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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
~~010~~	~~memo~~	~~Memorandum for Record~~ (dup. #155, NSF, CF, India, Volume 6, box 130) open 12-14-04 NLJ 04-153	~~C~~	~~2~~	~~11/30/65~~	~~A~~
020	memo	from Harold Saunders sanitized 12/28/07	S	2	11/8/65	A
~~024~~	~~letter~~	~~Komer to Bowles~~ (dup. #3, NSF, Files of Komer, Box 13, Bowles 11/3/63-1965) Dup. #267 Papers of Komer, Chron, Oct-Dec 65, Box 6 open 6/25/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-360	~~S~~	~~1~~	~~10/22/65~~	A
~~032~~	~~memo~~	~~Komer to McG. Bundy [sanitized 2003]~~ (dup. #17, NSF, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. 2, box 6) (Dup. #21, NSF, Files of Komer, "Bundy, McG-Decisions, 1965-66" Box 13]	~~S~~	~~1~~	~~10/14/65~~	A
046	cable	Komer to Bowles [sanitized 2001] (dup. #5, and near dup. #85 NSF, Files of Komer, Bowles 11/63-1965; near dup. #31, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/Bowles, box 134) Dup. #65, Papers of Komer, chron, July-Sept. 65, Box 5	S	1	9/20/65	A
047	memo	Memorandum for Record [sanitized 2002] (dup. #168, NSF, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. 2, box 6)	S	1	9/18/65	A
~~056~~	~~memo~~	~~Komer to the President~~ Dup. #113, Papers of Komer, Chron July-Sept. 65, Box 5 open 3/3/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-350	~~S~~	~~3~~	~~9/9/65~~	~~A~~
056a	list	1965 chronology Dup. #113 Papers of Komer, Chron July-Sept 65, Box 5 sanitized 12/7/12 per NLJ/RAC 12-351	S	2	[1965]	A

open 7-23-08 NLJ 07-7

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
061	memo	Komer to the President [sanitized in FRUS, vol. 25, #175] (dup. #15a, Memos to the President, Bundy, Vol. 13, box 4) Dup. #161, Papers of Komer, Chron, July-Sept 65, Box 5	S	1	8/28/65	A
~~065~~	~~memo~~	~~Komer to the President~~ Sanitized 12/15/06 NLJ06-188 Dup. #216, Papers of Komer, chron, July-Sept 65, Box 5 dup. #103, Komer "Pakistan 1965 - March 66" box 46 open 3/29/19 per RAC	~~S~~	~~1~~	~~8/14/65~~	~~A~~
~~067~~	~~report~~	~~by Saunders re Indian army~~ Dup #10, Files of Komer, India-Pak 12/63-3/66, Box 26 Dup #97a, Files of Komer, Kashmir 12/63-3/66 Box 37 Open 3/29/19 per RAC	~~S~~	~~2~~	8/11/65	A
067a	list	Deployment of Indian Army [sanitized 2001] Dup #10a, Files of Komer, India-Pak 12/63-3/66, Box 26 Dup #97b Files of Komer, Kashmir 12/63-3/66, Box 37	S	1	[1965]	A
067b exempt 12/28/07	note	handwritten note Dup #97, Files of Komer, Kashmir, 12/63-3/66 Box 37	PCI	1	8/11/65	A
~~084~~	~~memo~~	~~Komer to Phil Talbot (sanitized 1976)~~ (dup. #226, NSF, CF, India, Vol. 5, box 129) Dup #28, Papers of Komer, Chron, Jan-June 65, Box 5 Open 3/29/19 per RAC	~~S~~	~~2~~	~~6/22/65~~	~~A~~
085a	memo	Komer to the President [sanitized in FRUS, Vol. 25, #134] (dup. #47, NSF, Memos to the President, Bundy, Vol. 11, box 3; #29f, NSC History, So. Asia, Box 24; #33, NSC Hist., Indian Famine, Vol. 1 box 25) Dup. #34a, Papers of Komer, Chron, Jan-June 1965 Box 5	TS	1	6/21/65	A
093	letter	Komer to Mr. Cook [sanitized 2002] (dup. #29a, NSF, NSC History, So. Asia, Box 24; #22, NSF, NSC History, Indian Famine, Vol. 1, box 25) Dup. #18, Files of Komer, India-Pak 12/63-3/66, Box 26 Dup. #88, Papers of Komer, Chron, Jan-June 65, Box 5	S	4	6/3/65	A

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
096	memo	Komer to Bundy [sanitized 2000] (dup. #92, NSF, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. 1, box 6; #21, NSC History, Indian Famine Vol. 1, box 25; #28e, NSC History, South Asia, box 24) ~~same sanit per RAC, 12/28/07~~ same sanitization 6/13/11 NLT 10-420	S	5	5/30/65	A
104	cable	Bundy to Bowles [sanitized 2001] (near dup. #108a, this file; near dup. #14, 16a Files of Komer, Bowles 11/3/63-1965, box 13; near dup. #34a, NSF, CF, Exchanges w/Bowles, box 134) sanitized 12/28/07	S	3	4/28/65	A
~~105~~	~~letter~~	~~Komer to Bowles~~ open 11-9-10 (dup. ~~#15, NSF, Files of Komer, Bowles 11/3/63-1965, box 13~~)	~~S~~	~~2~~	~~4/28/65~~	~~A~~
108a	cable	Bundy to Bowles (near dup. #104, this file; near dup. #14, 16a Files of Komer, Bowles 11/3/63-1965, box 13; near dup. #34a, NSF, CF, Exchanges w/Bowles, box 134) sanitized 12/28/07	S	3	4/27/65	A
109	memo	Komer to Bundy [Dup. #60, NSF, Files of Saunders, "INDIAN FAMINE" Box 38] [Dup. #59a, NSF, NSC Hist. "Indian Famine, Vol. I] ~~sanitized~~ sanitized 12/28/07	S	1	4/27/65	A
111	memo	Komer to the President [sanitized 2000] (dup. #65, Files of Komer, India-Economic 1965-March 1966, box 22; #28a, NSC Hist., So. Asia, Box 24; #17, NSC Hist., Indian Famine, Vol. 1, box 25)	S	4	4/22/65	A

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113a	cable	Bundy to Bowles [sanitized in FRUS, Vol. 25, #101] (near dup. #35a, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/Bowles, box 134; #117, Files of Komer, Shastri Visit-Postponed, box 22) [Dup. #57c, NSF, NSC HIST. INDIAN FAMINE, Vol. I] [Dup. #58a, NSF, Files of Saunders, INDIAN FAMINE, Preface ... Box 38] #112a, Papers of Komer, Chron. Jan-June 65. Box 5	S	2	4/15/65	A
118	memo	Saunders to Bromley Smith sanitized 2/14/13 per NLJ 12-240	S/	1	2/23/65	A
118a	cable	Bromley Smith to Bowles sanitized 9/4/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-353	S/	1	[2/65]	A
~~127~~	~~cable~~	~~New Delhi 2511~~ Open 3/29/19 per RAC	~~S~~	~~8~~	~~3/6/65~~	~~A~~
129	cable	New Delhi 2482 Sanitized 8.27.08 NLJ 08.91	C	2	3/4/65	A
136	cable	18810 to New Delhi [sanitized 2001] (near dup. #136a, this file; dup. #29, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134	S/	1	12/10/65	A
136a	cable	Komer to Bowles [sanitized 2001] (near dup. #136, this file; near dup. #29, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/Bowles, box 134) Sanitized 12/28/07	S	1	12/10/65	A
138	cable	Bowles to Komer [sanitized 2002] (near dup. #66, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134)	TS/	1	12/8/65	A
146a	memo	Memorandum for the Record by Arthur W. Barber sanitized 3/29/19	S	2	11/29/65	A

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~~150a~~	~~memo~~	~~Bowles to Rusk~~ open 8/14/12	~~S~~	~~23~~	~~11/10/65~~	~~A~~
~~151~~	~~letter~~	~~John Baker to Komer~~ open 3/29/19 per RAC	~~S~~	~~2~~	~~11/12/65~~	~~A~~
~~152~~	~~cable~~	~~New Delhi 1190~~ ~~exempt 1976~~ Dup. #52, NSF, CF, India, vol. 6, Box 130 Open 3/29/19 per RAC	~~TS~~	~~6~~	~~11/4/65~~	~~A~~
162	cable	New Delhi 1007 [exempted 1977] (dup. #59, NSF, CF, India, Vol. 6, box 130)	S	4	10/16/65	A
165	cable	to White House for McGeorge Bundy	S/	1	10/14/65	A
166a	cable	Bundy to Bowles sanitized 2/14/13 per NLJ 12-240	S/	1	10/13/65	A
186	cable	Bowles to Komer sanitized 9/4/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-353	C/	1	8/27/65	A
187a	letter	Bowles to Tom Mann sanitized 7/8/17 per NLJ/RAC 12-352	S	6	8/26/65	A
188	cable	New Delhi 372	S	3	8/25/65	A
204	ccable	Ottawa 1558 [exempted 1994] (dup. #69, NSF, CF, Canada, Vol. 3, box 166)	C	6	6/16/65	A

Open 11.19.04 NLJ 04-152

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
~~207a~~	~~letter~~	~~Bowles to Phil Talbot~~ (duplicate of #200a, NSF, CF, India, Vol. 4, box 129)	~~S~~	~~2~~	~~5/13/65~~	~~A~~
		open 12.14.04 NLJ 04.150				
222	cable	Bowles to Rusk, et. al.	TS	4	5/7/65	A
		~~sanitized 8.27.08 NLJ 08-41~~ more info released 5/12/10 per NLJ/RAC 12-352				
222a	cable	New Delhi 3185	C	4	5/7/65	A
226a	memcon	with Bowles and Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit	C	3	4/14/65	A
~~233a~~	~~letter~~	~~Sudhir Ghosh to Phil Potter~~ (duplicate of #200c, NSF, CF, India, Volume 4, box 129)	~~C~~	~~1~~	~~3/28/65~~	A
		open 12.14.04 NLJ 04.150				
~~233b~~	~~letter~~	~~Sudhir Ghosh to Shastri~~ (duplicate of #200d, NSF, CF, India, Volume 4, box 129)	~~C~~	~~2~~	~~3/26/65~~	~~A~~
		open 12.14.04 NLJ 04.150				
242	cable	New Delhi 2661	C	3	3/22/65	A
246	cable	New Delhi 2571 [sanitized 1976] (dup. #91, NSF, CF, India, Vol. 4, box 129)	C	1	3/11/65	A
250	cable	Bowles to Komer	S/	1	2/23/65	A

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253a	memo	John Lewis for the Administrator [sanitized 2002] (dup. #186a, NSF, CF, India, vol. 4, box 129; #229a, NSF, CF, India, Vol. 5, box 129)	C	12	1/14/65	A
255	cable	Bowles to Komer sanitized 8.27.08 NLJ 08-41	TS	1	2/4/65	A
255a	cover	cover sheet to cable sanitized 12/28/07	S	1	2/4/65	A
255b	cable	Komer to Bowles exempt 12/26/07	S	1	2/4/65	A

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Initials

SECRET

McGB: December 31, 1965

In the context of your Vietnam work, RWK has asked me to give you for ready reference (a) the President's 5 June letter to Shastri explaining by lengthy memo our earlier peace efforts and (b) Bowles' report on his latest talk with Shastri, which shows how Shastri's thinking is moving toward fuller understanding of the relationship between his Chinese threat and Vietnam's.

HHS

SECRET

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By JC, NARA, Date 3-2-04

Mr. Komer

2

India

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, Dec. 28, 1965
4:45 p. m.

Mr. President

Despite its length, this long cable from Bowles on his talk with Shastri is worth scanning. Between the pressures of circumstance and our own policy, we have Indians as well as Paks coming more our way. Note particularly Shastri's evolving position on Vietnam.

We ought to use the same softening up technique on Shastri that worked so well with Ayub, i. e., get word to him in advance on what is worth talking about and what isn't. I'll send some thoughts shortly on this. Aside from Kashmir (on which Ayub may be back hard at you if Tashkent flops), the Shastri visit should be an easy one. His main concern (though, like Ayub, he may not ask directly) will be when and on what terms we'll resume badly needed economic aid.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By fc, NARA, Date 3-2-04

DEC 28 1965

3

India + Sh Visit

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE December 23, 1965

FOR PRESIDENT

FROM KOMER

State proposes following formal letter of invite to Shastri . You did same for Ayub.

QUOTE Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am very pleased that you and Mrs. Shastri will visit Washington early in February and am looking forward with much anticipation to meeting you both then. Your visit comes at a most appropriate moment in the history of our two countries and will give us a valuable opportunity to get to know each other and learn more about the problems we both face. Our two countries have much in common, and we shall have much to discuss.

I should also like to take this occasion to thank you for your thoughtful message at the time of my recent illness. I do appreciate your kind wishes and warm expression of concern.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending season's greetings to you and Mrs. Shastri.

Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

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4 file

India

SECRET

December 17, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Talk with Ambassador B. K. Nehru. I asked BK to come in so that I could pass on (as the President had requested) that we had to put some wheat on the market to prevent upward pressure on prices because of the 1-½ million tons we were shipping to India. I told him this was a measure of the President's determination to help--he was even risking a price rise in bread for the American people.

We then discussed the Subramaniam visit. I suggested that the Minister see Hornig, Rostow, and Bell. I also thought it would be wise if he took a quick trip to Canada despite the so far negative Canadian attitude. Our info was that the Canadians had at least 1-1/2 million tons available. BK had already been looking into this, but said that most of the key ministers seemed to be out of town.

I then stressed the importance of the GOI organizing an adequate international effort in which we could play a ~~dual~~ role. This was really a job for Indian initiative. I pointed out that while surplus foodgrains might not be readily available in other countries, many could contribute by providing shipping, fertilizer, or pesticides. BK broached as hiw own the idea of asking the FAO to organize an international rescue effort. He had proposed this to Subramaniam. I suggested he talk to Freeman about this, since I wasn't very familiar with it. However I doubted that the FAO had the management capability to run the logistics of a big international effort. He agreed but said that what he had in mind was the FAO calling a meeting at which the various participants would be under joint pressure to participate.

I then pressed BK on Vietnam, saying that one of the most important things Shastri could do to create the proper atmosphere for his visit would be to recognize that we and the Indians were facing essentially the same Chicom pressures--they in the NEFA and we in Vietnam. It was hard for Americans to accept that India was serious about the Chicoms if it failed to see this connection. He gave me the usual answers--including fear of offending Russia--but I pressed on him the importance of greater Indian public understanding of our problem in Vietnam. BK indicated he would again raise the matter with his home office.

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-2-04

~~SECRET~~

At his request, I commented briefly on the Ayub visit, confining myself to the line we had already put out. Nehru was interested in any Ayub comments about his ties with China and I said that he indicated that he had only "normal" relations. I took the opportunity to press on BK the importance of some movement on Kashmir, and the great risk to India if Pakistan went sour. I repeated my favorite theme that we had really protected India from the consequences of its foolish policy toward Pakistan. I underlined our conviction, particularly after the Ayub meeting, that Ayub was by far the most sensible leader in Pakistan today; the Indians would do well to treat him as such.

Finally, BK again raised the question of preliminary talks before he left on 29 December, so that he could take back some better idea of the issues and agenda. I told him I'd talk with Ray Hare.

R. W. Komer

cc: Ambassador Raymond Hare
William Macomber

5 file

India

December 17, 1965

Dear Mr. Ebright,

The President fully shares your belief in the importance of a viable, democratic India. There is no question that the United States has a strong interest in its growth and prosperity.

He is also painfully aware of the forces which have divided India and Pakistan. He believes that we must press for peace and for increased cooperation between them and that only that course will make possible the social and economic development for which we all hope.

Sincerely,

R. W. Komer
Deputy Special Assistant
to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Reverend Donald F. Ebright, Ph. D.
Community Appeal of Church World Service
in the Pacific Southwest
Suite 501
1411 West Olympic Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90015

6

Letter to Bowles

December 16, 1965

~~SECRET~~
VIA CLASSIFIED AIR POUCH

EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR

Dear Chet:

Few steps would better serve the national interest or please the President than greater Indian support on Vietnam. As we confront difficult decisions, to know that the largest country in Free Asia (and biggest democracy in the world) was with us would be of immense help.

Shastri must be brought to realize that his pleas to us for help against Chicom pressure are greatly weakened by India's self-centered failure to acknowledge that we are fighting for the same purpose in Vietnam. Some kind of Indian "flag" for Vietnam may be hard to arrange, but even a medical team would be the best investment India ever made. Do your damnedest.

Merry Christmas!

R. W. Komer

Hon. Chester Bowles
U.S. Ambassador to India
American Embassy
New Delhi.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jcl NARA, Date 3-2-04

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India + Pak + Kennedy file

December 6, 1965

RWK:

Here's a rundown on press reaction to the President's 29 November backgrounder on India/Pakistan which USIS put out there on 1 December:

1. McConaughy responded immediately, saying it was excellent and would help clear the air. He gave a copy to Ayub, who hadn't seen it but prinked up his ears immediately (since "he knows what a backgrounder is"). This alone more than justifies the whole exercise.

2. The Pak press reported it fully and factually without editorial comment. The press has generally been writing on Ayub's visit in conciliatory tones; we assume the government has told it to. So the absence of editorial comment so far may reflect a Pak effort to avoid any blunders.

3. The one discordant note we know of was an Urdu broadcast which quoted sources close to "the President's secretariat" as being unhappy because the "basic rules and structure" of visits are usually worked out by "mutual negotiation" rather than unilaterally through the press.

4. Reaction in India has been slower. The loading Madras paper reacted favorably, objecting only to the apparent parity between India and Pakistan. Neither State nor USIA has seen anything else, but SOA Saturday specifically asked the embassy to give us a rundown.

5. Leading eastern US papers all gave the backgrounder prominent and accurate play but haven't commented editorially. Its real use among editorialists and columnists may be in prepping them for the things they'll undoubtedly do as the visits draw closer.

If you consider this enough now, I can turn it into an RWK-LBJ memo. However, it would be better if we can say more about India. We should get an answer to SOA's query very soon.

HHS

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-2-04

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jcfc NARA, Date 3-2-09

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India + Sh Visit

8

December 3, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

B. K. Nehru called to say that first we had talked with him through the newspapers (an allusion to my earlier complaint about Shastri's public remarks on MAP to Pakistan), and now were talking to him through Indian ministers. This last was a reference to Law Minister Sen's talk with Arthur Goldberg, in which Arthur asked him to have India come up with some kind of formula for Kashmir talks before Ayub arrived. What did this mean?

I gave him the party line--movement toward withdrawal and some kind of negotiating process was most important. I recalled to BK his own contention that India was more willing to talk than we seemed to recognize. The more we could reassure Ayub that there was hope for constructive discussion, the better the chance of keeping Ayub from going off the deep end. This (as we kept insisting) would create greater dangers for India than for us.

BK asked why the Tashkent meeting wouldn't take care of this problem. We could simply tell Ayub that since he and Shastri were going to talk at Tashkent, there was no need for other negotiating tracks as yet. I countered that the more candor his government were able to show in assuring us that they meant to talk seriously, whether at Tashkent or elsewhere, the easier it would be for us to buy this line. I added that Shastri's recent public remarks seemed to betoken more flexibility. He agreed, but again warned of the domestic political limits within which Shastri had to operate. My counter was to say "tell us privately and we'll keep the faith."

I then reminded Nehru that his government as well as ours was beginning to see signs of possible increased Chicom obstreperousness (e. g. L. K. Jha's recent pitch to Bowles). It would be tragic if India were caught in a three-front squeeze--a domestic war on food at the same time as it faced pressures from Pakistan and China. Despite whatever help we could give in such a three-front "war," it would be a terrible strain on India. Thus we greatly hoped that the Indians would take seriously the risk of Pakistan going off on an even more dangerous bent.

BK asked about the results of the Freeman meeting with the President. I referred him to the Baltimor Sun. He asked what might now be in prospect? I told him that I was encouraged at the way in which our governments seemed to be moving closer together on agriculture but could say no more just then.

Distribution:
Mr. Bundy
Amb. Hare

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR

December 1, 1965

Dear Chet:

Well, the President's backgrounder was certainly good news. So I hope that you and John will stay of good heart while we work painfully and tortuously through our reassessment of South Asian policy. My own hunch is that in perspective the current sorting out period will turn out to be a blessing in disguise--and appear so in time to the Indians as well as ourselves. The President was dead right, in my judgment, in questioning the accepted "wisdom" on South Asia. If nothing else proved it, the folly of the three weeks' war certainly did.

We're nearing the climax with the Ayub and Shastri visits, even though there may well be a subsequent sorting out period lasting months or even years. In other words, it may be unrealistic to count on early full-scale resumption of aid solely because the President and Shastri reach a good meeting of minds. My own sense is that the President would still want to see a parallelism of actual performance and our turning on the spigot again.

We here have had to deploy most of our energies in exorcising devils--an indispensable prerequisite to moving ahead on a more sensible basis than in the past. If this process produces nothing more than a clearer sense of priorities--between India and Pakistan as well as between agriculture and industry--it will provide a better foundation on which to rebuild. We are now well along--although the process is by no means completed--toward removing the past ambivalence of US policy, which contributed in great measure to the present mess. In fact, ever since 1959 or so we have really been engaged in this transitional process--rectifying the strategic error that you warned Dulles against back in the early Fifties.

Just because you don't hear from us about interim fertilizer, or shipping more food, etc. don't think that these matters aren't all

Hon. Chester Bowles
U. S. Ambassador to India
American Embassy
New Delhi

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By jcw NARA, Date 3-2-04

being looked at. We're also quite conscious that our Indian affairs (and our Pak affairs as well) could go quite sour if we overdo the tactical pullback. But at least I am convinced that the odds are--and the evidence is--that the President's strategy is working, and that the overall aims he has in mind are worth the pain and strain.

Sincerely,

R. W. Komer
Deputy Special Assistant
to the President for
National Security Affairs

File 10 India x Pak x Visits

CONFIDENTIAL

November 30, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

I called B. K. Nehru today to make sure he had read the President's message in the daily prints. He seemed quite impressed. I stressed that it was important not to misinterpret the statements about "peace" and "settlement" as prerequisites to resumption of aid. We regarded a settlement as highly desirable in the interests of both countries. We stood firmly behind the UN process, as he knew. But he should note that the word "Kashmir" was not highlighted in the backgrounder. He got the point.

BK came back at me again on the importance of prior discussions to clarify the issues for the Shastri/Johnson meeting. He expected to leave for Delhi at the end of December. My response was that first things must come first. Our focus now would have to be on the Ayub visit. Once this was over, however, I personally hoped that some kind of preliminary sorting out process could be arranged before he went to India.

Nehru said he had a cable from Delhi citing the Subramaniam/Freeman discussions and expressing the hope that if we were able to act on any of Freeman's "recommendations" we do so before the Lok Sabha took up the food problem on 3 or 4 December. Not being sure what he was referring to, I told him that I personally doubted any action would be taken that quickly on anything Secretary Freeman had in mind, simply because there would not be time for the necessary discussions here.

At 3:30 I had an hour's talk with Iftikar Ali, the Pak Charge. We discussed the Ayub visit. I emphasized the importance of avoiding any recriminations; these would simply cast a pall over the meeting. We had nothing to apologize for in our policy--I dealt with such concerns as the betrayal of allies;Pakistan the aggrieved party, massive military aid to India, and Hindu treachery. Ali agreed that there was no point whatsoever in raking over old coals. We should see whether a new start was possible.

I then emphasized that for this crucial meeting to be productive, neither President could ask the other the impossible. If Pakistan's real fear was larger India, we could give Pakistan something no one else could--sheer viability and security. We had proved this. No one else could provide it. The Soviets wouldn't, The Chicoms couldn't. In fact, if the Paks got into bed with China, it would simply force us, and the Soviets to boot, to give greater support to India. This made no sense. We favored a peaceful settlement over Kashmir

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but we couldn't buy or bully India into giving it up. The only answer was a process of reconciliation. At the minimum there must be peace. The Paks could not ask us to be tacit allies of the Chicoms in squeezing India, at the very time when we were fighting the Chicoms by proxy in Vietnam.

Iftikar understood all of these points. His one strong rebuttal was that if we were insisting that Pakistan subordinate itself to India and "become a satellite" in return for US aid, this was impossible. I assured him that we recognized it as impossible, and had no such intention. Indeed we thought we were giving Pakistan the very sinews to maintain its independence. If, however, he meant that we must equate Pakistan with India in the sense of giving a Pakistan of 100 million exactly what we gave an India of 485 million, this flew in the face of simple facts of life. He agreed. Indeed, I think Iftikar got the message I was trying to deliver. I twitted him about previous misquotation of what I said, or rather that Karachi had tried to put two and two together and get five.

R. W. Komer

Dwg to Bundy

~~SECRET~~

November 30, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR S/S

Attached cable is OK, except that it ought to advise our Embassies how to handle the one deliberate ambiguity in the Presidential backgrounder on which they may be pressed. Moyers and I regard the following amendments as representing the President's views, but I suggest you show it to Mr. Ball again tomorrow morning before it goes out:

"While President believes that a Kashmir settlement of great importance at some point, backgrounder carefully omitted specific mention of Kashmir except for reiterating US support of the UN resolution. Yet it did speak of subcontinent peace and need for settlement of outstanding issues. If the Paks ask what this means, we wish to forestall any Pak misinterpretation that US insists on an early Kashmir settlement as prerequisite for continuation of US aid. On other hand, if Indians inquire, we do not wish the lack of mention of Kashmir to be misinterpreted as lack of US interest in a peaceful settlement of this issue."

R. W. Komer

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SECRET

November 23, 1965

FOR MOYERS FROM KOMER

EXPOSE OF PRESIDENT'S thinking on India might be premature. Some virtue in his continuing to keep his Indian hand close to his chest a while longer. Since Ayub coming first on 15 December, might also be better to cover Pakistan first. Anything friendly we say about India just before Ayub arrives might create problems for him.

On other hand, can see some Indian themes that could be played now which would be useful in stemming mounting Indian confusion over US policy, and maybe also warning Ayub indirectly not to expect too much when he comes. However, I'm not at all sure I'm on President's wavelength on these matters, so what follows may not be suitable.

As I see it, three useful themes are: (1) "peace" is the first prerequisite--reiterate difficulty of resuming sizable US aid until there is fully effective cease-fire (if not withdrawal to previous positions) and US thus convinced we not simply fuelling a renewed conflict; (2) get out again President's own deep feeling that massive US aid must be tied to adequate self-help measures, since otherwise it is merely a palliative rather than of lasting benefit; and (3) stress US hope for a process of reconciliation between India and Pakistan which would permit a settlement of the outstanding issues between them.

We are on much safer ground if we avoid dwelling any further than the above on Pak/Indian issues such as Kashmir, where anything we say risks being misunderstood by one or the other (or both). Much better to talk about bilateral issues between us and India, particularly the question of US aid. Indians can hardly cavil too much if President stresses inadequacies of Indian agricultural performance, pointing up way in which needs for US PL 480 continually rising as India's own output fails to keep up with population growth. If present trends continue total US wheat crop would be going to India within next decade. We are on sound ground in stressing that even massive Western aid not enough to generate the rate of development Indian people want, and deserve, if India's own efforts are not jacked up.

Another theme might be how we Americans are baffled when Indians call on US to support them against Chicom encroachment, yet seem unable to see necessity of similar US support of free nations in Southeast Asia, e. g. Vietnam. We would think India, of all countries, would understand US role in Vietnam.

Can easily develop these themes further or send down talking paper if desired.

R. W. KOMER

13

~~SECRET~~

November 22, 1965

India
X Shastri Visit

Mac:

As you'll see from attached, there's a job to be done in clearing the air prior to a Shastri visit. In my judgment this can best be carried on by us with BK, rather than by Bowles in Delhi or the Department here. But I'm easy on the matter. The important thing is to get the President's OK for certain exploratory discussions, after the Ayub visit but before BK returns to Delhi. What say?

RWK

Let's raise it when he talks to us about Shastri.
McG.

Attach. RWK/Nehru Memo for Record 11/22/65

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By kfk NARA, Date 3-2-04

13a

~~SECRET~~ November 22, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

I invited myself to lunch with B. K. Nehru today and made clear to him the risks in such GOI-inspired press stories as the Harrison article in Monday's Post ("Shastri Objects to New US Military Aid to Pakistan") and the Keats' article in Friday's Sun ("US Must Give Fertilizer Loan and Six Months PL 480 Before Shastri Can Come"). We recognize the GOI's difficulty (like ours) in dealing with a democratic press, but for high Indian officials to negotiate with us through the press before a visit was simply no way to do business, and could not help but obscure the prospects for fruitful summit talks.

BK understood fully; in fact, he's worried about how Shastri might be quoted in tomorrow's Harrison article on Vietnam. He granted the importance of utmost discretion on both sides in the crucial period before the two leaders got together. I believe that he will so indicate to Delhi.

On the other hand, BK gave me the same pitch as that of L. K. Jha to Bowles, i. e. it is most important that we work out in advance--and in confidence--the right agenda and issues for the summit. This was more than a fishing expedition; I got the impression that BK is genuinely fearful lest Shastri's visit end in failure because he's unprepared for what might transpire in Washington. He agreed that advance consultations obviously could not commit principals, but pleaded for some clearer signals as to what we had in mind. He said he'd be returning to Delhi about three weeks before a Shastri visit, in order to prepare the way, and almost pathetically hoped that we could give him as much of a picture as possible to take back.

I agreed in principle that prior consultation would be useful to a meeting of such critical importance, but stressed the even greater importance of creating the proper atmosphere for such a visit by avoidance of public statements which would tend to freeze issues and cause unnecessary frictions. We left it that I would look into the matter of if, when and how preliminary discussions might be useful.

