210

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

03225

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO:

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Origin
55
Info:

ACTION: AmEmbassy New Delhi 2540 PRIORITY

Jun 5 7 07 PM '65

Ordered x Cowen

EXDIS

In response to Shastri letter to President of May 23 repeated septel, please deliver following reply from President soonest and in any event prior Shastri departure.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 00-172 (#58)
By jc/66 NARA, Date 3-5-01

BEGIN TEXT: SECRET

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Your letter of May 23 arrived as I was writing to send my best wishes on the first anniversary of your assuming the office of Prime Minister. The year has been a difficult one for both of us, but I know that our faith in the democratic way of doing things will bear fruit.

We have also been deeply concerned over the unhappy events in the Rann of Kutch and the use of U.S. ~~mdk~~ military equipment in this dispute. The role of a friend to both parties is not easy and often misunderstood. But I believe our efforts to put a stop to the use of our military equipment were helpful in getting the fighting stopped. Now the

Drafted by: WPBundy/RWKomer:cv 6/5/65

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: FE: William P. Bundy

Clearances:
The Secretary (substance)
White House - Mr. Komer
NEA - Miss Laise (substance)
Mr. Ball (substance)
S/S - Mr. Mills

~~TOP~~ SECRET

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FORM 8-63 DS-322 JUN 7 1965

problem becomes one of finding a formula for peaceful settlement as a substitute for settlement by force. Despite the problems you mention, I deeply hope that you can ~~take advantage of the British efforts~~ reach an agreement, and thereby reduce the awesome possibility of larger conflict.

I fully share your desire that you and I, and our two governments, should act always in a spirit of mutual understanding. In that spirit, let me respond very frankly to your suggestion that the search for peace in Vietnam might be furthered by a cessation of the air strikes being conducted against North Vietnam by the South Vietnamese and US air forces. You know the importance we attach to a solution to the Vietnam problem. To us, the Chinese Communist-supported aggression in Vietnam poses the same kind of threat to Free World interests as Communist China's attack on India in 1962.

I wish to tell you in utmost privacy of the effort we have already made to induce a response from Hanoi by a suspension of air strikes, and the depressing lack of any response. I enclose ~~an informal~~ an informal and confidential memorandum which candidly described our efforts to date, and our current thinking as to certain future possibilities. It reflects my own deep desire to ~~find~~ find a road to peace in Vietnam, and to share my thinking with you fully to this end.

Let me assure you that we will continue prayerfully to explore any hopeful opening. There is no step I would not take if in my judgment it offered real

~~TOP~~ SECRET

prospect of the peaceful settlement we both want.

I deeply regret that your Parliamentary and other commitments may not permit an autumn visit. I assure you we would welcome a visit at any future date you should conclude would be desirable and convenient to you.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

END TEXT

BEGIN TEXT ACCOMPANYING MEMORANDUM ~~TOP SECRET~~ SECRET

(TITLE) MEMORANDUM

1. Though compelled to launch air strikes against North Vietnam, we have taken every possible precaution to hit only objectives directly related to Hanoi's persistent aggression against the South. From the military standpoint alone, we believe the strikes have had the effect of considerably reducing what would otherwise have been a steep rise in Hanoi's infiltration campaign. They have also encouraged the South Vietnamese government--which strongly urged them--and the South Vietnamese people and army. Over time, we believe they must make a

major contribution to persuading reasonable elements in Hanoi that their campaign is simply not worth it, and that they should cease their interference in South Vietnam, leaving that country to determine its future, including its relation to the north, by peaceful means.

2. Simultaneously, however, we have made every effort to keep the door open to negotiation. We have made clear our readiness for discussions with no conditions whatever. Indeed, we have welcomed a succession of initiatives, from the call of the 17 non-aligned nations to Mr. Gordon Walker's attempt to visit Hanoi and Peiping and the recent constructive suggestions of ~~xx~~ your government for a cessation of ~~hostilities~~ hostilities and an Afro-Asian force to give effect to it. But Hanoi has made it clear, both publicly and privately, that it wants no part of any of these. Regrettably, we see no sign as yet that Hanoi is ready for any political solution other than a takeover of the South.

3. While we cannot be sure what motivates Hanoi's leaders, their attitude appears to be dictated by the belief that they can still hope, perhaps expect, to impose their will by force on South Vietnam, and that we and the South Vietnamese will not have the determination and resources to prevent this. If that is their reasoning, any cessation on our part of justified military actions might well feed the very beliefs that keep them from any realistic move toward a political ~~xxxx~~ solution.

4. We are conscious, of course, of the argument that the mere fact of the air strikes may be preventing Hanoi from taking forthcoming actions. Our suspension of bombing in mid-May was undertaken partly to see if this was indeed a factor, and partly to indicate to Hanoi the possibility of working toward a solution by reciprocal actions, or rather by reciprocally reduced or suspended actions. As we told the Indian governme nt through diplomatic channels, our intentio n to suspend was communicated in advance to Hanoi, together wi th the suggestion that changes in Hanoi's visible military actions wo uld be considered a forthcoming response. The details of this effort are as follows:

a. On Wednesday, May 12, Ambassador Kohler informed the DRV Embassy Moscow he had a communication for the DRV. DRV Ambassador declined appointment but subsequently telephoned to say that any communication to DRV should be made through Soviets as co-chairman. (Soviets had already informed us they did not wish to act as intermediaries, which accounted in part for our choice of this channel.)

b. Kohler than arranged to see senior official of Soviet Foreign Office, who stalled on delivery to DRV but did retain "oral statement" paper addressed to DRV. Concurrently, Kohler arranged for US Embassy representative to see DRV Embassy official and to hand him same paper wi th request he deliver to Ambassador, which offici al said he would do. Nonetheless, k on May 13, DRV Embassy returned communication alleging that it could not receive it.

c. We concluded at this point that DRV Embassy had certainly in fact made copy of communication and relayed it to Hanoi, and that it also very likely that Soviets had passed on copy delivered to them. Nonetheless, we enlisted British cooperation, and on May 18 British Consul General in Hanoi delivered same paper to senior DRV official. DRV returned this paper to Consul General following day again asserting it could not receive USG communication.

5. We can only conclude from these episodes that DRV was resisting any attempt to communicate, even though it surely received the message. But the DRV made every effort to pretend that it had not even been received. This attitude, coupled with continued and even intensified activity in South Vietnam during period of suspension, which we believe Hanoi could have controlled at least in major respects, led inescapably to conclusion DRV not ready respond at this time to suspension. Since Hanoi did not react by word or deed, we felt compelled to resume air strikes.

6. We had also communicated our intention to the Soviet Government, actually on May 11. They made it quite clear that they did not wish in any way to be an intermediary to Hanoi, and Mr. Gromyko subsequently expressed a highly negative reaction to Secretary Rusk in Vienna on May 15. This confirmed our feeling that the Soviets are not now willing to exert effective influence on Hanoi, despite the fact that suggestions for a suspension had in fact come to us privately

through Soviet quarters for some time.

7. We did not inform the Indian government in advance of our intention solely because we wished to leave the matter in the hands of Hanoi and Moscow. We realize that its not being informed about ~~xx~~ our suspension may have affected the Prime Minister's discussions in Moscow, but we believed it best that the two Communist nations should have an uninterrupted period to deliberate on their response to the suspension. For similar reasons, we have steadfastly resisted giving any publicity to the fact of our communications to Hanoi and Moscow. Such publicity might get us credit in the world, but we give greater weight to the risk that it might diminish the effectiveness of diplomatic communications in the future.

8. Nonetheless, despite the absence of any response to date, we will continue to look at every possible opening. For example, we do not discard the possibility of another suspension, possibly of longer duration, in the hope that it may next time produce a real response by Hanoi, and perhaps begin a sequence of reciprocal actions that could lead toward a solution. Such a sequence has the advantage that it does not require admissions, only deeds. We have tried it once, and will consider it again at the appropriate time, having all factors in mind. Unless another such temporary suspension led to a real change in Hanoi's actions, however, we could not afford to consider extending it to the kind of cessation that the Indian government may have in mind.

9. A second way in which progress might be achieved toward the peace we all want in Southeast Asia would be if Hanoi were willing to engage in unconditional discussions, which might start with this very problem of what reductions in military action might be taken reciprocally on each side. We have repeatedly suggested this both publicly and through third parties in a position to relay the message to Hanoi, and continue to keep our ears and eyes open for any indication of a response.

10. A third way might arise through constructive proposals from third parties, which might at some point elicit a suggestive response that could be followed up. We have particularly in mind the proposal recently put forward by the Indian government. We have discussed this with them frankly, pointing out the difficulty of determining exactly what actions should be stopped and in what reciprocal sequence, and the difficulty of mounting an effective international force to help keep the peace. These difficulties would have to be faced if the Communist side did show itself responsive at some juncture. But they are secondary to the essential point, which is that the Indian proposals focus realistically on central matters that must be met in working toward any solution.

11. For this reason, we welcome the activity of the Indian government in putting forward these proposals and particularly what we understand are its plans

~~TOP~~ SECRET

to present them for discussion at the forthcoming conference in Algiers. Perhaps there will again be no reaction or a continued negative reaction from the Communist nations involved, but the discussion alone should prove helpful.

END TEXT ACCOMPANYING MEMORANDUM

GP-4

END

RUSK

2/1 Lib

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday
June 4, 1965
1:40 PM

India

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

If you could have a quick look at this reply to Shastri, we can get a final decision on it, either by a word to Komer this afternoon or by revision tomorrow. My brother Bill points out that Shastri leaves on Tuesday for Canada, and therefore it would be well to get this delivered to him in the next day or two. A quick look suggests to me that the letter is a helpful one, but I have asked Bob Komer to see if he can tighten it a little.

The signed copy can be done later because this must go as a cable in order to get there in time.

McG. B.

McG. B.

Ok_____

Ok as revised_____

Komer or you speak to me_____

2386

211a

1. Komer
2. Lit BKS

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

June 3, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Suggested Reply to Prime Minister Shastri

On May 28, the Indian Ambassador delivered a personal letter for you from Prime Minister Shastri (Tab A attached). Mr. Shastri's letter refers to your own message of April 16 concerning the possibility of a visit in the fall, discusses India's difficulties with Pakistan, but above all returns to Mr. Shastri's favorite notion of our stopping completely the bombing of the north as a prelude to negotiations of some sort on Viet-Nam.

I recommend your signature to the attached draft reply (Tab B), for the following reasons:

a. It would firm up your personal relation to Shastri.

b. It would present your position directly to him, on a matter where we have reason to believe that his own harping on cessation of the bombing is not shared by other members of his government.

c. India has a particularly crucial role to play in the next month on the Viet-Nam front. Shastri visits Canada about June 11 for five days, and thereafter the Indian delegation will be perhaps the leading moderate nation in the Algiers conference of Afro-Asian nations.

d. It is particularly desirable at this moment both to shoot down the cessation idea and to encourage the Indians to pursue their own proposal. This proposal has bugs in it, but it is the best third-party initiative now in the ring, and it could be the best compromise at Algiers to forestall some hostile resolution.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3501

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified

For all these reasons, we have prepared a draft response for your signature which goes into our position at great length, in the fashion which we believe will be most persuasive with Shastri and with more moderate members of his government. The draft reply is attached as Tab B.

To round out the matter, we would propose to instruct the Embassy in New Delhi to give Shastri a more complete fill-in on our communications to Hanoi at the time of the pause. We believe this is desirable to impress upon Shastri the soundness of our conclusion that the response was negative and fully justified our resumption. A draft cable is attached as Tab C.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Attachments:

Tab A - Letter from Prime Minister Shastri.

Tab B - Proposed Reply to Prime Minister Shastri.

Tab C - Draft Cable to New Delhi.

भारतीय राजदूतावास
वाशिंगटन, डी० सी०
EMBASSY OF INDIA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

8531

May 28th, 1965

My dear Mr President:

I have the honour to transmit to you the enclosed message from the Prime Minister of India, which has just been received at this Embassy.

With my high regard and esteem,

Yours sincerely,

(B.K. NEHRU)
Ambassador of India

The President,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

211C

PRIME MINISTER.
INDIA.

May 23, 1965.

Dear Mr. President,

On April 16, 1965 Ambassador Chester Bowles conveyed to me your message informing me that for various reasons it would not be convenient for you to receive me in Washington on the 2nd June as previously arranged. In deference to your wishes, I had naturally, and I must confess with some sense of disappointment, to cancel the visit to the United States which was scheduled for early June. You have suggested that I should visit the USA in autumn. I am, however, not able to say at present whether my parliamentary and other commitments will permit me to do so.

You have referred to our close association in many common endeavours. We greatly value this association and trust that it will continue undiminished in a spirit of mutual understanding.

I was happy to meet Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge who also handed me your letter of April 15. I was interested to learn from him about the Vietnam situation. The situation is really depressing and dangerous. I hope that it might be possible for circumstances to arise which will permit of a dialogue and a peaceful solution of the Vietnam problem. I know the same thought must be uppermost in your mind also. In today's situation when China is pursuing an aggressive policy, it is difficult to anticipate with any degree of certainty, the likely course of events. But believe me Mr. President, I do feel sincerely that the more rational elements might possibly respond well if it were possible for you to consider a cessation of the air strikes. In any case it would greatly strengthen the chances of a peaceful solution. Such a decision on your part would be a significant contribution towards the promotion of world peace and would be in keeping with the high statesmanship which the United States has displayed in moments of crisis.

contd.....

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RNS 09-68.10125.#123
By JC, NARA, Date 3-5-04

PRIME MINISTER.
INDIA.

We ourselves have been passing through a difficult situation. You are no doubt informed of the recent attack on us by Pakistan in the Kutch-Sind border area. This has roused a great deal of feeling. We are a peaceful nation wedded to the pursuit of peace and economic development but it seems our neighbours China and Pakistan are determined to provoke us. We are exercising a great deal of patience and we have responded positively to Prime Minister Harold Wilson's initiative to bring about a ceasefire and restoration of status quo ante. I am afraid Pakistan has been raising all kinds of difficulties regarding ceasefire and restoration of status quo as on 1st January, 1965 which have prevented an agreement being reached. The fact that Pakistan has been using United States armour and equipment against us has naturally caused much concern in our country. I know, however, that your Government has already taken up this matter with the Government of Pakistan.

With warmest personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

Lal Bahadur

(Lal Bahadur)

His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States of America,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

211d

SECRET / DRAFT June 2, 1965/7:00 pm

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Your letter of May 23 arrived as I was writing to send my best wishes on the first anniversary of your assuming the office of Prime Minister. The year has been a difficult one for both of us, but I know that our faith in the democratic way of doing things will bear fruit in the kind of just and peaceful society we both want.

We have also been deeply concerned over the unhappy events in the Rann of Kutch and the use of U.S. military equipment in this dispute. The role of a friend to both parties is not easy and often misunderstood. But I believe our efforts to put a stop to the use of our military equipment were helpful in getting the fighting stopped. Now the problem becomes one of finding a formula for peaceful settlement as a substitute for settlement by force. Despite the problems you mention, I deeply hope that you can take advantage of the British efforts to reach an agreement, and thereby reduce the awesome possibility of conflict elsewhere on the Pakistan-Indian borders.

I completely share your desire that you and I personally, and our two governments, should act always in a spirit of mutual understanding. In that spirit, let me respond very frankly to your suggestion that the search for peace in Vietnam might be furthered by a cessation of the air strikes being conducted against North Vietnam by the South Vietnamese and US air

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By JC, NARA, Date 3-5-04

forces. You know the importance we attach to a solution to the Vietnam problem. To us, the Chinese Communist-supported aggression in Vietnam poses the same kind of threat to Free World interests as Communist China's attack on India in 1962.

We have taken every possible precaution that our air strikes should hit only objectives directly related to Hanoi's persistent aggression against the South. From the military standpoint alone, we believe they have had the effect of considerably reducing what would otherwise have been a steep rise in Hanoi's infiltration campaign. They have also encouraged the South Vietnamese government--which strongly urged them--and the South Vietnamese people and army. Over time, we believe they must make a major contribution to persuading reasonable elements in Hanoi that their campaign is simply not worth it, and that they should cease their interference in South Vietnam, leaving that country to determine its future, including its relation to the north, by peaceful means.

Simultaneously, however, we have made every effort to keep the door open. We have made clear our readiness for discussions with no conditions whatever. Indeed, we have welcomed a succession of initiatives to this end, from the call of the 17 non-aligned nations to Mr. Gordon Walker's attempt to visit Hanoi and Peiping and the recent constructive suggestions of your government for a cessation of hostilities and an Afro-Asian force

to give effect to it. But Hanoi has made it clear, both publicly and privately, that it wants no part of any of these. I regret to say that we see no sign as yet that Hanoi is ready for any political solution other than a takeover of the South.

While none of us can be sure what motivates Hanoi's leaders, their attitude appears to be dictated by the belief that they can still hope, perhaps expect, to impose their will by force on South Vietnam, and that we and the South Vietnamese will not have the determination and resources to prevent this. If that is their reasoning, any cessation on our part of justified military actions might well feed the very beliefs that keep them from any realistic move toward a political solution.

I am conscious, of course, of the argument that the mere fact of the air strikes may be preventing Hanoi from taking forthcoming actions. Our suspension of bombing in mid-May was undertaken partly to see if this was indeed a factor, and partly to indicate to Hanoi the possibility of working toward a solution by reciprocal actions, or rather by reciprocally reduced or suspended actions. As we have told you through diplomatic channels, our intention to suspend was communicated in advance to Hanoi, together with the suggestion that changes in Hanoi's visible military actions would be considered a forthcoming response. Far from there being such changes, I can tell you privately that Hanoi not only ~~did not respond to our~~ failed to STET communication but in fact made every effort to pretend that it had not even

received it. The story is a complex one, and I am asking our Charge in New Delhi to give you the details in confidence. In any case, Hanoi did not react by word or deed, and we were compelled to resume.

I also might add that we communicated our intention to the Soviet Government as well, actually on May 11. They made it quite clear that they did not wish in any way to be an intermediary to Hanoi, and Mr. Gromyko subsequently expressed a highly negative reaction to Secretary Rusk in Vienna on May 15. This, I am afraid, confirmed our feeling that the Soviets are not now willing to exert effective influence on Hanoi, despite the fact that suggestions for a suspension had in fact come to us privately through Soviet quarters for some time.

We did not inform your government in advance of our intention solely because we wished to leave the matter in the hands of Hanoi and Moscow. I realize that your not being informed about our suspension may have affected your discussions in Moscow, but we believed it best that the two Communist nations should have an uninterrupted period to deliberate on their response to the suspension. For similar reasons, we have--as I am sure you have noted--steadfastly resisted giving any publicity to the fact of our communications to Hanoi and Moscow. Such publicity might get us credit in the world, but we give greater weight to the effect it might have in diminishing the effectiveness of diplomatic communications in the future.

Nonetheless, despite the depressing lack of any response to date, I wish to assure you that we will continue to think prayerfully about all possible openings. There is no step I would not take if in my judgment it offered real prospect of the peaceful settlement we both want. For example, I want you to know in utmost confidence that we do not discard the possibility of another suspension, possibly of longer duration, in the hope that it may next time produce a real response by Hanoi, and perhaps the opening of a sequence of reciprocal actions that could lead toward a solution. Such a sequence has the advantage that it does not require admissions, only deeds. We have tried it once, and will consider it again at the appropriate time, [having all factors in mind.] Unless another such temporary suspension led to a real change in Hanoi's actions, however, we could not afford to consider extending it to the kind of cessation that you may have in mind.

A second way in which progress might be achieved toward the peace we all want in Southeast Asia would be a willingness in Hanoi to engage in unconditional discussions, which might start with this very problem of what reductions in military action might be taken reciprocally on each side. We have repeatedly suggested this both publicly and through third parties in a position to relay the message to Hanoi, and continue to keep our ears and eyes open for any indication of a response.

A third way might arise through constructive proposals from third parties, which might at some point elicit a suggestive response that could be followed up. I have particularly in mind the proposal recently put forward by your government. We have discussed this with you frankly, pointing out the difficulty of determining exactly what actions should be stopped and in what reciprocal sequence, and the difficulty of mounting an effective international force to help keep the peace. These difficulties would have to be faced if the Communist side did show itself responsive at some point. But they are secondary to the essential point, which is that your proposals focus realistically on central matters that must be met in working toward any solution.

For this reason, I welcome the activity of your government in putting forward these proposals and particularly what I understand are the plans of your government to present them for discussion at the forthcoming conference in Algiers. Perhaps there will again be no reaction or a continued negative reaction from the Communist nations involved, but the discussion alone should prove helpful.

I trust you will forgive the length of this reply. It reflects my own deep desire to find a road to peace in Vietnam and to share my thinking fully with you to this end. I share your disappointment about the necessity for

postponing your visit to Washington, but look forward to seeing you later on when we both have greater freedom to reason together over our common problems and opportunities. I hope you will find it possible to come in the autumn, or as soon thereafter as can be conveniently arranged.

In the meantime, Mr. Prime Minister, as you begin the coming year please accept my sincere good wishes for every success in your high office.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

LBJ

State/RWK:jk

211e

SECRET

TAB C.

DRAFT
FE:WPBundy:mk
6/2/65

Tab C

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI

INFO: Amembassy MOSCOW

NODIS.

EYES ONLY FOR CHARGE FROM SECRETARY.

In connection with Presidential letter to Shastri, being sent septel, you should seek early appointment with Shastri to inform him in confidence of events surrounding our communication to Hanoi on May 12-13 in connection with the suspension of bombing attacks against DRV.

Facts were as follows:

On Wednesday, May 12, Ambassador Kohler informed DRV Embassy Moscow he had communication for DRV. DRV Ambassador declined appointment but subsequently telephoned to say that any communication to DRV should be made through Soviets as co-chairman. (Soviets had already informed us they did not wish to act as intermediaries, which accounted in part for our choice of this channel.) Kohler then arranged to see senior official of Soviet Foreign Office, who stalled on delivery to DRV but did retain "oral statement" paper addressed to DRV. Concurrently, Kohler arranged for US Embassy

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-5-04

representative to see DRV Embassy official and to hand him same paper with request he deliver to Ambassador, which official said he would do.

Nonetheless, on May 13, DRV Embassy returned communication alleging that it could not receive it.

USG concluded at this point that DRV Embassy had certainly in fact made copy of communication and relayed it to Hanoi, and that it also very likely that Soviets had passed on copy delivered to them. Nonetheless, USG enlisted British cooperation, and on May 16 British Consul General in Hanoi delivered same paper to senior DRV official. DRV returned this paper to Consul General following day again asserting it could not receive USG communication.

USG could only conclude from these episodes that DRV was resisting any attempt to communicate, even though it surely in fact received the message. This attitude, coupled with continued and even intensified activity in South Viet-Nam during period of suspension, which we believe Hanoi could have controlled at least in major respects, led USG inescapably to conclusion DRV not ready respond at this time to suspension.

GP-1.

End.

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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UNCLASSIFIED

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FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3526
STATE GRNC
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1965 JUN 2 AM 8 13

REF : DEPTEL 2508

FOLLOWING MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT JOHNSON RECEIVED TODAY FROM PRESIDENT RADHAKRISHNAN:

"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

I THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND MESSAGE OF SYMPATHY REGARDING OUR TRAGIC MINE DISASTER. WE APPRECIATE THE KIND SENTIMENTS EXPRESSED THEREIN.

YOURS SINCERELY,
S. RADHAKRISHNAN

EMBASSY ACKNOWLEDGING MESSAGE. GREENE
BT

BUNDY
RATOR
BOWDLER
BOYMAN
CHASE
COOPER
HAYNES
JESSUP
JOHNSON
KEENY
KLEIN
KOMER
MOODY
REDDY
SAUNDERS
THOMSON

Radhak - Kisman 4-2-68 6/2/65

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

213

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INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
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India (X) Cables

46
Origin
NEA
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI 2508

MAY 31 2 24 PM '65

SS
P
USIA
NSC
CPR

LBJ to Radhakrishnan 5/31/65

Please deliver following message from President to President Radhakrishnan:

QUOTE Dear Mr. President: I have learned with great regret of the tragic coal mine explosion at Dhanbad. Please accept my sincere sympathy offered on behalf of the American people. I should be grateful if you would convey our sentiments to the families of the men who lost their lives or were injured. Sincerely, LYNDON B. JOHNSON UNQUOTE

White House does not intend release but has no objection if GOI wishes do so.

END

BUNDY-SMITH
BATOR
BOWDLER
BOWMAN
CHASE
COOPER
HAYNES
JESSUP
JOHNSON
KEENY
KLEIN
KOMER
MOODY
REEDY
SAUNDERS
THOMSON

RUSK

Drafted by: NEA:SOA:FJCrawford:bts 5/28/65

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA: WJHANDLEY

Clearances: NEA - Mr. Handley
S/S - Mr. Moose
NEA/P - Mr. Baldanza
P - Mr. McCloskey
O/CPR - Ambassador Hand
SOA - Mr. Cameron
White House - Mr. Komer
S/S - Mr. Moose

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FORM 6-63 DS-322

214

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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43 Origin
55 Info

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI 2507 IMMEDIATE

LIMDIS

MAY 31 1 34 PM '65
025

EMBTEL 3499

White House shares Department's view and yours on importance of making non-release Shastri's May 23 letter stick.

White House regards Presidential correspondence as privileged; release our standard practice is not to/even when press comments appear; and we would consider release could not help but inhibit candor in future correspondence.

In answer all queries here we are taking line we do not REPEAT not discuss Presidential correspondence full stop.

