

(Drafting Office and Officer)

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 1, 1965

1965 NOV 16 PM 5 07

SUBJECT: Relations Between India and the United States

**PARTICIPANTS:** Raymond A. Hare, Assistant Secretary, NEA  
 S. K. Patil, Indian Minister of Railways  
 Carol C. Laise, Director, SOA  
 Herbert G. Hagerty, India Desk Officer, SOA

**COPIES TO:** Amembassy New Delhi  
 Amembassy Karachi  
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1965 NOV 12 PM 1 02 P.O.L

INDIA-115

Mr. Patil, just returned from a brief trip to Brazil and Uruguay, referred to his earlier visit to Washington (October 18th through 20th) and said that the common "song" in all of his earlier interviews was that Prime Minister Shastri and President Johnson should meet "as soon as possible." Everything "boils down to this," he said. He then went on to say he had tried to arrange such a meeting during his trip to the United States last year, but events had passed and it had not worked out. If it had, he said, things might have been different than they are now. He said that with everyone he has met there is "anxiety" about the state of Indo-Pakistani relations, that there must be good relations between India and Pakistan; he added, India "most of all knows this." He went on to emphasize the oneness of the two countries in terms of geography, peoples, history, etc. He moreover described himself as "a good friend of Pakistan" and his view on Indo-Pakistani relations as "not extreme." He spoke, however, of India's secularism and said that however simple it might be to talk of plebiscite for Kashmir, it is "not only impossible," but at this time it would be "disastrous." Some "other remedy must be found" which does not jeopardize Indian secularism and the lives of the 50 million Muslims living in India; but there "must be a little time. Let a ceasefire be established, then let's have some settlement. Many solutions have been mentioned; they're not all bad. But tempers are not ready now to discuss them." No leader in either country could last long if he were to discuss them in the present state of anger.

He then covered familiar ground on the need to keep the question of ceasefire and withdrawal separate from the political side, so as not to reward Pakistan for its aggression. And he spoke pointedly of the infiltrators in Kashmir

SECRET

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
 not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By *jk*, NARA, Date 3-3-04

GPO 865971

NOV 16 1965



~~SECRET~~

-2-

Kashmir as a problem in getting a working ceasefire.

Finally, he moved on to the need for good relations between India, "the world's largest democracy," and the United States, "the world's most powerful democracy." He said he has noted criticism in the newspapers of his trip, that he is being accused of "exceeding his brief. What brief?" he said, "I have no brief." Those who make this charge, he said, are part of the powerful forces which do not want Indo-U.S. amity, which seek "to drive a wedge between us."

Ambassador Hare told Mr. Patil his theme was welcome to our ears and in large measure paralleled our thoughts. Reverting back to his own earlier experience with South Asia, he agreed on the essential unity of the area, suggesting that so long as India and Pakistan focused only on the Kashmir question, serious misunderstandings would persist. He felt the whole matter must be set into a larger, less restrictive framework. Moreover, Ambassador Hare continued, "this present period concerns me." Some steps are necessary now to lower the fever, and it is in the nature of things human that only the larger or stronger can be magnanimous, to take the first step.

Mr. Patil agreed but went back to his earlier comments about not rewarding the aggressor and about the need to allow time for tempers to cool. He stressed that while Shastri now symbolizes the unity of the country, he still needs to build himself up so as to strengthen his own position and the durability of India's democratic institutions. He also spoke about the possibility of the US and the USSR combining to help bring about some political solution, saying Shastri would favor this.

Ambassador Hare pointed out the difficulties and hazards we and the Russians would face in such an effort at cooperation when our basic objectives are so far apart. He then reverted to his earlier thought that hostilities reduce the level of approach to one so primitive that there is not much we can do about it, but if anyone can raise the level of this thing, then it's going to have to be India. India is the only one of the two capable at this time of magnanimity.

Mr. Patil concluded by saying this is a good thought and the President should put it to Shastri when he comes.

~~SECRET~~

*gch/me* *X*  
BILLY GRAHAM

C. F. 156

70 3-2

*Copy of white  
House Central File*

October 29, 1965

*India*

Dear Marvin:

Thank you for your letter of October 21. I never dreamed you would go to so much trouble over this inquiry. I can understand why the President relies so heavily upon you. You do a thorough job. I shall pass this information along to "the powers that be" who called me about this matter.

We think of you often and thank God upon every remembrance.

Most cordially yours,



Mr. W. Marvin Watson  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

✓  
RECEIVED  
NOV 4 1965  
CENTRAL FILES



gah/gf

✓

156a

C. F.

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HE 5

CO 121

October 21, 1965

Billy

Dear Dr. Graham:

The wheels of government grind slowly -- obviously. I have had the question of aid for the Ludhiana Christian Medical College of North India in the mill since the day I received your letter.

The recommendations all the way through have been negative. Information is very good -- and very lengthy! In a nut shell, this is what I am told:

1. Emergency aid could only come from a contingency fund which has heretofore not been used for similar purposes. Too, this would require the personal intervention of the President.
2. The emergency decreases every week -- and with the time already consumed -- and the additional weeks that would necessary be to secure funds, the emergency would most probably exist no longer.
3. AID is considering \$450,000 to build wards -- and the thought is that this additional request might dim chances of approval of the ward financing.
4. Nothing of this kind for one of our privately owned hospitals located in another country has ever been done. Approval here would set a precedent in other countries. This has been forcefully brought out by all who have considered this.
5. Perhaps one of the biggest problems is one of international implication in that AID and other agencies are not making any new commitments in India or Pakistan.

RECEIVED  
OCT 21 1965  
CENTRAL FILES

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I very much appreciate your writing and hope that the situation at the hospital in India will somehow receive relief from a private agency.

Marian joins me in sending best personal regards to you and Mrs. Graham.

Sincerely,

*Marvin*

W. Marvin Watson  
Special Assistant  
to the President

Dr. Billy Graham

Montreat, North Carolina

WMW:MJC:rgm

3

156b

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 21, 1965

Dear Dr. Graham:

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I very much appreciate your writing and hope that the situation at the hospital in India will somehow receive relief from a private agency.

Best personal regards,

Sincerely,

W. Marvin Watson

*Marvin joins me in sending*

*(W.M.W.)*

*Best To Mrs. Graham  
to you and  
Mrs. Graham.*



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

156c

10/20/65

Marvin:

I concur with Komer. I am sure  
we cannot get into this one now.  
It would be choosing sides at a  
bad time.

McG. B.

✓ 1360  
✓ 07

156a

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

October 19, 1965

Mac -

I'm opposed: (1) Emergency aid could only come from contingency fund; (2) the emergency need to take care of wounded decreases with every passing day, and the request is now almost three weeks old--by the time they got the money it wouldn't be needed; (3) AID is already looking at \$450,000 to build wards--this is enough; (4) the precedent is lousy; (5) why help Indian wounded and not Pak; and (6) finally, Billy Graham's letter is very carefully drafted not to be a desperate plea.

RWK  
RWK

Marvin: I agree with Kamen. I am sure we cannot get into this one now. It would be choosing sides at a bad time. Incl. B.



ROUTE SLIP

156e

(Fold Here)

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

DATE 10/16/65

TO: Mary Jo Cook

FROM: Jean McRae

REMARKS:

In sending attached memo to  
Mr. Watson today, we failed to  
return the incoming. So here  
it is.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

156 f

October 16, 1965

Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy

Will you please study the attachments  
and give me your opinion?

Thanks.

Marvin Watson



1569

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

October 15, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WATSON

Subject: Emergency Assistance to Ludhiana Christian  
Medical College, India

Attached is a fairly lengthy memorandum which my staff prepared on the Indian Medical College (request from Dr. Graham).

In brief, the memorandum concludes

1. Assistance can be given, preferably through the AID contingency fund.
2. There are tricky international questions involved about giving selective aid to India at this time. Combined with other problems, this fact raises substantial question about the wisdom of giving this assistance.
3. The problems involved should be checked with MacBundy before any decision is made.
4. The Medical College in question might be eligible for some kind of food aid (see last page of memorandum).

*Charles L. Schultze*

Charles L. Schultze  
Director

Attachment

10/18/65

156<sup>h</sup>

## EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

## BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

OCT 15 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MARVIN WATSON

Subject: Emergency Assistance to Ludhiana Christian Medical College,  
India

This memorandum is in response to your request for information with respect to Dr. Graham's proposal to grant emergency support for Ludhiana Christian Medical College in India.

Background

Ludhiana Christian Medical College is a private, non-sectarian organization with an annual operating income of about \$860,000 (1963-64 data). Of this, \$480,000 is from Indian sources, mostly patient and student fees with about \$70,000 from Indian government sources. American support is about \$240,000, largely donations through protestant churches. The remainder of \$140,000 comes from other countries, apparently private sources.

So far this college has received no assistance from AID. It has, however, submitted a request to AID for a \$450,000 construction loan. While the loan has not been approved and may be considered relatively low priority, Bishop Pickett has contacted a considerable number of congressmen seeking their support.

With respect to the requested grant of three months emergency support totalling \$60,000 (presumably in rupees), there are four possible funding sources legally available.

1. AID Contingency Fund. A disaster relief grant could be made from this fund to Ludhiana. This would be the first such grant given directly to an American sponsored hospital for an emergency situation.
2. An allocation of rupees for emergency or extraordinary relief. By executive order, the Budget Director can allocate excess foreign currencies to AID after seeking the advice of a joint Congressional-Executive advisory committee and after laying the proposal before the Agricultural Committees for 30 days (60 if Congress is not in session).
3. The President's Emergency Fund. This relatively small fund of \$1,000,000 may be used to provide in the President's discretion "for emergencies affecting the national interest, security, or defense which may arise at home or abroad." This fund is used almost entirely by the President for domestic emergencies. Its use would involve the President fairly explicitly in aiding an institution in one of the belligerent countries.



4. Section 214 of the Foreign Assistance Act (American Schools and Hospitals Abroad). Under this section AID funds may be used to furnish assistance to American sponsored hospitals abroad serving as centers for medical education and research. "Treatment" was expressly dropped from this provision this year and inasmuch as the emergency at Ludhiana is caused by an increased demand for treatment rather than education, this section--while legally available--does not appear appropriate.

#### Comment and Conclusion

With respect to the funding alternatives, if the President decides to grant this assistance, we recommend use of the AID Contingency Fund (alternative 1 above) which permits fastest response with fewest complications.

The answer to the question "should the grant be made" is more complicated, involving the following considerations:

1. As you know, we are not making any new AID commitments in India or Pakistan. Nevertheless, it may be argued that this policy does not apply in this case, since this aid is emergency and humanitarian in nature and is going to an American sponsored institution rather than an Indian institution. However, this aspect should be considered by the President.
2. This grant would assist the wounded of one of two belligerent countries, and as you know, we have studiously avoided any action which might suggest partiality. State staff believes that before action is taken our Indian and Pakistan Embassies should be asked for their judgment on the political ramifications of responding favorably to this request.
3. It is difficult to assess the precedent involved in the requested grant. We understand that wounded from Kashmir fighting are being distributed fairly widely in India and Pakistan, and we do not know how many hospitals in the general area are supported in whole or part by private U.S. funds. State would have to go to our Embassy to obtain definitive information on this.
4. The requested grant, the first direct financial emergency grant to a U.S. sponsored hospital, might become a precedent for such requests in areas outside India. Traditionally our disaster relief is given either as assistance on a government-to-government basis or as non-financial aid to a voluntary agency. However, the risk of this precedent could be minimized by basing the grant on the fact that Ludhiana is: 1) a medical education center abroad; 2) American sponsored; 3) non-sectarian. (These are the section 214 criteria.) Using these criteria limits the number of potential claimants worldwide to about 5 or 6. Even with these limits, AID staff believes granting this request would represent a precedent which would prove troublesome in the future.
5. Approval of Ludhiana's application for an AID construction loan is by no means certain. Granting this emergency assistance might tend to prejudge the case.

The above considerations, based on our preliminary exploration of the problem lead me to recommend against giving the requested money grant. It involves too many uncertainties. However, if there is a decision to pursue the matter, more definitive advice should be sought from

-- State on questions 2 and 3 above, and

-- AID on questions 4 and 5.

Also the matter should be checked with Mac Bundy.

If some response is deemed desirable, there is one other possible approach which would involve assistance in kind rather than a money grant. Ludhiana apparently has some connection with the Church World Service, a charitable voluntary agency. This agency is registered with AID and is therefore eligible for certain types of assistance primarily, but not exclusively, food-stuffs. Ludhiana's ties to the CWS might permit some meaningful assistance through this channel if non-financial aid would help in the present situation.

If any assistance were provided it should be done with a minimum of publicity and, if a money grant, limited to a one time grant of \$60,000.




THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 4, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLIE SCHULTZE

Attached is a telegram and a letter which Dr. Graham has sent to me. Could you give me the story on this and tell me what, if anything, could and should be done? Thanks.



W. Marvin Watson  
Special Assistant  
to the President

1561

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1563  
BILLY GRAHAM

October 2, 1965

Dear Marvin:

Words cannot express my deep appreciation for your letter of encouragement during my recent illness. At the moment, I am still in the process of recuperation. The doctors assure me that I will be able to conduct on schedule the Houston Crusade beginning October 15.

The other night Bishop Pickett, who for more than forty years was the Methodist Bishop of India and a long-time personal friend and confidant of Mr. Nehru, called me on the telephone. He had just been with Vice President Humphrey and the Vice President suggested that he call me. Apparently he is partially responsible for the rather large hospital in North India that is facing a general emergency because of refugees and the wounded from the war. They are in desperate need, immediately, for additional funds to help cope with the situation.

The Vice President told me that the President has at his disposal certain discretionary funds which might possibly be available for such an emergency. The Vice President has promised the Bishop that he will personally take it up with the President. Enclosed is a copy of a telegram that I asked the Bishop to send me explaining the situation.

Like all President's friends, I am constantly asked to do this or that -- but normally turn all such requests down. However, since this did involve a great humanitarian project and since Vice President Humphrey apparently has become involved, I thought I should send this along to you to handle as you see fit.

Please give my warmest greetings to Marion; and be assured of my daily prayers on your behalf.

With warmest personal greetings, I am

Cordially yours,



Mr. W. Marvin Watson, Jr.  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

✓



Class of Service

This is a fast message unless the deferred character is indicated by the proper symbol.

# WESTERN UNION

## TELEGRAM

W. P. MARSHALL, President

SYMBOLS

DL = Day Letter

NL = Night Letter

LT = International Letter Telegram

SP-1201 (4-00)

The time shown in the date line on domestic telegrams is LOCAL TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is LOCAL TIME at point of destination.

792A EST OCT 1 65 AA090

A A UA040 TBC NL PD

WASHINGTON DC 30 NPT

REVEREND BILLY GRAHAM

MONTREAL NCAR

THE LUDHIANA CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE LOCATED 200 MILES NORTH DELHI REPRESENTS MOST CHURCHES OF NORTH INDIA. IS VERY POPULAR WITH GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLIC IS NON SECTARIAN IN MANAGEMENT. THE STAFF REPRESENTS SEVEN NATIONS THE HOSPITAL IS KNOWN TO ALL AS THE AMERICAN HOSPITAL. THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT HAS ADVANCED PLANS FOR GIVING \$450,000 TO BUILD A 72 UNIT BLOCK FOR PRIVATE PATIENTS WHOSE FEES WILL IN NORMAL CONDITIONS PROVIDE 80 PER CENT OF THE COST OF CARING FOR POOR PATIENTS. A GRAVE EMERGENCY HAS BEEN CAUSED BY THE WAR WITH PAKISTAN THE 500 BED HOSPITAL IS COMPELLED TO LIMIT ACCOMODATION TO WOUNDED SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS AND TO ARRANGE TEMPORARY

ACCOMODATION FOR 300 ADDITIONAL WOUNDED. THESE PROVIDE NO FEE INCOME. THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE HAS HEAVY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR STAFF BUILDING AND EQUIPMENT

PLEASE JOIN IN ASKING FOR A GIFT OF \$20,000 A MONTH FOR 3 MONTHS

IF FIGHTING STOPS SOON FURTHER HELP WILL NOT BE NEEDED. THE PRESIDENT IS AN AMERICAN, KENNETH SCOTT. DR MELVIN CASBERG ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE UNDER A FORMER PRESIDENT DR MELVIN CASBERG, WAS ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE UNDER EISENHOWER. PRYAEFULLY HOPEFULLY.

J U PICKETT.

156K

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

TYPE OF DOCUMENT \_\_\_\_\_ Cable \_\_\_\_\_  
Letter \_\_\_\_\_  
Memo \_\_\_\_\_  
Other Statement

DATE 10/27/65

FROM W.H.

TO \_\_\_\_\_ NUMBER \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT Approval of recommendation  
that Peace Corps personnel  
proceed to India.

SEE Presidential Decisions



(Deputy Office and Officer)

10/19/65

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

16872

Approved by Vice President  
10/26/65

## Memorandum of Conversation

1965 OCT 28 PM 5 03

DATE: October 19, 1965

SUBJECT: The India-Pakistan Conflict; U.S.-India Relations

PARTICIPANTS: The Vice President  
His Excellency S. K. Patil, Indian Minister of Railways  
His Excellency Braj Kumar Nehru, Indian Ambassador  
Deputy Assistant Secretary William J. Handley, NEA  
Mr. John Reilly, Assistant to the Vice President

## COPIES TO:

S/S	IO	White House ✓	Amembassy NEW DELHI
G	USUN	Vice President's office	Amembassy KARACHI
S/P		CIA	Amembassy LONDON
NEA		DOD/ISA	
INR			

The Vice President received S. K. Patil and the Indian Ambassador on October 19th in his office at the Capitol. The meeting lasted one hour and fifteen minutes and covered a predictable range of subjects.

Minister Patil began the discussion by saying that Prime Minister Shastri had asked him to visit the United States to discuss recent problems with top American leaders. He said that no country was as dedicated to peace with its neighbors as is India. Pakistan was not only a neighbor but 100,000 families have relatives on both sides. India, however, had not wanted to accept religion as the basis for the determination of the future of Kashmir because this could be disastrous to the Indian Republic. He pointed out there were fifty million Muslims in India, making it the third largest Muslim country in the world. India like the United States was a Democracy. In India all citizens had the same rights whether they were Hindu, Muslim, or Buddhist.

Patil said that India ruled out a plebiscite in Kashmir "for all time to come." Kashmir was an integral part of India and a non-negotiable subject. He said that forty-five per cent of the area of Kashmir was already in Pakistan and in any event to reopen the question would cause

FORM DS-1254  
2-61~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 3-3-04

GPO 508082

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-2-

incalculable harm to India and to the fifty million Muslims living there. He felt that one result of Pakistani control over all of Kashmir would be the migration to India of one million additional non-Muslim refugees since Pakistan would not permit them to remain in Kashmir.

Patil said the India-Pakistan conflict had been started by fully armed Pak infiltrators whose mission was to create disturbances within the Kashmir Valley, destroy bridges, electric plants, etc. Infiltration actually started one month before August 5 but was only discovered later. He defended India's crossing the international frontier in Pakistan as being a defensive measure designed to draw off the Pakistan Army in the Chhamb area of Kashmir. He underlined that Patton tanks, F-86's, F-104's and other equipment given by the United States to Pakistan was intended to be used against the Communists and not against Indians. Patil explained that India had accepted the cease fire even though it was winning. Pakistan had to agree because it was losing. He said it was essential that Pakistan take its infiltrators out of Kashmir and that the UN give guarantees to India that they would not return. He said he had heard that the Pakistanis were asking the United States to replace the tanks and aircraft and other equipment they had lost. He said that this would be most dangerous and would encourage the Pakistanis to continue their efforts to solve the Kashmir question by force. If the United States gave more arms to Pakistan, tempers in India against the United States would rise to dangerous levels. In his opinion the United States would be quite within its rights to refuse to provide arms to India as well as Pakistan for the time being.

Turning to economic aid Patil said that India had received about six billion dollars worth of United States assistance. India had never defaulted in its payments but if aid was stopped or delayed India might have to be in default and economic development might stop. He hoped that some way could be found to avoid these eventualities. He hoped that economic aid policy could be differentiated from military aid policy. This should make it possible for the United States to continue economic aid; and he believed that this policy should apply to Pakistan as well.

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-3-

Mr. Patil pointed out that he, himself, had been responsible for working out the agreement with President Eisenhower for a \$1300 million four-year PL 480 agreement. During this period food grain prices did not rise in India. However, if PL 480 continues on a month-to-month basis, he predicted prices would spiral; already they were going up dangerously because of the uncertainty of future long term commitments.

Patil explained that Pakistan is not really India's main concern. India regarded the "colossus of China" as being its public enemy number one. China was not only the enemy of India, but also that of the United States and even of the Soviet Union. The kind of diplomatic notes now being sent by China to the Indians was stronger than ever but India was now tough, unified, and would not go down before Chinese threats. India did not wish to be dependent on the Soviets. India and the United States were the two mightiest and largest Democracies in the world and India wanted to live up to its Constitution, much of which had been derived from that of the United States. He devoutly hoped for friendly relations between our two countries.

Patil said that he had seen Prime Minister Shastri prior to his departure and that the Prime Minister very much wants to visit the President. The Vice President said that the invitation was very much "alive" and the date only needed to be worked out in terms of mutual convenience. Because of his operation the President would not be in a position to receive a visit from the Prime Minister for five or six weeks. Patil noted that this would make a December visit feasible and said that the Indian Parliament would be out of session on December 10; the Prime Minister might be able to get away either immediately before that date or just after.

The Vice President told Mr. Patil that a Senate delegation was going to India at the invitation of the Indian Parliament and that the visit was being announced today. He and the Majority Leader were working together to develop a large, strong, well-balanced delegation. He also mentioned that James Patton of the Farmers' Union would be going to India to give a series of lectures. The Vice President expressed the strong hope that the Senate Delegation would be given the opportunity to have meaningful experiences in the specialized fields in which the members are interested, e.g., armed services, peaceful uses of atomic energy, agriculture, and industry.

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-4-

The Vice President alluded to his interest in India; going back to his university days when he was an advocate of Indian independence. But he pointed out that we were also friends of Pakistan. He said we had ties through CENTO, SEATO and our own bilateral mutual security arrangements. The Soviets on the other hand were capable of putting all their cards on India. The Vice President said that he fully understood India's attitude about the use by Pakistan of American weapons against India but he felt that under the circumstances it was probably inevitable. He was personally distressed to see pictures of Patton tanks being used in this way. He said that India had a tremendous body of good will in the United States but the feeling here is that India has been reluctant to solve the Kashmir question and this has clouded our relationship since the impression is that India should be strong enough to deal with this problem on a statesmanlike basis.

Mr. Patil said that he thought the Kashmir problem could have been settled in 1947 and that even now India would try to improve its relations with Pakistan "after this is all over." He thought that within six months or a year the situation might be ripe for substantial improvement. The Vice President hoped that current problems on the subcontinent might cool off by the time of the visit of Prime Minister Shastri to the United States so that the President and the Prime Minister might be able to discuss long term problems and relationships. The Vice President noted that Pakistan too has through the years made a strong case with the American public on the Kashmir question. Part of this had been attributed to the strong early anti-Communist commitments of the Pakistan Government. All Americans, however, were united in abhorrence of the war between India and Pakistan which they considered tragic and enormously wasteful.

The Vice President said the United States was determined to work with the United Nations in seeking to bring about peace and understanding in the subcontinent. Our efforts would therefore be much more multilateral than bilateral.

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-5-

Patil said that he thought Pakistan had lost a great opportunity in 1962 when it had failed to support India against China. If Pakistan had made a gesture at that moment there would have been such an outpouring of gratitude in India that many of the political problems between the two neighbors could have been solved. The Vice President replied that he wanted to make it absolutely clear that the United States did not appreciate in any way Pakistan's flirtation with Communist China. At the same time, he wondered why India, as a strong friend and as an important power in the confrontation with Communist China, had not supported the United States on Viet Nam. He noted that Shastri had shown firmness against the Chinese but that Indian spokesmen had been critical of our Viet Nam policy, increasing our difficulties with the Communist Chinese. At this point Ambassador Nehru said that India's policy was not as far apart from ours as it seemed. India certainly did not want the United States to leave South Viet Nam but had been opposed to the bombing of North Viet Nam. He noted that a recent letter from Prime Minister Shastri to the President had described the infiltration of Kashmir as a "new form of aggression" and added that this was obviously no surprise to the United States because of its experience in Viet Nam. The Vice President said that Souvanna Phouma had been in his office the previous day and had said that Laos could not have survived against the Pathet Lao in the past ten months had it not been for the American presence in Viet Nam.

The Vice President asked about India's present thinking on the nuclear question. Patil said that India will not go the nuclear weapons route although some Indians had been writing to the Prime Minister advocating a change in India's policy of using atomic energy for peaceful uses only. The Vice President pointed out that development of nuclear weapons was a great temptation. In fact, however, the United States was not using nuclear weapons and would not use them in Viet Nam. Our earlier preoccupation with nuclear strength had perhaps led us to neglect the development of more conventional weapons. The nuclear weapon had only a "terror value."

The conversation ended with a further discussion of the visit of the Senate delegation. The Vice President pointed out that the delegation would be well staffed, well organized and briefed. He hoped that preliminary work could be done by the Indian Embassy in Washington and the Department of State so that the visit could be as productive as possible.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

10/18/65  
159  
Hol =  
is his  
Dead?

Yes. Nehru exhibition will open  
26 Oct. 6:30 p.m. - Mrs. Johnson not  
involved. Don't know when or how change  
came about.



159a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

To: Bob Komer

From: Liz Carpenter

*Jedea*

Mrs. Johnson will accept the  
"opening" of the ~~Her~~ Nehru Memorial  
Exhibition at the Smithsonian on the evening  
of Oct. 14.

We are asking ~~Katie~~ Katie Louchheim  
at State to draft some remarks. She'll probably  
be calling you for details.

Meanwhile, I'll count on you to  
notify the appropriate people at the Embassy and  
keep me abreast of any other details.

August 11

*Insist on Brief Remarks,*  
*Bob*

AUG 19 1965

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 16, 1965

Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy

Will you please study the attachments  
and give me your opinion?

Thanks.

Marvin Watson

*India*

*To: Hall 10/18/65  
See NWS memo to Rusk-10/19  
See Rusk memo to McGeorge-10/19*

OCT 18 1965



160a

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

October 15, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WATSON

Subject: Emergency Assistance to Ludhiana Christian  
Medical College, India

Attached is a fairly lengthy memorandum which my staff prepared on the Indian Medical College (request from Dr. Graham).

