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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Origin ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI 2478

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Info:

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NSC

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Chavon
X India
X Cable
India

289
Chavon
5/28/64

Please deliver following message from President
to Chavan:

QUOTE

May 28, 1964

I too am sorry we did not have the opportunity
to meet, and I deeply regret the tragic circumstances
which caused its postponement. However, I too look
forward to close and friendly association between our
two countries. I am sure that your discussions here made
clear our continuing desire to help India in the military
as well as economic field.

Lyndon B. Johnson

This message not for release.

- UNQUOTE-SMITH
- ALEXANDER
- BATOR
- BELK
- BRUEBECK
- CHASE
- FORRESTAL
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- KEENEY
- KLEIN
- KONER

BALL.

Drafted by:
Text received from WH:mj 5/29/64
Classification approved by:

S/S MOODY
REDDY

- SAUNDERS
- SAYRE

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Phoned from Secretary Rusk's plane - 12:30 p.m. May 27

May 27, 1964

MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM INDIAN DEFENSE
MINISTER CHAVAN

I deeply regret that I have to return to India in such tragic circumstances without meeting you. I was looking forward to meeting you and conveying the greetings and good wishes of the Prime Minister to you, Mr. President, and to the American people. We look forward to close and continued association between our two countries and I am confident your friendly interest in our country would continue. I am most grateful for the courtesies and assistance extended to me personally while I have been in your country.

100
Chavan Visit
x India
x Nehru

101
K
May 27, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. VALENTI

SUBJECT: Appointment with the President
- Indian Defense Minister Chavan

Chavan was scheduled to see the President at 11:30 A.M. on May 28. Because of Nehru's death, Chavan is now on his way back to India, and you can cancel the appointment.

Gordon Chase

cc: Mr. Bundy
Mr. Komer ✓

MAY 27 1964

SECRET

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By je, NARA, Date 2-11-01

102 Chavan
Indira Indira May
May 25, 1964

Mac -

Indian air defense decision. Question of a contingent aid offer to Indians if they'll scrap MIG-21 production plan will probably be main subject your talk with Bowles tomorrow, and I hope come up at LBJ lunch, so we can say something to Chavan Thursday.

Context is important. With lowering of direct US/USSR temperature, Khrushchev is obviously going in for increased competitive effort in those key third countries where we've had successes--first India, Algeria, now UAR, tomorrow perhaps Iraq, Indonesia. In many cases he's picked up things we've been reluctant to sponsor--Bokaro, VOA transmitter, arms aid, heavy industrial projects. He sees a way to get real political mileage at relatively modest cost because he knows Passmanism makes it hard for us to compete these days.

I see merit in F-104 proposal not just to pre-empt Soviet MIGs (I doubt that we can). Instead I see it as the key symbolic gesture we can make at this point to maintain the momentum of our Indian enterprise at a time when the Soviets are catching up from behind. Also important, when the Indians see Pakistan getting 104s for no better reason than they, they think we treat them as second-class citizens.

The State/Bowles proposal is clever. We tell Chavan:

- a. To meet your immediate needs we'll give you 72 surplus F-6As (\$25 million only).
- b. For the longer run, we'll break our backs to make your own HF-24 supersonic.
- c. If after a good try at this HF-24 doesn't pan out, we'll sell you 2-3 squadrons of F-104s.
- d. Of course, this fully meets your air need as we see it, so no point in going ahead with MIG-21 production. To do both would be unjustifiable extra foreign exchange drain on your economy. So we pre-empt MIGs except for say one squadron Indians buy.

Most of us are convinced India is so far along on MIG deal it can't renege, so we get credit for 104 offer without having to make good. But say Chavan bites (his air chief would greatly prefer 104s to MIGs). We would still be providing F-104s within grant or sales ceilings we're setting now, so they would be a substitute, not an add-on. No extra out-of-pocket cost to us.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

2.

Paks would be mighty unhappy, but they'll be getting F-104s too. And if we refuse 104s to India, then go ahead with Paks, we'll just have same problem in reverse.

So I see problem as 90% political. While McNamara is right in saying 104 is too rich for Indian (or Pak) blood, fact is they (and everyone else) love these flashy supersonics. So if it doesn't cost Bob anything (but injured pride), why not get credit for a gesture that probably is free, or that won't cost extra if Indians nibble?

Could I urge you talk directly with McNamara on this before seeing Bowles tomorrow?

RWK

P.S. Phil Potter was in this afternoon, asking about Chavan visit. Saying he gathered F-104 (being touted by Indians) was fairly remote, he said "we really ought to go ahead with it for basically political reasons." Listen to him, if you won't to me.

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
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103

SECRET

WILLY-SMITH
ALEXANDER
BATOR
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CHASE
FORRESTAL
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JOHNSON
KEENEY
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SMITH, WM. Y.

MAY 23 11 27 AM '64

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Origin
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Info

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI 2400
INFO : Amembassy KARACHI 1511
Amembassy LONDON 7694
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Indian Defense Minister Chavan and Ambassador B. K. Nehru called on Governor Harriman May 21. During discussion Chicom threat, Harriman observed current Chicom peace-loving posture suggested attack on India not imminent. Stated, however, beneath this was basic aggressive attitude of China, which was basis conflict with Soviets.

Discussing Pak-Chicom relationship Harriman explained we thought it was limited. It quite clear Pakistan depends on ties with West. Ambassador Nehru said India believes there is military understanding between Pakistan and Communist China. Expressed concern that Paks would keep Indian troops diverted if Communist China attacked. Communist China would play similar role if Pak-Indian trouble developed. Ambassador Nehru said, given common Pak-Chicom enmity toward India he wondered how it could harm Pakistan to continue anti-Indian policy in concert with Communist China. West doesn't want cut off aid and Pakistan knows this. Harriman replied we doubt there any such military agreement. We have no serious objection to trade with China, in which many Free World countries engaged. Talbot repeated that Paks limited by

Drafted by:	Telegraphic transmission and	M - Gov. Harriman
NEA:SOA:DTSchneider:fah:5/22/64	classification approved by:	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Clearances:		

S/S - Miss Moor

SOA - Mr. Schneider

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

By jc, NARA, Date 2-11-04

~~SECRET~~

dependence upon relationship with West. Observed that principal preoccupation of Pakistan was with relationship with India; there no deep ties with China. Ambassador Nehru agreed fear--or hate--of India is behind Pak policy. India not suggesting Pakistan will join Communist bloc.

Harriman said it came as great shock to Pakistan when US provided arms aid India. We don't think Pakistan's fear of India justified but believe it will continue at least until Kashmir solved. We believe Ayub understands that in long run subcontinent can be secure only if India and Pakistan come to agreement. We hope India can help get us out of difficult position of supplying arms to two countries engaged in regional dispute. We are hopeful Sheikh Abdullah talks in India and Pakistan may bring progress towards solution Kashmir.

Chavan responded that India wishes well to Abdullah who is considering entire Indo-Pak issue QUOTE on broader level UNQUOTE. Mere solution Kashmir, however, will not resolve Indo-Pak dispute and may create new set of problems.

GP-3.

End

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

104

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~BUNDY~~
~~ALEXANDER~~
~~BATOR~~
~~BELK~~
~~BRUTICK~~
~~CHASE~~
~~FOURSTAR~~
~~JESSUP~~
~~JOHNSON~~
~~KENNY~~
~~KLEIN~~
~~KOMER~~

092

AIR

~~REEDY~~
~~SAUNDERS~~
SAYRE

Gov. Harriman

MAY 25 1964 By jc, NARA, Date 2-1-04

~~SECRET~~

Governor Harriman said if Ambassador Nehru had any ideas how to deal with Laos problem we would welcome them. Indian Chairman ICC can play important role. We assume Indians have interest in preventing Chicom advance in Southeast Asia. When Chavan inquired what India could do to help, Governor Harriman replied Indian Chairman has not always done what we would like, although he has been basically helpful.

GP-3.

End

NOTE: POUCHED BY OCT

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

India Chavan
X India Map

~~SECRET~~

May 23, 1964

105

Mac -

McNamara took rather hard line during Chavan visit, but did not get into airplane matter at all. He emphasized importance of shaving Indian defense effort to reasonable size, particularly on air side. If Indians would do so along lines we suggest, he'd allow \$50 million in arms credits for FY'65 (on top of planned \$50 million MAP). At my suggestion Chavan will see him again Thursday before seeing LBJ.

McNamara was pretty firm with Rusk on opposing 104s for India as wasteful and unnecessary. In fact, Bob's against any more 104s for Paks either although we've in effect "committed" ourselves to two more squadrons if political climate is right.

So air aid to India needs to be discussed at Tuesday lunch. Issue still shapes up along lines I described. In essence, it's a political decision. If the Indians want 104s they'll have to give up MIGs. If the Indians won't give up MIGs, they don't get 104s, but we get credit for offering them. In either case, net out-of-pocket cost to us is no greater-- in other words any provision of supersonics to India will have to be within existing MAP or credit ceiling.

Meanwhile I'll try to head off Bowles from over-agitating this issue. It's OK if he works on Rusk when he sees latter Monday, but not McNamara or LBJ. I also intend to tell him he shouldn't try to see LBJ until after he comes back from vacation.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By ja, NARA, Date 2-11-04

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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SAYRE
SMITH, JIMMY

May 22 9 01 PM '64

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Origin
NEA

Info:

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ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI 2397
INFO: Amembassy KARACHI 1568
Amembassy LONDON 7691
Amembassy VIENTIANE 1055
CINCSTRIKE FOR POLAD
Amembassy PARIS (POUCH)

Following summary FYI only and NOFORN. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review of memcon.

During meeting with Indian DefMin Y. B. Chavan May 21, Secretary discussed at length problems in Southeast Asia. Secretary said uncertainties about immediate days and weeks ahead in Southeast Asia in matter of make it a little difficult for us to look ahead/over India's defense problems over a period of years. Said it uncertain what Peiping up to in Southeast Asia. If Chicoms press we may be in very serious trouble there and shape of things to come may be changed. The issue of war is on our doorstep. We greatly appreciate work of Indian Chairman ICC in recent weeks.

Questioned regarding Laos, Secretary replied Soviets say they continue support Geneva Agreements but they have found every pretense claim West not living up to Geneva. Soviets in real dilemma; we believe they had originally intended support Agreement. However, if they support Geneva in Laos now their influence in Hanoi vis-a-vis Chicoms will decline. Seems possible Soviets may, in effect, wash hands of Laos; withdrawal of

Drafted by:

NEA:SOA:DTSchneider:dln 5/22/64

Clearances:

FE/SEA - Mr. Bruns
S/S - Miss Moor

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: NEA/SEA - David T. Schneider

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

MAY 25 1964

Authority: NLS-032R.023.001/6
By: NARA, Date: 6-28-12

~~SECRET~~

Polish member from ICC suggests this. ⁴ Emphasizing seriousness Southeast Asia crisis, Secretary ~~xxx~~ said since Geneva, Hanoi and Pathet Lao ~~guilty~~ battalions guilty violating Geneva accords on two counts: 1) Viet Minh ~~units~~ never withdrawn; 2) Ho Chi Minh trail from North Viet Nam has continued in use for infiltration Laos. Secretary saw three possible explanations Pathet Lao activity: 1) normal pre-monsoon push with limited objectives; 2) attempt ~~xxxxxx~~ secure territory up to cease-fire line of 1962 between Pathet Lao and neutralists on one side and rightists on other; 3) possible push QUOTE all the way, UNQUOTE although we have no intelligence indicating this.

B. K. Nehru interjected that Poles had told Indians tripartite Laos no longer existed and Souvanna is prisoner of rightists. Secretary replied problem had been that Souvanna had never had any authority whatsoever over Pathet Lao. Returning to subject of Polish withdrawal of ICC Secretary said our ~~position~~ position is ~~xx~~ that absence of one member does not prevent ICC from functioning. Noted Polish Deputy, according to recent report, had participated in latest ICC investigation perhaps as result our attitude functioning of ICC.

GP-3.

End

RUSK

NOTE: Pouched by DCT

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DECLASSIFIED

May 21, 1964

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 25, #44

By jc . NARA. Date 2-11-04

Mac -

107
Chavon Visic
x India Map

Indian Defense Team talks here have boiled down to two issues, which may be decided when McNamara talks with Chavan tomorrow morning.

A. FY'65 arms credit ceiling. Indian 5-Year Defense Plan called for \$1.9 billion foreign exchange outlays 1965-69. By some tall talking about how to get more defense for less and overriding need to protect development program, we've brought Indians down to \$1.5. We think proper level ought to be about \$1.3 billion, a cool one-third cut (but we can probably get Indian Finance Ministry to do this).

Issue turns on whether we should now offer Indians up to \$50 million in FY'65 MAP credit sales (on top of \$50 million MAP grants we plan). Since Indians will spend foreign exchange anyway, credit offers mean they'll buy from us rather than Sovs (or Brits, etc.) thus limiting purchases they can make from Sovs (pre-emption in fact). DOD wants to tell Indians now, so they can plan properly. State wants to hold off firm credit offer as lever to bring Indian ceiling down from \$1.5 to \$1.3. I don't feel strongly but lean toward State, especially since we could give 3/4 % terms which makes Indian mouths water.

B. Should we offer F-104s? We're convinced Indians won't buy our aid package of 75 surplus F-6As plus help on HF-24 designed to pre-empt MIG deal. If not, McNamara would like to offer his favorite F-5. But Indians don't want it; like everyone else they want flashy 104s (Lockheed went out and sold them again). Bob says "never!" From a purely military viewpoint he's dead right. F-5 or F-6A is cheaper, easier to handle, maintain, etc.

But issue turns on political grounds (and NEA hopes to get Rusk to talk to Bob). NEA would like to tell Indians let's see if HF-24 deal can be worked out in lieu of MIGs. If not, we'll help you get alternate 2-3 squadrons of 104s within next 3-4 years, provided you don't build MIGs. Argument runs:

a. This gives fighting chance of blocking MIG production (1 in 5 is my guess). But if Indians don't bite, as all too likely, then we at least get the credit for having been forthcoming. We've convinced them at least that we don't regard them as second-rate citizens vis-a-vis the Paks (who get 104s). So we get a free ride.

b. True 104s are "wasteful", but they involve no extra out-of-pocket cost to us. All we'd do is substitute 104s for other items, not add them on. Since Indians are going to waste money on supersonics anyway, why not let it flow back to us rather than to Soviets?

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2.

c. Bowles is right, after all, that Sovs are mounting a major new Indian aid effort (in response to ours, by the way). We'll have to live with it, and it partly serves our purpose, but after the big upward push of 1961-63 why let the Soviets gain too much kudos by picking up every option--supersonics, BOKARO, new VOA transmitter--we let drop.

d. We know we're going to give Paks two more squadrons of 104s, even though we're playing hard to get just now. Are 104s for Paks more sensible than for Indians? Hell no.

- - - - -

I've carried this as far as I can with DOD. Would you entertain calling Bob on this before he sees Chavan tomorrow? Bob's right that 104s are wasteful, but I think you'll agree that's not the point.

At minimum I'd like to see Bob avoid saying "no" till you, he and Rusk could talk with LBJ next Tuesday lunchtime. LBJ sees Chavan Thursday. He could make some real Indian mileage by offering 104s in lieu of MIGs, an offer which probably wouldn't be picked up, which wouldn't cost extra if it was, and which is no more than we're already doing for no better reason for Pakistan.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 19, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. KOMER

SUBJECT: Meeting with President -- Indian
Defense Minister Chavan

Chavan is scheduled to see the President for a
brief visit at 11:30 on May 28. State and DOD
have been informed. State will coordinate with
DOD on the preparation of a briefing memo-
randum.

Gordon Chase

cc: Mr. Bundy
Mr. Valenti

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 2-1-04

MAY 19 1964

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

109

BUNDY-SMITH

~~SECRET~~

ALF

DEK

FOU BOK

CHAP

DUNGAN

FARISTAL

JESSUP

JOHNSON

KENNY

KIRK

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SMITH, WM. Y.

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1964 MAY 14 PM 1 52

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Action

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INFO RUSBKP/AMEMBASSY KARACMO
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BT

~~SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT 3372 INFO KARACHI 1243 LONDON 1226
CINCMEAFSA UNN FROM NEWDELHI MAY 14, 11:00 AM

DEPT PASS DEFENSE, AID

CINCMEAFSA FOR POLAD

REF: (A) EMBTEL 3304 INFO KARACHI 1217, LONDON 1198, CIN-
CMEAFSA UNN; (B) EMBTEL 3355, INFO KARACHI 1235, LONDON 1217,
CINCMEAFSA UNN

1. THIS MESSAGE FURTHER SPELLS OUT SUGGESTION IN REFTELS
THAT WASHINGTON STRESS POTENTIAL ROLE OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN
DEFENSE PRODUCTION WITH THE RAO TEAM AND CHAVAN DURING VISIT.
ON REALISTIC APPRAISAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL BRAKES
LIMIT PRIVATE SECTOR RE DEFENSE TO COMMON-USE ITEMS AND COM-
PONENTS. EVEN SO MOD RESISTS BRINGING PRIVATE SECTOR INTO THESE
FIELDS AND MAKING ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES NEEDED
TO UTILIZE PRIVATE SECTOR FOR THIS PURPOSE. COGENT PRESENT-
ATION OF THE ADVANTAGES OF THE CIVIL SECTOR PROCUREMENT AND
OF VARIOUS MEANS TO ASSURE ADEQUATE STANDARDS AND AVOIDANCE
EXCESSIVE PRICES AND PROFITS WOULD BE HELPFUL.

2. SUGGEST AT LEAST THE FOLLOWING GENERAL POINTS BE PRESENTED
AND ILLUSTRATED WITH CASES:

(A) BROADENING MOBILIZATION BASE--IF PRIVATE PRODUCERS UTILIZE
PART OF THEIR CAPACITY FOR DEFENSE, THEY CAN EXPAND RAPIDLY
AND ECONOMICALLY TO WARTIME RATES OF PRODUCTION WHEN NEC-

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date *2-11-04*

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MAY 15 1964

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-2- 3372, MAY 14, 11 AM

CESSARY, WHEREAS TO BUILD NEW ORDNANCE FACTORIES TO MEET FULL WARTIME DEMAND WOULD BE BOTH TIME-CONSUMING AND COSTLY.

(B) ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND BETTER UTILIZATION OF PLANT CAPACITY--DEFENSE PROCUREMENT IN PRIVATE SECTOR WILL ENABLE ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND BETTER UTILIZATION OF PLANT CAPACITY WHICH WILL REDUCE COSTS AND WILL THUS BE ADVANTAGEOUS FROM STANDPOINT OF ONLY OF GOVT PROCUREMENT BUT OF OPERATION OF CIVILIAN SECTOR AS WELL. IF GOI PLACES DEFENSE ORDERS WITH PRIVATE INDUSTRIES, MANY OF WHICH ARE SMALL OR MEDIUM-SIZED, THEY CAN EXPAND TOWARD MORE EFFICIENT OUTPUT LEVELS. IN CASE OF TRUCK PRODUCTION, FOR EXAMPLE, IF PRODUCTION AT TELCO COULD BE INCREASED TO MOST ECONOMIC SCALE, MANUFACTURING COSTS COULD DECLINE 15-25 PERCENT. ON OTHER HAND, IF GOVT BUILDS ITS OWN SMALL OR MEDIUM-SIZED PLANTS OPPORTUNITIES TO ACHIEVE ECONOMIES OF SCALE WILL BE LOST.

(C) HIGHER QUALITY PRODUCTS--LINKED TO ECONOMIES OF SCALE IS POINT THAT LARGER PLANTS CAN PRODUCE HIGHER QUALITY MATERIAL BECAUSE THEY CAN AFFORD TO EMPLOY SPECIAL PURPOSE EQUIPMENT, AUTOMATIC TRANSFER MACHINERY, AND SO FORTH.

(D) SHARING OF OVERHEADS--THERE CAN BE SOME CONSERVATION OF OVERHEADS, PARTICULARLY OF SCARCE MANAGERIAL TALENT, WHEN CIVILIAN PRODUCERS TAKE ON DEFENSE ORDERS.

(E) INCREASED FLEXIBILITY AND SPEEDED EXPANSION IN CASE OF EMERGENCY--IF PROCUREMENT ORGANIZATION EXISTS AND MANUFACTURERS HAVE EXPERIENCE WITH DEFENSE ORDERS, BASIS WILL HAVE BEEN LAID FOR READY CONVERSION AND EXPANSION OF CIVILIAN SECTOR INTO DEFENSE PRODUCTION. ONCE NECESSARY STOCKAGE LEVELS HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED, DEFENSE PRODUCTION RATES WILL DECLINE SHARPLY; WHEREAS IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES PUBLIC SECTOR PLANT MAY REMAIN PARTIALLY IDLE AT GREAT EXPENSE, PRIVATE MANUFACTURER WHO HAS BEEN DEVOTING PORTION OF HIS FACILITIES TO DEFENSE CAN CONVERT THESE TO CIVILIAN PRODUCTION COMPARATIVELY SMOOTHLY, WITH LESSER OVER-ALL COST TO THE ECONOMY.

