I will spare no effort in this cause.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan  
President of India  
New Delhi, India

LBJ:RWK:tmt

SECRET

McGB:

December 10, 1963

In response to Bowles plea in Delhi 1822 that he be allowed to say something to lay political groundwork for Taylor visit when he sees Nehru tomorrow evening, I've cleared off on following:

Bowles is authorized only to say that we are considering our longer term military aid plans for India (this nothing new). It would help us very much in doing so, if Indians could provide a clearer idea of their own plans, e. g. force ceilings, probable foreign exchange allocations, likely purchases from Soviets. Taylor will want to discuss these matters with Indian military when he arrives.

It seems to me that this doesn't in any way prejudice LBJ consideration of Bowles package (WPB and Averell have signed on) but if you think differently, there is time to reverse gears tonight.

RWK

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By je, NARA, Date 2-11-01

74 *file*  
*India*  
*x India Map*



SECRET

December 6, 1963

*India*  
75

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

We have prepared the attached draft reply to Prime Minister Nehru's recent warm letter to you (also attached). It provides an occasion for you to reiterate the friendly sentiments in your reply to President Radhakrishnan's condolences and your oral message to Nehru via Bowles. The reply demonstrates your desire to continue a personal exchange of views and your intent to advance our present policies.

R. W. KOMER

Attach. Read Memo to Bundy, 12/6/63  
subj. Reply to PM Nehru's Ltr of 11/29/63

also

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 2-11-04

*file*  
*Ludica*  
*16*

~~SECRET~~

December 2, 1963

MAC -

I well realize problem, but think Talbot did right about BK Nehru. Facts are:

When Phil told me BK had message from Nehru with instructions to deliver it personally, I urged him simply to try and turn BK aside; LBJ would be pre-occupied for next few weeks.

BK expressed full understanding. Said he instructed return Delhi around 20 December, and would tell home office it better to try and see President just before then. Phil said he sure this would be better and should be no problem (his memo attached). He then told me, but even if he'd checked beforehand I would have thought this a good deal. That such things are always ad referendum is, I think, understood by all.

RWK

Memo, Talbot to Komer, 12/2/63  
re Indian Ambassador's request  
to see President

*Damn it, Phil's memo  
specifically asks P. to  
commit himself to later  
date & that's exactly what  
I do not want. Some time  
and do what I ask /Meg B/  
I love you.*

~~SECRET~~

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77

*India  
✓ Bowles*

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MEMORANDUM FOR

November 26, 1963

BENJAMIN READ

Here is a memorandum which Mr. Bundy gave to Ambassador Bowles at the President's request, containing a personal message from the President to Nehru.

Bromley Smith

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Att.: Memo, Bundy to Bowles, 11/26/63

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file  
77a Ludwig  
X Bowles

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

November 26, 1963

AMBASSADOR BOWLES

The President was terribly sorry he could not keep his appointment with you, and asks that you deliver the following personal and private message from him to Prime Minister Nehru:

I wish to assure you that I fully supported President Kennedy's policy of deep interest and concern for India, for her domestic programs and her defense against aggression, and that I intend to continue it.

It is my hope that you and I will establish the same personal relationship of confidence and frank exchange of views as you had with President Kennedy. In the meantime let me also assure you that Ambassador Bowles and I are old and good friends, and you can rely on him just as fully as before, in every way.

McGeorge Bundy

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79  
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Visit of Indian Railways Minister

S. K. Patil

August 4, 1964

S.K.  
Patil  
visit  
Aug. 1964

OUTGOING

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

XEROGRAPH

TELEGRAM

## Department of State

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~BUNDY, SMITH  
ALEXANDER  
BATOR  
BENK  
CHASE  
FORRESTAL  
JESSUP  
JOHNSON  
KEENY  
KLEIN  
KOMER  
MOODY  
REEDY  
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SAYRE  
SMITH, WM. Y.

MFG. 11-63

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State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 2-11-01

Aug 17 3 57 PM '64

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI 358

INFO: Amconsul BOMBAY 98

Embtel 423

S. K. Patil's Visit

During Washington visit August 3-7, Patil met President, Secretaries Rusk, Dillon, Freeman, Attorney General, AID Director Bell, McGeorge Bundy. Secretary Freeman and Governor Harriman hosted parties for him to meet members of Congress. Patil also had lunch with IERD Pres. Woods. He appeared on TV program QUOTE Today UNQUOTE, gave VOA interview and addressed National Press Club luncheon. Wien of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association arranged call on Patil to make pitch on patent legislation question.

In talks with President, Secretary and McGeorge Bundy, Patil said that new Indian leadership considerably more pro-West and pro-US than Nehru had been; that Shastri largely shares Patil's own pro-Western views, and, under Shastri govt, India will come much closer to Free World while retaining nominal nonalignment. Patil's meeting with Secretary Rusk, reported separately, was prototype his discussions with other officials where he covered essentially same ground. Meeting with Attorney General was purely courtesy call at which Patil paid homage to late President. His contact with Secretary Freeman essentially social and as personal friend. There were

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

NEA:SOA:AALakeland:bsk 8/14/64

Classification approved by:

NEA - Turner C. Cameron

Clearances:

SOA - Miss Laise  
Treasury - Mr. Zagorin (subs)  
AID/NEA - Mr. Furst (subs)Agriculture - Mr. Street (subs)  
g/s - Mr. Davies  
White House -  
Mr. KomerREPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
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AUG 18 1964



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were no substantive discussions re new PL-480 program. Talks with Secretary Dillon thanked and Bell were very generalized. Patil/~~XXXX~~ Secretary Dillon for latter's role in negotiation 1960 PL-480 agreement and mentioned need for another multi-year agreement. He intimated to Bell that new Indian govt would sympathetically consider proposals for private foreign investment in fertilizer field.

In private talks and public statements Patil said Prime Min Shastri anxious visit US and suggested next May as appropriate time. He did not seek any commitment re invitation nor was he given any. Nor did he deliver letter from Shastri to President.

Patil was cordially received at highest levels of USG. His warm and friendly approach created favorable impression on officials and press (latter characterized him as India's Jim Farley) but visit has not rpt not registered with much impact largely because he seemed to lack specific mission and mainly talked pleasant generalities. Both Patil and Indian Embassy have described his visit to US as semi-official and major portion Patil's total time in country has been devoted to personal interests which were object of Patil's earlier planned private visit cancelled because of Nehru's death.

In public and private Patil spoke frequently about Indian food situation. However, he talked in general terms and was careful prefaced remarks with statement that he no longer Food Min and not in position enter negotiations on food matters. He tended downplay seriousness of present food price problem by characterizing it as short-term and seasonal, and expressed Indian gratitude for US food shipments. He also cited controls, zonal trading restrictions and non-remunerative prices to cultivators as sources aggravation food problem. He did not get into substantive discussions re additional US assistance and no understandings were made with him.

Patil

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Patil left Washington August 7 and presently plans depart US from New York on August 15. We understand he returning India via Europe and will arrive Delhi about August 20.