In brief, the memorandum concludes

1. Assistance can be given, preferably through the AID contingency fund.
2. There are tricky international questions involved about giving selective aid to India at this time. Combined with other problems, this fact raises substantial question about the wisdom of giving this assistance.
3. The problems involved should be checked with MacBundy before any decision is made.
4. The Medical College in question might be eligible for some kind of food aid (see last page of memorandum).

*Charles L. Schultze*

Charles L. Schultze  
Director

Attachment

1606

## EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

## BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

OCT 15 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MARVIN WATSON

Subject: Emergency Assistance to Ludhiana Christian Medical College,  
India

This memorandum is in response to your request for information with respect to Dr. Graham's proposal to grant emergency support for Ludhiana Christian Medical College in India.

Background

Ludhiana Christian Medical College is a private, non-sectarian organization with an annual operating income of about \$860,000 (1963-64 data). Of this, \$480,000 is from Indian sources, mostly patient and student fees with about \$70,000 from Indian government sources. American support is about \$240,000, largely donations through protestant churches. The remainder of \$140,000 comes from other countries, apparently private sources.

So far this college has received no assistance from AID. It has, however, submitted a request to AID for a \$450,000 construction loan. While the loan has not been approved and may be considered relatively low priority, Bishop Pickett has contacted a considerable number of congressmen seeking their support.

With respect to the requested grant of three months emergency support totalling \$60,000 (presumably in rupees), there are four possible funding sources legally available.

1. AID Contingency Fund. A disaster relief grant could be made from this fund to Ludhiana. This would be the first such grant given directly to an American sponsored hospital for an emergency situation.
2. An allocation of rupees for emergency or extraordinary relief. By executive order, the Budget Director can allocate excess foreign currencies to AID after seeking the advice of a joint Congressional-Executive advisory committee and after laying the proposal before the Agricultural Committees for 30 days (or if Congress is not in session).
3. The President's Emergency Fund. This relatively small fund of \$1,000,000 may be used to provide in the President's discretion "for emergencies affecting the national interest, security, or defense which may arise at home or abroad." This fund is used almost entirely by the President for domestic emergencies. Its use would involve the President fairly explicitly in aiding an institution in one of the belligerent countries.



4. Section 214 of the Foreign Assistance Act (American Schools and Hospitals Abroad). Under this section AID funds may be used to furnish assistance to American sponsored hospitals abroad serving as centers for medical education and research. "Treatment" was expressly dropped from this provision this year and inasmuch as the emergency at Ludhiana is caused by an increased demand for treatment rather than education, this section--while legally available--does not appear appropriate.

#### Comment and Conclusion

With respect to the funding alternatives, if the President decides to grant this assistance, we recommend use of the AID Contingency Fund (alternative 1 above) which permits fastest response with fewest complications.

The answer to the question "should the grant be made" is more complicated, involving the following considerations:

1. As you know, we are not making any new AID commitments in India or Pakistan. Nevertheless, it may be argued that this policy does not apply in this case, since this aid is emergency and humanitarian in nature and is going to an American sponsored institution rather than an Indian institution. However, this aspect should be considered by the President.

2. This grant would assist the wounded of one of two belligerent countries, and as you know, we have studiously avoided any action which might suggest partiality. State staff believes that before action is taken our Indian and Pakistan Embassies should be asked for their judgment on the political ramifications of responding favorably to this request.

3. It is difficult to assess the precedent involved in the requested grant. We understand that wounded from Kashmir fighting are being distributed fairly widely in India and Pakistan, and we do not know how many hospitals in the general area are supported in whole or part by private U.S. funds. State would have to go to our Embassy to obtain definitive information on this.

4. The requested grant, the first direct financial emergency grant to a U.S. sponsored hospital, might become a precedent for such requests in areas outside India. Traditionally our disaster relief is given either as assistance on a government-to-government basis or as non-financial aid to a voluntary agency. However, the risk of this precedent could be minimized by basing the grant on the fact that Ludhiana is: 1) a medical education center abroad; 2) American sponsored; 3) non-sectarian. (These are the section 214 criteria.) Using these criteria limits the number of potential claimants worldwide to about 5 or 6. Even with these limits, AID staff believes granting this request would represent a precedent which would prove troublesome in the future.

5. Approval of Ludhiana's application for an AID construction loan is by no means certain. Granting this emergency assistance might tend to prejudge the case.

The above considerations, based on our preliminary exploration of the problem lead me to recommend against giving the requested money grant. It involves too many uncertainties. However, if there is a decision to pursue the matter, more definitive advice should be sought from

-- State on questions 2 and 3 above, and

-- AID on questions 4 and 5.

Also the matter should be checked with Mac Bundy.

If some response is deemed desirable, there is one other possible approach which would involve assistance in kind rather than a money grant. Ludhiana apparently has some connection with the Church World Service, a charitable voluntary agency. This agency is registered with AID and is therefore eligible for certain types of assistance primarily, but not exclusively, food-stuffs. Ludhiana's ties to the CWS might permit some meaningful assistance through this channel if non-financial aid would help in the present situation.

If any assistance were provided it should be done with a minimum of publicity and, if a money grant, limited to a one time grant of \$60,000.



1600 ✓  
October 4, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLIE SCHULTZE

Attached is a telegram and a letter which Dr. Graham has sent to me. Could you give me the story on this and tell me what, if anything, could and should be done?  
Thanks.

W. Marvin Watson  
Special Assistant  
to the President

WMW:MJC:gt

RE; Funds for hospital in N. India to handle refugees and wounded

160d  
BILLY GRAHAM

October 2, 1965

Dear Marvin:

Words cannot express my deep appreciation for your letter of encouragement during my recent illness. At the moment I am still in the process of recuperation. The doctors assure me that I will be able to conduct on schedule the Houston Crusade beginning October 15.

The other night Bishop Pickett, who for more than forty years was the Methodist Bishop of India and a long-time personal friend and confidant of Mr. Nehru, called me on the telephone. He had just been with Vice President Humphrey and the Vice President suggested that he call me. Apparently he is partially responsible for the rather large hospital in North India that is facing a general emergency because of refugees and the wounded from the war. They are in desperate need, immediately, for additional funds to help cope with the situation.

The Vice President told me that the President has at his disposal certain discretionary funds which might possibly be available for such an emergency. The Vice President has promised the Bishop that he will personally take it up with the President. Enclosed is a copy of a telegram that I asked the Bishop to send me explaining the situation.

Like all President's friends, I am constantly asked to do this or that -- but normally turn all such requests down. However, since this did involve a great humanitarian project and since Vice President Humphrey apparently has become involved, I thought I should send this along to you to handle as you see fit.

Please give my warmest greetings to Marion; and be assured of my daily prayers on your behalf.

With warmest personal greetings, I am

Cordially yours,



Mr. W. Marvin Watson, Jr.  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.



## CLASS OF SERVICE

This is a fast message unless the deferred character is indicated by the proper symbol.

WESTERN UNION  
TELEGRAM

W. P. MARSHALL, President

## SYMBOLS

DL = Day Letter

NL = Night Letter

LT = International Letter Telegram

SF-1201 (4-00)

The filing time shown in the date line on domestic telegrams is LOCAL TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is LOCAL TIME at point of destination.

792A EST OCT 1 65 AA010

A A UA040 TBC NL PD

WASHINGTON DC 30 NPT

REVEREND BILLY GRAHAM

MONTREAL NCAR

THE LUDHIANA CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE LOCATED 200 MILES NORTH DELHI REPRESENTS MOST CHURCHES OF NORTH INDIA. IS VERY POPULAR WITH GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLIC IS NON SECTARIAN IN MANAGEMENT. THE STAFF REPRESENTS SEVEN NATIONS THE HOSPITAL IS KNOWN TO ALL AS THE AMERICAN HOSPITAL. THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT HAS ADVANCED PLANS FOR GIVING \$450,000 TO BUILD A 72 UNIT BLOCK FOR PRIVATE PATIENTS WHOSE FEES WILL IN NORMAL CONDITIONS PROVIDE 80 PER CENT OF THE COST OF CARING FOR POOR PATIENTS. A GRAVE EMERGENCY HAS BEEN CAUSED BY THE WAR WITH PAKISTAN THE 500 BED HOSPITAL IS COMPELLED TO LIMIT ACCOMODATION TO WOUNDED SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS AND TO ARRANGE TEMPORARY

ACCOMODATION FOR 300 ADDITIONAL WOUNDED. THESE PROVIDE NO FEE INCOME. THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE HAS HEAVY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR STAFF BUILDING AND EQUIPMENT

PLEASE JOIN IN ASKING FOR A GIFT OF \$20,000 A MONTH FOR 3 MONTHS

IF FIGHTING STOPS SOON FURTHER HELP WILL NOT BE NEEDED. THE PRESIDENT IS AN AMERICAN, KENNETH SCOTT. DR MELVIN CASBERG ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE UNDER A FORMER PRESIDENT DR MELVIN CASBERG, WAS ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE UNDER EISENHOWER. PRAYERFULLY HOPEFULLY.

J W PICKETT.

160 e



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

161

BUNDY-SMITH  
BATOR  
BOWDLER  
BOWMAN  
CHASE  
COOPER  
JESSUP  
JOHNSON  
KEENE  
KOMER  
MOODY

~~SECRET~~

43

Action

SS

Info

QSA697SBA718  
RR RUEHCR RUEHEX RUEHDT RUQVKR RUFHDN  
DE RUSBAE 719A 2911345  
ZNY SSSSS  
R 181325Z  
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 1025  
INFO RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE UNN  
RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK 278  
RUQVKR/AMEMBASSY KARACHI 433  
RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON 335  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~SECRET~~ OCT 18 SECTION ONE OF TWO.

L I M D I S

ON SATURDAY EVENING OCT 16 I HAD A FRANK LEISURELY 45 MINUTE TALK WITH SHASTRI AT HIS MEA OFFICE WHICH I BELIEVE MAY BE PRODUCTIVE IN SEVERAL WAYS. BECAUSE OF THE SPECIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VIEWS AT THIS PARTICULAR MOMENT I SHALL REPORT OUR EXCHANGE IN SOME DETAIL.

(1) ALTHOUGH THE PRIME MINISTER CANNOT GO TO THE US IN NOVEMBER BECAUSE OF PARLIAMENT WHICH STARTS ON NOVEMBER 3 AND ADJOURNS ABOUT DECEMBER 10, HE IS CONSIDERING A VISIT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THIS

PAGE 2 RUSBAE 719A ~~SECRET~~  
ADJOURNMENT PROVIDED (AND HE EMPHASIZED THIS) THAT THE PRESIDENT REALLY WANTS TO SEE HIM.

HE DOES NOT WANT TO PRIMARILY TO MAKE A SPEECH AT THE UN BECAUSE HE "DOESN'T WANT TO APPEAR TO BE DEBATING WITH BHUTTO." IF HE GOES TO THE US TO SEE PRESIDENT JOHNSON IT IS MY GUESS THAT HE MAY END UP WITH A SPEECH AT THE UN BUT HE WOULD LIKE LATTER TO APPEAR AS A BY-PRODUCT.

SHASTRI ALSO SAID HE IS ANXIOUS TO AVOID IMPRESSION THAT HE IS "COMPETING WITH AYUB KHAN FOR US FAVORS," AND THEREFORE IS HOPEFUL THAT HIS OWN VISIT CAN TAKE PLACE BEFORE THAT OF THE PAKISTAN PRESIDENT. FINALLY, AS A GENERAL MATTER HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE KIND OF PERSONAL RECEPTION HE WILL GET IN THE US. "I AM SURE," HE SAID, "THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS NO DESIRE TO SEE ME."

THIS UNREASONABLE SENSITIVITY IS THE RESULT, I BELIEVE, OF SEVERAL FACTORS: (A) HIS LINGERING DISAPPOINTMENT OVER THE POSTPONED VISIT LAST SPRING, (B) NEGATIVE REPORTING WHICH I

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 90-95 (#57)  
By *clm* NARA, Date 3-3-04



~~SECRET~~

-2- 1025 October 18 From NEW DELHI (SECTION I of II)

SUSPECT B.K. NEHRU IS SENDING BACK FROM WASHINGTON, AND (C) GENERALLY ANTI-INDIAN COLORATION OF NEWS STORIES THAT APPEAR IN TIME, U.S. NEWS AND SOME AMERICAN PAPERS WHICH ARE WIDELY REPRODUCED HERE IN INDIA AND WHICH HE CAREFULLY READS

PAGE 3 RUSBAE 719A ~~SECRET~~

SHASTRI BELIEVES THAT IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT IT WAS PAKISTAN'S AGGRESSION INTO KASHMIR THAT SET OFF RECENT CONFLICT, INDIA IS IN THE US DOG HOUSE FOR REASONS THAT ARE UNCLEAR TO HIM AND HE FEELS UNCERTAIN AS TO WHAT TO DO.

I STRONGLY URGED HIM TO GO, STRESSING THAT HIS DOUBTS WERE UNFOUNDED AND THAT HE WOULD RECEIVE THE WARMEST PERSONAL WELCOME NOT ONLY FROM THE WHITE HOUSE BUT ALSO FROM MY COLLEAGUES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND OTHER AGENCIES OF OUR GOVERNMENT, IF, AS HE BELIEVES, THERE ARE CERTAIN MISUNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN US, IT IS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT THAT HE GO AND STRAIGHTEN THEM OUT.

(2) SHASTRI REMARKED THAT EVERY THOUGHTFUL INDIAN UNDERSTANDS THAT THE US HAS HELPED INDIA MORE THAN HAS ANY OTHER NATION; US ATTITUDES OVER THE YEARS HAVE BUILT UP TREMENDOUS GOOD WILL IN INDIA FOR THE US. HOWEVER, THERE IS NOW A STRONG CONVICTION, WHICH HE SHARES, THAT US POLICIES HAVE SUDDENLY CHANGED. IS THIS TRUE AND IF SO WHAT IS THE REASON?

I AGREED THAT THIS FEELING DID EXIST IN INDIA BUT STRESSED THAT IT IS UNJUSTIFIED. LONG BEFORE RANN OF KUTCH INCIDENT LAST

SPRING, PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD DECIDED CAREFULLY TO EXAMINE OUR AID PROGRAM IN ALL COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, AND PARTICULARLY THOSE

PAGE 4 RUSBAE 719A ~~SECRET~~

IN SOUTH ASIA WHICH ABSORB A GOOD PART OF OUR FUNDS. THE PRESIDENT WAS ANXIOUS TO KNOW WHAT PRECISELY OUR PROGRAMS WERE ACCOMPLISHING, HOW THEY COULD BE IMPROVED, AND WHETHER THE RECIPIENT NATIONS WERE DOING EVERYTHING WITHIN THEIR POWER TO HELP THEMSELVES. I HAD TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER OF THIS STUDY LAST APRIL AND EXPRESSED THE PERSONAL BELIEF THAT THIS REVIEW WAS NOT ONLY JUSTIFIED, BUT OVERDUE.

I ALSO REMINDED THE PRIME MINISTER THAT ON MY RETURN FROM THE US IN EARLY AUGUST I HAD TOLD HIM OF THE PROGRESS OF THIS EXAMINATION, STRESSED THAT IT WAS IN THE INTEREST OF BOTH INDIA AND US, AND POINTED OUT THAT OUR GOAL IS NOT TO KEEP INDIA ON PERMANENT US AID DOLE BUT TO HELP DEVELOP IN INDIA AN ECONOMIC FORMULA WHICH COULD ENABLE IT TO BECOME SELF-SUFFICIENT IN BOTH FOOD AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT WITHIN TEN YEAR PERIOD. CONSEQUENTLY, CURRENT EMPHASIS OF INDIAN GOVERNMENT ON NEED WE STAND ON ITS OWN FEET IS FULLY ENDORSED BY USG.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-3- 1025 October 18 From NEW DELHI (SECTION I of II)

THE FLOW OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE ALREADY CONTRACTED FOR HAS CONTINUED IN SPITE OF THE PAK/INDIA CONFLICT AND OVER 60 GRAIN SHIPS FROM US ARRIVED IN INDIA IN MONTH OF SEPTEMBER. WE EXPECT SAME NUMBER IN OCTOBER, NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER.

THE ONLY REASON FLOW OF US GRAIN HAS BEEN ON A MONTH TO MONTH BASIS HAS BEEN CONCERN IN WASHINGTON THAT INDIA MAY NOT HAVE

PAGE 5 RUSBAE 719A ~~SECRET~~  
DONE ENOUGH TO INCREASE ITS OWN AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT.

I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT TWO-THIRDS OF OUR US OVERSEAS GRAIN SHIPMENTS ARE NOW SOLD FOR HARD CURRENCY. THUS WE ARE PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS THAT OUR PL480 GRAIN SHIPMENTS ARE NOW ALLOWED TO BECOME PERMANENT CRUTCH: RATHER WE SEE THEM AS TEMPORARY PROGRAM TO ASSIST RECIPIENT COUNTRY WHILE IT IS ACHIEVING FOOD GRAIN SELF-SUFFICIENCY.

AS FAR AS THE PAK/INDIA CRISIS WAS CONCERNED, WE ARE NOT USING OUR AID TO PRESSURE THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT. WE ARE HOWEVER ANXIOUS TO KNOW THE TOTAL WAR DAMAGE AND TO MAKE SURE OUR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IS NOT DIVERTED TO OTHER EXCESSIVE DEFENSE EXPENDITURES.

SHASTRI EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR MY FRANK PRESENTATION AND

STATED THAT NOTHING I SAID APPEARED UNREASONABLE TO HIM.

(3) I THEN SUGGESTED THAT WHILE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT AMERICA BETTER UNDERSTAND INDIA, IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT THAT INDIA UNDERSTAND AMERICA. FOR YEARS WE HAVE CARRIED A HEAVY LOAD IN AN EFFORT TO ACHIEVE WORLD STABILITY. WE HAVE TAKEN GRAVE RISKS TO KEEP GERMANY FROM FALLING INTO HAND OF THE RUSSIANS, AND TO KEEP RUSSIANS OUT OF CUBA. WE MADE MAJOR COMMITMENTS OF AMERICAN LIVES AND MATERIAL FIRST IN KOREAN WAR AND NOW VIETNAM.  
GP-3. BOWLES

~~SECRET~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

SECRET

83  
Action

SS

Info

NNNSA701SBA725  
RR RUEHCR RUEHEX RUEHDT  
DE RUSBAE 719B 2911400  
ZNY SSSSS  
R 181325Z  
FM AMEMBASSY/NEW DELHI  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 1025  
INFO RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE UNN  
RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK 278  
RUQVKR/AMEMBASSY KARACHI 433  
RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON 335  
STATE GRNC  
BT

SECRET OCT 18 [SECTION TWO OF TWO.]

L I M D I S

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WHOSE ENERGIES ARE NATURALLY CONCENTRATED ON THEIR OWN URGENT PROBLEMS HAVE NOT FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE SCOPE OF THIS EFFORT. I WAS GRATIFIED THAT INDIA HAD DEVELOPED A MUCH BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR COMMITMENT TO WORLD STABILITY BECAUSE OF OUR COMMON CONCERN OVER THE EXPANSIONIST AIMS OF CHINA. I DID NOT MEAN TO CLAIM THAT AMERICA ALWAYS DID THE RIGHT THING AT THE RIGHT MOMENT, BUT WE WERE EARNESTLY WORKING FOR A PEACEFUL WORLD AND FOR A FREE AND PROSPEROUS INDIA, AND WE SOMETIMES

PAGE 2 RUSBAE 719B SECRET  
WONDERED IF THIS IS ADEQUATELY APPRECIATED.

NO THOUGHTFUL AMERICAN, I ADDED, BEGRUDGED INDIA HER GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS. INDEED IF INDIA CAN PERSUADE THE RUSSIAN LEADERS TO GIVE UP THEIR OUTDATED LENINIST THINKING, IT WILL BE A GREAT STEP FORWARD FOR US ALL. IF INDIA CAN BUILD A BRIDGE BETWEEN US AND USSR, BETTER STILL. A GOOD PLACE TO START WOULD BE IN SOUTH VIET NAM WHERE INDIA AND AMERICA HAVE A COMMON STAKE, AND WHERE THE RUSSIANS RIGHT NOW ARE PARTICULARLY UN-HELPFUL.

CHINA, HOWEVER, IS A DIFFERENT STORY, INDIA WAS PREPARED TO FIGHT CHINA ALONG HER NORTHERN FRONTIER AND I ASSUMED WOULD ALSO FIGHT TO PRESERVE THE INDEPENDENCE NOT ONLY OF NEPAL BUT ALSO OF BURMA ON INDIA'S VULNERABLE 700 MILE EASTERN BORDER.

SHASTRI SAID THESE THOUGHTS WERE VERY MUCH IN HIS OWN MIND. ABOVE ALL, HOWEVER, SOVIETS AND CHINA MUST BE KEPT APART.

SECRET



~~SECRET~~

-2- 1025, OCTOBER 18 (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM NEW DELHI

I AGREED THAT THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE, BUT SUGGESTED THAT THE END RESULT WAS BEYOND CONTROL OF EITHER INDIANS OR OURSELVES. THE SOVIETS HAVE A LONG AND VULNERABLE BORDER WITH CHINA. WHEN MAO DIES THEY WILL MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TO RE-ESTABLISH WORKING POLITICAL AND PERHAPS EVEN MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA. IF THEY SUCCEED THIS AGREEMENT INEVITABLY WILL BE AT EXPENSE OF INDIA AS WELL AS US.

PAGE 3 RUSBAE 719B ~~SECRET~~

THUS, WHILE IT WAS REASONABLE FOR INDIA TO CULTIVATE THE SOVIETS, IT WOULD NOT BE WISE TO TRUST THEM TOO FAR. HERE IN INDIA RIGHT NOW THE SOVIET WING OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IS DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO UNDERCUT THE CONGRESS PARTY AND TO DISCREDIT AMERICAN EFFORTS TO HELP INDIA BECOME ECONOMICALLY INDEPENDENT.

(4) SHASTRI THEN BROUGHT THE CONVERSATION BACK TO THE PRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION. THAT MORNING HE HAD READ TIMES OF INDIA STORY CRITICIZING INDIA'S HANDLING OF THE PRESS DURING THE MILITARY EMERGENCY. HE ASKED HOW WE HANDLED SUCH MATTERS IN THE US AND I DESCRIBED OUR MILITARY INFORMATION SYSTEM AND ITS OPERATIONS IN VIET NAM.

I THEN EXPRESSED MY CONCERN OVER RECENT CRITICISMS OF US BY MEMBERS OF HIS GOVERNMENT WHICH I SAID ARE EASILY MISUNDERSTOOD. IF THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD READ IN THE NEWSPAPER THAT SECRETARY MCNAMARA, SECRETARY UDALL, OR SECRETARY FREEMAN HAD MADE SPEECHES CRITICAL OF INDIA HE WOULD ASSUME THAT THESE COMMENTS MUST HAVE

APPROVAL OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON. JUST SO, WHEN MEMBERS OF HIS OWN CABINET OR KEY MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS PARTY MAKE SPEECHES CRITICAL OF AMERICA, IT MAY BE ASSUMED RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY THAT THEY MUST REFLECT THE PRIME MINISTER'S VIEWS.

PAGE 4 RUSBAE 719B ~~SECRET~~

SHASTRI AGREED IN PRINCIPLE BUT SAID HE WAS NOT CONSCIOUS THAT MEMBERS OF HIS CABINET HAD CRITICIZED US. I REPLIED THAT WHILE I WOULD PREFER NOT TO GO INTO SPECIFICS I WOULD SEND QUOTES ILLUSTRATING WHAT I MEANT IF HE WISHED TO SEE THEM. HE ASKED HOW THIS SITUATION WAS CONTROLLED IN US AND I EXPLAINED THE WHITE HOUSE SPEECH CLEARING SYSTEM. SHASTRI SAID ONE OF THE DIFFICULTIES HERE IS THAT VERY FEW INDIAN OFFICIALS WRITE OUT THERE SPEECHES IN ADVANCE. USUALLY THEY SPEAK TO LARGE AUDIENCES EXTEMPERANEOUSLY WITH A CONSEQUENT RISK OF BEING MISQUOTED.

~~SECRET~~



85  
Action  
55  
INCOMING TELEGRAM

Rome  
SECRET CORRECTION ISSUED: 10/18/65, 9:50 PM  
CONTROL: 1 3 8 7 6 (cc)

-3- 1025, OCTOBER 18 (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM NEW DELHI - 052  
CORRECTED PAGE 3

(5) BEFORE CLOSING CONVERSATION I AGAIN BROUGHT UP MATTER OF SHASTRI'S TRIP TO US. HE AGREED ON BALANCE THAT TRIP WAS ESSENTIAL AND STATED THAT I HAD GREATLY EASED HIS DOUBTS. HE WOULD AGAIN TALK IT OVER WITH HIS ASSOCIATES AND ASK L.K. JHA TO LET ME KNOW IN A FEW DAYS WHETHER HE CAN COME AROUND TENTH OF DECEMBER PROVIDED, OF COURSE, THAT THIS TIME IS CONVENIENT FOR PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PROVIDED NO NEW EMERGENCY DEVELOPS. HE WOULD WANT TO COME ONLY THREE OR FOUR DAYS, LEAVING A LONGER VISIT FOR A Milder SEASON.

COMMENT: SHASTRI TALKED FREELY, CONFIDENTLY AND WELL, BUT HE SEEMED GENUINELY PUZZLED REGARDING THE ITCHY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US.

PAGE 5 RUSBAE 719B ~~SECRET~~  
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES I BELIEVE IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT SHASTRI COME TO US AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND THAT HE VISIT SHOULD BE ARRANGED TO GIVE HIM MAXIMUM SENSE OF PERSONAL CONFIDENCE. A SUCCESSFUL VISIT AT THIS TIME WOULD TAKE MUCH OF THE STEAM OFF CURRENT IRRESPONSIBLE LEFT WING CRITICISM OF US AND GIVE SHASTRI MORE ELBOW ROOM TO DEAL WITH PROBLEMS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. THE LONGER WE POSTPONE THE RESOLVING OF KEY ISSUES THE MORE DIFFICULT OUR TASK MAY BECOME.