(F) SAVINGS ON GOVT CAPITAL OUTLAY--UTILIZATION OF PRIVATES SECTOR WILL REDUCE NEED FOR GOVT CAPITAL OUTLAYS FOR DEFENSE PRODUCTION. WITH ASSURED MARKET AND REASONABLE PROFIT 5 PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURS WILL INVEST THEIR OWN FUNDS, WHICH TO SOME DEGREE AND IN SOME CASES WOULD NOT OTHERWISE BE PROFITABLY INVESTED, THUS OBTAINING NECESSITY FOR GOVT INVESTMENT.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 3372, MAY 14, 11 AM

(G) COLLABORATION WITH FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTORS--LATTER WILL BE MORE DISPOSED TO COLLABORATE WITH PRIVATE PRODUCERS THAN WITH PUBLIC PLANTS. THUS NEEDED FOREIGN CAPITAL AND MANAGERIAL AND TECHNICAL SKILLS MORE LIKELY BE FORTHCOMING IF DEFENSE PRODUCTION IN PRIVATE RATHER THAN PUBLIC SECTOR.

3. IN ADDITION TO PRESENTING THE ABOVE POINTS DURING THE DISCUSSIONS IN WASH, U.S. SHOULD TRY TO SHOW INDIANS THE CONTRIBUITION WHICH OUR PRIVATE MANUFACTURERS ARE MAKING TO US DEFENSE. SUGGEST ITINERARIES OF SEVERAL MEMBERS, PARTICULARLY CHAVAN, RAO, AND SOUNDARARAJAN, INCLUDE VISITS TO PRIVATE PRODUCERS AS WELL AS GOVT INSTALLATIONS.

4. ONE KEY REASON WHICH INDIANS GIVE AGAINST RELIANCE ON PRIVATE SECTOR FOR DEFENSE PROCUREMENT IS THAT PRIVATE SECTOR WILL CHARGE EXORBITANT PRICES AND REAP UNCONSCIONABLE PROFITS. AS INDICATED IN PARA 4, REF (B), I HAVE TRIED TO SUGGEST TO CHAVAN AND OTHER GOI OFFICIALS THAT THERE ARE WAYS TO PROTECT THE GOVT AGAINST PRICE GOUGING AND EXCESSIVE PROFITS. I HAVE GIVEN CHAVAN MEMORANDUM BRIEFLY DESCRIBING US MILITARY PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES, INCLUDING CONTRACT RENEGOTIATION, AND MEANS WHEREBY GOI UNDER ITS OWN LEGISLATION AS WELL AS BY ADAPTING AMERICAN PROCEDURES COULD PROTECT ITSELF AGAINST OVER-PRICING. COPY OF MEMORANDUM BEING SENT TO GRANT. YOU MAY WISH TO ELABORATE SOME OF POINTS IN MEMORANDUM.

5. IN ADDITION, WE SUGGEST THAT WASHINGTON OFFER PROVIDE GOI WITH EXPERTS IN DEFENSE PROCUREMENT FIELD TO HELP GOI SET UP EFFECTIVE PROCEDURES AND CONTROLS. GOI IN GREAT NEED SUCH ASSISTANCE NOT ONLY FROM STANDPOINT COMPARATIVELY NARROW PROBLEM OF AVOIDANCE OVER-PRICING BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY FROM GENERAL STANDPOINT OF ESTABLISHING EFFECTIVE SYSTEM FOR UTILIZING PRIVATE SECTOR AND FOR MAINTAINING ADEQUATE CONTROL SYSTEM.

GP-3.

BOWLES

NOTE: PASSED DEFENSE 5/14/64, 3:50 PM

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

110

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Control: 11519
Rec'd: MAY 14, 1964
7:00 PM

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~~MOODY~~
~~REEDY~~
~~SAUNDERS~~
~~SMITH, WM. Y.~~

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AIR
RMR

FROM: NEW DELHI

ACTION: SECSTATE 3355

INFO: LONDON 1217
KARACHI 1235
CINCMEAFSA UNNUMBERED

DATE: MAY 12, 7 PM

CINCMEAFSA FOR POLAD

LATE MONDAY I CALLED ON CHAVAN AT HIS REQUEST FOR LAST VISIT BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE. HE LEFT FOR BOMBAY TODAY WHERE HE WILL SPEND FEW DAYS BEFORE DEPARTING FOR US.

CHAVAN WITH WHOM IT IS USUALLY DIFFICULT TO COMMUNICATE WAS IN RATHER OUTGOING MOOD. HE WAS APPRECIATIVE OF OUR FRANK DISCUSSIONS IN PREPARATION FOR VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND REASSURING IN RESPECT TO INDIA'S DESIRE TO MAINTAIN BALANCE BETWEEN MILITARY DEFENSE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS DURING CONVERSATION HE IMPLIED THAT MILITARY PEOPLE WERE PRESSING HARD FOR EQUIPMENT ABOUT WHICH HE HIMSELF WAS UNCERTAIN. THIS GAVE ME OPPORTUNITY TO STRESS THAT WHILE THIS SITUATION IS PRESENT IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER IN ALMOST EVERY GOVT, IT CAN BE COSTLY IF SUCH VIEWS ARE ALLOWED TO DOMINATE.

FOLLOWING POINTS DEVELOPED DURING CONVERSATION:

1. ACCORDING TO CHAVAN, ARJAN SINGH, WHO WILL BECOME AIR-MARSHAL ON RETIREMENT OF ENGINEER, BELIEVES F-104 TO BE WORLD'S FINEST AIRPLANE AND CONSEQUENTLY HAS SET HIS HEART ON PROCURING SOME FROM US. I SUGGESTED THAT HEAVY COST OF F-104 AND SLOWNESS OF DELIVERY WOULD APPEAR TO MAKE OTHER PLANES OFFER BETTER INVESTMENT IN VIEW OF INDIA'S IMMEDIATE SECURITY PROBLEM. SITUATION AS I SAW IT WAS TO FIND INEXPENSIVE HIGH PERFORMANCE

~~SECRET~~

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Authority NW.032R.023.001/7
By re, NARA, Date 6-28-12

MAY 15 1964

~~SECRET~~

-2- 3355, MAY 12, 7 PM FROM NEW DELHI

AIRCRAFT TO FILL IMMEDIATE GAP AND THEN PUSH FOR DEVELOPMENT OF HF-24 (MACH 2) FOR DELIVERY WITHIN FEW YEARS.

2. SPEAKING FRANKLY I SAID THERE WERE SEVERAL POLITICAL ANGLES IN PRESENT SITUATION THAT I FOUND DISTURBING; NAMELY POSSIBILITY OF OVERLY CLOSE MILITARY CONNECTION WITH USSR AND PARTNERSHIP WITH UAR IN BUILDING PLANE WHICH WOULD BE AS LIKELY TO FIGHT ISRAELIS AS CHINESE.

ALTHOUGH THESE WERE QUESTIONS FOR INDIANS TO DECIDE, AND ADMITTEDLY WE HAD BEEN DELAYED IN REACHING DECISION IN REGARD TO US ASSISTANCE, CHAVAN SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT MILITARY POLICY AND FOREIGN POLICY WERE INEVITABLY TIED TOGETHER.

3. I THEN REFERRED TO POSSIBILITY OF CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WARNED CHAVAN AGAINST DANGER OF DEVELOPING AIR DEFENSE WHICH MIGHT BE OUTMODDED WITHIN NEXT FEW YEARS IF CHINESE SUCCEED AS WE SUSPECT THEY MAY IN DEVELOPING INTERMEDIATE MISSILES WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS. WHEN AND IF THIS OCCURS, INDIA WILL BE FACED WITH THREE DIFFICULT CHOICES:

(A) TO PRODUCE COSTLY AND WASTEFUL NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF HER OWN, (B) TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH NUCLEAR POWER SUCH AS USA TO PLACE CREWS WITH NUCLEAR DETERRENT WEAPONS IN NORTH INDIA, OR (C) TO FOLLOW OUR EXAMPLE IN CUBA AND WARN CHINESE THAT IF THEY DO NOT REMOVE MISSILE INSTALLATIONS FROM THREATENING POSITIONS IN TIBET, INDIAN AIR FORCE WILL KNOCK OUT INSTALLATIONS.

ALTHOUGH THESE CHOICES MIGHT BE SEVERAL YEARS AWAY, IT WAS NOT TOO SOON FOR GOI TO BEGIN TO THINK ABOUT THEM, PARTICULARLY SINCE THEY WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY INFLUENCE NATURE OF INDIA'S PRESENT DEFENSE BUILDUP AND COURSE OF HER FOREIGN POLICY. CHAVAN QUICKLY DISMISSED FIRST CHOICE, I.E. POSSIBILITY OF INDIA BUILDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES, HE SAID, WOULD INDIAN GOVT. TAKE THIS STEP. SECOND PRESENTED OBVIOUS POLITICAL PROBLEMS. ON BALANCE, HE SEEMED TO BE INTRIGUED WITH CUBA-LIKE CONFRONTATION WITH MAO TSE-TUNG IF SITUATION SHOULD IN FACT DEVELOP AS I SUGGESTED IT MIGHT.

4. I ALSO EXPRESSED HOPE THAT INDIAN GOVT WOULD NOT ADOPT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 3355, MAY 12, 7 PM FROM NEW DELHI

NARROW DOCTRINAIRE VIEW IN REGARD TO USE OF PRIVATE SECTOR FOR DEFENSE PRODUCTION, PARTICULARLY IN AREA SUCH AS TRUCKS WHERE INCREASED VOLUME FOR PRIVATE SECTOR PLANTS COULD BE EXPECTED TO BRING DOWN COSTS. ALTHOUGH HIS PREDECESSOR (KRISHNA MENON) MAY HAVE BEEN HELD UP BY PRIVATE SECTOR PLANTS OVERPRICING OF ARMY TRUCKS, WHY SHOULD HE ALLOW THIS TO HAPPEN TO HIM? WHY NOT ESTABLISH RE-NEGOTIATING POWER AS IN US WHICH PERMITS USG EXAMINATION OF BOOKS OF MANUFACTURING PLANTS AND TO COLLECT FOR OVERCHARGES. TO THIS HE SEEMED RESPONSIVE. (NOTE. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL DURING CHAVAN VISIT FOR SOMEONE TO EXPLAIN TO HIM HOW OUR LEGISLATION WORKS AND PERHAPS LEAVE WITH HIM MEMO ON SUBJECT.)

COMMENT: BY AND LARGE I BELIEVE CHAVAN IS GOING OFF IN AN AFFIRMATIVE AND REASONABLY BALANCED MOOD. IT IS CLEAR FROM OUR CONVERSATION THAT HE HAS HAD SOME DISAGREEMENTS WITH HIS OWN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, AND FACT THAT HE ADMITS THIS INDICATES INCREASING CONFIDENCE IN HIMSELF. HE IS IN NO SENSE IMPRESSIVE MAN AND YOU MAY EXPECT HIM TO REMAIN QUIET THROUGH MOST OF SESSIONS. HOWEVER HE TAKES IN MORE THAN HE APPEARS TO TAKE IN AND I BELIEVE EVERYTHING WE CAN DO TO MAKE HIM PERSONALLY FEEL AT HOME, SECURE AND AMONG FRIENDS WILL PAY OFF IN DIVIDENDS HERE IN INDIA.

GP-3.

BOWLES

GEJ/22

NOTE: MESSAGE DELAYED IN TRANSMISSION.

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

36

Action

SS

Info

VV EUB830RED068
RR RUEHCR
DE RUSBAE 469 12/0815Z
R 120749Z ZEA
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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUSBKP/AMEMBASSY KARACHI
RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUCQKKB/CINCMCAFSA FOR POLAD
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~
ACTION DEPT 3345 INFO KARACHI 1232 LONDON 1215CMEAFSA
FOR POLAD UNN MAY 12 2PM
DEPT PASS DEFENSE

~~BUNDY-SMITH~~
~~ALEXANDER~~
~~BEIK~~
~~BRUBECK~~
~~CHASE~~
~~DUNGAN~~
~~FORRESTAL~~
~~JESSUP~~
~~JOHNSON~~
~~KEENE~~
~~KOMER~~
~~MOODY~~
~~REEDY~~
~~SAUNDERS~~
~~SMITH, WM. Y.~~

008575
1964 MAY 12 AM 6 51

Chavon
Vicil 037

LIMDIS

EMBTTEL 3304.

REFTEL OUTLINED OUR VIEWS ON US OBJECTIVES AND POSITION WE SHOULD ADOPT IN DISCUSSIONS WITH RAO TEAM AND CHAVAN.

BEFORE MY DEPARTURE TO US MAY 22XI PLAN PURSUE THIS MATTER WITH SEVERAL KEY MINISTERS AND OFFICIALS. I SAW CHAVAN YESTERDAY SUMMARY OF TALK IN SEPTEL AND WILL BE SEEING TTK AND OTHERS SHORTLY. IN ORDER THAT WE SPEAK WITH SAME VOICE IN WASHINGTON AND HERE, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT I HAVE FOR MY OWN BACKGROUND INFORMATION THE MAJOR POINTS AND THRUST OF WASHINGTON PRESENTATION TO RAO AND CHAVAN. WE OBVIOUSLY SHOULD NOT OPERATE HERE IN THE DARK AND IF THIS INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE TO ME, I CAN HELP KEEP INDIAN OFFICIALS HERE ON SAME WAVE LENGTH.

CFN 3345 1232 1215 3304 22

PAG TWO RUSBAE 456X ~~SECRET~~

XI WOULD ALSO LIKE TO REITERATE IMPORTANCE OF INFORMING GOI RESULTS WE EXPECT FROM CHAVAN VISIT BEFORE HE LEAVE FOR ... IN ADDITION IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL AT THIS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date *2-11-04*

MAY 12 1964

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 3345, MAY 12, 2 PM, FROM NEW DELHI

TIME TO MAKE PUBLIC U..DECISION TO FINANCE MILITARY PROGRAM
 PRIMARILY ON BASIS OF GRANT AID. THIS GENERAL APPROACH WILL
 NOT DETRACT FROM CHAVAN'S OBJECTIVES AND IT WILL KEEP
 LINES OF COMMUNICATION TO GOI IN DELHI WHERE THEY BELONG.

GP-3.

PLEASE REPLY SOONEST. BOWLES

BT

NOTE: PASSED DEFENSE 5/12/64, 8:55 AM.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

112

2498

7

Indo-Chinese
Orig Brink 5/11
9 MAY 1964

Kodak
Read memo
w/ ROK memo
5/13/64

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit of the Indian Minister of Defense

Indian Minister of Defense Y. B. Chavan will be visiting Washington at the invitation of the Secretary of Defense during the period May 19-21, 1964. As this is his first visit to the United States, a brief tour of the United States is being arranged for him from May 22-27, ending in New York. From there he will travel to London for talks with the British.

Chavan, as Defense Minister, has had primary responsibility for shaping India's defense effort following the Chinese Communist attack on India in late 1962. His visit takes place in a period of major Indian political readjustment and transition to new leadership, and at a delicate juncture in United States-Indian military relationships. As an indication of United States support to India in these circumstances, the Secretary of State and Secretary McNamara recommend that you see Chavan briefly in the afternoon of May 21.

Signed
CYRUS R. VANCE

Chavan did not see Pres. Recalled to India by Nehru. Devika 5/26

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DDI 9-24-75

By pc/w NARA, Date 2-11-04

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sec Def Cont Nr. X - 2786

MAY 11 1964

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

112a

5/11/64

To: Mr. Komer

From: McGeorge Bundy

For comment.

(Mr. Bundy also asks: How many
Indians per month?)

MAY 11 1964

CONFIDENTIAL

112b

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

9 MAY 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit of the Indian Minister of Defense

Indian Minister of Defense Y. B. Chavan will be visiting Washington at the invitation of the Secretary of Defense during the period May 19-21, 1964. As this is his first visit to the United States, a brief tour of the United States is being arranged for him from May 22-27, ending in New York. From there he will travel to London for talks with the British.

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Cyrus Vance

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Authority DDO 9-24-75

By plw NARA, Date 2-11-04

5/11/64

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Sec Def Cont Nr. X - 2786

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~BRUBECK~~
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~~JESSUP~~
~~JOHNSON~~
~~KEENE~~
~~KEIN~~
~~KOMER~~
~~MOODY~~
~~REEDY~~
~~SAUNDERS~~
~~SMITH, WM. Y.~~

54
 Action
 SS
 Info

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 PP RUENCR
 DE RUSBAE 309A 07/0230Z
 P R 071304Z ZEA
 FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
 TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
 INFO RUSBKP/AMEMBASSY KARACHI
 RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON
 RUCQHB/CINCMEAFSA
 STATE GRNC
 BT
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1964 MAY 7

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DEPT PASS DEFENSE

CINCMEAFSA FOR POLAD

DEPTEL 2085, EMBTELS 3052 AND 3112

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF OUR VIEWS ON CHAVAN VISIT INCLUDING
 BROAD US OBJECTIVES AND SPECIFIC US POSITIONS ON MAIN POINTS
 TO BE DISCUSSED.

PART 1. US OBJECTIVES

I BELIEVE WE ARE GENERALLY AGREED ON FOLLOWING OBJ-
 ECTIVES, WHICH ALTHOUGH UNLIKELY TO BE ACHIEVED IN BRIEF
 SQAN OF CHAVAN'S VISIT SHOULD SET FRAME FOR DISCUSSIONS.
 CFN 3304 1217 1198 2085 3052 3112 1

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 09 ~~SECRET~~

1. ENCOURAGE GOI TO FOCUS PRIMARY ATTENTION ON CHINESE
 THREAT RATHER THAN PAK OR JOINT THREAT. THIS CALLS FOR
 CONVINCING EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN OVER LONG TERM CHINESE
 HOSTILE INTENTIONS AND CAPACITY WHILE RECOGNIZING SOME
 CURRENT TACTICAL REDUCTION IN CHINESE MILITARY CAPABILITY
 (I.E., NUMBERS OF CONVENTIONAL AIRCRAFT). ABOVE ALL,
 WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO PRESENT OUR VIEWS IN REGARD
 TO REDUCTIONS IN INDIAN DEFENSE PLAN IN A MANNER WHICH WILL
 LEAD INDIANS TO CONCLUDE THAT AFTER WARNING THEM FOR LAST
 TEN YEARS OF IMMINENT DANGER OF CHICOM AGGRESSION, WE ARE
 NOW WATERING DOWN CHINESE THREAT IN RESPONSE TO PRESSURES
 FROM GOP.

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Authority NWS.032R.023.0017
 By *x*, NARA, Date 6-28-12

MAY 8 1964

~~SECRET~~

-2-3304, May 7, 7 p.m., from New Delhi (SECTION I OF II),

2/ PREVENT SOVIETS, WHICH WE BELIEVE TO BE A STEADILY GROWING POLITICAL THREAT TO OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INDIA, FROM DOMINATING THE SUPPLY OF SOPHISTICATED COMBAT EQUIPMENT TO INDIAN ARMED FORCES AND PARTICULARLY TO INDIA AIR FORCE.

3. EMPHASIZE FACT THAT INDIAN SECURITY PROBLEM IS TWO-DIMENSIONAL: (1) NEED TO BUILD A ADEQUATE MODERN DEFENSIVE MILITARY SHIELD AND (2) NEED TO PROMOTE A VIGOROUS EXPANDING DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY. (NOTE: THIS POINT CAN BE PERSUASIVELY PRESENTED BY REFERENCES TO OUR CURRENT DILEMMA IN SOUTH VIETNAM WHERE WELL ARMED AND TRAUNED MILITARY FORCES ARE SORELY HANDICAPPED BY LACK OF SUPPORT FROM PEASANTS AND OUR HOPE THAZ A SIMILAR MISTAKE WILL NEVER BE MADE IN INDIA.)

IN ADDITION TO MORE EFFICIENT AND LESS COSTLY WAYS OF PROVIDING A FULLY ADEQUATE DEFENSIVE SHIELD THE USG SUGGESTS TWO ADDITIONAL FACTORS WHICH WILL HELP EASE INDIAN DEFENSE BUDGET.

CFN 1 2 3 1 2

PAGE RUSBAE 309 ~~SECRET~~

A. MORE PARTICIPATION OF PRIVATE FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC CAPITAL IN PARTS OF INDIAN DEFENSE PRODUCTION (AS WELL AS DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS) THUS SAVING VITAL INDIAN FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND PROVIDING THE ESSENTIAL TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL ASSISTANCE. (EXAMPLES: VEHICLE AND ELECTRONICS PRODUCTION).

B. RECOGNITION OF FACT THAT NO NATION CAN ACHIEVE TOTAL MILITARY SELF SUFFICIENCY AND CONSEQUENT NEED FOR SOME MEASURE OF INTERDEPENDENCE WITH FRIENDLY FORCES OF PROVEN RELIABILITY. TO BE PERSUASIVE RELEVANT FACTS SHOULD BE PRESENTED IN WAY THAT LEADS TO INDIAN CONCLUSION REACHED ON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE RATHER THAN BLATANTLY SELF-SEEKING US PRESENTATION. (FOR INSTANCE, IF INDIAN FORCES SHOULD BE RE-DEPLOYED TO MEET INTERNAL SECURITY EMERGENCY, WE WOULD RESPOND TO INDIAN REQUEST FOR HELP IN MAINTAINING DETERRENT AGAINST CHINESE. PRINCIPLE OF SECURITY INTERDEPENDENCE WOULD HAVE SPECIAL PERTINENCE IN PERIOD AFTER CHINA DETONATES NUCLEAR DEVICE.)

