

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

48

Origin
NEA

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI 510

Info:

SS
G
P
USIA
NSC
CPR

03336
159
SEP 4 9 19 PM '64

Following message from President Radhakrishnan to President Johnson

received commercially:

QUOTE On the happy occasion of the birthday of Your Excellency, I have great pleasure in conveying to you the warm felicitations of the Government and the people of India, to which I add my own together with our sincere good wishes for your long life, health and happiness.

I am confident that under your wise leadership the bonds of friendship and cooperation happily existing between our two countries in the cause of world peace and progress will become still stronger.

Please accept, Your Excellency, my best wishes for your continued success in the great responsibilities that you shoulder. UNQUOTE.

Following message from President Johnson to President Radhakrishnan being sent commercially, repeated for your info:

QUOTE Thank you for your warm message of greeting on my birthday. I take this opportunity to convey my best personal wishes to Your Excellency and, through you, to the people of India. UNQUOTE.

White House does not plan release of reply but has no objection if President Radhakrishnan wishes to do so.

End

Drafted by:

NEA:SOA:FJCrawford:dln 9/4/64

Clearances:

SOA - Mr. Schneider
S/S-S - Mr. Russell

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

S/S - Mr. Moose
NEA - Turner C. Cameron, Jr.

RUSK

SEP 8 1964

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FORM
8-63 DS-322

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

03335

160

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

44

Origin

ACTION: His Excellency

NEA

Info

Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan,

President of India,

New Delhi.

SS

P

US IA

NSC

C PR

SEP 4 9 19 PM '64

*India
+ calls**237
to
Radhakrishnan
9/4/64*

Thank you for your warm message of greeting on my birthday.

I take this opportunity to convey my best personal wishes to Your
Excellency and, through you, to the people of India.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

BUNDY-SMITH
ALEXANDER
BATOR
BELK
BRUBECK
CHASE
FORRESTAL
JESSUP
JOHNSON
KEENE
KLEIN
KONER
MOODY
REEDY
SAUNDERSON
SAYRE
SMITH, W.

Drafted by:

NEA:SOA:FJCrawford:dln 9/4/64

Clearances:

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

S/S - Mr. Moose

SOA - Mr. Schneider
S/S-S -

NEA - Mr. Cameron

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FORM
8-63 DS-322

161

New Delhi - August 19, 1964.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Bob:

I am enclosing an Airgram which I have just written, analyzing the nature of the new Indian Government and suggesting some of the prospects and problems which may lie ahead.

It is based on conversations with almost everyone in and around the Government and although naturally a good deal of it is speculative (including such important questions as Shastri's health), I believe it is generally sound and that you may find it worth reading.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Enclosure:
Airgram

Mr. Robert Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-1-04

CONFIDENTIAL



162
भारतीय राजदूतावास
वाशिंगटन, डी० सी०
EMBASSY OF INDIA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 17, 1964

India

Dear Mr President:

I have the honour to transmit to you the
enclosed message from the Prime Minister of India.

With my high regard and esteem,

Yours sincerely,

B.K.

(B.K. NEHRU)
Ambassador of India

The President,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

*Copy to BKS for
transmission to State
Comeron now feed
it being sent*

*No reply needed.
See Read-Bundy
memo 9/15/64
indicating no
reply necessary*

162a
New Delhi,
August 15, 1964.

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your message of August 5, which was handed over to me by Ambassador Bowles.

We were surprised and disturbed to learn of the attack on Maddox. You took the decision to order limited air action against North Vietnamese torpedo boats and certain supporting facilities in North Viet Nam. You may have seen the statement which was issued on behalf of our Government on the subject. We were naturally concerned and worried over the possibility of a much wider conflict with incalculable consequences for peace in South East Asia and the world. We were, however, relieved to learn from your broadcast to the American people on Tuesday night and your declaration that you sought no wider war.

It is a matter of satisfaction that no action has since been taken by the U.S. armed forces. We were confident that the discussions presently proceeding in the U.N. Security Council will lead to a calming of the situation and diminution of the danger of further conflict. Eventually, I am sure you will agree that the problems in Viet Nam and indeed in South East Asia, can only be settled by political measures.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

Lal Bahadur

The President,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 4, 1964

India

Ret'd to JCT 8/7-163

Bob -

The attached is from a recent long letter to me from Chet Bowles.

"The issue" is the old chestnut of drawing India into a closer relationship with SEA.

Your thoughts on Chet's proposal?

JCT, Jr.

*I'm all for conditioning
Indian elite this way, even though
it's a long term process. Chet's come
Mr. Komer
in with cable urging 6 newsmen
visit now. I'm dubious, but why
don't you explore state reactions
PWT*

AUG 4 1964

When coming out to India I expressed the hope that within two years we might make some very real progress on the issue. As a matter of fact, the situation has moved much more rapidly. The Indians are now keenly aware of the impact that the collapse of our position in Southeast Asia would have on their own security. Indeed, one Cabinet Minister remarked a few days ago that "if you lose out in Southeast Asia, you can always go back to California, but we would have the Chinese directly on our eastern border."

I can help the situation along by my discussions with various Indian officials. However, what would be most effective is a visit by some Indian military and press representatives through the area (a) to give them a better idea of the difficulties we face in Southeast Asia and the relevance of these difficulties to their own position and (b) some concept of American military power in Asia and the availability of that power to India if she should find herself in further difficulties with Peking.

Do you suppose we could get the Thais, Vietnamese and Japanese Governments to extend an invitation to the Indian military? Once this is set we could invite them to Okinawa. The press invitation might come through some such group as the International Press Institution.

As you know, Indian public opinion is rather thinly spread, perhaps no more than four and a half million people being involved in shaping up the thinking of this entire nation of 465 million. Therefore, an operation of this kind handled with skill could have a much bigger impact out here than most Americans realize. I will probably send in a cable on this in the next few days which will go to you as a matter of routine. However, I do want you to have this background with the hope that "you will find time on your busy schedule" to give it a lift.

(Extract from letter from Chester Bowles, July 24, 1964)

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

DATE: ☐ COLLECT
CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - EXDIS

MFG. 11-03
1525

Aug 4 11 02 PM '64

51
Origin

SS
Info

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI FLASH 265

VERBATIM TEXT

PIERCE ARROW - EXDIS
FOR THE AMBASSADOR

*India
X Vietnam
(X) coasts*

The following personal message from the President to Prime Minister Shastri should be delivered as soon as possible to him or senior available official:

QTE I am asking Ambassador Bowles to convey to you the grave facts about the attacks that North Vietnamese torpedo boats have deliberately made on United States naval vessels this week. He is also to inform you of the actions that we have taken since the second series of attacks a few hours ago.

These are limited actions that I have ordered in pursuit of our right of self-defense. I wish you to know, Mr. Prime Minister, that they have been taken only after the most careful consideration of all the many factors involved. After the first attacks we had given the most solemn warnings to the authorities of North Viet Nam of the grave ~~consequences~~ consequences which would inevitably result from any further unprovoked offensive action against US forces.

It is my earnest hope and my expectation that the steps that we are taking will serve both the cause of justice in upholding the traditional rights of

PK:MGGreen:NEA:PTalbot:cae 8/4/64

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

The Under Secretary

FK - Mr. Bundy
S/S- Mr. Hilliker

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - EXDIS

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By *je*, NARA, Date *3-1-04*

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - EXDIS

all ships to operate freely on the high seas and the cause of peace by making it clear that acts of aggression do not pay. UNQTE.

Text of Presidential message as well as Pentagon announcement being sent to you and via USIS wireless file, respectively, deptel/and should accompany this personal message.

GP-3

END

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - EXDIS

PRESERVATION COPY

4166
165

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Attachment)

1. Kofner
~~2. [unclear]~~
August 3, 1964

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Mr. Benjamin H. Read *mat*
Executive Secretary

Attached for your information
is a copy of a memorandum of conver-
sation between Jane Abell and
Mr. Lakeland regarding conversation
with Y. B. Chavan, Indian Defense
Minister dated July 7, 1964.

Attachment:

As stated.

AUG 4 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Attachment) ✓

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: July 7, 1964

SUBJECT: Conversation with Y. B. Chavan, Indian Defense Minister

PARTICIPANTS: Y. B. Chavan, Indian Minister of Defense
Jane Abell, American Consul (Political Officer), Bombay
A. A. Lakeland, India Desk Officer, NEA/SOA

COPIES TO: INR - 8 AmEmbassy NEW DELHI
NEA - 3 AmEmbassy LONDON
SOA - 3 (lcc) AmEmbassy KARACHI
BNA - 2 AmEmbassy MOSCOW
SOV - 2 AmConsul BOMBAY
DOD/ISA - 3 White House

On July 7, 1964, Jane Abell and I called on Chavan at his flat on Marine Drive in Bombay. Chavan was in an exceptionally friendly and forthcoming mood. He expressed considerable satisfaction over the results of his recent visit to Washington, and much appreciation for the personal welcome he received. He expressed the view that his talks in Washington had laid the foundation for close Indian-U.S. collaboration in the military field. (Although he did not say so specifically, the clear implication of what Chavan said to me was that he envisages India's primary future military relationship to be with the United States.) I commented somewhat platitudinously that there is a close parallel between the long-term interests of the United States and India. Chavan emphatically corrected me, saying "our interests are not parallel, they are identical."

Referring to a recent statement by Pak Foreign Minister Bhutto, Chavan asked me about Pakistani objections to our military assistance agreement with India. I replied that we were at least glad that the Paks were venting their anger at us, rather than against India, which indicated a desire by the GOP not to disrupt the atmosphere of detente being pursued by Ayub and Shastri. Chavan nodded approvingly and said that an Indo-Pak rapprochement was very desirable.

I asked Chavan if any final decisions had been made regarding the composition, size and overall pattern of the Indian Air Force, and referred to a report which had just appeared in the Indian press to the effect that Chavan would soon be going

to Moscow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By pc, NARA, Date 3-1-01

GPO 908992

AUG 4 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

to Moscow to negotiate for MIG-23's. Chavan dismissed the press report as meaningless and said that we could be sure he would not do something like that without first informing his American friends. Regarding the shape and pattern of the IAF, Chavan said India's defense plan had set a 45 squadron force goal. He added that the Shiksha Report had concluded that India has a requirement for a supersonic fighter. He went on to say that he appreciated our difficulties in providing F-104's to India and that he could see the points made by Secretary McNamara quite clearly. He acknowledged that these points had considerable validity, especially from the U.S. viewpoint. Chavan then said "let us keep this open," adding that he would not object to deferring further consideration of, and discussions on, the question of supersonics. However, he stressed the need for the U.S. to avoid giving a "refusal" on the F-104's. He said that a refusal would create a very difficult situation for the U.S. and for him ("like Bokaro") and would provoke a bad public opinion reaction in India. (It should be noted here that, according to Jane Abell, sources close to Chavan in Bombay have been saying that Chavan is confident he will get F-104's after the U.S. elections.)

Chavan spoke highly of Shastri and said that the new leadership arrangement in India would be "better" than it was under Nehru. He added, however, that Shastri's illness raised a number of questions and had stimulated some political maneuvering. He expressed the view that there would be a "very bad" situation if Shastri were unable to carry on and that there would be "a lot of trouble" if a new leader had to be chosen soon. He did not believe that another smooth transition could be accomplished in the near future.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : White House - Mr. Rona

DATE: 7/28

FROM : C C Laise

India

SUBJECT: Charam memo.

As you requested I am sending you an
advance copy of the Lakeland - Charam memo.

JUL 29 1964

166a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Y. B. Chavan, Indian Minister of Defense
Jane Abell, American Consul (Political Officer)
A. A. Lakeland, India Desk Officer, NEA/EOA

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I asked Chavan if any final decisions had been made regarding the composition, size and overall pattern of the Indian Air Force, and referred to a report which had just appeared in the Indian press to the effect that Chavan would soon be going to Moscow to negotiate for MIG-23's. Chavan dismissed the press report as meaningless and said that we could be sure he would not do something like that without first informing his American friends. Regarding the shape and pattern of the IAF, Chavan said India's defense plan had set a 45 squadron force goal. He added that the Shiksha Report had concluded that India has a requirement for a supersonic fighter. He went on to say that he appreciated our

difficulties

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-1-04

JUL 29 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

167

SOUTH ASIA

2. Swaran Singh Appointed Indian Foreign Minister

The appointment of Swaran Singh to the Foreign Ministry, announced on 18 July, appears intended to demonstrate continuity in Indian foreign policy.

Shastri probably feels he can depend on Singh to carry out his wishes in administering India's foreign affairs. Singh, a Sikh, has established his credentials as an experienced, competent administrator, loyal to his prime minister. The appointment will cause no apprehensions that any significant changes are contemplated in India's basic foreign policies.

Shastri still hopes to improve relations with Pakistan, despite border clashes and recent strains on the propaganda moratorium. His choice may have been influenced by the fact that Singh is especially well informed on relations with Pakistan. The new foreign minister

has represented India in negotiations with Pakistan on several occasions, most recently in the series of talks on Kashmir during the winter of 1963.

The appointment of Singh, who is not a controversial figure in Indian domestic politics, will arouse fewer jealousies among cliques within and outside the cabinet than several of the candidates who have been more prominently mentioned for the Foreign Ministry. His Industry and Supply portfolio has been filled by minor reshuffling.

Shastri's decision at this time to give up the foreign affairs portfolio, which, like Nehru, he has held since becoming prime minister, is in response to his doctor's insistence that he must cut down his former heavy schedule of duties.

25X1

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ-032-023-1-12
By ag/cbm NARA, Date 8-11-07

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

GENERAL

Khrushchev's Forthcoming Visit
To Warsaw

Khrushchev may use his visit to Warsaw on 22 July for the 20th anniversary of Poland's liberation to announce the withdrawal of some Soviet troops from East Germany.

