

## LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Page 1 of 1

<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
<del>04a</del>	<del>airgram</del>	Enclosure to A-424 from Baghdad open 8/15/12 per NLJ/RAC 11-57	<del>C</del>	<del>6</del>	<del>10/30/65</del>	<del>A</del>
04e	airgram	A-22 from Tabriz sanitized 8/15/12 per NLJ/RAC 11-57	S	16	1/26/65	A
04f	airgram	A-629 from Baghdad sanitized 8/15/12 per NLJ/RAC 11-57	S	6	1/8/65	A
<del>07</del>	<del>letter</del>	Townsend Hoopes to Raymond Hare open 9.24.07	<del>S</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>3/7/65</del>	<del>A</del>
13	report	pp. 15-16 of Current Intelligence Digest - sanitized per RAC 09/00	S	2	2/11/64	A

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**Collection Title** National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer**Folder Title** "Iraq - Kurds (1964 - March 1966)"**Box Number** 28

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**Restriction Codes**

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(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

06/03/2003

  
Initials

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 23, 1966

RWK:

We have another letter from Mullah Mustafa Barazani to the President. He says the Iraqi government is intensifying its campaign to exterminate the Kurds and asks the President to prevent the supply of arms to the Iraqi government and to use his influence to settle the Kurdish problem.

State proposes we tell Barazani's emissary if he comes back that we still see this as an internal affair, don't intend to interfere and urge negotiations. In addition, State will give it's people in a separate telegram the facts on our military aid to Iraq in order to deflate any notion that we're responsible for the current flow of arms against the Kurds.

Since we don't even officially acknowledge that we've received this letter here, can't you clear this cable and save LBJ's time? It's consistent with past handling and still makes sense as long as we're going to stay out of the Kurdish business.

HHS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
DATE 11-15-00  
BY 12 NARA Date 6-2-03

SECRET

Mildred *guyac*

April 30, 1965

As you requested, I returned Mr. Vanli's call to Mr. Bundy. For the record, I had to tell him that we could not receive him. When he asked how he might deliver the letter he carries from Kurdish leader Barzani, I suggested that perhaps he might put it in the mail. He expressed disappointment as I had expected.

The problem here is that he is a representative of Kurdish rebels in Iraq and has a visa which prohibits him from doing any political work here in the US. The State Department always refuses to receive these people officially because we have tried to keep a "hands-off" policy toward the rebellion saying that it is strictly an Iraqi internal affair. The Iraqi Embassy here in town is watching this fellow like a hawk so we can't afford to have anything to do with him.

HHS

~~SECRET~~

*file*  
*Kurd*  
*2*

DEPT. ASSISTANT  
EO. 12812, Dec. 28  
12812-101  
NARA, Box 6-2-03

SECRET

April 29, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WATSON

An Iraqi Kurd, Ismet Sharif Vanli, is in town telling people he has a letter for the President from the Kurdish leader, Barzani. He may try to get in to see someone in the White House.

We have maintained a strict hands-off policy toward the Kurdish rebellion, saying it's entirely an internal Iraqi affair. We issue visas to Kurds on the condition that they will not politic here and will not be officially received, but this one won't take no for an answer.

So if he calls, secretaries might be warned to turn him away politely.

Harold H. Saunders  
McGeorge Bundy's Staff

cc: McGeorge Bundy

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, NO. 3.5  
DATE 10/1/01  
By *NA* NARA, GPO 6-2-03



NEA-10

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# AIRGRAM

POL 13-3 IRAQ

FOR RM USE ONLY

RM/R	REP	AF
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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
3	10	4
OSD	USIA	NSA
31	8	3
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A-424

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: ADANA, ALEPPO, ANKARA, BASRA, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, LONDON, TABRIZ, TEHRAN

FROM : Amembassy BAGHDAD

DATE: October 30, 1965

SUBJECT : Analysis of the Kurdish Problem

REF :

DECLASSIFIED

Ambassy FRUS, Vol. XXI, # 177

NAHA, Date 6-2-03

Enclosed is an analysis in outline form of the Iraqi Kurdish problem prepared by Ambassador Strong. The analysis sets forth the many and varied competing interests and motivations involved and should be helpful to all concerned with United States policy on this problem.

The central conclusion from the standpoint of the United States is that a high degree of autonomy or independence for the Iraqi Kurds would be disruptive of area stability and inimical to our interests in the long run. Neither is the continuation of the fighting in United States interests, although the consequences do not, at least for the time being, warrant a major initiative by the United States. That the communists and Soviets will gain control of a large-scale insurrection seems unlikely, as is Kurdish ability to establish an autonomous or separatist regime.

The analysis brings out that while the United States, Soviet and UAR postures advocating a peaceful, negotiated settlement are superficially parallel, the positions are differently motivated and, especially in the United States and Soviet cases, based on different assumptions as to probable results.

Similarly, the Iranians and Israelis - and perhaps the British - appear for varying motivations to favor continuation of the conflict for its debilitating effect on Iraq.

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In ☐ Out

FORM 4-62 DS-225

Drafted by:

AMB:RCStrong/POL:ESDuncan:plj:10/29/65

Contents and Classification Approved by:

ESDuncan

Clearances:

AMB:RCStrong

1965 NOV 5 AM 11 33

COPYFLO-PBR

BUNDY-SMITH  
GATOR  
BUNDY-ER  
BUNDY-UN  
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CORNER  
JES-UP  
KENTON  
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KENTON  
KENTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Airgram No. 424, page two  
Baghdad, Iraq

Continued Iranian/Israeli intervention is a threat to the United States position in Iraq but, unfortunately, neither country is likely to be heedful of United States interests in the matter.

For the immediate future, neither the Kurds or the GOI appear able to force a military solution. Similarly even a negotiated solution is not likely to be permanent. The Kurdish problem is long-term.

The current United States policy stance seems the most suitable - that the problem is an internal Iraqi one for which a negotiated political solution is desirable.

For the Ambassador:

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Enoch S. Duncan", written over a horizontal line.

Enoch S. Duncan  
Counselor for Political Affairs

Enclosure:

As stated

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

43  
Enclosure to A-424,  
Baghdad, Iraq

Kurds - Iraq

U. S. Objectives

- 1) Avoid Soviet influence over Kurds and Soviet use of Kurds to disrupt Middle East.
- 2) Avoid establishment of full autonomy or independence for Kurds.
- 3) Keep them in Iraq, living peacefully with Arabs and participating fully in national life.
- 4) Avoid stirring up of Kurdish problem in Turkey and Iran.
- 5) Prevent Kurdish problem from affecting adversely U. S. interests in Iraq.

Kurdish Objectives

- 1) KDP element, mainly of urban origin, seeks independence, by autonomy route if necessary.
- 2) Tribal element probably seeks sufficient authority to maintain tribal structure.
- 3) While wish external support and internal communist assistance, Kurds wish maintain independence of external or communist control.

Iraqi Objectives

- 1) Avoid alienation of territory.
- 2) Avoid diffusion of authority.
- 3) Find workable formula to pacify Kurdish minority and keep passive:
  - (a) Some Arabs desire accommodation.
  - (b) Many Arabs believe Kurds must be brought to heel and then given limited concessions.
  - (c) Some Arab believe Kurds should be Arabicized.

Soviet Objectives

- 1) Gain increasing influence with Kurds through support other than material, designed to keep Kurdish issue stirred up.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLI/RAC 11-57

By LCB NARA, Date 07-17-12



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Enclosure to A-424, page two  
Baghdad, Iraq

- 2) Eventually have strong influence over an independent Kurdistan coming into existence through indigenous efforts.
- 3) Utilize an independent Kurdistan to further Soviet purposes in Turkey, Iran and the Gulf.
- 4) In the process, avoid severely antagonizing Arabs.

Turkish Objectives

- 1) Prevent Kurds from again being serious problem in Turkey.

Iranian Objectives

- 1) Prevent Kurds from creating serious problem in Iran.
- 2) Assist Kurds in Iraq sufficiently to bring change of government in Baghdad suitable to Iran.
- 3) Otherwise keep Iraq weak, divided and separate from UAR.
- 4) Advance interests in Gulf.
- 5) By stressing racial and cultural links between Persians and Kurds, keep door open to annexation.

British Objectives

- 1) Prevent Iraqi-UAR union.
- 2) Keep Iraq internally divided and weak.
- 3) Protect interests in Gulf from Iraqi pressures.
- 4) Keep oil flowing.

UAR Objectives

- 1) Establish and maintain strong influence in Iraq for area political purposes and economic profit.
- 2) Promote internal Iraqi unity.
- 3) Maintain influence with Kurds if possible for future use, possibly against Iran and Turkey.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Enclosure to A-424, page three  
Baghdad, Iraq

Situation of Kurds Compared to 1961-62

- 1) Rested by truce, control large areas along Iranian frontier, supplied from outside by enemies of Arabs, much better equipped, at least 10,000 fighting men, using guerrilla tactics only, well led, better communications, some of the Kurds paid by government deserting with weapons to Kurdish side.
- 2) While lacking heavier weapons, now have mortars, bazookas, mines, and a clandestine radio station.
- 3) Strongly supported in northern cities.
- 4) Developing resistance and action capabilities in Baghdad.
- 5) Supported politically by Soviets and local commies.
- 6) Supported clandestinely to limited extent by Iran and Israel - but Iran distrusted by Kurdish leaders.
- 7) Probably seriously divided on objectives. (Or is Barzani deceiving us on his real intentions?)
- 8) Trying to establish political office in U. S. and appeal to world - probably hope for U. S. political support but not physical help.
- 9) Far stronger than before and aware of strength, but lack resources to establish separate state.
- 10) Threaten turn to Soviets and commies in case of need.
  - (a) But rebellion is controlled by mountain tribal Kurds, who fiercely independent.

Situation of GOI

- 1) Large forces in north, apparently unsuccessfully seeking to intimidate.
- 2) Trying to buy Kurds and divide them politically.
- 3) Undertaking limited military operations - with limited success.
- 4) Trying to whip up feeling against Kurdish rebels.
- 5) Unwilling to enter genuine negotiations - wish to impose conditions - refused by Kurds.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Enclosure to A-424, page four  
Baghdad, Iraq

- 6) Fearful of international attention; has only recently acknowledged military operations occurring.
- 7) Unable to defeat Kurds militarily.
- 8) Unable withdraw army without giving Kurds great victory.
- 9) Rent by disputes and weak.
- 10) Somewhat at odds with UAR over Kurds and other matters.
- 11) After failure of earlier tactics, obliged to step up campaign especially in effort close foreign aid routes.
- 12) Feeling sense of desperation, of international conspiracy against them through Kurds.
- 13) Can prevent Kurds from establishing credible government controlling defined territory.

Situation of USG

- 1) We have not necessarily been informed by the British of their true position, who apparently are encouraging Kurds.
- 2) We know Iran is encouraging and aiding Kurds, as is Israel.
- 3) GOI suspects USG encouraging Iran or at least not discouraging it. GOI cannot conceive of U. S. inability discourage Iran if it wishes to. Iraqi reaction limited to date, but feeling beginning to intensify.
- 4) USG has temporarily surmounted problem of Kurdish representation in U. S. (mission of Ismet Sharif Vanli), whose goals are anathema to GOI.
- 5) Apparently USG unable influence GOI at present and probably cannot influence Kurds.
- 6) USG cannot influence Iran without extreme pressure and only if British cooperate with us. U. S. unwilling to use such pressure in view of other interests.
- 7) If USG, British and Iran work against Kurds, Kurdish commies strengthened.
- 8) USG in dilemma:

(a) Strength of Kurdish movement growing.

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Enclosure to A-424, page five  
Baghdad, Iraq

- (b) Iraq may be kept in turmoil and continue to waste assets on military operations.
- (c) U. S. must continue support GOI and consider Kurdish problem an internal one.
- (d) Kurds trying act politically in U. S. and U. N. - anathema to Iraqi Arabs.
- (e) Iran and other countries friendly to U. S. may soon begin to supply arms of U. S. origin to Kurds. Will exacerbate U. S. problem in Iraq and U. S. interests will suffer.

Is Kurdish Threat to Turn to Soviets and Commies Realistic?

- 1) What are real allegiances of leaders of Kurdish rebels?
- 2) Numbers of Kurdish and Arab communists already in north.
- 3) To date Soviets have provided only political support.
- 4) Kurds who actively rebelling are mountain people, extremely independent.
- 5) Barzani and friends experienced Soviet betrayal - Mahabad Republic.
- 6) If Soviets provide arms and advisers or "volunteers", harmful to other Soviet interests.
  - (a) Arabs need Soviets - support on Israel, balance off West, provide arms.
  - (b) Because of these needs Soviets have leeway to support Kurds politically.
  - (c) Physical assistance to Kurds by Soviets would bring strong Arab reaction.
    - i. GOI would have to react strongly.
    - ii. UAR and Syria would have to support GOI.
    - iii. Commie apparatuses would suffer setbacks.
    - iv. Soviet economic interests would suffer.
- 7) Kurds would probably doublecross Soviets anyhow, eventually.

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Enclosure to A-424, page six  
Baghdad, Iraq

- 8) Critical point is inability Kurds maintain and establish credible government controlling defined territory.
- 9) Soviets better off to let others do helping in Kurdistan - help politically and financially outside of Kurdistan and support Kurdish commie movement.
- 10) Kurds are very long-range game for Soviets - no timetable.

#### Conclusions

- 1) Kurdish problem likely to continue indefinitely; likely to go through cycles of insurrection and relative quiescence.
- 2) Communist control over Kurds unlikely.
- 3) Turkey and Iran likely to prove able to control own Kurds.
- 4) Iraqi Kurds unable establish separate state.
- 5) Kurds will continue to try to internationalize their problem in the U. S. and U. N.
- 6) Even a negotiated solution is not likely to be permanent.

#### U. S. Policy

- 1) Current stance suitable - internal Iraqi problem, political solution desirable.
  - (a) Willing continue to listen to Kurds, but support GOI.
- 2) U. S. should not support Kurdish efforts at internationalization.
- 3) U. S. should not permit Kurds establish political office in U. S.
- 4) U. S. should continue to recommend to Shah that he keep hands off Iraqi Kurds.
  - (a) Iranian efforts ineffective and create more problems for Iran and U. S.
  - (b) No risk of Nasserite control of Iraq.

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

05884

46

AUG 11 7 15 PM '65

82

Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy TEHRAN 138

NEA

Info:

INFO: AmEmbassy ANKARA 115  
" BAGHDAD 55  
" KARACHI 175  
" LONDON 789

SS

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Baghdad's 74 to Department

Iraqi request for support efforts halt flow of arms from Iran to dissident Iraqi Kurds cannot reasonably be refused. Our consistent policy has been Kurdish insurrection matter concerning only Iraq and flow of arms and men across border to bring pressure to bear against Iraqi government incompatible our goal area stability. Kurdish victory in Iraq in pragmatic terms could have only most ominous import for stability if not integrity Iran and Turkey. Indications Iraq now has fairly accurate information nature and extent Iranian assistance insurrectionists makes it probable continuance support will lead to rapid deterioration relations.

At level GOIran you deem appropriate you should note Iraqi demarche and express US concern over pressures by Iraqis arising out of Iranian assistance to Kurds. US desires maintain good relations with Iraq and Department views it also to Iran's advantage that US limited potential for influence in Iraq not be weakened.

FOR BAGHDAD. Embassy may inform Foreign Office Embassy Tehran instructed raise matter with GOI.

FOR LONDON. You may apprise Foreign Office of foregoing.  
GP-3.

END

RUSK

Drafted by: 8/11/65

Telegraphic transmission and

NEA/NE:RPDavies:LFDinsmore:aj

classification approved by:

NEA - William J. Handley

Clearances:

NEA/GTI - Mrs. Bracken (draft)  
EUR/BNA - Mr. Judd

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FRUS, Vol XX, # 175

NARA, Dec 6-203

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

07719

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

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85

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy BAGHDAD 59

AUG 14 2 19 PM '65

NEA

Info

INFO: Amembassy ANKARA 121  
Amembassy KARACHI 190  
Amembassy LONDON 848  
Amembassy TEHRAN 154

*Kurds*

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Iraqi Ambassador on instructions made demarche to NE Director

August 13 along lines reported Baghdad's 74. He repeated Iraqi determination pursue Kurds across border if Iran does not cease aiding them.