P  
THE MOOD OF SHASTRI IS ILLUSTRATED BY A SPEECH HE MADE YESTERDAY BEFORE MORE THAN ONE MILLION PEOPLE IN BOMBAY: "WE CAN'T FIGHT OUR ENEMIES," HE SAID, "LIVING ON BORROWED FOOD. THE TIME HAS COME FOR US TO LIVE ON WHAT IS PRODUCED IN OUR OWN COUNTRY. INDIA IS DEEPLY GRATEFUL TO THE UNITED STATES FOR THE HELP SHE HAS GIVEN INDIAN ~~OVER~~ THE PAST YEARS THROUGH PL 480. BUT HOW LONG CAN WE CONTINUE ON THE GENEROSITY OF OTHERS? IF WE DO SO WE WILL RISK THE MOST BASIC THING OF ALL, OUR SELF RESPECT AS A NATION."

THIS IS NOT SAID OUT OF A SENSE OF ARROGANCE BUT OUT OF GENUINE DETERMINATION TO STAND ON THEIR OWN FEET, A DESIRE WHICH AMERICANS OF ALL PEOPLE SHOULD RESPECT AND WELCOME. GP-3. BOWLES  
BT

SECRET



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

83

~~SECRET~~

034

Action 665A147  
RR RUCJHK RUEHCR RUEHDT RUEHEX  
NEA DE RUSBAE 658A 2891715  
ZNY SSSSS  
Info R 161606Z  
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
SS TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC (1007)  
G INFO RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE  
SP RUEHDT/USUN NEWYORK 274  
SAH RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 56  
L RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON 332  
EUR RUQVQR/AMEMBASSY KARACHI 426  
FE RUQTAW/AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI 43  
IO RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONGKONG 78  
NSC RUCJHK/CINCFEAFSA  
INR ZEN/AMCONSUL MADRAS UNN  
CIA ZEN/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA UNN  
NSA ZEN/AMCONSUL BOMBAY UNN  
BT

SUMMARY

1 3 1 8 8

1965 OCT 16 PM 5 29

BUNDY-SMT  
BATOR  
BOWDLER  
BOWMAN  
CHASE  
COOPER  
JESSUP  
JOHNSON  
KENNY  
KROMER  
MOODY

*India*  
*Fah*

~~SECRET~~ OCT 16 SECTION ONE OF TWO

CINCFEAFSA FOR POLAD

REF: RAWALPINDI'S 147 TO DEPT.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 04-152  
By us, NARA, Date 10-20-04

ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT AGREE WITH ALL ITS FINDINGS, REFTTEL IMPRESSES US AS A SOBER AND THOUGHTFUL DISCUSSION OF OUR COMMON PROBLEM. WE WILL LIMIT OUR COMMENTS TO A FEW POINTS WHICH WE BELIEVE TO BE PARTICULARLY PERTINENT.

(1) IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE CURRENT DISCUSSION SHOULD START BY A FRANK REALIZATION, HOWEVER DISTASTEFUL IT MAY BE TO ALL OF US, THAT OUR CURRENT POLICY IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN HAS PROVED TO BE A COSTLY FAILURE. THE PAKISTANIS, CONVINCED THAT THE UNITED STATES

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 658A-~~SECRET~~  
GOVERNMENT HAS SOMEHOW LET THEM DOWN, HAVE ESTABLISHED A COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH OUR ENEMY CHINA WHILE PUBLIC ANTAGONISM TOWARDS THE US IN WEST PAKISTAN HAS ERUPTED IN THE BURNING OF LIBRARIES.

ALTHOUGH THE MOOD IN INDIA IS MUCH LESS ANTAGONISTIC, THERE IS DISILLUSIONMENT AND UNCERTAINTY HERE ABOUT FUTURE US-INDIAN RELATIONSHIPS WHILE THE SOVIETS ARE NOW AT A NEW PEAK OF RESPECT, APPRECIATION AND INFLUENCE.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-2- 1007, OCTOBER 16, FROM NEW DELHI (SECTION ONE OF TWO).

(2) THIS DISTRESSING SITUATION IS THE PRODUCT OF SEVERAL FACTORS:

(A) HOWEVER IRRATIONAL IT MAY APPEAR TO US, PAKISTAN POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT WE WOULD NOT SERIOUSLY OBJECT TO THEIR USE OF US MILITARY EQUIPMENT AGAINST INDIA AND THAT SOMEHOW WE WOULD FIND A WAY TO HELP THEM SECURE KASHMIR;

(B) THE INDIANS GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT WE WOULD NOT ONLY SUPPORT THEM AGAINST CHINA (WHICH THEY STILL HOPE WE WILL DO) BUT THAT WE COULD ALSO FIND A WAY TO LIVE UP TO THE EISENHOWER COMMITMENT TO PREVENT THE PAKS FROM USING US MILITARY EQUIPMENT AGAINST THEM.

(C) SINCE THE CHINESE INVASION OF 1962 THE PAKS HAVE BEEN FRUSTRATED BY THEIR INABILITY TO PREVENT OUR SENDING ARMS TO INDIA WHILE THE INDIANS HAVE BEEN FRUSTRATED BY OUR UNWILLINGNESS IN THE

PAGE THREE RUSBAE 658A ~~SECRET~~

FACE OF PAK PRESSURES TO PROVIDE THEM WITH THE SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS, SUCH AS SUPERSONICS, TANKS, ETC., WHICH WE HAD ALREADY GIVEN PAKISTAN.

(D) WE, IN TURN, HAVE WRONGLY ASSUMED THAT WE COULD SOMEHOW CONTROL THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF BOTH PAKISTAN AND INDIA, ALTHOUGH AS THIS MISSION HAS CONSISTENTLY POINTED OUT, US AID IS ONLY ONE OF SEVERAL SOURCES OF MILITARY SUPPORT OPEN TO INDIA; FOR EXAMPLE, THEIR OWN MANUFACTURES, PURCHASES IN EUROPE, ASSISTANCE FROM THE SOVIET BLOC, ETC.

(3) THE MOST REALISTIC WAY TO DEAL WITH THIS SITUATION, AS WE SEE IT, IS NOT REPEAT NOT IN THE WORDS OF THE KARACHI TELEGRAM "TO DROP ONE AND CONCENTRATE ON THE OTHER" BUT RATHER TO ASSERT AS OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE THE CLOSE POLITICAL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIA WHICH IS CRUCIAL TO AN EFFECTIVE ASIAN POWER BALANCE, WHILE PROVIDING PAKISTAN WITH THE MEANS OF IMPROVING THE LOT OF HER PEOPLE AND FINDING A NEW AND MORE AFFIRMATIVE RELATIONSHIP TO HER NEIGHBORS.

ALTHOUGH THIS IS EASIER SAID THAN DONE, WE DO NOT THINK IT IS IMPOSSIBLE. RIGHT NOW, THE CHOICES AVAILABLE TO THE PAKS ARE STRICTLY LIMITED. NEITHER CHINA NOR RUSSIA CAN PRESENT THEM

PAGE FOUR RUSBAE 658A ~~SECRET~~  
WITH KASHMIR NOR CAN THEY WIN KASHMIR BY MILITARY FORCE.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-3- 1007, OCTOBER 16, FROM NEW DELHI (SECTION ONE OF TWO).

CHINA CANNOT BUILD UP PAKISTAN'S MILITARY POSITION TO EQUAL THAT OF INDIA; AND IN VIEW OF INDIA'S MUCH GREATER POTENTIAL AND THE STRONG POSITION THEY HAVE ALREADY DEVELOPED HERE, IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD DO SO.

ALTHOUGH THE US IS EQUALLY POWERLESS TO GIVE KASHMIR TO PAKISTAN OR TO GUARANTEE PAKISTAN MILITARY EQUALITY WITH INDIA, WE HAVE THE CAPACITY SIGNIFICANTLY TO RAISE THE LIVING STANDARDS OF THE PAKISTANI PEOPLE AND TO HELP THEM TO DEVELOP A NEW POLITICAL STABILITY BASED ON A MORE REALISTIC APPRAISAL OF THEIR STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS.

UNTIL THE TWO NATIONS SHAKE DOWN INTO A MORE NORMAL RELATIONSHIP, IT IS WISHFUL THINKING TO ASSUME THAT EITHER LOGIC OR PRESSURE WILL PRODUCE AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO KASHMIR--ANY MORE THAN WE CAN EXPECT IN THE CURRENT TENSE ATMOSPHERE TO NEGOTIATE A SOLUTION TO BERLIN. IN OTHER WORDS, WE MUST VIEW THE SETTLEMENT OF KASHMIR NOT AS A MEANS TO AN END BUT AS AN ULTIMATE BY PRODUCT OF A FRESH AND MORE EFFECTIVE US POLICY IN THE SUBCONTINENT.

(4) A READJUSTED US POLICY WHICH RECOGNIZES THE POTENTIAL POLITICAL

PAGE FIVE RUSBAE 658A-~~SECRET~~

AND MILITARY ROLE OF INDIA IN ASIA MIGHT BE EXPECTED TO ACHIEVE THE FOLLOWING RESULTS:

(A) IT COULD BRING INDIA INTO A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES VIS A VIS THE CONTAINMENT OF CHINA; AND IN SO DOING IT COULD GRADUALLY DRAW THE THRUST OF THE INDIAN ARMY EASTWARD (A US-INDIAN UNDERSTANDING IN REGARD TO A CHINESE MOVE INTO BURMA IS ALREADY DISCUSSABLE IN NEW DELHI).

(B) IT COULD HELP BRING ABOUT INDIAN SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN AGRICULTURE IN THE NEXT SIX OR SEVEN YEARS AND WITHIN A DECADE HELP ASSURE ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY;

(C) IT COULD GREATLY INCREASE THE PROSPECTS FOR A VIGOROUS INDIAN DEMOCRACY WHICH WOULD BE A SHOWPLACE OF DEMOCRATIC METHODS THROUGHOUT THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

(D) IT COULD ENCOURAGE INDIA TO EMERGE AS AN INFLUENTIAL MODERATE VOICE WITHIN THE ASIA/AFRICA BLOC.

(E) IT COULD PLACE A LIMITATION ON FUTURE SOVIET INROADS.

BOWLES  
BT

~~SECRET~~



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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SUMMARY

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INFO RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE

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RUEHDT/USUN NEWYORK 274

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RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 56

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RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON 332

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RUQVCR/AMEMBASSY KARACHI 426

NSC

RUQTAW/AMEMB OFFICE RAWALPINDI 43

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RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONGKONG 78

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~~SECRET~~ OCT 16 SECTION TWO OF TWO

(F) BY STRENGTHENING THE MODERATES AND SWITCHING THE INDIAN MILITARY FOCUS TOWARD CHINA, IT COULD EASE INDIAN ANTAGONISM TOWARD PAKISTAN AND IMPROVE THE OUTLOOK FOR AN EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT WHICH SOONER OR LATER MUST COME.

(5) WHAT WE URGENTLY NEED NOW IS NOT TO WARM OVER A POLICY THAT WAS DESIGNED ELEVEN YEARS AGO FOR THE MIDDLE EAST BUT TO DESIGN A FRESH REALISTIC ASIAN STRATEGY WHICH WILL ENABLE THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO WORK WITH RATHER THAN AGAINST THE FORCES THAT WILL SHAPE ASIA IN THE NEXT TEN TO TWENTY YEARS.

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 658B ~~SECRET~~

UNLESS WE BOLDLY ADAPT OUR NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE TO THESE BROADER GOALS, I AM PERSUADED THAT ALL OF OUR MASSIVE AND COURAGEOUS EFFORTS IN VIET NAM WILL COME TO NOTHING, AND THAT IN THE NEXT TEN YEARS WE WILL WITNESS THE EROSION OF THE VAST INVESTMENT IN BLOOD AND DOLLARS THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE MADE IN ASIA SINCE PEARL HARBOR. BOWLES  
BT

~~SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
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Origin

ACTION:

NEA

Info:

Amembassy NEW DELHI

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INFO: Amembassy KARACHI

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Your recent tele such as 829 have given us most perceptive and useful view of atmosphere in India. Your recommendations touch fundamentals of US policy and are under study. In meantime, stance we are adopting with regard India takes into account this atmosphere and its implications for Indian policy. This stance is based on recognition that India has emerged from recent ordeal with strengthened unity, sense of national purpose, and status as the dominant power on subcontinent. This is distinct plus. At same time, however, believe we are justified in reminding India of its responsibility to help solve problems peacefully in troubled times ahead; this means that India must recognize that Pakistan has major problems in its relations with India which are being exploited by Chicom. Therefore it is reasonable to ask India, in its own interest as well as ours, to

~~BURDY-SMITH~~  
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OCT 2 5 19 PM '65

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and	A.
NEA:SOA:DTSchneider:bld	10/1/65	Classification approved by:	NEA:Raymond J. Hare
Clearances:			
SOA:Miss Laise	IO:Mr. Popper		S/S - Mr. deMartino

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Authority: FRUS 64-68, vol. 25, #232  
By: [Signature], NARA, Date: 3-3-01

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FORM 8-63 DS-322



~~SECRET~~

engage in creative efforts to help lessen Pakistan's problems as a way of reducing Indo-Pak tensions and frustrating Chinese designs. It will be difficult for us to resume assistance until we are assured conditions exist on subcontinent which make development feasible.

With these thoughts in mind we have prepared following talking points for use by officials meeting Indians here in immediate future. Hope you will reinforce our efforts here in similar talks in Delhi.

India-Pakistan Dispute

1. We recognize that India is the larger power on subcontinent, with considerable force at its disposal.

~~and can of course maintain the upper hand by force if necessary~~

2. Force, however, constitutes no solution in this day and age.

As the larger power India in its own interest and in interest of world peace must take account of aspirations of people of Pakistan, quite apart from question of rights and wrongs. Recent conflict settles nothing and indicates Kashmir will not fade away. The longer it is allowed to fester, the more India runs danger of encouraging destructive Pakistan policies which can be exploited by Communist China.

3. We hope India will recognize desirability of availing itself of all the instruments of diplomacy to achieve better Indo-Pak relations and to give evidence of a willingness to do so.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

4. We wish to assure India we recognize that a solution can only evolve from political compromise and accommodation of positions of both parties. It cannot be imposed from outside. However, we do consider that as fellow member of UN we have right to urge that process of unconditional talks within an agreed framework should be started in order to work toward peaceful settlement of outstanding differences. We all have stake in outcome.

Economic Assistance

1. Although we have been continuing shipments food and other commodities under our existing economic aid agreements, even with passage aid appropriation we are committed to consulting with Congress on situation in subcontinent in connection with making new economic aid loans or grants to either India or Pakistan. As we prepare for these considerations we will wish consider number of matters.

2. We will need to have idea of the effect of fighting on Indian economy.

3. Prospects for development will also be affected by future allocation of Indian resources between development and defense. We will also therefore need to know effect of GOI's

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proposed military expenditure on prospects for economic development.

4. More broadly, we will need to be assured that economic development in subcontinent, in which we have invested so heavily, is not again to be disrupted by fighting between India and Pakistan. It would appear to us therefore that there is a need for military disengagement and establishment of a process of negotiation which will provide a basis for peace in subcontinent.

5. Aside from new problems arising out of fighting, we are aware of the basic economic problems India faces in its development effort. We attach critical importance to policy measures India will take to make maximum use of its own resources and foreign assistance.

#### Military Assistance

We are committed to consulting fully with appropriate members of Congress regarding situation on subcontinent on conditions under which military aid might be resumed. We do not see how we can resume military aid or sales at the present time, particularly since fighting is still going on.

END BALL

~~SECRET~~



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Origin

NEA

Info:

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ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI

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7 32 PM '65

Please deliver soonest following message from the President to  
President Radhakrishnan:

QUOTE Thank you for your considerate and thoughtful message.  
I am grateful for your kind wishes and prayers and appreciate  
your warm expression of concern on my behalf. UNQUOTE.

FYI. Above message is in reply to following message from  
Radhakrishnan conveyed by letter from Ambassador Nehru in Washington:

QUOTE Hope and pray for your operation to be successful and  
you will be fit for work soon. My prayerful wishes for your rapid  
improvement. UNQUOTE. END FYI.

White House does not plan release of reply but has no objection  
if President Radhakrishnan wishes to do so.

~~XX~~

GPR

END

RUSK

207  
Radhakrishnan  
10/15/65

Drafted by:

NEA:SQA:HCWing:dm 10/11/65

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved

~~XX~~

Mr. Handley

Clearances:

S/S-S - Mr. Kelley

S/S-

~~NEA~~

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166  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

10/13/65

Mr. Komer:

Mr. Bundy wants you to look  
at this before it goes out.

Alice

OCT 13 1965

*Believe Rev K  
answered this  
by phone*

October 13, 1965

~~SECRET~~

TO AMBASSADOR BOWLES FROM McGEORGE BUNDY

1662  
SANITIZED

I really do not think there is any prospect that Tom Mann or I can get out to you in the next few weeks. There is a somewhat higher prospect that we might be able to get an experienced private citizen of the sort that you suggest. The decision on this will have to await further recovery by the President, and a decision between him and Shastri on the timing of a visit here by the Prime Minister.

Meanwhile, you can be quite sure that the concerns which you express are in our minds every day, and are being thoughtfully considered by the President himself. Moreover, your own reporting has given us a clear sense of the present situation in India, and we, on our side, are trying to take steps to insure that you have a continuous and up-to-date sense of our position.

This comes with continuing admiration for all that you are doing in a post of critical importance at a critical time.

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 12-240

By cbm NARA, Date 1-30-2013



167  
New Delhi,  
October 7, 1965.

*Indira  
+ Shastri  
Visit*

My dear Mr President:

I am sorry to learn of your indisposition necessitating hospitalisation for surgical treatment. I want to convey to you my sincerest good wishes for your full and speedy recovery. In the world of today, you have to carry a very heavy responsibility and it is my earnest hope that you are soon restored to normal health to meet the many challenges of our time.

There are many problems, short-term and long-term, which I have been looking forward to discussing with you personally at an early date. It is my hope that at a later date, it should be possible for me to come and meet you in Washington in response to your invitation.

With warmest personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Lal Bahadur

His Excellency  
Lyndon Baines Johnson,  
The President of the United States of  
America,  
The White House,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

*Shastri  
L.B.J.  
10/7/65*

~~SECRET~~

SecDel/MC/5

October 2, 1965

1-Komer  
2-Ret

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION  
TO THE  
TWENTIETH SESSION OF  
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
New York, September-October 1965

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: October 1, 1965

Time: 3:15 p.m.

Place: USUN

Subject: India/Pakistan Conflict

## Participants:

US

The Secretary  
Ambassador Goldberg  
Mr. Daniel Newberry

India

H. E. Sardar Swaran Singh, Minister  
for External Affairs  
H. E. Gopalaswami Partasarathi,  
Permanent Representative to the UN  
Mr. Brajesh C. Mishra, Deputy Permanent  
Representative to the UN

## Distribution:

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The Secretary began by inquiring about the reports received during the morning of cease-fire violations in the Chamb area. The Minister for External Affairs agreed that there had been some trouble but he hoped that it had been localized.

The discussion then moved to next steps to be taken when the cease-fire is stabilized. The Minister called particular attention to the problem of armed infiltrators for whom the Pakistani Government was disowning responsibility. He noted that the radio of the so-called Revolutionary Council of Kashmir had been announcing that the cease-fire was not accepted

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Authority

NLS 93-244 (\*196)

By

NARA. Date 3-30-04

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- 2 -

by the Council. In answer to the Secretary's question about the location of the radio transmitter, the Minister said that the broadcast had been traced to a frequency allotted to Pakistan under international agreements, a fact which the Minister said had not been disputed by the Government of Pakistan. The Minister said he feared that this kind of incitement to the "freedom fighters," if it continued, would keep up the tension in the air.

Ambassador Goldberg reminded the Minister that we had insisted on including references to "armed personnel" in the Security Council resolution precisely because of our understanding of the importance of the matter of infiltration.

The Secretary remarked that we had been encouraged by the fact that the Security Council was able in this crisis to act with unanimity. He hoped that the importance of this unanimity would be appreciated in the subcontinent. The Minister responded that such a similar appreciation had motivated India to react positively to the Security Council and to the Secretary General. He regretted that India's quick response to the appeal for cease-fire without conditions had not been taken into account adequately by the Secretary General. The Minister recalled that even after the Secretary General's visit to both capitals, Mr. Thant continued to refer to the failure of both countries to accept the ceasefire at that stage.

Ambassador Goldberg asked the Minister to speak about how India visualized the steps now to be taken in the crisis. The Minister reviewed the Indian position with regard to infiltrators and went on to emphasize that Pakistan's insistence on a political solution of the Kashmir question was totally unacceptable to India. Referring to what he called Pakistan blackmail, the Minister predicted that any attempt to link the question of withdrawing armed personnel with a dialogue on the so-called "political problem," would be refused by India.

The Minister said that he would prefer to see the discussions moved away from New York -- where he thought they would always be beset with political overtones. He suggested the alternative of starting talks in New Delhi and Rawalpindi on the "experts" level with the aim of working out modalities for exfiltrating Pakistani armed personnel and to set the stage for general disengagement. The Minister predicted that if the UN insisted on introducing non-technical elements into the discussions, it would be so unpopular in India that the Indian Government would find it difficult to sustain its cooperation with the Security Council.

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- 3 -

Ambassador Goldberg recalled that the Security Council resolution called for a definite sequence of steps to be followed, namely: cease-fire, withdrawal of armed personnel, and consultations envisaged in paragraph four of the resolution. As he had told Foreign Minister Bhutto, the US could see no basis for departing from the sequence ordained by the Security Council. Ambassador Goldberg confided that we were under instruction from the President not to support a departure from the sequence. Ambassador Goldberg added that we regarded it as axiomatic that in a renewed dialogue between India and Pakistan the two parties must talk with one another about all their problems.

The Minister pointed out that there were more immediate obstacles. He referred to the Pakistani thesis that unless the principle of political talks is accepted there could be no implementation of cease-fire and withdrawal. The Minister said this thesis was not in keeping with the Security Council's resolution and furthermore it was quite unrealistic to talk about a political solution while the armies were still disengaged.

Ambassador Goldberg posed a hypothetical question about what might ensue if India and Pakistan undertook direct talks with one another. The Minister, responding that it would be unrealistic to hurl India into talks, averred that if he had the faintest idea that such talks held any promise, the Minister would persuade his Prime Minister to assent to them.

The Minister advised against the notion of a Four Power Commission which, he said, was certain to be misunderstood in India. He asked the Secretary not to put India in the position of having to say "no" to such a proposal. Ambassador Goldberg noted that the Commission idea was still only in the stage of consideration. In any event, Ambassador Goldberg repeated, we were determined that the sequence ordained by the Security Council resolution should be followed.

Ambassador Goldberg noted that there was now considerable pressure from other members of the Security Council to convene another Council meeting again soon. The Minister predicted that if the sequence of steps we had been talking about should be adhered to in a purposeful manner and, if after cease-fire and disengagement there could be a cooling off period, we might arrive at a stage later on when India could consider "other things." The Minister expressed concern lest India's willingness

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- 4 -

to cooperate be misunderstood as evidence of India's anxiety. India, he asserted, held a superior position on the ground. Furthermore, India in the period since August 5, had undertaken limited objectives which were entirely defensive in character and these objectives had not been stifled, the Minister asserted. Consequently, India's cooperation with the Security Council must not be interpreted as a concession on the part of India, the Minister urged.

Alluding to the sale of United States military equipment, the Minister asked that the United States Government reassess its objectives regarding aid to the subcontinent. He asked that we see how deep had been the collusion between China and Pakistan, a fact which the Minister asserted was now definitely established. The Minister made allusion to an occasion during the 1962 Chinese attack on India when Chinese troop-carrying aircraft had made use of an airfield in Pakistan which had been built with US assistance. The Minister referred to a more recent incident of Pakistani Boeing aircraft hauling Chinese gold, a report the Minister said he had related to Ambassador Bowles.

The Minister said that he would like to leave the question in our thoughts as to whether further aid to Pakistan would be used against India. It would certainly not be used against China, he asserted. The Minister declared that American aid to Pakistan was clearly not achieving our objective of defense against communism. In analyzing the alleged Pakistani conviction that tension between China and India was something to exploit for Pakistani ends, the Minister expressed the fear that Pakistan was getting some encouragement in this regard from Western friends. Ambassador Goldberg reminded the Minister that the United States had clearly not given Pakistan any such encouragement in the Security Council deliberations.

The Minister went on to contrast India's performance with that of Pakistan in relation to US aid objectives. He noted that India had shown a sense of maturity in not diverting for use against Pakistan the arms which India had got from the United States and the United Kingdom. He cited an episode during the time of the three-day Chinese ultimatum last month when Pakistan had bombed an Indian airfield near the frontier of East Pakistan. The Minister said he hoped that the United States would fully appreciate India's restraint in not taking countermeasures in East Pakistan at that time despite what the Minister called obvious Pakistani-Chinese collusion. The Minister summarized this part of his conversation by asking that the United States not cut off supplies to India. He expressed the hope that there could now be a new chapter in American appreciation of the several roles of the nations in that part of the world.

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- 5 -

The Secretary recalled that the United States has a record covering a period of 17-18 years during which we have tried to find a basis for a solution to the problems of the subcontinent. He expressed regret that the enormous interest we have shown has not produced happier results. He observed that the United States had been able to exert a minimum of influence on the two parties. On the contrary the Secretary found that our experience had been that the Pakistani and Indian Governments were always eager to have us tell the other party what to do but were rarely receptive to counsel on their own performance.

The Secretary deplored the rate at which the crisis on the subcontinent had escalated during August and September. He remarked that he could think of several crises elsewhere in the world during the past two decades which, if they had escalated at the same rate as the India-Pakistan conflict, would have plunged the world into a global conflict several times.

The Secretary remarked that the India-Pakistan conflict had created a disturbing problem for the United States Government. He pointed to the profound sense of frustration felt in the legislative as well as the executive branch of our government. The Secretary reminded the Minister that we had come very close to seeing enacted a legislative prohibition against further aid to India and Pakistan. The Secretary assured the Minister that the United States has no ambitions in the subcontinent other than finding a solution to which both parties can agree.

The Secretary told the Foreign Minister the US was giving 100 percent support to the Security Council and he strongly urged that India and Pakistan also give the Council their fullest cooperation.

~~SECRET~~

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Drafted by: Daniel Newberry, 2 October 1965.

PRESERVATION COPY



EMBASSY  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

169  
*John + Bowles*  
New Delhi - September 29, 1965

Dear Bob:

I am enclosing an article by N. J. Nanporia, the editor of The Times of India, which appeared in Monday's paper. Nanporia has been a persistent and outspoken but non-Communist critic of US policy in Asia, often in the harshest terms.