Since we had already informed Delhi about the preferred timing for Shastri, I told BK. I also mentioned that Ayub might be coming earlier, since he apparently wanted to visit the UN (to avoid a leak I did not mention dates). I repeated to BK the point made in our outgoing to Bowles that whatever the

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order of the visits, it bore no necessary relationship to their importance. He assured me that the GOI would be very relaxed should Ayub come first; this would not cause undue pain in Delhi.

Nehru and I had an uneventful discussion of various substantive matters, especially India's food problem. He objected to the spate of press articles on this matter, so I told him that the US press was highly interested. I pointed out inter alia our discouragement over Shastri's attitude on Vietnam, our longstanding concern over India's failure to face up to the problem of Pakistan, and our increasing emphasis on self-help across the board.

R. W. Komer

Cy to Kare 11/23/65

14

India + Pak

SECRET

November 16, 1965
Tuesday/ 7:00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here are the ppers Arthur Dean mentioned today. Since aid to India and Pakistan is so central to the FY 1967 foreign aid problem now under review for you, we made a special effort. The attached papers are the result, and we are shooting them at your tough-minded friends.

We've madeevery effort to be hard-nosed, to put the alternatives coldly, and to give you a basis for choice. But we just can't get around two basic propositions: (1) that India is (with Japan) one of the two really key countries in Free Asia--so merits a comparable investment almost despite the Indians; (2) that Pakistan can complement our effort in India, or greatly complicate it if it goes the Chicom route.

Because these two big programs are the key variables, you may want to read parts of the argument before the aid review. If you wish to scan only the key portions, these are:

On India

pp. 5-7 which argue that India has actually done reasonably well with our money, and is basically going our way. Thus our real problem is less India's basic outlook than its performance.

pp. 8-10 on how we can't "buy" a Kashmir settlement, even if we throw all our aid in the balance. So we can't afford to make this the keystone of our policy.

pp. 16-19 which say that what we need is a new policy--not in content but in method--which would directly bargain continued massive aid for sharply improved Indian self-help. We would make this bargain self-enforcing by adjusting aid flow to Indian performance--especially in agriculture.

pp. 21-22 on how this sort of bargain can be struck by you and Shastri at the summit--the earlier the better.

SECRET

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Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 25, #278
By [illegible], NARA, Date 3-2-04

On Pakistan

pp. 1-4 which describe our cruel dilemma--how just when our economic aid begins to pay off we find ourselves on divergent political courses.

pp. 7-11 on the urgent need for a meeting of minds at the summit and the political bargain we must insist on if our aid is not to be wasted.

pp. 16-19 on how it makes sense to support Pak development if we can reach a political understanding, and how tactically we might handle Mr. Ayub.

R. W. Komer

Attach. India and Pak Strategy Papers

India Pak file 15

~~SECRET~~

November 16, 1965

WHAT MAY BE ON THE PRESIDENT'S MIND

A. What can we really accomplish in South Asia? Are India and/or Pakistan worth the investment? Was our policy of favoritism toward Pakistan because it signed up a mistake? If so, do we now have a major opportunity to re-sort our priorities in South Asia and get a lot more for our money?

B. Should we try to settle Kashmir as the price for aid resumption? Can we, no matter how much pressure we exert, now that India just licked the Paks on this very issue? From a strictly US viewpoint is Kashmir more important than using India against China?

C. How important is it to keep India from going nuclear?

D. What should I say to Ayub and Shastri? When should I have them here? Do those strategy papers Bundy and Komer did make sense--i. e. strike a political bargain with Ayub and an economic one with Shastri?

E. What about the new Indian food crisis? Should Freeman get their Food Minister here first and beat him up?

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~~SECRET~~

India
+ Shastri Visit
+ Indian Econ

16

November 15, 1965
7:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The squib you sent me from the San Antonio Express on how Shastri said no aid with conditions just ain't so. In fact, it took us two days to figure out how it could have happened.

It was based on wire service stories sparked by a working committee of Shastri's Congress Party, which passed a resolution on 7 November defending India's austerity program and several other reforms to meet the food crisis. The Indian press said Shastri had expressed gratitude for US food but fended off opposition by saying in effect that he would not compromise India's stand on Kashmir to get aid. The background of that remark--and the omitted half of the story--is that the Communists sponsored a resolution calling for termination of PL 480 imports, accusing us of using PL 480 as leverage to pry Kashmir loose. When the Congress executive committee unanimously rejected the Communist resolution, Shastri assured members that he himself would favor ending PL 480 if "political strings" were attached but he was categorical in stating there was no likelihood of this happening.

Shastri has had to tread the difficult line between looking politically independent while knowing he is economically dependent. He's pushing hard now for programs that would make India self-sufficient in food. It's quite clear that Shastri is not talking about economic conditions when he rejects "political strings". In fact, his food minister said in Parliament 8 November that he did not consider it "interference in India's affairs for the USA to insist on scrutiny of India's agricultural programs which would make India independent of PL 480." Not bad.

R. W. Komer

India Pak
Dean File
17

~~SECRET~~/EYES ONLY

November 12, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR ARTHUR DEAN

Hope you had a good trip and come back eager for the fray, because our Pak/Indian affairs should go into high gear now that the President is well on the mend. In fact he may ask you down next Wednesday or Thursday, while he's in Washington, to get your advice on future plans.

Rusk and Bundy had a brief session on this at the ranch, and left two strategy papers with him. I enclose them both, and some other sensitive memoranda which will help bring you up to date. Also enclosed is an answer to your query on how much we ever got out of Pak membership in SEATO and CENTO. Brief answer (as you suspected)--mighty little.

The key issues which must be decided soon are:

1. Aid strategy for India and Pakistan. This is the key issue, since the two bulk so large in the FY'67 aid bill we'll have to firm up soon. The two enclosed papers argue for continued major investment, but only if we can drive home the necessary reciprocal bargain--political in Ayub's case and economic in the case of Shastri. This takes us to:

2. The bargaining process. Here the summits with Ayub and Shastri will be critical. How should the President put it to them? What preliminary softening up would be desirable? Depending on when they come, how about special emissaries first?

I see us at the climax of a difficult transition period, in which we've gradually been sorting out our strategic priorities in South Asia. If we play our cards right, we can come out ahead in both India and Pakistan but it won't be easy. Latent pactitis in various USG quarters (some just don't seem to grasp that our de jure allies have been helping China, while those damn neutralists are opposing them) could still lead us to miss the opportunity.

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By jc, NARA, Date 3-2-01

R. W. Komer
Deputy Special Assistant
to the President for
National Security Affairs

Enclosures:

Cy, RWKomer Memo to McGBundy, 10/23/65
Cy, RWKomer Memo for the President, 10/30/65
Cy, RWKomer Memo for the President, 11/3/65
Cy, RWKomer Memo for Ambassador Hare and Mr. Macomber, 11/3/65
Cy, RWKomer Memo to McGBundy, 11/10/65
Cy, RWKomer Memo for the President, 11/10/65
Cy, RWKomer Memo for McGBundy, 11/11/65

List not sent w/ memo

18 file

India

SECRET

RWK: November 10, 1965

Gaud and Macomber feel strongly that the following paragraph should go into our India paper (between pages 10 and 11 as a new para. B):

"B. Can aid forge peaceful coexistence on the subcontinent?

Although we can not force India to disgorge Kashmir, we can, and must, insist that India fulfill its major power role on the subcontinent. This requires India to adopt policies and take actions designed to lessen Indo-Pak tensions and to permit a responsible government in Pakistan sufficient face-saving so that it can survive while it is de facto modifying its policy on Kashmir."

This is not far off your discussion in present III A, though it's a little stiffer.

This comes mechanically through Ernie who knows what is and isn't in the paper from his work on it, but he was acting under instructions from Gaud and Macomber. The question is whether you buy this suggestion and we insert it at this eleventh hour as p. 10a or whether you let AID put it in later when Bell gets his crack. AID would like it in before the President sees the paper.

HHS

SECRET

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19

India

SECRET

November 10, 1965

Mac -

Here are:

1. The cover note requested for the India aid paper.

2. A note from me to you which gives LBJ a free-swinging summary of Pak/India matters if you choose to leave it.

The only thing I left out was the case for an interim $50m. fertilizer loan to save India's next rice crop. This needs more argument.

RWK

SECRET

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Authority State ltr. 7/10/76, NSC ltr. 4/5/77
By kbg, NARA, Date 3-2-01

19a

SECRET

November 10, 1965

Mac -

Here is how our India/Pak enterprises stand at the moment. I still think things are going our way, with the Paks and Indians increasingly nervous over our intentions, and now Ayub as well as Shastri are eager to come and find out.

A. Sorting out visits. This is problem no. 1, since the President himself devised the shrewd tactic of holding up everything till they came. Many of us believe that he can accomplish much more with both if he has Shastri first and Ayub second. Having them in the right order may be even more important than how soon. If Shastri comes first he'll be much easier to deal with, while Ayub--who has no place else to go--will be the more malleable if we let him sweat awhile.

Though Shastri bit first last August, the President gave Ayub first refusal on the phone. But Ayub stalled, while Shastri has been conveying eagerness to come. So we've discharged this obligation.

The mechanics are simple. Shastri thinks the ball is in our court--the President need only authorize us to ask if he'd like to come on a certain date. If Shastri buys we make a joint announcement; if he doesn't, we switch to Ayub.

B. The Summit Bargain. We're really getting home our dissatisfaction with Indian performance, especially on agriculture. See Delhi 1223 attached on how even Agriculture Minister Subramaniam--a top-notcher whom LBJ would like--is singing our tune. The President could easily seize the high ground--and relieve Indian fears that we're just Paks at heart--by telling Shastri how India must pull up its own socks before we turned the aid spigot on again. This would put the bee on Shastri's back and make our aid dependent on his subsequent performance.

The Ayub scenario is also fairly clear--though the longer we let him worry the more he'll listen instead of argue (and the less we'll have to talk Kashmir).

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By kbj NARA, Date 3-20-04

C. Kashmir. There are interesting rumbles, but nothing solid to alter our hunch that September's war really settled this one. At any rate we can't settle it. If the President is equally convinced, his telling Rusk so would turn off a lot of eager beavers who are confusing the issue here and in the field.

D. The Outlook. Resumed hostilities are quite unlikely, though both sides are still jockeying for position. Both are eager to get closer to us again (especially Ayub, who now realizes his folly). But the longer we wait before showing our hand, the greater the risk that one side or the other will do something foolish which movement sets everything back instead of it continuing to move our way. Ergo, if the President does not feel up to having these brown men in December, would he entertain some tough-minded interim emissaries--Arthur Dean or even thee--to keep the ball in play?

R. W. Komer

19b

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New Delhi 1223 November 8, 1965

In meeting of Upper Parliamentary House today, Food andAgriculture Minister Subramaniam denied US using PL-480 to apply political pressure to India and said that since it was essential for India to get rid of dependence on PL 480 wheat as soon as possible, US view "coincides with our interests".

Replying to question, Subramaniam pointed out US had gone into short-term PL-480 arrangements prior outbreak Indo-Pak hostilities and that he did not consider it "interference in affairs of India for USA to insist on scrutiny of our agricultural production programs which would make us independent of PL-480."

Subramaniam added US was only country with capacity to feed "giant like India", and that it should not be thought that US eager thrust its wheat on India. He said that GOI had, in response USG interest in India plans for increasing food production, sent forward picture of GOI program and that, pending review this picture, short-term arrangements being undertaken.

At same time he was defending US PL-480 policy against charges "political strings", Subramaniam stressed that India should make and was making every effort achieve independence in regard to food and that there were two plans for present situation, one involving continuation PL 480 and the other in event PL 480 halted, in which case India would have to and was ready to face sacrifices.

Comment: Subramaniam's defense PL 480 was courageous, going against widespread popular interpretation US using PL 480 as device impose unacceptable settlement on Kashmir, while at same time recognizing India's need to improve its performance in matter of food production. It is characteristic of Subramaniam's performance as food minister that his is strongest and most outspoken voice thus far to defend US against charges US using PL 480 as political lever on Kashmir. He has thus demonstrated once again that he is ablest and most courageous member of Cabinet, and his statement in Rajya Sabha today has put him out on political limb in our defense.

Bowles

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SECRET

November 10, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

New Study on India. The question of aid to India is so central to the FY 1967 foreign aid problem now under review for presentation to you that we made a special effort on it. The attached paper is the result, and is what we are shooting at your tough-minded friends.

It is written by us "soft on India" types who just can't get around the basic proposition that India is (with Japan) one of the two really key countries in Free Asia--so merits a comparable investment almost despite the Indians. But we've been hard-nosed enough to put the alternatives coldly and give you a basis for choice.

We're sending this down because--if India is the key variable--you may want to read parts of the argument before the aid review. We could then re-examine any points which you thought soft. If you wished to read only the key portions, these are:

pp. 5-7 which argue that India has actually done reasonably well with our money, and is basically going our way. Thus our real problem is less India's basic outlook than its performance.

pp. 8-10 on how we can't "buy" a Kashmir settlement, even if we throw all our aid in the balance, so can't afford to make this the aim of our policy.

pp. 16-19 on how what we need is a new policy--not in content but in method--which would directly bargain continued massive aid to get sharply improved Indian self-help across the board. We would make this bargain self-enforcing by adjusting aid flow to Indian performance--especially agriculture.

pp. 21-22 on how this sort of bargain can be struck by you and Shastri at the summit--the earlier the better.

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Authority NSC ltr. 4/5/77
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R. W. Komer

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India x Pak

20

~~SECRET~~

November 8, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR [redacted]

Thanks very much, [redacted] for the package on India/Pak aid and food problems. Here are the papers back (except for the ORR one on Indian food shortages) with some marginal comments. This whole exercise has led me to several thoughts, which I'd like to share with you. But please consider what I say as a continuation of our lunch conversation--not as a formal pronouncement from the White House. Also, please remember that what I say is not written as a criticism of these papers but as observations on a general problem--how to make CIA's product as relevant as possible to the policy-makers. With these caveats, let me be blunt.

The two OCI papers are more reporting than analysis; I don't think there's much in them that staffers around town who read the calls wouldn't already know. The ORR paper on food shortages is good general analysis but naturally doesn't apply that analysis in detail to current problems. Result: none of them ends up peoviding the policy-maker (or at least his staff) with detailed analysis of the logical consequences of courses of action open to him. I admit fully there's a need for this kind of summarization for the busy policy maker. But for the senior staff people who already know this much, what analyses take him further in marrying deep studies with current problems.

Now I know bureaucratically that's ONE's job. But these papers do generalize about the future, so that comeback isn't good enough. The point is, they generalize without coming to grips with the policy-maker's questions.

What I'm saying is that these papers may be good for the summaries they are, but they're not oriented to policy questions. I've noted in the margins some that come to mind.

After thinking this problem through, I realize that the basic problem with these papers for me is that they weren't written to answer my questions. So the fault is mine for not having put the questions to the analysts. But when I've conceded that major point, I remind myself that, given the failure of the policy end of town to ask the questions, it would still be nice if the analysts knew clearly enough what the questions are so they'd just naturally be writing answers. For instance, AID (State) Agriculture/White House will have to decide over the next couple of months aid and PL 480 levels for India. What would happen to the Indian economy and food supply if we decided to give zero, or x level or y level?

This, I imagine, is where your function comes in. But it's too big a job for one man. Only contact between the analysts and their chiefs with the policy-making agencies can really do the job up and down the line.

~~SECRET~~

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Authority NLJ-032-023-21
By sg/ctm NARA, Date 11-13-07

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Only that kind of contact, too, can make the policy-making agencies aware of the help they can get from the intelligence analysts.

Again, these are personal reflections on a problem--not criticisms.

Harold H. Saunders

Att: CIA Memo, OCI No. 2321/65, 9/18/65, cy #9
CIA Memo, OCI No. 2385/65, 9/28/65, cy #25
Page 3 (cy) from Special Report, 9/24/65, OCI No. 0308/65A, "Warfare Aggravates Indian Food Shortages"
Thermo cy of Notes on the Status of Economic and Military Aid to India and Pakistan, 10/12/65

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ November 3, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR HARE
MR. MACOMBER

When John Lewis was last here I gave him the works on our dissatisfaction with India's agricultural performance. He fully agreed with our strategy of making any further longer term PL 480 deals contingent on much greater Indian performance in this field, but pointed out the inconsistency between focussing on fertilizer as the key to this better performance yet not helping India get enough ferilizer for the purpose.

As a follow-up to this conversation, John has now sent me the attached informal message, with the concurrence of the Ambassador, and suggested that I take it up with you. I am tentatively persuaded that this is a sufficiently important option to warrant putting it up to the President, which would be necessary.

John's proposal would be an exception to the present freeze on new economic aid. This leads me to wonder whether there is some other way in which we could get the Indians to free up the $98.6 million foreign exchange they had previously allocated to fertilizer. Could we, for example, promise to release the $50 million aid which John hopes for by 1 January, if the Indians went ahead now with their $98.6 million program? How soon, for example, must this fertilizer be purchased for use on the next kharif crop?

Since the Schnittker memo, etc. have made the President fully aware that fertilizer is the key to jacking up India's food out-put, I think he might be receptive to some proposal particularly if we could work it out in a way which did not violate the existing ground rules. What say?

R. W. Komer

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-2-04

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By JC, NARA, Date 3-2-04

21a

CONFIDENTIAL

Message from John Lewis to R. W. Komer 11/3/65

First week back leaves me still much concerned both about continued pause-induced momentum toward more and tighter controls and about deepening short-run bite into industrial, especially private, production. However am fairly hopeful adverse political fall-out in parliament session beginning Wednesday can be minimized if Washington beside publically re-iterating intention maintain PL 480 flow decides quickly give GOI feasible assurances (a) object of pause not to force particular Kashmir settlement and (b) no early resumption military assistance to Pakistan (see reference).

Therefore am most concerned of all right now about fertilizer. Clear present prospect is pause will eliminate at least half country's total fertilizer availability next kharif season if not beyond costing perhaps 2 million tons foodgrains production or one-third present annual rate PL 480 imports. Situation makes new post-emergency crash grow-more-food campaign an exercise in semi-futility. Hamlet without Hamlet. And makes our PL 480 related pressure on agricultural production effort look schisophrenic if not cynical to Indians.

Realize issue of quick loan specifically for fertilizer may seem closed for moment. However, have new scheme that would complement our hard-headed policy on PL 480 duration and lever GOI into allocating more of its scant foreign exchange to fertilizer than currently intending.

To wit:

Prior hostilities MinFin had allotted RS. 46 crores or $98. 6 million foreign exchange for about 350, 000 T. (nitrogen equivalent) imports this FY that with domestic production would give total supply 650, 000-700, 000 T or slightly more than last year. Of this $63 million (cost of some 230, 000 T. or about two-thirds all imports) was assigned our projected FY 66 non-project loans.

Have just learned from Bhoothalingam that while they have restarted limited import licensing with other credits as we felt they should begin doing if outlook our lending remained uncertain they see no possibility reallocating any other foreign exchangw pieak (sic) up some of fertilizer earmarked for our missing nonproject. Despite my expression concern at this news Bhoothalingam adamant that no room for maneuver citing for example needs provide necessary supplies for jute exporters, import entitlements for exporters, and purchases American cotton to satisfy our PL 480 normal marketing requirements. We hope get detailed spelling out this case this week. Meanwhile Bhoothalingam acknowledged consortium

in future appraisal intensity agricultural program likely to take dim view of present GOI failure to reallocate in favor of fertilizer but glumly reiterated no alternative.

Prospect therefore two-thirds planned fertilizer imports will be delayed at least long enough to miss kharif season for which largely intended and that therefore on rather well established ten-to-one marginal pay-off of tons of food for tons of fertilizer India's PL 480 needs next year will be some 2 million tons higher than otherwise.

Proposal: Offer GOI immediate $50 million fertilizer on condition it purchase quickly as possible full $98.6 million worth previously projected. Would force them in addition to $35.6 million already budgeted squeeze extra $13 million (i.e. difference between $63 million hoped for from US and $50 million herein proposed) out of own free foreign exchange or other credits. Under circumstances this fair-sized money here but despite foregoing MinFin protestations am confident bait suggested would persuade them dig it up.

Comment: (1) Suggestion consistent with continued short tether PL 480. Rationale of latter expresses skepticism about adequacy Indian agricultural production effort, to which fertilizer loan would contribute (and force GOI to step up own contribution) in sure-fire manner that would forestall need next year for American wheat worth 2 or 3 times value this proposed loan. (2) have considered some kind parallel conditioning on successful completion negotiations with foreign private investors in fertilizer factories but conclude impractical, especially within time frame. But authorization of loan could occasion strong generalized representations in this regard (3) Package of short-tether PL 480 plus this specific support for next year's food would thoroughly establish credibility our reason for short tether and have salutary effect both on new Lok Sabha session and Shastri attitude toward and during coming visit.

22 file

Indian

~~SECRET~~ November 1, 1965

I. The US interest in India.

A. To keep India out of the Communist orbit. The second largest nation in the world with 475,000 people (more than in Latin America or Africa), India's fall to Communism would be comparable only to China's in 1948. If the confrontation with Communism is the United States' major worldwide concern, India is certainly one of the more important arenas.

B. To block Chinese expansion, India by just being there, strong enough to survive and stand off the Chinese can do this. It now recognizes its own national interest in doing this, so we only have to capitalize on this nationalist drive to gain a natural "ally" If it is important to block Communist aggression in Vietnam, it is all the more important in India.

C. To demonstrate that a developing nation can make progress under a non-totalitarian government and a mixed economic system. None of these emerging economies will develop exactly as ours has. But there is a distinction between those that rely wholly on central planning and control and those at least willing to experiment with a market economy. We assume that a pluralistic society where power is spread around is less a threat to its neighbors, to us and to world peace. We aren't sure, but we believe there is a relationship between decentralization of economic power and decentralization of political power. So we have an interest in encouraging India's experiment with its form of parliamentary democracy and with its form of a mixed economy.

II. How to pursue these interests--is aid the only way?

A. What has western aid done for India. Difficult to argue what might have been, but Western aid has provided _____% of Indian investment, ___% of food consumed, etc.

B. What would India accomplish without Western aid.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3.2.04

~~SECRET~~

23

India x Pak

SECRET

October 30, 1965
Saturday/3:00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pak/Indian Roundup. While the two sides are still glaring at each other and sticking to rigid propaganda positions, there is considerable movement behind the scene.

There are many signs that the Paks are finally hoisting aboard that they have gotten themselves into a pretty mess, and that if hostilities resumed they'd take a licking. As a result they are now more eager for a withdrawal than for simultaneous talks on settling Kashmir.

This has also led to increasing Pak eagerness to get back in our good graces. Now Shoaib as well as Bhutto are signalling that Ayub is eager to come here soon; indeed Shoaib says Ayub now realizes that a considerable shift in Pak policy will be necessary to get back on a firm footing with us. We even have a report that Ayub intends to sack Bhutto in time.

So the Paks are moving our way. If we sit tight, Ayub should be ready to hear sweet reason within another month or two. However, the Paks are still threatening to move toward the Chicoms (and have leaked that Peiping has offered a tank factory). They also are still hinting that we must give Ayub something first, so he doesn't have to come here as a beggar.

The Indians, who regard themselves as victors, show less flexibility. Knowing they have the upper hand, they've been scaring the Paks with threats to reopen the war if Pakistan won't lay off Kashmir.

Meanwhile, they are refusing even to discuss Kashmir in New York on the grounds that the issue is closed. Their private and public utterances still indicate acute suspicion that the US and UK are trying to pressure them into giving up the fruits of victory. My own reading is that this mood will last until Shastri can hear from you personally where we stand. According to recent envoys, he's still eager to come around 10 December.

R. W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 25, #291
By [illegible], NARA, Date 3-2-04

SECRET

24

India Bowles

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

October 22, 1965

VIA CLASSIFIED POUCH

Dear Chet:

Many thanks for your kind wire. Would that a new shingle which otherwise changes little would really give me more leverage to get the job done.

Depend on it that we are not being idle, as I presume John Lewis will have reported to you by now. The US is clearly at a crossroads, and I for one am determined to clarify for all concerned that we must not fall back into the ambivalence of yesteryear. Settling Kashmir simply is not the ultimate aim of US policy.

Indeed the Paks themselves are helping greatly to clarify our choices, but I can't say the same for the Indians. They want us to treat them as a great power, but the trouble is they don't act like one. Pakistan is essentially their problem, not ours, as I think they'll find out to their cost. Wait till they lose Ayub and have a really irridentist, fully-Chicom oriented Pakistan on their hands--and one on which the US has lost all leverage.

I see no intent at the top here to slip back into the old ways in which even Kennedy treated Pakistan. Indeed the real issue is not India vs. Pakistan, but whether our massive subcontinent investment is worthwhile. The real question is whether it would serve our interests to let both Delhi and Pindi go it alone for a while. You don't have to argue with me about this one--the job to be done is for the Indians to convince us. If Shastri wants what we have to offer, he's going to have to prove it to the President. You can't, and we can't either.

All those here who really know the score fully realize how beautifully you've handled a critical situation. Nor does your performance suffer from the comparison with next door. But more needs to be done if we and India are to cement a new and better tie. So do emphasize both self-help and India's need to come up with a good solution to the Pak problem.

If Ayub gets here first (which is in the lap of the gods), it's crucial that Shastri neither pout nor misunderstand. Mac and I hope you'll drive this home to L. K. Jha in spades if the ball bounces that way. In other words we'd have no intention of treating India like Pakistan, if only the Indians would stop acting almost as jejune as the Paks.

All the best,

The Honorable
Chester Bowles
U.S. Ambassador to India
New Delhi

R. W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/NPC 12-3140
By: LCD NARA, Date 06-11-2014

25

India + P.S.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY October 22, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Peace Corps Volunteers. Now that the Pak/Indian ceasefire seems to have firmed up, most US agencies and other countries have lifted the bars on official travel. State, AID and Defense have resumed normal personnel movement, and are allowing families to go in and out as usual. AID did pull some of its technicians out of the Punjab, but they've now returned. As far as we know, the British too are functioning normally. Several Congressional groups are also planning tours.

This leaves the question of Shriver's Peace Corps Volunteers. We have 95 in Manila and 83 in Israel marking time with some additional "training," but they're itching to get to work and I gather there's some drop in morale. There is still a small risk of renewed hostilities or communal riots but the Peace Corps shouldn't get too far out of step with the rest of the USG abroad.

Yes _____ R. W. Komer

No_____

See me____

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

26

~~SECRET~~ October 22, 1965

India
X Shastri Visit

Mac -

If you get a chance to say a word about Shastri first, or to write it in as extra para. in food memo, it's well worthwhile.

I'm not just trying to prove to the Paks (and this town) that it's India first--though this too is useful.

Rather it is the tactical advantage we get. If Shastri comes second he'll be on the defensive; if he comes first we can better urge him to think big. This in turn will better enable us to tell Ayub the limits of the possible. Also, by being forced to wait, Ayub will be more malleable when he comes; if he got the first shot, he'd be far more inclined to con or pressure LBJ.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jcf, NARA, Date 3-2-04

27

SECRET

October 20, 1965

India
x Kosh

Mac -

We have a few more recruits to our devoted band of brothers than thee, me, Chet, and Joe. I'd rate McNaughton and Hoopes as full members, also Hare's deputy Handley and all of his South Asians (Ray Hare himself seems more wedded to the mistakes he shared in yesteryear). Helms is aboard (though as always too cautious to stick his neck out). So too, I believe, is Arthur Dean (on whom I've worked carefully--simply by giving him my memos to read). Even Goldberg agreed that a process didn't mean a settlement. And finally, don't forget Phil Potter who says he told LBJ flatly that it was impossible to get India to give up Kashmire In fact, we may even have the Boss himself on our team.

This many swallows don't make a summer, but we're not entirely alone. Perhaps the key people to keep after are Goldberg, Dean, and the ineffable Ball (isn't he opposed to overcommitment everywhere but in Europe?)

RWK

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 89-06
By kmg, NARA, Date 3-2-04

OFFICIAL USE ONLY October 19, 1965

India

Mac -

I'm opposed: (1) Emergency aid could only come from contingency fund; (2) the emergency need to take care of wounded decreases with every passing day, and the request is now almost three weeks old--by the time they got the money it wouldn't be needed; (3) AID is already looking at $450,000 to build wards--this is enough; (4) the precedent is lousy; (5) why help Indian wounded and not Pak; and (6) finally, Billy Graham's letter is very carefully drafted not to be a desperate plea.

RWK

Attach. Watson Memo to Bundy 10/16/65 re Emergency Assistance to Ludhiana Christian Medical College, India

File
India 29

October 19, 1965

RWK:

State/AID (Schneider, Rees) reactions to emergency aid for Ludhiana Christian Medical College:

1. Should we help? The determining factor is the US domestic angle--how strongly we feel we have to give in to Billy Graham and other supporters of this project. Deciding on purely foreign policy grounds, we've tacitly supported voluntary agencies giving emergency relief aid to civilians, but we have not as a government helped soldiers. Ludhiana has a good reputation, but in this war-related instance, Schneider would rather keep hands off.

If domestic reasons dictate our going ahead anyway, State would want to ask Bowles first and then ask McConaughy whether we'd have to make a compensatory gesture in Pakistan.

2. How could CWS channel be used? Only if food would help. We don't know how big CWS stocks are, but if we gave an OK it might pass on food quickly from current stocks. However, we don't know that food would help since many hospitals in that part of the world don't have food service but depend on patients' families to bring food in.

My conclusion is that, if the hospital were catering to victims of natural disaster, it might be a good humanitarian move to help them and simultaneously encourage a sound American-sponsored institution. In fact, CARE on its own is using some of its food stocks to help refugees from the fighting. But helping to treat soldiers (as well as civilians) wounded in fighting we disapproved of is politically much harder to justify. If there were no American churchmen or doctors asking for help, we as a government wouldn't think of offering any. I don't see a USG cash grant; I wouldn't object to CWS releasing some of its food stocks (and replenishing them) if that would help. Finally, if we want to give money, let's use rupees even if it takes Congressional committee approval.