We said U.S. policy not changed, that CENTO in no way involved. U.S. has told GOIran we desire maintain good relations with Iraq and that exacerbation Kurdish situation could adversely affect peace which is leading U.S. objective in area. Added that U.S. not in possession facts Iraq alleges re Iran, that adjacent Kurds in Iran naturally prone support fellow Kurds. U.S. not aware Iranian official complicity. Ambassador said GOIraq has solid evidence and attributed intervention policy directly to Shah.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

L RUNDY-SMITH  
L EATOR  
L BOYDLER  
L BOWMAN  
L CHASE  
L COOPER  
L HAYNES  
L JESSUP  
L JOHNSON  
L KERRY  
L KLEIN  
L KONER  
L MOODY  
L REXDY  
L SAUNDERS  
L THOMSON

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.5

By *14* NARA, DATE 6-20-03

Drafted by:

NEA/NE:LFDinsmore:dam 8/14/65

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA/NE - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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1965 MAR 18 AM 9 01  
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EO 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S-88001  
By *Handwritten initials* NARA, Date *6-20-01*

BURDY-SMITH  
BATOR  
BOWMAN  
CHASE  
COOPER  
HAYNES  
JESSUP  
JOHNSON  
KEENE  
KLEIN  
KROMER  
MOODY  
REEDY  
SAUNDERS  
SAYRE  
THOMSON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ L 773 MARCH 18-2:05 PM  
INFO ADANA ALEPPO ANKARA BASRA BEIRUT CAIRO DAMASCUS  
LONDON TABRIZ TEHRAN UNN

FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY'S TRANSLATION OF LETTER FROM ULLA  
MUSTAFA TO AMBASSADOR STRONG DATED MARCH 3 AND RECEIVED  
MARCH 16:

BEGIN TEXT

WE HAVE THE HONOR TO MAKE KNOWN TO YOU THE MOST RECENT  
DEVELOPMENTS OF THE KURDISH PROBLEM AND OF THE NEW CRISIS  
WHICH THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS CREATED AROUND IT. AS IN THE  
CFN 773 3 16

PAGE TWO RUQVWG 1505 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
PAST, WE HAVE INFORMED YOU, YOUR EXCELLENCY, OF THE EVENTS  
WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE. YOUR EXCELLENCY KNOWS VERY WELL  
THAT FOR A YEAR NOW WE HAVE STOPPED THE FIGHTING AND WE  
HAVE AFFORDED THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO  
SOLVE THE KURDISH QUESTION AND TO GRANT OUR JUST NATIONAL  
RIGHTS WHICH ARE LESS BY FAR THAN THOSE WHICH ANY NATIONALITY  
WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH IN THIS CENTURY. BUT WITH GREAT  
REGRET THE GOVERNMENT HAS SHOWN NO READINESS TO ACCEDE TO ANY  
OF THE RIGHTS OF OUR PEOPLE. RATHER IT HAS SUPPRESSED WHAT  
FORMAL RIGHTS WE HAD UNDER THE IRAQI CONSTITUTION OF 1957  
AND HAS DECIDED TO PRESS US TO DISBAND OUR GROUPS OF PARTISANS  
WHICH MEANS, IN EFFECT, SURRENDER WITHOUT ANY LIMITS OR  
CONDITIONS. THIS IS NOT JUST IN ANY WAY.

RECENTLY THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEGUN TO PREPARE FOR A  
NEW MILITARY ATTACK ON OUR PEACEFUL PEOPLE AND WE HAVE  
MUCH PROOF OF THIS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS FORMED A MILITARY  
FIELD COMMAND AND GOVERNMENT MILITARY FORCES HAVE BEGUN  
TRYING TO ENTER KURDISTAN IN MANY PLACES AND HAVE SUB-  
JECTED NUMEROUS PLACES (INCLUDING DOHUK, ZAKHO AND OTHERS)  
CFN 1957 NOT

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-2- 773, MARCH 18, 2 PM FROM BAGHDAD

PAGE THREE RUQVWG 1505 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
TO THE ROAR OF CANNON FROM AIRPLANES AND TANKS, NOT TO  
SPEAK OF THE UNJUST PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN WHICH THE GOVERN-  
MENT BROADCASTING STATION IS WAGING AGAINST US. WE ALSO  
HAVE FIRM INFORMATION PROVING THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS  
BOUGHT A LARGE AMOUNT OF POISON GAS TO USE AGAINST PEACEFUL  
INHABITANTS TO WHOM INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS AND HUMAN LAWS  
ARE NOT APPLICABLE. THUS, WE BEG YOUR EXCELLENCY TO USE  
YOUR COMMENDABLE EFFORTS ON THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT TO PREVENT  
THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES FROM WHICH WILL SPRING A  
DISTURBANCE TO THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE MIDDLE  
EAST AND THE CREATION OF NEW TENSIONS FRAUGHT WITH MANY  
SEQUENCES WHICH WILL THREATEN THE INTERESTS OF VARIOUS  
PARTIES IN THIS REGION. THUS WE HAVE STRONG HOPES, YOUR  
EXCELLENCY, THAT YOU WILL HELP IN WARDING OFF THIS  
AGGRESSION FROM OUR PEOPLE WHO LOOK TO YOUR FRIENDLY  
COUNTRY WHICH ALWAYS STANDS ON THE SIDE OF PERSECUTED  
PEOPLES AND WHICH IS THE INHERITOR OF WILSON'S LAWFUL  
PRINCIPLES CALLING FOR SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES.

FINALLY, WE BEG TO INFORM YOU THAT WE WILL NEVER  
BE THE ONES TO BEGIN THE FIGHTING BUT IF ATTACKED WE  
CAN NOT

PAGE FOUR RUQVWG 1505 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
WILL BE OBLIGED TO DEFEND OURSELVES AS SELF-DEFENSE IS  
A LAWFUL RIGHT. END TEXT

COMMENT: WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER IRAQI ARMY HAS  
POISON GAS OR IF SO WHETHER INTENDS USE IT. HOWEVER,  
BELIEVE WORTHWHILE USE SUITABLE INFORMAL OPPORTUNITIES  
WITH SELECTED GOI OFFICIALS TO REFER TO KURDISH CONCERN  
OVER POSSIBLE USE OF POISON GAS AND TO ADVERSE POLITICAL  
EFFECT SUCH USE WOULD HAVE ON GOI CASE INTERNATIONALLY.

GP-4.  
STRONG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# AIRGRAM

POL 23-9 IRAN  
XR POL 13-3 IRAN  
FOR RM USE ONLY

NEA-5		
RM/RE	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
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AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
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OSD	USIA	NSA
		NSC 6

1965 FEB 3 PM 2 14  
BUNDY/SMITH  
BATOR  
BELK  
BOWMAN  
COOPER  
JESSUP  
JOHNSON  
KLEIN  
KUMER  
SALINGER  
SAYRE  
THOMSON

20  
A-22  
NO.  
SECRET NOFORN  
PRIORITY  
HANDLING INDICATOR  
TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
INFO : Amembassy TEHRAN, Amembassy ANKARA, Amembassy BAGHDAD, Amembassy BEIRUT, Amembassy LONDON, Amembassy CAIRO, Amembassy TEL AVIV, Amembassy DAMASCUS  
FROM : Amconsulate TABRIZ  
DATE: January 26, 1965  
SUBJECT : Evolution of Iran's Kurdish Policy: A Background Report  
REF : Consulate's A-20, January 12, 1965; and A-17, January 17, 1965.  
I INTRODUCTION  
COPY NO. 51  
SERIES B

This airgram is one-third of a trilogy, with A-17 and A-20 constituting the other parts. A-20, which is really the "summary and conclusions" section of the three, begins with the assertion that toward the end of 1963 the Iranian authorities began covertly to assist the KDP element of the rebel Iraqi Kurdish movement on a significant scale. Meanwhile, the same authorities began to put some real effort behind the development program in Iran's own Kurdish areas (particularly in the road construction, land reform, and public health sectors).

A-17 documents the assertion about the development effort; this airgram is designed to document the one about covert support of the KDP. A-17 is based primarily on my own research here in the Tabriz consular district; the present airgram, on the other hand, relies only secondarily on first-hand material. In essence it is a synthesis and interpretation of the very considerable files on Kurdish affairs that have been preserved and added to ever since World War II in this Consulate. In going through these files I could not help but be struck by the organic way Iran's Kurdish policy has evolved during the postwar era, and the inseparability of its internal and external parts. In the belief that it might interest other students of Kurdish affairs as well, I have tried to build some of this sense of continuity into my synthesis. Hence the panoramic nature and perhaps excessive length of this report.

## GROUP 3

Downgraded at 3-year intervals,  
Not automatically declassified.

FORM 4-62 DS-323

SECRET NOFORN

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by:

CSCoon/ss

1/26/65

Contents and Classification Approved by:

CSCoon

Clearances:

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NJ/RAC 11-57

NARA, Date 07-17-12

By UCB



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Note: There has always been a relationship between Iran's Kurdish policy and its Arab policy, but this relationship has expanded a great deal in the last several years in both its importance and its complexity. As it lies somewhat outside this consulate's province, I have not attempted to relate the evolution of Iranian Kurdish policy to parallel developments on the broader Arab front except in a very superficial manner. However, it should be clear that this report, as well as A-17 and A-20, together form only one piece of a larger picture, and need to be considered in the context of such reports as Tehran's A-378 (received here after our present report was drafted).

## II Early Post-War Period (pre-Cassem):

As long as there was a conservative and friendly regime in Baghdad, and that regime was keeping its Kurds under control, Tehran's interest in Kurdish affairs was restricted largely to the question of maintaining order in its own Kurdish areas. Interest in the situation west of the border did exist, mainly because of trans-frontier tribal interrelationships, but I have seen no evidence indicating that this interest went much beyond immediate questions of border control, preserving some sort of balance of power amongst the tribes along the border (divide and rule), etc..

In 1946, when the Kurds had a republic of their own centered at Mahabad, the Iranian Government's primary objective was the re-establishment of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. This was accomplished at the end of the year when the Soviets withdrew from northern Iran. (See William L. Bagleton's book, The Kurdish Republic of 1946, London, 1963).

For a number of years after that, Iranian authorities evidently ruled most Kurdish areas, and particularly those that had been associated with the Mahabad insult, more or less as enemy-occupied territory. There seems to have been some recognition at relatively high levels within the GOI of the long term desirability of assimilating the Kurdish population into Iranian society as a whole. Very little tangible evidence of this intent, however, could have been apparent to the Kurdish people. Thus in 1951, just before Mossadeq came to power, Consul William C. Burdett reported as follows:

"The long run objective of the Government is to break the loyalty of the people to their tribes and tribal leaders and shift this allegiance to Iran as a nation ... To achieve its goal the Government unfortunately relies to a large extent on guile and the big stick. The brigadier at Sanandaj enumerated punishment, gifts, threats and flattery as methods used. The principle of divide and rule is adhered to ...".<sup>1/</sup>

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<sup>1/</sup> D-45, April 2, 1951.

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As Consul Burdett implies, the immediate tactics the GOI used during this period to maintain its position involved playing the tribal leaders off against each other, as well as maintaining overwhelming military force. Though the long term objective may have been to break down tribal institutions, specific actions had to be geared to reality, and the reality of the situation at the time was that throughout the areas the tribes were the significant loci of indigenous power and authority. Thus, though government strategy was anti-tribe, government tactics were necessarily tribe-oriented. This tribal orientation of policy, or stated differently, this assumption that tribes were the only significant institutional elements to be dealt with, was to dominate Iran's Kurdish policy until fairly recently.

As to the repressive character of the Iranian presence in its Kurdish areas, there was apparently no improvement when Dr. Mossadeq came to power. If Mossadeq was a man of the people, this evidently did not include the Kurds. In a message to the Embassy dated October 28, 1952, Consul John D. Iams reported:

"Kurdistan continues to be neglected by government which sends such opium-smoking wretches as present Sardasht Bakshdar to administer civil affairs. Army treatment Kurds perhaps exemplified in unforgettable picture of a young Kurdish donkey driver who, mistaking consulate jeep for military vehicle, broke down sobbing by roadside for fear jeep would deliberately run down his only animal." (Comment: Civic action proponents please take note.)

Throughout this period the Iranian military seems to have been the only effective government authority, and it seems to have ruled as ruthlessly as any other occupation army. Civilian officials, such as they were, seem to have been corrupt and ineffectual. As far as any genuine efforts to develop the region economically and socially, this is what another of my predecessors, Consul Robert B. Dreessen, had to say:

"... The general feeling of the Kurds regarding the government seems to be one of contempt and, regarding the officials representing the government in Kurdistan, one of hatred and distrust. One heard the statement repeatedly that the Iranian Government has promised much for Kurdistan and done almost nothing. Judging from what the writer observed in Kurdistan, this is essentially true."<sup>1/</sup>

The foregoing quotes shed a good deal of light on Kurdish attitudes toward Persians, and suggest, correctly I believe, that even now the Persians may have a good way to go before they convince many Kurds they are really on their side. And while the foregoing is generally less explicit in illuminating the then prevailing Persian attitude toward Kurds, it is reasonable to infer that the predominant Persian view was to hold Kurds in utter contempt as being dirty, lazy, and backward — a view that still can be rather frequently found amongst Persians in this area. One suspects that to some extent this feeling of contempt is a sublimation of a feeling of envy arising from the Kurd's demonstrated

<sup>1/</sup> D-49, February 14, 1955.

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superiority as a fighter — a kind of ethnic sibling rivalry. If this suspicion is justified, it helps explain why the Persians left their Kurdish areas in such an appalling state of backwardness and neglect for so long. That is, because it satisfied certain psychological needs to regard Kurds as unkempt barbarians, many Persians presumably had a subconscious vested interest in keeping them that way.

Since Iraq's Kurds were virtually indistinguishable from those in Iran, the Persian attitude of contempt presumably extended to them as well. And as long as someone else was competently attending to the business of keeping the "varmints" across the border under control, an overt Iranian policy of non-involvement was the only one that made much sense, emotionally as well as rationally. But times were soon to change ...

### III The Beginnings of Change (1958-60)

Despatches Consul Harold Josif sent in from Tabriz shortly after the Baghdad coup of July 1958 suggest early stirrings of a more "modern" Iranian Kurdish policy. Actually, Iranian concern about a possible Arab threat via Kurdistan antedated the Baghdad coup by a few months; apparently it was first touched off by events following the initial formation of the UAR. (Evidently Iranian authorities were also quite concerned at that time about a Soviet threat in Iranian Kurdistan operating via the back door through the UAR and especially through Syrian Kurds.) Radio Cairo began Kurdish language broadcasts June 7, whereupon Radio Tehran increased its own Kurdish broadcasts from 15 minutes to half an hour a day. Evidently, however, some Persians felt this was inadequate as a countermeasure. On the defensive side, they sent a special commission to Sanandaj and there was some talk of economic development. Shortly thereafter Kurdistan was elevated to the status of an independent ostan or province. Farther north, in Mahabad, a dynamic military officer was also beginning to take action:

"The Government of Iran has made some notable efforts in recent months to bring about economic improvements in Kurdish areas. In Azerbaijan these efforts are most noticeable in Mahabad, where Lt. Gen Kerim VARAHRAM has forced through a large-scale program to create and pave streets. It is reported that he has also been able to erect new school houses and provide teachers in the villages around Mahabad. As commander of the Third Army Corps, General Varahram is the key official, civil or military, in the Kurdish areas of Azerbaijan. Until a few months ago he was singularly unapproachable by Kurdish leaders, but a recent report from two Kurdish chiefs is that he has changed his manners. These chiefs attribute the change to instructions from Tehran."<sup>1/</sup>

This new interest in Kurdish affairs was, of course, strengthened when an unknown nationalist named Qassem toppled the conservative ally, Nuri Said, in next-door Baghdad. After that event General Varahram, and perhaps other Iranians, was not content to limit his horizons to defensive measures. According to Josif:

<sup>1/</sup> D-32, November 24, 1958.

