

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
024	memo	Komer to Valenti <i>Dup. #29, Papers of Komer, Chron, Feb 66, Box 6</i>	C	1	2/21/66	A
026	cable	CAP66062, Komer to Bowles (duplicate #26a, this file) <i>sanitized 9/4/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-250</i>	S/	1	2/28/66	A
026a	draft	of CAP cable from Komer to Bowles (duplicate #26, this file)	S/	1	[2/26]	A
069a	cable	Komer to Bowles [sanitized 2000] (duplicate #26a, 27, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges w/ Bowles, box 134; #22, Files of Komer, Bowles, Chester 1966-, box 13) <i>Dup. #103a, Papers of Komer, Chron, Jan. 66, Box 6</i>	S	2	1/8/66	A
071a	cable	Komer to Bowles [sanitized 2000] <i>Dup. #115a, Papers of Komer, Chron, Jan. 66, Box 6</i> <i>#14a, NSF, Files of Komer, Bowles, 1966- Box 13</i>	S	1	1/6/66	A
102	memcon	re Food for India, with the US and Canada	C	2	2/19/66	A
103	memcon	at Secretary's Lunch for Canadian Foreign Minister [exempted 1993] (duplicate of #14b, NSF, CF, Canada, Volume 4, box 166)	C	1	2/19/66	A
106a	memo	Raymond Hare to the Secretary	C	2	2/17/66	A
180	report	Intelligence Memorandum <i>open 10-05-07</i>	S	12	1/66	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer

Folder Title "INDIA - Food January-March 1966"

Box Number 25

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5/11/2004

Initials *jc*

March 31, 1966

Indice Econ *1*

MEMO FOR BILL MOYERS

**Bromley Smith asked me
to prepare an answer to this
letter for your signature.**

Harold H. Saunders

cc: BK Smith

1a
March 31, 1966.

Dear Mrs. Mathias:

The President is confident that many Americans will respond as you have to his urgent appeal for help to India--with your compassion, your ideas and your energies.

The message he has sent to the Congress is an appeal to both governments and peoples to respond generously to India's need. He will be hard at work in the next weeks organizing our own government's further efforts. He hopes that ideas like yours will also galvanize communities across our land to an appropriate response. He hesitates to suggest how individuals organize their giving because he feels deeply that private initiative must be given free rein. He believes that people like you putting your ideas to work in practical ways in your own communities are capable of producing results beyond government's highest hopes.

I myself have been impressed by the fact that in Italy, Germany and the Netherlands private contributions for Indian relief already total almost \$19 million. Think what Americans could do if actively organized by their own community leaders!

Thank you for your letter. Our prayers are with you as you put your thoughts into action.

Yours sincerely,

/s/
Bill D. Moyers

Mrs. Charles William Mathias
87 West High Street
Union City, Pennsylvania 16438

2
India Econ
Israel Econ
x
March 30, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR:

To my knowledge, I have left only three items of business which need to be finished up:

1. I sent the President the attached memorandum seeking permission to tell George Woods the U.S. would back a sensible economic bargain reached by the Bank and India. Since we'll get little direct read-out from the President, I chose this device as a means of getting a clear signal. If he sends the memo back approved, I would incorporate the substance in a memo to Bell (copies to Rusk, Freeman, Schultze) requesting Bell to pass this work to George Woods on the President's behalf. ✓

2. Now that the Jordan/Israel plane deal is settled, there remains the matter of telling Israel about this year's economic aid and PL-480 level. The President approved a certain level last January (memo in files), but I held up telling the Israelis (I told the President I would do so) as a means of leverage on them to settle the plane deal on our terms. Now we should tell them the aid level. Gaud and I had agreed that I would do so. We should touch base with the President once more and then let Gaud do so, if the President OK's before my return. ✓

3. Fowler's Vietnam inflation package went back up to the President today - 30 March.

R. W. Komer

M. Saunders India Econ
3
March 30, 1966

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR CONGRESSMAN MAHON

As I said I would provide, here are some solid facts on the extent to which India is helping itself -- and, therefore, deserving of our help:

1. India probably finances more of its own development effort than any other developing country. It is about 80% self-financed.
2. India has accomplished a great deal on its own in agriculture. Its food grain output has averaged 3% to 3-1/2% growth a year, and industry has grown even faster -- about 7% a year.
3. A big problem has been India's 2.4% population growth, which adds some 12 million people a year. However, Mrs. Gandhi plans an extensive population control program, which is already under way.
4. The Indian Government has decided on a much higher priority for agriculture in the new 5-Year Plan. As a first step, outlays for agriculture have been increased in the central government budget by 30% this fiscal year. We understand that India will increase expenditures for agriculture by at least this figure over the next five years.
5. The Indian Government is paying much more attention to the use of fertilizer. It is increasing purchases abroad rapidly and has streamlined procedures to encourage private investment. This is a sharp departure from the past, and we believe that India is now determined to attract foreign investment, especially in fertilizers.
6. The basic reason for the President's emergency food message is that, just when India was beginning to take off agriculturally, it was hit by an unprecedented drought -- the worst in this century. As a result India's food output dropped from a high of 88 million tons in the 1964-65 crop year to probably under 75 million tons this year.
7. The Indians themselves intend to take up much of this deficit by tightening their belts. They expect to do without as much as nine million tons of grain that they would otherwise consume.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date *4-28-01*

8. But this still leaves a gap of 11-12 million tons during the present Indian crop year (roughly the same as our calendar year). The U.S. has already met a portion of this need via emergency allocations by the President under PL-480. However, before going further into what would be unprecedently high U.S. PL-480 aid to a single country, the President desired the endorsement of the Congress.

9. We ought to give it to him. India's 500 million people are a bulwark of Free Asia against Chicomm expansionism. India has the resources and people to become a major world power in its own right, and a counter-weight to Red China. It is no more than enlightened self-interest for the U.S. to support India's development effort and to help feed its teeming millions.

R. W. Komer

N.B. I caught up with the India economist's comments which you sent to Harry McPherson. A few Indians feel as he does, but most of them feel quite differently. We are not using our food bluntly as a "club" to force changes in India's agriculture policies; rather we have been withholding long-term food commitments as an incentive to the Indians to change their own policies. They have had the initiative -- and it is in response to their proposed policy changes that the President is willing to provide massive help.

Indie Econ file
4
March 28, 1966

Mr. Peterson
Harry -

You ought to have a copy of this on hand in case we get to the point of providing friends on the Hill with a possible response to the President's Indian Food message. Bob and I drafted this several weeks ago and have checked it informally with the Budget Bureau.

Harold H. Saunders

Enc. Cy Joint Resolution, 3/7/66

file

India Econ 5

March 28, 1966

MEMO FOR DOROTHY JACOBSON

Bob Kemer sent the attached letter to Secretary Freeman. Now here is all the backup material Dr. Ewell sent to you. You can make better use of it then we.

Harold H. Saunders

Att: Cy, Memo for Freeman and Hare from HHSaunders, 3/23/66
Orig. ltr from Raymond Ewell to RWKemer, 3/14/66, with four reports on Fertilizer for India

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 25, 1966
Friday, 10:30 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Good news on India food. The Canadians announced yesterday they will give India during this calendar year about one million tons of food, mainly wheat and flour, worth about \$71 million. The Canadians also plan to give about \$19 million worth of food to other countries and the World Food Program.

I can assure you that this didn't just happen, but was the result of a lot of indirect and delicate prodding about how the Canadians ought to respond on their own before we and the Indians begin publicly pointing the finger.


R. W. Komer

Mr. Saunders.

India
econ

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- OTTAWA 1268
3/24/66

CONFIDENTIAL

RWK:

March 25, 1966

7
India Food
file

1. How about sending our draft food message to Freeman as a working draft? He'll want to change the end, but the statement of the problem is good--and now in the President's style. It already incorporates earlier State, AID and USDA comments.

2. Canada's handsome increase in food for India raises total non-US contributions to:

Governmental	\$125.7 million
Private	\$ 18.7 million
World Food Plan	
(US commodities at	
WFP disposition)	\$ 5.8 million
Total	<u>\$150.2 million</u>

I realize the formula idea is up in the air, but just to keep up to date: In terms of my formula, this means other donors have now picked up half the value of the emergency deficit (5 million tons at \$300 million).

The Aussies are the next to be heard from, and maybe Mrs. Gandhi will have some luck in Paris.

HHS

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 4-26-04

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By xc, NARA, Date 4-28-04

March 25, 1966

RWK

Subramaniam has just cabled Freeman that India needs 7 million tons more wheat in CY 1966 -- 2 million April-June and 5 million July-December. This looks to me like extremely bad tactics because he still shows no evidence of intent to beat the international bushes. Wouldn't it be wise to clue Nehru or Bannerjee before Mrs. Gandhi arrives?

Politics aside, this means Subramaniam must be estimating the total deficit now at 13 million tons. (He hasn't officially revised his earlier estimate but says preliminary data on current crop indicate it may rise 1-1.5 million tons.) The arithmetic looks like this:

US already shipping	5.000 million tons
Canada	1.000
Australia	0.100
World Food Program	0.054
Greece	0.005
	<u>6.159</u>
Remaining requirements	7.000
Total needs CY 66	13.159 million tons

Pertinent arithmetic:

Normal import requirements	6 (\$360 million)
US has already furnished	5 (\$300 million)
Remainder of normal needs	<u>1</u> (\$60 million)
Latest estimate emergency requirements	7 (\$420 million)
Other donations so far	1.2 plus other commodities (\$150 million)

Whether we want a formula or not (this will fit mine if we do), I'd say the right number for the food message is 4 million -- 1 million to finish normal import requirements plus 3 million (\$180 million) to match and encourage other donors. That with other donations might get us up to the next crop. In addition, the message must be open-ended enough to let the President do more in the late summer if necessary.

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My number is higher than the President's but my main purpose is to put Subramaniam's request in context.

I'll be working on the message tomorrow.

HHS

CONFIDENTIAL

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March 24, 1966

Mr. Saunders

*9 Indian
econ.*

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MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY FREEMAN

India Food Message. In discussing the food problem with Secretary Rusk, Ambassador Bowles, and myself today, the President expressed the following views:

1. We should be ready to go with a message by Tuesday.
2. He does not want to make any more interim allocations prior to putting the whole matter before the Congress.
3. He believes that we must propose specific quantities in the message, as otherwise it will get amended in this sense on the Hill.
4. His own current thinking is to request on the order of 2.5 million tons of wheat, a million tons of milo, and some cotton -- all to be included in the message. By not asking for any more we would keep up the pressure on other countries to contribute.
5. He is open-minded on the subject of a formula.

I am sure that the President would be prepared to hear argument on these points, but I wanted to be sure you had his current thinking.

R. W. Komer

cc: Joe Califano
Dave Bell

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Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 25, #363

By jc NARA. Date 4-23-04

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RWH file
India review

MEMORANDUM FOR HARRY McPHERSON

March 24, 1966

AID may differ with Draper over the details of how to spur India's population planning program. But we all agree that it's top priority business.

One of the main items on the President's agenda with Prime Minister Gandhi will be the food-population problem. We're pushing the Indians to make increased food production top priority, and we'll gear our future food shipments to their performance. The other side of that coin, of course, is population planning, and the President will tell Mrs. Gandhi we consider good performance there as one of the criteria for our further aid since there's no point pouring in money to spur growth which will just be eaten up by population increases.

AID's expert. Frans Rosa, is just back from India to plan our program to support Indian efforts. He thinks the Indians have the people they need and the main help we can provide is logistical. The first thing we'll probably do is give them a loan for some vehicles to move the Indian clinics into the back country. (Vehicles at first blush seem unrelated to the real problem, but Ford is doing the same thing in Egypt and we are in Turkey. Transportation is crucial since you have to go where the women are.) Then he'll probably go back to India with a staff of half a dozen to offer further technical help.

I'd suggest passing Draper's letter on to Dave Bell if that wouldn't violate a confidence. AID is moving now, but every excuse for focusing Bell's attention on the problem is so much to the good. AID doesn't always agree with Draper, but their dialogue is useful. As for Draper's main point, we can't go so far as to get American experts in to brief Mrs. Gandhi or the President, but he will be stressing the problem as Draper recommends.

R. W. Komer

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India Econ

March 23, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary Freeman
Ambassador Hare

Bob Komer asked me to send you copies of this letter to him from Dr. Raymond Ewell, recommending that the President offer Mrs. Gandhi five fertilizer plants. He is passing this along for whatever use you may find in it.

Harold H. Saunders

cc Macomber

March 22, 1966

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India Econ

file

Dear Dr. Ewell:

Thank you for your recommendations on how we should help India increase fertilizer production. We agree with you that this is crucial to raising Indian production.

I am putting the material you sent in the hands of our experts who must integrate how we tackle the fertilizer problem with our broader plans for helping the Indian economy across the board.

Yours sincerely,

R. W. Komer

Dr. Raymond Ewell
Vice President for Research
State University of New York at Buffalo
Buffalo, New York 14214

RWK:

March 22, 1966

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✓
file
India
econ
(just one
copy)

Raymond Ewell--a respectable India expert--has written you (attached) proposing that the President offer Mrs. Gandhi 5 fertilizer plants at a cost of \$350 million, half of it in rupees. In essence, he argues this would make as big a splash as any Bokaro--and hit the crucial fertilizer problem at the same time.

He recommends we avoid the public-private argument, and there's a big question whether we want to evade that issue now that we may be on the threshold of a breakthrough which could have economy-wide implications. But the idea is certainly worth passing on to AID.

So I've drafted a reply to Ewell's letter and a note to put this in Macomber's basket.

HHS

MARCH 22, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR BILL MACOMBER

Here's a batch of material from a responsible guy. You're in a better position than I am to put it to use. I see problems in avoiding the public-private issue as he does but pass this on for whatever you may find useful in it.

R. W. Kemer

**Att: Ltr from Raymond Ewell, Vice-President
for Research, State University of New
York at Buffalo, 3/14/66, re Fertilizer
for India**

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file

India Econ

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March 21, 1966

15
file
India Econ

RWK:

Here's the Indian food message package:

1. Covering memo. I've scrapped the complicated one we had earlier. There's no simple way to take the President through all the arithmetic. So let's just give him what we've come up with after two months of struggling. (However, I'm attaching the latest version of the long memo at the bottom of this package for you because all the facts are there.)

2. Food message. Revised in staccato style.

3. Joint resolution. Revised to reflect latest formula without tying our hands.

After two months of struggling with this, I think it would be worth arguing a little with the President that we can't push the matching formula idea too far. I've checked numerous times with Jacobsen, Farr, Sober, Clark and BOB staff, and no one has said a good word for it yet. My three-phase formula is the best we have.

HHS

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 4-28-04

15a
file
India Econ

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 94-255 (#58)

By JCL NARA, Date 4-28-01

March 21, 1966
Monday, 4:30 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Special Message on India Food. Here is a draft version which rings all the changes on how much we've done already, how a big international effort is needed, and how we'll do as much or more than anyone else if Congress approves.

The one tough problem is to build a workable matching formula which will encourage others to pitch in without putting us on the spot.

Any formula will put pressure on the Indians to beat the bushes harder --but it will also punish the Indians for what others refuse to give. Matching gives us leverage on the Indians but not directly on other donors. Our real leverage on them comes from bilateral arm-twisting. Pressing the Indians is useful because they could push harder than they have through diplomatic channels. But pressing them via a loud international alarm about famine in India could set off hoarding and price speculation and make it even easier for the leftists to stir up food riots. So while a matching formula would spur greater Indian effort, we'd want to be careful not to put all our eggs in that basket.

The other side of the story is that--right or wrong--other donors just won't come close to matching our total effort. Some don't have grain but are sending modest quantities of other foodstuffs, port-handling equipment or money. Those who do have grain are heavily committed to other buyers, though they're gradually raising India's share. But so far other governmental contributions total around \$70 million--not bad but not even close to the \$660 million value (world prices) of India's 11 million ton wheat deficit or to the \$300 million value of the emergency deficit (5 million tons) above normal import levels. The tough part is that very little of this \$70 million is grain. Agriculture guesses we might only get 1 million tons from other donors, so even if other donors come through with half the dollar value of the emergency deficit (\$150 million or about 2.5 million tons' equivalent), India will still need 4 million tons of actual grain. So while a formula might encourage donors, tying ourselves too rigidly to direct matching could leave us later facing a choice between backing down if other donors failed and letting Indians starve.

After several months with this incredibly complicated and frustrating problem, my answer is a simple three-phase formula: (1) We finish meeting

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India's normal import level of 6 million tons. Another million tons would do that. (So far they have 1.5 million you authorized in December, 3 million from February's authorization and 0.5 million in spillover from old purchases). (2) As the next step, say in effect we expect other donors to pick up at least half the value (\$150 million) of the emergency grain deficit (5 million tons) as we now see it--by sending grain, other commodities, cash or services. We'll match the value of their contributions in grain. (3) Then we'll review India's remaining grain needs in June to see where we stand. There will be time then to see whether we want to put in another 1-2 million tons on our own.

The purpose of this is frankly to keep grain flowing while putting as much heat as we can on the Indians and other donors in the next three months without either tying our hands or looking inhumane. Another million tons of wheat by early April would keep ships leaving with both wheat and sorghum into June, and another 1-2 million tons in matching would keep them going another 2-3 months through the monsoon. I've written this approach into the attached draft message to Congress and possible joint resolution.

R. W. Komer

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DRAFT

March 7, 1966

THE WHITE HOUSEMESSAGE ON COPING WITH HUNGER IN INDIA

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

I proposed in my message on Food for Freedom that the United States lead the world in a war against hunger. The nation will profit from the deliberations of the Congress on that proposal.