AT THIS POINT DISCUSSION OF LIKELY COURSE OF FUTURE SOVIET CHINESE RELATIONS WOULD BE EFFECTIVE. FOR INSTANCE REFERENCE MIGHT BE MADE TO POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET-CHINESE RAPPROCHMENT FOLLOWING DEATH OF MAO OR KYRUSHCHEV, OUR CONCERN OVER RELUCTANCE OF OTHER COMMUNIST NATIONS TO ADOPT KREMLIN'S PRESENT HARD LINE TOWARD CHICOMS, ETC.

BY STRESSING THIS INTERDEPENDENCE PRINCIPLE IN A DISCREET AND

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-3304, May 7, 7 p.m., from New Delhi (SECTION I OF II),

SENSITIVE MANNER WE WILL ADVANCE US AIMS GRADUALLY TO BUILD CLOSER MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIA IN MILITARY FIELD AND TO KEEP INDIAN RELIANCE ON SOVIETS WITHIN REASONABLE LIMITS.
CFN A B US US

PAGE 4 RUSBAE 309 ~~S E C R E T~~

PART II. NATURE AND SCOPE OF US MILITARY ASSISTANCE

1. INIAN PROPOSED 5 YEAR DEFENSE PLAN: DISCUSSION OF THE PLAN SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO ELICIT SUGGESTIONS BY INDIANS ON HOW THEY COULD CUT DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE SPENDING FOR DEFENSE, STARTING WITH INDIAN FY 64-65. WE FULLY AGREE WITH WASHINGTON'S STRESS ON NEED TO SHOW INDIANS HOW THEY CAN GET DEFENSE WITH LESS MONEY (DEPTEL 2085). (NOTE: PLEASE ALSO REFER TO MY LETTER TO NEHRU SENT BY AIRGRAM A-1049 WHICH SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN HIGHLY PERSUASIVE WITH NEHRU, TTK AND SHASTRI AND WHICH DID NOT APPEAR UNREASONABLE TO CHAVAN.)

WE SHOULD EXPRESS GENERAL CONCERN ON SIZE AND COST OF PROJECTS AND PLANS AS WE HAVE BEEN DOING HERE AND SEEK BY VARIOUS DEVICES TO PERSUADE GOI OF ITS OWN INITIATIVE TO REDUCE MILITARY SPENDING TO NO MORE THAN 5 PERCENT OF NATIONAL PRODUCT, PERHAPS BY SPREADING EXPENDITURES OVER A LONGER PERIOD.

US POSITION SHOULD REFLECT RAO'S CONCEPT IN THE OPENING DISCUSSION OF THE PLAN (EMBTel 2915): ACTUAL DECISION IN REGARD TO INDIAN MILITARY PLAN COMES ANNUALLY IN CONNECTION WITH BUDGET. THIS IS THE TIME THAT MODIFICATIONS ARE INTRODUCED AND SLICE OF THE PLAN BECOMES SPECIFIC. THE US WILL MAKE ITS MORE SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON EACH ANNUAL PORTION AS THE PLAN UNFOLDS, ETC.
CFN II US 1 5 FY 64-65 2085 A-1049 NEHRU TTK SHASTRI CHAVAN
GOI 5 US RAO

OQT US

PAGE 5 RUSBAE 309 ~~S E C R E T~~

ALTHOUGH WE THINK THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HERE SINCE MID7APRIL GOI HAS NOT YET FULLY GRASPED CONFLICT OF MILITARY DEFENSE SPENDING AND NEED FOR RAPID ECONOMIC GROWTH. IF INDIANS CK BE PERSUADED TO TACKLE THIS TASK, WE ARE CONVINCED THEY WILL COME TO SHARE OUR VIEW THAT IMPLEMENTING PROPOSED DEFENSE PLAN WILL UNACCEPTABLY SLOW NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN FACE OF GROWING POLITICAL PRESSURES FOR PROGRESS. EMBTEL ON ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF PLAN BEING DISPATCHED TODAY.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4-3304, May 7, 7 p.m., from New Delhi (SECTION I OF II).

AT SAME TIME WE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT CHAVAN MISSION IS PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN MILITARY DEFENSE AND ONLY SECONDARILY IN POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF INDIA'S ECONOMIC GROWTH. THE ULTIMATE DECISIONS IN THIS REGARD WILL BE MADE BY NEHRU, SHASTRI, TTK AND OTHERS WHOM WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS HERE IN NEW DELHI.

NOR SHOULD WE EXPECT TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH INDIA ON ITS FORCE CEILINGS. WHETHER OR NOT USG CHOOSES TO CONSIDER THEM, GOI IS FORCED BY CURRENT POLITICAL REALITIES TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF PAKISTAN THREAT AND INDIAN INTERNAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

WITHIN THIS CONTEXT, WE MIGHT REACH UNDERSTANDING WITH INDIA ON FORCE LEVELS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCH FORCES WHICH US WOULD SUPPORT, BUT THESE WOULD BE DISTINCT FROM AGREEMENT ON OVER-ALL FORCE LEVELS. OUR BEST ARGUMENTS FOR URGING GOI TO SPEND FEWER RESOURCES TO BUILD THE DEFENSES IT BELIEVES TO BE NECESSARY ARE COMPETING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS, INTERDEPENDENCE, AND FOREIGN INVESTOR PARTICIPATION IN PORTIONS OF DEFENSE PRODUCTION.

BT

CFN GOI TTK USG GOI US GOI

NOTE: Passed Defense May 7 at 2:55 p.m.

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

114

34
Action

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Info

NNNNAQSA752SBA014
RR RUEHCR
DE RUSBAE 1227 27/1400Z
R 271215Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
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~~BELK~~
~~BRUBECK~~
~~CHASE~~
~~DINGEMAN~~
~~DUNGAN~~
~~FORRESTAL~~
~~JESSUP~~
~~JOHNSON~~
~~KLEIN~~
~~LOMER~~

021930

1964 APR 27 PM 2 21

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (3187, APRIL 27, 7:00 PM

LIMDIS

FOR NEA TALBOT AND GRANT FROM GREENE.

BEFORE AMBASSADOR LEFT SATURDAY MORNING (EMBTel 3130) WE AGREED I WOULD COMMUNICATE WITH YOU ABOUT PROSPECT OF ARRANGING FOR CHAVAN TO MEET PRESIDENT DURING HIS WASHINGTON VISIT. WE CONSIDER THAT THIS WOULD BE A VERY GOOD THING IF IT CAN POSSIBLY BE ARRANGED. TEN OR FIFTEEN MINUTES WOULD SUFFICE TO MAKE THE DESIRED MILEAGE. GENERAL KELLY AGREES.
CFN: 3187 3130

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 1227 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
AS YOU WILL RECALL, WHEN CHAVAN'S (AND TTK'S) VISIT TO WASHINGTON FIRST MOOTED (EMBTel 2543) ONE OF THE THOUGHTS IN INDIAN MINDS WAS TO ESTABLISH, OR RE-ESTABLISH, CLOSE RELATIONS WITH HIGHEST-LEVELS US GOVT. THERE IS STILL SOME TENDENCY HERE TO SHARE B. K. NEHRU'S FRUSTRATIONS IN THIS RESPECT AND TO DRAW COMPARISON WITH PRACTICE IN NEW DELHI, WHERE GOVT LEADERS ARE ACCESSIBLE TO AMBASSADOR AND VISITING CABINET OFFICERS, MOST RECENTLY ORVILLE FREEMAN.

THERE IS OF COURSE MORE SUBSTANTIAL REASON FOR OUR RE-COMMENDATION RE CHAVAN, NAMELY TO HELP BY ATMOSPHERICS TO ESTABLISH A RELATIONSHIP OF CONFIDENCE AND DEPENDABILITY IN THE MILITARY FIELD WHICH WILL ADVANCE OUR INTERESTS ACROSS THE BOARD. CHAVAN AS YOU KNOW IS NOT THE MOST ARTICULATE OF PEOPLE, SO CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT MAY BE EXPECTED BE ONE-SIDED. DESPITE THIS QUALITY, WE BELIEVE CHAVAN TAKES THINGS
CFN: 2543

PAGE THREE RUSBAE 1227 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
IN ACUTELY, AND WHAT WE WOULD WANT HIM TO TAKE IN IN THIS INSTANCE COULD BE COVERED IN A BRIEF SPAN.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 2-11-04

APR 28 1984

023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 3187, April 27, 7 p.m., from New Delhi

AS WE ARE REPORTING SEPARATELY, CHAVAN IS ONE OF AT LEAST
FOUR GOI MINISTERS WHO WILL BE TREKKING TO WASHINGTON IN NEXT
FEW MONTHS, SO WE MAY HAVE TO FACE SENSITIVITIES AND JEALOUSIES
IF CONTRARY OUR HOPE PRESIDENT HAS TO BE SELECTIVE ABOUT WHICH
HE SEES. WE THINK WE COULD LIVE WITH THIS AND HOPE YOU AND
B. K. NEHRU COULD IF REAL PITCH IS MADE FOR CHAVAN.

I REALIZE OSD IS PROPERLY COORDINATING CHAVAN'S SCHEDULE,
BUT AS MATTER AT HAND IS HIGHLY POLITICAL, HAVE THOUGHT IT
BETTER TO OPERATE THROUGH THIS CHANNEL.

GP-3.

BOWLES

BT

CFN 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SMITH, W. A.
BYRON
KORNE
KLEIN
JOHNSON
JESSUP
KORNE
DUNCAN
CHAVE
BRIDGES
BET
ALEXANDER
BRIDA-SMITH

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

BUNDY-SMITH

ALEXANDER

BELK

BRUBECK

CHASE

DUNGAN

FORRESTAL

JESSUP

JOHNSON

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April 25, 1964

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FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUJFKP/AMEMBASSY KARACHI

RUDSC/AMEMBASSY LONDON

RUEPDA/DEP OF DEFENSE

RUCQHKB/CINCEAFSA

STATE GRNC

BT

UNCLAS ACTION DEPT IMMEDIATE [3174] INFO KARACHI 1163 LONDON 1141

DEPT OF DEFENSE UNN CINCEAFSA UNN FROM NEW DELHI TWENTYFIFTH

PASS USIA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRESS RELEASE TO BE ISSUED BY GOI
1730 DELHI TIME TODAY:

" THE DEFENCE MINISTER , SHRI Y.B. CHAVAN, HAS ACCEPTED AN
INVITATION FROM THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY FOR DEFENCE,
MR. ROBERT T. MCNAMARA, TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES.

" THE DEFENCE MINISTER HAD RECEIVED AN INVITATION LAST YEAR
BUT WAS THEN NOT ABLE TO ACCEPT IT.

"SHRI CHAVAN HAS ALSO ACCEPTED AN INVITATION FROM THE BRITISH
GOVERNMENT TO VISIT THE UNITED KINGDOM.

" HE IS EXPECTED TO LEAVE FOR THE UNITED STATES ON
CFN 3174 1163 1141 1730

PAGE 2 RUDSND 1162G UNCLAS

ON MAY 17, 1964. HE EXPECTS TO SPEND ABOUT 12 DAYS IN THE UNITED
STATES DURING WHICH HE WILL DISCUSS WITH MR. MCNAMARA MILITARY
MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. HE WILL ALSO VISIT SOME DEFENCE
INSTALLATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES.

" SHRI CHAVAN WILL REACH THE UNITED KINGDOM ON MAY 30, 1964
AND WILL SPEND ABOUT A WEEK DISCUSSING MATTERS OF DEFENCE INTEREST
WITH HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT. SHRI CHAVAN WILL ALSO VISIT SOME
DEFENCE INSTALLATIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.

UNCLASSIFIED

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APR 27 1964

UNCLASSIFIED

-2- 3174, April 25, from New Delhi

" AN OFFICIAL TEAM WILL LEAVE FOR THE UNITED STATES ON MAY 9 FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH DEFENCE OFFICIALS IN PREPARATION FOR SHRI CHAVAN'S VISIT. THE TEAM WILL LATER GO TO THE UNITED KINGDOM.

"THE OFFICIAL TEAM WILL CONSIST OF SHRI P.V.R. RAO, SECRETARY MINISTRY OF DEFENCE; LT AGEN. MOTI SAGAR, CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, ARMY HEADQUARTERS; REAR ADMIRAL S.M. NANDA, DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF; AIR VICE-MARSHAL ARJAN SINGH VICE-CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF; BRIG S.N. ANTIA, DIRECTOR OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT. ARMY HEADQUARTERS; SHRI S.J. SHAHANEY, DIRECTOR-GENERAL FOR ORDNANCE FACTORIES; SHRI S. SOUNDARARAJAN, DEPUTY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE; SHRI S. GUHAN, UNDER SECRETARY
CFN 17 1964 30 12

PAGE 3 RUDSND 1162G UNCLAS
MINISTRY OF FINANCE. SHRI CHAVAN WILL BE ACCOMPANIED TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM BY HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY, SHRI R.D. PRADHAN. BOWLES
BT

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 4:23 a.m., April 25, 1964

NOTE: Passed White House at 4:40 a.m., April 25, 1964

UNCLASSIFIED

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI
INFO: Amembassy LONDON
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Chavan Visit

Indian Minister Dar called on Grant March 28 to deliver three copies of India's Five-Year Defense Plan and to discuss Chavan visit. Re Defense Plan Dar said M.G. Kaul had held up his delivery to us of QUOTE smudged UNQUOTE copies; in fact tables on these copies had contained QUOTE slight inaccuracies UNQUOTE which now corrected.

Re Chavan visit Dar said GOI anxious have visit take place as early as possible. (Dar used ~~reference~~ ^{rationale} that QUOTE interested parties UNQUOTE in India already spreading rumors US dragging feet and not rpt not interested giving military aid; GOI wants QUOTE nip this in bud UNQUOTE). He went on to say that Air Marshal Engineer now schedule visit US May 4-16. As Engineer's visit already postponed thrice, GOI desirous there be no further postponement. QUOTE Complication UNQUOTE lies in fact that Air Vice Marshal Arjun Singh, who member of Officials Team, cannot be out of India at same time as Engineer (for domestic reasons). Thus, Officials Team could not arrive in US until May 18 following Engineer's return. This would push Chavan's arrival back to May 28 which QUOTE rather late UNQUOTE.

Under circumstances Dar said GOI now thinking Chavan could arrive about May 24 (6 days after arrival officials), spend 2 days in Washington for

Drafted by:

NEA:SOA:AALakeland:fah:3/28/64

Clearances:

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - James P. Grant

DOD/ISA - Mr. Stoddart

SOA - Mr. Cameron

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FORM 8-63 DS-322

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines

MAR 30 1984 By *je*, NARA, Date *2-11-84*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ceremonial preliminaries, tour US for week and return Washington end of May for final wrap-up. Alternatively, Dar said, Officials Team could come in early April before Engineer's visit, with Chavan coming later accompanied by Rao. Dar said these matters also being discussed in Delhi with Embassy.

Grant explained that early April arrival of Officials Team not rpt not good from our viewpoint. (He mentioned CENTO-SEATO visits at that time). Grant told Dar we would take matter under advisement and give him reaction on Monday (March 30).

Embassy should inform both Chavan and MEA that we agreeable to any arrangement GOI wishes work out regarding relative timing, visits Officials, Engineer, and Chavan and we thus leaving it to GOI to sort out. It should be made clear, however, that rpt not US will not/be in position initiate discussions with Officials Team until May 4. Also keep in mind that we have told British we would explore possibility holding off Chavan visit so he would not arrive in UK on way home prior week beginning May 25.

Question of invitation from Secretary McNamara is still under consideration.

GP-3.

End

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

37
Orig: **ACTION:** Amembassy NEW DELHI 1949
INFO: " LONDON 6181
NEA " KARACHI 1284
Info: CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA

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March 23 Indian Charge Dar showed Grant copy of March 18 letter from Kaul in MEA. Principal item in letter dealt with Def Min Chavan's visit. Schedule called for Chavan be in Washington for three days in mid-April. An officials' delegation was shown arriving week earlier. Letter stated this schedule had been presented to American Embassy and its advice being sought. Grant informed Dar that Ambassador Bowles had seen M. J. Desai March 16 on same subject. At that time Desai had given several alternative possibilities, including one mid-May. We were advising our Embassy that mid-May date was by far most satisfactory for USG for variety of reasons. Dar expressed personal view that Chavan would be coming here for visit which would be more honorary than for purpose of reaching substantive decisions.

Dar then raised two subjects with respect to Five-Year Military Assistance Program. He said Desai had written saying Americans in New Delhi had not mentioned that GOI would have to cover expenses of USMSMI. Desai said however GOI had taken this under consideration. Grant said mention of this may have been omitted by our Embassy in New Delhi through inadvertence. Dar then asked about references both in Washington and New Delhi in presenting multi-year plan to political factors, i.e., references to Soviet

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KLEIN
KOMER

Drafted by: STANDERS
NEA:JPGrant:fah:bw 3/25/64
Classification: SMITH, WM. Y

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - James P. Grant

MAR 26 1964

FORM 5-61 DS-322

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc NARA, Date 2-11-04

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military assistance, relations with Pakistan and coordination of efforts against
Chicom. He said there was some uncertainty in New Delhi as to just what was meant
on these counts. He assumed that these were not explicit strings on our assistance
and that they did not call for any substantial change of India's present conduct of
its relations in any of the three areas. Grant replied that these were not explicit
strings. However they were obviously important factors that USG needed to take into
account as we proceeded with our military assistance to India. The more Indians
could do to lower temperatures on tensions between India and Pakistan easier it was
for us on a number of counts to provide military assistance to India. With respect
to Communist China we are not expecting major change in Indian actions. However, as
two largest nations with an acute concern with Communist China we assume that it is
national interest of each to facilitate the other's efforts wherever possible in
dealing with China. Insofar as Soviet assistance to India was concerned, USG expected
Indians to keep this within limits for reasons which had been mentioned earlier,
including security aspects and very real Congressional and public opinion problems
in US that could arise from such Soviet programs.

Discussion of Security Council Session being reported separately.

GP-3

END

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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INFO RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEWDELHI
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT. 4567 INFO NDELHI 186
CINCSTRIKE 30 FROM LONDON MAR 18, 5 PM

CINCSTRIKE FOR POLAD; DEPT PASS DEFENSE

CHAVAN VISIT

NEW DELHI TEL 2731 TO DEPT

CRO SAYS DESAI ASKED UK HICOM FOLLOWING CONVERSATION
REPORTED REFTEL WHETHER IT WOULD BE CONVENIENT TO HMG
FOR CHAVAN TO PROCEED LONDON FOR 4-5 DAYS FOLLOWING
WASHINGTON VISIT, WHICH DESAI SAID TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED
MAY 10-17. PERIOD OF LONDON VISIT WOULD COINCIDE WITH
CFN 4567 186 30 18 5 2731 4-5 10-17

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SMITH, WM. Y

PAGE 2 RUDTLN 456C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
GENERAL EXODUS FROM LONDON DURING USUAL PARLIAMENTARY RECESS
FOLLOWING WHIT MONDAY HOLIDAY AND THERE IS ALWAYS POSSIBILITY
THAT PARLIAMENT MAY ADJOURN IN MAY IF JUNE IS TO BE ELECTION
MONTH. CRO NOW IN PROCESS OF DETERMINING WHETHER VISIT
FEASIBLE IN LIGHT THESE FACTORS AND WILL CABLE DECISION TO
MISSIONS WASHINGTON AND DELHI.

COMMENT: CRO IS MOST ANXIOUS ARRANGE LONDON VISIT FOR
CHAVAN. EMBASSY BELIEVES POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT UK MIGHT
ASK THAT US VISIT BE SCHEDULED TO PERMIT CHAVAN ARRIVE HERE
BEFORE WEEKEND MAY 16 OR, IF JUNE ELECTION SEEMS REAL POSSIBILITY,
SUGGEST THAT CHAVAN COME HERE BEFORE WASHINGTON.

GP-3. BRUCE

BT

CFN 16 GP-3

NOTE: PASSED DEFENSE AT 1:45 PM 3/18/64

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date *2-1-04*

MAR 19 1964

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

119

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUŠBKP/AMEMBASSY KARACHI
RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON
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1964 MAR 20 AM 8 13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ROUTINE MARCH 20, 1130AM FROM
NEW DELHI.

ACTION DEPARTMENT 2768 INFORMATION KARACHI 999,
LONDON 962, CINCSSTRIKE/CINCMCAFSA UNNUMBERED.

DEPARTMENT PASS DEFENSE.

EMBTel 2731.

CHAVAN'S ANNOUNCEMENT TO PRESS THAT HE WILL BE VISITING U.S. AND UK SHORTLY MARKS BEGINNING OF ANNUAL SPRING OUTING OF INDIAN OFFICIALS TO U.S. HAVING SO FAR BEEN CONTENT TO REMAIN IN BACKGROUND, CHAVAN'S DECISION TO LEAD MINISTERIAL PROCESSION ABROAD HAS A NUMBER OF INTERESTING OVERTONES. ALTHOUGH CHAVAN'S PRESS MANAGEMENT OF TRIP WITHOUT PRELIMINARY CONSULTATION WITH US SEEMS HEAVY HANDED WAY TO PREPARE GROUND FOR VISIT, IT DOES NOT DIFFER VERY MUCH FROM TACTICS FOLLOWED BY SOME OF HIS COLLEAGUES LAST YEAR, INCLUDING PATNAIK AND TTK. BY FORCING PACE ON HIS TRIP, CHAVAN HOPES, OF COURSE, TO PRECIPITATE DECISIONS ON U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WHICH INDIANS HAVE BEEN EXPECTING FOR MANY MONTHS. HOWEVER, WE SUSPECT CHAVAN IS MOTIVATED LARGELY BY HIS ASSESSMENT OF IMPERATIVES OF LOCAL SITUATION AS THEY AFFECT HIS POLITICAL STANDING.

