

~~SECRET~~

May 7, 1965

McGB:

Here are the issues on Indian PL-480 I'd appreciate your views on at staff meeting this afternoon.

1. Do you want to stick to a one-year agreement? State, backing Bowles (3057), recommends two-year. Agriculture feels a two-year would achieve more agriculturally--permit Indians to build buffer stocks and allow them to free their market by removing zonal restrictions on flow of produce. AID is divided but would buy a two-year agreement--some feel our leverage as a continuing proposition bolstered by promise of continued help; others understand the "big package" argument that we may want special leverage this year.

You and RWK have already told Bowles you favor a one-year frankly interim agreement. To make this salable, we'd have to append some formula to assure the Indians of our continued support. We can probably sell this in State (they already have compromise language in mind, though they'd prefer not to use it). However, if we're going to turn down the recommendation of three agencies, it might be well for you to reach an understanding with Rusk. One way to compromise might be to give Bowles our arguments formally and ask him to stack them against his. Giving him another crack would lay groundwork for a formal decision on one-year, two-year debate.

2. Can you (or President) let Bowles say anything on next year's PL 480 before Shastri goes to Moscow? Bowles might either make a public statement talking about quantities for next year or give GOI confidentially our current thinking as an earnest of good intent. This is one of the things he pushed for in his plea to you and Rusk.

I understand the President's prohibition on making aid splashes. However, would he oppose a confidential word? State argues that any indication we're not going ahead in India would create adverse reaction among PL 480 supporters from Fulbright down.

The time problem (Shastri goes Wednesday) is whether we can clear anything in time to do Bowles any good.

cc: Mr. Bator  
Mr. Rowen

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *jk*, NARA, Date *3-2-04*

HHS

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CONFIDENTIAL

McGB:

May 5, 1965

101  
file  
India

I gather Bowles may have written you asking you to see M. J. Desai, who has at least temporarily retired from his job as SYG of India's Ministry of External Affairs. Desai turned down a job somewhat like yours (in relation to Shastri) to get a rest but may well go back to some equally influential spot. So he's still an important guy.

He'll be here 17-22 May on a private visit sponsored by the Friends of India. However, Bowles has also written Humphrey, Rusk, Fulbright, Talbot, Hughes asking them to see him. State isn't pushing but does have to handle the scheduling.

This might be a very good private way to get another (assuming Lodge did his piece) word back to Shastri on how we really didn't mean to insult him. Any interest? I can either encourage or discourage. Also, RWK will be back and might see him if you don't have time. (Might also mollify Bowles, who may be feeling a little bruised.)

Another matter. I'm assuming you've answered Bowles on his home leave plans since this was a personal plea to you.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 3-2-04

SECRET

McGB:

May 3, 1965

Before he left, RWK suggested an LBJ-Shastri letter to begin knitting them back together as the shock of postponement dulls.

We'll have to do something like this sooner or later to soothe the sting and pave the way for setting a new date. From our point of view this Dominican week isn't the best time, but Shastri leaves for Moscow 12 May. So there's much to be said for restoring his perspective by then. We still don't know whether Lodge raised the postponement with Shastri as you instructed, but you'll get a clearer picture tomorrow of much healing still needs to be done.

Attached is a draft from Handley in State, which I reworked. If you think it's worth trying on the President, I'll send this draft back to Talbot for more formal clearance in the Department.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 3-2-04



~~SECRET~~ - DRAFT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 3-2-04

102a  
May 3, 1965

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I want to tell you how much I regret the disturbing public speculation and comment triggered by suggestion to postpone your visit here until early fall. Perhaps this was to be expected, but I do hope that you and I, at least, as principal executives of the world's two largest democracies can share an understanding of the problems which led me to that suggestion.

When I wrote you on April 17, I deeply felt that early in June my own preoccupations with Viet Nam and with the unfinished business of the legislative year would have been so heavy that they would have surely kept us from the kind of exchange we both look forward to. Unfortunately, due to a truly regrettable press leak--one of the troublesome costs of democracy--there was insufficient time for the two of us to exchange views on the postponement and to fix a new date for our meeting before the announcement had to be made in New Delhi and Washington. I assure you and know you will understand that there was absolutely no thought of discourtesy.

You should know that I have been facing a major problem with the American Congress this year regarding our aid legislation. There are proposals currently before Congress which, if enacted, would go to the very heart of our approach to foreign aid and might seriously impair our ability to provide assistance to a number of countries. Since your visit

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- 2 -

would have been during the most critical moments of Congressional debate, it would have placed undue emphasis on the fact that India is the largest single recipient of our economic aid. I recalled only too clearly how President Kennedy was unable to overcome Congressional resistance to the Bokaro steel project and, on reflection, became convinced that a visit later in the year after Congress had acted was a far better time for the two of us to meet.

Parenthetically, you should also know that one of the reasons that led me to suggest to President Ayub a similar postponement was the fact that Pakistan is the second largest recipient of United States aid--and not, as has been speculated, an attempt to equate Pakistan with India.

I also hope that, in perspective, the fall will turn out to be a more fruitful time from your point of view. I know that your third Five Year Plan, which I have followed most closely, will be coming to an end and that soon you and your Government will be seeking to improve the lot of your citizens with a fourth Plan. I am proud of the support that my Government, through several administrations, has given to India's efforts to build a better life. This support will continue and I will do everything I can to associate all segments of American life--executive, legislative, educational and business--with your efforts. Hopefully, a meeting in the fall will make more sense for both of us than a hurried one now before all our plans are in order.

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- 3 -

I firmly believe that our mutual undertakings over many years have achieved such depth and underlying strength that we should not permit them to be undermined. As one who, like you, has devoted most of my adult years to politics, that most rewarding, difficult and essential profession, I know how oppressive the tyranny of the political calendar can be. I do hope, however, that you and I can soon arrange a time within the next few months for our meeting so that we might sit down to discuss together, not momentary crises, but how to mobilize the human, moral, technical and material resources of both of our countries to complete the unfinished work that lies ahead.

Sincerely,

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

McGB:

April 29, 1965

Bowles has endorsed L. K. Jha's suggestion (New Delhi 3082) that Lodge, when he sees Shastri Friday, bring a message from the President saying we'd press the Paks not to use MAP equipment in the Rann of Kutch.

In your absence, I've told State my tentative feeling is we shouldn't get the President involved now in this ticklish problem, especially since we're still not sure of the facts. State's initial reaction is the same. Besides, Lodge has important Vietnam business and we want to leave the India-Pak problem to Bowles. If Lodge gets across our points on the visit postponement, he will have done a good day's non-Vietnamese work.

Although we want to keep the President out of this now, this problem will raise a lot of noise unless we get a cease-fire. Bowles has already recommended we threaten to suspend Pak military aid. We've always told the Indians we'd keep the Paks from using MAP equipment against them, and now they're publicizing pictures of US-made tanks presumably in action in Kutch. The Paks claim they're within their MAP agreement rights--just deploying the tanks for defense. We're not sure to what extent the tanks have been used, but at least some small MAP equipment must have been used because we're the Paks' main supplier.

McConaughy is right (Karachi 2040) in fearing we might send Ayub off the deep end by cutting off his chief source of security. He's also right in admitting we're in a box with the Indians and with Congress if we don't try to control use of MAP equipment. We don't see any obvious way out yet, except to bet heavily on a cease-fire.

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By jc, NARA, Date 3-2-04

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25X1

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TO NEW DELHI

April 28, 1965 - 11:00 a.m.

EYES ONLY FOR BOWLES FROM BUNDY

Have just seen your 3057 asking help on pending matters before you return here mid-May. We are fully and sympathetically aware of hectic situation in subcontinent and will do our best to push some of these matters forward. However, with all the candor you have come to expect via this channel, let me warn against great expectations just now. With Vietnam in the forefront of all minds, there is simply not likely to be the kind of constructive focus on the issues you raise which is necessary to push them through.

Moreover, while tactical considerations may argue for early gestures before Shastri goes to Moscow, we still see merit in reserving some of the items you propose till we can fit them better into package approach being considered here, rather than dishing them out piecemeal. Two-year PL 480 commitment now, for example, might deprive us of major leverage before we have fully worked out what we want Indians to do in return, at least in agriculture sector. A one-year, frankly interim, agreement might suffice for our immediate purpose.

As for F-5A, we see little chance of promising aircraft now when Paks and perhaps Indians are using our MAP for purposes far afield from what we intended.

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ-032-023-2-15  
By *dg/cbu*, NARA, Date 11-13-07

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- 2 -

In sum, my reading of Washington end is that the way of wisdom is not to push too hard on big new programs till we can revalidate our Indian enterprise and get the aid bill through. Here we must grant the President's own unparalleled sense of the rocky road the aid bill is travelling and his strong desire not to rock the boat till he knows what's in his pocket. Nor does Vietnam, where the course we have to take will not win us many short term plaudits overseas, ease the problem.

So timing is everything just now. On this score, Komer and I strongly urge that you postpone your home leave for six weeks or so. When we heard you were coming, we thought it wise on your behalf to check with the President, and this is his own distinct preference. Aside from the value of having you at the helm in Delhi during a ticklish period in US/Indian relations, we may need your guiding hand in handling Vietnam affairs with the Indians. Equally important, you could not come back now without talking India and it is simply not a propitious time to do so. You would inevitably be caught in the backwash of the Shastri affair, and have to answer embarrassing queries. Even strictly home leave might be misconstrued, and you couldn't really come back without a Washington leg.

These are difficult times, not least for you, and we all appreciate your gallant handling of affairs at your end. I also realize how difficult

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~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

it is in Delhi to get the full flavor of the situation here. However, I'm sure you will understand the President's own judgment as to why the timing would be better, and your presence here more productive, when our own affairs on the Hill and in Vietnam are more fully sorted out.

~~SECRET~~



DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS.032R.023.002/5

By jc, NARA, Date 1-4-10

SECRET/EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR  
VIA CLASSIFIED DIPLOMATIC POUCH

106  
*India* ✓ *Bowles*

Chet:

April 28, 1965

Your note of the 21st (received today) deserves an immediate explanation. Your friends in the know here all appreciate the way in which you took a bolt from the blue, without unduly fighting the problem. As you can imagine, our personal cable (it was Mac's as well as mine) was first and foremost a hasty effort to give you most privately the full flavor.

Let me add that I largely share your disappointment over the setback to our Indian enterprise, which has been proceeding remarkably well (all things considered) since October 1962. But longer term impact is often less adverse than initial pained reactions would suggest. Without seeking to minimize the problem, I've seen a lot of these flaps come and pass away.

This said, I'll confess that the initial press emphasis on Vietnam, together with the bracketing of India and Pakistan, did tend to point the finger more than was justified on the record. The fact of the matter is that the President was far more exercised about Pak misbehavior than Indian. Also we simply couldn't in the initial public statements talk about the aid problem, lest we clue our Hill critics. In all private fence-mending, however, we've pointed essentially and quite legitimately to the aid angle (as the President did in his letter to Shastri).

Bundy and I are distressed that our private comment about an enterprise that "isn't going anywhere fast" should have been so painful. However, we were referring not only to the "appalling" domestic problems cited in your own letter to the President but to our political relations. Let's face it on both scores. In the economic field per capita growth is painfully slow (which is precisely why some of us are trying to argue for a larger scale joint effort to get India moving). And politically, the high point reached in November 1962 has receded. For many reasons (most of them quite understandable) Washington and Delhi are not working as well in harness as they should. This is by no means your fault (or mine), but it is a fact of life. If it weren't, you and I wouldn't be trying so hard to get some new momentum into the enterprise.

In any case, I can assure you that whether or not India is going anywhere fast, this was not a factor in the postponement of the visit. So misinformation--gross or otherwise--was not at issue.

SECRET/EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR~~

- 2 -

I might add that I'm not as pessimistic about Washington's views as its recent cables (or lack of them) may suggest. I also doubt that the recent painful episode will sweep away very much of what we--you foremost--have been trying to build. Let's reserve judgment over the ultimate results till at least some of the dust has settled.

But we do have a terrible problem in getting adequate focus on South Asia at a time when all thought and energy is focussed on Vietnam. This is inevitable, I suspect, but don't think we aren't trying. Mac and I are doing our best. But we--and most of all the President face an added hurdle in that foreign aid is the one piece of major legislation on which there's no consensus--and on which the Congress may vent its frustrations as a result. We're trying quiet diplomacy, but this isn't easy. On the bright side, however, the billion for SEA is the President's first use of a major aid tool to help settle new problems. If we can't do it for Vietnam, why not for intrinsically more important places?

You'll have received Mac's well meant suggestions on home leave. Please, please bear in mind that we're trying to protect your flank--and preserve your maneuverability--by keeping you properly clued. It's painful for us too to have to tell you not to come, but this is what friends are for. And no personal slight from on high is involved!

All the best, and I'm hopeful it is all for the best. We're doing well overall, and I'm confident that affairs which are lagging will get the treatment too, as soon as the time is ripe. But even LBJ can't do everything simultaneously, even though that's what the job description demands.

Sincerely,

R. W. Komer

Honorable Chester Bowles  
U.S. Ambassador to India  
U.S. Ambassador  
New Delhi, India

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR~~



~~SECRET~~

April 28, 1965

106

India  
XVH

McGB:

Why don't we embrace the Radhakrishnan  
plan for Vietnam?

I assume it's a non-starter because enemy  
wouldn't touch it but this is all the more reason  
for getting a free ride. From standpoint of our  
Indian affairs it would certainly help to improve  
our currently tarnished eschutcheon in Delhi. Bear  
in mind also that Radhakrishnan is one of the tough-  
minded and highly pro-West Indians, so support  
for him is money in the bank.

RWK

cc: Chet Cooper

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By pc, NARA, Date 3-2-04

~~SECRET~~

April 28, 1965

107  
India

Mac -

Additional evidence that Radhakrishnan  
may be useful to us, not only on Vietnam  
but in India.

By the way, despite all the flak, I see a  
few signs that both Paks and Indians are a  
little more nervous about US support.

RWK

Attach. Delhi 3059, 3060

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 3-2-04

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Mac -

April 27, 1965

Here's most artful way I could devise to break the word gently to Chet.

It could stand a lot of improvement, but I also see urgency in turning Chet around before his plans get too set. He's already sending in cables (and I suspect writing people).

To edge into a painful subject, I took advantage of his new 3057 (attached), which is also addressed to you. Chet is overbidding here in his desperate effort to salvage something from Shastri affair and forestall an Indian/Soviet love affair at our expense when Shastri gets the red carpet in Moscow. I'm worried here too, largely because the Kutch affair may give the Sovs a golden opportunity to offer all sorts of new hardware (since now it would appear to be against the Paks, not the Chicoms).

LBJ's press conference statement was first class, but I still see a good letter indicated, and will do draft before I go. Even if we seem to be running after Shastri just before he goes to Moscow, I'd swallow my pride to help avert risk of a real setback. I'd even like to see LBJ lift the veil a bit as a teaser on the big things we'd like to talk about in the fall (big new multi-year PL 480 solid help for Fourth Five Year Plan, etc), but this may be shorting too high.

Side wire to Bowles attached.

RWK

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By h/r, NARA, Date 3-2-04

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108a

~~SECRET~~

April 27, 1965/6:00 pm

TO NEW DELHI

FOR BOWLES FROM BUNDY

Have just seen your 3057 asking help on pending matters before you return here mid-May. We are fully and sympathetically aware of hectic situation in subcontinent and will do our best to push some of these matters forward. However, with all the candor you have come to expect via this channel, I want to warn against great expectations at this particular time. With Vietnam in the forefront of all minds, there is simply not likely to be the kind of constructive focus on the issues you raise which is necessary to push them through now.

Moreover, while tactical considerations may argue for early gestures before Shastri goes to Moscow, we still see merit in reserving some of the items you propose till we can fit them better into package approach being considered at staff level here, rather than dishing them out piecemeal. Two-year PL 480 commitment now, for example, might deprive us of major leverage before we have fully worked out what we want Indians to do in return, at least in agriculture sector. A one-year, frankly interim, agreement might suffice to serve our immediate purpose.

As for F-5A, we see little chance of promising aircraft now when Paks and perhaps Indians are using our MAP for purposes far afield from what we intended.

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ-032-023-2-16  
By ag/abm, NARA, Date 11-13-07

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- 2 -

In sum, my reading of Washington end is that the way of wisdom is not to push too hard on big new programs till we can re-validate our Indian enterprise and get the aid bill through. Neither Komer nor I are unduly pessimistic here, but we must ask you to grant the President's own unparalleled sense of the rocky road the aid bill is having and his strong desire not to rock the boat till he knows what's in his pocket. Nor does Vietnam, where the course we have to take, will not win us many short term plaudits overseas, ease the problem.

So timing is everything just now. On this score, Komer and I wonder if you wouldn't be wise to postpone your Washington consultations and home leave for a month or so. Entirely aside from the value of having you in Delhi during a ticklish period in US/Indian relations, we may have need of your guiding hand in handling Vietnam affairs with the Indians. Equally important, you could not come back now without talking India and it is simply not a propitious time to do so. I know you will understand when I express my own sense that the President would be happier with you at the helm in Delhi for the next six weeks or so.

These are difficult times, not least for you, and I realize how difficult it is in Delhi to get the full flavor of the situation here. So I fully understand why you want to come back, but can only offer you my own judgment that the timing would be better, and your presence more

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- 3 -

productive here, when our own affairs on the Hill and in Vietnam are more fully sorted out.



~~SECRET~~

Mac -

April 27, 1965

Since Lodge's visit may be an excellent chance to do a quick repair job, I've gone overboard on a friendly private pitch.

I've focussed almost wholly on the aid argument, not just because Lodge can handle it best but because it's the best one for Shastri. It also indirectly reminds him of how important US aid really is to India.

Unless Lodge can say something that sounds like the inside story he won't be credible. So I've tossed in the press leak and Bokaro angles.

RWK

*India  
Shastri Visit*

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*Revised X sent*

*CAP 65-137*

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Authority NLJ-032-023-2-17  
By ag/abm NARA, Date 11-13-07

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April 23, 1965

110

Mac -

Department of wild ideas. If LBJ got invited to have lunch in Ottawa when Shastri was visiting in early June, it would be a grande geste.

*India*

I'm sure Pearson would be happy to oblige, but I realize this doesn't look good from LBJ viewpoint. Nonetheless, I will try to keep thinking imaginatively about ways and means of massaging the injured dignity of our Indian friends. While we don't want to be precipitous, some gesture before Shastri goes to Moscow 12 May would be good insurance. An LBJ letter inviting Shastri for a specific date mid-September might only generate an Indian rejection, but if only this could be kept private the exchange of snub for snub might expunge the record. Then we could agree subsequently on a later date.

RWK

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By *plw*, NARA, Date 3-2-04

109a  
~~SECRET~~

AMEMB NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE

April 27, 1965

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE FROM BUNDY

President desires that you be fully up to date on reasoning behind Shastri visit postponement so that you can respond knowledgeably in case issue arises in your private talks with key Indian officials. In fact, he sees merit in your raising matter with Shastri yourself. With your Hill experience you should be in good position underline why President felt June timing unpropitious, given rocky passage of aid bills these days.

Embassy will have file of White House announcements and President's own comment in his press conference today. Beyond this, however, you could add following private gloss as seems appropriate:

1. You know from President himself that he intended no discourtesy.

It was unfortunate fact of press leak here just after President's letter had been sent, which forced abrupt announcement in both Delhi and Washington before we had time to work matter out jointly.

2. President was genuinely worried that early visits Shastri as well as Ayub, while aid fight still in progress on Hill, would inevitably lead to undue focus on fact that India largest single recipient of US aid, at time when Congressional critics seeking make major cuts in US aid programs. President recalls how Kennedy Administration

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By jc, NARA, Date 3-20-01

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- 2 -

unable overcome Congressional resistance to Bokaro steel project, even though in Administration view it made good sense. Thus President's own deep sense was that it far better to ask PM to postpone visit till late summer or early fall, when we would be past aid hurdle.

4. Since President was advised that biggest mutual problem which ought to be on agenda was how US and India could work together to make India's new Fourth Plan a success, he also saw merit in waiting till he could get better sense of what Congress prepared to go for.

5. You might express your hope that there is no misapprehension that US equating India with Pakistan. Main reason that Ayub and Shastri visits were focussed on here simultaneously is that the two countries are first and second largest recipients of US aid. Europeans not in same category. As for Pak of Korea, we had special problem in seeking to back his hand on ROK/Jap settlement.

6. You may tell Shastri of President's personal hope that visit can be rescheduled soon. Our mutual undertakings over a period of years have achieved such depth and underlying firmness that we cannot permit them to be undermined.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

April 22, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The US and India. Here is the summary you requested. I only hit the highlights, because India is really a continent--its 475 million people are more than in Latin America and Africa combined.

I. Our immense investment in India--around \$6 billion to date--has not been because of India's foreign policy, but rather in spite of it. Basically, we can't afford to let India go the way China did, without a staggering setback. On the positive side, we see a free, democratic and viable India as an essential counterweight--with Japan--to Communist China. We're banking on a natural conflict of interest between the two giants of Asia (and Peiping's 1962 attack went a long way to prove our point). Once India has conquered its internal problems, we count on it as well as Japan to shoulder the main burden of containing Chicom expansion. So what we win in Vietnam today will be partly up to India to preserve tomorrow. Loss of India would make loss of Southeast Asia pale by comparison, and mean loss of Pakistan too.

These fundamentals have led four US administrations to a huge long term investment (fortunately 45% of it surplus food), and to endure all the frustrations arising from India's neutralist policies and all the problems of its emergence as a nation.

II. But from the standpoint of India's own national interest, its policies are understandable (as are Pakistan's vis-a-vis India). Indians naturally want to avoid over-involvement abroad (even in Southeast Asia) until they have built their power base at home. Their isolationism parallels ours in a similar period. For the same reason, they want passionately to avoid a global war which might cut them down before they realize their potential. They also know they're big and important enough to command aid from the USSR (\$1 billion economic) as well as the West. Delhi's powerful interest in keeping Moscow split from Peiping is another reason why it plays up to Moscow as well. Finally, Indians show all the intense nationalism of a young nation anxious to assert itself. Because of its colonial heritage and its reverence for Gandhi's successful non-violent tactics against the UK, this all too often has an anti-Western and pacifist bias.

SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : NLJ-032-022-1-3-1

SECRET

Authenticity NLJ-032-022-601/3

By je NARA, Date 12-17-03



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- 2 -

India's ambitions are exceeded only by its problems (castes, rapid population growth, religious divisions, different languages). We have a major interest in seeing that it does not solve these by taking the Communist route. So we've swallowed our distaste for the dogmatic and inefficient Indian brand of quasi-socialism, and given massive support to Nehru's series of five-year plans since 1951 (see attached chart). We've concentrated on power, transport, agriculture and education--all major bottlenecks. In 1958, to bring India out of a grave foreign exchange crisis, we organized a World Bank consortium as a device to get other Western nations to share the burden. It has contributed around \$1 billion in development capital a year, of which our share runs about 40%.

III. However, given the immensity of India's problems, and its own inefficiencies, all this has barely managed to keep it moving ahead slowly. While industrial production has more than doubled since 1951, and agriculture is up by almost half, the population explosion has held per capita increase in income to 1-1/4% per annum in latest plan period. Our surplus food has provided an indispensable cushion (\$2.7 billion to date).

Now there is the added burden of meeting the Chinese threat. The Indians starved their armed forces till the Chinese struck, but since have mounted a crash rearmament effort. We've put in about \$80 million in MAP, oriented toward mountain war with China (none of it major hardware yet). The Soviets have put in much more (\$300 million).

IV. The Future. If a free and viable India is really of such great long term interest to us, it may be worth an even greater investment. The \$700 million (including food) we give or lend each year is larger in the absolute, but far less per capita than we spend on most other key countries--the Latines, Turks, Koreans, or even the Paks. Taking the long view, our biggest problem in India is helping to make it tick. Our aid gives us real leverage here:

1. Our plans call for an FY'66 package of \$358 million in loans and grants, \$50 million Exim, \$325 million food, \$50 million MAP. Yesterday's consortium pledge of \$435 million (out of a \$1 billion total) comes from the above.

2. But many experts argue that stepping up our Indian program (not even to the Pak per capita level) would pay great dividends, if tied to Indian performance on several key things we want. Such



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- 3 -

beefing up would also get India to the self-sustaining stage a lot faster-- and thus save us money in the long run. Calbraith, Kayson, and Ed Mason have just written you urging a \$500 million increase in US aid. Since no such increase seems presently feasible, we're looking at how to get the same effect more cheaply--debt rollover, more World Bank and Exim money, and even more food. The time to move may be next year, when India starts its new Fourth Plan.

3. The case for working out a new package deal rests not only on India's crucial position but on what we could get in return:

a. Major economic policy changes (freeing up the private sector, new emphasis on agriculture, relaxation of import controls), that we think could greatly boost their lagging growth rate. The other consortium donors agree that we should use our future pledges as a lever to get better economic performance. But Indians have a case when they say they can't decontrol, for example, unless they get enough aid (as the Paks did) to cover a possible run on foreign exchange.

b. A firm anti-proliferation pledge from Shastri. Peiping's test has renewed pressure on India to build the bomb. Forestalling this is worth a goodly price in nuclear reassurances and other convincing evidence India won't stand alone.

c. A stronger anti-Chicom stance. This is worth building toward, though it will take time. India is working increasingly

turning increasingly to the Soviets for hardware, because of our reluctance to provide much. They want six squadrons of F-5s, and Bowles urges we sell three new on credit (about \$70 million). But first we have to sort out the issue of planes for Pakistan too.

d. Finally, to lay the groundwork for Pak/Indian reconciliation, perhaps starting in the economic field rather than on Kashmir.

V. Cy Sulzberger isn't overdoing much in claiming that "India is America's most crucial long-term problem" (article attached). Making it a going concern will cost far less over a decade than having to fight

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

for it later. And in our own interest, we can't let Indian/Pak relations be the touchstone of our policy toward either India or Pakistan. The sooner the Paks and Indians are brought to realize we won't be jockeyed by either, the sooner they may compose their differences.