But today in India we face crisis so urgent as to require a special immediate effort.

The Indian Crisis

Over one-fifth of the half-billion people in the world's largest working democracy live in areas stricken by their worst drought of the century.

Last year we shipped about 6.5 million tons of grain to India--about one-third of the amount of wheat we used here at home.

But the Government of India estimates it will need 11-14 million tons to meet essential requirements--even after drawing down meager stocks and tightening belts. A team of experts which I sent to India confirms this estimate.

The need is staggering. Eleven million tons of foodgrains, valued at around \$700 million, would equal about forty percent of India's total annual export earnings.

Responsibility of All Nations

India has asked for help.

The United States answered by allocating 1.5 million tons last December and another 3 million tons on 4 February, after I consulted with the Congressional leadership.

We must do even more.

Yet meeting human tragedy on this scale cannot be left to a beleaguered India and to the United States alone.

The whole community of nations must play a humanitarian role.

Indeed, India's needs are already recognized as demanding a truly international response .

--The Government of India has itself addressed urgent inquiries to all nations believed able to contribute.

--The Secretary General of the United Nations and the Director General of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization on 11 February made an urgent appeal to the world community.

--His Holiness Pope Paul VI has written to me and has appealed to other nations and peoples to help.

--The World Council of Churches on 10 February made a parallel appeal.

In an emergency of this magnitude, the obligation to assist a neighbor in distress should extend to every nation in the world.

To those who have no food to spare, we point out that India needs more

than food--transportation and equipment, fertilizer and chemicals, credit and cash.

To those who believe they have nothing to spare, we suggest another look--first, at the critical urgency of the crisis--and then once more at their own potential to help.

There is no nation on earth far enough from India to be immune from the effect of hunger and starvation there.

There are few nations on earth that cannot afford to give something.

And there is no great and rich nation on earth that can sustain its claim to greatness if it cannot find some way to assist its "neighbor" in this emergency.

Though some besides the United States have already responded handsomely, the general response to date must be termed disappointing. Of the world's uncommitted export supplies of grain, other nations have about half as much as the United States. Yet it is estimated that so far aid from others amounts to only about seven percent of India's total import need /to around twenty percent of the emergency need above normal import levels/.

An International Response

So I ask the Congress to join with me in calling on all other nations for a response equal to the need. Let us look on this as an opportunity for strengthening the bonds of international cooperation.

I propose that the United States' response reinforce this international effort and demonstrate our own deep concern for the people of India.

But before embarking on this task of mercy--which could involve substantial quantities of additional foodstuffs--I believe it appropriate to call on the Congress to discuss fully my proposals and to endorse them. I seek the endorsement of the Congress for a simple three-phase program including:

- Fulfilling US plans to help meet India's normal import requirements of about 6 million tons.

- A further special US contribution in grain equal to at least half of India's emergency grain deficit as now forecast on the understanding that other donors will match this with contributions of equal value or more.

- Review with the Government of India of the results of this international effort to determine how remaining requirements shall be met when the situation becomes clearer.

I urge these emergency measures in full recognition that they must not obscure the need for a broader, longer-range attack on hunger and

DRAFT

March 7, 1966

JOINT RESOLUTION

To support United States participation in relieving victims of hunger in India and to enhance India's capacity to meet the nutritional needs of its people.

Whereas the Congress has declared it to be the policy of the United States to make maximum efficient use of this nation's agricultural abundance in furtherance of the foreign policy of the United States;

Whereas the Congress will be considering legislation to govern the response of the United States to the mounting world food problem;

Whereas critical food shortages in India threatening the health if not lives of tens of millions of people require an urgent prior response; Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the President's initiative in organizing substantial American participation in an urgent international effort designed to:

(a) Help meet India's pressing food shortages by selling to India under Public Law 480 agricultural commodities to meet India's normal import needs plus added quantities of agricultural commodities as the United States' share in the international response to the Indian emergency.

(b) Help combat malnutrition, especially in mothers and children, via a special program;

(c) Encourage and assist those measures which the Government of

- 2 -

India is planning to expand India's own agricultural production.

That the Congress urges the President to join India in pressing on other nations the urgency of sharing appropriately in a truly international response to India's critical need.

CONFIDENTIAL/DRAFT

15d
March 21, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Special Message on India Food. Here is a draft version which rings all the changes on how much we've done already, how a big international effort is needed, and how we'll do as much or more than anyone else if Congress approves.

The one tricky problem is to build some kind of matching formula which will put the arm on others to pitch in. If they had their druthers, State/AID/Agriculture experts would prefer not to see us bind ourselves to any formula. They fear it won't work because it won't put the pressure on the right point--it punishes the Indians for what others refuse to give. It might spur the Indians to greater international effort, but the Indians cannot sound too frantic an international alarm for fear of stimulating hoarding and price speculation and facilitating food riots already being stirred up by leftists. They are worried lest we tie our hands if the crisis worsens or if other countries can't measure up. State/AID/USDA would prefer no formula at all to one which predictably will fail.

But if a formula will help sell a special effort to the Congress or prod the Indians, we can come up with one that won't tie our hands. Here are the main problems in developing a sensible one:

A. The formula must be credible as a crisis measure. If we propose a formula which in effect calls for us to do little more than we did last year, no one will take us seriously. For example, assuming India's total 1966 need to be 12 million tons, for us to say we'll meet half would mean we'd be shipping 6 million tons--half a million less than we actually shipped in the last fiscal year. So we'd be making no extra effort ourselves to meet special emergency needs. Even a 2:1 matching would take us only to 8 million tons--still a relatively small special effort.

I see two ways around this. One is to apply our formula to the remaining shortfall of about 7 million tons. (We've already allocated 4.5 million tons against the 11-12 million total, leaving 6.5-7.5 million.) The other is to figure that India's regular import needs run about 6-7 million and count as emergency needs only the 5 million above that. A variant which would also come out with a 5 million remaining shortfall, would be to allocate another 1.5 million when Mrs. Gandhi comes and then say we'll match anything anyone else gives in the current effort to beat the monsoon (that would give us a chance to review later).

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Authority NSC 7-2580; ~~State~~
By felisp NARA, Date 4-28-01

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

B. The formula must be realistic enough to give us leverage without boxing us into an inhumane position. How we pick a credible base and a reasonable matching ratio hinges on how much we can realistically expect others to contribute. We don't want to set an impossibly high target and then be caught in the vice of either backing down or letting Indians starve because other donors aren't as generous as we say they should be.

So far, others have premised a collection of commodities, cash and services--most don't have grain to send--amounting to about \$70 million. As a practical matter there are limits to Canadian and Australian willingness and ability to give away wheat which is, after all, their primary foreign exchange earner; and their trade balances are not that rich. No other likely donor has surplus grain; and any contributions from other members of the Indian Consortium of fertilizer, shipping, farm implements or cash may well be deducted from Consortium aid. Everyone here thinks it's unrealistic to hope for much more than \$100-150 million altogether (\$150 million would equal about 2.5 million tons of wheat at world prices)--and we would have to get pretty tough to get that much, leaving us that much less leverage with our allies for other important matters such as better contributions to regular aid consortia.

So to be realistic, we ought to be shooting at a reasonably high but attainable target for other donors:

--If we work from a 7 million ton shortfall (\$420 million at world prices), it would take a 2:1 ratio (\$280 million to \$140 million) to stay in the \$150 million range.

--If we work from a 5 million ton shortfall (\$300 million), a 1:1 matching looks possible, if we really want to twist some arms. A 2:1 ratio would provide a cushion.

C. The formula must be flexible. We have to keep an open end. If the total need hits 14 million tons instead of 11-12 million, it may be harder than ever to squeeze more aid out of others. Yet that last 2-3 million tons may be the most critical since it would be needed just at the time when stocks are lowest before the next harvest. Beyond that, some experts are now looking for smaller crops and stocks next year too because soil water will be so low, seed will have been eaten and stocks will be near bottom. So we don't want to put ourselves in a position where Indians are starving but we won't send food because no one else will match us.

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D. The formula must be simple enough for everybody to understand.
There are two problems here:

--What to match? Many other donors will probably give cash, services or other commodities since most of them don't have grain to send. Some of the cash will go for freight costs rather than for buying more wheat (under recent PL 480 amendments India must pay shipping costs).

So the first problem is how to establish a common denominator. Dollar value seems the best, and it's probably better to value wheat at world market prices (about \$60 per ton) for this purpose than at CCC cost (about \$75 per ton) since it wouldn't go down well to ask other donors to match our farm subsidy.

--What total burden to share? The only good measure of the Indian shortages we have is the value of the emergency grain shortfall (about \$300 million for 5 million tons). That's India's first need. The simplest thing to do would be just to match 1:1 in grain the value of other donations. But if everyone else gave \$150 million in gifts other than grain and we matched them with 2.5 million tons (\$150 million) of grain, India would end up with only our 2.5 million tons against a grain need of 5 million.

The easiest way around this is to start with a simple matching formula for emergency needs as we see them now. Then allow for another look as the picture sharpens. No one knows for sure what the dimensions of the crisis will turn out to be, or how generous others will be. The shortage may hit 14 million tons; it may even run into a second year. Others might surprise us and exceed \$150 million, or fall way short. But we could say we'd tackle the current phase of meeting the shortfall as we now see it on a simple matching basis and then review results in late spring when we see where we stand.

My answer is a simple three-phase formula: (1) We go ahead meeting India's normal import level of 6 million tons. Another million tons would do that (1.5 in December, 3 in February and 0.5 spillover from old purchases). (2) As the next step, say in effect we expect other donors to pick up at least half the value (\$150 million) of the emergency grain deficit (5 million tons) as we now see it--by sending grain, other commodities, cash or services. We'll match the value of their contributions in grain. (3) Then we'll review India's remaining needs in June to see where we stand.

CONFIDENTIAL

Thursday, March 17, 1966

16

1. India
2. UN
3. P.D.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

State endorses Freeman's attached suggestion that you see B. F. Sen, Director General of the Food and Agriculture Organization. FAO has been the most responsive of the UN agencies we're trying to get more deeply involved in Vietnam. Sen will also be a key figure in dramatizing and organizing an international attack on the world food problem to complement your food message.

As an Indian, he can also be prodded on India's failure to beat the bushes harder for other help in meeting the current drought.

On the other hand, neither State nor I will argue that this call is essential. Despite Freeman's plea, it's a marginal case.

(51)

R. W. Komer

I'll see him _____

I'm too busy _____

PRESERVATION COPY

17

file
J. dia
clon

March 17, 1966

RWK:

Durand and Schedler came in yesterday (they insisted and I thought this might take the heat off you).

What they really want--though they are darned fussy in explaining it--is for somebody from top side to prod their project out of AID. Bart Harvey tells me it's in the works and not ready for decision yet. Personally, he doesn't think it will make the grade (a) because the World Bank and private companies are already deeply into this field and (b) because Durand just doesn't impress them as the kind of precise, practical mind that should manage a research effort like this.

Durand keeps trying to link this to the Gandhi Visit. When I said I was sure that agriculture and fertilizer will be top priority subjects of discussion during the visit, he couldn't tell me what more he would like to see done. But then he started running on again about the urgency of doing something before the Gandhi Visit. He is trying now to get to the Vice President through some of his ADA associates.

Durand claims that the World Bank has said his study would be a useful complement to what they are doing. I told him he would have to let AID judge that.

While I agree wholeheartedly with your ignoring him--I really have never been so frustrated in trying to get somebody to say precisely what he wants. If you want to do anything at all, a call to Gaud would be about all that is reasonable.

HHS

W# 24243

⁷⁴India econ

Hal Saunders

March 14

18

Will you
handle on
listen
only basis
Rob

Mr. Komer

Dana Durand called and left the following message for you:

In view of the announcement by the World Bank (NYT of March 6) that it was going deeply into the natural gas-fertilizer question, along the lines we have discussed with you and AID, we have taken the following steps:

1. A talk with our lawyer, Max Kampelman, who regards the Bank announcement as an "important break" for our project which puts us "on the home stretch."
2. A talk with Mr. Richard Demuth, Director of the Development Service Department of the World Bank, who said that our proposed research, especially in the political, social and economic fields, would be a valuable parallel to the Bank approach.
3. A talk with Arthur Schlesinger who felt that the work of the International Study Group on Democratic Development in both the Persian Gulf-Indian and the Latin American fields was now very important. Arthur offered to do whatever he could to help us, including a call to McGeorge Bundy when he returns from leave, and a call to you.

These and other developments I believe make it urgent that we discuss the project with you personally. I would greatly appreciate an appointment.

Done 3/16/66
H.S.
See my
memo to
Ruth of
3/17.

CONFIDENTIAL

March 7, 1966

19
India Food
file

MEMORANDUM FOR NICK FARR

Bob and I would appreciate your personal reaction to the attached.

The idea has been dormant since you left for India, but we're afraid it will wake up any day. We want to have something ready when it does.

So what we'd appreciate from you is not textual criticism but your personal feelings about the approach. We'll allow you 30% of your time to fight the problem and argue the no-formula-at-all line (maybe the second para. should be tougher), but we would like your thoughts on the rest--on grounds that, if there may have to be a formula, we need one we can both sell and work with.

No need to respond formally. Jot your comments on the paper itself or just give me a call.

Harold H. Saunders

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Att: cy Draft Memo to the
President 3/7/66 on
India Food.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 4-28-01

20
file
India Food

CONFIDENTIAL/DRAFT

March 7, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: JOE CALIFANO

Special Message on India Food. Here is a draft version which rings all the changes on how much we've done already, how a big international effort is needed, and how we'll do as much or more than anyone else if Congress approves.

The one tricky problem is to build some kind of matching formula which will put the arm on others to pitch in. If they had their druthers, State/AID/Agriculture experts would prefer not to see us bind ourselves to any formula. They fear it won't work because it won't put the pressure on the right point--it punishes the Indians for what others refuse to give. It would spur the Indians to greater international effort, but it might also tie our hands if the crisis worsens or if other countries can't measure up. They'd rather say in effect that we'll "at least match" whatever others do--leaving the implication we'll do much more if need be.

But a formula will help sell a special effort to the Congress or prod the Indians, we can come up with one that won't tie our hands. Here are the main problems in developing a sensible one:

A. The formula must be credible as a crisis measure. If we propose a formula which in effect calls for us to do little more than we did last year, no one will take us seriously. For example, assuming India's total 1966 need to be 12 million tons, for us to say we'll meet half would mean we'd be

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

shipping 6 million tons--half a million less than we actually shipped in the last fiscal year. So we'd be making no extra effort ourselves to meet special emergency needs. Even a 2:1 matching would take us only to 8 million tons--still a relatively small special effort.

I see two ways around this. One is to apply our formula to the remaining shortfall of about 7 million tons. (We've already allocated 4.5 million tons against the 11-12 million total, leaving 6.5-7.5 million.) The other is to figure that India's regular import needs run about 6-7 million and count as emergency needs only the 5 million above that. A variant which would also come out with a 5 million remaining shortfall, would be to allocate another 1.5 million when Mrs. Gandhi comes and then say we'll match anything anyone else gives in the current effort to beat the monsoon (that would give us a chance to review later).

B. The formula must be realistic enough to give us leverage without boxing us into an inhumane position. How we pick a credible base and a reasonable matching ratio hinges on how much we can realistically expect others to contribute. We don't want to set an impossibly high target and then be caught in the vice of either backing down or letting Indians starve because other donors aren't as generous as we say they should be. So far, others have promised a collection of commodities, cash and services--most don't have grain to send--amounting to about \$70 million. Everyone ^{here} thinks it's unrealistic to hope for much more than \$100-150 million altogether (\$450

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

million would equal about 2.5 million tons of wheat at world prices)-- and we may have to get pretty tough to get that much.

So to be realistic, we ought to be shooting at a reasonably high but attainable target for other donors:

--If we work from a 7 million ton shortfall (\$420 million at world prices), it would take a 2:1 ratio (\$280 million to \$140 million) to stay in the \$150 million range.

--If we work from a 5 million ton shortfall (\$300 million), a 1:1 matching looks possible, if we really want to twist some arms. A 2:1 ratio would provide a cushion.

C. The formula must be flexible. We have to keep an open end. If the total need hits 14 million tons instead of 11-12 million, it may be harder than ever to squeeze more aid out of others. Yet that last 2-3 million tons may be the most critical since it would be needed just at the time when stocks are lowest before the next harvest. Beyond that, some experts are now looking for smaller crops and stocks next year too because soil water will be so low, seed will have been eaten and stocks will be near bottom. So we don't want to put ourselves in a position where Indians are starving but we won't send food because no one else will match us.

D. The formula must be simple enough for everybody to understand. There are two problems here:

--What to match? Many other donors will probably give cash, services or other commodities since most of them don't have grain to send.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

Some of the cash will go for freight costs rather than for buying more wheat (under recent PL 480 amendments India must pay shipping costs).

So the first problem is how to establish a common denominator. Dollar value seems the best, and it's probably better to value wheat at world market prices (about \$60 per ton) for this purpose than at CCC cost (about \$75 per ton) since it wouldn't go down well to ask other donors to match our farm subsidy.

-- What total burden to share? The only good measure of the Indian shortages we have is the value of the emergency grain shortfall (about \$300 million for 5 million tons). That's India's first need. The simplest thing to do would be just to match 1:1 in grain the value of other donations. But if everyone else gave \$150 million in gifts other than grain and we matched them with 2.5 million tons (\$150 million) of grain, India would end up with only our 2.5 million tons against a grain need of 5 million.