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"It is reliably understood that now that the regime in Iraq has changed for the worse, the Government of Iran has begun to take its own propaganda seriously and is considering the adoption of a program of covert activity designed to wean the Iraqi Kurds away from the predominantly Arab government at Baghdad. In the Consulate's opinion, such a program would be unduly risky..."<sup>1/</sup>

Not all Iranians were willing to go along with General Varahram. The following January General Pakravan, then Deputy Chief of SAVAK, told an officer of our Embassy in Tehran: "I hope you will not in any way encourage our very foolish General Varahram in his wild schemes for conquering Kurdistan."<sup>2/</sup>

Meanwhile Mulla Mustafa Barzani, already a towering and dominant figure in the evolving Kurdish drama, had ended his long exile in the USSR and reappeared on the scene. Instinctively, the Iranians regarded him as the enemy. After all, Barzani had provided the Mahabad Republic of 1946 with most of its effective military strength, had given the IIA a rough time in battle, and then had humiliated it by slipping through its net to the USSR with his followers after the Mahabad Republic collapsed. Furthermore, since the Soviets had released Barzani after Gassen's coup, the Iranians assumed he must have become a communist agent.

Our files for the years 1958, 1959, and 1960 are voluminous but confusing. The Iranians were evidently showing a great deal of interest in tribal affairs on both sides of the border; the tribal orientation of policy was still dominant. Serious thought had been given to supplying arms to Iraqi tribes opposed to both Barzani and Baghdad (note that during this period Barzani was ostensibly a Gassen protege), but by and large the Iranians refrained from such intervention, though they tried to "encourage" anti-communist (i.e., anti-Barzani) elements across the border.<sup>3/</sup> During this period their appraisal of the enemy forces seems, at least in retrospect, to have been somewhat naive. For example, [redacted] from Tehran<sup>4/</sup> suggests that at that time the Supreme Commander's Staff of the IIA regarded both Barzani and the LDP as completely subservient instruments of the USSR.

In sum, during these three years the Iranian authorities were reacting to external forces and developments they did not really understand while trying to maintain old policies that no longer fitted the changed circumstances. The fundamental Persian distaste for the Kurd continued to determine the real thrust of Tehran's policy. Military control and repression continued to dominate internal policy; though external pressures dictated some talk about development of Iranian Kurdish areas, very little was done, and that little was largely accomplished by a single individual of uncommon energy. When he left, even that little was undone. Take, for example, this quote from Consul Bagleton's D-46, of December 6, 1960:

<sup>1/</sup> D-7, August 1, 1958.

<sup>2/</sup> Tehran's G-137, January 17, 1959.

<sup>3/</sup> Tabriz D-72, April 19, 1960.

<sup>4/</sup> NIT 4329, October 25, 1960.

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"According to several local citizens, the old system is returning, with instances of high-handed acts by the lesser military being cited as proof. As for the public works projects that were the hallmark of Varahram's administration, unrepaired holes in an asphalted street near Military Headquarters were noteworthy. Thus, Varahram's departure is viewed by most Mahabadis with genuine regret, untempered by optimism regarding his replacement, Lt. General Kamal, who is well known in the region because of his previous assignments there in more junior positions. One of the rumors attending Varahram's transfer to Tehran with no new assignment's being announced is that he is being punished by the military for his honesty which is contrary to the prevailing code of official behavior."

Externally, the Iranians were even more muddled. Their tendency to regard all potential enemies as communists, their uncertainties and suspicions about the UAR and Qassim, and their particular phobia about Barzani all tended to distort their view of what was going on on the other side of the Iraqi frontier.

#### IV The First Round (1961-February 1963)

In March of 1961 Barzani left Baghdad and retired to his natal hills in the north. The fat was already in the fire, but it was not particularly obvious at first. The war began almost gently in July, with a series of engagements between Barzani's men and rival neighboring tribes. For a while it looked like another old-fashioned Kurdish disorder. Then, in early September, some Kurdish groups farther south, including KDP elements, got into a scrap with Iraqi Government forces and the Iraqi army attacked in force --- but not, at first, against Barzani. Towards the end of the month it looked as though the Iraqi army had severely punished the Kurdish dissidents -- at least to judge from official Iraqi communiques, and other information was fairly hard to come by in the first heat of battle. Kurdish representatives approached us, and apparently also the Iranians, with a plea that the Iranians keep the border open and permit smuggling.<sup>1/</sup>

Late in September Barzani's village was bombed and, as Dana Adams Schmidt puts it in his book on the Kurdish struggle,<sup>2/</sup> "then Barzani decided to fight." The KDP, according to Schmidt, formally made the same decision the next day.

From then on the Kurds more than held their own, despite Baghdad's increasingly shrill and implausible protestations of victory.

"Out of hundreds of little operations and a few big ones between the summer of 1961 and February 1963 Barzani shaped a grand strategy. First he defeated the tribal enemies whom the government had set against him in the northwest, between Mosul and the Turkish frontier. Then in a long series of raids and ambushes, he earned the serious respect of the Iraqi army and shattered the morale of the isolated police posts and the josh whom the army used as a mountain-eering auxiliary. He won a host of new recruits from friends and former foes among the Kurds and equipped them with arms he took from the forces of the Iraqi government.

<sup>1/</sup> Baghdad T-177, September 30, 1961.

<sup>2/</sup> Journey Among Brave Men, Dana Adams Schmidt, Little, Brown & Co., 1964.

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"Then, with most of the territory between Zakho and Arbil and the Syrian and Turkish borders under his control, Barzani turned eastward. In mid-April he moved with the hard core of his men via the Zibari, Surchi and Bradost territories toward the northeastern corner of Iraq between the Iranian and Turkish borders. Here again his first task was to destroy tribal opposition, a task completed in May, June and July. Cooperating now with party forces to the south, Barzani's men and an ever-increasing force of other tribal and party figures in a rush of operations in July and August moved in a great arc north of Rewanduz through the high mountains, then southward. They reduced army and police posts as they went, and cleared the josh from the mountaintops. Finally moving westward again at a point south of Shaqlawa, Barzani closed the circle on about 12,000 soldiers and police of the Iraqi forces. These positions Barzani maintained the rest of the summer of 1962 and through the winter, thereby immobilizing a considerable portion of the Iraqi army. During the late summer and winter, until the Iraqi coup d'etat of February 8, 1963, the General's tribal forces and Kurdish Democratic Party forces consolidated control of the areas around Khanequin, Suleimaniya, Kirkuk and Arbil."<sup>1/</sup>

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How did the Iranians view these developments? On the eve of hostilities they were apparently still clinging rather forlornly to the old-fashioned view that Kurds on either side of the border could be controlled rather inexpensively by playing the tribes off against each other. Thus, in April of 1961, Consul Eagleton reported the following views expressed to him by another of General Varahram's successors: "After noting that Iran possesses important assets in Kurdistan, including that portion inside Iraq, General Kusheshi made it clear that in the present context he favored an Iranian policy of non-intervention. Thus, while he would continue to develop his intelligence lines into Iraq, he would prefer to let General Qassim maintain the tribal balance in northern Iraq without direct Iranian interference."<sup>2/</sup>

The policy of maintaining a tribal balance must have developed a rather antique aroma by September, after virtually all of Iraqi Kurdistan erupted into open war against the Iraqi armed forces. The Iranians had to modify their policy and evidently they did. According to Embassy Tehran, by late September they had embraced what amounted to a policy of containment. "The foremost concern of the Iranian Government at present is to contain the fighting in Iraqi Kurdistan ... Iranian army units have been ordered to prevent contacts between Mulla Mustapha's men and Iranian Kurds ... propagandizing and contacts that Mulla Mustapha is maintaining with Iranian Kurds are a source of extreme worry ... SAVAK is reorienting operations in Kurdistan."<sup>3/</sup>

Meanwhile IIA units were disposed along the frontier, on the mountain tops as well as in the valleys, to guard against any intrusion by Barzani's forces.<sup>4/</sup> Apparently there was some feeling within the IIA that Barzani might again attempt to break through to sanctuary in the USSR as he had fifteen years earlier.

<sup>1/</sup> Schmidt, ibid, pp. 80-81.

<sup>2/</sup> D-69, April 8, 1961.

<sup>3/</sup> Tehran's A-66, September 25, 1961.

<sup>4/</sup> Various consulate telegrams, October 1961.

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Presumably one result of this misguided assumption was that for a while, at least some parts of the frontier were sealed off as tightly as they ever have been, or can be.

So far, Iranian reaction to the new and dangerous situation in Iraq was entirely defensive. The assumptions that Kurds generally were unmitigated liabilities, and that both Barzani and the KDP were guided by Moscow continued to underly Tehran's view of where its interests lay.

By the spring of 1962, harbingers of more positive policies began to emerge. The top command once more turned its thoughts, albeit somewhat desultorily, to the possibility of wooing Iranian Kurds through a more or less serious development effort.<sup>1/ 2/</sup> It was agreed that intelligence, defense, and security measures must be increased. Current Iranian interest in the special forces concept seems to date from that time. Most interesting, however, were indications that the Iranian military was "discussing" a basic policy switch to support of Barzani. Evidently this "discussion" was caused as much as anything by the increasingly obvious fact that the Iraqi Kurdish rebellion had become a national movement, Barzani was its leader, and Barzani was winning. The IIA proponents of a new policy toward Barzani were evidently operating on the theory it was better to back a winner than a loser.<sup>2/</sup>

In midsummer of 1962, Barzani let us know he was willing to bring Iraqi Kurdistan into Iran.<sup>3/</sup> Apparently he had also made this offer directly to the Shah, shortly after the fighting began.<sup>4/</sup> Although the Shah had politely declined the offer, knowledge of its existence may have influenced the policy deliberations of senior IIA officers and others, then and later.

The record indicates fairly clearly that the initial reaction within the government to the proposal to switch to a policy of active support for Barzani was generally negative. But the record also indicates that the summer and fall of 1962 was a period of confusion and reappraisal which resulted in substantial modifications in the containment policy hammered out the previous year.

In June the Shah assured the British Ambassador "that Iranian Kurdish policy had been reassessed and non-intervention reaffirmed."<sup>5/</sup> On the other hand, it was during that same month that the first of a long series of reports came in from Iraqi Kurdish sources indicating satisfaction with "improvement" in the Iranian position.<sup>6/</sup> Subsequent reports suggest that for the time being at least, this "improved" attitude did not entail supply of substantial assistance to the Iraqi Kurds, but consisted rather of a partial repudiation of the containment

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<sup>1/</sup> Tehran NIT 5822, March 20, 1962. <sup>2/</sup> Tehran's T-924, May 10, 1962.  
<sup>3/</sup> Tabriz T-3 of July 12, 1962, downgraded to Secret January 18, 1964.  
<sup>4/</sup> Tehran's NIT 5167, May 28, 1964.  
<sup>5/</sup> Tehran's A-296, June 4, 1962.  
<sup>6/</sup> Beirut's A-431, June 29, 1962.



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policy, involving a relaxation of border control enabling support from Iranian Kurds and perhaps other sources to flow across the border relatively easily.<sup>1/</sup> Barzani seems to have had British financial support during this period.<sup>2/</sup> With the Turkish frontier fairly well closed, the blind Iranian eye on the border to the east may have been almost as important to the Iraqi Kurds, in terms of supply and so forth, as active Iranian assistance. And as far as the official Iranian position was concerned, a rather lax control over a border that couldn't be completely controlled anyway was far easier to cover up, and far easier to reconcile with a "correct" policy of non-involvement, than a policy of active support. In a sense, the blind eye on the border was a device that permitted the Iranian Government to eat its cake and have it too.

During its early stages, this policy of ambivalence may have grown out of honest differences within the government more than out of any calculated decision to be hypocritical. It would seem the Foreign Ministry was generally in favor of an entirely correct posture, while the army commanders along the Iraqi frontier found the temptations to be rather less correct to be irresistible, particularly since some of them were espousing activist policies anyway. But this is speculation.

In August, 1962, the Prime Minister and the Shah both indicated they were convinced of a need to develop Iranian Kurdish areas.<sup>3/</sup> This new stress on an old but hitherto sterile theme did evidently result in some improvement in the administrative structure in Sanandaj, capital of Kurdistan province. But in January, 1963, Embassy Tehran noted that that this new emphasis on development had produced very little except talk.<sup>4/</sup> And as late as the following autumn, there was little if any evidence on the ground of serious development activity.<sup>5/</sup>

To sum up: During the first round of fighting in Iraq the Iranians sloughed off their old tribal balance policy, tried and discarded a policy of containment, and ended up with a now-you-see-it, now-you-don't policy of ambivalence based on a relaxed stance along the frontier combined with an outwardly correct posture of non-intervention. Meanwhile steam was building up for a real development effort in Iran's own Kurdish areas, but no significant motion had resulted. Support for the idea of a more active, pro-Kurdish policy in Iraq was spreading within the IIA, but had yet to gain much acceptance elsewhere in the Government. In sum, Iran was slowly swinging toward a more active and aggressive Kurdish policy, but hadn't really burned any bridges by February 1963, when Qassem was overthrown, the fighting stopped, and the Kurdish problem temporarily lost some of its urgency, or seemed to.

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- 1/ The Iranians may have been supplying a trickle of essentially token aid themselves during this period. The Iraqis in Baghdad seem to have thought so. Evidence available here does not answer this point. It might be difficult in some cases to distinguish between aid furnished by Iranian Kurds and that provided by the Iranian Government.
  - 2/ Tehran's MIT 6599, January 4, 1965.
  - 3/ Tehran's T-165, August 3, 1962, and T-173, August 11, 1962.
  - 4/ Tehran's A-437, January 10, 1963.
  - 5/ Tabriz A-17, January 7, 1965.

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There is little evidence in the files that significant changes occurred in Iranian and other positions during the cease-fire that existed between February 1963, when Qassem was overthrown, and the following June, when the Ba'ath regime launched its surprise attack. In April we reiterated our strong endorsement of a correct Iranian policy of non-involvement to appropriate Iranian authorities, but whatever effect this may have had was probably more than offset by concurrent and subsequent deterioration in Tehran's relations with Baghdad.<sup>1/</sup>

On June 8, the Baathis launched a new and extremely vigorous attack against the Kurds. The Iranian position thereupon unfroze, but at the same time became extremely obscure. I suspect that one result of our earlier attempts to dissuade the Iranians from any form of intervention was to induce them to redouble their efforts to conceal from us any plans they might be entertaining for such action --- and this of course increased our difficulties in figuring out just what they were up to. I also suspect that an important reason for the obscurity of the Iranian position during the first few weeks of the second round was that the Iranians were, for a while, uncertain of the outcome. In July and August prevailing Iranian Army opinion was that the Iraqi Army might well crush the Kurds before winter. This gave a new lease on life to some old attitudes and policies that had been submerged by Barzani's successful prosecution of the first round. For a few weeks something like the old containment policy was introduced, at least on the northern part of the frontier, with IIA units perched on the mountains waiting for a vanquished Barzani to be driven across into their net.<sup>2/</sup> (Shades of 1946 and 1961). Then, by September, it began to become evident that Barzani wasn't getting beaten after all, in fact was holding his own quite handily, and Iranian policy resumed the movement toward active intervention that had begun a couple of years earlier.

In Tehran, top GOI officials were assuring us that they were tightening up the border and strengthening their policy of strict nonintervention.<sup>3/</sup> However, it may be significant that while these protestations were being made, the Foreign Minister added another theme: Iranians had traditionally sympathized with Kurds (sic) and did not wish to see them exterminated in Iraq.<sup>4/</sup>

In Baghdad the Kurds had been telling us that they expected Iranian help.<sup>5/</sup> In late July, well after the fighting had started, a responsible KDP leader told us the Kurds had learned that the Iranians had promised the Iraqis their cooperation against the Kurds, but that fortunately the Kurds had seen no evidence of this and hoped that Iran would maintain its policy of benevolent neutrality toward them.<sup>6/</sup>

It did seem as though the Iranians were trying to occupy several positions at once. At the time, however, we might have found it easier to figure out what

<sup>1/</sup> Baghdad T-716, May 2, 1963, and T-730, May 4, 1963.