This more measured and thoughtful piece reflects the basic and potentially very productive reassessment of Indian foreign policy which is now taking place here.

I hope that I may have an opportunity to discuss the future of our position in the Subcontinent with you personally in the near future. I deeply appreciate all that you have done to make our job during these difficult times an easier one.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

*C. Bowles*  
Chester Bowles

Mr. Robert W. Komer,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

Enclosure:

As stated.

OCT 6 1965



# COMMENTARY

## Wanted: An Asian Ally

By N. J. N.

IT was perhaps to be expected as a result of the conflict with Pakistan that there would be a substantial swing of opinion in favour of a new foreign policy. The demand for a withdrawal from the Commonwealth and for second thoughts on the development of nuclear weapons is one aspect of the general feeling—undefined and unstudied—that the country is in need of a reconditioned foreign policy. There is nothing to suggest that those who support such a sea change in India's international posture have worked out the implications of what they propose or, indeed, of the conflict that has ended in an uneasy military truce. This is certainly not to insist that all is well with India's foreign policy and that it is not subject to change when change is necessary in the nation's interests. The point is rather that a foreign policy, in the degree that it is related to certain fundamental national requirements, tends to remain valid and constant even in a rapidly changing situation. An underdeveloped country requires peace, economic aid, security, and good neighbourly relations wherever these are possible. By the same token it must avoid anything that makes more difficult or impossible the achievement of these objectives—objectives that are dictated by such unchanging factors as geography, economic need and an equally compelling and permanent need for security.

### REAPPRAISAL

A foreign policy, therefore, is not necessarily abandoned because of a nasty experience. The methods, however, by which it is conducted and the particular emphasis it makes from time to time are always subject to reappraisal. It is here, surely, that some strenuous rethinking is most appropriate in the light of the unresolved crisis with Pakistan. Much has been said in recent weeks about the U.N. failure to brand Pakistan an aggressor to the point where it even appears to be suggested that the purpose of India's foreign policy is simply to have Rawalpindi suitably denounced and

States in Asia. The entire record of this policy from Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek to the Diem regime and its innumerable successors as well as to the Ayub Khan dictatorship has been consistently one of dependence on "allies" distinguished for their ability to create tension without in any way "containing" Chinese Communism. This truth has been obvious for many years but has been made screamingly apparent by the Indo-Pakistani conflict in which a so-called "ally" colluded with Peking while vilifying or flattering the United States according to the day's convenience.

This is certainly a kind of "alliance" which Peking must unconditionally approve since it is so patently ridiculous. Washington's greatest need, therefore, is a genuine and independent Asian ally at the political level, an ally which defends democracy by being democratic and whose Asian and non-aligned outlook will complement the power of the United States. This implies equal partnership in the task of stabilising Asia, ensuring its peace, and containing communism in a manner that is fully consistent with Asia's independence and interests. These are the possibilities that have been opened up by the Indo-Pakistani conflict and to which the United States must respond if the promise they hold is not to be irrevocably lost. The predominant objective of Indian diplomacy should, therefore, be to persuade the United States into an appreciation of these facts by offering the fullest political co-operation in achieving America's objectives which are also those of India but by methods which Washington has so far not attempted.

They are methods which in fact the United States cannot attempt without a political alliance with a reliable, non-aligned, democratic Asian Power. The long-term programme of containing communism needs to be fully based on Asian nationalism which is a force the United States is not equipped to tap and mobilise as the only complete and final answer to communism in Vietnam or elsewhere. U.S. military power alone and equally its pact with autocratic Asian "allies" has



A foreign policy, therefore, is not necessarily abandoned because of a nasty experience. The methods, however, by which it is conducted and the particular emphasis it makes from time to time are always subject to reappraisal. It is here, surely, that some strenuous rethinking is most appropriate in the light of the unresolved crisis with Pakistan. Much has been said in recent weeks about the U.N. failure to brand Pakistan an aggressor to the point where it even appears to be suggested that the purpose of India's foreign policy is simply to have Rawalpindi suitably denounced and labelled. This would undoubtedly be of considerable help, affording us some degree of psychological satisfaction and giving us the practical advantage of having the fact of Pakistani aggression clearly inscribed in the records of the United Nations. Yet it can hardly be suggested that these exhaust the resources of our diplomacy abroad or that a certain arrangement of words castigating Pakistan for breaking the peace is all that is required. Both Rawalpindi and New Delhi will be obliged to extract many conclusions from the experience they have recently had.

But the most decisive conclusion in relation to the future of this area can be made and no doubt will eventually be made in Washington alone.

The Indo-Pakistani conflict did not occur in some kind of a vacuum created exclusively by the policies of these two countries. So-called Hindu-Muslim hostility about which so much is said in the West and the Kashmir issue are not the cause, but the context in which the conflict has been wilfully placed. This is the essential point which the Soviet Union has grasped and to which it owes its conciliatory and constructive role. What is in question and on which judgment must now be passed is the entire system of military alliances the United States has established in Asia as the basis of its containment policy against Communist China. After all that has happened no one can possibly accuse New Delhi of not being interested in the containment of aggressive Chinese Communism. Its conviction remains, however, that these alliances through which military aid is liberally and indiscriminately given to "allies" whose unreliability has been openly demonstrated have become worse than ineffective. They are sources of tension and instability—as the Indo-Pakistani conflict has indisputably established.

## INEVITABLE

The arms with which Pakistan was equipped and the encouragement it thereby received made possible the conflict that occurred, indeed, made it almost inevitable. Kashmir, in other words, became a factor in the American containment policy which would be easy enough to justify from the U.S. point of view if it helped to make the containment policy more effective. This it has most emphatically failed to do since the Indo-Pakistani conflict has caused the greatest satisfaction in Peking by creating tension and instability in the sub-continent. If, therefore, any policy requires to be changed for the simple reason that it has failed it is a policy over which neither President Ayub Khan nor Prime Minister Shastri has any direct control—the policy in fact of the United

States which are also those of India but by methods which Washington has so far not attempted.

They are methods which in fact the United States cannot attempt without a political alliance with a reliable, non-aligned, democratic Asian Power. The long-term programme of containing communism needs to be fully based on Asian nationalism which is a force the United States is not equipped to tap and mobilise as the only complete and final answer to communism in Vietnam or elsewhere. U.S. military power alone and equally its pact with autocratic Asian "allies" has yielded no results but on the contrary—such is the nature of politically meaningless military aid—has isolated the so-called pro-American Asian Governments from the mainstream of Asian nationalism. It has thereby enabled Peking to pose, despite its communist garb, as a genuinely Asian movement. If this is the vital moral of the Indo-Pakistani conflict it follows that far from having any doubts regarding its international role India must reconfirm itself in the posture it has consistently adopted.

## U.S. RETHINKING

It must, moreover, take such active diplomatic steps as are necessary to promote American rethinking on these lines at a time when the implications of the conflict with Pakistan are available as a powerful reinforcement of New Delhi's point of view. Beside these considerations the demand for a withdrawal from the Commonwealth and for the development of the nuclear bomb become thoroughly irrelevant—seemingly valid at its own modest level but having no bearing on the direction of India's foreign policy. Equally it is of minor importance that the United States has not verbally acknowledged its folly in providing Pakistan with the military means by which Rawalpindi has caused nothing but dangerous instability in this part of the world. It is neither necessary nor desirable that Indian diplomacy should rub in what is obvious and, especially so at the cost of failing to pursue the main objective of persuading the United States to reassess the essentials of its Asian policy.

Meanwhile Rawalpindi can be expected by every available means to justify Washington's Asian policy and, therefore, the military alliances through which it has benefited so greatly. It will represent itself as loyally anti-communist and skilfully play on the American desire to contain China by purely military methods. It will continue to flirt with Peking and blackmail the United States and it will propagate the theory to which Washington is particularly susceptible that unless the Kashmir issue is "settled" the sub-continent will not be able to resist China. The contrary theory is that unless the philosophy of military alliances is abandoned and, therefore, the support and encouragement of regimes such as that of Pakistan the sub-continent will indeed be seriously weakened and America's own objective of containment will not be achieved. In this sense—and it is the only sense in which the recent conflict becomes meaningful for the future—the Indo-Pakistani clash is a test of U.S. leadership and final decisions will have to be awaited in Washington rather than in Rawalpindi or New Delhi.



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**Memorandum of Conversation**DATE: September 27, 1965  
5:00 pm

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ambassador B. K. Nehru (India)


## PARTICIPANTS:

M - Mr. Thomas C. Mann

Ambassador B. K. Nehru (India)

## COPIES TO:

Under Secretary Ball  
White House - Robert Komer  
NEA - William Handley  
S/S - Benjamin H. Read



Ambassador Nehru called this afternoon at his request and said that he understood that Ambassador Bowles had been talking with L. K. Jha some more about the possibility of an October visit. What would we think about a visit in view of recent developments? I said it was the unanimous opinion here that direct conversations between the President and the Prime Minister were more necessary than ever.

The Ambassador asked whether we had in mind a visit by the Prime Minister to the UN sometime in October followed by a brief stopover in Washington on the way back to India. I said that we thought this arrangement would be entirely satisfactory but we naturally hoped that the Prime Minister would not set Indian policy in concrete in his statements at the UN before he reached Washington.

The Ambassador inquired whether we had any particular dates in October in mind. After checking with Mr. Komer, I said that it now appeared that most any time in October convenient to the Prime Minister could be worked out at this end.

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

The Ambassador said he would think some more about the visit and would be in touch with me again.

The second subject discussed was the possibility of a political settlement of the Kashmir issue. I started off by saying that if there were no political settlement it seemed probable that India and Pakistan would face a pause to gather strength for a later resumption of hostilities perhaps on a wider scale. I had not talked with the Secretary about this but my own feeling was that many people in the Congress and in the country would think it would be wrong to resume either large-scale economic or military aid during such a pause. Also, a lot of people here would be concerned that the Chicomos would take advantage of renewed fighting. It did not seem to me to be in either the interest of India or Pakistan to be Chinese pawns in this kind of game.

The Ambassador said, as expected, that the separation of Kashmir from India was not negotiable. India is a multi-racial, multi-linguist, multi-cultural society. Kashmir was only one of four secessionist movements. The second is in Nagaland (between Assam and Burma) and the separatist movement here was based on "tribal" considerations. The third was in the Northern Punjab where the Sikhs have talked about separation because of a difference of religion. And the fourth was Madras where the separatist groups talked in "cultural" terms about indigenous people repelling "invaders".

The Ambassador also said that India expected in the recent crisis that China would not make its principal attack in Northeastern India although cutting off the Indian corridor between East Pakistan and Sikkim would probably be an objective.

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SECRET

- 3 -

India is strong in this area. Rather India considered that China, while making noises about Northeastern India, planned to move into Northern Kashmir through the Karohoram and Mustagh Passes which the Paks had ceded to China. He said these passes were the only natural defense points and that China would have all the advantage here because of India's difficulty in keeping Indian troops supplied and reinforced.

To all of this I said that I could not speak officially and much less did I want to propose any particular kind of political settlement but it did seem to me from what the Ambassador had said that what both India and the U. S. wanted was an independent and viable subcontinent capable of defending itself against the Chinese expansionist aims. A political settlement on some basis would seem to make a great deal of sense from the standpoint of the selfish interests of both India and Pakistan as well as the interest of the Free World. It seemed to me that it would be a mistake to slam the door on such a settlement by calling Kashmir non negotiable. It ought to be possible to devise some scheme on Kashmir which would be compatible with the self-interest of both India and Pakistan and which at the same time could give the subcontinent some kind of assurances against aggression from India and, at the same time, introduce new safeguards against all other separatist movements based on the right of self-determination. If something along these general lines were feasible then a great many serious problems would be avoided and we could get on with the task of building a strong and viable India.

The conversation about a political settlement was general and exploratory. Ambassador Nehru did not depart from his thesis that the Kashmir problem is non negotiable.

SECRET

Wm

9/27

Mac

Shriver and Co. aren't letting any grass grow on resuming the PCV flow to India. Since case-fire was still fragile, however, I thought felt mean enough (and prudent enough) to turn a blind eye till Sarge returned.

India

Rut

RWR:

Let them @ this is between

President - Shriver & I'll run pass

Shriver; see to Sarge at President

SEP 28 1965

whenever he asks me to

mtg

9/28

None - RWR



171a

PEACE CORPS

WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

September 24, 1965

Dear Mac:

I thought you would want to have this  
cable called to your attention.

Sincerely,

*Sarge*  
Sargent Shriver  
Director

Enclosure

Honorable McGeorge Bundy  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

SEP 28 1965

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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IN LIGHT FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS INDO-PAK RELATIONS  
PLAN PERMIT PCVS RETURN PUNJAB AND OTHER LOCATIONS ASAP AFTER  
CEASEFIRE EFFECTIVE.

PC/I STRONGLY URGES THAT FOUR GROUPS TRAINED FOR INDIA BE  
SENT SOON. THEY ARE BADLY NEEDED FOR ONGOING PROJECTS FOR WHICH  
THEY TRAINED AND PROGRAMMED. NONE OF PCVS IS TO BE ASSIGNED IN  
AREAS LIKELY TO BE AFFECTED BY INDO-CHINESE HOSTILITIES SHOULD THIS  
MATERIALIZIZE.

GOI URGES ARRIVAL INDIA SIXTEEN THROUGH NINETEEN ON OCTOBER  
2, 3 OR 4, IF POSSIBLE ON SAME DAY. THESE DATES BEST IN CROWDED  
OCTOBER SCHEDULE WHICH INCLUDES THREE SEMINARS. PC/I CONCURS GOI  
SUGGESTION AND SELECTS OCTOBER 2 AS BEST DATE.

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SEP 28 1965



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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UNCLASSIFIED

PEACE CORPS

WASHINGTON

171c

OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

September 24, 1965

Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy:

Please note the attached cable relative to our situation with India Volunteers who are now in Israel and the Trust territories.

*Warren W. Wiggins*

Warren W. Wiggins  
Deputy Director

SEP 28 1965



DM Hoerner

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 25, 1965

Mr. David E. Bell  
Administrator

Mr. William B. Macomber, Jr.  
Assistant Administrator/NESA  
Agency for International Development  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dave and Bill:

It may be useful in this immediate post-cease-fire period for me to send along some tentative impressions of what this business of the past three weeks has done to India, its development outlook, and our prospects here. I would hate to be held to all of the following six months from now, but I want to get these first thoughts into the hopper quickly, for I think the way things in Washington begin to jell in the next few days may be decisive.

Pluses

India has come out of this fracas with a rather remarkable improvement in its self-confidence. Both sides have been exaggerating their military successes, but the Indians at the highest levels -- military and civilian -- are genuinely convinced their military did very well -- certainly better than expected, especially against the sophisticated weapons in the earlier stages of the fighting. They are sure a stretched out war of attrition, barring interventions, would have gone decisively in their favor. Although they have effected a cool and collected style throughout, they are obviously cocky, their national pride is renewed, and there has been a very strong resurgence of nationalism. Under fire, people of all groups and from all parts of the country identified with the Nation. The Center's hand surely has been strengthened vis a vis the States. In general the country has a more buttoned up, competent feeling; it's sure it can do a job; and this style should carry over into the economic field.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 9-20-79 NSC 9-9-81  
By Jcl/ier NARA. Date 3-30-04

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- 2 -

Shastri and his Government have gained much stature in domestic eyes. They have emerged a long stride further from the Gandhi-Nehru shadow, and leadership henceforth is apt to be appraised in terms of what it can perform in the present and promise for the future rather than of its Independence-Movement history.

In these brief three weeks much of the venom has been leached from the communal troubles spectre that has overhung the country since 1947. Indian Muslims have proved their national loyalty, and civil order has been well maintained. The Jan Sangh would seem to have had most of its platform cut from under it.

Direct, short-term economic disruption has been minimal. Hence, given its refurbished sense of drive and purpose, the Government is in a position, if so minded, to attack with increased vigor and little more than a break in stride the encouraging economic program toward which it seemed to be moving in spring and summer.

#### Minuses

With Pakistan still there, apparently unchanged, and Kashmir still a bone of contention, the Indians have emerged from the fighting much more military minded. Many of them, at least (I would guess this characterizes the bulk of the Lok Sabha), are determined not only to replenish their stocks of sophisticated weapons rapidly, whatever the foreign exchange implications, but to enlarge the army and move aggressively toward much greater self sufficiency in defense production.

In some quarters the self sufficiency lesson being drawn from recent events is cast in a much broader frame: an influential minority in the Government already is arguing that they need to make a fundamental re-examination of their degree of dependence, even in the short run, on foreign aid. This talk is still highly impressionistic but is already welling up conspicuously among Parliamentarians and some of the press. And one hears it from some of the keener, more influential senior officials.

Thus far these people have not gotten beyond such broad assertions as this: they were planning an intensified domestic input that, together with heavy foreign aid, would yield a 6 percent growth rate;

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- 3 -

instead they should make at least as intensive an indigenous effort but virtually cut out the foreign aid and make good a 4 percent growth rate on their own. I fear that TTK may have slid off the track he was on as he approached his projected Washington trip and may now be heading in this direction. This go-it-alone right-away scheme is still only a minority view, I am sure, but its combined appeal to intellectuals and jingoists is alarming. The Indians have yet to figure out the implications of this new isolationist hypothesis, and we need to be doing such figuring right alongside them. But it probably would not be far wrong to immediately jump to the conclusions that adherence to this approach would mean (a) shelving of all the liberalization-type policy changes for which we have been hoping and (b) after the present patriotic fervor began to flatten out, the end of Indian constitutional democracy.

#### Other

The nub of the diplomatic dilemma emerging from the fighting is that the Indians' determination to hold Kashmir has been strengthened, not weakened; and yet it's hard to imagine what alternative gains can be offered a Pakistan whose demands may also not be undiminished. It isn't just that, on Kashmir, the Indians at this point react about as we would have done circa 1860 to third party suggestions that our juridical claim to Texas was a lot weaker than Mexico's; nor do they rely solely on the philosophical objection that other secular states should think twice before submitting the Kashmir question to a theocratic criterion; they now also have a reinforced strategic concern -- namely, fear of a massive Himalayan linkage between Pakistan and China -- that we will find it hard to blink.

#### Implications

1. In the course of the past year I think I have gotten to be more of a realist about the use of development-promoting economic assistance for our near-term political ends. Yet I am perfectly convinced -- now that the fighting is stopped and the Indo-Pak dispute is back in the diplomatic arena -- that the most dangerous of all things we could do here would be to try to use economic assistance to force the Indians to accept a particular outcome on Kashmir. This almost surely would

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- 4 -

blow us right out of the water as far as our stakes in Indian economic development are concerned. And it would be doubly explosive with the Soviets not doing likewise.

2. The extent to which the economic isolationist minority noted above gathers support during the next few weeks -- or, to put it the other way around, the speed and sureness with which the forces of enlightenment manage to resume the process of convergence with the Consortium that, on the whole, seemed to be going so well this summer -- will depend very heavily on what kind of noises the Consortium and, more particularly, the U.S. now make. At minimum, now, there is more skepticism about the reliability of Consortium assistance. Many of the Indians expect us to be less forthcoming as a result of the war. The GOI, therefore, is apt to be playing it very close to the vest for some weeks. If we do likewise, those here already disposed to draw negative conclusions may be able to convince the Cabinet that this is the only wise and safe course. And the "Big Push" will be aborted at this end ~~and~~ while we are still contemplating it at ours.

3. There is a considerable danger that we will adopt a course that looks for all the world to the Indians like trying to use economic sanctions for promoting Kashmir-related political ends even when that is not our intention. For us the pre-hostilities status quo was a substantial freeze on new aid decisions. But most of the Indians either never understood this or by now have forgotten it. Hence if we simply return to our pre-hostilities posture, feeling now that we have more reason than ever to sit tight for a while and observe Indian performance, this will surely be interpreted as trying to pressure them on Kashmir.

4. Obviously, if we opt for the revival of the Big Push and avoidance of the (I believe dead-end) economic sanctions route, we will by these decisions in no sense be deterred from hard bargaining in the Fourth Plan negotiations about GOI economic performance. As a matter of fact, the bargaining probably will have to be tougher than we contemplated before, because, in addition to all the other priority issues on our agenda, we now shall have to be concerned about minimizing our

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- 5 -

indirect contributions to a military build-up that we are apt to be unwilling to support directly.

5. Meanwhile, our decisions with respect to some of our FY 1966 program probably should be disengaged from our Big Push dealings more than was our intention a month ago. Then it looked as though nearly all of this year's nonproject loan should be reserved as a potential first tranche on a three-part package deal involving exchange rate, liberalization, more maintenance imports. Now, in order that such holding back not be misinterpreted as pressure on Kashmir-related political decisions, it seems to me urgent that some portions of this year's nonproject money, as well as something on the order of a one-year PL 480 agreement, be broken loose very quickly.

In sum, what we do in the next few weeks and even days may well skew either the pluses or minuses here a long way for some time to come.

Warm best regards.

Sincerely,

John P. Lewis  
Minister-Director

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171e  
भारतीय राजदूतावास  
वाशिंगटन, डी० सी०  
EMBASSY OF INDIA  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

September 17, 1965

*India  
x Kashmir*

Dear Mr President:

I have the honour to transmit to you  
a message from the Prime Minister of India, which  
has been received at this Embassy telegraphically.

With my high regard and esteem,

Yours sincerely,

(B.K. Nehru)  
Ambassador of India

The President,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

9/17/65



1916  
New Delhi,  
September 16, 1965.

Dear Mr President:

Ambassador Nehru has reported to me the sympathetic hearing which you gave him when he delivered my last message to you regarding the present conflict between India and Pakistan. I am sending this further communication to you to keep you informed of subsequent developments and to share with you, on a personal level, my thoughts and concerns about the trend of events.

2. As you doubtless know by now, I indicated to the Secretary-General the willingness of my Government to agree to an immediate cease-fire without any pre-conditions, while acquainting him with our stand on certain issues. One of the features of the Pakistani invasion is that it includes large numbers of armed personnel who are not in uniform for whom Pakistan disowns responsibility, although there is unquestionable evidence to show that they have, in fact, been equipped, organised and directed by Pakistan. This is a new technique of aggression to deal with which no effective weapons have yet been designed by the international community. Even so, as I have said, I was agreeable to a cease-fire if Pakistan also agreed to it. While I do not know the precise nature of President Ayub's reply to U Thant, the fact remains that there has been no cease-fire and the fighting continues.

3. I notice from President Ayub's press conference that he regards Pakistan to be engaged in a life and death struggle with India. All I can say is that so far as we are concerned, we consider it to be in our interests to see the people of Pakistan prosper and to live in friendship with India. We are not out to destroy Pakistan, but to protect our own territory from repeated attacks.

4. President Ayub ..(2)

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Authority FRVS 64-68, vol. 25, #206  
By jc, NARA, Date 3-3-04

Shastri  
#185  
7/17/65



4. President Ayub, in his press conference, also stated that what he really wants the U.N. Security Council to do is not to deal with the issues raised by Pakistani invasion, overt and covert, but to lend support to Pakistan's fantastic claim over the State of Jammu & Kashmir. This claim is based on Pakistan's assertion that since the majority of the inhabitants of the State of Jammu & Kashmir are Muslims, the State should have acceded to Pakistan and not to India.

5. The Indian nation consists of people who subscribe to different religious beliefs -- Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Parsees, as well as tribal peoples living in this country from pre-historic times, who speak different languages, almost as many as are spoken on the continent of Europe. We have, in fact, as many Muslims in India as there are in West Pakistan. In India, as in the United States of America, people of different origins, different races, different colours and different religions, live together as citizens of a state in which, despite the stresses and strains which do develop in a mixed society, the Constitution and the laws guarantee equal rights to all citizens. You yourself, Mr President, have made, in recent months, a tremendous contribution in your own country to the task of giving adequate legal protection to a racial minority. It is through national solidarity, rather than through the mischievous doctrine of self-determination, the minorities can find their fulfilment.

6. The reason why, when in 1947, we first went to the Security Council with a complaint of aggression against Pakistan, we made a unilateral promise of having a plebiscite in the State of Jammu & Kashmir, was that, at that time, the State had no democracy, having been under the rule of a prince in the British days, and we were anxious ourselves to be satisfied that the people, as distinct from the ruler, genuinely favoured accession to India. Ever since the accession

of the State ...(3)



of the State, we have been building up democratic institutions. There have been three general elections in conditions of freedom. The results of these elections have demonstrated clearly that the people of Jammu & Kashmir have accepted their place in the Indian Union. I should like to state quite categorically that there can be no further question of any plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the people of Jammu & Kashmir. Furthermore, I would assert that the relationship between a federal government and its constituent states is no matter for any other country or for the Security Council. If President Ayub feels that by launching an invasion on the State of Jammu and Kashmir, he will pressurize us into ceding any part of the State of Jammu & Kashmir, all I can say is that he is grievously mistaken. Much though we love peace, we shall not buy it by selling our territory.

7. The real question before the U.N., the Security Council and the international community, as a whole, is not of the State of Jammu & Kashmir, but that of restoring peace which was broken once again by Pakistan, and of ensuring that the boundary line between India and Pakistan is not repeatedly violated either by regular troops or by those in disguise.

8. President Ayub has made an appeal to the United States to use its influence for the restoration of peace. I very much hope, Mr President, that the United States will do so. I think the first essential for this is to prevent the conflict from spreading. Pakistan, as you know, has appealed to many nations for help: to western powers in the name of its alliances, to middle-east and Arab countries in the name of religion, as well as to Indonesia and China on the basis of the philosophy of which these two countries are the main exponents. I hope, Mr President, you will find it possible to make it clear to Pakistan that the neutrality which you have, for understandable reasons, maintained in this conflict so far, will have to be modified if other powers begin to join it directly or indirectly. That Pakistan is anxious to spread the conflict is evident from the fact that despite further



declaration that we do not want to see any fighting start in East Pakistan, it is making repeated air attacks from East Bengal on Indian air bases, particularly those which are vital for our defence against China.

9. Before leaving India, the Secretary-General left with me a letter throwing out various suggestions for the restoration of peace, his efforts to bring about a cease-fire having failed. One of them is a meeting between President Ayub and me. I do not see how, while the armies of the two countries are locked in combat, the heads of two governments could start a dialogue across the table. You can imagine the effect it would have on the morale of our troops and our people who are solidly behind them. Quite apart from that, I cannot quite see what such a meeting might possibly lead to. As you know, in 1962 there was a meeting between President Ayub Khan and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru when it was agreed that there should be meetings between ministers followed by a summit. We did have a number of meetings between the foreign ministers of two countries, but their positions were so far apart that it became pointless to think of a meeting at the level of heads of government.

