

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1 of 2

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 report	Draft - Summary Report of Discussions with JCAE Group S 14 pp <i>open 7-13-99 NLS 97-165</i>	10/12/65	A
#8 cable	Paris 4240 S 3 pp <i>open 7-13-99 NLS 97-165</i>	11/5/64	A
#11 memcon	Brosio and McNamara S 7 pp <i>open 8/6/99 NLS 97-168</i>	9/28/64	A
#16 report	Information Report <i>sent 11/3/02</i> S 6 pp <i>exempt 8-13-98 NLS 97-171</i>	6/17/64	A
#19 cable	Paris 1458 S 4 pp <i>open 7-13-99 NLS 97-165</i>	4/14/64	A
#20 cable	Paris 1125 S 4 pp <i>open 7-13-99 NLS 97-165</i>	2/14/64	A
#22 cable	Paris 1182 C 2 pp <i>open 7-13-99 NLS 97-165</i>	2/19/64	A
#23 cable	Paris 1188 S 3 pp <i>open 7-13-99 NLS 97-165</i>	2/25/64	A
#24 cable	State CA-9943 to Paris <i>open 7-13-99 NLS 97-165</i> C 5 pp	3/30/64	A
#25 report	Channels, Procedures & Authority for the Exchange ... C 7 pp <i>open 5-10-00 NLS 97-165</i>	3/23/64	A
#26 memo	Memo of Discussion of the MLF at the White House S 3 pp <i>Open NLS 97-169 9-25-98</i>	4/11/64	A
#27a memo	Bundy to Secretary of State S 2 pp [duplicate of #28]	7/11/63	A
#28 memo	copy of #27a S 2 pp	7/11/63	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, FILES OF CHARLES E. JOHNSON, "Multilateral Force - General", box 3

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

2 of 2

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#29 memo	Johnson to Bundy C 1 pp <i>Open NLJ 97-169 9-25-98</i>	7/7/63	A
#30 letter	Seaborg to McNamara S 1 pg <i>open NLJ 97-369 9-13-99</i>	5/15/63	A
#30a summary	AEC Staff Study S- 5 pp <i>exempt w/19/14 per NLJ 12-178</i>	n.d.	A
#31 letter	Ink to Charles Johnson <i>open 7-13-99</i> S 1 pg <i>NLJ 97-369</i> [duplicate of #31a]	5/2/63	A
#31a letter	copy of #31 S- 1 pp	5/2/63	A
#31b draft	Draft Analysis S- 16 pp <i>exempt w/19/14 per NLJ 12-178</i>	n.d.	A
#33a letter	Chairman to Bundy <i>open 7-13-99</i> S 2 pp <i>NLJ 97-369</i>	5/2/63	A
#35 memo	Ricketts to Chairman, AEC S- 6 pp <i>Sanitized 7-7-06 NLJ 97-373</i> <i>more info released w/19/14 per NLJ 12-178</i>	4/30/63	A
#35a memo	MLF Requirements S- 1 pp <i>Sanitized 7-7-06 NLJ 97-373</i> <i>same sanitization w/19/14 per NLJ 12-178</i>	n.d.	A

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1
November 12, 1965

NOTE FOR MR. BUNDY

Mac --

I had not sent a copy of the attached to you because it was an advance draft and I was waiting to hear what changes Holifield wished to make. However, in view of Holifield's immediate interest in getting Administration views on several matters touched on in this report I think you might find it useful -- it deals at some length with MLF and matters related thereto. I have also given a copy to Spurg.

Charles E. Johnson

~~SECRET~~-NOFORN Attachment

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DRAFT

*Has not yet been
checked over by
Holifield. See last*

Summary Report of Discussions with JCAE Group

At NATO Building, Paris, on Tuesday, October 12, 1965

*paraphrase.
Scott Greig*

Ambassador Cleveland began the meeting by asking Chairman Holifield whether he would like to make any remarks on the custodial and security aspect of his visit, particularly his impressions of the two units visited on Saturday.