<sup>2/</sup> Tabriz A-12, September 18, 1963, p. 3.

<sup>3/</sup> Tehran's T-1123, June 19, 1963, and T-18, July 6, 1963.

<sup>4/</sup> Tehran's T-1133, June 22, 1963.

<sup>5/</sup> Baghdad's T-554, June 10, 1963.

<sup>6/</sup> Atkins-Shawkat Alkrawi memo, July 26 and 27, 1963.

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was really going on if we had paid more attention to the polarization of the Iraqi Kurdish leadership between Barzani and the tribal elements, on the one hand, and the Political Bureau of the KDP and its detribalized followers on the other. Particularly if we had correlated this polarization with the geographic facts and other evidence. We might have noted that it had always been KDP representatives who had confidently assured us the Kurds would get support or at least a benevolent neutrality from the Iranians --- never Barzani's men. When Barzani did communicate with us, the emphasis was on establishing a direct link between Kurds and the U.S. Barzani was in the north, while the KDP held down a more southern portion of the front, adjacent to the Merivan-Baneh sector of the Iranian frontier zone. The limited and inconclusive information I was able to pick up at that time from Tabriz suggested that Iranian border control was strictest in the north, in the Khaneh area opposite Barzani, while farther south a good bit of smuggling was still going on.<sup>1/</sup> And it was primarily the northern sector where IIA units staked themselves out on the hills for a while, licking their chops over the prospect of a Barzani breakout.

Looking back a bit, had not the 1946 humiliation and the subsequent conviction Barzani was a communist combined to render Barzani a primordial foe in the eyes of Persians responsible for Kurdish policy? The tribal balance policy in the Qassem era had first and foremost been directed toward keeping Barzani from becoming too strong. Had Barzani's recent military successes expunged this policy completely, or did its aftertaste linger on, influencing current policy formulation? What could be expected of Persians accustomed to thinking in terms of support for Barzani's tribal foes, after said foes had been neutralized? Why not support the remaining Iraqi Kurdish element in the area that provided at least a potential counterweight to Barzani's influence? Some old policies, like some old soldiers, can take a long time to fade away.

Actually, Major General Fereidun JAM, then the senior IIA officer in the Kurdish area, virtually showed me the Persian hand in conversations I had with him in September, November, and December 1963,<sup>2/</sup> but I had neither the experience nor the wit to draw the correct inferences until much later. Though Jam was obviously fencing with me during these conversations, trying to find out how much I knew, there were the following consistent threads in his remarks to me: a) interest in the polarization between Barzani and the KDP, with the KDP clearly being the "good guys"; b) conviction, dwindling later in the year to suspicion, that Barzani was a Soviet agent; c) suspicion that the Kurds were holding their own against the Iraqi Army growing to conviction at year's end that they would win; d) growing pride in the ethnic kinship between Kurd and Persian and a feeling that "all Kurds are Iranians."

Somewhere along the line, and probably during this period, Jam became emotionally committed to the Kurdish cause in Iraq, albeit nursing a continuing suspicion of Barzani personally. In the process he had developed a healthier attitude toward Iran's own Kurds than that of his predecessors. His successor, Major General Afkhami, has shown a similar emotional commitment, minus Jam's

<sup>1/</sup> A-12, September 18, 1963, p. 4.

<sup>2/</sup> Memcon dated September 9, 1963; Consulate's A-17, Nov. 20, 1963; Consulate's A-20, December 19, 1963.



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suspicion of Barzani. (Last December I asked Afkhami if he thought Barzani was a communist. His left eyebrow shot up an inch and he snapped, "Of course not!") Afkhami has also, like Jam, shown considerable sympathy for rapid development of Iranian Kurdish areas.

It has previously been observed<sup>1/</sup> that the IIA plays a major role in the formulation of Iran's Kurdish policies, under the personal guidance of the Shah. The senior military officer in Mahabad, whether he be General Varahram, General Jam, or General Afkhami, is generally considered the Shah's own "man on the spot" for Kurdish affairs. I cannot, of course, document it,<sup>2/</sup> but I believe that sometime after the Baath attack had started the Shah was infected with the same sort of enthusiasm for the Iraqi Kurdish rebels that Generals Jam and Afkhami evinced when talking to me. Possibly General Jam and like-minded senior IIA officers were the direct agents of this infection. In any event, the theory of the Shah's emotional conversion does mesh rather neatly, and help explain, Iran's decision late in 1963 to escalate its commitment to the KDP in Iraq. (And also, as pointed out in my A-17 of January 7, 1965, the concurrent emergence of some real zip in the development program on this side of the border).

It is easier to document this decision to escalate now than it would have been a year ago, because recent reports from Tehran and Baghdad supplement and fill out what formerly was a rather sparse assemblage of hard information. I shall now list the main items of evidence that are available here chronologically, in the order in which they were received:

1) Nicosia's A-129, September 25, 1963: An AP correspondent who was in Iraqi Kurdistan during July and August reports that at the time the Kurds were getting no help from any quarter except for limited aid from Kurds in Iran.

2) Baghdad's T-407, October 12, 1963: Kurdish sources in Baghdad report (a) their financial position is very weak, (b) major policy decisions are being considered on the war's conduct.

Comment: regarding the first point, note that according to Tehran's NIT 6599 of January 4, 1965, the British evidently did not provide financial support during the second round, as they had in the first. Regarding point (b), the implication Embassy Baghdad drew here and in item 3 below was that the KDP was considering accepting Soviet aid. In retrospect it seems more likely that they were considering throwing their lot in with the Shah. Embassy Baghdad might be able to shed some light on this question.

<sup>1/</sup> E.g. Tehran's A-66, September 25, 1961.

<sup>2/</sup> It is rather difficult to document any attitude change such as this. But note that in early August of 1963 the Shah was only dissuaded with some difficulty from making a public statement identifying Iran with the Kurds; this arose in the context of the Soviet accusation of interference in Iraq (Tehran's T-120, August 3, 1963). Foreign Minister Aram's expression of sympathy for the Kurds about the same time has already been noted.

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3) Baghdad's A-339, October 19, 1963: a) Kurdish sources give further indications of acute shortage of funds (p. 2). b) These sources also confirm the current Iranian policy of the blind eye on the border, and note that "considerable" assistance is being received from Iranian Kurds. c) Kurds in Baghdad are surprised at Talabani's sudden recall to Kurdistan and speculate that major policy decisions are being made there.

4) Dept's circular 927 of November 21 and other messages: The Baath regime has been overthrown and the new Aref regime is likely to be more pro-UAR, although it is doubtful Aref will permit the growth of UAR influence in Iraq. (Comment: the latter opinion may not have been shared by the Iranians. Considering the fact that last summer Aref tried to give his country away to Nasser, the Shah's initial reaction may have been closer to the mark than ours.)

5) Tehran's T-553, December 5, 1963, and supporting memcons: A British journalist and an American photographer had just returned from Iraqi Kurdistan, where they saw KDP leaders but not Barzani. Savak arranged the trip. The Talabani people called Barzani "old fashioned." The reporter saw "substantial quantities of Czech rifles, which Kurds admitted were supplied to them by the Iranians." He later saw the Shah, who "acknowledged that Iran had given some modest assistance to the Kurds in the past," but stressed that a negotiated settlement was what was needed now.

6) Baghdad's T-632, December 12, 1963: A KDP source asserts that the Iranian govt had asked the Iraqis whether they were going to follow Nasserite policies but Iraqis hadn't replied; the source interpreted this as a favorable development for the Kurds.

7) Teheran's MIT 6367, December 12, 1963 (Appraisal 2): Kurdish leaders believe de Gaulle encouraged the Shah to continue covert aid to the Iraqi rebels when he visited Iran in October. Their belief is based partly on leaks in Tehran, partly on Talabani's earlier talks with the French in Paris.

8) Tehran's MIT 6448, April 30, 1964 (Appraisal 3): Iranian officials secretly supporting Iraqi rebels forwarded a large shipment of crates to the Mawat area headquarters of the KDP about April 20.

9) Tehran's MIT 6480, June 22, 1964 (tested Iranian Kurdish source, Appraisal 2): "Much assistance in terms of money, materials, and weapons have gone from Iran to Iraq through both official government and independent Kurdish channels."

10) Baghdad's A-86, July 30, 1964: (A detailed recapitulation and analysis of the Barzani-KDP split): Mulla Mustafa asserts "... that the Political Bureau's taking refuge in Iran was only the final indication that they had become Iranian agents ..."

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"Shortly after the expelled members of the Political Bureau arrived in Iran, a clandestine Kurdish radio station began broadcasts attacking Mulla Mustafa and praising the position of the Political Bureau. Mulla informed the Iranian government that if these broadcasts did not stop he would send soldiers into Iran to destroy the station. The broadcasts stopped after three days."

11) Tehran's NIT 6508, August 3, 1964 (Appraisal 2): Declaration of Sixth Congress of the KDP, which Barzani dominated and which led to the expulsion of the Talabani-Ahmed group, charges that the expelled KDP leaders had been receiving 50,000 dinars a month from the "enemies of the Kurdish nation" (understood by source, an Iranian Kurd, to mean the Iranian Government).

12) Baghdad's NCB 4683, August 5, 1964 (Appraisal 3): The Iraqi Kurds recently expelled into Iran took along a large number of weapons including bazookas, machine guns, grenades, and a radio station. (Comment: This has been substantially confirmed, and I believe we have more details now on this weaponry, though I do not have it in my files.)

13) Tabriz T-3, 8/16/64, and Tehran's T-185, 8/15/64. Iranian authorities permitted the KDP group to re-enter Iraq with their weapons. Comment: seems like rather relaxed treatment for a government following a policy of non-intervention.

14) Tehran's NIT 6529, September 1, 1964 (Appraisal 2): Most of the KDP group reentered Iran August 29, surrendered their weapons to GOI, and became political refugees. The Iranian Government would like to keep this group intact as a small but fairly effective fighting force. (Latter reiterated in NIT 6539).

Comment: late in September the group was moved from its camp near the border to a location near Hamadan. General Afkhami told me in December that Talabani is with them part of the time; he also frequently visits Tehran.

15) Tehran's NIT 6539, September 22, 1964 (Appraisal 3): The Iranian Government is attempting to heal the split in the Kurdish movement. Barzani has again requested aid from Iran.

16) Tehran's NIT 6562, November 3, 1964 (Appraisal 3): Barzani and friends assert "Iran has positively assisted only those elements of the Iraqi Kurdish movement responsible for the former democratic party leadership who were consistently opposed to Barzani's leadership."

17) NIT 6599, January 4, 1965 (Appraisal 2): As of November 1964 Barzani was short of heavier weapons and money ... During the later stages of the rebellion<sup>1/</sup> Barzani had come to believe information arriving at his headquarters that the United States was directly assisting the Kurdish Democratic Party/KDP/ and its leader Ibrahim AHMED. This aid was said to be either directly supplied or indirectly through the Iranians in contact with the KDP. Subsequently, he

<sup>1/</sup> Underlining mine.

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became convinced that the Iranians alone were behind this support ... The Shah continues to let occasional aid reach Barzani but at the same time supports Kurdish elements in active opposition to Barzani's leadership."

\* \* \* \* \*

The picture is now clear enough. The KDP was on its uppers until October 1963; then Talabani came rushing back from Europe, presumably via Iran, to participate in important policy decisions; and we hear no more about the Politbureau's financial condition until the following summer, when Barzani accuses it of having been accepting a very substantial monthly stipend from the Iranians. We have IIA surplus rifles in KDP headquarters in December and heavier weapons later on. And, of course, as the KDP-Barzani struggle unfolds over the course of 1964, the nature of the relationship between the old Politbureau and the Iranian Government becomes increasingly clear -- and embarrassing to both.

#### VI The Present (Interbellum?) Period and the Future.

I shall not endeavor further to inflate this already lengthy report with any detailed analysis of developments since the February 1964 ceasefire. The principal highlights have already been touched upon, and anyway they are presumably still fairly fresh in the reader's mind: the KDP-Barzani split, the exile of the former in Iran, the unsuccessful Iranian efforts to heal the breach, and current Iranian interest in a resumption of hostilities. See the Consulate's recent A-20 for further analysis of the present situation.

The main thing to watch at the moment, in this reporter's opinion, is the relationship between Barzani and the Shah. A little over a year ago the Persians succeeded in buying the old KDP, but as it turned out, they bought a loser. Now they obviously want to buy Barzani, who has turned out to be a surprisingly durable winner. But Barzani, who will probably be marked by historians as one of the truly great men of this century, seems a little too big to be bought. He is a tough old warrior, with long memories, and his mistrust of the Persians is both monumental and well documented.


But if the Shah's attitude towards Kurds really has changed, and this change really does filter down and infuse other Persians with a new sense of brotherhood for the Kurds, and if the development program in Iran's Kurdish areas does proceed as rapidly as I am currently predicting (see A-17, January 7), then Kurdish attitudes toward Persians will eventually warm up in response. This hasn't happened yet, of course; it will take more than one balmy spring morning to melt the layered ice of a long winter of contempt and neglect. However, Barzani may yet find that his destiny lies with the Persians. If and when that happens, the Arabs would be well advised to cut their losses.

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If this Kurdish problem could be handled on its own merits, isolated from Khuzistan, Nasser, etc., and if the Arabs were not already demented by the Israeli experience, it might be possible for the protagonists to sit down around a table and work out something sensible. But it is not a particularly sensible part of the world, and I suspect the Kurdish problem will be with us for some time to come. As I suggested in A-20, I can think of nothing better for us to do than stand on the sidelines, watch, and keep out of the action, at least for the time being.



Carleton S. Coon, Jr.  
American Consul

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## AIRGRAM

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A-629

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LONDON, TABRIZ, TEHRAN.

ANALYSIS &amp; DISTRIBUTION

COPY NO. 63 SERIES B

FROM : Amembassy BAGHDAD

DATE: 8 January 1965

SUBJECT : Kurdish Situation Report.

REF : A-626, 8 January 1965.

Kurds

This document consists of  
 6 pages of 1 of 17  
 Copies Series A.

## SUMMARY

The GOI still maintains that the Kurdish problem has been solved; the Minister of the Interior has stated that the Kurds had been given all they could legitimately aspire to. It will now be difficult for the government to open any negotiations with the Kurds as it had promised or at least implied it would do. The government is now making its first public references to clashes between the Kurds and the Army and may be trying to prepare the people and the Army for resumption of hostilities. It has referred to recent Kurdish action as "treachery" committed by "bandits and criminals". They are acting, says the GOI, under the orders of imperialism which is trying to disrupt the "traditional Arab-Kurdish brotherhood" and to build a "new Israel in this integral part of the Arab homeland". The Kurds say they are determined not to permit the government to enlarge the area under its control and claim that the recent incidents between Army and peshmerga near Khanaqin and at Darband Bazian (between Chemchemal and Sulaimaniya) arose from the Army's attempts to do this. They say they do not believe the Army wants to fight now but they have definite information that the GOI plans to attack the Kurds in March.

Many Kurds feel they should act now while they have the relative advantage given them by winter but Mulla Mustafa believes that the GOI must bear the psychological burden of resuming hostilities. Kurds claim that this time they will carry the war to Kirkuk and the Arab south. (It may be recalled that they made the same threats, which proved empty, prior to the Baathi attack in June, 1963.)

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by:

POL:JEAKins:mlh:01/07/65

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Charge:JWAdams

Clearances:

JAN 14 1965

SANITIZED  
 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
 NLJ / RAC 11-57  
 By UCB NARA, Date 03-17-12



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Page 2, Airgram No. 629  
Baghdad, Iraq.

The government is trying to split the Kurdish ranks even further (but apparently without success); it is still recruiting "josh"; it has blocked distribution of CARE food to areas under Kurdish control in the liwas of Diyala, Sulaimaniya and Kirkuk. The Kurds meanwhile are proceeding with the organization of civil authority throughout Kurdistan - including some areas under nominal government control - and they have started issuing laws and regulations.