END

GP-3

RUSK

BUNDY-S...
BATOR
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KOMER
MOODY
REEDY
SAUNDERS
THOMSON

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Authority State 8/1/76; NSC 4/1/77
By jcl rng NARA, Date 3-5-01

Drafted by: NEA:CLaise:vah 5/31/65
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Carol Laise

Clearances:
SOA - Mr. Cameron
S/S - Mr. Moose
P - Mr. Reap
NEA - Mr. Handley (substance)
White House - Mr. Komer

~~SECRET~~

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

215

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Action 43
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3501
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BT
S E ~~C R E~~ T MAY 31

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1965 MAY 31 AM 10 00

L I M D I S

IND
State/Sheila
Cable

REF: MBTEL 3499

FOREIGN SECRETARY JHA CALLED ME URGENTLY TO MEA THIS AFTERNOON RE GARBLED LEAK OF SHASTRI'S MAY 23 LETTER TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON, DEIVERY OF WHICH HE SAID BK NEHRU HAS CONFIRMED. JHA SAID LEAK WAS ENTIRELY UNAUTHORIZED AND MEA AND PRIMIN'S OFSRCE HAVE COME UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE TO RELEASE TEXT AS ANTIDOTE TO CRITICISM THA SHASTRI HAD "KOWTOWED" TO PRESIDENT. HE GAVE ME A COPY, SAID EMERGENCY COMMITTEE OF CABINET THEN IN SESSION OWN THE HALL WAS CONSIDERING WHAT TO DO ATTHIS EVENING'S OFFICIAL PRESS BRIEFING, AND ASKED MY VIEWS.

I SAID THAT APRT FROM SUBSTANTIVE CONSIDERATIONS, REFERENCES IN PRIMIN'S LETTER TO TWO COMMUNICATIONS FROM PRESIDENT WOULD LEAD STRAIGHT TO PRESS REQUESTS FOR TEXTS OFLATTER IF FORMER RELEASED IN FULL. I WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT WANT TO EXPRESS ANY OPINION WITHOUT TIME FOR PRESIDENT TO CONSIDER THE MATTER.

IN ENSUING DISCUSSION JHA SPOKE OF GIVING PRESS A SUMMARY OF SHASTRI LETTER WHICH I POINTED OUT WOULD ONLY LEAD TO FURTHER TROUBLE IF FULL TEXT LATER BECAME AVAILABLE. JHA WAS RELUCTANT TO CONTEMPLATE RELEASEOF PRESIDENT'S APRIL 15 LETTER (DEPTEL 2162) BECAUSE OF ITS REFERENCE TO AID PROGRAM.

IT WAS LEFT AS JHA WENT TO JOIN CABINET MEETING THAT HE WOULD RECOMMEND (A) FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY GOI OF ALL ASPECTS QUESTION RELEASE FULL TEXT AWAIT USG'S VIEWS; (B) MEANWHILE AT PRESS BRIEFING THIS EVENING SPOKESMAN ANSWER QUESTIONS BY SAYING CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN PRIMIN AND PRESIDENT IS PRIVATE BUT VERSION REPORTED IN PRESS IS INACCURATE.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-5-04

COMMENT: IN RESPONSE PRESS QUERIES HERE WE WILL FOR THE PRESENT HOLD LINE THAT CORRESPONDENCE IS PRIVATE FULL SHMP. BALANCING PROS AND CONS OF RELEASE SHASTRI'S LETTER, I DO NOT REPEAT NOT SEE SUFFICIENT ADVANTAGE TO OUR INTERESTS IN MATTERS IT DEALS WITH TO WARRANT ENCOURAGING GOI TOWARD RELEASE. BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THERE IS GOOD CHANCE OF MAKING NON-RELEASE STICK (RELEASE WOULD SET UNDESIRABLE PRECEDENT, FLAP WILL DIE DOWN, ETC.) IF WE RESPOND QUICKLY.

PLEASE INSTRUCT. GP-3. GREENE
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 10:22 A.M., 5-31-65.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 10:35 A.M., 5-31-65.

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

216

5
Action

SS
Info

SECRET

BUNDY-SMITH
BATOR
BOWDLER
BOWMAN
CHASE
COOPER
HAYNES
JESSUP
JOHNSON
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1965 JUN 1 AM 6 17

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PP RUEHCR
DE RUSBAE 15 01/0950Z
P 0109 50Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3506
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S E C R E T JUNE 1

LIMDIS

DEPTEL 2507, EMBTEL 3503

026

FOREIGN SECRETARY HAVING LEFT FOR COLOMBO, I CONVEYED TO PRIME MINISTER'S SECRETARY L. K. JHA NEGATIVE REPLY TO QUESTION ABOUT PUBLICATION SHASTRI'S MAY 23 LETTER. JHA UNDERSTOOD, SAID HE THOUGHT LINE COULD BE HELD AT LAST EVENING'S DENIAL OF EARLIER REPORTS (EMBTEL 3503) AND PROMISED GIVE ME OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK AGAIN IF FOR ANY REASON GOI FURTHER CONSIDERS POSSIBILITY OF RELEASE.

GP-3.

GREENE
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-5-04

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Staff mtg Tues

भारतीय राजदूतावास
वाशिंगटन, डी० सी०
EMBASSY OF INDIA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 28th, 1965

B.K. Nehru to President 5/25/65

India

My dear Mr President:

I have the honour to transmit to you the enclosed message from the Prime Minister of India, which has just been received at this Embassy.

With my high regard and esteem,

Yours sincerely,

(B.K. NEHRU)
Ambassador of India

The President,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

217a

PRIME MINISTER.
INDIA.

May 23, 1965.

Dear Mr. President,

On April 16, 1965 Ambassador Chester Bowles conveyed to me your message informing me that for various reasons it would not be convenient for you to receive me in Washington on the 2nd June as previously arranged. In deference to your wishes, I had naturally, and I must confess with some sense of disappointment, to cancel the visit to the United States which was scheduled for early June. You have suggested that I should visit the USA in autumn. I am, however, not able to say at present whether my parliamentary and other commitments will permit me to do so.

You have referred to our close association in many common endeavours. We greatly value this association and trust that it will continue undiminished in a spirit of mutual understanding.

I was happy to meet Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge who also handed me your letter of April 15. I was interested to learn from him about the Vietnam situation. The situation is really depressing and dangerous. I hope that it might be possible for circumstances to arise which will permit of a dialogue and a peaceful solution of the Vietnam problem. I know the same thought must be uppermost in your mind also. In today's situation when China is pursuing an aggressive policy, it is difficult to anticipate with any degree of certainty, the likely course of events. But believe me Mr. President, I do feel sincerely that the more rational elements might possibly respond well if it were possible for you to consider a cessation of the air strikes. In any case it would greatly strengthen the chances of a peaceful solution. Such a decision on your part would be a significant contribution towards the promotion of world peace and would be in keeping with the high statesmanship which the United States has displayed in moments of crisis.

contd.....

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS 64-68, vol 25, #123
By JC NARA, Date 3504

PRESERVATION COPY

PRIME MINISTER.
INDIA.

We ourselves have been passing through a difficult situation. You are no doubt informed of the recent attack on us by Pakistan in the Kutch-Sind border area. This has roused a great deal of feeling. We are a peaceful nation wedded to the pursuit of peace and economic development but it seems our neighbours China and Pakistan are determined to provoke us. We are exercising a great deal of patience and we have responded positively to Prime Minister Harold Wilson's initiative to bring about a ceasefire and restoration of status quo ante. I am afraid Pakistan has been raising all kinds of difficulties regarding ceasefire and restoration of status quo as on 1st January, 1965 which have prevented an agreement being reached. The fact that Pakistan has been using United States armour and equipment against us has naturally caused much concern in our country. I know, however, that your Government has already taken up this matter with the Government of Pakistan.

With warmest personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

Lal Bahadur

(Lal Bahadur)

His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States of America,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

PRESERVATION COPY

218

American Embassy,
New Delhi, India,
May 26, 1965.

UNCLASSIFIED

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Dear Bob:

As you may know, we have been working for some time here in New Delhi to develop a new Division of Political Economic Affairs which combines the usual Political and Economic Sections. We are also moving to draw our Consulates General more fully into the total Mission operation. The enclosed memorandum spells out some of the details of these moves.

Because we are trying quite a new institutional set up, we have taken several weeks to prepare the ground. A series of meetings has been held to discuss the problems that might arise, and above all to stress our objectives: namely, to bring about a better integration of our economic and political analysis and reporting and to encourage members of the new division to think in more action-minded terms about the situations they have analyzed and reported. We have also given each individual affected a chance to express his personal views about how and where he thought he would be most useful.

As a result, this far-reaching move has been made with a maximum of good will and, I believe, a feeling on everybody's part that he now has a broader and more challenging job.

Although we are going to be seriously handicapped for the next few weeks by a massive turn-over and a whole string

Robert W. Komer, Esquire,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

UNCLASSIFIED

JUN 2 1965

of home leaves, I am confident that by the end of summer this new set up will have proven its effectiveness.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Enclosure:

As stated.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By JC, NARA, Date 3-5-04

Komer

India
+ Shastri Visit

OO RUSBAE
DE RUEPWW 316 28/0029Z
O 280029Z
FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC SECRET
TO AMEMB NEW DELHI
EXEC GRNC
BT
S ~~E C R E~~ T NODIS CITE CAP65137. FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE
FROM MCGEORGE BUNDY

PRESIDENT DESIRES THAT YOU BE FULLY UP TO DATE ON REASONING BEHIND SHASTRI VISIT POSTPONEMENT SO THAT YOU CAN RESPOND KNOWLEDGEABLY IN CASE ISSUE ARISES IN YOUR PRIVATE TALKS WITH KEY INDIAN OFFICIALS. IN FACT, HE SEES MERIT IN YOUR RAISING MATTER WITH SHASTRI YOURSELF. WITH YOUR HILL EXPERIENCE YOU SHOULD BE IN GOOD POSITION UNDERLINE WHY PRESIDENT FELT JUNE TIMING UNPROPITIOUS, GIVEN ROCKY PASSAGE OF AID BILLS THESE DAYS.

EMBASSY WILL HAVE FILE OF WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENTS AND

PAGE 2 RUEPWW 316D ~~S E C R E~~ T NODIS
PRESIDENT'S OWN COMMENT IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE TODAY. BEYOND THIS, HOWEVER, YOU COULD ADD FOLLOWING PRIVATE GLOSS AS SEEMS APPROPRIATE:

1. YOU KNOW FROM PRESIDENT HIMSELF THAT HE INTENDED NO DISCOURTESY. IT WAS UNFORTUNATE FACT OF PRESS LEAK HERE JUST AFTER PRESIDENT'S LETTER HAD BEEN SENT, WHICH FORCED ABRUPT ANNOUNCEMENT IN BOTH DELHI AND WASHINGTON BEFORE WE HAD TIME TO WORK MATTER OUT JOINTLY.

2. PRESIDENT WAS GENUINELY WORRIED THAT EARLY VISITS SHASTRI AS WELL AS AYUB, WHILE AID FIGHT STILL IN PROGRESS ON HILL, WOULD INEVITABLY LEAD TO UNDUE FOCUS ON FACT THAT INDIA LARGEST SINGLE RECIPIENT OF US AID, AT TIME WHEN CONGRESSIONAL

PAGE 3 RUEPWW 316D ~~S E C R E~~ T NODIS
TO MAKE INDIA'S NEW FOURTH PLAN A SUCCESS, HE ALSO SAW MERIT IN WAITING TILL HE COULD GET BETTER SENSE OF WHAT CONGRESS PREPARED TO GO FOR.

5. YOU MIGHT EXPRESS YOUR HOPE THAT THERE IS NO MISAPPREHENSION THAT US EQUATING INDIA WITH PAKISTAN. MAIN REASON THAT AYUB AND SHASTRI VISITS WERE FOCUSSED ON HERE SIMULTANEOUSLY IS THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES ARE FIRST AND SECOND LARGEST RECIPIENTS OF US AID. EUROPEANS NOT IN SAME CATEGORY. AS FOR PAK OF KOREA, WE HAD SPECIAL PROBLEM IN SEEKING TO BACK HIS HAND ON ROK/JAP SETTLEMENT.

6. YOU MAY TELL SHASTRI OF PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL HOPE THAT VISIT CAN BE RESCHEDULED SOON. OUR MUTUAL UNDERTAKINGS OVER A PERIOD OF YEARS HAVE ACHIEVED SUCH DEPTH AND UNDERLYING FIRMNESS THAT WE CANNOT PERMIT THEM TO BE UNDERMINED.

(FOR YOUR INFO)
PRESIDENT AUTHORIZES YOU TO ADJUST THIS MESSAGE IN LIGHT DELHI PROBLEM AS YOU AND BOWLES SEE FIT. HE PARTICULARLY HOPES YOU WILL ADD APPROPRIATE COMMENT ON FOREIGN AID PROBLEMS IN SENATE FROM YOUR OWN EXPERIENCE. (END FOR YOUR INFO)
BT

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

NNNN

220

ROBERT J. CLARK, Ph.D.
ECONOMIST
24 East 94th Street
New York, N. Y. 10028, U.S.A.
Telephone 212 SA 2-7663
c/o Fundo de Fomento de Exportação
Rua Ponta Delgada 44A
Lisboa, 1, Portugal.
27 May 1965

Dear Mr. President:

Last 31 January I wrote to you from Taiwan saying I had just been in Laos, Cambodia, and South Viet Nam in pursuit of my own business. As just one of 190 million of your people, I urged that you did not yield to the soft people in our country and give up or back up in South East Asia. Now I give thanks in my prayers that we have a man as President, that we take a stand when it isnecessary to protect freedom, and that our flag and an American passport mean something. God Bless you.

Even though I realize letters such as thisprobably find their way into the Secret Service wastebaskets after having been thoroughly screene to see what sort of a nut writes to the President, I feel I must have my say on another subject, aid to India.

I was in New Delhi for two months as a member of an international trade team (2 Americans, 2 Japanese, 2 British, and I Italian) studying how India could increase its exports to alleviate its billion-dollar-a-year trade defecit which we underwrite thru our various aid programs.

In the course of the Trade Team's study, we talked to more than 800 people in government andin what they laughingly call business and finance I also had the benefit of the views of my 6 collegues all of whom have some knowledge and experience in foreign trade. It was our unanimous opinion that the Indians have no real desire to take a place in the world They simply want to beg their way along.

India is using the billion dollars a year which the American taxpayer hands out to that country to underwrite its sinsane socialism, its idioti nationalism, and the stupidly sensitive personal pride of its degraded people. The Indians have no real incentive to increase their foreign trade. I could give you chapter and verse on many many instances wherein they are more interested in personal pride or a fast rupee or that socialism and nationalism than they are in developing exports. Why should they worry about producing and exporting? They always have the American taxpayer to bail them out year after year.

As one of those American taxpayers, I urge you to look at India an d find out just how wasteful our efforts are. I am all for helping people, but when they don't even try to help themselves and are so arrogant and stupid about it, I wonder if it is not time to get the American taxpayer off the hook. The Indians aren't even trying.

And if you take a look at India, you might look at the AID operation there. Those people are themost scraggly bunch of misfits you could find. They couldn't hold a job at home so they become big men handing out money in India. The day I was leaving, one of those misfits grabbed me and begged for my help because, "I must get rid of a million dollars quick

JUN 4 1965

PRESERVATION COPY

to meet a budget." That was a million dollars of foreign exchange and of taxpayers' money he was so anxious to be rid of. If we must help out enemy (when has India sided with us?), why let the misfits of our country handle it?

If you are really interested in reducing the dollar drain, you could also take a look at the charitable American foundations which are dishing out millionsof dollars of foreign exchange in India much of which goes to help propagate theories in basic opposition to our own, i.e. socialism.

On another subject, I am now working in Portugal for three months (earning dollar exchange, not giving it away or spending it) and I have seen all over the country old castles made into what they call pousadas which are small hotels where travellers can stay for a limited number of days at low prices. Why cannot we do this with someof our historic buildings instead of letting them be torn down for freeways and such. Or if there are not historic buildings, build small inns at places like Little Big Horn, Sutter's Mill, Lincoln's birthplace, etc. This way the people can participate in and enjoy their heritage.

God Bless you. It isgood to have a man running things.

Sincerely yours

Robert J. Clark

PRESERVATION COPY

MAR 12 1965

China
Taipei (E)

220a

2/5/65
State

ROBERT J. CLARK, Ph.D.
ECONOMIST
24 East 94th Street
New York, N. Y. 10028, U.S.A.
Telephone 212 SA 2-7663

Written at
Taipei, Taiwan
31 January 1965

President Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House
Washington, 25, D.C.

Dear President Johnson:

Before I get to the substance of this letter, may I say I hope your cold is gone. Also, may I say it is a blessing to have a president who is pulling Americans together instead of dividing them into antagonistic groups.

The purpose of this letter is to the most sincere and fervent plea of one American citizen not to let the soft heads prevail and pull us out of Southeast Asia.

In the course of developing more clients for my own business of advising people on their investments, I am on my way home from Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. I have talked to all sorts of people, substantial people who have money to invest and some who don't. In this business, talk always gets around to our policy in Southeast Asia. The people in Laos, South Vietnam, and here in Taiwan aren't playing games. The Lao and Vietnams are out there dying for their freedom and for their countries. Americans are dying too. The people I talked to want to believe in us because we are helping them. But how can they believe when our soft-heads talk of pulling out, soft-heads most of whom have never been any where near Southeast Asia. The people I talked to - all of them - have a bewildered faith in us. But every time a soft-head opens his mouth, the bewilderment increases and the faith diminishes.

The soft-heads talk of the danger of a nuclear holocaust. Well, to the man behind the stone wall on Bunker Hill the smallest ball between the eyes was his nuclear holocaust. His world was finished. But without his guts and his willingness to die for freedom, you and I would not have this magnificent country and our beautiful flag.

Somewhere sometime we have to hurt a little or a lot to preserve our freedom and the faith of the world in what we are and what we stand for. That time has come again. It is now and the place is where people are fighting for freedom side by side with us. Just because it is far away and their customs are strange

Please, Mr. President, keep the faith with those Americans who have died for our freedom and with those people in Laos and South Vietnam who are fighting and dying for theirs no matter how tough and how depressing it is. Their freedom is no less important to them than ours is to us even though we do not fully understand their ways. Remember we had help from overseas in gaining our own freedom.

Sincerely yours,
Robert J. Clark

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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May 14, 1965. Kamer

Orig'd BKS
of Rec'd OK

India

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to the President from
Hakim Manik Rau

Enclosed is the translator's summary of Mr. Rau's letter of April 12, 1965 addressed to the President, requested in your communication of April 20, 1965. The Department recommends that Mr. Rau's letter be referred to our Consulate General in Madras for reply. The original letter is being held by the Department and will be forwarded to Madras if you approve.

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

1. Translator's summary of Mr. Rau's letter.

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MAY 17 1965

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

LS No. 34447
C/R-13

TRANSLATOR'S SUMMARY OF COMMUNICATION

Language: Hindi

Date of Communication: April 12, 1965

Addressed to: The President, thru U.N. Office of Secretariat, New York

Name and address of writer: Hakim Manik Rau, Vaidya Charya
Palace (Shasikalabai) at Varun Lal Darvaja,
Chaminaka, Bhatjibapu Bag, Highcourt Nigrani,
Hyderabad, Deccan, India

Substance of writer's statement:

Subject: White Paper (being sent as Notice).No.2
Office Municipal Corporation, Hyderabad, Deccan

Contents are:

1. Role of U.S. towards the freedom of India
2. Turmoil in India following its partition. Atrocities from Pakistan
3. World with people of no religion, principles and decency.
4. China, a new aggressor. Budhism and their present day actions.
5. Times are bad, there is no assurance of safety, etc.
6. Suffering of people, deaths by starvation
7. Corruption and people of influence
8. New faces of administration. So many officials
9. Winston Churchil, Mahatma Gandhi, Jawahar Lal Nehru.
10. Russia, Germany. New scientific feats.

FORM 2-63 DS-378

11. American friendship towards India and help.

12. Brahma, Brahaman, God.

13. Bicycles, coal, carbon dioxide, electricity, magnate, Moon.

14. Photo appeared in the paper.

15. Sending copies to: Indian Parliament, Swaran Singh,
March 23,1965,under certificate of posting
Lord Mau Tung, Prime Minster Chou-en-Li New China, Peking.
and President and Prime Minister of Russia.

Please send me a prompt reply. It is not a joke. It is your responsibility to see.

Thanks.

C02848413

RWK -
Here is Bowles' latest. Jessup says Critchfield is still working on it and isn't ready to make a TOP SECRET proposal yet.

EO 13526
3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

7 MAY 1965 1400

IMMEDIATE FOR: SECRETARY OF STATE RUSK

MCGEORGE BUNDY WHITE HOUSE

WILLIAM RABORN CIA

FROM: AMBASSADOR BOWLES

Sent via Bowles

WE BELIEVE THERE IS URGENT IMMEDIATE NEED TO INTRODUCE DRAMATIC NEW ELEMENT INTO PAK-INDIA IMPASSE.

SHASTRI GOVT HAVING STARTED FROM IMPECCABLE POSITION ON KUTCH ISSUE IS NOW STARTING TO WOBBLE UNDER PRESSURE FROM COMMUNISTS, FELLOW TRAVELERS, AND INDEED, FROM MANY NORMALLY RESPONSIBLE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS PARTY. CABINET IS SPLIT AND COMBINED EMOTIONAL IMPACT OF CHINESE MILITARY VICTORY, CHINESE NUCLEAR BREAKTHROUGH AND RECENT PAK CLAIMS OF SWEEPING MILITARY VICTORY OVER INDIAN ARMY IN KUTCH HAS PRODUCED A MOOD HERE WHICH COULD EASILY BLOW UP IN ANY ONE OF SEVERAL DIRECTIONS.

WHAT WE NEED NOW IS BRAND NEW ELEMENT THAT WILL DISCREDIT LEFT WING CHAUVINISTS, SOBER MORE

TOP SECRET

SANITIZED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 12-352
By UUS NARA, Date 03-24-2016

C02848413

Attached

MODERATE OPPOSITIONISTS, DIVERT INDIAN PUBLIC FOCUS FROM PAKISTAN BACK TO CHINA, AND GIVE SHASTRI RATIONALE FOR CONSTRUCTIVE AGREEMENT WITH PAKISTAN.

IN POINT 2 OF EMBTEL 3185 SENT THIS MORNING FROM NEW DELHI I SKETCHED LINE OF REASONING THAT WE BELIEVE CAN BE USED COVERTLY TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE. IN BRIEF, THIS WOULD ASCRIBE PAK THRUST IN RANN OF KUTCH TO CHINESE TRICK DESIGNED TO GOAD INDIA INTO RETALIATION, TO CONFUSE INDIA'S POSITION BEFORE WORLD OPINION AND TO CONFRONT GOI WITH CHOICE OF BACKING DOWN BEFORE CHINESE WARNINGS TO CEASE ITS ATTACK ON PAKISTAN, OR TO EMBARK ON WAR WITH PAKISTAN WHICH IN VARIETY OF WAYS WOULD ADMIRABLY FIT CHINESE PURPOSE.

I BELIEVE AND BRITISH HICOMM FREEMAN AND OTHERS AGREE THAT THIS ANALYSIS MAY IN FACT BE CLOSE TO TRUTH; EVEN IF CHINESE DID NOT PRECISELY PLAN IT THAT WAY, THEY WOULD SURELY PUSH EVENTS DOWN THIS UGLY CHANNEL IF THEY HAD OPPORTUNITY.

WHAT WE NEED SOONEST IS EVIDENCE OF CALCULATED CHINESE PLAN OF THIS KIND PREFERABLY IN FORM OF SOME

C02848413

APPARENTLY AUTHORITATIVE DOCUMENT SUPPORTED BY ALLEGED MONITORING OF CHINESE RADIO, RECENT CONVERSATIONS BY FOREIGNERS WITH HIGH CHINESE OFFICIALS, ETC.

IF EFFECTIVE AND PERSUASIVE OPERATION OF THIS KIND CAN BE MOUNTED QUICKLY ENOUGH WE BELIEVE TENSE ATTITUDE BOTH HERE AND IN PAKISTAN COULD BE MODIFIED AND BOTH COUNTRIES MIGHT EVEN BE PERSUADED TO MOVE TOWARDS COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.

THIS PRESENTATION HAS ADVANTAGE OF UNDERCUTTING THEORY THAT PAKS ARE PLOTTING WITH CHINA AGAINST INDIA AND INSTEAD PUTS PAKISTAN AND INDIA IN SAME BOAT, I.E., AS COMMON VICTIMS OF NEFARIOUS CHINESE PLOT DESIGNED TO PLUNGE SUBCONTINENT INTO BLOODSHED AND TOTAL CONFUSION. AT SAME TIME IT WOULD PLACE COMMUNIST-ALIGNED PRESS, BLITZ, ETC., IN POSITION OF OPENLY SUPPORTING CHINESE PROGRAM TO DESTROY INDIAN GOVERNMENT AND CAST EMOTIONAL MODERATES WHO HAVE BEEN CALLING FOR RETALIATORY ACTION IN ROLE OF CHICOM DUPES.

[redacted]

[redacted] EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS DIVERSIONARY EFFORT CALLS FOR HIGHEST PRIORITY AND SPEED. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT US ROLE SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE DISCLOSED. WE BADLY NEED YOUR ASSISTANCE AND WE WILL BE GRATEFUL FOR IT.

Critchfield is already working on this and believes it feasible with modifications

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

May 7, 1965
Date

Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

Note addition p. 2 NHS

The enclosed is for White House clearance prior to transmission.