HHS

30

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By JC, NARA, Date 3-2-04

India

SECRET

October 18, 1965

Mac -

Talking Points for S. K. Patil. Read Goldberg's talk with Patil (New York 1374 attached).

You're first on Patil's visiting list. Later today and tomorrow he'll see Rusk and Bunker, probably Freeman, and Fulbright or Morse.

The best line with Patil is the one which you used on B. K. Nehru--we recognize that India is the big power in the subcontinent and that India needs support against China, but we expect India in turn to take a more big league view of its problems.

For example, India has not used our massive economic assistance very wisely. A much harder bargain on development will have to be driven in the future--in India's own interest.

India's performance in the agricultural sector has been particularly lamentable (it has used PL 480 as a crutch). This is basically why we are holding off a new PL 480 agreement until the whole question can be sorted out. We may have to insist on tough measures leading to Indian self-sufficiency by a specified date, before we will undertake further long-term underwriting of India's food deficit.

Similarly, Pakistan is much more India's problem than ours. The last six weeks' crisis must lead sensible Indians to recognize that an irridentist Pakistan, perhaps tied to an expansionist China, will be a long-term threat to Indian interests. Some kind of Pak/Indian reconciliation is imperative for India's own sake, and we count on the GOI itself to face up to this issue.

At the same time we are not trying to dictate any Kashmir solution; indeed, we doubt that this problem can be solved at any early date, if only because of the lack of statesmanship and inflamed emotions on both sides. But we do think that India's own larger interests demand some kind of negotiating process which will defuse the present crisis and hopefully permit quiet progress toward Pak/Indian reconciliation across the board.

If Ayub won't play ball it will be his tough luck. But it's up to larger India to provide him with a face-saving way to play ball (just as we provided the USSR a way to back down gracefully in the Cuban missile crisis).

India has been independent now for 18 years. It has proved itself as a nation. Therefore, if India wants more aid from us than we give any other country, President Johnson feels entitled to ask that India in turn live up to its responsibilities as a key member of the Free World club. Frankly, we have been quite disappointed

in how long it has taken India to come of age (you can freely use such candor with Patil, who is 200% pro-US and himself keeps saying precisely this sort of thing to his Cabinet colleagues).

Instead of sending a Swaran Singh to the UN to erect legalistic defenses, why doesn't the GOI lift the Pak/Indian dialogue to a new plane? Pakistan, as the weaker country, cannot be expected to do so. But why should India limit itself to playing Pakistan's game?

On a Shastri visit, the President continues to look forward to seeing Shastri here as soon as feasible--which we now assume could not be until the new Lok Sabha session is over in early December. The President has no desire to chastise Shastri or to badger him to disgorge Kashmir. Instead he wants to talk about the larger problem of India's own bilateral relations with the US and the kind of understandings which are essential if our two great powers are to pursue their obviously common interests in a mutually beneficial way.

RWK

31

~~SECRET~~

October 15, 1965

Mac -

Shastri Visit. Attached is a proposed friendly reply to Shastri's 7 October get well message (note it's cleared by Rusk). It says let's get together soon.

We can either keep waltzing around this way or force Shastri's hand by proposing a date. Before 3 November is clearly out, if only because it is already 15 October. So the real question is whether the President should reply now saying "come on in mid-December."

I'm strongly for this course, and would assume the Boss is too. The sooner we firm up matters the more we limit the risk of further misunderstanding and further drift in our Pak/Indian affairs.

I'm also convinced that once Shastri is signed on, it will powerfully whet Ayub's appetite. In late September he said he couldn't come for 6-8 weeks, so he might even seek to come before Shastri.

Attached memo is designed to present these options to the President.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By plc, NARA, Date 3-2-07

31a

~~SECRET~~

October 15, 1965
Friday/6:30 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is Rusk's proposed reply to Shastri's get-well message (also in draft cable). Other reports make clear that Shastri is nibbling hard, and that he was probably even willing to come before his next parliament session 3 November-10 December.

Rusk proposes merely replying that you too look forward to seeing Shastri at an early date. My own instinct is that if you wish to firm up this visit, you need merely say instead that you'd be delighted to have him come in mid-December. Shastri's in effect asking you to do just this.

Once Shastri's visit is arranged, this will be powerful medicine to get Ayub here, perhaps even before Shastri. You'll recall he said on 29 Sept. that he didn't see how he could come for 6-8 weeks.

Approve Rusk version_____

Approve mid-December_____

R. W. Komer

Attach. Read/Bundy Memo encl. draft tel to Delhi msg
LBJ to Shastri ~~SECRET~~

no copy sent

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jcr, NARA, Date 3-2-04

32

~~SECRET~~

October 14, 1965

India
X B.B.

Mac -

The latest 303 proposal that we finally give greater backing to India's U/W effort makes a great deal of sense.

Paradoxical as it may seem to provide $13 million in aid of this sort when we are holding off on far larger sums, it actually makes good sense. A $13 million investment proves to the Indias that we are serious about China, thus helping to counter their suspicions that we are really Paks at heart. Nor do I see any harm in being helpful under the table at the time when we are being standoffish on top of the table. This will help to reassure the Indians along the same lines as our talk with BK Nehru the other day.

On the specifics of the proposal, the reason for high cost is the provision of aircraft, etc.

RWK

cc: Peter Jessup

~~SECRET~~

But this must wait until LBJ has a whack at Soviet problem.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 07-7 (# 21)
By isl, NARA, Date 4-10-08

33 file

~~SECRET~~

India
X Pak

Mac - October 13, 1965

Here's a clean version of our Pak/Indian guidelines. I have no trouble with your changes, and added a few of my own.

If we want to get this out pronto and reasonably whole, it's infinitely better if you try it on Rusk first. I could sell Hare, but he's new enough to this problem that he'll insist on bringing in his people, who'll just nit-pick like hell (without changing much). Then they'll have to clear it with IO, Mann, EUR, E, P, etc.

So why not try it on Rusk as something badly needed to fill the gap till we get Ayub and Shastri here. Everybody is going off in different directions at the moment, precisely because the basic party line hasn't been laid down yet. So attached is your sense of President's current thinking, as badly needed guidelines for us all.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By JC, NARA, Date 3-2-07

33a file

SECRET

To: AmEmb New Delhi
Karachi
London
USUN

October 13, 1965

EXDIS FOR AMBASSADOR

Following is designed provide you with interim guidelines during period whil e we sort out longer term policy best designed serve US interests in South Asia. It has received highest level approval.

1. Basic principles. At this point it is most important that we sort out the basic operative principles on which our policy must be based. Otherwise we risk critical misunderstanding by both parties, and even among ourselves.

A. While we desire retain influence in both India and Pakistan, and to prevent either from kicking the traces, the larger US interest--if we are forced to a choice--is clearly India.

B. By the same token, we cannot hitch our whole policy to achieving a Kashmir settlement, since even extreme pressure on India would probably not produce one any time soon. We are committed to a process of negotiation in order to defuse the current crisis, and we would regard a compromise settlement as highly desirable. But we doubt that it will be possible to move India into any early solution (even over the next year or two) which will be satisfactory to Pakistan.

DECLASSIFIED
State Guidelines;
Authority NLJ 89-134 (#177a)
By JC NARA, Date 3/2/04

SECRET

C. Therefore, the US should avoid taking the lead in any Kashmir negotiation. Instead we should fully support the UN, or any other third party means of promoting talks which proves acceptable to the two parties and does not directly involve the US except as part of an SC commission or similar larger body.

2. US aid policy. Nor do we intend to hitch US aid policy directly to a Kashmir solution, as distinct from progress under UN resolution and other forms of readiness for peaceful procedure. We believe that such a policy would probably drive India into an extreme nationalist position which would run against our larger interest, while still not achieving a settlement.

For the time being we intend to adopt a "wait and see" posture on new US aid. This position aims to help defuse the crisis by increasing the pressure on both sides to comply with the UN cease-fire and withdrawal resolution. If fighting should flare up again, we would probably clamp down on aid in the pipeline too. PL 480 will be handled on an interim basis; we currently expect to keep a minimum pipeline flowing, but we are not ready to discuss larger arrangements until the two countries can show us that it makes sense to plan for peace.

Longer-term US aid policy will be based on a thoroughgoing review here of its relevance to our own long-range interests. Past US

aid policy has not kept Pakistan from drifting closer to Communist China. Nor has aid to India generated enough internal growth to justify the massive investment. We gravely question whether such a massive investment in either country is justified, unless it gives us much greater political and developmental return than in the past. We recognize the risk of unleashing a "go-it-alone" spirit in both countries, but we will accept this risk for the present.

3. US Tactics. The appropriate posts should support the above interim policy guidelines by developing the following themes:

A. Both parties must be persuaded to withdraw in compliance with the UN Resolution. So long as they do not, there is considerable risk of renewed hostilities. To this end, we should make clear that there can be no new aid until this matter is resolved.

B. We must convince the Indians that in seeking a negotiating process, we are not attempting to dictate a settlement. But we do regard it as emphatically in India's interest to face up to the problem of a peaceful solution to its differences with Pakistan, if only to forestall a violently irredentist combination of Pakistan and Communist China. Pakistan is India's problem at least as much as it is ours.

C. We must also convince the Indians that the current freeze on new aid does not represent an attempt to force India to disgorge Kashmir, but springs rather from uncertainty both as prospects for peace and

on question whether India is taking adequate self-help measures to use such aid effectively. In effect, we would rather have the Indians angry with us on these issues (on which we can command wide international and Indian support) than on Kashmir.

D. Since we are unlikely to be able to get a satisfactory Kashmir settlement for Pakistan, we must start getting across to the Paks that something else which we can give is even more important to them. This is continued substantial US aid. Our position is that the choice is up to Ayub. To clarify this choice, we must convince him that, if he continues on his present irredentist course, and moves closer to Peiping in his frustration, he will sacrifice US support.

(1) Turning to China is a dead-end street; not only would China be unable to replace what the US can give, but the US would naturally be forced to give even more support to India against a Pak/Chicom squeeze.

(2) Pakistan's policy of attempting to force a Kashmir settlement has failed. It's only hope of getting one lies in reversing its present course and seeking a reconciliation with India, which will simultaneously assure Pakistan's long run security vis-a-vis India. It is a simple fact that no Kashmir settlement is possible when both sides are becoming more antagonistic and more frozen in their positions than the reverse.

4. The US continues to believe it most important to have an early dialogue at the Summit with both Ayub and Shastri, to begin sorting out these issues. Such summit meetings will have less chance of being effective, however, unless the groundwork has been laid by getting across the above themes to both Indians and Paks. It is important, therefore, that all agencies and relevant overseas missions utilize the means at their disposal to clarify US policy as stated above. Should the Ayub and Shastri visits be further delayed, moreover, we are considering the prior dispatch of special emissaries as well.

34

Saw (for attachment to Pol Pic file)
X Pol W

~~SECRET~~

Bill - Handley

October 13, 1965

Here's the draft instruction I mentioned to you. It seems to me that it ties in quite well with the paper you sent to Ball; indeed I took the thrust from their excerpt on the question of aid where the President's view is clearly more negative.

I do hope you and Ray will bear in mind that the style and tone of this instruction is perhaps more important than whether we put in every last qualifier. Clearly we can rely on our ambassadors to exercise judgment on such matters of detail. The important thing, to our minds, is to get out the word loud and clear.

RWK

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-2-04

35 file

India
x Pak
x Newsp

October 11, 1965

Mac -

We're getting out the story. Unna got most of the attached from State (Handley) and AID, but I got my themes played adequately.

RWK

Att: Clipping from Washington Post, October 11, 1965, "US Goes Slow on Aiding India, Pakistan"

36 file

India
X Pak
X Kash

SECRET

Mac - October 9, 1965

It's just terribly difficult to do a policy options paper--with all the costs and risks spelled out--in less than 20 pages. I can't see LBJ sitting still for this just yet.

So I've chosen the route of drafting an instruction which sums up a pretty hard line--one which doesn't deprive the President of any levers--but which in effect saws off on: (1) India first, Pakistan second; (2) don't overplay Kashmir; (3) get out and start working on Paks and Indians instead of moaning to me.

As I reflect the chief trouble with our current stance is not that we're playing hard to get (except on food). It is that we're not reaping the benefit of so acting, because we're not getting across "why"! Thus we're taking all the risks, and getting few of the benefits. In fact, we're running the added major risk of both Delhi and Pindi misunderstanding our intentions. The attached would do a lot to reverse this process at any rate. What say?

RWK

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By JC, NARA, Date 3-2-04

36a

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-2-01

SECRET

To: AmEmb New Delhi
Karachi
London
USUN

October 9, 1965

EXDIS FOR AMBASSADOR

Following is designed provide you with interim guidelines for US policy during period while we sort out longer term policies best designed serve US interests in South Asia. It has received highest level approval.

1. Basic principles. At this point it is critically important that we sort out the basic operative principles on which our policy must be based.

A. While we desire retain influence in both India and Pakistan, and to prevent either from kicking the traces, the larger US interest--if we are forced to a choise--is clearly India. We can no longer afford, at least in our own minds, to straddle two horses if the net result is that we successfully ride neither.

B. By the same token, we cannot hitch our whole policy to achieving a Kashmir settlement, if one is possible only by extreme pressure on India. We are committed to a process of negotiation in order to defuse the current crisis, and we would regard a compromise settlement as highly desirable. But we are quite dubious that it will be possible to pressure India into any early solution (even over the next year or two) which will be satisfactory to Pakistan.

SECRET

C. Therefore, the US must at all costs stay out of the middle of any Kashmir negotiation. Instead we should fully support the UN or any other third party means of promoting talks, which proves acceptable to the two parties and does not directly involve the US except as part of an SC commission or similar larger body.

D. Nor do we intend to hitch US aid policy directly to a Kashmir solution. We believe that such a policy would probably drive India into an extreme nationalist position which would affect our larger interest, while still not achieving a settlement which would satisfy Pakistan.

2. US aid policy. For the time being we intend to adopt a "wait and see" policy on resumption of US aid, designed to help defuse the crisis by increasing the pressure on both sides to comply fully with the UN cease-fire and withdrawal resolution. If fighting should flare up again, we would probably clamp down on aid in the pipeline too. PL 480 will be handled on an interim basis designed to keep a minimum pipeline flowing.

Longer term US aid policy will be based on a thorough-going review here of whether and how it serves our longer range interests. Past US aid policy has not kept Pakistan from drifting closer to Communist China. Nor has aid to India generated enough internal growth to justify the massive investment. In a period of likely declining aid availabilities, we increasingly question whether such a massive investment in either country is justified unless it gives us much greater political and developmental return than in the past. We recognize the risk of unleashing a "go-it-alone"

spirit in both countries, but are convinced that this risk can be accepted for the time being.

3. US Tactics. The appropriate posts should recommend promptly ways of supporting the above interim policy guidelines. We regard the following as essential:

A. We must convince both parties to withdraw in compliance with the UN Resolution. So long as they do not, there is considerable risk of renewed hostilities. To this end, we should make clear that there can be no aid resumption until this matter is resolved.

B. We must convince the Indians that in seeking a negotiating process, we are not attempting to dictate a settlement. This is up to the two parties. But we do regard it as emphatically in India's interest to face up to the problem of a peaceful solution to its differences with Pakistan, if only to forestall a violently irredentist combination of Pakistan and Communist China.

C. Since we are unlikely to be able to get a satisfactory Kashmir settlement for Pakistan, we must start getting across to the Paks that something else which we can give is even more important to them. This is continued US aid. Therefore, we must convince Ayub that: (1) if he continues on his present irredentist course, and moves closer to Peiping in his frustration, he will sacrifice US support.

(2) Turning to China is a dead-end street; not only will China be unable to replace what the US can give, but the US will naturally be forced to give even more support to India against a Pak/Chicom combination.

(3) Pakistan's policy of attempting to force a Kashmir settlement has failed. It's only hope of getting one lies in reversing its present course and seeking a reconciliation with India, which will simultaneously assure Pakistan's long run security vis-a-vis India.

D. We must convince the Indians that the current freeze on new aid does not represent an attempt to force India to disgorge Kashmir, but springs rather from uncertainty as to whether India is taking adequate self-help measures to use such aid effectively. In effect, we would rather have the Indians angry with us on this issue (on which we can command wide international and Indian support)than over Kashmir.

4. We continue to believe it most important to have an early dialogue at the Summit with both Ayub and Shastri, to begin sorting out these issues. Such summit meetings will have less chance of being effective, however, unless the groundwork has been laid by getting across the above themes to both Indians and Paks. It is important, therefore, that all agencies and relevant overseas missions utilize the means at their disposal to clarify US policy in this manner.

37 file

India
X B 2.

~~SECRET~~

Mac - October 9, 1965

In response to an invitation from the Lok Sabha, a Senate delegation is off to Japan and India. Morse (chairman), Lausche, Dominick, Church, Burdick, perhaps Prokty are planning to be in India 6-13 December (they leave for Japan 24 November).

This is apparently being handled out of the VP's office (Reilly). I'm unimpressed by the calibre of the delegation, but can't see a good reason for saying "no". Any reactions likely upstairs?

RWK

He has agreed to this.
McGB.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-2-04

38

India
Pak
Newsp

~~SECRET~~ October 8, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Warren Unna came in to say goodbye; he's off to India this weekend. I gave him my suggestions as to people to cultivate and issues to investigate. My thesis was that there was too much superficial reporting from India, and not enough analysis in depth of what was really going on in that vast subcontinent.

Unna asked a few questions about aid, saying that he'd been assigned to do a story before he left. He was remarkably well informed. I gave him our defensive brief on PL 480 and believe it went down reasonably well.

He said he had it on very good authority that President Johnson was not going to resume aid to either country until their top men came here. Thinking this a poor news theme, I sought to downplay it. I pointed out that: (a) the aid pipeline was continuing at a substantial level, and we had continued food releases; (b) this indicated that the President, while happy to see Ayub and Shastri because of the large number of things needing to be sorted out at the top, was obviously not holding up everything till they came. I attributed the continued aid hiatus to the imprudence of resuming business as usual while the cease fire was still so fragile. There was no withdrawal as yet, and the whole situation could blow up at any time.

Unna pressed on military aid (and was on his way to see McNaughton). I gave him my personal opinion that we would be unlikely to be able to resume military aid at an early date to either party, given what they had just done with our aid, the possibility of renewed hostilities, and the likelihood of popular reaction here.

R. W. Komer

cc: Bill Moyers

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 88-143 (432)
By jlp NARA, Date 3-2-04

~~SECRET~~

39 file

India

CONFIDENTIAL

October 6, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

I led off with Indian Finance Secretary Bhoothalingam (I. G. Patel, M. G. Kaul and Sundarajan were with him) by saying that I wanted to give him my own personal view as to why he could not get any concrete responses during his visit here. I assured him that we are not taking a pro-Pak line in an effort to exert political pressure on India to disgorge Kashmir. Indeed many of the problems which prevent our giving him definitive answers reached back well beyond the recent fighting over Kashmir. In fact, I said I would prefer to leave Kashmir out of our discussion, though clearly until the immediate Pak/Indian situation was more under control it would be difficult for us to move forward.

I explained that what had really been going on here over the last several months had been deep soul-searching as to what our aid program in the subcontinent had really been accomplishing. Not only had we gone through the seasonal wrangle on Capitol Hill over the aid bill, but also within the Executive Branch we had been in the process of helping a new President sort out his own thinking on this unpopular subject. He understood from years of experience what the foreign policy problem was, but he also knew from his deep roots in the Congress that foreign aid has only a very small constituency. As he personally tried to bridge the gap between these two far-removed positions, we had necessarily suffered a few bumps and jogs.

To underscore my point I said that I was constantly amazed by foreign friends who tell us that we have no foreign aid problem on Capitol Hill. There is no arguing with the fact that the man in the White House is a master in this field, and he is convinced that this is one of his most serious Congressional problems. Even in the aid appropriation fight just ended, he still lost $230 million. Since about one-third of our aid goes to the subcontinent, it is not only natural that our programs there should be the most seriously questioned; it is also obvious that when the appropriations cuts are apportioned, those big nations which have recently been spending their resources fighting each other will be prime candidates.

Moreover, when we ask ourselves what this aid program has produced, we find on the Pak side what we believe to be substantial economic achievement--better than India's. On the political side, however, this apparently successful aid program has not prevented Pakistan from drifting closer to Communist China.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jcfw NARA, Date 3-2-04

In India the reverse appears to be true, if one may over-simplify. The Chinese blunder in 1962 helped consolidate Indian nationalism and helped India and the U. S. discover closer common purposes. However, while politically we had more clearly recognized our common ground, India's economic performance had not been anywhere near as good as it could be. I ticked off the well-known shortcomings of the Indian economy, though adding that, even granting these, I knew that Indian achievement had been substantial. However, we all knew that India could do even better and that we were vulnerable to arguments that India had used our aid as a crutch to avoid facing up to some of these serious issues. This was particularly true in the stagnant agricultural sector.

Parenthetically, I was upset to see that some of India's reputable papers like the Hindustan Times had begun writing that the US was using food to bring pressure for a Kashmir settlement. All of the insiders know that the PL 480 agreement expired in June, our first stopgap PL 480 extension had been signed in July, some time before the Kashmir fighting broke out. To illustrate my basic point that we were in a period of sorting out, I said that what really was holding up a new longer term PL 480 agreement was our disappointment over Indian agricultural performance and our desire that the next agreement be coupled with firm Indian plans to improve that performance. We had no desire to attach unnecessary conditions to our food aid but we did expect that the Indians would themselves advance their plans for improved achievement and explain how our aid would contribute.

To sum up, I felt there was a whole complex of problems which the US and India had to work out before we could take the next big steps on the aid front. These had little to do with the recent fighting in Kashmir, although that had certainly not made our job any easier. Until we had a clear view of where the Indians wanted to go and where our aid fits into that picture, there would probably be a hiatus. I did not find this surprising since we had known for some months that this fall would be a period of rethinking in Delhi, as the Indians put the final touches to their new development plan.

In making one final point, I said that they should bear in mind how one did business with this Administration. They should know that this President intended to run it from the top. We are no longer in the Eisenhower days of decentralized programs. Therefore, what was most necessary was a political knitting together at the top. I admitted that this seemed odd advice, since we had just finished saying last spring that then was not the time for a high level meeting (although I stood by that judgment and regretted only that the tactics of the postponement had gotten out of hand). I saw the time as ripening now, and hoped we would not have to wait very much longer for the necessary top level discussion.

A new factor was that all of us had been made uncomfortable by the thought that now both the Indians and Paks might feel compelled to spend even larger portions of their scarce foreign exchange on defense. In such a case, we would end up indirectly subsidizing those expenditures, at least by substitution. I cited India's recent submarine deal with the USSR as an example of what I felt to be foolish expenditure. Then I turned the floor over to Bhoothalingam.

He began by saying he wanted to be equally candid. He felt he understood what we were looking for. He wanted us to understand that India recognizes the problems I had cited and was not complacent about them. India's economic performance had indeed been "disappointing." While he did not agree with my comparison of India and Pakistan economic performance, he did feel we would be pleased with the reforms that would be made under the Fourth Plan. He mentioned specifically a major attack on the population problem and a number of reforms in the agricultural field very similar to those we envisioned.

However, he made clear his fear that our reappraisal might cause too much of a pause in our program. He felt that this would be misrepresented, and would make more difficult the job of those in the Indian Government who were trying to inject some economic rationality into Indian domestic policy.

I interrupted to say that we were aware of this risk. However, we at the staff level had to accept one fact, i. e. that the political level of both of our governments is going to make the major decisions over the next few months. Much as we might agree at the technical level about what needs to be done, there was far more uncertainty at the top on both sides. The pause resulted from that uncertainty, not from a tactical holdup.

Dr. Patel interjected that there were different kinds of pauses and that there was still the risk of our intention being misrepresented to their political level, thus having an effect on the ultimate Indian decisions quite different from what we intended. He added parenthetically his fear that in over-simplifying the picture in the subcontinent for the political level of our government, we had developed a certain mythology about Pak economic performance. We had studied this in great detail and felt that the gap between Pak and Indian performance simply was not as great as we often made it out to be. I said I had heard some of our Indian experts say this too; I'd look into it.

In concluding our conversation, I put to Bhoothalingam a hypothetical case about a problem which both of us face, namely how to deal with Pakistan over the coming months. I asked how New Delhi would feel if we cut off all our aid to Pakistan. Bhoothalingam replied unhesitatingly that Delhi did not consider that in its interest, even though it might be happy to see military aid ended. I elaborated on the problem, by saying that we already faced

an irredentist Indonesia and North Vietnam in Asia; adding Pakistan to that list would not serve either our interests or India's. I pointed out that we had played a major role between 1954-1965 in containing Pakistan, and I doubted that India would want to see us give up that role.

In saying goodbye, I pointed out that this undoubtedly would be a period of difficulty on both sides; I felt our job was to inject as much sensible analysis into the deliberations of both our governments as we possibly could. I recognized the risk of Indian go-it-alone-ism, but warned him that Indian emphasis on this could have quite a backlash here. There were many in the US who would be delighted to see both India and Pakistan go it alone, at some great saving to us. But I really doubted that this would be in India's interest.

R. W. Komer

orig. to Mc G B
cc: Amb. Hare
Macomber

40

India
X Kashmir

SECRET

October 6, 1965

Mac -

Here's the read-out on our attempt to influence Indians through BK Nehru:

1. At my suggestion Rostow saw BK on 5 October. As Walt put it, BK focussed on his own personal anxiety lest LBJ not understand the limits of any commitment Shastri could make now on Kashmir. According to BK any Indian politician had to operate within two limits of the possible. First, Kashmir/Jammu must be kept within the Indian union whether autonomous or no. However, BK thought cease-fire adjustments might be possible (I presume along lines of what Indians were prepared to do in the 1963 exercise). Second, no deal is possible unless Ayub can moderate the virulent anti-Hinduism in Pakistan. In fact, the Indians think that only such anti-Hinduism keeps Pakistan together (East and West wings).

Apparently, BK saw no difficulty in getting talks of some kind going after a cease-fire but real difficulty in a Four Power Commission.

Politically, it would be very hard to explain in India any military aid to Pakistan, according to BK. Walt's solution to this is to let both sides buy from us under a foreign exchange ceiling.

2. Barbara Ward's talks with BK was a dead heat by her own account. In fact, she claims that we won't get good communication through BK because he is deliberately taking an extreme position so she thinks it's better to use Bowles or send someone out there (note, however, that BK has been much more forthcoming in other talks so I doubt that he's all that bad an interlocutor even though he is deliberately taking a hard line for obvious reasons).

She says the only gleam of light was Nehru's thought that if it were possible to get some form of procedural postponement through India's 1966 elections, Shastri might be able to move after that.

On a Four Power Commission, BK said they can't buy because it would be three powers aligned against them. When Barbara Ward asked whether good offices by anyone else would be acceptable, say a Pole or a Swiss, BK gave the impression India wouldn't stonewall completely on this.

In sum, she saw little give in any willingness to talk before withdrawal but a little give on possible negotiating processes afterward. She found the Indian position typically and terribly legalistic.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 00-256 (#135)
By jdcb, NARA, Date 3-2-04

SECRET

According to her, the Indians are enormously confident of US support (they are equally confident of the Soviets) because of our anti-China stance. The only time she worried BK a little was when she suggested that the Soviets might be interested in parallel action with the US because of the strong Afro-Asian backing for Pakistan. Her reasoning was that the Soviets badly want Asian backing to be an Asian nation so might not take an all-out Indian position. She thinks this is a good line to worry the Indians.

BK claimed that India wasn't the least bit scared of what the Paks could do with the Chicoms because the Indians had drawn the Paks' sting (by grinding up their armor).

Barbara did a good job on the question of our aid hold-up saying that this should not be misconstrued as a matter of pressure; it was rather a measure of the growing Congressional disillusionment with such vast expenditures in countries which ended up using our aid against each other.

BK asked her whether she thought Shastri should come here soon. She asked for 24 hours to think it over. I told her to go right back at BK and say by all means, that a meeting of minds at the summit would make sense, since if she knew Lyndon Johnson this was the way to do business with him.

Finally, she has been invited to India in late November (to leave around the 21st). I strongly encouraged her to go, on the grounds that her plugging of our views from the sidelines might have considerable credibility.

3. Tom Mann saw BK at the latter's request on 27 September (I got some good licks in with Tom first). BK was trying to get a current reading on the advisability of a Shastri visit. Tom said all the right things.

On the question of a Kashmir settlement Tom was pretty hard-lined expressing his own feeling that our Congress would think it wrong to resume large scale aid unless there were progress toward a political settlement. BK said that the separation of Kashmir from India was not "negotiable" giving the usual argument that India as a multi-racial, secular democracy could not afford to give up Kashmir lest it promote additional secessionist movements (e.g. the Sikhs, Nagaland, even Madras). BK also thought that Kashmir was only the beginning of Pak ambitions--the Paks were really out to cut India down to size.

R. W. Komer

MEMORANDUM

41

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

Tuesday, October 5, 1965, 8:45 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: India and Pakistan

This is one subject on which I think you may wish to have a brief meeting before you go to Bethesda. There are storm signals in both countries and we can do better in the next two weeks if all hands have up-to-date guidance from you.

Moreover, your stay in Bethesda obviously puts off the time at which Shastri could come here, and, along with Ayub's unreadiness to move in a continued state of crisis, reduces the prospect that we can move forward by pressing for early conversations with you -- although the Shastri possibility remains important and hopeful, perhaps for late October.