He probably would couple this with an appeal for further reductions of all foreign forces in Germany as a means of carrying forward the "policy of mutual example."

Khrushchev may also believe the Warsaw ceremonies will provide a good forum for pressing the recent Soviet theme that West Germany and the three Western powers are still bound, by obligations arising from Hitler's unconditional surrender and the Potsdam Agreement, to uproot German "militarism" and to prevent German "aggression." He may elaborate on vague proposals put forward during Ulbricht's visit to the USSR last month for reducing West Germany's armed forces and for establishing in-

ternational control over its military production.

The Soviet premier may feel the time is ripe to restate or modify Soviet positions on European security questions such as a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, a nonaggression pact, and a treaty banning the dissemination of nuclear weapons. Moscow's 11 July notes, which renewed the attack on the Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) project, reaffirmed Soviet support for "collective measures against the dissemination of nuclear weapons."

Pronouncements along these lines probably would be aimed primarily at stimulating further resistance to the MLF in Western countries and at giving an impression of movement in the USSR's German and European policies.

25X1

~~SECRET~~



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

American Embassy,
New Delhi, India,
July 18, 1964.

India + Pakistan
168
RWIS
What can we do for him?
in R

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

Dear Mac:

By the time you receive this letter you will perhaps have read and digested our Embtel 143 in which I outlined the situation I found on my return to India in regard to military assistance in general and the proposed Air Force package in particular.

Although the GOI was greatly pleased by our willingness to provide grant and loan assistance on a five year basis, they became convinced some time in late June that we are not prepared to provide the assistance to the Indian Air Force which was the primary item on Chavan's shopping list. At the same time, they decided that the British, to whom we referred them, would not come up with a submarine to match the one we gave the Pakistanis.

This gives the USSR the opportunity to enter the Indian defense situation by the dramatic measures which we had sought to deny them. Khera will be in Moscow sometime in August and the Chavan mission arrives there on August 28. In the normal course of events, we may expect announcements in the Indian and United States press in early September stating that the Soviet Union has agreed to provide surface-to-air missiles for the protection of north Indian cities, twelve additional MIG-21s to make an active squadron of sixteen, an assembly line to produce MIG-21s here in India, and possibly one or more submarines.

Such announcements in the midst of a particularly bitter United States election debate on foreign policy will provide an open

Mr. McGeorge Bundy,
Special Assistant to the President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 25, #66

By pc NARA, Date 3-1-04

SECRET

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-2-

invitation to the more irresponsible elements at home, and consequently our difficulties in dealing rationally with the Indian subcontinent will be further compounded.

As you know, this is precisely the kind of situation that we have been warning against for months. Indeed you may find it worthwhile to reread the memorandum which I prepared on November 12 for my visit to Washington just before Jack Kennedy died. (There is a copy in your files.)

I think you will be impressed all over again with the opportunity which we had then to evolve a realistic South Asian military-political policy which would take into account our relations with India and Pakistan, reconcile the defense needs of each nation in a balanced fashion, encourage a greater Indian involvement in South Asia and keep the Soviets away from the more sensitive and dramatic military areas -- all at a modest cost to ourselves.

If we had been free to offer at an earlier date the five year \$50 million grant-\$50 million loan military program outlined in the McNamara-Chavan exchange plus the aircraft proposal which Rusk recommended to McNamara (and which he largely accepted) we could have largely pre-empted the military situation in India in a way that would be greatly to our advantage and that of the Paks.

Although I am most appreciative of your support and that of Bob Komer and Jim Grant, I am deeply distressed over my own failure to break through the wall of timidity and inertia that I encountered in other quarters.

However, this is water over the dam; our task now is to consider what we can do to make the best of a situation which still contains many major elements of strength.

As soon as T. T. Krishnamachari has a chance to settle down after his visit to London, I shall describe to him the implications of this situation in our forthcoming election and stress the importance (a) of making sure that the Khera-Chavan purchases in the Soviet Union do not result in India's exceeding our agreed ceiling on foreign

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-3-

exchange expenditures and (b) the advisability of keeping publicity regarding whatever agreements may be reached with the USSR to an absolute minimum, and, if at all possible, of spreading these agreements over a period of several months in order to cushion the public impact here and in the United States.

I will see that this message comes through loud and clear to TTK and to Shastri. However, it is important that the United States Government at this stage avoid any appearance of petulance or frustration in India and so I plan to limit myself to casual comments on this particular subject in discussions with other members of the Cabinet and the press.

For the time being this is about all we can expect to accomplish here within our present authority. However, to establish the optimum tactical position a further step is essential, i.e., well in advance of Chavan's visit to the USSR we should casually establish the fact that if the GOI had chosen to follow a different course, we would have been prepared to provide India with a comprehensive and fully adequate Air Force defense program including some arrangement for F-104s.

With a little elbow room and a few well placed but hazy conversations, I believe I can establish the impression that the present situation was India's deliberate choice. This may help persuade the Indians to keep their present air defense dealings with the Soviets in a low key; above all it will prepare the ground first with the Indian Government and later, if necessary, with key members of the Indian press when the announcement comes that the Pakistanis are getting their additional squadron of F-104s.

It is particularly important, Mac, that I quietly establish this point soon; otherwise it will look like the comment of a petulant loser on the eve of the Soviet-Indian negotiations in Moscow. I'll be deeply grateful for your support and help.

In the meantime, we are proceeding vigorously with our analysis of the overlapping interests of Pakistan and India in economic,

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-4-

military and political fields, which I am hopeful can be used effectively in our dealings with both governments.

I am also embarking on a renewed effort to persuade the GOI and key members of the Indian press not only of India's stake in keeping the communists out of Southeast Asia (which they already accept) but also the similarity of United States-Indian interests in this area and the expedient character of the whole Soviet operation there (witness USSR support for Sukarno against Malaysia). With a little luck perhaps I can bring them into some degree of conflict with the Soviets on this question and eventually persuade them to take a somewhat more active role.

It is folly for either the United States or the Indians to assume that they can count on Soviet policies in Asia paralleling our own interests. To be sure, there may be occasions when for tactical reasons we will momentarily find ourselves on the same side of the table. But a little more than three years ago Khrushchev was threatening Jack Kennedy with oblivion if we failed to get out of Berlin and less than two years ago he was busily planting missiles in Cuba. The Indians must gradually be convinced of these realities.

In the meantime, United States influence is bound to suffer in some degree because of the deep concern over the news of the Goldwater nomination. The fact that he was nominated by the Senate minority leader and seconded by the leader of the House and that all the other Republican candidates promptly moved to make the nomination unanimous has compounded the impression that a major segment of the American people actually favor a program of reckless adventurism in world affairs, and the abandonment of our present efforts in the developing nations.

The possibilities are rather frightening and I only hope that our good Republican business friends such as Jack McCloy, as well as Nelson Rockefeller and other political leaders, will see the urgent need to help us assure not only Goldwater's defeat but his political destruction.

~~SECRET~~


PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-5-

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Chet Bowles".

Chester Bowles

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

05232

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

57

Origin

ACTION: **Ambassy NEW DELHI** 60

JUL 9 8 27 PM '64

NEA

Info:

SS

PR

P

USIA

NSC

Please deliver following message from President to President

Radhakrishnan:

QUOTE On behalf of the American people I thank you for your kind message of best wishes on the 188th anniversary of our nation's independence.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

White House does not plan release. No objection if GOI wishes to do so.

President Radhakrishnan's message, received commercially, is repeated for your info:

QUOTE On behalf of the government and the people of India and on my own behalf I have great pleasure to convey to your Excellency and to the government and people of the United States of America our cordial greetings on the occasion of the Independence Day of the United States of America together with our best wishes for your personal well being and for the continued advancement of the people of your country. May the understanding and cooperation between the United States of America and

Drafted by:

NEA/SOA/FJCrawford:dln 7/8/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA/SOA - Carol C. Laise

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Higgins

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UNCLASSIFIED

and India which have grown so close in recent years further develop in the cause of world peace and in pursuit of the ideals our two countries held in common.

S. Radhakrishnan, President of India, UNQUOTE

End.

ACTING

BALL.

UNCLASSIFIED

Mr Komer

170

June 25, 1964

India
Bowles
(+)

Dear Kermit:

I deeply appreciate your interest in our rupee dilemma and your willingness to help us find a way out of the impasse. I am particularly grateful for your efforts to get a favorable answer in this session of Congress.

As I pointed out, there are three areas in which we can greatly strengthen our performance in India by the more liberal use of our massive rupee holdings which are now largely denied us:

1. In providing more rupee funds for our administrative operations including travel funds, use of rupees to buy real estate for which we are now paying exorbitant rents, etc.;
2. In expanding our USIS operations, particularly in publishing locally produced books, our "American Reporter" etc., plus various tested projects which are awaiting adequate rupee funds or promising new projects for which no funds are available;
3. In setting up our proposed binational foundation which, as I see it, should be similar to the Carnegie or Rockefeller foundations in concept and financed with our "U.S. uses" rupee holdings.

In regard to tactics, I suggest three approaches in what seems to me the order of their desirability:

1. The President might call together Congressional leaders of both parties and describe to them the extraordinary dilemma in which we find ourselves, i.e., rupee holdings presumably for U.S. uses in India that will soon total \$600 million, side by

side

Mr. Kermit Gordon, Director,
Bureau of the Budget,
Executive Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

side with restrictive procedures which keep us from using them in support of American interests. The President might then suggest the following choice of procedures in dealing with the problem:

A. Withdrawal of the rider which, I believe, was placed on the Foreign Aid Bill last year which deprived the President of much of the authority previously granted under PL 480 to make an Executive determination in regard to the use of local currencies. Once this rider amendment has been removed, the President could, I believe, proceed to make a series of findings which he could sketch to the Congressional leaders:

(i) That our holdings of local currency in certain countries are excessive in terms of current needs (note: for instance "excessive" could mean that holdings were more than five times annual expenditures, or that annual income into the U.S. uses fund is more than double out-going, etc.);

(ii) That the projects he has in mind will help to strengthen American interests in the country or countries in question; and

(iii) That no dollar expenditures are directly or indirectly involved.

B. If the Congressional leaders do not agree to this direct action by the President without reference to Congress as a whole, he could, as an alternative, suggest that the Reid Amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill be expanded by the Senate to include language that would authorize the President, in situations where our local currency holdings are excessive, to allocate them to various projects, provided no dollar expenditures are involved, with an annual report to the Appropriations Committee describing the action he has taken under this authority. The bill would then go to Conference with the House Foreign Affairs Committee and according to my information there is an excellent chance of its being accepted by the two Houses, particularly if the way had been prepared by previous conversations with the leadership.

C. If the reaction of the Congressional leaders to both these proposals is unfavorable, the President could ask them at the very least to support supplemental legislation which could be promptly introduced and which would go through the regular appropriation process providing really adequate local currency funds for administration, publishing, and other USIA activities, our India binational foundation, etc..

There would

There would be much to gain by avoiding the route through the Appropriations Committee, if that is possible, since they are bound to drag their feet where large sums of money are involved, even though the "money" is now idle in the banks far beyond any prospective needs and cannot be expended in any other way. However, if the leaders are not willing to go along on the indirect approach, the discussion of these possibilities should at least make them more willing to support really adequate supplements through the regular procedures.

Believe me, Merritt, I would not have pressed this question on the President at this time if it were not for my belief that the present rupee situation in regard to India is intolerable. It is tragic to see a great nation such as ours so immobilized by its own procedures that it cannot use a resource which could be of utmost value in promoting its national interests. I hate to think what the Soviets would do to us in India, for instance, if similar rupee resources were available to them. Even without them, they are vastly stepping up their information, education and cultural programs.

Let me say once again that I am profoundly grateful for your help.

With my warm regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

~~BUNDY/SMITH~~
~~ALEXANDER~~
~~BRUBECK~~
~~CHASE~~
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~~FRANK~~
~~GLAVIN~~
~~ROSEN~~
~~SAUNDERS~~
~~W.C. WILSON~~
~~KLEIN~~
~~LOOMER~~
~~SAUNDERS~~
~~COL. W.Y. SMITH~~

Research Memorandum
RNA-18, June 16, 1964

India

Thomas L. Hughes

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes
Subject: China and Pakistan in Indian Foreign Policy

We have examined recent developments in the South Asian area that have pre-empted Indian attention in the foreign affairs field; the continuing conflict with China and the renewed challenges in regard to Kashmir and Pakistan -- with a view towards assessing their impact on Indian foreign policy.

ABSTRACT

India in the past tended to concentrate its attention on broad international questions, rather than regional problems. The Communist Chinese invasion and its aftermath as well as renewed Pakistani pressures concerning Kashmir forced New Delhi during the last two years to recognize its relations with these two neighbors as its principal foreign policy concern. The possibility that Pakistan and China might make common cause has become a nightmare for Indian foreign policy makers. Both China and Pakistan have been assiduously pressing their cases among the Afro-Asian nations. China has been primarily concerned to cast doubts on the validity of India's nonalignment, while the Pakistanis have exploited recent unrest in Kashmir to press for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute. There are signs that the Indians

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *3.2.04*

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JUN 18 1964

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might show greater flexibility, especially in relations with Pakistan, but prospects still are that the Indian Government will not be able to reach an overall settlement with either opponent in the near future.

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The Foundations of Indian Foreign Policy

Within the framework of Indian foreign policy, relationships with China and Pakistan are of most immediate and specific concern. India is challenged by Chinese claims to large areas of Northern India, and at the same time must contend with Pakistan's claim to Jammu and Kashmir. The Kashmir dispute and the underlying tension with Pakistan that it symbolizes have been factors in Indian foreign policy ever since the two subcontinent nations received their independence. The dispute with China is also not new, but the Indian Government was able to play down its importance until the end of the last decade.