The easiest way around this is to start with a simple matching formula for emergency needs as we see them now. Then allow for another look as the picture sharpens. No one knows for sure what the dimensions of the crisis will turn out to be, or how generous others will be. The shortage may hit 14 million tons; it may even run into a second year. Others might surprise us and exceed \$150 million, or fall way short. But we could say we'd tackle the current phase of meeting the shortfall as we now see it on a simple matching basis and then review results in late spring when we see where we stand.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

My answer is a simple three-phase formula:

(1) We go ahead meeting India's normal import level of 6 million tons. We've almost done that already. That will keep grain flowing at top port capacity. (2) As the next step, say in effect we expect other donors to pick up at least half the value (\$150 million) of the emergency grain deficit (5 million tons) as we now see it--either by sending grain, other commodities, cash or services. We'll match the value of their contributions in grain. (3) Then review India's remaining needs in the spring to see where we stand.

CONFIDENTIAL

20^a

DRAFT

March 7, 1966

THE WHITE HOUSE

MESSAGE ON COPING WITH HUNGER IN INDIA

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

I proposed in my message on Food for Freedom that the United States lead the world in a war against hunger. The nation will profit from the deliberations of the Congress on that proposal.

But today in India we face crisis so urgent as to require a special immediate effort.

The Indian Crisis

Over one-fifth of the half-billion people in the world's largest working democracy live in areas stricken by their worst drought of the century.

Last year we shipped about 6.5 million tons of grain to India--about one-third of the amount of wheat we used here at home.

But the Government of India estimates it will need 11-14 million tons to meet essential requirements--even after drawing down meager stocks and tightening belts. A team of experts which I sent to India confirms this estimate.

The need is staggering. Eleven million tons of foodgrains, valued at around \$700 million, would equal about forty percent of India's total annual export earnings.

Responsibility of All Nations

India has asked for help.

The United States answered by allocating 1.5 million tons last December and another 3 million tons on 4 February, after I consulted with the Congressional leadership.

We must do even more.

Yet meeting human tragedy on this scale cannot be left to a beleaguered India and to the United States alone.

The whole community of nations must play a humanitarian role.

Indeed, India's needs are already recognized as demanding a truly international response.

--The Government of India has itself addressed urgent inquiries to all nations believed able to contribute.

--The Secretary General of the United Nations and the Director General of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization on 11 February made an urgent appeal to the world community.

--His Holiness Pope Paul VI has written to me and has appealed to other nations and peoples to help.

--The World Council of Churches on 10 February made a parallel appeal.

In an emergency of this magnitude, the obligation to assist a neighbor in distress should extend to every nation in the world.

To those who have no food to spare, we point out that India needs more

than food--transportation and equipment, fertilizer and chemicals, credit and cash.

To those who believe they have nothing to spare, we suggest another look--first, at the critical urgency of the crisis--and then once more at their own potential to help.

There is no nation on earth far enough from India to be immune from the effect of hunger and starvation there.

There are few nations on earth that cannot afford to give something.

And there is no great and rich nation on earth that can sustain its claim to greatness if it cannot find some way to assist its "neighbor" in this emergency.

Though some besides the United States have already responded handsomely, the general response to date must be termed disappointing. Of the world's uncommitted export supplies of grain, other nations have about half as much as the United States. Yet it is estimated that so far aid from others amounts to only about seven percent of India's total import need [to around twenty percent of the emergency need above normal import levels].

An International Response

So I ask the Congress to join with me in calling on all other nations for a response equal to the need. Let us look on this as an opportunity for strengthening the bonds of international cooperation.

I propose that the United States' response reinforce this international effort and demonstrate our own deep concern for the people of India.

But before embarking on this task of mercy--which could involve as much as \$700 million in additional foodstuffs--I believe it appropriate to call on the Congress to discuss fully my proposals and to endorse them. I seek the endorsement of the Congress for a simple three-phase program including:

--Fulfilling US plans to help meet India's normal import requirements of about 6 million tons.

--A further special US contribution in grain equal to at least half of India's emergency grain deficit as now forecast on the understanding that other donors will match this with contributions of equal value or more.

--Review with the Government of India of the results of this international effort to determine how remaining requirements shall be met when the situation becomes clearer.

I urge these emergency measures in full recognition that they must not obscure the need for a broader, longer-range attack on hunger and malnutrition in India as elsewhere.

DRAFT

March 7, 1966

JOINT RESOLUTION

To support United States participation in relieving victims of hunger in India and to enhance India's capacity to meet the nutritional needs of its people.

Whereas the Congress has declared it to be the policy of the United States to make maximum efficient use of this nation's agricultural abundance in furtherance of the foreign policy of the United States;

Whereas the Congress will be considering legislation to govern the response of the United States to the mounting world food problem;

Whereas critical food shortages in India threatening the health if not lives of tens of millions of people require an urgent prior response; Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the President's initiative in organizing substantial American participation in an urgent international effort designed to:

(a) Help meet India's pressing food shortages by selling to India under Public Law 480 agricultural commodities to meet India's normal import needs plus added quantities of agricultural commodities as the United States' share in the international response to the Indian emergency.

(b) Help combat malnutrition, especially in mothers and children, via a special program;

(c) Encourage and assist those measures which the Government of

India is planning to expand India's own agricultural production.

That the Congress urges the President to join India in pressing on other nations the urgency of sharing appropriately in a truly international response to India's critical need.

March 5, 1966
Saturday, 10:45 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Freeman Report on Indian Agriculture. I'll summarize this latest long progress report, so you won't have to read it.

1. Dimensions of India's deficit are still in 12 million ton range. Rationing is moving slowly.
2. Subramaniam is under sharp political attack for the policies agreed on with us.
3. Historically, India recovers slowly from a drouth, so we may have an abnormal (through less so) 1967 too.
4. India's fertilizer program is not picking up as fast as hoped (we're prodding on this). Freeman would like us to press for greater diversion of foreign exchange to this sector, and to push the Germans and Japs to help out.
5. We're looking at feasibility of getting India to shift more acreage from cotton to wheat, while we supply cotton from our enormous stockpile. Poage raised this during hearings.

R. W. Komer

MAR 7 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 26, 1966

Mac -

Suggest this for evening reading.
It's a good way to correct record (recall
our exchange in East Room yesterday).

RWK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Att: New Delhi 2207, 2/25/66

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By je, NARA, Date 4-28-04

22^a

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By clj, NARA, Date 4-28-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From New Delhi 2207

February 25, 1966

1. This morning I had a frank and comprehensive discussion with Subramaniam. The following points emerged:

A. I opened the conversation by stressing our disappointment over the lack of response from other nations to India's appeal for assistance in meeting its feed problem. While a significant number of nations had pledged assistance of one kind or another the contributions were small. According to our figures, the amounts promised thus far total only \$74 million from sixteen countries. I asked in particular if there was not more the GOI could do to persuade the Australians, Canadians and French to provide substantial supplies of wheat. On a personal basis, I suggested the possibility of a letter from Mrs. Gandhi to Pearson, Holt, De Gaulle and others similar to the one she wrote to President Johnson. I stated that I expected to see Mrs. Gandhi the early part of next week and would suggest this directly to her, but hoped Subramaniam could push the idea in the meantime.

B. Subramaniam replied that he was particularly discouraged by the response of Canada and Australia, each of which reported that it had no more wheat available. In view of the flat turndown he had received so far he doubted the letter would be effective but thought it would be a good idea to put them on the spot and would so advise Mrs. Gandhi.

C. Subramaniam stated that India had already contracted for 250 thousand tons of rice and wheat from the U.S., Burma, and Thailand and was considering further purchases totalling 200 thousand tons from Burma, Argentina, U.S., Australia, UAR and British Guiana.

D. Subramaniam then said he would like to discuss very frankly the impossible political dilemma in which he finds himself in regard to public statements about the current shortage. As he sees it, he has two alternatives both of which involve serious difficulties:

(1) If through his public statements in the Lok Sabha and elsewhere he feeds the stereotyped picture of starving India in order to encourage increased foreign assistance, grain dealers will continue to hold back supplies, prices will rise precipitously, riots will grow in volume and extent, and political attacks on him and the Government will become increasingly difficult to handle. Under these circumstances it is entirely conceivable that he would be forced out of office;

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

(2) If, on the other hand, he seeks to reassure the country, hold down prices and discourage hoardings then the foreign press and indeed many foreign governments including our own will assume that the situation is under control and that nothing more need be done.

E. The actual situation as he sees it is as follows: He expects one million tons to come in the month of March and anticipates no problem in handling it in ports and in transportation throughout the country. He hopes that unloadings can somewhat exceed one million tons a month in April, May, June with 850,000 tons a month during the monsoon season, with an efficient distribution system within India and the continued dampening down of the current fears of the people, the food shortage can successfully be contained and the Government's wobbly political position greatly strengthened. Even under such circumstances there will be considerable hardships and shortages but no actual starvation. May and June will be difficult months and there will no doubt be additional riots organized by the Communists. Nevertheless he feels both he and the Government can ride through the crisis successfully without unduly damaging election prospects for 1967.

2. The situation as we all know is extremely serious and could turn into a national disaster. But to describe it publically as a disaster in advance is to assure the very outcome which we are all trying to prevent. Therefore he hopes the American Government will have a thorough understanding of his dilemma and continue to give him the sympathetic support and understanding which he desperately needs.

3. Comment: Subramaniam's dilemma is real. The first words uttered by every foreign reporter and photographer who gets off a plane in New Delhi are "Where are the bodies?" The fact is that there are no bodies and need be none.

4. Our own public relations task will be much easier if we pull out all the stops in describing India's food problem, but the consequences will be disastrous for the Indian Government and for the good friends of the U. S. as Subramaniam.

5. In my opinion the GOI is earnestly striving to meet a dangerous and delicate situation fraught with grave political difficulties. We should of course urge them to continue their efforts as we have been doing consistently and vigorously in New Delhi.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

6. However, to allow it to be known or suspected that we are forcing them into certain prescribed courses of action will only provide ammunition for the already irresponsible and ruthless left-wing opposition, weaken our friends within the Congress Party and force this harassed and worried Government in an election year into a highly vulnerable position.

Bowles
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

23
File
India
food

February 25, 1966
Friday 7:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is a cordial reply to the Pope's warmly congratulatory letter about our efforts to meet Indian famine.

It doesn't seem appropriate to suggest again that the Pope also write other leaders (as you did in your 10 February letter) especially since his letter says that he has asked his representatives to lay the problem before them.

But it might be useful if Jack Valenti could mention orally to the Nuncio your continued hope that His Holiness would also write directly to such leaders as de Gaulle, Pearson, etc. -- since you know how great an impact a personal letter from him would have.

For Signature

R. W. Komer

cc: Jack Valenti

2/25/66

23a

Your Holiness:

I am deeply grateful for your warm letter of 13 February regarding the United States response to the grave food shortages on the Asian subcontinent. I was greatly impressed by your own appeal and by those of the World Council of Churches, the United Nations and the Food and Agriculture Organization.

As you have already done, we must all bend our efforts now to the practical and difficult matter of encouraging humanitarian responses. In some countries like Italy and the Netherlands, the generosity of private citizens alone has surpassed any expectation. Your own personal gift was an inspiration. But in all candor and confidence, we are disappointed that the other major producers of wheat have so far not contributed in proportion to the size of their stocks. Nor have those nations which enjoy substantial foreign exchange reserves done what we believe they could.

We hope that the call of India's hungry millions will not go unheeded. This country is fully prepared to join with all other willing nations in meeting India's pressing needs.

Sincerely,

15/LBJ

His Holiness
Pope Paul VI
Vatican City
Rome

LBJ:
RWK:saw

LBJ
Pope Paul
2/25/66

25

file
India's
food

February 19, 1966
Saturday, 2:15 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You may have seen that Australia just made a \$9 million emergency gift to India (100,000 tons wheat plus other foodstuffs).

The British tell me that it was stimulated by a Wilson message to Holt on February 14, saying that India was in a mess and that food surplus countries like Australia should help as much as possible. Wilson even urged postponing shipments to the Chicoms if necessary.

This was a most useful intervention, so I suggested that Wilson might also hit Canada (whose wheat stocks are a lot larger than Australia's). I've also urged that Rusk hit Canadian Foreign Minister Martin while he's here, and have repeatedly told our Indian friends that Mrs. Gandhi should write others besides just you.

These quiet needles will be more immediately productive than any conference of heads of food surplus countries, which these heads might resent as pressure tactics which would embarrass them. However, it's a good stick to hold over their heads, as a means of getting them to contribute.

R. W. Komer

Good.
L.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By plp, NARA, Date 4-29-01

~~SECRET~~
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HANDLE VIA ~~SECRET~~ EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
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FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
ZEM

~~SECRET~~

CAP66062

FOR AMBASSADOR BOWLES FROM KOMER

SUBRAMANIAM'S REQUEST TO VICE PRESIDENT THAT US PICK UP OVER SIX MILLION TONS INDIA'S REMAINING FOOD DEFICIT MOST DISCOURAGING. AS YOU KNOW, OUR ABILITY BE ADEQUATELY RESPONSIVE FROM HERE ON CRITICALLY DEPENDENT ON SUFFICIENT INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO CONVINCE US CONGRESS AND OTHERS WE NOT BEING LEFT TO FOOT WHOLE BILL.

HOW DO WE SHAKE APPARENT INDIAN ASSUMPTION THAT SOMEHOW US WILL DO SO? IT WILL BE HIGHLY UNCOMFORTABLE FOR US AND FOR INDIANS IF IMPASSE DEVELOPS ON THIS ISSUE LATER. TO ME, CRITICAL ELEMENT IS TO GET CANADA AND AUSTRALIA TO PUT IN AT LEAST 2-3 MILLION TONS. THIS SIMPLY WILL NOT HAPPEN UNLESS MRS. GANDHI STARTS BALL ROLLING BY A PERSONAL APPEAL TO PEARSON AND HOLT (AND PERHAPS FRENCH, SOVIETS, AND ARGENTINES), SIMILAR TO HER APPEALS TO PRESIDENT. URGE YOU PROMOTE THESE WELL BEFORE SHE COMES HERE SO SHE CAN TELL PRESIDENT WHAT SHE'S ALREADY DONE.

225

~~SECRET~~

HANDLE VIA COMINT
CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY

NNNN

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLI/RAC 12-250

By ch NARA, Date 6-27-13

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL/DRAFT~~

February 16, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: JOE CALIFANO

Special Message on India Food. Here is a draft version, shown to nobody as yet. It rings all the changes on how much we've done already, how a big international effort is needed, and how we'll do as much or more than anyone else if Congress approves.

The one tricky problem is to build some kind of matching formula which will put the arm on others to pitch in. If they had their druthers, State/AID/Agriculture experts would prefer not to see us bind ourselves to any formula, lest it tie our own hands if the crisis worsens or if other countries can't measure up. They'd rather say in effect that we'll "at least match" whatever others do--leaving the implication we'll do much more if need be. But they're fighting the problem.

If a formula will help sell a special effort to the Congress and give us effective leverage over other donors, we can come up with one that won't tie our hands. Here are the main problems in developing a sensible one:

A. The formula must be credible as a crisis measure. If we propose a formula which in effect calls for us to do little more than we did last year, no one will take us seriously. For example, assuming India's total 1966 need to be 12 million tons, for us to say we'll meet half would mean we'd be shipping 6 million tons--half a million less than we actually shipped in the last fiscal year. So we'd be making no extra effort

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

ourselves to meet special emergency needs. Even a 2:1 matching would take us only to 8 million tons--still a relatively small special effort.

I see two ways around this. One is to apply our formula to the remaining shortfall of about 7 million tons. (We've already allocated 4.5 million tons against the 11-12 million total, leaving 6.5-7.5 million.) The other is to figure that India's regular import needs run about 6-7 million and count as emergency needs only the 5 million above that. A variant which would also come out with a 5 million remaining shortfall, would be to allocate another 1.5 million when Mrs. Gandhi (or when the VP reports) comes and then say we'll match everything from there on out.

B. The formula must be realistic enough to give us leverage without boxing us into an inhumane position. How we pick a credible base and a reasonable matching ratio hinges on how much we can realistically expect others to contribute. We don't want to set an impossibly high target and then be caught in the vice of either backing down or letting Indians starve because other donors aren't as generous as we say they should be. So far, others have promised a collection of commodities, cash and services--most don't have grain to send--amounting to about \$60 million. Everyone here thinks it's unrealistic to hope for much more than \$100-150 million altogether (\$150 million would equal about 2.5 million tons of wheat at world prices)--and we may have to get pretty tough to get that much.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

So to be realistic, we ought to be shooting at a reasonably high but attainable target for other donors:

--If we work from a 7 million ton shortfall (\$420 million at world prices), it would take a 2:1 ratio (\$280 million to \$140 million) to stay in the \$150 million range.

--If we work from a 5 million ton shortfall (\$300 million), a 1:1 matching looks possible, if we really want to twist some arms.

C. The formula must be flexible. We have to keep an open end. If the total need hits 14 million tons instead of 11-12 million, it may be harder than ever to squeeze more aid out of others. Yet that last 2-3 million tons may be the most critical since it would be needed just at the time when stocks are lowest before the next harvest. Beyond that, some experts are now looking for smaller crops and stocks next year too because soil water will be so low, seed will have been eaten and stocks will be near bottom. So we don't want to put ourselves in a position where Indians are starving but we won't send food because no one else will match us.

D. The formula must be simple enough for everybody to understand. There are two problems here:

What to match?