\* \* \* \* \*

Official Version of Recent Developments in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The GOI still maintains that the Kurdish problem has been solved. Minister of the Interior, Subhi Abd al-Hamid, in a press interview January 3, 1965 stated that the government had kept all the promises it made to the Kurds in February, 1964 and all legitimate aspirations of the Kurds have now been met. All Kurdish prisoners have been freed, he said, and the Kurds have been reinstated in their old civilian and military jobs.

Several editorials in the government newspapers recently have taken the same line, and adding, for the first time since February 1962, accounts of incidents of "banditry" in the North which "must be stopped". There is also evidence, they said, that "imperialism" is trying to incite certain Kurdish elements to stir up troubles. The GOI warns all those involved in these schemes that any attempt to combat Arab union through disturbances in the northern provinces of Iraq will meet with failure; that the Arabs will never permit the establishment of a new "Israel" in the northern part of the Arab homeland. On January 1, 1965, a group of armed Kurds at Bazian pass on the road between Chenichemal and Sulaimaniya, "treacherously" attacked and murdered a group of unarmed Kurdish and Arab soldiers, returning to their bases from leave. An editorial in al-Jumhuriya, (the government organ), written, [REDACTED] by Lt. Col. Hadi Kharras (Director General of Military Intelligence and a strong anti-Kurd) condemned the attack in the strongest terms and said the guilty would have to be brought to justice. On January 6 the press carried a statement by acting Army Chief of Staff (and brother of President Aref) Abd al-Rahman Aref, which quoted Mulla Mustafa Barzani as condemning this "treacherous act" and promising to "cooperate with the armed forces to arrest the killers and hand them over to the government so that justice will be secured and the criminals receive due punishment".

Kurdish Version of the Same Developments.

The GOI has kept none of the promises it made to the Kurds in February 1964. The "josh" (Kurdish auxiliaries fighting with the Army) has not been disbanded; Kurdish national rights have not been defined; Kurdish civilians have not been rehired and the ten ex-soldiers who accepted the government offer to return to their positions have been arrested and are still in prison. Kurds who were held without charge have been released but all of those sentenced for political crimes in the last three years are still in prison. And most important, Arabs have not been removed from the Kurdish lands on which they have been settled and the original Kurdish inhabitants are still being kept out.

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Page 3, Airgram No. 629  
Baghdad, Iraq.

As for the recent clashes: Kurds say the Army in early December tried to capture a peshmerga leader in Mandali. The Kurds resisted and several soldiers were killed. Later in the month the Army tried to penetrate into Kurdish-held territory around Khanaqin. The Kurds again resisted and again several soldiers were killed. Siddiq Mustafa, the Army Commander in the region, issued a warning that any village harboring peshmerga would be destroyed and its male inhabitants executed. The Army then attacked several villages in the area, destroyed them with tanks and artillery and used planes on at least one village.

The engagement lasted through December 28 and 29. Mulla Mustafa sent an urgent telegram to the Prime Minister pointing out the danger of a wider war and asked that the Army offensive be stopped. It was, but it is not clear whether or not the cease-fire was in response to Mulla's request or to any order from the Prime Minister.

The Army has recently started reinforcing its garrison in Sulaimaniya. The Kurds interpret this as a build-up prior to a full-scale attack and, the end of last year, they decided they would prevent further government strengthening of Sulaimaniya. On January 1, 1965 they stopped an armed convoy at Bazian pass between Chemchemal and Sulaimaniya, burned several trucks, captured a substantial amount of military equipment and killed a number of soldiers. It is not clear what connection, if any, this attack had with the destruction of the Kurdish villages around Khanaqin.

We do not yet know whether Mulla has condemned the January 1 action as reported by General Aref, but we doubt it. The GOI has consistently put words into Mulla's mouth words which, on checking, have proved to be false. This particular Kurdish attack on the Army, however, may have been made by Kurds who were trying to provoke a resumption of full-scale hostilities and hence acted without the knowledge or permission of Mulla. In such a case, Mulla may have issued an "apology" to the government, but it is highly unlikely that he would agree to turn over peshmerga - of any political persuasion - to the government.

#### Resumption of Hostilities.

Kurdistan Democratic Party representatives in Baghdad claim they have definite information the Army planned to attack them the end of December - not with troops but with napalm and poison gas.

This plan was dropped and the Army now plans a full-scale conventional attack in March. source has confirmed that the Army believes no solution to the problem can be reached through negotiations and now plans to attack the Kurds in March - NQB 4783.)

Shawkat Aqravi still thinks that there is a possibility that Nasser will be able to persuade the government to try to reach a peaceful solution to the problem but he is perhaps the only responsible Kurd who holds this view. Aqravi is widely accused by Kurds here of having been seduced by Nasser - either with words or with money, and his (Aqravi's) insistence that several members of the government truly want a settlement and are prepared to make political concessions to the Kurds to reach it, say his Kurdish detractors, is naive at best and "treason" to the Kurds at worst.

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Mulla Mustafa, it seems, is also convinced that the government will make no concessions but he is still unwilling to resume fighting. He believes that the government should bear the psychological burden of starting the war. He feels that if the government attacks the Kurds he will be able to win the support of southern Iraq, of the Arabs as a whole, and of the outside civilized world.

A large number of Kurds, including a significant portion of the KDP, are sceptical of the chances of winning any support from the Arabs; they believe Nasser and his men in Baghdad are no more friendly to the Kurds than any other group and they say the world's "moral support" would not be worth a fig to the Kurds. They believe the Kurds should attack now while they have the relative advantage of the winter. We believe they would not do so without Mulla's approval (although the January 1 attack may indicate otherwise) but there is always the possibility that a small incident could grow into major action and full-scale war could then break out without either side really wanting it.

The Kurds, including Mulla, are determined to prevent the government from enlarging the area under its control and the recent incidents in Khanaqin and Sulaimaniya seem more to be part of this Kurdish plan than a deliberate KDP provocation of the Army or an attempt to precipitate hostilities. Assuming the negotiations fail, the war, almost certainly, will begin when the Army tries to re-establish itself in the mountains.

#### Nature of War.

Kurds state, with considerable bravado, that the nature of the war will change completely if they are forced to resume fighting. They say this time the fight will be taken to the Arabs and the Kurds will engage in the sabotage in <sup>the</sup> Kirkuk oil fields, in Baghdad and even in Basra. Shawkat Aqrabi, (probably exaggerating), claims that the Kurds already possess sufficient arms to destroy the IPC installation but the KDP representatives say they still need heavy weapons.

Kurds have recently become much more reticent about discussing their relations with the Iranians, either Iranian incitement to fight or supplies they have received through Iran. (Possibly the Iranians have been alarmed at the security leaks.)

It should be noted that the Kurds in 1963 made the same threats to carry the war to the south. Yet when the Baath attacked in June, 1963, the Kurds were forced back into the mountains and, with the exception of a few bungled attempts at sabotage in Baghdad, they engaged in no military activity outside their mountains.

#### Other Recent Government Action in Kurdistan.

According to Kurdish sources the government is engaging in rather crude attempts to split the Kurds. The Prime Minister has written another letter to Mulla Mustafa singing his praises but condemning the new Political Bureau. Government agents had also tried to encourage dissatisfaction in Sulaimaniya with the Barzani domination of the movement. And the government is still actively recruiting "josh". The publication



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Page 5, Airgram No. 629  
Baghdad, Iraq.

of the Barzani "apology" may be merely a government attempt to persuade other Kurds that he is really with Aref.

Although the economic blockade has not been re-established, government food deliveries to the North have stopped and severe restrictions have been placed on the CARE food program. According to the CARE representative here, the government has allowed no distribution of CARE food in Kirkuk and Diyala liwas. In Sulaimaniya it has limited distribution to government employees and supporters. In Erbil and Mosul, however, the distribution has gone more or less according to plan.

#### Other Recent Kurdish Action.

The KDP, in a pamphlet issued December 5, accused the government of breaking promises made to Mulla Mustafa in February. It pointed out it had opposed the truce which Mulla concluded at that time but said that the government was wrong to think it could exploit the differences between the Kurds. If the war started again, they said, the Kurds will be firmly united.

The efforts of Jalal Fuad and Ismet Sherif Vanli (Kurds from Europe) to bring about a reconciliation between the Ibrahim Ahmad and the Mulla Mustafa groups have failed but several of the Ahmad faction who had taken refuge in Iran have now returned. The KDP men in Iraq are still embarrassed by the split and still hope to heal the breach. But almost all of them recognize the importance of Mulla Mustafa and, while not repudiating Ibrahim Ahmad, have maintained their allegiance to Mulla.

Meanwhile, the Kurds proceed with their organization of administration in the North. Local officials have been appointed throughout the area, even in many villages under nominal government control and the Kurdish National Council has started issuing laws and regulations (A-626).

#### Chance of Negotiations Seem Slim.

The proposal taken by Aqrawi to the North to start limited negotiations with the government has not yet been accepted by Mulla. KDP men here say the Kurds cannot afford to send another team to Baghdad if the government will only delay and equivocate and finally arrest the team when it launches its attack in March. They say they would accept the proposal if the government were to agree to a specific date for the meetings and if it were actually prepared to appoint its own negotiating team. But this seems highly unlikely especially in view of Subhi Abd al-Hamid's statement January 3 that the Kurds had already been given all they could legitimately aspire to.

#### Conclusion.

There is little encouraging about the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan. The central government has given no public and little private indication that it is willing to discuss issues with the Kurds. Indeed, Subhi Abd al-Hamid's statement that nothing more will be

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


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Page 6, Airgram No. 629  
Baghdad, Iraq.

of such statements.  
conceded to the Kurds, was only the last of a series/ The government speaks of keeping its promises to Mulla Mustafa and of its great patience in face of repeated Kurdish provocation. Now for the first time since February, 1963, it has admitted serious clashes which it has branded as the Kurdish treachery for which those responsible must be punished. The GOI may well be preparing its people and its soldiers for a resumption of the war. Nonetheless, we doubt that either side plans any major action before March. Unfortunately we see no indication that this period will be used to try to avoid hostilities.

For the Charge d'Affaires a.i.:

  
James E. Akins  
First Secretary of Embassy

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Hand 2/22  
OK 5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 23, 1966

RWK:

Good stuff.

We have another letter from Mullah Mustafa Barazani to the President. He says the Iraqi government is intensifying its campaign to exterminate the Kurds and asks the President to prevent the supply of arms to the Iraqi government and to use his influence to settle the Kurdish problem.

State proposes we tell Barazani's emissary if he comes back that we still see this as an internal affair, don't intend to interfere and urge negotiations. In addition, State will give it's people in a separate telegram the facts on our military aid to Iraq in order to deflate any notion that we're responsible for the current flow of arms against the Kurds.

Since we don't even officially acknowledge that we've received this letter here, can't you clear this cable and save LBJ's time? It's consistent with past handling and still makes sense as long as we're going to stay out of the Kurdish business.

H.  
HHS

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CLASSIFICATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

March 21, 1966

Date

Mr. Bromley Smith  
The White House

The enclosed is for White House  
clearance prior to transmission.

Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Draft telegram to TEHRAN

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.1(a)

BY Cl ON 8-6-93

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HSE memo  
3/23/66*



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Tehran's A-625 ~~ref Airgram, GP-4~~

Department concurs proposed oral response to Mofti outlined  
ref Airgram. GP-4

END

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NEA/GTI:FJCrawford:djg 2498

NEA/GTI - John M. Howison

NEA/NE - ~~KrynKinsolving~~  
Mr. Wiley

NEA - Mr. Davies  
S/S -

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A-625

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NO. 22

with UNCLASSIFIED enclosure

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1966 MAR 12 PM 12 44

INFO : ANKARA, BAGHDAD, LONDON, **FILE COPY**

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION  
BRANCH

DATE: March 12, 1966

FROM : Amembassy TEHRAN

SUBJECT: Iran-Iraq: Letter to President Johnson from Mullah Mustafa BARZANI

REF : Embassy's A-543 dated April 24, 1965; A-28 dated July 8, 1965; and A-544 dated February 8, 1966

Shamsuddin MOFTI, who is BARZANI's liaison agent in Tehran with SAVAK, delivered to the Embassy a few days ago an envelope containing a letter in Arabic from Mullah Mustafa Barzani addressed to President Johnson pleading the Kurdish case.

The letter (Translation attached) contains the usual appeal to intervene on behalf of the Kurdish people in Iraq in order that they might achieve their desires: "We want for our people their constitutional rights in the Iraqi Republic, the system that is consistent with international traditions and which corresponds with the traditions of your country concerning the freedom of peoples and with your government's position on human rights." The letter asks assistance in ending the "scorched earth policy" of the Iraqi government. It also states that the "League of Nations recognized the rights of the Kurdish People" in 1925.

Summarizing, Barzani requests that the United States prevent the supply of arms to the Iraqi government, support the Kurdish people, and apply its great influence and efforts to solving the Kurdish problem, "for the sake of peace and the basic constitutional rights of my people."

## Enclosures:

1. Original Barzani Letter.
2. Informal Translation.

Group 4

Downgraded at 3-year intervals.  
Declassified after 12 years.

DECLASSIFIED  
EO. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLI-5-08001

By NA NAHA, Date 6-7-03

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

with UNCLASSIFIED enclosure

Contents and Classifications Approved by:

Classified by: POL-WAH/eth:abw 3/12/66

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Page 2, A- 625 from Tehran

Comment:


In 1965, Barzani sent two letters to the American Ambassador in Tehran asking that the United States Government assist the Kurds in their struggle against the Iraqi government. At that time, we informed Barzani's emissary, on instructions from the Department, that (a) the USG views the Iraqi-Kurdish conflict as an internal Iraqi problem, (b) we intend to maintain our posture of non-interference and (c) we urge negotiations to resolve the present conflict.

We recommend that we be authorized to make the same response to Mofti if and when he calls again at the Embassy. We see no advantage in a written response or acknowledgement of Barzani's letter.

Attached are the original letter and an informal translation.

ACTION REQUESTED: Confirmation of our proposed oral response to Mofti.

For the Ambassador:



Martin F. Herz  
Counselor of Embassy  
for Political Affairs

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UNCLASSIFIED

(Informal translation from the Arabic)

To His Excellency President Johnson  
via His Excellency the American Ambassador in Tehran

The intention of this letter is to present the truth of the war in our country, Iraqi Kurdistan. You know that the people of Kurdistan have begun a partisan war which has continued for four years against three military dictatorships.

The war dates from the First World War and not from the better known situation after the Second War; and the destructive weapons, the death and injury from airplanes, bombs and cannon which the government of Iraq has used against the Kurdish people are like those inflicted in the two universal wars.

You, Excellency, and your people who have suffered war and its calamities can understand our country and our people and extend your sympathy.

In addition, this war which has forced our peaceful people to adopt a defensive policy, has spread destruction and fire among cities, towns and houses and their occupants - children, adults and leaders (Shakhs) - without compassion or mercy.

I am directing this letter to you because of the extension by the misguided Iraqi government of its scorched earth policy of recent years and the eviction of tens of thousands of Kurds, after burning and looting, in an attempt to exterminate the Kurdish people. This began after the military dictator government had itself become discouraged at the prospect of victory over the Kurdish rebellion.

All this has happened because our people want to defend their language and national customs. At a later date we want for our people their constitutional national rights in the Iraqi Republic, the system that is consistent with international traditions and which corresponds with the traditions of your country concerning the freedom of peoples and your government's position on human rights.

If the Iraqi government defends itself by saying that the Kurdish case is an internal problem it will be false, because the Kurdish people form a nation with language, customs and possessions, and because the League of Nations recognized the rights of the Kurdish

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people, (rights which we are asking for today) in a special agreement on the rights of Southern Kurdistan in Iraq. This was on the 16th of Tashrin al Thani (an Arab month) 1925. In spite of this the Iraqi army has engaged in armed attacks against the Kurdish people beginning in 1963 and because of this war in Kurdistan, it will not be possible to have peace in the Middle East. The war will also jeopardize the well being of all nations.

In my name and in the name of my persecuted people, I ask your Excellency to prevent the supply of arms to the Iraqi government, for your support for the Kurdish people in this war, and for the extension of your great influence and efforts to solving the Kurdish problem. I ask this for the sake of peace and the basic constitutional rights of my people.