Concern with regional problems such as China and Kashmir -- or at an earlier date Goa -- is only part of India's foreign policy stance, and not the one in which in the past the Indian leadership has been primarily interested. New Delhi has considered itself to be a near-great power, a natural leader of the "third world" and entitled to deal with the US and USSR as a peer. In terms of national interest, India has seen its world-wide activities as a means of promoting peace and creating the conditions necessary to overcome its economic problems free from external interference, but with foreign assistance. Regional problems have been regarded as being of a different order, the traditional tasks that a nation faces in fulfilling its manifest destiny and ensuring its national integrity.

Until the late 1950's there was little conflict between the two aspects of India's national interest. Relations with Pakistan were poor, and to some extent this made for difficulties with the United States, Pakistan's ally in SEATO and CENTO. Yet the very fact of Pakistan's alignment facilitated India's pursuit of nonalignment and Pakistan commanded little prestige among the other Afro-Asian states. India was able to present many of its difficulties with Pakistan as proof that an aligned nation was a disruptive influence within the Afro-Asian community. The inherent rivalry between India and China was papered over by mutual protestations of friendship; proof, as the Indians saw it, that a nonaligned foreign policy was a means of sublimating bothersome regional conflicts. Thus India seemed to enjoy the best of both worlds, reaped considerable material rewards by its policy, and took for granted that the newly-emerging nations would look to it for leadership.

The Deterioration of the Indian Position

The Communist Chinese attack of 1962 and the public deterioration of Sino-Indian relations that had preceded it came near shattering the fabric of Indian foreign policy. The Chinese onslaught was the most dramatic of a chain of events that forced the Indians to choose among policy goals that had previously been considered complementary. New Delhi felt it necessary for the first time to solicit military aid.

The rapid Western response to the Indian predicament was appreciated, and in the minds of many Indians the conflict with China raised questions regarding the tenability of nonalignment.

The Indians were spared the necessity of abandoning nonalignment. Had China and the Soviet Union been firmly allied in late 1962, India would have had little alternative but to throw itself completely into the Western embrace. Since the two Communist powers were at odds, India was able to maintain its good relations with the USSR and even obtain military equipment from the Soviets as a means of diluting the political effects of the Western assistance program. New Delhi thus felt that its nonalignment policy was vindicated by the assistance given by the Soviets, and that a good relationship with Moscow was a vital means of restraining Chinese aggressiveness.

In the eyes of many Asian nations, however, India was severely compromised -- not only by its humiliating defeat, but also by the political consequences of this defeat. For countries whose main preoccupation is within the Asian framework, good relations with China are the touchstone of "nonalignment." Even India's acceptance of military aid from the USSR was not enough to offset the stigma created by enmity to China and the acceptance of large-scale Western military assistance. By means of intensive diplomatic maneuvering throughout 1963, the Chinese attempted to cement relationships with other Asian states and isolate India. Although unable to get other nonaligned states to side actively with them, the Chinese were able to promote a corollary to the theory of nonalignment; that a properly neutral state should also be nonaligned between China and India. No doubt many of the neutrals had already begun to tire of Indian claims to leadership, and Nehru was unable to summon up the personal and political resources that had previously enabled him to assert his primacy. Furthermore, a number of Asian and African countries probably find it difficult to identify themselves with India, increasingly a status quo power with economic and political problems of a different order from those that plague the smaller emerging nations.

The Indian position has also been complicated by the emergence of an "independent" Pakistani foreign policy. While maintaining its alliance relationships with the United States, Pakistan has attempted to create an image of itself as aligned in word more than deed, while portraying India as aligned in fact despite its claims of nonalignment. Pakistan's most dramatic tactic has, of course, been its flirtation with Communist China. Acting on the time-honored principle that "my enemy's enemy is my friend," both Peiping and Karachi have at least given the impression of having reached an understanding with regard to India, buttressed by the border agreement, the exchange of landing rights for civilian aircraft and the recent visit of Chou En-lai to Pakistan.

It is not clear how far this Sino-Pakistani rapprochement is going to go, but even the remote possibility of a two-front war is a nightmare to the Indians.

Other moves also reflect Pakistan's attempt to break into the mainstream of Afro-Asian politics, undercut the Indian position, and establish firmly its "independent" foreign policy. Pakistan has associated itself also with the non-status quo powers, and has advocated a Second Bandung conference of Afro-Asian states, that India opposes. It is exploring ties with Indonesia and has pursued hitherto neglected relationships with India's immediate neighbors. Foreign Minister Bhutto has stated that a Southeast Asia settlement must include Communist China, and has announced that Pakistan would not send troops to Southeast Asia within the SEATO framework.

Foreign Policy Choices

At present then, India is pursuing a number of foreign policy objectives, some of which are at least potentially contradictory. The most important of these are:

- 1) Maintaining a preponderance of military strength over Pakistan and minimizing Pakistan's influence on the international scene.
- 2) Developing sufficient military strength to prevent further Chinese Communist aggression and ultimately to regain lost territory in Ladakh, while encouraging international opinion to support India's case against China.
- 3) Maintaining good relations with the United States and the USSR and obtaining military aid and economic assistance from both.
- 4) Utilizing the USSR as the most important political counterweight to China.
- 5) Maintaining a leadership role among the nonaligned states of Asia and Africa.

This list of objectives does not necessarily indicate any degree of priority. Since the problems of China and Pakistan are the most pressing, however, these will be taken as the context within which other foreign policy options will be considered.

India's problems would be simplified if it could secure the friendship or benevolent neutrality of either Pakistan or China, and thereby be free to deal with the remaining threat. India's fear of a concerted attack from the two countries would seem to impel New Delhi to seek the best possible deal with one and concentrate on its remaining enemy.

A Settlement with China

Although the Indians may magnify the threat from China, they are no doubt aware that for some time to come, China will not pose a military threat to the existence of India or even a serious territorial threat much beyond the Northeast Frontier Agency and parts of Kashmir.^{1/} On the other hand, even with substantial foreign military assistance and allocations of domestic resources, it will be some years before India could hope to impose its will upon China in the border areas. India is greatly disturbed by even the limited threat that Communist China does pose and realizes that the dispute with China is costly in terms of relationships with other nonaligned countries.

New Delhi would undoubtedly like to reduce its dependence upon foreign help to cope with the threat from Communist China. To the extent possible, India is trying to develop its own defense production facilities. Still, as long as it is faced by an adversary of inherently greater military potential, India cannot enjoy quite the same degree of freedom in foreign policy that it had in the past decade.

Furthermore, many of the Afro-Asians have made it clear that they expect India to come to terms with China on the border issue. Despite the Chinese aggression of 1962 (or perhaps because of its success) a number of Afro-Asian states are reluctant to take sides in the dispute and even in the face of China's rejection and India's acceptance of the Colombo proposals are critical of India's refusal to negotiate with China without preconditions. The Chinese can, of course, precipitate negotiations almost overnight by accepting the proposals, but the subtle pressure from the Afro-Asians to negotiate is felt particularly keenly by many Indians.

Few Indians believe that a genuine settlement could be reached with Peiping. Despite the urgings of left-wing elements, Indian political and military leaders are hardly likely to let themselves be lulled into the old complacency. Even a demarcated boundary would not remove the threat of an aggressive northern neighbor that also aspired to be the leader of the third world and has the potential to make its claim credible. By coming to terms with Peiping, New Delhi would be removing whatever stigma still attaches to China as a result of the 1962 attack, would sacrifice some territory, and in return get a promise of amity that might well prove hollow.

^{1/} The sole exception would be in the event of a Chinese acquisition of a significant nuclear capability, a possibility that will not be considered here.

Furthermore, New Delhi may fear that a settlement with China would sharply reduce the military support from the United States without a compensating increase from the Soviet Union. While in theory Indian defense requirements would be substantially reduced -- to the level needed to overawe Pakistan -- the danger from China would, to the Indians, not be eliminated. India would also fear that the United States would again draw closer to Pakistan, leaving India in a position where it might have to depend on the USSR to a greater extent than might be deemed desirable.

Nehru made strong public commitments not to yield any Indian-claimed territory to China, and no settlement with Peiping seems possible unless at least considerable parts of Ladakh are sacrificed. A broad spectrum of Indian public opinion, particularly among influential right-wing groups, would strongly oppose any "dishonorable" settlement with China, and could not be convinced that the danger from Communist China had in fact lessened. Enthusiasm for the struggle with China -- at its high point right after the invasion -- has, however, waned. The prospect of a semi-permanent state of emergency and heavy taxes could be cleverly exploited by groups on the left as the memories of the Chinese attack fade. Anti-Chinese sentiment in India, although intense, is a new phenomenon and is not rooted in historical antipathy or personal experience on the part of most Indians. Nevertheless, even though not as stridently vocal as the left-wing, the anti-Chinese forces of the right would be able to impede any policy of compromise that they found distasteful.

A Settlement with Pakistan

If the conflict with Pakistan were limited to a purely territorial dispute in Kashmir, a few minor boundary quarrels and stabilization of migration, a magnanimous settlement by India would appear logical. India and Pakistan have common political traditions, their systems are very much closer to each other than to China's, and both countries are opposed to the spread of communism.

Unfortunately, the quarrel dividing India and Pakistan goes much deeper. Traditional distrust between Hindu and Moslem, the Pakistani fear of Indian domination and the bitter, often personal memories of partition, cannot be wiped out overnight. Pakistan, founded on the basis of Islam, is distasteful to the Indian concept of a secular state, and many Pakistanis feel that India is only awaiting the opportunity to reassert Hindu hegemony over the subcontinent. A settlement on Kashmir would treat an important symptom of the communal malaise and might pave the way for the elimination of the more fundamental divisive forces, but it would not by itself eliminate them.

Within India, anti-Pakistani feeling and unwillingness to yield on Kashmir are strong. Persistent propaganda has magnified the Kashmir problem into perhaps the most important foreign policy issue in the minds of the Indian people. The Krishna Menon left and the right wing Hindu communal parties are united in their devotion to Kashmir -- if not as a cause, at least as a topic for agitation. It would have taken the prestige of Nehru at his full power to sell an unpopular Kashmir settlement to the Indian people, and a successor government is hardly likely to risk incurring an "anti-national" stigma by making major concessions to Pakistan. Furthermore, although Indian claims that concessions on Kashmir would precipitate a communal holocaust are probably exaggerated, there is no doubt that the government would be hard put to restrain Hindu fanatics from unleashing a bloodbath.

Internationally, the effects of a settlement with Pakistan would be generally favorable. The Soviet Union might regret the passing of a divisive issue on the subcontinent, but would not be likely to make any significant policy retrenchments towards India. The United States would see one of its major policy objectives fulfilled, and Afro-Asian and neutralist opinion would be generally pleased to see this issue laid to rest.

New Delhi, however, is not under any great compulsion to make a settlement with Pakistan, barring a drastic deterioration of the political situation within Kashmir. India already has the most valuable parts of the area and, except as an ally of China, Pakistan presents only a marginal military threat to India. While the possibility of a two-front war is regarded as a serious danger by India, the Indian leadership so far at least has not drawn the conclusion that Pakistan could be wooed away from China, even at the cost of major concessions. This is due to the depth of the antagonism between the two countries and the feeling that Pakistan's flirtation with China is proof of its unreliability and hostility towards India. An additional reason probably is the belief that for the time being Pakistan's dependence on US military and economic aid would serve as a powerful deterrent to a Pakistani alliance with China.

The Balance of Choices

Domestic economic and political pressures to come to terms with China or Pakistan are not sufficient to overcome the Indian disinclination to make the concession necessary to placate either of their adversaries. The question then arises to what extent wider foreign policy considerations impel the Indians towards a settlement. China, and to a lesser extent Pakistan, have had considerable success in presenting their positions to the Afro-Asians, and India probably feels itself under pressure to present a more conciliatory pose in its international relations. New Delhi has been shocked by the failure of the neutralists to speak out against the Chinese aggression in 1962, and the reluctance

of many Afro-Asian states to support the Indian position on Kashmir. It has only been partially successful in its attempts to undercut the Second Bandung conference. As new would-be leaders and other power centers have emerged within the third world, and as new issues have shaken the illusion of Afro-Asian unity, India has found that many of the old concepts have proved hollow and that the primacy of earlier years has evaporated. India has now come to a position where the pursuit of its regional foreign policy objectives comes into varying degrees of conflict with its world-wide aspirations.

This conflict is still not intolerable. Western pressure for a Kashmir agreement is something the Indians have learned to live with; the Afro-Asians do not present a united front on the China question or the Kashmir problem and are far from resolute in their position. If India is willing to steel itself against a certain amount of criticism and reject demands that it should accommodate its policy to the desires of a decreasingly coherent Afro-Asian bloc, it need not compromise on its regional interests. Furthermore, new figures among the foreign policy-makers such as Shastri and T. T. Krishnamachari tend to be more sober in their political outlook and less attached to the mythos of Afro-Asia than were Nehru and Menon.

The pressures to settle with either China or Pakistan come from different directions. The Afro-Asians are principally interested in a Sino-Indian truce; the West urges friendship with Pakistan. Domestic public opinion is aroused on both issues, but antipathy towards Pakistan is stronger. China presents the greater long-term danger, but the Indians feel the short-term threat from Pakistan to be more imminent. No Indian government could make any settlement that sacrificed large sections of Indian-claimed territory -- be it Ladakh or Kashmir -- and be confident of remaining in office.

Although the Chinese attack of 1962 undermined the traditional Indian view of Pakistan as the prime enemy, until quite recently the balance of pressures seemed to make a settlement with China more likely than one with Pakistan. The recent bitter recriminations between Pakistan and India served to reinforce their enmity. Yet the most recent developments, before and after the death of Nehru, have given some indications that the Indian leadership is showing more interest in exploring means of improving Indo-Pakistani relations while holding firm on China. Nehru's April 6 Lok Sabha statement reasserted the Indian position that the Aksai Chin was not available for bargaining, and almost simultaneously negotiations between Sheikh Abdullah and the Indian leaders raised the possibility of greater Indian flexibility on Kashmir. Since Nehru's death, Prime Minister Shastri has reiterated his willingness to seek agreements with both Pakistan and China, but his overtures to Pakistan have been much more pronounced.