GP-3

End.

RUSK



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

Control: 2896

Rec'd: August 5, 1964  
6:35 a.m.

NEA  
Info  
SS  
G  
SP  
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USIA  
NSC  
INR  
CIA  
NSA

FROM: New Delhi

ACTION: Secstate 167

INFO: Karachi 117  
Bombay Unnumbered  
Calcutta Unnumbered  
Madras Unnumbered

DATE: August 5

\_\_\_BUNDY-SMITH  
\_\_\_ALEXANDER  
\_\_\_BATOR  
\_\_\_BELK  
\_\_\_BRUBECK  
\_\_\_CHASE  
\_\_\_FORRESTAL  
\_\_\_JESSUP  
\_\_\_JOHNSON  
\_\_\_KEENY  
\_\_\_KLEIN  
\_\_\_KOMER  
\_\_\_MOODY  
\_\_\_REEDY  
\_\_\_SAUNDERS  
\_\_\_SAYRE  
\_\_\_SMITH, WM. Y.

RMR

Press August 5 reports S.K. Patil Washington meetings August 4 with President, Secretary, McGeorge Bundy. Stories frontpaged in two Delhi papers, carried inside pages two others. Most accounts give prominent treatment to Patil August 4 statement to newsmen that PM Shastri "most anxious" visit U.S. in May or June, 1965. TIMES OF INDIA (Vohra) says he is "preparing the ground" for a Shastri visit. Patil also reported to have told newsmen he explained to U.S. officials what Shastri Government stands for and proposes to do to tackle country's problems, and papers emphasize his comment that he was pleased by sympathy and understanding shown by President and other leaders for India's new Government. TIMES OF INDIA calls Patil's talks "significant," says he is "creating impression of India's strength and stability despite the current difficulties."

Press adds Patil plans "preliminary talks" with "key" U.S. officials to "smooth way" for coming formal negotiations on another PL-480 agreement. STATESMAN also reports his remarks to reporters expressing concern over current Sino-Pak "friendship."

BOWLES

RMA

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~~SECRET~~

August 4, 1964

82  
Patil Visit

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

S. K. Patil is just in to shake your hand. Though nominally Minister of Railways, he actually runs very potent Bombay political machine. He's India's most pro-US leader too.

Patil will talk as long as you'll let him, but he realizes you're very busy. I'd suggest you only ask about:

1. Indian food crisis. How bad is it (we hear it's as much hoarding and poor distribution as a real shortage). We drastically stepped up shipments when problem began in January and are sending wheat faster than Indians can unload it. We'll deliver a massive 4-500,000 tons a month up to next February. We're also shipping corn, and have promised 300,000 tons of rice from next crop.

2. How is Shastri doing? Will his health hold up? Patil may put in a plug for a Shastri visit here next Spring.

R. W. Komer

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By jc, NARA, Date 2-11-04





DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Appointment With Indian Railways Minister, S. K. Patil,  
at 10:00 a.m., August 4, 1964

The Indian Minister of Railways, S. K. Patil, has an appointment to discuss with you recent political developments in India; subsequently we understand he will meet the President briefly to deliver a letter from Prime Minister Shastri.

Items Patil Will Raise:

As he explained it to the Secretary yesterday, the main purpose of Patil's visit is to establish personal contact on behalf of Prime Minister Shastri with the President, and high United States officials, and to convey to them the desire of the new Indian Government to draw nearer to the United States. He may also raise the question of a Shastri visit to the United States.

Suggested Response:

Besides indicating our general support of the Shastri government and its aims, it is suggested that you may wish to draw Patil out on the question of the Shastri's government's intentions regarding better relations between India and Pakistan, since this would be the most important contribution India could make to our common objectives in the subcontinent.

Since S. K. Patil was formerly Food Minister, he is well-informed about the food situation in India, and you may wish to query him on this.

Grant C. Hilliker  
Acting Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Biographic Sketch

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GROUP 3

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State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date 2-11-04

AUG 4 1964

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83a

S. K. PATIL

Indian Minister of Railways

A leading figure in India's ruling Congress Party for many years, Patil has been a member of the central Cabinet since 1957, except for a brief, nine-month period in 1963-64. He has held a variety of Cabinet portfolios, but is best known for his tenure as Food and Agriculture Minister from 1959 to 1963. He negotiated the four-year, seventeen million ton P.L. 480 agreement in 1960. Within the Cabinet he has been traditionally identified as a conservative.

For many years Patil has been an outspoken advocate of closer relations with the United States - even when this was not politically expedient in India - and apparently believes he is now in a position to do something concrete to bring this about. He played an important role in bringing about the election of Prime Minister Shastri as Nehru's successor and has emerged in the post-Nehru period as a key member of the new Indian leadership. He is on close personal terms with Shastri and other leading members of the Shastri administration.

In effect, Patil views himself as Shastri's principal link with the United States, and would like to reinforce his claim to this role, both in India and the United States, as a result of this visit. However, since Patil's visit is termed semi-official, it is not clear just what mandate he has for his talks with the President and other high officials he is meeting. Moreover, as there is always an element of self-promotion in his activities, Patil can be expected to exploit his visit, and the call on the President in particular, to enhance his own position at home.

He is sixty-four, speaks good English, and has a warm and engaging personality. He has visited the United States many times previously.

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*Paul Virel 84*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
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August 3, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. KOMER

SUBJECT: Appointment with President --  
Indian Railway Minister S.K.  
Patil

The President will not be able to see S.K.  
Patil.

*6C*  
Gordon Chase

cc: Mr. Bundy

*Bob,*  
*As you requested*  
*McB memo is attached.*

*6C*

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By *je*, NARA, Date *2-11-04*

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AUG 3 1964

~~SECRET~~

July 31, 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. VALENTI

SUBJECT: Appointment with President - Indian Railway  
Minister S.K. Patil

1. Chet Bowles recommends that the President receive Indian Railway Minister S.K. Patil who is presently in the U.S. and who is carrying a letter for the President from Prime Minister Shastri. Secretaries Rusk and Ball, reportedly sensitive to the demands on the President's time, are not pushing for this appointment.

2. While I do not regard an appointment with Patil as absolutely essential, I tend to agree with Chet Bowles, and to believe that a brief visit with Patil would be a good thing. The ardently pro-U.S. Patil is one of India's most potent politicians and is the first Indian Cabinet Minister to visit the U.S. since Nehru's death. I think it is also pertinent to note that Indian Defense Minister Chavan missed his appointment with the President on May 28 because of Nehru's death.

3. Patil is in Washington from August 2 to August 7.

McG. B.

President will see Patil for 15 minutes.

✓ Bundy should see Patil and receive letter.

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 2-11-04

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CONFIDENTIAL

Mac -

July 28, 1964

Bowles has made a strong pitch (when here, and now in Delhi 149 and 193 attached) to have President see S. K. Patil, however briefly. Aside from carrying a note to LBJ from Shastri, he's one of India's most potent politicians and certainly the most ardently pro-US. He's back in as Railway Minister. Recalling that LBJ agreed to see Chavan but this cancelled because of Nehru's death, it would make sense if he'd give Patil just ten minutes during 2-7 August.