SINCE ASSUMING DEFENSE PORTFOLIO IN 1962 CHAVAN HAS BEEN SATISFIED TO GO ABOUT HIS WORK BIDDING HIS TIME AND ESCHEWING ACTIVE ROLE. THIS HAS DISAPPOINTED HIS SUPPORTERS, PERTURBED FOREIGN VISITORS WHO GAIN IMPRESSION HE IS A CIPHER, AND HAS DISTURBED CONGRESS LEADERS SUCH AS TYAGI, WHO WOULD LIKE MORE DYNAMIC LEADERSHIP IN DEFENSE MATTERS. TYAGI'S OUTBURST IN LOK SABHA ON MARCH 12 (EMBTel 2701) CRITICIZING LASSITUDE OF DEFENSE FRONT WAS AIMED AT CHAVAN, WHO IS REGARDED BY THIS GROUP AS IN-

BUNDY-SMITH
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BRUBECK
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JESSUP
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SAUNDERS
SMITH, WM. Y

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date 2-11-01

MAR 20 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 2768, MARCH 20, 11 AM, FROM NEW DELHI

ADEQUATE MANAGER OF INDIA'S DEFENSE. NOTWITHSTANDING THIS GENERALLY NEGATIVE IMAGE WHICH CHAVAN HAS PROJECTED ON FOREIGN VISITORS AND WITHIN INDIA, WE DO NOT FEEL HE SHOULD BE UNDERESTIMATED. HE REMAINS A POLITICAL FACTOR WHO SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED OUT OF HAND.

IN THIS CONTEXT, CHAVAN'S DECISION TO MOVE OUT INTO OPEN AND STAKE OUT CLAIM FOR HIMSELF IN DEFENSE RELATIONSHIPS WITH U.S. AND UK HAS SOME SIGNIFICANCE. THIS IS A ROLE WITH SOME POLITICAL ADVANTAGE WITHIN INDIA. MORARJI DESAI FOR LONG TRADED ON HIS REPUTATION AS PRINCIPAL CONTACT MAN WITH U.S. WHO COULD DELIVER GOODS. WITH MORARJI'S DEMISE, JOB HAS BEEN OPEN. TTK HAS CONSIDERED HIMSELF AS MORARJI'S LOGICAL SUCCESSOR IN THIS FIELD, BUT CHAVAN HAS APPARENTLY DECIDED TIME IS RIGHT TO STAKE OUT HIS OWN CLAIM IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN HIS POLITICAL POSITION AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF THE SUCCESSION SWEEPSTAKES. DECISION HAS PRECIPITATED CONFLICT AMONG MEA, FINANCE AND DEFENSE MINISTRIES, EACH OF WHICH WOULD LIKE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OVER DEFENSE NEGOTIATIONS WITH U.S. HOWEVER, IN FACE OF UNEXPECTEDLY FIRM OPPOSITION BY CHAVAN TO PARTICIPATION BY OTHERS IN WHAT HE INSISTS IS RESPONSIBILITY OF DEFENSE MINISTRY. BOTH MEA AND FINANCE HAD BACKED AWAY. TTK IS NOT HAPPY WITH CHAVAN'S UNEXPECTED VIGOR, BUT HE IS NOT OPPOSING CHAVAN'S TRIP ON UNDERSTANDING HE WILL FOLLOW LATER. HIS EFFORTS TO HAVE OHOOHALINGAM ACCOMPANY RAO IN ADVANCE PARTY WERE VETOED BY CHAVAN, WHO INSISTS THIS IS DEFENSE MINISTRY SHOW.

PAGE FOUR RUSBAE 871 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
HAVING SET HIMSELF ON THIS COURSE, CHAVAN HAS COMMITTED HIMSELF TO A GAMBLE IN WHICH HE HAS PROBABLY NOT FULLY CALCULATED ODDS. HE APPARENTLY ASSUMES WE CAN MEET HIS PERSONAL EXPECTATIONS AND GIVE HIM ENOUGH TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR HIM ON HIS RETURN TO CLAIM THAT HIS TRIP WAS SUCCESSFUL. AS ONE OF THE FEW CABINET MINISTERS WITH A LOCAL POLITICAL BASE, HE SHOULD NOT BE LIGHTLY DISMISSED IN SPITE OF HIS UNGLAMOROUS RECORD. HE WARRANTS SOME ATTENTION IN U.S. WE DO NOT SUGGEST HE COME BACK WITH BAG FULL OF MAP DECISIONS, BUT WE HOPE THAT HE WILL RETURN WITH FEELING THAT TRIP WAS WORTHWHILE. GP-3.
BOWLES

BT

NOTE: PASSED DEFENSE 3/20/64, 8:51 AM.

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

120

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Action
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control: 12360
Rec'd: March 17, 1964
9:31 AM

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FROM: New Delhi
ACTION: Secstate 2731
INFO: London 944
CINCSTRIKE Unnumbered
DATE: March 17, 5 PM
DEPARTMENT PASS DEFENSE

Chavan Trip

At request of M. J. Desai I called at MEA afternoon of March 16; subject was timing of Chavan's trip to US. Desai stated from standpoint of Indian government best time to arrive would be mid to late April or around 10-12 May immediately after closing of Parliament. Desai states that Chavan would like to send team about ten days in advance headed by P.V.R. Rao and include Lt. General Moti Sagar, Brigadier Antia, Rear Admiral Nanda, Air Vice Marrewnmjarjan* Singh, Shahaney, Director General Ordnance Factories, Soundararajan and Guhan. Defense Minister would be accompanied by Khera.

I replied that mid-May would appear to be more convenient than mid-April (A) because both Indians and ourselves could use extra time for preparation, and (B) because likelihood of conflicting dates during April period. I said I would inform Department and Pentagon, suggest that date be set for latter period, and inform him of your reply.

I expressed hope that there would be moratorium on publicity from Defense Ministry in regard to Minister's visit; indeed there had already been much too much press discussion on questions which could be hurtful to all we were trying to accomplish together. Desai who is probably GOI's most skilled speaker nodded benignly in agreement.

It is clear from group that has been chosen to precede Chavan

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By *pc* NARA, Date *2-11-01*

MAR 18 1964

that there are looking forward to comprehensive discussions.

*As received.

Note: Relayed Defense at March 17, 10:59 AM

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON
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~~SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT 2552 INFO LONDON PRITY 845 FROM
NEW DELHI FEBRUARY 29, 3:10 PM.

PASS DEFENSE

LONDON FOR TALBOT

EMBTLS 2542 AND 2543

LIMDIS

WHEN I SAW CHAVAN FEBRUARY 26 HE SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO VISIT
WASHINGTON SOON IF THIS WERE CONVENIENT. HE SAID HE WOULD
BE READY ANYTIME AFTER MID-MARCH, AND WOULD LIKE TO SEND
AHEAD A FEW MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF FOR PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS.
CFN 2552 845 2542 2543 26

PAGE 2 RUSBAE 1028 ~~SECRET~~

ASSUMING WE ALL AGREE THAT SUCH A VISIT IN NEAR FUTURE WOULD
BE A GOOD IDEA, PRINCIPAL QUESTION IS TIMING AS IT AFFECTS
VISIT'S USEFULNESS. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW HERE, BELIEVE THIS
WOULD BE WELL-SERVED IF BEFORE CHAVAN WENT WE AND WASHINGTON
HAD REASONABLY CLEAR IDEA OF HOW OUR MILITARY-ASSISTANCE
PROPOSALS ARE SHAPING UP IN TERMS OF INDIAN PLANS (EMBTLS
2542). THIS WOULD PROBABLY MAKE MARCH TOO EARLY, WITH APRIL
A BETTER BET. WE ALSO SUGGEST THAT FORMAL INVITATION BE
CONVEYED BY SECRETARY MCNAMARA; THIS WOULD OF COURSE COMMIT
HIM TO GIVING SOME TIME TO THE EXERCISE AND WOULD THUS HAVE
TO FIT IN WITH HIS PLANS.

I WOULD LIKE TO BE RESPONSIVE IN NEXT COUPLE OF WEEKS,
SO WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR EARLY INDICATION OF POSSIBILITIES
AT WASHINGTON END. GP-3
BOWLES

NOTE: PASSED DEFENSE FEBRUARY 29, 1964.

~~SECRET~~

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MAR 2 1964

122
/

Mrs.
Indira
Gandhi
4/27/64

Visit of Mrs. Indira Gandhi

April 27, 1964

SECRET ATTACHMENT

2450

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S/S-6837

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

May 7, 1964

To: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

From: Benjamin H. Read *DFW (for)*
Executive Secretary

Subject: Memorandum of Conversation
between the President and
Mrs. Indira Gandhi

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For White House approval prior to
distribution.

The President's remarks are side-
lined in blue.

Attachment:

Memorandum of Conversation.

SECRET ATTACHMENT

MAY 8 1964

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123a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

6838

DATE: April 27, 1964

SUBJECT: Meeting of President with Mrs. Indira Gandhi

PARTICIPANTS: Mrs. Indira Gandhi
Ambassador B. K. Nehru

The President
Assistant Secretary Phillips Talbot
R. W. Komer

COPIES TO:

S/S	FE	DOD/JCS	Amembassy KARACHI
G	INR	White House	Amembassy NEW DELHI
S/P	CIA		Amembassy LONDON
NEA-2	DOD/ISA		

The President greeted Mrs. Gandhi cordially, remarking on his previous meetings with her and with her father. It was because he regarded himself as such a strong friend of India that he was surprised at Mrs. Gandhi's referring to US favoritism toward Pakistan on Kashmir as she had in a recent interview with the New York Times. The President stressed that we were firm in our determination to have the most friendly relations with India. So, he said smilingly, he could not accept any implication of partisanship.

Mrs. Gandhi reassured the President that India understood and appreciated US policy and US help. She and her father personally knew of the President's strong friendship for India, and she had merely been referring to one part of US policy, that toward Kashmir, on which we did not seem sympathetic to the Indian point of view. Ambassador Nehru interjected that two great powers could certainly disagree on one among many questions without any diminution in the overall friendly relations between them.

The President came back again on the issue of US friendship for India and decried any suggestion of partisanship on any issue between us. As for the Indians being disturbed at our relations with Pakistan, they should realize that the Pakistani were far more angry with us. The Paks were much more unhappy about our policy toward India than India seemed to be about our policy toward Pakistan.

DECLASSIFIED

The President

Authority FRVS 64-68, vol. 25, #39

By jc NARA, Date 2-11-04

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 3

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intervals; not
automatically declassified

FORM 8-61 DS-1254

MAY 8 1964

GPO 908992

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- 2 -

The President went on to describe how the US was not only seeking to help nations abroad develop themselves but to deal with the problems of poverty and discrimination in the US. He outlined his own recent efforts to this end citing various statistics. He mentioned, for example, that 49% of draft-age Americans failed to meet minimum physical standards for the draft. Ambassador Nehru was shocked that this figure should be so high, but Mrs. Gandhi pointed out that India had had similar difficulties in recruitment after the Chinese attack.

Mrs. Gandhi then presented a letter from Prime Minister Nehru to the President. The latter read it carefully and commented on how much he appreciated the friendly sentiments it contained. India could count on US friendship and on continued US help.

The President remarked on how many friends India had in his Administration. We sent Ambassadors to India who seemed to spend every day thinking of new ways in which we could be helpful.

Mentioning his particular affection for Mr. Nehru, the President asked about his current health. Mrs. Gandhi replied that he was better and up and around a bit more. The President remarked upon how people had counted him out at the time of his own heart attack. But two months later he was back in shape again and had been ever since. No one should count Mr. Nehru out either. He urged Mrs. Gandhi to carry this message back to Prime Minister Nehru and to give him the President's affectionate regards.

After pictures were taken, the President showed Mrs. Gandhi and the Ambassador the rose garden.

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5/1

124
Ret'd to
Polly Gates
5/1/64
Indian Dist

Jeanette:

Would Mr. Komer suggest an appropriate inscription for the President for a picture he is going to give to Mme. Gandhi taken during her visit the other day.

Also, an inscription for a picture which the President will give to the Indian Ambassador.

Today, please?

Happy May Day.

Polly

P.S. The President does not like long inscriptions.

(Claude Gandhi --)
warms
With regards to a woman
of distinction
With all *best* wishes to a *good*
friend of the US
an able Ambassador

~~SECRET~~

April 27, 1964

125
Indira Vissis
x India

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Your short session with Indira Gandhi (she goes on to tea with Mrs. Johnson) will still give time to read Nehru's letter and make one or two points.

A. She will be fascinated by your economic program, attack on poverty, civil rights drive, etc. Alluding to them will remind her that America is on the move.

B. But to avoid any impression you're preoccupied with domestic affairs, you might take polite exception to Indira's remark about US "favoritism toward Pakistan" on Kashmir (attached). Our only interest is in a peaceful settlement of the 17-year old issue, so both India and Pakistan can get on with their wars on poverty too. Nor does our current help to India jibe with such remarks. In fact the Paks are quite unhappy with our policy.

Indira is going straight back to India tonight, so can carry your good wishes to Nehru (her line is that he's much better but we think not, even though he's said he's going to annual Commonwealth Conference in July).

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

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Authority NWJ 88-164 C#81
By plip NARA. Date 2-1-01

NYT article by
Tumbull 4/22



S/S 5771

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 21, 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Appointment with the President for
Mrs. Indira Gandhi

In his April 11 memorandum to the President, the Acting Secretary recommended that the President and Mrs. Johnson receive Prime Minister Nehru's daughter, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, during her April 25 to April 27 visit to Washington. The Department has been informed that Mrs. Johnson has agreed to receive Mrs. Gandhi at 11:00 a.m. on April 27.

Subsequent to the despatch of the Acting Secretary's memorandum, it has been learned that Mrs. Gandhi will carry a letter to the President from Prime Minister Nehru and, in effect, will be visiting Washington as her father's personal emissary. The Indian press has already referred to this letter. These new considerations, combined with the fact that Mrs. Gandhi is an important political figure in India in her own right, and a possible successor to her father as Prime Minister, make it important that she meet the President, as well as Mrs. Johnson.

It is, therefore, strongly recommended that the President also receive Mrs. Gandhi so that she may have an opportunity to deliver her father's letter.

BHR
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

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Authority State 4-30-76

By jc/ew NARA. Date 2/1/04

PRESERVATION COPY

126
Komer
Indira
Ret'd to President
with Pres memo 4/22

LIB saw Mrs Gandhi
4/27/64

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1) Brown Smith - to
clerk of State.

2) Bess Abell - cl
guess grand went
to call Indian
Embassy and
invite Indira
B.K.H.

127

20 BKS - 4/16/64

Bob Komer:

The President says he would like Mrs.
Johnson to receive Mrs. Gandhi, which
Mrs. Johnson has agreed to do. The
President might possibly drop in if
he can.

Please follow through with Mrs. Abell.

Thanks.

Bill Moyers

Indira

LBJ and Mrs. Johnson
saw Mrs. Gandhi
4/25/64

APR 16 1964

127a
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

April 14, 1964

THE PRESIDENT

I urge you do find a moment for Mrs. Gandhi. She'd bring the Ambassador here along, but she's more worth listening to on Indian domestic politics.

Alternatively, Mrs. Johnson could invite Mrs. Gandhi (who is out of government now) for tea, and you could drop in.

R. W. Komer

R. W. Komer

I agree
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *mfb*

*The Indians should be sensitive
but then are - fact of life.*

1276

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 11, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment for Prime Minister Nehru's Daughter

Recommendation:

I recommend that you and Mrs. Johnson receive Prime Minister Nehru's daughter, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, when she visits Washington from April 25 to April 27.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Background

Mrs. Gandhi is coming to the United States for the inauguration of the World's Fair. When she visited the United States in 1961 with her father and in 1962 when she was here on a lecture tour, Mrs. Gandhi was received at the White House. You and Mrs. Johnson, of course, met her both in New Delhi and here. In addition to being a key intermediary between her father and the outside world during his illness, she is an important Indian political figure in her own right. She was at one time President of the Congress Party and is among those mentioned as possible successors to her ailing father.

As you know, Ambassador Nehru had hoped to see you before he returned to India at Christmas. I believe you have not had the opportunity of meeting with any Indian dignitary since the funeral of President Kennedy. This appears to have become a matter of concern within the Government of India in New Delhi. A short appointment for Mrs. Gandhi at the White House would do much to reassure the Indians of the continued close association of senior officials of both our Governments.

George Ball
Acting Secretary

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *3-1-01*

4/12/64

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

April 11, 1964

India
Ref'd to me DB
w/ Rusk memo
4/14

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Subject: Appointment for Prime Minister Nehru's Daughter

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Langewiesche
Acting Secretary

Ref from Mrs Gandhi
4/27/64

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *3-1-04*

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4/13/64

129

Ghost

ORIGIN/ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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BUNDY/SMITH

ALEXANDER

BRUBECK

CHASE

DUNGAN

FRESTAL

MESSUP

JOHNSON

KLEIN

KOMEI

SAUNDERS

COLL. WY. SMITH

A-1214
NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO : KARACHI, LONDON, USUN

FROM : Amembassy NEW DELHI

POUCHED May 26, 1964
DATE: May 22, 1964SUBJECT : Proposal of Sudhir Ghosh, MP. for
Kashmir Settlement Involving Sheikh
Abdullah and US-Soviet Guarantee

REF :

Sudhir Ghosh, a Congress Party member of the Rajya Sabha, has given the Ambassador three documents (attached as enclosures) pertaining to Ghosh's proposals for a Kashmir settlement involving Sheikh Abdullah and a US-Soviet guarantee.

Enclosure #1 is the text of a letter which Ghosh wrote to Prime Minister Nehru on May 9. Ghosh reported to Nehru that Abdullah, in response to a direct question, had confirmed to him on May 7 that he did not question the accession of Kashmir to India, but that he wanted the accomplished fact of accession to be reconfirmed or ratified by a free vote of the Kashmir people. Ghosh also reported that according to Maulana Masoodi, reconfirmation of accession to India in a free vote was not possible now, but that if the vote were taken after a year or 18 months, and in the meantime the Kashmiris were given a government in which they had confidence and Abdullah and his colleagues got down to the job of preparing the minds of the people for the vote, India could then win the vote. Masoodi, Ghosh reported, thought that if such a settlement were considered just and fair in the eyes of the world, Pakistan would have to reconcile itself to it even if it were not happy about it. Ghosh then suggested to the PM that the logic of the situation therefore seemed to lead to

Enclosures:

1. Sudhir Ghosh May 9 Letter to Nehru
2. Ghosh proposal for Kashmir settlement
3. Ghosh draft of US-Soviet Declaration

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals
not automatically declassifiedFORM
4-62 DS-323

CONFIDENTIAL

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☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by:

POL:JEaves:bl

Contents and Classification Approved by:

POL:LDHeck

Clearances:

JUN 1 1964

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 032R-23-1-8-3

By 8/09 WARA Date 2-12-18

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page 1

A- 1214 from New Delhi

the GOI's entrusting Abdullah with the Government of Kashmir and asking him to reorganize it and take the necessary steps to win the election.

Enclosure #2 is a proposal drafted by Ghosh for a Kashmir settlement. It proposes that Sheikh Abdullah should take the following positions: (a) that he does not question the accession of Kashmir to India but wants the accomplished fact of accession to be ratified or reconfirmed by a fair and free vote of the people of Kashmir; (b) that such a vote is not feasible now, but the time may be right in 12-18 months; (c) that in order to create the right atmosphere for a free and fair vote, it is necessary, in the interim, to give the Kashmir people a government in which they have faith and confidence; and (d) that the vote is to be taken also in the part of Kashmir which is occupied by Pakistan. The second aspect of Ghosh's proposal is that such a statement by Abdullah should be supplemented by a joint US-Soviet declaration that both countries will work together for a peaceful settlement of Kashmir and for peace between India and Pakistan. Ghosh's proposal concludes by stating that the combination of Sheikh's statement and the US-Soviet declaration will be a powerful enough force to solve the problem.

Enclosure #3 is Ghosh's draft of the proposed US-Soviet declaration. In it, the US and USSR express their concern over the tense situation existing between India and Pakistan, appeal to the GOI and GGP to enter into direct negotiations to resolve all differences peacefully, and express their willingness to "associate themselves with and to guarantee" any peaceful solution arrived at.

In a handwritten note of May 14 to the Ambassador, referring to enclosures #2 and #3, Ghosh said: "Sheikh Abdullah confirmed--when I saw him yesterday at 5:30 a.m., for the 3rd time--that my summing up of his position was correct. He told me at the airport yesterday as we saw him off that he had handed to Mr. Nehru these two pieces of paper with the remark 'Sudhir Ghosh gave me these two pieces of paper; it is all right with me if it is all right with you.' I expect to talk with PM in Bombay about this matter."

Comment: As of the date of this airgram, Ghosh has not returned to Delhi and we are therefore unable to report whether he was able to discuss his proposals with the Prime Minister in Bombay.