10. The Secretary-General has also put forward the idea of mediation by the Secretary-General himself, or by any power friendly to both countries. The difficulty about this too is that what Pakistan wants is not a mediation to bring about an end to fighting and to restore peace without losing face, but mediation in respect of Pakistan's claim to the State of Jammu & Kashmir which we cannot possibly accept.

11. I do not question that even after the present fighting has come to an end, there will remain many issues between the two countries which will continue to create ill-feeling and give rise to friction. We have always felt that this is an unfortunate state of affairs and with better relationship and greater

cooperation ... (5)



(5)

cooperation between the two countries, their economic progress, which is the prime task before them, and in which your great country has been helping so much, will be accelerated. Such an improvement in the relationship between the two countries is eminently desirable, but it would need at least a couple of years of real peace on the borders and a willingness on the part of Pakistan not to align itself in any way with the main threat against India, namely China, before any efforts to improve overall relations between two countries can really become fruitful.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Lal Bahadur

His Excellency  
Lyndon Baines Johnson,  
The President of the United States,  
The White House,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

09923

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Origin

55  
Info

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI  
Amembassy KARACHI  
Amembassy LONDON

IMMEDIATE PRIORITY 502  
IMMEDIATE PRIORITY 438  
IMMEDIATE PRIORITY -1482

SEP 17 7 30 PM '65

033

LIMDIS

Text of Shastri letter to President which Amb Nehru delivered to Secretary September 17 follows:

QUOTE: Dear Mr. President: Ambassador Nehru has reported to me the sympathetic hearing which you gave him when he delivered my last message to you regarding the present conflict between India and Pakistan. I am sending this further communication to you to keep you informed of subsequent developments and to share with you, on a personal level, my thoughts and concerns about the trend of events.

2. As you doubtless know by now, I indicated to the Secretary-General the willingness of my Government to agree to an immediate cease-fire without any pre-conditions, while acquainting him with our stand on certain issues. One of the features of the Pakistani invasion is that it includes large numbers of armed personnel who are not in uniform for whom Pakistan disowns responsibility, although there is unquestionable evidence to show that they have, in fact, been equipped, organized and directed by Pakistan. This is a new technique of aggression to deal with which no effective weapons have yet been designed by the international community.

Drafted by:

NEA:SQA:CSCoon:mer 9/17/65

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

NEA - William J. Handley

Clearances:

s/s Mr. Merriam

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

White House - Mr. Saunders

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 25, #206

By JC NARA, Date 3-3-04



**SECRET**

community. Even so, as I have said, I was agreeable to a cease-fire if Pakistan also agreed to it. While I do not know the precise nature of President Ayub's reply to U Thant, the fact remains that there has been no cease-fire and the fighting continues.

3. I notice from President Ayub's press conference that he regards Pakistan to be engaged in a life and death struggle with India. All I can say is that so far as we are concerned, we consider it to be in our interests to see the people of Pakistan prosper and to live in friendship with India. We are not out to destroy Pakistan, but to protect our own territory from repeated attacks.

4. President Ayub, in his press conference, also stated that what he really wants the U.N. Security Council to do is not to deal with the issues raised by Pakistani invasion, overt and covert, but to lend support to Pakistan's fantastic claim over the State of Jammu & Kashmir. This claim is based on Pakistan's assertion that since the majority of the inhabitants of the State of Jammu & Kashmir are Muslims, the State should have acceded to Pakistan and not to India.

5. The Indian nation consists of people who subscribe to different religious beliefs -- Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Parsees, as well as tribal peoples living in this country from prehistoric times, who speak different languages, almost as many as are spoken on the continent of Europe. We have, in fact, as many Muslims in India as there are in West Pakistan. In India, as in the United States of America, people of different origins, different races, different colours and different religions, live together as citizens of a state in which, despite the stresses and strains which do develop in a mixed society, the Constitution and the laws

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ALL

~~SECRET~~

and the laws guarantee equal rights to all citizens. You yourself, Mr. President, have made, in recent months, a tremendous contribution in your own country to the task of giving adequate legal protection to a racial minority. It is through national solidarity, rather than through the mischievous doctrine of self-determination, the minorities can find their fulfilment.

6. The reason why, when in 1947, we first went to the Security Council with a complaint of aggression against Pakistan, we made a unilateral promise of having a plebiscite in the State of Jammu & Kashmir, was that, at that time, the State had no democracy, having been under the rule of a prince in the British days, and we were anxious ourselves to be satisfied that the people, as distinct from the ruler, genuinely favoured accession to India. Ever since the accession of the State, we have been building up democratic institutions. There have been three general elections in conditions of freedom. The results of these elections have demonstrated clearly that the people of Jammu & Kashmir have accepted their place in the Indian Union. I should like to state quite categorically that there can be no further question of any plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the people of Jammu & Kashmir. Furthermore, I would assert that the relationship between a federal government and its constituent states is no matter for any other country or for the Security Council. If President Ayub feels that by launching an invasion on the State of Jammu and Kashmir, he will pressurize us into ceding any part of the State of Jammu & Kashmir, all I can say is that he is grievously mistaken. Much though we love peace, we shall not buy it by selling our territory.

7. The real question

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

7. The real question before the U.N., the Security Council and the international community, as a whole, is not of the State of Jammu & Kashmir, but that of restoring peace which was broken once again by Pakistan, and of ensuring that the boundary line between India and Pakistan is not repeatedly violated either by regular troops or by those in disguise.

8. President Ayub has made an appeal to the United States to use its influence for the restoration of peace. I very much hope, Mr. President, that the United States will do so. I think the first essential for this is to prevent the conflict from spreading. Pakistan, as you know, has appealed to many nations for help: to western powers in the name of its alliances, to middle-east and Arab countries in the name of religion, as well as to Indonesia and China on the basis of the philosophy of which these two countries are the main exponents. I hope, Mr. President, you will find it possible to make it clear to Pakistan that the neutrality which you have, for understandable reasons, maintained in this conflict so far, will have to be modified if other powers begin to join it directly or indirectly. That Pakistan is anxious to spread the conflict is evident from the fact that despite further declaration that we do not want to see any fighting start in East Pakistan, it is making repeated air attacks from East Bengal on Indian air bases, particularly those which are vital for our defense against China.

9. Before leaving India, the Secretary-General left with me a letter throwing out various suggestions for the restoration of peace, his efforts to bring about a cease-fire having failed. One of them is a meeting between President Ayub and me. I do not see how, while the armies of the two countries are locked in combat, the

heads of two

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real

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real peace on the borders and a willingness on the part of Pakistan not to align itself in any way with the main threat against India, namely China, before any efforts to improve overall relations between two countries can really become fruitful. Yours sincerely, (Signed) Lal Bahadur. UNQUOTE.

GP-3.

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

Schneider:

- 1.
2. EKDIS on  
LOJ-BK talk.

India

OK 173

September 15, 1965

RWK:

S/S wants to clear with you following  
message from President to Radakrishnan:

Thank you for your kind message  
on my birthday. I take this opportunity  
to extend my <sup>and</sup> warm personal regards  
to you.

They're just nervous about anything  
in this part of the world.

184-5635

H

HHS

Done  
HS.



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174 *File*  
*Indice*  
Sept. 15, 1965

*L* RWK:

I relayed our strong feelings to Schneider.  
Said our chief concern in this case is safety,  
not politics.

He said Peace Corps now upset at possibility  
of delay, partly worried about its apolitical image.  
I reiterated that our prime concern is safety.

NEA will be deciding early this afternoon.  
I asked him to say that Bundy and Komer want  
to delay.

*H.*  
HHS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

174a

Hal

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

McGB:

September 14, 1965

178 new Peace Corps volunteers are scheduled to leave this weekend for India. 28 more are already in Tehran awaiting onward passage. Another 200 are in training to leave November-December. All told, they'd double the Peace Corps effort there.

hol  
now

Bowles wants to go ahead with this long-planned buildup. He says he'll keep them away from the fighting and wants them as a symbol of our long-range commitment.

We're inclined to agree with Bowles on the odds but suspect the President would prefer prudence. It hardly makes sense to put 200 more potential evacuees on Bowles' hands until the possibility of communal rioting is past. So we've suggested holding the fellows in Tehran where they're safer and telling this weekend's group to stay on leave another couple of weeks until we see where we stand.

Peace Corps is still totting pros and cons, but they'll probably prefer a hold like this to cancelling altogether right now since it hard to start all over.

Hal  
HHS

Let's make this  
firm policy.  
RHX

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I agree  
meB



*Return  
Jeannette*

- 16 Congressmen; down to 3 congressmen.
- Huron says could be a warassing.
- Charge shocked
- Davies called SC1 to run briefing; spokesman.  
Change in plans

CONFIDENTIAL

*India*

175

RWK:

September 14, 1965

Seaborg's itinerary still includes Bombay 26-28 September and Karachi the 29th, but he realizes these stops will probably have to be changed and has left the final judgment to State. The same is true of Ramey who had planned to be in New Delhi and Bombay 25-29 September. State is sending messages asking Ambassador's opinion. Schneider guesses we'll get a "no" from Karachi, a "yes" from Delhi and then call it off. But we may want to wait a little longer.

*Balance; another signal*

Seaborg still plans Cairo 3-5 October, and Ramey Tel Aviv on 30 September.

US - Indian uranium sale. State has put out a stop order.

*Hal*

*H.H.S.*

*Tell Dave I feel they shouldn't go!*

CONFIDENTIAL

*Schneider told 8/15. He says this is their view to. H.*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RWK:

September 14, 1965

Peace Corps schedule for volunteers  
going to India is:

28 volunteers now in Tehran seeking  
onward passage; bumped by Air France

83 now on leave after training; due to  
assemble in New York on 18 September and go

95 now on leave, due to go 20 September.

Later groups still in training; not  
due to leave till November - December.

Schneider still doesn't have a full  
report from the Peace Corps on the problems  
of postponing departures. However, his  
reaction is to let the 28 in Tehran go ahead if  
they can get a ride, but telegraph the others  
to stay on leave for another couple of weeks  
until we see how things look. He thinks this  
is better than cancelling now altogether because  
it's so hard to get going again.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 3-3-04

HHS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9/14/65 File  
with HHS  
note to  
Bundy.  
176

Hold  
Cancel

Cancel

Cancel



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

176a

47-40

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Action  
NEA

Control:  
Rec'd:

7895

SEPTEMBER 10, 1965

5:22 AM

BUNDY-SMITH  
BATOR  
BOWLER  
BOWMAN  
CHASE  
COOPER  
JESSUP  
JOHNSON  
KEENE  
KOMER  
MOODY

Info

FROM: NEW DELHI

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 551

SP

SAH

DATE: SEPTEMBER 10

L

H

P

SUBJECT: PEACE CORPS PROGRAM

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

AID

PC

RSR

THIS IS SECOND IN OUR SERIES OF MESSAGES AS TO HOW WE SEE OUR PROGRAMS IN LIGHT PRESENT DEVELOPMENTS INDO-PAK RELATIONS:

1. PEACE CORPS PROGRAM IN INDIA SCHEDULED GROW FROM PRESENT SIZE OF ABOUT 400 VOLUNTEERS TO OVER 800 DURING NEXT FOUR MONTHS. TWO HUNDRED NEW VOLUNTEERS TO ARRIVE THIS MONTH; FIRST GROUP OF TWENTY-EIGHT DUE SEPTEMBER 13. DESPITE PRESENT HOSTILITIES I STRONGLY URGE THAT THIS PEACE CORPS BUILD-UP CONTINUE AS PLANNED. COUNTRY TEAM CONCURS.

ALTHOUGH FULLY AWARE THAT VOLUNTEERS MAY FACE NEW FRUSTRATIONS BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE DISRUPTION OR CURTAILMENT OF SOME DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS IN WHICH THEY ARE TO WORK, I BELIEVE PEACE CORPS CAN CONTINUE TO PLAY USEFUL GRASSROOTS ROLE IN INDIA'S DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS. PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE CRITICAL MONTHS AHEAD, VOLUNTEERS' PRESENCE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY CAN BE A SYMBOL OF AMERICA'S COMMITMENT TO AND INTEREST IN INDIA'S GROWTH AND WELL-BEING.

UNLESS CIRCUMSTANCES CHANGE RAPIDLY, NEW VOLUNTEERS WILL NOT BE ASSIGNED AT PRESENT TO PUNJAB, TO CERTAIN AREAS OF RAJASTHAN AND WEST BENGAL OR TO ANY AREAS WHERE FIGHTING MAY DEVELOP. HOWEVER, VOLUNTEER PROJECTS IN OTHER STATES WILL BE IMPLEMENTED ACCORDING TO PRESENT PLAN.

BOWLES

JVC/20

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14301

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

September 10, 1965

RECEIVED  
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE  
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1965 SEP 10 PM 12 09

177  
3924  
1-Komer 9/10  
2-Ret.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Cancellation of appointment with  
the President on September 16, 1965  
for T. T. Krishnamachari, Indian  
Finance Minister

The Indian Embassy has informed us that Mr. Krishnamachari has canceled his visit to Washington next week in view of the current situation in the subcontinent. Consequently, his appointment with the President on September 16 may be canceled.

*DeWitt*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Exempted from automatic decontrol.

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SEP 10 1965



~~SECRET~~

September 9, 1965

178

TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING

WITH AMBASSADOR B. K. NEHRU

*India*

1. We appreciate Shastri's letter, and think the U.S. has a pretty good picture of how the present crisis evolved. But there is no point in discussing who flung the first stone. The simple fact is that Pakistan and India have drifted into an open war which has in it the seeds of disaster for both countries involved.

2. Nor is this the time to argue the merits of the Kashmir dispute. The fact is that Pakistan and India because of Kashmir have gotten into a fight which threatens their larger interests, both in national-building and in collaboration against a growing external threat.

3. The immediate, overriding need is for both countries to haul back from the lip of the abyss before they both fall in. That's why we solidly back U Thant and the SC cease-fire appeal.

4. Just as in Viet-Nam, there must be a political settlement to the Indo-Pakistan conflict. We wonder if the Indians are seeking such a settlement now. Doesn't U Thant's presence on the subcontinent offer India an opportunity to work out a political settlement before the fighting eliminates the possibility that either country can achieve its national objectives?

5. This fight is much bigger than an isolated conflict between India and Pakistan. The security of Asia is increasingly at stake; the nations of the Free World, therefore, have a real interest in seeing the fighting end.

6. We don't know how to assess the latest Chicom note, but it could be ominous. The Chicom threat to India's future is so great in any case that it would seem to us a cardinal aim of Indian as well as U.S. policy should be to keep Pakistan from joining the Chinese.

7. Furthermore, if the fighting continues, India is likely to be drawn further into the cross currents of the cold war and the conflict within the Communist bloc.

8. At any rate, the dangers in the current war - communal outbreak, a halt in economic development, possible Chicom involvement - are so great that we earnestly appeal to Shastri to cooperate fully with U Thant. This war must be halted, or India and Pakistan will both be the losers. Neither side can win anything commensurate with the risks involved. It is the future of free India and Pakistan which is at issue now - not Kashmir.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *pc*, NARA, Date 3-3-04

SEP 9 1965

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 8, 1965

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request for Appointment for  
Indian Ambassador

Recommendation

I recommend that you receive Indian Ambassador B. K. Nehru as soon as possible so that he may present a letter to you from Prime Minister Shastri.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion

Ambassador Nehru has requested an appointment with you so that he can present Prime Minister Shastri's letter in person. Undoubtedly the letter concerns India's case in its current conflict with Pakistan. A talk with the Ambassador would give you an excellent opportunity to demonstrate our strong support for the Security Council's appeal for a cease-fire and to discuss the implications of a continued conflict for India and the United States.

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Authority E611652 SC 5A+D  
By JVB NARA Date 3-3-07

CONFIDENTIAL  
GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3-year intervals,  
declassified 12 years after date  
of origin.

*Dean Rusk*  
Dean Rusk

*President saw  
Nehru 9/9/65*

PRESERVATION COPY

9/8/65





180  
भारतीय राजदूतावास  
वाशिंगटन, डी० सी०  
EMBASSY OF INDIA  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

September 7, 1965

*India  
x Kashmir*

Dear Mr President:

I have the honour to transmit to you  
herewith a message from the Prime Minister of India,  
which has been received at this Embassy telegraphi-  
cally.

With my high regard and esteem,

Yours sincerely,

(B.K. Nehru)  
Ambassador of India

The President,  
The White House,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

519571  
T-101  
9.7.65

SEP 10 1965

New Delhi,  
September 7, 1965.

Excellency:

You are doubtless aware that starting August 5, 1965, armed personnel from the Pakistan side of the Cease-Fire Line in Kashmir began massive infiltration across the Cease-Fire Line. The whole world knows, and ample support to this has been given in reports of General Nimmo to the Secretary-General, that these armed personnel were, in fact, not stray raiders, but had been trained and equipped in Pakistan to bring about a revolution in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. The developments that have taken place since are doubtless known to you both through press reports, as well as information obtained through diplomatic channels. The conflict unleashed by Pakistan on August 5, 1965, has been escalating steadily. When the expectation that there would be some kind of internal unrest or rebellion which the infiltrators would lead and support was belied, further heavy reinforcements began coming in from the part of Kashmir under Pakistani occupation, supported by artillery fire across the Cease-Fire Line. As the U.N. Observers confessed their inability to stop the repeated violations of the Cease-Fire Line, we had no option but to ask our armed forces to take up new positions even by going across the Cease-Fire Line in order to seal the passes and put an end to the infiltration.

2. In order to prevent further escalation, we were anxious that the U.N. should assert itself to ensure that the Cease-Fire Line was respected. We were, therefore, anxious that General Nimmo's reports to the Secretary-General should be made public and that the Secretary-General should himself issue a statement which would clear the air and disprove the claim of Pakistan that she had no responsibility in the matter. Eventually, on August 31, the Secretary-General did address an informal and confidential memorandum on the subject to members of the Security Council

of which India ..(2)

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Authority NLS 00-172(48a)  
By jc/cb. NARA, Date 3-30-1

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of which India and Pakistan were supplied copies. The very next day on September 1st, Pakistan launched a brigade strength attack supported by heavy artillery, heavy tanks and aircraft in the Chhamb sector of the State of Jammu & Kashmir. Apart from the fact that this was a massive attack by the regular forces of Pakistan without any attempt to disguise the fact, this particular invasion altered the whole area of the conflict, because the attack was launched not across the Cease-Fire Line, but across the international boundary between the Indian State of Jammu & Kashmir and West Punjab in Pakistan. Our armed forces naturally fought back the invaders, but in any fighting in the Chhamb sector, our troops were severely handicapped. While the Pakistan forces were supported from bases in Pakistan only a little distance across the border, our troops were handicapped by a long line of communications which was not suitable for the transport of heavy tanks and artillery.

3. On the 2nd September, I received a message from the Secretary-General of the U.N. I replied to it on the 4th September saying that India is not at all anxious for a military conflict and pointing out that the withdrawal of the infiltrators and armed forces that come from Pakistan across the Cease-Fire Line and the international frontier between Jammu & Kashmir and West Pakistan, should be the starting point for the restoration of peace. We should also be assured that there would be no repetition of such aggressive actions in the future. So far as we know, there was no response to the Secretary-General's message from President Ayub.

4. On the 4th September, Security Council met and adopted a resolution. While we were still considering it, Pakistan's offensive in the Chhamb sector was further intensified. On the evening of September 5, a Pakistani aircraft bombed an I.A.F. Unit near Amritsar in Punjab. At about the same time, the Pakistan Air Force bombed Ranbirsinghpura and other places in Jammu & Kashmir well away from the Cease-Fire Line. In these circumstances our armed forces had no option but to take action against the bases in West Punjab from which the entire range of

(3)

operations first across the Cease-Fire Line, then across the international boundary with Jammu & Kashmir and finally, across the international boundary between India and Pakistan were mounted and assisted.

5. In acquainting you with these developments, I only want to emphasise to you that our action is purely defensive in character. All we are concerned with is preserving the integrity of our boundary with Pakistan.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Lal Bahadur

His Excellency  
Lyndon Baines Johnson,  
The President of the United States of America,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.



General's draft answer  
b25 Sep

181

9

New Delhi,  
September 7, 1965.

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Shastri  
to L.B.T.  
9/7/65

of which India ..(2)

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Authority NLS 00-172648a  
By PCB NARA. Date 3-3-04



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Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Lal Bahadur

His Excellency  
Lyndon Baines Johnson,  
The President of the United States of America,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.



13682

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

 WASHINGTON  
 RECEIVED  
 McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE  
~~SECRET~~

August 31, 1965

1965 SEP 1 AM 9 13

 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
 THE WHITE HOUSE

 Subject: Request for Appointment with the  
 President for T. T. Krishnamachari,  
 Indian Finance Minister

In his letter of July 9, 1965 to the President, delivered by Ambassador B. K. Nehru on July 13, Prime Minister Shastri stated that Finance Minister Krishnamachari would be visiting Washington in September to discuss India's proposed Fourth Five-Year Plan with the World Bank and United States officials. Shastri stated "We would appreciate it greatly if you would receive him and let him explain to you personally in greater detail that what we are trying to do is the minimum that we can possibly do, that we are making every sacrifice that we are capable of and that the demands we shall make on you as on other governments will not be excessive." The President told Ambassador Nehru that he would be delighted to see Mr. Krishnamachari.

Mr. Krishnamachari, one of the key political figures in New Delhi, will be in Washington on September 13-18. It is recommended that the President receive Mr. Krishnamachari, preferably toward the latter part of his visit.

*for* Benjamin H. Read  
 Executive Secretary

GROUP 3

 Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
 not automatically declassified.
~~SECRET~~
 DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
 State Dept. Guidelines  
 By jc, NARA, Date 3-3-04

SEP 1 1965

 1- Komer 9/1  
 2- Ret. 182

*India*

*See Reck to Wilson*  
*9/1/65*  
*2/Sec for "30 9/16/65"*  
*3/Cancelled Read/Bundy*  
*memo 9/10/*



183  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

August 30, 1965

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read *BN*  
Executive Secretary *Jadua*

In accordance with Mr. Komer's request concerning the letter signed by the Secretary to the Vice President supporting a possible visit of the Congressional delegation to India, (S/S 13609) there is enclosed a copy of the letter from Vice President Humphrey to Secretary Rusk as well as a copy of a letter from Vice President Humphrey to Senator Fulbright.

Enclosures:

As stated.

AUG 30 1965



11001

183a

THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

July 7, 1965

(Rec'd. July 16)

Reply drafted  
8/23/65  
NEA:SCA:RA Leland


Dear Dean:

I am sending you a copy of a letter which I sent to Bill Fulbright, urging him to take the lead in organizing a Senate delegation to visit India some time in the autumn. I have been after him before on this, but believe that there is a special urgency in trying to get a group to go over this year. Could you try and lean on some of the senior people like Senators Fulbright and Mansfield in the Senate, and Speaker McCormack and Doc Morgan in the House. I believe the Indian Government will be extending separate invitations to the Senate and the House. I will do my part and hope that you will make it clear that the Department encourages this.

I know that many of my colleagues prefer to go to London, Paris and Rome, but we have to impress upon them that Asia is important -- and not just the Indochina peninsula. We simply cannot ignore key countries like India and Japan. As I recall, there has not been a good Congressional group in India for a long time. Anything you can do to encourage this will be appreciated.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

  
Hubert H. HumphreyThe Honorable Dean Rusk  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

Enclosure

AUG 30 1965





1836

THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

July 7, 1965

Dear Bill:

My office has just been informed by the Indian Embassy that the Indian Parliament is planning to renew the invitation originally extended a year ago for a U.S. Congressional group to visit India. I am informed that the upper house will be extending an invitation to the Senate to send a Senatorial delegation some time this fall.

As you know from our previous conversations on this subject, I believe that high priority consideration should be given to sending over a strong Senatorial delegation to India. We have even more reason for doing this now than we did when the invitation was extended.

Given the fact that there are elections in Germany and France this fall, this might provide a good opportunity for some of the ranking people in the Senate to visit another part of the world. I would hope that you might consider leading a delegation to India. Would you be interested in this? I should think that someone on the Committee could take the lead in organizing a good delegation of six or eight Senators and their wives. It would be not only a very beneficial trip from the point of view of U.S.-Indian relations, but could also be a most enjoyable one. I know that the Indian Government will give the Senators a most generous reception.

In view of the reluctance of the Senate to establish additional parliamentary exchanges on a continuing basis, it could be made clear that the acceptance of this invitation does not imply further obligations in the future.

What are the prospects? Do let me know.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

Hubert H. Humphrey

The Honorable J. W. Fulbright  
United States Senate

*[Handwritten signature]*  
184

August 28, 1965

*India*

Mac -

You'll know how to handle this better than I. May I just send it on cold, or with simple notation that this makes sense to thee and me?

RWK

Att. Read/Bundy Memo 8/27, encl. for WH approval  
ltr Rusk to VP re visit to India of CongDel.

8/30  
Bundy  
Rec'd from w/urgent for VP  
Att  
Rec'd (see above) and  
file w/d to Bundy  
for handling





S/S 13609

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED WASHINGTON  
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE  
August 27, 1965

1965 AUG 28 AM 9 20

1- Komer 8/28

2- Ret.

1840

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Enclosed for White House approval is a letter signed by Secretary Rusk to be sent to the Vice President concerning the visit of a Congressional delegation to India. The Secretary has requested White House approval prior to transmittal.

*Benjamin H. Read*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

As stated.

PRESERVATION COPY

8/30/65

1846  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Vice President:

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter to Bill Fulbright concerning a possible Congressional visit to India later this year.

Chet Bowles told me when he was here recently that few Senators and Congressmen have visited India since his arrival there two years ago. He believes a visit by a Congressional delegation would be an excellent means of getting across to Congressional leaders what India is trying to accomplish and the ways in which we are helping.

Such a trip would be very worthwhile and should be more than just a protocol visit. I would like to see a strong delegation go to India and take a hard look at our economic assistance programs there.

In keeping with your suggestion, I will urge senior members, such as Senators Mansfield and Fulbright, Speaker McCormack and Chairman Morgan to make the trip. I hope that you also will continue to stimulate interest in a visit.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

The Honorable  
Hubert H. Humphrey,  
The Vice President.



185

August 30, 1965

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

*India*

In accordance with Mr. Komer's request concerning the letter signed by the Secretary to the Vice President supporting a possible visit of the Congressional delegation to India, (S/S 13609) there is enclosed a copy of the letter from Vice President Humphrey to Secretary Rusk as well as a copy of a letter from Vice President Humphrey to Senator Fulbright.