However, Rusk and Ball both turned Talbot down, on grounds that LBJ had growled at them recently about visitors. Any objection to our asking LBJ or would this be injudicious, given his recent remarks about Indian policy? If you agree, I'll do a note (or it might be better handled orally).

Similar case is that of six Turk deputies (here till Friday), whom Seventh Floor also vetoed. These people did see Khrushchev and Brezhnev earlier this year in Moscow. Even more important, we urgently need to massage a key group of Turk deputies like this.

My hunch would be that Rusk and Ball are quailing because of on-again off-again LBJ remarks about visitors.

RWK

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jk, NARA, Date 2-11-04

85 *file*  
*Patil Visit*  
*X Turk Parl Visit*

*Set for 400 Tuesday*  
*w/ Bundy*  
*Note: LBJ saw Patil at*  
*10:00 2/4/64*



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

86

48

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action CONTROL: 17201  
NEA RECD: JULY 22, 1964, 4:10AM

Info FROM: BOMBAY  
SS ACTION: SECSTATE IMMEDIATE 31  
G  
H INFO: NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 58  
FE  
PR DATE: JULY 22, 10AM  
E  
AID  
P

BUNDY-SMITH  
ALEXANDER  
BATOR  
BELK  
BRUBECK  
CHASE  
FORRESTAL  
JESSUP  
JOHNSON  
KEENEY  
KEELIN  
KOMER  
MOODY  
REEDY  
SAUNDERS  
SAYRE  
SMITH, WM. Y.

USIA RE DEPTTEL 140 TO DELHI AND EMBTEL 34 TO BOMBAY, RPTD DEPT 205  
NSC  
INR IN CONVERSATION EVENING JULY 21 UNION MINISTER S.K.PATIL  
CIA CONFIRMED TO ME HIS PLAN DEPART FOR US FROM BOMBAY EARLY AM JULY  
NSA 23 VIA AIR INDIA TO LONDON WITH ARRIVAL NEW YORK VIA BOAC AT  
SY 1545 HOURS JULY 23. SAID SOON AFTER ARRIVAL NEW YORK HE  
A INTENDED GO BOSTON FOR FEW DAYS MEDICAL CHECK-UP. THEREAFTER  
OPR HE SAID HE WOULD BE AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON FOR APPOINTMENTS  
AGR DURING PERIOD JULY 31 TO AUGUST 7 OR FOR AS LONG PERIOD  
WHM THEREAFTER AS NECESSARY.

RMR PATIL SAID AMBASSADOR NEHRU RESPONSIBLE FOR ARRANGING APPOINTMENTS  
BUT THAT HE HOPED TO CALL ON PRESIDENT, SECRETARY RUSK,  
SECRETARY FREEMAN, AND MESSRS BALL, BUNDY AND TALBOT, AS WELL  
AS ON KEY SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN IN PL 480 FIELD. PATIL  
CONCEDED THAT FOOD SUPPLIES NO LONGER HIS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY  
BUT STRONGLY INTIMATED HE HAD ROLE OF "PREPARING WAY" WITH US  
FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS.

PATIL VERY CLEARLY IS KEENLY ANTICIPATING HIGH LEVEL TALKS IN  
WASHINGTON. IN SUBSEQUENT BOMBAY PRADESH CONGRESS COMMITTEE  
SEND-OFF FUNCTION WHICH I ATTENDED HE PUBLICLY REFERRED,  
IN SPEECH LARGELY DEVOTED TO INDIA'S FOOD PROBLEM, TO  
HIS PREVIOUS "SUCCESSFUL" VISITS TO US, WARMTH OF HIS RECEPTION  
THERE AND DEPTH OF AMERICAN SYMPATHY AND UNDERSTANDING FOR  
INDIA.

GP-3.

REWINKEL

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O JULY 22, 4:50 A.M.  
PASSED TO THE WHITE HOUSE JULY 22, 5:05 A.M.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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JUL 22 1964



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

87  
✓ Bundy  
S

46

Action

~~SECRET~~

Control: 17183  
Rec'd: July 22, 1964  
3:41 a.m.

SS

Info

FROM: Bombay  
ACTION: Secstate 32 Immediate  
INFO: New Delhi 59 Immediate  
DATE: July 22, 11 a.m.

113

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Re Consulate telegram 31 to Department repeated information  
58 to Delhi

In discussing with him his July 31 to August 7 visit in  
Washington Union Minister S. K. Patil told me on confidential  
basis that he carrying letter to President from Prime  
Minister Shastri. Commented that Shastri would probably  
make visit to USSR next April and that Shastri hopefully  
contemplating visit to US thereafter in late May. Patil  
intimated that one of his tasks in Washington would be to  
"prepare way" for this possible visit.

25X1A

GP-2.

REWINKEL

DLW

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-O at 4:10 a.m., July 22.

Passed White House at 4:50 a.m., July 22.

~~SECRET~~

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SANITIZED

Authority RAC-NLJ 001-128-3-6  
By ies, NARA, Date 10-15-01

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

88

UNDY-SMITH  
ALEXANDER  
RATOR  
BELK  
BRIDGEC  
CHASE  
FORRESTAL  
JESSUP  
JOHNSON  
KEENEY  
KLEIN  
KOMER  
MOODY  
REEDY  
SAUNDERS  
SAYRE  
SMITH, WM. Y.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

30

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FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

CONFIDENTIAL 193 JULY 20, 6 PM.

ON JULY 18, SK PATIL CALLED AT MY HOME TO DISCUSS HIS VISIT TO US, PARTICULARLY IN REGARD TO SUBJECTS HE WOULD BE DISCUSSING WHILE THERE. HE TOLD ME HE IS CARRYING LETTER TO PRES. JOHNSON FROM PRIMIN SHASTRI AND, AS FIRST INDIAN CABINET MINISTER TO VISIT US SINCE NEHRU'S DEATH, WISHES TO DISCUSS WITH LEADERS IN AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS ATTITUDES AND OBJECTIVES OF NEW INDIAN GOVT AND LIKELY COURSE OF DEVELOPMENTS HERE IN THIS COUNTRY

HE ARRIVES IN WASHINGTON, THURSDAY, JULY 23, AND WILL PROBABLY CFN 193 20 6 18

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 821 CONFIDENTIAL  
STAY TOTAL OF TWO WEEKS.

AS I SUGGESTED IN TELEGRAM 149, HE IS ANXIOUS FOR A VISIT WITH PRES. JOHNSON DURING WHICH HE WOULD DELIVER LETTER FROM SHASTRI; ALSO CHANCE TO TALK WITH SECRETARIES RUSK, DILLON, FREEMAN, MCGEORGE BUNDY, DAVID BELL AND UNDER SECRETARY BALL AND

HARRIMAN. I AGAIN SUGGEST IMPORTANCE OF SETTING HIM UP WITH KEY CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS ON CAPITOL HILL AND, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE FOR A SPEECH AT PRESS CLUB, IN WHICH I THINK HE WOULD BEAR DOWN VERY HARD ON CHINESE SITUATION IN A WAY THAT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO US IN ACCEPTANCE OF OUR POLICY IN USA.