Meanwhile, there is a real danger that both Pakistan and India will misread our policy. The Paks may wrongly believe that their alternatives are crude pressure on us or a crude bargain with the Red Chinese -- this is the way they are talking and acting. The Indians may wrongly feel that we are using food as a blunt instrument and that the only safe reply in Indian political terms is to move publicly and proudly toward isolation from the West. The Indians may also feel -- again quite wrongly -- that we intend to try to trade our assistance for their "surrender" on Kashmir.

These problems are compounded by the fact that our channels to Ayub and Shastri are clogged, both in Asia and in Washington. Except at the moment of truth on the ceasefire, your government has not succeeded in communicating sharply just what we do and do not want. In part this is the inevitable result of our decision to hold everything until Shastri and Ayub get here. But in part it is also the result of the very rapid changes in Pakistani and Indian thinking because of the enormous national crises into which they have steered themselves. We have not yet adjusted our responses to this new situation.

All of this, I suspect, is at least as clear to you as it is to us. But what we now need to do is to sort out our own thinking, and then make some sober and straightforward noises to the Asians.

Not as final answers, but as indications of the shape of the problem, we suggest the following principles and the following tactical conclusions:

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Authority E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4
By [illegible], NARA, Date 3-2-09

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A. Principles

1. India is more important than Pakistan and there is enough hope in India to justify continued support by food and economic aid if the Indians in turn are reasonable with us.

2. Within this priority we still need not lose Pakistan if we can show the Paks the emptiness of the Chinese route and the reality of continued Western economic support.

3. We should not kid ourselves about any early Kashmir settlement. American fidgeting over Kashmir will only make us trouble with India and arouse false hopes in Pakistan. The most we can do is what Goldberg is doing: press for acceptance by both sides of the process of peaceful discussion as against the process of trial by arms. (We emphasize this point because it would help wonderfully in this town if you were to announce this conclusion as your own. Kashmir fixers are a plentiful and dangerous commodity.)

4. We cannot tie our economic aid to positive progress on Kashmir. We can tie it to reasonable progress under observance of the UN ceasefire resolution and to the acceptance of political process. We can also tie it to other basic US interests such as:

a. Keeping the Paks out of Chinese arms;

b. Keeping the Indians from unbalanced surrender to the Soviets (although Soviet help in itself is not intolerable.)

c. Keeping the Indians away from nuclear weapons;

d. Pressing both countries toward better economic and agricultural policies.

B. Tactics

1. The thing which is giving us most trouble right now is the absence of dialogue. We are inclined to think that someone clearly speaking for you should be sent to these two countries within the next two or three weeks. This could be Arthur Dean, who begins work tomorrow, but if you want to

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give him more time to learn, you might want to send one of us this time. There is great advantage in sending someone who really speaks for President Johnson; whatever our other failings, we play your tune, and most people know it.

2. In due course, we should defuse the explosive issue of food as a political weapon. At the same time, we should not get back into long-term agreements. A shift in a couple of weeks from the current one-month basis to a quarterly basis, with appropriate agricultural assurances attached, would do us a lot of good and cost us nothing in terms of leverage.

3. The burden of our song to Ayub and Shastri should be a judicious mixture of firmness, concern, and continued readiness to help on a reasonable terms. Specifically, to Ayub:

a. We should drive home to the Paks the folly of threats and the still greater folly of switching to Peking.

b. On Kashmir, we should maintain our commitment to a process, but make it crystal clear that the only real hope the Paks have here is in conciliation and not conflict with India. This is a fact of life, and their adventure this summer proves it.

c. If the Paks are responsive, we are ready to start talking renewed economic aid, but as a simple fact it will be a long time before military assistance can begin again to either party. (These are warnings and expressions of willingness to negotiate -- they should not be commitments, since these ought to be reserved both for a later time and a higher level.)

4. To the Indians, we would make it quietly clear that we accept and indeed support their primary role in the subcontinent, and that in particular we are not agents for Pakistan or supreme judges on Kashmir.

But, within this basic premise, we could and would press the Indians to recognize the necessity for political process and the advantage to them of gradual conciliation, since they too would lose if the Pakistanis made a fatal plunge toward China.

5. With respect to the UN Resolution, and political process, we should emphasize to both that unless there is a return to the methods of peace, it

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is a fact and not a theory that the whole future of US assistance will be gravely jeopardized. How can the American Congress justify long-range, large-scale efforts to people who cannot do what is needed to keep the peace. It is this test, not the test of a specific Kashmir settlement, which the American Congress will apply.

We have sketched these outlines of a policy, not because we are convinced it is the only one, but because we see a prospect of grave losses in both countries if we go forward in the coming weeks with no policy at all. It is this prospect which makes us urge a meeting even in these last hectic days before you go to Bethesda.

McG. B.

R. W. Komer

Set Up a Meeting_____

Speak to me_____

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42

Indian x Pak

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 00-256 (#737)
By jcb, NARA, Date 3-7-04

October 5, 1965

Mac -

Our Pak/Indian affairs are in sad disarray. We're now beginning to get the worst of both worlds in both India and Pakistan with little light at the end of the tunnel to justify taking these risks.

At this critical point (the one major foreign policy issue on which we are at a moment of decision) we lack even the outlines of a policy. We neither know where we're going nor what we want to accomplish. The most we have is a set of by now perhaps outdated tactical expedients, such as our desire to hitch any aid releases to getting Shastri and Ayub here. Yet if we get them here, what would we say to them? I'm all for using our vast leverage, but not past the point of diminishing returns. Nor is the President, if I read him right.

But the town is paralyzed because no one knows the President's mind, not even we. We half suspect that if we suggest letting the subcontinent go it alone as one real option, he might buy it as a means of disengaging from an expensive aid enterprise which shows little short-term result. Rusk is willing to push issues up, but rarely to argue on behalf of the better course.

Indeed, the lack of leadership in State on this matter is appalling. Neither Rusk nor Ball nor Mann have either particular competence or interest. NEA is headless, and the SOA people (who thus exercise a veto) are against doing anything which rocks the boat in any way; so they spend most of their time bemoaning the President's policy rather than coming up with ideas of their own. Nor does it do much good to have Goldberg conducting a shadow exercise which could become the tail that wags the dog, or to add yet another weighty but uneducated voice such as that of Arthur Dean.

What we need instead is to do some serious skull practice and hash out the affair with the President. Surely this is worth 1/100th of the time that has already been spent on Vietnam.

Where is this lack of a clear policy taking us? Our current even-handed negativism and the attendant lack of explanation, is getting us in trouble with both sides. Nor is it giving us much leverage, primarily because it is not clear to either side to what end this leverage is being exerted.

A. Pakistan. Here we are losing ground rapidly, partly because we serve as a logical whipping boy for Pak frustration over their recent failure, but also as a culmination of the long-term drifting apart of our two countries (which began when we started helping India against the Chicoms). Both out of frustration and because it's the only game they know, the Paks are leaning on us again.

Keeping our facilities closed can hardly be read any other way. The threats to leave the UN, the nice noises toward Peiping, the severing of relations with Malaysia are also designed to warn us that Pakistan will go off the reservation if we don't play ball. And it might, at that.

B. India. And now the Indians too are getting mad at us. They see us as robbing them of the fruits of their own victory by again pressing on Kashmir. This is bringing out all the old complaints of our being pro-Pak at heart (once quite true--and by that token all the harder to counter). By appearing to use aid--even food--as a lever to force India to disgorge Kashmir we're rapidly drawing down all the capital we gained by helping India in 1962-64. The Soviets will be the gainers--the harder we press on Kashmir the more Delhi will turn to Moscow for a Soviet veto (and for arms). And the more rabid India's own sense of nationalistic go-it-aloneism becomes, the more likely it is to make the bomb.

Look at the recent quotes: Chavan on 4 October alleged that the US and UK were in partnership with the "Pakistani dictatorship" against "Indian democracy" so there could be no substitute for Indian self-reliance. Shastri on 3 October warned publicly that India would reshape its policies toward nations that tried to pressure India into settling Kashmir. Kamaraj the Congress Party boss reportedly said on 3 October that "any country that extends aid to Pakistan is an enemy of India." All this is pressure on us too, but it's also quite indicative of a developing mood.

C. Thus I see us as slipping into the position of getting the worst of both worlds. We could sustain this for a while if we thought that the ultimate outcome would be to our advantage. If the Paks and Indians could purge themselves by venting their spleen against us and then would become more reasonable we could stand the short-term gaff. But this is sufficiently unlikely to be the case to make me boggle at the risk. Once an irridentist Pakistan turned definitively to China we'd be forced to cut it off (and to withdraw our installations). It would be a long time before we got back in, if ever, partly because this would force us to a 100% pro-Indian policy. Yet if in the process we have also pushed India back toward pro-Soviet neutralism we would not even be in a position to reap the gain in India from our loss of Pakistan. Since Indian nationalism would not tolerate prolonged US economic pressure, we would end up without settling Kashmir, with Paks lost and the Indians semi-permanently disaffected, and with the Chicoms or Soviets in the favored position we now hold. Not a pretty prospect.

The Outline of a Policy. The answer lies in deciding now where we want to go, and then adjusting the policy to fit the grand design. If I'm right that you and I see in the same way, our job is to sell the President and the town. As I see it, we have to drive home ____ principles:

A. Let's at long last decide that the fundamental object of our policy must be India, with Pakistan a variable. This alone doesn't constitute a policy, but it would marvelously sort out our order of priorities.

B. The above said, we want to preserve a sound relationship with Pakistan as well as India, but on a basis which is consistent with our primary interest.

C. While we are committed to a process which will afford another try at a Kashmir settlement, we should avoid US over commitment past the point of diminishing returns. If Kashmir seems insoluble in the short run, let's not hitch our wagon to this star. Failure will not satisfy Pakistan, but the effort itself could easily estrange India.

D. We should avoid hinging our aid policy wholly to the Kashmir process. Instead we should also use it as leverage to:

(1) Keep the Paks from going off the reservation.
(2) Keep the US/Indian relationship from slipping backward.
(3) Keep India from going nuclear.
(4) Get both countries to adopt more sensible economic policies.
(5) Promote a longer range Pak/Indian reconciliation.

These are just first principles, but until we settle on these we can't work out the tactics, and will just continue floundering.

R. W. Komer

43

SECRET

October 5, 1965

India
X Kash
X Pak

Mac -

Here for your eyes only (my deal with Walt) is his weekender to the President on Pak/India.

By and large it's a good piece, because it makes the case for gradually unfreezing our aid policy. Otherwise we're at a dead end, I fear.

But in another sense it's quite dangerous, because Walt still pursues the will-o-the-wisp of a Kashmir deal. We can take Shastri up on any number of Rostow's magic mountains and still not convince him as a politician that he must give up what his electorate just thinks he won.

Nor will we get Ayub and his fanatics by sweet reason. We've got to convince them that they can't have their American cake and eat it with chopsticks too.

RWK

Attach. Rostow Memo to President, subj. The Future of India and Pakistan dtd 10/1/65 w/ cover note to Valenti

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By JC, NARA, Date 3.24

44

SECRET

October 4, 1965

Mac -

Here's the John Lewis letter which I mentioned to you. He's not necessarily the most acute of political observers but his comments in this case fully reflect recent Embassy Delhi reporting. On the one hand, the recent war has been a great unifying force in India and has created a new self-confidence. At the same time, however, it has generated a growing attitude of go-it-alone if necessary, which could create real problems for us.

To me the big issue is rapidly becoming one of how far we push a probably forlorn effort to get Kashmir if it's at the expense of a real set-back in our Indian affairs.

RWK

Att. Letter Lewis to Bell/Macomber 9/25/65

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jcfw, NARA, Date 3-2-04

45

Indian Troop

CONFIDENTIAL

September 27, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR BILL MOYERS

After your OK I returned John Finney's call. He seemed to be much more relaxed on food, though it's clear that someone is still feeding him (since he already knew that we'd released another 500,000 tons of wheat to India). At any rate, I responded in the same low key, making the point inter alia that in the passionate atmosphere of the last month both Paks and Indians had been over-reacting to presumed cut-offs of US aid.

Finney said the new problem he was working on was what US policy would now be on resumption of military, economic, and food aid to India/Pakistan. I simply told him (very deep background) that we hadn't had time even to focus yet on these problems since some shooting was still going on. Obviously problem #1 was to help the UN get the war turned off, then we could worry about the rest.

He's still interested in US arms sales and had some snide comments about McNamara's recent "boastful" press conference about all the arms we'd sold. I think I calmed him down on the merchants of death theme pointing out that we were really quite cautious in selling to LDCs and that most of these sales were to developed allies in support of mutual defense plans. He quickly conceded that over 90% was indeed in this category.

Finney is a very persistent and sober guy, so my own sense is that keeping in loose touch will enable us at least to get our defensive gloss on stories that would otherwise have much sharper hooks in them.

R. W. Komer

cc: McG. Bundy

Determined to be an
administrative marking
By jcpch On 3-2-07

Approved For Release 2001/08/16 : NLJ-032-013-1-1-3

46

~~SECRET~~

September 20, 1965

25X1A

[redacted]

NEW DELHI

FOR AMBASSADOR ONLY FROM KOMER

You can depend on it that your proposals and concerns getting top level attention here. As you have seen, our intention is to move carefully and soberly in what has become major crunch in subcontinent.

As to food in particular, we giving most sober attention to ways and means of keeping food pipeline going, though as you too have recognized major new PL 480 agreement most unlikely this time. Would hope have decision soon.

Approved For Release 2001/08/16 : NLJ-032-013-1-1-3

SANITIZED
Authority NLJ.032.013.001/1
By JC NARA, Date 8-26-03

Approved For Release 2002/09/12 : NLJ-032-023-2-4-8

47

SECRET

September 18, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

25X1 After checking with Bundy, I told [redacted] (to tell Helms) [redacted] 25X

25X1 [redacted] said he fully understood but that even procurement of a few spare parts was being held up. I told him to go ahead, rechecking with me if necessary.

R. W. Komer

Copy to McG. Bundy

Approved For Release 2002/09/12 : NLJ-032-023-2-4-8

SANITIZED
Authority NLJ.032.023.002/4
By JC NARA, Date 3-704

48 file

September 15, 1965

India

RWK:

S/S wants to clear with you following message from President to Radakrishnan:

> Thank you for your kind message on my birthday. I take this opportunity to extend my warm personal regards to you.

They're just nervous about anything in this part of the world.

HHS

49 file

Indian

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE Sept. 15, 1965

RWK:

I relayed our strong feelings to Schneider. Said our chief concern in this case is safety, not politics.

He said Peace Corps now upset at possibility of delay, partly worried about its apolitical image. I reiterated that our prime concern is safety.

NEA will be deciding early this afternoon. I asked him to say that Bundy and Komer want to delay.

HHS

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50 file

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

McGB: September 14, 1965

178 new Peace Corps volunteers are scheduled to leave this weekend for India. 28 more are already in Tehran awaiting onward passage. Another 200 are in training to leave November-December. All told, they'd double the Peace Corps effort there.

Bowles wants to go ahead with this long-planned buildup. He says he'll keep them away from the fighting and wants them as a symbol of our long-range commitment.

We're inclined to agree with Bowles on the odds but suspect the President would prefer prudence. It hardly makes sense to put 200 more potential evacuees on Bowles' hands until the possibility of communal rioting is past. So we've suggested holding the fellows in Tehran where they're safer and telling this weekend's group to stay on leave another couple of weeks until we see where we stand.

Peace Corps is still totting pros and cons, but they'll probably prefer a hold like this to cancelling altogether right now since it hard to start all over.

HHS

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51 file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RWK: September 14, 1965

India

Peace Corps schedule for volunteers going to India is:

28 volunteers now in Tehran seeking onward passage; bumped by Air France

83 now on leave after training; due to assemble in New York on 18 September and go

95 now on leave, due to go 20 September.

Later groups still in training; not due to leave till November - December.

Schneider still doesn't have a full report from the Peace Corps on the problems of postponing departures. However, his reaction is to let the 28 in Tehran go ahead if they can get a ride, but telegraph the others to stay on leave for another couple of weeks until we see how things look. He thinks this is better than cancelling now altogether because it's so hard to get going again.

HHS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By JC, NARA, Date 3-2-04

52

September 10, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Attached are 3 copies of my informal memcon on the President's meeting with Ambassador Nehru 9 Sept. 1965

R. W. Komer

India file

53

SECRET

September 9, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

The President's Meeting with Indian Ambassador B. K. Nehru, 6 p. m. 9 September 1965 (off the record)

Ambassador Nehru gave the President a letter dated 7 September 1965 from Prime Minister Shastri. After the President had read it, Nehru explained that he had asked for a meeting so that he could stress certain points in the letter. First, "we want peace not war". Second, "The only way to stop Pakistan's attack in Kashmir had been to counterattack in the Punjab." This was the only reason why India had responded as it did. Third, India genuinely wanted a cease fire and withdrawal; its reply to U Thant's appeal had been badly "misunderstood". But India had to have all of the people shooting at Indians up there in Kashmir stop firing and withdraw. It couldn't just be the uniformed forces. India had to cross the cease-fire line in the first place to stop such infiltrators from causing havoc.

Nehru then gave the President a copy of the Defense Minister Chavan's 8 September speech with certain passages marked, saying these indicated that India acted purely as a defensive measure. For example, India would not take any action to escalate the war in East Pakistan. He also showed the President a copy of the Secretary General's report with passages marked citing Pak's infiltration into Kashmir. He said that he wished to make such points clear at the top level to the President.

Nehru went on to say that two additional points disturbed India. One was the use of US arms against them. India had based its whole defense policy on US assurances that it would not permit Pakistan to use US arms against India. Otherwise it would have armed much more heavily. This assurance had not been honored, but Nehru admitted he didn't see what could be done about it. Then he complained that the State Department kept saying that both sides were using US arms. This was just not so up to the present. Mr. Komer mentioned, in response to the President's inquiry, that this had occurred once but that he believed that it was inadvertent and had not been repeated.

The President stated with vigor that this war must be halted somehow. Neither side could win anything in any way commensurate with the risks involved. The stakes were far bigger than Kashmir now. We were going to "put all our chips behind U Thant." We had also made strong representations to Pakistan about the use of US equipment. We had made clear that we could not accept this.

SECRET

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Authority FRUS 64-68, vol 25 #195
By JC NARA, Date 3-2-04

Nehru asked about the China problem. He said that his government had no firm evidence, but that it felt there was a clear Chinese-Pakistani-Indonesian understanding "to put a triple squeeze on us." Perhaps the Chinese would not go to war, but at least they would use political pressure. If the Chicoms did come in, what do we do?

The President said this was "giving us gray hairs right now." We were worried, but we just didn't know what the Chicoms would do. The cardinal point was, however, to keep Pakistan from going the Chinese route. For all we knew, Pakistan might have some kind of agreement with China. Nehru interjected that India thought the Indonesian contribution might be to take the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. India couldn't stop this; it had no navy.

The President reiterated that we must all back U Thant in order to get peace. The whole future of Asia was at stake. However, stronger US public noises about the Chinese Communist threat might only provoke Peiping.

Raising the Kashmir question, Nehru said that a nation under attack could not even talk about a Kashmir settlement at such a time. That would mean surrender. We can not let them shoot their way into getting Kashmir. At this point the President raised the question of our aid bill. He was afraid that the India-Pak mess might kill the aid bill. He had managed to ram it through the House, but the Senate was another matter. Other countries didn't seem to realize our problems on these matters. Those who criticized our lack of sophistication or our policies didn't realize that Congress might just listen to them and stop aid.

Then the President described how Shastri and Ayub visits last spring would have been at precisely the wrong time. Congress was always looking for awkward statements by foreign leaders or for the President himself to make mistakes which would permit them to cut aid. Then recently we were within one week of passing the aid bill when war broke out. He regretted that the delays in postponing the earlier visit scheduled for Ayub, and then the leak, had made it difficult for us to notify Shastri in time. Nehru assured him that there was "no ill will left" about the visit postponement. The President had no need to worry. Indeed Shastri had hoped to come in October, but this was probably impossible now because of the war.

The President summed up by saying that what was urgently needed was (1) all-out support for the Syg; (2) rush the aid bill through; (3) tell both sides not to use our equipment; and (d) watch the Chinese. He had spent

two hours on this problem today, and stressed that we "must find the solution". We would do everything we could. The future of Asia is at stake. Recalling his 1962 visit with pleasure, he said he had the warmest feeling for the people of India. We were anxious to do everything we could in the hope that India one hundred years from now would be like the United States.

The President said that "what I am doing in this country this year, I would like to do worldwide. My foreign policy is the Great Society." He described how there were only four bills left of all those that he hoped to get passed this year. When he got these passed, his domestic job would be largely done. Foreign aid was the toughest, though. The US had spent $800 billion on armaments since the end of World War II. One could remake the world with $800 billion. The President then took Nehru to meet various members of his staff.

R. W. Komer

Distribution
Mr Bundy
S/S (3)

54

~~SECRET~~

September 9, 1965

McGB:

Here's State's revision of my brief. They just added two points. It reads well.

I'll sit in unless you'd rather not.

RWK

Attach. Talking Points for Mtg w/Amb. BNehru

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By JC, NARA, Date 3-2-04

55

Reviewed By State

SECRET

September 9, 1965

India + Kashmir

TALKING POINTS FOR BK NEHRU

1. You appreciate Shastri's letter, and think the US has a pretty good picture of how the present crisis evolved. But no point in arguing over who flung the first stone. The simple fact is that Pakistan and India have allowed themselves to drift into an open war which will settle nothing but which has in it the seeds of disaster for both countries involved.

2. Nor do we want to argue the merits of the Kashmir dispute. Could Kashmir possibly be worth such risks as both countries are courting now? We have never been able to understand why Pakistan or India centered their policies toward each other on the dispute over Kashmir, which has been at sharp expense to their larger interests both in nation-building and in collaboration against a growing external threat. We've tried our best for years to help achieve a peaceful settlement of this dispute, precisely because of our fear of just what has happened now.

3. The immediate, over-riding need is for both countries to haul back from the lip of the abyss before they both fall in. That's why we solidly back U Thant and the SC cease-fire appeal, and why we will not--indeed cannot--help either side.

4. Neither India nor Pakistan have taken seriously our repeated warnings of Congressional disillusionment with our massive aid to them. But this latest disaster has almost led to a Hill revolt, as Rusk found out yesterday. It's not only a matter of giving arms to friends who use it against each other, but of our being expected to bankroll economic development while two friends waste their own substance on senseless quarrels among themselves.

5. We don't know how to assess the latest Chicom note, but it could be ominous. The Chicom threat to India's future is so great in any case that it would seem to us a cardinal aim of Indian as well as US policy should be to keep Pakistan from joining the Chinese.

6. At any rate the dangers in the current war are so critical--communal outbreak, a halt in economic development, possible Chicom

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St/WH Guidelines;
Authority NSC ltr. 8/12/76
By JC NARA, Date 3-2-04

involvement--are so great that you earnestly appeal to Shastri to cooperate fully with U Thant. This war must be halted, or India and Pakistan will both be the losers. Neither side can win anything commensurate with the risks involved. It is the future of free India and Pakistan which is at issue now--not Kashmir.

RWKomer/jk

56 file

Sidey + Bator Rostow

~~SECRET~~

September 9, 1965
9:00 a. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is a hasty review of your decisions and guidelines on India/Pak matters. It's doubtless incomplete but forms a pretty coherent picture.

November 1963. You saw Bhutto twice while he was here for President Kennedy's funeral, the second time to receive a note from Ayub. You told him you were "a friend of Pakistan and would try to continue to be one if Pakistan would let you." You reminded him we were paying "great attention" to Chinese Communist actions and were therefore concerned about the scheduled Chicom state visit to Pakistan. You "wanted him to know there would be a problem of public relations in this country if Pakistan should build up its public relations with Communist China." You said you were not pro-Pakistani or pro-Indian but pro-Free World. "The United States was not going to let anyone attack Pakistan. But it was going to be increasingly difficult for us in this country when Pakistan invited the Chinese Communists for state visits."

9 December 1963. Letter thanking Ayub for message delivered by Bhutto also underscored your concern over Pakistan's several recent "actions which redound to the advantage of Communist China," especially the state visit planned for February 1964. "Regardless of Pakistan's motivations, which I understand but frankly cannot agree with, these actions undermine our efforts to uphold our common security interests in the face of an aggressive nation which has clearly and most explicitly announced its unswerving hostility to the Free World." You said you were aware of his "intensity of feelings" about India and reminded him "we have given--solemnly and with full awareness of their significance and importance--assurances that we would come to Pakistan's assistance in the event of aggression from India."

30 January 1964. You replied to Ayub letter explaining that he had asked for a Security Council meeting because India had begun to "integrate" Kashmir. While we would help wherever we could, we continued to believe that the Kashmir problem would have to be settled between India and Pakistan, not by a solution imposed from outside.

8 February 1964. You signed NSAM 279 on "Military Assistance to India and Pakistan." You approved "exploratory approaches looking toward possible five year MAP programs for India and Pakistan" but said you did not want us to discuss MAP levels yet with either country.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 12-350
By LWB NARA, Date 12-19-2014

We were to "make clear to both countries what we expect of them in return for prospective long-term military aid." You singled out for India holding down defense expenditures, so they wouldn't upset our economic program. In Pakistan, you required that "our MAP help should be appropriately linked to satisfactory performance with respect to its alliance obligations and to our intelligence facilities."

4 June 1964. You were to see Indian Defense Minister Chavan, but he had to leave suddenly because of Nehru's death. So you approved a press release and McNamara-Chavan memo outlining the agreements reached while Chavan was here. The Indians had produced a Five-Year Defense Plan; we agreed to $50 million MAP in FY 65 but withheld any definite commitment beyond that. We also agreed to $10 million credit in FY 64 for military purchases and $50 million in FY 65.

7 July 1964. Ambassador Ahmed delivered a letter from Ayub spelling out the dangers of US military aid to India. You interrupted Ahmed's presentation to ask whether this explained Ayub's silence on requests for help in Vietnam, which had "shocked you." After an exchange on Ayub's statement that he might have to "reconsider" Pakistan's "commitments to her allies," you said you could not agree with Ayub's analysis but "guessed we were coming to the point at which we would all have to re-evaluate the condition of our relationship." This troubled you deeply because of your warm personal regard for Ayub and the Pak people.

15 July 1964. You reviewed US-Pak relations with McConaughy, who explained that Ayub felt we had not taken Pak views into account in developing MAP for India. You gave him an oral message to Ayub along these lines: "You had read Ayub's letter with considerable distress. You did not share Ayub's view that we were being disloyal to our alliance. You were distressed by his attentions to Communist China. You recognized Pakistan's right to re-examine its policies. We valued the Pak alliance, but we would have to re-examine our policies too, if Pakistan did." You then told McConaughy that you would decide after our election whether you wanted "to have Ayub here for a debating contest, or let Pakistan go its own way." You asked how much we were getting for the large amounts of aid we have given India and Pakistan, especially now that Ayub was no longer willing to help in Southeast Asia. You were not sure all our actions with India have been the wisest possible but we were set on that course and would see it through. Then after the election we should take a "long look" at our Indian policy over the next four years.

July 29, 1964. You instructed McConaughy to give Ayub an oral message in response to Ayub's letter, including this point: "USG expected Pakistan to join the Free World effort in Vietnam and at least show the flag there."

56a

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

SECRET 1965

18 February 1965. You wrote Ayub confirming your invitation for a Washington visit 25-30 April. 23 March 1965 letter invited Shastri.

14 April 1965. You wrote Ayub: "I have . . . reluctantly come to the view that this month is not a good time for the two of us to meet in Washington. . . I think it would be in the interests of both our countries and contribute to the assurances of close and mutually helpful relations between us if we could postpone our meeting until later this year--perhaps early in the fall. . . . I shall, therefore, look forward to a full, frank and friendly discussion, but I do think it can be more profitable in a few months than at the moment." Similar letter to Shastri.

20 April 1965. You told Mann you did not want to make any pledge to the Indian consortium till our aid bill was passed. Upon pleas that the pledge was due the next day, you authorized one only if it was sufficiently hedged by conditions that we were not obligated to any specific level or timing.

23 April 1965. Following the above, we assembled for you a rundown on current Pak/Indian aid decisions. You approved four small loans, but disapproved any advanced on FY 66 money because we might not even get an aid bill.

21 June 1965. You approved several tactical moves (stalling on MAP, stalling on the July Pak consortium meeting, thinking about signalling via [redacted] with the Paks) to flesh out a harder line designed to make the Paks and Indians come to us. You elaborated to Mann and Kemer why you felt unable to approve any US pledge until Congress had appropriated the funds. On June 30 (Deptel 1485) McConaughy was instructed to inform Shoaib and/or Ayub that "given fact US Congress has not yet completed its authorization action on aid bill, given fact that after authorization process is completed it will be necessary to go through a separate appropriation procedure in the Congress, given consortium meeting be postponed until after Congress adjourns." (Note: This message (Deptel 1485) conveyed to Ayub by McConaughy "almost verbatim" to Ayub. "Ayub took the news quite hard--worse than I had anticipated.").

July - August. Discussions of new India PL 480 agreement. In early July, you told Mann to get the Indians to ask us for PL 480 before you'd approve a new agreement. On 15 July (?) B. K. Nehru brought in Shastri's 14 July letter and you gave a go-ahead for a stop-gap agreement to cover two months' supply.

SECRET

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ IRAC 12-351
By UCD NARA, Date 11-13-12

6 July, 1965. You requested (via Bundy memo to Rusk and McNamara) an orchestrated USG effort to convince Pakistan of our dissatisfaction with its current posture.

18 July 1965. You told Bundy "you would like to get a message to the Paks either through a letter to Ayub or a talk with the Ambassador - making it very clear indeed that you do not propose to talk about assistance programs until they have been authorized and appropriated by the Congress." Rusk said "that the message had been communicated over and over, but that he thought it would be good to do it again."