Enclosures;

As stated.

186

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TO WHITE HOUSE  
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RECEIVED  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Bo*  
*India*

~~CONFIDENTIAL/HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

TO: (ROBERT KOMER) WHITE HOUSE  
FROM: AMBASSADOR BOWLES

HARRISON TELLS ME HE HAS REMOVED ALL QUESTIONABLE MATERIAL  
FROM HIS WASHINGTON POST PIECE AND THAT STERILIZED VERSION WILL  
PROBABLY RUN ON SUNDAY.

HOW ABOUT SENDING ME AN EYES ONLY BACKGROUND STATUS REPORT?  
I AM BEGINNING TO FEEL OUT OF TOUCH.

REGARDS.

BOWLES"

BT

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 12-353  
By ch NARA, Date 6-27-13

PRESERVATION COPY





EMBASSY  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

187

New Delhi, India,  
August 26, 1965.

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

Dear Bob:

I am sending you in confidence a copy of a letter which I have just written to Tom Mann on the Indian situation in general with some further thoughts on the impact of the Kashmir situation on our current relations to the subcontinent. I hope you will feel that it makes sense.

One more point. I have just heard from the grapevine the story that the President has not agreed to my "Binational Foundation", and naturally if this is the case I am deeply disappointed. Bill Fulbright told me that he was confident he could get it through Congress provided he had any reasonable support from the Administration. Indeed, some months ago he told me he doubted it would have more than six or seven votes against it, and that he would assume a similar majority in the House.

It may be that the President is simply holding this up for further discussion with Shastri or T. T. Krishnamachari in order to give us a little leverage. I am afraid that it will not serve the purpose. The Indians have never been enthusiastic about this project and indeed it took a lot of persuasion on our part to get them to agree. The advantages of it are largely on our side.

I hope that the rumor is wrong. In any event, do let me know where it all stands as I am beginning to feel somewhat cut off.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 3-3-04

Chester Bowles

Enclosure:

cc letter to Thomas Mann, 26Aug65.

Mr. Robert W. Komer,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

This document consists of 6 pages.

Copy No. 5 of 8 copies,  
Series A.

New Delhi, India,  
August 26, 1965.

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

Dear Tom:

I have now been back in Delhi for three weeks and have had a chance to touch base with the Prime Minister and key Cabinet and Civil Service officials. I assume you have seen some of the results in our cables and in my memorandum to the President on our military assistance programs to India and Pakistan.

In brief, our situation here appears to be as follows:

1. All key Indian officials seem receptive in regard to the economic steps which we and the World Bank believe to be necessary to speed India's development. Although we may expect a certain amount of trading, I believe that India will ultimately agree to do what we and the World Bank feel is necessary.

2. Indian leaders from the Prime Minister on down accept our concept that we should be planning for the gradual and responsible phasing out of United States economic assistance in a way that will assure India's continuing self-sufficient growth within a reasonable time span.

Asoka Mehta, head of the Indian Planning Commission, is preparing a memorandum which will deal with this question in terms of India's problems, prospects and foreign exchange needs.

The Honorable

Thomas C. Mann,

Under Secretary for Economic Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

Authority NL/RAC 12-352  
By CTS, NARA, Date 6/25/11



~~SECRET~~

-2-

Subramaniam, Minister of Food and Agriculture, has just completed a similar memorandum in regard to the continuing need for PL 480 food imports which suggests that agricultural self-sufficiency should be achieved by 1971.

3. India is developing a clearer appreciation of the problems we face in Viet Nam. This is borne out by the editorial analysis which I recently sent to you, the President, and others. This analysis indicates that in the last sixty days the number of Indian editorials generally favorable to the United States position in Viet Nam has more than doubled and now accounts for about seventy-five percent of the total newspaper circulation of India.

Evidence of this trend among Indian Government officials is reflected in Shastri's statement in his Independence Day speech on August 15 in which he said: "All countries of Europe and America want peace. There is only one country in the world which does not want peace either in Viet Nam or India. And that country is China."

4. Unhappily the recent abortive Pakistan effort to take over the Valley of Kashmir by armed force has added a new and explosive dimension to the complex political situation on the subcontinent. In May and June [ ] a Pakistani guerrilla force was undergoing training in Pakistan-occupied Azad Kashmir for the purpose of infiltrating the Indian-held Valley of Kashmir. [ ] the first two weeks in August as the probable time for this operation.

On August 3 somewhere between two and five thousand Pakistan-trained guerrilla fighters began to infiltrate across the rugged five hundred mile border into the Kashmir Valley for the purpose of blowing up key installations such as power plants and bridges, and organizing the Kashmiris to rise against the Government.

Although I know of no one who doubts the scope or purpose of this exercise, the Pakistanis denied all responsibility. They described the movement as indigenous, spontaneous and under the direction of a non-existent "Kashmir Revolutionary Council". In support of their claim they referred to the broadcasts from "Free Kashmir Radio" which according to all available evidence is located

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

not in the Kashmir Valley but in Pak-controlled territory.

We cannot blink at the fact that these developments have further complicated the American policy dilemma on the sub-continent; and whatever we do or fail to do in regard to Pakistan will have a major impact in India.

In my view it will be most unwise for us to attempt to balance one nation against the other regardless of their political views and actions as we have been doing rather ineffectively for the last ten years. It would be equally destructive to adopt a kind of "plague on both your houses" attitude as a means of dodging an admittedly difficult decision.

If we can patch up our quarrel with Pakistan on a basis that approximates our terms, it would obviously be wise for us to do so. However, in view of the recent Pak actions in Kashmir there is a serious danger that in seeking to ease our relations with Pakistan we may seriously damage our improving relations with India. This we must seek to avoid.

At the moment Ayub Khan appears to be in a weak tactical position. His clumsily covert thrust into Indian-held Kashmir appears to have failed. With very few exceptions the Kashmiri people whom he and his associates assumed would welcome his Pakistan-trained guerrillas remained indifferent or antagonistic; indeed, many of them are said to have cooperated with the Indian forces in identifying and apprehending the infiltrators.

The basically moderate Shastri Government is already under heavy pressures to retaliate and if in his frustration Ayub Khan should now introduce more formidable forces into Kashmir such retaliation would almost certainly follow. Already many Indians with tongue in cheek are saying that in Kashmir as in Viet Nam the only way to crush a foreign-supported guerrilla movement is to attack the source of infiltration and supply.

It is my guess that Ayub Khan, sensing this danger and conscious of Pakistan's growing political isolation, will prudently refuse to take the fatal step, and will temporarily swallow his embarrassment. If so, he may be expected to look for some dramatic way to recoup his rather seriously damaged political

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-4-

position. An obvious solution would be a visit to Washington to rediscover his devotion to the United States, and to offer a carefully hedged agreement to modify his relationship with China.

From the United States point of view this would represent the kind of reversal that we have been seeking and it would appear logical for us to forgive him his sins and to welcome him back into the fold. However, if we should do so without taking into account the reckless Pakistan military intrusion into Kashmir the reaction here in India would be very strong.

Even the most pro-United States Indian leaders would assert that while we are quick to blame them when they are wrong (and they have been wrong on many occasions), we are reluctant for some mysterious reason to apply similar judgments against Pakistan, even when they threaten to plunge the whole subcontinent into war in cooperation with our own major enemy, China, which also happens to be an enemy of India.

Any situation as complex as this one will obviously generate a wide variety of prescriptions. My own suggestion would be to go ahead undramatically with the usual economic assistance to Pakistan on the grounds that this aid is being used effectively and it is in our national interest to assure Pakistan's continued economic development. Far from being resented in India, such a move by us would be welcomed here.

// As a balancing factor we could then quietly and without public announcement cut down on our military assistance to Pakistan on the grounds that Pakistan has now made it even more clear that its military forces are designed not to fight our enemy China, but our friend, democratic India.

In regard to India this would leave the door open, provided our other conditions are met, to assure the Shastri Government of United States assistance to the Fourth Five Year Plan in cooperation with the World Bank, plus continuing military assistance as long as India maintains a vigorous posture against China. This would include the defense of the 2,200-mile Himalayan wall and the border of Burma, plus India's willingness to continue to cooperate with us through [ ] arrangements aimed at China.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-5-

We would not, of course, deliver to India a new assortment of United States weapons in the midst of the present Kashmir confrontation. The F-5s which are India's greatest need could not be delivered for some months at least, and by then the Kashmir situation should be under better control.

However, by drawing a clear distinction between economic and military assistance to both of these countries, we could underscore our disapproval of Pakistan's recent military aggression, reward the Pakistanis for an excellent job of economic development, and tie our future military assistance to the divergent views of Pakistan and India vis-a-vis our primary Asian enemy, China.

Whatever else we may say to the Pakistanis, I believe we must make it clear that we disapprove of (a) the ill disguised Pak military attack on Kashmir, and (b) the Pakistani effort deliberately to deceive us in regard to this exercise. I do not believe that the Pakistanis will force the issue to the breaking point either with the Indians or ourselves. They are in a politically weak position and both economically and militarily they depend almost wholly on us.

Although we may expect some carefully leaked stories out of Karachi and elsewhere that the Soviet Union is prepared to fill any economic or military vacuum which we may leave in Pakistan, I would not take them seriously. The Soviets are not stupid in such matters.

Although they may seek to improve their relations with the Pakistanis, they are not going to sacrifice their relatively strong position in India. This is not to say that they may not build a steel mill in Pakistan and provide other assistance of one kind or another. But they will not attempt to fill any major vacuum which we may leave.

Moreover, far from being to our disadvantage such limited Soviet assistance may serve our interests, i. e., it will tend to moderate Pakistan militancy towards India and Afghanistan, increase India's suspicions of the USSR, and moderate Pakistan's relation with China.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-6-

T. T. Krishnamachari will soon be leaving for the United States. He is particularly anxious to talk to you. I think you will find him in a cooperative mood.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

P. S.

I have made this Eyes Only for obvious reasons but have taken the liberty of sending a copy to Bob Komer with whom I have discussed this subject frequently.

CBowles/hm

~~SECRET~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

189

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*India*

P S E C R E T SEONE OPTWO AUGUST 25

USIA ON MONDAY EVENING I MET FOR NEARLY HOUR WITH PRIMIN SHASTRI.  
NSC SINCE I HAD NOT SEEN HIM SINCE BEFORE MY RECENT HOME LEAVE, IT  
INR MAY CONTRIBUTE TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF CURRENT ATMOSPHERE  
CIA HERE AND OF SHASTRI'S OWN MOOD, REACTIONS AND INTERESTS IF I  
NSA REPORT THE EXCHANGE IN MORE THAN NORMAL DETAIL.

DOD 1. I OPENED CONVERSATION BY PRESENTING SHASTRI WITH DELUXE  
AID COPIES OF FIVE OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S SPEECHES MADE IN LAST  
E EIGHT MONTHS. THIS LED DIRECTLY INTO DISCUSSION OF BROAD  
RSR PROGRAM OF DOMESTIC LEGISLATION WHICH PRESIDENT IS NOW PUSHING  
THROUGH CONGRESS.

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 1066A S E C R E T  
SHASTRI SHOWED LIVELY INTEREST IN POLITICAL MANEUVERS RELATED  
TO THIS EFFORT AND QUESTIONED ME SPECIFICALLY ABOUT SUCH CURRENT  
US PROGRAMS AS MEDICARE, LOW COST HOUSING, MINIMUM WAGES,  
EDUCATION, TAX REDUCTION, AND CIVIL RIGHTS; HE WAS PARTICULARLY  
INTERESTED IN EFFECT OF RECENT TAX CUTS IN INCREASING PURCHASING  
POWER.

SHASTRI THEN ASKED ABOUT CAUSE OF LOS ANGELES RIOTS. I SUGGESTED THAT IN  
ANY DEMOCRACY DISORDER IS MOST LIKELY TO DEVELOP WHEN A  
DEPRIVED GROUP BEGIN TO FEEL SENSE OF PROGRESS AND CONSEQUENTLY  
ACQUIRES NEW CONFIDENCE ACCOMPANIED IN MANY CASES BY A DEGREE  
OF MILITANCY.

HE WAS INTERESTED IN REFERENCE TO NEW DEAL PERIOD WHEN THE DISORDERS  
OCCURRED NOT IN THE DEPTHS OF THE DEPRESSION WHEN 15 MILLION  
WERE OUT OF WORK BUT DURING THE RECOVERY PERIOD WHEN PEOPLE WERE

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

Authority *File 10-28-76*  
By *JKW* NARA, Date *3-3-01*



~~SECRET~~

-2- 371, August 25 (SECTION ONE OF TWO), From: New Delhi  
BEGINNING TO REGAIN THEIR CONFIDENCE. I SUGGESTED THAT IN INDIA  
WE MAY SEE SIMILAR PROCESS. AS INDIAN PEOPLE BEGIN TO FEEL  
SENSE OF GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT THEY WILL BECOME MORE AGGRESSIVE  
IN THEIR DEMANDS AND PROTESTS. SUCH FERMENT GOES WITH PROGRESS  
IN A DEMOCRACY AND ALTHOUGH IT IS OFTEN TRYING, WE MUST LEARN  
TO LIVE WITH IT, CONTAIN IT, ETC.

2. SHASTRI THEN INTRODUCED SUBJECT OF US AID TO INDIA. IN  
MY REPLY TO HIS QUERIES I COVERED SAME GROUND AS I HAD WITH

PAGE THREE RUSBAE 1066A ~~SECRET~~

OTHER MEMBERS OF GOVT, I.E., THAT PRES JOHNSON HAS BEEN DIVIDING  
HIS TIME BETWEEN MASSIVE PROGRAM OF DOMESTIC LEGISLATION ON  
ONE HAND AND VIET NAM ON OTHER, THAT SINCE HE IS ANXIOUS TO  
KNOW PRECISELY WHAT INDIA PROGRAM HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHING,  
HOW TO MAKE IT MORE EFFECTIVE, ETC. AND BECAUSE CONGRESS  
HAD NOT YET FINALLY ENACTED NECESSARY LEGISLATION HIS DECISIONS  
IN REGARD TO OUR CONTRIBUTION TO INDIAN FOURTH FIVE YEAR PLAN  
ARE STILL HANGING FIRE.

I TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO SUGGEST NEED, AS I SEE IT, FOR REEXAMINATION  
BY BOTH RECIPIENTS AND DONORS OF WHOLE CONCEPT OF ECONOMIC  
ASSISTANCE. PURPOSE OF US AID IS TO ENABLE NON COMMUNIST  
COUNTRIES LIKE INDIA TO GET SOLIDLY ON THEIR OWN FEET, TO BE IN  
POSITION TO MAKE THEIR OWN DECISIONS, AND TO PROVIDE INCREASING  
DEGREE OF PROSPERITY AND OPPORTUNITY FOR THEIR PEOPLE. SINCE  
BOTH GIVING AND RECEIVING FOREIGN AID PRESENTS OBVIOUS  
PSYCHOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES, THE QUICKER THIS GOAL CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED  
THE BETTER IT WILL BE FOR BOTH PARTIES.

WE WERE THEREFORE EXPLORING WHAT WOULD BE REQUIRED BY OUR  
GOVT., WORLD BANK, AND OTHER INTERESTED COUNTRIES ON ONE HAND  
AND INDIA ON OTHER TO HELP INDIA TO BECOME FULLY SELF-  
SUPPORTING NATION WITHIN REASONABLE TIME SPAN. SHASTRI VIGOROUSLY  
ENDORSED THIS CONCEPT AND STATED THAT EFFORT ALONG THESE LINES

PAGE FOUR RUSBAE 1066A ~~SECRET~~  
WOULD HAVE HIS FULL SUPPORT.

3. FROM THIS POINT I LED DISCUSSION TO QUESTION OF SHASTRI'S  
VISIT TO US. PRES JOHNSON, I SAID, HAD ISSUED HIM INVITATION  
LAST SPRING TO COME IN FALL AND HE WAS MOST HOPEFUL HE COULD  
TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT. PRESIDENT WAS EAGER FOR OPPORTUNITY TO

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-3- 371, August 25 (SECTION ONE OF TWO), From: New Delhi

DISCUSS WIDE RANGE OF PROBLEMS SUCH AS PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA, INDIAN AGRICULTURE AND ITS RELATION TO PL 480, INDIA'S SECURITY PROBLEM VIS-A-VIS CHINA, PROSPECT FOR GRADUALLY IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN, ETC.

I WAS SURE PRESIDENT WOULD WELCOME OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON HOW FIGHTING CAN BE STOPPED IN VIETNAM WITHOUT ALLOWING CHINA TO OVERRUN SOUTHEAST ASIA. PRESIDENT WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE SHASTRI'S INSIGHTS INTO FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN ASIA AND AFRICA, HOW WE CAN REACH BETTER UNDERSTANDING WITH USSR, ETC. IN MORE PERSONAL TERMS PRESIDENT SIMPLY WISHED TO GET TO KNOW PRIMIN AS LEADER OF WORLD'S LARGEST DEMOCRACY. ALTHOUGH SHASTRI SEEMED MOST RECEPTIVE TO THIS PRESENTATION HE STRESSED THAT HE WAS NOW UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE AND HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF WHETHER THESE PRESSURES WOULD EASE OR NOT BY OCTOBER. THEREFORE IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO MAKE DEFINITE PLANS.

ALTHOUGH I AGREED WITH IMPOSSIBILITY OF NAILING DOWN

PAGE FIVE RUSBAE 1066A ~~SECRET~~  
SPECIFIC DATE, I SUGGESTED HE KEEP POSSIBILITY VERY MUCH IN MIND. I ADDED THAT HE MIGHT FIND IT OPPORTUNE TO VISIT UN IN OCT AND INSTEAD OF EXCHANGING EPITHETS WITH PAKISTANIS LAY OUT BASIS FOR WHAT MIGHT BE PEACEFUL SOLUTION. SPEECH OF THIS KIND BEFORE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WOULD PROVIDE DRAMATIC CONTRAST TO CRISES AND CONFLICTS WITH WHICH UN MEMBERS ARE NORMALLY CONTENDING.

I REMINDED HIM OF SPEECH PRES KENNEDY MADE AT UN IN SEPT 1962 AT POINT WHEN UN-SOVIET REALTIONS WERE AT LOW EBB WHICH DID GREAT DEAL TO EASE TENSIONS IN OUR OWN COUNTRY AND SOVIET UNION AS WELL. IN JUNE 1963 KENNEDY HAD SEIZED UPON ANOTHER TENSE PERIOD IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS TO OFFER SOVIETS OLIVE BRANCH IN A SPEECH AT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN WASHINGTON. THIS TOO WAS RECEIVED WARMLY THROUGHOUT WORLD AND HAD GONE FAR TO LAY BASIS FOR MOSCOW TEST BAN TREATY. IN HIS INAUGURAL ADDRESS WHICH I HAD JUST GIVEN TO SHASTRI TO READ PRES JOHNSON HAD FURTHER UNDERSCORED THE THEME OF PEACE AND UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN ALL NATIONS IN CONFLICT.

IT WOULD SEEM TO ME THAT A SHASTRI SPEECH BEFORE UN ASSEMBLY IN OCT MIGHT OFFER PRIMIN A PARTICULARLY DRAMATIC OPPORTUNITY TO EXERT LEADERSHIP WHICH WOULD BE WARMLY ACCLAIMED ABROAD AND WHICH WOULD CONSEQUENTLY HELP STRENGTHEN HIS DOMESTIC POSITION.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-4- 371, August 25 (SECTION ONE OF TWO), From: New Delhi

SHASTRI SEEMED TO WARM UP TO THIS VISION AND DESCRIBED IT AS AN APPEALING SUGGESTION. HOWEVER HE ADDED THAT PAKS AT PRESENT SEEMED TO BE EMBARKED ON A COURSE OF ACTION WHICH WAS CLOSE TO OUTRIGHT WAR, AND THAT DIFFERENT ATMOSPHERE WOULD BE NECESSARY BEFORE WE COULD REALISTICALLY EXPECT TO SETTLE DIFFERENCES NOW PLAGUING SUBCONTINENT. BOWLES

~~SECRET~~

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

114

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RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK 39  
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ZEN/AMCONGEN MADRAS UNN  
ZEN/AMCONGEN BOMBAY UNN  
STATE GRNC  
BT

19053  
1965 AUG 25 AM 9 51

SECRET AUGUST 25

SETTWO OF TWO

4. SHASTRI THEN BROUGHT UP QUESTION OF VIETNAM; HE ASKED IN PARTICULAR ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR MORE INTENSE FIGHTING AFTER MONSOON RAINS ARE OVER. I REPLIED THAT IN BOTH A MILITARY AND POLITICAL SENSE WE HAD COME THROUGH MONSOON PERIOD CONSIDERABLY BETTER THAN WE HAD EXPECTED AND SEEMED TO BE MAKING STEADY PROGRESS.

I ADDED THAT PRES JOHNSON HAD WELCOMED HIS RECENT STATEMENT IN WHICH HE REFERRED TO OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PEACEFUL SOLUTION AND STATED THAT CHINA SEEMED TO BE ONE NATION WHICH FAVORED CONFLICT AND WAR. WE ALSO WELCOMED FACT THAT HE HAD

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 1066B ~~SECRET~~  
DROPPED OUT OF SEVERAL RECENT STATEMENT'S DIRECT REFERENCE TO STOPPING OF BOMBING OF NORTH VIET NAM AND HAD INSTEAD PLEADED IN A BALANCED WAY FOR AN END TO ALL FIGHTING AND FOR MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS.

I ADDED THAT BOMBING WAS AT LEAST AS DISTASTEFUL TO US AS IT WAS TO HIM BUT IN VIEW OF INTRANSIGENCE OF NORTH VIET NAM THERE SEEMED TO BE NO ALTERNATIVE FOR TIME BEING.  
IF SOVIET UNION, INDIA, YUGOSLAVIA, UAR OR ANY OTHER NATION COULD PROVIDE US WITH CLEAR INDICATION THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE IN RALISTIC WAY WE WOULD RESPOND IN FORTHRIGHT MANNER.

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 371, AUGUST 25, (SEC TWO OF TWO) FROM NEW DELHI

I COMMENTED ON PRESENCE OF SOVIET DEPUTY PRIMIN K.T. MAZUROV WHO IS NOW IN NEW DELHI AND SAID I HOPED SHASTRI WOULD TELL HIM SPECIFICALLY WHAT I HAD SAID, E.E., THAT US IS GENUINELY ANXIOUS FOR PEACE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, THAT WE SHARE WITH SOVIET UNION AND ALL OTHER NATIONS COMMON DESIRE TO EASE TENSIONS WHICH HAVE CREATED SUCH DIFFICULTIES AND DANGERS FOR ALL OF US. IF THERE IS TO BE PEACE IN WORLD SOONER OR LATER US AND SOVIET UNION MUST FIND BASIS FOR WORKING TOGETHER FOR THIS COMMON END. I URGED HIM TO TELL MAZUROV THAT THESE WERE VIEWS OF US GOVT. SHASTRI WAS RESPONSIVE.

5. SHASTRI THEN VOLUNTEERED THAT KASHMIR SITUATION HAD SEEMED LITTLE MORE QUIET LAST DAY OR TWO. HOWEVER HE WAS

PAGE THREE RUSBAE 1066B RUSBAE ~~SECRET~~  
FEARFUL THAT INTRODUCTION OF PAK INFILTRATORS INTO KASHMIR VALLEY WHOSE NUMBER HE SAID HAD BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY LARGER THAN GOI HAD ORIGINALLY ESTIMATED, MIGHT BE ONLY FIRST STEP IN SUCCESSION OF AGGRESSIVE STEPS BY GOP. HE ASSUMED THAT IF FURTHER AGGRESSIVE MOVES OCCURRED PERHAPS EVENTUALLY INVOLVING PAK ARMY, IT WOULD BE COORDINATED WITH BORDER MANEUVERS BY CHINESE TO TIE DOWN SECTIONS OF INDIAN ARMY.

OBVIOUSLY WAR WOULD BE DISASTROUS FOR PAKISTAN AND INDIA AND FOR ALL OF SOUTH ASIA. ALTHOUGH THERE WERE MANY HOT HEADS IN INDIA AS WELL AS PAKISTAN WHO WERE PUSHING FOR WHAT THEY CALLED A SHOWDOWN HE WOULD NOT BE PRESSED INTO RETALIATION UNLESS PAKS THEMSELVES MAKE FURTHER MOVES.

I ASKED SHASTRI SPECIFICALLY WHAT ROLE HE SAW FOR UN. SHASTRI REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT UN'S FIRST RESPONSIBILITY WAS TO MAKE PUBLIC REPORT OF GEN NIMMO'S BORDER OBSERVERS OR AT VERY LEAST MAKE REPORT AVAILABLE TO MEMBERS OF SECURITY COUNCIL. HE SAID ONCE THIS HAD BEEN DONE ANY UN OFFICIAL INCLUDING RALPH BUNCHE WOULD RECEIVE WARM WELCOME IN NEW DELHI.

6. IN REGARD TO RANN OF KUTCH AGREEMENT SHASTRI, IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION, SAID THAT INDIA WAS DETERMINED TO

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-3- 371, AUGUST 25, (SEC TWO OF TWO) FROM NEW DELHI

PAGE FOUR RUSBAE 1066B ~~S E C R E T~~  
GO AHEAD ON SCHEDULE AND WITHIN SIXTY DAYS WOULD ANNOUNCE  
APPOINTMENT OF ITS NEGOTIATOR. MORE THAN SCORE OF NAMES ARE  
NOW BEING CONSIDERED.

COMMENT: SHASTRI WAS MORE IMPRESSIVE IN THIS DISCUSSION THAN  
ANY I HAVE HAD WITH HIM SINCE HE BECAME PRIME MINISTER. HE WAS MORE  
FORTHCOMING AND STATED HIS VIEWS ON A VARIETY OF SUBJECTS  
WITH CONSIDERABLE PRECISION WHICH REFLECTED MORE HOMEWORK AND  
WITH A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN PERSONAL CONFIDENCE. ALTHOUGH  
PROBLEMS THAT HE NOW FACES ARE APPALLING HE APPEARED RELAXED  
AND EVEN JOVIAL.

HOWEVER, SHASTRI IS AN INHERENTLY CAUTIOUS PERSON AND  
UNLESS FORCED TO DO SO BY EVENTS I DOUBT THAT HE WILL MAKE  
ANY POLITICALLY BOLD DECISIONS UNTIL HE HAS BEEN ELECTED IN HIS  
OWN RIGHT SEVENTEEN MONTHS FROM NOW. IN MEANTIME ALTHOUGH  
HIS PERFORMANCE AS PRIME MINISTER MAY BE UNIMAGINATIVE HE IS  
UNLIKELY TO GO OFF ON TANGENTS.