R. W. Komer



~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

112  
India  
X Ayub  
X Shastri  
X Pak  
April 16, 1963

All things considered, deferral of Ayub/Shastri visits went off quite well. We're inclined to feel Ayub got the word, and was quite big league about it. Naturally Ayub's main concern was that we disinvite Shastri too, and at the same time. Bowles didn't connect with Shastri, but latter's chief assistant was unhappy chiefly about the bracketing of India with Pakistan.

Fortunately, we got the public statements organized just in time to offset the unfortunate last minute leak. The Washington Post had the story yesterday but Jim Greenfield got them to hold off. The NY Times got it too late last night to confirm for today's papers. Rusk is most distressed about the leak and investigating, but no good leads yet.

We can expect plenty of press attention and some hostile editorials on lateness of postponement and speculation as to why. Were we sore because of Pak and Indian behavior? We're lying low, not talking to press, and letting the story blow over, but there may even be some good in the inevitable press speculation about Pakistan's recent behavior (so long as it can't be tied directly to the USC). We don't intend to be apologetic in any way.

It will take a bit longer before we can tell whether our Pak and Indian friends absorbed the lesson. We're looking at later ways to insure they do, and to soften both up before they come in the fall. At risk of being tabbed again an Indian-lover, I'll say that Shastri got the short end of the stick, since India necessarily seems to be lumped with Pakistan as a bad boy. But both will hopefully reflect on the moral that Uncle Sam should not just be regarded as a cornucopia of goodies, regardless of what they do or say.

R. W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

PLJ 00-253 (419)

By f/cam

NARA. Date

3-2-04

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Nac -

April 15, 1965

Here's a proposed side wire to calm down Bowles. I've tried to hit the right pitch.

We'll definitely need an LBJ letter. State and I are drafting to be ready.

The right press guidance to dampen speculation is also essential. Gil Harrison phoned Greenfield to ask if we had any repercussions yet on cancellation both visits. He thought we were cancelling Shastri because of his stand on Vietnam. Jim was floored at leak, but told Harrison story partly off, and appealed to him not to spread it. Harrison said he had story from "a loyal American pretty high up." We doubt he got it from his brother in Delhi (Bowles isn't that dumb).

RWK

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By flk NARA, Date 3-2-04

113  
file  
India  
X Shastri Visit

~~SECRET~~

113<sup>a</sup>  
April 15, 1965/5:30 pm

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

EYES ONLY FOR BOWLES FROM BUNDY

President and all rest of us here can well understand your distress at Shastri postponement, but I can assure you that this decision taken with best interests India as well as US thoroughly in mind. It is not to be construed as merely a conditioned reflex to decision disinvite Ayub.

In point of fact USG, with Vietnam and host of other problems on its plate over next few months, and with aid bill having rocky passage through Congress, is in no position talk turkey with Shastri just now. Nor for that matter does Shastri seem from here to be as yet in any position to say much to us. So rather than have merely a polite get-together with neither party yet ready for constructive palaver, the President prefers that we both do our homework and get aid bill passed first.

You should know that President feels deeply a Shastri visit here could focus unwelcome attention on the fact that we're spending biggest single chunk of our aid money on an enterprise which isn't going anywhere fast. Add to this the risk of undue focus on the fact that our two largest clients don't seem able to live on the same continent with each other without constant bickering. Regardless of the causes, this doesn't go down well here.

It also makes the time most unpropitious for those of us who feel that US interests dictate constructing a package of substantially larger help for

**SANITIZED**

Authority FRUS 64-68 10125 #01

By jc NARA, Date 3-7-01

~~SECRET~~

2.

India in return for some quite far-reaching understandings with respect to: (a) non-proliferation; (b) more sensible economic policies; and (c) movement toward Pak/Indian reconciliation. As we see it, Indians are no more ready to talk sensibly about this yet than we.

So our larger interests, as well as our immediate problems, argue for accepting any short term affront to Indian amour propre in the interest of a more productive visit later. Am sure you see this loud and clear.

Thus our chore at this point is to find ways and means of softening the blow. We will shoot for a candid LBJ letter, but much will also depend on your own ability to say convincingly that postponement must not be read as any more than what it is--a feeling on the President's own part plus that of all his advisers that the time would simply be riper in the fall.

RWKomer/jk



*Dr. Chester Cooper*  
*3/31/65*  
*114*  
*file*  
*India*

DRAFT

Dear Mr. Clark:

I enjoyed our discussion and have been mulling over your letter of March 12th.

I think we in the government agree with your basic thesis that private home ownership can be one good tool in undercutting the Communist appeal.

However, we believe the way to promote this idea in countries like India is by working with institutions--like savings and loan or cooperative housing associations--that help locals to marshal their own resources to finance home-building. We feel this goes farther than tackling construction itself, though we do get into this occasionally as a part of other projects like the one the Carvey interests will be working on near Calcutta.

So I don't think we as a government are in a position to push housing as a panacea, or even part of one. Our aid is so limited that we have to use it where it will have the widest possible impact.

It seems to me therefore that the way to promote this concept is to work through such organizations as the Savings and Loan League and the Foundation for Cooperative Housing. Our people are relying heavily on them to push work in this field, and our money, if it goes to any effort like this, will probably go in their direction.

Yours very truly,

Chester Cooper

*HHS draft*

114a

LESLIE A. CLARK

Attorney at Law

352 N. BROADWAY - TELEPHONE FO 3-1161

WICHITA, KANSAS 67202

March 12, 1965

Mr. Chester Cooper  
Executive Office Building  
17th and Pennsylvania Avenue  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Cooper:

Willard Garvey and I very much appreciated your time Saturday evening concerning, first, your primary concern with Viet Nam, and, second, housing problems in Kerala State and the other areas of India.

Naturally in a war situation such as Viet Nam, while housing is near and dear to the people, their personal safety and lives are even more near and dear. However, if making home ownership possible would assist in stabilizing and preserving political and individual independence to the remainder of Viet Nam, we would be pleased to pursue this matter.

Meanwhile, with regard to preserving Kerala State and other specific areas in India, we believe there is still time to do a major and effective job through a broad-gauged private ownership program. However, like all things, we can't wait until the horse has been stolen to close the barn door.

What is your reaction to this home ownership thesis? Do you believe it has a role in the situation above mentioned? If you agree that it can be an active force, will it require a major dosage rather than penny-ante or piece-meal application?

Do you have an opinion as to the best approach for promotion of this concept? Having planned and developed housing projects during the past three administrations, we have about concluded that an undertaking of this dimension will not be effective unless it is a personal project of the Chief Executive himself, or, at the very least, a personal project of the Vice President.

Again, we appreciated the opportunity to confer with you, and look forward to your observations on the matters above outlined.

Very truly yours,

*Leslie A. Clark*  
Leslie A. Clark

LAC:bjc

cc: Willard W. Garvey

3/31/65



~~SECRET/PERSONAL~~

March 20, 1965

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 9-20-79; NSC 99-81

By rc/lop NARA. Date 3-2-01

Dear Chet,

I realize how distressing you must find our deafening silence in response to your many recent efforts. However, I am sure you know (and I asked Averell to tell you) that it is only because of the fire brigade exercises Mac and I have been involved in here. He has been spending most of his time on Vietnam and I on the Congo, Cyprus and Arab-Israel. It's a pity but our other interests (perhaps even more important in the long run) inevitably get shunted aside by the immediate flaps.

Let me say, however, that we haven't been neglecting our Indian enterprise. On the F-5 matter we are getting a JCS study next week. We had to go through this phase, but even if the Chiefs are reluctant the rest of us realize that military aid to India is as much a political as a military matter. I don't want to hold out too much hope, unless you can actually engineer a tradeoff between F-5s and MIGs. But I can assure you that we will insist on a hard look at substituting F-5s for other MAP or MAP sales under present ceilings.

The concept of a substantial add-on to our investment in Indian development is gaining currency here, particularly since we might be able to tie it in some fashion to some highly important things we want: (a) non-proliferation; (b) significant economic changes which would permit our money to be used more efficiently; and even (c) some progress toward Pak-Indian reconciliation. I just read the report of the latest pre-pledging session in Paris. We are finally getting the IB to take more leadership in insisting on reciprocal Indian economic reforms in return for consortium input. Bill Gaud tells me that we plan a much greater effort next year, when we must come to grips with the Indian Fourth Plan.

Am also taking a hard look at your wheat/cotton substitution idea for the UAR, although I suspect that it's more imaginative than practical at this point (given Hill reluctance to let us do even this much for Nasser). Incidentally, we can find no written reference here to the point you make about your talk with Nasser in 1962, i.e. that Nasser agreed to lay off subversive activities in return for our major PL 480 input.

~~SECRET/PERSONAL~~



~~SECRET/PERSONAL~~

- 2 -

Your stimulating 2 March letter reminded both Mac and myself that the Administration cannot afford to neglect its Indian enterprise. We are getting a number of things underway heading up toward Shastri visit.

Am off to London now to side Averell in our confab with the Laborites on Africa. Was terribly disappointed when our bosses made me stay on in Tel Aviv to mop up, rather than letting me come on out and see you. You can imagine how eager I was to come. However, I'll end with a promise to take up our Indian affairs again as soon as I return. Averell reports you are in fine fettle, which is always good to hear.

Fond regards,

R. W. Komer

Ambassador Chester Bowles  
U. S. Ambassador to India  
New Delhi, India

~~SECRET/PERSONAL~~

March 18, 1965

McGB:

Here's my re-write of LBJ's invitation to Shastri. RWK approved, and we checked it out with State.

State's caveat against release can be handled by Ambassador Bowles when he gives this letter to Shastri.

HHS

116  
India  
x Shastri Vail

116a

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am happy to learn from Ambassador Bowles that you have accepted my invitation to visit the United States. Mrs. Johnson and I are looking forward to seeing you and Mrs. Shastri in Washington on June 2 and 3.

Anticipation of your visit revives fond memories of our journey to India in 1961. But it also underscores how markedly conditions have changed both for us personally and for our nations since then.

I have embarked on a program here to make America's promise a reality for all her people. I am deeply aware that our own hard work to solve our problems is a crucial ingredient in our continuing effort to help others with theirs. You too are engrossed in planning the next chapter of your program to bring Indians hope for a better life. We both feel the challenge of reaching to meet a nation's most pressing needs and to fulfill its highest aspirations, while providing for its essential security.

So we have much in common, and I look forward to sharing thoughts with you on these and other important problems we both face.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Lal Bahadur Shastri  
Prime Minister of India  
New Delhi, India

LBJ:State:HHS:tmt 3/18/65



~~SECRET~~

March 16, 1965

*file*  
*India*  
*117*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Seeing B. K. Nehru before he returns to Delhi would be desirable, though not vital. It could be held to 10-15 minutes, if you wished.

The chief virtue, as Rusk points out, would be that you could try to stiffen Indian spines on Vietnam. Shastri goes to Moscow just before coming here in early June. As Harriman told him, if he bought the Moscow line on a Vietnam conference without adequate preconditions, it would spoil the atmosphere here.

R. W. Komer

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Att: Memo for the President from Dean Rusk, 3/15, Subj: Request for appointment for the Indian Ambassador, B. K. Nehru

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *[signature]*, NARA, Date *3-2-04*

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

February 23, 1965

BKS:

I think this is the best way to respond to Bowles' two cables. Bob Komer asked me to prod both State and Defense so that we will be farther along toward a USG position by the time he and Bundy are back.

HHS

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

*India*  
118  
**SANITIZED**

**SANITIZED**  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 12-240

By cbm NARA, Date 1-30-2013

~~SECRET~~

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

115 a

~~SECRET/COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

TO: AMBASSADOR BOWLES

FROM: Bromley Smith, White House

Komer out of town till next week but  
he asked me b. phone to say, in response  
your message, that he has always been  
enthusiastic about Stephansky and thinks he  
would do a very good job.

Bundy also away until Monday. We will  
get wheels turning so he and Komer can focus  
on F-5 problem immediately on return.

~~SECRET/COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 12-353

By ch NARA, Date 6-27-13



LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

January 29, 1965

119

*India*

Bill -

I realize that cops may not fit into Indian development program neatly, but internal security is an essential prerequisite to development and India sure needs help. Doesn't an old cold warrior like you agree? Ref. is TOAID 1302.

RWK

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

January 25, 1965

120

MEMO FOR BILL CAPRON

Would BOB see any problems here? Please  
return.

*India*

RWK

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

January 25, 1965

120a

Mac -

I would favor this strongly, and think traffic would bear any possible leak. We would not be financing contraceptives, but only reimbursing voluntary agencies for shipping costs on all goods contributed by them, including contraceptives.

RWK

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Att. Read/Bundy Memo 1/22/65, subj. GOI Request for US Concurrence on Import of Contraceptives into India by Voluntary Agencies



~~SECRET~~

121  
January 12, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Dave Bell wants your OK to discuss with key Congressmen the proposal for a binational Indian foundation, to be financed out of our huge surplus of Indian rupees. You'll recall this as Bowles' pet idea, but it makes sense to all the rest of us too as the best way to get some mileage out of our growing stockpile of otherwise useless Indian paper money.

In fact the chief problem is the Hill's reluctance to free up such surpluses, because of the continuing misconception that somehow we could use them to save dollars. We only wish we could.

Bell and Freeman want to take the road of getting informal Hill approval of an executive waiver for the use of PL 480 rupees (less than half the total we hold), instead of asking for new legislation. State and Budget agree. What's involved is feeling out the key members of the Appropriations and Agricultural Committees (especially Ellender, who said last year he opposed endowing such foundations with surplus rupees), since they must be consulted under the new PL 480 law.

Bundy and I suggest that you authorize Bell and Freeman to try out a low key approach, saying you're favorably disposed. If this fails, we can always fall back and regroup.

R. W. Komer

McGeorge Bundy

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

Att: Bell Memo to President  
1/9/65, Subj: "Proposed  
India Binational Foundation."

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA Date *3-2-01*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mac -

January 11, 1965

122

Here are cables authorizing Ayub and Shastri visits, which State anxious to get out in time for McConaughy to clue Ayub when he sees him on 14th. Since Ayub is going to Peiping and Moscow (dates still unspecified), we also don't want to appear to be making a last minute counter-effort. If we invite Ayub, we have to get word to Shastri too. LBJ has of course OKed both.

The only problem of substance lies in last para. of Ayub cable, which is too fruity for me. I don't want to spook Ayub, but I do think we have to get across discreetly that it's up to him to revalidate our association if he expects to keep getting \$350-500 million per annum. We can use other channels to get this over before he comes, but we shouldn't start off by implying we intend to keep giving him everything he asks for. This will only encourage him to think he can come bore our leader with his complaints. My surgery on cable reduces this risk.

RWK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Att: WH-123  
WH-124

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *3-2-01*



Harmon  
Mission  
March 19 65



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*124*  
*124*

~~SECRET~~

4

Action

55

Info

RR RUEHCR  
DE RUMJMA 83A 08/0510Z  
R 080500Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RU SBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
STATE GRNC

06260

1965 MAR 8 AM 2 17

BT

~~SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT 1644 INFO NEW DELHI 63 FROM MANILA MARCH 8  
1 PM

EXDIS

REF: MANILA'S 1641 TO DEPT

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECSTATE FROM HARRIMAN.

BUNDY TELLS ME JACK MCCLOY HAS REPORTED T.T.K. AND SHASTRI  
COMPLAINED THAT OUR RELATIONS ARE NOT AS INTIMATE AS  
THEY USED TO BE. PERHAPS I SHOULD HAVE  
INCLUDED IN MY REFTTEL THAT EMBASSY OFFICER HAD TOLD  
ME T.T.K. WAS A BIT DISGRUNTLED OVER SEVERAL MATTERS,  
CFN 1644 63 1641

PAGE TWO RUMJMA 83A ~~SECRET~~

PARTLY HIS OWN REDUCED INFLUENCE IN GOVERNMENT, PARTLY  
OUR PRESSURE ON HIM TO ENCOURAGE MORE EFFECTIVELY PRIVATE  
SECTOR AND BE MORE REALISTIC IN MEETING REQUIREMENTS  
OF FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTORS, ETC. I FOUND NO SUCH  
FEELING BY SHASTRI. HE EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR  
PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S DOMESTIC PROGRAMS AND LOOKED FORWARD  
TO FRANK AND INTIMATE TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT IN JUNE.  
PERHAPS IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE TO INVITE T.T.K. TO WASHINGTON  
SOMETIME AFTER SHASTRI VISIT. BOWLES MAY WISH TO MAKE FURTHER  
COMMENT.

BLAIR

BT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *3-3-04*

~~SECRET~~

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MAR 9 1965



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

42  
Action

88

Info

PP RUEHCR  
DE RUMJMA 79A 07/1340Z  
P R PUQEETZ ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
STATE GRNC  
BT

06163  
1965 MAR 7 AM 10 29

~~SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT PRIORITY 1641 INFO NEW DELHI 62 FROM MANILA  
MARCH 7, 10 PM

EXDIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECSTATE FROM HARRIMAN

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF MAJOR IMPRESSIONS GAINED IN 3 1/2 DAYS  
CONCENTRATED DISCUSSIONS.

I HAVE VISITED INDIA FOUR TIMES IN THE LAST SIX YEARS, THE LAST  
TIME IN 1962 IN CONNECTION WITH INDIA'S EMERGENCY ARMS NEEDS.

I FEEL TODAY QUITE A NEW ATTITUDE TOWARDS US AND THE WORLD SITUATION  
REFLECTED BY INDIAN OFFICIALS AS WELL AS PRESS. I ALMOST FELT I WAS IN  
CFN 1641 62 3 1/2 1962

PAGE TWO RUMJMA 79A ~~SECRET~~

A DIFFERENT COUNTRY. WITH ONE EXCEPTION, DISCUSSIONS WITH INDIAN  
MINISTERS AND OFFICIALS WERE RELAXED AND FRANK WITH FULL AGREEMENT ON  
SUCH MATTERS AS AGGRESSIVE INTENTS OF RED CHINA, NEED TO PREVENT RED'S  
TAKE-OVER IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND SEA, WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER OBJECTIVELY  
OUR POLICIES AND WORK WITH US FOR COMMON OBJECTIVES IN OTHER AREAS OF  
WORLD. THEY SHOW GREATER CONFIDENCE IN THEIR ABILITY TO SOLVE INDIA'S  
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WITH INCREASED PRODUCTION IN AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY  
AND HAVE GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF NEED TO DEVELOP PRIVATE SECTOR BY  
BOTH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT, ALTHOUGH NOT YET TAKING ALL  
NECESSARY ACTIONS.

ON OTHER HAND, INDIANS STILL ARE OVER-HOPEFUL OF SOVIET UNION'S  
GOOD INTENTS, FEAR EFFECTS OUR TOUGHER ATTITUDE TOWARDS SOVIETS, AND  
ARE CONCERNED THAT OUR POLICIES TOWARDS HANOI WILL BRING MOSCOW AND  
PEIPING TOGETHER AGAIN. THEY WANT TO CONTINUE PLAY NON-ALIGNED ROLE  
ALTHOUGH THEY ARE CONSIDERABLY DISILLUSIONED WITH SUKARNO AND NASSER.

THEY WANT TO WORK WITH US ON NUCLEAR CONTROLS BUT DON'T WANT  
TO SPOIL THEIR NON-ALIGNED IMAGE BY BILATERAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

~~SECRET~~

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MAR 9 1965

PRESERVATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: FROUS 64-68, 14, 25, 492

By: NARA, Date: 3-3-07



~~SECRET~~

-2- 1641, MARCH 7, 10 PM, FROM MANILA

THEY SHOW A MORE PRAGMATIC AND LESS DOCTRINAIRE APPROACH TO POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MATTERS, BUT ARE SOMEWHAT HELD IN CHECK BY LOYALTY TO INTERPRETATIONS OF NEHRU'S PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES.

PAGE THREE RUMJMA 79A ~~SECRET~~

I HAD THE FEELING THAT I COULD TALK FREELY WITH THEM WITHOUT FEAR OF BEING MISUNDERSTOOD AND THAT WE COULD REACH UNDERSTANDINGS ON A MUCH BROADER AREA. THEY ARE, OF COURSE, STILL SUSPICIOUS AND FEARFUL OF SOME OF OUR POLICIES AND METHODS, I.E., THAT WE WILL FAIL TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF WHAT THEY CONSIDER MOSCOW'S WILLINGNESS TO COME TO AGREEMENTS ON NUCLEAR AND ARMS CONTROLS, POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS IN EUROPE, ETC. AND ALTHOUGH THEY DON'T WANT US TO LEAVE SOUTH VIETNAM BEFORE AN EFFECTIVE AGREEMENT, THEY FEAR WE MAY OVERLY REACT AGAINST HANOI AND THEREBY BRING RED CHINA AND SOVIET UNION INTO THE CONFLICT.

I FEEL OUR ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE IS BEGINNING TO PAY OFF, BUT IF WE DON'T CONTINUE, ECONOMY WILL NOT EXPAND TO BREAK-THROUGH TO SELF SUFFICIENCY, AND MILITARY CAPABILITY WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO ACT AS DETERRENT TO RED CHINESE AGGRESSION-FIRST IN NEPAL AND BHUTAN AND LATER ASSAM.

AMBASSADOR'S ABSENCE FIRST TWO DAYS GAVE ME BETTER OPPORTUNITY TO GET TO KNOW COUNTRY TEAM. I WAS FAVORABLY IMPRESSED BY ALL-POLITICAL ECONOMIC, INFORMATION AND MILITARY, AND BY THE COORDINATION UNDER BOWLES' VIGOROUS AND SPIRITED LEADERSHIP. GEN. JOHNSON, WHO WAS WITH ME IN 1962 HAS EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH INDIAN MILITARY. CHIEF OF

PAGE FOUR RUMJMA 79A ~~SECRET~~

STAFF GENERAL CHAUDURI SPOKE HIGHLY OF HIM AND OUR COOPERATION IN GENERAL. THERE IS NO DOUBT ARMY HAS MADE GOOD PROGRESS IN EVERY WAY DURING LAST TWO YEARS BUT AIR FORCE IS DANGEROUSLY WEAK. INDIANS ARE PREPARED TO EMPHASIZE AIR REQUIREMENTS IN NEXT YEAR'S AID PROGRAM REQUESTS AND I HOPE WE CAN FILL THEM.

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY



~~SECRET~~

-3- 1641, MARCH 7, 10 PM, FROM MANILA

INDIANS ARE STILL STUBBORN OVER KASHMIR SETTLEMENT AND RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN ARE MOST UNSATISFACTORY. INDO-PAK SETTLEMENT IS STILL NUMBER ONE PROBLEM AND SHOULD HAVE OUR CONTINUED ATTENTION IN CONCERT WITH BRITISH.

THE ONE EXCEPTION TO MY GENERALLY FAVORABLE REACTION IN TALKS WITH OFFICIALS WAS WITH SWARAN SINGH, MINISTER EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. I FELT I WAS ARGUING WITH KRISHNA MENON AGAIN. NOT THAT HE IS COMMUNIST INCLINED BUT BECAUSE HE TOOK CRITICAL ATTITUDE ON MOST ALL OUR POLICIES. BOWLES TELLS ME SWARAN SINGH HAS LITTLE INFLUENCE AND HOPES HE WILL BE REPLACED. BOWLES DOES HIS BUSINESS WITH PRIME MINISTER AND CAPABLE FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIALS, AS WELL AS OTHER MINISTERS DIRECT.

PRESS REACTION TO MY VISIT WAS GENERALLY GOOD WITH UNDERSTANDING EDITORIALS ON OUR POLICIES IN VIETNAM AND FAIR REPORTING ON MY BLUNT STATEMENTS.

PAGE FIVE RUMJMA 79A ~~SECRET~~

SURVEYS SHOW PUBLIC HAVE INCREASING RESPECT FOR AND CONFIDENCE IN US.

ALL IN ALL, I AM MUCH MORE HOPEFUL OF INDIA AND FEEL WE CAN EXPECT HER TO PLAY MORE EFFECTIVE ROLE TOWARDS FREE WORLD OBJECTIVES.

GP-3.

BLAIR  
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 10:50 AM, 3/7/65.  
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 11:20 AM, 3/7/65.

~~SECRET~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

126

BUNDY-SMITH  
BATOR  
BOWMAN  
CHASE  
COOPER  
HAYNES  
JESSUP  
JOHNSON  
KEENE  
KLIEN  
KORR  
MOODY  
REEDY  
SAUNDERS  
SAYRE  
THOMSON

81-S

NNNNUEZXXXXEM

~~SECRET~~

Action

01

ADQSA459SBA768

NEA

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GOVERNOR HARRIMAN MET SWARAN SINGH FOR A LONG AND AT TIMES SHARP ALMOST TWO HOUR EXCHANGE EVENING MARCH 5. DEPUTY MINISTER DINESH SINGH AND DCM AND POLITICAL COUNSELOR ALSO PRESENT.

DISCUSSION COVERED MUCH THE SAME GROUND AS MORNING MEETING WITH JHA AND DAYAL (EMBTTEL 2511), FOCUSING ON NUCLEAR MATTERS, ARAB-ISREAL CONFLICT, CONGO AND SOUTH EAST ASIA. HOWEVER, IN CONTRAST TO REASONABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDES DISPLAYED BY JHA AND DAYAL, SWARAN SINGH WAS PROVOCATIVE AND GENERALLY CRITICAL OF US ACTIONS. ON EACH OCCASION HARRIMAN INTERVENED FORCEFULLY TO SET RECORD STRAIGHT.  
CFN 2512 6 9 5 2511

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 349 SHUMCSI E T  
POSSIBLY RELECTING HEAVY DOSE OF ARAB AND COMMUNIST VIEWS TO WHICH SWARAN SINGH HAS BEEN EXPOSED IN RECENT VISITS OF HASSOUNA SEC GEN ARAB LEAGUE AND CZECH JOSEPH LENART, SWARAN SINGH PRESENTED DETAILED CRITICAL INTERPRETATION AND COMMENT ON MOST TOPICS THAT WERE COVERED.