These discernible shifts in emphasis may presage some reconsideration of Indian policy towards its two neighbors; in particular they may be indicative of the tone of the post-Nehru leadership. Nevertheless, the room for Indian maneuver will remain limited and dramatic shifts remain improbable. A forward Indian policy against Communist China is rendered unlikely by geographical and military factors; an across-the-board settlement with Pakistan would be difficult to achieve even in the still unlikely contingency of a Kashmir settlement.

Thus despite the possibility of somewhat more flexibility with regard to Pakistan, the problems and prospects of Indian foreign policy are not likely to shift greatly. New Delhi will probably find itself increasingly preoccupied with regional problems and increasingly will have to consider its broader international position in terms of the competition with Communist China and Pakistan.

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THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

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Intelligence Note

JUN 16 1964

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *T/LH*

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~~ALEXANDER~~
~~BRUBACK~~
~~CHASE~~
~~DUNGAN~~
~~FORRESTAL~~
~~JESSUP~~
~~JOHNSON~~
~~KELLY~~
~~SAUNDERS~~
~~COL. W.Y. SMITH~~

Subject: Moscow Canonizes Nehru, Assesses Shastri

Soviet handling of Nehru's death has once again shown the importance Moscow attaches to the maintenance of close relations with India. The Soviet reaction has been marked by expressions of sorrow from Soviet leaders, including Khrushchev, fulsome authoritative eulogies, and indications of concern over the future course of Soviet-Indian relations voiced by Soviet commentaries.

Image of Nehru Shaped for Future Use. Viewing Nehru's career, Moscow has adopted the same technique it used so often in the past: it identifies him as the exponent of "progressive" policies and attributes to him views that can be used in support of Soviet interest. There is, for example, great stress on Nehru's devotion to nonalignment, Indian-Soviet friendship, and anti-imperialism. In discussing Nehru's domestic policies, Pravda eulogized his interest in the Soviet system of planned economy and his efforts to develop state-owned heavy industry and to introduce "big state farms." Soviet propagandists are thus laying the groundwork for future charges that new political leaders are deviating from the policies of Nehru if their actions conflict with Soviet interests.

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JUN 17 1964

Praise for Shastri Tempered by Warnings. The Soviets have greeted with satisfaction the Congress Party's selection of Shastri rather than Desai as Nehru's successor. They probably realize that Shastri, who stands to the right of Nehru, is the best choice they could realistically have hoped for, and they expect that he will carry on many of Nehru's policies. However, Soviet commentaries warn that both the imperialist West and reactionaries within India will undoubtedly attempt to exploit the present moment of uncertainty in order to compromise India's neutrality and to push the country off the path of "noncapitalist development."

CPI Position Approved. The position of the Moscow-oriented faction of the CPI will probably parallel that of the Soviets. It will continue its policy of support for the leftist group in the Congress Party. A commentary in Pravda took favorable note of a resolution of the All-Indian Peace Council, a front organization, to support the "continuation" of Nehru's policies. It also cited approvingly the latest reiteration of the Indian communist leadership's support for national unity and the new government -- "if...it will adhere to the policies of Nehru."

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Orig Brady
June 15, 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment with Ambassador Bowles on
Tuesday, June 16 at 11:00 a.m. *India*

Ambassador Bowles may want to discuss the following subjects:

1. India's New Government. We believe India has made the transition to a new moderate government well and we like the noises Shastri is making on foreign policy, even though we still anticipate differences on tactics in Southeast Asia.

2. Indo-Pak Relations. We are particularly encouraged that Prime Minister Shastri has picked up Ayub's offer to work toward improvement of Indo-Pak relations. These gestures have come entirely as a result of Indian and Pakistani initiatives, without outside stimulation. In a very real sense Sheikh Abdullah is filling the third party role at present. It seems particularly important that we do nothing to rock the boat on the subcontinent while this process continues. The obstacles to working out compromises and securing political support for them in both countries are still tremendous.

3. Air Defense Assistance to India. We have told Ambassador Bowles that he should for the immediate present defer presentation to the Indians of a comprehensive air defense assistance package including help with US supersonics. We believe our recent agreement on military assistance, which did not include air defense help, is about all the traffic will bear in Pakistan at the moment. Although we are keeping a weather-eye on Soviet moves and the timing of any Indian military mission to Moscow, we hope to avoid injecting a new controversy in Indo-Pak relations at this delicate time which might interfere with Indo-Pak efforts to improve their relations. We do expect to move further along with our proposal to supply technical assistance to the Indians in developing their own supersonic HF-24.

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State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 3-2-04

JUN 16 1964

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4. Shastri Visit to Washington. We recommend that Ambassador Bowles be authorized to take back to Prime Minister Shastri an open-ended invitation to visit the United States at a mutually convenient date. We question the timing of an invitation to Shastri to come in mid-July after the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference, as Ambassador Bowles has suggested. A visit in July by Shastri (and the one by Ayub which would have to take place at roughly the same time) would involve the United States in Indo-Pak quarrels at a time when events on the ground are more conducive than they have been for a long time for the two leaders to work things out by themselves. We have no major bilateral issues to be discussed with Shastri; to expect him to discuss the broader questions which would come up with so little time to become familiar with them would impose an unnecessary burden on him so soon after his becoming Prime Minister. Furthermore five visits by Chiefs of State or Heads of Government are already scheduled for July.

DR

Dean Rusk

~~SECRET~~

Grant —

I. 10% issue.

A. When make it? Let Chet go ~~back~~ and make first wk. in July? Do as before and go to Moscow? Hold off longer if And. don't go to Moscow at all.

B. What goes into it? Rush letter to M.I. 72 F-6As, HF-24 help, possibly 2-3 sqdns 10% () if no more than 1 sqdn. of MIGs (ceiling of 23) after a yr. or so. (Cah got 36 10% in all, plus 44 F-5As in their 5 yr. plan). Thus And. always stay in phase w. Cah.

St doesn't want to let anything get in way of Cah - And. honeymoon. St wants go ahead before Moscow trip, preferably next wk.

We cd. go to Ayub and tell him frankly just what we're doing.

C. 5-Yr. MAP for Pak. When go ahead? ^{With} In what kind of polit. conditions? Grant favors signal now that will be ready for talk in Sep.

Merits of going ahead as that: (a) it lays groundwork for further help to And. (b) it signals Ayub that we like his current policy.

At end 5 yrs. Govt. will be in good mil. pos. vis-a-vis And.

We go ahead w. half-bits on facilities. aft. 5% mil. in const. w/o new land or more people.

C. Some reverse twist



S/S 8525

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 10, 1964

*India*MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: India's New Government

Enclosed is a memorandum setting forth the Department's most recent estimate of India's new government headed by Prime Minister Shastri.

/s/ John A. McKesson

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Memorandum on India's
New Government.~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,
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JUN 11 1964

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Lal Bahadur Shastri - Nehru's SuccessorShastri's Selection

- India's young democracy passed a crucial test with high marks. Succession to Nehru accomplished in dignified, orderly, constitutional manner. Behind-scenes jockeying vigorous but within bounds. Formal election of Shastri, five days after Nehru's death, was uncontested.
- Shastri was candidate of the dominant "moderate" faction of Congress Party, was opposed by extreme rightist and leftist factions. Shastri's principal support came from Congress Party President Kamaraj Nadar and from State Chief Ministers and party leaders.
- Principal rival was Morarji Desai, leader of the right wing faction. Desai's Hindu nationalist "hard line" on Kashmir and relations with Pakistan also gained him the support of Krishna Menon's small leftist faction.

Shastri's Personality and Background

- Shastri, 59, played minor role in India's freedom struggle but was close political associate of Nehru from 1952; Nehru's "right hand man" since 1961. Widely experienced in domestic affairs. Ten years in Cabinet; held succession of important portfolios (Home, Commerce and Industry, Transport and Communications, Railways). Has equally impressive background in Congress Party organization; particularly skilled and experienced as an election organizer.
- Shastri noted for his skill as a conciliator and trouble shooter. Has a gentle, unassuming manner; and very small physical stature to match. His genuine humility and proverbial courtesy have gained him wide popularity. Has high reputation for honesty and integrity. Draws great political strength in India from his apparent lack of ambition for power (Hindu ideal of renunciation and self-sacrifice).
- More pragmatic, more parochial than Nehru; less ideological, less theoretical-minded. Shastri more concerned with day-to-day implementation of policies than with enunciation of policy objectives.

- Greatest

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By JDV vARA Date 2-12-18

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- Greatest deficiency in Shastri's background is lack of experience in foreign affairs. His trip to London in July for Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference will be his first trip out of subcontinent. He has had some experience in field of Indo-Pakistan relations, and relations with Nepal. Also, particularly in last six months, Shastri has had increasing dealings with foreign diplomats and dignitaries.
- Despite lack of experience in foreign affairs, Shastri indicated considerable alertness to international responsibilities of his new job at his first press conference after his election, showed an appreciation of the gravity of the situation in Laos and responded deftly to President Ayub's "hand of friendship" speech.

Shastri's Cabinet

- Like Nehru, Shastri has kept External Affairs (and Atomic Energy) for himself, other faces are very familiar; continuity with Nehru Cabinet is dominant characteristic.
- No member of Krishna Menon faction included.
- Indira Gandhi who is a long time friend and co-worker brought in as Information and Broadcasting Minister. Had been expected to get External Affairs. Possibly she wanted "quiet" job at first and may later move to bigger portfolio.
- Chavan, TTK, Nanda retain Defense, Finance and Home Portfolios respectively.
- Morarji Desai and Jagjivan Ram are excluded. They had challenged Shastri for the leadership. Desai leads the party's rightist, Hindu-nationalist faction.
- S. K. Patil returns as Railways Minister.
- Less one-man-rule; wider sharing of authority.

Shastri's Policies

- We anticipate very cordial, cooperative relationship with new government. Agreement on all points not expected but over-all community of interests and compatibility of approach foreseen.
- Nonalignment will continue. Shastri announced this at first press conference. General continuity of policy expected. More pragmatism in implementation.

- Major

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-3-

- Major domestic policies to continue; democratic socialism and planned economic development. Economic portfolios are in hands of pragmatic, realistic men. More flexibility, less doctrinaire socialism expected.
- Defense buildup to continue.
- Relations with Pakistan may improve. Shastri favors accommodation with Pakistan and supports Sheikh Abdullah's initiatives, but he will have difficulty in obtaining political support for the type of concessions on which a lasting accommodation would have to be based. His policies on Pakistan will be challenged by right and left extremists (who not represented in Cabinet). Ayub has welcomed new government and offered it "warm hand of friendship." Shastri has expressed "appreciation" and has arranged to meet Ayub in London in July.
- No change in India's China policy expected although Shastri's statements reflect his conciliatory approach to problems; talks may begin if Chicom accept Indian version of Colombo Proposals. Suspicion and hostility will remain; no border settlement or rapprochement envisaged.
- Shastri government will maintain good relations with Soviets who provide India considerable economic and military assistance; political support against Chicom and diplomatic support on Kashmir. However, Shastri's relations with Soviets likely to be governed more by practical considerations and less by ideology than Nehru's was.

Basic Problems Remain

- Kashmir and Indo-Pak relations.
- Hindu-Muslim tensions; regionalism (Shastri, unlike Nehru, depends on support of coalition of regional politicians).
- Slow down of economic growth, semi-stagnation of agriculture. Pervasive, grinding poverty of country remains largely unresolved.
- Defense buildup and burden it imposes on economy, resources, manpower situation (we believe development can stand the burden of Indian Defense Plan as revised downward as a result of our talks with Chavan).
- Large population growth.
- Kerala; elections in eight months.

Positive

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- 4 -

Positive Factors

- In last few years Nehru's leadership had grown less and less creative; his overwhelming personal dominance and somewhat outdated ideological approach had stifled energies and blocked new leadership initiatives.
- New leadership can capitalize on latent Indian psychological readiness for change of leadership, style, pace.
- Fuller use can be made of the skills and energies of a new generation that has reached maturity in the post-independence period.
- Successful transition to new leadership will give new government and nation greater confidence in India's democratic system.

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India

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भारतीय राजदूतावास
वार्शिंगटन, डी० सी०
EMBASSY OF INDIA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Shastri
to LBJ
6/10/64

June 10th, 1964

My dear Mr President:

I have the honour to transmit the following message to you from the Prime Minister of India, which has been received by this Embassy telegraphically :-

"Thank you for your warm greetings and good wishes.

"It will be my endeavour to continue to strive toward our common goals of peace and progress in the spirit of friendship and cooperation that has marked the relationship between our two countries. In this endeavour I know that I shall have the full support of the people of India.

"Our peoples and countries are inspired by the common ideals and values of social justice, economic advancement and human dignity, which are a firm foundation for fruitful cooperation and abiding friendship.

Lal Bahadur Shastri."

With my high regard and esteem,

Yours sincerely,

(B.K. NEHRU)
Ambassador of India

The President,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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THE INDIAN CABINET
(9 June 1964)

Portfolio	Minister	Age
Prime Minister, Minister of External Affairs, Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission	Lal Bahadur Shastri *	59
Minister of Home Affairs	Gulzarilal Nanda *	65
Minister of Finance	T. T. Krishnamachari	63
Minister of Information and Broadcasting	Indira Gandhi *	49
Minister of Industry, Engineering, and Technical Development	Sardar Swaran Singh	56
Minister of Railways	S. K. Patil *	63
Minister of Law and Communications	A. K. Sen	50
Minister of Defense	Y. B. Chavan *	50
Minister of Steel and Mines	Sanjiva Reddy *	51
Minister of Food and Agriculture	C. Subramaniam	54
Minister of Petroleum and Chemicals	Humayun Kabir	58
Minister of Parliamentary Affairs and Civil Aviation	Satyanarain Sinha	63
Minister of Irrigation and Power	H. C. Dasappa	69
Minister of Education	M. C. Chagla	63
Minister of Labor and Employment	D. Sanjivayya *	43
Minister of Rehabilitation	Mahavir Tyagi	64

Names in red identify ministers who were members of previous government.