2 August 1965. You asked Komer through Califano to pass on to Rusk and McNamara that we ought to get the word to Ayub that he couldn't afford to wait out the 23 September consortium deadline because you wanted to talk with him before approving our pledge. You talked with Rusk, McNamara and Goldberg yourself and underscored that we should get the word out that the Paks couldn't run our India policy, though we didn't want to be Pakistan's masters either. You told Goldberg to talk with the Pak ambassador at the UN and told us to do what we thought best

4 August 1965. John Bonny of Morrison Knudsen delivered an oral message from Ayub. You voiced your annoyance with the way Ayub had reacted to the consortium postponement but said you'd be willing to talk to him as soon as the aid bill was through Congress. "Then you would decide what to do in our national interest." You warned that Ayub couldn't pressure us by trying his case in the papers.

6 August 1965.

and approved Rusk's recommendation that no further additions or improvements be undertaken at this time.

20 August 1965. In commenting on a wrapup of our Pak/Indian progress you noted: "We will await Congressional action before commitments. Then we will await their visit before participating in consortium. Goldberg goes too far in assuming as soon as Congress acts all is well. We will determine what is in our national interest and act accordingly after Ayub visit. Get this word to them loud, clear and unequivocal. L."

4 September 1965. Reply to Ayub letter of September 2 (regarding the critical situation in Kashmir) urging that Pakistan accede to the SYG's appeal for an immediate cease fire.

R. W. Komer

57

~~SECRET~~ September 1, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MARVIN WATSON

Since the President told the Indian Ambassador he'd be delighted to see their Finance Minister, we're committed on this one. But we may want to keep it off the record. I'd suggest a half hour.

R. W. Komer

Att. Read/Bundy Memo 8/31/65, subj. Request for Apptmt w/President for TTKrishnamachari, Indian Finance Minister

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By pc, NARA, Date 3-2-04

58

SECRET

September 1, 1965

Indian
x PL 480
x Pak

Mac -

Queries on Title III. AID's top PL 480 guy (Herb Waters) says one or another voluntary agency rep has called practically every day for the last 3-4 weeks. Since we've gone ahead on every other Title III program (as we normally do each July), the focus is right on India-Pak-UAR-Algeria. All confirm that the reason we haven't had more flak is that we've been pleading bureaucratic reasons for delay.

Waters says that the last time we suspended Title III for "political reasons"--during Suez, there was quite a stir with complaints to the Hill, etc. We later cut off Mexico for non-political reasons, and Bishop Swanstrom (head of CRS) took it to Mansfield.

Some 20 voluntary agency heads are being asked in tomorrow to talk help to Vietnam refugees. Waters says we'll surely get queries then. The Advisory Committee on voluntaries then meets here 15 Sept.

From attached you'll see that we've made before all the arguments rehearsed this morning. So I'm convinced that what we need is a way to help the President divide the honors. Would restricting the programs to six months do the trick?

RWK

SECRET

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jfw NARA, Date 3-2-04

India
x PL480
x Pak

59

SECRET

August 31, 1965
Tuesday/5:30 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Wednesday Meeting on Pak/Indian Matters. While the immediate purpose is to talk Title III PL 480, this is also a good chance for you to remind all concerned where you want to go on Pak/Indian matters in general.

In a nutshell, we now have the Indians nibbling on an October Shastri visit and coming to us on aid. The Paks are playing harder to get, but the British hope to see Ayub this week. We've also been passing other quiet signals. The trouble is that the looming Kashmir crisis precipitated by Ayub could easily blow up and wreck all our plans. We have quite disturbing reports that the Paks plan to escalate another notch by committing regulars. Here in brief are the points on which you might hear argument tomorrow.

I. What To Do About Kashmir? Despite our fears, it seems best to push the UN and UK out in front on this one, because intervention wins us no friends and we have plenty of other painful business with Paks and Indians on our plates. If a vicious cycle of escalation develops, however, we too may need to weigh in. We could at least privately urge restraint on both parties, which know by now that US aid is no longer a sure thing.

II. Consortium Strategy. Bundy and I have been steadily putting out the word "no meeting--no pledge," but many people are still putting more energy into worrying about the risks than into trying to get Ayub here. These risks are real, and it would be useful for you to remind all concerned you're well aware of them. Moscow almost certainly scents a chance to get us out of Peshawar, and might happily invest a few MIGs and aid loans in the effort. But Ayub probably recognizes by now that if he starts fiddling with the last real US asset in Pakistan he risks being cut off without a nickel (in fact the Paks have carefully avoided even mentioning Peshawar, despite all their brickbats to date).

So we suggest you tell State to come up with the best way to slide right past 23 September and to get Ayub here. Once the aid bill passes, we'll have to be ready with a new line (a Kashmir flareup, with the Paks to blame, may give us an excuse).

III. Title I for India. The two months time we bought with our million tons of wheat is running out, and the Indian food situation is getting worse. State/AID/Agriculture are working up a stiff interim 10 month agreement to cover

SECRET

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By RCB, NARA, Date 3-2-04

the period till we revise PL 480 next year. The basic problem here is that if we cut off food to India in the middle of a Kashmir crisis, it will inevitably be regarded as political pressure and a pro-Pak gesture to boot. No action required yet since the proposal will come before you shortly.

IV. Title III Programs for India-Pakistan-UAR-Algeria. This is the item on which you wanted us to see you (we've included Freeman--and Reuter so he wouldn't keep pressing for an appointment). These small programs, mostly school feeding, aren't government-to-government but run by the voluntary agencies. So they give us little leverage, yet their do-good constituency here will be up in arms if we cut them off. If you feel the annual renewal proposed is too much, I'd suggest cutting it to six months. This should carry us through to when new PL 480 legislation has to be introduced next year--and we can then say wait till the new law is passed.

MAP FOR India-Pakistan. We've kept this off the agenda so we can do the analysis you want, and let McNamara get back to review it. There is real appeal to suspending MAP, at least till Kashmir quiets down, but the risk is that (1) we leave the field wholly to the Soviets and Chicoms; (2) trigger a violent Pak as well as Indian reaction which would mess up the delicate game we're playing to bring both around.

- - - - - - -

There is considerable feeling among the worry-warts that you feel we ought to write off India and Pakistan as bottomless pits, and concentrate on Southeast Asia. We've tried to knock this on the head by saying: (a) nobody needs to tell you that the Indian subcontinent is still the key area we, Moscow, and Peiping are all competing for in Asia, and to which Vietnam is only an antechamber; but (b) somehow the town is slow to catch up with you that we aren't yet getting our money's worth from the $1.2 billion odd we invest annually in India/Pakistan--the former is floundering and the latter is slipping away from us; so (c) you're bound and determined to use this leverage to get more results or else cut our commitments accordingly. Thus it's up to the town to stop fighting the problem and start doing this job.

Hearing some such word directly from you would help mightily to get people to stop moaning and start working on what may yet become almost as big a headache as Vietnam.

R. W. Komer

60

India

August 28, 1965

Mac -

You'll know how to handle this better than I. May I just send it on cold, or with simple notation that this makes sense to thee and me?

RWK

Att. Read/Bundy Memo 8/27, encl. for WH approval
ltr Rusk to VP re visit to India of CongDel.

61

Indian + Pak

SECRET

August 28, 1965
Saturday/10:30 am

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pak/Indian Roundup. Kashmir is still bubbling merrily and could blow up. U Thant fears the whole 1949 cease-fire agreement may collapse. He wanted to report blaming the Paks for starting the mess, but the Paks threatened to withdraw from the UN if he did. Nor are the Indians too eager to take Kashmir to the UN lest the whole question of its status be reopened (which is what the Paks want).

Bowles sees mounting pressures for Indian retaliation and urges we call the Pak bluff that they aren't involved, lest they be encouraged to think they are getting away with the game. In fact, we have [redacted] a most reliable report that both the Kashmir infiltration and the earlier Rann of Kutch affair are part of a "well-organized plan" to force a Kashmir settlement. This plan was checked out with both the Chicoms and Indos. Worth reading (Tab A).

The UK gambit. Wilson sent a rather bland letter to Ayub (Tab B), as an opener to get Ayub to see his envoy next week. We think we frightened the Brits enough to get them to try hard, but I suspect that after they sound out Ayub Harold Wilson will be back at you.

Meanwhile the true extent of our disillusionment with the Paks is being gotten out through various quiet channels (the Pak Ambassador here is highly chastened, whatever his demeanor on the Sequoia). Even if Ayub doesn't come till October or so, all this will help insure that he comes in the right mood.

Ayub and Shastri Visits. The Kashmir flare-up makes it difficult for either to firm up plans now, though I'll wager we could land Shastri if you wrote him directly, reminding him we'd love to have him though we realized Kashmir might get in the way. My hunch still is that this would also help move along Ayub.

Wednesday Meeting. Though we've scheduled a Wednesday morning meeting of Rusk, Mann, and Bell with you on Title III feeding programs, Bundy and I suggest we broaden it to include Pak/Indian problems in general. We keep putting out the word "no meeting no pledge" but getting it directly from you would be quite useful at this point.

[redacted]
Typed text of Wilson/Ayub ltr

R. W. Komer

SANITIZED
Authority FRUS 64-68 Vol. 25, #175
By jc NARA, Date 3-7-04

SECRET

61a

~~SECRET~~

(Text of letter from Prime Minister Wilson to President Ayub)

I was glad to have your reply of 27 July to my message of 23 July in which I expressed my anxiety over developments in regard to the Pakistan Consortium.

I am sure that your Ambassador in Washington has kept you fully informed of the continuing and acute problems which face the United States Administration in getting their whole aid programme through Congress. There seem to have been profound and dangerous misunderstandings in the United States and in Pakistan which in particular affect United States aid to Pakistan and thus threaten the interests of us all.

In these circumstances I thought it right to send Pickard to Washington last week to ascertain more precisely the United States' difficulties and to explain our deep concern. I am so impressed by the dangers that I suggest, subject to your agreement, that we should, as your Commonwealth partner, explore what we can do to help. I am therefore asking Sir Morrice James to seek a frank exchange of views on the subject immediately on his return to Pakistan later this week.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By ja, NARA, Date 3201

62

India

8/26/65

Miss Laise - here is the letter from D. Singh I called you about. Per your suggestion Mr. Komer said to send it to you for a possible draft reply.

JK

63

August 20, 1965

India

Liz =

As you requested, we have told B. K. Nehru that Mrs. Johnson will accept October 14. I'll personally make sure that we get some brief remarks.

R. W. Komer

64

India
X TTK Visit

McGB: August 18, 1965

State is scheduling Indian Finance Minister T. T. Krishnamachari, who will be here 13-18 September. They'll be sending over a formal request for an appointment with the President, since LBJ told B. K. Nehru he'd be "delighted" to see TTK.

However, TTK has also asked for a separate appointment with you. Though he'll be concentrating on aid, he'll have a broad brief and will certainly get into the political realm too. RWK feels your seeing him after he sees the President would give us a chance to underline what the President tells him and provide any gloss that might help. We'd lay this on informally with State.

An alternative would be for you to sit in on the TTK-LBJ talk and then chat for a few minutes on the way out.

Separate appointment? Sit in with President? Don't want to see him?

HHS

65

India + Pak

~~SECRET~~

August 14, 1965
5:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pak/Indian Roundup. Pak criticism of us is temporarily overshadowed by the fracas in Kashmir. The Paks are flatly denying any involvement, but all our intelligence says otherwise. Though so far contained by India, this may yet become a major crunch. It may reflect a Pak effort to muddy US/Pak/Indian relations by dragging in the Kashmir issue again.

Ayub visit. We've put out two direct feelers--Goldberg to Amjad Ali, John Bonny to Ayub's best friend, and are now cranking up the UK. Rusk talked with Pat Dean yesterday. The British will give it the old college try if we worry them enough. So we're bringing their key man here to work him over (I'll make sure he gets the word). However, I doubt that Ayub will decide to come until we soften him up some more. Laying on a Shastri visit will help.

Shastri visit. You certainly softened up B. K. Nehru (and Mann did a brilliant job on him too). He's back and told Tom that Shastri could come for a few days in October, though he'd prefer January. We've told Bowles to land the fish, but to warn him gently against being too critical if he comes.

Softening up Ayub. While the British will help a good deal here, we're exploring other possibilities too. Because the Paks carefully scan the US press, we can use it to get back to them our side of the story (I've backgrounded Phil Potter and the Washington Post). But State, Defense, AID, and the intelligence people are still reluctant to move; I'm afraid they're all still focussing more on how to avoid stirring up the Paks than on how to bring them to us.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLC 032R-23-2-3-7
By JJL NARA Date 2-12-18

file

66

India

August 11, 1965

MEMO FOR LIZ CARPENTER

The Indian Ambassador would like to ask Mrs. Johnson to say a few words to open formally the Nehru Memorial Exhibition at the Smithsonian on the evening of 14 October. However, they don't want to embarrass her by putting her on the spot, so are inquiring informally whether she'd be interested and available.

This is a first-rate show and won all kinds of compliments for presentation and as a fitting tribute when it opened in New York last winter. The Vice President, the Chief Justice, Mrs. Kennedy all attended then. Since, it's been to London and, after Washington, will go on to Chicago and Los Angeles.

So it would be appropriate for the First Lady to do this if she wants. State heartily favors. However, we all realize the demands on Mrs. Johnson too and it's fair to point out that we've already blessed this exhibition via the VP. What informal word might I pass?

R. W. Komer

India
x Paks
x Ind/Pak

~~SECRET~~ August 11, 1965

INDIAN ARMY DEPLOYMENTS AGAINST PAKISTAN
April - May 1965

While Ayub exaggerated in saying that the "whole Indian army" had massed on his borders in the last three months (Karachi 147, 2 Aug.), it's easy to see how he could figure that something like two-thirds of it was pointed more at him than at China. It's not easy to square that statement with his more recent one that "30 divisions of troops" were involved on both sides, and that's probably more accurate by his mode of calculating. So it looks as if we should read these statements more as rhetorical flights than as serious order-of-battle reports.

Only about 183,000--8 divisions and 9 independent brigades--of the 942,000-man Indian army actually moved closer to Pak borders in April and May. Ayub is probably also justified in counting another 3 divisions and independent brigades together totaling 100,000 at their regular stations on the Jammu-Kashmir border and cease-fire line. He may also count 1 division in Ladahk and 6 in Northeast India, which didn't move, as close enough to be a direct threat; but our evidence shows these remained on the line, not deployed against Pakistan. So even allowing him to count 3 independent infantry brigades as the equivalent of a division, the most he could say is that the equivalent of 22 Indian divisions were involved (of which we'd count about 15)--by no means the "whole Indian army."

Peak Indian strength in The Rann of Kutch was about 14,000 army and police, almost all moved into the area from outside. Chief forces were the 31st Infantry, 50th Parachute and 9th Mountain Artillery Brigades. The 50th came from Agra (south of Delhi) and the 31st and 9th moved from Ahmadabad and Aurangabad, both southeast of the Rann. Pak forces numbered about the same.

Just north of the Rann, the Indians moved the 67th Infantry Brigade (4,000 men) closer to the border from Jodhpur to block any Pak flanking movement.

But what really worried the Paks was the movement in the Punjab, where top Indian strength reached an estimated 123,000 (Paks never got much over 70,000). In the Punjab and bordering areas of neighboring states are normally stationed 4 regular divisions (4th, 7th, 11th, 15th), the 2nd (independent) Armored Brigade, and a corps headquarters with normal artillery support. All four of these divisions plus the 2nd Armored

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Authority NAC 032A-37-2-5-0
By JDW NARA Date 2-13-18

Brigade moved closer to the border. The only units moved into this area from a distance were the 1st Armored Division (from Jhansi in central India) and 3 brigades (68th Infantry from Srinagar, 116th Infantry from Bangalore in Southern India, and elements of the 6th Division in Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh), a total of about 40,000 troops. So the actual buildup in the region was relatively small, though the deployment was substantial.

There was no change in the 100,000-man force along the border and cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir (19th, 25th, 26th Divisions plus 68th, 121st, 191st Brigades). But Ayub would reckon these as deployed against him, anyway, especially after the 121st seized Pak posts inside the cease-sire line near Kargil about 16 May.

The Indians moved about 42,000 men against the East Pak border. This included one mountain division (9th) and an infantry brigade (32nd) deployed between Calcutta and Jessore. Elements of another division (20th) in West Bengal near the corridor were turned around, and a brigade (59th) was deployed near Silchar against the eastern border. The Paks would also argue that the other 5 divisions in Northeast India (17th and 27th in the Sikkim corridor, 2nd and 5th in NEFA, 23rd in Assam) could have turned against East Pakistan. It's hard to draw a line here, but we have no evidence of actual movement.

In addition to these 5 divisions in the Northeast, the 3rd in Ladakh, the 8th in Nagaland, the 10th and 14th in Central and South India, and elements of the 6th in Uttar Pradesh remained on station.

So while Ayub is wrong in talking about the "whole Indian army" massing on his borders, the numbers highlight his basic worry. He argues that the Indian army before our aid ran about 450,000 and 10 plus divisions. Now with the increase to 20 plus divisions and 942,000 men, India can move 8 plus divisions against him and station 3 others on his borders without seriously reducing those on anti-China duty. Indian troops which actually moved toward his borders (not to mention the 100,000 stationed there in Jammu-Kashmir) just about equaled the 189,000 in his whole army. The Paks also judge rightly that their qualitative superiority is slipping as the Indians pull themselves out of their pre-1962 doldrums.

HHS

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67a

SECRET

DEPLOYMENT OF INDIAN ARMY
APRIL - MAY 1965

DIVISIONS

Moved closer to Pak borders

* 4th	Punjab	
7th	"	
11th	"	
15th	"	
1st	"	
* 6th	(minus elements)	"
9th	West Bengal	
* 20th	"	"

Did not move

19th	Jammu-Kashmir	
25th	"	"
26th	"	"
* 3rd	Ladakh	
* 17th	Sikkim	
* 27th	"	
* 2nd	NEFA	
* 5th	NEFA	
* 23rd	Reserve in Assam	
8th	Nagaland	
10th	South India	
14th	Central India (Saugar)	

INDEPENDENT BRIGADES

Moved closer to Pak borders

31st	Infantry	Rann
* * 50th	Parachute	"
9th	Mountain Artillery	"
67th	Infantry	North of Rann
2nd	Armored	Punjab
68th	Infantry	"
116th	Infantry	"
59th	Mountain	Against E. Pakistan
32nd	Infantry	" "

Did not move

9	Infantry
3	Anti-aircraft
1	Armored
4	Artillery
1	Parachute

---

* Some MAP support

** Limited MAP support (about 500 parachutes) through last year.

DIA-25x1

cc: Maj. Vinatti, DIA

[redacted]

SECRET

No Objection To Declassification 2001/08/09 : NLJ-032-023-2-8-4

SANITIZED
Authority NLJ-032-023-2-8-4
By jc NARA, Date 3-704

68 file

RWK Note to McGB: "After this morning I'd better check this with you. My instinct is to tell State this is their business.

India

~~SECRET~~

RWK: August 6, 1965

Rusk has to answer a letter from Humphrey asking support for a strong Congressional delegation to India, probably late November. After an Indian delegation visited Congress in 1963, the Indian parliament sent a reciprocal invite. Congress begged off then because of JFK's death and the long session. Now B. K. Nehru has sounded out Humphrey and is about to deliver a renewed invitation.

Humphrey is all for it. But the problem is to drum up top level interest on the Hill. Hence Humphrey's request for a plug from Rusk. The idea would be not just to send the faithful but to try to convert a couple of the curmudgeon's too.

Rusk proposes replying this way: Bowles would welcome a Congressional delegation as a real opportunity to let key legislators see firsthand what we're doing in India. Rusk would hope this would be more than just a protocol visit and that a strong delegation would take a piercing look at our AID and other programs there.

SOA's question is whether they should formally clear Rusk's reply to Humphrey with the White House in view of the President's tight control on our Indian tactics or whether they should just go ahead assuming (with your blessing) that this project is right in line with the President's desire to bring key Congressmen along behind him.

My own sense is that this is just the sort of thing the President wants--a hard look at India. So should I tell State to go ahead? Or would you rather (a) check across the street or (b) ask to clear formally (this might look like policing the VP)?

5/18/65
RWK to HHS
Tell SOA this up
to Secy as to
whether he wants
to touch base w/ Pres.

HHS

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-2-04

~~SECRET~~

69

CONFIDENTIAL

August 5, 1965

Mr. President -

The things you said to BK Nehru apparently sank in. We could hardly have given a better backgrounder than attached ourselves.

R. W. Komer

Att. Delhi 206 / 8/4/65

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Authority NSC 8-12-76
By jcl rg, NARA, Date 3-2-04

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By JC, NARA, Date 3-2-04

10

SECRET

July 30, 1965

RWK:

Here are my gleanings from lunch with Sid Sober today. Some may not be news to you.

Above all, though he is a very astute guy, he reflects the impact of the last few months' shocks on thinking at the State working level. When he asked me where we go from here, I suggested turning our thoughts to steps toward an LBJ meeting. He agreed but said that had been State's position before the April postponement so he was at a loss to figure out where we have been going the last few months. When I said that maybe the post-April shocks have educated people on both sides to the dire need for a new understanding, he agreed but countered with the thought that such an agreement might be harder to reach now because of the nasty things that have been said.

All this is to point out the fact that State's working level is partially paralyzed because the President grabbed the reins long enough to change course but then turned them back without giving any clear directions. Insofar as he did set the course, it hasn't filtered clearly past the Seventh Floor.

Here are some specific points:

1. Bell yesterday send a memorandum to Rusk recommending against a small commodity loan now since the Paks have been so nasty to us. Bill Cargo, the DCM, is in town and wants to press for a small loan but State doesn't quite know how to proceed now that even Bell is lined up against it, albeit for political reasons which State should feel justified to challenge.

2. Mann is now talking about sending Eugene Black (or maybe George Woods) to talk to Ayub.

Marrying these two points with your idea of a September Ayub-LBJ meeting, I'd suggest that an emissary like Black, in addition to clearing the air, might ask Ayub to call off his campaign in order "to make it possible" for us to go ahead with a program loan. Such a bargain might provide tokens of good faith on both sides and pave the way for a top level meeting.

3. Mann is also toying with the idea of letting other consortium members give in to Pak pressures and announce their pledges now. He

has the idea that if everyone else had pledged, perhaps we could say there was no need for a meeting and thereby remove the 23 September deadline for reaching a new understanding with the Paks. Sober thinks this is an interesting idea but doubts that it would work out quite so easily.

4. Two points on India:

(a) Sober's readout from the LBJ Nehru meeting is that Nehru is pleased by its cordiality but frankly at a loss to know what more the President wanted the GOI to do.

(b) Sid points out that it is not too early to begin working out the details of the big PL 480 agreement since it will have to go through the interagency staff committee again and since cotton will have to be added. Since I have been out of touch, I told him I couldn't give him any guidance on this but would check with you to see where we stood. In the interests of being ready to take the next step, whatever it may be, what guidance can we give?

HHS

71

SECRET

July 19, 1965

Mac -

Does this fill the bill? I believe I've made Chet a believer(at least for now) and told him that when he sees the President he should simply ask for instructions and not try to sell soap.

The only place I sounded really thin was on the binational foundation, where telling Chet that LBJ wanted a whole new look at how to spend excess currencies more wisely didn't wash. In fact the foundation idea does precisely what LBJ claims to want, and it's hard to fault Chet that we'll be the losers if we scratch it. He thinks the Indians will be pleased if it dies, and the Communists (who opposed it) delighted. Poor guy.

RWK

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jcfw, NARA, Date 3-2-04

71a

India

SECRET

July 19, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

After a long talk with Bowles over the weekend, I think he understands the drill and is determined to be a team player.

I made clear to him such matters as: (1) your deep concern over the Congressional pressures on aid programs generally and India/Pakistan specifically, and how you intended to change the aid programming cycle; (2) your concern lest there be too much special pleading on the part of US officials--if we let the Indians come to us a bit more they wouldn't take us so much for granted; (c) this would also increase their incentive (and our leverage) toward improvements in India's own performance--with aid money getting harder to get, all concerned had to work harder to justify it; and finally (d) the understandable irritation at all levels here when the very people whose battles we were fighting in Vietnam were gratuitously critical of our efforts.

Bowles thinks he can do a good deal to help bring Delhi around. All he naturally (and I think legitimately) argues is that we should use him as your ambassador and rely on his tactical sense. No one will ever cure Chet of wanting bigger and better programs, but I'm confident he sees they'll have to be earned. By the way, his physical recovery has been remarkable.

R. W. Komer

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 90-84 (#46)
By jclisp, NARA, Date 3-2-07

716

July 19, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

At Dr. William T. Close's request, He brought in Mr. Gandhi (grandsom of Mahatma) and Mr. Vaithiswaran who are editors of the new Indian weekly Himmat. They are also devout moral disarmers and spoke to me enthusiastically about the current Mackinac Island shindig.

I gave them a good pep talk about our great interest in India (they are strongly pro-American), expecially on Vietnam. I asked why there was any difference between the US coming to India's support when the Chicoms attacked in late 1962 and our coming to Vietnam's support when it too came under attack. The only difference was that one aggression was direct and the other indirect. They both quite agreed and were more distressed with GOI policy than I was. I stressed that my remarks were off the record.

R. W. Komer

72

SECRET July 16, 1965

MEMO FOR S/S

Attached are three copies of my Memo for Record on the President's 13 July 1965 talk with the Indian Ambassador. Because of its sensitivity, Mr. Mann has requested that circulation be restricted to himself, the Secretary, and Under Secretary Ball.

R. W. Komer

SECRET

India
+ 7 000 / 7

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By JC, NARA, Date 3-2-04

72a

SECRET

July 16, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: President's Talk with Ambassador B. K. Nehru, July 13, 1965

PRESENT: The President
H.E. B. K. Nehru, Indian Ambassador
Under Secretary Thomas Mann
Mr. R. W. Komer

The President greeted Ambassador Nehru cordially. After some small talk, the President asked about Shastri's trip to Canada and Europe. Nehru thought it had been quite successful. He described how Shastri had asked him in Ottawa how Vietnam was ever going to be settled. He had replied there was no easy way to settle Vietnam, but constant Indian comments didn't help the situation any. In effect Shastri should keep quiet about Vietnam.

Nehru then presented a letter from Prime Minister Shastri, which he described as a response to President Johnson's letter of 5 June. The President read it carefully, remarking that he was very pleased that the Rann of Kutch issue had been settled. Nehru agreed that it was a "great relief."

The President expressed his appreciation for Mr. Shastri's letter. As for Shastri's request that he see Finance Minister Khrishnamachari during the latter's visit in September, he would be delighted to do so.

Then the President noted Shastri's emphasis on food. He was considering a message to Congress on the Asian food problem so that Congress itself could become more fully involved. There was some feeling in the Congress against so much aid to other countries. Aside from the many complaints about aid in general, some Congressmen didn't understand why countries like India should go for steel mills instead of fertilizer. The President's idea was to get the House and Senate to debate out the issue of whether we should provide "food for famine", and decide on what position they wanted to take. The President himself was strongly for providing such help. He kept rereading Barbara Ward's book "Rich Nations

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Authority E.O. 12356-68, sec. 25 #149
By JC, NARA, Date 3-2-07

and Poor Nations", and felt deeply the moral obligation of rich nations like the United States to help others. So he had told Secretary Rusk just today that he wanted a food for famine proposal put before the Congress as soon as possible.

The President mentioned that because of the Congressional problem he had also held up a new pledge to the Pakistan consortium until the appropriation had been acted upon. He commented on the difficulties of getting the aid bill through, pointing out that the Administration had lost 12-8 on the bill in the Foreign Relations Committee, which simply shouldn't have happened. But the Indians kept telling us how to solve Vietnam and Ayub was off receiving Chou En-lai. This sort of thing certainly affected the vote. We had had to get the proxy of Senator Symington who was ill in Bethesda, but finally got the vote reversed 10-8.

The President then described his current difficulties with conference on the authorization bill. Fulbright wanted a two year bill; the House was adamant on one year. Their positions were irreconcilable. Besides all this, the Senate had gotten tired and one afternoon had let $200 million get cut off the barebones request he had sent up. In an exchange with Nehru, the President indicated that he'd like to get the $200 million from the Senate side and the two year bill from the House side; but the House wouldn't budge.

Then came the appropriation process. The President asked Nehru whether he had ever met Otto Passman. He described his next "easy job" was that of taking on Passman, who was always a tough customer. If he could only get by Passman, he was willing to gamble on the Senate in order to move ahead with discussions on aid to Pakistan.

On India's food needs, the President felt that we should promptly send a food for famine message to the Hill. He described the difficulties on the agricultural bill this year--on which he thought we would probably get licked. When Nehru praised his record to date, the President philosophized about his increasing difficulties with the Congress. In his judgment a Presidential mandate lasted only about six months under the US system. The Administration was having increasing difficulty with the mass media, with the muttering of the "diplomats", and with the Congress. So he was due for some reversals. It would become more difficult for the Administration to lead here and to lead abroad. He had no illusions about being able to maintain the present pace; in fact, he expected some reversals within the next 45 days. So he asked Nehru to give us any help he could in convincing the Congress about India's food needs. The President insisted that Congress must share this responsibility.

Nehru, referring to the Shastri letter, indicated that India's needs fell into two categories; first was the immediate need for food to avert great difficulty because India's food stocks were exhausted; second was a longer range aid need for the next 5 year plan. Commenting on India's immediate needs, the President said he certainly didn't want people to starve but wanted the Congress to be in partnership on whatever we did. So he told Messrs. Mann and Komer to get busy on a message to the Congress. Meanwhile, he said, we could do what needed to be done if necessary to avert catastrophe.