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Draft cable to New Delhi.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATION

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING. NOT NAT'L SECURITY INFORMATION, E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.1(a)
BY jw ON 2-17-93

TELECOMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS DIVISION WORK COPY

1915

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Amembassy NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State 8-11-76
By clrg, NARA, Date 3-504

LIMDIS - FOR AMBASSADOR

PL 480 Agreement.

Embtels 2937 and 3164.

We are still undecided as to whether next Title I agreement should be for one or two years. Appreciate cogent arguments you have made for two-year agreement, in terms of getting GOI to adopt necessary reforms on food front. However, also have poor experience of 1960 four-year agreement in mind. Our present ~~x~~ tentative thinking would be provide 5-6 million tons wheat and 300,000 tons rice if one-year agreement. If for two years, 10-12 million wheat and 600,000 rice. In any event we shall have to take Congressional soundings on scope and size of program.

Meantime we are extending beyond June 30 shipments of commodities remaining under present agreement. This will mean carry-in of approximately 600,000 tons wheat, over 100,000 tons corn, and 35,000 tons vegetable oil to keep pipeline flowing.

It will take some time to work out various details of proposed new agreement. These include approach to PL 480 Advisory Committee on interest rate for 104 (g) loans, and possibly on rupee allocation for US uses. On ~~minimum~~

SOA:SSober:ss

NEA - Phillips Talbot

AA/NESA - Mr. Macomber (draft)
USDA/ FAS - Mr. Eskildsen (subs)

S/S -
White House -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FORM DS-322 8-63

Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other flimsy work copies before delivery to Telecommunications Operations Division

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

XXXXXXXXX

wheat and rice quantities willx need consult other friendly exporters. We want also to consult with other wheat exporters to see what contributions they could make toward meeting India's needs.

Share your concern (Embtel 2982) on need avoid appearance our indulging in ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ fence-mending campaign. Believe any publicity on our intentions on new PL 480 agreement undesirable at this time, even if we were far enough ~~xhxm~~ along to be at all specific. It is particularly important to avoid any publicity until we have everyone on board here and tested Congressional sentiment.

You may, however, inform Shastri personally and confidentially that we recognize India's continuing need for major assistance under PL 480. You could tell him our proposal/~~xxxxxx~~ is still in process of formulation, but we are thinking in terms of program adequate for India's urgent needs. You should avoid, however, giving impression of any US commitment on size of next program. If question of one year versus two years comes up, you should say we are not yet ready to talk on this point, though you may say we sympathetic to Indian request and related efforts improve agricultural position.

We are aware this gives you less leeway than you had in mind. We hope, nevertheless, it will provide you adequate opportunity reassure Shastri on our friendly and positive intentions on program of particular importance to India.

Other proposals Embtel 3164 will be subject ~~xx~~ septel.

GP-3.

END

Corrections made on ORIGINAL GREEN MUST be made on this and other flimsy work copies before delivery to Telegraph Branch

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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April 23, 1965

India Shastri Visit

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Prime Minister Shastri's Letter to the President Accepting the President's Invitation to Visit the United States.

The Department believes that no reply is necessary to Prime Minister Shastri's letter of acceptance to the President, since it has been superseded by the President's letter suggesting a postponement of the Prime Minister's visit.

Enclosed is the signed original of Prime Minister Shastri's letter which was received by the Department from the Indian Embassy on April 22.

for

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Original of Prime Minister's
letter, dated April 22, 1965.

(?)

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

APR 24 1965

224 a

PRIME MINISTER.
INDIA.

New Delhi,
April 14, 1965

Shastri to LBJ 4/14/65

Dear Mr. President,

I thank you sincerely for your letter of March 23rd which was handed over to me by Ambassador Bowles. Mrs. Shastri and I are looking forward with great pleasure to our visit to the United States and to meeting you and Mrs. Johnson.

2. We have the most pleasant recollections of your visit to us in 1961. Since then much has happened. Unprovoked aggression by the People's Republic of China has cast a shadow on this country which threatens our independence and our way of life. To protect this independence and our democratic way of life we are ready for every effort and sacrifice. At the same time, we cannot forget that our main objective is to raise the living standard of our people. These tasks throw a heavy burden on us, in carrying which we have received the most valuable cooperation and assistance from your country, for which we are indeed grateful. I look forward to the opportunity of discussing these and other problems with you personally.

3. I am deeply conscious of the heavy burdens that you are carrying at the present time, both in the internal and international spheres. We are happy to see your statement on Vietnam in response to the appeal of the 17 non-aligned nations to which we were also a signatory. Your acceptance of the non-aligned nations' appeal for talks without pre-conditions is a constructive contribution towards the solution of the Vietnam problem. I hope and trust that it will lead to positive results.

Yours sincerely,

Lal Bahadur

(Lal Bahadur)

His Excellency
Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States of America,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

225

Julia
Bowles

New Delhi - April 21, 1965.

CONFIDENTIAL
EYES ONLY

Dear Bob:

I do not know quite what to say in response to your personal cable about the withdrawal of the Shastri invitation. As you know, the impact here has been more severe than we had anticipated and I am afraid it will be a long time before we see the end of it.

But what particularly concerns us, Bob, at this critical moment is a feeling implicit in your cable that in spite of our efforts here we have somehow lost touch with Washington over the last several months.

For instance, we have been steadily nursing the Indians toward a much closer and more sympathetic relationship to us. The results were reflected in Averell Harriman's recent cable to the Secretary and the President in which he remarked that on returning to Delhi after two years' absence he felt that he "was in a new country".

The President's initiative in regard to Southeast Asia was widely applauded here both inside and outside the Government. A tentative decision had been made to send a blood transfer and ambulance unit to South Vietnam. At Belgrade the Indians took the lead in working out an acceptable resolution. According to intelligence reports the Indian representative, Rahman, during his recent visit to Hanoi strived earnestly to develop support for negotiation.

Mr. Robert Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-5-04

Sec'd to Komer 4/28/65
Bowles

Shastri was looking on the forthcoming Moscow visit as an opportunity to bring direct pressure to bear on the Soviet leadership in behalf of the Belgrade proposals and President Johnson's imaginative initiative. He was clearly hopeful that he would be able to report favorable progress during his forthcoming talks with the President.

With all this so abundantly clear in our dealings here in New Delhi, we are baffled at the assumption in the cables from Washington that Indians and ourselves are on wholly different beams in regard to Southeast Asia. To be sure Shastri expressed concern over bombing north of the 17th parallel but this developed into a public criticism only after we had cancelled the visit. In any event, his remarks did not go any further than did those of Bill Fulbright and Mike Pearson and other good friends in England and elsewhere.

Even more disturbing in your cable, Bob, is the sentence that "the President feels deeply that Shastri's visit here could focus unwelcome attention on the fact that we are spending our biggest chunk of aid on an enterprise which isn't going anywhere fast". Either our reporting has been most unclear, or our cables have not been read or digested, or I suppose they may have been read, digested and then not taken seriously.

I know of no United States Government, World Bank, or Ford Foundation economist in New Delhi who does not agree that India is just now completing a record year of economic growth. The industrial and foodgrain growth rates in real terms are both up nine percent; the gross national product is up by seven percent in real terms with a per capita gain of 4.7 percent.

It is deeply disturbing to us here that the critically important judgment that was made in Washington cancelling Shastri's visit should apparently have been made on the basis of such gross misinformation.

In regard to nuclear proliferation the ball has been in our court for months. The visits of Jerry Wiesner and John Palfrey here last January were both stimulating and encouraging to the Indians. However, since then we have had almost no word from Washington until the recent news that the Irish who have almost no influence among the nonaligned nations of Asia and Africa and who are unwilling to deal with the Indians (who have the most at stake now that the Chinese are testing nuclear weapons) are being encouraged to take the lead.

We have worked hard in the last two years brick by brick to build a new relationship with India. It is disappointing to see a good part of this work swept away by a decision which appears in retrospect to have been based upon misinformation about what has actually been happening here.

Although we will do our best, much ground has been lost.

I am deeply grateful to you personally, Bob, for all the support and understanding you have given us. However, I would be less than frank if I did not express my profound concern with the recent turn of events.

I look forward to seeing you in Washington the week of May 17.

Warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

(Dictated but signed in Ambassador's absence)

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EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

New Delhi, India,
April 20, 1965.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Bob:

I am enclosing a memorandum regarding a conversation which I had recently with Nan Pandit. While it is too early to judge the extent to which she may influence the direction of the Government and the Congress Party, she has already made it clear by her actions that she is not content to play the role of a quiet backbencher or an inactive figurehead.

I think you will be interested in her present thinking.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Enclosure: Memorandum of Conversation
April 14, 1965

Mr. Robert Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-5-04

APR 26 1965

227

India

EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

New Delhi - April 20, 1965.

Dear Mac:

M. J. Desai, former Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs in India, will arrive in Washington on May 13 and will stay until May 19.

As you know, M. J. is one of the ablest people in the Indian Foreign Service and he has drawn close to us in the last year or so.

We arranged his visit through the Friends of India Committee because we felt it would be worthwhile for him to have a chance to visit various universities in the United States and also to exchange views with people like yourself in Washington.

I think you would find it worthwhile to talk to him about India and its relations with the Soviet Union, China, Africa, Southeast Asia, as well as with the USA. I assume that you can get in touch with him through the Indian Embassy.

RWK:
OK
I'll
au
him
I called Handley

Warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Mr. McGeorge Bundy,
Special Assistant to the President
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

APR 28 1965

FOR MR. KOMER (FOR INFO)
Cy sent to State Department

229

भारतीय राजदूतावास
वाशिंगटन, डी० सी०

EMBASSY OF INDIA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

April 15, 1965

Excellency,

I have the honour to transmit herewith a telegraphic message received for you today from the Prime Minister:-

Begins

"Dear Mr. President,

I thank you sincerely for your letter of 23rd March which was handed over to me by Ambassador Bowles. Mrs. Shastri and I are looking forward with great pleasure to our visit to the United States and to meeting you and Mrs. Johnson.

2. We have the most pleasant recollections of your visit to us in 1961. Since then much has happened. Unprovoked aggression by the People's Republic of China has cast a shadow on this country which threatens our independence and our way of life. To protect this independence and our democratic way of life we are ready for every effort and sacrifice. At the same time, we cannot forget that our main objective is to raise the living standard of our people. These tasks throw a heavy burden on us, in carrying which we have received the most valuable cooperation and assistance from your country, for which we are indeed grateful. I look forward to the opportunity of discussing these and other problems with you personally.

3. I am deeply conscious of the heavy burdens that you are carrying at the present time, both in the internal and international spheres. We are happy to see your statement on Vietnam in respect to the appeal of the 17 non-aligned nations to which we were also a signatory. Your acceptance of the non-aligned nations' appeal for talks without pre-conditions is a constructive contribution towards the solution of the Vietnam problem. I hope and trust that it will lead to positive results.

Yours sincerely,

LAL BAHADUR "

Ends.

Accept Excellency, the assurances of my very highest consideration.

(A.K. DAR)
Charge d' Affaires.

The President,
The White House,
WASHINGTON D.C.

APR 16 1965

229

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Classification

Origin

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE
FLASH 2162

INFO: Amembassy KARACHI IMMEDIATE 1150

APR 15 8 57 PM '65

NODIS

As indicated in immediately preceeding instructions, there follows Presidential message to Shastri which you may deliver in your discretion:

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

You know how much I have been looking forward to your visit here as an opportunity for the two of us to share our thoughts on the efforts we are making to give our peoples a better life. As the date approaches, I have realized that circumstances have combined to deprive us of the atmosphere in which we could most profitably do this. The Viet-Nam crisis has focused the attentions of my Government, as I am sure it has yours, on immediate issues related to our security in the Far East. Ambassador Lodge will give you my views on this and I hope you will speak to him most frankly regarding yours.

Furthermore, the future of the United States aid program has been called into question in the Congress and the coming weeks

Drafted by: NEA:SOA:DTSchneider:apr 14/15/65

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: S/S - Blaine C. Tueller

Clearances:

The Secretary (in substance)
NEA - Mr. Handley
White House - Mr. Bundy

~~SECRET~~
Classification

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FORM DS-322 8-63

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 25, #102
By [illegible] NARA, Date 3-5-04

APR 27 1965

promise to be ones of intense debate. In these circumstances the long-term interests of our two countries, and our ability to pursue them jointly, would be better served in my judgment if you came in the fall after the Congress has adjourned than in June. I have, therefore, reluctantly come to the conclusion that the next month or two would not be the right time for us to exchange thoughts on our long-range plans and aspirations. I hope that you will not find it too inconvenient to defer your visit here until early this fall.

Our countries have long been closely associated in many common endeavors. In this association I believe we have developed the confidence in each other which allows me to suggest a new time for us to meet.

With warm regards.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

END

GP-1

RUSK

India
230

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

TYPE OF DOCUMENT

Cable _____

Letter ✓

Memo _____

Other _____

DATE 4/14/65

FROM Chester Bowles

TO R.W. Komer NUMBER _____

SUBJECT Ltr. enclosing ltr. to President from Chester Bowles (cy ltr) re Shastri visit

SEE Shastri visit

231

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

84
Action

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RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

CONTROL 10337
Recd APRIL 12, 1965
6:11 P.M.

ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 2888 INFO CANBERRA 34 LONDON 690 SAIGON 115 TOKYO 62 FROM NEW DELHI APRIL 12 8PM

DEPT PASS INFO WHITE HOUSE

LATE SATURDAY I MET WITH PRIMIN SHASTRI FOR HOUR AND DISCUSSED IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA AND WORLD OF PRESIDENT'S SEA SPEECH. L.K. JHA WAS ALSO PRESENT. FOLLOWING EXCHANGE DEVELOPED:

1. PRIMIN OPENED DISCUSSIONS BY SAYING HE HAD READ SPEECH TWICE, THAT IT WAS HISTORIC DOCUMENT, THAT HE WISHED TO EXPRESS HIS DEEP APPRECIATION FOR PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE, THAT AS I COULD SEE FOR MYSELF PUBLIC REACTION IN INDIA WAS OVERWHELMINGLY FAVORABLE, AND CFN 2888 34 690 115 62 12 10 1

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 608 C O N F I D E N T I A L
THAT HE COULD ASSURE ME THAT THROUGHOUT MINISTRIES OF HIS OWN GOVT AND IN PARLIAMENT IT WAS EQUALLY SO.

2. I THEN ASKED HIM HIS VIEWS ON NEXT STEP. DID HE SEE ANYTHING FURTHER WE COULD DO? WHAT POSITION DID HE HAVE IN MIND FOR INDIA? WHAT ABOUT BELGRADE 17?

_BUNDY-SMITH
_BATOR
_BOWMAN
_CHASE
_COOPER
_HAYNES
_JESSUP
_JOHNSON
_KEENY X
_KLIEN
_KOMER
_MOODY
_REEDY
_SAUNDERS
_SAYRE
_THOMSON

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Authority Stak 8-11-76
By kfrg NARA, Date 3504

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. SHASTRI REPLIED IN SEMI-APOLOGETIC WAY THAT PAK BORDER INCIDENTS IN KUTCH HAD CLAIMED MOST OF HIS ATTENTION IN THREE DAYS SINCE PRES JOHNSON'S SPEECH. HE WOULD EXPLORE WITH HIS COLLEAGUES POSSIBLE WAYS TO HELP IN NEXT TWO OR THREE DAYS. IN MEANTIME HE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN MY OWN ANALYSIS AND POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION.

4. I SUGGESTED PRIMARY KEY MAY BE HO CHI MINH WHOM INDIANS PERSIST IN BELIEVING MAY STILL EMERGE AS ASIAN TITO. IF HE COULD BE PERSUADED TO MEET PRES JOHNSON HALFWAY AS CO-WORKER FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND FOR DYNAMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SEA AREA, HIS POSITION IN HISTORY WOULD BE ASSURED REGARDLESS OF HIS ADHERENCE TO COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY.

HOWEVER CHINESE, WHO WOULD PREFER TO ENCOURAGE VIETNAMESE TO FIGHT VIETNAMESE FOR GLORY OF CHINA,

MAY BE EXPECTED TO APPLY EVERY CONCEIVABLE PRESSURE TO PREVENT HO FROM ASSUMING THIS CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE. UNLESS SOVIET UNION CAN BE PERSUADED VIGOROUSLY TO SUPPORT HO A MAGNIFICENT OPPORTUNITY FOR MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH MAY BE LOST.

USG HAS RESPONDED PROMPTLY AND AFFIRMATIVELY TO PROPOSAL OF 17 BELGRADE NATIONS; WE HAVE EVEN ACCEPTED THEIR SUGGESTION OF NEGOTIATION WITHOUT CONDITIONS. CAN NOT INDIA, YUGOSLAVIA AND OTHER NATIONS OF BELGRADE GROUP PERSUADE SOVIET UNION IN ITS OWN INTERESTS AS WELL AS REST OF US TO URGE HO TO RESPOND IN EQUALLY CONSTRUCTIVE WAY AND EVEN OFFER TO PROTECT HIM IF NEED BE AGAINST CHINESE COUNTER-PRESSURES?

IF SOVIETS SHOULD TURN COLD SHOULDER TO SUCH PROPOSAL FROM BELGRADE NATIONS THEY WOULD FIND THEMSELVES INCREASINGLY ISOLATED IN WORLD AFFAIRS; NOR CAN THEY ESCAPE FROM THIS ISOLATION BY TURNING TO CHINA SINCE THIS WOULD MEAN PLAYING SECOND FIDDLE TO MAO'S REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP. IN PERSUADING SOVIETS TO SENSE THIS SITUATION AND TO GRASP OPPORTUNITY FOR CO-LEADERSHIP BELGRADE NATIONS MAY HAVE CRUCIAL ROLE TO PLAY.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE FOUR RUSBAE 608 C O N F I D E N T I A L
IT ALSO MIGHT BE USEFUL TO CONSULT WITH JAPAN IN REGARD TO PURELY ASIAN INITIATIVE. AMB REISCHAUER HAD REPORTED EXTREMELY WARM REACTION BY SATO GOVT. BY WORKING WITH BOTH BELGRADE 17 AND JAPAN, INDIA CAN PLAY MAJOR ROLE NOT ONLY IN BLOCKING CHINESE EXPANSION IN SEA BUT ALSO IN SEIZING INITIATIVE IN ADVANCE OF ALGIERS CONFERENCE IN LATE JUNE.
5. SHASTRI LISTENED ATTENTIVELY WHILE JHA TOOK FREQUENT NOTES. ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT OFFER ANY SPECIFIC OPINION BEYOND REPEATED EXPRESSION OF RELIEF AND GRATIFICATION AT PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE, HE IS OBVIOUSLY ANXIOUS TO FIND EFFECTIVE ROLE FOR INDIA. IN NEXT FEW DAYS WE SHOULD SEE MORE CLEARLY WHAT IT WILL BE.

IF DEPT AGREES THAT 17 BELGRADE POWERS HAVE IN FACT MAJOR ROLE TO PLAY VIS-A-VIS SOVIETS AND PERHAPS HANOI I AM HOPEFUL THAT STRONG PRESSURES CAN BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ELSEWHERE ALONG THESE LINES; WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY REACT FAVORABLY. WHETHER THEY WILL ACT ALONE IS LESS CERTAIN. GP-3. BOWLES
BT

NOTE: PASSED WHITEHOUSE, 4/12/65, 6:50 p.m.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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CONFIDENTIAL

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C ~~O N F I D E N T~~ I A L

ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 2878 INFO TOKYO 60 SAIGON 114 LONDON 684 MOSCOW 241 HONG KONG 215 CINCMEAFSA UNN APRIL 10, 7 PM

EMBTEL 2870

RESPONSE OF INDIAN POLITICIANS, OFFICIALS AND PUBLIC MEDIA TO PRESIDENT'S VIET NAM SPEECH THUS FAR OVERWHELMINGLY TO EXPRESSED SENSE OF RELIEF AND HOPE. FULL FLAVOR OF REACTION SHOULD BE SOURCE OF DEEP SATISFACTION TO YOU.

OVERWHELMINGLY FAVORABLE REACTION BY PRESS WAS REFLECTED BY LEAD POSITION IN ALL IMPORTANT PAPERS AND IMMEDIATE LAUDATORY
CFN 2878 60 114 684 241 215 10 7 2870

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 540 C ~~O N F I D E N T~~ I A L
EDITORIALS IN MOST. TIMES OF INDIA, CONSISTENT CRITIC OF U.S. POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, PRAISED SPEECH AS "TRIUMPH FOR SANITY, REALISM AND GOOD SENSE." SEVERAL COMMENTATORS AGREE WITH HINDUSTAN TIMES VIEW THAT PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS NOW PLACED HANOI IN POSITION OF "WEIGHING WHETHER THERE IS ANY PROFIT IN PROLONGING A CRISIS TO SUIT PEIPING'S INTEREST WHEN THERE IS A REASONABLE WAY OUT TO AN HONORABLE SETTLEMENT." MEA HOWEVER REGARDS PEIPING'S REACTION RATHER THAN HANOI'S AS DECISIVE.

_BUNDY-SMITH
_BATOR
_BOWMAN
_CHASE
_COOPER
_HAYNES
_JESSUP
_JOHNSON
_KEENY
_KLIEN
_KOMER
_MOSOY
_READY
_SAUNDERS
_SAYRE
_THOMSON

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By JC, NARA, Date 3504

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LEFTWING PATRIOT TODAY FRONTPAGED REACTION STORY UNDER HEADLINE "INDIA HAPPY AT JOHNSON RESPONSE" (TO 17-NATION APPEAL FOR NEGOTIATIONS). OTHER HEADLINES TODAY "DELHI HAILS JOHNSON'S STATEMENT" AND "JOHNSON HAS RAISED HOPE OF SOLUTION."

SECOND DAY PRESS REACTION INCLUDED CARTOONS (A) SHOWING MAO HOLDING BACK AN EAGER HO CHI MINH WHOSE OUTSTRETCHED ARMS REACH FOR A HELICOPTER-DROPPED OLIVE BRANCH LABELED "JOHNSON'S OFFER" AND (B) MAO AND HO STANDING ON BOMB-SHAPED WORLD, WITH HO READING THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AND A PERSPIRING MAO COMMENTING "CAREFUL! THIS INCREASES THE DANGER OF PEACE."

ALL INDIA RADIO HAS BROADCAST LENGTHY PORTIONS OF SPEECH, PUTTING PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE IN FAVORABLE LIGHT.
CFN 17

MINISTERS, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, POLITICAL LEADERS ON ALT NON-COMMUNIST PARTIES, AND EDITORS WITH WHOM EMBASSY REPRESENTATIVES HAVE TALKED HAVE PRAISED THE APPROACH AS POSITIVE AND WELL-CONCEIVED. THE LITERARY STYLE AND BASIC QUALITY AS WELL AS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS HAVE WON MUCH PRAISE.

TEXT OF SPEECH HAS BEEN SUPPLIED TO OFFICIALS, PARLIAMENTARIANS AND COMMUNICATIONS PEOPLE, (MANY OF WHOM HAD ASKED FOR COPY AS SOON AS REPORTS OF SPEECH ARRIVED), AND USIS TODAY DISTRIBUTING 47,000 PRINTED COPIES TO LEADING INDIANS IN SIGNIFICANT FIELDS. THIS WILL BE FOLLOWED BY 337,000 COPIES IN EIGHT LANGUAGES.

I AM SEEING PRIME MINISTER SHASTRI THIS AFTERNOON AND SWARAN SINGH ON MONDAY TO DISCUSS ISSUES AND THE INDIAN RESPONSE. THERE AFTER, I PLAN PRESS CONFERENCE TO FOCUS ADDITIONAL EMPHASIS LOCALLY ON PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR INITIATIVES BY INDIA AND OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES.
I BELIEVE OVERWHELMINGLY FAVORABLE REACTION THROUGHOUT INDIA MAY CONDITION PRIME MINISTER'S POSITION AND I AM HOPEFUL OF FORMAL INDIAN SUPPORT. IN FACT, ECHOING FONMIN'S FAVORABLE COMMENT TO DNC YESTERDAY (EMBTEL 2875), OFFICIAL MEA SPOKESMAN HAS TOLD PRESS THAT PRESIDENT'S "CONSTRUCTIVE AND POSITIVE RESPONSE"
CFN 47,000 337PPP 2875

PRESERVATION COPY

PAGE FOUR RUSBAE 540 C O N F I D E N T I A L
TO 17 NON-ALIGNED NATIONS' APPEAL "RAISES HOPES ABOUT A SOLUTION OF VIETNAM PROBLEM."

WE MUST REALIZE, HOWEVER, THAT FINAL POSITION OF INDIA AND LIKELY OTHER NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES WILL DEPEND IN SOME MEASURE ON WHAT SOVIET UNION WILL DO.

GP-3. BOWLES
BT
CFN 2875 17 3

PRESERVATION COPY

233

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 8, 1965

TO: McGEORGE BUNDY

FROM: Bill Moyers

Phil Potter wanted you to see this.

Indeed

Phil:
What's all this?

233-a

MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT
(RAJYA SABHA)

सत्यमेव जयते

95 South Avenue,
New Delhi

28 March, 1965

~~Confidential~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-150
By iss, NARA, Date 11-4-04

Dear Phil:

I write to you in sorrow. Kindly see the enclosed copy of a confidential letter I have written to Shastri about a speech I recently made on the Vietnam crisis and the insanity of India's policy of non-alignment with regard to China. Please also see the piece written on the subject of my speech by Prem Bhatia.