IN REGARD TO OCT VISIT I WAS SORRY NOT TO BE ABLE TO GET YOU  
A CLEARER ANSWER. HOWEVER IN VIEW OF VERY REAL FEARS HERE  
THAT PAKS MAY RAISE MILITARY ANTE IN NEXT FEW WEEKS IT IS  
CERTAINLY UNDERSTANDABLE WHY HE COULD NOT BE MORE SPECIFIC  
AT THIS TIME. IT IS MY GUESS WE WILL GET TENTATIVE ANSWER  
ONE WAY OR ANOTHER WITHIN WEEK BUT THAT HE WILL NOT FINALLY  
COMMIT HIMSELF UNTIL HE CAN SEE REASONABLY CLEAR PERIOD  
AHEAD. I WILL FOLLOW UP ON THIS PARTICULAR QUESTION WITHIN  
WEEK OR SO WITH L.K. JHA WITH A FURTHER PERSONAL PUSH ON THE  
OPPORTUNITY FOR SHASTRI TO EMERGE AS A WORLD STATESMAN VIA  
A MAJOR CONCILIATORY SPEECH TO UN ASSEMBLY. GP-3  
BOWLES  
BT

~~SECRET~~



RWK - Did you ever get an answer from McGB

190

on this or shall I check?

Hal - tell PDA this  
up to the Secretary  
as to whether he want  
to touch base with President

Told Larkin desk  
officer 8/18.  
H.

190a 7

*India*

~~SECRET~~

RWK:

August 6, 1965

Rusk has to answer a letter from Humphrey asking support for a strong Congressional delegation to India, probably late November. After an Indian delegation visited Congress in 1963, the Indian parliament sent a reciprocal invite. Congress begged off then because of JFK's death and the long session. Now B. K. Nehru has sounded out Humphrey and is about to deliver a renewed invitation.

Humphrey is all for it. But the problem is to drum up top level interest on the Hill. Hence Humphrey's request for a plug from Rusk. The idea would be not just to send the faithful but to try to convert a couple of the curmudgeon's too.

Rusk proposes replying this way: Bowles would welcome a Congressional delegation as a real opportunity to let key legislators see firsthand what we're doing in India. Rusk would hope this would be more than just a protocol visit and that a strong delegation would take a piercing look at our AID and other programs there.

SOA's question is whether they should formally clear Rusk's reply to Humphrey with the White House in view of the President's tight control on our Indian tactics or whether they should just go ahead assuming (with your blessing) that this project is right in line with the President's desire to bring key Congressmen along behind him.

My own sense is that this is just the sort of thing the President wants--a hard look at India. So should I tell State to go ahead? Or would you rather (a) check across the street or (b) ask to clear formally (this might look like policing the VP)?

HHS

Sent to McGB 8/6 - "After this morning I'd better check this with you. My instinct is to tell State this is their business."

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 3-30-1

~~SECRET~~



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

191  
003

~~SECRET~~

CORRECTION ISSUED:

8/4/65 RLC

41  
Action

SS  
Info

0 1 4 4 4

1965 AUG 4 AM 11 46

FROM: NEW DELHI - CORRECTED COPY

ACTION: SECSTATE 200 PRIORITY

DATE: AUGUST 3

*India file w/ltts)*  
*✓ cables*  
*K. Am*

EXDIS

DEPTTEL 124; EMBTEL 139

AT END CONVERSATION WITH L. K. JHA REPORTED IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM, HE ADVERTED TO PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO SHASTRI, WHICH I HAD DELIVERED JULY 26. WE DID NOT REPEAT NOT HAVE TEXT BEFORE US, BUT HE SAID HE AND SHASTRI HAD BEEN PERPLEXED BY SENTENCE IN PENULTIMATE PARAGRAPH "I KNOW THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY SIGNALLED ITS INTEREST AND CONCERN BY GIVING ASSISTANCE". THEY HAD CONSULTED SENIOR OFFICIALS OF MEA, WHO HAD ALSO BEEN PERPLEXED. COULD I EXPLAIN IT?

I SAID I WOULD RATHER NOT SPEAK OFF THE CUFF AND WOULD CHECK THE PRECISE LANGUAGE AND, IF NECESSARY, SEEK GUIDANCE.

COMMENT: I CONFESS THIS PASSAGE HAD ALSO STRUCK ME AT THE TIME, BUT I CONCLUDED THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT TIME BEFORE SHASTRI LEFT FOR BELGRADE TO CHECK WHETHER ITS INCLUSION WAS TAILOR MADE FOR SHASTRI. EVEN IF NOT REPEAT NOT, I SUGGEST IN CIRCUMSTANCES, WE RESPOND ALONG POSITIVE LINES, E. G. THAT SIGNALS OF INTEREST HAD BEEN NUMEROUS PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND THAT PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE HAD SUGGESTED GOI REALLY DOES WANT TO BE HELPFUL, AT LEAST IN POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC WAYS. I SENSE THAT THERE IS BETTER PROSPECT OF KEEPING SHASTRI AND HIS CLOSE ADVISERS RESPONSIVE TO OUR VIEWS IF WE MAKE A SHOW OF THIS SORT THAN IF WE TRY TO EXPLAIN WE DID NOT REALLY MEAN IT THE FIRST TIME.

PLEASE ADVISE. GP-3. GREENE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *State Hr. 10/28/76; NSC 5/6/77*

~~SECRET~~

By *plrmg* NARA, Date *3-5-01*

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AUG 4 1965



191a

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

41  
Action

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

SS

Info

QSA09WSBA394

Authority *Stk 10/28/76, NSC 5/477*

01444

By *plm*

NARA. Date *3-5-04*

1965 AUG 3 AM 11 46

DE RUSBAE 99 2151514  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 031501Z  
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY (200)  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ AUGUST 3

EXDIS

DEPTTEL 124; EMBTEL 139

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PAGE TWO RUSBAE 99 ~~SECRET~~  
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PLEASE ADVISE. GP-3. GREENE.

~~SECRET~~

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AUG 3 1965



~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

CLASSIFICATION

*India*

192

RECEIVED  
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Executive Secretariat  
1965 AUG 3 PM 2 49

McG

1965

August 3, 1965

Date

FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House  
  
FROM: Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

*Done  
RWK*

For your information and  
files.

Enclosures:

, NEW DELHI 200, CY 2 and 3

*Koma*

*etc:  
RWK:  
Can we  
help  
string  
this  
in at?*

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

CLASSIFICATION

AUG 5 1965

*called Read  
and speed in  
line to turn*

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY ju ON 21793

*Returned to  
Alice Boyce  
for files 8/5/65  
T.*



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

192a

41  
Action

SS  
Info

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED  
GEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

AUG 3 PM 02:44 44  
1965 AUG 3 AM 11 46

QSA009WSBA394  
PP RUEHCR  
DE RUSBAE 99 2151514  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 031501Z  
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY (200)  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
S E C R E T AUGUST 3

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 1928/16; K 15/477  
By pl/mg NARA Date 3-5-01

EXDIS

DEPTEL 124; EMBTEL 139

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PAGE TWO RUSBAE 99 ~~SECRET~~  
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PLEASE ADVISE. GP-3. GREENE.

~~SECRET~~

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AUG 5 1965



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

VERBATIM TEXT

12896

193

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 124

JUL 25 5 32 PM '65

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR

Message referred to in earlier telegram is as follows:

QTE Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I was glad to receive your letter of ~~July~~ 9, 1965 and welcome your expression of confidence in the United States objective of the establishment of peace in Viet-Nam. I am writing to you again because of the increasing seriousness of the situation in Viet-Nam despite the efforts of all of us to seek a peaceful settlement.

In the memorandum enclosed with my letter of June 5, I had told you of the extent to which the United States and the Government of South Viet-Nam had gone to offer the other side an opportunity for unconditional negotiations. Our Charge in New Delhi has provided (is providing) you with a new report which further demonstrates our desire to seize any opportunity for establishing peace in a free South Viet-Nam. For its part your government, through its efforts in formulating the 17 nation appeal and through the proposals of your President, has done much to show the world avenues to peace which, by asking compromise from both sides, would offer prospect of a Vietnamese

Drafted by: NEA:DSchneider:aws  
7/25/65

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

FE - William P. Bundy with

NEA - Mr. Talbot  
S/S

U - Mr. Ball

WH: Mr. M. Bundy

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8/8/80 1tr.

PRESERVATION COPY

FORM  
6-6

JUL 27 1965

By [signature] NARA. Date 3-5-01

SECRET

with honor.

Yet despite your efforts and ours, I regret I must report to you that the situation in Viet-Nam is becoming much more serious. I have been reviewing this situation during the last few days in the light of up-to-date reports from my most trusted associates. While final decisions have not been made here, I can tell you that it now appears certain that it will be necessary to increase the United States armed forces in South Viet-Nam by a number which may equal or exceed the 80,000 already there.

I want you to know that as we make this major additional effort we will also continue to make every political and diplomatic effort that we can to open the way to a peaceful settlement.

We will also continue to use every care and restraint to ensure that the fires of war do not spread on the mainland of Asia. Our objective remains the end of external interference in South Viet-Nam so that the people of that country can determine their own future.

In this situation I must <sup>express to</sup> ~~share with~~ you my own deep personal conviction that the prospect of peace in Viet-Nam will be greatly increased in the measure that the necessary efforts of the United States are supported and shared by other nations which share our purposes and our concerns. I know that your government has already signalled its interest and concern by giving assistance. I now ask that

you

SECRET

PRESERVATION COPY



~~SECRET~~

you give most earnest consideration to increasing that assistance in ways which will give a clear signal to the world--and perhaps especially to Hanoi--of the solidarity of international support for resistance to aggression in Viet-Nam and for a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam.

You may have some opportunity to ponder these thoughts in connection with your forthcoming talks with President Tito. You will bear in mind, I know, the importance to the United States, indeed to the free world, of actions which meet the aggressive challenge we face in South Viet-Nam.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

GP-3

End.

RHSK

~~SECRET~~

8/20  
194  
Dhanwant Singh  
32xWest 95th Street 382 Central Park West  
New York City 25, N. Y.  
Phone AC 2-7259

orig ret'd to  
Alice Boyce  
for file 12/3/65

August 13, 1965.

The President of the United States  
White House  
Washington D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

All commanders have looked to God's guidance in  
crucial times; we are amidst such a situation  
now.

Sir, you feel justified in your policy of "limited  
power" for limited objectives in Vietnam, but this  
policy is vulnerable to attack, both from those who  
want you to risk less and those who want you to risk  
more.

The task of winning an honourable settlement in Viet-  
nam still lies ahead. Many things are wrought by  
prayer; God's ways are wondrous.

One Dr. Kartar Singh in my old country saw a vision  
recently that "America is justified in going to Viet-  
nam's assistance". I reported this to Mr. Robert Komer,  
Assistant to Mr. McGeorge Bundy because I could not  
get to see Mr. Bundy in spite of repeated requests.  
Dr. Singh also saw that India and Pakistan would fight  
a major war although they may temporarily settle in  
the Rann of Kutch. I reported to Mr. Komer on June 21  
that Pakistan would infiltrate at many places and  
provoke fighting; it started on August 9. Dr. Singh  
informed us in 1946 about the creation of Pakistan and  
the bloodshed that was to follow. We informed Mr. Truman,  
Lord Attlee, Sir Stafford Cripps, and Sir Winston Churchill.  
That more than 500,000 people were to be killed and  
two million people were to become refugees was also  
revealed to this great man of God. Some three months  
ago he informed the President of India that Pakistan  
would force a war on India, and he told him to take heed.

I believe it may be possible for me to invite this  
great God realized Dr. Singh to the U.S. and you may

AUG 25 1965

PRESERVATION COPY



have a meeting with him.

If I can be instrumental in bringing you two together,  
I will feel greatly satisfied in having done a service  
for this country, the country of my adoption. I  
sincerely hope and pray that God will make it possible.

Sincerely yours,

*Dhanwant Singh*

Dhanwant Singh

PRESERVATION COPY

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thompson  
Kapa  
12808

*[Handwritten signature]*  
195

81  
Origin  
55  
Info

ACTION: Amembassy New Delhi 119 PRIORITY

EXDIS

JUL 24 3 38 PM '65

EYES ONLY CHARGE

1. In connection with your seeing Shastri to deliver statement our position on peaceful settlement, per septel instructions, you should be aware that Highest levels told Amb Nehru prior his departure that we considering major increases in US forces in SVN with possible call-up of reserves and force increases, and major increases in Defense budget.

2. Shastri undoubtedly informed of this, and you should take initiative to inform him that exact scope of decision foreshadowed to Nehru still under intense consideration here. We are sure that we will have to increase our forces to significant extent, but no decision has yet been taken on scope and timing of other actions mentioned to Nehru. You should stress that, as we contemplate such actions, we remain as deeply concerned as ever to find an honorable and peaceful solution. We are discouraged by present readings of Hanoi position but, as our effort with Nkrumah shows, we will leave no stone unturned to maintain preliminary dialogue with Hanoi. For same reason, we are deeply anxious stay in

Drafted by:

FE: WPBundy/bmm 7/24/65

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

William P. Bundy

S/S - Mr. Mills

NEA - Miss Laise

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~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 3-5-01

FORM DS-322  
8-63

JUL 27 1965



~~TOP SECRET~~

close touch with GOI and Shastri personally and, as indicated in septel statement and oral explanation, would welcome any constructive initiative for peace from GOI or 17 non-aligned nations.

GP-3.

END

BALL.

~~TOP SECRET~~

196

CEDAR POINT  
MACKINAC ISLAND, MICHIGAN

July 23, 1965

Mr. Robert Komer,  
372 Executive Office Building,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Komer,

It was good to see you again with Mr. Vaitheswaran and  
Mr. Gandhi.

I enclose an article written by Mr. Vaitheswaran on  
"National Communism". Since this seems to be becoming an  
issue of capital importance I think his views are most inter-  
esting and clarifying.

Very sincerely yours,

William T. Close, M.D.

JUL 26 1965



196a

THE GREAT DEBATE ON VIETNAM  
by  
R. Vaitheswaren  
Political Editor of "Hindustan"  
Bombay

The great debate on Vietnam is whether withdrawal is not better than escalation and negotiations are not preferable to war. In recent weeks, it has developed into a discussion of the acceptability or otherwise of what is called National Communism.

"If the Americans had been sensible," said an Indian spokesman to me, "they would have negotiated with Ho Chi Minh three years ago and given him South Vietnam. There would then have been a Communist regime in all of Vietnam and it would have been anti-Chinese. Now they will have a Communist Vietnam which is not anti-Chinese." This view of the Indian Government has received unexpected support in recent weeks.

"National Communism," said Mr. Patrick Gordon-Walker, semi-official spokesman of the British government in a speech recently in the United States, "is a force that can, in certain circumstances and in various parts of the world, be compatible with our attainable ends."

The New York Times endorses this view and in an editorial urges that, "Notice should be taken of Mr. Gordon-Walker's remarks about the potentials of National Communism as a weapon against Chinese imperialism."

"The Vietnamese who are Communists," continues the editorial, "also belong to a people with a centuries old tradition of resistance to Chinese domination. At least in this respect their interests coincide with those of both the United States and the Soviet Union. The task of diplomacy in the present situation will be to use this mutuality of interest as a force for a negotiated, honorable peace."

National Communism is thus sought to be encouraged as an instrument of foreign policy. It was right to support Tito against Stalin, the argument runs. "In Eastern Europe the Johnson Administration has moved skillfully to exploit the National Communism of Rumania, for example, as a means of weakening the Soviet hold over that area," writes the New York Times. By the same count, presumably, it is a good policy to strengthen Ho Chi Minh. It is assumed, we know not how, that he will be anti-Chinese. The policy is, therefore, to encourage him to move into the Soviet orbit. Russian missiles around Hanoi become somehow a desirable alternative to Chinese advisors in the jungle.

The great debate is, in fact, the great surrender. It is a face saver, a counsel of despair. "If a victory cannot be achieved," says Gordon-Walker, "then the chief end of policy must be the avoidance of defeat."

We cannot accept this policy for many reasons. Communism's practice has always been nationalist. As Djilas points out in his book "The New Class" the one achievement of Communism in our time has been the transformation of underdeveloped economies like the Soviet Union to a highly powerful nation state. Stalin harnessed the internationalism of Marx and the power of his ideology to the development of the Russian state. This is true of Mao Tse-tung today. The one does not become better than the other by virtue of conflict between the two.

National Communism in the conditions of Asia tends to adopt the Chinese pattern. The communist groups which advocate the Chinese line, that is, armed uprisings of peasants and a relentless guerrilla struggle escalating into total war, are also the most nationalist. This will be



increasingly true of the Communist parties of Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia and the left wing pro-Chinese groups in India and the other Asian countries. Therefore, National Communism may lead to a strengthening of the bonds between South and Southeast Asia and China. It is more militant and aggressive and with power may become more oppressive. It is true that official Communist parties, such as the Deng group in India, seem more nationalistic because of their anti-Chinese line but, in fact, they are merely pro-Russian.

The position has been different in Eastern Europe where National Communism has led to a weakening of the ties of Soviet Union with these countries. Resentment over Soviet domination will ultimately lead, in these nations, to a claim to independence. But, no universal law about National Communism can be deduced from this fact. Contradictions between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union may be amenable to exploitation. Nationalism may here be a liberalizing democratizing force though the increasing rapprochement between Tito and the Soviet leadership makes this doubtful. Moreover, no substantial concession to Communist power is involved when the Western powers help strengthen the independence of Eastern European nations.

On the other hand, extension of this theory that National Communism can be exploited to the benefit of Western powers to the Asian continent involves conceding large areas and even nations to Communism. It amounts to acceptance of the Soviet Union and Communist China as the principal powers of Asia and a recognition of their sphere of influence and satellitism. If this is considered inevitable, there is no reason for the United States or anyone else to fight in Southeast Asia. But, surely the powers in Vietnam who have chosen to give battle are doing so not just to force negotiations which will legalize transfer of South Vietnam to

the Viet Cong but because they want to prevent the imposition of such a result by the armed action of the Communists.

The vital issue in South and Southeast Asia is not Vietnam but China. A Vietnam unified under Ho Chi Minh will still leave unresolved all the problems of Chinese aggressiveness. In fact, it will speed up their timetable of advance in the region. The real lack is, therefore, an adequate China policy which will plan for the region as a whole.

At present, the alternatives in Asia are between a pro-China and an anti-China policy. Both have proved inadequate. The former has not checked the influence of China. The latter has failed to contain the expansionist ambitions of Mao Tse-tung. What is needed is a policy that will prepare for developments in China for the next 25 years and anticipate her moves in neighbouring countries in the coming period.

Surely, the lesson of Vietnam is that it is time to take care of the nations around China. We need to encircle China with a ring of nations united, stable and strong who together seek to present an ideological alternative to the Chinese. This is no easy task as the situation in many Southeast Asian countries is quite unstable. The leadership is often quite divided and militarily the nations are quite weak; but somehow these nations must be helped to put their own house in order. The leadership must rise up to this difficult task.



197

2419 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE  
WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

July 19, 1965

As from: HIMMAT  
13 Advent  
Foreshore Road  
Bombay 1

Dear Mr. Comer,

It was a real pleasure to talk with you this morning,  
and I hope it will not be too long before we can meet again.

Should work or holiday bring you to India, I do hope  
you will inform me and give me the chance of welcoming  
you.

With warm regards,

Sincerely yours,

Rajmohan Gandhi

Mr. Robert Comer  
The White House  
Executive Office Building  
Room 372  
Washington, D. C.

JUL 20 1965

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

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Origin  
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ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI PRIORITY

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*India  
x India Econ  
x cables*

JUL 14 4 05 PM '65

EXDIS

Embtel 83

Following is text of letter to President from Prime Minister Shastri dated July 9 and delivered July 13:

003

QUOTE Dear Mr. President: Your warm letter of June 5th was delivered to me shortly before I was leaving for a fairly protracted foreign tour from which I have only recently returned and I hasten to thank you for the good wishes you have sent me on the completion of my first year in the office of Prime Minister. As you say, the year has been a difficult one and possibly greater difficulties loom ahead; one can only, in our respective positions, endeavour to discharge our duties to our people and to the world, of which we form part, to the best of our ability. We have in the Hindu religion, Mr. President, a doctrine known as 'Nishkama karma' which enjoins the individual to perform whatever duties may be entrusted to him, having regard solely to what is right and not to what profit it may or may not bring to him. It is allegiance to such a principle that provides sustenance to our efforts.

I am glad that we have been able to arrive at a peaceful solution of the problem which has arisen on the Kutch-Sind border. What we wanted there was the

Drafted by:

NEA:SOA:CCLaise:bld 7/14/65

Clearances:

M - Mr. Johnston  
White House - Mr. Komer

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - Phillips Talbot

S/S - Mr. John P. Walsh

JUL 15 1965

DECLASSIFIED

FORM 8-63 DS-322

Authority

By

NEA 00-172 (456)

NARA, Date

35-01

~~SECRET~~

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*Shastri  
to LBJ  
7/9/65*



~~SECRET~~

was the vacation of our territory occupied by Pakistan. Once the territory was vacated, we were prepared to settle the boundary question by reference, failing other methods, to an impartial tribunal. Pakistan is now vacating our territory and both countries are endeavouring to reduce tensions on the borders. An extremely dangerous situation has been averted and we are thankful for the support the United States Government has given to the efforts towards a peaceful settlement of this matter.

I appreciate greatly your having taken me into confidence about the efforts the United States Government has made to induce a response from Hanoi for a peaceful settlement. We know fully well, Mr. President, that your ultimate objective is the establishment of peace in that area. We may differ somewhat as to the best means of achieving the peace, but we are sincerely appreciative of your offer of unconditional negotiations and your willingness, subsequently indicated, to have the Viet-Cong represented at any conference that might be called. We realise also that there is need for a response from the other side and that hitherto there has not been any indication of such a response.

I have wanted to write to you for some time in regard to the programme of economic development for India in which the Government of the United States has, for many years, rendered us great assistance and in which I know you have all along taken keen personal interest. Quite apart from the fact that the existence of poverty in the second half of the twentieth century anywhere in the world is an immoral blot on the human conscience, in countries like mine, its continuance endangers our free and democratic social order, to the ideals of which we are wedded and which we mean to preserve.

Ever since

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Ever since we regained our independence, the Government of India has devoted all its energies and all the resources it could possibly raise to the task of economic development. We are blessed in our country with all the factors of economic growth; we have the natural resources; we have a freely-elected and a stable government; we have an effective and well-established administration; we have the technicians, the engineers, the scientists, the lawyers in fairly abundant supply; we have the private entrepreneurs and businessmen with the requisite initiative and we have, above all, a people who are willing to undergo sacrifices necessary for developing themselves. Our great shortage is and has been that of capital. It is not easy for a free society to persuade people to save out of an income which is even now less than \$1.40 per week. We have held, however, that it is essential that the main burden of economic development must fall upon the people themselves, and it is gratifying to record, Mr. President, that my countrymen have responded to the challenge and have been making sacrifices which in real terms can hardly be equalled elsewhere, whether in peace or indeed in war.

There are limits, however, to the extent of the burden a society can impose on its people without endangering its freedom. It is for this reason that we decided before the commencement of the Third Five-Year Plan in 1961 to ask friendly foreign governments to support our developmental efforts by making loans to us. The support given to us in this endeavour by your nation has been pre-eminent and we are most grateful for the assistance we have received and are receiving. Without this aid, such progress as we have been able to make -- and it is impressive -- could hardly have been possible. We are now in the last year of the Third Five-Year Plan. The

Fourth

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Fourth Five-Year Plan, which will commence on the 1st April, 1966, is now under preparation and at this particular moment we are in consultation with the World Bank whose advice we have always valued, as to the strategy necessary for the goals we have to achieve. The draft of the Fourth Plan will be ready later this year. My Finance Minister, Shri T.T. Krishnamachari, will be visiting Washington in September to discuss with and explain to the World Bank and to your officials the contents of the Plan. We would appreciate it greatly if you would receive him and let him explain to you personally in greater detail that what we are trying to do is the minimum that we can possibly do, that we are making every sacrifice that we are capable of and that the demands we shall make on you as on other governments will not be excessive.

One of the methods by which you have given us most valuable assistance is by making available surplus agricultural commodities, principally wheat, rice and cotton, on payment in local currency. The availability of these commodities, which have been in short supply in India, has helped us greatly not only in our development effort, but also in keeping prices stable and in avoiding the necessity of rationing. The last agreement between our two governments under Public Law 480 expired on the 30th June this year. Another one has to be negotiated very urgently if the even flow of supplies is not to be held up. I understand that there is some hitch in the commencement of these negotiations. I would be grateful if you would take the trouble personally to look into the matter and expedite the necessary instructions to your negotiators.

I thank you for assuring me that a visit by me to the United States at any future date convenient to me would be welcome to you. I share your regret that it

may not

~~SECRET~~

Page 5 of telegram to Amembassy NEW DELHI

57

~~SECRET~~

may not be possible for me to come this year, but I shall look forward to a mutually convenient date next year being settled through diplomatic channels.

With kindest regards,

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Lal Bahadur UNQUOTE

GP- 2

End

RUSK

~~SECRET~~



SECRET

July 12, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

These words are in case I am unable to get through  
to you by telephone this evening.

Ambassador Nehru came in today and said that he had  
a telegraphic text of a letter from Shastri to you. It  
is in response to your letter to the Prime Minister of  
June 5. The telegraphic text is to be followed by a  
letter signed by Shastri.

The Ambassador did not show me the text. He said it  
was warm and friendly and consisted of paragraphs on the  
following subjects:

Introductory

Rann of Kutch

Viet-Nam

Economic Development

Plans of the Indian Finance  
Minister to visit Washington  
next September in connection  
with the annual World Bank  
and Fund Meeting

A Shastri visit to Washington  
"next year"

PL-480

This in general follows the outline of your letter  
of last June. On the assumption that the letter specifically  
and urgently asks for help on PL-480, there is one thing

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JUL 20 1965

Authority: Stak Hr. 10/28/76, NSC 5/6/77  
By: jd/mg NARA. Date: 3-5-04



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-2-

that bothers me -- the reference to the visit "next year".