GP-3.  
BOWLES  
BT

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By je, NARA, Date 2-11-01~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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JUL 20 1964

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

89

46

Action

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ARMY

NAVY

AIR

AGR

RMR

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~~BUNDY SMITH~~  
~~ALEXANDER~~  
~~BELK~~  
~~BRUBECK~~  
~~CHASE~~  
~~DUNGAN~~  
~~FORRESTAL~~  
~~JESSUP~~  
~~JOHNSON~~  
~~KEENY~~  
~~KLEIN~~  
~~KOMER~~  
~~MOODY~~  
~~REEDY~~

Control:  
Rec'd:

8423

MAY 12, 1964  
3:41 AM

FROM: NEW DELHI

ACTION: SECSTATE 3340

DATE: MAY 12, NOON

REF: DEPTELS 2243 AND 2246.

1. ASIA SOCIETY'S INVITATION IS BEING DELIVERED TO S.K. PATIL IN BOMBAY. THIS IS GOOD PEG FOR HIS VISIT.

2. RE WASHINGTON PORTION OF HIS VISIT WE SUGGEST (A) PATIL SEE SECRETARY, GOVERNOR HARRIMAN AND TALBOT IN DEPT; (B) PATIL MEET SOLBERT IN DEFENSE; (C) HE MEET SECRETARY FREEMAN. PATIL WAS IN CONTACT WITH SECRETARY DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO INDIA AND WE UNDERSTAND HAS BEEN CORRESPONDING WITH SECRETARY ABOUT HIS SCHEDULE IN U.S. (D) SECRETARY FREEMAN ARRANGE FOR PATIL TO MEET INFORMALLY WITH SENATOR ELLENDER AND WITH KEY MEMBERS OF SENATE AND HOUSE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEES.

3. PATIL'S OFFICE IN DELHI REPORTS HE HAS EXPRESSED INTEREST IN SEEING AMBASSADOR BUNKER IN WASHINGTON AND AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH IN BOSTON.

4. AMBASSADOR IS SEEING PATIL IN NEXT FEW DAYS AND FURTHER SUGGESTIONS WILL FOLLOW AFTER THEIR MEETING.

BOWLES

HC

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MAY 12 1964

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Control: 6011

Rec'd: MAY 8, 1964

11:31 A.M.

FROM: NEW DELHI

ACTION: SECSTATE 3315

DATE: MAY 8, 6 P.M.

REF: DEPTTEL 2233.

*Patel Visit*

PATIL IS INTERESTED IN HAVING SOME PLATFORM ON WHICH TO PEG HIS VISIT TO U.S., BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE HE CONSIDERS ELABORATE OR HIGH LEVEL PROGRAM NECESSARY. PATIL IS CLOSE PERSONAL FRIEND OF PROFESSOR GALBRAITH AND POSSIBLY LATTER MIGHT ARRANGE APPROPRIATE INVITATION FROM HARVARD WHICH WE BELIEVE WOULD ADMIRABLY MEET PATIL'S PURPOSES. HOPE SOMETHING CAN BE WORKED OUT VERY SOON AS TIME IN RUNNING SHORT.

PATIL PLANS LEAVE INDIA MAY 22 STOPPING BRIEFLY IN EUROPE AND ARRIVING U.S. ABOUT MAY 27 FOR APPROXIMATELY THREE-WEEK VISIT. ALTHOUGH HE MAY OVERLAP BRIEFLY WITH CHAVAN, WE DO NOT SEEK ANY DIFFICULTIES IN BOTH BEING IN U.S. AT SAME TIME. PATIL HAS WITHDRAWN FROM DEPUTY LEADERSHIP CONTEST AND IN ANY EVENT GETS ALONG WELL PERSONALLY WITH CHAVAN.

PLH/22

BUNDY SMITH  
ALEXANDER  
BOWLES  
BELK  
BRUBECK  
CHASE  
DUNGAN  
FORRESTAL  
JESSUP  
JOHNSON  
KEENY  
KLEIN  
KOMEZ  
MOODY  
REEDY  
SAUNDERS  
SMITH, WM. Y.

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MAY 9 1964



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

91

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FM AMEMBASSY NEWDELHI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

*Patil Visit*

BUNDY-SMITH  
ALEXANDER  
BELK  
BRUBECK  
CHASE  
DINGEMAN  
DUNGAN  
FORRESTAL  
JOHNSON  
KOMEK  
1964 APR 17 PM 5 14

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE (3110) APRIL 17, 7:45 PM

FOR CAMERON, SOA

S K PATIL TENTATIVELY PLANS TO VISIT USA FOR THREE OR  
FOUR WEEKS STARTING LATE IN MAY ACCOMPANIED BY HIS NIECE.  
HE REQUIRES NO FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE BUT DOES NEED AN INVITATION  
(TO JUSTIFY HARD CURRENCY TRAVEL) FROM SOME UNIVERSITY,  
FOUNDATION OR OTHER NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION TO DELIVER  
A FEW TALKS, ATTEND CONFERENCES OR PERFORM SOME SUCH FITTING  
FUNCTION. HE IS ANXIOUS TO KEEP UP HIS PERSONAL CONTACTS AT  
HIGH LEVELS IN OUR GOVERNMENT.  
CFN 3110

PAGE 2 RUSBAE 793 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
WE THINK IT IS MOST IMPORTANT FOR USG TO ENCOURAGE AND FACILITATE  
THIS VISIT. THOUGH PATIL NOT NOW HOLDING OFFICIAL POSITION HE  
REMAINS IMPORTANT FIGURE IN CONGRESS PARTY.

PATIL'S NIECE IS MISS ANASUYA M NADKARNI WHO WORKED FOR THE  
DEPARTMENT IN 1949-1950 AND HAS BROADCASTED FOR VOA ON SEVERAL  
OCCASIONS. SHE HOLDS DEGREES FROM AMERICAN UNIVERSITY.

WOULD APPRECIATE WORD FROM DEPARTMENT SOONEST WITH  
ANY SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM WHICH CAN BE DEVISED; PATIL IS  
LOOKING FOR A RATIONALIZATION FOR HIS TRIP AND WE SHOULD HELP  
HIM FIND IT.

BOWLES  
BT

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APR 20 1964

98  
/

Defense  
Minister  
Chavan  
5/20-27/64

Visit of Indian Defense Minister Chavan

May 20 - 27, 1964



EUC110

PP RUEPVV

DE RUEPCR 137 03/2141Z

P 032130Z

RECEIVED  
WHASA

42906

1964 JUN 3 22 44  
FM MR PETER SOLBERT, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, ISA, ROOM 4E  
813, PHONE 11-57273

TO MR ROBERT KOMER, EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING, ROOM 372, PHONE 128-  
22258

BT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ REQUEST YOUR CLEARANCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

FROM: OSD WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY, NEW DELHI

INFO CINCPACAFSA

AMEMBASSY, KARACHE

AMEMBASSY, LONDON

*Defence No. 971909*

*Chavun*  
*Visit*  
*X India Map*

~~SECRET~~

FROM OASD/ISA. THIS A JOINT STATE/  
DEFENSE MESSAGE. PASS TO CUSMSMI.