What hurts me is the behaviour of the U.S. State Department. Three days before I made the speech I sent the script to Bowles (we are old friends) and asked him to make sure that the mention of Nehru's appeal to Kennedy for American air protection in November 1962 was all right; because it might cause a flutter. Bowles informed me through his private secretary that it was perfectly all right; he even informed the State Department before I made the speech that I was going to do so. After I made the speech I met him; he was very happy because there is no other Member of Parliament out of the 750 who is today prepared to say a word in support of the U.S. in its predicament in Vietnam. Kindly see the transcript of what I actually said in Parliament.

The speech upset the Congress Party. Shastri told a half truth, as I have pointed out in my letter to him. But what is shocking is that the State Department obligingly issued a statement supporting this half truth. The denial makes no difference to the substance of what I said. But it is a filthy thing to let down a friend who had consulted you before hand. They cannot win the favour of the Indian Government by thus telling a diplomatic lie.

In any event you must find out whether the document (Nehru appeal to Kennedy dated the 19th November 1962) is there or not. You must do something about it.

I also hope you will show these papers to your friend, Bill Moyers. President Johnson ought to know this.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely,
Sudhir

(Sudhir Ghosh)

Mr. Philip Potter,
Baltimore Sun,
National Press Building,
Washington D.C (USA)

233b

Confidential

95 South Avenue,
New Delhi

26 March, 1965

My dear Shastriji,

Last Friday morning (19th March) you called me to your office in Parliament House. It was a characteristic act of kindness on your part to talk to me before making a statement about something I had said. I was much moved by your courtesy and kindness. You told me that neither you nor Nandaji (who was present at the discussion) knew anything about any special request made by Panditji to the American Government for air protection after the Chinese invasion in 1962 and that people around you had told you that my statement was incorrect. I offered to make a public apology if after enquiring from Ambassador Bowles you were satisfied that Panditji did not make such a special request for air protection to President Kennedy at that hour of our peril, apart from the omnibus letter he had written to all heads of governments. Nandaji supported my suggestion that Mr. C.S. Jha (who was present) should find out from the American Ambassador whether such an official document containing Panditji's appeal for air protection existed in the possession of the American Government. You decided not to make a statement on Friday, as you had planned to do, and to postpone it till Monday, the 22nd March. It was also decided that in the meantime Mr. C.S. Jha was to make the necessary enquiry.

On Sunday evening, 21st March, I met Mr. C.S. Jha and asked him what he had gathered from Ambassador Bowles; because I had promised to make an apology the next morning, if I was wrong. He said he had not seen Mr. Bowles but he had had a talk with "the Americans"; it was obvious that he did not wish to tell me frankly what he had found out. So I got into touch with Ambassador Bowles who informed me through his Private Secretary, Richard Celeste, that he had sent Mr. Douglas Heck, Counsellor of the Embassy, to Mr. C.S. Jha on Saturday; Mr. C.S. Jha had asked Mr. Heck a plain question and Mr. Heck gave him a plain answer that the U.S. Government did have the document (Panditji's appeal to President Kennedy for air protection); the document was in Washington and it could be produced if the Government of India so desired. I went to your office on Monday morning to ask you what you would like me to do in these circumstances but you did not see me. Sardar Swaran Singh and Mr. C.S. Jha were with you at the time. Since you did not see me the only sensible thing I could do was to be absent from the House when you made the statement because I could not say anything that conflicted with what my Leader said.

The statement you made before Parliament was technically correct; Panditji did not ask for an aircraft carrier (my information was that he asked for air protection which was more than an aircraft carrier; in his letter of appeal to Mr. Kennedy 16 squadrons of fighting aircraft, presumably manned by Americans, were mentioned); you were also correct in saying that no aircraft carrier was there in the Bay of Bengal at that time (Mr. Bowles says the aircraft carrier was ordered to proceed to the Bay of Bengal from the Indian Ocean and was on its way). All this makes no difference to the substance of what I said.

Looking back I see that I made an error of judgment; I could easily have made my point about the insanity of the policy

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of non-alignment with regard to China without telling the story about the wretched aircraft carrier. The thesis of my speech had nothing to do with any aircraft carrier. I made a brief speech on the crisis created by the power of Communist China in South East Asia and the crisis in the United Nations and I pointed out the inadequacy of our policy in both these grave situations. Our policy of non-alignment between Russia and America is correct and wise but I believe that our policy of non-alignment as between China and America is a dangerous game to play; we are unwittingly playing up to the communists in India and in China. I believe that by bringing this grave matter sharply to the notice of the people of India I have done a service to the country.

The essence of my speech was that, in the last analysis, it was not a practical proposition to defend India from the military might of Communist China without using the military power of the United States. Even Panditji, the apostle of non-alignment, realised that in the hour of our peril in 1962 and asked for American air intervention and, God forbid, if we are attacked again we shall have to ask for the same thing from the same Americans. Panditji did what any responsible statesman would have done; it only proves that he was a great patriot. It is silly of anybody to say that by telling this plain truth I have damaged the "image" of a great man or cast a slur on the fair name of India.

Panditji did make a special appeal for air protection which was delivered by Ambassador B.K. Nehru to President Kennedy late at night on the 19th November, 1962. It is not a great secret of Government. It is public knowledge. It has already been written about (Vide the Washington Post, 22nd February 1963 - the article on this subject by Selig Harrison). Harrison tells me that he got it directly from Ambassador Galbraith who told quite a few people in New Delhi about it. You personally did not know about it at the time. But Ambassador B.K. Nehru is just now in New Delhi. I request that in the interest of truth you ascertain the facts from him. I want to know the truth about this matter because I have to decide if I owe an apology to the Party and to the country.

With regards,

Yours sincerely,

Sd. Sudhir Ghosh

Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri,
Prime Minister.

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RAJYA SABHA

15-3-65 (Phalguna 24, 1886 Saka)
Uncorrected - Not for publication.

SHRI SUDHIR GHOSH (WEST BENGAL): Madam Deputy Chairman, last Tuesday our Prime Minister made an admirable speech before this House. It was very heartening to listen to the new note of firmness in his survey of our internal economic and organisational problems. But I could not help feeling somewhat sad to listen to his foreign policy statement, to the inadequacy of the Prime Minister's remarks about the two grave crises which are shaking the whole world today, that is, the crisis in Vietnam and South-East Asia and the crisis in the United Nations. I, therefore, wish to take this opportunity during the Budget discussion to offer a few very brief remarks on these two grave crises and to offer, if I may venture to do so, a few words of friendly advice to our Government.

It appears, Madam Deputy Chairman, that our foreign policy advisers have not pointed out to our Prime Minister that statesmanship demands the acceptance of responsibility for what is happening around us in this world and discharging that responsibility to the extent of the nation's capacity. We cannot become a moral force in the world merely by preaching occasional sermons to the Americans or to the Russians about what they should do or should not do.

Of all the dangers that threaten India today, nothing is more dangerous than the danger of Chinese military power, which has shaken up the whole of South-East Asia, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma and the whole of the northern frontier of India -- from N.E.F.A. to Ladakh -- and will do so more confidently when, in a week or two, the Chinese militarists explode their second and much bigger nuclear bomb.

The Government has made various pronouncements, Madam, on the crisis in South-East Asia. Our Foreign Minister says that he wants a Geneva-type conference and a political settlement in

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Vietnam. Last session when the House considered the international situation I got into some trouble with my friend, the Foreign Minister, for saying a couple of sentences about exploring the possibility of a political settlement, between India and China, of the grave conflict that is costing us nearly half of our annual budget in military preparation. Madam Deputy Chairman, I am not a person who talks in the air; I had a reason for mentioning it, although I was not free to disclose the details of what I was talking about. I had no proof before me of the genuineness of the Chinese desire for a political settlement with us. But if responsible statesmen of international standing claim, on the strength of their direct talks with Chou-En-lai and Mao-Tse-Tung, that the Chinese leaders do want a peaceful political settlement with us, then it becomes our duty, Madam, to put that claim to the test.

I agree with our Foreign Minister that the Chinese are unscrupulous and intransigent and have frustrated all our attempts and the attempts of the friendly Colombo Powers to bring about a political settlement of our problem. What I do not understand is the Foreign Minister's charming belief that the same unscrupulous and intransigent Chinese will, by some miracle, cease to be unscrupulous and intransigent, if only the Americans will gather together a Geneva-type Conference and the Chinese will cheerfully participate in a political settlement in Vietnam which will exclude the power of Communist China from that country. I am impressed to see the simplicity of our Foreign Minister's thinking on international affairs.

Our Prime Minister says that he wants the Americans to get out of Vietnam and he wants the sovereignty of the people of Vietnam to assert itself. I am entirely in agreement with the Prime Minister. I too want the Americans to get out of Vietnam, but I want to know what happens after the Americans get out? Is it not necessary to ensure that the power of Communist China does not

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fill in the vacuum left behind by the Americans? Or have we already taken it for granted in our minds that Vietnam anyhow is a part of the Chinese sphere of influence and the world had better let them take it, in the same way as we acquiesced in the taking over of Tibet by the Chinese Communists. The withdrawal of the ~~Chinese~~ Americans, Madam, makes sense only if a large enough and powerful enough United Nations peace-keeping force replaces the Americans in Vietnam. I would love to see the Americans getting out of Vietnam and an international force under the flag of the U.N. move in - to stand guarantee that the people of Vietnam shall have a chance to breathe and they will have a chance to exercise their own will and decide their own future. I do not understand why our Prime Minister does not go forward and place before the world a positive suggestion about an alternative to the American military presence in that part of the world.

But the United Nations today is on the way to its death on this very issue of the United Nations peace-keeping force and the refusal of two of its founding members, France and Soviet Russia, to pay their share of the cost of U.N. peace-keeping in the Congo, the Gaza strip and elsewhere. The International Court said that the payment of these dues was obligatory on the part of the members of the United Nations. We took the position that it was not obligatory; a sovereign State can decide whether it likes to pay or not. We seem to imagine that the pronouncement of that opinion was in full discharge of our responsibility to the world organisation. The Canadians, the Dutch, the Governments of Finland and Sweden and some others have voluntarily offered a certain number of units of their armed forces to the U.N. peace-keeping army and also to pay for their deployment. Nobody asked them to make that offer. They have done that voluntarily. Britain has offered logistic support with transport aircraft, signal units, ordnance supplies, ambulances, etc. How is it that our Prime Minister does not come

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come forward with an offer that he would be willing to set aside and maintain, say, a brigade of Indian troops at our own cost in India, ready to go to any part of the world?

SHRI GOPIKRISHNA VAJAIVARGIYA: We have sent to Congo our army.

SHRI SUDHIR GHOSH: That was asked by the United Nations. I am talking about whether this country can make an offer like some 11 other Members of the U.N. are making offers who have a sense of responsibility for keeping the U.N. alive. Why do we have to wait till somebody tells us to do it? Surely we could have offered in the same way as the small countries have done to set aside and maintain a brigade of our own troops, at our own cost - ready to go out to any part of the world, maybe to Vietnam, not to fight anybody but to go there under the flag of the U.N. to save peace. Shall I go on? It is already 1.30.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: You can finish or if you want you can continue later.

SHRI SUDHIR GHOSH: If the House desires then I can finish.

HON. MEMBERS: After lunch.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Then the House shall reassemble at 2:30 P.M.

The House re-assembled after Lunch at Half past Two of the Clock -- The Vice-Chairman (Shri Akbar Ali Khan) in the Chair.

SHRI SUDHIR GHOSH: Sir, before the lunch break, I drew the attention of Hon. Members to [illegible] how small countries like Finland, Sweden, Canada, Holland were trying to make all the sacrifices they can possibly make in order to save the U.N. and I wondered why such a big country as ours cannot offer to set aside and maintain at our own cost, say, a brigade of Indian troops for the U.N. Peace-keeping force, ready to go anywhere in the world, even to Vietnam if necessary, not to fight anybody but to save peace, under the flag of the U.N.

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The British Prime Minister has appointed a Committee consisting of the best brains of Britain including the ablest of their M.Ps and international lawyers of the standing of Professor Jennings, Lord Devlin, Lord Shawcross - to cudgel their brains to work out ways of saving the U.N. from its impending death - to work out proposals for submission to the Special U.N. Committee that has been set up. I have not yet heard that anybody in the Government of India is spending sleepless nights to save the U.N. from its death.

At present 49 per cent of the U.N's annual budget is provided by only two countries - the Super Powers, America and Russia; 14 per cent by Britain and France and 37 per cent by the rest of the whole world put together; 60 per cent of the U.N. budget for technical assistance to underdeveloped countries comes from only one country, the U.S. Naturally those who pay the piper try to call the tune. At the Afro-Asian Conference in Algeria, I hope that the Prime Minister of India will take the lead to rectify this imbalance in the U.N. organisation and I hope that the non-aligned countries will come forward with an announcement about what sacrifices they are prepared to make to save the U.N. and to build up a World Security System - instead of beating the dead horse of colonialism all over again. I hope the non-aligned countries themselves will come forward with an offer that they are prepared to meet the cost of sending a peace-keeping U.N. force to Vietnam to replace the American Armed forces, without taking charity either from America or Russia. The Super Powers - America and Russia - are so big that they can live without the U.N.; to the smaller powers the U.N. offers not only verbal dignity but the only hope of an escape from nuclear terror.

As I have said, I would like to see the Americans get out of Vietnam just as much as our Foreign Minister would like it. But may I, in this connection, share with hon. Members a few lines from the front-page editorial on this subject in the

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the London socialist newspaper, the New Statesman. It says:

> "The Americans would gladly pull out tomorrow if they could honestly persuade themselves that this would be the end of the story. But, of course, it might merely be the beginning. Last Friday, the Peking Government asserted, in plain terms, that its next objective was Thailand's subversion. This ramshackle dictatorship is ripefor plunder; it has an ill-used Chinese minority of 3 million; and now, according to Peking, it has what is virtually a government-in-exile, ready to invade Thailand once the military situation is favourable. With the collapse of South Vietnam, Laos, already half occupied by Communist troops, would be speedily swallowed, and the Ruritanian 'neutralist' kingdom of Cambodia snuffed out. Thailand would then be exposed along a thousand miles of indefensible frontier. And after Thailand? The Communists and their allies could move into Malaysia from the north, to reinforce their assaults from the South. Worse still, Thailand's fall would expose the fat eastern flanks of Burma and, beyond Burma, the plains of India. The road to New Delhi lies through Saigon."

If anybody imagines that there is exaggeration in this assessment I venture to share with him an assessment of another kind, on another level, of a saint and a seer, Sri Aurobindo, whose mind functioned on a plane higher than that of politics or diplomacy. He was asked a question when the Americans were faced with a similar situation in 1950 in Korea, by one of his disciples, and this is what he said:

> "I do not know why you want a line of thought to be indicated to you for your guidance in the affair of Korea. There the whole affair is as plain as 'pikestaff'. It is the first move in the Communist plan of campaign to dominate and take possession first of these Northern parts and then of South East Asia as a preliminary to their manoeuvres with regard to the rest of the continent - in passing Tibet as a gate into India."
>
> If they succeed, there is no reason why domination of the world should not follow by steps until they are ready to deal with America.
>
> Truman seems to have understood the situation if we can judge from his moves in Korea, but it is to be seen whether he is strong enough to carry the matter through. The measures he has taken are likely to be incomplete and unsuccessful, since they do not include any actual military intervention except on sea and in the air. One thing is certain, that is, if there is too much shilly-shallying and if America gives up now her defence of Korea, she may be driven to yield position after position until it is too late. At one point or another she will have to stand and face the necessity of drastic action even if it leads to war."

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SHRI C.D. PANDE: Prophetic words.

SHRI SUDHIR GHOSH: Mr. Vice-Chairman, I think the people of this country have a right to demand an answer from us - those who sit here in the Parliament as to what is going to happen to this country when the Chinese Communists bare their teeth again on the India-China frontier. The Defence Minister said in Parliament the other day that something like 16 divisions of mechanised Chinese troops are sitting on our frontier and he particularly pointed out the dangerous state of things in the Chumbi Valley, just on top of the narrow 25 miles wide strip that connects Assam-NEFA-Nagaland with the rest of India. He also explained that while our land forces -- the Himalayan divisions -- had made good progress, there is serious deficiency in airpower to give support to these mountain divisions when the conflict with China breaks out. That is our military position.

Back in 1962 October, when our brave soldiers suffered humiliation and dishonour -- which the Indian army will never forget thanks to politicians who took the decision to send them to the Thagla Ridge, against all canons of military science - day after day we heard the shattering news of how our supposedly impregnable strongholds crumbled one after the other at Towang and Sela and Bomdila and ultimately the Chinese Communist hoardes came down to the Brahmaputra Valley. Then as well all knew, very suddenly, to the great surprise of the whole world, the Chinese decided to turn back. Why did they decide to turn back? Some people think, some people claim that, faced with this grave danger, our people rose like one man instead of destroying each other, as we are doing today in a senseless war of languages, and the Chinese realised that they could not really make much headway in India and therefore they decided to turn back. There are others who believe that Bertrand Russell, the distinguished philosopher, sent a telegram to Mr. Chou-En-lai to point out that it was not nice to worry a good man like Jawaharlal Nehru and that therefore

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the Chinese decided to go back. There are still others who believe that our good friend, Mr. Khrushchev gave some good advice to Mr. Mao-Tse-tung, with whom he had very affectionate relations, and as a result of that good advice the Chinese decided to go home. But it is not widely known that in those dark days of India's peril there was standing just outside Calcutta, near the mouth of the Hooghly river, about a couple of miles outside our territorial waters, one of the largest and newest aircraft carriers of the United States Navy, fitted with a full complement of supersonic aircraft and all the latest gadgets of destruction, sufficient to pulverize an advancing Chinese army, however large. One great power knows how to give a signal to another great power, and it is not widely known that a signal was given by one side to the other that, if they advanced any further, they would be forcing the hands of the President of the United States. The American aircraft carrier with all its means of destruction was there, not on the initiative of the American President; it was there at the request of Prime Minister Nehru of India, who had asked for American air protection, which was provided by President Kennedy. In the hour of our danger, so proud a man as our former Prime Minister, realised that, in the last analysis, it was not a practical proposition to defend India from the military might of Communist China without using the military might of the United States. That was the background of the Prime Minister's famour remark that there was going to be no non-alignment where China was concerned.

The Prime Minister of India, in those dark days of our peril, wrote to all the heads of Governments in the world and asked for help. It is a fact of history, Mr. Vice-Chairman, that our Soviet friends did not even acknowledge his letter until the following july -- July 1963, when they came forward with some offer of military assistance, for reasons which had nothing to do with the Chinese threat to India.

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I conclude with this remark, Mr. Vice-Chairman. I am absolutely certain about the accuracy of the story I have told you. But I am not suggesting that we, therefore, forget our friendship with Soviet Russia. I believe in the warmest kind of friendship between Russia and India. I fully appreciate the difficulty and embarrassment our Soviet friends where Communist China is concerned. I have merely pointed out the facts of life as they are. I have drawn your attention to what is going to happen again when the chips are down.

In the world today, there are forces that are trying to reduce tension amongst nations, and there are other forces, China, Indonesia and their friends, which are working to create greater and greater tension. In this new division of forces in the world the Russians and the Americans are on the same side of the fence; they are both desperately anxious to avoid war. In these changed circumstances India's non-alignment requires redefinition. I believe in non-alignment where Soviet Russia is concerned. I do not believe in non-alignment where Communist China is concerned. The services of non-aligned India are no longer required as a peace-maker between the Russians and the Americans, between the Communists and the anti-Communists. India's real contribution to world peace today is her own survival.

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India

April 2, 1965

McG. B.

Mac:

For a quick glance. Evidently everybody is in the act. I am inclined to think, and will so advise Gardner, that there is no need for anyone from here to go out. There are enough of us who know enough about India to make the case. We will get good staff work out of John Lewis and his people in any case.

Komer and I will work up a memo next week.

FMB

CC: Mr. Komer

Attachment: Letter from John Lewis to Gardner Ackley, dated Mar. 29, 1965

APR 5 1965

ORIGIN/ACTION

L-3		
RM/R 1	REP 1	AF
ARA	EUR 5	FE
NEA 4	CU	INR 5
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L	FBO	AID 12
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INT 7	LAB	TAR 2
TR	XMB	AIR 5
ARMY 3	CIA 10	NAVY 3
OSD 2	USIA	NSA 3
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

India
AID 6 India
Director for India

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TO : Department of State 1965 APR 6 AM 9 53

INFO : BOMBAY, CALCUTTA, MADRAS, MOSCOW

RETURN TO ANALYSIS AND DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy NEW DELHI DATE: April 1, 1965

SUBJECT : Text of Soviet-aided Bokaro Steel Plant Agreement

REF :

Forwarded herewith is the text of the Indo-Soviet agreement for the construction of the Bokaro steel plant. It was signed on January 25 and was placed before Parliament on March 11. The agreement provides for the construction of a steel plant with an initial capacity of 1.5 - 2 million metric tons annually, with a provision for expansion of its capacity to 4 million metric tons. Although the Soviets are solely responsible for the detailed project report, the agreement calls for "maximum possible participation of the Indian organizations in carrying out the designing work and in the supply of equipment and materials", for construction of the steelworks. It states that the Soviet Government will "deliver to India during 1966-69 the equipment and materials which are not available in India", and stipulates that they will be charged for at "world market prices".

The Soviet Union has agreed to extend a credit of up to 190 million roubles ($210 million) carrying a 2.5 percent rate of interest for the construction of the plant. India is to repay utilized parts of the credit in equal annual installments starting from the year following the year during which the corresponding part of the credit has been utilized. In the event the costs of Soviet supplies and services required for the project exceed 190 million roubles, the amount of such excess shall be repaid by India by the delivery of Indian goods to the USSR "on terms and conditions of the Indo-Soviet Trade Agreement in force". Repayments of principal and interest are to be in Indian rupees deposited in a special account with the Reserve Bank of India in favor of the Bank for Foreign Trade of the USSR. The agreement states this amount may be used by the Soviet Union for purchasing goods in India "in accordance

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Drafted by: ECON:CCoudert:reb 3/31/65

Contents and Classification Approved by: ECON - Mary S. Olmsted

Clearances:

with the Indo-Soviet Trade Agreement in force and/or may be freely converted into pounds sterling".

For the Charge d'Affaires ad interim:

Mary S. Olmsted
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure:

Text of Indo-Soviet Agreement,
with Annexures.

235a

AGREEMENT

BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS FOR CO-OPERATION IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN IRON AND STEEL WORKS AT BOKARO AND FOR EXTENDING A CREDIT FOR THIS PURPOSE.

The Government of India and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Proceeding from the relations of friendship and close cooperation existing between India and the USSR, and

Guided by mutual desire for further developing and strengthening economic and technical cooperation,

Have concluded the present Agreement on the following:

ARTICLE 1

The Government of India and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will cooperate in the construction of an Iron and Steel Works at Bokaro with a capacity of 1.5 to 2 million tonnes of steel per year with provision for expansion of the capacity of the Works to 4 million tonnes of steel per year. A list of the main shops and departments of the Works is given in Annexure I to the present Agreement.

With this in view, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall extend to the Government of India a credit up to 190 million Roubles bearing 2.5 percent interest per annum and out of this credit shall render technical assistance to India for the construction of the said Iron and Steel Works.

ARTICLE 2

For the purpose of rendering the technical assistance stipulated in Article I of the present Agreement, the Soviet organizations shall:

1. Prepare the detailed project report for the construction of the Works within nine months from the date of the signing of the contract for the execution of the designing work. The scope of the detailed project report is given in Annexure II to the present Agreement.

2. Prepare the working drawings for the construction of the Works within the scope and the time to be determined by the Soviet and Indian organizations. The organizations of the parties shall, within two months from the date of the acceptance of the detailed project report by the Indian party, agree upon a division list of the working drawings to be done by the Indian and Soviet organizations.

It is understood that the detailed project report shall be prepared for the Works with a capacity of 4 million tonnes of steel per year and the working drawings shall be prepared for the complex of shops and units for production of 1.5 to 2 million tonnes of steel per year.

The technical documents handed over by the Soviet organizations to the Indian organizations shall be used by the latter exclusively at enterprises in India. Such documents shall not be transferred to any foreign physical or juridical entities without prior consent of the Soviet organizations thereto.

3. Deliver to India during 1966-69 the equipment and materials which are not available in India.

4. Render assistance to the Indian organizations in:

-- the construction of the Works by carrying out;
-- the designers' supervision and by providing the advisory services during construction;
-- the erection, adjustment and commissioning of the equipment.

For these purposes, Soviet specialists shall be deputed to India in number, specialities, for the periods and on the terms and conditions to be agreed upon between the organizations of both parties.

5. Recommend to the Indian organizations schemes and programs of industrial and technical training of Indian nationals with the view of training specialists and skilled workers required for the operation of the said Works.

6. Depute Soviet specialist-instructors, in number and for periods to be agreed upon with the Indian organizations, for rendering assistance in the training of specialists and skilled workers in India for the operation of the Works.

7. Receive in the USSR Indian specialists and skilled workers, in number, specialities and for periods to be agreed upon between the organizations of both parties, for industrial and technical training at the appropriate enterprises.

ARTICLE 3

For the purpose of implementation of the cooperation mentioned in Article I of the present Agreement, the Indian party shall:

1. Furnish to the Soviet organizations all the initial data required for the designing of the Works on the site selected by the Indian party.

2. Consider the detailed project report of the Works within two months from the date of its submission by the Soviet organizations and approve it with such modifications, if any, as may be agreed upon between the parties.

3. Prepare reports on and working drawings for all the facilities located outside the Iron and Steel Works site, which are necessary for its normal operation, e.g. the townships, power and water supply, ore mines and quarries, the ropeways for the transport of coal, sewerage system, marshalling yards, etc.