Mr. Holifield said the arrangements at the bases visited seemed quite satisfactory to the group and that he had no particular suggestions or criticisms to make. He noted that communications, in particular, had been much improved since the Committee's 1960 visit and said that this was a very gratifying sign of progress. He noted that at ^{the} Joint Committee's suggestion, the PAL System had now been installed in all weapons at the bases visited, and he assumed on other weapons in the Alliance. He mentioned the question of putting the PAL System on U.S. weapons and said that this was rather more debatable, that it was not a Joint Committee idea but that if the U.S. military is satisfied with the reaction time for U.S. weapons, the Joint Committee certainly has no objection to the PAL System for U.S. weapons. Mr. Holifield mentioned also that the destruct capability for weapons now seems much improved, and summarized by saying that the problems noted during the Committee's 1960 trip now seemed satisfactorily cleared up.

Ambassador Cleveland said he was very glad to hear this, and that there certainly was now a much higher degree of awareness and of priority attention

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NLJ 97-165

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being given to problems of this sort by responsible officers.

The meeting then turned to broader questions, and Mr. Holifield suggested that, since Congressman Bates would be leaving the meeting at 1100, we should turn to the heart of the problem, the MLF.

Mr. Bates said he would like to discuss this if in fact it still is a problem. He said he had just attended meetings of the NATO Parliamentarians in New York, and that the subject had not even been mentioned during the course of these meetings.

Ambassador Cleveland said he would like to put this matter in context. He summarized the state of the Alliance as having been in effect dead in the water for the last 10 months for a variety of reasons familiar to all present. We are now at the point, however, where we can perhaps see where to go next. Here, of course, France poses the main challenge. They have, however, played most of their cards as far as withdrawals or impediments to NATO are concerned, having left now only two divisions, some air squadrons and French real estate and air space to put into play. The real question is: What do the French actually want? - and the answer is that no one knows except General de Gaulle. General de Gaulle is a target of opportunity man, who does seem to have goals but does not have a scenario as to exactly how and when to move toward those goals.

The general Executive Branch strategy is to get the Alliance moving in areas which do not require France. Some proposals toward this end were about to get to the President last week. The various components of this approach all have the characteristic of being capable of achievement by less than 15 but more than 2 members.

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The first possibility is the Special Committee which we hope to get moving in November with 8 or possibly 9 members. The French have opted out of this Committee, exacting as their price for opting out the promise that Secretary General Brosio ^{will} [does] not participate in its work. A major problem area in which the Special Committee may be able to make some progress is that of command and control of nuclear weapons in the period before a Presidential decision to release has been made. Command and control arrangements in the Alliance in the period after the Presidential decision has been communicated seem to be in fairly good shape. By comparison, little has been done on the problem of what could be called Political Command and Control, i.e., in the period of consultation prior to a Presidential decision.

Congressman Holifield said [that] it seemed to him that, in view of how long NATO has been in existence, this sort of thing should have been accomplished long ago in view of its basic importance. Congressman Bates made a similar remark, asking why something had not been done previously. Was it due simply to lethargy?

Mr. Farley speculated in response to these questions that there seemed to be three main reasons why more progress had not been made to date:

1. The Allies tend to think a great deal about deterrence but comparatively little about use in case deterrence fails. They simply do not wish to think hard about questions relating to possible use.

2. The U.S. has offered to discuss these problems but we have had some difficulty in being able to furnish the necessary information, and we have also had comparatively little response from the Allies.

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3. The question of "how NATO goes to war" has not been addressed very seriously by the U.S. within the Alliance because of some fear that going down this road might involve us in multilateral procedures and ^{controls} check-points] which it would be just as well to stay away from, if possible.

Ambassador Cleveland added as a comment that we also have not in the past had to face up very seriously to limited war contingencies. This is a fairly new problem for the Alliance and a very difficult one to address.

At Congressman Holifield's suggestion, the discussion moved directly into the MLF area. Mr. Farley gave a resume of events in this area since last December. He said the pace of discussion in Paris had been slow, and could best be described as having been sparring between the UK and the Continental Europeans. The UK's suggestions are not liked by either the U.S. or the Europeans for various reasons, but there is a unanimous desire to keep the Working Group alive, because there is agreement that the nuclear sharing problem in the Alliance is a very real one which must be solved.

Mr. Bates asked if someone could explain the nature of the problem, which had been described as being primarily political rather than military.