Shastri's letter to you did not foreclose the possibility of a visit this year. He only said:

"I am, however, not able to say at present whether my parliamentary and other commitments will permit me to do so."

And in your reply you said:

"I deeply regret that your parliamentary and other commitments may not permit an autumn visit. I assure you we would welcome a visit at any future date you should conclude would be desirable and convenient to you."

My thought is that if Shastri talks about a visit "next year" in his letter to you tomorrow, it will be very difficult to arrange a visit this fall. The Indian Parliament meets in August and September but I understand there is a recess in October.

If you agree, I will suggest to Ambassador Nehru that he telephone and try to get permission to make some equivocal (rather than definitive) reference to the timing of the visit, so as not to shut the door on something that may well turn out to be important to the resumption of our program lending to India. If we are going to continue any aid programs it is desirable not to have any long hiatus in our program lending.

My recommendation is that I attempt to get Nehru to do this but I would not wish to do so without your authorization. Of course, it may be physically impossible to get the authorization in time.

/s/ THOMAS C. MANN

Thomas C. Mann

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



200  
Mr. Komer  
Copy sent to State  
for recommendation  
New Delhi,  
July 9, 1965.

India  
x India  
Dear Mr President:

Your warm letter of June 5th was delivered to me shortly before I was leaving for a fairly protracted foreign tour from which I have only recently returned and I hasten to thank you for the good wishes you have sent me on the completion of my first year in the office of Prime Minister. As you say, the year has been a difficult one and possibly greater difficulties loom ahead; one can only, in our respective positions, endeavour to discharge our duties to our people and to the world, of which we form part, to the best of our ability. We have in the Hindu religion, Mr President, a doctrine known as 'Nishkama karma' which enjoins the individual to perform whatever duties may be entrusted to him, having regard solely to what is right and not to what profit it may or may not bring to him. It is allegiance to such a principle that provides sustenance to our efforts.

I am glad that we have been able to arrive at a peaceful solution of the problem which has arisen on the Kutch-Sind border. What we wanted there was the vacation of our territory occupied by Pakistan. Once the territory was vacated, we were prepared to settle the boundary question by reference, failing other methods, to an impartial tribunal. Pakistan is now vacating our territory and both countries are endeavouring to reduce tensions on the borders. An extremely dangerous situation has been averted and we are thankful for the support the United States Government has given to the efforts towards a peaceful settlement of this matter.

I appreciate greatly your having taken me into confidence about the efforts the United States Government has made to induce a response from Hanoi for a peaceful settlement. We know fully well, Mr President, that your ultimate objective is the establishment of peace

in that area ..(2)

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Authority NLJ 00-172

By pkb NARA, Date 3501

JUL 15 1965



in that area. We may differ somewhat as to the best means of achieving the peace, but we are sincerely appreciative of your offer of unconditional negotiations and your willingness, subsequently indicated, to have the Viet-Cong represented at any conference that might be called. We realise also that there is need for a response from the other side and that hitherto there has not been any indication of such a response.

I have wanted to write to you for some time in regard to the programme of economic development for India in which the Government of the United States has, for many years, rendered us great assistance and in which I know you have all along taken keen personal interest. Quite apart from the fact that the existence of poverty in the second half of the twentieth century anywhere in the world is an immoral blot on the human conscience, in countries like mine, its continuance endangers our free and democratic social order, to the ideals of which we are wedded and which we mean to preserve.

Ever since we regained our independence, the Government of India has devoted all its energies and all the resources it could possibly raise to the task of economic development. We are blessed in our country with all the factors of economic growth; we have the natural resources; we have a freely-elected and a stable government; we have an effective and well-established administration; we have the technicians, the engineers, the scientists, the lawyers in fairly abundant supply; we have the private entrepreneurs and businessmen with the requisite initiative and we have, above all, a people who are willing to undergo sacrifices necessary for developing themselves. Our great shortage is and has been that of capital. It is not easy for a free society to persuade people to save out of an income which is even now less than \$1.40 per week. We have held, however, that it is essential that the main burden of economic development must fall upon the people themselves, and it is gratifying to record, Mr President, that my countrymen have responded to the challenge and have been making sacrifices which in real terms can hardly be equalled elsewhere, whether in peace or indeed in war.



There are limits, however, to the extent of the burden a society can impose on its people without endangering its freedom. It is for this reason that we decided before the commencement of the Third Five-Year Plan in 1961 to ask friendly foreign governments to support our developmental efforts by making loans to us. The support given to us in this endeavour by your nation has been pre-eminent and we are most grateful for the assistance we have received and are receiving. Without this aid, such progress as we have been able to make -- and it is impressive -- could hardly have been possible. We are now in the last year of the Third Five-Year Plan. The Fourth Five-Year Plan, which will commence on the 1st April, 1966, is now under preparation and at this particular moment, we are in consultation with the World Bank whose advice we have always valued, as to the strategy necessary for the goals we have to achieve. The draft of the Fourth Plan will be ready later this year. My Finance Minister, Shri T.T. Krishnamachari, will be visiting Washington in September to discuss with and explain to the World Bank and to your officials the contents of the Plan. We would appreciate it greatly if you would receive him and let him explain to you personally in greater detail that what we are trying to do is the minimum that we can possibly do, that we are making every sacrifice that we are capable of and that the demands we shall make on you as on other governments will not be excessive.

One of the methods by which you have given us most valuable assistance is by making available surplus agricultural commodities, principally wheat, rice and cotton, on payment in local currency. The availability of these commodities, which have been in short supply in India, has helped us greatly not only in our development effort, but also in keeping prices stable and in avoiding the necessity of rationing. The last agreement between our two governments under Public Law 480 expired on the 30th June this year. Another one has to be negotiated very urgently if the even flow of supplies is not to be held up. I understand that there is some hitch in the commencement of these negotiations. I

would be ... (4)

(4)

would be grateful if you would take the trouble personally to look into the matter and expedite the necessary instructions to your negotiators.

I thank you for assuring me that a visit by me to the United States at any future date convenient to me would be welcome to you. I share your regret that it may not be possible for me to come this year, but I shall look forward to a mutually convenient date next year being settled through diplomatic channels.

With kindest regards,

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Lal Bahadur

The President,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.



2874  
Mr. Komer  
201  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
UNDER SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 2, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MCGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

I think the President should see the attached memo of my conversation with Ambassador Nehru of India. I hope to see Ambassador Nehru again tomorrow following up on the decision taken today.

TAM  
Thomas C. Mann

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY ju ON 2-17-93

AUG 2 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: July 1, 1965  
1:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: India

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador B. K. Nehru  
Thomas C. Mann - M

COPIES TO: EXDIS

Mr. Nehru came to lunch. After the usual pleasantries, I said that I wanted to talk with him about a growing sentiment in the Congress and among the people concerning the aid program. I said there is increased pressure for self-help and there is increasing resentment over public attacks on the United States by aid recipients. Such phrases as "drink the Red Sea", "poisoned wheat", no longer go unnoticed. It would be worthwhile to look, for example, at the amendments which are currently being "tacked" on to the AID bill.

We are aware that since Krishna Menon's departure there is a closer identity of views between the United States and India regarding Communist China and other matters. The Indians played a constructive role concerning the recent conference in Algiers. We have, however, noticed public statements by Indian officials critical of the United States role in Viet-Nam.

Statements of this kind have an impact in this country comparable to the impact on public opinion in India if U.S. officials were to make similar statements about the Kashmir.

FORM DS-1254  
3-61~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Authority: 6589-134 (4221a)

EXDIS

GPO 908992

By: [Signature] NARA, Date: 3-5-01

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AUG 2 1965



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I wondered whether it would not be better for countries such as the United States and India, which have important bilateral relations, to discuss their differences in quiet, diplomatic channels rather than through the press. And where, because of the democratic and parliamentary character of our governments, it is occasionally necessary to make a public statement concerning the other's relations with a third country, this should at least be talked over first and carefully weighed before a public statement is made.

The Ambassador referred to what he considered to be the predominant position of the United States in the world and repeated the familiar line that great powers have throughout history been criticized and must expect this to continue. He thought the important thing from the point of view of the United States was to have stability and strength in the developing part of the world. At the same time, he acknowledged that the United States had been subjected to "abuse" by extremist governments.

I said that the question was not what the United States' reaction should be, but what it is. I acknowledged that India's official statements had not been as extreme as others but said nevertheless India was caught up in the general problem. The United States was reviewing its aid policies worldwide from a number of points of view and I thought it was no longer safe to assume that aid would automatically flow to friendly and hostile developing countries alike.

I referred to the figure of eight billion dollars in aid of all kinds which India had received from the United States, which is about half of the U.S. contribution to the Marshall Plan. The magnitude of our contribution was a good indication of the importance which we attach to India and of our sincere desire for the friendliest relations with India in pursuit of important common goals. It seemed to me our common goals could be pursued in a way entirely compatible with the dignity and self-respect of both countries.

The Ambassador reacted to the eight billion figure. Aid

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-3-

is separate from India's national convictions and principles. I agreed. The United States has learned long since that aid programs do not earn for us feelings of love or affection or gratitude. We do not think of economic and military aid as a means of changing the principles or convictions of others. We are well aware of India's difficulties with the Chinese communists and accept that India considers good Indo-Russian relations are needed to counterbalance the Chinese. We also understood India has a role to play in the Afro-Asian group of developing nations. It is not realistic to expect that India and the United States will have identical views on all problems. Each has a domestic public opinion to take into account. What concerns us is the reaction which we had from time to time encountered that countries which are large aid recipients believe they must make unfriendly statements about the United States in order to prove to themselves that they are still independent. We neither want nor expect conformity. But we do not think we should have to pay a political as well as an economic price for our economic cooperation.

I referred to the proposed visit of Shastri to the United States and said that it was our sincere conclusion at the time that it was in India's as well as our own interest to postpone the visit until Congress had completed its action on the aid program. I regretted that this decision had been leaked to the press and thought that perhaps we should have come to the conclusion earlier. Nevertheless, our position was taken in good faith and in an effort to enable us to be helpful to India. We were disappointed that the Indians "cancelled" the visit. This is not currently an issue. But the whole episode nevertheless left a residue of misunderstanding here.

Toward the end of the conversation the question of the proposed new PL-480 arrangement came up. The Ambassador said that he had received some time ago instructions to expedite

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-4-

an agreement concerning this problem. He had not been very active on the assumption that we needed more time to get ready. He had not realized that the United States was concerned about the subjects we had discussed. He agreed that a continuing dialogue is desirable. I said that I thought it was particularly important for him or some person such as L.K. Jha, who understands the United States, to look into the way we felt here and to make sure that the Indian Government, at the highest levels, was aware of our feelings. Bridge building and accurate interpretations of the feelings of other countries were the main responsibility of the people who worked in the foreign affairs field. I had no additional concrete suggestions to offer at the moment, but I would be in touch with him soon after consulting with my colleagues.

The entire conversation was friendly. We had agreed in the beginning that we would both treat it as a frank and informal exchange of views between personal friends rather than as a formal demarche.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER Company, Inc.

AEP

2 Broadway, New York, N. Y. 10008  
HA 2-4800

DONALD C. COOK  
President

Dear Mac:

Since our earlier conversations with regard to the possibility that I might accept an assignment to evaluate our aid program to India and Pakistan I have had an opportunity to read the material which you were kind enough to send me, and I have thought long and hard about the matter.

Regretfully, I have concluded that I must decline the assignment. There are a number of reasons which have impelled me to this conclusion, and I will mention two of the more important ones.

First, our companies are now in the process of putting together an extensive and accelerated construction program, including the construction of large amounts of facilities in Appalachia. I feel that my absence from the Company during this crucial period -- which will involve many decisions in which I, as president of the companies, should participate -- would be undesirable both from the point of view of our companies and, I believe, from the point of view of the public interest as it is manifested by the Administration's desire to accelerate private development as much as possible and, in particular, to accelerate extensive development in Appalachia.

Second, I am at this time deeply involved in fund-raising activities for a preparatory school and two colleges, and I have just recently accepted the chairmanship of the fund-raising committee for Appalachian Regional Hospitals, Inc. I understand that my name was suggested for this latter assignment by a number of people at the White House, and I have been urged to undertake it both by the White House and by John Sweeney, Chairman of the Federal Development Planning Committee on Appalachia. The burdens associated with these activities, which I take very seriously and which are now moving into a period of substantial activity, make it most difficult for me to take on any additional outside matters at the present time. This



is particularly true where the additional outside matter would require full time and would therefore preclude my carrying out the responsibilities I had earlier undertaken.

My natural disposition, of course, has always been to take on any public service project to which I could make any material contribution. I am particularly distressed in this case to have to decline the assignment since the suggestion comes from the President, who over a long period of time has shown himself to be such a good and generous friend.

Having looked over the material which you sent me, and having reflected on the implications of its contents, I will be rash enough to give you my general reaction to the aid program for India and for Pakistan even though I know that the extent of my information respecting it is relatively fragmentary and my views are, of necessity, based on surface considerations.

As I see it, there exist two principal bases for aid programs to India and Pakistan, one being humanitarian and the other political. To some extent, of course, the two are related, but I think it helpful to consider them separately.

I believe that under existing circumstances it is not possible for us to achieve any particularly significant or worthwhile political results from the Indian and Pakistan aid programs. My thinking on the matter starts from the belief that separation of old India into new India and Pakistan was a great mistake and that, from a political point of view, the fact of that separation now is and will continue to be an insurmountable obstacle to a successful program of aid to either country. So long as this separation exists, it is inevitable that India will turn to Russia for support against Red China, and Pakistan will turn to Red China for support against Russia and -- of more significance -- to gain an important local ally against India. This courting of Russia and China by these two countries, which is certain to continue, will necessarily make it impossible for us to accomplish any worthwhile political objectives in either. In my opinion, it can instead only result in India's playing us off against Russia and Pakistan's playing us off against China. Thus, I believe that any extensive aid program is not warranted for political purposes unless

a rapprochement could be effectuated between India and Pakistan so that the two would come to have a common foreign policy.


This leaves the humanitarian considerations. The natural instincts of all good men in the United States -- and I would like to include myself in this group -- would lead to the conclusion that aid to India and Pakistan is warranted on humanitarian grounds alone. But what kind of aid is the question.

In my opinion, the two crying needs of both countries are an improved food supply for the mouths already in existence and a really effective birth control program to prevent the multiplication of these mouths faster than the food supply can be increased to meet the needs of the existing and inevitably increased population that will result under any circumstances. A limited program emphasizing these two needs is, I think, warranted. I doubt that we would receive anything from such a program that would be of any particularly significant or enduring political value, but there may be some minor benefit to us, and, in any event, we would have the comfort and satisfaction of knowing that we had acted in a responsible way, in accordance with our historic tradition of rendering help to the needy.

The documents which you sent me I have, of course, carefully sealed and kept in a locked cabinet. If you would let me know how these papers should be handled, in view of their classified character, I will make the appropriate arrangements to return them to you.

Each day that goes by I am grateful for the fact that you are in Washington and at the White House, and periodically I burn a few candles to reinforce the hope that you will continue to remain there.

Sincerely yours,



Donald C. Cook

Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.





## STATEMENT OF THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS

Starting from December 30, 1964, about 900 active members of the pro-Chinese Communist Party of India have been detained in different States under Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962. On January 1, 1965, I made a brief statement over the All India Radio on the circumstances leading to the detentions. I am now placing on the table of the House a fuller statement giving the background of the action that we felt called upon to take. It contains only a part of the material, available with us, concerning the activities of the pro-Chinese communists. It is not in the public interest, including the interest of security, to disclose at this stage more information than has been furnished in this statement. The statement only gives the background of the decision to take action; it does not purport to cover the specific grounds on which each individual has been detained by the State Governments.

We were watching the growing activities of pro-Chinese communists with increasing concern, but there was reluctance on the part of the Government to take recourse to preventive detention until the decisions taken by the left CPI at its Calcutta Congress, followed by energetic preparations for subversion and violence, made it necessary in the vital interest of the nation to take action.

We are dedicated to the ideals and values of a free and democratic society. Our democratic Constitution guarantees to all citizens the right to freedom of speech, expression and association, and however strongly opposed we may be to the political philosophy of a party, we would not interfere with it unless its way of functioning constitutes a threat to national security. We were convinced that the plans and activities of the pro-Chinese Communists had developed into such a threat.

G. L. NANDA,  
Minister of Home Affairs.

*Entire report to thick to file. However, this  
filed as an indication of Indian awareness  
of domestic dimension of Chincom problem.*

203a

## CONTENTS

	PAGE
Chapter I Support to China over Tibet and the border question. . . . .	I—6
Chapter II Disloyalty during the Chinese invasion . . . . .	7—10
Chapter III Dissemination of pro-Chinese and anti-national documents. . . . .	11—22
Chapter IV A split at Peking's call. . . . .	23—31
Chapter V Preparations for subversion and violence. . . . .	32—45



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

11591

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

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85

Origin

NEA

Info

SS

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USIA

NSC

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CPR

NASA

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI

2624

*India*  
*x India cables*

205

JUN 18 7 47 PM '65

Please deliver following message from President to Prime Minister

Shastri:

~~"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:~~

~~"I am~~ I am most grateful for your considerate message of congratulations on the success of the Gemini 4 flight.

It is the hope of all of us that what we learn in the course of this and succeeding flights will broaden our knowledge of the universe and thereby benefit all mankind.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson"

message

This message in response to following/to President from Prime Minister transmitted by Indian Embassy:

"On behalf of the Government and people of India, I congratulate you and the U.S. scientists and astronauts on the magnificent achievement of Major James McDivitt and Major Edward White in orbiting the earth for four days and on their safe return."

Drafted by:  
NEA:SOA:FJCrawford:mwh 6/15/65

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

NEA - William J. Handley

Clearances:

SOA - Mr. Cameron  
~~NEA:SOA:FJCrawford:mwh~~

S/S - Mr. de Martino

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Department does not plan release reply but has no objections if  
GOI wishes do so.

END

RUSK

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
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Origin  
NEA  
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI

2584

JUN 14

6 04 PM '65

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USIA  
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NASA  
WHB

Please deliver following message from President to President

Radhakrishnan:

QUOTE ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

I am very grateful for your most thoughtful message of congratulations  
on the successful conclusion of the Gemini <sup>4</sup> flight.

It is our earnest hope that information gathered during the course of  
this and the succeeding flights will broaden our knowledge of the universe  
to the benefit of all mankind.

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

This message in response to following message received via commercial  
channels from President Radhakrishnan:

QUOTE We have followed with keen interest the progress of the flight of  
Gemini IV and are happy at its successful conclusion. On behalf of the  
people and the Government of India and on my own I send Your Excellency our  
hearty congratulations on this outstanding achievement. UNQUOTE

White House

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~/does not plan release reply but has no objections if GOI  
wishes do so.

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

NEA:SOA:FJCrawford:mb 6/11/65

SOA - Turner C. Cameron

Clearances:

SOA - Mr. Cameron  
NEA - Mr. Handley

S/S-~~6~~ Mr. de Martino

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LBJ  
to  
Radhakrishnan  
6/14/65



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

This document consists of 1 pages.  
Copy No. 1 of 4 copies, Series A.

TO : White House - Mr. Komer

DATE: June 10, 1965

FROM : NEA/SDA - Carol C. Laise *CC*

SUBJECT: Sudhir Ghosh

After receiving the Phil Potter package on Sudhir Ghosh from you, Phil wrote to Chet Bowles about the question raised therein. Enclosed is a copy of Chet's reply. We agree completely with what Chet has written.

~~SECRET~~

*002*  
NEA:SOA:AALakeland,Jr/mwh  
6/10/65

GROUP 3  
Downgraded at 12 year  
intervals; not  
automatically declassified.

JUN 12 1965

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date 3-5-01



file Letter to Phil 207a  
This document consists of 2  
pages, No. 1 of 1 copies,  
Series A.

~~SECRET~~

New Delhi, India,  
May 13, 1965.

Dear Phil:

I hardly know what to say about Sudhir Ghosh. He is an old friend whom I have known for many years, and who is deeply devoted to the United States. AAZ

He is also a person of great natural ability. Indeed, if he only had better judgment, a sense of balance and of responsibility he could in my opinion reach the very top levels of this government. Unfortunately, these qualities are lacking, and as a result he is constantly in difficulty, misquoting people, breaking confidences, name dropping, and otherwise trying the patience of his friends.

On the particular occasion to which you referred in your letter he made a really excellent speech in the Rajya Sabha to which, unfortunately, he added the claim that in November 1962 a United States aircraft carrier was lurking just off Calcutta with its planes waiting to pounce on the Chinese as soon as they raised their noses any further above the Himalayas. The left wingers immediately pounced on this one point, and the present leadership, not knowing anything about the Government of India's request for air support at that time, simply denied it.

We could, of course, have stated the truth, i. e., that while the Government of India had not asked for an aircraft carrier as such, nor was there one in fact "just off Calcutta", it had asked for fourteen squadrons of airplanes manned by United States pilots. However, I could not see anything to be gained by embarrassing the Government which had allowed itself to be caught in a half truth. Consequently we informed the Ministry of External Affairs of the actual facts which they later

The Honorable

Phillips Talbot,

Assistant Secretary,

Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,

Department of State,

Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 04-150

By iso, NARA, Date 11-4-04

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-2-

found in their own files, informed two or three press people on a confidential basis that Ghosh had not been wholly off the beam (they printed stories to that effect), and let the matter drop.

Nevertheless, Sudhir was very distressed over what he claimed to be "our letting him down"; indeed he has so complained to every American newspaper reporter in Delhi. However, after checking with us, and with some knowledge of his mercurial qualities, the newsmen let the incident fade out.

It would, I am sure, have been a serious mistake for us to have challenged the Government by publicly relating the full facts. We cannot take responsibility for half-baked remarks on the floor of Parliament even when they are made by people who are anxious to help. As a matter of fact, thanks to the background stories that appeared, Sudhir didn't come out so badly; and the Government now knows that he was more right than wrong.

There is nothing further that we can do except to continue to be careful in everything we say to him.

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

~~SECRET~~



208  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

June 5, 1965

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Your letter of May 23 arrived as I was writing to send my best wishes on the first anniversary of your assuming the office of Prime Minister. The year has been a difficult one for both of us, but I know that our faith in the democratic way of doing things will bear fruit.

We have also been deeply concerned over the unhappy events in the Rann of Kutch and the use of U.S. military equipment in this dispute. The role of a friend to both parties is not easy and often misunderstood. But I believe our efforts to put a stop to the use of our military equipment were helpful in getting the fighting stopped. Now the problem becomes one of finding a formula for peaceful settlement as a substitute for settlement by force. Despite the problems you mention, I deeply hope that you can reach an agreement, and thereby reduce the awesome possibility of larger conflict.

I fully share your desire that you and I, and our two governments, should act always in a spirit of mutual understanding. In that spirit, let me respond very frankly to your suggestion that the search for peace in Vietnam might be furthered by a cessation of the air strikes being conducted against North Vietnam by the South Vietnamese and U.S. air forces. You know the importance we attach to a solution to the Vietnam problem. To us, the Chinese Communist-supported aggression in Vietnam poses the same kind of threat to Free World interests as Communist China's attack on India in 1962.

~~SECRET~~

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Authority FRUS 64-68, v. 125, #127

By jc NARA Date 3-5-01

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~~SECRET~~

-2-

I wish to tell you in utmost privacy of the effort we have already made to induce a response from Hanoi by a suspension of air strikes, and the depressing lack of any response. I enclose an informal and confidential memorandum which candidly describes our efforts to date, and our current thinking as to certain future possibilities. It reflects my own deep desire to find a road to peace in Vietnam, and to share my thinking with you fully to this end.

Let me assure you that we will continue prayerfully to explore any hopeful opening. There is no step I would not take if in my judgment it offered real prospect of the peaceful settlement we both want.

I deeply regret that your parliamentary and other commitments may not permit an autumn visit. I assure you we would welcome a visit at any future date you should conclude would be desirable and convenient to you.

With warm personal regards.

Sincerely,



His Excellency  
Lal Bahadur Shastri  
Prime Minister of India  
New Delhi, India

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**Kamm 209*~~TOP SECRET~~*86*

Action

CONTROL: 5697

*SS*

RECD: JUNE 6, 1965, 5:21 PM

Info

FROM: NEW DELHI

ACTION: SECSTATE PRIORITY 3567

~~TOP SECRET~~ JUNE 6

3

EXDIS

DEPTEL 2540

I DELIVERED PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO PRIMIN'S SECRETARY, L K JHA, SUNDAY AFTERNOON JUST BEFORE HE WAS SEEING SHASTRI. PROMPTED BY MEMORANDUM'S REFERENCE TO RADHAKRISHNAN PROPOSAL, JHA COMMENTED THAT OPINIONS ARE DIVIDED WITHIN GOI ON WHETHER TO GO AHEAD WITH IT. SOUNDINGS WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS HAVE PRODUCED MIXED REACTION, AND GOI IS AWARE OF MANY PRACTICAL PROBLEMS THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE SOLVED IF PROPOSAL WERE TO BE REALIZED.

THEREFORE IN JHA'S VIEW IT IS IMPORTANT FOR GOI TO KNOW WHETHER USG CONSIDERS THAT PRESSING AHEAD WOULD IN ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES BE AFFIRMATIVELY HELPFUL, OR MERELY THAT THIS IS ONE OF SEVERAL PROPOSITIONS TO WHICH US DOES NOT PREFER TO MAKE EXEPTION. JHA SAID THAT IN LATTER CASE GOI WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER WHETHER IT WORTHWHILE TO RISK DIFFUSING DEBATE; HE DID NOT RPT NOT HOWEVER COMMIT HIMSELF ON WHAT GOI WOULD DO IF OUR VIEW IS AFFIRMATIVE.

JHA IS AWARE OF EXCHANGES ON THE SUBJECT HERE AND IN WASHINGTON BUT CONSIDERS THEY DO NOT RPT NOT PROVIDE CLEAR ANSWER TO HIS QUESTION. AS I AGREE, I TOLD HIM I WOULD PUT IT TO WASHINGTON.

ON TIMING, JHA NOTED ANSWER WOULD HAVE TO REACH DELHI BY TUESDAY TO CATCH HASTRI HERE. AFTER HE GETS TO OTTAWA, JHA SAID IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO COMMUNICATE VIA B K NEHRU WHO IS CONTEMPLATING QUIET TRIP TO OTTAWA NEXT WEEKEND TO SEE PRIMIN.

CFN 6

GREENE

GRRENE

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Authority State 1-22-76By jc/ew NARA, Date 3501~~TOP SECRET~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
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JUN 7 1965