The data for these outside facilities shall be prepared by means of mutual consultations between the two parties to the extent necessary. For these purposes, the Soviet organizations shall, at the request of the Indian organizations, depute Soviet specialists to India on such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon by the organizations of the two parties.

4. Ensure preparation by the Indian organizations of the working drawings of various units located within the boundary of the Iron and Steel Works, the list of these units being agreed upon between the Indian and the Soviet organizations. The Indian Party will be responsible for the conformity of the working drawings of such units prepared by the Indian organizations to the requirements of the detailed project report.

5. Purchase in third countries, as may be agreed upon between the parties, some equipment and materials which are not manufactured in India and in the USSR.

6. Execute all the construction and erection work necessary and provide all facilities and services for such construction and erection in accordance with the recommendations, advice and requirements of the Soviet organizations concerned.

7. Purchase licenses for technological processes and equipment, wherever necessary.

ARTICLE 4

The Indian and Soviet parties shall promote maximum possible participation of the Indian organizations in carrying out the designing work and in the supply of equipment and materials for the construction of the Works.

ARTICLE 5

For the purpose of establishing direct contact with the Administration of the Works under construction and for prompt and effective solution of all the problems which may arise, the Soviet organizations shall set up a Representation of the Supplier in the construction area of the Works.

ARTICLE 6

. The Soviet organizations shall, at the request of the Indian Government, render assistance to the Indian organizations in attaining the designed capacities and operation of the said Iron and Steel Works by deputing Soviet specialists, delivering spare parts and necessary materials on terms and conditions to be additionally agreed upon between the two parties.

ARTICLE 7

The credit to the amount up to 190 million Roubles envisaged in Article 1 of the present Agreement (one Rouble contains 0.987412 grams of fine gold) shall be used by the Government of India starting from the 1st January 1966, in payment for:

-- the designing work carried out by the Soviet organizations;

-- the equipment and materials which are not available in India and delivered from the USSR c.i.f. Indian ports when carried by Soviet ships and f.o.b. Soviet ports when carried by Indian ships.

Prices for the equipment and materials shall be fixed on the basis of the world market prices;

-- the expenses connected with deputing Soviet specialists to India for rendering technical assistance in the establishment of the Works envisaged by the present Agreement, except for expenses within the territory of India which will be reimbursed by the Indian party in rupees;

-- the expenses connected with the stay in the USSR of the Indian nationals sent for technical and industrial training at the corresponding enterprises in the USSR.

Should the costs of the supplies and services of the Soviet organizations for rendering technical assistance in the establishment of the Works envisaged in Article I of the present Agreement exceed the amount of the said credit, the amount of such excess shall be repaid by the Indian party by the deliveries of the Indian goods to the USSR on the terms and conditions of the Indo-Soviet Trade Agreement in force. The nomenclature and quantity of such goods shall from time to time be agreed upon between the parties.

In case of any change of the gold parity of Rouble indicated in the present Agreement, the sums of the credit evaluated in Roubles (the utilized and unutilized parts of the credit, balance of arrears on the principal and on the interest accrued thereon but not yet paid) shall be recalculated in accordance with such change. Reimbursement of the expenses of the

Soviet Organizations connected with rendering all kinds of technical assistance to the Indian organizations within the period up to January 1st, 1966, shall be effected by the Indian party in accordance with the Indo-Soviet Trade Agreement in force.

ARTICLE 8

The Government of India shall each calendar year repay utilized parts of the credit extended under the present Agreement during 12 subsequent years in equal annual instalments paid up to or an October 15th of each year starting from the year following the year during which the corresponding part of the credit has been utilized.

Interest on the credit shall accrue from the date on which the corresponding part of the credit has been utilized and shall be paid during the first three months of each year following the year during which it accrued, the final payment being effected simultaneously with the final payment of the principal.

The date of the utilization of the credit for making payments for the equipment and materials shall be considered the thirtieth day from the date of the Bill of Lading and for the expenses incurred in connection with deputing Soviet specialists to India and other expenses to be covered from the credit — the last day of each three month period during which these expenses were incurred.

The Government of India has the right to repay the principal and pay the interest on the credit ahead of the due date of payment.

ARTICLE 9

Repayments of the credit and payment of the interest accrued thereon shall be effected in Indian Rupees (one Indian Rupee contains 0.186621 grams of fine gold) to a special account to be opened with the Reserve Bank of India, Bombay, in favor of the Bank for Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R.

Conversion of Roubles into Rupees shall be effected on the basis of the above mentioned gold content of Rouble and Rupee.

The amount credited to the said account may be used by the Soviet organizations for purchasing the goods in India in accordance with the Indo-Soviet Trade Agreement in force and/or may be freely converted into pounds sterling.

In case of any change of the gold parity of Indian Rupee, which at present contains 0.186621 grams of fine gold, the Ministry of Finance of India and the Bank for Foreign Trade of the USSR shall recalculate the balance of the special account in proportion to such change.

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ARTICLE 10

For the purpose of keeping records of the utilization and repayment of the credit extended under the present Agreement and payment of the interest accrued thereon, the Ministry of Finance of India on behalf of the Government of India and the State Bank of the USSR on behalf of the Government of the USSR shall keep special credit accounts and shall jointly establish the technical procedure for keeping the said accounts and the settlement of the credit.

ARTICLE 11

The Government of India shall reimburse the Soviet party for the expenses of the Soviet organizations incurred in connection with the stay of Soviet specialists in India, beginning from January 1st, 1966, in Indian Rupees by crediting the corresponding amounts to the special account indicated in Article 9 of the present Agreement.

ARTICLE 12

The Soviet organizations shall guarantee that:

1. The detailed project report of the Works, prepared by the said organizations, shall conform to the production capacity stipulated in the present Agreement.

2. The equipment delivered by the Soviet organizations shall be in conformity with the above said detailed project report.

3. The performance of the equipment shall be in accordance with their stated capacities.

The periods of the guarantees, the order of their fulfilment and other conditions shall be provided in the contracts to be concluded in accordance with the present Agreement.

ARTICLE 13

The conditions of the fulfilment of the commitments of the Soviet organizations under the present Agreement shall be determined in the corresponding contracts to be concluded between the Indian and Soviet organizations.

The Soviet organizations shall furnish to the Indian organizations within one month of the acceptance of the detailed project report offers in the form of a draft contract for the supply of equipment and materials.

The contracts for the supply of equipment and materials shall be concluded within two months from the date of submission of the corresponding offers by the Soviet organizations.

The Soviet organizations may cooperate in carrying out the designing work, the deliveries of equipment and in the implementation of other forms of technical cooperation for which the Soviet party is responsible, with the corresponding organizations of third countries, but in case the need arises for deputing specialists to India from the said third countries, the Soviet organizations shall obtain prior consent of the Indian party thereto.

ARTICLE 14

The Indian and Soviet organizations shall exchange all the information and render assistance which may reasonably be required by either party in relation to the present Agreement and shall in particular furnish each other with progress reports and other information as may be required in regard to the program of work for the construction of the Iron and Steel Works mentioned in Article 1 of the present Agreement and other matters connected therewith.

ARTICLE 15

The Government of India and the Government of the USSR shall in the shortest possible time after signing the present Agreement inform each other of the corresponding Indian and Soviet organizations to be authorized for the implementation of the present Agreement; it is hereby understood that the said Governments may authorize one or several organizations.

Should it be found necessary subsequently to substitute the organizations authorized for the implementation of the present Agreement, such substitution shall be deemed possible.

The Government of India and the Government of the USSR reserve the right to transfer any or all rights and liabilities arising out of the present Agreement to such Indian and Soviet organizations as the respective Governments may consider necessary.

ARTICLE 16

In case the performance of the present Agreement is infringed for a certain period of time as a result of war, hostilities, embargo, blockades, or any other contingency beyond the control of either party, the representatives of the Government of India and the Government of the USSR shall immediately consult with each other and come to an agreement with regard to the measures to be taken and if such agreement cannot be reached within a reasonable period of time, the Indian organizations may complete the designing and construction of the aforesaid Works in the order which may be considered necessary, but even in this case the rights and liabilities of the parties arising from the present Agreement prior to that moment shall remain in force.

ARTICLE 17

In case of any disagreement between the Indian and Soviet organizations on any matters arising from or connected with the implementation of the present Agreement, the representatives of the Government of India and the Government of the USSR shall immediately consult with each other and endeavor to reach a mutual settlement of such disagreement.

ARTICLE 18

All correspondence on the matters connected with the implementation of the present Agreement shall be in English.

The present Agreement shall come into force on the date of its signing.

Done on this twentyfifth day of January, 1965 in New Delhi, in two original copies, each in the Hindi, Russian and English languages, the texts in Hindi and Russian being equally authentic and the English text being the operative one.

On behalf of the Government of India

N.N. WANCHOO

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

V. SERGEEV

ANNEXURE I
to the Indian-Soviet Agreement
of 25th January, 1965.

THE MAIN SHOPS AND DEPARTMENTS OF THE IRON AND STEEL WORKS AT BOKARO

1. Coke oven plant with coke ovens of 30.3 cu.m. capacity each with the necessary by-product plant.

2. Sintering plant for production of fluxed sinter.

3. Blast furnace plant with 2,000 cu.m. useful capacity of the furnaces.

4. Steel plant with the capacity of the converters 100 tonnes each.

5. Hot rolling plant with slabbing mill and with 2,000 mm continuous mill for production of hot rolled sheets 1.5 to 10 mm thick.

6. Cold rolling plant with 2,000 mm. continuous mill for production of sheets and coils 0.4 to 2.00 mm. thick and with the equipment required for finishing hot rolled and cold rolled sheets and with the equipment for production of galvanized sheets 0.4 to 1.2 mm. thick.

7. Shops for calcinating limestone, dolomite and production of resin-dolomite materials for converter lining and for production of refractory stock.

8. Maintenance facilities to provide the Works with spare parts and replaceable equipment except for rolls, heavy steel castings, non-ferrous casting over 1 tonne and forging over 3 tonnes. Construction of a steel structural shop is envisaged.

9. Power and air blower stations.

10. Training Center for the training of engineers, technicians and workers.

11. Units within the boundary of the Works for the supply of the Works with power, water, gas, compressed air, oxygen as well as communications and storage facilities.

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1. The detailed project report of the Works shall be prepared in sufficient detail in order to:

   determine and assess all the main technical and economic data for the Works as a whole;

   order the main equipment and prepare the working drawings at the subsequent stages.

2. The detailed project report will also include:

   General layout of the Works and arrangement drawings for the equipment for the main shops of the Works;

   Explanatory note specifying processes and the main equipment required;

   Recommendations on the construction of the Works, including the schedule of constructing the shops of the Works, the requirements of equipment for construction and erection and the requirements of manpower for construction;

   Data on the cost of the Works and the cost of production estimated on the basis of summary indices;

   Requirements of manpower necessary for operation and maintenance of the Works;

   Summary list of equipment indicating the necessary technical characteristics: Summary list of the scope of construction work and main construction materials and structures.

3. The detailed project report will include all facilities inside the Works boundary. Facilities outside the Works boundary shall be designed by the Indian organizations, which will consult with Soviet specialists, wherever necessary.

4. The detailed project report will be in English and done in the metric system. All costs will be shown in Indian Rupees.

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Research Memorandum

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- DESSUP
- JOHNSON
- KLEIN
- ~~KROMER~~
- ~~SAUNDERS~~
- SAYRE
- THOMSON

RNA-12, March 31, 1965

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes Thomas L. Hughes

Subject: India's Language Issue

Multilingual India has recently emerged from the throes of a severe controversy over its choice of a language for the nation's official business. This controversy has been particularly acute in the southern state of Madras and has led to the loss of many lives. This paper is a brief analysis of the background, emotional content, and political implications of the language issue.

ABSTRACT

The constitutional designation of Hindi as the official language of India has not proved popular in many of the nation's non-Hindi-speaking areas, notably in the South Indian state of Madras, where a high degree of competence in English has been developed. The South Indians, whose mother tongues are unrelated to those of North India, historically have distrusted the northerners and feared coming under their domination. Since independence, the Government of India has tried repeatedly to reassure those of its citizens who lack competence in Hindi that they would not suffer disabilities because of that fact. Nevertheless, the constitutional coming of age of Hindi as the official language in January 1965 touched off violent rioting in Madras and adjacent areas.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3504

APR 7 1965

Controversies over language are nothing new in India, and the basic framework of unity which has been built up over the years is able to withstand a good deal of divisive pressure. Nevertheless, the first post-Nehru government has lost prestige, relations between North and South India have been strained, and the exponents of regionalism encouraged. The Shastri administration has handled the present flare-up reasonably well, but is still faced with the need of resolving the national language problem in a way which would placate the southerners and others resistant to Hindi while satisfying the Hindi speakers -- who comprise approximately 40 per cent of the population. The Madras branch of the ruling Congress Party has been rocked by the language furor, but the dramatic resignation gestures by two Madrassi members of the central Cabinet over the issue may ultimately enable the local Congress unit to preserve its position.

From January 26 to February 15, 1965, more than 50 persons were killed during riots in the South Indian state of Madras and in a few scattered areas of adjoining states. In addition, hundreds were injured, large numbers arrested, and extensive damage incurred during the disturbances, which were touched off by the constitutional provision making Hindi India's sole national language as of January 26, 1965. Expressions of anti-Hindi sentiment also were forthcoming in the northeastern state of West Bengal and in a few other non-Hindi-speaking areas of India, but these were not accompanied by significant violence.

I. Background

The Indian Constitution, adopted in 1950, designated "Hindi in the Devanagari script" as the official language of the Indian Union, but provided for the continued use of English for virtually all official purposes until 1965 and its use after that, if needed, in the law courts and Parliamentary proceedings. As plans progressed for the difficult shift from English to Hindi, protests from non-Hindi-speaking Indians mounted until Prime Minister Nehru felt constrained to promise in 1959 that the deadline would be extended.

Subsequently, the Government of India made various pronouncements calculated to reassure the non-Hindi-speaking people of the country that they would not suffer discrimination or be disadvantaged because of their lack of competence in Hindi. In May 1963, the Indian Parliament passed the Official Language Bill, which specified that English would continue to be used indefinitely as an associate official language. The constitutional coming of age of Hindi in January 1965 as the official language of India was not designed to result in the abrupt discontinuance of English for official administrative purposes at the national and state levels. Nevertheless, the South Indians -- particularly the Tamil-speaking people of Madras State -- reacted violently.

II. Mainsprings of Rioting

As generally designated, South India includes only the four states of Madras, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, and Mysore, where Dravidian languages are spoken. South India has a smaller land area and population than has North India. Most of South India's inhabitants are descendants of peoples who were driven to the base of the subcontinent by Aryan invaders; in consequence, the South Indians have long feared coming under the political domination of the North Indians. Moreover, the northerners, the South Indians feel, look down upon them as darker skinned and hence inferior. Not surprisingly, the South Indians have tended to develop a defensive attitude. One of the more striking manifestations of South India's persevering individuality is its use of languages dating from pre-Aryan times, as contrasted with North India's wholly different linguistic base of Indo-European origin.* The English language, adopted in India during British colonial rule, has served well since independence as a vehicle of communication linking the diverse regions of the country.

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* See appended map.

Under the British, the South Indians -- notably the Tamils -- adapted themselves with conspicuous success to the language medium and administrative patterns of their colonial rulers. As a result, the South Indians obtained government positions in proportionally greater numbers than their countrymen to the north. Since the achievement of independence in 1947, the South Indians have feared that the indigenous government might substitute Hindi for English to conduct the nation's official business and thus give Hindi-speaking North Indians a marked advantage in the competition for jobs, particularly government posts.

The Tamils of Madras State are subjected to severe economic pressures. Generally of excitable temperament, the Tamils tend to blame outsiders for their economic and social ills. They also feel that the northerners consciously seek to exploit the southerners economically as well as politically, and that Hindi is a major instrument of North Indian "imperialism." Spurred by the fear of eventually facing competitive examinations given in Hindi, Tamil students spearheaded the recent mob action in Madras. Lawless elements and Communists reportedly exacerbated the disorders by using the mobs as covers for their own ends.

III. Political Implications of Language Issue

The outburst of violence over the language question has been politically costly. The Shastri government has lost prestige, relations between South and North India have been severely strained, and the champions of regionalism and obscurantism have been given a boost. Now that the language crisis seems to have subsided, at least temporarily, cooler heads both in New Delhi and in the disturbed states must seek to restore the damage -- physical and psychological -- that has been done. The Government of India is trying to work out a formula on the national language issue satisfactory to both the South Indians and those among the North Indians who speak Hindi. The Shastri administration faces a dilemma, however. If it seeks to placate the South Indians and other non-Hindi-speaking areas by granting the English language a statutory status equal to that of Hindi, the Hindi speakers (roughly 40 per cent of the total population) may feel that they have been sold out by a spineless government. The Hindi partisans are also capable of violence, and there are several political parties that would attempt to exploit their discontent at the polls. If no concessions are made to the non-Hindi-speaking populace, continued disorders will be in prospect, at least in the South. Shastri's penchant for compromise and consensus will be put to a severe test.

The eventual cost of the furor over the national language issue to India's ruling Congress Party -- in Madras and elsewhere -- is not easy to assess. The Congress Party is not a monolithic organization; its component parts have considerable latitude in adapting themselves to varying situations. Thus while the offers of resignations of Tamil central Cabinet members C. Subramaniam and O. V. Alagesan appeared to threaten Congress unity at a crucial moment, they in fact probably presented a net gain to the party. Although they withdrew their resignations when New Delhi expressed willingness to compromise, Subramaniam and

Alagesan have been hailed in Madras as men of honor willing to jeopardize their political careers in behalf of Tamil aspirations and interests. Thus, to some extent at least, the local branch of the party was able to identify itself with the anti-Hindi campaign and undercut the appeal of the other parties in Madras. Other South Indian Congress leaders, such as K. Kamaraj Nadar and N. Sanjiva Reddy, who did not act as dramatically as Subramaniam and Alagesan, nevertheless quickly took positions that appealed to South Indian sentiments, leaving their North Indian colleagues the task of maintaining good relations with the Hindi partisans. Conceivably, the Congress might even benefit in the long run from the language dispute. While the party's principal rivals in Madras -- the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and the Swatantra -- have been able to gain short-term advantages by joining in the anti-Hindi agitation, the Tamil electorate is more likely to credit its own Congress leaders with having taken action that "straightened out" New Delhi on the national language issue.


The likelihood that the Congress Party will hold its ground politically does not outweigh the serious problems raised in the language crisis. The search for a medium of expression that is both functional and satisfying to national aspirations will continue and the controversies will re-emerge, perhaps in a more virulent form than in recent months. The language problem is, moreover, only one of a number of divisive issues which promise, from time to time, to shatter Indian unity. Nevertheless, the various factors contributing to continuing unity -- a society firmly structured by caste and a common folklore, the integrative effect of the independence movement, the dominance of the moderate and well-led Congress Party -- thus far have outmatched the forces of fragmentation. It is encouraging that the government has apparently weathered this first post-Nehru storm over the language issue successfully and that it did so by relying upon the traditional techniques of mediation and compromise.

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GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF LANGUAGES, INDIA.

236 b


LADAKHI
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ORIYA
MARATHI
TELUGU
KANNADA
ORIYA
MALAYALAM
TAMIL



237

India
X Galbraith

JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

March 30, 1965

President Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

India is facing an accumulation of difficult problems that together threaten a major crisis. Such a crisis in the largest democratic country in the world poses a threat. It is also an opportunity for us--our chance to resume the initiative in this part of the world and to give our policy there a new lift and a new look. This letter outlines the problem and offers some suggestions for coming to grips with it.

Galbraith
Pres. C.
NSF
2/3/65

There are three current Indian problems, all of them grave and closely related. First, there is the near halt in economic growth; second, there is the mounting anxiety about Indian security and the impulse this provides to seek nuclear weapons and deterring systems; and third, there is a general decline in government strength and internal stability. Any one of these alone would create a serious problem for American policy. Since each reinforces the political effects of the other, they threaten the most serious crisis in Indian domestic and foreign policy since her independence.

One of the undersigned, Jerome Wiesner, has been in India recently, as have others of our colleagues. We have all discussed the problem. We share a sense of its urgency and thus our decision to place the matter before you.

The most immediately pressing concern from our own point of view is the debate in India over nuclear weapons policy. Indian reaction to the Chinese explosion was severe. While the interim decision was not to go ahead on a corresponding Indian effort, this is hardly firm. One or two additional Chinese tests could readily push the Indians to the opposite decision. During his recent visit, Homi Bhaba, Director of the Indian Atomic Energy program, gave every indication that he is still pushing to reverse the initial decision and go ahead with preparations for an Indian explosion. While Bhaba fully understands that India cannot achieve a significant military capability in the near future, he thinks that the lift to Indian self-confidence and prestige justifies the effort. In our conversations, he ascribed these views to others. We are persuaded that they are his own.

11/1/65

A decision by India to go ahead on their own nuclear weapons program, and the dramatic publication of that decision in a test explosion would be deeply adverse for us and for the world. Our whole disarmament effort and our campaign to limit nuclear diffusion specifically would be given a severe and possibly fatal blow. Further, the Pakistani reaction to an Indian explosion would be highly adverse; it would push our relations with them beyond the point where they could be repaired, short of cures in the form of weapons assistance that would be worse than the disease. So far, our diplomatic representations have had some effect on the Indians, but diplomatic argument only goes so far. We cannot succeed in this simply by asking the Indians to commit themselves to the ideals of a peaceful world.

On the broad political level, the strength and stability of the Indian government has declined severely. There was certain to be trouble when the postwar leadership changed. The language struggle, of importance in itself, is more important as a symptom of the deeper strains and stresses that compromise Indian unity. The power relations between the central government and the state governments remain unsettled and uneasy. The Federal government has had to take over the state government of Kerala to forestall a possible pro-Chinese communist administration. A process of deterioration could get underway elsewhere which, if it went unchecked, could spell the break up of the Indian union.

The economic picture is in some respects the key to the other problems. The rate of economic growth has declined sharply in the last two years. A struggle is developing over proper policies to promote growth--between those who seek to repress further already miserable levels of consumption in order to increase industrial investment, and those who seek more emphasis on agriculture and consumer goods. The food problems of the past year and the poor current performance have intensified the bitterness of this debate

In the view of most experienced observers, whatever their political beliefs, the widespread and stifling network of government controls on the Indian economy is heavily responsible for the poor performance. But the controls in turn are a reaction in considerable measure, to shortages including the shortage of foreign exchange. Bad as the controls are, to remove them, without companion steps to alleviate the shortages, would be worse.

The economic problems lie, as noted, at the root of the others. Both political instability and Indian willingness to divert scarce resources to a symbolic nuclear explosion are

partly reactions to failure on the economic front. From the first, the Government and the Congress party have made economic development the center of their political program. As lack of success in this area becomes increasingly evident, it is natural that both a weakening of the government's hold on the country, and a search for other symbols of achievement should ensue. Further, the inevitable comparison with Pakistan adds to Indian frustrations. Pakistan has been enjoying an economic boom. And despite Pakistan's alliance with the West, she has achieved increasing friendship with China. India's firmer China policy, as she sees it, has been rewarded by an invasion, the continuing threat implicit in the Chinese explosion, heavy defense costs and privation.

We believe it is within our power to grapple with these problems. We see clearly what needs to be done on the economic front, less clearly what specific steps should be taken on security and political issues. But it is clear that successful programs on the economic front will make possible forward steps on the others. Economic failure will mean failure everywhere.

Basically India needs a good deal more aid but in a context where it will be used to liberate her economy. Here there is great encouragement in what Pakistan has accomplished. Given the amounts needed for debt service, the gross level of aid to India will have to rise by several hundred million dollars in order to hold the net level constant. But much more is needed. Total foreign aid per capita to India is now about one half the level that it is in Pakistan. Annual Consortium pledges to Pakistan over the last three years have averaged about $4.30 per capita (of which the U.S. has provided $2.20); to India, about $2.40 (U.S. $1.00). If the flow of foreign exchange available to India over the next several years could be raised substantially and quickly, and if it were clear that this was to allow a large-scale reduction in restrictive controls and a liberation of internal economy, Indian economic growth could make a large forward spurt. The people and resources are the same; we believe that it would show results as good as Pakistan's. This increase in growth could also be for the benefit, rather than at the expense, of the mass of the population. This, in a heavily taxed country, would contribute strongly to political stability. We cannot estimate with any precision what would be required, as an immediate target we should; perhaps halve the difference between the per capita levels of aid to Pakistan and India. This would require an increase of total net aid by $500 millions a year, or about 50%. To get such an increase obviously presents difficult problems, first in the Congress, and second in terms of the present international consortium arrangements. Even if we were willing to put up our own share,

Other members, especially the British, might not be able to do so. Yet the need is here--and we shall be worse off if we do not act.

The importance of India to American interests cannot be exaggerated. It is the largest non-Communist country in the world; it is the only poor, ex-colonial and non-white country which is trying the non-coercive, democratic path to nation-building and economic development. With industrialized Japan, it is one of the two countries in Asia which are individually and directly vital to our security interests. We need only reflect that achievement of even the most ambitious goals in South Viet Nam would count as nothing in the face of the defeat of our hopes in India. In 1958, the Senate's vision in pushing the first big program of American aid to India marked a major turning point in our aid programs and indeed our whole foreign policy. It saved our position in the area. And whatever the problems and setbacks we have been far stronger ever since. The present situation in India provides the opportunity for what can be an even more significant milestone.