AMBASSADOR AUTHORIZED TO DELIVER TO CHAVUN THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM  
SECRETARY MCNAMARA.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4

By JW, NARA, Date 21793

(FRUS 64-68, vol. 25, # 52)

PRESERVATION COPY



PAGE 2 RUEPCR 137 ~~SECRET~~

\*HONORABLE Y. B. CHAVAN

MINISTER OF DEFENSE

NEW DELHI, INDIA

DEAR MR. MINISTER:

I AM VERY PLEASED THAT OUR RECENT DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING THE INDIAN FIVE-YEAR DEFENSE PLAN REACHED GENERAL AGREEMENT, BUT THE EVENT WHICH TERMINATED THEM HAS CAUSED US ALL GREAT SORROW. PRIME MINISTER NEHRU'S SUDDEN DEATH HAS BROUGHT TO A CLOSE A REMARKABLE CAREER, DEVOTED THROUGHOUT AS IT WAS TO THE SERVICE OF INDIA. ALL OF US HERE JOIN IN SENDING YOU OUR SYMPATHY ON SUCH A LOSS.

I KNOW THAT WE ARE BOTH INTERESTED IN THE MOMENTUM OF OUR TALKS IN WASHINGTON CARRYING ON. I AGREE WITH YOUR SUGGESTION TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY TOLBOT THAT WE OMIT FROM THE MEMORANDUM THE SENTENCE REFERRING TO THE RS. 650 CRORES LEVEL OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE. AS YOU RECALL, AT OUR MEETING I INDICATED MY FEELING THAT MOVING TOWARD THE RS. 650 CRORES LEVEL WOULD CONSTITUTE A LESS SEVERE DRAIN ON INDIA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, BUT I SEE NO NECESSITY TO INCLUDE THIS IN THE MEMORANDUM. I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU OTHER POINT RELATED TO THE INDIAN FORCE PLANS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 3 OF THE MEMORANDUM. HERE AGAIN I AGREE WITH YOUR SUGGESTED REVISION OF THE MEMORANDUM SO THAT THE SECOND AND

PRESERVATION COPY



THIRD SENTENCES OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE MEMORANDUM READ AS FOLLOWS:

"MINISTER CHAVAN SAID THAT INDIAN DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVES WOULD DETERMINE THE SPECIFIC ITEMS IN THE PLAN TO BE DEFERRED TO COME WITHIN THE ABOVE-MENTIONED FOREIGN EXCHANGE LEVEL AND WOULD DETERMINE APPROPRIATE READJUSTMENTS IN THE PLAN. PROJECTION BY THE UNITED STATES OF ITS MILITARY ASSISTANCE, BOTH GRANT AID AND CREDIT SALES, ON A MULTI-YEAR BASIS WILL DEPEND ON THESE DETERMINATION." AS YOU CAN WELL APPRECIATE, ANY MULTI-YEAR PROJECTION OF UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDIA MUST REST ON A GENERAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN

US WITH RESPECT TO PROPOSED DEFENSE FOREIGN EXCHANGE EXPENDITURES, RUPEE MILITARY BUDGET, AND FORCE PLANS WHICH SUCH ASSISTANCE WOULD GO TO SUPPORT. YOUR DEFENSE PLAN, INCLUDING THE FORCE PLANS, WILL CERTAINLY CONTINUE TO BE A TOPIC OF MUTUAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN US.

I HOPE THAT THESE SUGGESTIONS ARE HELPFUL IN PUTTING THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING INTO APPROPRIATE FORM FOR EXECUTION. I AM VERY PLEASED BY THE TENOR OF THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH WE HAD OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS HERE IN WASHINGTON ON YOUR DEFENSE PLAN AND I LOOK FORWARD TO AGREEMENT ON LONGER TERM ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS IN THIS RESPECT.

SINCERELY YOURS,"

IF MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING IS SATISFACTORY TO CHAVAN AS REVISED TO REFLECT EDITORIAL CHANGES IN DA 970998 AND SECRETARY MCNAMARA'S PROPOS



CHANGES AND TEXT OF ANNEX I AS FIRWARDED TO YOU BY DEF 971737, DTD 3 JUNE

1964. AMBASSADOR AUTHORIZED TO EXECUTE THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING.

TEXT OF PROPOSED JOINT PRESS RELEASE FOLLOWS. AFTER CLEARANCE WITH THE INDIANS AND INITIALLING OF MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, THIS SHOULD BE RELEASED SIMULTANEOUSLY IN NEW DELHI AND WASHINGTON. SUGGEST RELEASE TIME 6:00 P.M. NEW DELHI AND 8:30 P.M. WASHINGTON ON EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE. INFORM US SOONEST OF PROPOSED RELEASE DATE AND TIME.

JOINT PRESS RELEASE

DURING THEIR DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON, WHICH WERE INTERRUPTED BY THE SUDDEN DEATH OF PRIME MINISTER NEHRU, DEFENSE MINSITER Y.B. CHAVAN AND DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT S. MCNAMARA REVIEWED THE THREAT TO INDIA OF CHINESE AGGRESSION DIRECTED FROM PEIPING, THE RELATED INDIAN DEFENSE PLAN AND FUTURE U.S. MILITARY GRANT AID AND CREDIT ASSISTANCE TO INDIA. FOLLOWING THE DEFENSE MINISTER'S RETURN TO INDIA THERE HAVE BEEN FURTHER USEFUL TALKS IN NEW DELHI.

GENERAL AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED AS TO THE GRANT MILITARY ASSISTANCE WHICH THE UNITED STATES PLANS TO PROVIDE WITH RESPECT TO THE FISCAL YEAR 1965, SUBJECT TO NECESSARY ACTION BY THE UNITED STATES CONGRE

THIS ASSISTANCE INCLUDES SUCH ITEMS AS CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR INDIAN MOUNTAIN DIVISIONS, AIR DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, TRANSPORT



IT ALSO HAS BEEN AGREED THAT THE SUBJECT OF AIR DEFENSE AIRCRAFT FOR INDIA WOULD CONTINUE UNDER EXAMINATION BY BOTH SIDES.

IN ADDITION, THE UNITED STATES HAS AGREED THAT \$10 MILLION OF CREDIT WILL BE PROVIDED IMMEDIATELY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA FOR THE PURCHASE OF SUCH DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES AS VEHICLES AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, CERTAIN EQUIPMENT FOR THE MODERNIZATION OF INDIAN ORDNANCE FACTORIES AND AN ENGINEERING STUDY FOR THE NEW AMBAJHARI ORDNANCE PLANT.