Mr. Farley agreed that it was in fact primarily political and that the particular problem country was Germany.

Mr. Bates asked whether we are not pushing the MLF move on the Germans rather than vice versa.

Mr. Farley's comment was that far-seeing Germans want to find a rational solution which would tie Germany into the nuclear power of the Alliance before the German national nuclear capability problem becomes an acute political problem domestically, as it now is in India.

Mr. Holifield asked if someone could explain to him what is meant by "nuclear participation". Do the European countries really understand the degree of participation they now have? He thought the actions the U.S. has already taken, including the arrangements for release of more information, would make the Allies realize better what the actual present situation is. Hasn't this sort of information been given to the member countries?

Mr. Howard said that these countries thought there would be immediate release of information when the NATO 144 b Agreement was concluded. We have not as yet been able to do this but determinations made in September will now make it possible.

Mr. Holifield asked whether adequate evaluation has been made as to the need for excessive security concerning release of information. He said he could not really see the need for some extreme measures that seemed to be in effect concerning the numbers of weapons in Europe. We are very strong in Europe. Why not tell everybody so? This would impress the Soviets and help strengthen the deterrent.

Ambassador Cleveland said this was a very good point but we must remember that what we would be disclosing is the presence of U.S. power in Europe, not joint power.

Chairman Holifield said he could not see this. The power we have in Europe is joint power. The only possible step further would be to relinquish control over use to the Germans or other Allies. This could not possibly be gotten through the Congress and "I would be laughed off the floor if I proposed such an action".

Ambassador Cleveland said this is obviously not in anyone's mind but there are other ways to increase Alliance participation. What we must

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avoid is a situation which would permit extremists in Germany to say: "Everyone else has nuclear weapons, why not us?" We must develop something into which the Germans can tie. At a minimum, this would mean deep consultation; at a maximum, joint management.

Mr. Holifield and Mr. Conway both asked simultaneously whether we do not in fact have joint management today.

Ambassador Cleveland agreed that in a sense we do, but ^{said} that it is necessary to increase the sense of Alliance participation.

Turning to the question of an independent national nuclear capability, Congressman Holifield asked whether anyone thinks the U.S. can really stop any nation desiring to build its own weapons. He said India is going to have weapons, Israel will have weapons, and non-proliferation simply is not a practical policy. If the Germans wish to have nuclear weapons, maybe the right posture is to say let them go ahead and build nuclear weapons. I don't mean that we should help the Germans, but it is certainly foolish to attempt to resist them. It seems to me that we should postpone the day as best we can by giving the Germans a bigger part in operation of nuclear power under the present ground rules, but that this is the most we can do. Perhaps we ought to move toward some sort of NATO Consortium to decide on management. There should be some kind of formula, not unanimous, but as nearly unanimous as can be worked out.

Ambassador Cleveland observed that this is one of the purposes of the MLF.

Mr. Holifield's reply was that as long as we retain a veto on use, this can not satisfy the urge of which we have been speaking. General de Gaulle picked this up immediately, pointing out that a U.S. veto meant that

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European participants would still be subservient to the U.S. The only reason he could see that the Germans would want an MLF is that they see it as only an interim step toward some sort of eventual German takeover of control.

Mr. Holifield summed up by saying that it seemed to him that we should aim at developing tight enough command and control arrangements in the Alliance to contain national urges toward weapons if possible, but if these arrangements prove insufficient, we should simply let the countries go their way.

Mr. Farley observed that comparing Germany to India posed one problem because Germany is different. We have treaty obligations concerning Germany, and the U.S. can not permit Germany to take actions which it might not be able to permit in other countries of the world.

Mr. Holifield asked whether our treaty rights are such that we, ourselves, can say no if the Federal Republic wants to build weapons. Mr. Farley said he was not at the moment certain of the answer to this, but that it was possible we did not have these rights. (NOTE: At lunch this point was developed further. Mr. Farley pointed out the relevance of the great fears of German revived militarism, on the part both of their NATO neighbors and of the Soviets. Even if we haven't the right to stop a German nuclear program, the Soviets would never believe we couldn't, and their reaction would be violent and involve us as well as the Germans. Finally, we are not trying to enforce something on the Germans, but working in full mutual understanding with the most far-seeing and balanced German leaders to try to prevent emergence of a domestic situation in Germany which would get out of control.)