President Shastri will be here in the late spring. Perhaps in consideration of the complexity of the problem and in anticipation of his visit, you might give thought to creating a Presidential Commission to look into the whole Indian problem in its economic, political and security aspects and suggesting a program. Its main tasks would be two: first, to shape a rounded program of actions by both the United States and India for the immediate and near future; second, to begin that process of public education and persuasion that will be required to win support for the actions it recommends. Obviously, it should be in thoughtful but sympathetic hands; one thinks of someone like Senator John Sherman Cooper as a chairman. The appointment of a Presidential Commission of course announces your concern with India to the world. This has the virtue at this time as an added showing that our interest in Asia is not just the negative one of military action. It is in keeping with the aid message, which stated that additional needs could and would be examined if they arouse. There is a problem of timing here in relation to the Aid bill that is obviously important, where your judgment is obviously superior to any we might offer.

We are wholly aware of the fact that our aid program has a hard political passage. Even when coupled with a broad effort to release and revitalize the Indian economy, what we are suggesting won't be easy. But there is one point to be strongly urged. We always see what our aid has not done. We never see what it has

accomplished--the disasters from which it saves us we do not experience. It have saved the Indian sub-continent from past disaster and, in fact, kept it fairly solidly on our side. This, given all of the problems, has been a great achievement and one we seek to protect.

Yours respectfully,

John Kenneth Galbraith

Carl Kaysen

Jerome B. Wiesner

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India
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+ India Cables

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ACTION: VERBATIM TEXT
Amembassy NEW DELHI 2005

dated March 23,

Signed letter of invitation from President to Prime Minister Shastri, has been ~~being~~ pouched Embassy for delivery. Text, which White House does not intend release, follows for your information:

QUOTE Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am happy to learn from Ambassador Bowles that you have accepted my initiation to visit the United States. Mrs. Johnson and I are looking forward to seeing you and Mrs. Shastri in Washington on June 2 and 3.

Anticipation of your visit revives fond memories of our journey to India in 1961. But it also underscores how markedly conditions have changed both for us personally and for our nations since then.

We are ~~We have~~ embarked on a program here to make America's promise a reality for all her people. I am deeply aware that our own hard work to solve our problems is a crucial ingredient in our continuing effort to help others with theirs. You too are engrossed in planning the next chapter of your program to bring Indians hope for a better life. We both feel the challenge of reaching to meet a nation's most pressing needs and to fulfill its highest aspirations, while providing for its essential security.

So we have much in common, and I look forward to sharing thoughts with you on these and other important problems we both face. Sincerely LYNDON B.Johnson UNQUOTE

RUSK

Drafted by: NEA:SOA:FJCrawford:bts 3/25/65	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA/SOA - Turner C. Cameron, Jr.

Clearances: S/S - Mr. Gordon
White House - Mr. Saunders
SOA - Miss Lasse

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BUNDY-SMITH
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ACTION PRIORITY DEPT (2698) INFO CINCMEAFSA UNN FROM NEW DELHI MARCH 24, 8 PM

LIMDIS

EMBTELS 2661 AND 2697

DCM SAW L.K. JHA MORNING MARCH 24 TO TAKE STOCK ON "CARRIER EPISODE". IN RESPONSE TO EARLIER EXPRESSION OF PRIME MINISTER'S DISCOMFITURE THAT MEMBER OPPOSITION PARTY HAD LEARNED IN ACCURATE DETAIL OF FOREIGN SECRETARY'S TALK WITH POLITICAL COUNSELOR

PAGE 2 RUSBAE 1217 C ~~O N F I D E N T I~~ A L
DCM TOLD JHA THAT HE HAD AT AMBASSADOR'S REQUEST CAREFULLY LOOKED INTO MATTER AND WAS SATISFIED THAT LEAK HAD NOT. REPEAT NOT, OCCURRED AMONG VERY LIMITED NUMBER OF AMERICAN OFFICIALS WHO KNEW OF THE CONVERSATION.

DCM REITERATED THAT EMBASSY AND US GOVERNMENT WANT TO BE HELPFUL TO GOI IN THIS MATTER. WE ARE CONTINUING MAINTAIN COMPLETE SILENCE HERE AND STATE DEPT'S STATEMENT OF MARCH 22 WAS LIMIT OF WHAT WOULD BE SAID AT THAT END. HOWEVER WE ALSO CONTINUE TO FEEL THAT TOO CATEGORIC DENIALS OF FACTS WHICH GROWING NUMBER OF PEOPLE KNOW TO BE TRUE SIMPLY INCREASES THE PRESSURE TO FERRET THEM OUT. IN THIS CONNECTION, DCM SUGGESTED THAT PREM BHATIA'S PIECE IN "EXPRESS", BEING SO CLOSE TO THE MARK, IS KIND OF THING THAT INCREASES PRESSURE ON OFFICIAL SPOKESMEN.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-5-01

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JHA CONCEDED THIS AND WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT NOT, REPEAT NOT, CLEAR THAT EPISODE IS OVER. TWO MOTIONS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO SPEAKER OF LOK SABHA, ONE AS POINT OF PRIVILEGE CHARGING PRIME MINISTER HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY FRANK IN HIS STATEMENT MONDAY,

ANOTHER CONTINUING PURSUIT OF DETAILS MEA/EMBASSY CONVERSATION LAST WEEK. GOVERNMENT IS URGING SPEAKER TO REFUSE ADMIT THESE MOTIONS BUT THIS MAY NOT RPT NOT WORK.

IN ADDITION TO PRESS, THERE ARE OTHERS NOT RPT NOT NOW IN GOVERNMENT, NOTABLY MORARJI DESAI, KRISHNA MENON, WHO WERE PRIVY TO EVENTS OF 1962 AND WHO CANNOT BE ASSUMED TODAY TO BE OF FRIENDLY DISPOSITION.

SPECULATING ON MOTIVES OF OTHERS, JHA THOUGHT PATEL WHEREVER HE GOT THE STORY OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN EMBASSY AND MEA, HAD INJECTED IT TO SUPPORT HIS THESIS INDIA SHOULD FORTHRIGHTLY ALIGN ITSELF WITH US. GOVERNMENT WILL HOLD LINE IT DOES NOT RPT NOT DIVULGE CONTENTS OF SUCH CONVERSATIONS.

IN THIS CONTEXT, JHA REFERRED APPROVINGLY TO "STATESMAN" EDITORIAL POINTING OUT THAT THERE IS NOTHING INCONSISTENT BETWEEN NONALIGNMENT AND SEEKING ASSISTANCE IN DEFENSE OF THE COUNTRY. HE THOUGH GOVERNMENT, IF IT HAS TO, COULD HANDLE

THIS ISSUE BY CARRYING THIS POINT FURTHER TO ARGUE THAT US ITSELF HAD ACCEPTED IT IN COMING TO INDIA'S AID WITHOUT DEMANDING RECIPROCAL UNDER-TAKINGS.

JHA THOUGHT COMMUNISTS ARE HUNG UP ON DILEMMA, IN THAT TO CHARGE PRESENT GOVERNMENT AND CONGRESS

PARTY WITH DUPLICITY AND DAMAGE TO NEHRU IMAGE WOULD ALSO SHOW THAT NEHRU DEPENDED MORE ON US THAN ON SOVIET UNION -- AND GOT MORE. THIS DEILEMMA HAS SO FAR PRETTY WELL STIFLED COMMUNISTS IN PARLIAMENT BUT HAS NOT RPT NOT PREVENTED THEM FROM CIRCULATING RUMOR AROUND TOWN THAT AMERICANS PUT SUDHIR GHOSH UP TO HIS STATEMENT AS WAY TO CLIP GOI'S WINGS IN CONTROVERSY OVER US-SVN AIRSTRIKES AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM. DCM GAVE THIS ONE SHORT SHRIFT IT DESERVED AND SAID HE HOPED GOI WOULD TOO IF IT SURFACES.

DISCUSSION ENDED WITH DCM SUGGESTING, AND JHA AGREEING, THAT IF GOI FINDS IT HAS TO CHANGE CURRENT LINE, WE BE GIVEN TIMELY NOTICE SO THAT US SPOKESMEN DO NOT INADVERTENTLY CROSS THEM UP. GP-3.
BOWLES
BT

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

14128

240

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

41

Origin NEA

Info: SS G SP P USIA NSC INR CIA NSA

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI 1990

INFO: CINCMEAFSA for POLAD

MAR 24 10 07 AM '65

Ref: Embtel 2661

In response to press query March 23 on aircraft carrier story Department official followed same line recommended reftel, although confining himself to statement: QUOTE We have nothing to add to Prime Minister Shastri's statement UNQUOTE.

Ambassador Galbraith same day informed Dept he replied to AP query checking out this story by saying QUOTE No such request was made. These and other matters were discussed at that time UNQUOTE.

GP-3

END

RUSK

BUNDY SMITH
BATOR
BOWMAN
CHASE
COOPER
HAYNES
JESSUP
JOHNSON
KEENY
KLEIN
KOMER
MOODY
REEDY
SAUNDERS
SAYRE
THOMSON

Drafted by: NEA:SOA:FJCrawford:bts 3/23/65

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - William J. Handley

Clearances:
SOA - Mr. Cameron
NEA/P - Mr. Baldanza
P-Reap
DOD-DISPA-Sullivan

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3504

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 23, 1965

Shastri Visit

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am happy to learn from Ambassador Bowles that you have accepted my invitation to visit the United States. Mrs. Johnson and I are looking forward to seeing you and Mrs. Shastri in Washington on June 2 and 3.

Anticipation of your visit revives fond memories of our journey to India in 1961. But it also underscores how markedly conditions have changed both for us personally and for our nations since then.

We are embarked on a program here to make America's promise a reality for all her people. I am deeply aware that our own hard work to solve our problems is a crucial ingredient in our continuing effort to help others with theirs. You too are engrossed in planning the next chapter of your program to bring Indians hope for a better life. We both feel the challenge of reaching to meet a nation's most pressing needs and to fulfill its highest aspirations, while providing for its essential security.

So we have much in common, and I look forward to sharing thoughts with you on these and other important problems we both face.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Lal Bahadur Shastri
Prime Minister of India
New Delhi, India

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 17, 1965

Bob:

I am not really trying to steel India from under you while you are busy with your other folk. We had a discussion at the last staff meeting about what next on the LDC front, and, with the Shastri visit coming up, Mac thought a package focused on South Asia might be worth a try.

Remind me to tell you about the meeting. People kept looking for new departures. I kept incurring our master's imitation by insisting that all we need is a lot of money -- and that without money, talk about new departures is plain silly. Harry Rowen brought up the question of food -- that's why the attached.

F.

FMB

MAR 17 1965

243a

March 16, 1965

McG. B.

Re India and all that

You might wish to read the attached memorandum of January 14 from John Lewis to Bell.

If the Shastri visit provides an opening for another go on the Task Force line (limited to South Asia), would it be useful very quietly to put together a government non-task-force to work up a package?

* * *

Concerning food, of course the Indians could use more, and not merely to increase current consumption. The problem is one of mix. Given some appropriate target-price of food, calculated to provide whatever incentive one might wish to provide for Indian farmers, the balance between the demand for food and the domestic supply will depend, inter alia, on income. Taking the crudest model: every additional dollar of real income will induce some additional spending for food. The ratio, call it x ($\lessgtr 1.0$), will depend in part on the price, but it is likely to be at least .5, and may be as high as .7. If we match each extra dollar's worth of food-aid by $\left(\frac{1-x}{x}\right)$ dollars of cash, there will be no reduction in the amount spent by Indians on home-grown food. If x = .6, the appropriate blend, at the margin, is 67¢ of cash for each $1 of food.

One can design an elaborate version of the above simple-minded scheme which takes into account the variety of foods produced and consumed, imports from other sources, possible exports, the way aid resources are made available, the range of variation in the parameters, etc., etc. The real difficulty is not in devising a sensible scheme, nor even in estimating the appropriate parameters within a tolerable margin of error, but organizing and administering the operation in conformity with the scheme. One danger is that our agricultural people will go wild and we'll end up swamping the LDCs with food and cutting down on money. The effect would be to smother their agriculture and stunt their industry. There is an opposite danger. There are faint signs in the air that the bloom is off agricultural subsidies. It is not yet a case of loser on loser, but it may become so.

Nevertheless, more food would have a role to play. What is needed, is a package with both more food and more money.

FMB

cc: Mr. Komer

MAR 17 1965

244 1052

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

March 15, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request for Appointment for the Indian Ambassador, B. K. Nehru

Recommendation

I recommend that you receive Ambassador Nehru who is returning to New Delhi around March 23 on consultation.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Background

Ambassador Nehru has not had a substantive talk with you since your assumption of the Presidency. You saw him briefly last spring when he brought Indira Gandhi, the daughter of former Prime Minister Nehru, to coffee with Mrs. Johnson.

I sense that we need to encourage the Indians in their position on Viet-Nam. They say that hostile activities from both sides of the line must stop before talks can be held; but this is a minority position among the Afro-Asians who are tending to point the finger more at us than at the North Vietnamese. As these countries consult among themselves in the weeks ahead, it will be very useful to us for the Indians to maintain their position. A talk with you would be the weight we need.

Ambassador Nehru will also be talking in New Delhi about the visit of Prime Minister Shastri who has accepted your invitation to be in Washington on June 2 and 3. A personal word from you through the Ambassador will do much to build up Shastri's confidence about his visit here. He has made only two previous trips abroad during his lifetime.

Dean Rusk

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State 8-11-76
By klrg NARA, Date 3-5-04
MAR 16 1965

Indian
Dean Rusk
memo & Reply
3/16/65

Answer is "no"
S/S notified

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EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

New Delhi, India,
March 12, 1965.

Bowles

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Bob:

I am enclosing a copy of a letter I wrote to the Secretary some months ago on our relations with Nasser.

I believe a review of the record of these conversations will indicate that there was a clear understanding that we were considering this assistance only on the assumption that he would forego interference in Africa south of the Sahara and do his best to downgrade the Israeli-UAR conflict. It would seem to me that both of these understandings have been violated.

One more point that you may want to explore: Our massive wheat shipments to the UAR allow the latter to feed the people and still raise large quantities of cotton with which to finance foreign imports including arms from the USSR. If we cut off the wheat gradually on a two or three year basis, couldn't the UAR solve its food problem by switching cotton acreage to rice or wheat? If so, the effect would be not to squeeze the Egyptian people who are relatively innocent bystanders, but to mess up the UAR's trade relationship with the USSR, and reduce their capacity to finance covert and overt gambits in Africa.

If this reasoning is borne out by the facts, we should consider an announcement to the UAR that our wheat shipments will first be reduced and then eliminated, so they may have reasonable time to make the agricultural adjustment.

Mr. Robert Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By RJR NARA, Date 3-504

MAR 16 1965

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Enclosure:
Copy of letter to the Secretary,
December 18, 1964.

245a F

CONFIDENTIAL

New Delhi, India
December 18, 1964

Dear Dean:

I will appreciate it if you will treat this letter as a personal and confidential message to you and not as an official communication to the Department. I say this because it deals with a subject which although of great interest to me over a period of years is not in my present bailiwick, and because I do not want others to feel I am infringing on their judgements.

During the period in which I worked as Special Assistant to the President on Asian, African and Latin American Affairs, you may remember that I took special interest in the UAR. In the winter of 1962 when the UAR Government was in dire need of economic assistance, not only of PL480 funds but also of assistance on their balance of payments I visited Cairo for extensive talks with Nasser.

In the course of two long five-hour visits we explored in some depth the sharp existing conflict which existed between the United States and the USSR on several questions of foreign affairs, and I expressed the view that they could not reasonably expect us to help them in a major way if they were to continue to undercut the effort of our Government and the U.N. to create stability in central Africa.

I pointed out that in this situation and in many others, the UAR had been following a line that was radically antagonistic to the interests of the United States and indeed to what I believed to be their own national interest. Why, I asked, under these circumstances should they ask us to bail them out of their economic

The Honorable
Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-5-04

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difficulties? However, if the UAR were prepared to moderate its covert and overt opposition to our efforts in Africa I was prepared to recommend to my Government that they be given the economic assistance which his Government sorely needed. After considerable discussion we reached agreement on this exchange, and as far as I know, the UAR until at least recent months has by and large kept up to this agreement.

Two weeks after I left Cairo Ed Mason arrived there, made a favorable economic analysis, and recommended the program of direct aid and expanded PL480 funds which we have been providing ever since.

In all frankness, Dean, I do not see why the UAR should expect us to live up to our side of the bargain if as I understand from the somewhat fragmentary reports which I receive from Africa they have turned their backs on the implicit agreement Nasser and I had at that time. He would of course deny the specific deal had been made. Nevertheless, the understanding was clear from the beginning; he understood it and I understood it as a basis for our expanded economic help.

This, of course, brings up the question of "political strings" on foreign aid. In my opinion there are two categories (1) those nations which while disagreeing with our position on various questions maintain a friendly, responsible posture, and (2) those who go beyond honest disagreement to burn our libraries, insult our Government and subvert our efforts to create stability.

In the first case, I believe we should maintain our assistance and trust to our own powers of persuasion. (If Doug Dillon and Chris Herter had allowed Krishna Menon's antics to kill our aid to India program in the late 1950s instead of a stable India we would have economic and political chaos here today.

However, when nations move from criticism and adverse votes to burning libraries and to direct attempts to undermine important policies of our Government, I think we have a right

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and obligation to take a very different view. If we fail to take a strong position in situations of this kind, we are going to be walked on more and more, and I don't think this pays dividends either for them or for us.

Again let me emphasize this is really none of my business. However, I have put a great deal of effort into this relationship between the UAR and ourselves, and it is my opinion that the UAR has totally fallen down on their part of the bargain. I do not like us to look like a soft touch nor do I feel it helps our position generally throughout the world.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

P.S. I am sending a copy of this letter in confidence to MacBundy who is also familiar with my unwritten Cairo arrangement in March 1962.

CONFIDENTIAL

CBOWLES:nlp

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246

Komer

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action
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Info

RR RUEHCR RUEHEX
DE RUSBAE 609 11/1535Z ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
R 111229Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE
STATE GRNC
BT

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1965 MAR 11 PM 5 05

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ ACTION DEPT 2571 WHITE HOUSE UNN FROM NEW DELHI MARCH 11 6PM

E X D I S

FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN AND SECRETARY TALBOT

WHITE HOUSE FOR KOMER

IN TTK'S CONVERSATION WITH HARRIMAN MENTION MADE OF POSSIBILITY HIS COMING US FOR VISIT. LATER ASOKA MEHTA TOLD ME TTK WOULD LIKE COME IN MAY BEFORE SHASTRI VISIT AND THAT HE FELT IT WOULD HELP EASE HIS CURRENT PETULANCE.

HOWEVER, IN MY OPINION, IT WOULD BE A GREAT MISTAKE TO RUSH INTO SUCH A VISIT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. TTK IS IN POOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL SHAPE. HIS REACTIONS UNPREDICTABLE CFN 2571

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 609 C ~~O N F I D E N T I A L~~
AND HE GIVES IMPRESSION OF CONSIDERABLE MENTAL CONFUSION.

IN THIS MOOD HE LIKELY REACT EXPLOSIVELY EVEN TO MILDLY CRITICAL QUESTIONS AND HENCE A VISIT TO US PREVIOUS SHASTRI VISIT WOULD INVOLVE SERIOUS RISKS.

HOWEVER IF SHASTRI VISIT IS SUCCESSFUL AND A GENERALLY AFFIRMATIVE MOOD IS ESTABLIHSED HERE IN DELHI I BELIEVE TTK'S ATTITUDE WILL BECOME MUCH MORE MODERATE. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES VISIT TO STATES NEXT JUNE DURING WHICH HE COULD TALK TO BUSINESS GROUPS, GOVT OFFICIALS AND OTHERS WOULD BE MOST WORTHWHILE.

THEREFORE I WOULD LIKE LIMIT MY CURRENT DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM TO A VAGUE COMMENT THAT SOMETIME BEFORE YEAR IS OUT I AM HOPEFUL HE MAY HAVE CHANCE TO PAY US VISIT.

I THINK IT MOST IMPORTANT THIS QUESTION BE HANDLED DIRECTLY IN DISCUSSIONS WITH B. K. NEHRU [redacted]

GP-3.

BOWLES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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MAR 12 1965

SANITIZED
Authority State ltr. 8/11/76
By klrmg NARA, Date 3-7-04

05627

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

43 42 S
Origin FE
Info: SS G SP L SAL NEA NSC

VERBATIM TEXT

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI 1888 PRIORITY

INFO: Amembassy SAIGON 1947

MAR 10 9 14 AM '65

BUNDY
BATOR
BOWMAN
CHASE
COOPER
GAINES
JESSUP
JOHNSON
KEITH
KOMER
MOODY
REEDY
SAUNDERS
SAYRE
THOMSON

DECLASSIFIED
Authority state 8/11/76; NSC 4/1/77
By jcl/rng NARA, Date 3-5-04

Please deliver the following message from President Johnson to Prime Minister Shastri:

QUOTE Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter of February 10 on the situation in Viet-Nam. I have read your comments and the statement of the Government of India on this difficult problem and greatly appreciate the careful thought and understanding spirit which underlie them.

As I stated publicly on February 7 and again on February 19, the United States seeks no wider war in Viet-Nam. We, too, would like to see the people of Viet-Nam enjoy the independence and freedom from outside interference that was prescribed in the Geneva Agreements of 1954. We would gladly see a return to full observance of those agreements. We seek no military bases or permanent military presence in South Viet-Nam; the United States /Government has made it clear that it covets not one square inch of North Vietnamese soil; neither

Drafted by: FE:MGreen/ACA:LGrant:hst 3-4-65

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Secretary

Clearances: FE/VN - Mr. Corcoran; L - Mr. Salans (draft); NEA - Mr. Handley; FE - Mr. Unger; NEA/SOA - Mr. Schneider; White House - Mr. Cooper; S/S - ; FE - Mr. Bundy (draft); S/AL - Amb. Thompson; SECRET

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

MAR 17 1965

SECRET

my Government nor the Government of South Vietnam has designs on North Viet Nam or any desire whatever to interfere in its affairs. However, Hanoi has persisted in its direction and support of aggression against South Viet Nam. This aggression has visited upon an innocent people the cruelest of terrors and depredations. The Government of South Viet Nam requested our assistance in the face of this threat, and we have responded to this request because unchecked aggression of this sort is a threat not only to the people of Viet Nam but to the peace and freedom of us all.

In the statement of your Government of February 8, I was particularly struck by the phrase, "As a first step there should be an immediate suspension of all provocative action in South Viet Nam as well as in North Viet Nam by all sides involved in the Viet Nam situation, and nothing should be done to aggravate the situation." I can assure you that if the aggression against South Viet Nam is ended, there will be no need whatever for any of the actions by the United States which have been taken in reply to that aggression. I can therefore agree with you fully that if there is an end to aggression, there can be a peaceful and equitable resolution of the situation in Viet Nam.

Let me thank you again for communicating to me your thoughts on

SECRET

matters which are of interest and concern to all of us. It is always helpful to me to have the benefit of your views.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

END

GP-1.

RUSK

India

248

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

TYPE OF DOCUMENT Cable _____

Letter _____

Memo _____

Other _____

DATE March 4-7, 1965

FROM _____

TO _____ NUMBER _____

SUBJECT Harriman Mission
Paris-Afghan-India

SEE Harriman Mission File

CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Intelligence Note 249

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

India

BUNDY-SMITH
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JOHNSON
KEENY
KLIEN
KOMER
MOODY
REEDY
SAUNDERS
SAYRE
THOMSON

MAR 6

To : The Secretary
Through : S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes TLH

Subject : India's Kerala Elections

The election in southern India's Kerala State have resulted in what seems to be a stalemate. No party or likely coalition disposes of a majority of seats in the 133 member state assembly, and direct rule by the central government seems likely to continue. Political maneuvering will be intense over the next several days, however, and several significant trends have emerged in the voting. The results of the election, with comparative totals from 1960, are attached.

The Results

The strongest showing was made by the leftist Communists (CP/L), despite the fact that the Indian government has jailed large numbers of them, including about 28 of the 40 successful CP/L candidates, for alleged pro-Chinese activity. The Chinese issue was probably a minor factor in the campaign. The CP/L success stemmed from its role as the most prominent party opposing the discredited Congress. Together with its coalition allies -- the Socialists and some independents -- the CP/L disposes of about 54 seats in the assembly. No other party is likely to join the CP/L coalition in a government, and New Delhi has reaffirmed its determination not to release the successful jailed candidates. Thus the CP/L and its supporters fall far short of the 67 seats needed to govern. Demonstrations and some violence

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By JC, NARA, Date 3-501

MAR 8 1965

may be expected in protest to New Delhi's refusal to release the leftists, but the government should be able to maintain its control effectively.

Should the Congress and the Congress Rebels coalesce, they would control 59 votes and might be able to influence enough independents to form a government. A Congress-Rebel Congress coalition has been made somewhat more feasible by the defeat of former Congress Chief Minister Shankar -- the bete noir of the Rebels -- and the surprisingly good Rebel showing at the polls. The Congress will probably be unwilling to make concessions to the Rebels, however, and would in any event be loath to govern with a slim and uncertain majority.

It is likely that no government will be formed. In this case, the Congress Party and the national government will probably decide to keep Kerala under direct President's Rule, whereby the state is run by administrators responsible only to the central government. Although new elections could be called for at any time, President's Rule will probably be continued until the national general elections in 1967. In the interim, Congress will hope to mend its political fences in Kerala and the central government will begin to tackle some of the economic and social problems that lie at the root of Kerala's political disorder.