Names followed by an asterisk identify ministers who are also on the
all-powerful 19 - member Congress Party Working Committee.

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ETATPTY IMMEDIATE HIS EXCELLENCY MR LYNDON B JOHNSON

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WASHDC

WE ARE DEEPLY MOVED BY THE EXPRESSION OF YOUR SYMPATHY ON THE
PASSING AWAY OF SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU STOP IN THIS HOUR OF
OUR NATIONAL BEREAVEMENT IT IS COMFORTING FOR US TO KNOW THAT
OUR SORROW IS SHARED BY YOU AND THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES

TO A.B.
G.C.

OF AMERICA STOP THE NOBLE SENTIMENTS YOU HAVE EXPRESSED THAT
A WORLD WITHOUT WAR WOULD BE A SUITABLE MEMORAL FOR
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU WILL FIND AN ECHO IN EVERY INDIAN HEART STOP
WE GREATLY APPRECIATE THE PRESENCE WITH US ON THAT SOLEMN OCCASION
OF HIS EXCELLENCY MR DEAN RUSK STOP PLEASE ACCEPT MY MOST
SINCERE THANKS FOR YOUR KIND MESSAGE

S RADHAKRISHNAN PRESIDENT OF INDIA.

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ALEXANDER
BATOR
BELK
BRUBECK
CHASE
FORRESTAL
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MOODY
REEDY
SAUNDERS
SAYRE
SMITH, WM. Y.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Research Memorandum
RNA-15, June 3, 1964

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *Thom L. Hughes*
Subject: Lal Bahadur Shastri; New Indian Prime Minister *India*

The Congress Party high command and its parliamentary membership have selected Lal Bahadur Shastri to be the new Prime Minister of India. Shastri will take over from Gulzarilal Nanda, who had served as interim Prime Minister following the death of Jawaharlal Nehru. We have examined Shastri's past career and known attitudes, and have reached the following conclusions.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Shastri's main talents have been those of a conciliator and he has been a loyal executor of Nehru's programs.
2. Nevertheless, he has shown considerable intellectual capacity and independent political skill. He has been an effective cabinet minister and has demonstrated a capability for decisive action.
3. Shastri has excellent relations with most Congress Party leaders. He is not tainted by communalism or sectionalism and his nationwide image is favorable. He can, of course, not rival Nehru's charismatic leadership.
4. In domestic affairs Shastri is an outspoken anti-Communist.
5. Shastri probably holds moderately socialist views, similar to Nehru's, on Indian economic development, but he will be under pressure to take a less doctrinaire position on socialism.

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Authority Stat 4-30-76 Hr.
By K/LW NARA. Date 3-2-04

GROUP 3: Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified.

JUN 6 1964

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6. Shastri has spoken out in favor of the Indian military build-up and will no doubt continue it along the present lines. He has little personal experience with military matters and is likely to rely heavily on his advisers.

7. Shastri is weakest in the field of foreign affairs, where he has little experience. He will probably continue Nehru's policy of non-alignment; if he makes any changes, they are more likely to be towards a more pro-Western orientation.

8. He has enunciated a firm attitude towards Communist China. Even if he wished to be more flexible, his options would be closely circumscribed by the strong anti-Chinese feelings generally present in India.

9. Shastri's role in the recent crisis in Kashmir has been crucial. He is hardly likely to make any broad political concessions to Pakistan, but may be more conciliatory in his attitude than other Indian leaders.

Personal Data

Shastri is 59 years old. He was born on October 2, 1904 near Benares in Uttar Pradesh (U.P.). He is a high-caste orthodox Hindu of the Kayastha (scribe) caste; the son of a minor government official. He is married and has six children (four sons, two daughters). In 1959, he suffered a severe heart attack, but has apparently recovered fully and is known as an extremely hard and devoted worker who keeps long hours with little recreation. The new Prime Minister's family name is actually Srivastava, but it is never used. "Shastri" is an honorific title, indicating that he has completed a course of Hindu higher education. Rather incongruously, it is now used in lieu of his family name. Shastri received his education in Hindu schools and apparently did not attend any institutions based upon the English educational system. He nevertheless speaks good English.

Early Political Career

Shastri's introduction to politics was through the Gandhian civil disobedience movement. He served several jail terms for his activities and soon came into contact with the leading figures of Congress politics in U.P. -- then the stronghold of Indian nationalism. Among these was the Nehru family, and Shastri is said to be particularly close to Indira Gandhi, the late prime minister's daughter. He rose steadily through the party machinery of his home state during the last years of British rule, and from 1937 onwards he participated in the Congress government of the state under British aegis. In 1937 and 1946 he directed highly successful election campaigns for the U.P. Congress Party, and following independence in 1947, served as Minister of Police and Transport in the state government.

Experience in National Politics

Shastri entered the national political scene in 1951 as general secretary of the Congress Party. Nehru himself had assumed the presidency of the party as a result of factional in-fighting, and Shastri performed a valuable service in conciliating the various factions and preparing the party for the 1952 general elections. His performance evidently made him invaluable to Nehru, and since that time he has been closely associated with Nehru. In the course of 1952 Shastri shifted the field of his activities from party to governmental work. He was elected to the upper house of the Indian national parliament, and was appointed Minister of Railways and Transport.

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His tenure in the cabinet was terminated in 1956. A disastrous accident had taken place on the government-owned railways. Although Shastri was in no way responsible, he and Nehru felt that he should tender his resignation as a symbol of expiation for the government's responsibility. His resignation was, if anything, politically beneficial. Such grand gestures are widely appreciated by the Indian public, and Shastri soon found employment as the Congress party's chief organizer for the 1957 general elections. Shastri again performed well in this role, and was himself elected to the influential lower house of the Indian parliament. He was appointed Minister of Transport and Communications in the new government; in the following year (1958) he was given the Commerce and Industry portfolio, and in April 1961 was promoted to the Home Ministry -- the most important cabinet post.

In the 1962 elections, Shastri was again accorded a key role, serving with Nehru and his daughter as one of the party's three key strategists. After the elections he continued as Home Minister. In August 1963, Shastri was selected by Nehru as one of the top officials who should relinquish their governmental posts under the so-called "Kamaraj Plan" and devote themselves to rejuvenating the Congress Party at the grass-roots level. Although Nehru used the Kamaraj plan to rid the national and state cabinets of some undesirables, the elimination of Shastri -- who had performed well as Home Minister -- was not interpreted as a sign of Nehru's displeasure. By accepting the decision gracefully (others did not), Shastri probably improved his image as one who puts the national and party good above his own interests.

Shastri was not long out of office, however. When Pandit Nehru suffered a stroke in January 1964, it was generally recognized that someone would have to take much of the burden of day-to-day business off the Prime Minister's shoulders. Shastri was brought back into the cabinet as Minister Without Portfolio and in the period prior to Nehru's death acted virtually as Nehru's deputy. When Nehru died, Shastri was the logical choice to succeed him as prime minister.

Role in Domestic Affairs

At first glance, Shastri seems a somewhat surprising choice for Prime Minister. He has never been a commanding figure in Indian politics, and only in the past few years has he even been considered as a contender for the Prime Ministership. He is not comparable in stature to the charismatic Nehru, and although he has demonstrated a great capacity for growth, it is hard to imagine him filling the role of Nehru. He is a quiet, unassuming man -- a "machine" politician whose outstanding qualifications have been as a conciliator and as

an executor of the decisions of his superiors. His political career has never put him in a position of great independent authority, such as that held by the Chief Minister of a state; even in the powerful post of Home Minister, he was popularly thought of as Nehru's agent rather than as a decision-maker in his own right. In the Indian context, however, close identification with Nehru should be of inestimable advantage to Shastri in his new office. It is widely assumed that Shastri was -- aside from Indira Gandhi -- the person closest to Nehru in the last years of his life. Thus Shastri will be in a position to present his policies as an extension of Nehru's, and assume the position of executor of Nehru's last wishes.

The image of Shastri as little more than Nehru's minion is probably incorrect. Shastri has had close relations with American officials and impressed them with his intellectual capacity and inner strength. Over the years, he has acquitted himself well in Parliament and as Nehru's deputy in recent months he has shown considerable skill and courage. He has had a wealth of administrative experience on the national level, and during his tenure as Home Minister he reportedly performed his job creatively and enjoyed at least as much latitude in policy matters as did any other key cabinet minister. In his first few days as Prime Minister-select, he has moved forcefully to bridge the transitional gap and to prevent Indian policy from drifting.

In addition to the advantages of his own capabilities and the aura of being Nehru's heir, Shastri's position is further strengthened by the role that he has played within the Congress Party organization. He is a skilled political technician, has apparently made no significant enemies, and has on numerous occasions been the bridge between contending factions. It is noteworthy that he enjoys the trust and confidence of Congress president Kamaraj, the dominant political figure of South India. Despite his early work with the party in U.P., Shastri has no political base in that state. His rise to eminence has been solely as a national figure so that he is not the target of sectional or communal animosities. His outstanding record as an election manager should prove a strong attraction within the Congress, which is already looking uneasily towards the 1967 polls.

Shastri has cemented good relations with most of the powerful Congress Party leaders. He will be more responsive to their demands than was Nehru, and should be able to work more closely with them, perhaps thereby making Congress a more cohesive political force. Now that Nehru is gone, the Congress Party must rely more upon its own strengths in ruling India, rather than the image of a popular leader. The government itself will no longer be the "one man show" that it was during much of Nehru's tenure, and the cabinet will probably assume

a much more important role. Few Congress leaders are as well suited to cooperate fruitfully with the party as is the new Prime Minister. In addition, Shastri is said to have good relationships with the bureaucracy. He is a popular administrator who is noted for a sympathetic and friendly attitude towards subordinates. His past career shows no special concern with military matters. Presumably he will maintain good relations with the military. He has affirmed his support for continuation of the Indian military build-up, and will probably rely heavily upon advisors in the military field.

There are varying reports about Shastri's attitude towards "socialism", but his public statements put him firmly on record as a supporter of the ideal of creating a "socialist" India. At the January 1964 Congress Party Conference at Bhubaneswar, Shastri moved the resolution on democratic socialism that is supposed to provide the framework for Indian domestic policy over the coming years. It was a solid reaffirmation of the socialist slogan, but fell far short of the doctrinaire position that the Congress Left demanded; it was also less strong than Nehru desired. Although proclaimed devotion to the slogan of socialism is an essential part of any Indian politician's armory, Shastri's attachment to the cause is probably stronger than that of many other Congress leaders. He will, however, probably be less able than was Nehru to withstand the pressure of the Congress Right when it urges a more pragmatic course, and the views of its leaders, such as T. T. Krishnamachari and S. K. Patil, should carry increased weight in the new government.

Foreign Affairs

Shastri's weakness may be in the foreign policy field. He has never been outside of the Indian subcontinent and is not generally regarded as a person of cosmopolitan outlook. The choice of a foreign minister will thus be of the greatest importance. It cannot be assumed that Shastri will leave the conduct of foreign policy completely in the hands of others, but it is hardly likely that he will assert anything like the dominant authority over foreign affairs that Nehru did. It is very difficult to predict what Shastri's attitudes towards foreign affairs will be, nor even to gain any clear idea of what views he may have held in the past. It seems likely that he will be moderately pro-West in attitude and that he does not share the emotional attachment that Nehru had for the Soviet Union. Shastri's selection as Prime Minister was promoted by a coalition of forces that tend to be pro-Western in outlook. Even should he choose Indira Gandhi -- often thought to incline to the left -- as Foreign Minister, the principal influence upon his foreign policy is likely to come from the right, rather than from the pro-Soviet or extreme "neutralist" groups within the Indian government.

There can be little doubt that the new Indian foreign policy team, whatever its composition, will in the foreseeable future follow India's traditional non-alignment policy. Good relations with the West are essential for economic and military reasons and correspond to the inclinations of virtually all Indian leaders. On the other hand, Indians consider that ties with the Soviet Union provide them with valuable support in their conflict with China, are useful in balancing Western influence, and also are economically beneficial. Shastri's adamant anti-communism in domestic matters may carry over somewhat into foreign affairs and the West may find India easier to deal with, but the basic thrust of Indian foreign policy is not likely to change.

Shastri's lack of international stature will diminish still further India's position as a leader of the Afro-Asian and neutralist groupings. It has been generally accepted that any successor government in India would devote more of its attention to internal matters and expend less effort on building an international image. The selection of Shastri as Prime Minister tends to support this estimate.

The one "foreign" issue with which Shastri has been intimately involved is the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan. Nehru's illness coincided with the recent Kashmir crisis, and it was Shastri who took the most active role in displacing the discredited Kashmir government and releasing Sheikh Abdullah from his long imprisonment. Shastri's political rivals have attempted to smear him as a proponent of a "soft line" on Kashmir and Indo-Pakistani relations. This campaign appeared to have some success, but since Nehru himself became involved in dealings with Abdullah in the last weeks of his life and implicitly approved Shastri's approach to these problems, the new Prime Minister will be able to draw upon Nehru's prestige should he decide to continue to pursue a conciliatory policy. Although Shastri is hardly likely to risk his political position by making any broad concessions to Pakistan, his past performance shows him to be one of the most moderate Indian leaders in this field -- one likely to be more forthcoming in dealings with the Kashmiris and the Pakistanis than would have been either such "rightists" as Morarji Desai or the Krishna Menon left.