ON NONPROLIFERATION ISSUE HE REPEATED SOVIET VIEWS ON MLF AND ARGUED THAT JOINT PARTICIPATION IN NUCLEAR WEAPONRY WAS IN EFFECT PROLIFERATION. (HARRIMAN STRONGLY REFUTED ARGUMENT)

ON DELIVERY OF ARMS TO ISREAL HE SUGGESTED US HAD SUPPLIED SIZABLE QUANTITIES AND THAT MILITARY EQUIPMENT RECEIVED FROM WESTERN EUROPE ON GRANT BASIS. ON CONGO SWARAN SINGH RECITED LITANY OF GRIEVANCES AGAINST TSHOMBE AND SUGGESTED ONLY SOLUTION TO CURRENT CONFLICT WAS SOME KIND OF COALITION GOVERNMENT.

ON SOUTH EAST ASIA SWARAN SINGH PROPOSED THAT FUTURE OF LAOS AND CAMBODIA BE CONSIDERED SEPARATELY FROM VIET NAM QUESTION. HE ADVANCED THESIS THAT US PROCEDURES IN VIET NAM

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State Dept. Guidelines

By pc, NARA, Date 3-3-04



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-2- 2512, MARCH 6, 9 P.M. FROM NEW DELHI

ENCOURAGED SINO-SOVIET RAPPROACHMENT. HE REPEATEDLY CAME BACK TO GENEVA TYPE CONFERENCE AS ONLY WAY OUT OF PRESENT IMPASSE. HE WAS PREPARED TO AGREE WITH HARRIMAN THAT GOI AND US HAD PARALLEL INTEREST IN SOUTH EAST ASIA BUT HE ALSO INSISTED THAT TACTICS AND METHODOLOGY DIFFERED.

IN REPLY HARRIMAN COMMENDED GOI FOR ITS DECISION NOT TO OPT FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONRY, AND SOLICITED GOI COOPERATION FOR WORLD ACCEPTANCE OF NONPROLIFERATION AGREEMENT. HE MENTIONED US WOULD

PAGE THREE RUSBAE 349 ~~SECRET~~  
BE INTERESTED IN SHASTRI'S ESTIMATE OF SOVIET VIEWS ON NUCLEAR POLICIES AS THEY DEVELOPED DURING HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW AND INDICATED WE ZTRZBALWAYS\*READY TO TALK WITH SOVIETS ON THIS MATTER.

TURNING TO NEAR EAST SITUATION, HARRIMAN RECDIM<sup>2</sup> QUATED\*RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN UAR AND OUR ASSESSMENT OF NASSER'S ACTIVITIES AGAINST ISREAL IN ORGANIZING UAC, SPIKE DIVERSION JORDAN WATERS AND ARMS TO REBELS IN CONGO. HE STATED UAR AND US RELATIONS WERE DETERIORATING AND THAT NASSER COULD NOT EXPECT US COOPERATION UNLESS HE CHANGES HIS ATTITUDE. IT IS FOR NASSER TO DECIDE WHETHER HE WISHES TO REMAIN NONALIGNED OR JOIN THE SOVIET BANDWAGON.

ON CONGO HARRIMAN MADE CLEAR WE SUPPORT LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT AND WE LOOK TO OAU AND UN TO FIND SETTLEMENT CURRENT CONGO CRISIS. IN REGARD TO SOUTH EAST ASIA, HARRIMAN SAID WE DO NOT HAVE ANY AMBITIONS IN AREA, WE SOUGHT ONLY STABILITY ALLOWING STATES IN AREA TO DEVELOP AS PEOPLE DESIRED. HARRIMAN REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED WE WERE READY TO TALK ANY TIME NORTH VIET NAM STOPPED ITS AGGRESSION AGAINST SOUTH VIET NAM AND ACCEPTED CONCEPT OF TRULY NEUTRAL, NON-COMMUNIST NEIGHBOR. HE HOPED US COULD COUNT ON GOI COOPERATION AND SUPPORT ON THIS ISSUE AS INDIA EQUALLY IF NOT MORE INTERESTED IN NON-CHINESE CONTROL OF SOUTH EAST ASIA. IN RESPONSE TO SINGH'S WARNING OVER MOSCOW'S STRONG ADVERSE REACTION TO RECENT AIR ATTACK HARRIMAN STATED BLUNTLY SOVIETS WOULD HAVE TO UNDERSTAND US WOULD NOT PERMIT NORTH VIET NAM TAKEOVER OF SOUTH VIET NAM.

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COMING AFTER A SERIES OF FRIENDLY MEETINGS DURING WHICH INDIAN PARTICIPANTS WERE FORTHCOMING AND REVEALED GENERAL UNDERSTANDING AND IDENTICAL VIEWS WITH US ON MANY COMMON PROBLEMS, THIS MEETING WAS DISAPPOINTING. HOWEVER, IT MAY HAVE BEEN USEFUL EXERCISE BECAUSE HARRIMAN TOLD SWARAN SINGH BLUNTLY THAT HIS OTHER DISCUSSIONS IN DELHI HAD BEEN MOST FRIENDLY AND CONSTRUCTIVE INCLUDING ONE WITH SHASTRI WHEREAS SINGH HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF EVERY US POSITION AND MADE CLEAR THAT IF SWARAN SINGH'S COMMENTS REJECTED VIEWS OF GOI, WHICH HE HOPED THEY DID NOT, OUR RELATIONS WOULD INEVITABLE BE AFFECTED.

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\*AS RECEIVED, WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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ACTION DEPT 2511 INFO MOSCOW 227 SAIGON 124 MARCH 6, 8 PM.

GOVERNOR HARRIMAN, ACCOMPANIED BY DCM AND POLITICAL COUNSELOR, MET WITH FOREIGN SECRETARY JHA AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY DAYAL MORNING MARCH 5 FOR WIDE-RANGING TWO-HOUR EXCHANGE. DISCUSSION COVERED MOST OF TOPICS ON WHICH DEPARTMENT HAD PROVIDED GUIDANCE WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON ARAB-ISRAEL SITUATION, AFRICA, SOUTH EAST ASIA AND VIETNAM, NUCLEAR ISSUES, ARTICLE 19 AND INDO-PAK RELATIONS.

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PAGE TWO RUSBAE 348 ~~SECRET~~

## ARAB ISRAEL SITUATION

AT JHA'S SUGGESTION, HARRIMAN SUMMARIZED OUR VIEWS ON NASSER'S RECENT ACTIVITIES WHICH WERE CONTRIBUTION TO UPSETTING TRANQUILITY IN AREA, INCLUDING INVITATION TO ULBRICH, SUPPORT OF REBELS IN CONGO, ORGANIZATION OF UNITED ARAB COMMAND, AND PLANS TO DIVERT SPITEFULLY JORDAN WATERS. HARRIMAN SAID WE WERE ON SHOWDOWN BASIS WITH NASSER OVER HIS UNWILLINGNESS SO FAR TO MODIFY HIS POSITION AND TOGETHER WITH BEN BELLA WAS TURNING MORE AND MORE TO ALIGNMENT SOVIETS. WE SUPPORTED ISRAEL IN ITS RIGHT TO TAKE ITS SHARE WATER FROM JORDAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH JOHNSON PLAN AND OPPOSED FORCE BY EITHER ARAB OR ISRAEL.

## AFRICA

RECALLING INDIA'S CONTRIBUTION TO UN EFFORT IN CONGO AND DAYAL'S ROLE THEREIN, HARRIMAN SAID INDIA AND US HAD NO CONFLICT OF INTERESTS IN AFRICA. HE HOPED THAT WE COULD WORK TOGETHER AT UN AND ELSEWHERE ON AFRICAN MATTERS AND THAT INDIA WOULD CONTINUE TO PLAY A ROLE IN AFRICA. OUR CURRENT EFFORTS WERE DIRECTED TOWARDS SUPPORT OF OAU AND ITS ATTEMPTS TO EXERCISE LEADERSHIP IN AFRICA AND TO WORK FOR CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN CONGO WITHOUT UNDERMINING LEGITIMACY OF TSHOMBE GOVERNMENT.

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Authority RAC 032A-23-2-64

By JDL WARA Date 2-12-18



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-2-2511, March 6, 8 p.m. (SECTION 1 of 3) from: New Delhi

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DAYAL EXPLAINED THAT GOI MAINTAINS CORRECT RELATIONS WITH TSHOMBE BUT AT SOME COST TO ITS POSITION IN AFRICA AND IN FACE OF CONSIDERABLE DOMESTIC PRESSURE TO JOIN WITH THOSE OPPOSED TO TSHOMBE. HE SAID GOI SHARED WITH US HOPE THAT PEACE AND STABILITY COULD EVENTUALLY BE ESTABLISHED IN CONTINENT. INDIAN RESOURCES WERE LIMITED BUT GOI WAS UNDERTAKING EFFORT TO IMPROVE COMMERCIAL RELATIONS AND START MODEST TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE DEMAND FOR INDIAN EXPERTS, SOME BEING CONTRIBUTED THROUGH BILATERAL AGREEMENTS, OTHERS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. SOME OF PROJECTS DAYAL CITED AS UNDER WAY WERE SUGAR MILL IN UGANDA, TEXTILE PLANT IN NAIROBI, ENAMELWARE FACTORY IN TANZANIA TEXTILE PLANT IN ETHIOPIA, ETC. MUCH OF THIS WAS EFFORT OF PRIVATE INDIAN ENTREPRENEURS WHO JKA NOTED WERE SATISFIED TO PARTICIPATE ON MINORITY BASIS.

HARRIMAN SAID HE APPLAUDED THESE INDIAN INITIATIVES, WHICH AMONG OTHER THINGS, OFFERED AFRICAN STATES AN IMPORTANT AND ATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO RELATIONSHIP WITH CHICOMS. HE SUGGESTED WE CONTINUE TO COMPARE NOTES AND DEVELOP AN INTIMATE EXCHANGE REGARDING OUR VARIOUS EFFORTS IN AFRICA.

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REGARDING TSHOMBE, HARRIMAN SAID WE HAD NO BRIEF FOR HIM AND RECALLED WE AND INDIANS HAD WORKED TOGETHER TO OUST HIM FROM KATANGA. (DAYAL AGREED). HOWEVER, HE REPRESENTED LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT IN CONGO, WHICH WE HAD TO WORK. HE ALSO NOTED SOME ENCOURAGING SIGNS IN AFRICA, INCLUDING EFFORTS OF OAU TO FIND SOLUTION IN CONGO AND MODERATE POSITION OF AFRICAN STATES PARTICIPATING IN RECENT NOUAKCHOTT MEETING, WHICH PROVED RASCALS IN MINORITY IN OAU.

SOUTH EAST ASIA

HARRIMAN SET FORTH AT LENGTH AND FORCEFULLY OUR ASSESSMENT OF VIETNAM SITUATION AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF PRESSURES ON MOSCOW RISING OUT OF CHICOM AGGRESSIVENESS AND COMPETITION FOR LEADERSHIP OF COMMUNIST WORLD AS WELL AS CHICOM SUPPORT FOR GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES IN VIETNAM AND ELSEWHERE. WE FACE BROAD QUESTION OF OUTWARD THRUST OF CHINA AND MORE SPECIFICALLY PROBLEM OF NORTH VIETNAMESE AGGRAVATION REFERRING TO RECENT WHITE PAPER OUR RECENT ACTIONS WERE IN RESPONSE TO NORTH VIETNAMESE ESCALATION AND WERE DESIGNED TO MAKE HANOI REALIZE THAT IT HAD EMBARKED ON POLICY IT COULD NOT ACHIEVE AT SAME TIME NEITHER SVN NOR LA WERE GOING TO INVADE NORTH VIETNAM.

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WE WERE, OF COURSE, PREPARED TO TALK BUT ONLY ONCE NORTH VIETNAM STOPPED ITS AGGRESSION WE HOPED GOI WOULD STAND FOUR SQUARE WITH US ON NEED FOR CONDITIONS BEFORE CALLING CONFERENCE.

JHA AND DAYAL INQUIRED ABOUT SOVIET AND CHICOM INVOLVEMENT MENTIONING REPORTS GOI HAD RECEIVED OF CHICOM TROOPS MASSING ON NORTH VIETNAM BORDER AND OF SOVIET PLANS DEVELOPED DURING KOSYGIN'S VISIT TO HANOI TO PROVIDE MILITARY EQUIPMENT WITH TECHNICIANS AND AIRCRAFT MANNED BY SOVIET PERSONNEL.

HARRIMAN SAID WE WERE GRATEFUL FOR THIS AND ANY OTHER INFORMATION GOI HAD, ESPECIALLY FROM HANOI WHERE WE HAD NO SOURCES. HE WENT ON TO SAY WE BELIEVED CHICOM INVOLVEMENT NOW LIMITED ALTHOUGH MOST OF CAPTURED EQUIPMENT WAS LARGELY OF CHICOM ORIGIN. AS FOR SOVIETS, WE HAD NOT SEEN MUCH SOVIET EQUIPMENT AND THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE EVIDENCE OF SOVIET PRESENCE SINCE 1962 HOWEVER, KOSYGIN VISIT MAY HAVE CHANGED THINGS. WE NOT AWARE OF ANY DELIVERIES OF SOVIET COMBAT EQUIPMENT BUT IT POSSIBLE THAT KOSYGIN AGREED TO PROVIDE SAME.

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*Note: Handled Linds per SS/O*

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ACTION DEPT (2511) INFO MOSCOW 227 SAIGON 124 MARCH 6, 8 PM

HARRIMAN ALSO NOTED THAT SOVIETS HAD SIGNALLED THAT THEY WISHED TO KEEP THEIR RELATIONS WITH US SEPARATE FROM VIETNAM DEVELOPMENTS AND HOPED BILATTEAL LINES WOULD REMAIN OPEN TO U.S. FURTHER, THEY CONTINUED TO LOOK FORWARD TO VISIT FROM PRESIDENT.

JHA THEN SET FORTH GOI VIEWS ON SITUATION AS FOLLOWS:

1. U.S. AND INDIAN OBJECTIVES COINCIDE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.
2. GOI DOES NOT WANT STATES IN AREA TO COME UNDER "EVIL CFN 2511 227 124 6 8 227

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 348B ~~SECRET~~  
INFLUENCE" OR DOMINATION OF CHICOMS.

3. GOI CAN LIVE WITH STATES IN AREA WHICH ADOPT NON- DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS SUCH AS BURMA.
4. INDIAN TACTICS DIFFER FROM THOSE OF U.S., PARTLY BECAUSE OF NEUTRAL POSITION REQUIRED OF GOI IN ITS ICC ROLE AND ALSO BECAUSE OF ITS POLICY OF NONALIGNMENT.
5. GOI UNDERSTANDS AND IS SYMPATHETIC WITH US ACTIONS IN AREA INCLUDING NEED TO REQUIRE NORTH VIETNAM TO CEASE ITS AGGRESSION. HOWEVER, MILITARY ESCALATION WILL ONLY WORSEN SITUATION AND MAKE EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT MORE DIFFICULT.

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-2-2511, March 6, 8 p.m. (SECTION 2 of 3) from: New Delhi

6. AS THREAT OF WAR IS SERIOUS, SOME KIND OF POLITICAL ACTION IS CALLED FOR. THIS MIGHT INVOLVE ELEMENTS SET FORTH IN GOI'S FEBRUARY 8 STATEMENT CALLING FOR CESSATION OF ARMED ACTION PREPARATORY TO DISCUSSIONS. GOI HOPES THIS FORMULA MIGHT PAVE WAY TO PURPOSEFUL DIALOGUE AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

7. OUT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS MAY COME GENEVA-TYPE CONFERENCE FOLLOWED BY INTRODUCTION OF SOME FORM OF INTERNATIONAL FORCE AND GENERAL NEUTRALIZATION OF AREA.

PAGE THREE RUSBAE 348B ~~SECRET~~

JHA ADDED THAT MESSAGE INDIANS RECEIVED FROM SOVIETS WAS THAT USSR FOUND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO KEEP LINES TO U.S. OPEN WHILE SITUATION ESCALATED. GENERAL IMPRESSION FROM SOVIETS WAS THAT THEY WERE WORRIED OVER RISK OF GREATER INVOLVEMENT AND CONSEQUENT SET BACK TO RELATIONS WITH U.S. SOVIETS WERE ALSO ANGERED AT U.S. PRESSURE AND OVER EMBARRASSMENT TO KOSYGIN BY OUR STRIKES WHILE HE WAS IN HANOI.

IN REPLY, HARRIMAN EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR JHA'S ARTICULATION OF GOI VIEW AND URGED THAT WE CONTINUED DISCUSSIONS WITH GOI WHICH COULD PLAY IMPORTANT ROLE WITHOUT IDENTIFYING ITSELF WITH U.S. HE STRESSED U.S. PREPARED FOR TALKS BUT WE COULD NOT AGREE TO CONFERENCE WITHOUT ADEQUATE CONDITIONS. IT WAS PREMATURE TO SPELL THEM OUT BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO ACCEPT CONCEPT THAT CONDITIONS WERE NECESSARY PRELIMINARY TO A CONFERENCE.

FINALLY, HARRIMAN EXPRESSED HOPE THAT SHASTRI WOULD NOT SUCCUMB TO SUGGESTIONS FROM MOSCOW THAT HE JOIN WITH RUSSIANS AND DE GAULLE IN CALLING FOR A CONFERENCE WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. THIS WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL IN ACHIEVING OUR COMMON OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA NOR CONDUCTIVE TO IMPROVING HIS RELATIONS WITH U.S.

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BURMA

TURNING TO BURMA, JHA SAID GOI HAD RECENTLY SUCCESSFULLY RE-ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH BURMA. LATTER WAS DEVELOPING ITS OWN KIND OF SOCIALISM WITH WHICH GOI HAD NO QUARREL. NE WIN WAS IN

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-3-2511, March 6, 8 p.m. (Section 2 of 3) from: New Delhi

FIRM CONTROL. HE HAD STRESSED TO INDIANS THAT BURMA DID NOT WISH TO BE STOOGE OF CHICOMS, BUT WISHED TO KEEP ON GOOD TERMS WITH ITS NORTHERN NEIGHBOR. NE WIN REPORTED HE HAD OBJECTED TO CHICOMS MAKING RANGOON THEIR JUMPING OFF PLACE FOR EXCURSIONS ELSEWHERE. JHA SUGGESTED U.S. TAKE GREATER INTEREST IN BURMA.

HARRIMAN NOTED THAT NE WIN HAD MADE CLEAR HE DID NOT WANT U.S. PRESENCE. IN DEFERENCE TO BURMESE DESIRES, WE HAD REDUCED OUR ACTIVITIES BUT WE WERE PREPARED TO RECONSIDER IF WE HAD ANY INDICATIONS FROM BURMESE.

LAOS

HARRIMAN EXPRESSED HOPE SHASTRI'S VISIT TO MOSCOW MIGHT HELP TO CLARIFY SOVIET VIEWS AND INTENTIONS IN LAOS AS WELL AS VIETNAM.

SOUVANNA WAS SHOWING UNEXPECTED VIGOR AND SITUATION IMPROVED BY ELIMINATION OF GENERAL PHOUMI.

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ARTICLE 19

JHA RAISED ISSUE STATING THAT POSTPONEMENT OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY BUSINESS HAD BEEN REAL SETBACK AND IF NO SOLUTION FOUND BY SEPTEMBER UN MIGHT SUFFER IRREPARABLE DAMAGE WHICH WOULD ONLY BENEFIT CHICOMS AND INDONESIANS WHO WERE MAKING INSIDIOUS ONSLAUGHT ON UN. HE SAW TWO QUESTIONS EMERGING: FIRST, IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF HOW TO DEAL WITH ARREARS UNDER ARTICLE 19 AND, SECONDLY, LONG TERM QUESTION OF WHAT PRINCIPLES TO ESTABLISH ON SHARING OF EXPENSES. GOI CONSIDERED THAT BREATHING SPELL UNTIL SEPTEMBER PROVIDED OPPORTUNITY TO TACKLE BOTH QUESTIONS. GAP IS A NARROW ONE WHICH GOI FELT MUST BE BRIDGED OR UN MAY COLLAPSE.

HARRIMAN AGREED TO URGENCY AND IMPORTANCE OF ISSUE. IT WAS NECESSARY FOR SOVIETS TO MAKE THEIR CONTRIBUTION AND WE HOPED FORMULA COULD BE WORKED OUT BEFORE NEXT GA. WE WERE NOT DOGMATIC ON HOW THIS MIGHT BE DONE. HE POINTED TO INDIA'S INTEREST IN MAINTAINING EFFECTIVE PEACEKEEPING FUNCTION.

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ACTION DEPT 2511 INFO MOSCOW 227 SAIGON 124 MARCH 6, 8 PM.

NUCLEAR ARMAMENT

HARRIMAN ASKED FOR GOI COOPERATION ON WHAT WE CONSIDERED ONE OF MOST IMPORTANT POLICY OBJECTIVES OF U.S.; TO ADVANCE PRINCIPLE OF NONPROLIFERATION AND TO WORK OUT SOME TYPE OF ASSURANCES FOR NON-NUCLEAR POWERS. WE AWARE GOI DID NOT WANT SPECIAL BI-CFN 2511 227 124 6 8 227

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 348C SECRET  
LATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH NUCLEAR POWERS AND IF GOI INTERESTED WE WERE READY TO DISCUSS MATTER. RECALLING SHASTRI'S DISCUSSIONS ON NUCLEAR SHIELD IN LONDON WITH WILSON, JHA SAID PM WAS TALKING IN VERY GENERAL TERMS BUT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY RAISE MATTER IN WASHINGTON. GOI DID NOT BELIEVE THERE WAS IMMEDIATE THREAT TO INDIA AND RECOGNIZED THAT FORMULA ON REASSURANCES WOULD REQUIRE LENGTHY DISCUSSIONS. PRELIMINARILY, GOI FAVORED A PLAN WHICH WOULD NOT IMPINGE UPON NON-ALIGNMENT AND APPLIED TO ALL ASIAN NON-NUCLEAR POWERS. JHA NOTED THAT SOVIETS TOLD INDIANS THEY WERE CONSIDERING MATTER VERY SERIOUSLY AND HE HOPED THAT FORMULA THAT MIGHT EVENTUALLY EVOLVE WOULD CALL FOR SEPARATE OR JOINT U.S. AND USSR STATEMENTS OF REASSURANCES TO NON-NUCLEAR POWERS.

INDO-PAK RELATIONS

HARRIMAN STATED U.S. REMAINED HOPEFUL THAT NEW MEANS WOULD BE FOUND TO RESUME INDO-PAK DISCUSSIONS. U.S. HAD CONTINUING INTEREST IN SETTLEMENT AND HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED OVER EVENTS DURING LAST DAYS OF NEHRU'S LIFE. HOWEVER, WE WERE DISAPPOINTED OVER LACK OF MOVEMENT SINCE THEN. JHA REPLIED AT LENGTH IT WAS GOI'S DECLARED POLICY TO WORK FOR SETTLEMENT OF ALL ISSUES WITH PAKS. MORATORIUM ON CRITICISM AFTER NEHRU'S DEATH HAD GOOD

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-2-2511, March 6, 8 p.m. (SECTION 3 of 3) from: New Delhi

EFFECT IN INDIA, BUT SUBSEQUENT EVENTS INCLUDING BREAKDOWN

PAGE THREE RUSBAE 348C ~~SECRET~~  
OF MINISTERIAL TALKS, POISONOUS ANTI-INDIAN PROPAGANDA DURING  
ELECTION CAMPAIGN, AND PAK-CHICOM COLLUSION TO VILIFY INDIA  
IN AFRICA HAD MADE IT DIFFICULT TO MOVE AHEAD. PRESENT  
ASSESSMENT WAS THAT PAKS DID NOT WANT TALKS BUT INDIA WOULD  
BE READY TO RESUME DISCUSSIONS IF PAKS GAVE SIGNAL.

HARRIMAN NOTED THAT GOI HAD NO MONOPOLY ON ELECTION CRITICISM  
BUT HE HOPED INDIA WOULD UNDERSTAND OUR CONCERN AS U.S.  
MILITARY AID OF INDIA HAD STRAINED OUR RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN.  
THERE WERE REASONABLE PEOPLE IN PAKISTAN AND HE URGED GOI TO  
FIND WAYS TO TALK TO THEM. WE DID NOT CONDONE RECENT PAK  
FLIRTATIONS WITH CHICOMS AND INDONESIANS, BUT WE HOPED GOI  
WOULD PERSEVERE. HE ADDED GOI COULD DO NOTHING MORE IMPORTANT  
FOR WORLD PEACE THAN PAK SETTLEMENT;!

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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ACTION DEPT (2481) INFO MOSCOW 223 SAIGON 120 FROM NDELHI  
MARCH 4, 11 PM

GOVERNOR HARRIMAN AND DCM CALLED ON MEA MINISTER OF STATE LAKSHMI MENON MORNING MARCH 4. AT HER INITIATIVE, MOST OF HOUR'S CONVERSATION WAS ABOUT VIETNAM, WITH MRS. MENON REFLECTING FAMILIAR INDIAN CONCERNS AND HARRIMAN EMPHASIZING US DETERMINATION TO STAY WITH THE JOB UNTIL IT IS DONE.

IN RESPONSE MRS. MENON'S OPENING QUERY, HARRIMAN RECAPITULATED  
CFN 2481 223 120 4 11 4

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PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS OF DEPARTMENT'S FEBRUARY 27 REPORT ON NORTH VIETNAM AGGRESSION. HE URGED MGL. MENON AND GOI TO ACCEPT THIS REPORT AS FACTUAL, NOT NORTH VIETNAMESE PROPAGANDA. IN REPLY POINTS RAISED BY MRS. MENON, HARRIMAN ALSO:

1. ON PROSPECTS OF ESCALATION, STRESSED THAT ESCALATION GOING BACK OVER PERIOD OF YEARS HAS BEEN NORTH VIETNAMESE AGGRESSION PARTICULARLY DURING LAST YEAR. US-SVN RESPONSES HAVE IF ANYTHING BEEN OVERLY DELAYED, AND WHETHER "ESCALATION" CONTINUES IS UP TO THE NORTH.

2. PROSPECTS OF STABLE GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON ARE IMPROVING.

3. ON POSSIBILITY THAT INTENSIFIED CONFLICT VIETNAM MAY PUSH CHINESE AND SOVIETS TOGETHER, AS INDIANS FEAR, THOUGHT IT WOULD NOT DRIVE THEM APART, BUT IN BROADER CONTEXT, SOUTHEAST ASIA IS MOST CRITICAL OF MANY AREAS IN WHICH MOSCOW AND PEKING ARE

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By jc, NARA, Date 3-30-04

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 2481, March 4, 11 p.m., from New Delhi.