Implications for the Communists

A significant element in the elections is the complete eclipse of the Rightist Communists (CP/R) -- the Dange faction recognized by Moscow. Although many special forces are at work in Kerala, and the disproportionate success of the CP/L over the CP/R is not indicative of the nation-wide situation, Communists throughout India will reassess their loyalties between the two factions.

Even though the Kerala leftists are probably the least Peiping-oriented element of the Indian CP/L, Peiping will trumpet the leftists' success in their campaign against the Soviet "revisionists."

Name of Party	Seats Won (1965)	Seats Contested (1965)	Seats Won (1960)
Congress	36	133	63
Congress Rebels	23	61	
Leftist Communists	40	74	29
Rightist Communists	3	84	
Socialists	13	29	20
Muslim League	6	15	11
Revolutionary Socialists	--	13	1
Jan Sangh	--	16	--
Swatantra	1	15	--
Independents (some sponsored by other parties)	11	118	2
Totals:	133	558	126

NOTE: The legislature was increased in size from 126 to 133 between the 1960 and 1965 elections. In 1960, the Congress, the Socialists, and the Muslim League contested as a coalition; the Congress and Communist parties were united. In 1965, the Rightist Communists, Revolutionary Socialists and three independents contested as a coalition; there was an electoral alliance between the Muslim League and the Congress Rebels; and the Leftist Communists were allied with the Socialists.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

251

New Delhi - February 17, 1965.

Dear Bob:

Several days ago, Prime Minister Shastri inaugurated the United States-aided Sharavathy Hydroelectric Plant in Mysore State. You may be interested in the attached copy of a speech I gave on this occasion.

For some time I have felt that there was the need for a statement as to precisely why we are giving India economic assistance, and this frank presentation seems to have been accepted here with considerable warmth and appreciation.

Although I have pointed out that our objective is not simply to make people "grateful" but rather to help them to build a solid base on which they can move ahead in their own cultural framework each of the Indian speakers was eloquent in expressing his appreciation for American assistance, and Prime Minister Shastri went out of his way to stress the common purposes, interests and problems which India and the United States of America share.

Sharavathy, as you may know, is the largest single Indian project for which we have provided foreign exchange assistance. It will be the fifth biggest hydroelectric plant in the world with an ultimate capacity of 1.2 million kilowatts.

As every major Indian newspaper has pointed out, it will literally transform the villages, farms and industries of a significant part of South India.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Mr. Robert Komer,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

FEB 24 1965

251a

January 24, 1965

SPEECH BY THE HONOURABLE CHESTER BOWLES
AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES TO INDIA
AT THE SHARAVATHY HYDEL INAUGURATION

The American people are proud and pleased to contribute capital and equipment for the building of this great hydroelectric plant. And I am personally grateful for the invitation of your Chief Minister to join with you in this impressive ceremony.

But precisely why should an American Ambassador be taking part in this dedication of an Indian dam, on an Indian river, running entirely through Indian soil, into the Arabian Sea?

I cannot add significantly to the praise which the Indian planners, engineers and workers have earned by their great achievement. Nor can I say anything fresh or new about the momentous contribution the dam will make to the people of Mysore and South India -- the thousands of newly lighted villages, the hundreds of new small industrial plants

and .....

FEB 24 1965

and the scores of larger factories.

But what I can do is help answer a basic question on which there is much confusion both in your country and my own: Why have the American people who live on the other side of the world been loaning or giving India each year Rs. 225 crores in dollars plus an equal sum in wheat, rice and other commodities to speed India's ambitious development plans?

In our annual Congressional and public debates over what we call "foreign economic assistance" a variety of claims are put forward to justify these expenditures to our American taxpayers.

Some advocates, for instance, argue that our contribution to overseas development will win us friends in India and elsewhere in Asia, Africa and Latin America. I sincerely hope that this dam and the other assistance we are giving India will contribute to this end, and I can assure you that there is a deep and genuine spirit of friendship in the United States toward India, her leaders and her people.

Yet if our friendship continues to grow I do not believe it will be the result of the capital loans, wheat and rice which we send each year to India. In this context I am reminded of Mark Twain's remark to a contentious neighbour: "Why is it that you criticize me so? I cannot for the life of me remember ever having loaned you any money."

Indeed, ...

Indeed, our own American history should be enough to persuade us that recipient nations are not always grateful for foreign assistance. In the 19th century, for example, the United Kingdom invested literally billions of pounds in the building of American railroads and industry. Yet even today only a minority of Americans are conscious of the massive British contribution to our early economic development.

So, it would be a mistake for us Americans to have any illusions on this score. We earnestly seek the friendship of India, but we know that your friendship is no more for sale now than was our own in the critical early years of our development.

A second answer to the much discussed question of "Why American aid" is related to the first: By helping India's economic development it is suggested that we may bring you into closer agreement with America's approach to current international questions.

In my opinion this answer is no more valid than the first. Indeed, some nations which we have assisted seem to go out of their way to criticize various aspects of American foreign policy in order to demonstrate to their own people and the world that United States aid money has not undermined their independence. I confess that on more than one occasion in the last ten years this thought has passed through my mind here in India.

We .....

We will, of course, continue to seek common ground with India on international questions. But we know that such agreement carries no price tag. So, again we shall have to seek an answer elsewhere.

A third response to the question of "Why American aid" is that our American economic assistance programme is a moral obligation which we, as the richest nation in history, are duty bound to assume. Four years ago, President Kennedy emphasized this point in his Inaugural Address:

"To those peoples," he said, "in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period -- not because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is morally right."

Those of you who have visited my country will testify that America's sense of moral commitment runs deep. A recent dramatic demonstration of it is the Peace Corps under which some 75,000 dedicated young Americans apply each year for opportunities to work almost without pay in the urban slums and rural areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Twelve thousand are now abroad; several hundred of them are here in India with a contingent in Mysore State itself.

Yet .....

Yet the American tradition of overseas service provides only part of the answer to our question.

The rest of the answer grows out of a concept which a hundred years ago or even thirty years ago would have been hard for either you or us to understand, but which in our modern era is overriding.

After two world wars, most Americans have come to see that our own security and prosperity cannot be isolated from that of the rest of the globe.

Whether we all like it or not, whether we always agree with each other or not, we are all members of the human race. Consequently, our common future depends on our ability to live together rationally on our increasingly crowded and turbulent planet.

As our world grows smaller, each nation, large or small, has a growing stake in the behaviour of everyone else.

In the postwar years, Stalin's intransigence concerned us all. More recently, when an irresponsible China threatened India with a conflict which might have extended throughout Asia, the security of every man, woman and child in America was involved in some degree.

Nor does our mutual interest in a more rational world stop with matters of aggression and military defence.

If .....

If we Americans should flounder and fail in our efforts to provide an increasing measure of prosperity, opportunity and dignity for all of our citizens under a free government, the impact would be ultimately felt in every Asian, African and Latin American village.

Similarly, unless the poverty, malnutrition and illiteracy of countries such as India are met and mastered there can be no hope for security and prosperity in the more privileged countries of the world.

Furthermore, because of new technologies the economic interdependence of all nations is rapidly increasing. In today's world the continuing dynamism and growth of the American economy would be impossible without expanding foreign trade. And for India and other developing countries increasing trade with the more highly developed nations is equally essential if an adequate rate of growth is to be achieved and maintained.

In this sense, every living American -- indeed, everyone everywhere who believes in peace and human freedom -- has a deep personal stake in the success of the unprecedented development effort which has been undertaken by free India.

The Industrial Revolution which in the 19th century laid the basis for the present prosperity of Western Europe and America involved a heavy cost in human suffering which was vividly described by Charles Dickens.

Under.....

Under different circumstances and through different methods the Soviet Union under Stalin concentrated Russia's energies and resources on building industrial and military capacity regardless of the consequences to the Russian people.

Today, democratic India seeks what would have been beyond the reach of any developing country not so many years ago: a rapid rate of national economic growth side by side with increasing direct social and material benefits for the individual.

Your success or failure as a nation rests not only on your ability to construct great dams, new factories and more miles of railroad tracks. Equally important is your capacity to build a society which offers a steadily increasing measure of dignity, opportunity and social justice to each individual.

This calls for higher real incomes and improved living conditions for your urban people, and the right to land ownership and fair crop prices for your cultivators.

This twin objective requires bold pragmatic national planning, the wise use of all available domestic resources, a keen sensitivity to human suffering and enlightened political and economic leadership.

It also requires a substantial amount of capital and technical assistance from the more privileged nations so that the present generation need not be sacrificed for the sake of its grandchildren.

Not.....

Not only the amount of foreign assistance which you receive but also its nature and the manner in which it is provided are of crucial significance.

In this regard, we Americans have come to see from hard experience that not all developing nations have the will or the ability to do what India is striving to do, and when these qualities are lacking, the effectiveness of our aid is blunted.

For these reasons, we are concentrating our assistance in those countries which are prepared to use their own resources to pursue realistic development practices and where there is a certain degree of mutual respect and understanding.

We consider Sharavathy a prime example of the proper and constructive use of American assistance. It is part of a carefully conceived and well integrated programme for the development of South India. Its planning and engineering were completely Indian.

Sharavathy will promote massive employment; it will encourage rural electrification; and it will permit the establishment of dynamic new industries which will earn foreign exchange to pay for similar projects in the future.

You could have built this great project without American assistance. But with such assistance you were able to build it sooner, and without sacrificing other important projects or unnecessarily

suppressing the day-to-day needs of your people.

Thus, the primary purpose of American economic assistance may be summed up in the following terms: To enable competent, socially conscious nations such as India to respond quickly, constructively and responsibly to the forces which are shaping tomorrow's world.

More specifically, it represents an effort by the American Government and citizens to help new nations which are prepared to help themselves to generate increasing national incomes and to ensure political and social stability.

Only on such a foundation can any nation contribute effectively to our common objective which is a more peaceful and rational world.

If free India succeeds in reaching her democratic goals, the benefits will be felt in every community in my own country and, indeed, throughout the world. That in a nutshell is why I am here today.

VK:ONP:pkb:abk

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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VERBATIM TEXT
~~SECRET~~

Shastri to LBJ 2/11/65

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Origin
SS
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI

PRIORITY 1633

Indian Cables

FEB 11 0 10 PM '65

LIMDIS

Embtel 2263

Following is text Shastri letter to President dated February 10, 1965, xxxxxxx which was handed to Department for transmittal to President on same date.

BUNDY-SMITH
BATOR
BELK
BOWMAN
CHASE
COOPER
JESSUP
JOHNSON
KEENY
KLEIN
KOMER
MOODY
REEDY
SMUNDERS
SAYRE
THOMSON

QUOTE Dear Mr. President: I take the liberty of addressing you in regard to the latest developments in Viet Nam which are naturally a source of deep concern to us. You have no doubt the full picture of the complex and dangerous character of the Viet Nam situation. We have appreciated the United States' desire, to which you have given public expression more than once, to avoid a wider conflict in Viet Nam. We know that one thing has led to another and a vicious chain reaction has set in. The fact remains, however, that in the situation with which we are faced in Viet Nam today, there is a danger of extension of conflict and of military confrontation, however indirect, between not only United States and China but United States and the Soviet Union. This, of course, would be disastrous for the peace of South East Asia and would have grave consequences on the world situation.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 00-167 (#14)
By KCB NARA. Date 3-5-04

2. On February 8

Drafted by: NEA:SOA:DTSchneider:dmm 2/11/65

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA/SOA - Turner C. Cameron, Jr.

Clearances:
FE - Mr. Corcoran
S/S - Mr. Christensen

VERBATIM TEXT
~~SECRET~~

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

~~SECRET~~ -- VERBATIM TEXT

2. On February 8 we have issued a statement, the text of which you may have seen and which I have asked our Ambassador to hand over to you. May I express the hope, Mr. President, that the United States will give its support to the main lines of our statement and agree along with others to procedures which might lead to a search for a just and peaceful political solution to the problem of Viet Nam.

3. In the course of my statement before the Annual Conference of International Chamber of Commerce in New Delhi on February 8, I threw out a suggestion that a meeting between you and Mr. Kosygin might be most helpful. This was a thought prompted by the realization of the dangers of the situation. The important thing is that dialogue should start immediately between all or at least some of the principal powers concerned with a view to seeking peaceful solutions. If for this purpose other methods cannot be found, a meeting between Mr. Kosygin and yourself might be of great value.

With warm personal regards, Yours sincerely, (signed) Lal Bahadur

GP-3.

End

BALL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHEN WITH ATTACHMENT(S)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523

February 9, 1965

Saidw

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert Komer
The White House

Bob:-

John Lewis has sent me a copy of his letter to you of February 5. I am enclosing a copy of the paper that he presented to AID/W during his recent consultation trip here.

As the result of his consultation, I believe his views with respect to some of the specifics in his paper have been modified somewhat. In general, however, I believe the paper continues to reflect his basic thinking.

Bill

William B. Macomber, Jr.
Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Near East and South Asia

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January 14, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADMINISTRATOR

Subject: Betting on India

Along with the more specific points raised in the Statement of Interim Strategy and the companion personnel airgram we submitted last month, I hope that our Washington consultations can examine the general proposition that our India program is substantially too thin -- too thin in terms of

dollar loans,

technical assistance,

and Mission staffing.

Stakes, Images, and Realities

The United States has an enormous stake in India's constitutional-style development effort -- this is long-established doctrine and in the past few months it has become truer than ever thanks to

-- the resurgence of Chinese prestige;

-- India's rising relative attractiveness as an AID target as Africa and Southeast Asia have grown messier;

-- the fresh demonstration of India's constitutional commitment supplied by the Nehru-Shastri succession;

-- and the gathering prospect of stepped-up AID interest in population policy, for which India is the most important and conspicuous action arena.

But in some Washington quarters India's image -- a mixture of misguided ideology, inefficiency, and contentiousness -- ill fits the importance that rational U.S. policy attaches to India. Latterly, the GOI's slowness in decontrolling the economy and in taking up the conditioned,

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By ks NARA, Date 4-22-03

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add-on portion of this year's nonproject loan availability (always pointedly contrasted with the Pakistan case) has sorely disappointed the U.S. For some, moreover, our India Mission has acquired the image of an excessively diffuse and temporizing operation.

The realities, now that I am here, seem quite different:

1. The GOI itself and the garrulous Indian free press have done altogether too much poor mouthing. And our own country-team reporting often is triggered by a problem rather than a success.

   - The Third Plan record of output expansion, ex-agriculture, is good -- surprisingly good in the face of an unexpected military buildup -- and industrial capacity has been doing better than output.

   - Agriculture performance is inadequate, but the underlying trend is up, not down from that of the fifties; the present leadership is the best ever, and its policy results in terms of price supports, fertilizer imports and production expansion, water management, and reorganization of extension are beginning to show. This past year, with the first good break on the weather in three years, farm output has jumped enough to attain an over-all growth rate of 6 percent for the year.

   - Food distribution policy is moving, albeit haltingly, in a sensible direction.

   - Taxes have been raised ahead of the Third-Plan schedule.

   - Exports have been doing better than most expected.

   - And some major foreign private investments are shaping.

   In a vast country committed to evolutionary processes, breakthroughs seldom are going to be clean, sharp, and dramatic enough to be fully recognized until after the fact. But for all of the foregoing, plus the bomb decision, plus the absence of any serious national splintering to be the case at the six-months post-Nehru mark, isn't bad.

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2. As explained in our SIS, further decontrol could scarcely have been expected in the midst of a food price crisis and the most serious general inflationary problem of the past 15 years. But

   a. The GOI, taking advantage of the fertilizer component of our nonproject add-on, once we got its terms pinned down, has raised its fertilizer import target from 250,000 T (N equivalent) -- the level in view when I arrived -- to 350,000 T. This will claim $30-40 million of add-on nonproject money for the highest possible priority use.

   b. Shaken by our identification of substantial bottleneck busting uses for add-on nonproject dollars, the Ministry of Finance projects a sizeable loan request for this purpose in March.

   c. Without backing away from the newly stiffer screening of project loan proposals it has instituted (partly at Mission behest), the GOI now expects to advance about $120 million in proposals for AID project funding this fiscal year. These, together with the roughly $215 million which the conventional, fertilizer, and bottleneck portions of the nonproject loans plus the $107 million of loans already authorized by AID/W, should fully exhaust our FY 1965 availability of $385 million and reduce our carry-over to about $40 million.

3. Quite aside from the different situation with respect to food and general price inflation, the Indian performance re liberalization will not be comparable with the Pakistani until its aid underpinnings are comparable. The comparisons of average annual economic aid per capita, FY 1961/2 through 1964/5, are

	Pakistan	India
Consortium pledges	$4.32	$2.42
U.S. pledges	2.20	1.01

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As suggested below, India could achieve extensive liberalization and a great deal to boot with Pakistan's past per capita aid levels, not to speak of anything higher.

4. On the matter of softness versus hardness, what have been at issue between AID/W and the Mission at times have been essentially questions of tactics. The dialogue between us over specific decisions usually results in better decisions than either of us would make unilaterally. But it is the Mission which is immersed in the niceties and nuances of dealing with a proud, sensitive government that has a right to be so and that is uncumbered with all of the angularities of bureaucratic responsibility and democratic political accountability. Thus it is the Mission which should be in a better position to put the final tactical gloss on a course of action.

One recent example: In the case of the Beas project much of the initiative and most of the drive behind our insistence that Rajasthan Canal irrigation practices be tied into the transaction was the Mission's. But tactically we decided to try a side letter for incorporating this touchy aspect of the understanding. We know the GOI would have held still for this, but when AID/W insisted the Canal (a particular pet of the Finance Minister) be incorporated in the loan agreement itself, TTK blew his stack and vetoed any reference to the canal in the transaction, whatever the format. Thus an essentially useful project with a tortured history extending all the way back to 1959 is once again hung up.

I also have not found the Mission's program particularly diffuse. There are, to be sure, a few small projects and technicians' assignments -- e.g., poultry production, medical school staffing, nurses' education (in its present project form) and the posting of scattered agricultural technicians -- which are properly being phased out or down. And some of our existing personnel and activities are being refocused on our new priorities.

But the program as it stands has a coherent pattern and is attuned to the priorities. The fact simply is that those priorities must be fairly numerous in an aid program with the comprehensive responsibilities of this one in an economy as large and complex as India's. The program's real problem is not that it's diffuse; it's undernourished.

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Personnel Reinforcement

The India Mission has been trying to run much the largest country (development assistance) program with an American complement far smaller than has been found necessary in a number of other Missions. The following, for example, are the comparative direct-hire positions authorized in the November 25, 1964, NESA Staffing Pattern for India, Pakistan, and Turkey -- classified according to the revised organization we plan for the India Mission:

	India	Pakistan	Turkey
Office of the Director [a]	6	7	6
Office for Program and Finance (loans, economic analysis, program, food for peace, participant training)	24	42 [b]	19
Office for Agricultural Development	30	38	36
Office for Human Resources Development (health, education, management, labor)	35	33	44
Office for Physical Resources Development (power and water, mining, industry, transport)	10	55 [c]	31
Executive Office	24	41 [d]	38 [d]
Office of the Controller	8	10	8
Total	137	226	172

a. Including legal.
b. Loan Division twice as large and Economics Staff three times India's.
c. Includes large minerals program (34), but also power division of 18 compares with India's 3.
d. Secretaries: Pakistan 21, Turkey 38, India 12.

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We have not bothered even to calculate what relative personnel parity with such other Missions (i.e., equal staffing per dollar or per capita) would mean in India. We do not even seek absolute parity. We want to continue to run a lean operation that makes maximum use of local talent and of American graduate-student types employable on an ad hoc basis.

But we do urgently need to fill some glaring gaps in our staffing pattern and reinforce units, especially of overhead personnel, that are spread too thin to get our near-term workload done well and on time. In last month's airgram we asked for 18 more positions. This I regard as the minimum (but a safe one) for doing the job we project for FY 1966, including the technical assistance represented by the $13 million development grant budget the Mission proposed in late November.

If the several additional DG possibilities that have been generated by new developments since that time should materialize, some further staffing would be necessary. And more still would be needed beginning in FY 1967 if we were to get serious about the substantial expansion of the India aid program about which the final section of this memo speculates.

Obviously AID/W is in no position blithely to kick through personnel ceilings. We shall be delighted to make maximum possible use of contracts and reimbursable details; indeed we already have suggested that two substantial pieces of our direct-hire requirements -- for agricultural extension and (modified) nurses training -- be restructured as contracts. But I do believe some effective attack on our severe undermanning problem is essential.

Technical Assistance Reinforcement

In the matter of development grant budgeting, we've been a problem child for NESA this year. I have every sympathy for their difficulties in trying to extract solid and timely estimates from a Mission engaged for months in changing directors, educating a new director who's a freshman to the Agency, and reformulating its program. It is not surprising that the Bureau, when it finally toted up our delayed E-1's was upset to discover that, compared with a budgeted FY 1965 level of $6.8 million, we had proposed a FY 66 level of $13.2 million. But I nevertheless would urge that the following points be considered before NESA's decision to limit us to $8 million is frozen:

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1. $3.3 of the $13.2 is for the greatly expanded (and highly successful) Summer Sciences Institute program AID/W already has approved. There is no good reason why this should displace other portions of the DG program.

2. The funding proposed for FY 1966 is for solid, priority purposes consistent with the LAS and SIS.

3. It now appears that our actual DG allotments for FY 1965 may approximate $9 million. It would seem strange to estimate FY 1966 below probable FY 1965 when the needs all run in the opposite direction.

4. Awkward as it may be for budgeting, our LAS was essentially correct when it said that the effective constraint on technical assistance should be our staffing, not our financing, capacity.

In addition to the gap between the $13 million we have recommended for FY 1966 and the $8 million NESA has accepted, several major new opportunities for key technical assistance projects have opened up in the few weeks since our FY 1966 DG proposals were submitted:

- Population policy and family planning. The signal sounded by President Johnson's State of the Union message plus the intensification of top-level GOI concern indicated by the activation of a Cabinet Committee on Family Planning jointly point the need for a major Mission push in this area -- one that for family planning and related rural health activities may require up to 20 technicians and a budget of $1 million by FY 1967, and at least half these amounts in FY 1966.

- Regional water management. Interacting with various GOI leaders including the Minister of Food and Agriculture, we are by way of developing a major opening for a research and consulting team from an American university to weigh in on one of Indian agriculture's most critical problems in a way that has a particularly exciting pay-off potential. If an exploratory study were favorable, two-year funding of a long-term contract in FY 1966 could claim up to $1 million.

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- Public safety advice. Chief Parker's very recent, signally successful, visit has unexpectedly generated a GOI request for four public safety advisors. We look with favor on the proposal if it can be kept within bounds. [redacted] 25X6

25X6

- Urban renewal in Howrah. The idea that the provision of comprehensive technical assistance to urban renewal in Howrah may be our best early bet for an effective early impact upon Greater Calcutta was first surfaced in our SIS. It has been extensively explored since and, subject to certain changes in CMPO's preliminary version of the scheme, it continues to look good. It could claim $1.5 million of DG funds in FY 1966.

The Mission thus thinks it has hard, hungry needs for more than $16 million of technical assistance funding next year. I know it is a bit unorthodix to be shooting for twice one's projected allotment and recognize that the whole matter will have to be sorted out piece by piece.

We are perfectly prepared to go for loan funding of technical assistance, including its personnel components, where this approach is really saleable to the GOI. It is not, we fear, saleable in the field of scientific and technical education, where the Russians are eager to give, not just alternative, but, in an important sense, competing technical assistance via UNESCO on a grant basis. But we can cover the commodity portion of the education technical assistance budget by a loan, and Subramaniam is prepared, at least for the Fourth Plan, to go for an ominibus agricultural development project loan that would cover a variety of technical assistance (including personnel) as well as capital items. This last could take a good bit of the heat off our DG funding, and a foretaste of it might be possible this year.

Similarly, I hope that some of the Agency's worldwide research funds may be able to pick up not only the general research support about which you and I have corresponded (and which I have left out of the foregoing summary) but research components of some regular technical assistance activities.

But as we sort out these details in the light of near-term budgetary constraints I hope we can remember that, in absolute terms, the total amounts at issue are small; that relative to the size of the Indian economy they are very small indeed; and that while we're talking about a radically expanded program, it is one of lean, integrated, high-priority content.

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Development Loan Reinforcement

Finally, the big subject.

In this case the issue is the Fourth Plan, not FY 1966. There is every reason for maintaining loan funding during the coming year at at least its present level. But we sense that the last year of the Third Plan is not the right time in terms of either domestic or Consortium politics to press for a major change in loan policies. Nor do we suggest that Fourth Plan issues be explored at the coming March Consortium meeting.

But there is clear need for AID, both at headquarters and in the field, to shape its own thinking and, particularly if the idea of a major setup in the India program is taken seriously, to probe the possibilities in considerable depth. The following in no sense represents such a probe. It reflects, simply, enough preliminary thinking to persuade us that some real probing may be in order.

Alternatives. There are essentially three for the Fourth Plan:

1. Maintain the level of gross assistance, which, because of the rapid rise in debt repayment and servicing, would mean a substantial decline in net assistance.

2. Maintain the same net aid level, which would mean something like a $1½ billion rise in the Consortium's gross assistance bill for the five-year period.

3. Go for a true quantum increase in net assistance -- which, in our own thinking we have characterized as meaning something like the Pakistan level of aid per capita, or roughly a doubling of the gross India aid bill.