DURING THE DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON MINISTER CHAVAN EXPLAINED THAT THE INDIAN DEFENSE EFFORT, INCLUDING FOREIGN EXCHANGE EXPENDITURES FOR DEFENSE PURPOSES, SHOULD NOT IMPAIR THE RATE OF THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF INDIA. IT WAS AGREED THAT TO SECURE THIS OBJECTIVE CAREFUL CONTROL OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AS WELL AS CONTINUED EXTERNAL AID WOULD BE NECESSARY. SECRETARY MCNAMARA INFORMED MINISTER CHAVAN THAT THE UNITED STATES PLANS TO EXTEND ADDITIONAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE CREDIT TO INDIA IN FISCAL YEAR 1965, INCLUDING FUNDS TO PROVIDE EQUIPMENT FOR THE NEW AMBAJHARI ORDNANCE PLANT.

SECRETARY MCNAMARA AND MINISTER CHAVAN AGREED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA WILL CONTINUE TO CONSULT ON INDIA'S LONG RANGE DEFENSE EFFORTS AND RELATED UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE

~~SECRET~~

GR-4

BT

PRESERVATION COPY



94  
Attach. Tab A - Memo of Understanding Rev. Draft dtd 5/27/64

SECRET Tab B - Ltr McNamara to Chavan and Press Release June 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

McNamara's talks with Indian Defense Minister Chavan went quite well, until interrupted by Nehru's death. Indians had produced a 5-Year Defense Plan at our request, and we managed to squeeze the key foreign exchange component down \$332 million (about 20%) on grounds deleted items were militarily unnecessary and too great a burden on the economy.

In turn McNamara has agreed to \$50 million MAP in FY'65 for mountain warfare equipment, communications, and defense production. He has withheld any 5-year MAP promises until he can work over their plan some more, especially on the air side. We did, however, tell Indians they could assume for planning purposes roughly same level in future years.

McNamara also agreed to sell on credit terms up to \$10 million in FY'64 and \$50 million FY'65 certain items to be agreed. Since the Indians intend to spend some of their own hard currency anyway, this neat device meant that much of it will flow to us rather than to the Soviets or UK.

Both we and Indians regard this exercise to date as successful and want to tape it down in a Memorandum of Understanding (Tab A), which McNamara has OKed. Chavan has himself appealed to us to OK it, so that he can run it through Indian cabinet, and we can put out a brief announcement on success of talks, a good gesture in India just now.

The Memo, and proposed bland press release (Tab B), fall far short of what Bowles wants (but will be a plus in India even so). For example, it does not include any US jet offer designed to pre-empt Indian MIG deal with Soviets. Bundy and I hope you'll hear argument on this separately later

We simply want to give you the final word on this before going ahead. It's only an early stage in a long and painful dialogue with the Indians but both sides are happy with progress to date. Nor will Paks be too unhappy, because we haven't given much (we've kept them clued).

Recommend your early approval. Indians hope to get it so their cabinet can act before it goes Saturday to bury Nehru's ashes.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68 vol. 25 #53

R- jc NARA. Date 2-11-01

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

R. W. Komer

McG. Bundy

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

94a  
June 3, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

McNamara has approved attached US/Indian Memorandum of Understanding on military aid to India resulting from the Chavan visit. We merely want to check it (and accompanying press release) with you before sending it out.

It falls far short of what Bowles wants, but will still be a plus noise in India at a time when we want one. In fact, Shastri has already described Chavan's visit as "successful." Nor will the Paks be too unhappy because we haven't given much yet.

The Memorandum commits us only on FY'65 MAP (\$50 million). In accord with your NSAM 279, we reserve on any 5-year promise till Indians have revised their plan (though we say that for planning purposes only they can assume continuation at same level). We had considerable success in getting Indians to cut \$332 million in foreign exchange out of their plan, and McNamara intends to keep working for more cuts, especially on air side. However, to meet Indian political sensibilities, he has at Chavan's request put his reservations in a separate letter to Chavan (also attached).

Only new feature is our willingness to provide credit for sales up to \$10 million in FY'64 and \$50 million in FY'65, if Indian plan is satisfactory. This means in effect that we'll get a fair share of the hard currency the Indians intend to spend anyway, instead of it flowing to the Soviets, UK, or someone else.

Air package which Bowles badly wants is not included in attached, but Bundy and I hope you'll hear argument on this shortly. We see some real political mileage to be gained at little cost.

Recommend your early approval, as Chavan has urged we make press release Saturday before new Indian cabinet leaves to scatter Nehru's ashes.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 2-11-04



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUCQHKB/CINCMEAFSA  
STATE GRNC

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1964 JUN 3 AM 7 10

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT IMMEDIATE 3626,  
INFO CINCMEAFSA. JUN 3, 3PM.

FOR SECRETARIES RUSK AND MCNAMARA. ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
TALBOT AND MCGEORGE BUNDY.

IN HALF-HOUR DISCUSSION THIS MORNING. DEFENSE MINISTER  
Y.B. CHAVAN TOLD ME THAT HE HAD REPORTED TO SHASTRI  
IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE LATTER'S ELECTION AS PRIMIN THAT  
HIS MEETING IN WASHINGTON HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL AND THAT  
LATER HE HAD EXPANDED ON THIS REPORT TO THE CABINET.  
FIMMIN AND OTHER KEY INDIVIDUALS HAD APPROVED STATEMENT  
OF UNDERSTANDING SUBJECT TO THE TWO CHANGES WHICH HE HAD  
SUGGESTED.

CFN 3626

. Y.

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 154 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CHAVAN STRESSED FACT THAT HE HOPED PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT  
WOULD BE MADE SOONEST. UNLESS SOMETHING DEFINITE IS  
SAID THERE WILL BE PRESS LEAKS AND SPECULATION WHICH  
WILL CREATE EMBARRASSMENT AND CONFUSION FOR BOTH GOI AND  
OURSELVES.

AS AN EXAMPLE. CHAVAN REFERRED TO AP STORY WITH  
WASHINGTON DATELINE ON FRONT PAGES OF DELHI NEWSPAPERS  
THIS MORNING WHICH WAS HEADLINED "USA TO GO SLOW ON ARMS AID  
TO INDIA". THIS FOLLOWED ON HEELS OF SHASTRI'S STATEMENT  
AT HIS INITIAL PRESS CONFERENCE LAST EVENING THAT  
"DEFENSE MINISTER CHAVAN'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON TO  
EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE HAS  
BEEN SUCCESSFUL".

CHAVAN FURTHER STATED THAT ONCE WE INFORM HIM OF OUR  
ACCEPTANCE OF STATEMENT OF GENERAL UNDERSTANDING. HE  
CAN SECURE FORMAL GOI APPROVAL WITHIN FEW HOURS. WE CAN  
THEN PUT OUT SIMULTANEOUS PRESS STATEMENTS WHICH WILL  
REFER TO THE FACT THAT AIRCRAFT PACKAGE WILL BE TAKEN UP  
IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS.