The President then described "in confidence" the difficulties the US was having in Vietnam, and what we were going to have to do. We were going to have to put in more people--at least 100,000 and perhaps double that number. We would also have to go for several billion dollars more in additional defense expenditures this year, and probably call up reserves, postpone the discharges of people serving in Vietnam, even increase the draft--perhaps calling up married men. McNamara was going to Vietnam to get the facts on which to base any such decisions. As an added problem, the Republicans were beginning to criticize our Vietnam policy. People like Congressman Ford wanted the President to do reckless things, but he would not do so. We were not bombing Hanoi nor were we crossing the Chinese frontier. So the President was mystified by the Chinese accusation that we had done so; he speculated that perhaps the Chinese were seeking to provide an excuse to cover some move that they planned. As Nehru knew, we had also tried in every way possible to get the North Vietnamese to talk but had failed. Now the latest effort, Wilson's sending Davies to Hanoi, had flopped too. The President ended up by indicating that he wasn't pessimistic. He didn't think we would lose out in Vietnam but it would be a long hard struggle. However, in view of the way the Indians seemed compelled to comment so often on Vietnam, we would certainly like to know India's solution. If Shastri knew how to settle Vietnam, we wished he would tell us.

As an example of how things could turn out better than they seemed at the low point, the President cited the Dominican Republic situation. He thought that it was steadily improving. There would have been a Castro regime in another 24 hours if we hadn't moved in. The Dominican Republic might yet go in this direction in the next election, but at least this would be a free choice.

At this point the President was informed that Ambassador Lodge was waiting, so he invited Nehru to stay and visit for a few moments with Lodge. After a brief discussion of the Problems Lodge would confront in Vietnam, the President showed the group the Rose Garden.

R. W. Komer

Distribution:

Secretary Rusk
Under Secretary Ball
Under Secretary Mann
Mr. McG. Bundy
Mr. R. W. Komer

73

~~SECRET~~

July 14, 1965

Tom -

Take a look at my read-out of the session with BK, and add or change as you will. I naturally left out all the personalia.

India

R. W. Komer

RWK Memo for Record 7/14/65, subj. President's Talk w/Amb. BNehru 7/13/65

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By JC, NARA, Date 3-2-04

OK by Mr Moore 7/16/65
w/o change
Final Version 7/16/65
See T.O.S/S

73a

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By JC, NARA, Date 3-2-04

~~SECRET~~/DRAFT July 14, 1965 - 9:15 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: President's Talk with Ambassador B. K. Nehru July 13, 1965

PRESENT: The President
Under Secretary Mann
Mr. Komer
Indian Ambassador Nehru

The President greeted Ambassador Nehru cordially. After considerable small talk, the President asked about Shastri's trip to Canada and Europe. Nehru thought it had been quite successful. He described how Shastri had asked him in Ottawa how Vietnam was ever going to be settled. He had replied there was no easy way to settle Vietnam and constant Indian comments didn't help the situation any. In effect Shastri should keep quiet about Vietnam.

Nehru then presented a letter from Prime Minister Shastri, which he described as being in response to President Johnson's letter of 5 June.

The President read it carefully, remarking inter alia that he was very pleased that the Rann of Kutch issue had been settled. Nehru replied that it was a "great relief."

The President said that he appreciated Mr. Shastri's letter very much. As for Shastri's request that he see Finance Minister Khrishnamachari during the latter's visit in September, he would be delighted to do so.

Then the President noted Shastri's emphasis on food. He was

considering a message to Congress on the Asian food problem so that Congress itself could become more fully involved. There was some feeling in the Congress against such help to other countries. Aside from the many complaints about aid in general, some Congressmen didn't understand why countries like India should go for steel mills instead of fertilizer. The President's idea was to get the House and Senate to debate out the issue of whether we should provide "food for famine", and decide on what position they wanted to take. The President himself was strongly for providing such help. He kept rereading Barbara Ward's book "Rich Nations and Poor Nations", and felt deeply the moral obligation of rich nations like the United States to help others. So he had told Secretary Rusk just today that he wanted a food for famine proposal put before the Congress as soon as possible.

The President mentioned that because of the Congressional problem he had also held up a new pledge to the Pakistan consortium until the appropriation had been acted upon. He commented on the difficulties of getting the aid bill through, pointing out that the Administration had lost 12-8 on the bill in the Foreign Relations Committee, which simply shouldn't have happened. But the Indians kept telling us how to solve Vietnam and Ayub was off receiving Chou En-lai. This sort of thing certainly affected the vote. We had had to get the proxy of Senator Symington who was ill in Bethesda, but finally got the vote reversed 10-8.

The President then described his current difficulties with conference on the authorization bill. Fulbright wanted a two year bill; the House was adamant on one year. Their positions were irreconcilable. Besides all this, the Senate had gotten tired and one afternoon had let $200 million get cut off the barebones request he had sent up. In an exchange with Nehru, the President indicated that what he preferred would be to get the $200 million from the Senate side and the two year bill from the House side; but the House wouldn't budge.

Then came the appropriation process. The President asked Nehru whether he had ever met Otto Passman. He described his next "easy job" that of taking on Passman, who was always a tough customer. If he could only get by Passman, he was willing to gamble on the Senate in order to move ahead with discussions on aid to Pakistan.

On India's food needs, the President felt that we should promptly send a food for famine message to the Hill. He described the difficulties on the agricultural bill this year--on which he thought we would probably get licked. When Nehru praised his record to date, the President philosophized about his increasing difficulties with the Congress. In his judgment a Presidential mandate lasted only about six months under the US system. The Administration was having increasing difficulty with the mass media, with the muttering of the "diplomats", and with the Congress. So he was due for some reversals. It would become more difficult for the Administration

to lead here and to lead abroad. He had no illusions about being able to maintain the present pace; in fact, he expected some reversals within the next 45 days. So he asked Nehru to give us any help he could in convincing the Congress about India's food needs. The President insisted that Congress must share this responsibility.

Nehru, referring to the Shastri letter, indicated that India's needs fell into two categories; first was the immediate need for food to avert great difficulty because India's food stocks were exhausted; second was a longer range aid need for the next 5-year plan. Commenting on India's immediate needs, the President said he certainly didn't want people to starve but wanted the Congress to be in partnership on whatever we did. So he told Messrs. Mann and Komer to get busy on a message to the Congress. Meanwhile, he said, we could do what needed to be done if necessary to avert catastrophe.

The President then described "in confidence" the difficulties the US was having in Vietnam, and what we were going to have to do. We were going to have to put in more people--at least 100,000 and perhaps double that number. We would also have to go for several billion dollars more in additional defense expenditures this year, and probably call up reserves, postpone the discharges of people serving in Vietnam, even increase the draft--perhaps calling up married men. McNamara was going to Vietnam to

get the facts on which to base any such decisions. As an added problem, the Republicans were beginning to criticize our Vietnam policy. People like Congressman Ford wanted the President to do reckless things, but he would not do so. We were not bombing Hanoi nor were we crossing the Chinese frontier. As Nehru knew we had tried in every way possible to get the North Vietnamese to talk but had failed. Now the latest effort, Wilson's sending Davies to Hanoi, had flopped too.

At this point the President said he was mystified by the Chinese accusation that we had done so; he speculated that perhaps the Chinese were seeking to provide an excuse to cover some move that they planned. The President ended up by saying that he wasn't pessimistic. He didn't think we would lose out in Vietnam but that it would be a long hard struggle. However, we would certainly like to know India's solution. If Shastri knew how to settle Vietnam, we wished he would tell us.

As an example of how things could turn out better than they seemed at the low point, the President cited the Dominican Republic situation. He thought that it was steadily improving. There would have been a Castro regime in another 24 hours if we hadn't moved in. The Dominican Republic might yet go in this direction in the next election, but at least this would be a free choice.

At this point the President was informed that Ambassador Lodge was waiting, so he invited Nehru to stay and visit for a few moments with Lodge.

After a brief discussion of the problems Lodge would confront in Vietnam, the President showed the group the Rose Garden.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

July 12, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDERSECRETARY MANN

Here is a copy of an info memo from McNamara to the President with a covering note from me. We don't like to hold up the President's mail, but you'll note I suggested avoiding any action till we could get a position worked out.

My own sense is that we should on the one hand avoid pushing either Paks or Indians too hard, but on the other hand keep stalling on key new programs till we see the whites of their eyes. Many bureaucrats in all agencies seem to be running scared, especially when the Paks growl back at us, but I feel this is no time for panic reactions. It isn't easy to make our clients come to us; it will take time and delicate handling. If we cave before the issue is joined, however, we'll have lost the ballgame.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

Attach: (1) McNamara Memo to President 7/5/65, subj. Pakistan and India
(2) RWK Memo to President 7/9/65, MAP for India and Pakistan

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-2-04

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jcfw, NARA, Date 3-2-04

India X India Econ
75

~~SECRET~~

July 12, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

B. K. Nehru appointment. He's coming in with quite a friendly Shastri letter, framed as an answer to your last one to him (attached). BK described the topics (Rann of Kutch, Vietnam, economic development, a visit next year, and PL 480) but was coy about the substance. Tom Mann said he'd talk with you about the visit problem.

The most immediate problem is of course food. Embassy Delhi reports that this issue is coming increasingly to the forefront as the lean months before the next harvest approach. Shastri has just scheduled a conference on it with his state governors 22 July. However, there's no press discussion of PL 480 yet.

We haven't told the Indians anyone is holding this up or what our position might be, so you have full freedom of action. Assuming that Shastri's request is suitable, the way would be open for you to respond along the lines discussed last Wednesday, perhaps as follows:

1. Condolences on death of BK's father Sunday.

2. We appreciate India's food and development problems, and have always tried to be helpful.

3. You gather that there are many technical PL 480 problems to be negotiated, such as the new Congressional requirement that the recipient pay ocean freight.

4. There's also some US feeling that India itself isn't doing enough to lick its agricultural problem, such as using enough fertilizer. The population explosion is also a factor. Orville Freeman tells you that if present trends continue India would need half the US wheat crop by 1970 to feed its people. So the US and India have to work out more effective ways of helping India move toward self-sufficiency.

5. You understand India's Food Minister says his immediate emergency need is for a million tons of grain to tide India over the lean months immediately ahead. To prevent an interruption in shipments, why not extend present agreement for two months or so, while we sort out all these other problems? However, we can't go behind Congress on ocean freight.

~~SECRET~~

6. You'll want to play Vietnam by ear, depending on what Shastri's letter says.

7. On a visit, unless signals have been changed, I'd suggest saying neither of us should get fixed in concrete on timing, because who knows what the coming months might bring.

R. W. Komer

76

SECRET

July 9, 1965

India
+ Pak Map
+ India Map
+ POW

Mac -

Weekend reading? I don't like to hold up McNamara's mail too long, but he came in without recommendations and we ought to give Tom Mann a swing at this too.

I favor the "second alternative" and in a way we already have LBJ's authority to stall. But I think we ought to touch base with State and DOD first, while still cluing the President as to the options.

RWK

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jfw, NARA, Date 3-20-04

16a

~~SECRET~~

July 9, 1965
11:15 am

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

MAP for India and Pakistan. Attached is a longish memo from Secretary McNamara describing our current programs. It breaks down into three categories: (a) FY 65 and prior programs still undelivered--roughly $50 million for Pakistan and $70 million for India; (b) FY 66 programs (roughly $46 million for Pakistan and $50 million for India), which have not yet been approved by DOD and passed as firm to the recipients; and (c) various other requests such as Ayub's recent plea for submarines, F-104s, and tanks. There are also certain dollar credit sales, which I presume we would not want to interfere with (e.g. the sale of $8 million in ammo to the Paks which you recently approved).

There are political risks in holding up MAP. It has traditionally been most sensitive to the Paks, who regard it as essential vis-a-vis India, and whose military are a major political force. As to the Indians, we could spook them to buy more from the USSR. There is also a real question of whether we want or need to hit either Paks or Indians harder than we have already, lest we trigger an open confrontation by pushing too hard.

Thus there is a case for continuing business as usual, except for continuing to hold off on key items such as F-5s for India and F-104s or submarines for the Paks.

A second alternative would be to handle MAP as you have economic aid: (a) continue with deliveries under FY 65 and prior grant programs for which the funds have been appropriated and commitments in effect made; (b) defer telling either we approve the FY 1966 programs, on the grounds that the funds have not yet been appropriated; (c) simply not respond on major additional requests until we have better indications as to the future attitudes of India and Pakistan.

We are not recommending any action till we can get the views of State and Defense. In the meantime, however, DOD will hold off telling the Paks and Indians about any FY 66 program approvals.

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Authority ERVS 64-68 vol. 25, #145
By K NARA, Date 3-2-04

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

Alice - for your files
Dee talked with McGB.

Rusk:
Up to date?
I doubt it.
McGB.
Amend Rusk.

SECRET

July 7, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a letter from Don Cook regretfully declining a Pak/Indian assignment on what seem quite legitimate grounds. In passing he offers some tentative reactions on aid to India and Pakistan. He sees a "humanitarian" need to help feed India's masses, but seems rather defeatist about our ability to achieve "political" aims with US aid.

He's probably right that partition was a great mistake in the first place. He's also dead right that serving our "political" aims should be the ultimate test of US aid. But he seems to give up too easily when he ends up suggesting that unless Pakistan and India pull together against Russia and China we might as well not compete. One flaw in our past policy is precisely that we geared it too much to getting India and Pakistan together over Kashmir (I recall your remark to McConaughy last July that you didn't think either country would settle this ancient feud). Our effort to do so gave the Paks an inflated idea that we'd get Kashmir for them, and convinced the Indians that we were Pak-lovers at heart. Since Pak-Indian animosity will last a long time, we can't afford to make eliminating it the immediate goal of our policy. On the other hand, we needn't despair of promoting eventual rapprochement. Over time, their growing awareness of the external Communist threat is going to thrust India and Pakistan together, just as it has France and Germany.

But the more important problem is to prevent trouble in South Asia of the sort we have in Southeast Asia right now. Buying insurance against this risk seems to be worth the price. And the price is less than that we are already paying in Southeast Asia, whereas South Asia is ten times more important. We lost China by failing to engage, and now look at the trouble Peiping is causing us. If we leave a similar vacuum in India the Communists will flow in there too (note that the USSR is greatly increasing its aid to India).

I suspect that Mr. Cook would grant that he neglected this key argument. We're playing for much larger stakes than settling Pak/Indian differences, important as this would be. If we withdrew from every ballgame where we didn't like the playing field, we could save a lot of money and lose a lot of games.

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-2-04

R. W. Komer

Att. Ltr to McGB 7/2/65 frm
Donald Cook/American Electric Power Co. Inc.

SECRET

78 file

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State/WH guidelines
By JK, NARA, Date 3-2-07

India + Pak

SECRET

Mac - July 6, 1965

I find Don Cook's letter discouraging. It's a strange combination of hard common sense and some mighty loose generalizations.

He's probably right that partition was a "great mistake." But it's a fact nonetheless, and I find it hard to accept that it's an "insurmountable obstacle" to successful aid programs in India or Pakistan. He's also dead right that serving our "political" aims is the ultimate test of success. But what he ends up saying in effect is that unless Pakistan and India pull together against Russia and China, we might as well not compete. The result would be chaos, and the gainers the enemy. Why not tell our European friends we won't defend any of them unless they pull together? Or Greece and Turkey? If we withdrew from every ballgame where we didn't like the playing field, we could save a lot of money and lose a lot of games.

I don't despair of promoting a rapprochement between India and Pakistan. But I don't regard it as a be-all and end-all either. We can successfully forestall chaos in the subcontinent by operating separately on both India and Pakistan. We've done pretty well so far, in fact. Over time, growing consciousness of a greater external threat is going to thrust India and Pakistan together, just as it has France, Germany, and Italy. We can use our leverage to help that process along, but not if we throw out the baby with the bath.

Put another way, does economic development serve our political interests? You asked this question yourself the other day. My answer is "don't we wish we had a viable South Vietnam?" Chaos creates vulnerability, which in turn invites subversion, which becomes a very difficult game for us to win. Buying insurance is cheap at the price, and we could both afford and profit by a much bigger policy, rather than cutting back. We lost China by failing to engage, and now look at the trouble it is causing us.

Cook's letter will just add wrongly to the President's disenchantment. Is this worthwhile? If you feel you must send it up, however, let me do a cleaned up version of the above. What are we fighting for in Indo-China anyway, if we give up in an area ten times more crucial on anybody's scale?

RWK

79

India
x India Econ

SECRET July 3, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Tom Mann has skilfully begun the process of letting the Indians know they'd better come to us. His memcon on his first talk with B. K. Nehru is worth reading.

Mann called in B. K. again today, and told him that if India was hurting for PL 480 the best way to overcome any roadblocks would be for Shastri to get word directly to you. BK said he would get off a message to Delhi right away, seeking a letter. If necessary, BK would go back to Delhi personally.

If we get a letter it may not be couched in quite the terms we want, but the important thing is that we've opened a dialogue.

R. W. Komer

SECRET

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By KH, NARA, Date 3-2-04

80 file

India Pak

~~SECRET~~ June 30, 1965

Mac -

To bring you up to date on India/Pakistan, LBJ called Tom Mann before lunch yesterday. Gist was: (a) he didn't want any memos from Mann on why help India; (b) he didn't want to send any special emissaries to Pakistan or India, but (c) if they sent some here so much the better.

Mann decided someone should tell B. K. Nehru the score soonest--Talbot nominated Mann as the one who "really knew the President's mind." Mann will do (as is poetic justice, I feel).

When Solbert told McNamara White House favored selective stalling on MAP to India/Pakistan and queried whether this discussed at lunch (along with $8 million), McNamara said he saw no reason for slowdown on MAP. Before I straighten him out, am I on solid ground?

LBJ really shook up Charley Schultze Monday on economic aid in general, and wants a tough new look. BOB (or Rowen at least) is unhappy about AID anyway because they can't quantify the returns (Ye Gods).

I feel in my bones that we're going to lose Dave Bell if he feels frozen out and under attack without much chance to defend himself. In fact, I'm beginning to wonder whether I'm doing much good either. I'm all for a tough-minded use of aid, but we need to play a smart open-field running game--not use bulldozer tactics.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By [illegible], NARA, Date 3-2-04

File

~~SECRET~~/DRAFT June 29, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We're tightening the line on India and Pakistan and are now in a good position to make our weight felt. Unfortunately, though Shastri's remarks on Vietnam last night were worse in the headlines than in the text, they'll make it harder to avoid the appearance that we're just chastising him.

The problem in implementing our tougher/tactical line is how to hold off things like the new PL 480 agreement for India or the advance program loan for Pakistan without doing permanent economic and political damage. The best compromise I can suggest is only to let a necessary minimum flow, while holding off on the more flexible things like the Pak consortium pledge and the big Karachi steel mill.

Bell has asked your approval of the PL 480 (attached). We've sat on this as long as possible in order to bring the Indians to us with at least tacit acknowledgment that the program is vital to them. If we delay much beyond 6 July, there's real danger of interrupting wheat shipments and triggering an almost immediate round of hoarding and inflation. The Indians are plenty worried, but so far they've refrained from approaching us at a high level because they still think our delay is purely over technical details. So we may want to consider letting word out at the working level that the agreement is in trouble in the White House. The difficulty is doing this without triggering emotional over-reaction to our playing politics with food.

Bell's proposal represents what we believe to be truly the minimum. It will keep India's head above water but not much more. India, State and AID wanted a two-year agreement; now it's down to one. They wanted to

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By ___, NARA, Date 3-2-04

waive the 20% US uses; we said no. India wanted 7 million tons of wheat and 300,000 tons of rice; we propose only 6 million wheat and 225,000 rice. Only on the interest rate did we give a little because we have surplus rupees coming out of our ears. Mann and Freeman approve, and we've checked the Congress. Even Ellender bought. So you might approve on condition that Amb. Nehru come in for a heart-to-heart talk with Bell or Rusk.

We have a little more time on the Pak advance program loan and a couple of other pressure points to exploit. The program loan ($50-65 million) will become an issue in July because foreign exchange reserves are low and our friends have just fought out a new foreign exchange budget favorable to our economic policies there but dependent on our loan. If we don't come through, we're likely to cut off the limb they've climbed out on in facing down stiff opposition from the anti-US clique around Ayub. However, we can still delay the consortium pledging session and hold off on the big Karachi steel mill loan which will be ready in July. We've already had George Woods tell Ayub privately in London last week how fed up a lot of top level people in Washington are with his antics. This at least should lay the groundwork for delaying the consortium if we want.

So we think we're creating the kind of pressures you want, though it may be necessary to take a few steps from time to time to keep the programs alive.

~~SECRET~~

82 file

India x Pak

~~SECRET~~

Mac - June 28, 1965

Here's the India/Pak memo. I didn't mention Mann's memo (due tonight or tomorrow) lest it be contaminated by my comment. It ain't bad.

Ball took it on himself to have Woods suggest Shoiab come here (not Bhutto). Ayub bit, so we'll probably have a high level visitor. Let's decide first to postpone Pak consortium.

Rusk may favor ammo sales to Paks. These amount to only $8 million so I'm not excited. But I do feel that if we want to show displeasure we ought to be consistent. I'd vote for selling half.

We've documented over a score of Indian approaches to us about PL 480. They go back to late March when the No. 1 civil servant in Indian Agricultural Ministry took it up with Freeman. Indians are now expressing real concern.

Unless we sign a new PL 480 deal by 15 July at the latest we can't avoid an interruption in shipping. We must allow several days for negotiating the agreement too. So I come up with 6 July as the final target date. We can afford to make our friends sweat till then.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By RCB, NARA, Date 3-2-04

82a file

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT June 28, 1965

Our Pak/Indian affairs. Here is a current rundown, prior to your Tuesday lunch.

The UK mediation effort on the Rann of Kutch seems on the brink of success. A deal here, and subsequent pullback of Pak and Indian forces from their border, will greatly reduce the risk of a major clash.

Ayub is apparently starting to hoist aboard our unhappiness with him. George Woods gave it to him straight in London last week, though Ayub's reaction was to send Woods (or Finance Minister Shoiab) back here to explain he really was a right guy.

To keep up the pressure, our next move should be to postpone the 27 July Pak consortium session (ostensibly on economic grounds). Our guess is that this will bring the Paks running. This won't happen, however, unless you order it. We also want to postpone in a way which won't upset Pakistan's promising import liberalization program (a great success); this may involve assuring them of at least $40-50 million in FY 66 program loans. This wouldn't interfere with our larger purpose since what they're really interested in is whether we come through with the full $250 million in consortium pledges they want.

As to India, its request for a new PL 480 agreement is the chief aid matter pending. We recommend giving them only an interim one-year agreement on pretty stiff terms (see attachment). We've stalled the Indians till they're nervous as cats, and are pleading that we come through before shipments are interrupted.

Unless we get a go-ahead in early July, there won't be enough lead time to negotiate the new agreement, put out bids, and line up shipping in time to prevent an interruption in actual shipments. Indian food stocks are so low that this could trigger an almost immediate round of hoarding and inflation. It could also lead to emotional claims that we were playing politics with food. So going ahead shortly with a minimum program would both avoid these risks and still let the Indians know we are no longer such easy marks.

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jcb, NARA, Date 3-2-04

~~SECRET~~

All in all, the town is slowly coming around to pull in the direction you want. There is still a great deal of bureaucratic resistance, however, and great concern lest we throw out the baby with the bath. We've sought to make clear that you are not clamping down on all aid to India or Pakistan but you do insist that (a) we prove to you why so much is needed; and (b) show we are using it more effectively to produce results.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

RWK: June 25, 1965

83 file India x Pak

Two developments suggest maybe we should stop "signaling" Ayub and Shastri and start tipping our hand to tell them directly how bad things really are. My comments also reflect a round of discussions with Farr, Stoddart, Laingen and Sober, who at least see how our signals affect operations.

First, McConaughy came in (Karachi 2470) saying we're about to cut off the limb Shoaib is on while letting him believe everything is OK. Macomber wanted Bell to send this to the President, but Bell vetoed in favor of letting Mann send over his general India-Pak memo first.

Second, State/AID tell me the Indian working level here is fending off high-level Indian demarches on PL 480 because they honestly believe our delay is due only to bureaucratic thrashing over details. (See my memo attached.

In both cases, it's apparent we've muted our big "signals" to avoid tipping our hand. In the process, we've left Indians and (probably to a lesser degree) Paks under the illusion that the essentials of our relationship remain unchanged.

The Woods enterprise is a first step toward tipping our hand to Ayub. We should have a report from him Monday (London 24-25 June), and this will give us something to start from. Maybe we should back this up by telling Shoaib in some detail what's going on here. We could use MacDonald's farewell call on Ayub and could still fall back on the special emissary.

But we haven't done anything comparable with the Indians. We could take a similar step with them at a low level by letting State or AID working level drop word to their opposite numbers that the PL 480 agreement is in trouble in the White House. This would immediately provoke high-level Indians to "come to us."

The argument against tipping our hand is that we don't want to trigger an emotional reaction in Karachi or New Delhi (where emotions are closer to the surface). It also risks soliciting pro forma representations at a suitably high level to satisfy the President that they're now "coming to us" without accomplishing anything very basic.

The arguments for hand-tipping are that waiting much longer without at least telling our friends (like Shoaib) what's up risks hurting them and our own interests. Also, mere delays only amount to petty harrassment unless we get out into the open what we want Paks and Indians to do. Finally, we have to get out of the current box we're in where, in an effort not to tip our hand, our left hand mutes our right hand's signals.

If we decide to tip our hand, the next step is to decide what we want from them. If we just want them to kow-tow, what form should their gesture take? If we want an apology and promise to be good, from whom and on what? Or do we just want an acknowledgment that our aid is vital? Or are we trying to set the stage for a Pak-Indian rapprochement and new economic momentum?

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By KJK, NARA, Date 3-2-07

I recognize we may be shooting at two separate targets. First, we're shooting at the President's target of making Ayub and Shastri "come to us." I'm ignorant of whether you or the President knows what he wants to tell them when they come. Second, we're shooting at your target of making sure Ayub doesn't "kill the goose" and of wringing enough economic policy reforms from Shastri to get his economy off a dime and make our aid pay off. From my limited vantage point, I can't tell whether the first target is a step to the second, as it should be. If we're still in the stage, as I assume we are, of building a bridge from the first to the second, then we face the very serious tactical problem of keeping from damaging our basic interests while we do so. That's why I argue that we'd better speed up the process by tipping our hand now.

HHS

India file

84

~~SECRET~~ June 22, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR PHIL TALBOT

I just spent a fascinating hour with a Mr. D. W. Singh of New York (he had called Bundy and myself several times for an appointment). His story revolved around a Dr. Kartar Singh, apparently an important Sikh practitioner of guru-nanal, a man trained as a medical doctor who has spent most of his time ministering to the rich and poor without compensation. D. W. Singh explained at length Kartar's remarkable powers.

In 1946, several months before partition, Dr. Kartar Singh predicted that Pakistan would be created. He said that there would be disturbances in several places including Lahore (where he and D. W.'s family were then living). D. W.'s father sent letters to Churchill, Truman, and Sir Patrick Lawrence telling them of Kartar's prophesy. According to D. W. all that he prophesied came to pass, including riots in Lahore on 14 March 1947, the very date Kartar had predicted.

Two years ago D. W.'s mother went blind, first in one eye and then in the other. The best doctors in India said that there was no chance she would see again. Dr. Kartar Singh, who was now living near Agra in Rajasthan, told D. W.'s family that if they would say a Sikh hymn his mother's sight would be restored. It turned out precisely this way. Bhagt Singh, a retired Sessions judge now living in Simla (and according to D. W. a prominent Sikh) could attest to this event.

While D. W. was in Delhi visiting his family a few months ago, Dr. Kartar called his father and asked him to arrange an immediate appointment for Kartar with President Radhakrishnan because Kartar had "a message from God." D. W.'s father demurred on the obvious grounds, saying he didn't even know how to get in touch with the President. Kartar said "it would be arranged." D. W.'s younger brother decided to call Radhakrishnan's military secretary. Ten minutes after the call the military secretary called back and said that Radhakrishnan would send his car for Dr. Kartar at the latter's convenience.

D. W.'s father accompanied Kartar to meet Radhakrishnan and reported the following 25-minute talk. Kartar told the President that God sometimes reveals things to us if we destroy our own "self-willedness" and are willing to listen. Kartar's message was that Pakistan would attack India with superior arms supplied by the US. It would be an all-out war. Non-violence had made India weak, and India might lose its independence. Radhakrishnan

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By JOW NARA Date 2-12-18

~~SECRET~~

asked what India would have left. Kartar further said that Shastri's denunciation of US policy on Vietnam had greatly annoyed the US. The US was justified in protecting South Vietnam because China was using Hanoi as a tool to help dominate Asia. America would continue to help Pakistan. The UK would help no one. Red China would help Pakistan. The USSR would help India but it wasn't reliable; it wouldn't give enough. There would be widespread communal troubles and the whole Indian administration would break down resulting in chaos. But Shastri wouldn't act because of India's non-violent tradition. Radhakrishnan asked what should be done and said that as President he had little power. Kartar's answer was abandon all industrial programs and put everything into defense.

Later D. W. told Kartar that he would try to see various key people in Washington who knew him. He would even try to see President Johnson. Kartar approved, but said the Americans were so annoyed with India they wouldn't listen.

D. W. would like to bring Dr. Kartar here, presumably at his own expense, to meet the President. He thinks Kartar is a truly saintly person with a gift. He sought to describe this by saying that everyone felt a sense of bliss when Kartar walked into a room and a sense of loss when he went out. Kartar was a man who came along only rarely in the life of a nation. D. W.'s only interest was to be an instrument in bringing Kartar message to the attention, first of Radhakrishnan and then of President Johnson. He regarded himself simply as a mailbox.