In our SIS we emphasized the importance of shooting, at minimum, for target No. 2. Although we expressed interest in the more ambitious target, we implicitly questioned its realism. On further reflection we are not so sure; it may just be that not only the United States but the Consortium as a whole will be ready next fall really to go all out in betting on India as a major island of orderly developmental promise and achievement in a sea of considerable confusion -- an "island," it should be noted, with a population equal to that of the 55

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countries of Latin America and Africa. Moreover, as we have reflected on the "Chenery approach," we are more and more impressed with its intrinsic merit.

The general thesis that Indian performance and promise warrant a massive vote of confidence has been alluded to sufficiently at the start of this memorandum. Our general strategy in first selling ourselves, then other members of the Consortium, on a big push in the Fourth Plan would be, of course, to extract very much improved performance from the Indians. Some of this would entail outright quid-pro-quo bargaining. But the larger part of the improvement would be induced automatically by the greater freedom to move in sensible policy directions that a much larger availability of foreign exchange would provide.

The following is a somewhat more specific and amplified account of our reflections on a Big Push than was contained in our SIS. But let me underscore again the need for far more thorough investigation if you decide the "Chenery hypothesis" is to be taken seriously.

Absorptive Capacity. We have little real doubt of India's ability rather quickly to digest the same relative volume of assistance Pakistan is now using to good advantage. At present the GOI has made a commitment of administrative energies to development projects that is roughly appropriate to the aid it receives. In the early 50s, its administrative machinery was geared to a much lower level of capital development. But it has been able to make the big jump to present levels.

- From 1961/2 to 1964/5, for example, aid utilization aside from PL 480 will have increased from $545 million to about $1.1 billion and utilization of AID/DLF loans has soared $80 million to $380 million.

- As noted already, AID absorption has been matched by an equally impressive performance in GOI domestic resources mobilization.

There is no serious reason to doubt India's ability to keep its administrative capacity for using aid growing rapidly. If there is any absorptive bottleneck at present, it is in the preparation of projects that can meet the new higher screening standards. This learning process may be fairly short, but, in any event, if we were to find it strategic to give substantially more assistance, we could

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increase the provision of technical assistance as to project preparation. Moreover, much of the incremental aid would be nonproject, and here, with the reduction and simplification of controls that the aid itself would permit, there could be no question at all of the absorptive capacity.

What would sharply increased aid buy?

1. For agriculture:

   -- more imported fertilizer, pesticides, and small tractors;

   -- many more fertilizer, tractor, pump factories;

   -- massive rural electrification;

   -- the productive incentive provided by a greatly increased availability of consumer goods;

   -- a growth rate of 5 percent in farm and food output.

2. Consumer goods production: The expanded availability of imports and stronger rural market would permit and promote the rapid multiplication of smaller, modern, private consumer-goods-manufacturing enterprises.

3. A viable decentralized pattern of industrial location: The rapid expansion of consumer-goods production and agro-industries would create the need, and the loosening of the foreign exchange constraint would provide the necessary underwriting, for the rational location policy that India is beginning to want but doubts she presently can afford.

4. Growth rate: With a 4-5 percent growth rate in agriculture, stepped up consumer goods expansion, and the accelerated expansion of power, transport, and heavy industry that sharply increased aid also would permit, India should readily achieve a 6-7 percent growth rate (or nearly 4-5 percent per capita). Indeed, we wouldn't be surprised to see more.

5. Employment: This sort of swift, uninhibited expansion of supply, backstopped by ample imports, would itself, of course, greatly expand employment opportunities. Moreover, it is the

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one formula that can readily remove the inflationary constraints on massive rural public works as a transitional solution to the employment problem.

6. Taxation: A Fourth Plan of the dimensions the GOI is now contemplating is, as Mr. Kamaraj opined at Durgapur, going to present a painful domestic financing dilemma: how, in the immediate aftermath of Third-Plan tax raising to raise enough additional resources without smothering private enterpreneurial incentives. The one congenial answer is, with generous aid, kick up the growth rate and get sizeable increments in revenues out of large increments in incomes.

7. Population control: An economy surging forward at a 4-5 percent per capita growth rate is much likelier to begin generating a perceptible standard-of-living deterrent on the birth rate. Beyond that, its people are far more likely to be receptive to the changed mores family planning seeks.

8. Earlier achievement of self-support: A big push, by achieving a substantially higher per capita growth rate and, therefore, higher marginal savings and tax rates, should mean earlier attainment of India's capital formation requirement for self-support. Also it would hasten the multiplication of the necessary technical and managerial skills. As for the country's longer-run foreign exchange outlook per se, a big aid push could have mixed effects some plus, some minus, on both the import-substitution and export-promotion routes to self-support. But at least it would create the opportunity for getting the aid job done sooner. One of our primary concerns, were we to embark on such an accelerated effort, would be to see that the GOI exploited that opportunity fully.

Conclusion. At minimum, all of this makes for exciting speculation. I propose that AID/W/PC and our Mission collaborate during the next three-four months on a serious study of the whole matter.

John P. Lewis

Approved For Release 2002/08/24 : NLJ-001-129-1-25-3

25-4

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

FARIDKOT HOUSE
NEW DELHI-1 INDIA

February 5, 1965

Mr. Robert Komer
The White House

Dear Bob:

My flying trip in and out of Washington Inauguration Week was exceedingly ill-timed (but the attempt to get the trip in and still be back here in the event Dave Bell was able to get away for his projected trip to these parts locked us into that week) and it was too short (but personal considerations here dictated trying to do it in very tight space). We got a lot of business done at AID, but I never did get over to the Executive Office, except for 35 minutes the last day at the Council, and I am very sorry I missed talking with you.

I was doubly sorry to have missed you when I learned from John Ulinski, who trailed me back, that we had been operating on a mistaken impression, namely, that thanks to new assignments you were no longer directly concerned with the India program. We think that a number of things here are stirring up in a promising way, and I would have liked to talk to you about them. As a bad second best I have suggested to Bill Macomber that he may want to pass along to you a few of the pieces of paper we brought with us.

Are you apt to be getting out here any time soon? It would be great to see you in these environs, and, in any event, I shall try to make sure that we get together the next time I'm back in Washington -- I hope within 6 months.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

John P. Lewis
Minister-Director

FEB 8 1965

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TO WHITE HOUSE INT SIT RM
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~~TOPSECRET~~ TOP SECRET

"TO: ROBERT KOMER, THE WHITE HOUSE
FROM: BOWLES

ON ABOUT NOVEMBER 19, 1962, PRIME MINISTER NEHRU SENT A CABLED MESSAGE TO THE INDIAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, TO BE DELIVERED TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY. IT WAS A REQUEST FOR DIRECT AMERICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE INDO-CHICOM WAR INCLUDING, I BELIEVE, A REQUEST FOR EIGHTEEN SQUADRONS OF SUPERSONIC FIGHTERS MANNED BY AMERICAN AIR FORCE PILOTS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT A DUPLICATE COPY OF THIS LETTER WAS RECEIVED BY KEN GALBRAITH FOR TRANSMISSION THROUGH OUR CHANNELS, BUT THERE IS NO RECORD OF THE MESSAGE HERE AS ALL OUR TOP SECRET FILES ARE DESTROYED TWO YEARS AFTER DATE.

I WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR OBTAINING THE TEXT AND CABLING IT TO ME [redacted] 3.3 (b)(1) I HAVE NO INTENTION OF USING IT IN ANY SPECIFIC SITUATION, BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT SOME SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES HAS STARTED A MAJOR RE-THINKING IN THE GOI ON THE SUBJECT OF THEIR AIR DEFENSE, AND I EXPECT TO BE HOLDING FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON THE SUBJECT WITH CHAVAN, WHO OF COURSE IS AWARE OF THE 1962 NEHRU APPEAL. CONSIDERING THE TENDENCY IN THE GOI TO REGARD ALL DOCUMENTED NEHRU ACTIONS AS SETTING THE LIMITS FOR POLITICALLY SAFE ACTION TODAY, I FEEL IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR ME TO READ THIS TEXT STRICTLY FOR MY OWN BACKGROUND USE.

BOWLES"

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~~TOP SECRET~~ TOP SECRET

[redacted] 3.3(b)(1)

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 08-41
By isl, NARA, Date 8-8-08

WHCAApproved For Release 2003/05/01 : NLJ-032-023-2-28-2

1965 FEB 4 18 21

THE WHITE HOUSE

OUTGOING MESSAGE

WHASA

Immed — PRECEDENCE

~~Secret~~ — CLASSIFICATION

4 Feb 65 — DATE

255a

FROM: Komer

TO: Amb Bowles - Eyes Only

INFO:

CITE: CAP65029

SENT
WHCA
1965 FEB 4 19 20

SANITIZED
Authority NLJ-032-023-2-28
By lgk, NARA, Date 11-13-07

PAGE ____ OF ____

WHASA FORM 12
1 JAN 61

Approved For Release 2003/05/01 : NLJ-032-023-2-28-2

255c

NEW DELHI
19th November 1962

Dear Mr. President,

Within a few hours of despatching my earlier message of today, the situation in the N.E.F.A. Command has deteriorated still further. Bomdila has fallen and the retreating forces from Sela have been trapped between the Sela Ridge and Bomdila. A serious threat has developed to our Digboi oil fields in Assam. With the advance of the Chinese in massive strength, the entire Brahmaputra Valley is seriously threatened and unless something is done immediately to stem the tide the whole of Assam, Tripura, Manipur and Nagaland would also pass into Chinese hands.

2. The Chinese have poised massive forces in the Chumbi Valley between Sikkim and Bhutan and another invasion from that direction appears imminent. Our areas further North West on the border with Tibet in the States of U.P., Punjab and Himachal Pradesh are also threatened. In Ladakh, as I have said in my earlier communication, Chushul is under heavy attack and shelling of the airfield at Chushul has already commenced. We have also noticed increasing air activity by the Chinese air force in Tibet.

3. Hitherto we have restricted our requests for assistance to essential equipment and we are most grateful for the assistance which has been so readily given to us. We did not ask for more comprehensive assistance particularly air assistance because of the wider implications of such assistance in the global context and we did not want to embarrass our friends.

4. The situation that has developed is, however, really desperate. We have to have more comprehensive assistance if the Chinese are to be prevented from taking over the whole of Eastern India. Any delay in this assistance reaching us will result in nothing short of a catastrophe for our country.

.... 2

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Authority NLJ 01-139 (*8K)
By jc/sf NARA, Date 3-8-04

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5. We have repeatedly felt the need of using air arm in support of our land forces, but have been unable to do so as in the present state of our air and radar equipment we have no defence against retaliatory action by the Chinese.

6. I, therefore, request that immediately support be given to strengthen our air arm sufficiently to stem the tide of Chinese advance.

7. I am advised that for providing adequate air defence a minimum of 12 squadrons of supersonic allweather fighters are essential. We have no modern radar cover in the country. For this also we seek your assistance. Our needs are most immediate. The United States Air Force personnel will have to man these fighters and radar installations while our personnel are being trained. U.S. fighters and transport planes manned by U.S. personnel will be used for the present to protect our cities and installations from Chinese air attacks and to maintain our communications. We should if this is possible also like U.S. planes manned by U.S. personnel to assist the Indian Air Force in air battles with the Chinese air force over Indian areas where air action by the I.A.F. against Chinese communication lines supplies and troop concentration may lead to counter air action by the Chinese.

8. Any air action to be taken against the Chinese beyond the limits of our country, e.g. in Tibet, will be taken by I.A.F. planes manned by Indian personnel.

9. Determined as we are to liberate all parts of our territory which may pass into the hands of the Chinese aggressors it is clear that sooner or later we would have to neutralise their bases and airfields by striking from the air. For this purpose I request you to consider assisting us with two Squadrons of Bombers of B-47 type. To man this indispensible arm we would like to send immediately our Pilots and Technicians for training in the United States.

...3

PRESERVATION COPY

10. The Chinese threat as it has developed involves not merely the survival of India, but the survival of free and independent Governments in the whole of this sub-Continent or in Asia. The domestic quarrels regarding small areas or territorial borders between the countries in this sub-Continent or in Asia have no relevance whatever in the context of the developing Chinese invasion. I would emphasise particularly that all the assistance or equipment given to us to meet our dire need will be used entirely for resistance against the Chinese. I have made this clear in a letter I sent to President Ayub Khan of Pakistan. I am asking our Ambassador to give you a copy of this letter.

11. We are confident that your great country will in this hour of our trial help us in our fight for survival and for the survival of freedom and independence in this sub-Continent as well as the rest of Asia. We on our part are determined to spare no effort until the threat posed by Chinese expansionist and aggressive militarism to freedom and independence is completely eliminated.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

The President,
The White House,
WASHINGTON D.C.

PRESERVATION COPY

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

256

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47
Origin
NEA
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI 1552

India + Ceylon

FEB 3 12 03 PM '65

BUNDY
BATOR
BELK
BOWMAN
CHASE
COOPER
JESSUP
JOHNSON
KLEIN
KOMER
MOODY
REEDY
SAUNDERS
SAYRE
THOMSON

X89 S Radhakrishnan 2/3/65

SS
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USIA
NSC
CPR

Please deliver soonest following message from the President to President Radhakrishnan:

QUOTE My sincere thanks for your thoughtful message of congratulations on my inauguration as President of the United States. I warmly reciprocate your expression of confidence that the bonds of friendship and cooperation between our two countries, and our common commitment to world peace, will grow even stronger in the years ahead. UNQUOTE.

White House does not plan release of reply but has no objection if President Radhakrishnan wishes to do so.

FYI. Above message is in reply to following congratulatory message from Radhakrishnan received by commercial cable:

QUOTE On the happy occasion of your Excellency's assumption of the high office of the President of the United States of America I have great pleasure in conveying to you and the people of the United States of America the warmest greetings of the government and people of India to which I add my own. While expressing my best wishes for your Excellency's success I feel confidence that the bonds of friendship and cooperation so happily existing between our two countries will become stronger in the cause of world peace during your term of office as President. UNQUOTE. End FYI.

End

Drafted by: NEA:SOA:AALakeland:dmm 2/1/65

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Turner C. Cameron, Jr.

BALL

Clearances:
NEA/SOA - Miss Laise
S/S-S - Mr. Rattray
White House - Mr. Komer
S/S - Mr. Hilliker

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

THE WHITE HOUSE

OUTGOING TELEGRAM ~~Department of State~~

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

11084

India
X India Code
257

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4

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ACTION:

Info: SS G NEA P USIA NSC SSC

To Be Sent January 24, 1965
USIA Do Not Release Before January 26.

JAN 24 1 39 AM '65

BUNDY SMITH
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SEND INFO COPY AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1482

HIS EXCELLENCY

DR. SARVEPALLI RADHAKRISHNAN,

PRESIDENT OF INDIA,

NEW DELHI.

It gives me pleasure to extend to Your Excellency and to the people of India from the people of the United States of America, felicitations and best wishes on the occasion of the anniversary of the founding of the Republic of India.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Drafted by: O/CPR:LNichols:pr 1/20/65

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: Angier Biddle Duke, Chief of Protocol

Clearances: SOA - Mr. Lakeland; NEA - Mr. Cameron; S/S-C - Mrs. Halla; S/S - Mr. Hoffacker

WHITE HOUSE CONCURRENCE NOT NECESSARY

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

S/S 915

January 22, 1965

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Government of India Request for U.S. Concurrence on Import of Contraceptives into India by Voluntary Agencies

The Government of India has asked for the U.S. Government's concurrence on the import into India of contraceptives offered for donation by American voluntary agencies under the terms of the Indo-U.S. Agreement of 1951. This agreement provides that the U.S. Government may finance the overseas transportation costs of goods contributed by the voluntary agencies.

Hitherto, AID has abstained from financing not only the procurement of contraceptives but also the cost of shipping contraceptives. AID has decided, however, to reimburse the voluntary agencies for shipping costs in the future. The attached airgram would instruct Embassy New Delhi to inform the Government of India that we have no objection to the import of contraceptives under the agreement.

This airgram is being held pending White House review of it.

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Airgram to New Delhi

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JAN 25 1965

ORIGIN/ACTION

/R	REP	AF
A	EUR	FE
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	P	IO
	FBO	AID
R	COM	FRB
T	LAB	TAR
R	XMB	AIR
MY	CIA	NAVY
ID	USIA	NSA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

Original to be Filed in _____ Decentralized Files.

FILE DESIGNATION

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NO. HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : American Embassy NEW DELHI

258a

FROM : Department of State DATE:

SUBJECT : GOI Request for U.S. Government Concurrence on Import of Contraceptives into India by American Voluntary Agencies.

REF : Embassy's A-471 of November 17, 1964.

The Department considers the language of Article 3 of the Indo-U.S. Agreement of 1951 broad enough to include contraceptives. The Embassy should therefore reply to the note of January 28, 1964 from the Ministry of External Affairs, stating that the U.S. Government has no objection to the importation of donations of contraceptives by the approved Receiving Agencies under the terms of the Indo-U.S. Agreement.

FYI A statement of non-objection to importation does not of itself result in an obligation upon the United States Government to finance the overseas transportation of goods sent to India under the agreement. Such goods must be acceptable to both governments and must be brought into India by agencies registered with AID. However, neither acceptance nor registration creates an obligation on the part of the United States to pay for overseas transportation. The financing of transportation is a matter to be agreed between AID and the voluntary agency. Overseas transportation costs for contraceptives donated by voluntary agencies will normally be reimbursable to the voluntary agencies. END FYI

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FORM 4-63 DS-323

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY ☐ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: NEA:SOA:ACBauman:rf:1/12/65 | Drafting Date: 1/12/65 | Contents and Classification Approved by: NEA - Phillips Talbot

Clearances:
S/S -
A/AID - Mr. Bell DEB/GDB
AA/MR - Mr. Post DEB GDB
AID: GC - Mr. Phillips
SOA - Mr. Cameron
L/E - Mr. Malmborg (draft)
TCR/HS - Dr. Jessup DEB Gmb
AA/NESA - Mr. Macomber
H.- Miss Folger (subs)
ES - Mr. Van North (subs)

JAN 5 1965

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1963 O - 652219 (123)

Comunidad, freely publishes articles favorable to the Christian Democratic Movement. Although the GOP neither permits publication of newspapers without authorization from the Ministry of Interior nor allows opposition parties to publish dailies, the three opposition papers are not subject to GOP censorship and do not shy away from sharp criticism of the government.

Partial Relaxation of Police Control - The state of siege for the first time in more than 25 years was lifted by Presidential Decree on November 12, 1963, in ten of Paraguay's departments. The GOP now maintains the state of siege only in the Departments of Central (Asunción), Itapúa, Caazapá, and Villa Hayes.

The police have begun to show marked restraint in the handling of political cases. Improved treatment of political prisoners is even conceded privately by the opposition. The number of political prisoners has diminished notably during the past two years and most of the few prisoners currently in government jails are known Communists.

Municipal elections have been called for October of this year in which three parties will participate.

Summary - In fine, the present trend toward political liberalization seems more likely to persist than to be reversed. The GOP still seemingly accepts the implications of the policy of political liberalization which President Stroessner himself re-affirmed in his April 1, 1964, state-of-the-nation address to the Congress. The policy of the USG is to make known to the GOP our satisfaction with the recent political progress towards a freer society and to continue to urge that government to move in this direction.

259

SECRET

India

NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

INDIA CRACKS DOWN ON COMMUNIST/LEFT

The Indian Government's (GOI) nationwide crackdown on the "pro-Chinese" radical left wing of the Communist Party of India (CPI/L) on December 30 -- resulting in the arrest of around 800 members -- apparently has been under consideration for some months; its timing is probably related to the GOI's concern regarding the Kerala state elections scheduled for March 4. Since the fragmented Kerala Congress Party has minimal chances of winning a majority in the elections and a CPI/L -led coalition had good prospects, the GOI may hope that apprehension of the leftist Communists will ensure inconclusive election results, making necessary the continuation of President's Rule from New Delhi. (Kerala has been under such rule since last September when the faction-ridden state government fell because of the defection of 15 local Congress members.) The arrest of 125 leftist Communists in Kerala inevitably will seriously disrupt the election campaign and strategy of that group. However, there could be a counterbalancing tide of voter sympathy for the leftist Communist "martyrs."

In a forthright official denuncation of the Communist leftists, the GOI Home Ministry accused them of treasonous actions and intent. Evidence against them purportedly includes documentation of large Chinese Communist payments to the CPI/L. (According to press reports, the recently closed Indonesian Consulate in Calcutta was used to channel Chinese funds and propaganda material to the CPI/L.) Because no Indian group outside of the Communist Party wants to defend those charged with aiding and abetting the Chinese Communists, the GOI has been able successfully to rationalize the action as an anti-Chinese Communist measure. A source close to the Home Minister told our Embassy at New Delhi that the arrests were a first step in the direction of outlawing the CPI/L and that a bill to ban the party would be introduced during the February session of Parliament.

CPI Split - The Communist Party of India has split organizationally into two separate parties: the right-wing pro-Soviet CPI/R, and the left-wing pro-Chinese CPI/L. Apparently both Communist parties will continue to use the same name, although their election symbols are different. (The CPI/R retains the use of the hammer and sickle, while the CPI/L has been assigned by the Indian Election Commission, a symbol composed of hammer, sickle and a star. Although it is not clear whether there will be electoral cooperation between the two parties, there is evidence to indicate they were seeking a formula for cooperation in the Kerala elections.

The CPI/R has met the GOI test of political legitimacy by belatedly denouncing Chinese Communist aggression and by claiming to support a concept of "peaceful transition of socialism." However, the

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-504

arrests of the CPI/L must be publicly embarrassing to the CPI/R and Moscow. Being unable to condone the GOI action, the CPI/R has somewhat mildly denounced it, while Moscow thus far has refrained from public statement. Nevertheless, whatever public stance the CPI/R and Moscow may feel called upon to take for ideological and fraternal reasons, or whatever their disappointment over this evidence of the GOI's ability to act effectively and ruthlessly against disruptive political elements, for the short term they probably are not too displeased with the GOI action. There were many indications, prior to the recent arrests, that the CPI/L was forging ahead of the CPI/R in the struggle for ascendancy with the Indian Communist movement. It is too early to tell whether the arrests will tip the balance back in favor of the CPI/R, which the GOI regards as relatively "tame."

--Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 2, 1/13/65

Turkey

SOVIET DELEGATION VISITS TURKEY

The visit to Turkey, January 4-13, of the Soviet Parliamentary delegation, headed by Presidium member N. V. Podgorny, resulted in exceptionally heavy press coverage and comment, the general tone of which was that the Soviet-Turkish thaw makes ample sense from Turkey's viewpoint and does not weaken Turkey's ultimate ties to the West. The official talks apparently covered the subjects of trade, Cyprus, and cultural exchanges, which had been discussed during Foreign Minister Erkin's visit to Moscow last fall (see CFR No. 47, Nov. 18, 1964). The Soviet delegation's references to Cyprus, particularly to the island's "separate communities", were widely acclaimed.

The delegation's public statements on possible Soviet economic assistance brought Turkish denials that the subject had been discussed; and Podgorny's unfavorable references to NATO resulted in Turkish Government statements that no consideration is being given to any changes in Turkey's NATO alliance. Prime Minister Inonu apparently told Podgorny of Turkey's plans to withdraw from the MLF; these plans evidently were also leaked to an Istanbul paper which printed them along with a vague connection to the presence of the Soviet delegation.

One negative aspect of the Soviet delegation's visit concerned Podgorny's controversial speech to parliament. His propagandistic address was delivered amid objections and noises and the departure of some opposition members from the Grand National Assembly (GNA). Given the traditional Turkish hospitality and great courtesy customarily accorded to visitors, the GNA's negative behavior is significant in terms of Turkish culture. However, in view of the satisfaction the Turks have derived from the favorable Soviet attitude toward their position on Cyprus, it is doubtful the incident will represent a lasting setback for the Soviets.

*

--Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 2, 1/13/65

NEA NOTES

Yemen

Following his return from Cairo, President Sallal on January 5 appointed former Vice President al-Amri to form a new government, thus resolving the Yemeni Government (YAR) crisis which had commenced in mid-December (see CFR No. 51, Dec. 16). Al-Amri's cabinet is made up in the main of Egyptian puppets and nonentities with the possible exception of former Prime Minister al-Jaifi (who was assigned the portfolio of Treasury and Economics), and a few others who may not in fact assume their assigned jobs. Also designated Military Governor-General, al-Amri has been charged with establishing a tribunal to try former Ministers of the Republic.

A preliminary analysis of the new government indicates that it represents a hardened Egyptian position, a refusal to make any accommodation with the Yemeni moderate forces (whose leaders have indicated to us a desire for peace in both the north and the south), an even stronger UAR hold on Yemen, and probably an increase of UAR support for terrorism and dissidence in Aden and the South Arabian Federation.

Saudi Arabia

Prince Mohammad bin Faisal, King Faisal's son (and possible heir) presently in the United States, has expressed to an officer of the Department his view that Nasser's immediate aim in Yemen was to eliminate the Imam. With the Imam presently holed up in the Jebel Shadda area near the Saudi-Yemen border, this presented a grave danger that Saudi territory would be attacked in the process, "particularly by air." In such an event the Saudi Government would not hold back again, as it did two years ago, but would launch full-scale fighting. If this occurred, the Saudis were not clear what the US position would be.

He was assured that the Presidential statement of May 1963, promising US measures both within and outside the United Nations to resist the use of force or threat of force in the Near East, still remained an explicit expression of the US position. It was clear from that statement that we would oppose an unprovoked attack.

Israel-FRG Relations

The Israeli Ambassador called on the Under Secretary on January 5 and urged that the United States inform the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) that we favor the establishment of FRG-Israel diplomatic relations. The Under Secretary replied that, although the question of diplomatic relations is a matter for the countries concerned to decide for themselves, we favored in principle the normalization of