The new Prime Minister's attitude towards Communist China is firm, although in a speech of February 19 he pointed out that doors to negotiation with both China and Pakistan "should never be closed." This statement raised some speculation at the time as to whether Shastri might be prepared to make major concessions to the Chinese position. He later dispelled these rumors and it is believed that he will pursue

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essentially the same line on Sino-Indian relations that has been followed for the past year and more. Indian opinion on the China issue is generally strong and united; even should Shastri desire to introduce more flexibility into the Indian position, his options would be closely circumscribed. In his own words: "No one in this country, and especially those in power, can conceive of any kind of negotiation or discussion which will not be in consonance with the dignity and honor of our country."

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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MOODY

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WYATT

ZIMMERMAN

IMMEDIATE

JUN 2 3 25 PM '64

Please deliver soonest appropriate following message from
President to Prime Minister Shastri. White House plans release
about 5:00 p.m. Washington time.

QUOTE June 2, 1964

I hasten to send my hearty congratulations on the occasion
of your ~~election~~ ^{appointment} as Prime Minister of India. The people and
Government of the United States look forward to working with you
and your countrymen in the same spirit of friendship and under-
standing that marked the relations between India and our country
during the time of your great predecessor. I send my warmest
personal good wishes for your success in the great tasks you
now undertake, and my assurance of the reliable friendship and
cooperation of the United States. Our countries are united in
their purpose of peace, their effort for economic progress, and
their dedication to human dignity.

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

Drafted by: Text recd from White
House 6/2/64

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

S/S - Mr. deMARTINO

JUN 3 1964

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

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*orig. returned to
Blomley Smith 6/16/64*
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1. K...
2. R...
June 2, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: India Under Shastri Government

India

We have the following initial observations regarding the new Indian Prime Minister designate, Lal Bahadur Shastri, and the government he is likely to form:

1. An adept conciliator, Shastri seems to be the best choice available in the immediate post-Nehru period to reunite the Congress Party after its bruising internal battle over succession. It remains to be seen, however, how well Shastri can handle the long run problems of maintaining unity both in the Congress and in the country as a whole.

2. The Shastri government will probably consist of familiar faces and continue familiar policies.

Faces:

- Finance Minister Krishnamachari, Defense Minister Chavan and Home Minister Nanda will probably remain but there could be some changes in Portfolios.
- Former Food and Agriculture Minister Patil and Finance Minister Desai seem likely to return.
- It is uncertain who will be Foreign Minister; Indira Gandhi is a leading prospect, despite her apparent present reluctance to enter the government.

Policies:

- Nonalignment will continue, perhaps with a more practical bent and more balanced application.
- Planned economic development will continue to be the watchword of the Government of India; implementation is likely to be more pragmatic.

- India

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GROUP 3

By *[signature]* NARA, Date 3-2-01 Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

JUN 3 1964


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- India will remain firm in the face of threat to it from Communist China; in deciding how to meet China elsewhere (e.g., Southeast Asia) it will weigh the effect of its actions on its relations with both the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
- Shastri will probably try to continue efforts to reach an accommodation with Pakistan but he is likely to have trouble attracting the necessary political support for this policy.

3. Shastri's government will probably be the same "broad spectrum" type as that under Nehru, representing all sectors of Congress opinion from left to right, but the leftist faction will probably be less influential than it was in Nehru's time.

- Some representative of the Menon left--but not Menon himself--may be included.
- Shastri's government will, nevertheless, reflect the moderate rightist character of the Congress Party.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

181
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June 2, 1964

To: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary
Department of State

From: McGeorge Bundy

Subject: Telegram from President
to Prime Minister Shastri

For transmittal.

India

JUN 2 1964

18/a

2

June 2, 1964

Cable to

To: Amembassy in New Delhi

From: The President

Please deliver soonest appropriate to Prime Minister Shastri.
White House plans release about 5 p. m. Washington time.

"I hasten to send my hearty congratulations on the occasion of your ^{appointment} election as Prime Minister of India. The people and Government of the United States look forward to working with you and your countrymen in the same spirit of friendship and understanding that marked the relations between India and our country during the time of your great predecessor. I send my warmest personal good wishes for your success in the great tasks you now undertake, and my assurance of the reliable friendship and cooperation of the United States. Our countries are united in their purpose of peace, their effort for economic progress, and their dedication to human dignity. /s/ Lyndon B. Johnson"


WH APPROVED 6/8/64

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: June 2, 1964

SUBJECT: India: Views of Industrialist on Shastri; Kashmir; Private Sector

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
Mr. Ralph Dungan
Mr. Robert Komer
Mr. Lloyd Cutler
Mr. Harold Linder
Mr. C. D. Birls
Mr. Edgar Kaiser
Mr. James P. Grant

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M	AID-7		
NEA-2	CIA-2		

Mr. Ralph Dungan arranged a small White House luncheon for Mr. Birla, with the party assembling first in the Cabinet Room. The President came into the Cabinet Room for a brief (five-minute) discussion with Mr. Birla. The President expressed his sorrow at the passing of Prime Minister Nehru and our gratification, as friends of India, at the rapid progress in selecting a successor. Mr. Birla opened his comments by saying that "Shastri is a good man, a very good man for India." He then made a little talk in which he stressed India's need for American help and the importance of the private sector in India. He emphasized that now was the time for increased progress by the private sector and said "you Americans" (pointing at Harold Linder) have often favored the public sector. Mr. Kaiser interjected that Mr. Birla and he were seeing Mr. Linder about a loan that afternoon. The principal theme of Birla's comments was the need to help support the development of the private sector.

The President left the room on the light note that he was sure that Birla and Linder could sort out the problems between them.

Mr. Birla's subsequent luncheon conversation included the following:

1. His papers have favored the release of Sheikh Abdullah and he personally and most Indian businessmen to not believe Kashmir should stand between settlement of the Indo-Pak problems. He was prepared to see condominium or even independence for Kashmir.

2. He made

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JUN 10 1964

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2. He made it very clear that he was a Shastri supporter and had already sent him a message of congratulations.

3. He said that the big business community in India would be pleased with Shastri's appointment; that they had become disillusioned with Morarji Desai after his heavy increase of taxation.

4. He personally favored T.T. Krishnamachari but allowed that many businessmen have been disappointed by TTK's budget message which eliminated and reduced some taxes but increased others.

5. He said it was terribly important that India be able to defeat China and clear the Chinese out of Aksai Chin: "Only this way can India regain its shattered prestige in Asia."

6. He asked for (and Dungan assented) an autographed picture of the President.

7. He said India now has "true democracy for the first time" and if there were any special themes we wished pushed in India he could do so subtly.

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183

*Jawahar
Nehru*

SOUTH ASIA

Shastri Elected Unanimously as
Indian Congress Party's Par-
liamentary Leader

Less than a week after Nehru's death, his loyal lieutenant Lal Bahadur Shastri was on 2 June elected the Congress Party's parliamentary leader by a unanimous vote.

Unity was stressed by having the nomination proposed by left-leaning interim prime minister Nanda and seconded by conservative former finance minister Desai, Shastri's most serious challenger until he finally pulled out of the contest on 1 June. Party fissures have run deep over the selection, however, and will be a long time--if ever--in closing.

The moderate Shastri will be asked promptly by President Radhakrishnan to form a government, a process in which the new leader will make his first conciliatory gestures. At least initially, the new government may resemble closely the government over which Nehru presided. The loss of Nehru, however, automatically makes that government more conservative; any new Shastri appointments are likely to deepen somewhat that conservative coloration. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 032.023.001/13
By jc NARA, Date 2-9-04

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

4. UN Secretary General Reluctant
To Send UN Troops to Bukavu in
The Congo

UN Secretary General Thant is reluctant to send UN troops to Bukavu unless the Congolese Army can put up a more substantial showing than heretofore.

Thant appears intent on maintaining the 30 June deadline for the UN military withdrawal from the Congo. He evidently opposes UN involvement now in a situation in which UN forces would perform more than a back-up role.

There are no reliable Congolese troops in Kivu Central available to defend Bukavu. Two

companies south of Bukavu are reported planning to ambush rebels, but morale is very poor. Efforts to rally other troops have failed. Adoula reportedly planned to start portions of another battalion for Bukavu from Katanga on 2 June. Efforts are being made to get two T-28 aircraft armed with rockets into the area soon.

A rebel force was reported on 1 June to have clashed with Rwandan security forces along the border about 15 miles south of Bukavu. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

~~SECRET~~

184
SOUTH ASIA

12. Nanda Appointed Indian Prime Minister as Necessary Temporary Measure

G. L. Nanda's appointment as prime minister on 27 May reportedly had the cabinet's unanimous backing only as a necessary temporary measure.

There is no indication as to when a permanent successor will be chosen by the Congress Party group in the Parliament. That group's initial session on 28 May was apparently devoted mainly to procedural matters; a second session will occur on 29 May following the scheduled meeting of the Congress Party's all-powerful working committee.

Even though the working committee is not formally a participant in the parliamentary group's selection process, the decision on a permanent successor will in fact be made inside that committee and communicated thereafter to the members of Parliament who formally constitute the electorate. Once the parliamentary group has named its leader, President Radhakrishnan will ask him to form a government.

Radhakrishnan reportedly is pressing for an immediate decision; supporters of front-runner Lal Bahadur Shastri may also be interested in forcing an early decision, although they can afford to be somewhat conciliatory, in the interest of preventing deep party fissures. Those who hope to stop a Shastri bandwagon --and these would presumably include acting Prime Minister Nanda on the left and former Finance Minister Desai on the right-- will probably resort to delaying tactics as they play for time to form alliances.

Nehru's death has forced Kashmir's Sheikh Abdullah to cancel the remainder of his two-week conciliation mission to Pakistan. Since his dealings were so directly and privately with Nehru, he must retrace his steps, await developments, and begin again.

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25X1

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ-032-023-1-12
By Ag/cbm, NARA, Date 8-11-07

~~SECRET~~

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

Pressure Mounting on Lebanon's
President Shihab to Seek Unpre-
cedented Second Term

Pressure is mounting on President Shihab to seek an unprecedented second term.

Parliament's passage on 27 May of a motion calling for the amendment of the constitution to allow Shihab's re-election is part of a move to "draft" him despite his public and apparently sincere disclaimer of any desire to succeed himself. The resolution is sufficient to keep the door open for further steps in the constitutional amendment process beyond expiration of the present session of parliament on 31 May.

Shihab's supporters believe his continuance in office is necessary to avoid political and religious strife over the election of a successor. The office traditionally is held by a Maronite Christian in deference to the assumed dominance of members of that faith in Lebanon's populace. Shihab is strongly opposed, however, by some influential Christians, notably by Maronite Patriarch Maushi and former President Shamun.

The Egyptian Embassy, which regards Shihab as more acceptable than any other prospective candidate, has encouraged the campaign for a second term.

25X1

~~SECRET~~

Confidential

862

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May 28th, 1964.

Foreign Report

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After Nehru

China's Neighbours: North

China's Neighbours: South

France, America and NATO

After Nehru

Mr. Nehru's death has come at a time when unusually important choices have to be made in New Delhi, about both internal and external affairs.

Who will make them? The succession was wide open when Mr. Nehru died. It is still open. Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri (see FOREIGN REPORT of October 3rd, 1963) was, in effect, appointed Mr. Nehru's deputy in January. But doubts about the release of Sheikh Abdullah, whose liberation he backed, and Mr. Nehru's failure to name him formally as his deputy ensured that on Wednesday Mr. Shastri's claims were too strongly contested for him to be named at once as the new prime minister. Mr. Gulzarilal Nanda, the home minister, was named head of the government simply by virtue of cabinet seniority. This step, specifically described as temporary, was intended strictly as a holding operation while the party battle continued, though it has done Mr. Nanda no harm.

Whoever ultimately succeeds—as FOREIGN REPORT goes to press, the choice appears to lie between Mr. Shastri and Mr. Nanda, with Mrs. Indira Gandhi not out of the running—it will be wrong to suppose that the decisions in New Delhi have been settled by the choice of prime minister. Collective party pressures hemmed in even Mr. Nehru very closely. Any lesser man will be still more subject to them. The Indian political system does not in practice give the prime minister, once installed, the overwhelming power that its British model does.

The choices to be made are:

A.—*Home affairs.* The big issue here is whether Congress means what it says about socialism. Mr. Nanda, who two years ago set up a "Congress forum for socialist

action," genuinely believes that Congress must do what it promises. Its promises, embodied in a resolution passed unanimously at the party meeting in January, would mean much more in practice than may have seemed likely to those who accepted them then, on paper, for the sake of party unity. Among them were:

1. Limitation of private income and property, especially inherited wealth and urban property.
2. "A large share" of capital gains for the state and a "much larger proportion" than now of unearned income.
3. Power for the government "more effectively to direct credit and investible resources." This was a compromise with the left-wing demand for outright nationalisation of private banks. This argument is far from dead within Congress.
4. Land reform to be completed within two years. Processing of agricultural produce (in particular, rice) should not remain in private hands but come under co-operatives, or, till that is possible, "the state itself should progressively take over."

Foreign banks could well worry about this programme. Other foreign investors should not need to, unless they were to judge that the "important role" promised to private business in the resolution would in fact be seriously diminished. FOREIGN REPORT's judgment is that the foreign businessman should not, and after some initial caution would not, be too much alarmed at a government headed by Mr. Nanda or Mrs. Gandhi, and correspondingly less alarmed at one headed by the pragmatic Mr. Shastri.

Internally the political repercussions of this programme, particularly of its fourth point, could be considerable. It would tend to polarise politics, at the level of both the voters and of the politicians. Of the latter at least Mr. S. K. Patil, the still powerful former food minister, might quit Congress. But a massive formal split in Congress is improbable unless the Menonite wing, through Mrs. Gandhi, captures power.

B.—Foreign relations. India's basic foreign policy was established virtually single-handed by Mr. Nehru, but it has now become so ingrained that no successor, whatever his personal views, can hope to shift it more than marginally.