COMPETING FOR LEADERSHIP OF WORLD COMMUNISM. HARRIMAN THOUGHT THAT AFTER LAPSE OF TWO YEARS, KOSYGIN VISIT INDICATED SOVIETS MAY BE AS INTERESTED IN AREAS AS WAS KHRUSHCHEV IN 1961 AND 1962. HE NOTED SOVIETS WERE ATTEMPTING TO COMPETE WITH  
CFN 27 1 2 3 1961 1962

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 242 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~  
CHICOMS IN REVOLUTIONARY ZEAL IN OTHER AREAS AND ASKED WHETHER IF CONFRONTED WITH US DETERMINATION IN SEA, SOVIETS MIGHT EXERT MODERATING INFLUENCE. MRS. MENON DOUBTED WHETHER ANY COMMUNIST WOULD EVER EXERT MODERATING INFLUENCE.

4. ANSWERING QUESTION ON DESIRABILITY GENEVA-TYPE CONFERENCE, EXPLAINED US UNWILLINGNESS HEAD INTO A CONFERENCE UNLESS NORTH VIETNAMESE SHOWED DESIRE TO STOP INTERFERENCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

5. ON PUBLIC ATTITUDES IN US, EMPHASIZED THAT DESPITE A FEW SENATORIAL AND OTHER VOICES, PRESIDENT HAS OVERWHELMING SUPPORT FOR CURRENT POLICIES AND DETERMINATION.

6. ON SECURITY OF SEA, HARRIMAN EMPHASIZED INDIAN INTERESTS IN KEEPING AREA INDEPENDENT; MRS. MENON AGREED.

DIALOGUE WAS LARGELY QUESTION AND ANSWER; MRS. MENON DID NOT ATTEMPT PUSH GOI VIEWS BUT, ESPECIALLY AS MEA NOTE-TAKERS WERE BUSY THROUGHOUT, TALK USEFUL PRELIMINARY TO FURTHER CONVERSATIONS ON THIS ~~SUBJECT~~.

GP-3. BOWLES

BT  
CFN 4 5 6 GP 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

129

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

49

Action

NEA

Info

SS

G

SP

SAH

EUR

FE

P

USIA

NSC

INR

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NSA

DOD

AID

RMR

Control:

Rec'd:

3845

MARCH 4, 1965

1:04 PM

FROM: NEW DELHI

ACTION: SECSTATE 2482

INFO: MOSCOW 224

DATE: MARCH 4, 10 PM

*U. M.  
X India*

BUNDY-SMITH  
BATOR  
BOWMAN  
CHASE  
COOPER  
HAYNES  
JESSUP  
JOHNSON  
KERRY  
KLIEN  
KOMER  
MOODY  
REEDY  
SAUNDERS  
SAYRE  
THOMSON

GOVERNOR HARRIMAN IOYCSCM\* MET WITH FINANCE MINISTER TTK FOR HOUR AFTERNOON MARCH 4. MOST OF CONVERSATION DEALT WITH FOREIGN AFFAIRS. TTK SEEMED RELUCTANT TAKE UP OPPORTUNITIES TO DISCUSS INDIAN ECONOMIC MATTERS ALTHOUGH HARRIMAN COMPLIMENTED HIM ON HIS BUDGET AND ON RECENT IMPROVEMENT OF PRODUCTION. HARRIMAN INDICATED AT CLOSE THAT HE WOULD LOOK FORWARD TO RESUMING DISCUSSIONS OF DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT AT LUNCH NEXT DAY.

IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ABOUT DEFENSE ALLOCATIONS IN RECENT BUDGET, TTK STRESSED MAGNITUDE OF CONTINUING CHINESE THREAT ON NORTHERN BORDERS

AND

33  
(b)(1)(6)

SAID INDIAN MILITARY ARE STILL SHORT OF HEAVY EQUIPMENT AND AIRCRAFT. HE EXPRESSED SOME DISTRESS, WHICH SEEMED LARGELY SUBJECTIVE, THAT LACK OF AMERICAN RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR AIRCRAFT EXEMPLIFIED BREAKDOWN IN COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN USG AND GOI. GOVERNOR HARRIMAN AVOIDED AIRCRAFT QUESTION AND SUGGESTED TTK MIGHT USEFULLY VISIT U.S., PERHAPS AFTER PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT IN JUNE. TTK SEEMED INTERESTED.

HARRIMAN DESCRIBED MOROCCAN EXPERIENCE WITH SOVIET MIGS AS EXAMPLE OF SOVIET EFFORTS TO EXACT POLITICAL COMPLIANCE IN RETURN FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND OF HOW TOUGH THEY CAN BE IF THWARTED BY WITHHOLDING SPARE PARTS.

TURNING TO SEA, HARRIMAN DETAILED U.S. VIEW OF SITUATION ALONG LINES OF EARLIER CONVERSATION WITH LAKSHMI MENON

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 08-41

By *isl* NARA, Date *8-8-08*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 2482, MARCH 4, 10 PM, FROM NEW DELHI

(EMBTel 2481). TTK EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER INDONESIA-MALAYSIA CONFRONTATION. HARRIMAN IMPLIED, HE THOUGHT BRITISH, HAVING LAUNCHED MALAYSIA, WOULD SEE MALAYSIA THROUGH WITH AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND HELP. HE AND TTK AGREED THAT TUNKY IS NOT AS ADROIT AS HE MIGHT BE BUT SUKARNO IS MAKING REAL TROUBLE FOR HIMSELF BOTH IN PURSUING "CONFRONTATION" AND IN LETTING INDONESIAN ECONOMY DECLINE.

IN DISCUSSION RECENT DEVELOPMENTS UAR, HARRIMAN NOTED NASSER SEEMS TO HAVE MADE MISTAKE BY FOLLOWING SOVIET DEMANDS WHICH WERE FORCING WEST GERMANS OUT. EAST GERMAN CREDIT WAS OF DUBIOUS VALUE. TTK RECOUNTED HOW HE HAD TURNED DOWN EAST GERMAN OFFER OF \$50 MILLION CREDIT, WITH EXPLANATION TO GDR THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO JEOPARDIZE WEST GERMAN ROLE IN INDIAN DEVELOPMENT BY ACCEPTING.

GP-3.

BOWLES

BAP

\*AS RECEIVED. WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



THE FORD FOUNDATION

32, FERROZSHAH ROAD  
NEW DELHI 1, INDIA

DOUGLAS ENSMINGER  
REPRESENTATIVE IN INDIA

December 31, 1965

*India*

Mr. Robert W. Komer  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Komer:

My visit with you on December 17th was a highlight of the two days I spent in Washington and I look forward to keeping in touch with you. I left Washington feeling hopeful that India's need for sympathetic understanding and massive assistance to alleviate an impending famine was understood and that the U.S. response would be prompt and ample.

I am writing at this time to share with you a thought you might like to pass on to President Johnson. In thinking about Prime Minister Shastri's visit to the United States, the possibility occurred to me that the President might want at that time to announce sending some high level team or other special and timely assistance to India.

It is my suggestion that the President consider offering to provide assistance to expedite the formulation of plans for the orderly development and optimum utilization of the country's vast underground water resources. The announcement of such an offer would be timely, because many areas which depend upon surface water supplies are currently experiencing severe water shortage. The present drought has underlined again the strategic importance of the high priority India is giving to inventorying and planning for the exploitation of underground waters.

Sincerely,

*Douglas Ensminger*



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

44-S

Origin  
NEA

Info:

SS

G

P

USIA

NSC

CPR

AGR

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE

*India -  
Presidential  
message*

1133

Dec 24 12 20 PM '65

12987  
131  
-BUNDY-SMITH  
-BATOR  
-BOWDLER  
-BOWMAN  
-CHASE  
-COOPER  
-JOHNSON  
-KEENEY  
-KOMER  
-MOODY

Embassy should deliver soonest following message from

President to Prime Minister Shastri:

QUOTE Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am very pleased that you and Mrs. Shastri will visit Wash-  
ington early in February and am looking forward with much anticipa-  
tion to meeting/~~you~~ both then. Your visit comes at a most appro-  
priate moment in the history of our two countries and will give us  
a valuable opportunity to get to know each other and learn more  
about the problems we both face. Our two countries have much in  
common, and we shall have much to discuss.

Secretary Freeman and I were very pleased with our discussions  
about your short and long term agricultural problems with Food  
Minister Subramaniam. While ~~for~~ firm commitments were neither  
asked nor given, he has enhanced our confidence in your determination  
to cope not only with India's grave agricultural difficulties but  
with its larger development needs. We are glad that you sent him  
here.

/I should

Drafted by:

NEA:SOA:HGWin:dnm 12/22/65

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances:

SOA - Miss Laise  
S/CPR - Amb. Hand

P - Mr. Sieverts  
NEA/P - Mr. Brown

White House - Mr. Komer  
S/S - Mr. Gordon

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*2BJ  
To  
Shastri  
12/24/65*



**LIMITED OFFICIAL USE**

I ~~am~~ should also like to take this occasion to thank you for your thoughtful message at the time of my recent illness. I do appreciate your kind wishes and warm expression of concern.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending season's greetings to you and Mrs. Shastri.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

White House does not plan release of text of message.

Exempt.

END

RUSK

**LIMITED OFFICIAL USE**

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

11858

85

Origin  
NEA  
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI

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Dec 22 6 12 PM '65

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USIA  
NSC  
SCI  
CPR  
NASA

WINDY-SMITH  
SOLER  
KORNER

1. Please deliver soonest following message from the President to Prime Minister Shastri:
2. QUOTE Thank you for your thoughtful message of congratulations on the successful flights and rendezvous of Gemini 7 and Gemini 6. The knowledge obtained from the accomplishment of this mission adds another ~~stake~~ dimension to the exploration of outer space for the benefit of all mankind.
3. I shall be happy to convey your felicitations to the four astronauts who participated in the flights. UNQUOTE.
4. White House does not plan release of reply but has no objection if GOI wishes to do so.
5. Above message in reply to following message from Prime Minister Shastri ~~was~~ delivered by Indian Embassy to President:
6. QUOTE Mr. President, kindly accept my heartiest congratulations on the stupendous achievement by the astronauts of Gemini VI and VII who kept the world's first rendezvous in space last night. It is a matter of great pride for your scientists, for your great country and for ~~you~~ personally. But I think the whole human race can take pride in ~~the~~ tremendous feat and in the courage and efficiency displayed by astronauts Walter M. Schirra, Jr., and Thomas P. Stafford last Sunday and again yesterday. Please also be good enough to convey my felicitations to the four astronauts. UNQUOTE. END

Drafted by:

NEA:SOA:HCWing:phr 12-21-65

Clearances:

Tel. Ext.

5070

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ W.J. Handley

SOA - Miss Laise  
S/S-S- Mr. Kelley

S/S -Mr. Walsh

NEA/P - Mr. Brown

White House -  
Mr. Komer

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LBJ  
To  
Shastri  
12/22/65



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 13, 1965  
6:15 p.m. Monday

MEMO FOR BOB KOMER

This is a copy of a letter  
that Barbara Ward has sent.  
It concerns Shastri and  
Ayub.

Jack Valenti

133

1965

1. President Radhakrishnan, the Prime Minister, the Finance Minister, the Defence Minister, the Minister for Broadcasting (Mrs. Indira Gandhi), and the various operating ministers - Subramanian, Manubhai Shah and at another level, Asoka Mehta, have all expressed a readiness to discuss all issues with Pakistan even though, implicitly, this includes Kashmir. Some of them have discussed possible procedures - for instance a high-level Indo-Pak conciliation commission or working parties for separate issues. Nevertheless this policy is bitterly opposed by the "hard liners" in the Cabinet - above all, Nanda, the Home Minister and Chagla, the professional Moslem Education Minister, their tough attitude has its appeal outside the Cabinet in the Congress Party (where Morarji Desai on the right and Krishna Menon on the left are anxious to exploit it in order to get back to personal power.)



2.

These pressures limit Shastri very sharply since he is not a leader and rules by conciliation. Thus it may be that only strong pressure from London and Washington and Moscow will keep him on the line of being ready to open up all issues with Pakistan and then, over time, explore the negative ones - refugees, debts, frontier rectification - and pursue the positive ones - joint economic policies, the Brahma-Putra Joint Water scheme, etc. - the hope being that after some years of positive negotiations, Kashmir can be looked at in a calmer spirit.

2. This same group of Indian leaders seems seriously disturbed by conditions inside Kashmir. Mrs. Gandhi calls the imprisonment of Sheik Abdullah "folly" but fears that to release him now could restart public hysteria. In short, many moderate Indians

suspect that the Kashmiris dislike both India and Pakistan and a solution based upon Kashmir's own choice must be sought.

But again, the move cannot take place immediately. It is something which can evolve out of a process of reconciliation. It cannot be a condition of it.

3. I have the impression that a cold look at the Indian economy has put a sudden end to wild talk of fighting both China and Pakistan while trebling food output - all in a single year. The crucial stick possessed by Washington lies in this fact of economic dependence on both sides. Ayub has played and lost the military card. If he refuses the process of slow reconciliation, his only alternative is to turn wholly to China - but a full Chinese Alliance will not feed his people nor make Pakistan anything but a very poverty stricken "people's democracy." The Indian economy can survive in the short run only with large external aid in food. This year's bad



4.

monsoon has clinched this fact.

4. But this dependence is also Washington's best asset. If both sides agreed to set in motion the processes of sustained reconciliation, nothing would so reinforce or hasten the effort as a massive increase in economic aid.



THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

134  
I'll see him  
if he calls.  
RWT

American Embassy,  
New Delhi, India,  
December 13, 1965.

India

Dear Bob:

Sri Mulgaokar, editor of the Hindustan Times,  
will be in Washington soon on a visit.

Sri is an outstanding editor who is friendly to  
the United States, sophisticated on world affairs  
generally, and moderate in his views on Kashmir  
and Pakistan.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Mr. Robert W. Komer,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.

RWT xocw

1/13/66

DEC 21 1965



135

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

P

December 11, 1965

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT KOMER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: ASSOCIATED PRESS STORY FROM NEW DELHI CONTAINING PERSONAL  
ATTACKS ON THE PRESIDENT

On December 6 the Associated Press wires carried a story from New Delhi which made it appear that the Indian press had launched an orchestrated attack on President Johnson and his policies.

The article's lead paragraphs quoted several Indian newspapers, but without dates. Ambassador Bowles has reported (Embassy telegram 1444 December 8) the following:

"AP story is based on material gleaned from nine articles over a period of five months. To suggest that these instances of criticism constitute a concerted, general attack on the president's policies or personality is patently false... Quotations in AP piece are clearly not prompted by GOI guidance to press but run considerably counter to mainstream of official statements and indeed general press play."

When queried by Associated Press State Department Correspondent Spencer Davis on the New Delhi story Daniel Brown, Public Affairs Adviser for the Near East and South Asia, speaking for the Department, commented: "This sounds rather odd, for it contradicts what we have heard in public declarations by Prime Minister Shastri and other Indian officials."

The AP subsequently ran as an insert to the New Delhi story a section stating that Washington officials had expressed "surprise" at the editorial attacks on President Johnson.

Mr. Brown has learned in discussions with representatives of the AP and the United Press International that there is a bit of running warfare going on between the agencies and the White House press office. The reason, according to Spencer Davis of AP and Don May of UPI, is that the wires were excluded from the Austin


backgrounder

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By pc, NARA, Date 3-3-01

DEC 11 1965

backgrounder on the Ayub-Shastri visits, this background having been provided only to the Baltimore Sun, the Washington Post, the New York Times, and the New York Herald Tribune. Mr. Davis has said that not only was the AP not called in for the briefing but was asked to leave when, having heard that the briefing was taking place, dispatched a reporter to cover.

When the New Delhi story came in on the wires, according to our AP sources, the AP's front office rather gleefully sent it along to its subscribers, feeling that it was a tit for a tat.



Richard I. Phillips  
Acting

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



136  
SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 00-421  
By CBM, NARA Date 7-9-01

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WHCA

*Bundy*

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~~SECRET~~

CITE [REDACTED] 18810

DECEMBER 10, 1965

[REDACTED] TO EMBASSY NEW DELHI

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

FOR AMBASSADOR BOWLES FROM KOMER

ASSUMPTIONS IN YOUR 1466 TO STATE ARE NOT CORRECT. INDEED, IT IS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT THAT WE IN NO WAY GET OUT AHEAD OF DECISIONS WHICH PRESIDENT IS PERSONALLY HANDLING. HE IS NOW FULLY SEIZED OF THE GRAVITY AND MAGNITUDE OF THE INDIAN FOOD PROBLEM, AND WOULD I AM SURE WELCOME YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS ON FURTHER STEPS. BUT I REPEAT THAT WE MUST NOT ASSUME ANY

PAGE 2 ESF 660 ~~SECRET~~

CONTINUATION OF NEWLY ESTABLISHED PATTERN BEYOND WHAT WAS JUST ANNOUNCED UNTIL HE HAS SO AUTHORIZED.

PRESIDENT'S STRONG FEELING IS THAT INDIANS MUST TAKE IMMEDIATE LEAD IN ORGANIZING MAXIMUM POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. OUR FUTURE RESPONSES WILL BE THE MORE FORTHCOMING IF OTHERS ALSO PARTICIPATE. SO HOPE YOU WILL STRESS TO GOI VITAL IMPORTANCE OF EARLY MAXIMUM EFFORT ALONG THESE LINES.

LEST SUBRAMANIAM'S NOSE BE OUT OF JOINT ABOUT VISIT HERE, TELL HIM THAT WHITE HOUSE MERELY ANNOUNCED THAT FREEMAN WAS PLANNING TO INVITE HIM SHORTLY. PRESS MISUNDERSTOOD THIS TO MEAN HE HAD ALREADY BEEN INVITED. FREEMAN TELLS ME INVITATION WILL BE FORTHCOMING SHORTLY.

BT

[REDACTED]


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~~SECRET~~

December 10, 1965



to Embassy New Delhi

FOR AMBASSADOR BOWLES FROM KOMER

Assumptions ~~last response~~ <sup>in</sup> your 1466 to State are not correct. Indeed, it is critically important that we in no way get out ahead of decisions which President is personally ~~taking on this matter~~ <sup>handling.</sup> He is now fully seized of the gravity and magnitude of the Indian food problem, and would I am sure welcome your recommendations on further steps. But I repeat that we must not assume any continuation of newly established pattern beyond what was just announced until he has so authorized.

President's strong feeling is that Indians must take immediate lead in organizing maximum possible contributions from other countries. Our future responses will be the more forthcoming if others also participate. <sup>hope</sup> So/you will stress to GOI vital importance of <sup>early</sup> maximum effort along these lines.

Lest Subramaniam's nose be out of joint about visit here, tell him that White House merely announced that Freeman was planning to invite him shortly. Press misunderstood this to mean he had already been invited. Freeman tells me invitation will be forthcoming shortly.

SANITIZED

Authority NLS-032-023-2-21  
By lg/cbm NARA, Date 11-13-07



~~SECRET~~

137  
*India*  
December 8, 1965

~~FOR JACOBSON FOR PRESIDENT FROM KOMER~~

~~(Pass copy to Moyers)~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *3-3-01*

In light of Delhi explanations, so-called press campaign looks like one-time puffery. Even so it provided very useful opportunity for me, without bringing you in at all, to remind Bowles and BK Nehru forcefully of the potentially grave impact on your own freedom to act of irresponsible press commentary. Results have been salutary, as our previous messages show.

In these circumstances see positive value in going ahead with press release on new food decisions.

AID raises question of whether you would want to make public the fertilizer loan, even QUOTE subject to consultation with the appropriate members of the Congress END QUOTE. Most of them are out of the country and might be miffed at being consulted only after the announcement. On the other hand, without the fertilizer, the proposed release lacks substance.

Another question is whether you would like to have Freeman invite Subramaniam here. Latter has now announced his program (which all here think looks very good), so a meeting is not essential. However, Freeman is willing, and having Indians come to us might look better than sending Galbraith out there.

Have also included last sentence on an international effort, and told Nehru in spades that it is up to India to take the lead.

Proposed release follows QUOTE:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Page 2

India's critical food needs, as well as its longer-term agricultural problem, are viewed with growing concern by the President, who has followed both closely. He believes that the American people and Congress fully support assisting India to overcome these difficulties in a manner whereby US assistance can be used to maximum effect to complement India's own self-help endeavors.

To help meet the immediate food crisis, the President has authorized another amendment to the existing PL 480 agreement with India which will extend it for two months and include a million tons of foodgrains.

He also proposes to authorize, subject to consultation with appropriate members of the Congress, an emergency \$50 million program loan for urgent purchase of fertilizer in the US. It is understood that India plans to spend a like sum of its own foreign exchange. This fertilizer should permit increased Indian foodgrain output of three to four million tons in the next crop year.

The President welcomes further discussions with the Indian Government about how US can help meet India's agricultural problems. Secretary Freeman is inviting Food Minister Subramaniam to come to the US shortly for this purpose. The US is fully prepared to join with other nations in a special international effort to help India meet its critical short term food needs. END QUOTE.

We are still holding up everything here. If you prefer to go ahead without White House press release we can easily do so.

~~SECRET~~



SENT  
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OO WTE10  
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1965 DEC 8 18 57

SENT  
1:57 PM  
WED, DEC. 8, 1965

FROM KOMER  
TO JACOBSEN FOR THE PRESIDENT  
INFO MOYERS  
CITE CAP65846

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 3301

~~SECRET~~

DECEMBER 8, 1965

IN LIGHT OF DELHI EXPLANATIONS, SO-CALLED PRESS CAMPAIGN LOOKS LIKE ONE-TIME PUFFERY. EVEN SO IT PROVIDED VERY USEFUL OPPORTUNITY FOR ME, WITHOUT BRINGING YOU IN AT ALL, TO REMIND BOWLES AND BK NEHRU FORCEFULLY OF THE POTENTIALLY GRAVE IMPACT ON YOUR OWN FREEDOM TO ACT OF IRRESPONSIBLE PRESS COMMENTARY. RESULTS HAVE BEEN SALUTARY, AS OUR PREVIOUS MESSAGES SHOW.

IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES SEE POSITIVE VALUE IN GOING AHEAD WITH PRESS RELEASE ON NEW FOOD DECISIONS.

AID RAISES QUESTION OF WHETHER YOU WOULD WANT TO MAKE PUBLIC THE FERTILIZER LOAN, EVEN QUOTE SUBJECT TO CONSULTATION WITH THE APPROPRIATE MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS END QUOTE. MOST OF THEM ARE OUT OF THE COUNTRY AND MIGHT BE MIFFED AT BEING CONSULTED ONLY AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, WITHOUT THE FERTILIZER, THE PROPOSED RELEASE LACKS SUBSTANCE.

ANOTHER QUESTION IS WHETHER YOU WOULD LIKE TO HAVE FREEMAN INVITE SUBRAMANIAM HERE. LATTER HAS NOW ANNOUNCED HIS PROGRAM (WHICH ALL HERE THINK LOOKS VERY GOOD), SO A MEETING IS NOT ESSENTIAL. HOWEVER, FREEMAN IS WILLING, AND HAVING INDIANS COME TO US MIGHT LOOK BETTER THAN SENDING GALBRAITH OUT THERE.

HAVE ALSO INCLUDED LAST SENTENCE ON AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT, AND TOLD NEHRU IN SPADES THAT IT IS UP TO INDIA TO TAKE THE LEAD.

PROPOSED RELEASE FOLLOWS QUOTE:

INDIA'S CRITICAL FOOD NEEDS, AS WELL AS ITS LONGER-TERM AGRICULTURAL PROBLEM, ARE VIEWED WITH GROWING CONCERN BY THE PRESIDENT, WHO HAS FOLLOWED BOTH CLOSELY. HE BELIEVES THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CONGRESS FULLY SUPPORT ASSISTING INDIA TO OVERCOME THESE DIFFICULTIES IN A MANNER WHEREBY US ASSISTANCE CAN BE USED TO MAXIMUM EFFECT TO COMPLEMENT INDIA'S OWN SELF-HELP ENDEAVORS.

TO HELP MEET THE IMMEDIATE FOOD CRISIS, THE PRESIDENT HAS AUTHORIZED ANOTHER AMENDMENT TO THE EXISTING PL480 AGREEMENT WITH INDIA WHICH WILL EXTEND IT FOR TWO MONTHS AND INCLUDE A MILLION TONS OF FOODGRAINS.

HE ALSO PROPOSES TO AUTHORIZE, SUBJECT TO CONSULTATION WITH APPROPRIATE MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS, AN EMERGENCY \$50 MILLION PROGRAM LOAN FOR URGENT PURCHASE OF FERTILIZER IN THE US. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT INDIA PLANS TO SPEND A LIKE SUM OF ITS OWN FOREIGN EXCHANGE. THIS FERTILIZER SHOULD PERMIT INCREASED INDIAN FOODGRAIN OUTPUT OF THREE TO FOUR MILLION TONS IN THE NEXT CROP YEAR.

THE PRESIDENT WELCOMES FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT ABOUT HOW US CAN HELP MEET INDIA'S AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS. SECRETARY FREEMAN IS INVITING FOOD MINISTER SUBRAMANIAM TO COME TO THE US SHORTLY FOR THIS PURPOSE. THE US IS FULLY PREPARED TO JOIN WITH OTHER NATIONS IN A SPECIAL INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO HELP INDIA MEET ITS CRITICAL SHORT TERM FOOD NEEDS. END QUOTE.