Offered with thanks and esteem,

The Worthy  
Mustafa al Barzani

Leader of the Supreme Revolutionary Council  
of Iraqi Kurdistan

15/1/66

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

7 MAR 1966

In reply refer to:  
I-21628/66

*Hal- Ziv*  
*Tell Haggas*  
*to talk agree*  
*with him, and*  
*will ex note.*  
*RWK*

Honorable Raymond A. Hare  
Assistant Secretary of State for  
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Ray:

Partly because of recent Iraqi military actions against, and unofficial Iranian support of, the Kurds, I ordered an ISA review of our military aid to Iraq. This has uncovered some information new to me and has led me to certain conclusions which I would like to share with you. Following seem to be the essential facts.

The Soviet Union has been Iraq's major source of military materiel--through a series of purchase agreements--since the overthrow of the Nuri el Said regime in July 1958. The first of these agreements was signed in November 1958 with subsequent agreements becoming effective during February 1960, October 1961, and June 1964. Iraq received a two-thirds discount on most items, with repayment over 10 years at 2% interest. The 1964 agreement provided for a one-third discount. These sales have totalled about \$190 million.

The UK rates next to the Soviet Union as a supplier of arms to Iraq. Significant Iraqi purchases from the UK have been in Hawker-Hunter aircraft, Westland Wessex helicopters and related ground equipment. Most of the UK ground force items being provided are ammunition and spare parts for British equipment currently in the Iraqi inventory.

US equipment in Iraq originated with a MAP grant program which was terminated shortly after the 1958 revolution and a sales program begun in 1961. The value of grant aid was approximately \$46 million; the sales programs have amounted to \$14.9 million.

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By sglcm, NARA, Date 8-16-07

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Except for a \$10 million sale in June 1964, US military sales to Iraq have been modest, covering essentially ammunition and spare parts. The items contained in the US-Iraq \$10 million sales package are:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Delivery Status</u>
Armored personnel carrier, M-113A1	200	Delivered
Tank recovery vehicle, M-578	6	March 1966
Truck, 1/4-ton M-151	300	Delivered
Truck, 1-ton M-601	300	Delivered
Truck, 2 1/2-ton Van M-292	6	May 1966
Howitzer, towed 8" M-115	3	Delivered

During January 1965, the Iraqis submitted a request to purchase 60 105mm self-propelled howitzers, but cancelled this request in November 1965. More recently, they expressed interest in 50 AN/MPQ-4A Radars (a mortar-locating battlefield device) and have formally submitted a request to State. We understand that State has approved this case, and is submitting it to DoD(ILN) for concurrence and implementation. I have serious reservations about the wisdom of selling these devices to Iraq in view of the recent border skirmishes with Iran, some of them involving Iranian mortars.

To the best of my knowledge, the most recent expression of US arms policy for Iraq is set forth in a memorandum from Phillips Talbot to Mr. Harriman dated April 9, 1963 (copy attached). I would like to suggest that we undertake a joint State/Defense review of this policy paper, in the light of our general desire to minimize our arms commitments (and the complications thereof) in the Middle Eastern area, and more specifically to avoid the awkward situation that could arise in the event of a military dispute between Iraq and Iran, if we were a major arms supplier to both. To this end, I would call attention to the following paragraphs of the 1963 policy paper:

1. With regard to paragraph 2, ISA would be inclined to preclude future consideration of requests for heavier guns, and to qualify our willingness to sell even small arms and machine guns. In this connection, we have removed 8" Howitzers from the Jordan program, and I was disappointed to learn that a similar action could not be taken with respect to Iraq, in view of the fact that the three such weapons programmed in 1964 have already been delivered. In keeping with our

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basic objective of damping down the Middle East arms race, I believe we should not sell further artillery pieces to Iraq.

2. Paragraph 6 of the policy paper stated that we should refuse to cede to the UK its previous position of primacy in arms sales to Iraq. In present circumstances, characterized by our increasing military and political stake in Iran, and in view of the Iraq-Iran border troubles involving the Kurds, ISA sees some merit in letting the UK resume the lead in Western arms sales to Iraq. This would satisfy our desire to leave the Iraqis a "window to the West" while minimizing US embarrassment in the event of an Iraq-Iran confrontation. Also, this would contribute to our corollary aim of assisting the British with arms sales in the area where this does not run counter to our fundamental purposes.

3. Paragraph 10 of the policy paper calls for consultation with Iran and Turkey before concluding arms sales agreements with Iraq. To the best of our knowledge, this policy requirement has been carefully ignored in our past dealings with Iraq. ISA considers such consultation important to our larger interests in each of these countries, and therefore suggests that this policy requirement be observed in future.


The foregoing are merely the highpoints of our initial review here. As indicated, I believe a State/Defense staff review of the 1963 policy paper would be useful, and might suggest further revisions to bring it into proper alignment with new circumstances. If you find this thought agreeable, my staff is prepared to go forward immediately.

Sincerely,

(Signed) Townsend W. Hoopes

Townsend Hoopes  
Deputy

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Robert Komer, EOB   
NESA Region

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TO: M - Governor Harriman  
THROUGH: S/S  
FROM: NEA - Phillips Talbot  
SUBJECT: US Arms Policy for Iraq

With the emergence of a new political situation in Iraq potentially altering drastically the political dynamics of the Near East, it is necessary to determine what policy should govern US sale of arms to that country. For several years prior to the recent coup, the US as a matter of policy sold to Iraq for cash only spare parts and ammunition for the military equipment of US origin previously supplied to Iraq. Several months ago we did approve, after delay of more than a year, the sale of 500 Reo trucks to the Iraqi Army, but the sale was not consummated.

Essential factors to be considered are:

A. The previous Iraqi regime acquired large quantities of Soviet military equipment to the point of standardization. We understand the Iraqi Army is disappointed in the quality of Soviet transport equipment, including aircraft.

B. Iraq still employs only limited quantities of US-origin tanks, artillery, transport radar and communications equipment supplied during the period of the Baghdad Pact.

C. Although the new regime is non-aligned and intends to maintain normal relations with both the Soviet Bloc and the West, attacks on it by International Communism for its alleged mistreatment of Iraqi Communists may well lead the regime to reduce its present dependence on the Soviet Union. Recent indications are that the regime may not only gradually come to rely primarily on the West for economic development and technology, but may turn also to the West for substantial military materiel.

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DATE 10-10-01  
BY *MS* *MAWA, GWS* 6-2-03



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D. The UK, prior to the Qasim regime, desired to be and acted as the main supplier of arms to Iraq. We assume the UK will wish to seek again to establish itself as the prime supplier of any armaments Iraq may desire from the West.

E. France has restored relations with Iraq, and may possibly wish to be available as a source of arms alternate to the Soviets and other Western countries, although French ties with Israel may serve as a restraint to some degree.

F. Iran and Turkey both are concerned over the buildup of Soviet arms in Iraq, and probably would be displeased at Western policies which might further strengthen Iraq, particularly if the new Iraqi regime should prove to be a Nasserist satellite, which we do not expect, or if it should otherwise mount a credible irredentist threat against Iranian or Turkish territory.

G. Jordan and perhaps the UAR (depending on the outcome of current unity negotiations between Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad) might regard as favoritism towards Iraq a US policy permitting sale of any significant quantities or types of heavy or sophisticated weapons to Iraq.

H. Israel must regard the present Iraqi regime, with its pan-Arabist attraction to Syria and eventually Jordan, as a potential increase in the Arab threat to Israel's security. Israel would react strongly to the appearance of Iraqi military forces in the vicinity of Israel's border. Thus Israel would object seriously to a US policy permitting sale of significant quantities or types of heavy weapons or sophisticated equipment to Iraq.

I. Iraq's capacity to mount an offensive outside the country, particularly against distant Israel, is not limited by lack of military equipment (the Army already has about 350 heavy tanks, mainly Russian T-54's) but by logistics, organization, and problems of internal security. No real offensive capability is likely to be developed in the foreseeable future.

J. Iraq may desire training in the US for certain categories of military personnel.

K. Unlike the UAR, which uses its cotton surplus to pay for arms, Iraq must pay the Soviets in hard currency.

With these factors in mind, we recommend that in general the US follow toward Iraq the same arms policy as that governing sale of arms to those Arab states directly involved in the Arab-Israel conflict, namely, declining to become a major supplier of offensive weapons, taking into account, however, Iraq's distance from Israel, its lack of logistical capability, and

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its legitimate defensive and internal security needs. Requests for sales that fall into "offensive" categories should be considered on a case-by-case basis. Specifically, we propose that the US should:

1. Avoid sale to Iraq of any significant quantities of heavy military equipment or sophisticated weapons, including late-model, high-performance combat aircraft and naval vessels and craft.
2. Agree to requests for reasonable quantities of small arms up to and including machine guns, but not preclude consideration of requests for small numbers of heavier guns.
3. Be willing to sell quantities of transport vehicles, communications equipment, engineering equipment, and other "non-shooting" materiel.
4. Be willing to sell reasonable numbers of transport aircraft, up to and including limited numbers of "Flying Boxcars" (C-119).
5. Continue the present program of grant aid non-combat training, consider requests for additional training on a reimbursable basis, but not preclude additional grant aid training if US interests would be served.
6. Refuse to cede to the UK its previous position of primacy in arms sales to Iraq. Notwithstanding, interpose no objection should the IAF seek to phase out its Soviet equipment and acquire reasonable numbers of British or other Western combat aircraft.
7. Agree to continue to sell Iraq spare parts and ammunition for equipment of US origin still employed by the Iraqi Army.
8. Given Iraq's relatively favorable foreign exchange position, undertake only cash sales to Iraq unless better terms are required to compete with other Western suppliers.
9. Sell nothing classified to Iraq.
10. Consult with the Iranians and Turkish Governments before concluding agreements for arms sales to Iraq.
11. After informing the UK and French Governments of the foregoing, acquaint the Iraqi Government informally in the near future of the essentials of this policy.

Approved: Averell Harriman

Date: 9 April 1963

prepared by AIK/llgore 3/26/63

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Kamal

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## KURDISH

NICOSIA, CYPRUS (AP)-THE LEADER OF THE KURDISH REVOLT IN NORTHERN IRAQ CLAIMED TODAY THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS AUTHORIZED THE USE OF POISON GAS TO WIPE OUT KURDISH RESISTANCE AND END THE 4-YEAR-OLD WAR.

MULLAH MUSTAFA BARZANI MADE THE CLAIM IN A CABLE SENT FROM NICOSIA TO U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL U THANT AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT ALEX QUASON-SACKY OF GHANA. HE APPEALED TO THEM TO DISSUADE THE BAGHDAD GOVERNMENT FROM ITS ALLEGEDLY IMMINENT PLAN TO LAUNCH GAS ATTACKS.

IDENTICAL MESSAGES WERE ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON, FRENCH PRESIDENT DE GAULLE, SOVIET PREMIER ALEXEI N. KOSYGIN, PRESIDENT KWAME NKRUMAH OF GHANA, PRESIDENT TITO OF YUGOSLAVIA AND BRITISH PRIME MINISTER HAROLD WILSON.

A KURDISH EMISSARY SAID HE HAD BROUGHT THE MESSAGES TO NICOSIA AND DELIVERED THEM TO THE VARIOUS EMBASSIES BECAUSE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT TO SEND THEM FROM ANY NEIGHBORING ARAB COUNTRY.

BARZANI'S CABLE CLAIMED THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT PLANS TO MAKE THE FIRST GAS ATTACK IN THE ROWANDUS REGION IN AN ATTEMPT TO EXTRICATE THE IRAQI ARMY'S 1ST DIVISION.

THE CABLE CLAIMED KURDISH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE HAD DISCOVERED THE PLAN BY DECIPHERING AN IRAQI MILITARY TELEGRAM AUTHORIZING THE USE OF PISON GAS.

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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MOODY

*Kurds*

SMETN HEAIF VANLY\*, FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVE COMMAND COUNCIL  
OF THE REVOLUTION OF IRAQI KURDISTAN, TODAY HANDED EMBOFF  
UNSIGNED LETTER TO PRES JOHNSON FROM MUSTAFA BARZANI GIST AS  
FOLLOWS:

1. IRAQI MILITARY TELEGRAMS DECIPHERED BY KURDS INDICATE  
IRAQI FIRST ARMY DIVISION, HARD PRESSED IN ROWANDUZ REGION,  
ABOUT TO LAUNCH GAS ATTACKS AGAINST KURDS.
2. URGE PRES INTERCEDE GOI PREVENT GASSING, TAKE APPROPRIATE  
STEPS SAVE KURDS FROM GENOCIDE, END WAR.
3. APPEAL TO PRES BRING CONFLICT AND KURDISH NATIONAL

PAGE TWO RUQMBE 449B C O N F I D E N T I A L  
QUESTION BEFORE UN FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN SPIRIT CHARTER.

SIMILAR MESSAGES CABLED TO KOSYGIN, WILSON, DE GAULLE,  
U THANT, WUAISON-SACKEY, NKRUMAH, TITO. NASSER ADDED LAST  
MINUTE. VANLY, WHO PLANS REVEAL MESSAGES AT NEWS CONFERENCE  
BEIRUT AUGUST 19, 1700 HOURS, TOLD EMBOFF IRAQI GAS THREATS  
RESULT SUCCESSFUL KURD COUNTERATTACK ERBIL ROWANDUZ AREA IN  
WHICH BRIGADE AND BATTALION FIRST DIVISION IRAQI ARMY CUT OFF.

MEMCON, BARZANI LETTER AND COVERING LETTER FROM VANLY TO  
AMBASSADOR BEING POUCHED.

GP-3. PORTER

\*AS RECEIVED

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By *15* NARA, QRS 6-2-03

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

RECEIVED  
SEC. 1  
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U.S.C.

Research  
Memorandum

RNA-11, April 5, 1965

To : The Acting Secretary  
Through: S/S  
From : INR - George C. Denney, Jr. *H.C.D.*  
Subject: The Kurdish Situation in Iraq

~~BUNDY/SMITH~~  
~~BAYDR~~  
~~BELK~~  
~~BOWMAN~~  
~~COOPER~~  
~~JESSUP~~  
~~JOHNSON~~  
~~KLEIN~~  
~~KOMER~~  
~~SAUNDERS~~  
~~SAYRE~~  
~~THOMSON~~

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This study was prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs as a working paper. It summarizes the failure of the Government of Iraq and the Kurds to reach an agreed settlement, and appends the successive schedules of demands and counter-offers exchanged since February 1964. INR/RNA fully agrees with the analysis it contains, and has provided for its reproduction and distribution believing that it will be useful to a wider audience.

ABSTRACT

Since the cease-fire of February 10, 1964, there have been ineffectual attempts, perhaps better termed probes, between the Government of Iraq and the Kurds to find a mutually acceptable formula for a settlement of Iraq's most stubborn and destructive internal problem. Because of the absence of large scale fighting, the Government has developed a false sense of security and has diverted its attention from the situation. There have been an increasing number of reports which predict a resumption of hostilities in the Spring of 1965. It appears there is little that the United States can do in an advisory capacity to head off a clash beyond what it already has done.

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Downgraded at 12 year  
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President of Iraq Abd al-Salam 'Arif, and Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani, the Kurdish leader, issued separate but closely related announcements on February 10, 1964, the former acknowledging the national rights of the Kurds within the framework of "the Iraqi people" in "one national unity," and the latter repeating in almost identical language the same formulation. In this manner, the hostilities which had raged almost continuously in Iraq's northern provinces from late in the summer of 1960 between Kurdish guerrilla partisans and Iraq government forces ceased, and both sides retired to lick their wounds.

The Government should have made the next, obviously called-for, move. But it was another new government, not yet consolidated, unsure of itself and of its assets, and unskilled. Had the Government gone about the negotiation of a compromise settlement with the weary Kurds, there was probably a better-than-even chance at that juncture for the establishment of the basic terms of reference of a future settlement between them. A year later there seemed to be no signs of any basic understanding.