Ghosh's activities are being reported primarily because they illustrate the fluidity of the situation created by Abdullah's release. Ghosh appears to be operating essentially on his own and not in concert with any of the other private individuals--such as Jayaprakash Narayan, Rajaji,

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Page 2

A-1214 from New Delhi

or the members of the Indo-Pakistan Conciliation Group who have also been making efforts to contribute to a Kashmir solution.

For the Charge d'Affaires ad interim:

L. Douglas Heck

L. Douglas Heck
Counselor for Political Affairs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page 1 of 4
Enclosure #1
A- 1214 from New Delhi

My dear Panditji,

Please forgive me for unburdening myself before you.

I am writing this letter to you because I am not likely to get a chance of seeing you in the near future. It is not for me to interfere in any way with the complicated Kashmir problem but one feels anxious and unhappy in the midst of all the excitement and intolerance around us. I was, therefore, grateful for an opportunity of listening to Sheikh Abdullah who was good enough pay me a visit on Thursday morning and talked with me for one and half hour in the presence of Dr. Syed Mahmud. I tried to understand Sheikh Saheb's mind; I also spent some hour with Maulana Masoodi (who unlike Mr. Beg appears to be a very gentle and understanding man) and tried to seek clarifications from him; I have also talked with Lal Bahadurji and Nandaji; and at the end of it all I am left with a sense of sadness and depression and a fear that we are heading for a disaster.

If I had any influence with the Government I would have persuaded it not to release Sheikh Abdullah at the time and in the manner it was done. But after having released him is there any course open to us except to trust him? Why can't we have the courage to trust him? Trusting him means taking a very big risk. But is there really any alternative to it? And there is no half-way-house between trust and distrust.

Did we expect that he would, after 11 years in detention come out and support the status quo in Kashmir? If we did we are very naive. After his release he has said a number of things in Kashmir and here in New Delhi which has caused much confusion and some of his statements have been distorted and gleefully reported by American and British newspaper men. The world is watching not the proceedings of the Security Council but what is happening in New Delhi in the talks between you and Sheikh Abdullah. The talk in Parliament is that nothing has happened.

May I venture to give you my own report on what I have found? At the end of his talk with me on Thursday morning I put to Sheikh Saheb a direct question: "Sheikh Saheb, have I understood you correctly if I say that your position is that you do not question the accession of Kashmir to India; but you want that the accomplished fact of accession be reconfirmed or ratified by a free vote of the Kashmir people?"

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Page 2 of 4
Enclosure #1
A-1214 from New Delhi

Sheikh Abdullah confirmed that that was his position. If that is his position can we not get him to make a clear public statement to state that position before the world? Whether the Government of India accept the position or not is another matter; he is entitled to take that position. In view of all the confusion that has been created in this matter in India and abroad I see great merit in getting him to make a well-worded statement at the end of his visit to New Delhi to make clear to the world that this is his position.

"Plebiscite" according to the UN Resolution was very different from the above position. It is one thing to say that Pakistan will vacate their part of Kashmir, India will withdraw her forces, and under UN auspices there will be a plebiscite and the people of Kashmir will be asked if they want to go to Pakistan or to India; it is quite another thing to say that the accession of Kashmir to India is not to be questioned but we are going to have it reconfirmed by the people of Kashmir under the auspices of a Government of our own but we shall satisfy the world that the vote is fair and free. But I find that both Lal Bahadurji and Nandaji see grave risk in it. If we give the people of Kashmir a chance to approve an accomplished fact we also give them a chance to say that they disapprove. What will be our position if they disapprove? The pro-Pakistan element in the Valley is strong; Sheikh Abdullah's position is not by any means so strong that he can be sure of winning the election for us, even if he proves to be dependable, which is doubtful. Therefore, accepting the above position means taking the grave risk of losing Kashmir and losing Kashmir means a violent upheaval in the whole of India and grave danger to the 50 million Muslims of India. And if Sheikh Abdullah really does not question the accession of Kashmir to India why does he want it reconfirmed? I personally see great merit in that reconfirmation because no country in the world, except the USSR (for purely diplomatic reasons) believes that our position is honest when we say that the people of Kashmir have already exercised their will and the Kashmir question is finally and irrevocably settled; there is an international problem called the Kashmir problem which is still to be settled; it is no use our saying that such an unsettled problem does not exist. And the reconfirmation by the people of Kashmir, if achievable, will be a great victory for India and will squash all arguments and controversies from all quarters and settle the problem once and for all.

But the question is: is it achievable? I tried to find an answer by a 2-hour talk with Maulana Masoodi. He says that it is clearly not achievable if the vote is taken today; because the

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page 3 of 4
Enclosure #1
A-1214 from New Delhi

mind of the Kashmiri Muslims today is, by and large, anti-India, partly due to propoganda of the pro-Pakistan elements but mainly due to bad and dishonest government given by India to them. According to him the people today are in a state of excitement; but if the vote is taken after a year or 18 months and in the meantime they are given a Government in whom they have confidence and if Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues get down to the job of preparing the mind of the people for the vote then in a year or 18 months' time the vote can be won by India. I do not know whether Maulana Masoodi is right or wrong but this is his assessment and his conviction. I asked the Maulana what would be Kashmir's position in India after the election is won. He said very clearly that Sheikh Abdullah would be entirely satisfied if the defence of Kashmir and its foreign diplomatic relations were the responsibility of India and Kashmir was made autonomous for everything else. "How about Pakistan?" I asked, "such a settlement, even if it was accomplished by winning the vote of the Kashmir people, will not satisfy Pakistan. And Sheikh Saheb seems to say that whatever be the settlement Pakistan will have to be satisfied, too." The Maulana's personal view appears to be that if the settlement is just and fair in the eyes of whole world, then Pakistan will have to get reconciled to it, even if it is not happy about it. I do not know whether his colleagues share this view.

The logic of the action with regard to Sheikh Abdullah's release appears to be that apart from showing him the greatest courtesy and kindness we must show the maximum trust and confidence in him. The meaning of this trust is that the Government of Kashmir should be handed back to him and he should be asked to reorganise the Government and take such steps as he may consider necessary to prepare the people to win the election. What happens if he proves unworthy of our trust? We lose Kashmir. And if we lose Kashmir there will be grave trouble in India; but it is quite likely that the nature and the magnitude of possible trouble is being grossly exaggerated. If we cannot put our faith in him what is the alternative? The only logical action is to send him back to prison and face a violent upheaval in the Kashmir Valley; this action will blacken the great name of Jawaharlal Nehru in the world; we will be giving a handle to Pakistan; they will kill some more Hindus in East Pakistan and there will be an outbreak of violence to Muslims in India. There is danger if we follow the way of trust; there is danger if we follow the way of distrust. In either way we run the grave risk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page 4 of 4
Enclosure #1
A-1214 from New Delhi

of losing Kashmir; if we lose it by following the way of distrust we lose it in a way which is ignominious and we lose much else besides Kashmir; if we lose Kashmir by trusting Sheikh Abdullah we lose it in a clean and decent way. And who knows? We may win a victory and it would be a great victory if we win it.

At the end of the talk I said to Sheikh Abdullah "Sheikh Sahab, I am not a leader; I am only a follower in this country; I have an appeal to make to you. Jawaharlal Nehru is something much bigger than the Prime Minister of India. We have grown up in the shadow of his personality; he has done more than enough for all of us; it will break our heart if he, towards the end of life, is humiliated before the world because of Kashmir; it is within your power to act in such a way that he is not humiliated." He said, "My friend, I like your sentiment; but how do you help a man if he does not allow you to help him?" Whatever may be the significance of that remark I thought I ought to report it to you.

With regards,

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Sudhir Ghosh

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru,
Prime Minister.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page 1 of 1
Enclosure #2
A- 1214 from New Delhi

The hands of those who are trying to make the Government of India put their faith in Sheikh Saheb without any reservation will be enormously strengthened if Sheikh Saheb agrees to make it plain in his statement at the end of his Delhi visit

- (a) that it is Sheikh Saheb's stand that he does not question the accession of Kashmir to India but he wants that the accomplished fact of accession be ratified or reconfirmed by a free and fair vote of the people of Kashmir.
- (b) that in the present disturbed condition of Kashmir a free and fair vote is not feasible just now; maybe the right time will come in 12 or 18 months.
- (c) to create the right atmosphere of a free and fair vote it is necessary to give the people of Kashmir, in the interim period, a Government in whom they have faith and confidence.
- (d) the vote is to be taken also in the part of Kashmir which is occupied by Pakistan. This matter will have to be negotiated with Pakistan.

The Government of India may not accept the above position because a free vote means that the people are not only given an opportunity to approve accession but also an opportunity to disapprove it; but this resistance can be broken down by forces of peace and sanity if Sheikh Saheb takes the above position. It will also make a big impact on the world outside and remove confusion and will enhance Sheikh Saheb's prestige as a statesman.

If the above statement of Sheikh Saheb is supplemented by a joint-US-Soviet declaration that the two super-powers are going to work together for a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir problem and for peace between India and Pakistan (instead of the USSR taking the Indian side and USA taking the Pakistan side) then an atmosphere will be created in which negotiations will be possible between India and Pakistan to come to an agreement with each other.

Sheikh Saheb's statement and the US-Soviet statement--two together--will be a powerful enough force to solve the problem.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1308
Page 1 of 1
Enclosure #3
A- 1214 from New Delhi

The Governments of USSR and USA - Being desirous of reducing tensions, step by step, in all parts of the world, and with a view to maintaining and strengthening peace throughout the world;

Have agreed to issue the following joint statement:

The Governments of USSR and USA feel concerned about the tense situation existing between India and Pakistan. The peoples of India and Pakistan have for centuries been neighbours with strong cultural, racial and other friendly ties. It is unfortunate that relations between them should have become strained after Independence. It is regrettable that large scale migrations of minority communities should have taken place. In the larger interests of the peoples of India and Pakistan, and in the interests of peace in Asia and the world, it is necessary and desirable for these two great countries to create an atmosphere of peace and friendship and conditions for a peaceful settlement of all differences, including the question of refugees, the situation in Kashmir, and other problems, which may pose a threat to their peaceful and friendly relations.

The Governments of USSR and USA appeal to the Governments of India and Pakistan to take every step towards this end and to enter into direct negotiations after a peaceful atmosphere is created so as to resolve these differences peacefully and amicably.

The Governments of USSR and USA will be glad to associate themselves with and to guarantee any peaceful settlement that is arrived at between the Governments of India and Pakistan directly or through any other means acceptable to them both.

The Governments of USSR and USA hope that this assurance will help remove the existing mistrust in the minds of India or Pakistan and help them to speed up the peaceful solution of their existing differences.

The Governments of USSR and USA sincerely hope that India and Pakistan will never resort to the use of force in settling these differences.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FM CIA

TO WHITE HOUSE FOR BUNDY 1964 MAY 21 05 58

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~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

FOLLOWING RECEIVED

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING FOR BUNDY, WHITE HOUSE FROM BOWLES.

"IN REGARD GHOSH PROPOSAL OF JOINT US-USSR
STATEMENT URGING KASHMIR SETTLEMENT; GHOSH IS OUT
OF TOWN, GUNDEVIA (ALSO RCVD GUNDEVITE) IN RESPONSE
TO MY INQUIRY WAS NON-COMMITTAL AND SINCE SOVIETS
APPEAR TO BE LETTING US DOWN IN LAOS SUGGEST WE PUT
IDEA ASIDE UNTIL I SEE YOU NEXT WEEK.

BOWLES"

0600

~~SECRET~~

NNNN

SANITIZED

Authority NLS/RAC 00-422 (*90)
By jc/bm NARA, Date 3-8-04

~~SECRET~~

May 18, 1964

Mac -

Comments on Sudhir Ghosh Proposal. First, I suspect that Ghosh-Cromyko memcon Bowles refers to is the old 16 March talk Ghosh had before he came to Washington (and gave us). Ghosh said he was returning via Moscow so I'd infer he didn't get any further there (or he would have said so). In any case I see four hookers.

1. I'd still doubt that Soviets would join in this venture, but admit this is no reason for not trying. As Bowles says, if Moscow balked, it would look silly in India.

2. Would the Indians buy? Ghosh seems to be speaking for himself so far, not for the GOI. Latter might balk at admitting in effect that Kashmir is an "international issue" not just a domestic matter. But here too why not probe?

3. Despite fact that above Indian admission would be a plus for Paks, State thought last month that Paks would react most adversely to what their hearts would tell them was US/USSR collusion in Delhi's favor.

4. Lastly, do we want to invite Soviet participation in Kashmir talks? Ghosh's proposal just has US/USSR saying "we appeal for a settlement and guarantee it", but Sovs might exploit this leading edge.

Despite all the above, Bowles has a point. Why not discreetly explore this further to see what's in it? However, I wouldn't let Chet loose on Dobrynin yet. Let's first find out in Delhi (a) if Ghosh did go back to Moscow; (b) what reception he got; (c) what Delhi thinks of Ghosh idea. Then we'll have better feel for whether we have a starter. Chet returns Saturday. Let's catch him with attached pronto.

RWK

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RA-032R-23-1-9-2
By JDW xARA Date 2-12-18

132
Index -
Ghosh

Attached
went out 5/19/64

Att Bowles CAS
msg to me
5/15

137a

~~SECRET~~

May 18, 1964/4:00 pm

25X1A



AMEMBASSY DELHI
FOR BOWLES FROM BUNDY

Case for taking hard look at Ghosh proposal turns partly on whether Soviets will at least nibble. We struck by fact Ghosh-Gromyko talk you describe seems to be same talk Ghosh had in Moscow before coming here. He left memcon here too.

Since Ghosh said he returning to India via Moscow, suggest you probe discreetly whether he had any subsequent talk and with what result. Might also be worthwhile to probe discreetly MEA attitude toward Ghosh idea. We have no sign GOI interested. Important of course that both probes be on carefully non-committal basis.

SANITIZED

RWK/jk

Authority NLJ-032-023-001/10

By jk NARA, Date 3-2-01

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India Shook

Komel

3.4(b)(1)

TO WHITE HOUSE FOR BUNDY

FOLLOWING FROM NEW DEHI

~~SECRET~~ /

~~SECRET~~

3.4(b)(1)

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING TO WHITE HOUSE FOR BUNDY FROM BOWLES:

[REDACTED] HAS JUST GIVEN ME [REDACTED] DOCUMENT

3.4(b)(1)

WHICH INCLUDES A REPORT OF HIS CONVERSATION IN MOSCOW WITH GROMYKO, KUZNETSOV AND FIRUBIN (VICE FOREIGN MINISTER IN CHARGE OF SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS) IN REGARD TO JOINT USA-USSR STATEMENT ON KASHMIR.

ACCORDING TO TRANSCRIPT WHICH WAS REPORTED BY TEJA, FIRST SECRETARY, INDIAN EMBASSY IN MOSCOW, GROMYKO WHILE XXPRES RING HIMSELF AS FAVORABLE TO THIS JOINT US-SOVIET INITIATIVE WAS CONVINCED THE US WOULD NOT GO ALONG WITH IT. THE WORDING OF THE GHOSH PROPOSAL WHICH WAS DISCUSSED WITH GROMYKO IS AS FOLLOWS:

"THE GOVERNMENTS OF USSR AND USA--BEING DESIROUS OF REDUCING TENSIONS, STEP BY STEP, IN ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD, AND WITH A VIEW TO MAINTAINING AND STRENGTHENING PEACE THROUGHTOUT THE WORLD, HAVE AGREED TO ISSUE THE FOLLOWING JOINT STATEMENT:

SANITIZED

Authority NLS/RAE 00-422(492)
By J/KCM NARA, Date 3-8-04

PRESERVATION COPY

"THE GOVERNMENTS OF USSR AND USA FEEL CONCERNED ABOUT THE TENSE SITUATION EXISTING BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN. THE PEOPLES OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN HAVE FOR CENTURIES BEEN NEIGHBOURS WITH STRONG CULTURAL, RACIAL AND OTHER FRIENDLY TIES IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM SHOULD HAVE BECOME STRAINED AFTER INDEPENDENCE. IT IS REGRETTABLE THAT LARGE SCALE MIGRATIONS OF MINORITY COMMUNITIES SHOULD HAVE TAKEN PLACE. IN THE LARGER INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLES OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN, AND IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE IN ASIA AND THE WORLD, IT IS NECESSARY AND DESIRABLE FOR THESE TWO GREAT COUNTRIES TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP AND CONDITIONS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF ALL DIFFERENCES, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF REFUGEES, THE SITUATION IN KASHMIR, AND OTHER PROBLEMS, WHICH MAY POSE A THREAT TO THEIR PEACEFUL AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS.

"THE GOVERNMENTS OF USSR AND USA APPEAL TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN TO TAKE EVERY STEP TOWARDS THIS END AND TO ENTER INTO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AFTER A PEACEFUL ATMOSPHERE IS CREATED SO AS TO RESOLVE THESE DIFFERENCES PEACEFULLY AND AMICABLY.

"THE GOVERNMENTS OF USSR AND USA WILL BE GLAD TO ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH AND TO GUARANTEE ANY PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT THAT IS ARRIVED AT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN DIRECTLY OR THROUGH ANY OTHER MEANS ACCEPTABLE TO THEM BOTH.

"THE GOVERNMENTS OF USSR AND USA HOPE THAT THIS ASSURANCE WILL HELP REMOVE THE EXISTING MISTRUST IN THE MINDS OF INDIA OR PAKISTAN AND HELP THEM TO SPEED UP THE PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THEIR EXISTING DIFFERENCES.

USSR AND USA SINCERELY HOPE THAT INDIA
AND PAKISTAN WILL NEVER RESORT TO THE USE OF FORCE IN SETTLING
THESE DIFFERENCES."

THIS IDEA HAS, OF COURSE, BEEN KICKING AROUND FOR SOME
TIME AND I HAVE BEEN HIGHLY SKEPTICAL THAT THE USSR WOULD EVER
AGREE. HOWEVER, IF THE USSR IS IN FACT PREPARED TO EMBARK ON
SUCH AN ENTERPRISE AT THIS TIME, IT WOULD APPEAR TO ME TO OFFER
US SEVERAL IMPORTANT ADVANTAGES, AND I THEREFORE SUGGEST THAT
WE EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY IN PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS. IF THE SOVIETS
SHOULD IN FACT AGREE, OUR POSITION HERE IN REGARD TO KASHMIR
WOULD BE GREATLY IMPROVED AND THE SOVIET'S ROLE OF PROTECTOR
OF INDIA'S INTEREST IN KASHMIR AGAINST THE ENCROACHMENT OF
WESTERN IMPERIALISTS WOULD BE SHARPLY UNDERCUT. IF ON THE
OTHER HAND SOVIETS REJECT THIS PROPOSAL IT WOULD BECOME
CLEAR TO INDIAN LEADERS ALL OF WHOM KNOW OF GHOSH-GROMYKO
DISCUSSIONS THAT KREMLIN IS PLAYING COLD WAR POLITICS IN REGARDS
TO KASHMIR.

IN EITHER EVENT PAKISTAN WOULD ALSO BE THE GAINER SINCE
THE STATEMENT CLEARLY REFUTES THE INDIAN ASSERTION THAT KASHMIR
IS A DOMESTIC MATTER AND THAT THERE ARE NO INTERNATIONAL IMPLICA-
TIONS.

AT THE SAME TIME KGINT USA-USSR STATEMENT OF THIS KIND
WOULD BRING CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE TO BEAR ON BOTH PAKISTAN AND
INDIA TO WORK TOWARDS A RATIONAL SOLUTION SINCE IT WOULD BECOME
CLEAR TO EACH OF THESE COUNTRIES THAT NEITHER COULD GAIN BY
PLAYING THE US AND USSR AGAINST EACH OTHER.

FINALLY, A DISCUSSION OF THIS JOINT ENTERPRISE ON A
CONFIDENTIAL BASIS PROVIDES A HANDY DEVICE TO TEST THE WILLING-
NESS OF THE SOVIETS TO COOPERATE WITH OUR GOVERNMENT IN AREAS
OF POLITICAL CONFLICT. IF THE USSR WILL WORK WITH US ON LAOS
AND KASHMIR, THERE IS SOME REASON TO HOPE THEY MAY ULTIMATELY
TAKE A SIMILAR VIEW TO VIETNAM AND CYPRUS.

I AM SENDING YOU THIS MESSAGE [REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1)

TO AVOID THE INEVCTABLE BUREAUCRATIC RESISTANCE THAT PROPOSALS
OF THIS KIND NORMALLY AROUSE AND TO SUGGEST CONSIDERATION
AT THE TOP LEVELS OF OUR GOVERNMENT. IF IT WOULD BE USEFUL
FOR ME TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY ON A PERSONAL, INFORMAL AND
UNOFFICIAL BASIS WITH DOBRYNIN WHEN I AM IN WASHINGTON NEXT
WEEK, I SHALL BE GLAD TO DO SO. BOWLES.

MAY 15 1984

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] 3.4(b)(1)


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4/17/64

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KOMER

In the event that you may see more of Sudhir Ghosh during his current visit to Washington, I am enclosing for your use our analysis of the proposals he is pushing, as well as a package which we prepared for Phil Talbot who is seeing him tomorrow.


James P. Grant

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : NEA - Mr. Talbot
Through: NEA - Mr. Grant

FROM : SOA - Carol C. Laise

DATE: *Indira* April 17, 1964
Shank

SUBJECT: Sudhir Ghosh - Your Meeting at 10:30 a.m., April 18.