WE ARE STILL HOLDING UP EVERYTHING HERE. IF YOU PREFER TO GO AHEAD WITHOUT WHITE HOUSE PRESS RELEASE WE CAN EASILY DO SO

DTG: 081824Z DECEMBER 1965

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY



FOR JACOBS' FOR PRESIDENT FROM KOMER  
~~FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM BOWLES FOLLOWING~~  
MESSAGE: QUOTE

RECEIVED  
WHCA

India 138

1965 DEC 8 11 45

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

FOLLOWING RECEIVED

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING TO THE WHITE HOUSE FOR ROBERT KOMER  
FROM BOWLES:

"TO ROBERT KOMER, WHITE HOUSE  
FROM AMBASSADOR BOWLES

IN REGARD TO FALLOUT FROM DISTORTED AND UNBALANCED AP ARTICLE  
TWO TALKS WITH L.K. JHA HAVE RESULTED IN THE FOLLOWING:

1. B.K. NEHRU HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO GET IN TOUCH WITH YOU  
IMMEDIATELY AND EXPRESS HIS CONCERN. (NOTE: MEA SENT OUT THIS  
CABLE BEFORE THEY RECEIVED NEWS OF SECOND AP STORY OUT OF WASH-  
INGTON.)

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THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAS EXPRESSED TO ME HIS PROFOUND SHOCK  
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THE GOI AS ALLEGED IN THE AMERICAN REPORT AND THE GOI APPRECIATES  
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FAR FROM SETTING OFF ADVERSE REACTIONS WHICH SEEM TO BE ASSUMED  
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REPORTED THAT HE FELT IT WAS AN OBVIOUSLY FORTHRIGHT STATEMENT OF  
OUR POSITION WHICH HAD BEEN EXTREMELY HELPFUL TO THE PRIME MINISTER  
AND CABINET.

THE AFFIRMATIVE POSITION OF GOI IS FURTHER INDICATED BY NEARLY  
COMPLETE ABSENCE OF CONGRESS PARTY CRITICISM OF U.S. DURING CURRENT  
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THE ASSUMPTION EXPRESSED IN THE WASHINGTON STORY THAT THE  
ALLEGED CAMPAIGN OF CRITICISM REPRESENTS AN EFFORT BY THE GOI TO  
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MISUNDERSTANDING WHICH THIS UNBALANCED AP STORY HAS GENERATED  
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INDIA'S EFFORTS TO AVOID FAMINE SITUATION WHICH COULD SET BACK  
INDIAN DEMOCRACY IRREVOCABLY." ~~END QUOTE~~

~~REMOVED~~ COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WILL FOLLOW. I NOTE  
THAT NYT, TRIB, POST, WASH ST. JOURNAL DID NOT PICK  
UP STORY. ONLY SUN DID.

WE HAVE ALSO RECEIVED FOLLOWING STATE CABLE  
FROM EMBASSY DELHI COMMENTING ON AP STORY: QUOTE  
1444

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ/RK 00422(466)

By jkbn NARA, Date 3-7-04

PRESERVATION COPY



ERA419

OO RUEHEX

DE RUEHCR 6078 3421220

ZNY SSSSS

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR BUNDY

O 081125Z

FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1444

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ DECEMBER 8

LIMDIS

DEPTELS 987 AND 1082

~~PASS TO WHITE HOUSE~~

RECEIVED

WHCA

1965 DEC 8 12 27

~~SECRET LIMDIS~~

AP STORY IS BASED ON MATERIAL GLEANED FROM NINE ARTICLES OVER A PERIOD OF FIVE MONTHS. TO SUGGEST THAT THESE INSTANCES OF CRITICISM CONSTITUTE A CONCERTED, GENERAL ATTACK ON THE PRESIDENT'S POLICIES OR PERSONALITY IS PATENTLY FALSE. AP CORRESPONDENT WHO FILED STORY HIMSELF PROFESSES SURPRISE THAT THE ARTICLE IS BEING GIVEN THIS INTERPRETATION.

~~PAGE TWO RUSBAE 381 SECRET~~

SOME CRITICISM HAS OCCURRED, PARTICULARLY DURING THE EMOTION-CHARGED PERIOD OF HOSTILITIES WHEN THE PRESS FREQUENTLY ATTACHED THE US FOR ARMS AID TO PAKISTAN. BUT IN RECENT WEEKS RESPONSIBLE PAPERS, FAR FROM INDULGING IN INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS ON THE UNITED STATES OR ON THE PRESIDENT PERSONALLY, HAVE BEEN TAKING A REALISTIC AND CONSTRUCTIVE VIEW OF US-INDIAN RELATIONS.

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THUS PRAN CHOPRA IN THE STATESMAN ARTICLE QUOTED IN THE AP STORY URGES PRIME MINISTER SHASTRI TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY IN HIS TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND FOCUSES ON "PARALLEL INTEREST IN PROMOTING STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA." THE SAME PAPER, IN ITS DECEMBER 7 ISSUE, UNDER THE HEADLINE "MONUMENTAL WORK DONE AT JOHNSON'S INITIATIVE," HAS EXTRAVAGANT PRAISE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S "QUICK AND THOROUGH" INITIATIVE ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION YEAR.

INDIAN EXPRESS, ANOTHER PAPER WHICH AP USES AS A SOURCE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Ltr. 11/7/77

By jc/kmg NARA, Date 3-3-04

PRESERVATION COPY

~~PAGE THREE RUSBAE 381 SECRET~~

FOR ANTI-JOHNSON STATEMENTS, ON DECEMBER 1 PRINTED AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS ON US-INDIAN RELATIONS BASED ON AUSTIN BACKGROUNDER. THE ARTICLE SAYS, "MR. JOHNSON REPORTEDLY FEELS INDIA'S ACHIEVEMENT IN LAYING FIRM FOUNDATIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS DESPITE ITS MASSIVE POPULATION AND MANY OTHER PROBLEMS IS "A MIRACLE" AND CONTRASTS INDIAN DEMOCRACY WITH THE RULE OF MINORITY IN CHINA. HE ALSO REPORTEDLY FEELS THAT PAKISTAN IS ATTEMPTING TO MAKE THE UNITED STATES A SCAPEGOAT FOR PAKISTAN'S OWN DIFFICULTIES..."

THE TONE OF THIS ITEM TYPIFIES THE REACTION OF THE RESPONSIBLE PRESS TO THE PRESIDENT'S BACKGROUNDER. IN ADDITION JHA TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND OTHERS WHO HAD READ IT FELT THAT IT WAS A REASONABLE AND CONSIDERATE STATEMENT OF OUR VIEWS AND THAT THE GOI WAS GRATEFUL TO HAVE IT.

QUOTATIONS IN AP PIECE ARE CLEARLY NOT PROMPTED BY GOI GUIDANCE TO PRESS BUT RUN CONSIDERABLY COUNTER TO MAINSTREAM OF OFFICIAL STATEMENTS AND INDEED GENERAL PRESS PLAY.

THE AP WOULD HAVE DONE BETTER TO LABEL THEIR FINDINGS A COLLECTION OF UNRELATED COMMENTS GATHERED OVER A PERIOD OF MONTHS WHICH PROVE ONLY THAT SOME INDIAN CORRESPONDENTS

~~PAGE FOUR RUSBAE 381 SECRET~~

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SIMILARLY TO ACCEPT AP VIEW AS REFLECTION OF INDIAN OFFICIAL ATTITUDES TOWARD PRESIDENT AND US POLICY WOULD BE A GRAVE MISREADING OF THE SITUATION AS IT EXISTS IN NEW DELHI TODAY.

GP-3

~~EWLES~~

~~SECRET LIMDIS~~



SENT  
WHCA

1965 DEC 8 15 43

139  
SENT TO RANCH  
10:43 AM  
WED, DEC. 8, 1965

EEA405  
OO WTE10  
DE WTE 613

FROM KOMER  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
INFO BILL MOYERS  
CITE CAP65842

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

*India*

FOR JACOBSEN FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM KOMER  
RECEIVED FROM BOWLES FOLLOWING MESSAGE:

QUOTE

IN REGARD TO FALLOUT FROM DISTORTED AND UNBALANCED AP ARTICLE  
TWO TALKS WITH L.K. JHA HAVE RESULTED IN THE FOLLOWING:

1. B.K. NEHRU HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO GET IN TOUCH WITH YOU  
IMMEDIATELY AND EXPRESS HIS CONCERN. (NOTE: MEA SENT OUT THIS  
CABLE BEFORE THEY RECEIVED NEWS OF SECOND AP STORY OUT OF WASH-  
INGTON.)
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TO AFFECT OUR DECISION IN REGARD TO STRONG U.S. SUPPORT FOR  
INDIA'S EFFORTS TO AVOID FAMINE SITUATION WHICH COULD SET BACK  
INDIAN DEMOCRACY IRREVOCABLY. UNQUOTE

MY COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WILL FOLLOW. I NOTE THAT NYT,  
TRIB, POST, WALL ST. JOURNAL DID NOT PICK UP STORY. ONLY SUN DID.

WE HAVE ALSO RECEIVED FOLLOWING STATE CABLE FROM EMBASSY  
DELHI NR 144 COMMENTING ON AP STORY:



QUOTE:

AP STORY IS BASED ON MATERIAL GLEANED FROM NINE ARTICLES OVER A PERIOD OF FIVE MONTHS. TO SUGGEST THAT THESE INSTANCES OF CRITICISM CONSTITUTE A CONCERTED, GENERAL ATTACK ON THE PRESIDENT'S POLICIES OR PERSONALITY IS PATENTLY FALSE. AP CORRESPONDENT WHO FILED STORY HIMSELF PROFESSES SURPRISE THAT THE ARTICLE IS BEING GIVEN THIS INTERPRETATION.

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GP-3

UNQUOTE:

~~TOP SECRET~~

DTG: 081500Z DEC 1965

PRESERVATION COPY



India

140

SENT  
WHCA

SENT

12:50 PM

WED, DEC 8, 1965

EEA410  
PP WTE10  
DE WTE 619

1965 DEC 8 17 50

FROM: KOMER  
TO : THE PRESIDENT  
CITE: CAP65844

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECEMBER 8, 1965

FOR PRESIDENT FROM KOMER

RUSK PROPOSES FOLLOWING REPLY TO HAROLD WILSON'S 29 NOVEMBER MESSAGE TO YOU ON RHODESIA. IT OFFERS GENERAL ENCOURAGEMENT IN ORDER TO KEEP BRITAIN OUT IN FRONT, BUT IS IN FACT CAUTIONARY IN TONE BY STRESSING THE KEY IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING MEASURES WHICH MIGHT PRECIPITATE AN INTERRUPTION OF ZAMBIAN COPPER EXPORTS.

DRAFT MESSAGE FOLLOWS --

QUOTE

SECRETARY RUSK

D R A F T

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR THOUGHTFUL LETTER ON THE RHODESIAN SITUATION. I CANNOT EXPRESS TOO STRONGLY MY ADMIRATION FOR THE CALM BUT FORCEFUL WAY YOU HAVE TAKEN PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THIS COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT PROBLEM.

WITHIN THE LIMITS IMPOSED ON US BY VIET-NAM, WE INTEND TO GIVE OUR UTMOST SUPPORT FOR YOUR EFFORTS TO REACH AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION IN RHODESIA. AS YOU KNOW, OUR PEOPLE ARE TIGHTENING THE ECONOMIC NOOSE. WE HAVE ESTABLISHED ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY FOR CONTROLS ON EXPORTS AND WILL PUT THESE INTO EFFECT IN TANDEM WITH YOURS. WE ARE ASKING OUR IMPORTERS TO RESTRICT THE SHIPMENT OF RHODESIAN GOODS TO OUR SHORES, THOUGH TOTAL VALUE OF THESE IMPORTS LAST YEAR AMOUNTED TO ONLY \$11 MILLION. WE WILL RECOGNIZE THE AUTHORITY OF THE NEWLY-APPOINTED BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE RHODESIAN BANK. AND WE ARE PREPARED TO TALK WITH OUR OIL COMPANIES ABOUT TERMINATION OF SHIPMENTS TO RHODESIA, DEPENDING ON THE OUTCOME OF

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By JC, NARA, Date 3-3-04

& FRUS, vol. 24, #504

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YOUR ANALYSIS OF THIS PARTICULAR DILEMMA.

WE ALL HOPE THAT THESE MEASURES WILL PRODUCE THE DESIRED OBJECTIVE. AT THE MOMENT, HOWEVER, WE HERE FEEL THAT IT IS HARD TO BE CERTAIN OF FAVORABLE RESULTS IN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. BECAUSE OF THIS, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF ZAMBIA-KATANGA COPPER EXPORTS MUST TAKE A HIGH PLACE IN OUR PLANNING. ALL OF OUR LONG-TERM INTERESTS INDICATE THAT WE CANNOT CONTEMPLATE ACTION WHICH WOULD STRANGLE THE ZAMBIAN ECONOMY AND DISLOCATE WORLD COPPER MARKETS FOR ANY SUBSTANTIAL PERIOD OF TIME.

THE EFFORTS INVOLVED AND THE POSSIBLE DANGERS, BOTH ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL, ARE SO GREAT THAT I THINK WE SHOULD, AS YOU SUGGEST, ARRANGE TO HAVE OUR PEOPLE GET TOGETHER BEFORE OUR MEETING ON DECEMBER 17. ALTHOUGH ROSWELL GILPATRIC WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR THIS, GEORGE BELL HAS HIMSELF ORGANIZED A GROUP WITHIN HIS OWN OFFICE AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT WHICH IS ACTING AS A FOCAL POINT FOR THE RHODESIAN SITUATION. THEY ARE PLANNING TO MEET WITH YOUR REPRESENTATIVES WHO ARE ARRIVING HERE ON WEDNESDAY TO DISCUSS OUR MEASURES IN EAST AFRICA AND AT THE UN IN THE COMING DIFFICULT WEEKS AND GO OVER THE RHODESIAN ITEMS TO COME UP AT OUR MEETING--TO WHICH I LOOK FORWARD WITH GREAT PLEASURE.

END QUOTE:

I SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING CHANGE, THOUGH IT IS NOT VITAL. THE KEY LAST SENTENCE OF THE PENULTIMATE PARAGRAPH IS QUITE AMBIGUOUS. IT SEEMS TO WARN THE UK NOT TO TAKE ANY FORCEFUL ACTION WHICH MIGHT TRIGGER RHODESIA TO CUT OFF ZAMBIAN COAL AND COPPER. HOWEVER, THE EQUAL RISK IS THAT IF THE UK DOESN'T MOVE FAST THE ZAMBIANS AND AFRICANS WILL CUT THIS OFF THEMSELVES BY SHOULDERING THE UK ASIDE AND TAKING ACTIONS WHICH WILL FORCE RHODESIA TO REACT. THIS IS REALLY THE UK'S CHOICE, AND A TOUGH ONE, AND WE SHOULDN'T PUT OURSELVES IN A POSITION WHERE THEY CAN BLAME US LATER FOR DETERRING THEM FROM MOVING FAST. SO I WOULD REWORD THIS SENTENCE TO SAY QUOTE- OUR LONG TERM INTERESTS INDICATE THAT THE ONLY SENSIBLE COURSE OF ACTION IS THAT WHICH AVOIDS STRANGLING THE ZAMBIAN ECONOMY AND DISLOCATING WORLD COPPER MARKETS FOR ANY SUBSTANTIAL PERIOD OF TIME -END QUOTE.

DTG: 081715Z DEC 1965

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY



D R A F T

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you very much for your thoughtful letter on the Rhodesian situation. I cannot express too strongly my admiration for the calm but forceful way you have taken personal responsibility of this complex and difficult problem.

Within the limits imposed on us by Viet-Nam, we intend to give our utmost support for your efforts to reach an acceptable solution in Rhodesia. As you know, our people are tightening the economic noose. We have established administrative machinery for controls on exports and will put these into effect in tandem with yours. We are asking our importers to restrict the shipment of Rhodesian goods to our shores, though total value of these imports last year amounted to only \$11 million. We will recognize the authority of the newly-appointed Board of Governors of The Rhodesian Bank. And we are prepared to talk with our oil companies about termination of shipments to Rhodesia, depending on the outcome of your analysis of this particular dilemma.

We all

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Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 24, #504By jc NARA, Date 3-3-01

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We all hope that these measures will produce the desired objective. At the moment, however, we here feel that it is hard to be certain of favorable results in a short period of time. Because of this, we are convinced that the maintenance of Zambia-Katanga copper exports must take a high place in our planning. All of our long-term interests indicate that we cannot contemplate action which would strangle the Zambian economy and dislocate world copper markets for any substantial period of time.

The efforts involved and the possible dangers, both economic and political, are so great that I think we should, as you suggest, arrange to have our people get together before our meeting on December 17. Although Roswell Gilpatrick will not be available for this, George Ball has himself organized a group within his own office at the State Department which is acting as a focal point for the Rhodesian situation. They are planning to meet with your representatives who are arriving here on Wednesday to discuss our measures in East Africa and at the UN in the coming difficult weeks and go over the Rhodesian items to come up at our meeting--to which I look forward with great pleasure.



SECRET

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 3-3-04

December 8, 1965

*Mae = OK? My change isn't worth  
arguing with S. Ball, who'd stonewall.  
But it also may not be worth bothering the  
President.* PNT  
140b

FOR PRESIDENT FROM KOMER

Rusk proposes following reply to Harold Wilson's 29 November message to you on Rhodesia. It offers general encouragement in order to keep Britain out in front, but is in fact cautionary in tone by stressing the key importance of avoiding measures which might precipitate an interruption of Zambian copper exports.

Draft message follows QUOTE

(insert draft)

END QUOTE

I suggest the following changes, though it is not vital. The key last sentence of the penultimate paragraph is quite ambiguous. It seems to warn the UK not to take any forceful action which might trigger Rhodesia to cut off Zambian coal and copper. However, the equal risk is that if the UK doesn't move fast the Zambians and Africans will cut this off themselves by shouldering the UK aside and taking actions which will force Rhodesia to react. This is really the UK's choice, and a tough one, and we shouldn't put ourselves in a position where they can blame us later for deterring them from moving fast. So I would reword this sentence to say QUOTE Our long term interests indicate

~~SECRET~~

Page Two

that the only sensible course of action is that which avoids strangling the  
Zambian economy and dislocating world copper markets for any substantial  
period of time END QUOTE.



Bob:

Do you have any feelings about this?

Our usual policy is to turn <sup>down</sup> any request for the President to express an opinion on a literary composition or to take part in their introduction or promotion.

*Ret'd 12/15*

Wayne Hawks

*Wayne:*

*I'd stick with the policy.  
Bob K.*

DEC 14 1965

12/

# UNITED NATIONS VOLUNTEER EDUCATIONAL UNIT

NORTH CEDAR STATION

PINE BLUFF, ARKANSAS


141a

DR. M. K. ALEXANDER

ADVISOR

Care District Magistrate,  
Ernakulam, Kerala, INDIA.

December 7, 1965.



To

President Lyndon B. Johnson,  
White House, Washington D.C.

Dear sir,

May I take this opportunity to send you warmest greetings from India and to wish you good health and success in your endeavors for World peace.

After 12 years of educational work and service as Advisor to the United Nations Volunteer Educational Unit and Chairman, Humanities Department, Arkansas AM & N. College, I came here on leave to do some research and writing. I was delighted by the warm reception given to me by President Radhakrishnan, Prime Minister Shastri and other national leaders.

While in America, I had written a book on Education in the United States with a view to inform and inspire the youth of India. The book received prepublication notice through the U.S. Information Agency in Washington. It is to<sup>be</sup> published in the Malayalam language on December 30 by the National Book Stall of India, the largest publication Agency in this language. Honorable Pattom Thanu pillai, Governor of Andhra will inaugurate the publication at a ceremony at the Kottayam Public Library. I beleive that this publication and this program will be a means for promotion of better understanding and friendship.

My last book "A Survey of Philosophy" was dedicated to you and President Radhakrishnan. The present book on Education in America contains many excrepts from your speeches. I know these are going to

DEC 14 1965

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inspire the people here as they have inspired me. I should appreciate very much receiving your photograph for printing in the next edition of this book. I wonder whether you would find it possible to send a message for the meeting on December 30. It will be most timely for the promotion of goodwill and friendship.

Yours faithfully,



(Dr. M.K. Alexander)



# DR. MITHRAPURAM ALEXANDER

*Your Speaker for These Disturbing Times*

Mithrapuram Alexander is more than a lecturer on India which he understands so thoroughly. He has had an active part in India's epic struggle for freedom and the attainment of democratic nationhood. As an interpreter of India to America and America to India, Dr. Alexander has made an important contribution toward better understanding and friendship between the two countries.

From his extensive studies, travels and inheritance, he brings to the platform a cultural and spiritual message presented in the style of the best of international speakers.

Author of several books on The Humanities and Religion, Dr. Alexander has made a lasting contribution to clear thinking on World Peace by his book, THE PRINCE OF PEACE. It has been hailed as "one of the truly great books of the twentieth century."

MANAGEMENT:

DIVIE PURTAH

601 WILSON BUILDING

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# DR. MITHRAPURAM ALEXANDER

## *Teacher — Lecturer — Interpreter of India*

After a brilliant academic career in the University of Madras, Dr. Alexander entered upon a far flung mission in the interests of India and World Peace, which carried him into many countries. Along with his worldwide lecture tours, Dr. Alexander has served on the faculties of Howard University, the Arkansas State A. M. & N. College and Nagpur University. He has also served as a representative at the meetings of the United Nations, the Asian Relations Conference and several other international conferences. It was Mahatma Gandhi's choice that Dr. Alexander should work in the field of India's international relations.

### SOME OF HIS MOST POPULAR LECTURES

America and India, a study in cooperation

India, Key to World Peace

The Clash of World Forces in India.

A Federation of Asia

America's Future in the Far East

The India I Have Known

India's Answer to Totalitarian Communism

### TYPICAL COMMENTS AND APPRECIATIONS

"We appreciate very much Dr. Alexander's contribution to our interest and information in his lecture before an assembly of faculty and students of Boston College of Liberal Arts. His address was excellently organized and supported with adequate documentation."

DEAN RALPH TAYLOR, Boston University

"I want to thank you for arranging for Doctor Alexander's visit to our campus and community for he made a real contribution. His sincerity, his scholarly manner, his pleasing personality added to the real message which he had to present, made a deep impression on all those who heard him speak. I am so happy for our students to have had contact with a man like him."

PRESIDENT GUY H. WELLS, Georgia State College  
Milledgeville

"Please accept our thanks for sending us such a splendid lecturer as Dr. Mithrapuram Alexander. The

lecture was one of the finest we have had at Park College. Dr. Alexander has a charming personality which draws students to him. He has a spiritual quality which is very impressive. We have been fortunate to have him with us."

PROFESSOR CHARLES GRIFFITH, Park College  
Parkville, Mo.

"There are few men engaged in the teaching profession in this country whose spiritual and intellectual powers are better adjusted than yours. Your teaching of Philosophy so interweaves the past and the present as to make it very powerful."

EX-PRESIDENT J. B. WATSON, A. M. & N. College,  
Pine Bluff, Arkansas

"We greatly value your membership on this committee (The Committee on Food for the Small Democracies). Your inclusion gives added moral strength to the efforts."

HONORABLE HERBERT HOOVER, Ex-President, U. S. A.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation  
McGEORGE BUNNY'S OFF

DATE: December 1, 1965

1965 DEC 6 PM 4 54

SUBJECT: India-Pakistan

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador B. K. Nehru of India  
W. W. Rostow, Department of State

COPIES TO: S - The Secretary  
U - The Under Secretary  
M - Mr. Mann  
S/AH - Gov. Harriman  
S/AL - Amb. Thompson  
INR - Mr. Hughes  
NEA - Mr. Hare  
Mr. Handley  
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NSC - Mr. Komer  
White House - Mr. Bundy  
S/P - Mr. Johnson  
Mr. Linebaugh  
White House - Mr. Valenti  
S/P (2)

At his request I had lunch with Ambassador Nehru today. The substance of his remarks follow.

1. He intends to return to New Delhi soon to convey to Shastri his sense of U.S. policy towards the subcontinent. He volunteered that the President's backgrounder on the subcontinent, published in yesterday's Times and Washington Post, was "helpful." He understands fully that the President cannot come before the Congress and the American people and ask for long-term U.S. resources for the subcontinent unless he has reasonable confidence that India and Pakistan will not again fight.

2. He said that he thought the agenda for the talks might be: China; India-Pak relations; and economic policy. I asked if he thought the Prime Minister would raise the nuclear issue. He was thoughtful about this. He said that it was a real problem, but he did not know what the Prime Minister would say. Perhaps it should be discussed. I pointed out that, aside from the disruptive effects on Pakistan and others of an Indian national nuclear capability, it could not be merely symbolic, given the distances of the

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State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 3/3/04

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major Chinese centers from Indian soil. India would have to commit itself not merely to blowing a nuclear device, but also to sophisticated and expensive delivery systems; and this would be a serious economic matter quite aside from its other disruptive implications.

3. His greatest concern is, evidently, that the U.S. will commit itself with Ayub to pressuring India for a Kashmir solution incompatible with "Indian political realities." He said that no solution can be envisaged that does not leave Kashmir an Indian state.

4. I said that thought in Washington mainly centered around starting a sustained negotiating process between India and Pakistan, across the board, covering the long agenda of economic, military, and political issues the two countries must face if they are to normalize their relations, including Kashmir. I said that while the present posture of India towards Pakistan was understandable, no one could say what that posture might be a year or two from now, after a negotiating process had proceeded and both political leaders had made efforts to create an atmosphere conducive to normalization. I pointed out that this, after all, was an old Indian position; namely, that a Kashmir settlement should be part of a total normalization package. I urged that India not demand a status quo Kashmir position as a prior condition for entering into an across-the-board negotiation. He replied that it was necessary for Ayub "to face reality" and that minor modifications in the status quo were all that would prove possible in the foreseeable future.

5. We left the Kashmir issue at this point and turned to economic matters. He said he had just received the Freeman report. It was an important document, but he didn't know whether the President would accept its recommendations. He said the food situation in the next year was "extremely dangerous."

6. With respect to other economic matters, he thought a freeing up of bureaucratic control over the Indian economy was possible; but it required a reliable flow of foreign exchange on a higher level than in the past. One could not move back and

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forth from controls to a free market. If one were going to dismantle the control machinery designed to conserve foreign exchange, one had to have confidence that adequate flows of foreign exchange would be available. He said that when he talked to the World Bank people they could not offer satisfactory guarantees on this point.