--Many other donors will probably give cash, services or other commodities since most of them don't have grain to send. Some of the cash will go for freight costs rather than for buying more wheat (under

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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recent PL 480 amendments India must pay shipping costs).

So the first problem is how to establish a common denominator. Dollar value seems the best, and it's probably better to value wheat at world market prices (about \$60 per ton) for this purpose than at CCC cost (about \$75 per ton) since it wouldn't go down well to ask other donors to match our farm subsidy.

-- What total burden to share? The only good measure of the Indian shortages we have is the value of the emergency grain shortfall (about \$300 million for 5 million tons). That's India's first need. The simplest thing to do would be just to match 1:1 in grain the value of other donations. But if everyone else gave \$150 million in gifts other than grain and we matched them with 2.5 million tons (\$150 million) of grain, India would end up with only our 2.5 million tons against a grain need of 5 million.

There are two ways of getting around this:

--Start with a simple matching formula but leave it frankly open-ended. No one knows what the dimensions of the crisis will turn out to be. It may hit 14 million tons; it may even run into a second year. But we could say we'd tackle the current phase of meeting the shortfall as we now see it on a simple matching basis and then review results in late spring when we see where we stand. We could just say we'd "at least" match what others give.

--Or we could set an arbitrary target for other donors

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equal to at least one-third or one-half of what we now estimate to be India's shortfall (\$140-150 million, depending on what base we work from and what ratio we establish). Then we would agree to pick up India's remaining grain needs when others hit their target. That wouldn't quite be a simple 1:1 match, but it would give us leverage and appearance of a pretty even match.

My own preference is to work against the 5 million ton emergency shortfall (I just think it's easier to sell to other donors). Then set a target for other donors and be ready to pick up remaining grain needs. Meanwhile, we'd support maximum Indian pressures on everyone--U Thant, the FAO, Canada (Rusk sees FM Saturday) Australia and any other capital that could contribute anything. Leaving ourselves room for maneuver, we could either stick strictly to the matching formula or interpret it liberally as we see how well others respond and how big India's need turns out to be.

28/

file
India food

CONFIDENTIAL

RWK: February 15, 1966

Jim Clark called concerned about this morning's press stories that we're leaning toward letting the FAO organize the international response to India's food crisis.

He just wanted you to know that he has real reservations about the FAO. It hasn't been well run, and he feels going that route would forfeit our self-help leverage.

I said I thought the press had overplayed that angle. He said BOB would like a chance to weigh in heavily if anyone is thinking seriously along those lines.

HHS

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 4-28-09

29
/

*India
food*

February 15, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE

Would you draft a reply for the President's signature?

I think this must be the letter Cooley handed the President at the leadership meeting on India food.

R. W. Komer

Att:

Lt Cong Cooley,
to the President,
Feb 3, 1966

DRAFT

Feb. 14, 1966

JOINT RESOLUTION

To support United States participation in relieving victims of hunger in India and to enhance India's capacity to meet the nutritional needs of its people. Whereas the Congress has declared it to be the policy of the United States to make maximum efficient use of this nation's agricultural abundance in furtherance of the foreign policy of the United States;

Whereas the Congress will be considering legislation to govern the response of the United States to the mounting world food problem;

Whereas critical food shortages in India threatening the health if not lives of tens of millions of people require an urgent prior response;

Whereas the Secretary General of the United Nations has just issued an urgent special appeal to all countries for assistance; Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the President's initiative in organizing substantial American participation in an urgent international effort designed to:

(a) Help meet India's pressing food shortages by making available added quantities of agricultural commodities [Alternative "A": over and above the six million tons we would have allocated to meet India's regular import needs at least to match--ton for ton--whatever portion of this added need other nations will undertake to meet. /Alternative "B": as other nations undertake to supply commodities and services equal in value to one-third the value of

foodgrain currently estimated as still needed for import. / Alternative "C": over and above the six million tons we would have allocated to meet India's regular import needs as other nations undertake to supply commodities and services equal to half the value of the foodgrain currently estimated as needed for import.⁷

(b) Help combat malnutrition, especially in mothers and children, via a special program;

(c) Encourage and assist those measures which the Government of India is planning to expand India's own agricultural production.

That the Congress urges the President to join India in pressing on other nations the urgency of sharing appropriately in a truly international response to India's critical need.

31/

file
India
food

CONFIDENTIAL / DRAFT

February 14, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I've explored more fully ways of how to set up a formula for our share in the international effort to meet India's food needs. What I come up with is an arbitrary dollar target for others' contributions described publicly as their picking up a third to a half of the remaining grain needs as now calculated. I think this is the best way to force others to help, while still retaining our own maneuverability by not tying ourselves publicly to specific numbers. You'll find the possibilities spelled out as alternatives in the attached draft message to Congress (pp. ____).

State, AID and Agriculture would rather not bind themselves to any formula at all because they fear it might tie our hands if the Indian crisis worsened or if other countries didn't measure up. If we have to mention a formula at all, they'd like to see it frankly open-ended (see Alternative "A").

It's good sense to leave ourselves room for maneuver, but I don't think that keeps us from setting up tough guidelines. What we need is to set up a ratio between our and others' contributions that pressures them to ante up while still making sure India's minimum needs are met.

It's hard to set up a strict matching formula that takes account of the wide variety of commodities and services others will be contributing--grain, shipping, port equipment, dried milk and vegetables, cash--when the only way we can measure India's shortage is in terms of grain shortfall. The one common denominator is dollar value. But even then, we don't know the value of total food and equipment needs in addition to grain. And we can't hold

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- 2 -

others to sending grain because most countries don't have any.

The arithmetic of strict matching makes the problem clearer. India's main emergency need is for about 5 million tons of foodgrain (say about \$300 million). If we said we'd match other donors in dollar equivalents, we might end up sending 2.5 million tons of wheat (\$150 million) while they sent \$150 million worth of other needed commodities. As a result, India would still need 2.5 million more tons of grain even though everyone had lived up to 50-50 sharing in dollar terms.

To get around this, I'd suggest setting an arbitrary dollar target for others' contributions. We could keep the number to ourselves and describe it publicly as "half/one-third the value of foodgrain currently estimated as needed for import." As others did that share, we'd meet remaining grain needs. We might end up going higher than others, but we'd have succeeded in forcing them to shoulder a good chunk of the burden.

We can adjust the dollar target both by varying the ratio and by figuring India's shortfall in either of two ways. One way to count is to say the remaining shortfall (we've already allocated 4.5 million tons) against the 11-12 million total) is 6.5-7.5 million. Another is to figure we'd have sent 6 million tons anyway to meet India's regular needs, so the emergency shortfall is 4-5 million.

If we worked from a 7 million ton base (420 million), we could match others' contributions 2:1 and set their target at \$140 million (see Alternative B). If we worked from a 5 million ton base (\$300 million), we could match

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- 3 -

others 1:1 and set their target at \$150 million (see Alternative C).

I think it's neater to focus on the emergency figure, but I recall you didn't cotton to that approach when we tried it out earlier. It just looks to me like the easier to sell to the Indians and other donors. However, in either case, since both prices and estimates of the shortfall are fluid, using words instead of numbers publicly would keep us flexible.

R. W. Kone r

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India
food

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February 14, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR BILL MOYERS

I see from UPI 87 that Luns had given an unnecessarily firm twist to his discussions with the President on India food. An "international conference" to deal with threatening famine in India might well be a grand idea, but I think we should indicate at this point that it is merely one of several ideas the USG is exploring in its desire to see an adequate international effort to deal with India food.

Nor is Luns correct in saying that any such conference would deal with increased economic aid for development in India or Pakistan. This would be a nonstarter.

So I think you might want to clarify this matter at your afternoon briefing before it gets overplayed.

R. W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 4-28-01

CONFIDENTIAL

33/

file
Ind
food

February 14, 1966

RWK:

Jim Clark agrees with this way of
handling Harry McPherson's request for
comment on the attached letter from Draper.

HHS

34
file
India
food

February 14, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR HARRY McPHERSON

There are three sides to the Draper letter. After BOB piddled with it for two weeks, here are our joint comments.

1. As far as this year's Indian food crisis is concerned, we're moving as fast as the President wants. We've had a technical team out there and Washington study groups run by Freeman himself, so we know pretty well what the problem is. The Indians have been slower in marshalling help from other nations -- which the President insists on -- but they're coming along now. The President is also thinking of an international conference of chief donors, which would be more useful than any "Manhattan Project."

2. On the longer range problem of raising Indian food production, we can obviously crank in all the effective help we can find. However, even before the crisis was full-blown, Freeman and Indian Food Minister Subramaniam had agreed that the Indians would make certain basic reforms to improve production. They're moving on fertilizer too. We've told the Indians we'll make such reforms conditions of any new food agreement (beyond the emergency). We know there's lots to be done, and surely the foundations can help. But the Indian government, with help from AID and USDA, already are working with the foundations. With the President's food message now on the record, what we need is less another White House push but for all these people to get together, where they haven't already, and get on with the job.

The one key area where we're hardly off the ground is in population planning. AID has finally sent a team to India under Dr. Franz Rosa to map out what we can do. Rosa will be back the end of March to organize the effort and then go back to run it. I understand the tough job will be rounding up good people, so Draper's offer in para. 6 might be worth picking up. So I'd suggest sending this letter to Dave Bell, calling attention to the offer and suggesting Dr. Rosa might be interested when he gets back. This would serve the added purpose of another prod.

We certainly want to encourage anybody like Draper who wants to pitch in. However, this is a complex exercise, and there's considerable advantage in making sure AID concerts the effort.

Updating the Rockefeller study (Draper's pp 3-4) also makes sense to me.

R. W. Komer

35
2000
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2/19/66

182-2735
Mr. Komer:

Mr. Moffett, Benelux desk in State called, asking for instruction to get Foreign Minister Luns to your office since you were to escort him to the President's office. I did not know whether you intended to be in Bundy's office or your own in EOB, so I am to call him back with the directions.

EOB _____

Bundy's ofc _____

Thelma

35a

February 12, 1966

Memo for Francis Bator

The President has agreed to see Luns at 11:30 Monday, 14 February. My valentine to you. It is your action, so will you provide any briefing in order and escorting needed. It is on the record.

RWK

35b

February 11, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Department of State

Mr. Watson's office says that:

1. The President will see Foreign Minister Luns at 11:30 Monday, February 14. Should this be on or off the record?
2. The President will see the Moroccan emissary on Tuesday, February 15, at 11:30 a. m. Should this be on or off the record?
3. The President will see Ambassador Green at 12:30 Tuesday, February 15, off the record.

R. W. Komer

Mr. Komer

36

India
food

x P. J.

February 9, 1966
Wednesday, 5:00 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We now expect a UN food for India appeal on Friday. Following your earlier guidelines, I have asked that Goldberg make an immediate supporting statement making no new US promises but seizing the occasion to call on others once more to do their share.

His proposed statement is attached and we will go ahead unless you prefer otherwise.

R. W. Komer

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

See me ☐

DRAFT STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG

The United States welcomes the eloquent appeal addressed to the world community which has just been issued by the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Director General of FAO. The United States Government has been in almost constant discussion with the Government of India on its food needs. A team of U.S. Government experts recently toured India to work with the government there to get a clearer idea of the total dimensions of the crisis and what steps might be needed to meet it. A week ago President Johnson announced the immediate allotment of 3 ^{additional} million_A tons of grain to be shipped to India as quickly as possible, bringing United States emergency grain commitments to India during the current U.S. fiscal year to 6½ million tons.

My government has stated publicly its firm belief that all nations in a position to do so should join in a special international effort to help India meet

the grave

the grave food problem it is now confronting. We have also said that we are fully prepared to participate in such an effort. India's problem is the world's problem. We believe that all men of goodwill have a stake in seeing that people do not starve. As President Johnson said last week -- "You can be sure America will do more than her part."

It is inconceivable to me that the world community will not do its part to help the people of India in their hour of need, for their needs are urgent and the time is short.

CLEARANCES:

AGR - Mrs. Jacobson *JS*

SOA - Mr. Sober *JS*

IO - Mr. Kotschnig *WK*

OES - Mr. Kiefer *AK*

JS
IO/OES:LvanNort:cm
2/8/66

February 8, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN SCHMITTKER
DAVID BELL
DOROTHY JACOBSEN
RAYMOND HARE

Here is a very rough draft of a special message on measures to meet India's food crisis. It is consistent with the President's desires, as I understand them, with one important exception.

The President's first reaction was very cool to the formula proposed in this draft. Since then, however, he has allocated 3 million tons. This (together with the 1.5 million allotted on 9 December) brings us up to 4.5 million of the 6 million ton "normal" requirements which the US itself ought to meet in order to justify moving to a matching principle on what could be called India's additional famine need. So this formula looks less one-sided at this point.

Should the President nonetheless regard it as still too soft, I'd suggest putting everything beyond the 4.5 million we've already allocated on a 1 for 1, or 2 for 1, matching basis. The chief difficulty is, of course, the sheer unlikelihood that other nations would contribute as much during 1966 as called for by any of these formulas.

May I have your comments by c. e. b. Wednesday, 9 February.

R. W. Komer

cc: Joe Califano

Note: Attached is our only copy of draft. Do not give away without making more copies.

37a

(3:30 p. m.)

DRAFT SPECIAL MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS
R. W. Komer 2/8/66

COPING WITH FAMINE IN INDIA

I have sent to the Congress separately a message and proposed legislation on new initiatives we must take to help meet the increasingly serious world food problem. I stated in that message my belief that the United States must do everything in its power to help those nations ready to help themselves in mounting a major long-term attack on hunger and malnutrition. ^eThe nation will profit from the deliberations of the Congress on this grave problem.

Today, however, we also confront an immediate crisis in India. Over one hundred million of the ^{half billion} ~~200 million~~ people in the world's largest working democracy face the spectre of famine. The current food crisis in India is so urgent as to require a special immediate effort.

Dimensions of the Indian Crisis

Last year, under our Food for Peace program, we shipped ~~X~~ ^{six} million tons of grain to India. This was one-half as much (?) as the total amount of wheat we ^{consumed} ~~used~~ here at home. But this year India's need for food imports has more than doubled in the wake of the worst drought of the century.

Last year, India had 95 million tons of grain from production and imports. This year, with a harvest of 76 million tons (as against its own harvest of _____ million last year), there is an apparent import deficit of 19 million tons. The Government of India estimates this can be reduced to 11 million tons by drawing down existing meager stocks and by strict ^{rationing}.

A team of experts, which I sent to India to evaluate the magnitude of India's needs and to report on measures that must be taken to meet those needs, confirms this estimate. Eleven million tons of foodgrains, valued at from \$ _____ to \$750,000,000, seems the minimum necessary to avert extremely grave consequences. ~~the~~ \$750 million ^{would be} equivalent to one-half of India's total annual export earnings.

Responsibility of All Nations

India has asked the United States for help in this emergency in an amount far greater than in the past. India has also asked for the help of other nations. The United States responded with an allocation of 1.5 million tons last December. After consultations with the leadership of Congress, I authorized three million additional tons on 4 February 1966.

We must do ^{even} ~~yet~~ more. Yet meeting an emergency of this gravity cannot and must not be left to a beleaguered India and the United States alone. Even our vast resources may be strained at covering a requirement of such magnitude.

Indeed, India's needs are already widely recognized as demanding a fully international effort, in which the whole community of nations must play a humanitarian role.

-- The Government of India has itself addressed urgent inquiries to all nations believed able to contribute.

-- The Secretary General of the United Nations, and the Director General of the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation, have made an urgent joint appeal (Friday, 11 Feb.) to all UN members to aid India in its hour of trial.

-- His Holiness Pope Paul VI has written to me, and is calling on other key nations with major resources⁷, to help meet in the name of humanity the anguish of India's millions.

In an emergency of this magnitude, the obligation to assist a neighbor in distress should extend to every nation in the world.

To those who have no food to spare, we point out that India needs more than food. Her needs include transportation and facilities for handling commodities, as well as fertilizer and other chemicals to assist in her own efforts to produce food. Her needs include credit -- and cash.

To those who believe they have nothing to spare, we suggest another look -- first, at the critical urgency of the crisis -- and then once more at their own potential to help.

There is no nation on earth far enough from India to be immune from the effect of hunger and starvation there.

There are few nations on earth that cannot afford to give something.

And there is no great and rich nation on earth that can sustain its claim to greatness if it cannot find some way to assist its neighbor in this emergency.

Though some others besides the United States have already responded handsomely, their response to date must be termed disappointing. Of the world's uncommitted export supplies, other nations have six or seven million tons -- about half as much as we in the United States. Yet

it is estimated that total aid from all other countries but the US amounts so far only to three or four percent of the total emergency need.

An International Response

So I ask the Congress to join with me in calling on all other nations, for a response commensurate with the human need. I believe that the American people will want to continue doing our share -- and more. The United States had already, before the drouth struck, been sending wheat to India under Public Law 480 at a rate of 500,000 tons per month -- more than we had ever before provided India. We cannot now ask others to replace this effort. So I believe that the United States itself should continue meeting India's regular need of at least six million tons in 1966. I have already allotted 4.5 million tons of this total for quickest shipment before the summer monsoons reduce India's port capacity.

But I call on the rest of the world -- the community of nations -- to share in the emergency task of meeting India's added requirements for at least five million tons additional foodgrains. Notwithstanding the six million tons that I propose to allocate in any case, I propose that this country offer to match -- ton for ton -- whatever portion of this added need other nations will undertake to meet. In fact, I would propose yet more. In recognition that many other countries lack foodgrains to contribute, we should stand ready to match from our food stocks each ton equivalent, calculated in dollars, that others provide in the form of cash, ships, port handling equipment, fertilizers, and the like.