BUNDY-S  
ALEXANI  
BATOR  
BELK  
BRUBEC  
CHASE  
FORREST  
JESSOP  
JOHNSON  
KEENEY  
KLEIN  
KOMER  
MOODY  
REEDY  
SAUNDE  
SAYRE  
SMITH, W

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By pc, NARA, Date 2-1-04

JUN 3 1964

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-2- 3626, JUNE 3, 3 PM, FROM NEW DELHI

PAGE THREE RUSBAE 154 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SHASTRI AND OTHER CONGRESS PARTY LEADERS ARE LEAVING  
NEW DELHI ON SATURDAY TO TAKE NEHRU'S ASHES TO  
ALLAHABAD AND CHAVAN STRESSED THE GREAT ADVANTAGES BOTH  
TO NEW INDIAN GOVT AND U.S. IN ANNOUNCING THE GENERAL  
OUTCOME OF WASHINGTON MEETING BEFORE THAT TIME.

ALTHOUGH CYNICAL MINDS MAY SPECULATE THAT CHAVAN IS  
PRESSING FOR EARLY STATEMENT TO HELP STRENGTHEN HIS OWN  
POSITION, I DO NOT BELIEVE THEY ARE CORRECT IN THIS  
INSTANCE SINCE THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT IN CHAVAN'S MIND  
OR ANYONE ELSE'S THAT HE WILL STAY IN CABINET.

I APPRECIATE THAT EVERYONE, PARTICULARLY THE TWO  
SECRETARIES, ARE UNDER HEAVY PRESSURES IN REGARD TO  
SOUTHEAST ASIA SITUATION. HOWEVER. IN VIEW OF GREAT  
POLITICAL ADVANTAGES OF A PROMPT DECISION HERE. I  
EARNESTLY RECOMMEND THAT I BE AUTHORIZED, FOLLOWING  
FINAL AGREEMENT WITH INDIAN GOVT, TO PUT OUT A PRESS  
STATEMENT ALONG LINES OF MY RECENT EMBTEL 3572.

PAGE FOUR RUSBAE 154 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ONCE THIS STEP HAS BEEN TAKEN. AIR HERE IN NEW DELHI  
WILL BE COMPARATIVELY CLEAR AND WE CAN THEN PROCEED TO  
PRESENT WHATEVER AIR PACKAGE MAY BE AGREED ON WITH  
PRESIDENT TO CHAVAN AND HIS ASSOCIATES. THIS WILL PUT ME  
IN BEST POSSIBLE POSITION TO BRING TACTFUL PRESSURES  
TO BEAR ON SHASTRI, TTK. VHAUDHURI AND OTHERS FOR  
ACCEPTANCE OF OUR PACKAGE, WITH PROVISION THAT MIGS BE  
STRICTLY LIMITED.

IF GOI RESPONDS POSITIVELY TO AIR PACKAGE AND TECHNICAL  
DISCUSSIONS ARE REQUIRED WHICH ARE BEYOND OUR COMPETENCE  
THE NECESSARY EXPERTISE CAN BE SUPPLIED FROM WASHINGTON.  
IN MEANTIME, BY EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT OF GENERAL AGREEMENT WE  
WILL HAVE GREATLY STRENGTHENED U.S. POSITION IN INDIA AND  
EARNED SPECIAL APPRECIATION OF NEW MODERATE. PRO-US  
GOVT THAT URGENTLY NEEDS CONFIDENCE IN ITSELF AND IN  
SUPPORT OF ITS FIRENDS. GP-3.

BOWLES  
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 7:25 AM, 6/3/64.  
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 8:10 AM, 6/3/64.  
PASSED OSD FOR MCNAMARA AT 8:10 AM, 6/3/64.

NOTE: DISTR JTTION COORDINATED WITH SS.

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

BUNDY-SMITH  
ALEXANDER  
RATOR  
BELK  
BRUBECK  
CHASE  
FORRESTAL  
JESSUP  
JOHNSON  
KEENE  
KELLEY  
KOMER  
MOODY  
REEDY  
SAUNDERS  
SAYRE  
SMITH, WM. Y.

96

44

~~SECRET~~

Action

NEA

Info

SS

G

SP

L

H

E

AID

P

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

TRSY

RMR

RR RUEHCR  
DE RUSBAE 1278 29/1900Z  
R 291430Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY NEWDELHI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~SECRET~~ 3563 MAY 29 8PM

EN ROUTE DELHI WITH SECRETARY, INDIAN DEFMIN CHAVAN REVIEWED DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING THAT HAD BEEN WORKED OUT IN WASHINGTON BY RAO AND US OFFICIALS. HE APPROVED DRAFT EXCEPT AT TWO POINTS WHERE HE SAID CHANGES WOULD BE NEEDED TO AVOID DIFFICULTIES IN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.

FIRST, CHAVAN ASKED DELETION OF SECOND SENTENCE OF FIRST NUMBERED PARAGRAPH READING "IN ADDITION, MINISTER CHAVAN INDICATED HE WOULD EXAMINE THE FEASIBILITY OF WORKING TOWARD A FOREIGN EXCHANGE LEVEL OF RS. 650 CRORES (\$1,365 MILLION)." HE SAID HE BELIEVED HE COULD PERSUADE CABINET TO ACCEPT RS. 682 CRORES LIMIT MENTIONED IN PRECEDING SENTENCE AND HE UNDERSTOOD SECRETARY MACNAMARA HAD ALSO ACCEPTED THAT FIGURE. HE FELT REFERENCE TO LEVEL OF RS. 650 CRORES NOT ENTIRELY CONSISTENT  
CFN: 3563 650 \$1,365 682 650

PAGE 2 RUSBAE 1278 ~~SECRET~~  
WITH ABOVE, AND SAID THIS SENTENCE WOULD GIVE HIM GREAT TROUBLE IN CABINET. RAO ADDED THAT THEY RECOGNIZED THAT FOREIGN CURRENCY RESOURCES NOT NOW IN SIGHT BEYOND RS. 650 CRORES.

SECOND, CHAVAN STRONGLY RESISTED US WORDING IN THIRD NUMBERED PARAGRAPH "THE CORRESPONDING RUPEE BUDGET DEFERRALS AND THE FORCE PLANS REASONABLE SUPPORTABLE FROM THE AVAILABLE RESOURCES." HE SAID THIS MIGHT SUGGEST ABROGATION OF FORCE LEVEL DECISIONS TO EXTERNAL AUTHORITIES WHICH WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO INDIAN CABINET. GOI COMMITTED TO FORCE LEVELS IN PLAN AND FURTHER CHANGES SHOULD COME BY ADJUSTMENT TO REQUIREMENTS RATHER THAN FROM FOREIGN PRESSURES. TO AVOID SERIOUS POLITICAL COMPLICATIONS, HE ASKED THAT USG ACCEPT SUCH ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE AS "AND MAKE APPROPRIATE READJUSTMENTS IN THE PLAN." TALBOT SAID HE UNDERSTOOD SECRETARY MCNAMARA HAD EXPRESSED US CONCERN WITH FORCE LEVELS IN DEVELOPING ITS ASSISTANCE PROGRAM BUT COULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT INDIAN DIFFICULTIES IN WORKING OUT APPROPRIATE WORDING.  
CFN650

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-2- 3563, MAY 29, 8 PM, FROM NEW DELHI

PAGE 3 RUSBAE 1278 ~~SECRET~~

CHAVAN REQUESTED USG RESPONSE TO ABOVE TWO POINTS BY TELEGRAM IF POSSIBLE. HOPED TO BE ABLE TO PRESENT MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING TO INDIAN CABINET PROMPTLY.