7. I underlined that we were back again to the question of India-Pak relations: to generate capital in the free world for India on an adequate scale hinged on what Shastri could do persuasively to normalize the relationship between the two countries -- and, as Prime Minister of the major nation on the subcontinent, the responsibility was primarily his.

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Excerpts from Bowles/L. K. Jha Dialogue\*  
re Shastri Visit - RWK comments on visit

*India + Shastri Visit*  
**SECRET**

August 1965

8/27/65 - Delhi 400. Jha suggests setting aside 2-3 days in early October which wld ensure availability both Shastri/LBJ if PM cld leave country then. Bowles suggested visit could be in context UN speech. It Bowles' view Jha not reflecting PM view but merely exploring .

September 1965

9/24/65 - Delhi 779 (Exdis). Bowles has impression from Jha that Shastri giving serious consideration to visiting UN sometime before 10/15/65. Bowles asks for authorization to encourage Shastri to make trip which he likely to make anyway and indicate President invites him to come down to Washington.

9/24/65 - RWK to President. Passing on Bowles request Delhi 779. Suggesting that since Ayub may come early in October, Shastri come a week or so later. Or we could simply wait and see "who signs up first." President approved. (RWK talked to Pak Min 9/25/65 and inquired).

9/29/65 - RWK to McGB. RWK told BK Nehru (1) we had no fixed view as to type of Shastri visit (i. e. official or in context UN); assumed that with aid bill passed President wld be happy to see Shastri; that matter of a formal invite no problem once mutually convenient date worked out; that it his understanding PM wanted to come at a time when he cld spend several days seeing US.

October 1965

10/8/65 - RWK to President. Urging reply to Shastri's get well message as means firming up visit since Shastri probing and angling for reply. RWK draft response suggests last week in October; leaves open question of official visit or in conjunction UN.

10/11/65 - Delhi 941. Jha implies PM anxious go to US; was prepared to go late in October if it had not been for LBJ illness. If President not able see him before 11/3 he could come second or third week in December. Bowles hopes President can write Shastri letter expressing ... "hope PM will come to US soon as parliamentary duties permit. Bowles feels it important mtg be held soon as feasible. 'Our position in India will grow increasingly difficult...

\*Including Bowles/Shastri dialogue 10/18/65 (Delhi 1025)



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10/15/65 - RWK to McGB. Attaching reply (cleared by Rusk) to Shastri Oct. 7 get well message saying "let's get together soon." We can either waltz around this way or force Shastri's hand by proposing a date... real question is whether the President should reply saying 'come on in mid-December.' RWK for this course and would assume President is too... "The sooner we firm up matter the more we limit risk of further misunderstanding and further drift in our Pak/Indian affairs. RWK also attached Memo to President setting forth these options.

10/18/65 - Delhi 1025. Bowles sees Shastri. PM cannot go to US in Nov. because of Parliament... he considering visit immediately after adjournment provided President really wants to see him; does not want primarily to make UN speech (wants any UN speech to appear as by-product), is anxious to avoid impression he competing with Ayub for US favors; therefore hopes his own visit can take place before Ayub's. He also concerned with kind of personal reception he will get in US. Shastri sensitivity probably due (a) his disappointment over postponement visit last spring; (b) negative reporting from BK Nehru; (c) anti-Indians News stories in US press. Shastri feels India is in US doghouse but not clear why. Bowles urged visit, said doubts were unfounded, that he wld be received warmly not only from WH but from all agencies USG.

10/20/65 - Delhi 1050. PM will not be free to leave India until after Parl session (11/3-12/10). Could be ready for discussions in Washington on 12/13. He anxious avoid any appearance confrontation /with Ayub/ or a trading of accusations. If Ayub coming late Nov/early Dec Shastri will postpone until middle/late January. If Ayub not coming until late December or until Jan. there good chance Shastri will accept for mid-December. Bowles wants authorization to say (to be followed by letter) LBJ will see him during week 12/13 in Washington and thinks PM will be delighted to accept--barring any interim emergency.

10/21/65 - RWK to McGB. "I strongly believe that Shastri shld be first (a) because he was willing to come when Ayub wasn't; but (b)... if India is our main concern we ought to act that way."

10/22/65 - RWK to Bowles. "If Ayub gets here first, ... it's crucial that Shastri neither pout nor misunderstand. Mac and I hope you'll drive this home to L. K. Jha in spades if the ball bounces that way."

10/22/65 - RWK to McGB. "If Shastri comes second, he'll be on the defensive; if he comes first we can better urge him to think big."



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Page Three

10/28/65 - RWK Memo to President. Suggesting we "answer Shastri's get well note along lines of attached (?) which in effect invites him to pick a date after mid-December. Best guess is he'd like to come promptly."

10/30/65 - RWK to President. "My own reading is that this mood <sup>--</sup>inflexibility on Kashmir/ will last until Shastri can hear from you personally where we stand. According to recent envoys, he's still eager to come around 10 December."

November 1965

11/1/65 - Delhi 1157. Jha says Shastri not ready to fix any particular date, feels "imperatives of Indian political life" wld not permit him to go either as supplicant or in bracket with Ayub. PM wants visit to appear in context mainstream of constructive relationship... not a "make or break" proposition; thus may not want to decide for perhaps another month when to go. Jha acknowledged visit cld not take place during precarious ceasefire or hostilities. Indian Parliament, in session beginning 11/3/65, may solidify pressures on Shastri but he cld handle if he has some clear signal of our position. Bowles comments this clear signal (defined by Mehta) would involve: (1) pause in <sup>(2)</sup>US assistance is not directed to forcing any particular settlement and that no resumption of US MAP to Pakistan is in the offing.

11/1/65 - RWK to McGB: "...latest word from Delhi is that Shastri might be able to come a little before the 10 December end of Lok Sabha session."

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 30, 1965

Bob Komer:

Per your request.

Hayes

NOV 30 1965



100  
To →

Sarge Here's a first draft  
of my case.

India  
Very convincing to me!  
October 26, 1965

But you should be addressing  
your ideas to Tam

MEMORANDUM TO SARGENT SHRIVER

SUBJECT: On a Hard Line for the Indian Subcontinent

Hughes, Philip  
Talbot, U. Alex.  
Johnson, Rusk,

Continuing our conversation on India, I want to argue for an even harder line than the one being considered.

Trying to force India to yield on Kashmir is really the "soft" course: it satisfies our sentiments about UN resolutions and the principle of self-determination, but it is strategically unsound. ~~we will lose~~ Barring a miracle by Arthur Goldberg, we will lose and in the end have to reverse ourselves.

Bundy  
Mayer!  
NOT  
Shriver

Trying to forge a solid alliance with India goes against the current grain but strategically makes much more sense. It involves no more--perhaps less--injustice than any of the other bad alternatives. It capitalizes on the fantastic opportunity opened by China's attack on India and alliance with Pakistan.

Our real interest is the stability, security and progress of the subcontinent--and the development there of an effective Asian counterbalance to China. That primarily depends upon the stability, security and progress of India.

It is after all the Indian subcontinent. India dominates it as naturally as the United States dominates the Northern Hemisphere. The recent fighting gave a further demonstration of this. The divided 100 million people of Pakistan are peripheral. The central question is the state of 450 million Indians.

There is one dimly possible solution bringing justice to both countries and to the people of Kashmir: an agreement by India enabling the independence of Kashmir, or some kind of "open state" autonomy, under UN guarantees. As a long-time admirer of Sheikh Abdulla and an old Kashmir hand, I would like to see Goldberg produce this miracle. I suspect it is what most Kashmiris

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would prefer. It is just possible that the Indian Government, if it felt secure enough, might in time be persuaded to permit this. But I cannot believe this will happen under the present public and private pressure.

Knowing something of the Indian mind, I predict that this Indian Government, fervently backed by its people, will hold firm on this, to and beyond the point of mass starvation if necessary, and that if we withhold aid to that point, the Indian Army would in effect take over and be even firmer. In the process of trying to bring one of the proudest people in the world to their knees we would have created animosities toward America that would last long after we once again go to India's aid.

But even if the miracle should occur and India yielded under pressure, we would probably still lose. For then the predictable result would be the <sup>weakening</sup>collapse of Indian democracy, a new chance for Communism, and at some point our intervention under the most adverse circumstances.

Kashmir--and standing firm against Pakistan--is the number one emotional political issue in India, far more deeply ingrained and explosive than any question of Castro or Red China in American politics. Indians believe that the partition which created Pakistan was a mistake, that it divided a subcontinent which economically, culturally and politically needed to be one nation. They can accept the existence of Pakistan but not any further extension of the partition idea. Any Indian Government which yielded on this would almost certainly fall. The likely new Government, dominated by right-wing or fanatical Hindus in and out of the Army, would be far more aggressively anti-Pakistan. There would be no real peace on the subcontinent until India's natural dominance were established by force and Pakistan crushed.

There are perhaps 60 million Muslims within India. The militance of Pakistan turns them into hostages. Their one hope lies in the success of India's effort to build a secular democratic state. Losing Kashmir would <sup>practically doom</sup> that effort. In considering the interests of the several million Muslims of Kashmir, we must weigh the larger interests of these 60 million Muslims in the rest of India.



We find ourselves committed to a UN plebiscite for Kashmir. But self-determination is obviously not a universal principle for us or anyone. We chose a civil war rather than permit secession. We support one side in Vietnam and do not intend to let it be submerged under any kind of plebiscite. We do not intend to support Somalia in its drive for the self-determination of the people of the Ogaden, who couldn't care less for Haile Selassie. Nor do we press for self-determination in Angola. There was, to be sure, a UN resolution on Kashmir, but history has outrun that resolution, as it has with other UN resolutions or World Court rulings, on Palestine and UN dues, for example.

In pressing for a plebiscite we line up with India's adversary, Pakistan, and weaken India internally just when it needs to develop its strength to resist its greater adversary, China.

Instead of pursuing a course that alienates us from the Indian Government and people, that drives that key nation toward Russia, that plays into the hands of the Chinese, that leads only toward chaos on the subcontinent, that undermines the integrity of our aid programs everywhere, this is the time for us to accept the fact ~~of~~ that we have a great national stake in the success of India--in the success of this constitutional Government in India.

We should fully commit ourselves to join in India's defense, with all force necessary, against any further invasion from China, and proceed with large-scale aid to India's development program, without whose success there can be no stability or security on the subcontinent.

H.W.

Harris Wofford

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MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

29 November 1965

EYES ONLY

To: Mr. Komer

From: Adam Yarmolinsky

FYI.

NOV 29 1965



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Limited Distribution

29 November 1965  
*[Signature]*

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Security Assurances to India

Following Mr. McNaughton's instructions to assist Alexis Johnson in a reexamination of the problem of Indian assurances, I called Alex late Wednesday evening, 24 November. Alex said he would like to have the Chiefs review the earlier State Department proposal made in June which included the stationing of Canberra bombers in England or Malaysia. [REDACTED] 25x6

I asked Alex whether this review of "assurances" should also include public or private guarantees, presidential statements, or treaties. He said that the State Department was quite convinced that such steps would be inadequate and that some type of hardware solution was required. I said I would get together with Ray Garthoff and formulate a requests to the Chiefs.

I met with Mr. Garthoff on Friday, 26 November, and agreed to the following course of action:

I said that it appeared to me the crucial statement was that Dean Rusk had in mind some type of arrangements which would enable [REDACTED] 25x6 without providing a basis for Soviet attack on the United States. Therefore, if that was State's primary objective, I would ask the Chiefs what they believed to be the best means of achieving this objective. This does not mean necessarily that the objective can be achieved by any policy. I asked how quickly State wanted some answers. Garthoff said "as soon as possible." I said that considering the importance of the issue, I felt anything less than three weeks was unwise. Furthermore, I said that a 3-week review of the policy aspects was absolutely essential before people could seriously consider any possible hardware solutions in detail. Therefore, I assumed the first cycle of review would determine what alternatives were worth examining in detail, and a second cycle would clearly be required to examine the detailed implications of the chosen alternatives.

During our discussion Mr. Garthoff said: "We should definitely make a comparable offer to the Pakistanis so that they would not believe this offer to India was directed against them." He also indicated that State was well aware that it has not considered some major policy implications of this proposal such as:

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a. What policy should we take toward follow-on weapons, if this offer is made on the basis of existing weapons? e.g. Do we include joint operation of Polaris, F-111 and MRBM's in a few years?

b. While this study is based primarily on India, what do we do in regard Japan, Australia and New Zealand, if we should pursue this course of action? Mr. Garthoff said that State assumes that the original offer, at least in its inception, would not be made to Japan, Australia or New Zealand.

Mr. Garthoff said State had started the review of the carrier and Canberra proposal, not because they believed it was the best way, but because it was a way to look at concrete issues that would be raised by such a proposal.

We asked what the relationship was between this proposal and US contingency planning against China. Mr. Garthoff replied that this, at least in its initial phases, should not in any way be related to US contingency planning. These were two quite different and separate programs.

*Arthur W. Barber*

Arthur W. Barber  
Deputy Assistant Secretary

cc: Mr. McNaughton  
Mr. Yarmolinsky  
Mr. Friedman  
Mr. Hoopes  
Mr. Wyle  
Col Haynes

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# THE WHITE HOUSE

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27 NOV 65  
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SN 153

FROM: KOMER

TO: BILL MOYERS

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November 27, 1965

FOR MOYERS FROM KOMER

Following talking points are designed help President create right atmosphere for Shastri and Ayub visits. They will cause some reactions in Delhi and Pindi, even <sup>when</sup> ~~if~~ camouflaged, but this outweighed by desirability softening up visitors and warning them in advance what to expect. Since backgrounder will take place shortly after Ayub visit announced, thus highlighting Pak problem, have included this as well as India.

1. President has taken special interest in South Asia because: (a) he sees it as most populous and--with Japan--strategically important area in Free Asia; (b) US has already invested around \$10 billion in food and other aid, with equivocal results; (c) difficulties between India and Pakistan--both good friends--have grown and finally erupted last August/September in open war, disrupting our programs there and causing us to re-examine our policies ~~and programs~~.

2. Events over the past eight months have made President painfully aware that our policy in South Asia badly needs sorting out. New circumstances demand a new look at old answers. These circumstances have forced us to hold up any major new aid commitments to either country, and to take a new look at where we go from here. America cannot and will not ignore the dire poverty and vast needs of one-sixth of the world's people--as our past performance amply demonstrates--but President has obligation to US taxpayer to see that our assistance is used wisely and well.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *jc/c* NARA, Date *3-3-04*



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Page Two

3. In case of Pakistan, Administration and Congress have been increasingly discouraged by Pakistan's steady drift toward closer relations with Communist China, at very time when US carrying chief burden of curbing Chicom expansionism in Asia--and despite fact Pakistan formally allied with US against this very type of threat. Indeed, US confronted with strange irony of allied Pakistan moving away from US toward China, while non-aligned India becoming more alert to Chicom pressures. There is also growing resentment in US over public Pak criticisms which ignore fact that US alliance with Pakistan was against Communist threat, not against India, and <sup>OVER</sup> ~~that~~ attempt to make US scapegoat for Pakistan's own current difficulties.

4. In case of India, big question for US is whether massive Western economic aid can be justified to US taxpayer if all it does is keep India's head above water instead of moving forward. India's staggering agricultural problem is best example. Growth in Indian food output has kept barely ahead of population growth, and Indian needs for PL 480 grain have been steadily mounting.

5. President initially wanted to discuss these problems with Ayub and Shastri last spring but then decided time not ripe for such discussions until after foreign aid bill passed and he had firm idea of what Congress prepared to make available. Many of our friends somehow fail to appreciate that under American system it is Congress which holds the power of the purse. President has no regrets over postponement, which both Ayub and Shastri accepted gracefully, though he is sorry that a press leak made it necessary to announce the Shastri postponement prematurely.

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Page Three

6. Subsequent events, especially growing Pak/Indian friction, led to August/September hostilities. This further delayed any summit talks, and led to suspension of any new US military and economic aid until peace could be restored and US confident that its aid would not merely be fuelling fratricidal conflict. Current US policy is to fully support UN effort to bring about firm ceasefire and withdrawal and then steps toward longer term settlement of issues between India and Pakistan.

7. President now looks forward to seeing Ayub and Shastri, because in his view US needs a clear understanding of directions in which India and Pakistan are each going before it possible to make solid decisions on future US policy. He feels that best way to get this understanding is by face-to-face discussion at the top.

8. High on President's agenda with both is his increasingly strong conviction that massive US aid is little more than palliative unless matched by comparable effort at self-help. He made this crystal clear when he signed the FY 1966 foreign aid bill, "Our assistance must and will go to those nations that will most use it. . . . Action, not promises will be the standard of our assistance."

9. Since India has been by far the largest single recipient of total US aid, the Administration wants to take a hard look at what India proposes to do in the critical fourth Five Year Plan period which begins next year. India has done respectably in the past, but still faces staggering problems--especially

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Page Four

in agriculture. The President has been struck by India's steadily growing demand for US surplus foods, which has already risen from 3 million tons in 1960/61 to over 6 million tons this year (20% of US wheat crop). If present trends continue, India within a decade could be short of food by an amount equivalent to the whole US wheat crop. So the President has felt that long term PL 480 agreements like that signed with India in 1960 have operated as a crutch rather than an incentive. As a result the US has held off any new agreement, though continuing massive food shipments, until we could get a clear picture of how US help could be most effectively tied into an all-out Indian effort to feed themselves.

10. So the problem is not that the US doesn't want to help India--the sheer fact that we've invested around \$6 billion to date belies that notion. The President has clearly in mind India's key role in Free Asia, its democratic institutions, and the growing pressure it is under from Peiping. But he feels that simply shovelling in food and dollars is not the answer--in India's own interest or in ours.

11. Aside from his interest in the Indian Government's economic intentions, he wants to be sure that peace has returned between India and Pakistan. We don't want to find ourselves any longer in a situation where each side accuses us of arming the other against it, or one where US aid provided for economic

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Page Five

development simply frees India and Pakistan to use their own resources to buy arms. In this case, the US is simply indirectly subsidizing another arms race between them.

12. The President understands the deep sensitivities on both sides, now exacerbated by the recent fighting. He feels that the US alone cannot be the arbiter of those bilateral issues which must ultimately be settled by the Indians and Pakistanis themselves. But it is no disservice to either India or Pakistan for the US to contend that reconciliation and cooperation instead of conflict would be a great boon to both--and to the most effective use of US aid. India and Pakistan must learn to live together on the same subcontinent, and the President is hopeful that out of the crucible of recent conflict will come a new order of statesmanship which will build on this simple fact.

13. Nor does the President expect any nation to agree 100% with us on all issues as the price for US aid. He believes that, despite certain divergencies, there is a basic community of interest between the US and both India and Pakistan. ~~He does feel,~~ However, ~~that~~ when the US is carrying such a heavy burden for the defense of Free Asia, it is naturally sensitive to apparent lack of understanding if not support from those Asian nations whose ultimate security is also at stake. For example, Americans are baffled when Indians call on US to support them against Chicom encroachment, yet seem unable to fathom necessity of US helping beleaguered nations like South Vietnam.

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Page Six

14. Whereas an understanding of India's economic course is crucial to where we go in India, Pakistan has performed well economically--with massive US aid. This only sharpens our disappointment with Pakistan that Pak foreign policy has made it increasingly difficult to defend such massive aid before Congress just at a time when that aid was really beginning to show results. While we in no way expect to dictate Pakistan's foreign policy, we do hope that Pakistan will weigh its own real interests and give us some notion of what course it plans to take. The US cannot cavil at normal Pak relations with Red China, but it can hardly be expected to support--however indirectly--any Pak/Chicom alignment to squeeze India. To do so would be flatly inconsistent with the longstanding US effort to build up free Asian countries which can stand on their own feet against the encroachments of Peiping.

15. In sum, President regards the common purposes of US with both India and Pakistan as far outweighing differences. He looks forward to meeting with Ayub and then Shastri as best way of confirming whether this also their view. If so, though specifics obviously cannot be worked out in such brief encounters, he is confident that the broad understandings reached can subsequently be translated into renewed concrete collaboration--on a new and more constructive basis than before.

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
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**THE WHITE HOUSE**  
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23 NOV 65  
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FROM: KOMER

TO: BILL MOYERS, AUSTIN

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CITE: CAP 65736

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November 23, 1965

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 3-3-04

FOR MOYERS FROM KOMER

EXPOSE OF PRESIDENT'S thinking on India might be premature. Some virtue in his continuing to keep his Indian hand close to his chest a while longer. Since Ayub coming first on 15 December, might also be better to cover Pakistan first. Anything friendly we say about India just before Ayub arrives might create problems for him.

On other hand, can see some Indian themes that could be played now which would be useful in stemming mounting Indian confusion over US policy, and maybe also warning Ayub indirectly not to expect too much when he comes. However, I'm not at all sure I'm on President's wavelength on these matters, so what follows may not be suitable.

As I see it, three useful themes are: (1) "peace" is the first prerequisite--reiterate difficulty of resuming sizable US aid until there is fully effective cease-fire (if not withdrawal to previous positions) and US thus convinced we not simply fuelling a renewed conflict; (2) get out again President's own deep feeling that massive US aid must be tied to adequate self-help measures, since otherwise it is merely a palliative rather than of lasting benefit; and (3) stress US hope for a process of reconciliation between India and Pakistan which would permit a settlement of the outstanding issues between them.

We are on much safer ground if we avoid dwelling any further than the above on Pak/Indian issues such as Kashmir, where anything we say risks being misunderstood by one or the other (or both). Much better to talk about bilateral issues between us and India, particularly the question of US aid. Indians can hardly cavil too much if President stresses inadequacies of Indian agricultural performance, pointing up way in which needs for US PL 480 continually rising as India's own output fails to keep up with population growth. If present trends continue total US wheat crop would be going to India within next decade. We are on sound ground in stressing that even massive Western aid not enough to generate the rate of development Indian people want, and deserve, if India's own efforts are not jacked up.

Another theme might be how we Americans are baffled when Indians call on US to support them against Chicom encroachment, yet seem unable to see necessity of similar US support of free nations in Southeast Asia, e. g. Vietnam. We would think India, of all countries, would understand US role in Vietnam.

Can easily develop these themes further or send down talking paper if desired.

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R. W. KOMER



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1965 NOV 23 23 29

FROM: KOMER  
TO : BILL MOYERS  
CITE: CAP65736

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NOVEMBER 23, 1965

1:05 PM NOV 23 PM 6:34

TUESDAY

EXPOSE OF PRESIDENT'S THINKING ON INDIA MIGHT BE PREMATURE. SOME VIRTUE IN HIS CONTINUING TO KEEP HIS INDIAN HAND CLOSE TO HIS CHEST A WHILE LONGER. SINCE AYUB COMING FIRST ON 15 DECEMBER, MIGHT ALSO BE BETTER TO COVER PAKISTAN FIRST. ANYTHING FRIENDLY WE SAY ABOUT INDIA JUST BEFORE AYUB ARRIVES MIGHT CREATE PROBLEMS FOR HIM.

ON OTHER HAND, CAN SEE SOME INDIAN THEMES THAT COULD BE PLAYED NOW WHICH WOULD BE USEFUL IN STEMMING MOUNTING INDIAN CONFUSION OVER US POLICY, AND MAYBE ALSO WARNING AYUB INDIRECTLY NOT TO EXPECT TOO MUCH WHEN HE COMES. HOWEVER, I'M NOT AT ALL SURE I'M ON PRESIDENT'S WAVELENGTH ON THESE MATTERS, SO WHAT FOLLOWS MAY NOT BE SUITABLE.

AS I SEE IT, THREE USEFUL THEMES ARE: (1) "PEACE" IS THE FIRST PREREQUISITE -- REITERATE DIFFICULTY OF RESUMING SIZABLE US AID UNTIL THERE IS FULLY EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE (IF NOT WITHDRAWAL TO PREVIOUS POSITIONS) AND US THUS CONVINCED WE NOT SIMPLY FUELLING A RENEWED CONFLICT; (2) GET OUT AGAIN PRESIDENT'S OWN DEEP FEELING THAT MASSIVE US AID MUST BE TIED TO ADEQUATE SELF-HELP MEASURES, SINCE OTHERWISE IT IS MERELY A PALLIATIVE RATHER THAN OF LASTING BENEFIT; AND (3) STRESS US HOPE FOR A PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN WHICH WOULD PERMIT A SETTLEMENT OF THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES BETWEEN THEM.

WE ARE ON MUCH SAFER GROUND IF WE AVOID DWELLING ANY FURTHER THAN THE ABOVE ON PAK/INDIAN ISSUES SUCH AS KASHMIR, WHERE ANYTHING WE SAY RISKS BEING MISUNDERSTOOD BY ONE OR THE OTHER (OR BOTH). MUCH BETTER TO TALK ABOUT BILATERAL ISSUES BETWEEN US AND INDIA, PARTICULARLY THE QUESTION OF US AID. INDIANS CAN HARDLY CAVIL TOO MUCH IF PRESIDENT STRESSES INADEQUACIES OF INDIAN AGRICULTURAL PERFORMANCE, POINTING UP WAY IN WHICH NEEDS FOR US PL 480 CONTINUALLY RISING AS INDIA'S OWN OUTPUT FAILS TO KEEP UP WITH POPULATION GROWTH. IF PRESENT TRENDS CONTINUE TOTAL US WHEAT CROP WOULD BE GOING TO INDIA WITHIN NEXT DECADE. WE ARE ON SOUND GROUND IN STRESSING THAT EVEN MASSIVE WESTERN AID NOT ENOUGH TO GENERATE THE RATE OF DEVELOPMENT INDIAN PEOPLE WANT, AND DESERVE, IF INDIA'S OWN EFFORTS ARE NOT JACKED UP.

ANOTHER THEME MIGHT BE HOW WE AMERICANS ARE BAFFLED WHEN INDIANS CALL ON US TO SUPPORT THEM AGAINST CHICOM ENCROACHMENT, YET SEEM UNABLE TO SEE NECESSITY OF SIMILAR US SUPPORT OF FREE NATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, E.G. VIETNAM. WE WOULD THINK INDIA, OF ALL COUNTRIES, WOULD UNDERSTAND US ROLE IN VIETNAM.

CAN EASILY DEVELOP THESE THEMES FURTHER OR SEND DOWN TALKING PAPER IF DESIRED.