To organize this common effort, we suggest that some appropriate form of international consortium be devised. Perhaps the Secretary General of the United Nations [the FAO] or the Indian Government itself *could* undertake the task. I have asked Ambassador Goldberg to discuss this matter promptly with the Secretary General.

Before embarking on this task of mercy, which may involve as much as \$600 million in foodstuffs which must be paid for by our taxpayers, I believe it appropriate to call on the legislative branch of this government to discuss and debate fully my proposals, and to endorse them before any further action is taken. I seek the endorsement of the Congress for

-- US provision of the six million ton Public Law 480 allocation that we would normally have shipped to India without the stimulus of famine.

-- Further special US contribution to match each ton of foodgrain equivalent others contribute to an international consortium to meet India's critical famine needs -- up to and if needed beyond a total of 8.5 million tons.

-- An expected expenditure of at least \$600 million for this purpose, financed through the Commodity Credit Corporation, which the Congress will be asked to reimburse.

- - - - -

I am confident that the US people, through their elected representatives, will not be found wanting in their response to the cries of India's needy.

I am convinced that our example will generate a comparable response from other nations, along the lines I have proposed. So I call upon the Congress to join me on this immediate battlefield of the world-wide war on want.

(N. B. Simultaneously with delivery of this message, appropriate Congressional sponsors would be asked to introduce a Joint Resolution endorsing the proposals).

February 10, 1966

Mr. McGuire:

(Valentis office)

As you requested, here is the text of the President's letter to the People which we sent for his signature on February 8. I gather from Bob Komer that the President has now signed it.

Harold H. Saunders

38

file
India too &
x India

39

File
India food

February 8, 1966
Tuesday 3:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Reply to Pope Paul's appeal for food aid to India. At Tab A is his letter to you. It provides an excellent occasion for a reply which cites all that we are doing, and enlists the Pope's help in stimulating others to make a suitably generous response.

The UN appeal will probably come out on Friday morning. So I'd urge that we also cable this letter promptly via Embassy Rome, so that it reaches His Holiness before the UN appeal is issued. For signature, if you approve this idea.

R. W. Komer

cc: Jack Valenti

Your Holiness:

I fully share your deep humanitarian concern for the victims of famine in South Asia. As you know, the United States has for years been providing massive food assistance to both India and Pakistan. We have sent India alone over 35 million tons of foodgrains. Since receiving your appeal I have authorized yet another 3 million tons. We are also engaged in a sweeping effort to help both countries increase their own production and improve the nutritional quality of what they produce.

We will do yet more -- but even the great resources of my country may be strained to meet India's enormous needs. So I earnestly seek your help in bringing together in a truly international effort all nations who can contribute in any way. We must use this crisis to forge greater bonds of international cooperation too.

I believe that the United Nations will shortly issue a worldwide appeal. I hope that you can join me in actively supporting it, and in calling on all nations able to do so to help in the name of humanity. France, Canada, Australia and Argentina in particular have considerable grain stocks beyond their current needs. A letter from you, similar to that which you have just sent to me, would do much to encourage the leaders of these nations as well to make a generous response. In fact, few nations are so small or poor that they have nothing to give, and hunger is a trial that should unite all men.

We ask your invaluable help and assure you that the United States will not be found wanting.

Sincerely,

**His Holiness
Paul VI
Vatican City, Rome**

**cc: McGB
LBJ:RWK:saw
(Typed 2/8/66)**

cc. Jack Valenti

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *pcjw*, NARA, Date 4-28-04

40
India Econ
** Pakistan Econ*

Saturday, February 5, 1966
10:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

To respond to your recent queries, you can rely on it that no significant India or Pak aid gets through without my flagging it. In fact, most requests die in my office as inconsistent with your policy.

I sensed that you were surprised Thursday evening to hear that of the \$435 million we tentatively pledged India for FY '66, only your \$50 million December fertilizer loan had moved. In fact, we still have about \$85 million in prior year loans authorized but held up.

The Pak story is the same. We programmed for \$212.5 million in FY '66, but have released \$0. The five projects we released for Ayub were from FY '65.

On military aid, the same is true. Nothing (except admin. costs) has flowed from FY '66, and we have held up a big backlog from prior years (over \$200 million in all).

To remind you that we here don't just serve as a transmission belt, here's what our ambassadors are pleading for. McConaughy recommends about \$200 million in economic aid (an \$80 million commodity loan and the \$120 million Karachi steel mill loan), plus food and maybe a little military aid. He feels Ayub's gentle pressure for resumption of military aid.

Bowles recommends \$247 million in economic aid, apart from food, and \$75 million in non-lethal MAP. Most of that is \$150 in non-project loans with \$97 million for projects.

Even if we ease up considerably, we'll actually spend this year on India and Pakistan way below what the agencies estimated to Congress. I'd guess we could end up saving about \$500 million (including MAP). Of course, if we get onto a better political track with both countries, we ought to spend more -- but then we'd get more for our money.

~~SECRET~~

cc: McGB

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

February 4, 1966

Mac -

LBJ wanted these figures, and I'd like to try belling the cat on our formula at the same time.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

OK
mcgB.

Att: RWK Memo for the President, 2/4/66
re Indian food

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 89-135 (#96)

By pelisp. NARA, Date 4-24-04

~~SECRET~~

41a
file
India
ford

February 4, 1966
Friday, 12:00 noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here are Agriculture's quick figures on significant world wheat supplies (includes carryovers as well as output), and on estimated export availabilities.

	<u>Total Supply</u> 1965-66 <u>Million Metric Tons</u>	<u>Estimated</u> <u>Uncommitted Availability</u> <u>Million Metric Tons</u>
Canada	28.2	4.0
France	7.4	1.0
Argentina	8.7	0.5
Australia	7.9	0.5
Italy	9.0	0.2
Greece	2.5	0.5
US	58	10-15

Agriculture says that all other countries are either net importers (like the USSR or Red China), self-sufficient, or insignificant.

Even though 6.7 million tons are theoretically available elsewhere, much of it is virtually unusable. The experts think we'll be doing mighty well if India, the UN and we could liberate one or two million tons of it. Canada's 4 million tons is virtually unavailable because of ice-frozen parts and extremely tight shipping through end July. Greece's is extremely poor quality and port facilities aren't equipped for sizeable exports. France has never cooperated in food for famine ventures (though we're pressing India to try).

The Indians could eat rice, but the world rice market is far tighter than that for wheat.

The chart at Tab shows where the wheat from the four major export producers other than ourselves is going in FY 1966. They plan to export about 34 million tons (Canada 16.3, Australia 6.1, Argentina 7.1, France 4.5). So only Canada (and to a minor extent France) still have any substantial wheat not already sold or earmarked for traditional markets and Communist countries.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NWJ 89-135 (#96)
By plip, NARA, Date 4-28-01

SECRET

The best bet is Canada, especially for later in the year when ports are open and more shipping available, and Canada is sensitive to Indian needs. So more Indian appeals to Canada are in order (Pearson has already allocated 150,000 tons). At some point we also ought to put the blocks to Pearson ourselves.

The second best target may be the USSR. It is importing about 9 million tons in 1965/66. But India might be able to put pressure on Moscow to stretch out its imports and thus free stocks for India.

But the blunt fact is that of a total Indian need running at least 11 million tons, it will be terribly difficult as a practical matter to get more than two million tons from other sources. This is the town's best judgment, though I hope we're wrong.

Sensible guidelines. So the guts of the matter is to devise guidelines which will be equitable -- in terms of getting the most from others -- but also practicable -- in terms of meeting a critical need. If we calculate on the basis of a formula covering all 11 million tons, then it would take about a 5 to 1 (or even higher) ratio of US to other contributions to come near the target. Will the Hill be receptive to such a one-sided ratio? But if we stick to a 50/50 or even 2 to 1 formula, can we come within a country mile of preventing mass famine? This is our dilemma.

Though your first reaction to our proposed solution was sulphurous, let me explain why we all came to it. The only way to avoid an impossible ratio was to separate out India's "normal" need assuming no famine (e. g. the 6 million tons we allocated last year -- which it's hard for us to ask other countries to share all of a sudden), and treat the remaining 5 million tons as the emergency, one-time need.

Then we could quite equitably insist that this latter be met on a matching basis (or even 2 for 1, since the US has roughly two-thirds of the world's uncommitted food reserves). We could announce that we'd contribute a ton of wheat for each ton of wheat equivalent others put in. The arithmetic works out as follows:

SECRET

Page 3

India's total 1966 import needs	11 million tons
Less regular US Title I program	6 million tons
<u>Remaining Emergency Need</u>	<u>5 million tons</u>
Less matching contribution from others	2.5 million tons
Matching US Pledge	2.5 million tons

We'd ask the Congress to endorse our full contribution, not just the matching formula. But the formula proposed would protect us from press and other accusations that we were drawing back, at the very time when India faced its worst food crisis. No one could criticize us for trying to shift an old burden to others, and we'd then be in a very strong position to make India and the UN get others to match whatever emergency aid we gave. If they didn't, we wouldn't. So I'd still urge that this formula is the most ingenious way of getting what we want--a formula fully understandable and defensible to Congress, the press, the Indians, and the world--yet one which forces others to cough up more than they ever have before.

R. W. Koner

SECRET

41^b

February 3, 1966

WHEAT SUPPLY
July 1965 - June 1966
In the Four Major Producers Other Than US
(Million Metric tons)

	<u>Canada</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Argentina</u>	<u>Australia</u>	<u>Total</u>
Total supply for export or carryover	28.2	7.4	8.7	7.9	52.2
Minus exports already planned or committed:					
To Communist countries	(8.6)	(2.0)	(4.5)	(2.6)	(17.7)
To Free World markets	(7.7 ^a)	(2.5)	(2.6)	(3.5 ^a)	(16.3)
Total	16.3	4.5	7.1	6.1	34.0
Minus desirable stocks as of 1 July 1966	<u>8.2</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>13.6</u>
Balance theoretically available for additional shipments	3.7 ^b	1.0	.5	.5	4.6

a. Estimate includes 0.2 from Canada and 0.1 from Australia for India under Colombo Plan.

b. Canadian rail and port facilities cannot move much (if any) more than the 16.3 million tons already planned for export.

Available from Minor Producers

These are the best USDA guesses at the moment, subject to minor revision as we update marketing information:

Greece	0.5 (ports probably unable to move that much)
Italy	0.2
United Kingdom	0.2
Sweden	0.1
Syria	0.1
Mexico	--- (very small amount possible)

41c

~~SECRET~~

February 4, 1966

	Total supply 1965-66 Million metric tons	Estimated uncommitted availability Million metric tons
Canada	28.2	<u>1</u> /4.0
France	7.4	1.0
Argentina	8.7	<u>2</u> /0.5
Australia	7.9	<u>2</u> /0.5
Italy	9.0	0.2
Greece	2.5	<u>3</u> /0.5
US	58	10-15

1/ Shipping extremely tight through July 31, 1966

2/ Availability through December 1, 1966.

3/ Very poor quality; export facilities limited.

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Authority NLS 89-135 (496)

By fc/np NARA, Date 4-28-04

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CONFIDENTIAL

RWK:

february 4, 1966

1. An Ayub letter on Tashkent will be coming over by Read-Bundy memo. It was pouched to the embassy dated 22 January—not urgent, and no surprises. It describes what Tashkent means and pressures Ayub is under as a result. Again asks that we use our influence on the unresolved Kashmir problem.

2. FYI. In Texas, "maize" means "grain sorghum." So USDA is construing the President's statement to mean sorghums since that's what we've been talking about.

HHS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 4-28-04

CONFIDENTIAL

43

1. India food
2. India
3. Ruck-India Food

February 4, 1966

MEMO FOR S/S

Attached are two copies of my
memorandum on the President's recent
talk with Ambassador Nehru.

R. W. Komer

43 a India Food
x India
x ~~Food~~ India
Food

~~SECRET~~

February 3, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: President's Meeting with Indian Ambassador Nehru

The President greeted Ambassador Nehru warmly, saying that he thought the new cabinet was off to a good start. He well understood India's succession problem, having gone through the same tragic situation himself. Nehru replied that Mrs. Gandhi was touched by the President's message and sent warm greetings to him. The President commented jocularly that with a woman Prime Minister in India, the pressure was now on us. We would have to do something more for our women. Nehru riposted that the women of India were "impossible" now.

Commenting that talks were long overdue, the President was anxious to see Mrs. Gandhi as soon as possible. He was troubled because he had an incipient revolt on his hands in Congress. He did not want to go to Congress on future aid to India till he had talked things over further with Mrs. Gandhi. In the meantime he had asked our best people to get up a program; then he would ask the Congress to join in it. The President wanted to go this route because he was getting tired of the charges that he was running everything, even though he kept asking for Congress' views (as on Vietnam).

The President then discussed multilateralizing our aid, including food. He didn't wholly agree with Senator Fulbright on doing everything via multilateral rather than bilateral means. The best argument against multilateralism, as the AID people kept claiming, was that we didn't get credit for the aid we gave. Yet given the UN's success in dealing with the Pak/Indian cease fire, he wondered if it might not be better to use the multilateral route in meeting Indian food needs. We might make a substantial contribution to the World Food Program or the UN itself and ask every other country to come in appropriately. We put in 50% of the World Food Program now. We could even say that we would increase this proportion if others would do the same, not necessarily in wheat alone but in its equivalent. The Ambassador commented that the US was the only country which had food to spare, and it didn't cost the US anything to send it abroad. The President bridled at this, retorting that we did have to pay for every nickel's worth of wheat or other commodities. He had just seen figures from the Budget Bureau indicating that we had to pay \$60-80 per ton for wheat.

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Authority: FRUS 64-68, vol. 25, #289

By h, NARA, Date 4-28-01

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- 2 -

The President wanted to sit down with the new Prime Minister and discuss what he could do for India as well as vice versa. Then he would tell the Congress what he wanted to do in bushels and dollars. This had not been budgeted yet. He noted that he was being severely criticized right this minute for feeding Vietnam refugees, while cutting out \$600 million in military construction here. We could get results from the Congress if we consulted it. Congressmen kept claiming that they were not consulted enough. Senator Fulbright kept saying that when the President acted without the Congress he was being ostentatious and dictatorial.

The President then raised the question of promises vs. performance. He described how in 1961 we had committed \$300 million to Brazil for social projects. The Brazilians were to do several things in return. They passed a number of resolutions, but didn't perform on a single one. Then he, President Johnson, had doubled aid to \$550-600 million, but Senator Morse claimed that we were less liked in Latin America now than ever. The President suspected that a good deal of this problem was our "image", created by Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. So we had to figure out--the quicker the better--what to do for India and then put it up to the Congress. He was trying to get a five-year authorization for aid, but doubted that he would get it in an election year.

The President told Nehru to evolve--with Komer and others--a sensible program. Then we would send our people--including Secretaries Rusk, Freeman and Gardner--up to testify. The first program we would undertake under the new AID/Food Message was the Indian emergency. At the moment the President thought we should act through the UN, perhaps after an interim allocation to keep things going. Senator Fulbright was right that we got no credit for what we did bilaterally.

Ambassador Nehru interjected that handling food this way was difficult. But economic aid had to be given with conditions, which were more acceptable if exacted through multilateral agencies. Mrs. Gandhi had asked him to say that she would like to come in the second half of March. The Indian Parliament would still be in session then, but she thought she could get away. The President asked the Ambassador to tell her that there was no one in the world who understood her problem in taking over better or with more sympathy. Mrs. Johnson and he would see her on no notice at all, at any time she could come. It was essential that they meet as early as possible so he could get ahead with what he wanted to do. Nehru should tell Mrs. Gandhi just to wire when she was coming.

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- 3 -

The Ambassador mentioned that Mrs. Gandhi had asked him to tell the President how much she appreciated the peace moves on Vietnam. She was greatly disappointed at the lack of response. Nehru commented on India's contribution through talking with Kossygin at Tashkent. He added, "I don't know if you know yet, but we also made some approaches through our Consul General in Hanoi." However, the North Vietnamese were not responsive. We also sent our ICC Chairman to Hanoi. He reported that there were two parties in the NVN Government. The moderates were gaining ground but were still in the minority.* Nehru repeated that Mrs. Gandhi was "very distressed" at the lack of response to these approaches.

The President then explained at length our decisions on the pause and the many efforts we had made to establish contact and generate a response. He explained how the Soviets and others had said something would come of a pause if we stopped ten days or so, but it didn't work. He "appreciated very much" what Shastri said at Tashkent with Kossygin. However, the net of the whole exercise was that the President was worse off than a month ago. His basic problem was not with the peace lovers but with those who argued for a yet tougher line.

The President indicated that he was "terribly proud" of what India did at Tashkent in moving toward reconciliation with the Paks. "Shastri died the right way in the cause of peace, not at the end of a gun barrel." Ambassador Nehru replied that Mrs. Gandhi had asked him to tell the President that "India was going all-out to make Tashkent work." The Indians hoped to withdraw well before 25 February. They were also proposing resumption of ministerial meetings and of transit overflights. Meanwhile, anti-Pak propaganda had been stopped.

The President discussed Ayub's problems, remarked that one of these was that he had ended up almost an "advocate of India". But Ayub had many difficulties with his own people. When he came to the US he was a chastened man, but also a proud one. He didn't rebel or even argue, when the President told him he had to settle with India. Nehru remarked that what the President had done with Ayub had had considerable effect on Tashkent. The President hoped that Ayub wouldn't lose his job as a result; Bhutto and others seemed to be a serious threat. Nehru said that the Indians realized they had to help Ayub, but India had a few problems of its own at home with hardliners.