Western attention is likely to be focused on the margin between the Soviet Union and the United States. If so, it will be misdirected, so long as Congress remains in one piece and in power. The trend within Congress is presently somewhat toward the Soviet Union, and India's third-world position (which Mr. Nehru tended to take for granted) may dictate slightly stronger anti-colonial zeal. But (a) any shift will depend first not on Indian attitudes but on the actions of the Americans, Russians and Chinese; (b) no shift will be large enough to have much effect on world affairs.

The real issues are China and Pakistan. In detail:

(i) *China.* Here too Indian freedom of manoeuvre is limited. No military initiative is conceivable. The choice is between immobility on the border issue and the present mixture of diplomatic carrot and stick. One kind of stick is discussed below; the carrot discussed in FOREIGN REPORT of February 27th has since been made more

palatable by public statements indicating that India would not insist on its right to set up civil posts in the demilitarised zone in Ladakh if China did likewise. The Chinese have not responded to what was effectively an offer of negotiations. The initiative now is with them. If they seriously want successful negotiations, they are likely to wait until the new Indian leader is securely established. Correspondingly, an early offer from Peking should not be taken at its face value. On the Indian side, Mr. Shastri is more inclined to negotiate than Mr. Nanda. But neither, politically, can indicate in the near future any kind of bargain that might come out of the negotiations. The likeliest outcome is immobility in New Delhi until at least the autumn, followed by a very cautious resumption of diplomatic probing.

(ii) *Pakistan*. Relations with Pakistan had been dismal and were growing worse until the mutual terrorism against Hindu and Moslem minorities shocked both governments into realising how near they were to an exodus and slaughter like that of 1947. Since early April there have been signs on both sides of terrified sobriety, and a revival of the feeling (mainly in India) that Indians and Pakistanis if not brothers are at least still cousins.

The make-or-break question is Kashmir. The new Indian prime minister inherits a situation which has developed out of recognition since the Kashmiri leader Sheikh Abdullah was released from prison in early April. This development was misleadingly unreflected in the just-ended Security Council debate in which India's long-standing arguments were rehearsed unchanged, though with quite remarkable asperity, and with the Chinese invasion thrown in, by Mr. M. C. Chagla, India's education minister and former envoy in Washington and London.

In fact, the situation before Mr. Nehru's death was that:

(i) Mr. Nehru and Mr. Shastri were in favour of at least investigating a settlement acceptable to Pakistan. The Hindu communalists, within Congress and outside, were strongly opposed. So, for their own political reasons, were the Menonites. So were Mr. Morarji Desai, Mr. Nanda, and very notably Mr. Chagla.

(ii) The key to the situation was Sheikh Abdullah, whose right to speak for Kashmir is now unquestionable. A well-informed source enables us to bring order into the welter of confusion and speculation that surrounded Abdullah's speeches and his numerous meetings with Indian leaders, particularly Mr. Nehru. Abdullah's thinking has been:

1. To shock Indian opinion into realising that Kashmir's future, contrary to the received version, had not been finally settled.
2. Having successfully done so, to explore possible solutions, taking full account of the three parties to the dispute, while emphasising (a) that a settlement would be no settlement unless Pakistan accepted it, while (b) it must not be one that endangered India's Moslem minority—hence his insistence that a plebiscite was not the only method of self-determination, and his opposition to the calling of elections in Kashmir which would sweep him to power.
3. His plan was a united secular Kashmir, including that part now held by Pakistan, and the Hindu province of Jammu; self-governing but with

its defence shared by its neighbours. He hoped that this plan or something like it could be agreed upon between all three parties and then put to the vote in Kashmir, thus avoiding the consequences of a disputed plebiscite or elections.

4. The clue to this thinking was Abdullah's insistence on Indo-Pakistani friendship, and the part that Kashmir could play in it. Having been a source of enmity, it could be a source of reconciliation. It was this approach that won Mr. Nehru's approval for Abdullah's exploratory talks in Rawalpindi, which had just begun when Mr. Nehru died.

Abdullah has been widely criticised in India, relatively few Indians realising that he was vigorously resisting the pro-Pakistani pressures of many of his own political colleagues. His attitude has indeed aroused considerable suspicion among the more militant anti-Indians in Pakistan—though his representative position has been accepted by his pre-1947 political opponents in Kashmir, who are now in Pakistan's "Azad Kashmir."

India's new leader will now have to decide whether what may be the last hope, however slim, of settling the Kashmir dispute in the next decade should or should not continue. Mr. Nehru's death is undoubtedly a considerable setback, since, within Congress, it leaves Mr. Shastri isolated among the major leaders in a readiness to surrender some of India's pride—and conceivably territory—for a settlement.

The Pakistan question also involves what is potentially the biggest problem any Indian prime minister may be called on to face, that of the Moslem minority. Though it has only recently come into prominence again, the threat of Hindu-Moslem hostility has always been more dangerous to Indian unity than more fashionable problems. Mr. Nehru before his death had been nobly resisting Hindu communalism both among the people and within his own party. If relations with Pakistan cannot be improved, the dangers of organised Hindu communalism—organised in the first instance as a tool against Congress by the Jan Sangh party—will be very real. Fortunately, there is no potential prime minister, whatever his own views (Mr. Nanda is more religious than most), who does not know that at all costs communalism must be kept in check.

China's Neighbours: North

Thousands of Soviet technicians and construction workers are moving into Mongolia as part of Russia's policy to end Chinese economic influence there. Mongolia and Russia signed an agreement to this effect on March 17th.

Recently Russia has been disturbed by the thought that Mongolia, its only whole-hearted Asian supporter, would be enticed by the Chinese into taking a more independent stand in communist affairs. For instance:

A.—China's economic influence. This has been considerable, even though by 1961 China's offers of aid totalling £31 million had been trumped by Russian offers totalling £114 million.

- (i) Mongolia's industrial progress would have been held back but for China's

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NSC

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI 2478

MAY 29 1 34 PM '64

289
to
Chavan
5/28/64

Please deliver following message from President
to Chavan:

QUOTE

May 28, 1964

I too am sorry we did not have the opportunity
to meet, and I deeply regret the tragic circumstances
which caused its postponement. However, I too look
forward to close and friendly association between our
two countries. I am sure that your discussions here made
clear our continuing desire to help India in the military
as well as economic field.

Lyndon B. Johnson

This message not for release.

UNQUOTE-SMITH

—ALEXANDER

—BATOR

—BELK

—BRUBECK

—CHASE

—FORRESTAL

—JESSUP

—JOHNSON

—KEENY

—KLEIN

—KOMER

BALL

Drafted by:

Text received from WH:mj 5/29/64

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Clearances:

S/S MOODY Mr. Moose
—REEDY

—SAUNDERS

—SAYRE

—SMITH WM Y

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

187
--BATOR
--BELM
--BRUCE
--CHATE
--FARRISTAL
--JESUP

Intelligence Note

TO : The Acting Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *TH*
SUBJECT: Nehru's Death: Some Implications

MAY 27 1964

[Signature]
--REEDY
--SAUNDERS
--SAYRE
--SMITH, WM. Y.

For your information, we have made a list of some of the most important questions raised by the death of Indian Prime Minister Nehru. This survey is necessarily tentative.

1. Succession: The succession will probably take place in an orderly fashion, although there may be some in-fighting behind the scene. Ranking cabinet minister G. L. Nanda has been named interim Prime Minister. However, among the various contenders for Nehru's post, Lal Bahadur Shastri has the best chances. Whoever is selected, there will inevitably be a period of adjustment. Wider participation in decision-making is to be expected; the general trend of Indian foreign and domestic policy is likely to be preserved.

2. U.S. Relations: The new leaders are less likely to engage in irritating sermonizing than was Nehru; many of them have long experience in working together with U.S. officials. Krishna Menon is not likely to play a significant role in the new government.

3. USSR Relations: Nehru had an emotional attachment for the USSR and "socialism" that a successor government is not likely to have. Nevertheless, nonalignment between the US and the USSR is likely to be maintained as a keystone of Indian policy.

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
Not automatically declassified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAY 28 1964

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date *3-2-04*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

4. Chinese Communist Relations: The new leaders are at least as anti-Chinese as was Nehru. The Indian defense build-up is expected to continue.

5. Pakistan/Kashmir Relations: Nehru's successors share the general Indian distrust of Pakistan. Although Shastri and some others appear to hold more flexible attitudes on Kashmir, initially at least they are unlikely to risk their uncertain political capital by making unpopular concessions.

6. Economic Policy: Indian attachment to "socialist development" will continue as a slogan but should become more pragmatic in application. Concentration on rapid development will continue, including support for heavy industry (e.g. steel mills and atomic reactors). Private enterprise may be allotted a greater role.

7. National Unity: Nehru's absence will be most severely felt as the symbol of Indian unity. Nevertheless, the Congress Party has a momentum of its own as a large, successful political machine which provides a framework for Indian political developments. Although fissiparous tendencies within India present serious problems, they are more of a danger in the longer term.

8. Other International Implications: Nehru's passing and the manner of the succession will be watched by many other new nations. India, personified by Nehru, has been for years the **most** effective champion of non-Communist national development and his generally

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

moderating influence will be sorely missed in the Afro-Asian context. His successors may be expected to focus primarily on Indian problems showing less interest in international issues that do not directly concern India.

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188
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

May 27, 1964

FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read *ml for*
Executive Secretary

For information.

MAY 28 1964

*Return
X India
X Chron View*

*Ret to me
w/ back K draft
LB after shown
5/28*

Phoned from Secretary Rusk's plane - 12:30 p.m. May 27

May 27, 1964

MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM INDIAN DEFENSE
MINISTER CHAVAN

I deeply regret that I have to return to India in such tragic circumstances without meeting you. I was looking forward to meeting you and conveying the greetings and good wishes of the Prime Minister to you, Mr. President, and to the American people. We look forward to close and continued association between our two countries and I am confident your friendly interest in our country would continue. I am most grateful for the courtesies and assistance extended to me personally while I have been in your country.

RWK
do right answer
R my ore

WA 188a

Bundy
Copy sent
Mrs Roberts

FBIS 54

SWEARING-IN CEREMONY

DELHI DOMESTIC SERVICE IN ENGLISH 1530 27 MAY 64 B

(TEXT) THE PRESIDENT HAS APPOINTED GULZARILAL NANDA TO BE PRIME MINISTER. NANDA WAS SWORN IN BY THE PRESIDENT AT THE RASHTRAPATI BHAWAN AT 1630 HOURS THIS AFTERNOON. NANDA HAS INVITED ALL MEMBERS OF THE OUTGOING COUNCIL OF MINISTERS TO SERVE IN THE NEW CABINET.

LATER, AT A CEREMONY AT RASHTRAPATI BHAWAN, ALL CABINET MINISTERS, EXCEPT CHAVAN AND KABIR WHO ARE AWAY, WERE SWORN IN BY THE PRESIDENT. ALL MINISTERS OF STATE, AND ALL BUT FIVE DEPUTY MINISTERS WHO ARE ALSO AWAY, TOOK THE OATH OF OFFICE. NANDA WAS PRESENT.

ADDRESSING THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AFTER THE SWEARING-IN CEREMONY, DR. RADHAKRISHNAN SAID: WE ARE ALL PASSING THROUGH A PERIOD OF CRISIS. THE ONLY WAY IN WHICH WE CAN SHOW OUR RESPECT TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU IS BY ADOPTING AN ATTITUDE OF FREEDOM FROM EVERY KIND OF PREJUDICE IN THE MATTER OF DEALING WITH THE AFFAIRS WHICH ARE BROUGHT TO OUR NOTICE.

THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OBSERVED A MINUTE SILENCE.

THE CONGRESS PARTY WILL ELECT ITS LEADER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. UNTIL THEN, THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENT WILL CONTINUE.

27 MAY 025P MLH/HH

1

NEHRU

NEW DELHI, (AP)-JAWAHARLAL NEHRU, PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA SINCE IT BECAME INDEPENDENT IN 1947 AND ONE OF THE WORLD'S LEADING STATESMEN, DIED TODAY AFTER SUFFERING HIS SECOND STROKE IN LESS THAN FIVE MONTHS.

HE WAS 74.

"THE PRIME MINISTER IS NO MORE," STEEL MINISTER C. SUBRAMANIAM TOLD THE SOBBING PARLIAMENT. "LIFE IS OUT. THE LIGHT IS OUT."

NEHRU WAS STRICKEN AT 6:25 A.M. AS HE AROSE AT HIS USUAL HOUR. HE DIED AT 2 P.M. (4:30 A.M.), SEVEN HOURS AND 35 MINUTES LATER. A STROKE ON JAN. 7 HAD PARTIALLY PARALYZED HIS LEFT SIDE BUT HE HAD RECOVERED SOMEWHAT AND IN RECENT WEEKS HAD RESUMED HIS SEAT IN PARLIAMENT.

HIS ONLY CHILD, MRS. INDIRA GANDHI, WAS WITH HIM WHEN HE DIED. A LARGE TEAM OF DOCTORS WAS IN ATTENDANCE. THE U.S. EMBASSY OFFERED ITS MEDICAL STAFF AND EQUIPMENT, BUT AN EMBASSY SPOKESMAN SAID THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT DID NOT REQUEST ATTENDANCE.

JK833AED 5/27

2

U.S.-NEHRU

WASHINGTON, (AP)-PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND SECRETARY RUSK WERE ADVISED AT AN EARLY HOUR TODAY OF THE DEATH OF PRIME MINISTER NEHRU OF INDIA.

THE DEATH OF NEHRU PUT AN IMMEDIATE HALT TO U.S. DEFENSE TALKS HERE.

INDIA'S DEFENSE MINISTER, Y. B. CHAVAN, WAS NOTIFIED IN COLORADO SPRINGS, COLO., WHERE HE WAS VISITING THE U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY.