I attach the two papers Sudhir Ghosh is currently peddling and Ambassador Bunker's memorandum of his conversation with Sudhir. These papers are: an alleged report of his conversation in Moscow and a proposed joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. appeal to India and Pakistan to settle their differences. Also attached is a letter from the Deputy Leader of the Congress Party in Parliament.

To my knowledge Ghosh has seen Senators Cooper, Sparkman, Humphrey, Mundt and Symington, as well as Governor Stevenson, Ambassador Bunker and Bob Komer. Senator Cooper informs me Sudhir is making headway with the Foreign Relations Committee members and Humphrey wants to take it up with the President. As I understand it, this may take place tomorrow and Humphrey wants Cooper to go along. The Senator didn't say whether Ghosh would also go, but I presume this is likely.

We sent his papers to SOV for comment. Their reaction is that it is easy for the Soviets to keep within the points by making agreeable noises on this proposed declaration, especially as they must have considered that the U.S. is not likely to agree to it.

David Guyer reported to me that the conversation with the Governor was anodyne; the Governor took some time to convey to Ghosh the difficulties India faces in the Security Council with its present uncooperative stance.

These annual pilgrimages of Sudhir's are somewhat mystifying. Dar of the Indian Embassy thinks we are financing it, as he says he has made it a personal mission to find out why he is here since he represents nobody except himself. Dar categorically told me that the GOI has not authorized foreign exchange for him. Ambassador Bunker pressed Ghosh as to his auspices and was told that it was authorized by the Finance Minister and the Congress Party in Parliament.

Recommendation:~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 032A -23-1-10-0
By JOL *ARA Date 2-12-18

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Recommendation:

I think we have to recognize Sudhir as a self-promoter and deal with him accordingly. Somebody in Delhi must think he is useful in massaging U.S. Congressmen - and they do like him according to Senator Cooper.

As for the substance of Sudhir's proposals, polite noises would seem to be in order, as they cannot be taken as representing anybody but himself. As you will see from his conversation with Ambassador Bunker, Ghosh has shifted his position on Kashmir from last year's presentation (i.e., away from autonomy to partition). Equally, he has shifted grounds on the subject of the U.S.S.R.-U.S. appeal from the Sino-Indian conflict (last year) to Pakistan.

It would seem to me that our best line to take is that in the Security Council consideration of Kashmir in February we were all working toward a consensus (including U.S. and U.S.S.R.) that accomplished what Sudhir is suggesting and we hope he'll be able to persuade his Government to accept such a consensus when the Council meets May 5. A more detailed analysis of Ghosh's proposals indicating their unworkability will be submitted later today.

New Subject

When you see B.K. Nehru at lunch next week, I suggest that you show him the record of the conversation in Moscow. Dar contends Ghosh saw only low-level functionaries in Moscow and is not aware of this memo. Also it would be well to ask him formally what standing Ghosh and his proposals have with the GOI.

Attachments:

1. Two Ghosh Papers.
2. Ambassador Bunker's Memcon.
3. Letter from Deputy Leader of Congress Party in Parliament.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NEA:SOA:CCLaise:mb:fah

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EMBASSY OF INDIA

MOSCOW

135a
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-142
By js, NARA, Date 10-17-04

Mr. Sudhir Ghosh met the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, this afternoon at 3 P.M.; Mr. Kuznetsov, Vice-Foreign Minister in charge of U.N. Affairs and Mr. Firyubin, Vice-Foreign Minister in charge of South Asian affairs were also present. The meeting lasted about 90 minutes. During the meeting Mr. Firyubin took extensive notes.

At the outset Mr. Ghosh explained with the help of a map the India-China military confrontation in the Eastern Sector where the Chinese military build-up between Bhutan and Sikkim, just above the Chumbi Valley, was increasing instead of decreasing. Mr. Ghosh explained that the Chinese army were in a position to cut off at any moment the 25-mile wide strip of land connecting the vast area of Assam-NEFA-Nagaland with the rest of India; he added that the U.S. military assessment was that the Chinese were in a position to do it but were not likely to do it. The Soviet assessment also was that the Chinese could do it but would not do it; but India's problem was: what would India do if they did it tomorrow. India knew that the military assistance so far received from the U.S., the USSR and Britain, all put together, was a fraction of what was needed to hold the Chinese if they decided to cut off Assam-NEFA-Nagaland.

Mr. Ghosh explained further that in the West India-Pakistan problem over Kashmir (with Mr. Chou-En-Lai having a finger in the pie) had become serious; Pakistan was by no means a military threat to India but Pakistan had a sense of grievance against India about the unsettled problem of Kashmir and when it decides to put pressure on India all it has to do is to kill a few hundred Hindus of the minority community in East Pakistan (which is ruled by West Pakistan, 1500 miles away) and there is immediate repercussion in India where some innocent Muslims are killed by the non-Muslims and there is general breakdown of law and order; this is a peculiar problem and this together with the pressure from China has created an intolerable situation; and this will continue to be so until a settlement was found of the Kashmir problem which was acceptable, first, to Pakistan and India, and then the other parties involved, mainly the U.S. and the USSR.

Mr. Ghosh then handed to Mr. Gromyko the draft of the suggested joint US-Soviet Statement on the India-Pakistan situation and explained why he thought that such a joint US-Soviet initiative would create a situation in which a peaceful settlement would become possible. Mr. Ghosh stated that there was general appreciation in the Indian Parliament of the consistent support given to India by Mr. Khrushchev in the Kashmir dispute; during his visit to Kashmir Mr. Khrushchev made a public statement that the whole of the State of Jammu and Kashmir belonged to India, including that part of the State which is in the occupation of Pakistan; Mr. Khrushchev said at a public meeting in Kashmir that if they needed any help for the defence of Kashmir all they had to do was to give a shout to the Russians across the mountains; the Russian veto was also made available to India in the U.N. Security Council whenever necessary. So whatever may be the nature of the settlement, it will have to be acceptable to Mr. Khrushchev; Mr. Nehru cannot make a settlement without Mr. Khrushchev. The U.S. Government was also very much involved in that situation; the U.S. does not want to see India go under due to pressure from China; the late President Kennedy tried very hard to find a just settlement of the Kashmir dispute. In the circumstances it seemed appropriate for the two super powers who have a predominant responsibility for peace-keeping to take a joint initiative.

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Mr. Ghosh also talked briefly about the suggestion he had put up to the late President Kennedy in March 1963 about the possibility of a joint U.S.-Soviet declaration for a peaceful settlement of the India-China conflict. Although the Government of India had made known to the U.S. Ambassador and the Soviet Ambassador in New Delhi its interest in this proposal nothing had so far materialized. Mr. Ghosh wondered what the Soviet Government's views were, although he appreciated their difficulty in participating in such a joint statement because of their military alliance with China which still existed in spite of ideological differences.

Mr. Gromyko then gave his replies to the points raised by Mr. Ghosh. He said he was going to be very frank. On Kashmir, he said that the Soviet position was well-known. The Soviet Union had consistently supported India's position and there was no question of any change in that policy. As Mr. Khrushchev himself had said, the Soviet Union would continue to pursue this policy. Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviet Government had no doubt whatsoever in their mind on this and, "you should have none either". "We have firmly and fully supported you on Kashmir -- our position is the same as before and I can say this in front of anybody without hesitation." The Soviet Union continued to support India's stand on Kashmir in spite of criticism from "certain countries", he added.

Mr. Gromyko went on to say that the American position on the Kashmir issue was very different; Pakistan was their military ally; Pakistan was a member of the aggressive SEATO and CENTO military blocs; the U.S. had deep military involvements in Pakistan; the U-2 plane which smashed the Paris Conference came from Peshawar for spying in the USSR; the Americans had certain military installations there, mainly for spying; because of these involvements the Americans cannot even show firmness to Pakistan. "Today Pakistan has become an ally of China and that seems to suit the Americans. It is an odd situation." According to their understanding the Americans, more so the British, did not want a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir problem. Kashmir is no longer a dispute between two neighbors; it has become a pawn in the international chess game; the Americans and the British secretly resented India's non-aligned position, although they are polite to India about it; they want to dislodge India from its non-aligned position and Kashmir is being used as an instrument for pressurising India into giving up her non-aligned position. That must be the reason why Pakistan's intrigues with China to create an intolerable situation for India seems to suit the United States in spite of her profession of friendship for India. In these circumstances, Mr. Gromyko wondered how the U.S. position and the Soviet position could be reconciled and Mr. Ghosh's suggested U.S.-Soviet statement could be considered. He saw no objection to such a joint statement but he did not believe that the U. S. Government would be prepared to go along with it.

Mr. Ghosh then said that he knew the Americans too well to accept Mr. Gromyko's analysis of the American position in the Kashmir dispute; he said he was not sure what sort of game the British Conservative Government was playing in this matter but personally he was deeply convinced that the Americans wanted a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir problem. Mr. Ghosh went on to say that he did not think that the U. S. Government desired to dislodge India from her non-aligned position; his impression was, and he knew a very large number of Americans amongst politicians and in the Administration, that the U.S. felt that India's non-aligned position and India's friendly contacts with the Soviet Government and the Indian Prime Minister's personal friendship with Chairman Khrushchev were good things for the non-communist world.

Mr. Ghosh explained that he had an opportunity of meeting the late President Kennedy briefly on the 27th of March, 1963 and had talked with him about the Kashmir problem; Mr. Ghosh was completely convinced that President Kennedy had a deep feeling for India; he understood the real nature of the Kashmir problem; he was determined to find a peaceful settlement which was just and fair to both India and Pakistan and he did not want anything to happen which did real injury to India's position in Kashmir and her ability to offer effective resistance to China. It was a tragedy for the world that he was removed from the world scene last November; if he lived a little longer he was sure to find a settlement of this problem and many other problems that threaten the peace of the world.

At the mention of President Kennedy's name the expression on the faces of the Soviet Ministers visibly changed. Mr. Gromyko quietly said that he agreed with Mr. Ghosh that Kennedy was a man of peace. He had no love for Communism or Soviet Russia but they felt that they could do business with him. Mr. Gromyko, however, seemed to make a distinction between Mr. Kennedy and the U. S. State Department; he made the caustic remark that there were far too many men in the U. S. State Department who made a career of the cold war.

Mr. Gromyko went on to say that he did not wish to discourage Mr. Ghosh. Mr. Ghosh can certainly try and persuade his American friends in Washington to participate in such a joint statement but he felt that there was no chance of their agreeing to it; the State Department would never agree to it; Washington without Kennedy was a different place. "This new man Johnson" he said "has been making nice speeches but we don't take him seriously" He says he is going to support Kennedy's policies. We don't really believe it. You will not know as we will not know what he is really like -- until after the November election; he will show his hand only after that. The U. S. Administration is already paralyzed because of the coming election; you will get nothing out of them now."

Mr. Gromyko added that Mr. Ghosh should certainly make his effort, whether he succeeded or not. He made complimentary remarks about Mr. Ghosh's association with Mahatma Gandhi and said that efforts made by people like him were never wasted, even if they did not produce immediate results.

As regards Mr. Ghosh's suggestion of last year about a joint U.S.-Soviet statement on the India-China situation, of which proposal he was aware, Mr. Gromyko said this was not really feasible in the present circumstances; the situation between Russia and China was very delicate; if the Soviet Government did such a thing along with the U. S. Government "it would be one more brick the Chinese would have to throw at us".

Throughout the interview Mr. Gromyko and his two colleagues were extremely courteous to Mr. Ghosh and invited Mr. Ghosh to stop by on his way back from Washington to New Delhi.

(J. S. Teja)
First Secretary
16 . 3 . 1964

The Governments of USSR and USA -

Being desirous of reducing tensions, step by step, in all parts of the world, and with a view to maintaining and strengthening peace throughout the world,

Have agreed to issue the following joint statement:

The Governments of USSR and USA feel concerned about the tense situation existing between India and Pakistan. India and Pakistan are two great neighbours which have had strong cultural, racial, religious and other friendly ties for centuries. It is unfortunate that relations between them should have become strained soon after Independence. It is regrettable that large scale migrations of minority communities should have taken place. In the larger interests of the peoples of India and Pakistan, and in the interests of peace in Asia and the world, it is necessary and desirable for these two great countries to restore an atmosphere of peace and friendship, and to create conditions for a peaceful settlement of all differences, including the question of refugees, the situation in Kashmir, and other problems, which may pose a threat to their peaceful and friendly relations.

The Governments of USSR and USA appeal to the Governments of India and Pakistan to take every step towards this end and to enter into direct negotiations after a peaceful atmosphere is created so as to resolve these differences peacefully and amicably.

The Governments of USSR and USA will be glad to associate themselves with and to guarantee any peaceful settlement that is arrived at between the Governments of India and Pakistan directly or through any other means acceptable to them both.

The Governments of USSR and USA hope that this assurance will help remove the existing mistrust in the minds of India or Pakistan and help them to speed up the peaceful solution of their existing differences.

The Governments of USSR and USA sincerely hope that India and Pakistan will never resort to the use of force in settling these differences.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

April 9, 1964

Participants: Sudhir Ghosh, Member of the Rajya Sabha
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker

Subject: Conversation with Mr. Ghosh concerning
Indo-Pakistan Relations

Mr. Ghosh came to report on the purpose of his visit to the United States and to tell me about his conversations in Moscow. He is evidently pursuing the same subject with which he concerned himself last year, i.e., the betterment of Indo-Pakistan relations -- his interest being centered primarily on a possible solution of the Kashmir problem.

He reported that he had conferred at some length with Mr. Gromyko in Moscow. He had gone there because of the Russians' long-continued interest in the Kashmir dispute and their consistent support of India. Gromyko's first advice was that India attempt to settle the border problems with the Chinese, asserting that they have good reason to believe that the Chinese are planning no further aggression. Ghosh, on the other hand, countered with a statement that any settlement with the Chinese would mean giving up Indian territory, i.e. Aksai Chin, something the great preponderance of Indian opinion would not accept. Such a settlement, further, would not remove Indian suspicion of China. There would be continued doubt in everyone's mind whether this would be the end of the story. He asked whether Mr. Khrushchev could give a guarantee that a Chinese invasion would not occur again, to which the obvious answer was "no". He pointed out that there were heavy concentrations of Chinese troops close to the Assam border, and that while a wholesale invasion of India might not be possible, the narrow neck connecting Assam and eastern India with Bengal could be closed easily by the Chinese. China,

in

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: RA 0324-23-1-11-9
By: JON Date: 2-12-18

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in his opinion, did not wish to accept India as an equal in Asia, even though she might be willing to co-exist with her.

The alternative, therefore, was to attempt to work out a settlement with Pakistan. The release of Abdullah was a preliminary step toward this. Ghosh reported that secret talks had been held by members of the Indian Government with Abdullah and they had come away with the impression that in spite of his imprisonment, Abdullah felt no enmity toward Mr. Nehru; hence his release had been an act of faith that out of it would come some relaxation of tensions.

I said that it seemed to me that the release of Abdullah must mean that India was contemplating the possibility of some kind of autonomy for Kashmir. Ghosh replied that he did not think this would be wise; that an autonomous Kashmir would become a cockpit for competing political factions and might eventually fall an easy prey to China. To my query whether he felt some kind of international guarantee might be possible, he replied that he did not believe this would be effective or sound, and that a definitive division of the area would be preferable.

He went on to explain that the Punjabi-speaking Muslims, who largely inhabited the hill areas, would not willingly stay in India. Kashmiri-speaking Muslims, however, tended to be rather timid and submissive and would very probably elect to remain a part of India. He then showed me on a map what he claimed to have discussed with both the military and with Shastri and some other members of the Government, as a feasible division. Since Pakistan was insisting on control of the Jhelum River and its sources, he felt this would have to be taken into account in any division. Consequently, what he had proposed was a division in which the Punch and Rajouri districts containing Punjabi-speaking Muslims should go to Pakistan. In addition, the Handwara

district,

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-3-

district, which is part of the valley including Wular Lake and the Jhelum river, would also go to Pakistan. In the latter area there are about 10,000 Kashmiri-speaking Muslims who might have to be resettled elsewhere. The Pakistani line (cease fire line) in the Northeast might have to be moved back a little so as not to be too close to the Indian lifeline to ~~Ladakh~~.

Ghosh says that the military have privately suggested such a division, that Shastri would accept it, and felt that Mr. Nehru could eventually be persuaded. He believes that a joint statement, something along the lines of the attached draft, would be important in gaining Mr. Nehru's acceptance. Rightly or wrongly, Khrushchev has supported the Indian position on Kashmir and therefore, Mr. Nehru feels under obligation to him.

Ghosh reported that he had discussed these matters with Senators Humphrey and Sparkman, who both professed interest and had offered to speak to President Johnson. Ghosh has also talked with Bob Komer, who said that he would discuss the matter with Mr. Bundy.

Attachment:

Draft joint statement.

EBunker:jk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

संसदीय कांग्रेस दल
Congress Party in Parliament

Ref. No. _____

24-25, PARLIAMENT HOUSE,
NEW DELHI-1.

11 March 1964

~~Confidential~~

Dear Sudhir,

I write to convey to you our warmest wishes for your visit to Moscow and Washington. We do hope you will be able to talk very fully with our Russian and American friends about our twin-problem, the India-China conflict and the India-Pakistan conflict, and our earnest desire for a peaceful settlement of these problems and our belief that a peaceful settlement will become possible if our Russian friends and our American friends feel able to put their heads together to find a way out.

The military power of China hangs on our head like the Sword of Democles. We have no desire to have a military conflict with our Chinese neighbours; but what are we to do in view of the steadily increasing Chinese military build-up, except to get ready to defend the territorial integrity of India and to resist Chinese aggression? Quite clearly China does not believe in co-existence with India as equals; China wants India to exist but wants India's existence to be at the mercy of China.

As regards the India-Pakistan problem, we do want a peaceful settlement; but the anxiety of our British and American friends about the right of self-determination of 2 million Kashmiris in the Kashmir Valley has puzzled us: they have shown no anxiety at all about the right of self-determination of 60 million men and women living in East Pakistan. In order to get rid of the British we unhappily accepted the partition

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Authority AAC 032A-23-1-128
By JOL VARA Date 2-12-18

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संसदीय काँग्रेस दल
Congress Party in Parliament

-2-


24-25, PARLIAMENT HOUSE,
NEW DELHI-1.

Ref. No. _____

of India. What was India has now become three pieces : (1) East Pakistan (2) India (3) West Pakistan and (4) Kashmir, which is hanging fire; situation created by the partitioning of India has yet to be stabilised. Don't our friends want self-determination for all the four parts ? Or do they want self-determination only for one part, Kashmir ? Have they ever heard of a country consisting of two parts, one at a distance of 1500 miles from the other, with an independent Sovereign State in between ? That is Pakistan today; and culturally, racially and linguistically East Pakistan (consisting of Bengali Muslims and Hindus) has nothing whatever to do with West Pakistan; there is no bond either of common economic or political interests. Please show our friends the enclosed statement of the eminent Muslim leader of East Pakistan, Maulana Bhasani. Do not his people have a right of self-determination ? Peace will prevail in this subcontinent if self-determination is guaranteed for all.

We shall look forward to talking with you on your return. Please know that you are fortified by the good wishes of all of us in the Party.

Yours sincerely,



(Surendra Mohan Ghose)

Deputy Leader,
Congress Party in Parliament.

Shri Sudhir Ghosh, M.P.
95 South Ave.
New Delhi.

PRESERVATION COPY

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Proposals of Sudhir Ghosh

Ghosh is making two proposals in Washington which he has already tried to peddle in Moscow. The first and most important is that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. join in an appeal to India and Pakistan to restore an atmosphere of peace and friendship and enter into direct negotiations to resolve their differences. The second is that the Kashmir issue be settled through partition (he is not precisely clear where the partition line would lie).

Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Appeal

The appeal is worded in such an innocuous manner that neither the Soviets nor the Indians would be likely to have much trouble with it. It asks for no particular concessions. India could fully support the appeal without altering any of its basic positions on its disputes with Pakistan. Issuance of such an appeal would put India in a favorable propaganda position. By accepting the appeal, it would be supporting all of the virtues without having to pay anything.

On the other hand, Pakistan would almost certainly consider the appeal pro-Indian. Pakistan would note that India was not asked to make any concessions on Kashmir or other issues. From the Pakistani viewpoint a document produced by the Soviet Union, which has consistently supported India on Indo-Pakistan disputes, and the U.S., which Pakistan sees as a new supporter of India, would be strongly loaded against Pakistan. It seems quite doubtful that such an appeal would bring the Pakistanis any closer to negotiations. In fact, they might resist negotiations for fear that joint Soviet-U.S. pressure would be brought to bear in favor of India.

Needless to say we would not like the Soviet Union to get involved in the details of any possible mediation of Indo-Pakistan disputes, particularly of Kashmir.

Kashmir Settlement Through Partition

Partition is clearly not now a feasible solution of Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah and his followers, who at the present time would have to support any Kashmir solution if it were to succeed, have ruled out partition. Even if the present situation in Kashmir were conducive to a settlement--and it is clearly not--partition would not be likely now to provide a basis. Some kind of autonomy is the more likely alternative.