DTG: 232259Z NOV 65

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 3-3-04

PRESERVATION COPY



Minister (Economic)



भारतीय राजदूतावास  
वाशिंगटन, डी० सी०  
EMBASSY OF INDIA  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

November 16, 1965

466/CF/65


Mr. Robert W. Komer,  
Deputy Special Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs,  
Executive Office Building, Room # 372,  
Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. Komer,

According to the "Quick Estimates of National Income" prepared by the Central Statistical Organization of the Government of India, the national income for 1964-65 at 1948-49 prices has been found to be Rs 149.3 billion. In 1959-60, the national income at 1948-49 prices was Rs 118.6 billion. During the quinquennium ended 1964-65, therefore, the Indian economy has, in real terms, shown a growth of 25.9 per cent. This rate of growth, it will be noticed, is comparable to the rates of growth shown by other countries in this region during the same period.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

  
K.S. Sundara Rajan

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*Rest*  
*Proactive*  
*RWK*  
*11/28/65*  
*Acknowledged*  
*India*

NOV 18 1965



EMBASSY  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

150  
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pages. No 1 of 6 copies.  
Series A.

~~SECRET~~  
OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

New Delhi, India,  
November 12, 1965.

*India*  
*x Bowles*

Dear Bob:

I am enclosing a memorandum which offers a point of view in regard to Asia which I hope may interest you. Although it is not new (much of it has been included in our cables during the past two years), it focuses on a central point which I believe is of primary importance i.e., we have been forced in the last 15 years by the neutralist attitudes of the larger Asian nations to attempt to balance the power of Communist China with something like 5% of the Asian peoples (Taiwan, South Viet Nam, South Korea, etc.).

Our present experience in Viet Nam makes it decidedly clear that such a balance can be achieved only by introducing massive amounts of American armed force. Now the deep bitterness of India (with 1/7 of the human race) towards China offers us an opportunity to build a more effective power balance which, once the Viet Nam situation is behind us, will require a much smaller American military commitment.

I am conscious that such a proposal runs contrary to many habits of mind developed over the years. Nevertheless, I think there is a good chance that India will go at least 60% of the way with us.

With my warm regards,

Sincerely,

*Int.*

Chester Bowles

Enclosure:  
As Stated.

Mr. Robert Komer,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *pk* NARA, Date 3-3-01

NOV 16 1965



C O P Y

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150a

MEMORANDUM

TO : Secretary Dean Rusk

DATE: November 10, 1965

FROM : Chester Bowles

SUBJECT : The Subcontinent's Role in a New Asian Strategy

Events of the last six months underscore the fact that the South Asia policies under which we have been operating since the mid-1950s are no longer relevant.

Although the resulting situation is both distressing and dangerous, the broader strategic decisions which we are now required to make may open the way for a much more positive and effective United States posture in Asia as a whole.

In December 1941 the United States went to war to keep Japan from assuming a dominant role in Asia. In the immediate post-war period we based our hopes for Asian stability and for continuing U. S. influence on a U. S. -China political-military partnership.

The rise of the Chinese Communists blasted these hopes, and in order to prevent a massive Chinese expansion we were forced into a series of defensive and largely expedient military moves which have

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Authority NWJ.032R.023.002/7  
By pc, NARA, Date 6-28-12

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NOV 16 1965

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been supported only by a very limited minority of non-Communist Asians.

Our inability to rally more indigenous Asian support for the containment of China has been due to several factors which were beyond our control. These included Pakistan's obsession with Kashmir and more recently her flirtation with Peking, the political confusion of Indonesia under Sukarno, and the pacifist orientation of war-weary Japan. Much the most important factor, however, has been the political and military neutralization of India, which contains more than half of all non-Communist Asians. This was largely the result of Nehru's stubborn hope for a detente with China.

Thus to maintain some semblance of Asian political stability we have been forced to depend primarily on the direct application of American military power with the cooperation of such relatively minor nations as South Korea, South Viet Nam and Formosa. Because of their right-wing political orientation these nations in spite of their own strong anti-Communist orientation have been unable to muster any significant support from the other non-Communist peoples of Asia.

In October 1962 a favorable break of potentially great importance occurred when the Chinese attack on India shattered Nehru's dream

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of Panch Shila. China's ultimatum to India in September of this year accompanied by India's forthright reaction to this threat, and the need for a sweeping reassessment of our own relationships with Pakistan because of her partial alignment with China, have now combined to give us an opportunity to base our Asian policy upon more favorable power factors.

The decisions which we now face involve certain risks. Nevertheless for the first time since 1949 I believe the United States Government has an opportunity to move towards a new and vastly more realistic strategic posture in Asia. We are in fact faced with a choice between two sharply opposing political strategies.

The first calls for the step-by-step creation of a much broader Asian political base, eventually encompassing a majority of the non-Communist Asians, with direct American military power, following the stabilization of Viet Nam, playing a much more limited back-up role. The second assumes that our present limited political base in Asia is not likely to be expanded and therefore calls for permanently increasing inputs of American military forces to fill the resulting vacuum.

The first approach requires the creation of a much closer political relationship between the United States and an economically

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viable, democratic and vigorously anti-Chinese India which would be accompanied by a measured effort to promote an indigenous free Asian development and defense association. This association would include other key non-Communist Asian countries and would be supported but not spear-headed by American military power.

The second approach would continue to assume that because of their differences Pakistan and India must inevitably cancel each other out, that Japan cannot be persuaded to play a more positive role vis-a-vis China and that hence there is no practical alternative to our present flimsy anti-Communist political front of South Vietnam, Laos, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand (representing less than 5% of the Asian people) backed by increasing imports of raw American military force to compensate for this built-in political weakness.

A totally unacceptable third choice would be a U. S. political and military withdrawal leaving the future of Asia with more than half the human race to be shaped by China and/or the USSR.

The full weight of reason and national self-interest favors the first of these choices. The key to the success of this new strategy lies in a closer U. S. political relationship with an economically viable democratic India. Let us therefore consider the sub-continental policy objectives which are best calculated to build the

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broad Asian political base which we need but now lack.

I. U. S. Policy Objectives in India and Pakistan

In regard to India:

1. We should vigorously promote, insofar as India's own efforts will permit, the success of Indian democracy and India's emergence as a major political, industrial and military factor in Asia. It is our conviction that with an adequate U. S. contribution (which need not be greatly in excess of our average annual net inputs since 1959) plus a capable performance by India itself, India can achieve economic self-sufficiency by 1975.

2. Insofar as possible we should seek to keep Soviet hands away from India's most sensitive political-military control levers. This is not to suggest that every Soviet gain in India is necessarily our loss; much less that all Soviet economic aid to India is contrary to our interests.

However, until we have clear evidence that the Soviets are in fact working towards a peaceful, prosperous and stable Asia, we should view with profound concern any further expansion of Soviet political and military influence in India.

If the Soviets should at some stage indicate a genuine

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willingness to work with us in behalf of Indian development, let us meet them halfway; in the meantime, it would be folly to assume that Soviet political and military objectives in this key nation are not antagonistic to our own.

3. We should make a major effort through USIS and through personal contacts to restore U. S. influence in India and to create an increasing sense of political partnership between the two largest democracies.

In this effort we will have some major advantages. For instance, most Indians have a deep respect and liking for Americans and for American institutions. We share a common official language. And we have a vast reserve of U. S. uses rupees with which to finance expanded publication programs, libraries and other cultural and educational programs at no cost to the American taxpayer.

The Bi-National Foundation offers a most promising opportunity to undertake an unprecedented new cultural-educational effort here.

4. In the political field we should strive to shape India's policy vis-a-vis China, insofar as possible, along lines parallel with our own. As a first step we should seek to draw India into a common position in regard to the defense not only of Nepal, Bhutan

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and Sikkim but also of Burma. This will help draw India's strategic thinking toward ways and means of blocking Chinese expansionism into Southeast Asia.

For the longer haul, we should work towards the gradual development of an indigenous Asian counter-balance to China, starting with India and expanding as the situation permits to include Japan and Australia, with other non-Communist peoples in varying degrees of cooperation. Eventually, following the stabilization of Viet Nam, U. S. military force could withdraw to a discreet, supporting position.

5. We should encourage a more moderate Indian policy toward Pakistan by low key reminders that India cannot afford two enemies, and that with sensitive leadership and some good luck, Pakistan may eventually be persuaded to join with India and the United States in the defense of South Asia against China.

6. We should encourage India to play a moderate and constructive role in the UN particularly on issues concerning Africa and the Middle East.

In regard to Pakistan:

I have suggested that U. S. influence can best be expanded in Asia by developing an effective political working relationship with democratic India which alone under present conditions can provide

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us with the non-Communist mass support which we now lack.

Clearly, U. S. strategy interests in Asia will be much better served by a strengthened democratic India which maintains a dominant but constructive role in the subcontinent than by an effort to maintain an uneasy balance of power between Pakistan and India which immobilizes both nations.

However, this new strategic concept will inevitably add to the heavy pressures which are now being brought to bear on us from Karachi.

While we cannot allow these pressures to deter us from pursuing our own national interests, every reasonable effort should be made to blunt Pakistani opposition and to create an acceptable working relationship. We hold important cards and if we play them firmly and skillfully, there is every reason to assume that Pakistan's reaction can be contained within politically manageable limits.

1. As a key step we should bring home to Pakistan tactfully but firmly that her efforts to annex the Kashmir Valley are doomed to fail. The U. S. cannot give the Kashmir Valley to Pakistan and neither can the Chinese nor the Russians; nor can Pakistan win Kashmir by a war with India.

2. The Government of Pakistan must also come to see that

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it has no alternative but to adjust to the existence of a powerful India as Mexico gradually became adjusted to the presence across the Rio Grande of the more powerful United States.

The Pakistanis must be persuaded that China has nothing to offer Pakistan except sterile slogans and irresponsible political gambits (on this question Ayub Khan might consult Sukarno).

3. At the same time we should seek to persuade Pakistan that with U. S. assistance her economic future is bright. Provided that the Pakistani leadership agrees to assume at least a neutral position in regard to China, we should be prepared to help generously to make Pakistan economically self-sufficient.

Let us now consider the political and economic forces within the subcontinent which will affect our efforts to achieve these objectives.

## II. The Present Balance of Forces in the Subcontinent

### I. India

In the last six months profound political-military changes have occurred in India and these changes have by no means run their course. The confrontation with Pakistan which began last April in the Rann of Kutch has already resulted in the following developments:

- a) An exhilarating new self-confidence in India's future

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among all segments of Indian society. Although the self-righteous braggadocio of many Indian leaders which is a by-product of this new mood can be profoundly irritating, we may find it easier to take if we remember that not so long ago earlier generations of militant Americans responded with equal fervor to such slogans as "54-40 or fight!" and "Remember the Maine!"

b) India's pride in her armed forces which, contrary to the expectations of most western military observers, more than held their own on a man-to-man basis with the better equipped Pakistanis.

c) Similar pride in India's new sense of national unity, in the effectiveness of Indian democracy under pressure, and in the absence of communal disturbances.

d) A new uneasiness about foreign economic and military assistance from both the western nations and the Soviet bloc. Suddenly literate Indians have become aware that about 25% of all India's foreign exchange, a crucial seven percent of India's food grain consumption, and much of the ammunition and spare parts necessary for India's national defense can still be turned on or off by far-away foreigners on the basis of their own political judgments.

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Out of this sense of economic and military insecurity has grown a determination to achieve economic self-sufficiency as rapidly as possible, with whatever sacrifice of India's meager comforts may be required.

e) At the same time, the militant Chinese ultimatum of September 16 has aroused fresh fears of India's vast and embittered Communist neighbor beyond the Himalayas.

Right now India is determined to defend her northern and eastern frontier, including Kashmir, Sikkim, Nepal and Burma, against all comers. However, if the present two-front threat continues domestic political pressures will arise to ease relations with whichever of India's two adversaries appears most amenable to reason.

f) Regardless of legal arguments, UN insistence, or her own past mistakes, India is no more likely to allow Pakistan to take over the Kashmir Valley than America in the 1840's would have permitted Mexico to absorb Texas.

g) Among the many affirmative by-products of the developing situation in India is the further strengthening of Indian democracy, of Congress Party political leadership, and of Prime Minister Shastri as a tested responsible national leader who appears ready,

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willing and able to protect India's internal and external interests.

## 2. Pakistan

Pakistan seems to be undergoing changes of an equally drastic nature.

a) In spite of the militant posture of the Pakistan Government, an increasing number of Pakistanis are coming to realize that their army and air force cannot hope to defeat India militarily.

b) Pakistani expectations that her CENTO allies would willy-nilly bail her out of her difficulties have been blasted. As a consequence public resentment and bitterness against the United States in particular runs deep at nearly all levels of Pakistan society.

c) Communist China which many Pakistani leaders attempted to build up as an alternative to Pakistan's dependence on the West has appeared increasingly unreliable.

d) As a result of these disappointments the absorption by Pakistan of the Kashmir Valley with either Western or Chinese assistance now appears remote.

e) Although the political scraps thrown to the Pakistanis by the USSR are welcome, there are few illusions in Pakistan that the Soviets would actually support them against India.

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f) In the meantime despised "Hindu India" which most Pakistanis assumed would fall apart under pressure has emerged as a united, determined, and tough adversary.

### 3. The Soviet Union

By combining diplomatic skill and flexibility and with a generous measure of luck, the USSR since the political demise of Khrushchev has made massive gains in Asia as a whole as well as in the subcontinent.

a) In Indonesia they have a promising new political opportunity; in Vietnam we probably cannot make peace without them; in North Korea and possibly in North Vietnam their influence is now greater than that of China; in India they are riding very high indeed.

b) Soviet diplomacy has been particularly effective in the subcontinent. By appearing to adopt a less blatantly pro-India position, the Soviets have encouraged Pakistani hopes while continuing to respond to India's political, military and economic needs. Since the Rann of Kutch incident of last April the Soviets have quietly established their position as the only dependable foreign source of military equipment for all three Indian armed

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forces--thus far, without political strings.

New contracts have been signed for four squadrons of MIGs, some 80 PT-76 tanks, 4 submarines and other naval vessels and large quantities of ammunition and other equipment. In addition the Indians are now seeking major new contracts to include six regiments of T-55 tanks, two squadrons of MIGs, and various naval craft (see NBD 7481).

By promptly furnishing all three branches of the Indian armed forces with the relatively sophisticated weapons which we (out of fear of offending the Indians) had consistently denied them, the Soviets have moved significantly closer to some of the key Indian political control levers while cementing their relationship with many Indian military leaders.

c) At the same time Moscow has continued its program of political blandishments which was given impetus in India during Shastri's state visit to the USSR last May. Right now the Kremlin instructions to its New Delhi Embassy seem clear: massage India's national ego in every possible manner and undermine Indian faith in the West at every opportunity.

d) As part of this propaganda/political effort the Soviets

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armed with large supplies of rupees are sharply stepping up their cultural/informational effort in India. In almost every field they are now using techniques borrowed directly from our own United States program and are outspending us by nearly 3 to 1.

e) In the covert field the Soviets are also taking shrewd advantage of our weakened political posture by creating distrust and antagonism against the United States.

f) We should not, however, assume that everything favors the Soviets in South Asia. Indeed the increased Soviet effort in India faces two very formidable disadvantages:

(1) India's democratic roots grow deep and there is an instinctive mistrust among literate Indians of the Soviet form of government that tolerated Stalin for thirty years and which overnight deposed the much admired Khrushchev.

(2) In respect to India's primary enemy--China--the Soviet intentions are particularly suspect. We have, I think, successfully cultivated the belief that given a choice between China and India the USSR will inevitably pick China with which she has a 4500 mile border and that when the veterans of the Long March finally pass from the scene the Kremlin will make a major effort to achieve a Sino-Soviet rapprochement which inevitably will be at India's expense.

In other words, we suggest, and many Indians believe, that the Soviets view India primarily as a fallback position if the hoped-for

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rapprochement with China should fail.

#### 4. China

The future political and military role of China is the most difficult to judge.

a) It can be argued persuasively that China's economy is now carrying an impossible burden, that China's military capacity beyond her own border is strictly limited, and that China's foreign policy is based on unrealistic premises. However, it would be folly for us or for any other nation to underestimate the political and military potential of the great Chinese resurgence under Communism.

b) Because of India's size, dedication to democracy and steady industrial progress China regards India as its major ideological rival in Asia and potential indigenous military antagonist.

c) In view of recent political set backs in North Vietnam, North Korea, Indonesia, and the Himalayas, China is undoubtedly undergoing a period of intense frustration. If the military prudence which has thus far guided Chinese foreign policy should be shelved, the least risky target for compensatory chastisement might appear to be India.

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d) At the same time, whatever her capacity or intentions, China's expansionist posture in recent years makes China an extremely useful diplomatic instrument in the pursuit of many key U. S. objectives in Asia.

For instance, the more India fears China the more India's political focus will be turned away from Pakistan. And the more Indians suspect the USSR of yearning for a rapprochement with China in the post Mao Tse Tung era the greater will be American influence in India and the stronger the role of India's capable anti-Communist political moderates.

##### 5. The United States

In India the United States stands at a crossroad.

a) If we decide to follow policies that are directed towards the more broadly based strategic objectives which I have described a new and vastly more effective U. S. relationship with India and Asia generally is likely to evolve.

However, if we drift back into the habit of equating Pakistan and India, resume U. S. assistance to the Pak Military, and press India to satisfy Pakistan's ambitions to possess the Kashmir Valley, the present opportunity to create a closer political relationship with

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the one-seventh of all the human race who live in India will be destroyed. Under such circumstances pressures might develop in India to seek to cover her military rear by a detente with China while the USSR would move at our expense into an even stronger political-economic-military position in the subcontinent.

b) Inevitably developments of the last six months have placed us at a grave political disadvantage in India. Because we decided for tactical reasons not to label Pakistan as an aggressor following the massive Pakistan guerrilla action starting August 5th, and because it was technically impossible for us to carry out President Eisenhower's assurance that U. S. weapons would not be used aggressively by the Pakistani Army against India, we came under heavy criticism even from our staunchest Indian supporters.

c) In this sensitive framework the delays in regard to economic assistance due to the review of the India-Pak programs which we launched in late April have been interpreted as pressures designed to force India to make concessions in regard to Kashmir which would mean political suicide for the Congress Party leadership.

The above elements have been skillfully orchestrated by the Soviets and Communist left-wingers into a widespread anti-American campaign.

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d) However for the long haul the most significant public opinion development in India during recent weeks has not been the effectiveness of the Soviet propaganda effort, which admittedly has been substantial, but the clear evidence that a vast reservoir of friendship and respect for the United States still exists among almost all segments of Indian society. This cushion of good will is a product of at least four factors:

(1) India's deep commitment to democratic institutions which over the years has brought her far closer to the United States than most Indians were prepared to admit.

(2) The extent of the U. S. contribution to India's development and to India's food supply which is widely understood and appreciated. (NOTE: Last year a poll showed that 84% of all literate Indians recognized the United States as the major source of developmental assistance; only 4% designated the USSR.)

(3) A maze of warm personal relationships with individual Indians which have been created in the last 15 years by several thousand well-oriented American educators, students, Foundation representatives, businessmen, missionaries, and Mission employees (Foreign Service, AID, USIS, and Peace Corps). In the same period

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more than 55,000 Indians have visited the United States as students, trainees, and specialists and have returned in the vast majority of cases with warm and favorable impressions of America and its people.

(4) In the last difficult months, a concerted effort by this Mission to create among Indian leaders a more balanced perspective in regard to U. S. attitudes, to feed the latent Indian suspicions of the Soviets, and to reaffirm America's deep abiding commitment to the success of Indian democracy,

This effort has included not only an expanded effort by the USIS but an intensive series of background press conferences and countless personal visits with Indian leaders, MPs, businessmen, labor leaders and educators.

### III. The Prospects of Success

The strategy which I propose can be simply stated: to rally a significant majority of non-Communist Asians into an effective indigenous political counter-weight to China in Asia with American military power held in a backup position. What are the prospects?

Japan, which is rapidly becoming China's major trading partner and is still suffering from her war experience, cannot be expected to take the lead. Indonesia is in a chronic state of chaos.

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Thus the feasibility of this approach depends largely on India and this in turn raises a series of political and economic questions. Can India break loose from old habits of mind to assume a leading political role in Asia? Will India act with a sufficient degree of independence from the USSR which seeks to become the permanent power in Asia and can scarcely be expected to welcome such a more positive role by India?

Although no one can answer such questions categorically, I believe the answers are sufficiently affirmative to justify a major effort on our part. This is particularly so because no single dramatic move is called for; it is a policy which can and should evolve gradually, not suddenly burst forth into being.

Moreover, as indicated above, there are several favorable political factors. A vastly more confident India is now looking for a major role to play in Asia and in particular to draw closer to Japan. Most Indian leaders have a latent respect for the United States. They are worried about our present exposed and fragile political position in Asia and would much prefer to see us in the more secure supporting role which I have described. And India is genuinely and deeply afraid of the future development of China as a powerful and aggressive neighbor.

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In the economic field there are also some formidable uncertainties. Will India's new food grain production plans achieve their ambitious target of a 5% annual increase? Can India organize its resources to meet its equally ambitious goal in regard to family planning? Can India free itself from its ideological inhibitions to give the private sector the green light which is so vitally important? Will the United States, World Bank and other members of the Indian Consortium provide the increased capital flow that is necessary to make India economically self-sufficient in ten years?

In regard to these same questions my own views are also cautiously affirmative.

However, on the central point I am certain. The strategy which I advocate will only be possible if it reflects a determined decision at the highest levels of our Government. In governmental affairs as elsewhere old habits of mind die slowly and unless the new approach is solidly backed and skillfully administered, the tough minded, affirmative moves which are required will not materialize.

In any event a realistic view of the situation we are likely to face in Asia in the next few years indicates that this broader

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-23-

approach may be the only satisfactory alternative to our present narrowly based effort.

The simple truth is that we cannot reasonably assume that a small group of right-wing nations with only 5% of the total population of Asia can effectively balance the weight and purposeful power of Communist China without a politically unacceptable investment of direct American military force.

GP-3

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151



UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

799 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA  
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

YUkon 6-2424

November 12, 1965

~~SECRET~~

Dear Bob:

I am writing you because I know you will want to have the latest information from our Sikh oracle here in New York. This particular matter involves a purported decision by India to construct an atom bomb and therefore, however unusual the source, it may be worth some investigation or checking. The story is as follows:

At around 2:00 PM November 12, D. W. Singh phoned me and said he had just received a few moments before a letter from his brother postmarked New Delhi. His brother described a conversation which took place between Dr. Kartar Singh and Indian Home Minister Nanda, at which he was present. The background of the conversation was that Nanda had invited Kartar Singh to stay with him in New Delhi since he allegedly is a great admirer of Kartar Singh and desired to have the calming influence of his wisdom near at hand. During the conversation, Kartar Singh stated his belief that the trouble on the sub-continent would become much greater than heretofore and that by Spring of next year life in New Delhi would be very difficult indeed. Kartar Singh indicated that any future trouble would also involve hostilities with Communist China and on this ground urged Home Minister Nanda to work for the construction of an atomic bomb by India.

According to D. W. Singh's brother's letter, Nanda responded to Kartar Singh stating that instructions have already been issued to India's Atomic Energy authority to go ahead and construct an atomic bomb. Nanda reportedly said that this would take much less time to produce than the world expected and there would be considerable surprise when India revealed that it possessed a functioning atomic bomb.

Mr. Robert Komer,  
NSC Staff,  
The White House.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 032R-23-2-8-2

By JDN vARA Date 2-12-18

~~SECRET~~

This document consists of 2 pages.  
No. 1 of 4 copies, Series a.

NOV 16 1965



~~SECRET~~


- 2 -

I naturally expressed some skepticism to D. W. Singh pointing out that this matter had been discussed in the Indian Government and in Parliament, and that it would therefore seem odd that the Government would go ahead on its own. D. W. Singh did not attempt to defend his information but said he had no reason to question his brother's honesty in conveying what he had heard. When I asked why, if a decision of that kind had been made, it would be conveyed so blithely, to Dr. Kartar Singh, he replied, as you might expect, that Kartar Singh's authority and the respect in which he was held by Nanda would easily explain the receipt of such a confidence.

D. W. Singh passed on a few more tidbits which he had had from an Indian airlines pilot with whom he had been talking earlier today. This pilot, (presumably a Sikh) had been up to the Punjab front in recent weeks and had spoken with three fairly high ranking Indian Army Generals of Sikh origin who commanded major units on that front. Two of the names I caught were "Erbak Singh" and "Rajendra Singh". These generals were reported to be annoyed at the imposition of the cease-fire and anxious for resumption of hostilities.

I knew you would not want to miss having these latest details so I decided to pass them on to you without delay. The conversation with Nanda is supposed to have taken place around the beginning of this month. D. W. Singh expressed considerable surprise that the venerable Kartar Singh favored construction of the bomb!

Yours sincerely,

  
John Baker

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year  
intervals; not  
automatically declassified

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

5 152

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action CONTROL 3781

RECD: NOVEMBER 4, 1965  
4:51 P.M.

Info

FROM: AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

ACTION: SECSTATE 1190

SECTION ONE OF TWO

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOVEMBER 4

DEPT ALSO PASS WHITE HOUSE UNN AS ACTION ADDEE

NODIS

ON THE EVENING OF NOVEMBER 2 I HAD A REVEALING AND ENCOURAGING DISCUSSION FOR MORE THAN ONE AND A HALF HOURS WITH PRESIDENT RADHAKRISHNAN. HE WAS IN BED -- NOT BECAUSE OF ILLNESS BUT BECAUSE HE HAS BEEN URGED TO CONSERVE HIS STRENGTH.

WHEN I ENTERED THE ROOM RAJAGOPALACHARI, WHO IS AN OLD AND CLOSE FRIEND, WAS ALSO PRESENT AND GREETED ME WARMLY. THE PRESIDENT, HE SAID, HAD A VITALLY IMPORTANT QUESTION TO DISCUSS WITH ME. AFTER AN EXCHANGE OF PLEASANTRIES, RAJAGOPALACHARI LEFT THE ROOM.