Briefly, the cease-fire produced a false sense of security, and led to costly inattention in Government circles.\* And, as time wore on, it is safe to assume that military elements and others in the hierarchy of the regime, lulled by the pleasant absence of humiliating military events, began or tried to think of the problem as settled. Perhaps there was an attitude of leaving well-enough alone and a reluctance to take the necessary next steps of difficult negotiation for fear of a failure to secure an agreed solution. Then there was the awkwardness of the government's public position that the North was already pacified, save for a few insignificant brigands. Always, behind it all, there was the shame of having openly to concede even more than the cease-fire itself had demonstrated -- the inability of the Iraqi Armed Forces to defeat the Kurdish guerrillas.

Whatever the reason, the Government and the Kurds remained immobile throughout the summer of 1964. Sporadic and minor clashes occurred revealing no pattern or strategy, but exposing the still smoldering situation underneath the calm. In October 1964 Mulla Mustafa broke the calm with a long and rather cynical statement (written) to the government reflecting the Kurdish view that the Government had failed to bring about the necessary conditions to promote a resolution of the problem -- "the seeds of confidence were sown, but they did not sprout." Mulla Mustafa, in what for the Government must have been alarming detail, then listed exactly what the Kurds meant by "national rights," including largely autonomous Kurdish "vilayets" (provinces), a Kurdish military force, and a condition that in the event of federation or union between Iraq and any Arab country the Kurdish vilayet would become a "region" in the union with the same rights as the regions (in this context, countries) constituting the new union or federation.

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\*Sufficient details of specific proposals, answers, and counter demands are attached.

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The Kurds had grown impatient during the period following the ceasefire, and their demands on October 11 were the result of the GOI's failure to initiate negotiations earlier. Nevertheless, the GOI replied later (all of these exchanges were via the sterile means of letters) basing its offers largely on assurances in the February 10 statement by President 'Arif but also requiring certain responses from the Kurds. For a brief moment, it appeared that the two sides were close to agreement on the pre-conditions for a final settlement when the Kurds replied with only minor elaborations of the Government's offers.

But nothing happened, and as the winter closed in over the north of Iraq, and with President 'Arif almost entirely occupied with his primary preoccupations, the balancing of his political assets at home and maintaining his place in the Arab world, the Kurds were left again without an answer.

An ineffective exchange in December 1964 between al-Barzani and the Minister of Interior revealed a bit more of the negotiating positions of both sides, but the exchange was frigid, still lacking the warmth of personal give-and-take, the only negotiating relationship either the Kurds or the Arabs understand or trust.

In the middle of January a vaguely or not fully authorized delegation from the Kurds came to Baghdad with concessions, accompanied by certain firm requirements (such as the maintenance of a 3000-4000 man Kurdish military force). There appears to have been no answer yet to this latest gesture, and our Embassy in Baghdad has suggested that perhaps the Kurds made this fairly good-looking proposal in order to be in a better position to make their case internationally. We are aware they have sent an emissary to visit several capitals to explain the Kurdish position.

The spring of the year is near in Iraq, and it is then that increasing predictions from Iraqi and foreign observers have estimated that fighting would be resumed again, probably at government initiative. Army reinforcements began rolling northward early in March, almost before the wet ground would bear their weight. By about March 25, some three-quarters of Iraq's armed forces will be assembled in the North -- approximately the same proportion that engaged in the 1963-4 campaign.

There appears to be nothing that the US can do in an advisory role which could head off a clash or get the parties together for a serious conference leading toward a negotiated settlement. Feeling on both sides is deep -- the Government taking the point of view that it has offered much to this dissident minority which has refused to accept reasonable conditions; and the Kurds are resignedly coming to the conclusion that the Government never intended to change their status. The Kurds grimly look ahead to fighting again, fairly confident that the Government cannot defeat them and hopeful that in the course of prolonged struggle they will convince Iraqi Arab leaders that there is no solution to the Kurdish problem except by way of concessions to Kurdish nationalism, concessions embodying some degree of Kurdish autonomy in defined areas of the country.

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CHRONOLOGY KURDISH DEMANDS AND GOI REPLIES -- BEGINNING FEBRUARY 10, 1964

February 10, 1964: Signed statement by President 'Arif "decided....

1. To acknowledge the national rights of our Kurdish brothers within the framework of the Iraqi people in one national and brotherly unity and to insert that in the interim constitution.
2. To release all detainees and prisoners....remove the attachments on properties.
3. To return local administrations to northern regions.
4. Reinstate officials, employees.
5. Remove restrictions on marketing of foodstuffs.
6. Begin reconstructions,....those who suffered damages are to be compensated.
7. Compensate owners of lands flooded by Dokan and Derdendi Khan Dams.
8. Peace and security to be re-established.
9. Ministries concerned....are charged with execution (of above)."

February 10, 1964: Signed statement by Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani "In response.... we have decided to start a cease fire....

"It would also give an opportunity for acknowledgement of the National rights of Kurdish citizens within the framework of the Iraqi people in one national unity."

October 11, 1964: Kurdish note to Government of Iraq

"....the seeds of confidence were sown, but they did not sprout."

Ministry of Oil changed "Iraqization of Oil Companies" to "Arabization of Oil Companies." "...the right of the Kurd in employment is lost."

Government of Iraq announced "that it had allocated 5 million dinars annually for what had been destroyed....costing 100 million dinars....of the small amount allocated only several thousand dinars were spent." And this was used to rebuild "police stations and military roads."



...27 Kurdish villages in Erbil were evacuated and given to Arab tribes....and were provided with protection and money....with the object of Arabizing the area." "In Kirkuk thousands of families were expelled from their houses in order to let Arab families take their place."

The regime "has restricted political action to a single government organization, the Arab Socialist Union." This "confirms a hidden intention that the Kurds should be Arab." Kurdish "rights" were recognized in 1932 in a declaration ratified by Iraq's parliament which "provides that Kurdish is to be the official language in offices, courts and schools in Kurdistan, and that the region should be managed by Kurdish officials." Furthermore, the declaration stated that "established rights of the Kurds...cannot be revoked by subsequent law, regulation or official action." After acknowledging Kurdish "national rights" following the July 14, 1958 overthrow of the monarchy and after the February 18, 1963 coup against the Qasim government, the Iraqi Government in 1964 did not mention the right of the Kurdish people in its constitution, except "haphazardly in an ambiguous manner." Calls upon government to "accede to the right of the Kurdish people to self-government within a democratic and constitutional Iraqi Republic similar to....Yugoslavia, Switzerland, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Canada, India, and others."

#### The National Rights of the Kurdish People

1. Amendment of the last clause in Article 19 of the Interim Constitution which states: "and this Constitution admits their national rights within the unity of Iraq" to read "and this Constitution admits the rights of the Kurdish people on the basis of self-government within the unity of Iraq."
2. In execution of (1) above, we consider that this proposal should be worked out as follows:
  - (a) There shall be set up an administrative unit comprising the Liwas of Arbil, Kirkuk and Sulaimaniya, and the Qadhas of Zakho, Dohuk, Aqra, Shikhan, Sinjar, Tel Afar, Amadia, Khanaqin, and all the Qadhas and Nahiyas of the Liwas of Mosul and Diyala and inhabited by a Kurdish majority. This administrative unit to be called the Vilayet, or Governorate, of Kurdistan.
  - (b) This Vilayet or Governorate shall be administered by an Executive Council stemming from a Legislative Council known as "The Vilayet or Governorate Council." Its members shall be elected directly by those residing in Kurdistan.

The Executive Council shall be responsible to the Vilayet or Governorate Council which shall have the right to withdraw its confidence in it. It shall be attached to the Central Government through its President who shall be known as the President of the Executive Council in the Vilayet or Governorate of Kurdistan.

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(c) The Vilayet or Governorate Council shall be competent to pass local laws and regulations for administering the affairs of Kurdistan provided they do not violate the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic.

(d) The Executive Council shall be competent to deal with the following matters within the boundaries of the Vilayet or Governorate:

(1) Execute laws and regulations to be enacted by the Executive Council of the Vilayet or Governorate in the following subjects:

Justice, Administration, Police, Culture and Education, Health, Agriculture, Forests, Roads and Communications, Municipalities, Labor and Social Affairs, Development and Housing, Summer Resorts, Tobacco, and other affairs not falling within the competence of the Central Government.

(11) Carry out general laws and regulations enacted by the Central Government provided these do not tell against the entity of the Vilayet or Governorate.

(111) Appoint officials and employees to administer all the affairs of the Vilayet or Governorate.

3. The Kurdish language shall be the official language in the Vilayet or Governorate together with the Arabic language. Minorities (Turkomans, Assyrians, Chaldeans) shall have the right to use their own languages.

4. The finances of the Vilayet or Governorate shall consist of:

(a) Local resources and taxes and fees collected therein.

(b) The Vilayet's or Governorate's share of all loans and grants-in-aid obtained by the Central Government in proportion to the population of Kurdistan as a fraction of the population of Iraq, and grants-in-aid and loan given it by the Central Government.

(c) The Vilayet's or Governorate's share of the receipts of Customs, Airports and Ports in proportion to the number of its population to that of the whole of Iraq.

(d) The Vilayet's or Governorate's share of the oil royalties in proportion to the number of its population to that of the whole of Iraq.

5. The Rights of Minorities in the Vilayet or Governorate:

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The laws and regulations of the Vilayet or Governorate shall ensure the cultural, social and economic rights and democratic freedoms of all citizens resident in Kurdistan, so that they shall have complete equality in rights and obligations with the sons of the Arab and Kurdish races. They shall be represented in the Vilayet or Governorate and the Executive Council, etc., in an equitable proportion.

6. The Vice-President of the Republic shall be a Kurd and shall be elected by the Legislative Council of the Vilayet or Governorate.

7. Miscellaneous Matters.

(a) The national partisan units ("Pish Merga") shall be retained as they are at present until the establishment of the Vilayet or Governorate Council. Thereafter they will be converted into a regular force called Gendarmerie (DARAK) or Frontier Guards, their number to be limited to 20,000 armed men.

(b) Citizens of the Vilayet or Governorate will serve the Colours within its boundaries.

(c) Kurdish officers, non-commissioned officers and men expelled from government service and retired for national (political) reasons shall be restored to their posts, and the period of their service in the ranks of the partisan units shall be considered as effective service for the purposes of promotion and pension.

(d) Officers, non-commissioned officers and men who are citizens of the Vilayet or Governorate shall be employed in military units within the Vilayet or Governorate in conditions other than those of war, if the cadre so permits.

(e) A number of students of the Vilayet or Governorate on the usual proportionate basis shall be admitted to the Military College, the Police College, the Staff College, the Air Force College and other military institutions.

(f) The declaration of martial law in the Vilayet or Governorate in peacetime, or if no real danger of foreign aggression exists shall be carried out with the consent of the Legislative Council of the Vilayet or Governorate.

(g) The Central Government may despatch additional forces to the district of Kurdistan in the event of foreign aggression or the existence of a real threat to the Republic of Iraq. In conditions other than these, the consent of the Legislative Council and the Executive Council in Kurdistan must be obtained, provided that the contents of this article do not prevent the Iraqi Army from carrying out its normal exercises and duties.

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(h) Tactical military operations within Kurdistan by units of the Iarqi Army shall be carried out with the consent of the Legislative Council or at the request of the Executive Council.

8. Any legislative text of any origin shall be considered null and void if such a text is calculated to restrict the national and democratic rights of the Kurdish people and to clamp down on their enjoyment of these rights.

9. In connection with the execution of these demands:

(a) A joint committee composed of equal number of members from the two parties shall be set up to enact a law for the establishment of the Vilayet or Governorate of Kurdistan, for the election of the Vilayet or Governorate Council, and for the application of these and other clauses.

(b) The Joint Committee shall discuss and decide all the necessary measures. It shall draw up draft laws and regulations which it considers should be enacted by the Government, to strengthen confidence between the two parties, consolidate the ties of fraternity between Arabs and Kurds, and to avoid any difference or mis-interpretation concerning competences and obligations required by agreement and harmony between the Central Government, its Ministers and Departments on the one hand, the authorities of the Vilayet or Governorate and its machinery on the other.

(c) The Joint Committee shall complete the matters contained in clause (a) of paragraph 10 above as early as possible and elect the Vilayet or Governorate Council so that it can exercise its duties within a period not exceeding 4 months from the date of agreement to this plan.

(d) The allocation shall be expedited of adequate sums for just compensation of all members of the national partisan units. Payments shall be made to them by a special joint committee set up for this purpose.

(e) Adequate sums shall be set aside for the payment of just compensation to all victims, in life and property, of the war in Kurdistan, under the supervision of a joint committee to be set up as early as possible.

(f) The Arab tribes which the Baathis settled in villages in Kurdistan shall be returned to their original homes, and the legitimate owners of these villages shall be resettled there as early as possible.

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(g) The restoration to their previous appointments shall be expedited of all official and employees discharged and placed on pension, including those who were deemed to have resigned due to the incidents in Kurdistan. Compensation shall be paid to them for the damage suffered, and the periods of their absence from service shall be considered as service for the purposes of promotion and pension.

(h) All students discharged, expelled or fled, due to the incidents in Kurdistan, shall be reinstated in their schools and institutions. They shall not be considered as having failed their examinations during that year, as other (Arab) students were treated.

(i) The (Salahaddin) Cavalry shall be disbanded and resettled in their homes.

(j) The release of all those placed under detention or imprisoned due to the incidents in Kurdistan shall be expedited and a general amnesty shall be issued to all prisoners and internees and persons deported from Iraq for political reasons.

11. Article 1 of the Interim Constitution which provides that the people of Iraq are a part of the Arab nation shall be amended to read "the Arab people in Iraq are a part of the Arab nation".
12. The following article should be added to the Interim Constitution: "The Kurdish race shall develop to the same standard (level) as the Arabs in political, economic and cultural matters".
13. The rights of the Kurdish minority outside the boundaries of the Vilayet or Governorate of Kurdistan shall be safeguarded, and they shall be given equal treatment in rights and obligations as other citizens.
14. In the event of the establishment of a Union or Federation between the Republic of Iraq and any other Arab country, the Vilayet or Governorate of Kurdistan shall become a region enjoying the same rights as the regions constituting the Union or Federation, and shall have the same obligations. It shall be known as the Region of Kurdistan.

October 23, 1964: Minister of State Mas'ud Muhammad told Ambassador Strong that the GOI had approved the following presentation to the Kurds, and Mas'ud was to accompany a high-powered delegation to Mulla Mustafa.

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The GOI is ready to make the first move by:

1. Releasing all Kurdish prisoners.
2. Returning Kurdish government employees to their former positions.
3. Removing the Salaneddin (Josh) Cavalry from the north.
4. Removing Arab tribes and returning Kurds to their occupied villages.
5. Compensating persons who suffered during hostilities.

The GOI asked, in return, that the Kurds take the following steps:

1. Withdraw pesh merya (Kurdish armed forces) from major roads and halt their harassing activities.
2. Return weapons captured from Iraq Army.
3. Permit re-establishment of local administration, mostly Kurds, but under GOI supervision.

When the above moves were to have been completed, the GOI and the Kurds would meet to discuss a political settlement.

October 27, 1964: Mulla Mustafa's reply (letter) to GOI offers delivered by Mas'ud Muhammad.

The letter refers to his October 10-11 message (above page) and says "we firmly believe that (it) comprises a broad and reasonable foundation for solving the Kurdish question..." the government's points were "clarified", or modified, to read as follows:

- A. Release all those detained and sentenced...and publication of a general amnesty...
- B. Release...and return to their previous positions all officials and employees who lost employment because of incidents in Kurdistan. Indemnify them for the loss of time.
- C. Disband, disarm, and return to their homes all Salaneddin cavalry.
- D. Return to Kurds the villages occupied by Arab tribes.
- E. Indemnification of those who suffered from incidents in Kurdistan to be supervised by a joint GOI-Kurdish Committee.

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According to Shawqat Agrawi mid-December 1964.