Ghosh's

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By JOW vARA Date 2-12-18

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Ghosh's Auspices

Ghosh states that he is here as a representative of the Congress Party and has a letter of good wishes from Surendra Mohan Ghose the Deputy Leader of the Congress Party in Parliament. The latter individual, however, is not a very influential Congress Party member; he does not belong to the government. His letter does not sponsor Ghosh's trip but simply conveys "warmest wishes." Furthermore, the letter is quite contentious about the Indian position on Kashmir and is emotionally anti-Pakistan, claiming that the Government of Pakistan should give self-determination to East Pakistan. Such a letter, even if it were from a more senior official, would hardly provide the basis for a mission directed toward Indo-Pak conciliation.

Mr. Ghosh, from time to time, cites the support of senior Indian officials including the Prime Minister. Our experience in the past has been that he does not always represent their views and that, in fact, he represents only himself. He has little if any political position in India. He controls no part of the Congress Party and does not seem to be of particular influence on anyone in the Government of India.

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Ghosh's

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-2-

Ghosh's Auspices

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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DEC 9 1964

India

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter from Lions Club, Banswara, India,
to the President dated November 29, 1964.

The Department recommends that the attached letter from Mr. H. D. Parikh to the President, requesting a message to the Lions Club of Banswara, India be sent to our Embassy in New Delhi for appropriate reply. The Lions Club of Banswara is not of sufficient importance to warrant a message from the President. Requests of this nature are normally handled by the Embassy.

cc memo for
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Original letter from
Mr. Parikh dated
November 29, 1964.

12/28/64.

Approved in S
12/18/64

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SecDel/MC/ 32
December 11, 1964
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SECRETARY'S DELEGATION
TO THE
NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, November, 1964

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: December 10, 1964

Time: 1:15 p.m.

Place: Carlyle Hotel

PART I of VI

Subject: Chinese Communist Policies and the Chirep Issue

Participants:

U.S.

The Secretary
Ambassador Yost
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Walsh

India

Foreign Minister Swaran Singh
Ambassador to U.S. Nehru
Ambassador to U.N. Chakravarty
Counselor of U.N. Mission Singh

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The Secretary said that we are quite concerned about the manifestations and consequences of aggressive Communist Chinese policies. While we feel that an accommodation is probable in the West between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, we are far less sanguine about the situation in Asia. The Chinese are on a collision course with us and the consequences will be serious if they are not diverted.

Simply stated, if the Chinese Communists and the North Vietnamese would leave their neighbors alone, the situation would be de-fused. We would then withdraw our military from South East Asia. We have no desire for bases or installations in this region. We do, however, intend to help our friends defend their independence. We have made this fundamental position perfectly clear to Peiping and Hanoi. The Secretary went on to say that a number of countries have direct relations with the Chinese. However, we

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 3-1-04

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note with concern that no one other than the U.S. appears to be urging Peiping to draw back from its present course. This is a scandalous situation.

The Secretary stated that the Chinese are unlikely to change their aggressive course unless they are persuaded that their policies are not paying dividends. This is the problem that we have had with French recognition of Peiping. The Chinese accepted it as a fruit of their policies.

This aspect of the Chicom problem is highlighted in the Chirep issue. Favorable developments from Peiping's viewpoint in this respect will increase the aggressive tendencies which so deeply concern us. This would be a particularly bad time for the Chicoms to win a majority on the admission question; we must realize that a vote now would be a close thing. Continued Chinese belligerency in South East Asia, on top of the intimidating nuclear detonation, makes it most important to prevent Peiping's tactics from succeeding. For these reasons we would hope that the Indian Government would this year abstain on any resolution to admit Peiping. This would have a considerable effect on the votes of the Afro-Asian states and would carry a clear message to the Chinese Communists that they could not shoot their way into the UN. This would not represent a change in the basic Indian position in respect to the universality concept but would merely be a change in tactics this year because of the special circumstances now existing.

In reply, the Minister said that he was in essential agreement with the Secretary's assessment of Peiping's policies and of the dangers of the situation in Asia. His Government was quite concerned about the deteriorating situation in SEA and the growing consequences of Sukarno's confrontation with Malaysia. Furthermore, they are very much aware of the possibilities of a major conflict between Peiping and the U.S. which could grow to unpredictable magnitudes.

The Indian Government, he said, naturally wished to do what it could to check this generalized deterioration. There were, however, substantial restraints on Indian power and freedom of action. It was, for example, highly important for India to refrain from actions which would endanger Russian support against the Chinese Communists. Furthermore, India had very little influence with Peiping. Signals from New Delhi, such as ^{done} in respect to the representation issue, would be ignored.

The Minister stated that the Indian Cabinet had carefully reviewed Indian policy in regard to the admission of Peiping to the UN. The Cabinet was aware that the nuclear explosion had increased the voting prospects of Peiping in the UN and had raised the possibility that they would be invited to join ENDC. Although there had been some dissenting

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views, it was the majority opinion that the policy should not be changed. India had voted for the admission of the Chinese Communists after the Chinese attack in the fall of 1962 and again in 1963. While the nuclear explosion was certainly a worrisome development, the majority did not believe that it altered the basic logic of the existing position supporting Peiping's admission. While the Cabinet decision prevented him from agreeing to the Secretary's proposition, he wished to emphasize his appreciation of the opportunity to discuss this matter in some depth with the Secretary.

In conclusion, the Secretary said that he hoped that the Minister would give the question of abstention further thought. We are convinced that Chinese admission would increase the already dangerous Asian situation.

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Approved in S
12/18/64

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SecDel/MC/32
December 11, 1964

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION
TO THE
NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, November 1964

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: December 10, 1964

Time: 1:15 p.m.

Place: Carlyle Hotel

PART II of VI

Subject: The South East Asian Situation

Participants:

U.S.

The Secretary
Ambassador Yost
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Walsh

India

Foreign Minister Swaran Singh
Ambassador to U.S. Naru
Ambassador to U.N. Chakravarty
Counselor of U.N. Mission Singh

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In the course of his comments on the increasing dangers of aggressive Chinese Communist policies (Part I), the Secretary expressed serious concern about the situation in South East Asia. He pointed out that stability in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia had deteriorated further in recent months.

In Vietnam, he said, the Communists had increased their pressures. In this calendar year, the North Vietnamese will have infiltrated between 8-10,000 professionally trained soldiers. Simultaneously, they have introduced high quality arms, ranging from small arms through mortars and anti-aircraft guns. Interrogation of prisoners had provided clear intelligence on the nature of this flow of men and equipment, including the positive identification of Chinese arms. This movement in one way or another had to be halted.

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By pc, NARA, Date 3-10-94

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In Laos, the Geneva Agreements designed to preserve Lao independence and neutrality have been increasingly jeopardized. The ICC has been unable to perform its functions effectively.

The Secretary went on to say that the policies of Sihanouk in Cambodia have become increasingly capricious and the outlook for that country is increasingly depressing. We are on the verge of talks now with Cambodian representatives in an effort to bring our views and intentions once again to the attention of the Cambodian Government.

In reply, the Minister said that the Indian Government is quite concerned about the current situation and the outlook in South East Asia. He planned on visiting a number of the more troublesome spots within the next few weeks. After his departure from New York on December 17, he hoped to make two trips to this region within a time-span of a few weeks -- the first to Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia and the second to Cambodia, Indonesia, and Laos. He would report his conclusions to the Secretary after he completes these trips.

The Minister stated that the deteriorating situation in Vietnam was quite worrisome but he was inclined to doubt that a solution could be found from accelerating the conflict. The Cambodian situation, he agreed, was considerably complicated by the unpredictable actions and policies of Sihanouk.

Turning to Laos, the Minister said that India found itself in an unenviable position in the ICC. His Government felt that its role was to try to bring the parties together which was an extremely difficult task. Any change in this role would be regarded as a change against the Soviets which could cause complications adversely affecting Russian support against the Chinese Communists. Actually, India would like to give up this onerous responsibility but this does not appear feasible.

The Minister said that his Government believed that a Conference of the Fourteen could be useful in respect to the Laos situation and might open the door to some type of an arrangement for Vietnam. It was better, he said, to talk than to fight.

In conclusion, the Secretary said that we could agree to a Conference but it would be necessary to halt the aggression in Laos and to recognize Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister rather than merely the chairman of the various factions. Furthermore, we would have to be careful that the Communists would not use the Conference as a means to prove that the Geneva Accords are dead. This could create an even more dangerous situation in the area.

JFWalsh:nrs:12-11-64

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12/18/64

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December 11, 1964

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION
TO THE
NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, November 1964

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: December 10, 1964

Time: 1:15 p.m.

Place: Carlyle Hotel

PART III of VI

Subject: India Assistance for Vietnam

Participants:

U.S.

The Secretary
Ambassador Yost
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Walsh

India

Foreign Minister Swaran Singh
Ambassador to U.S. Nehru
Ambassador to U.N. Chakravarty
Counselor of U.N. Mission Singh

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In the course of his discussion with Swaran Singh, the Secretary briefly mentioned our hope that the Indian Government would provide some form of tangible assistance to Vietnam. He said that about 15 countries are now providing aid in varying quantities and forms and if this could be raised to 25 or 30 it would be of considerable help to the Vietnamese and might give pause to the Communists. The Secretary recalled that the Indians had provided an ambulance unit in Laos and suggested that a similar contribution would be helpful in Vietnam. He told the Minister that Ambassador Bowles would raise this subject with him when the Minister returned to New Delhi.

The Minister said that he would be pleased to discuss the subject with Ambassador Bowles. Ambassador Nehru observed that the Laos ambulance unit had created difficulties in Parliament and had been sharply attacked by Peiping.

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State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-1-04

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12/18/64

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December 10, 1964

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION
TO THE
NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, December 1964

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: December 10, 1964
Time: 1:15 P.M.
Place: Carlyle Hotel

PART IV OF VI

Subject: Post-Khrushchev Russian Policies

Participants:

U. S.

The Secretary
Ambassador Yost
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Walsh

INDIA

Foreign Minister Swaran Singh
Ambassador to U. S. Nehru
Ambassador to U. N. Chakravarty
Counselor of U. N. Mission Singh

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The Secretary said that he wished to exchange impressions with the Minister in respect to the new Soviet leadership. Our contacts, he said, have proceeded in two stages. In private talks the Soviets have been relatively amiable, whereas their public statements have been harsh. While there have been many hours of discussion with them, little substantive progress has resulted. We have, for example, attempted without success to engage the Soviets in a discussion of our respective budgetary structures for comparability purposes in respect to military expenditures.

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The Secretary stated that it appeared to us that Soviet policies would be formulated on a committee basis for some time. When he asked Gromyko who would be on the other end of the line if the President called, Gromyko had indicated that he would reply a bit later. The next day Gromyko told him that the Soviet Government would answer the telephone. The Secretary went on to say that Soviet policies in the short-term are likely to be marked more by inertia than by bold new initiatives.

The Minister said that he agreed with this general assessment. He felt that it was unlikely that the new Soviet leadership would be able to formulate striking policy initiatives; conversely, he was inclined to doubt that they would be as flexible in critical conditions as Khrushchev had been. He believed that they might be more dangerous than Khrushchev if pressed into a tight corner.

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December 10, 1964

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION
TO THE
NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, December 1964

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: December 10, 1964
Time: 1:15 P.M.
Place: Carlyle

PART V OF VI

Subject: Indian-Pakistan Relations

Participants:

U. S.

The Secretary
Ambassador Yost
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Walsh

INDIA

Foreign Minister Swaran Singh
Ambassador to U. S. Nehru
Ambassador to U. N. Chakravarty
Counselor of U. N. Mission Singh

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S/P	NEA-3	INR/OD	SEC DEL-2 White House ✓

The Minister raised the subject of Indian-Pakistani relations, stating that they were in a very trying stage. Prime Minister Shastri had visited Prime Minister Ayub in Pakistan as a good will gesture but the results have not been very rewarding. Pakistan seems to have grown closer to Communist China. The meeting of Home Ministers which had been arranged by the two Prime Ministers has been cancelled by the Pakistanis. Meanwhile firing incidents along the border have increased and India is being deluged with refugees. The magnitude of this problem makes the Palestine refugee issue look trivial in comparison.

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By jc, NARA, Date 3-1-07

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The Minister went on to say that the Pakistanis continue to threaten that they will raise the Kashmir issue in the Security Council. If this occurs - and India might in frustration agree to having it out with Pakistan - he hoped that India would have the understanding of the United States.

In response, the Secretary said that he is not sure that we know all of Pakistan's relations with Peiping. What we do know, we don't like.

In looking at the Indian-Pakistani situation, he said, it seems that we might make two points. In the first place, U. S. interests would be best served by a united, peaceful sub-continent. This would constitute a bulwark for world peace and would provide the basis for fully meaningful U. S. aid programs in the region. Therefore, if we had our own way, "the two governments would stay in negotiation until the white puff of smoke" indicated agreement. In the second place, the deep preoccupation of the U. S. over the dangers of war with Communist China should be understood by both countries. In these circumstances, the American people are inclined to help countries which help the U. S. It might be said that this represents both an opportunity and a policy problem for India.

JWalsh:12/11/64

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12/18/64

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December 10, 1964

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION
TO THE
NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, November 1964

Date: December 10, 1964

Time: 1:15 p.m.

Place: Carlyle Hotel

PART VI of VI

Subject: The New Look in Diplomatic Practices: Library Burning

Participants:

U.S.

The Secretary
Ambassador Yost
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Walsh

India

Foreign Minister Swaran Singh
Ambassador to U.S. Nehru
Ambassador to U.N. Chakravarty
Counselor of U.N. Mission Singh

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The Secretary said that we are concerned about the serious deterioration in manners which is occurring in international affairs. While this to some extent reflects the rapid expansion in the number of countries with ^{which} the United States has relations, some of the more gross examples of recent bad conduct have occurred in countries which have been involved in international affairs long enough to know better.

The Secretary stated that he had particular reference to the library burning fad which is beginning to take on a worldwide character. In addition, there have been other manifestations of this disturbing trend such as the heinous seizure of hostages, including consular personnel, in the Congo; the arrest of one of our consuls by a Prime Minister; and the organization by one of the UN delegations in the past week of a demonstration ^{by pickets} in front of our Mission. This sort of thing must be brought under control.

The Minister said that he shared the Secretary's concern about the deterioration of diplomatic manners, particularly on the part of

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By je, NARA, Date 3-1-04

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the new and smaller states. However, he noted that the eccentric characters of certain rulers in some states of a certain age and experience would indicate that we should choose psychiatrists rather than professional diplomats as Ambassadors. He felt that the UN had a real role to play in teaching diplomatic manners, although to be effective it appeared that an enrollment of three to five years was required. He noted that conduct in the General Assembly was better than in some of the UN subordinate bodies. Without concurrence from the other participants in the discussion, Ambassador Nehru observed that good manners are the luxury of the rich.

JPWalsh:nrs:12-11-64

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 28, 1964

*To Mr. B. with
Rusk note 11/30/64*

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India

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment for Ambassador Bowles

Ambassador Bowles would like to meet you while he is in Washington. He plans to be here from November 27 to December 7. I believe he will wish to discuss several important questions regarding our relations with India, such as our economic and military assistance policies, use of our surplus rupee holdings, India's relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China, and a possible visit to the United States by Prime Minister Shastri next spring. I strongly recommend that you agree to meet him if your schedule permits.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

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Authority Group 4

By jc NARA. Date 3-1-01

17
R. K. SINGH,
M.A., LL.B., D.Ed. (Harvard),
DIRECTOR

141
PHONE No. 3641
Balwant Vidyapeeth Rural Higher Institute,
P. O. BICHPURI
(Agra)

November 24, 1964.

Bob Komer
Index
Dear Mr. President,

I should very much like to continue the stream of congratulations on your coming out successful in the presidential election. The people have voted with reason and sanity.

All quarters in this country, both political and non-political are happy over your victory. We, our Institute and I personally, do join in this happiness.

Send
It is so gratifying to remember that you had been here with us on a hot summer noon in 1961 and encouraged us in our educational efforts. To bring back to you the memory of that occasion, I am enclosing two pictures taken here at that time.

With the sincerest regards,

Yours respectfully,

RK Singh
(R.K. Singh)

President Lyndon B. Johnson,
WASHINGTON, U.S.A.

See R.K. Komer
to Singh
12/7/64

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Pass following message from Talbot to Mrs. Pandit:

QUOTE

Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit

New Delhi, India

The President has asked me to convey to you his thanks for your warm message of greeting on the occasion of his election.

Most sincerely,

Phillips Talbot UNQUOTE

Following message was delivered to Department by Indian Embassy:

QUOTE

President Johnson

Washington

Please accept my sincere congratulations on your splendid victory.

Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit UNQUOTE

BALL

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA:SOA:FJCrawford:mrs:11-20-64

NEA - Phillips Talbot

SOA - Mr. Cameron
SS/S - Mr. Bartley (subs.)

S/S - Mr. Mills

NOV 23 1964

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Pandit to
Talbot reply
11/21/64

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Nov 13 11 32 AM '64

Please deliver soonest following message from President to

President Radhakrishnan:

QUOTE

Dear Mr. President:

I deeply appreciate your kind message of congratulations on my election as President of the United States and extend to you and the people of India my personal best wishes. We in the United States also look forward to close and friendly relations between our two countries, and to continuing cooperation in the cause of world peace.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

White House does not plan release of reply but has no objection if President Radhakrishnan wishes to do so.

Drafted by: NEA:SOA:AALakeland:nrs:11-10-64	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Phillips Talbot
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XXXXXX

White House - Mr. Komer

S/S - Mr. Davies

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203 To
Radhakrishnan
11/13/64

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Following is text of Radhakrishnan message to President:

QUOTE

The people of your great country have shown abounding faith and confidence in your dedicated and distinguished leadership. Please accept our warmest felicitations and good wishes.

We in India look forward to close and ~~extensive~~ friendly relations between our two countries and to cooperation with the Government of the U.S.A. under your able leadership to promote cooperation and understanding between nations and further the causes of world peace, progress and prosperity which we all hold dear.

Radhakrishnan. UNQUOTE

END

RUSK

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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☐ CHARGE TO

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Coall

41

Origin
NEA

ACTION: AmEmbassy NEW DELHI 975

India / India

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SAUNDERS

Nov 13 11 33 AM '64

L.B. To P.M. Shastri 11/13/64

Info:
SS
P
USIA
NSC
CPR

Minister Shastri:

QUOTE

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I deeply appreciate your kind message of congratulations ~~on~~
~~the outcome of our Presidential election~~ As one who has played a
leading role in the three general elections in India, you can
appreciate the importance to a democratic government of a fresh
mandate from the voters. I ^{quite} ~~entirely~~ agree that the future of all
humanity depends upon ^{its} ~~the~~ ability ~~of the world~~ to develop a fabric
of international understanding. With this great demonstration of
support from the American people, I ^{shall} ~~will~~ redouble my own efforts
to build a secure community of nations in which free men can live
in peace and prosperity.

In the years ahead, I ^{know} ~~am confident~~ that India and the United
States of America will continue to work together, ^{toward} ~~achieving~~ the
objectives which we both hold so dear. In this common quest, I
hope that you and I can come to know each other better.

Drafted by:

NEA:SOA:AALakeland:nrs:11-10-64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - Phillips Talbot

Clearances:

~~XXXXXX~~ White House - Mr. Komer S/S - Mr. Davies

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FORM DS-322
5-61

NOV 13 1964

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I shall draw encouragement
As I prepare to face the problems of the years ahead/~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
from
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~/your confidence and best wishes.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

White House does not plan release of reply but has no objection if Vice
Minister Shastri wishes to do so.

~~XXXXX~~

Following is text of Shastri message to the President:

QUOTE

On behalf of the people and the Government of India, I want to convey
to you our warmest felicitations and good wishes on your election to the
high office of the President of the United States of America. Your great
and memorable victory demonstrates the massive support of the American
people that you have. The world today needs peace and international under-
standing. Upon these depends the future of the entire humanity. There is
no doubt that under your leadership the United States will continue to
make its weighty contribution towards these noble objectives.

between

The close and friendly relations/~~between~~ our two countries will,
I am confident, grow stronger in the years to come. May I take this
opportunity to wish you all success in the great tasks that await you.

/ Lal Bahadur. UNQUOTE

END

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

*India
Borales*

New Delhi - November 12, 1964.

~~SECRET~~

Dear Bob:

Many thanks for your letter of October 28 which has just reached me as I am preparing to return to the States by way of Moscow and London. As always, I am very glad to have your comments on what we are doing and especially on the Washington scene, and I look forward to a chance to discuss them with you very soon.

Meanwhile we have the Department's telegrams 964 and 966 on the Navy question, and I imagine that by the time I get to Washington we will have some idea whether Chavan and the British are able to agree on a satisfactory package. We can then better judge whether the balance of pros and cons should be recalculated in terms of our own interests.

I am certain that the Government and the Indian Navy would much prefer to keep the Navy a Western equipped and oriented force. But if they meet resistance or unresponsiveness they cannot be expected to ignore the fact that the Soviets are offering the moon, including the submarine arm to which you refer. The Indians have not asked for a submarine arm, and know how much one would cost. Thus it is not we and the British, but the Soviets who whether intentionally or not would help India go broke. The opportunity we and the British have is to meet what the Indians consider minimum requirements in ways which do not break the bank.

Mr. Robert W. Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

This document consists
of 2 pages. Copy 2
of 5 copies, Series A.