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- 4 -

The Ambassador then made "two specific emergency requests." The first was food. The US had given India 1.5 million tons in December, and the last would be shipped this week. Could the US give a firm public commitment on more, to cover at least till the end of June? If the US were unable to make a public commitment, it would promote hoarding and riots--as in Kerala. Of course, the Kerala crisis was partly food and partly politics. He explained that if the Indian people lacked confidence that sufficient wheat was coming, they would not give up their own stocks of rice and wheat for distribution. If India could have 5 million tons of wheat now, "it would take us up through June." Second, the Ambassador claimed that there had been a freeze on all US aid, including what was pledged last year--about \$500 million was outstanding. The Indian economy was running out of raw material. Factories were operating way below capacity and unemployment was up. Since it took eight months between the signing of a loan agreement and the actual arrival of the goods involved, India's economic problems were bleak unless aid was started up again. These two problems were so urgent that the Prime Minister had asked Nehru to take them up right way. India also intended to talk with the World Bank shortly about its broader economic problems.

The President replied that he understood the urgency of these matters. His problem was whether he could borrow on his own prestige by going ahead without the Congress on these matters. He didn't know how soon this bank would run out. So his judgment was that he should make no commitments till there was an understanding between our two countries, and till he got the approval of the American people via the Congress. Otherwise, he was just asking for more problems. So on food in particular, he desired to send a message and legislation to the Congress on what we could do and what we thought others should do. To act in any other way would jeopardize the future relations between our two countries--and the President's own relations with the Congress.

Nehru asked how India's short term emergency needs could be met in the meantime. The President replied that he might take some action before the Congress moved, but could only afford the utter minimum. He did not want to make new agreements until he could both touch his Congressional base and talk with Mrs. Gandhi. Nehru pointed out that if Shastri hadn't died, he would have been in Washington this very day. Circumstance had prevented a US/Indian meeting of minds. The President reminded him that we had planned on the 1.5 million tons carrying us till Shastri came, and pointed out that it had lasted till this time. However, he thought that we might be able to make another interim

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- 5 -

allotment to carry us past the time when the Prime Minister came, because he didn't want her to be under pressure to come here. He would get the appropriate Congressional leaders together before the week was out, and then announce an interim allotment. The President thought that the American people would come through, but the Indian people had to understand that we Americans had our problems too. If the President sent a message to Congress and there was full public discussion Indians must realize that they were going to be criticized during this discussion. Nehru thought that Indians would understand.

The President then re-emphasized that the Prime Minister should come--the sooner the better. The two of them could work out an understanding. The President would get a food message up to Congress right after, and we would get it through in thirty days.

Nehru again made a plea for economic aid; "defreezing" economic assistance was as important as food. The President said he would talk with Nehru again on this. He had made up his mind that there would be no new aid till we had agreed on a new course with both India and Pakistan. He thought he had such an agreement with Ayub, but had been holding up any new initiatives with Pakistan till the Indians could visit. Indeed, he believed that his talk with Ayub had more to do with the success of Tashkent than almost anything else. Ayub knew from his talks here that war with India or ties with China were "inimical to US interests". Ayub had said that he would not do anything inimical to the interests of the US.

The President then said that he would deal with the Kerala problem (another interim food allotment) without Mrs. Gandhi asking him. He was going to treat Mrs. Gandhi as he would want her to treat him. He knew her problem better than she might think he knew it, since he had gone through a similar succession crisis. The President then walked Ambassador Nehru out through the Lobby.

R. W. Komer

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44
file
India
food

SECRET

RWK:

February 3, 1966

Thoughts on guidelines for sharing the Indian food burden. I'm only roughing out possible approaches. We ought to be very careful about precise numbers until we get State, AID, USDA judgments.

I'd also like to sell the word "guidelines" instead of "formula" since we need a touchstone like the wage-price guidelines rather than an equation we can put into a computer for this collection of money, commodities and services. Besides we don't want to lock ourselves in.

Assumptions about facts:

1. Maybe we can push other wheat producers up to 1 million tons (\$65 million). So far we only know of concrete offers for about 300,000 tons of that, so hitting the 1 million mark will be a job in itself.
2. The Indians are now talking about getting 10-11 million tons (\$650-715 million) altogether.
3. Other donors so far are talking about \$35 million in money plus other quantities of commodities it's impossible to value yet.

Conclusion: The present very rough ratio (reducing everything to dollar value) looks like about \$700 million from the US and \$100 million from others, or a ratio of about 7:1.

Possible ways to figure ratios:

1. Use totals (in dollars). This would include about 6-7 million tons we were planning to send anyway under the regular Title I program. This would put us in the 7-8:1 range, or even higher.
2. Count only contributions above regular programs (as in your memo). So we'd have (a) normal shipments to India and (b) a special international effort against the famine. This would reduce our contribution to 3-4 million tons (\$195-260 million). We don't know how it would affect the Canadian and Australian levels, but even the \$35 million in financing plus some food might put us in the 5:1 range. Include their 1 million tons of wheat (\$65 million) and you're around 1:2. This is best.

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Authority Stak 12-77, NSC 845-78
By plisp, NARA, Date 4-28-04

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- 2 -

3. Use totals but use two separate guidelines--one for wheat based on current uncommitted and movable quantities and a second for other commodities. This might come out 9-10:1 on wheat--since we alone have it. But it might look a lot better on other commodities.

HHS

SECRET

45

India food

February 3, 1966
Thursday 4:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached are Freeman's proposals (worked out with State and AID) for an interim allocation and an equitable formula. I too would strongly endorse them as the course which best meets your criteria and avoids multiple added headaches later.

A. Two million ton interim allocation. We could stretch out any amount from 500,000 tons up over the next few months. But applying the criterion you gave B.K. Nehru -- enough to relieve the pressure on Mrs. Gandhi through her late March visit -- Agriculture/AID urge 2 million. This would look responsive and buy time for full Hill debate on the big problem.

B. Formula for a matching effort. Can we legitimately tell other countries that they must now take up part of what we have been regularly sending India under PL 480 for the last few years, i.e., 500,000 tons monthly? It's also difficult to find any workable formula to cover India's full 11 million ton need. So we would say we'd continue to meet India's pre-famine need as before, but insist that others participate fully in meeting the famine emergency (5 out of 11 million tons). Freeman says we could offer to match others on a 2 for 1 basis (since we have 2/3 of the world's uncommitted food reserves) or even 50/50 (our share in the the World Food Program). We could ask the UN to monitor the pledging. It would be mighty hard to get others to match these offers, but the formula would be clear, understandable and defensible before Congress and the world.

Presentation to the Congressional Group. If the above makes sense, you could tell the group this evening, after Freeman's briefing, that:

1. You feel the US must help India, but on a basis where other nations help proportionately too.
2. You regard this as a problem on which the Congress should be fully heard.
3. So you intend to send a special message, asking legislative support for the full US participation envisaged including endorsement of the entire amount of money involved.
4. We can't expect others to take over what we've normally been giving India in PL 480 (recently at a rate of 6 m. tons per year). We'll negotiate this with the Indians ourselves. But we can expect all others to join us in the humanitarian endeavor to meet India's special famine needs, which they and we estimate at another 5 m. tons.

So, just as we've pledged to provide 50% of the UN World Food Program, you propose pledging that we'll help meet on a matching basis (one for one), India's emergency needs. We will ask India and the UN to call on other nations for a special program, through which they will share the burden by pledging in food or food equivalent an amount equal to what we put up.

6. At a time when Vietnam and other US burdens are so heavy, you want the Congress to debate fully and decide in its wisdom whether the US should take on this new burden -- with the cost involved.

R. W. Komer

Attachment

410

India food

Feb. 3, 1966
Thursday, 2:00 p. m.

Mr. Komer:

David Schneider phoned re list of names of Congressman interested in India Food problem which you requested.

He says a list has been prepared by Henry Wilson to which he would add the following names who have had some recent association:

Cohalen *
Zablocki *
Morse *
McGovern
Holifield *
Cooper

- * These all headed Codels (Congressional Delegations) which have been recently in India.

T.

47
/

India
food

February 3, 1966
Thursday 4:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here are Ambassador Nehru's notes on the Indian food problem, as you requested him to provide yesterday.

R. W. Komer

Attachment

48

index

February 2, 1966

Mac:

Here's the gist of the President's thinking out loud with B. K. Nehru. Freeman and I are working out the substance and O'Brien's office is calling the meeting (after checking with the Boss).

I think it might be sensible to put out the attached memo for record pronto to Rusk, Freeman and Bell if you see no objection.

R. W. Komer

Att:
MFR

48 a
~~SECRET~~

February 2, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Indian Famine Relief

The President, in the course of talking with Indian Ambassador B. K. Nehru today, outlined the steps he proposes to take toward meeting India's emergency food needs. The President stressed two points (a) that he intends to proceed only in full consultation with the Congress; and (b) that the US contribution should be appropriately proportionate to the help from other countries.

To this end, the President proposes to call a meeting of key Congressional leaders shortly, probably Thursday, at which he will consult them on the following proposals:

1. The US would make promptly another interim allocation designed to help meet India's needs through the time of Mrs. Gandhi's visit (probably the third week in March). The purpose would be to avoid putting Mrs. Gandhi in a position where she would have to come under pressure.
2. To secure Congressional endorsement of US participation in meeting the remainder of India's emergency food needs, he would send to Congress shortly a special message calling for appropriate legislative support (perhaps a Joint Resolution).
3. The US contribution would be based on some equitable formula whereby other countries would be called on to make proportionate contributions. Thus the whole burden would not fall on the US. A sensible formula should be developed soonest.
4. It might be desirable to put emergency food aid to India under some sort of multilateral umbrella, perhaps the UN World Food Program. We will look urgently into this possibility.

R. W. Komer

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Authority State 12-12-77; NSC 815-78
By g/lisp NARA. Date 4-28-04

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February 2, 1966
Wednesday 3:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here are Agriculture's quick figures on significant world wheat supplies (includes carryovers as well as output), and on estimated export availabilities.

	<u>Total Supply</u> 1965-66 <u>Million Metric Tons</u>	<u>Estimated</u> <u>Uncommitted Availability</u> <u>Million Metric Tons</u>
Canada	28.2	4.0
France	7.4	1.0
Argentina	8.7	0.5
Australia	7.9	0.5
Italy	9.0	0.2
Greece	2.5	0.5
US	58	10-15

Agriculture says that everybody else is either an importer (like the USSR or Red China), self-sufficient, or insignificant. Canada has the only other major wheat supply available, but ice-frozen ports and extremely tight shipping through end July make it hard to move.

The Indians could eat rice, but the world rice market is far tighter than that for wheat.

The chart at Tab shows where the wheat from the four major export producers other than ourselves is going in FY 1966. They plan to export about 34 million tons (Canada 16.3, Australia 6.1, Argentina 7.1, France 4.5). So only Canada (and to a minor extent France) still have any substantial wheat not already sold or earmarked for traditional markets and Communist countries.

France has never cooperated in food for famine ventures, but we are pressing India to try. The best bet is Canada, especially for later in the year when ports are open and more shipping available, and Canada is sensitive to Indian needs. So more Indian appeals to Canada are in order (Pearson has already allocated 150,000 tons). At some point we also ought to put the blocks to Pearson ourselves.

Most Communist states are importers (especially the USSR -- 9 million tons in 1965/66). But India might be able to put pressure on them to stretch out their imports and thus free stocks for India.

But the blunt fact of the matter is that of a total Indian need running at least 11 million tons, it will be terribly difficult as a practical matter to get more than say a million to two million tons at the outside from other sources.

A sensible formula. The guts of the matter is to devise a formula which will be equitable -- in terms of getting the most from others -- but also practicable -- in terms of meeting an increasingly desperate need. As you see from the above figures, if we calculate on the basis of a formula covering 11 million tons, then it would take about a 5 to 1 ratio of US to other contributions to come near the target. Will the Hill leaders be receptive to such a one-sided ratio? But if we stick to a 50/50 or even 2 to 1 formula, we won't come within a country mile of preventing mass famine.

My solution -- simple and easily explicable -- is to separate out India's normal need if there weren't a famine (the 6 million tons we allocated last year -- which it's also hard for us to ask other countries to share all of a sudden) and then treat the remaining 5 million tons as the emergency need to be filled on a one-time basis.

We could quite equitably insist that this latter emergency need be met on a 2 for 1 basis, since the US has roughly two-thirds of the world's uncommitted food reserves. We could announce that we'd contribute two tons of wheat for each ton of wheat equivalent others put in. The arithmetic works out as follows:

<u>India's total 1966 import needs (confirmed by Freeman)</u>	11 million tons
Less regular US Title I program	6 " "
<u>Remaining Emergency Need</u>	5 " "
Less 1 for 2 contribution from others	1.67 " "
<u>Matching US Pledge</u>	3.33 " "

Since we've already allocated 1.5 million tons and you plan to make say another similar interim allocation shortly, this would take care of half of our 6 million base. My scheme would put major pressure on others to cough up (and get the Indians humping too). At the same time it protects us against accusations that we're coming up with a formula which can't be realized -- and thus condemns Indians to starvation. I'm working this out with Freeman and Bell.

Tab

R. W. Komer

49a
January 14, 1966

WHEAT SUPPLY
July 1965 - June 1966
In the Four Major Producers Other Than US
(Million Metric tons)

	<u>Canada</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Argentina</u>	<u>Australia</u>	<u>Total</u>
Total supply for export or carryover	28.2	7.4	8.7	7.9	52.2
Minus exports already planned or committed:					
To Communist countries	(8.6)	(2.0)	(4.5)	(2.6)	(17.7)
To Free World markets	(7.7 ^a)	(2.5)	(2.6)	(3.5 ^a)	(16.3)
Total	16.3	4.5	7.1	6.1	34.0
Minus desirable stocks as of 1 July 1966	<u>8.2</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>13.6</u>
Balance theoretically available for additional shipments	3.7 ^b	.9	0	0	4.6

a. Estimate includes 0.2 from Canada and 0.1 from Australia for India under Colombo Plan.

b. Canadian rail and port facilities cannot move much (if any) more than the 16.3 million tons already planned for export.

Available from Minor Producers

These are the best USDA guesses at the moment, subject to minor revision as we update marketing information:

Greece	0.4 (ports probably unable to move
Italy	0.3 that much)
United Kingdom	0.2
Sweden	0.1
Syria	0.1
Mexico	---(very small amount possible)

India
50

February 2, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR DOROTHY JACOBSEN

Orville Freeman suggested I send you the attached outline draft of the possible special message to Congress and accompanying Joint Resolution on India food. The President is now thinking more firmly of taking this route, subsequent to his food message.

R. W. Komer

Attachment

To the Congress of the United States:

I am sending /have sent/ to the Congress separately a message and proposed legislation on new initiatives we must take to help meet the increasingly serious world food problem. I have stated in that message my belief that the United States must do everything in its power to help those nations ready to help themselves in mounting a major long-term attack on hunger and malnutrition.

This nation will profit from the deliberations of the Congress on this grave problem. However, the current food crisis in India is so urgent as to require a special immediate effort. Therefore, I am asking the support of the Congress to move ahead quickly under existing authority to organize United States participation in an international effort to relieve victims of famine in India and to enhance India's capacity to meet the nutritional needs of its people. As an initial step, I propose to make available added quantities, of which /1.5-2/ million tons of grain is being allocated immediately.

51
February 2, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR JOE CALIFANO

From talking with the President yesterday, and from what he said to Orville Freeman this morning, he's not going to buy pp. 17-19 on India, so I suggest the following briefed down rewrite as more in line with his current views:

India

That great nation, young in years of independence but old in civilization and culture, has long been suffering from scarcity of food. Last year -- not a crisis year -- the United States shipped to India under our Food for Peace program one half as much wheat as the total amount we used here at home.

But this year India's need for food imports has more than doubled in the wake of the worst drought of the century.

In the face of this dire emergency, I have asked the Secretary of Agriculture to ascertain the magnitude of India's needs and to assess the effort it is making to meet these needs. To this end he sent a team of experts to India to evaluate the most immediate problems and to report on measures that must be taken -- by India herself as well as by those who would help her.

In response to the urgent requests of the new Indian Government, the United States is prepared to do more than its fair share as part of the international emergency effort that is needed. We call on other nations to join us now.

To those who have no food to spare, we point out that India needs more than food. She needs transportation and facilities for handling commodities, as well as fertilizer and other chemicals to assist in her own efforts to produce food. Her needs include credit -- and cash.

To those who believe they have nothing to spare, we suggest another look -- first, at the critical urgency of the crisis -- and then at their own capacity to help.

For a response commensurate with the need, some form of international consortium may be required. We will join fully in any such undertaking -- under Indian or suitable international auspices -- if other nations also respond in fair measure to the urgent need.

There is no nation on earth far enough from India to be immune from the effect of hunger and starvation there.

There are few nations on earth that cannot afford to give something.

There is no great and rich nation on earth that can sustain its claim to greatness if it cannot find some way to assist its neighbor in this emergency.