D. W. Singh speaks with obvious sincerity. He is a US citizen and a businessman who is apparently well-connected in the Sikh community in India. He served 11 years in the army, apparently rising to colonel, and says he has a master's degree in economics. He did a fair amount of name-dropping about his connections on Capitol Hill, claiming he had been in touch with 22 Senators when he lobbied against the Bokaro steel project because he opposed government control. He is also apparently opposed to the present PL 480 program as simply enabling India to avoid grappling with its agricultural problem; he would insist on a great deal more self-help as the price. The names D. W. mentioned were Lausche, Morse, McGovern, and Mundt.

It's all too easy to fob off this story, but I wonder if it isn't worth further checking. D. W. insists that he's "not a nut". My thought is that Carol might send a sanitized version of this to Radhakrishnan's son Gopal, and ask him for his father's own evaluation if Gopal thinks the matter worth pursuing. I gave no encouragement over an appointment with the President but I did indicate that we would prudently check further on the matter, and that of course he could count on his message being taken seriously.

cc: McGBundy

RWK

85 file

India
+ Pak
+ Pak Comment

TOP SECRET

Mac - June 21, 1965

A progress report like the attached will help back our play, besides keeping LBJ informed and ahead of the game.

There's a lot of weeping and wailing in State (Talbot's shop), AID, DOD, and will be soon among our intelligence confreres if we do the necessary. I've tried mightily to explain and justify the President's position (though I'm worried too). It ain't easy.

On the intelligence side, there are several things we could start doing. I'm holding up talk with Vance till I have some solid shot in my locker (so he'll have something to say to his boys).

RWK

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 89-11
By [illegible] NARA. Date 3-5-04

SANITIZED
Authority FRUS 64-68, v 12 5 #139
By JC NARA, Date 3-7-04

85a File

~~TOP SECRET~~

June 21, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We have set in train the following actions to flesh out your new tactical line designed to soften up the Paks and Indians, and make them come to us:

1. Stalling on MAP. Though matters referred to you recently have involved only economic aid and PL 480, we're operating on the assumption that you want well-orchestrated action across the board. So we've told DOD that, while not suspending everything, we should delay action on certain key MAP and sales items to make both Paks and Indians come to us. In India's case this means chiefly continued stalling on F-5s; in Pakistan's case on F-104s, ammo, and perhaps armor.

Since there is a higher risk of a Pak/Indian flareup than any time since 1947, our stalling on MAP makes sense as a warning here too. A major risk, however, is that we're driving the Indian military to get more from the Soviets, which doesn't serve our longer term interest.

2. Intelligence. Since Ayub thinks the Peshawar facility is his top card, we're looking at ways and means of convincing him it isn't all that important to us. For example, we could halt new construction. This would make the intelligence community scream, but is probably worth it. We're also planning to use [redacted] to get across indirectly to Ayub that we're close to giving up on the Paks.

3. Stalling on Pak Consortium. So far our hold-up on economic aid is hurting the Indians more than the Paks (for the simple reason that more Indian matters have been pending). But the next big occasion will be the FY 1966 pledge to the Pak Consortium, due 27 July. We favor telling the Paks now that we want to postpone this a month, ostensibly for economic reasons. Our thought is to have George Woods go to London and tell Ayub. This will shake Ayub, and buy us more time to see whether our signals are getting through.

- - - - - - - - - -

Are we on the right track on the above? Our new tough-minded Pak/Indian tactics are causing much anguish in the town especially from those who see their programs endangered. It would help if you'd tell Rusk in particular (he missed the June meeting), so that we'll have State with us, instead of dragging its feet on such matters.

Yes ____
No ____

R. W. Komer

~~TOP SECRET~~

86

India
x Bowles
x Pak

~~SECRET~~

Mac - June 18, 1965

Here's the one page summary of Bowles' memo to LBJ, which you requested. Since the President will see Bowles when he returns, I see merit in weekend reading.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

Att: RWK memo for the President, 6/17/65, with Bowles ltr to the President, 6/3/65

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-2-04

86a

SECRET

June 17, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a letter from Chester Bowles, enclosing a long memorandum which recommends a new look at our India-Pak policy. He fears failure to come to grips now with the forces shaping events there will result in the same kind of loss we suffered in China in the 1940s.

We offer it without prejudice and with the following brief summary of his main points. Bowles argues that the situation in the subcontinent has changed 180 degrees since we launched our present policy in the mid-1950s. Then, in the post-Korea climate, the Soviet military threat to South Asia seemed paramount. China seemed dangerous only as a potentially attractive economic and ideological model. Now the post-Stalin Soviet shift to penetration through economic and military aid, and China's 1962 attack on India, have reversed the picture.

Against this new backdrop, Bowles thinks that our economic policy still makes sense but that our military policy has become "irrelevant." Whereas we once looked to Pakistan as the one sure holdout against Communism in the subcontinent, he argues that now "India's domestic objective of a viable democratic state and her foreign policy objective of resisting Chinese aggression coincide more closely with our own interests than do those of any other major emerging nation."

Continued Free World economic aid to both Indians and Paks is still justified because it alone can produce the economic and political systems needed to build the strong counter-weight to China we want. Both are using our aid effectively, and he foresees a chance for a major breakthrough to a sustained high rate of Indian growth in the next 5-7 years, provided aid continues.

But we ought to ease out of our Pak alliance (which is an empty one) and gear our military aid more frankly to our chief strategic objective in Asia--containing China. We should give both India and Pakistan only the weapons they'd need against China. We'd get out of the box we're in now by now guaranteeing to protect one against the other and by trying gradually to draw the two together in joint defense. Bowles doesn't see any serious risk of driving Ayub into Peiping's arms.

Dave Bell will send you shortly a memo on the second subject Bowles raises in his covering letter--our mounting hoard of surplus rupees.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By KBC, NARA, Date 3-2-04

R. W. Komer

SECRET

87

SECRET

June 12, 1965

Indian + Pak

Mac -

Here's at least the raw material for a chit to the President. Francis of course would have reservations about even including Clay, Anderson, Rockefeller or even Black. I'd be inclined to join him, if only to minimize the risk of getting the wrong kind of result.

In fact, unless LBJ is determined on an independent opinion, I think we could give him a pretty damn good in-house view from a little group such as Busby or Gardiner Ackley, Francis, Harry Rowen, and myself. Alternatively or collaterally Schultze and Capron of BOB could be depended upon.

RWK

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jdw, NARA, Date 3-2-01

87a

~~SECRET~~

June 12, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Perhaps the best way to move along your thought of getting an informed outside appraisal of the India problem is to suggest a list of useful names. The following are the type of man whom we think might be considered for the job you have in mind:

Doug Dillon would be first class. He has a lot of background in the problem besides being toughminded.

George Woods would also be excellent but there's a problem in asking the World Bank head to undertake a straight USG task. He'd be a good man to consult on the side however.

Ellsworth Bunker would perhaps be best of all given his long experience as a first class ambassador from us to India, not from India to us. The problem here of course is whether we could break him loose from Santo Domingo in time.

Gene Black knows the India problem in general but is probably too heavily engaged on Southeast Asia.

Clark Clifford has the combination of brains, energy, and toughness to give you a good reading.

Abe Fortas would do the same in my judgment.

Phil Potter knows India as well as anyone.

Bob Anderson might be good.

David Rockefeller has gotten to think too much like a banker but might be considered.

Lucius Clay was strongly in favor of massive aid to India when he headed the Clay Committee but would certainly take a hard new look.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-2-04

R. W. Komer

McG. Bundy

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

June 12, 1965

Mac -

Bill and Phil Talbot are all for an LBJ letter to Harold Wilson. I told them we'd try our hand at a text.

Bill suggests mentioning the UK proposal to try and sign on the Commonwealth members of the "17" to propose again a conference without preconditions. Amen, and since you know more about this than I, suggest you add it in.

Talbot worries about telling Wilson we might get tougher with India and Pakistan. Let's keep this in-house, he says, till we get it sorted out. I'm not impressed with his argument; given the way in which LBJ has already decided this one, let's use the British too.

RWK

Att. RWK 6/11/65-3 pm draft ltr to Wilson

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By [illegible], NARA, Date 3-2-04

88a

SECRET

June 12, 1965 /12 Noon

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

While I hesitate to horn in on your Commonwealth Conference, this captive audience provides a major opportunity for moving forward an important joint enterprise of ours. I speak of our common interest in preventing the Afro-Asian session in Algiers from becoming an anti-Western rally. From reports reaching us, I'm far from sanguine that our moderate friends who will be attending will put forth much effort to this end.

For that reason I would hope that you could express our hopes as well as yours to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers. At a time when the US is defending the interests of free Asia in Vietnam as it did in Korea, and when the UK is doing the same in Malaysia, it would be painful indeed if none of these countries were permitted to participate at Algiers. Nor would the US Congress and public understand if our friends should be shy in at least preventing the Chinese Communists and Indonesians from passing resolutions which would tend to justify outright aggression.

Neither you nor we will be represented at Algiers, but I think we are entitled to ask those Commonwealth attendees for whom we've both done so much to act in our interest and theirs. I have particularly in mind Ayub and Shastri, who could each play a major role. If you see fit, you might mention that I told you the US would be watching closely the proceedings.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jfw, NARA, Date 3-2-04

I have watched with admiration your persistent effort to mediate the Rann of Kutch. We have made appropriate supporting noises in both Delhi and Rawalpindi and I would be happy if you chose to associate me with you in devoutly hoping for an early end to these non-productive disputes which so sap Pakistani and Indian resources and energies badly needed for their own development. In fact we are re-examining whether a period of more tough minded aid treatment on our part might not help bring home quietly to both that they risk dissipating not only their blood and treasure but our quite substantial contributions to their growth.

89

~~SECRET~~

June 10, 1965

India
+ Bowles

Mac -

Chet Bowles' attached letter to the President creates a dilemma. It's thought-provoking and worth reading, especially at this time. On the other hand, everything we send LBJ on this subject doubtless raises his suspicion that the India lovers are feeding him more propaganda.

My hunch is just to put it cold in weekend reading without endorsement. What say?

RWK

Attach. Bowles ltr to President 6/2/65 w/att
Bowles Memo to SecState 5/20/65

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By RLC, NARA, Date 3-2-04

90

India

June 7, 1965

Dear Mr. Clark:

Let me acknowledge your letter of 27 May to the President and express appreciation of your firm support of US policy in Southeast Asia.

Your comments on India are also most interesting. Economic progress in India does often seem slower than hoped, particularly in the stimulation of exports. Our Embassy in New Delhi reports, however, that the rate of growth has been picking up considerably. By the way, US economic aid runs well under a billion dollars a year, even including PL 480 food which does not represent a new dollar charge on the American taxpayer.

While it is discouraging to hear from you that "Indians have no real desire to take a place in the world," I think you will agree that a nation of around 500 million people inevitably does occupy an important place on the world stage. India is also the world's largest working democracy. It is largely for these reasons that we see it as in the US interest to help India develop, despite the many differences between Indian policies and those we would pursue in similar circumstances. However, we are making a major effort in connection with our aid program to encourage the Indian Government to adopt more constructive economic policies, in its own interest, and we see hope of significant progress.

Our aid mission in India is headed by Mr. John Lewis, a distinguished economist who served under the President as a member of his Council of Economic Advisors. I am afraid that neither he nor we would regard the mission as a "scraggly bunch of misfits."

The problems of India are many and complex, and the frustrations of trying to deal effectively with them often discourage many thoughtful Indians as well as well-meaning Americans like yourself. But I am sure you would agree on reflection that it is no solution to wash the American taxpayers' hands of them--any more than pulling out is a solution to the Vietnam problem. Moreover, India too has been recently exposed to Communist attack--as recently as October 1962.

Sincerely,

R. W. Komer

Mr. Robert J. Clark
c/o Fundo de Fomento de Expertacao
Rua Ponta Delgada 44A
Lisbon, Portugal

6/5/65

91

India

~~SECRET~~

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Your letter of May 23 arrived as I was writing to send my best wishes on the first anniversary of your assuming the office of Prime Minister. The year has been a difficult one for both of us, but I know that our faith in the democratic way of doing things will bear fruit.

We have also been deeply concerned over the unhappy events in the Rann of Kutch and the use of U.S. military equipment in this dispute. The role of a friend to both parties is not easy and often misunderstood. But I believe our efforts to put a stop to the use of our military equipment were helpful in getting the fighting stopped. Now the problem becomes one of finding a formula for peaceful settlement as a substitute for settlement by force. Despite the problems you mention, I deeply hope that you can reach an agreement, and thereby reduce the awesome possibility of larger conflict.

I fully share your desire that you and I, and our two governments, should act always in a spirit of mutual understanding. In that spirit, let me respond very frankly to your suggestion that the search for peace in Vietnam might be furthered by a cessation of the air strikes being conducted against North Vietnam by the South Vietnamese and U.S. air forces. You know the importance we attach to a solution to the Vietnam problem. To us, the Chinese Communist-supported aggression in Vietnam poses the same kind of threat to Free World interests as Communist China's attack on India in 1962.

~~SECRET~~

Sent via Department of State 2540

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 29, #127
By JC NARA, Date 3-2-04

I wish to tell you in utmost privacy of the effort we have already made to induce a response from Hanoi by a suspension of air strikes, and the depressing lack of any response. I enclose an informal and confidential memorandum which candidly describes our efforts to date, and our current thinking as to certain future possibilities. It reflects my own deep desire to find a road to peace in Vietnam, and to share my thinking with you fully to this end.

Let me assure you that we will continue prayerfully to explore any hopeful opening. There is no step I would not take if in my judgment it offered real proppect of the peaceful settlement we both want.

I deeply regret that your parliamentary and other commitments may not permit an autumn visit. I assure you we would welcome a visit at any future date you should conclude would be desirable and convenient to you.

With warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

/s/ LBJ

His Excellency
Lal Bahadur Shastri
Prime Minister of India
New Delhi, India

LBJ:RWK:JV:ny

91a

TOP SECRET

June 5, 1965

MEMORANDUM

1. Though compelled to launch air strikes against North Vietnam, we have taken every possible precaution to hit only objectives directly related to Hanoi's persistent aggression against the South. From the military standpoint alone, we believe the strikes have had the effect of considerably reducing what would otherwise have been a steep rise in Hanoi's infiltration campaign. They have also encouraged the South Vietnamese government--which strongly urged them--and the South Vietnamese people and army. Over time, we believe they must make a major contribution to persuading reasonable elements in Hanoi that their campaign is simply not worth it, and that they should cease their interference in South Vietnam, leaving that country to determine its future, including its relation to the north, by peaceful means.

2. Simultaneously, however, we have made every effort to keep the door open to negotiation. We have made clear our readiness for discussions with no conditions whatever. Indeed, we have welcomed a succession of initiatives, from the call of the 17 non-aligned nations to Mr. Gordon Walker's attempt to visit Hanoi and Peiping and the recent constructive suggestions of your government for a cessation of hostilities and an Afro-Asian force to give effect to it. But Hanoi has made it clear, both publicly and privately, that it wants no part of any of these. Regrettably, we see no sign as yet that Hanoi is ready for any political solution other than a takeover of the South.

3. While we cannot be sure what motivates Hanoi's leaders, their attitude appears to be dictated by the belief that they can still hope, perhaps expect, to impose their will by force on South Vietnam, and that we and the South Vietnamese will not have the determination and resources to prevent this. If that is their reasoning, any cessation on our part of justified military actions might well feed the very beliefs that keep them from any realistic move toward a political solution.

4. We are conscious, of course, of the argument that the mere fact of the air strikes may be preventing Hanoi from taking forthcoming actions. Our suspension of bombing in mid-May was undertaken partly to see if this was indeed a factor, and partly to indicate to Hanoi the possibility of working toward a solution by reciprocal actions, or rather by reciprocally

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jcjw NARA, Date 3-2-04

reduced or suspended actions. As we told the Indian government through diplomatic channels, our intention to suspend was communicated in advance to Hanoi, together with the suggestion that changes in Hanoi's visible military actions would be considered a forthcoming response. The details of this effort are as follows:

a. On Wednesday, May 12, Ambassador Kohler informed the DRV Embassy Moscow he had a communication for the DRV. DRV Ambassador declined appointment but subsequently telephoned to say that any communication to DRV should be made through Soviets as co-chairman. (Soviets had already informed us they did not wish to act as intermediaries, which accounted in part for our choice of this channel.)

b. Kohler then arranged to see senior official of Soviet Foreign Office, who stalled on delivery to DRV but did retain "oral statement" paper addressed to DRV. Concurrently, Kohler arranged for US Embassy representative to see DRV Embassy official and to hand him same paper with request he deliver to Ambassador, which official said he would do. Nonetheless, on May 13, DRV Embassy returned communication alleging that it could not receive it.

c. We concluded at this point that DRV Embassy had certainly in fact made copy of communication and relayed it to Hanoi, and that it also very likely that Soviets had passed on copy delivered to them. Nonetheless, we enlisted British cooperation, and on May 10 British Consul General in Hanoi delivered same paper to senior DRV official. DRV returned this paper to Consul General following day again asserting it could not receive USG communication.

5. We can only conclude from these episodes that DRV was resisting any attempt to communicate, even though it surely received the message. But the DRV made every effort to pretend that it had not even been received. This attitude, coupled with continued and even intensified activity in South Viet-Nam during period of suspension, which we believe Hanoi could have controlled at least in major respects, led inescapably to conclusion DRV not ready respond at this time to suspension. Since Hanoi did not react by word or deed, we felt compelled to resume air strikes.

6. We had also communicated our intention to the Soviet Government, actually on May 11. They made it quite clear that they did not wish in any way to be an intermediary to Hanoi, and Mr. Gromyko subsequently expressed a highly negative reaction to Secretary Rusk in Vienna on May 15.

This confirmed our feeling that the Soviets are not now willing to exert effective influence on Hanoi, despite the fact that suggestions for a suspension had in fact come to us privately through Soviet quarters for some time.

7. We did not inform the Indian government in advance of our intention solely because we wished to leave the matter in the hands of Hanoi and Moscow. We realize that its not being informed about our suspension may have affected the Prime Minister's discussions in Moscow, but we believed it best that the two Communist nations should have an uninterrupted period to deliberate on their response to the suspension. For similar reasons, we have steadfastly resisted giving any publicity to the fact of our communications to Hanoi and Moscow. Such publicity might get us credit in the world, but we give greater weight to the risk that it might diminish the effectiveness of diplomatic communications in the future.

8. Nonetheless, despite the absence of any response to date, we will continue to look at every possible opening. For example, we do not discard the possibility of another suspension, possibly of longer duration, in the hope that it may next time produce a real response by Hanoi, and perhaps begin a sequence of reciprocal actions that could lead toward a solution. Such a sequence has the advantage that it does not require admissions, only deeds. We have tried it once, and will consider it again at the appropriate time, having all factors in mind. Unless another such temporary suspension led to a real change in Hanoi's actions, however, we could not afford to consider extending it to the kind of cessation that the Indian government may have in mind.

9. A second way in which progress might be achieved toward the peace we all want in Southeast Asia would be if Hanoi were willing to engage in unconditional discussions, which might start with this very problem of what reductions in military action might be taken reciprocally on each side. We have repeatedly suggested this both publicly and through third parties in a position to relay the message to Hanoi, and continue to keep our ears and eyes open for any indication of a response.

10. A third way might arise through constructive proposals from third parties, which might at some point elicit a suggestive response that could be followed up. We have particularly in mind the proposal recently put forward by the Indian government. We have discussed this with them frankly, pointing out the difficulty of determining exactly what actions should

be stopped and in what reciprocal sequence, and the difficulty of mounting an effective international force to help keep the peace. These difficulties would have to be faced if the Communist side did show itself responsive at some juncture. But they are secondary to the essential point, which is that the Indian proposals focus realistically on central matters that must be met in working toward any solution.

11. For this reason, we welcome the activity of the Indian government in putting forward these proposals and particularly what we understand are its plans to present them for discussion at the forthcoming conference in Algiers. Perhaps there will again be no reaction or a continued negative reaction from the Communist nations involved, but the discussion alone should prove helpful.

92 file

~~SECRET~~ June 5, 1965

Bundy

Bill -

Attached redo seems to me to be precisely the same as the earlier version, but we can catch any errors I let slip in later.

I left the "Memorandum" deliberately un-titled and tabbed it TOP SECRET for safety's sake.

For simplicity's sake, I also simply added in the extra cable on details of our shot at communicating with Hanoi.

Suggest you put all in cable form, so we can move fast when we get an OK.

RWK

cc: Phil Talbot

~~SECRET~~

2 cc "Memoranda" to Wm Bundy

See attachment & LBJ Ltr & Sharlie 6/5/65

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By JC, NARA, Date 3-2-04

India-Pak
Cook Study
93

~~SECRET~~

June 3, 1965

Dear Mr. Cook:

The job the President would like you to take on is as complex as it is important--so much so that one hardly knows where to begin. The sheer size and location of India/Pakistan--India alone has more people than Latin America and Africa combined--in itself makes the area of great importance to us. Beyond this, however, we have developed over the years an infinite variety of relationships with both India and Pakistan, which extend far beyond straight economic and military aid into alliance ties, side commitments, intelligence collaboration, and private investments.

The President's great interest in a quiet new look at our India/Pakistan policy stems initially from the simple fact that the Indian subcontinent is our largest aid client. It gets more in total USG aid--if PL 480 is included--than the Alianza ($1.24 billion in 1965 as compared to $1.1 billion for all Latin America). Of course, if we omit PL 480 (which is after all surplus disposal on our part) than the real out-of-pocket cost turns out to be less. If private investment is included, than the comparison is even more in Latin America's favor.

In asking whether we're getting enough return to justify this massive investment, the President has in mind the increasing (at least till last year) Congressional disenchantment with foreign aid. He clearly sees aid to India/Pakistan as bulking so large as to be potentially quite vulnerable, particularly at a time when neither India nor Pakistan is giving us much political support and when each accuses the other of using US military aid against it, rather than for the purposes for which intended (each also accuses us along these lines). I might add that others do not see our Indian/Pak aid as so much at risk, but the President's own sure instinct on Hill matters puts the burden of proof very much on them.

Behind his overt worry over aid, moreover, I suspect a deeper concern as to whether we really know where we're going in the subcontinent. He seems to sense a sort of stagnation in US policy in this key area, and is reluctant to keep signing big checks until it's been sorted out. At any rate, he seems determined to force the government to rethink the matter.

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-140
By SJ NARA, Date 5-23-02

The job of rethinking our Pak/Indian policy must be an exercise in the art of the possible. Many of the frustrations inherent in our relations with the subcontinent stem in large part from factors beyond our control. India is India, to coin a phrase, and we aren't going to be able to change its perculiar Indian way of looking at itself and at the world. Pak and Indian nationalism, clearly on the rise, is another fact of life with which we'll have to live. Other aspects of the Pak/Indian scene may be more susceptible to outside influences, however, so as the starting point for your own preliminary look at the matter, here are some of these:

First is the question of what we're trying to accomplish with our massive aid program. Many regard it basically as a long term investment, and one in which we should not be unduly concerned about the limited short run returns. This has been our basic philosophy, especially with regard to India--the only other population concentration comparable to China. Probably influenced greatly by the loss of China, we've embarked since 1952 on the building of a viable democratic Indian subcontinent, first to prevent it from going the way of China and second to make it eventually into a pro-Western counterweight to Peiping. And we've done so consistently despite the fact that India's particular brand of isolationism and Asian neutralism has often worked against our shorter term interests.

Essentially this rationale would argue for attempting to help meet the subcontinent's basic needs for growth without attempting to use our aid too much as political leverage. Resist using aid for political purposes, in other words. Without contesting the long term goal of our effort, I would still ask whether our day-to-day policies won't have much more effect on our ability to realize our longer term investment than some of my colleagues suggest.

Our second major dilemma is that, while from the standpoint of our global purposes we look on the subcontinent as a strategic unit, in fact it is not. Britain's 1947 partition of India into two mutually antagonistic parts may yet prove to be, as many Indians claim, a historic miscalculation. Perhaps the British, in seeking to forestall communal Hindu-Moslem strife, instead perpetuated it. If one accepts the long term objective I cited, then our interest is not in backing India against Pakistan or vice versa, but in using such leverage as we have to get them to pull together, both to achieve viability more quickly and to present a common front to the external threat which we see as coming essentially from Peking and Moscow. But Pakistan's entire

policy has been dominated by its fear of India. Its concern lest it be re-absorbed by India, its effort to recover such terra irredenta as Kashmir, the policies it has pursued to this end (and the Indian responses) are facts of life which immensely complicate our policy problem.

Owing largely to circumstances, our policy has in some respects helped accentuate Pak/Indian antagonism rather than the reverse. When Pakistan logically sought a powerful external ally to help counterbalance India, it found the US in its eagerness to complete a network of defensive pacts around the Soviet periphery, a natural ally. In return for Pakistan's joining SEATO and then CENTO we provided it with massive military and economic aid and tended to gear our Indian policy to Pakistan's concerns. While we made a massive economic investment in India too, our preferential support of Pakistan is apparent from the aid figures themselves.

A readjustment in this relationship was inevitable, and began as our fears of further overt Communist local aggression on the Korean model declined, and as we realized that Pakistan's overriding concern with India meant that Pak forces would not be made available to us in the Middle East or Southeast Asia (as had traditionally been the case with the Indian army up through World War II).

The Sino-Soviet split and the Chinese attack on India in late 1962 hastened this readjustment (and further highlighted the ambivalence of our policy). Since the USSR pursued a competitive policy of investment in India, Pakistan had no alternative source of external support against India than the US. When Red China split off and began leaning on India, it opened up a new option for the Paks. Then, in response to the Chicom attack the US began providing India with military aid (MAP). This outraged the Paks, who saw this aid eventually being used against them. So they began to move toward China as the power most likely to help them against India.

Thus we face today a paradoxical situation in which our de jure ally Pakistan is in fact moving closer to Red China, while we see a major common interest with neutralist India in meeting the Chicom threat.

What adjustments should we make to this new situation?

Put another way, can we arrest the trend toward alienation of Pakistan from us, without paying an uneconomic price? To what extent must we inevitably

fall short of satisfying either India or Pakistan in our effort to keep on good terms with both? Should we press anew for a Pak-Indian reconciliation, including a Kashmir settlement? Or if we see little hope of achieving this in the short run, and risk alienating both India and Pakistan in the attempt, should we disengage from trying to settle Pak/Indian differences? Yet is disengagement feasible, even if desirable?

In purely development terms are we (and our consortium partners) providing the right amount and kind of economic aid to achieve the desired result? Should we tie it more directly to self help? Pakistan is doing remarkably well with our aid, partly because we give so much, and partly because the Paks are listening to our economic advice. India isn't doing badly either, though its problems are even greater and our per capita aid much less. In fact one school of thought sees it in our interest to invest much more in India, to bring it more quickly to the self-sustaining stage.

Yet another issue is posed by the risk that Paks and Indians might use against each other the military equipment we provided one against the USSR and the other against China. Each has already complained to us about such misuse by the other in the Rann of Kutch. We've been slowing up MAP aid to both, at real expense to our bilateral relations. Bowles also keeps pointing out that we're driving India to the USSR as prime supplier.

Will India go nuclear as psychological reassurance against the Chicom bomb? Here is a special problem and every US anti-proliferation instinct leads us to anticipate the risk. But what price should we be prepared to pay?

3.4(b)(1)

[redacted]

The above are perhaps the biggest policy issues we currently confront, though by no means the only big ones. For example, I've deliberately omitted how to get India and Pakistan to back us more vigorously in Southeast Asia, where we're defending their interests at least as much as ours. Attached are some papers which expand on these and related issues. It's quite a smorgasbord, but assembled so that you can pick and choose as time permits. They will give you an even better sense of the magnitude and complexity of our Pak/Indi enterprise. Forewarned is forearmed.

Sincerely,

R. W. Komer

93a

SECRET

ATTACHMENT

Here is an introductory sampling of the in-house material I think best suited to your purpose. Don't be intimidated by the apparent bulk, because they scan quickly, and we've set them up so you can pick and choose. You might start with the memos at the end, which will give you right off the flavor of the real issues to be faced:

A. The standard policy background papers. The three National Policy Papers lay out the basic framework of our interests and our policy, while the two National Intelligence Estimates give some sense as to the prospects. Regard these as reference material. As inter-departmental committee products, they tend to be so general and even-handed as to obscure some of the important policy issues.

B. Papers on Aid Strategy. Since our chief policy tool in the subcontinent is economic aid, I've included last fall's AID strategy reviews, a paper by John Lewis (AID director, New Delhi) on the India program, and a memo of a recent conversation with Dick Gilbert, who heads the Harvard Advisory Group in Pakistan. We omitted the basic aid strategy papers themselves as too bulky and technical.

C. Interpretive Pieces. This category cuts closer to the bone. Some items are admittedly partisan, coming as they do from those articulate spokesmen for Pak and Indian interests--our embassies in Karachi and New Delhi. They include a recent Karachi airgram laying out possible courses we might take with Ayub (written when his visit here was still on) and two recent letters from Bowles on how to achieve a closer relationship with India. We've also included several analytical papers: a recent Max Freedman article on India as the key to our Asian policy; two CIA studies on the key policy-makers (Ayub, Bhutto, Shastri) and the pressures that influence them; and a memo from McNamara to the President on why economic aid to India and Pakistan is strategically important.

D. White House Memos. Finally, and most sensitive, are a few of my own in-house memos which try to sort out for the President and Mac Bundy what our big problems really are. I've included them because they will probably give you more of a quick feel for the kind of problems we confront than the other papers, whether or not the policy prescriptions commend themselves. I've also included rundowns on how we might use economic aid leverage to bring Ayub back on the track. Last, but not least, are some reflections by Tom Hughes, State's intelligence chief, on a visit to the subcontinent a year ago.