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Authority RAc0348-23-1-14-6By JOW VARA Date 2/12/18

NOV 20 1964

~~SECRET~~

-2-

As you will have seen, prospects for a US role in the production of the HF-24 Mark I, have been reopened during Peter Solbert's visit here. The issue does not involve duplication of the MIGs as did the question of help for the Mark II; the Mark I is a different aircraft with a different mission (ground support) which if it is economically and sensibly done could save both Air Force and Army budget money in the future. I assume that this matter will be further discussed after we get the Indian report of their detailed plans for production of Mark I. Bear in mind, by the way, that the GOI is even now obtaining something like \$6.5 million worth of components for the Mark I for cash in the United States and consistency would require that if we are willing to issue export licenses, we ought also be willing to make sure that the project is successful.

I look forward to discussing with Dave Bell, Chenery and Macomber the status of GOI loan applications. I particularly want to go into the problem of nonproject loans for India. With respect to Hollis Chenery's idea about increasing aid and speeding up the growth rate, the approach is challenging, but I am not yet sure how realistic this is.

I very much look forward to seeing you again. I feel this is a particularly apt time for a thoroughgoing review of our policies on the subcontinent.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

~~SECRET~~

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CLASSIFICATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

11/10/64

Date

Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

The enclosed is for White House
clearance prior to transmission.

B. H. Read
for Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Telegram to Amembassy NEW DELHI

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CLASSIFICATION

NOV 12 1964

146

1. K. H. [initials]

*2. Ret BKS -
Ret'd to neg B
with Rusk memo
11/12/64.*

India

TELEGRAPH BRANCH

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Ambassy NEW DELHI

Please deliver soonest following message from President to Prime Minister Shastri:

QUOTE

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I deeply appreciate your kind message of congratulations, on the outcome of our Presidential election.] As one who has played a leading role in the three general elections in India, you can appreciate the importance to a democratic government of a fresh mandate from the voters. I ^{quite} ~~entirely~~ agree that the future of all humanity depends upon ^{its} ~~the~~ ability of the world to develop a fabric of international understanding. With this great demonstration of support from the American people, I ^{shall} ~~intend to~~ redouble my own efforts to build a secure community of nations in which free men can live in peace and prosperity.

In the years ahead, I ^{know} ~~am confident~~ that India and the United States of America will continue to work together, ^{toward} ~~seeking~~ the objectives which we both hold so dear. In this common quest, I hope that you and I can come to know each other better.

NEA:SOA:AALakeland:nrs:11-10-64

NEA - Phillips Talbot

XXXXXX White House -

S/S -

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TELEGRAPH BRANCH

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2

NEW DELHI

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1466

As I prepare to face the problems of the years ahead, ^(shall) ~~it is good to~~ ^{I have encouragement}
know ^{from} I have your confidence and best wishes.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

White House does not plan release of reply but has no objection if Prime
Minister Shastri wishes to do so.

TEXT

Following is text of Shastri message to the President:

QUOTE

On behalf of the people and the Government of India, I want to convey
to you our warmest felicitations and good wishes on your election to the
high office of the President of the United States of America. Your great
and memorable victory demonstrates the massive support of the American
people that you have. The world today needs peace and international under-
standing. Upon these depends the future of the entire humanity. There is
no doubt that under your leadership the United States will continue to
make its weighty contribution towards these noble objectives.

The close and friendly relations ^{between} ~~between~~ our two countries will,
I am confident, grow stronger in the years to come. May I take this
opportunity to wish you all success in the great tasks that await you.

Lal Bahadur. UNQUOTE

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AmEmbassy NEW DELHI

Please deliver soonest following message from President to
President Radhakrishnan:

QUOTE

Dear Mr. President:

I deeply appreciate your kind message of congratulations on my election as President of the United States and extend to you and the people of India my personal best wishes. We in the United States also look forward to close and friendly relations between our two countries, and to continuing cooperation in the cause of world peace.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

White House does not plan release of reply but has no objection if
President Radhakrishnan wishes to do so.

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Following is text of Radhakrishnan message to President:

QUOTE

The people of your great country have shown abounding faith and confidence in your dedicated and distinguished leadership. Please accept our warmest felicitations and good wishes.

We in India look forward to close and ~~strong~~ friendly relations between our two countries and to cooperation with the Government of the U.S.A. under your able leadership to promote cooperation and understanding between nations and further the causes of world peace, progress and prosperity which we all hold dear.

Radhakrishnan. UNQUOTE



EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

New Delhi, India,
November 9, 1964.

147
India
X Bowles

Dear Bob:

I think the President and indeed all of you would have been greatly pleased at the way the election news was not only received but presented here in India. I am enclosing a few photographs which will give you an idea.

"Election night" began here in the early morning hours of November 4, which happened to be on the second day of Diwali an important Indian holiday, and our USIS house and garden was the gathering spot for thousands of ordinary Indians, high level Indians, members of other foreign missions in Delhi and our American community.

USIS turned its auditorium into an operations center for receiving, sifting and tabulating all the returns we could get, some from the Voice of America, some from the commercial wire services and some from the wireless file. The operations center which opened at 6:00 a.m. had the appearance of our party headquarters in Hartford on election day. Nearly one hundred USIS, AID and Embassy wives and older children worked in the operations center as volunteers--ran the reporting boards and the films, acted as guides, and manned the public address system.

On the spacious lawn in front of the USIS building were large revolving flash boards readable more than a hundred feet away bringing the minute-to-minute totals of the popular vote, electoral vote, the Senate and House contests and the Gubernatorial races superimposed on a forty foot map of the USA.

Mr. Robert W. Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

NOV 16 1964

The exhibits included sample ballots and model voting machines, poster placard stories of earlier candidates and earlier elections, and one on the role of the women in United States politics. There was a tent cinema in the center of the garden continuously showing a 24-minute film on previous United States campaigns and voting procedures. The campaign posters and other back-up materials which Carl Rowan's people supplied gave a genuine flavor to the exhibits and festivities.

Several members of the Cabinet and military came and followed the reports with enthusiastic interest. So did many representatives of foreign missions (including the Soviet Ambassador and six associates), civil servants, members of Parliament and journalists, while regular busses filled with students shuttled back and forth all day from Delhi University. There was a cafeteria for those who stayed all day.


All day long the atmosphere of vicarious participation in the American election process prevailed. When the landslide figures began to come in enthusiasm ran high, yet there seemed to be no tapering off of interest with many people coming back for a second or third visit.

We were very proud of our countrymen on Election Day, and I think we succeeded in impressing a great many Indians with the vitality, good sense and dignity of our democratic process.

I look forward to seeing you in Washington shortly.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,


Chester Bowles

Enclosures:
Photographs.

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

TYPE OF DOCUMENT

Cable _____

Letter ✓ _____

Memo _____

Other _____

DATE 11/7/64FROM Miss Anna (daughter of Sgt. Buehler, No. 6 G.T.S. A.F. Bangalore 14, India)TO L B J

NUMBER _____

SUBJECT Election congratulations

Reply by Janita Roberts, Personal
Secretary to the President - 12/9/64.

SEE _____

NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

NEA NOTESSaudi Arabian King Deposed

Following a decision approved by religious leaders and royal family members, Saud was deposed as King and Faisal was proclaimed successor in a three-hour ceremony on November 2. Led by princes, religious leaders, army, police and other dignitaries, the citizens of Riyadh gave the new King their allegiance. November 3 was declared a national holiday, and Faisal announced continuance of Saudi internal reforms and foreign policy. Our Embassy at Jidda presumes that designation of a Crown Prince will require further royal family deliberations, followed possibly by another public bestowal of allegiance similar to that given to Faisal. The most likely heir apparent is Prince Khalid, and Prince Fahd may be Prime Minister. Both are brothers of Faisal and Saud.

--Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 45, 11/4/64

India-Ceylon Agreement

The Prime Ministers of India and Ceylon have reached an agreement in principle on the status of most of the nearly one million Tamils of Indian origin in Ceylon. As agreed by the two Prime Ministers, about 525,000 Tamils, will be repatriated to India over a period of 15 years, and about 300,000 will become citizens of Ceylon in that same period. Another meeting to be held probably early next year, should result in a solution for the estimated 150,000 remainder requiring status.

Agreement on the long-smoldering question of the future status of the Tamils, who had been declared stateless by Ceylon over ten years ago, is expected to aid Prime Minister Bandaranaike in the general elections which are expected to be held some time after July 1965. For India, Prime Minister Shastri has achieved his first major success in his declared objective of settling outstanding disputes with neighboring countries.

--Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 45, 11/4/64



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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines

By c, NARA, Date 3-10-97

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

New Delhi, India,
October 24, 1964.

PERSONAL

Dear Bob:

Bert Franklin, our very able Consul General at Madras, will be in Washington for consultation for the next two weeks. Knowing of your interest in Kerala, it occurred to me you might want to talk to him.

Bert knows the situation thoroughly and I am in full agreement with his analysis of both the dangers and opportunities.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Mr. Robert Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

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State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-1-07

NOV 2 1964

3728

11/10/64
RwK - he's
here & wants
an appointment
on Friday at 4:00?
Thursday

New Delhi, India,
October 20, 1964.

India Bowles

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Bob:

I am enclosing a confidential letter to Prime Minister Shastri which outlines a perspective on Indian economic development which we think is of great importance on both economic and political grounds.

If the Indian Government can be persuaded to build its fourth Five Year Plan around this people-oriented approach it will greatly strengthen its political position and at the same time release the energies of many millions of ordinary citizens who are now either apathetic or frustrated.

Although the Indian masses are already waking up to the possibilities of better housing, clothes, and simple necessities, the Communists are still concentrating their oratory on demands that the government take over the banks, which is a sterile gambit, and that the Seventh Fleet be kept out of the Indian Ocean, an issue which is even more remote from the lives of the ordinary people. The Socialists are largely splintered with a major share of their political energies going into the support of Hindi versus English.

The result is a vacuum of ideas which offers us an extraordinary opportunity to identify ourselves with the day-to-day interests of the Indian people and at the same time more effectively promote the rapid industrial growth in India.

Mr. Robert W. Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By *plc* NARA, Date *3-1-01*

CONFIDENTIAL

OCT 26 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

In several speeches Shastri has indicated his desire to concentrate more heavily on the objectives which I have outlined. Our task now is to provide him with specific concepts and programs which buttress his personal convictions against the arguments of some of his planners who insist that the poor can be ignored for another decade or so.

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Enclosure:

Copy of Letter to Prime Minister,
October 17, 1964.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

152

New Delhi, India,
October 15, 1964.

*India
x Bowles*

PERSONAL

Dear Bob:

I am enclosing a draft copy of an article I have just prepared for the January issue of the Foreign Affairs. It is not an easy task to sort out this complex subject, but I am fairly satisfied with the way it has developed.

I have tried to avoid any angles that might concern the Administration and I believe I have succeeded. If there are any points that really might create difficulties, I will, of course, be glad to adjust them.

I am sending a copy of the article to Jim Thomson and if he is available, I am sure he will be glad to get the necessary clearances and then send it on to Ham Fish Armstrong. However, I understand that Jim is working with Hubert Humphrey and this may mean he is out of town. If this is the case, I will be grateful if you could see that it gets the necessary clearances. I shall also send a copy to Jim Greenfield.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

P.S. Many thanks for your letter. I will have a memorandum in your hands two weeks before I reach Washington, which is now set for the 27 of November, which will sketch out the political and economic situations as we see it here and the general lines we think our political, military and economic policies should follow.

Enclosure:

Draft Article for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Robert Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

153
13

NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

MAKARIOS-GRIVAS DISCORD

As Makarios' flirtation with Moscow took serious form in the Cyprus-Soviet arms talks, right-wing, pro-Greek elements have grown restive. Their position has not been aided by the growth of anti-Greek feeling among Greek Cypriots in recent weeks, possibly the result of mainland Greek maladroitness in handling the Cypriots. General Grivas, and at least two Greek Cypriot newspapers have criticized Makarios' recent attempts to secure weapons from Egypt and the Soviet Union. They have correctly stated that only Greece has supplied material aid in the past, and should be the only country to supply it in the future. They also insist that enosis should be the government's goal rather than the official one of "uncommitted independence."

The first open criticism of General Grivas appeared in early October in one of the leading pro-Makarios Cypriot newspapers, Makhi. Grivas was accused of being "out of touch" with the present situation, suspicious of Cyprus' "true friends" -- Egypt and the Soviet Union -- and sympathetic to such enemies as the United States and NATO. The press attack on Grivas appears to be a natural reaction to an Athens-directed campaign to establish dominant influence on the civilian as well as the military side. They disagree not only over present foreign policies, but also over the political future of Cyprus. Grivas demands eventual enosis, while Makarios appears - at least for the present - to want unfettered independence.

Soviet Aid - Makarios, most of his cabinet, a majority of the Greek Cypriot press, and the large Cypriot Communist Party were placing great hopes of the recent negotiations in Moscow. However, the cautious

Soviet approach to negotiations with the Cypriot delegation was evident in the vague joint communique of October 1, which avoided any reference to specific military assistance. Although Nicosia obviously hoped for a public military aid agreement and a Soviet guarantee against Turkish intervention, the communique announced only that agreement had been reached on "practical measures of assistance" which the Soviet Union will render to Cyprus for "safeguarding its freedom and territorial integrity." Details of the agreement are still lacking. The general impression among the diplomatic community in Nicosia is that the Soviets "played a very wary game" and that the Cypriots got "little of significance."

--Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 42, 10/14/64

SHASTRI MAKES INTERNATIONAL DEBUT

Prime Minister Shastri made his international debut in traveling for the first time in his life outside the subcontinent in early October for a state visit to the UAR, attendance at the Nonalign-

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By J24 vARA Date 2-12-8

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~~SECRET~~

ed Conference (NAC), and a meeting en route home with President Ayub. Although he did not dominate the NAC as Nehru had three years earlier at Belgrade, Shastri was accepted as one of the leading figures and at the same time established himself as an effective and moderate leader of the nonaligned group. He took the initiative in suggesting that a delegation be sent to Peiping to urge the Chinese Communists to desist from developing nuclear weapons.

Although the conference did not take up his proposal, he apparently provided the main impetus to the call to all states to accede to the Moscow test-ban treaty and disavow possession of nuclear weapons as contained in the official NAC resolutions. Shastri fully reaffirmed Indian commitment only to use its nuclear capability for peaceful purposes and appealed through NAC to the Chinese Communists to undertake a similar commitment. Shastri lined up with the moderates at the conference, which included Nasser and Tito, and succeeded in resisting efforts for extreme resolutions by the militants led by Sukarno and Nkrumah.

Shastri-Nasser Meetings - Following three days of discussion with Nasser during Shastri's state visit to the UAR prior to the NAC, a joint communique was issued October 6 promising to enlarge the existing cooperation between the two states. While most of the communique is anodyne, it does express concern that there have been no negotiations of the Sino-Indian border conflict based on the Colombo proposals; this is seen as UAR support for the Indian position. In return, Indian support for the Arabs against Israel is reflected in Indian backing for "just claims of Arab countries to the waters of the Jordan River and to the rights of Palestine refugees."

Perhaps the most significant statement in the communique is a reaffirmation by the two countries that general and complete disarmament must be under "effective international control." Reportedly both sides resolved to proceed with the joint supersonic jet fighter project. This will involve the "marriage" of a UAR-produced engine with the Indian HF-24 airframe.

Ayub-Shastri Meeting - After a luncheon meeting in Karachi October 12, Shastri and Ayub issued a joint communique expressing their agreement on the need to improve relations and to resolve disputes. They also agreed that bilateral discussions should be held at the "earliest possible moment." This apparently clears the way for long-planned meetings at the Home Minister and Foreign Minister levels. Little information is yet available on the details of the Ayub-Shastri talks, but reported differences over the wording of the communique evidently were worked out satisfactorily. Indian sources in Karachi state Shastri was very satisfied with his talks with Ayub and thought they had gone well.

--Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 42, Oct. 14, 1964

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

154
Jedea
x Soule

New Delhi - September 21, 1964.

EYES ONLY
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Bob:

As you will remember, I have been very anxious to get a highly competent Soviet specialist to serve here in the New Delhi Embassy. The Department recently established a position for such a person, and the task now is to find the right man. As we have been saying for some time, India is clearly the primary Soviet target and I believe we can expect to see a greatly stepped up effort in this area, of which the recent military agreement is simply a forerunner.

Although we have a good Chinese specialist here in Jake Jacobson, we have no one really qualified in the area of Soviet studies, although many of us have, of course, been dealing with this problem in one way or another for many years. What I urgently need (and what I have been trying to get the Department to give me since last winter) is a man who understands the Soviet mind, and the fundamental changes that are taking place today in Soviet society that are bound to be reflected in Soviet policies. It is natural to become obsessed with the Soviet problem and to feel that everything the Russians do is contrary to our interests. Yet the challenge in some ways may be more difficult in the next few years; it will certainly be of a different character and require a greater flexibility on our part if we are going to handle it effectively.

25X1A When I was home, I asked several questions about this and the Department was unable to come up with anyone who was particularly right for the job.

25X1A

Mr. Robert Komer,
White House,
Washington, D.C.

CONFIDENTIAL

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9/25/64.

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ-032-023-001/11

By jc NARA, Date 3-2-04

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

FSR-3, 52 years old, and has had general experience in this area. I am told he is of White Russian descent, and some questions were raised that he might be somewhat doctrinaire in his views. I personally would feel a little more certain of him if he were a bit younger, though this may make no difference. New relationships are developing and a fresh approach is what we need.

Another possibility who has been highly praised to me is David Kline, a Foreign Service Officer with a background of Russian language and area training now on detail to the NSC. I assume you know him well.

25X1A

25X1A I would deeply appreciate it, Bob, if you would consider this problem, if possible interview [redacted] and Kline, perhaps discuss the problem further with [redacted] and discretely with people in the Department and then give me your thoughts as to the best available person. I will then ask officially for him in the hope he can be freed up in a reasonable period.

Although I hate to bother you with a chore of this kind the question has been kicking around for some time and I urgently need a man with both the intellectual capacity and the training to help us think through in fresh terms the role of the Soviets in India and our relationship to it.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

155
New Delhi, India,
September 18, 1964.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Bob:

Many thanks for your letter which, as always, was most helpful in giving me a better feel of what is going on in Washington.

More specifically, I would like to express my gratitude for the continued interest and support you have shown in our operation. It is good to know that you see the situation here in its broader aspects much as we do and that you are in a position to be helpful as you have been on innumerable occasions.

I realize the personal strain on all of you that must be reflected from the election and you can count on us to do all we can to dampen down any situations that may develop here which could be disturbing. In view of the unhappy timing of the Chavan and Radakrishnan trips to the Soviet Union, this is not an easy matter and there is bound to be some slippage.

I have hit the Indian officials hard on this whole matter, and, indeed, I was afraid a bit too hard. However, Paul Gore-Booth told me yesterday from several talks he has had with Government officials it appeared the pressure has been effective and while some Indians were a bit itchy, our concern is being taken seriously, particularly by Shastri.

As you and I said on innumerable occasions, our Government was mistaken in not coming to grips with the Air Force assistance situation when it was manageable. If we had been willing to do in January, February, March, April,

Mr. Robert Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 3-1-04

CONFIDENTIAL

SEP 25 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

or May, what we finally decided to do in June, the Chavan shopping trip would have been much more restricted. In view of the disruption of their relations with Peking, the Soviets can be expected to continue to woo the Indians at a furious pace.

I intend to press for clarification of this Soviet-Indian-United States relation on the one hand, and Indian economic development program on the other in the next few weeks. I plan to tell Shastri that I want to be able to report to President Johnson exactly where the situation stands, and within reason what we can count on India to do and not do in the next few years. I believe I may be able to make them think these relationships through and perhaps we can get our own ducks more in a row following the election.

I plan to leave here on November 14 for the United States, get a thorough medical checkup in Boston (no real problems), spend Thanksgiving with my family and then ten days in Washington for consultation, returning around December 5 to New Delhi. I have written Foy Kohler suggesting that I might go home by way of Moscow which would give me a chance to talk to him and his associates about the way things are shaping up from that end.

Again, Bob, many thanks for all you have done to be helpful. I know these are trying times for you and Mac and I hope you will let me know if there is anything I can do to make things easier.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SEP 15 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Letter from Indian Prime Minister on
Tonkin Gulf Incident

The enclosed copy of a letter from the Prime Minister of India to the President was transmitted to the Department on September 9 for recommendation.

Since Prime Minister Shastri is responding to the President's letter of August 5 on the Tonkin Gulf incident, no reply is considered necessary.

/s/ J. W. Davis/

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Copy of letter from
Prime Minister Shastri
to President Johnson.

SEP 30 1964

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American Embassy,
New Delhi, India,
September 11, 1964.

Dear Bob:

As you know, the members of the new Indian Government are now going through a major soul-searching operation in regard to economic policy, which is of the most fundamental importance to them and to us.

As a contribution to the national dialogue I have recently made several speeches in which I have discussed some critical aspects of India's national growth. The three enclosed papers, by and large, have had a good reception.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Enclosures:

Calcutta Speech
"An Integrated Rural Program"
"Who Owns the Land"

Chester Bowles

Mr. Robert Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

CROSS REFERENCE SHEETTYPE OF DOCUMENT

Cable _____

Letter ✓ _____

Memo _____

Other _____

DATE 9/4/64FROM Chester BowlesTO R. W. Komer

NUMBER _____

SUBJECT Food problems in IndiaSEE Bowles