52

February 2, 1966
Wednesday 9:15 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Talking points for BK Nehru. Our best guess is that he'll plead India's acute famine prospects and the sad state of its economy, then ask for emergency help in both categories. Assuming that you'll plan to be mostly a friendly listener at this point, you might make the following interim response:

1. We're impressed with the way Mrs. Gandhi has taken hold and seems to be going in the right direction.

2. We're also impressed with the spirit of Tashkent and progress toward a Pak/Indian stand-down.

3. You look forward to seeing Mrs. Gandhi -- the sooner the better.

4. We'll take a close look at BK's requests:

(a) On food for famine, he knows we want to be helpful. We've already done far more than all other countries combined. But we've tried to make clear that other nations should pitch in to do a fair share of the job, India itself must make a greater effort to get the Soviets, Canadians, Australians, Japanese, and others to help out. There's too much of a tendency to leave everything to Uncle Sam.

(b) On other economic aid requests, we'll try to get our ducks in a row to have answers for Mrs. Gandhi.

5. In general, India can depend on us to be helpful in as many ways as we can, consistent with our other problems. However, you're sure that India, like other countries will take due note of your strong convictions on self help, just highlighted in the Aid Message. Performance, not promises, will be the test we shall apply.

R. W. Komer

53

CONFIDENTIAL

February 2, 1966
Tuesday, 5:10 p. m.

Mac:

I didn't get a chance to give Rusk's attached Food memo to the President (I did give him Freeman's latest). So I suggest sending it in cold as night reading, just so another parish can be heard from. A covering note from me would be foolish.

RWK

CONFIDENTIAL

Determined to be an
administrative marking
By jc/DCM On 4-28-04

Typed 2/1/66

54 India food

D-R-A-F-T

JOINT RESOLUTION

To support United States participation in relieving victims of famine in India and to enhance India's capacity to meet the nutritional needs of its people.

Whereas the Congress has declared it to be the policy of the United States to make maximum efficient use of this nation's agricultural abundance in furtherance of the foreign policy of the United States;

Whereas the Congress will be considering legislation to govern the response of the United States to the mounting world food problem; and

Whereas critical food shortages in India threatening the health if not lives of tens of millions of people require an urgent prior response;

Whereas the Secretary General of the United Nations has just issued an urgent special appeal to all countries for assistance: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the President's initiative in organizing substantial American participation in an urgent international effort designed to:

(a) Help meet pressing India's food shortages by making available added quantities of agricultural commodities, of which $\bar{A}.5 - \bar{2}$ million tons of grain is being allocated immediately;

(b) Help combat malnutrition, especially in mothers and children, via a special program;

(c) Encourage and assist those measures which the Government of India is planning to expand India's own agricultural production.

That the Congress urged the President to join India in pressing on other nations the urgency of sharing appropriately in an international effort to prevent famine in India.

56 1/31/62 India food

DRAFT

JOINT RESOLUTION

To support United States participation in relieving victims of famine in India and to enhance India's capacity to meet the nutritional needs of its people.

Whereas the Congress has declared it to be the policy of the United States to make maximum efficient use of this nation's agricultural abundance in furtherance of the foreign policy of the United States;

Whereas the Congress will be considering legislation to govern the response of the United States to the mounting world food problem; and

Whereas critical food shortages in India require an urgent special response and provide an important immediate opportunity to attack the food problem in an area where it is now most acute: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the President's initiative in organizing substantial American participation in an urgent international effort in India designed to:

- (a) Help meet pressing food shortages by making available agricultural commodities, including 1.5 [1.8] million tons of grain immediately;
- (b) Help combat malnutrition, especially in mothers and children;
- (c) Encourage and assist the measures which the Government of India is planning to expand India's own agricultural production.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT

In the light of the worsening Indian food situation, and in response to an urgent request from the Indian Government conveyed by Ambassador B. K. Nehru, the President has authorized another allotment of PL 480 food grains wheat amounting to _____ million tons, as an emergency measure to help combat the specter of famine.

However, the President continues to ^{regard} ~~believe~~ that India's critical food shortage ^{as a} ~~is a~~ matter of grave concern to the entire international community, ^{he} ~~and~~ believes that all friendly nations must join with the US in a major international effort to meet this humanitarian need.

The President has discussed India's food crisis with Congressional leaders, and plans to send to Congress shortly a special message calling for Congressional support of a major US contribution to such an ^{international} effort. He believes that the American people will fully support their government in doing more than its fair share to combat hunger and malnutrition in the world's largest working democracy, but that India needs help from all its friends and Commonwealth partners in its time of critical need.

Phoned to Sec. Freeman's office, also Wm. Handley for clearance and any amendments.

From Sec. Freeman:

... amounting to 2 million tons and one million tons of grain sorghum, as an emergency.

Ruck then said - "Forget about the statement. President has already made an announcement."

~~SECRET~~

January 29, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR BILL MOYERS

The Agriculture technical team to India returned today. I too think there might be good value in their reporting to the President, as Tom Johnson suggests.

So I have told Agriculture to keep the wraps on the team till we could see if the President is interested. My sense is that a 15 minute meeting early next week before the food message goes up would serve to whet appetites and provide base for whatever the President includes about India in the food message.

I'll hold until I hear from you.

R. W. Komer

cc: Bundy
Califano

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Stat 515-78; NSC11-22-78

By jdip NARA, Date 4-28-01

57
Indra
G. com

January 28, 1966

India Ecm

RWK:

Message via Farr. Gaud and Macomber want to be sure you're aware of the current state of Indian food shipments.

They say that if we don't get a decision today or Monday on the next tranche, Indian-booked ships will begin standing idle.

The new political angle is that the Indian procurement mission is now drafting a cable to Delhi suggesting it be authorized to begin buying commercially to keep the ships moving. AID believes this will cause Delhi to wonder whether we're really going to come through--just at the time when the press is giving big play to current arrivals.

I told Farr you understood the urgency and promised to relay the political point.

HHS

~~SECRET~~

RWK:

January 28, 1966

Indeo *Em* *59* *file*

Figures for the next tranche of Indian food now stand at 1.5 million tons of grain and 30,000 tons of oil. Here's how I'd use them in connection with the resolution (attached):

1. I'd use "1.8 million tons of grain." State and AID support Freeman's overall recommendation for 1.5 million tons of grain, but they're all using that figure because they think it's all the President will buy. As you said, there's a case for even 2 million. I'd suggest trying 1.8 million (though I've inserted 1.5 in the draft) for this reason: Eskildsen says he thinks Indian parts may be able to handle 1.2 million. Releasing 1.5 million now gives us only 5 weeks, i. e. to about 4 March. If Mrs. Gandhi comes mid-March, we'll undoubtedly be left hanging just a week or two before she arrives. Wouldn't it be better to add another week's worth now just to give ourselves a little cushion? It may be easier to sell 1.8 than 2.

2. Steer clear of specific percentage of feedgrains. Neither State nor AID endorses a specific percentage. Farr's attitude (I agree) is that Freeman's reason for mixing is nonsense--making consumers unhappy with low quality grains so they'll push GOI. But since some Indians do eat sorghum, he doesn't object to whatever mixture makes technical sense. But can't we let the agencies settle that? I've left that open.

3. I'd mention "other commodities" rather than "30,000 tons of oil." I've tried to leave the figure and the specific commodities in the resolution open-ended. A Congressional resolution for 5 weeks' supply isn't very impressive, and we don't want anybody to interpret the figure as a limit.

4. I can't fault the boss, but I'd prefer to leave figures out of the resolution and handle them in the covering message (see attached revised draft message).

HHS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *4-28-04*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

January 20, 1966
Wednesday/12:00 Noon

60
E. W.
Indro
X.P.W.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is one small administrative step we can take privately which would ease the pressure on us for new India food allotments, and thus give you greater flexibility.

It is for Freeman to write a letter to the Indians simply telling them that if, as, and when we make any further PL 480 allocations these can be used to reimburse them for any abnormal wheat purchases they make previously with their own scarce foreign exchange. No commitment is involved. The Indians take the risk but they do get reassurance if at some future date we give them more PL 480 it will be used to replace that which they buy. This reduces the natural Indian hesitancy to book shipping in advance, when they don't know whether PL 480 wheat will be available to ship. A letter like this will encourage them to program ahead more efficiently and buy wheat to fill the bottoms they charter. Nor are we talking about astronomical sums, only about their doing forward buying to fill any gap before we make a new allotment.

Such a letter is useful whether or not we go ahead with another 1.5 million tons soon. Encouraging the Indians to act, instead of sitting around and wringing their hands waiting for US action, will save lives yet leave us even freer to hold back tactically on further allotments than before.

Approve _____

R. W. Komer

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 4-28-04

61/ India food

CONFIDENTIAL

RWK:

January 27, 1966

There are four ways to send a joint resolution on Indian food to the Congress:

- a. Under separate presidential message (draft attached). copy in HITS chron
- b. Add a paragraph to the bigger food message (scheduled for 4 Feb. delivery) saying the Indian problem is too urgent to wait and seeking support to go ahead now.
- c. Add a paragraph to the foreign aid message (scheduled for 1 Feb. delivery). This would avoid a jurisdictional fight that might crop up if we put this in the food message or sent it separately.
- d. Give the draft resolution to a key Senator or Congressman to surface as his own. The Gulf of Tonkin resolution was done this way. This would best avoid appearances of the President asking authority for something he already has authority to do.

My sub-para. (d) needs a special look. I think it belongs, and so does Jim Clark. However, it constitutes a decision to go ahead lifting the aid freeze and would require Bell-Rusk groundwork on the Hill. Tactically, leaving it in would help channel the resolution into the Foreign Affairs committees rather than the Agriculture committees.

HRS

Jim Clark says this is OK with him. Before clearing it formally, he'd like to check with Schultze. I said we'd ask him if you're ready to go that far.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 4-28-04

~~SECRET~~

January 26, 1966

62
Jaredo En

Mac -

I depend on your sense of whether to try out attached again, but I fear this modest, sensible point got lost in the wash.

This letter would have merit throughout the period of continuing interim allotments, which I'd continue to favor a while longer. So its utility is not affected by any early new allotment.

RWK

Attach. RWK Memo to President 1/26/66 12Noon
re Freeman letter to Indians on PL 480

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *jc* 4-28-04

63
file
January 24, 1966

RWK:

The international effort for food to India so far has netted about 360,000 tons of wheat plus a variety of other foods and financial support. The Indians have had specific responses from 10 donors and immediate hopes from 5 others.

Wheat offers come mostly from Canada (126,000) and Australia (150,000). Canada has also offered \$2 million worth of wheat flour. The World Food Plan has come up with 54,000 and the Yugoslavs have agreed to divert our shipments of 30,000. Sweden and Greece--two likely small donors--still haven't answered.

Other food offers aren't quantified but include dairy products, dried fruit, dried eggs, dried milk and milk powder, rapeseed, dried peas, baby food.

Other offers include fertilizer, pesticides, porthandling equipment, shipping.

The Soviets initially said their own needs are too great to help. The Indians are going back. Seems to me this could be the best bet because the Soviets could make more Canadian and Australian wheat available simply by agreeing to put off shipment of some of their own orders. The Indians should concentrate on that approach.

HHS

~~SECRET~~

January 20, 1966

Mac -

Unless you think I'm wrong, I don't propose to send attached Freeman memo forward in Freeman's own interest (since LBJ is reacting adversely). Moreover, in this case, his memo is both poorly drafted and grossly inaccurate:

(1) We have gotten a surprisingly good response from other countries, not just Canada. In fact, the UK has allocated more dough than Canada. But we'll keep pushing.

(2) Orville is mad to suggest that we offer to match what other countries do "in a ratio of 2 or 3 to 1." Aside from the fact that in another memo dated the same day he recommended 4 to 1, any such ratio would be condemning masses of Indians to starvation. We're going to get (mostly by the sweat of our own brows) a major international effort to provide cover for our own. But we are not going to get others to put in anything like a quarter (much less a third) of what we do. In the first place, there isn't that much grain available in the world. So it badly misleads LBJ for Orville to talk this way.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 4-28-04

Attach. Freeman Memo to President 1/18/66, subj. Participation of other nations in meeting 1966 India Food Crisis

OK but bring Orville
up to date / mcgB.

~~SECRET~~

January 18, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here are Freeman's new recommendations on India famine relief. He proposes (1) announcing a new 1.5 million ton allotment in your foreign aid/food message, or alternatively as a gesture of confidence as soon as the new Indian PM is elected; (2) making 1/5th of such allotments feedgrains, as a means of pressing India to do more on agriculture; (3) hitting other countries harder to share the burden; and (4) authorizing him to reimburse India out of later allocations for dollars it spends now to keep the pipeline full (this last gives us a lot more maneuverability).

The above seems sensible. I'd favor holding any allotment till your food message, rather than acting now, because it will probably lead the new PM to write you. We ourselves should also prod other countries harder now to contribute, especially since the Delhi government will be temporarily disorganized. This point is worth covering in your food message. But no matter how hard we and the Indians push, I frankly doubt that we can get others to contribute as much as 1/5th of India's needs (as Freeman suggests). Let's exhort like hell, but any such arbitrary formula would only tie our own hands.

Approve Freeman package _____

Make new allotment now _____

Discuss with me further ☒ _____

R. W. Komer

11/18/66

Bob, Come to see me.
Please try to get
Freeman to quit going
stuff away.

~~SECRET~~

Attach. Memo to President from Freeman, subj. India

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 25, #282

By jc NARA, Date 4-23-04

65
India
x O.D.

LCJ

Index *66* *file*
January 14, 1966

WHEAT SUPPLY
July 1965 - June 1966
In the Four Major Producers Other Than US
(Million Metric tons)

	<u>Canada</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Argentina</u>	<u>Australia</u>	<u>Total</u>
Total supply for export or carryover	28.2	7.4	8.7	7.9	52.2
Minus exports already planned or committed:					
To Communist countries	(8.6)	(2.0)	(4.5)	(2.6)	(17.7)
To Free World markets	(7.7 ^a)	(2.5)	(2.6)	(3.5 ^a)	(16.3)
Total	16.3	4.5	7.1	6.1	34.0
Minus desirable stocks as of 1 July 1966	<u>8.2</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>13.6</u>
Balance theoretically available for additional shipments	3.7 ^b	.9	0	0	4.6

- a. Estimate includes 0.2 from Canada and 0.1 from Australia for India under Colombo Plan.
- b. Canadian rail and port facilities cannot move much (if any) more than the 16.3 million tons already planned for export.

Available from Minor Producers

These are the best USDA guesses at the moment, subject to minor revision as we update marketing information:

Greece	0.4 (ports probably unable to move
Italy	0.3 that much)
United Kingdom	0.2
Sweden	0.1
Syria	0.1
Mexico	---(very small amount possible)

67 file

January 14, 1966

2 con

U. S. WHEAT SITUATION

(Million Metric Tons)

India

Carryover July 1, 1965	22.3
Production	36.1
Total Supply	<u>58.4</u>
Domestic disappearance	18.4
Exported July - December (dollar and concessional sales)	<u>10.4</u>
Available for export and carryover 12/1/65	29.6
Estimated dollar exports Jan. - June	3.1
PL 480 Program projections other than India, Jan. - June	<u>4.6</u>
Available for carryover and India, Jan. - June	21.9

January 14, 1966

**MEMORANDUM FOR
SECRETARY FREEMAN**

Here's a draft of what I'd propose to send the President tomorrow if you are on board. Also attached is my last memo to the boss, on which you and I collaborated.

As agreed, I left aside the question of your visit to India.

R. W. Komer

1) Attach. RWK Draft Memo to President 1/14/66 6:15 pm
on Indian Food

2) RWK Memo to Pres 1/8/66

India Com

68

~~SECRET~~/DRAFT

68a
January 14, 1966
Friday / 6:15 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Indian Food. The setback to our strategy from Shastri's death forces us to rethink the food problem first of all. The VP and Rusk promised the Indians they'd take this up with you, so this memo gives Freeman's ideas and mine.

Bowles is recommending a multi-month, multi-million ton agreement right now, to permit maximum shipments before the monsoon comes. Freeman and I see no need to go this far and deprive ourselves of leverage with the new man. On the other hand, we do see merit in an early generous gesture to show US confidence in India and to match the Soviet success at Tashkent.

The VP suggested that the new PM should make a new official request for help. There's some point waiting till he does so, although one disadvantage is that he will probably request the total amount (\$11 million tons) India thinks it needs this year. In this case, a response allocating only a million or 1.5 million tons might seem inadequate. Thus there may be merit in making such an interim allocation before the Indian request comes in, thus reminding them that we propose to keep turning the tap on by degrees for a while yet.

It is also fair to say that India is making a genuine effort to get help from others. The British, Canadians, Australians, and Dutch have already come through (I will send you a separate report on this).

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By pc, NARA, Date 4-28-04

The options available are still the same as in my memo of 8 January. Since an early visit is not on, however, Freeman and I would now recommend the following:

(1) Another million or 1.5 million tons around 24 January, assuming that the new PM had been selected by then. You could announce this as part of your new fight on hunger. Alternatively, you might announce it in the foreign aid/food message.

(2) Immediate announcement of a small (200,000 ton) special Title II program for child feeding. This would serve the purpose of enabling us to schedule maximum shipments through Indian ports in February.

(3) Approve Freeman's giving a letter to the Indians telling them that if they spend dollars now on food, we would reimburse them from any future PL 480 allocations. If we're going to make such allocations anyway at some point, this device helps move the Indians to maximise early procurement and shipment through Indian ports before the monsoon hits.

We believe that the above recommendations would both retain maximum food leverage in our hands and forestall any renewed allegations that we are playing politics with food. As I see it, you want to be generous enough to keep the Indians from starving, yet to keep them coming to us for PL 480.

Approve _____

Hold off till I talk with VP and Rusk _____

R. W. Komer

See me _____

~~SECRET~~

January 8, 1966

Mac -

I've generated a dozen prods via State, AID, and Agriculture, but feel that an added side wire to Chet is needed, if you see no objection.