R. W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 01-140 (#29a)
By klsj NARA, Date 3-9-04

SECRET

94

SECRET

June 2, 1965

India

Bill -

Here's essentially an editing job on your Shastri draft. I've only tightened it up, and then compensated for this by adding a paragraph Mac suggested. In fact, I see this as an occasion for a long letter; sheer length in this case adds credibility in showing how much we've tried already and how much further we're willing to go. Once State is signed on, we're ready to try out for size.

RWK

cc: Mac Bundy
Phil Talbot
Chet Cooper

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By JC, NARA, Date 3-2-04

94a

SECRET /DRAFT June 2, 1965/7:00 pm

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Your letter of May 23 arrived as I was writing to send my best wishes on the first anniversary of your assuming the office of Prime Minister. The year has been a difficult one for both of us, but I know that our faith in the democratic way of doing things will bear fruit in the kind of just and peaceful society we both want.

We have also been deeply concerned over the unhappy events in the Rann of Kutch and the use of U.S. military equipment in this dispute. The role of a friend to both parties is not easy and often misunderstood. But I believe our efforts to put a stop to the use of our military equipment were helpful in getting the fighting stopped. Now the problem becomes one of finding a formula for peaceful settlement as a substitute for settlement by force. Despite the problems you mention, I deeply hope that you will find it possible to reach an agreement which will reduce the awesome possibility of conflict elsewhere on the Pakistan-Indian borders.

I completely share your desire that you and I personally, and our two governments, should act always in a spirit of mutual understanding. In that spirit, let me respond very frankly to your suggestion that the search for peace in Vietnam might be furthered by a cessation of the air strikes being conducted against North Vietnam by the South Vietnamese and US air

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-2-04

forces. You know the importance we attach to a solution to the Vietnam problem. To us, the Chinese Communist-supported aggression in Vietnam poses the same kind of threat to Free World interests as Communist China's attack on India in 1962.

We have taken every possible precuation that our air strikes should hit only objectives directly related to Hanoi's persistent aggression against the South. From the military standpoint alone, we believe they have had the effect of considerably reducing what would otherwise have been a steep rise in Hanoi's infiltration campaign. They have also encouraged the South Vietnamese government--which strongly urged them--and the South Vietnamese people and army. Over time, we believe they must make a major contribution to persuading reasonable elements in Hanoi that their campaign is simply not worth it, and that they should cease their interference in South Vietnam, leaving that country to determine its future, including its relation to the north, by peaceful means.

Simultaneously, however, we have made every effort to keep the door open. We have made clear our readiness for discussions with no conditions whatever. Indeed, we have welcomed a succession of initiatives to this end, from the call of the 17 non-aligned nations to Mr. Gordon Walker's attempt to visit Hanoi and Peiping and the recent constructive suggestions of your government for a cessation of hostilities and an Afro-Asian force

to give effect to it. But Hanoi has made it clear, both publicly and privately, that it wants no part of any of these. I regret to say that we see no sign as yet that Hanoi is ready for any political solution other than a takeover of the South.

While none of us can be sure what motivates Hanoi's leaders, their attitude appears to be dictated by the belief that they can still hope, perhaps expect, to impose their will by force on South Vietnam, and that we and the South Vietnamese will not have the determination and resources to prevent this. If that is their reasoning, any cessation on our part of justified military actions might well feed the very beliefs that keep them from any realistic move toward a political solution.

I am conscious, of course, of the argument that the mere fact of the air strikes may be preventing Hanoi from taking forthcoming actions. Our suspension of bombing in mid-May was undertaken partly to see if this was indeed a factor, and partly to indicate to Hanoi the possibility of working toward a solution by reciprocal actions, or rather by reciprocally reduced or suspended actions. As we have told you through diplomatic channels, our intention to suspend was communicated in advance to Hanoi, together with the suggestion that changes in Hanoi's visible military actions would be considered a forthcoming response. Far from there being such changes, I can tell you privately that Hanoi not only did not respond to our communication but in fact made every effort to pretend that it had not even

received it. The story is a complex one, and I am asking our Charge in New Delhi to give you the details in confidence. In any case, Hanoi did not react by word or deed, and we were compelled to resume.

I also might add that we communicated our intention to the Soviet Government as well. They made it quite clear that they did not wish in any way to be an intermediary to Hanoi, and Mr. Gromyko subsequently expressed a highly negative reaction to Secretary Rusk in Vietnna on May 15. This, I am afraid, confirmed our feeling that the Soviets are not now willing to exert effective influence on Hanoi, despite the fact that suggestions for a suspension had in fact come to us privately through Soviet quarters for some time.

We did not inform your government in advance of our intention solely because ww wished to leave the matter in the hands of Hanoi and Moscow. I realize that your not being informed about our suspension may have affected your discussions in Moscow, but we believed it best that the two Communist nations should have an uninterrupted period to deliberate on their response to the suspension. For similar reasons, we have--as I am sure you have noted--steadfastly resisted giving any publicity to the fact of our communications to Hanoi and Moscow. Such publicity might get us credit in the world, but we give greater weight to the effect it might have in diminishing the effectiveness of diplomatic communications in the future.

Nonetheless, despite the depressing lack of any response to date, I wish to assure you that we will continue to think praryerfully about all possible openings. There is no step I would not take if in my judgment it offered real prospect of the peaceful settlement we both want. For example, I want you to know in utmost confidence that we do not discard the possibility of another suspension, possibly of longer duration, in the hope that it may next time produce a real response by Hanoi, and perhaps the opening of a sequence of reciprocal actions that could lead toward a solution. Such a sequence has the advantage that it does not require admissions, only deeds. We have tried it once, and will consider it again at the appropriate time, having all factors in mind. Unless another such temporary suspension led to a real change in Hanoi's actions, however, we could not afford to consider extending it to the kind of cessation that you may have in mind.

A second way in which progress might be achieved toward the peace we all want in Southeast Asia would be a willingness in Hanoi to engage in unconditional discussions, which might start with this very problem of what reductions in military action might be taken reciprocally on each side. We have repeatedly suggested this both publicly and through third parties in a position to relay the message to Hanoi, and continue to keep our ears and eyes open for any indication of a response.

A third way might arise through constructive proposals from third parties, which might at some point elicit a suggestive response that could be followed up. I have particularly in mind the proposal recently put forward by your government. We have discussed this with you frankly, pointing out the difficulty of determining exactly what actions should be stopped and in what reciprocal sequence, and the difficulty of mounting an effective international force to help keep the peace. These difficulties would have to be faced if the Communist side did show itself responsive at some point. But they are secondary to the essential point, which is that your proposals focus realistically on central matters that must be met in working toward any solution.

For this reason, I welcome the activity of your government in putting forward these proposals and particularly what I understand are the plans of your government to present them for discussion at the forthcoming conference in Algiers. Perhaps there will again be no reaction or a continued negative reaction from the Communist nations involved, but the discussion alone should prove helpful.

I trust you will forgive the length of this reply. It reflects my own deep desire to find a road to peace in Vietnam and to share my thinking fully with you to this end. I share your disappointment about the necessity for

postponing your visit to Washington, but look forward to seeing you later on when we both have greater freedom to reason together over our common problems and opportunities. I hope you will find it possible to come in the autumn, or as soon thereafter as can be conveniently arranged.

In the meantime, Mr. Prime Minister, as you beginthe coming year please accept my sincere good wishes for every success in your high office.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

LBJ

State/RWK:jk

95 file

India

~~SECRET~~ June 5, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We've cut to the bone State's filibustering letter to Shastri. It's now down to the page and a half you suggested.

We put the necessarily lengthy exposition of our efforts to communicate with Hanoi in a separate memorandum. You need only skim the sidelined portions for sense.

This device serves the very useful purpose of underlining the credibility of our assertion that we have taken, and will take any sensible move offering real prospect of a Vietnam settlement.

This exercise is most important to put our case before Shastri just before he goes to Canada, then the London Commonwealth Conference, and finally the Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers. At the least he'll be better able to defend us, and at best we may move him toward some useful initiative along the lines of the Radhakrishnan proposal. The urgency results from the fact that he leaves Delhi Tuesday.

R. W. Komer

McG. Bundy

SECRET

cc: McG Bundy

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By JC, NARA, Date 3-2-04

95a file

Revised & Signed 6/5/65

~~SECRET~~

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Your letter of May 23 arrived as I was writing to send my best wishes on the first anniversary of your assuming the office of Prime Minister. The year has been a difficult one for both of us, but I know that our faith in the democratic way of doing things will bear fruit.

We have also been deeply concerned over the unhappy events in the Rann of Kutch and the use of U.S. military equipment in this dispute. The role of a friend to both parties is not easy and often misunderstood. But I believe our efforts to put a stop to the use of our military equipment were helpful in getting the fighting stopped. Now the problem becomes one of finding a formula for peaceful settlement as a substitute for settlement by force. Despite the problems you mention, I deeply hope that you can take advantage of the British efforts to reach an agreement, and thereby reduce the awesome possibility of larger conflict.

I fully share your desire that you and I, and our two governments, should act always in a spirit of mutual understanding. In that spirit, let me respond very frankly to your suggestion that the search for peace in Vietnam might be furthered by a cessation of the air strikes being conducted against North Vietnam by the South Vietnamese and US air forces. You know the importance we attach to a solution to the Vietnam problem. To us, the Chinese Communist-supported aggression in Vietnam poses the same kind of threat to Free World interests as Communist China's attack on India in 1962.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS 64-68 vol. 25, #127
By jc, NARA, Date 3-20-07

~~SECRET~~

I wish to tell you in utmost privacy of the effort we have already made to induce a response from Hanoi by a suspension of air strikes, and the depressing lack of any response. I enclose an informal and confidential memorandum which candidly describes our efforts to date, and our current thinking as to certain future possibilities. It reflects my own deep desire to find a road to peace in Vietnam, and to share my thinking with you fully to this end.

Let me assure you that we will continue prayerfully to explore any hopeful opening. There is no step I would not take if in my judgment it offered real prospect of the peaceful settlement we both want.

I share your disappointment about the need for postponing your visit to Washington, but look forward to seeing you later on when we both have greater freedom to reason together over our common problems and opportunities. I hope you will find it possible to come in the autumn, or as soon thereafter as can be conveniently arranged. In the meantime, Mr. Prime Minister, please accept my sincere good wishes for every success in your office as you begin the coming year.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Lal Bahadur Shastri
Prime Minister of India
New Delhi, India

LBJ:RWK:tmt 6/5/65

cc: Mr. McG Bundy
W. P. Bundy
Phil Talbot

~~SECRET~~

95b file

TOP SECRET

June 5, 1965

MEMORANDUM

1. Though compelled to launch air strikes against North Vietnam, we have taken every possible precaution to hit only objectives directly related to Hanoi's persistent aggression against the South. From the military standpoint alone, we believe the strikes have had the effect of considerably reducing what would otherwise have been a steep rise in Hanoi's infiltration campaign. They have also encouraged the South Vietnamese government--which strongly urged them--and the South Vietnamese people and army. Over time, we believe they must make a major contribution to persuading reasonable elements in Hanoi that their campaign is simply not worth it, and that they should cease their interference in South Vietnam, leaving that country to determine its future, including its relation to the north, by peaceful means.

2. Simultaneously, however, we have made every effort to keep the door open to negotiation. We have made clear our readiness for discussions with no conditions whatever. Indeed, we have welcomed a succession of initiatives, from the call of the 17 non-aligned nations to Mr. Gordon Walker's attempt to visit Hanoi and Peiping and the recent constructive suggestions of your government for a cessation of hostilities and an Afro-Asian force to give effect to it. But Hanoi has made it clear, both publicly and privately, that it wants no part of any of these. Regrettably, we see no sign as yet that Hanoi is ready for any political solution other than a takeover of the South.

3. While we cannot be sure what motivates Hanoi's leaders, their attitude appears to be dictated by the belief that they can still hope, perhaps expect, to impose their will by force on South Vietnam, and that we and the South Vietnamese will not have the determination and resources to prevent this. If that is their reasoning, any cessation on our part of justified military actions might well feed the very beliefs that keep them from any realistic move toward a political solution.

4. We are conscious, of course, of the argument that the mere fact of the air strikes may be preventing Hanoi from taking forthcoming actions. Our suspension of bombing in mid-May was undertaken partly to see if this was indeed a factor, and partly to indicate to Hanoi the possibility of working toward a solution by reciprocal actions, or rather by reciprocally

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By jcfw NARA, Date 32-04

reduced or suspended actions. As we told the Indian government through diplomatic channels, our intention to suspend was communicated in advance to Hanoi, together with the suggestion that changes in Hanoi's visible military actions would be considered a forthcoming response. The details of this effort are as follows:

a. On Wednesday, May 12, Ambassador Kohler informed the DRV Embassy Moscow he had a communication for the DRV. DRV Ambassador declined appointment but subsequently telephoned to say that any communication to DRV should be made through Soviets as co-chairman. (Soviets had already informed us they did not wish to act as intermediaries, which accounted in part for our choice of this channel.)

b. Kohler then arranged to see senior official of Soviet Foreign Office, who stalled on delivery to DRV but did retain "oral statement" paper addressed to DRV. Concurrently, Kohler arranged for US Embassy representative to see DRV Embassy official and to hand him same paper with request he deliver to Ambassador, which official said he would do. Nonetheless, on May 13, DRV Embassy returned communication alleging that it could not receive it.

c. We concluded at this point that DRV Embassy had certainly in fact made copy of communication and relayed it to Hanoi, and that it also very likely that Soviets had passed on copy delivered to them. Nonetheless, we enlisted British cooperation, and on May 18 British Consul General in Hanoi delivered same paper to senior DRV official. DRV returned this paper to Consul General following day again asserting it could not receive USG communication.

5. We can only conclude from these episodes that DRV was resisting any attempt to communicate, even though it surely received the message. But the DRV made every effort to pretend that it had not even been received. This attitude, coupled with continued and even intensified activity in South Viet-Nam during period of suspension, which we believe Hanoi could have controlled at least in major respects, led inescapably to conclusion DRV not ready respond at this time to suspension. Since Hanoi did not react by word or deed, we felt compelled to resume air strikes.

6. We had also communicated our intention to the Soviet Government, actually on May 11. They made it quite clear that they did not wish in any way to be an intermediary to Hanoi, and Mr. Gromyko subsequently expressed a highly negative reaction to Secretary Rusk in Vienna on May 15.

This confirmed our feeling that the Soviets are not now willing to exert effective influence on Hanoi, despite the fact that suggestions for a suspension had in fact come to us privately through Soviet quarters for some time.

7. We did not inform the Indian government in advance of our intention solely because we wished to leave the matter in the hands of Hanoi and Moscow. We realize that its not being informed about our suspension may have affected the Prime Minister's discussions in Moscow, but we believed it best that the two Communist nations should have an uninterrupted period to deliberate on their response to the suspension. For similar reasons, we have steadfastly resisted giving any publicity to the fact of our communications to Hanoi and Moscow. Such publicity might get us credit in the world, but we give greater weight to the risk that it might diminish the effectiveness of diplomatic communications in the future.

8. Nonetheless, despite the absence of any response to date, we will continue to look at every possible opening. For example, we do not discard the possibility of another suspension, possibly of longer duration, in the hope that it may next time produce a real response by Hanoi, and perhaps begin a sequence of reciprocal actions that could lead toward a solution. Such a sequence has the advantage that it does not require admissions, only deeds. We have tried it once, and will consider it again at the appropriate time, having all factors in mind. Unless another such temporary suspension led to a real change in Hanoi's actions, however, we could not afford to consider extending it to the kind of cessation that the Indian government may have in mind.

9. A second way in which progress might be achieved toward the peace we all want in Southeast Asia would be if Hanoi were willing to engage in unconditional discussions, which might start with this very problem of what reductions in military action might be taken reciprocally on each side. We have repeatedly suggested this both publicly and through third parties in a position to relay the message to Hanoi, and continue to keep our ears and eyes open for any indication of a response.

10. A third way might arise through constructive proposals from third parties, which might at some point elicit a suggestive response that could be followed up. We have particularly in mind the proposal recently put forward by the Indian government. We have discussed this with them frankly, pointing out the difficulty of determining exactly what actions should

be stopped and in what reciprocal sequence, and the difficulty of mounting an effective international force to help keep the peace. These difficulties would have to be faced if the Communist side did show itself responsive at some juncture. But they are secondary to the essential point, which is that the Indian proposals focus realistically on central matters that must be met in working toward any solution.

11. For this reason, we welcome the activity of the Indian government in putting forward these proposals and particularly what we understand are its plans to present them for discussion at the forthcoming conference in Algiers. Perhaps there will again be no reaction or a continued negative reaction from the Communist nations involved, but the discussion alone should prove helpful.

cc: McG. Bundy
Wm. Bundy (2 copies)
Phil Dalbat

96

~~SECRET~~

May 30, 1965

Mac -

Our Pakistani and Indian Affairs. This memo is based on my assumption that the President's reluctance to move forward on India and Pakistan matters stems from his own deep instinct that we are not getting enough for our massive investment in either. As you know, I share that view; while I'd regard our investment as basically worthwhile, even at the present rate of return, my own longstanding feeling has been that a more active diplomacy and greater use of our aid leverage could bring more results, though necessarily entailing greater risks too.

A second reason for this memo is that our India/Pak policy is in a period of stagnation (I think the President senses this too). State's tendency is always to keep quiet and hope for the best. [redacted]

3.3
(b)(1)

[redacted] Bowles doesn't rethink the problem; his solution is simply to give the Indians everything they ask for, and more. So we need a new India/Pak policy even if the President weren't unhappy.

1. What do we want to accomplish? My point of departure is a hard new look at what we really want to get over the next few years in return for our massive Pak/Indian investment. I'll deliberately leave aside, as incontestable and undisputed, its longer term rationale, i.e. that building a viable democratic subcontinent is worth the price both in terms of denying it to the Communists and eventually using it as an effective counterweight to China.

While the shorter term problem is largely one of how to get greater movement toward this long term goal, it needs to be broken down as follows:

1. Our immediate aim in Pakistan is to get Ayub to pull back from his affair with the Chicoms, and to stop leaning on India. If he keeps pulling away from us, especially at a time when we're practically at war with Peiping, the Hill and popular US reaction may be such as to force us to suspend aid. Then Ayub loses his chief meal ticket and we probably lose Peshawar.

2. Next door, one key aim is to get the Indians to stop leaning so far toward Moscow (in order to forestall a Soviet-Chicom rapprochement) that they obstruct our Vietnam enterprise.

3. Equally important, we want to get India to pull up its socks and spend our aid money more efficiently so it can move toward self-reliance faster. We want to force it to do at least as well as Pakistan in this respect.

~~4.~~ We want to get both to stop wasting their time and energy quarrelling with each other at the expense of their attention to the Communist threat or

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 10-420 (#92)
By NARA, Date 4-20-11

their own internal development. The more the Paks divert India's focus to Pakistan instead of China the tougher our problem.

II. Bringing the Paks to heel. The longer we let Ayub think he can have his cake and eat it too, the harder it will be to reverse the trend toward China. For over two and a half years now we've turned the other cheek in hopes that the Paks would finally realize that they couldn't force us to change our India policy. Let's recognize that this policy has failed. So long as Ayub thinks he can cozy up to China, lean on India while it's weak, and still get as much US aid as ever, why should he stop? Moreover, he's now come pretty close to starting a Pak/Indian war.

My prescription for bringing the Paks around is to convince them that unless they alter course it's going to cost them US aid. Pakistan has nowhere else to go for it. True, a hard line risks losing Peshawar, but my fear is that if Pakistan continues going neutralist, we'll lose it anyway. We also risk upsetting Pakistan's economic success story (Dave Bell's worry). But here again if we let things drift much further we'll be forced to cut aid anyway.

If aid leverage is our secret weapon, how can we use it? I'd go ahead with remaining FY 1965 commitments just so Ayub can't complain we don't live up to our word. But FY 1965 is almost over, and we have numerous options for FY 1966:

1. Postpone the Pak consortium July pledging session, on grounds we just haven't made up our minds. Then come in with a pledge no higher than this year. The Paks want more (and deserve it on economic grounds) but the economic loss from investing $435 million instead of $500 million is far outweighed by the political gain.

2. Slow down FY 1966 aid disbursements. Stall further on the Karachi steel mill(which isn't such a hot project anyway).

3. Stall on a new PL 480 agreement (we'd normally start negotiating about _____)

4. Continue stalling on major MAP items (e.g. F-104s and F-5s) and hold up deliveries of tanks and APCs. The Paks would conclude we didn't like their use of MAP equipment in the Rann of Kutch.

5. Take a much harder diplomatic line with Pakistan by objecting vigorously to every anti-US move they make. Take issue with their obstructibnism in SEATO and CENTO. Before inviting Ayub here, send a hard case special emissary to soften him up.

III. Make India come to us. A degree of tactical disengagement from India too would serve our purposes. The Indians have also come to take US aid for granted and to use a double standard for the USSR and the US. Since the Indians have not shifted to anti-US policies, however, our professed rationale should be less one of punishing them than that India just isn't putting our help to good enough use. We can make a good case that (a) a much bigger Indian self-help effort is required; (b) moves toward reconciliation with Pakistan are also essential to this end; and (c) India's defense effort entails too big a diversion from development to defense.

We must face the fact that India will be much harder to move than Pakistan, simply because (a) it is so much bigger (b) Ayub can turn Pakistan around quickly but India's power structure is much more diffuse; and (c) the Indians can turn to the Soviets (though I doubt they'd get much). But the way to make the Indians learn to take us more seriously may well be to be much harder to get for a while:

1. Go through with FY 65 AID commitments, but slow down on FY 66.

2. Negotiate only a six-month or one year interim PL 480 agreement this June.

3. Tell the Indians that F-5s are out because we think their whole defense effort is too big a diversion from the new Fourth Plan.

4. Put India on notice that our contribution to the Fourth Plan (PL 480 as well as AID money) will depend on a much more vigorous Indian self-help effort in certain fields.

IV. Encouraging a reduction in Pak/Indian tensions. The more the Paks and Indians natter at each other the less our interests are served. We want both to focus more on the external threat (chiefly the Chinese), and to avoid diverting energy and resources to a quarrel which really benefits neither.

In getting them to stand down, we should work hardest on Pakistan: (a) because it's the Paks who are leaning on India not vice versa; and (b) because Pakistan as the weaker, and the one more dependent on us, is more malleable. These are hard facts of life. However much we might sympathize with Pakistan's case against India, especially on Kashmir, we are not going to be able to get far larger India to take the first step. If we can get an improved atmosphere, however, we can then begin educating the Indians too on

the sheer folly of their Pakistan policy.

But we cannot overburden the policy of tactical disengagement by assigining it impossible goals. To insist on a Kashmir compromise before we'd resume full scale aid would be to alienate India at the outset and play into Ayub's hands (it is precisely because we won't lean on India this way that he's turned to Peiping). A Kashmir settlement, if any, would come at the end of a long process of reconciliation not the beginning. And, as we've clearly recognized in the case of the Greek-Turk quarrel over Cyprus, our interest does not lie in backing one friend against another.

V. This memo does not spell out precisely what actions Pakistan and India must take to demonstrate that they are responding, or the point at which we should start opening the spigot wide again, and even increasing our aid (a good economic case could be made for doing so with both India and Pakistan). This would be the next step if the overall concept makes sense.

VI. The risks in the harder line proposed also need to be spelled out. At the outset both parties would devote more energy to complaining aboub us than readjusting their own thinking. At a minimum therefore, we'd have to expect a considerable noise. Only if we stood firm would both be forced to re-examine the cost to them of a degree of estrangement.

At the maximum, both might retaliate. The Paks could threaten Peshawar. The Indians could step up their criticism of our policies. But in each case the prospect of a descending spiral in our relationship would serve as a brake on their going too far.

There are also the domestic risks here. On the one hand what I'll call the "India lovers" will lambaste LBJ for yet another retreat from the Kennedy policy. On the other we might convince the Congress that such a massive investment in India/Pakistan is wrong anyway, thus defeating the whole purpose of the exercise. So quiet diplomacy is clearly essential.

VII. What now? I offer this line of action partly because it seems to me to fit this President's desires and style, and partly because I too believe that a more active subcontinent diplomacy offers real possibilities. We may well lose Pakistan anyway if we don't pull in on the reins. India is a tougher problem, and I worry that the President seems to insist on equating the two. But this is a fact we may have to live with too.

So I'd suggesting trying this out on the President first, and only then on the town. Neither State nor Defense (and neither AID nor CIA for

that matter) would go this direction without a strong Presidential lead. Ergo, if the President buys, he must tell Rusk, McNamara, Bell, and Raborn, and then we could spell out in a NSAM.

As to re-inviting Ayub and Shastri, there's no point in doing so until we've clearly sorted out what our policy is. In fact, I'd see merit in holding off even longer, till we'd had some preliminary skirmishes which tested out the new policy. Why burden the President with doing all the dirty work? Let Ayub and Shastri sweat a while.

R. W. Komer

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SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NSC 5-21-76
By jcl rg, NARA, Date 3-2-04

May 15, 1965

Mac:

M. J. Desai, whom you see Monday at 10, is a very cool, able customer, quite pro-US. Though retired, he's still very much part of the in-group. So he'd be a good channel for a few longer-range thoughts.

1. A little philosophy on the burdens of leadership might be useful. We see no one else ready and able to contain the Chicoms in Asia in the 60's, just as there was no one else to contain the Soviets in Europe or the ME in the 50's. We're buying time for a democratic India to come of age. Isn't this realized?

2. There's increasing feeling in the US that India isn't using this time as wisely as it might. From a pragmatic US point of view, Indian policy is too doctrainaire in economic as well as foreign policy fields. India must achieve a higher rate of growth, and the limiting factor is less external capital than domestic reform (rationalization of agriculture, freeing up private sector, etc.)

3. On foreign policy side, we fully understand Indian non-alignment, and Delhi's special concern lest Moscow and Peiping move together again. But we think Delhi is unduly fearful this will happen. Peiping simply won't accept Soviet terms

4. Nor do we see great risks of escalation; Soviets are going to be just as prudent as we are on Vietnam.

5. Finally, nothing is a greater drag on US/Indian relations than the constant bickering with Pakistan. It's nonsense to call us pro-Pak (at least since 1961). But we shudder at the vast waste of Indian, Pak, and US energy and resources because of Pak/Indian unwillingness to compromise what seem to us quite minor differences compared to other business confronting both (China, internal development).

I'd like to sit in, if you OK.

Att. Read/Bundy Memo 5/14/65, subj.
Your mtg with M. J. Desai, etc .

RWK

Note Mr. Bundy did not see Desai
Pd Jones Dunlop

SECRET

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May 12, 1965

India

Alice Boyce:

State confirms that 10:00 am May 17th is OK for M. J. Desai's appointment with McGB.

Mr. Lakeland, State desk officer, will escort him to the door just to be sure he doesn't get lost.

Thanks,

HHS

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~~SECRET~~ May 11, 1965

India

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HANDLEY

Here's Bundy's idea of how a letter to Shastri might look.

Obviously we can't get it out now prior to his departure for Moscow. So maybe the thing to do is to keep our eyes open for an appropriate occasion. Would something like this be soothing around June 1st?

Harold H. Saunders

Attach. HHS 5/11/65 draft ltr to Shastri

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By JC, NARA, Date 3-2-04

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By JC, NARA, Date 3-2-04

~~SECRET~~/DRAFT May 11, 1965

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I want to tell you how much I regret the disturbing public speculation and comment triggered by my suggestion to postpone your visit here until early fall. Perhaps this was to be expected, but I do hope that you and I, at least, as principal executives of the world's two largest democracies, can share an understanding of the problems which led me to that suggestion.

When I wrote you on April 17, I deeply felt that early in June my own preoccupations with Viet Nam and with the unfinished business of the legislative year would have been so heavy that they would have surely kept us from the kind of exchange we both look forward to. But as the result of a truly regrettable press leak--one of the troublesome costs of democracy--there was insufficient time for the two of us to exchange views on the postponement and to fix a new date for our meeting before the announcement had to be made in New Delhi and Washington. I know you will understand that there was absolutely no thought of discourtesy.

We have been facing a major problem with the American Congress this year regarding our aid legislation. There are proposals currently before Congress which, if enacted, would go to the very heart of our program of foreign aid and seriously impair our ability to provide assistance to a number of countries. Since your visit would have been during the most critical moments of Congressional debate, it would have placed undue

emphasis on the fact that India is the largest single recipient of our economic aid. I recalled only too clearly how President Kennedy was unable to overcome Congressional resistance to the Bokaro steel project and I became convinced that a visit later in the year after Congress had acted was a far better time for the two of us to meet.

Parenthetically, you should also know that one of the reasons that led me to suggest to President Ayub a similar postponement was the fact that Pakistan is the second largest recipient of United States aid--and not, as has been speculated, an attempt to equate Pakistan with India.

I also hope that, in perspective, the fall will turn out to be a more fruitful time from your point of view. I know that your third Five Year Plan, which I have followed most closely, will be coming to an end and that soon you and your Government will be seeking to improve the lot of your citizens with a fourth Plan. I am proud of the support that my Government, through several Administrations, has given to India's efforts to build a better life. This support will continue and I will do everything I can to associate all segments of American life--executive, legislative, educational, and business--with your efforts. Hopefully, a meeting in the fall will make more sense for both of us than a hurried one now before all our plans are in order.

I firmly believe that our mutual undertakings over many years have achieved such depth and underlying strength that we should not permit them to be undermined. As one who, like you, has devoted most of my adult

years to politics, that most rewarding, difficult and essential profession, I know how oppressive the tyranny of the political calendar can be. I do hope, however, that you and I can soon arrange a time within the next few months for our meeting so that we might sit down to discuss together, not momentary crises, but how to mobilize the human, moral, technical and material resources of both of our countries to complete the unfinished work that lies ahead.

Sincerely,