RADHAKRISHNAN THEN PLUNGED INTO THE SUBJECT OF KASHMIR. HE HAD SOME STRONG IDEAS QUITE WELL ADVANCED WHICH HE HAD JUST DISCUSSED WITH RAJAGOPALACHARI AND WHICH THE LATTER HAD URGED HIM TO DISCUSS FRANKLY WITH ME. THE PRESIDENT'S PRESENTATION WAS AS FOLLOWS:

1. WHEN HE VISITED KASHMIR IN SEPTEMBER THERE WAS NO DOUBT IN HIS MIND THAT THE PAKISTANI INFILTRATORS HAD FAILED BECAUSE THE KASHMIR PEOPLE HAD BEEN LARGELY INDIFFERENT TO OUTSIDE AGITATORS. TODAY HE FELT THAT KASHMIRIS THEMSELVES WERE EXPRESSING INCREASING RESTIVENESS AND THAT BOLD STEPS BY INDIA ARE NEEDED TO STABILIZE THE POLITICAL SITUATION.

CONSEQUENTLY HE HAD ARRANGED TO SEND TWO TRUSTED YOUNG MEN TO VISIT SHEIKH ABDULLAH IN SOUTH INDIA. ONE WAS AN EX-STUDENT OF HIS AND THE OTHER A PROTEGE OF JAY PRAKASH NARAYAN. THE PURPOSE OF THIS VISIT WAS TO EXPLORE ABDULLAH'S VIEWS ON KASHMIR IN DEPTH, PARTICULARLY HIS CURRENT ATTITUDES TOWARDS PAKISTAN AND INDIA.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Authority RAC 03R-23-2-9-1  
By JOK ARA Date 2.12.18

NOV 5 1965

PRESERVATION COPY



~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 1190, November 4, From New Delhi (Section one of two)

SPECIFICALLY RADHAKRISHNAN WAS ANXIOUS TO FIND OUT IF ABDULLAH'S VIEWS HAD CHANGED FROM THOSE THAT HE HAD EXPRESSED LAST WINTER. AT THAT TIME HE HAD TOLD PRESIDENT THAT HE WAS PERSUADED THAT AN INDEPENDENT KASHMIR HAD BECOME IMPRACTICABLE AND THAT HE ALSO REJECTED ACCESSION OF THE KASHMIR VALLEY TO PAKISTAN ON THE GROUNDS THAT PAKISTAN HAS EVOLVED INTO A FANATICALLY RELIGIOUS STATE WITH WHICH HE PERSONALLY WANTS NO CONNECTION.

ALTHOUGH HIGHLY CRITICAL OF GOI AT THAT TIME, ABDULLAH HAD EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIA AND INDIAN-HELD KASHMIR WHICH WOULD GIVE INDIAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER FOREIGN POLICY, DEFENSE, COMMUNICATIONS AND FINANCE WHILE THE KASHMIRIS WOULD ENJOY AUTONOMY ON OTHER MATTERS UNDER THEIR OWN ELECTED GOVERNMENT.

AFTER LENGTHY AND EXHAUSTIVE DISCUSSION THE TWO YOUNG MEN HAD REPORTED TO THE PRESIDENT THAT ABDULLAH'S VIEWS HAD NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CHANGED. ALTHOUGH HE HAD EXPRESSED PERSONAL BITTERNESS ABOUT HIS PERSONAL TREATMENT AT HANDS OF GOI HE EMPHASIZED HIS PROFOUND DISGUST OVER PAKISTAN'S RELIGIOUS FANATICISM AND THE BLOODSHED AND BITTERNESS FOR WHICH HE HELD PAKISTAN LARGELY RESPONSIBLE.

2. ON HEARING THIS FAVORABLE REPORT THE PRESIDENT HAD CALLED IN FOUR CIVIL SERVANTS WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS THE FOUR KEY SECRETARIES TO THE CABINET: L.K. JHA (SECRETARY TO PRIME MINISTER), P.V.P. RAO (DEFENSE MINISTRY), DHARMA VIAR (CABINET SECRETARY), AND L.P. SINGH (HOME MINISTRY). TO THESE FOUR MEN THE PRESIDENT OUTLINED FOLLOWING PROPOSITION:

A) ABDULLAH, WHILE STILL UNDER NOMINAL DETENTION SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO DELHI WHERE HE WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR PRIVATE, HEART TO HEART DISCUSSIONS WITH HIMSELF, THE PRIME MINISTER AND OTHER KEY INDIAN LEADERS.

B) IF SHEIKH ABDULLAH WOULD AGREE TO ASSUME POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF ALL OF KASHMIR NOW CONTROLLED BY INDIA AND ACCEPT IT AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF INDIA, AND IF HE WOULD FURTHER AGREE TO ACCEPT INDIA'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR FINANCE, COMMUNICATIONS, DEFENSE, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HE AND ALL OTHER KASHMIR LEADERS WHO HAVE BEEN DETAINED WOULD PROMPTLY BE RELEASED.

C) AFTER A SUITABLE INTERVAL (WHICH RADHAKRISHNAN DESCRIBED AS A PERIOD NO MORE THAN TWO OR THREE MONTHS) AN ELECTION WOULD BE HELD IN KASHMIR, WHICH ABDULLAH WOULD SURELY WIN. A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIA INVOLVING SEMI-AUTONOMY WOULD THEN BE PUT INTO EFFECT.

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PRESERVATION COPY



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-3- 1190, November 4, From New Delhi (Section one of two)

RADHAKRISHNAN ADDED THAT IN HIS DISCUSSION WITH L.K. JHA THE SUBJECT OF THE US-PUERTO RICO RELATIONSHIP HAD COME UP. JHA HAD SHOWN HIM THE PUERTO RICAN CONSTITUTION AND RELEVANT US LEGISLATION, WHICH HE FOUND BOTH INTERESTING AND RELEVANT. I STATED WITH SOME ALARM THAT I HAD GIVEN THESE DOCUMENTS TO L.K. JHA ON MOST CONFIDENTIAL BASIS AND IT WOULD BE DISASTROUS IF IT WERE KNOWN THAT THE US AMBASSADOR HAD PLAYED ANY ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THIS CONCEPT. RADHAKRISHNAN STATED THAT I NEED NOT WORRY SINCE THIS PARTICULAR EXCHANGE HAD NOT GONE BEYOND JHA AND HIMSELF.

3) AFTER A WEEK'S CONSIDERATION WITHIN THEIR MINISTRIES, THE FOUR SECRETARIES HAD RETURNED TO RADHAKRISHNAN ON NOVEMBER 1 TO SAY THAT THEY WERE ALL FAVORABLE TO PROPOSAL AND TO RECOMMEND THAT THEY SHOULD PRESENT HIS PLAN TO PRIME MINISTER.

CONSEQUENTLY THE PRESIDENT ARRANGED A MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER FOR WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 3, AT WHICH HE SAID HE WOULD PUT FORTH HIS PLAN AND STRONGLY URGE ITS ACCEPTANCE BY SHASTRI AND CABINET.

4) RADHAKRISHNAN THEN ASKED FOR MY SUGGESTIONS AND COMMENTS. I REPLIED THAT ALTHOUGH MY GOVERNMENT HAD NO PROPOSALS TO MAKE ON KASHMIR, I FELT AS AN INDIVIDUAL THAT HIS APPROACH WAS PROMISING. I EXPRESSED DOUBTS, HOWEVER, THAT SHEIKH ABDULLAH WOULD STAY HITCHED. I HAVE KNOWN HIM AS SOMEWHAT UNSTABLE INDIVIDUAL WHO OFTEN COULD BE PERSUADED BY PARTISANS OF ONE IDEA OR ANOTHER. I WAS ALSO SURPRISED AT RADHAKRISHNAN'S CONFIDENCE THAT CABINET COULD BE PERSUADED TO ACCEPT SUCH A PROPOSAL AT THIS TIME.

BOWLES

NOTE: Not passed White House

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

Action

CONTROL : 3644  
RECD : NOVEMBER 4, 1965, 1:37 PM

Info

FROM : NEW DELHI  
ACTION : SECSTATE 1190

SECTION TWO OF TWO

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOVEMBER 4

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5) RADHAKRISHNAN REPLIED WITH EMPHASIS THAT THERE WAS NO REASON TO QUESTION ABDULLAH'S ATTITUDE AS HE HAD DESCRIBED IT. HIS TWO EMISSACEES HAD BEEN UNEQUIVOCABLE ON THIS SCORE. ABDULLAH IS A PATRIOT AND A DEDICATED KASHMIRI; HE ABHORS VIOLENCE AND IS NOW DEEPLY OPPOSED TO PAKUDTAN BECUASE OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM OF ITS MILITANT LEADERSHIP.

WITH REGARD TO INDIAN CABINET, RADHAKRISHNAN WAS CONCERNED ONLY ABOUT TWO INDIVIDUALS, CHAGLA (MINISTER OF EDUCATION) WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS DEMAGOGIC AND SUPER-PATRIOT, AND TYAGI (MINISTER OF REHABILITATION) WHOM HE CALLED IRRESPONSIBLE AND UNPREDICTABLE.

IN RESPONSE TO MY INQUIRIES ABOUT INDIRA GANDHI AND CHAVAN, RADHAKRISHNAN STATED THAT BOTH COULD EASILY BE PERSUADED. HE EVEN FELT HOPEFUL ABOUT THE JAN SANGH. HIS PRIMARY CONCERN WAS SHASTRI HIMSELF, WHO STILL DID NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND THE EXTRA-ORDINARY PERSONAL INFULENCE WIICH HE HAS BUILT UP IN THE LAST TWO MONTHS. (NOTE: SHASTRI SPOKE TO 800,000 PEOPLE IN BOMBAY A WEEK AGO AND TO 1 1/2 MILLION IN CALCUTTA ON MONDAY).

6) I THEN EXPRESSED MY DOUBTS AS TO THE WISDOM OF BRINGING ABDULLAH TO DELHI AT THE TIME OF OPENING OF PARLIAMENT WHEN UNDER THE BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES SHASTRI IS BOUND TO BE ASKED SOME EXTREME AND EMOTIONAL QUESTIONS. EVEN THE HINT OF A MAJOR KASHMIR GAMBIT IN OFFING WOULD PUT THE PRIME MINISTER IN A CAUTIOUS AND DEFENSIVE MOOD AND MIGHT CAUSE HIM TO HANG BACK.

RADHAKRISHNAN REPLIED THIS POINT WAS WELL TAKEN BUT HE DID WANT TO CLEAR THE WHOLE QUESTION WITH SHASTRI AND A FEW KEY CABINET MINISTERS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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-2- 1190 (SECTION TWO OF TWO) :FROM DELHI CN 3644

7) I THEN ASKED ABOUT POSITION OF KASHMIR'S CHIEF MINISTER G.M. SADIQ, WHOM I THOUGHT WOULD TAKE VIOLENT OPPOSITION TO ANY PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD RESTORE SHEIKH ABDULLAH TO A PRIMARY ROLE IN KASHMIR. RADHAKRISHNAN ADMITTED THAT HE WOULD BE PROBLEM BUT HE THOUGHT A MANAGEABLE ONE. SADIQ COULD BE MADE DEPUTY CHIEF MINISTER IN CONTROL OF THE DAY TO DAY OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT, ROLE FOR WHICH HE WAS WELL FITTED.

8) I ASKED PRESIDENT, ASSUMING THAT THIS PLAN WENT INTO EFFECT IN DECEMBER, HOW SOON HE FELT ELECTIONS IN KASHMIR COULD BE HELD. THE SOONER, THE BETTER, HE REPLIED; HOPEFULLY, NO LATER THAN FEBRUARY 1. A SECOND ELECTION MIGHT BE HELD AT THE TIME OF ALL-INDIA ELECTION IN FEBRUARY 1967 WHEN THE KAEEMCL POLITICAL SITUATION WOULD BE FURTHER SETTLED DOWN AND SUPPORT OF KASHMIRI PEOPLE FOR NEW ARRANGEMENT WOULD EVEN MORE IMPRESSIVE.

9) I THEN BROUGHT UP QUESTION OF YGDSTRI'S TRIP TO US AND THE VARIOUS CONCERNS THAT L.K. JHA HAD TOLD ME WERE ON PRIME MINISTER'S MIND.

RADHAKRISHNAN FELT THAT WHILE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD GO TO THE US IT WOULD BE WISE FOR HIM TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER KASHMIR ARRANGEMENT WHICH HE HAD DEVISED HAD BEEN CONFIRMED, ASSUMING FAVORABLE RESPONSE FROM CABINET. SHASTRI WOULD THEN BE IN MUCH STRONGER POSITION TO VISIT US AND SCHEME ITSELF WOULD AVOID APPEARANCE OF BEING IN RESPONSE TO US PRESSURE WHICH WOULD BE POLITICAL KISS OF DEATH.

10) AT SEVERAL POINT DURING CONVERSATION RADHAKRISHNAN EXPRESSED VIEW THAT HIS ONE REMAINING OBJECTIVE IN LIFE IS TO BRING PEACE BETWEEN KASHMIR AND INDIA. IF PAKISTAN WOULD GO ALONG, SO MUCH THE BETTER. BUT MAIN OBJECTIVE AS HE SAW IT WAS TO GIVE KASHMIR THE KIND OF GOVERNMENT THAT IT WAS ENTITLED TO AND WHICH INDIA COULD ACCEPT. HE EMPHASIZED HE WAS THROWING ALL HIS PRESTIGE AND INFLUENCE BEHIND THIS PROGRAM AND THUS HE HAD EVERY HOPE IT WOULD SUCCEED.

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-3- 1190 SECTION TWO OF TWO FROM DELHI CN 3644

COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THIS MAJOR EXERCISE IS NOW WELL UNDER WAY, THAT IT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED BY THE PRESIDENT WITH KEY MEMBERS OF INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE, THAT THE PRESIDENT IS PREPARED TO PRESENT IT TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND TO BACK IT WITH HIS

OWN PRESTIGE, IT WOULD BE WISHFUL THINKING TO ASSUME THAT ITS SUCCESS IS ASSURED.

SHASTRI IS RARELY CONTENT TO ADVANCE ANY MAJOR PROPOSAL THAT DOES NOT HAVE A MASSIVE MAJORITY IN FAVOR AND HE IS LIKELY TO HAVE MANY DOUBTS AND WORRIES. IF I WERE ASKED TO GUESS AT THE ODDS I WOULD PUT THEM AT SOMEWHAT LESS THAN 50-50.

BUT EVEN IF THE PLAN FAILS TO GO THROUGH ACCORDING TO RAD-HAKRISHNANGXS SCHEDULE IT UNDERSCORES THE PRESENCE IN INDIA OF A VERY POWERFUL MODERATING POLITICAL FORCE IN INDIA, LARGELY IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN PARTS OF THE COUNTRY, WHICH REALIZES THAT INDIA HAS TREATED KASHMIR BADLY AND IS ANXIOUS TO FIND SOME WAY OF REDUCING CURRENT TENSIONS WITHOUT APPEARING TO DO SO IN RESPONSE TO FOREIGN PRESSURES.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER THAT ANY RECOGNIZED INDIAN LEADER CONTEMPLATES AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD REQUIRE NEGOTIATION WITH PAKISTAN. EVEN SUCH MODERATES AS JAY PRAKASH NARAYAN AND SHIVA RAO AS WELL AS THE PRESIDENT AGREE THAT IN VIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENTS OF AUGUST 5 AND CHINESE PRESSURES KASHMIR MUST REMAIN AN INTEGRAL PART OF INDIA. BUT AT LEAST WE NOW KNOW THAT THERE IS POWERFUL GROUP HEADED BY THE PRESIDENT OF INDIA WORKING IN POSITIVE DIRECTION.

OBVIOUSLY ANY LEAK ABOUT THE FOREGOING CONVERSATION WOULD TOTALLY WRECK WHATEVER CHANCE THERE MAY BE THAT INDIANS WILL MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION. THEREFORE I HOPE THAT THIS INFORMATION WILL BE HANDLED ON MOST RESTRICTED BASIS.

GP-2.

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PRESERVATION COPY

Mr. Komer

11/10

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for info

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*Ret'd Mcg B - 11/12*

NOV 10 1965





THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20230

NOV 5 1965

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Kumar  
info  
↑

Honorable McGeorge Bundy  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C. 20500

India

Dear Mr. <sup>McG</sup>Bundy:

Here is a copy of a report on a meeting I had a few days ago with Mr. B. M. Birla, a prominent Indian industrialist. I thought you would be particularly interested in the section pertaining to the role private investment may play in the development of India's defense industries.

Sincerely yours,

Juch

Secretary of Commerce

Enclosure

NOV 10 1965



THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20230

1536

NOV 5 1965

Honorable McGeorge Bundy  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. Bundy:

Here is a copy of a report on a meeting I had a few days ago with Mr. B. M. Birla, a prominent Indian industrialist. I thought you would be particularly interested in the section pertaining to the role private investment may play in the development of India's defense industries.

Sincerely yours,

(Egd.) John T. Connor

Secretary of Commerce

Enclosure



# REPORT OF PARTICIPATION

(Check appropriate box)

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Interdepartmental Committee Meeting | <input type="checkbox"/> International Conference              |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Meeting w/Other Agency Officials    | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Discussion or Conversation |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Industry-Trade Association Meeting  | <input type="checkbox"/> Nat'l Stockpile Discussion            |

PLACE

Secretary Connor's Office

DATE

November 2, 1965

PARTICIPANTS (Commerce, other agencies, industry)

See below

FROM (Sign: title, office and bureau)

Celia Herman, Acting Chief, Southern Asia Section, NESAS Div., OIRB, BIC

DISTRIBUTION TO DIB AGENCIES (Transmit directly)

The Secretary of State

McGeorge Bundy

A. B. Trowbridge

R. L. McNeill

Archie M. Andrews

Robert E. Simpson

Embassy, New Delhi

Records Management Section

(Other distribution - Mark for recommended recipient and transmit in accordance with DIB AI 1-2)

SUBJECT (Name of committee, conference or association, if applicable)

Visit of B. M. Birla

SUMMARY REPORT (Topics discussed and conclusions)

Participants: Secretary Connor B. M. Birla  
A. B. Trowbridge, Assistant Secretary DIB  
Archie M. Andrews, Deputy Director, BIC  
D. A. Kearns-Preston, Director, Near East-South Asia Div., OIRB, BIC  
Celia Herman, Acting Chief, Southern Asia Section, NESAS Division

Mr. Birla said that India was generally united in its anti-Communist Chinese feeling. The Communist Party in India was split into pro-Russian and pro-Chinese factions and so, even among the communists, there was an element of support against China. Fear of Communist China remains great; the Indian people have been leading their government on the Chinese defense issue. It is now India's desire to build up its military and economic strength in order to be prepared for Chinese aggression. In his opinion, the Chinese threat is a more serious problem than Pakistan. He believed that Indo-Pakistan difficulties would be resolved. He elaborated on the very active role played by Moslems in the Government of India and in the Indian army. During the fighting with Pakistan, it was a question of India against Pakistan and not Hindu against Moslem.

Mr. Birla said that India planned to add 40-50 divisions to its army. In building its defense strength, India's economy would benefit, for industrial development would be accelerated. As examples, he mentioned the food, clothing, and transport industries. He then presented a most interesting question by asking what U.S. policy would be toward U.S. private investment in manufacturing airplanes, helicopters, and other commodities for defense in India. Secretary Connor asked if this was not an area of industry reserved for governmental development in India and would private investment therefore not be precluded. Mr. Birla responded that the Government of India was now so anxious to expand these fields of manufacture that the old policies would have to go and it would be willing to permit private investment. He did not know whether particular ventures might be wholly private or some joint private and government collaboration, but the interest in private investment was there. Secretary Connor indicated his interest in hearing of this development and said he would give the matter careful consideration. Mr. Birla suggested that this subject be taken up with Prime Minister Shastri when he visits the United States. He characterized Mr. Shastri as a politician who had grown in his job as Prime Minister.

Mr. Birla said that India was capable of self-sufficiency in food and defense. The Government of India was anxious to increase its food production, and this, together with encouragement of defense-oriented industry would be priorities of the Fourth Five Year Plan. His government had asked him to take over 1,000 acres for seed farms and

he had arranged to work out the program with some assistance from the Rockefeller Foundation. Later the government asked him to take over 50,000 acres for such purposes.

He touched on some of the problems of doing business in India such as high taxes and exchange and industrial controls. He said that India was in the process of re-evaluating its relations with other countries following the Kashmir problem. U.K. stock is low primarily because of a statement by Prime Minister Wilson concerning India's action in Kashmir. U.S. stock, although adversely affected by our stand on the Kashmir issue, has remained high ever since our support to India during the Chinese attack a few years ago. He indicated that fear of China made India appreciate the U.S. position in Viet Nam and India's dependence on the United States for assistance in resisting Chinese aggression. On the other hand, while the United States had stopped military aid shipments to India after the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir, the USSR and Czechoslovakia were continuing such shipments. This has taught India not to rely on the West alone. He pointed up the fact that the USSR was giving aid to India for the manufacture of Migs and heavy industry and that the basis for continued extensive trade was thereby being established. He felt the United States could not stand by and let the USSR make further gains in India.



~~SECRET~~/NODIS ATTACHMENT

CLASSIFICATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

RECEIVED  
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

November 9, 1965

1965 NOV 10 AM 10 02 Date

Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

The enclosed is for White House  
clearance prior to transmission.

*for* *Laurence Eagleburger*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Telegrams to Amembassy NEW DELHI.  
Amembassy KARACHI. - #4847

~~SECRET~~/NODIS ATTACHMENT

CLASSIFICATION

NOV 10 1965

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1 - Kasper  
2 - Pitt. OK

*Ret'd #4847 B-1110  
with Rank memo.*

*Indica*

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Ambassy NEW DELHI

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

1. Embassy's reporting on attitudes of GOI leaders regarding next steps in Indo-US relations, and particularly on Shastri's visit to USA, suggests that message we want to get across to them is just not getting through. Consequently believe you should know how we see things here as background for your negotiations re visit.

2. It appears that GOI leadership, in its present militant and go-it-alone mood, may have developed mistaken notion of relative weight of elements in equation of our relationship. While we do not discount either intrinsic importance of India to us or importance at this juncture in our

relations

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority FRVS 64-68, vol. 25 # 244  
By K, NARA, Date 3-3-04

NEA:WJH:andley  
NEA:SOA:CCLaise:atm

S/S

The Secretary  
The Under Secretary

NEA - Ambassador Hare

~~SECRET~~

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NEW DELHI

~~SECRET~~

relations that Shastri come here, we are not prepared to make overtures to get him here or to bargain with Shastri over conditions under which <sup>he</sup> ~~we~~ will come. Given purpose of visit, it seems to us that it is of greater importance to Indians than to us that it takes place, and it is going to be a long, cold winter in our relationship unless he gets over here to sort things out with the President. We do not wish to encourage Indians to delude themselves regarding this basic point by our posture and our actions in period before meeting takes place. Moreover, while we recognize Shastri's narrow writ on Kashmir, it would seem from your reporting that he does have enough additional political strength these days to cope with any domestic political risks which he feels he may run in visiting US without prior understandings.

3. Our central concern will be to develop understanding of what constitutes workable relationship between aid donor and recipient. Aid is not a state of nature which US bound to respect. We have obligation to our citizens to demonstrate our aid is achieving concrete results in terms of objectives aid is designed to serve. In India's case, what needs to be demonstrated to our satisfaction includes following:

a. Actions to turn swords into plowshares. Present twilight state of no-war, no-peace threatens progress of economic development. Since India is larger country, special responsibility falls upon it to make every effort to restore peace and maintain security of subcontinent, along lines of SC Resolution of September 20. While movement toward reconciling Indo/Pak differences may be extremely difficult at this juncture, nevertheless there is in present situation an unparalleled

opportunity

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*the realistic distinction between a process and a settlement, i.e. that a negotiated compromise of an accident-fund like Kashmir may be unrealistic or at the least a long way off.*

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opportunity for India to steer Indo/Pak relations into new and more hopeful direction. At present time Pakistan is facing up to kind of hard realities and choices that would dispose it to come to terms with India on something less than plebiscite on Kashmir if India could provide way out. This means an honorable retreat for Pakistan into negotiations that will hold promise of easing its fears of Indian threat to Pakistan's security. Clearly this will involve Kashmir as well as other outstanding issues, and sorting out may take a long time. However, what is at stake is security of subcontinent and India's own larger interests vis-a-vis China. A serious and sustained process to find solutions to issues that divide India and Pakistan and to minimize thereby prospect of future war or exploitation by China is not too much for a friend interested in India's future to ask. And we intend to ask for such an effort while, <sup>Lully</sup> recognizing that settlement may be a long way off.

b. Actions to translate economic promises to Indian people and to US into economic performance. Most critical issue here is question of food production. My 800 and other messages have already spelled out nature of our concern over India's record to date and how this relates to future of PL 480 assistance.

4. On broader subject of aid resumption, etc. we want it to be unmistakably clear to the Indians that regardless of the actual and as yet unknown economic costs of their recent bout of warfare, it is widely accepted here by public, as reflected on the Hill and in the journals, that two nations we have helped considerably are frittering away scarce resources, both economic and military, as they bicker and fight. Any aid resumption, is going to be possible only if we can convince the Congress and the public at large that this is not going to happen again, and by

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QUOTE we UNQUOTE I include the Indians as well. As I told S. K. Patil when he came to see me, it was only by my assurances to the Congress that I was able to prevent legislative prohibitions on aid to South Asia.

5. As great Asian country, now alert to threat of expansionist Communist China, we believe India should be able understand and, indeed, give more support to efforts US and others making in Vietnam to thwart China's ambitions. We recognize GOI's difficulties, particularly with Soviet Union, in taking strong public position on this and that privately it does not wish see US pull out of Southeast Asia. But we consider that India's position and actions to date fall considerably short of what is possible.

6. In sum, Shastri should understand that President is interested in talking to him on wide variety of subjects in order to develop a personal sense of what kind of relationship between our two countries will best serve our mutual interests in years ahead, and that until this is accomplished we will not commit ourselves on numerous operational problems our two countries face. We do not intend to start out on journey until we know where we are going.

DAD

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