OK

Indro E

Note also my attached letter to John Lewis. Are we on all fours?

OK

*just about
meq B* RWK

Attach. RWK cable to Bowles 1/8/66
RWK ltr to John Lewis 1/4/66

69a

~~SECRET~~

January 8, 1966

TO NEW DELHI
25X1ASEND VIA [REDACTED] CHANNEL
FOR AMBASSADOR FROM KOMER

Might be helpful if I underline privately that failure GOI as yet to mount all-out effort to get famine aid from other countries is impeding our own response. We recognize that US will have to carry much of load, but adequate and timely US response may be critically dependent on our ability convince Congress and people that India not leaning exclusively on us.

All here aware of what Indians doing already and also of GOI's domestic political problem in avoiding too much local focus on famine. But from stand-point generating adequate US role, hope you can keep constantly before Subramaniam what was stressed to him here - that US wants to move in concert with others, not be left to do job alone.

As added incentive to Indians to get shipping contributions from others, we don't want them to count on our paying freight under Title II. Might be worthwhile get this discreetly into the works.

Am strongly of view that success of Shastri visit will critically depend on Shastri's own ability take initiative and convince President that India has a positive policy on development, agriculture, China, Pakistan, non-proliferation, etc. Is it too out of character for Shastri to come prepared make strong initial

Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : NLJ-032-025-1-1-0

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ-032-025-1-1By je NARA, Date 4-29-04

SECRET

Page 2

presentation such points, thus helping reassure us that India has vigorous, sensible leadership. Note my letter to John Lewis 4 January. If return from Tashkent delayed, little time will be left for you to brief him. In this case, might be point in delaying your return here. In either case, can we get you for dinner 27th?

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Saturday, January 8, 1966, 3:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

This is Bob Komer's second try at a balanced statement of the alternatives before us on the Indian famine problem before Shastri's visit. He is addressing the issues that remain after your decisions on Freeman's good memorandum yesterday. I think he has stated the alternatives pretty clearly, and I agree with the recommendations in which he and Orville join. I think it is the best available way of keeping the ports fully used in the spring, while keeping the heat on the Indians and avoiding new public commitments in January (except for some help to children, if you want it.)

M. B.

McG. B.

Bob,

this memo looks pretty good

comments - but we have

other comments today

SECRET

70a
January 9, 1960
Saturday/11:00 am

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

More on India Food. Let me assure you that I'm not trying to push too hard here. My one aim is to be sure that you are given the full picture on this complex matter, because our two chief objectives tend to conflict with each other.

A. Our first aim is to keep up the pressure on Shastri, especially before he comes. This involves not letting India conclude that the US will take on the full load of coping with Indian famine, and thus relax on Indian self-help and appeals to others.

B. Our other aim is to help forestall mass starvation, not only on humanitarian grounds but because a stable India moving forward is essential to our Asian containment policy of boxing in Red China. Nor do we want to let the famine get so bad that we have to resort to highly expensive emergency steps on which we'll have to pick up most of the tab.

The first objective argues for not making another major PL 480 allocation before Shastri comes, even though this puts Shastri under the gun to appeal for more food when here. On the other hand, the big bottleneck in Indian port capacity argues for another allocation shortly if we are to assure the most efficient and economical flow of food before Indian port capacity is cut 200,000-300,000 tons by the onset of the rainy season in late May. The cheapest and most effective way to meet the port capacity problem is to move in as close to a million tons a month as we can up to late May. Because of lead time, we can no longer do so in January-February, but if India books ships and we provide wheat now we can reach the optimum level by March. The Indians are booking a lot of shipping in advance on faith, but we face a host of practical problems here in positioning boxcars, buying grain, and telling the Indians where to send the ships. All this is hard to arrange without firm contracts. So if our only aim were to do the job at least cost we'd be back at you now for at least a million tons.

Practical Solutions. But Freeman and I have tried to find a few ingenious ways to serve both our objectives. Here they are:

A. Hold up another allocation till just after Shastri visit, but decide now to allot 1.5 million tons on 5 February so it can then be moved as quickly as possible. This would probably work if we: (1) encouraged India to continue booking ships in advance; (2) did all the preliminaries so we could move at

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

Authority NLS 00-256 (490a)
By je/ab. NARA. Date 4-28-04

~~SECRET~~

Page 2

top speed on 5 February; yet (3) told the Indians we could make no firm commitments till after Shastri visit (they'd read this loud and clear). Agriculture's experts are quite nervous about this scheme; they'd much prefer a firm allocation so they could make firm contracts, but Freeman thinks it could be managed, and has told his people to prepare to do so.

B. If we wanted to do the minimum essential to keep up the flow into Indian ports in February, you could announce now a special Title II program for emergency child and aged feeding (say 200,000 tons plus some vegetable oil and milk). Children were Subramaniam's special worry. This would appear as clearly a special gesture following up his visit, and demonstrate your concern for women and children.

C. Call again before Shastri comes for a special international effort, and announce US willingness to contribute several million tons under Title II (we pay the freight), above and beyond normal Title I aid. India is already trying hard to get other help (with some success), but also faces the domestic political problem of not crying famine too loudly yet lest it precipitate hoarding, food riots, etc. So this gesture seems better held until the Indians themselves take the initiative.

D. Authorize Freeman to proceed with a reimbursement procedure (used by India and other countries in the past). The Indians would buy now for dollars, but Freeman would give them a letter to the effect that if and when a new Title I agreement is made their dollar purchases would be covered. If this system were followed real transactions would take place, and the complicated process of coordinating internal supply with ships in the absence of actual transactions could be avoided. As in A above, the Indians would have to run the risk that the Shastri visit might not result in more Title I grain. But that is not too much to ask in light of their desperate need.

Recommended Course. Freeman and I would tend to favor Plan A (privately get ready for a prompt post-Shastri allotment of 1.5 million tons). To keep up momentum in the meantime, you might also authorize now the small Title II children's program. This combination is a tricky but ingenious way to prepare for the worst but keep the Indians guessing a bit.

Approve Plan A _____

Add on small children's program _____

Try Plan D _____

Keep thinking _____

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

January 6, 1966

Mac -

I've generated a dozen prods via State, AID, and Agriculture, but feel that an added side wire to Chet is needed, if you see no objection.

RWK

21
Indro E. in
Brooks
X

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By je, NARA, Date 4-28-04

71a

~~SECRET~~

January 6, 1966

TO NEW DELHI

25X1A

SEND VIA [REDACTED] CHANNEL

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM KOMER

Cannot emphasise too presumptorily urgency of India mounting all-out effort to get famine aid from other countries. We recognize that US will have to carry bulk of load, but adequate and timely US response may be critically dependent on our ability convince Congress and people that India not leaning exclusively on US.

All here aware of what Indians doing already and also recognise GOI's domestic political problem in avoiding too much local focus on famine. But from standpoint generating adequate US role, Subramaniam needs to be constantly reminded of what was stressed to him here--that US wants to move in concert with others not be left to do job alone.

As added incentive to Indians to get shipping contributions from others, we don't want them to count on our paying freight under Title II. You might also get this discreetly into the works.

Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : NLJ-032-025-1-2-9

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ-032-025-1-2By je NARA, Date 4-29-01

January 6, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR BILL MOYERS

Here's the proposed press release on agricultural team to India. I can dress it up more if you like.

If you want to use it, suggest holding for Friday release. This is so we can give Indians the courtesy of telling them what we plan to announce.

R. W. Komer

India 4 am

PRESS RELEASE

At the request of the President, Secretary of Agriculture Freeman is dispatching to India this weekend a team of experts to help assess India's food distribution problems. During his visit to Washington in late December, Indian Food and Agriculture Minister Subramaniam discussed with the President, Secretary Freeman, and Secretary Rusk India's greatly increased requirements for food imports in the year ahead, resulting from an unprecedentedly serious drought. India is expected to require a considerably higher level of food imports than its ports have ever before handled. The Government of India suggested that a team of US Government experts come to India to help assess India's ability to cope with potential difficulties concerning port and inland transportation requirements. The team is headed by C. R. Eskildsen, Associate Administrator of the Foreign Agricultural Service, and includes other experts from the Department of Agriculture as well as from the Agency for International Development and the Maritime Administration. The team is expected to stay in India for about three weeks.

726
Dictated to JK from Sober's office
Cleared by Agriculture and State

1/5/66

PRESS RELEASE

During his visit to Washington in late December, the Indian Food and Agriculture Minister, the Honorable C. Subramaniam, discussed with the President, Secretary Freeman, and Secretary Rusk India's greatly increased requirements for food imports in the year ahead, resulting from an unprecedentedly serious drought. India is expected to require a considerably higher level of food imports than its ports have ever before handled. At the request of the Government of India a team of US Government experts is going to India this weekend to help assess India's current critical food problems, particularly with respect to potential difficulties concerning port and inland transportation requirements. The team is headed by C. R. Eskildsen, Associate Administrator of the Foreign Agricultural Service, and includes other experts from the Department of Agriculture as well as from the Agency for International Development and the Maritime Administration. The team is expected to stay in India for about three weeks.

Revised

~~SECRET~~

January 6, 1966

Mac:

FYI, here's my current devious thinking on food for India. Am checking it out with Orville.

RWK

73
India Comm

Attach. RWK Memo for President 1/6/66-2:30 pm
subj. More on India Food.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 4-28-09

SECRET

January 6, 1966

MEMO FOR JOHN SCHNITTKER

Here's the draft memo I told Orville I'd send over today, as an example of the sort of recommendation we might send informally to the President. I've framed it as a memo from me with Orville concurring, on grounds that I'll take the onus this time. If he'd prefer it otherwise, no problem (but I don't think we should show or discuss this with task force or staff for obvious reasons).

R. W. Komer

Att. RWK Memo for President 1/6/66 2:30 pm
subj. More on India Food

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 4-28-01

74a
Chron

~~SECRET~~

January 6, 1966
Thursday, 2:30 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

More on India Food. This is an incredibly complex problem, not least because our two chief objectives tend to conflict:

A. First, we want to keep the pressure on India, especially before Shastri comes, to keep encouraging the economic and political responses we want. This involves not letting India conclude that the US will take the full load on coping with Indian famine, partly in order to ensure adequate Indian self-help and appeals to others.

B. But our other major aim is to forestall mass starvation in India, not only on humanitarian grounds but because a stable India moving forward is essential to our Asian containment policy of boxing in Red China. Nor do we want to let the famine get so bad that we have to resort to highly expensive emergency steps on which we'll inevitably have to pick up most of the tab.

The Problem. The first objective argues that we not make another major PL 480 allocation before Shastri comes, even though this puts Shastri under the gun to appeal for more food when here. However, the big bottleneck of Indian port capacity argues for another allocation shortly in order to assure the most efficient and economical flow of food into Indian ports before their capacity is cut by 200,000-300,000 tons at the onset of the rainy season in late May. Whether the Indian food deficit turns out to be 10 million or 15 million tons, the cheapest and most effective way to meet it is to move as close to a million tons a month as we can into their ports up to late May. Because of lead time, we've already missed this chance for January-February, but if we book ships and buy wheat now we can reach the optimum level by March. The Indians are booking a lot of shipping in advance on faith, but we have a host of practical problems here in positioning boxcars, buying grain, and telling the Indians when to send the ships. So if the only aim were to do the job at least cost we'd be back at you for at least a million tons now, and the same in February.

Practical Solutions. However, Freeman and I have focussed on various means of serving both our objectives.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 4-28-01

~~SECRET~~

not sent to Pres

~~SECRET~~

Page Two

A. Hold up another allocation till just after Shastri visit, but do all advance planning now to allot 1.5 million tons on 5 February so it can then be moved as quickly as possible. This would probably work if: (1) we encouraged India to continue advance booking; (2) did all the preliminaries so we could move at top speed on 5 February; yet (3) told the Indians we could make no more firm commitments till after Shastri visit (they'd read this loud and clear). Agriculture's experts are quite nervous about this scheme; they'd much prefer a firm allocation so they could make firm contracts, but Freeman thinks it could be managed.

B. If we wanted to do the minimum essential to keep up the flow into Indian ports in February, you could announce how a special Title II program for emergency child feeding (only 2-300,000 tons). You recall this as Subramaniam's special worry. This would be clearly separate from the main stream and appear as a special gesture.

C. Call again before Shastri comes for a special international effort, and announce US willingness to contribute several million tons under Title II (we pay the freight), above and beyond normal Title I aid. India is already trying hard to get other help (with some success), but also faces the domestic political problem of not crying famine too loudly yet lest it precipitate hoarding, food riots, etc. So this gesture seems better held until the Indians themselves take the initiative.

Recommended course. Freeman and I think the best idea is Plan A (privately get ready for a prompt post-Shastri allotment of another 1.5 million tons). If we want to keep up momentum in the meantime, authorize now the small Title II children's program (200,000 tons). Meanwhile keep prodding India behind the scenes for a bigger international effort. This combination is a tricky but flexible way to have our cake and eat it too.

R. W. Komer

Approve Plan A _____

Add on small children's program _____

Try again _____

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

4-9
P.N.
January 4, 1966
Tuesday/7:00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is another brilliant, though awfully wordy, report on India famine by Freeman. It boils down to the fact that the most efficient and cheapest way to minimize famine (there will be some in any case) is to schedule an optimum flow into Indian ports before their capacity drops sharply when the rainy season begins in May. Otherwise we and other donors will have to resort to expensive emergency measures at that time.

The 1.5 million tons have already been purchased and are being shipped as fast as possible. But there will be a gap in the pipeline and a sharp shortfall from the million tons a month we'd like to get in before the rains come unless we either (a) authorize at least another 500,000 tons shortly, or (b) at least tell the Indians privately we will so they can firmly book shipping ahead.

Freeman reports that India is urgently requesting help from others, and getting some responses, but the evidence is that no one besides ourselves and Canada has much wheat (and Canadian ports get frozen over).

Frankly, one problem is that Freeman and the rest of us hesitate to hit you so soon again on Indian food. However, would there be some appropriate place in the series of messages you are planning for a new dramatic announcement shortly?

Freeman is sending a technical mission to India Thursday and would like to go briefly himself around 20 January (perhaps en route to Vietnam). Would this merit a White House announcement along with another 500,000 or million tons of food?

Draft WH announcement _____

Draft para. for aid message _____

Tell Indians privately we'll allocate an additional million tons before Shastri comes _____

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRS 67-68, vol. 25 #274
By jc NARA, Date 4-23-01

Attach. Freeman Memo to President 1/4/65,
subj. Follow up on Indian Food and Agric.
Situation

R. W. Komer

SECRET

76
Jan 4
India
January 4, 1966

Mac -

Here's a report to LBJ on India food from Freeman, which I suggest we put in cold in night reading. Too many covering memos from me just suggest collusion.

The hell of it is that the cheapest and most efficient way to help limit famine is to schedule an optimum flow now into Indian ports, because their capacity drops by 250,000 tons a month when the rainy season begins in May. I made this point in my last memo, but Freeman and I are frankly both scared to prod on it, when LBJ was so recently generous on the 1.5 million tons.

Rostow just badgered me again on this very matter, so I asked why he didn't come in on the flank through his own channel. He says he will.

It strikes me that a good "occasion" for the next big step would be at time of the Presidential message on aid, or a separate one on food, if it came by late January. What say?

We both know the Boss is going to go big on India food; the problem is how to convince him soon enough to do so efficiently --and save lives to boot.

RWK

Att. Freeman Memo to President 1/4/65, subj. Follow up on Indian Food and Agricultural Situation

See RWK to Pres
1/4/66

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By je, NARA, Date 4-28-04

SECRET

January 3, 1966

*Indira Eam
x Sh Visit 77*

Mac -

Here's an absolutely first-class memo from John Lewis. When you read it, you'll agree that LBJ should too but this may be the wrong week. On other hand, if we can get an OK now it will help powerfully to get the Shastri visit set up right (and we really only have three weeks).

RWK

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 4-28-04

— 17a
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 18, 1966

Bob:

I agree that this memo is first-class, but I think it ought to go to the President in the correct context, and your memorandum is out of date now. Will you try again?

McG. B.

attach to
RWK 1/3/66
JFK & me

SECRET

Indira P.D. + Sh. Vire 776
January 3, 1966
Monday, 4:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached memo on the Indian economy is well worth scanning in anticipation of Shastri's visit. John Lewis, the author was a member of the CEA and is now one of AID's best mission directors. He's so much more sober than Bowles that I listen hard when he speaks.

He confirms that our aid strategy has really moved the Indians, and argues that by using our money more wisely we can force an economic breakthrough without spending any more in 1966-68 than we have in recent years. Since George Woods is also an advocate of this school, the World Bank would be a natural ally in this endeavor. Incidentally, Lewis' memo is along precisely the same lines as the India strategy paper approved by both your cabinet committee and non-committee (which Lewis has never seen).

If--and only if--Shastri says the right things when here, would you entertain an aid bargain along the lines Lewis plugs? I do not envisage any firm commitments, but rather a gentlemen's understanding that if he actually does all the things we think we can get him to promise, he will find us equally responsive in providing economic backing. India-lover or no, I see a big league opportunity shaping up here along the lines we want. If you like this concept, I'd favor getting word discreetly to Shastri beforehand (not through Bowles) on what we expect of him.

R. W. Komer

OK for pre-visit planning purposes _____

Show me what you'd tell Shastri beforehand _____

Let's hold off a while longer _____

*Not sent to L.B.J. but
returned with one note.
Revised by R.W.K. 1/18/66.*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *pc*, NARA, Date *4-28-01*

SECRET