7 IN REVIEW OF WASHINGTON TALKS TALBOT NOTED PRESIDENT HAD EXPECTED TO STATE USG POSITION ON SOME PREVIOUSLY UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS AT MEETING WITH CHAVAN ON THURSDAY. HOWEVER, CONSULTATION WITHIN USG HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETED WHEN SECRETARY HAD TO LEAVE FOR PRIME MINISTER'S FUNERAL. WE ASSUMED GOI WOULD NOW BE OCCUPIED WITH OTHER MATTERS FOR SOME TIME, BUT WE WOULD BE READY FOR COMPLETION OF TALKS WHEN IT DESIRED. CHAVAN EXPRESSED THANKS AND PREDICTED GOI WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH US SHORTLY.  
BOWLES

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Draft  
Chavon 97

INDIAN DEFENSE VISITS (11 - 29 MAY 1964)

Tentative List of Papers

India Visit

<u>Title</u>	<u>Responsible Agency</u>
A. <u>Scope Paper</u> Succinct statement of anticipated Indian positions, U.S. objectives and positions regarding same.	NESA
B. <u>Guidance Paper</u> Specific guidance on do's and don'ts to all addressees who will be doing business with Indian group. Request for prompt reporting MemCons. Guidance paper for Solbert's signature	NESA
C. <u>Assessment of Indian Five-Year Plan</u>	NESA Drawing on comments received from JCS, State, OFEA, DIA
D. <u>Analysis of Indian Defense Budget, Foreign Exchange for Defense</u>	OFEA in coord. with State/AID, OSD Compt., DIA
E. <u>The CHICOM Threat</u> a. Air b. Ground c. Sea	DIA
F. <u>Pak Capabilities and Threat to India</u>	DIA
G. <u>Indian Air Force Requirements</u> a. Aircraft (U.S.) b. HF-24	AF (Mr. Hilbert)
H. <u>Star Sapphire</u>	Air Force
I. <u>Defense Production</u>	Army (in coord. with AF & Navy)

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Authority NLS-032-023-1-7  
By sp/abm. NARA, Date 8-11-07



<u>Title</u>	<u>Responsible Agency</u>
J. <u>Military Sales, India</u>	ILN
K. <u>Third Country Aid to India (Commonwealth, Soviet, other), Past and Projected</u>	DIA, ODMA
L. <u>MAP for India; Prior, Present, Future (FY 63 - FY 65)</u>	ODMA
M. <u>JCS Recommended Force Goals for India, Rationale in Support Thereof</u>	Jt. Staff
N. <u>Biographics on Members of Indian Defense Team</u>	USMSMI, DIA
O. <u>Other Key Points for Discussion (Based on Kelly Recommendations not covered above)</u>	NESA - USMSMI
P. <u>MemCons on Discussions with Advance Party (To be prepared in sufficient time for inclusion in SecDef Briefing Book)</u>	All
Q. <u>Specific Areas of Agreement and Disagreement Emerging from Discussions with Advance Party</u>	NESA
R. <u>Covering Memo to Secretary</u>	NESA
S. <u>Talking Paper for Chavan--Secretary's Discussions</u>	NESA
T. <u>U.S. Support for Pakistan</u> General paper to be used as basis for discussions touching on Pakistan in our talks with Indians.	NESA
U. <u>Pertinent Documents</u> Five-Year Plan JCS Comments on Same Others	
V. <u>Pertinent Cables</u>	

COURSES OF ACTION FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH INDIAN DEFENSE OFFICIALS1. Prior to Arrival of Experts

a. Ambassador Bowles and General Kelly will initiate exploratory discussions with the Indians regarding the composition of our interim FY 1965 military assistance program. Ambassador Bowles will also indicate that we are reviewing our inventory of aircraft which might be available to fill India's interim requirements for all-weather interceptors and that we are looking into possibilities of assisting the Indians to obtain a power plant for the HF-24 and are consulting with the British on this. Our objective will be to ascertain what the Indian reaction might be to an offer of such assistance to the Indian Air Force.

b. Both in New Delhi and in Washington we will discuss with the Indians the implications of allocation of too large a portion of available resources to the Indian defense plan. Our objective will be to get the Government of India, prior to the visit of the Defense team, to impose an austere limit on defense expenditures envisaged under the Indian Five-Year Defense Plan. Failing this, we would hope at least to get the Indians thinking along these lines prior to reaching Washington.

2. Visit of Indian Officials

a. We would expect to explore further the content of our interim FY 1965 military assistance program and the prospects for our working out assistance to the Indian Air Force including F-6A aircraft and help with the HF-24.

b. Assuming that the Government of India had already agreed upon a financial ceiling, which would reduce expenditures under the Five-Year Defense Plan to economically sound levels, our major effort with the Officials would be to demonstrate how they could build a defense adequate to meet the Chicom threat within such a ceiling. For example, we could

demonstrate

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demonstrate that by using our F-6A aircraft, which they could obtain at relatively low cost, and by looking to the HF-24 over the longer run, the Indians could make great savings through avoiding the purchase of expensive supersonics today and setting up a second (MIG) production line in the future. Similarly in the area of defense production we might demonstrate that the Indians could make substantial savings by focusing on simpler projects, such as the manufacture of ammunition, and continuing to procure more complex equipment at considerable savings through MAP.

c. If the Indians have not yet set a satisfactory financial ceiling for expenditures under their Five-Year Defense Plan, we could suggest such a ceiling ourselves. Our procedure thereafter would be the same as under (b) above. The principal thrust of our discussion would be to show the Indians how they could obtain an adequate defense using such limited resources.

d. This approach could be used both in opening general sessions regarding the entire Five-Year Plan as well as in succeeding specialized sessions concerning various aspects of the Plan. It would require the presence of well-briefed experts who could talk in terms of alternative ways of meeting Indian Defense requirements and the relative cost of each.

### 3. Chavan Visit

a. As a result of our efforts in Stages I and II, we would expect that by the time he had reached Washington Chavan would already have begun to think in terms of building the best defense possible within a resource ceiling rather than planning an ideal defense and then searching for the resources necessary to finance it. We would hope that a series of talks with senior Defense, AID and State officials, culminating in a talk with Secretary McNamara, would bring home to Chavan the essentials of how India can get the best defense for the least expenditure and how it can use bargain basement MAP from the U.S. to help in this process.

~~SECRET~~