CHAVAN ARRANGED TO LEAVE IMMEDIATELY FOR NEW YORK. THERE HE IS DUE TO BOARD AN AIR INDIA AIRLINER TONIGHT FOR NEW DELHI.

JK835AED 5/27

3

NEW DELHI--ADD NEHRU (1)

NEHRU'S TWO SISTERS, MRS. VIJAYALAKSHMI PANDIT AND MRS. KRISHNA HUTHEESINGH, LEFT BOMBAY BY SPECIAL PLANE FOR NEW DELHI.

MRS. PANDIT IS GOVERNOR OF MAHARASHTRA STATE.

NEHRU'S DEATH URGENTLY RAISED A QUESTION THAT HAS PLAGUED INDIA FOR YEARS--HIS SUCCESSOR. THE STRONG-WILLED PRIME MINISTER HELD THE REINS OF POWER FIRMLY AND ADAMANTLY REFUSED TO DESIGNATE A SUCCESSOR.

A LEADING CANDIDATE HAS BEEN 59-YEAR-OLD LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI, A MILD-MANNERED, 5-FOOT-2 VETERAN OF THE RULING ALL-INDIA CONGRESS PARTY AND A CLOSE FRIEND OF NEHRU. AFTER NEHRU'S FIRST STROKE, HE SUMMONED SHASTRI, MADE HIM A CABINET MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO AND PUT HIM IN CHARGE.

BUT WHEN NEHRU BEGAN RECOVERING, SHASTRI WAS ELBOWED ASIDE AND HIS POLITICAL STOCK DROPPED.

TWO OTHER POLITICAL FIGURES GENERALLY REGARDED AS POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS ARE HOME MINISTER G.L. NANDA AND FINANCE MINISTER T.T. KRISHNAMACHARI.

NEHRU'S DAUGHTER ALSO HAS BEEN MENTIONED BUT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT SHE HAS GREAT POLITICAL BACKING.

THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR THE PRESIDENT, NORMALLY A CEREMONIAL OFFICIAL, TO TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENT ON THE DEATH OF THE PRIME MINISTER.

THE PRESIDENT IS SARVEPALLI RADHAKRISHNAN, AN ELDERLY PHILOSOPHER RENOWNED IN WORLD ACADEMIC CIRCLES AND A HIGHLY RESPECTED FIGURE IN INDIA.

JK839AED 5/27

4

U.S.-NEHRU (TOPS 2)

WASHINGTON, (AP)-SECRETARY RUSK WILL LEAD A HIGH-LEVEL U.S. DELEGATION TODAY TO THE FUNERAL OF PRIME MINISTER NEHRU OF INDIA.

ROUSED BEFORE DAYBREAK TO RECEIVE NOTICE OF THE DEATH OF THE INDIAN LEADER, RUSK ARRANGED TO FLY OUT OF ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE, MD., AT 11 A.M. EDT, FOR NEW DELHI. WORD OF NEHRU'S DEATH ALSO WAS RELAYED TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON.

OTHER MEMBERS OF RUSK'S PARTY WERE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE PHILLIPS TALBOT, IN CHARGE OF FAR EASTERN AND SOUTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS, AND AMBASSADOR CHESTER BOWLES, WHO HAS BEEN AT HOME FOR CONSULTATIONS.

INDIA'S DEFENSE MINISTER, Y. B. CHAVAN, WHO HAS BEEN VISITING THE UNITED STATES AND NEGOTIATING FOR ARMS AID, WAS INVITED TO ACCOMPANY THE PARTY.

JK342AED 5/27

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NEW DELHI--ADD NEHRU (3)

ALTHOUGH RADHAKRISHNAN OFFICIALLY TAKES OVER THE GOVERNMENT, INFORMATION MINISTER SATYANARAYAN SINHA TOLD NEWSMEN HOME MINISTER NANDA, SENIOR MEMBER OF THE CABINET, WILL HANDLE THE PRIME MINISTER'S WORK.

A STATE FUNERAL AND CREMATION WILL BE HELD QUICKLY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH INDIAN CUSTOM. THE DEFENSE MINISTRY SAID THE FUNERAL PROCESSION WOULD START IN NEW DELHI TOMORROW MORNING.

IF THE USUAL CUSTOM IS FOLLOWED, NEHRU'S ASHES WILL BE STREWN IN THE NATION'S HOLY RIVERS, PROBABLY AT ALLAHABAD, HIS BIRTHPLACE, AT THE CONFLUENCE OF THE GANGES, THE JUMNA AND THE MYTHOLOGICAL UNDERGROUND SARASWATI RIVER.

IN LONDON, PRIME MINISTER SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME SAID HE WOULD FLY TO INDIA THIS AFTERNOON FOR THE FUNERAL. BUCKINGHAM PALACE SAID QUEEN ELIZABETH II WOULD BE REPRESENTED BY EARL MOUNTBATTEN, WHO WAS INDIA'S LAST VICEROY AND FIRST GOVERNOR GENERAL AND A CLOSE FRIEND OF NEHRU'S.

JK851AED 5/27

8

NEW DELHI--ADD NEHRU (7)

HOME SECRETARY V. VISWANATHAN SAID NEHRU'S PHYSICIANS ATTRIBUTED HIS DEATH TO "HEART ATTACK AND SHOCK."

HOME MINISTER G.L. NANDA, A SENIOR CABINET MEMBER WHO HAS A REPUTATION FOR GETTING THINGS DONE, WAS SWORN IN AS ACTING PRIME MINISTER 10 HOURS AFTER NEHRU'S DEATH.

NANDA WAS SWORN IN BY PRESIDENT SARVAPALLI RADHAKRISHNAN. RADHAKRISHNAN WAS CHARGED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION TO TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENT ON THE DEATH OF THE PRIME MINISTER. BUT NANDA WAS QUICKLY CHOSEN TO HANDLE THE ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS.

JK853AED 5/27

10

NEW DELHI--ADD NEHRU (8)

THRONGS CONVERGED ON NEHRU'S RESIDENCE. IN INDIA FUNERALS ARE ALWAYS HELD WITHIN 24 HOURS OF DEATH.

OFFICIALS ANNOUNCED THE BODY WOULD LIE IN STATE IN THE HOUSE AND THE DOORS WOULD BE OPEN ALL NIGHT TO ALLOW PEOPLE TO FILE BY. POLICE FORMED A HUMAN FENCE TO KEEP THE CROWD IN ORDER.

AT 8 A.M. THURSDAY THE BODY WILL BE "TAKEN OUT IN PROCESSION," AS INDIANS SAY, THROUGH THE STREETS OF THE CAPITAL TO THE BURNING GROUND.

NEHRU WILL BE CREMATED AT A SPOT NEAR THAT WHERE GANDHI, "THE FATHER OF THE COUNTRY," WAS CREMATED IN 1948.

JJK929AED 5/27

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Z 270931Z

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

1964 MAY 27 09 31

TO WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR BUNDY

Z 270900Z

FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

42208

TO SECSTATE WASHDC

STATE GRNC

BT

UNCLAS ACTION FLASH CRITIC DEPT 3537 INFO FLASH LONDON 1284

KARACHI 1291 FROM DELHI MAY TWENTY SEVENTH

CRITIC

NEHRU DIED THIS AFTERNOON

GREENE

BT

CFN 3537 1284 1291

MAY 27 1964

NNNN

RECEIVED
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India
X India - Nehru

CONFIDENTIAL

OCI No. 1579/64

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
27 May 1964

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Nehru's Death

1. When Nehru announced to the world in 1948 that the great Indian independence leader Gandhi had died, he described the event in terms of a "light" having "gone out of our lives." India was fortunate that darkness did not immediately follow but rather that Nehru's "light" burned equally bright and lasted yet another 16 years. There is no "light" of equal magnitude in Indian politics today; Nehru was too jealous of his own power to allow one to build up. Now he is dead, the victim of a stroke, his second in six months, and India must settle on the next brightest "light" available.

2. Lal Bahadur Shastri, a diminutive, retiring, moderate 59 year-old, is likely to be the choice of the Congress Party group in Parliament which must now select a new leader. Shastri, a former home minister who left the cabinet at Nehru's request last August in a move to strengthen the party's organizational wing, was brought back into the cabinet following Nehru's first stroke in January. Nehru and those close to him successfully resisted suggestions that Shastri be named deputy prime minister; as a result Shastri has been functioning as minister-without-portfolio. In fact, however, the succession was already in train.

3. Long regarded as one of Nehru's closest and ablest lieutenants, Shastri began slowly to be the focal point of government. In parliament he began to be associated in the public mind with major policy pronouncements and with the major issues of the day; within the party, leaders began sorting themselves out into categories pro and anti-Shastri and found that those who were pro-Shastri

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By jc(lhw) NARA, Date 3-2-04

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were very much the stronger; a recent public opinion poll conducted by the newspaper Statesman put Shastri well out in front as the public choice for succession to the prime ministership.

4. The public, however, does not choose. The choice will be the party's, formally by the Congress Party's members of parliament, actually by the party's top bosses, most of whom prefer Shastri to other possible contenders. In his short period as front runner, Shastri has managed to acquire some new enemies; he has been very much in the van of the moderates dealing with the Kashmir question and has thus earned the ire of both the extreme right and the extreme left. He has grown in stature too, however, and the centrality of his public image has probably more than compensated for his association with divisive issues.

5. Until parliament makes its choice, the government will be in the hands of G. L. Nanda, Shastri's successor as Home minister and the second ranking man in the cabinet. Nanda is not a serious contender for the prime ministership but neither is he a Shastri man; in the past five months he has asserted the prerogatives of his protocol position and succeeded only in alienating those who are on the Shastri bandwagon. Nanda's head could be the first to roll in any Shastri cabinet, and aware of that strong possibility, Nanda will milk his present role for all it is worth. How long that will be is an open question. Hindu funeral rites are brief and quick; parliament is in session and the powers are therefore assembled; the succession should be quickly decided.

6. As of 0800 EDT, Nehru's funeral is planned for 0800 (New Delhi time) 28 May--2300 EDT 27 May.

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 May 27 11:02 AM '66

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Info:

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Deliver following message/from President Johnson to President

Radhakrishnan. Will be released Washington 11:00 a.m. Washington daylight saving time.

QUOTE Dear President Radhakrishnan:

Once again we come together in grief over the death of a great and beloved man - this time your own leader, Prime Minister Nehru.

Words are inadequate to convey the deep sense of loss which we, in particular, feel at his passing. For so long we had counted on his influence for good, it now seems impossible to believe that he is no longer with us. Yet his spirit lives on. The rich heritage he has left us, his faith in his people and in humanity, will, I know, serve to sustain you and us as we strive together to translate his ideals into reality.

History has already recorded his monumental contribution to the molding of a strong and independent India. And yet, it is not just as a leader of India that he has served humanity. Perhaps more than any other world leader, he has given expression to man's yearning for peace. This is the issue of our age. In his fearless pursuit of a world free from war he has served all humanity.

As it

SQA - Carol C. Laise

s/s - Mr. McKesson

White House - Mr. Bundy

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As it was for Gandhi, peace was the ideal of Jawaharlal Nehru; it was his message to the world. There could be no more fitting memorial to him than a world without war. It is my sincere belief that in his memory the statesmen of the world should dedicate themselves to making his ideal a reality. Our country is pledged to this and we renew our pledge today in tribute to your great departed leader.

Sincerely, ~~HERBERT~~

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Origin

NEA

Info:

ACTION: ~~Amembassy~~ NEW DELHI FLASH 2437

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May 27 11 28 AM '64

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Deliver following message soonest from President Johnson to ~~President~~
Mrs. Indira Gandhi:

~~Radio broadcast~~

QUOTE Dear Mrs. Gandhi:

When we met recently, I recall we shared the hope that we would not so soon be faced with this tragedy. I find it difficult to express the sense of personal loss which I feel as the result of the death of your father. His passing has left his country and all mankind, to whom he gave so much in word and deed, the poorer.

I shall always treasure my all too brief association with Prime Minister Nehru. He was always so generous of his time, as he was to so many of my countrymen. His comfort at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy was a great source of strength to me. That we should lose this great man, so soon after our own loss, grieves us more deeply than we can express.

I know the sorrow you must feel at the loss of your father. He had much more to offer India. Yet you will be sustained, I know, in the knowledge that history will always remember the crucial part he played in India's struggle for independence. His leadership and wisdom were indispensable

Drafted by:

NEA:SOA:CCLaise:mb 5/27/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

SOA - Carol C. Laise

Clearances:

S/S

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MAY 27 1964

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indispensible at its most critical years and his devotion to the great Indian adventure of freedom was unwavering. History will also record his leadership in starting the world on the road to an enduring peace.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in extending our deepest sympathy.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

House
White/does not plan to release.

End.

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May 27, 1964

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LOJ
Radhakrishnan
5/27/64

Dear President Radhakrishnan:


Once again we come together in grief over the death of a great and beloved man -- this time your own leader, Prime Minister Nehru.

Words are inadequate to convey the deep sense of loss which we in particular feel at his passing. For so long we had counted on his influence for good; it now seems impossible to believe that he is no longer with us. Yet his spirit lives on. The rich heritage he left us, his faith in his people and in humanity, will, I know, serve to sustain you and yours as we strive together to translate his ideals into reality.

History has already recorded his monumental contribution to the molding of a strong and independent India. And yet, it is not just as a leader of India that he has served humanity. Perhaps more than any other world leader he has given expression to man's yearning for peace. This is the issue of our age. In his fearless pursuit of a world free from war he has served all humanity.

As it was for Gandhi, peace was the ideal of Jawaharlal Nehru; it was his message to the world. There could be no more fitting memorial to him than a world without war. It is my sincere belief that in his memory the statesmen of the world should dedicate themselves to making his ideal a reality. Our country is pledged to this, and we renew our pledge today in tribute to your great departed leader.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan
President of the Republic of India
New Delhi

LBJ: McG;B; mz

NY 30 1964