Interior Minister proposed visiting Mulla Mustafa early in January. The latter replied that the Minister and government knew what the Kurds wanted but that he did not want to talk with someone not empowered to negotiate. Around December 12 a group of Army officers went to Mulla Mustafa and presented the following:

1. The government will recognize the Kurds as Kurds and will not try to Arabicize them;
2. Iraq will be a partnership of Arabs and Kurds as it was before 1961.
3. All government posts will be open to all Arabs and all Kurds. They will be filled on the basis of qualification. There will be no discrimination against Kurds.
4. Arabic will be the official language throughout Iraq. There will be no objection if the Kurds wish to use Kurdish in primary schools.
5. All appointments will be made by the civil service board; there will be no objection to having Kurds represented on the board.
6. No "third force" can be permitted in Iraq. The Kurdish pesh merga must disband. The ex-soldiers may return to the Army; the ex-police-men may return to the police; the ex-civil servants to their government positions. The government will endeavor to find work for those left unemployed.
7. The GOI will undertake just compensation to those who have lost property in the North.
8. The Salah al-Din Cavalry (Kurdish irregulars fighting with the government) will be disbanded only after peace and order are restored to the area.
9. Government officials will be transferred throughout Iraq in accordance with decisions of the central government - as was the case prior to 1961.
10. Mulla Mustafa is requested to submit a list of qualified Kurds from which the government will select an appropriate number for the Consultative Assembly which is about to be formed.

The Kurds replied that without abandoning their October 11 proposals they were prepared to enter into negotiations with the government on the basis of the following:

1. Kurdish rights should be defined within the context of the February 10, 1964 truce agreement.

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2. As the government has rejected the principle of Kurdish self-rule and has proposed a "partnership", this term must be defined. The government should inform the Kurds whether it intends to define it or whether this definition will be the work of Arabs and Kurds together.
3. All officials in the liwas of Kirkuk, Erbil, Sulaimaniya and Mosul and the Kurdish areas of Diyala should be Kurds. If the government has any objections for the Mosul Liwa the Kurds suggest that it be divided into two separate liwas, one Arab and one Kurd.
4. The official language in the Kurdish liwas should be Kurdish. Arabic should be the official second language.
5. A committee or council of Arabs and Kurds should be the interim governing body of Kurdistan. It may be located in Baghdad. This committee should be responsible for appointing officials in Kurdistan.
6. Part of the peş mersa should be incorporated into the local police; the rest should be converted into a mobile police for guarding the frontiers.
7. The compensation for lost properties should be expedited.
8. The Kurds should be repatriated to their homes.
9. The josh (Kurdish irregulars) should be disbanded and returned to their homes.

January 15-20, 1965: In another exchange between the Kurds and the GOI, the latter's "final" offer was answered by Kurds' "minimum" offer, terms of which follows:

The Kurds, though a not fully authorized delegation, indicated they were prepared to give up demands for:

1. Self-government.
2. A Kurdish parliament.
3. A United Kurdistan. (?)
4. Proportional division of oil income.

The Kurdish side was still demanding:

1. Kurdish officials in Kurdish regions.
2. Recognition of the Kurdish language as official.



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- 12 -

3. Disbanding the government-sponsored Kurdish and bedouin cavalry ("Salaheddin", "josh").
4. The return of Kurds and Arabs to their places of origin (probably a reference to Kurdish villages occupied by Arabs)
5. An amendment to the interim constitution to read, "the Arab people of Iraq are part of the Arab nation", and a statement recognizing Kurdish nationality.
6. Agreement to return Kurdish fighters (pesh marga) to the Army and police but Kurds to retain 3000-4000 man force pending final settlement Kurdish problem.

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## NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

*Kurds*IRAQI-KURDISH PROBLEM CONTINUES

In his meeting with the Secretary on December 10, Iraqi Foreign Minister Talib identified the Kurdish situation as the principal problem of Iraq. Fundamentally it dominated the Iraqi scene. He noted his government is so preoccupied with this issue that it has little time or energy to turn to pressing economic and social matters. Talib was not sure that Iraq is any closer to a solution of the problem now than when the fighting commenced several years ago.

Communist Support for Kurds - The Foreign Minister believed there are unidentified forces supporting the Kurds. The Iraqi Government might be able to deal with Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani but, in Talib's opinion, the Communists and the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (DPK) would be much more difficult. He thought the Kurds are under Communist control. The establishment of a Kurdish state would mean a Communist enclave which would split the Arab world, pierce the protective belt and shatter stability in Iran and Turkey. He referred to the Kurdish map showing Kurdistan beginning around Iskenderun and ending near Basrah on the Persian Gulf (see map).

Talib noted that the Turks had sealed their borders but that some support to the Kurds was received from across the Iranian border. He did not see this assistance as a result of deliberate Iranian Government intent but rather felt the weak government at Tehran was incapable of effectively patrolling its borders. Talib further stated that he did not wish to suggest the United States is supporting the Kurds but emphasized that his government is much occupied with the machinations of whatever power is giving aid to the Kurds.

US Reassurances - The Secretary categorically assured Talib that the United States is neither directly or indirectly supporting the Kurdish movement. We support the independence, integrity and prosperity of Iraq and have no other interest in Iraqi affairs. The Secretary shared the Minister's concern over the danger of Communist penetration of the Near East via the Kurdish movement. Expressing appreciation for the exchange of views and the Secretary's reassurances, Talib noted that the United States could help Iraq by determining who is behind the Kurds and what is their motivation.

Mutual Iraqi-Kurdish Distrust - The Kurds under Barzani reciprocate the deep distrust of the Iraqi Government. Barzani nevertheless has restrained his sometimes impatient followers in order to avoid the onus for renewed fighting. Iraq apparently has made a number of proposals to the Kurds since the cessation of hostilities in February which have not satisfied Kurdish leaders. On their part, the Kurds have demanded a greater degree of autonomy than they can



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expect to attain but have clearly expressed a willingness to negotiate. The present Iraqi Government has shown a greater degree of friendliness toward the Kurds than earlier regimes, but has talked in terms of only administrative decentralization and has failed to indicate intention to negotiate with Kurdish leaders.

Nasser's Position - The pro-Nasser element in the GOI, which gained in the recent cabinet changes, tends to favor a negotiated settlement as a prelude to closer links with the UAR. Nasser apparently recognizes the danger to the Iraqi Government and to his position if the Kurdish war is renewed and is believed to have urged his Iraqi supporters to be forthcoming with the Kurds. Other elements, however, including factions in the Iraqi Army, Radio Damascus, and the Iranians, are inciting both sides to resume their fight.

US Position - With both the Kurds and GOI officials, our position is the same, namely, that the Kurdish problem is an internal Iraqi matter in which we will not interfere directly or indirectly. Our role can only be that of a friendly and concerned bystander. In the past we have emphasized that an outbreak in hostilities could benefit only the enemies of Iraq (i.e., the Communists) and that the problem cannot be solved by military action. We believe a peaceful settlement satisfactory to both sides is possible in the context of Iraqi integrity and legitimate Kurdish aspirations.

--Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 51, 12/16/64

#### ESHKOL RESIGNS

Prime Minister Eshkol resigned on December 14 in protest against continued Mapai Party discussions of former Prime Minister Ben Gurion's demands for reopening the "Lavon Affair." In his letter of resignation Eshkol states a majority of his 18-month-old cabinet was not prepared to accept the proposal of the Justice Minister for a new inquiry into the affair. In the Knesset debate on the following day, there was support from almost all speakers against any re-opening of the investigation and unanimity among coalition parties that Eshkol head the new government. Constitutional procedure calls for the President either to convince the Prime Minister to reconsider or begin consultation with political leaders with a view to forming a new government.

We regard Eshkol's resignation as a tactical move designed to demonstrate his indispensability, and expect him to continue in office, although possibly in a caretaker capacity, until Knesset elections next year.

--Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 51, 12/16/64

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--Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 51, 12/16/64

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DCS/186 - 3/24/64

4. Pastor Agrees Guaranty Negotiations Should Begin Next Week -- Peruvian Ambassador Pastor told US Ambassador Cole yesterday that he had started working on a new draft of an investment guaranty agreement through the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry, Embassy Lima reports (See DCS/183, Item 5). Pastor indicated he had put great emphasis on the Chilean IG draft. Re timing, Pastor was inclined to wait until the IPC Case was well on the way towards settlement. Cole expressed concern over any delay in light of the new congressional provision and Pastor finally agreed that serious negotiations should begin immediately upon his return to Washington next week. (Limited Official Use)

NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

5. Iraq Requests PL 480, Title II Program -- The Under Secretary of the Iraq Foreign Office has made an official request for a PL 480 Title II program in connection with Kurdish rehabilitation. Embassy Baghdad states although justification apparently exists for some emergency relief under Section 201, the program visualized is development assistance under Section 202 with foodstuffs supplied for payment in kind to workers engaged in rebuilding villages, bridges and farming infrastructure. Wheat, bulgur and ghee are mentioned as the most needed commodities. There is interest also in feed grains to assist with restoration of decimated holdings of cattle and poultry. Embassy feels that a prompt sympathetic response is desirable in view of US past assurances. Authority is requested to inform GOI that the US is willing to proceed with a Title II program of a size and nature to be determined later and on condition that the usual requirements for cooperation and coordination are met. Embassy suggests it be given latitude to use the authorization to stimulate an early settlement of one or more claims of American contractors. A visit by our Agricultural Attache in Beirut is requested for assistance with the necessary planning. (Limited Official Use) *Kurds*

6. CT New Delhi Asks for Year's Extension of PL 480 Agreement -- CT New Delhi has reviewed the Title I, PL 480 Program in India with a view to steps to be taken in light of the existing agreement's expiration on June 30. CT recommends: (1) the May 4, 1960 Agreement be extended one year and, if possible, the extension include an amendment for adding 104(C) to currency uses and (2) another Title I agreement be negotiated as

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Background Memorandum

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February 28, 1964

Subject: Resume of Prospective U.S. Assistance to Rehabilitate Kurdish Area of Northern Iraq

1. Ambassador Strong on July 8, 1963 told Iraqi Foreign Minister Shabib that the USG would be glad to look into the question of emergency relief for the Kurds through "PL-480 surplus" and through "surplus for work relief projects". (The Department had authorized this in DEPTTEL 404, May 17.) Shabib expressed general interest but, although the offer was repeated during the conversation, did not respond specifically except to say that he thought an internationally organized effort in reconstruction and development would be helpful. In reporting this, the Embassy said it would explore in further conversations appropriate means for U.S. contributions to the welfare of Kurdish areas.

2. The Embassy reported in August that the GOI had formed in July 1963 an autonomous Directorate General for Development and Reorganization of the North. The GOI announced it had appropriated 10 million dinars for this agency and that a committee (presumably representing this agency) had visited the north and was preparing its initial report.

3. In early August, NE/E explored with various DOD and GSA officials the question of availability of tents, blankets, mess kits, medical supplies, and other relief items in the event they were needed on short notice. Embassy Baghdad was asked for, and supplied, rough estimates of the extent of the needs in the North. The post cautioned that while needs were apparently great they were very difficult to estimate. It was apparent to the Department that further action would await a detailed report and recommendations from the Embassy when the situation permitted.

4. Both Mr. Talbot and Mr. Komer indicated during August their great interest in our being ready to move with aid to the Kurdish areas whenever appropriate.

5. On August 18 Shabib told Ambassador Strong that the GOI Army and resources were inadequate to continue indefinitely the task of having to feed 500,000 Kurds. He expressed hope the GOI could qualify for help under Title II of PL-480. Our Ambassador suggested arrangements be made for an Embassy officer to make a quiet trip to the secure Kurdish area to obtain information about the magnitude, nature, administrative and other aspects of a relief program, for if the findings supported the need it would greatly facilitate possible U.S. Government assistance. Shabib was not enthusiastic but said he would consider this. A week later, Shabib reported the GOI military was unenthusiastic about an Embassy fact-finding trip to the North.

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6. Ambassador Strong on December 3 spoke with Prime Minister Yahya and referred to rehabilitation of the Kurdish area, repeating the previous U.S. offer to "assist through grant of food grains" provided the GOI would give a full description of projects and requirements, and subsequently a report on the use made of the grain. The Prime Minister expressed appreciation, said the Cabinet had considered this offer at its December 1 meeting and added that appropriate ministers were drawing up projects with the aim of submitting a request to the USG shortly.

7. On January 23 and again on January 28, the Embassy reported requests by Kurdish representatives in Baghdad for immediate relief supplies for Kurdish civilians, either directly, through the Red Cross, or through the Iranian Government. The Kurds said they were compiling a catalogue of the destruction in the North but that the need was pressing for immediate food, clothing and medical supplies for 150,000 women and children suffering due to the hostilities and the unprecedented cold weather. The Embassy responded that the USG had already offered food supplies to the Iraqis for use in Kurdistan but that the offer had not been accepted and was unlikely to be accepted so long as the revolt continued. Responding on February 4 to these reports, the Department authorized the Embassy, if it perceived no objection, to raise once more with the GOI our earlier offer of food supplies for use in Kurdistan.

8. About February 9 the Iraq Government announced a cease fire in Kurdistan. On February 15 our Embassy reported that there was uneasiness in Iraq about the vagueness of public announcements regarding the cease fire and that all details apparently remained to be worked out, with difficulties already appearing.

9. Iraqi Ambassador Sulaiman invited State, AID and CARE officials to lunch February 17 to discuss ways and means of U.S. assistance to the Iraqi Kurds now that the cease-fire had been announced. He described the situation as an emergency of vast scale, yet it was pointed out by Iraq Embassy representatives that the Ambassador desired not to cable his Government but to orient himself about the various means and techniques of U.S. private and public assistance so that on his return to Baghdad in early March he could advise and urge key Iraqi officials into appropriate steps to gain this assistance.

10. On February 19, Embassy Baghdad cabled that it intended at such time as it could obtain an appointment with Prime Minister Yahya, to remind him once more of the U.S. offer to assist in Kurdish relief, or to use a suitable earlier occasion to renew the offer at a lower level. The Embassy said the Iraqis probably had mixed feelings about accepting outside assistance for rehabilitating the North, and said it believed we should avoid pressing hard regarding offers of assistance.

cc: NEA:JDJernegan  
WH:RKomer  
INR:RNA:JWSpain

NEA:NE/E:WDWolle:acs

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Malaysia-Indonesia-Philippines: Sukarno, commenting on the inconclusive ministerial talks held in Bangkok from 5 to 10 February, has told Ambassador Jones that Indonesian guerrillas will remain in Malaysian Borneo until the Malaysian controversy is resolved. Between now and another ministerial meeting, probably in late February, talks will be held between Malaysia's Prime Minister Rahman and Philippine President Macapagal, and between Macapagal and Sukarno. (CONFIDENTIAL)

*Kurdish*  
Iraqi--Kurds: The Kurdish insurgent leader Barzani has agreed to end the fighting in northern Iraq, according to Iraqi radio. Concurrently, President Arif said that Iraq will recognize Kurdish rights "within the Iraqi people's unity"--suggesting the Kurds will receive some form of autonomy. It is unlikely that full Kurdish demands will be realized, and elements of the Kurdish Democratic Party--the political wing of the Kurdish insurgent movement whose radical leaders have been at odds with Barzani--may repudiate the agreement he has reached with the central government. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Panama: The financial and commercial consequences of the impasse in the Canal dispute are becoming increasingly severe. According to a reliable US source, 17.5 percent of total bank deposits in Panama--approximately \$25 million--have been transferred to other countries since the crisis began on 10 January. Banking authorities believe that most of these withdrawals will be permanent. Business in general has slowed considerably and some firms are laying off employees. (SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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Authority NLS/RA 032-028-4-5  
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LATIN AMERICA

13. Uruguayan Leftists Organizing Rural Labor Demonstrations

A month-long march on Montevideo by rural workers is scheduled to begin on 20 February. The Sugar Workers Union of Artigas (UTAA) and the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR) are planning the march from Artigas, Uruguay's northernmost department and a traditional center of rural unrest and agitation. En route, the workers plan to seize various large estates.

The MIR is a militant Communist group which espouses

the Peiping line. The UTAA and the MIR have obtained promises of support from six labor groups and other organizations, including university students.

Uruguayan internal security forces have the ability to control this demonstration if it should occur. A similar march attempted two years ago failed. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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