Dr. Agnew referred to the nuclear support arrangements, such as those seen on Saturday, and asked why it could not be made better known that

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such arrangements exist. What is the reason for holding this so closely?

Mr. Conway said the Joint Committee had made this suggestion four years ago and he saw no reason why it would not be a good idea now. If Prime Minister Erhard of Germany could speak out and say clearly what is going on in this base and other bases in Germany, in the mutual defense interest of Germany and the U.S., wouldn't this take care of the German problem?

Ambassador Cleveland said this had been a fascinating discussion to him, that he was still learning his way in this very complex area, but that, frankly, he had heard several times that excessive secrecy in this area could be attributed to the wishes of the Joint Committee.

Mr. Holifield said there was certainly some misunderstanding of the wishes of the Committee and that while he could obviously not now speak for the entire Committee, he would certainly advocate a much freer release policy on such data than seems to have been practiced in this area.

Mr. Ink said that perhaps there was some confusion between two quite different areas. The Joint Committee is very much concerned about the protection of weapon design information and submarine propulsion information. Information having to do with numbers and locations of nuclear weapons, however, is not sensitive in the same way. It was his impression that this has been safeguarded largely because of fear that local extremist groups might become agitated, and the JCAE has not, itself, been very much concerned in this area.

Mr. Conway said there is no secret to the numbers of weapons in Europe anyway. The countries know exactly how many weapons are there, because they have the responsibility for transporting them to the storage sites and they can count as well as anybody else.

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Ambassador Cleveland asked if the point being made by the Committee is that we can make better political use of numbers of weapons, locations, etc.

Mr. Holifield said that was exactly the point. Of course, we do not want to say exactly what sort of weapons and how many are located at particular sites but, in general terms, the more we say the better.

Mr. Holifield and Mr. Conway both asked whether any responsible German leaders have ever requested anything more of the U.S. in the way of nuclear sharing. They expressed the belief that there have been no such requests, and that we have in fact generated a lot of the alleged German dissatisfaction ourselves. Mr. Holifield said he would like to have any German dissatisfaction probed right down to the ground. Specifically, who is dissatisfied and what is his dissatisfaction? He mentioned that he had recently had dinner with General Speidel. When the subject of MLF was brought up, Speidel laughed and said that Germany was not really interested in MLF but if you fellows wanted it, we would be willing to go along.

Ambassador Cleveland said that Secretary McNamara had discussed this subject quite extensively with Minister of Defense von Hassel and had made it quite clear to von Hassel what the limitations would be within which the U.S. could reconsider proceeding with an MLF. He asked whether von Hassel was interested and desired to proceed within these limitations, and von Hassel said this was the German wish. The real question is: What does the German leadership think is necessary to satisfy their internal needs? We will perhaps learn something on this subject from Erhard's meeting with the President next month.

Mr. Holifield said: "Yes, this is true, but the President looks to you here in Paris to give him some ideas and recommendations, and I think you should try to do so to be of assistance to him before Erhard arrives."

Ambassador Cleveland said he was very much aware of this responsibility, that the President had told him to attempt to work out something which would satisfy both German and Congressional requirements, and that he would do the best he could to achieve this.

Turning to another subject, Mr. Holifield wondered whether it would not assist in handling the French problem if a speech or two could be made in the U.S. Congress along the lines of saying that if De Gaulle wants to pull out of NATO, let him pull out, but that NATO will go on without him. French territory is not all that important. We should assert our independence of De Gaulle and if some people are unwilling to talk tough, there are plenty of them who would be glad to.

Mr. Howard mentioned the fact that he had made a proposal some time ago to the Joint Committee to take numbers, yields and location of weapons out of the "restricted data" category of the Atomic Energy Act. He wondered what Congressman Holifield thought of this idea in view of his suggestion that we say more about our nuclear power in Europe.

Mr. Conway interposed at this point to say that he had asked Mr. Howard for details on his proposal some months ago and had received no answer. There followed a spirited discussion between these two, without very much in the way of a conclusion. Mr. Holifield observed that he was not speaking about precise numbers but only general numbers. If, for example, we have 300 megatons in Europe, why not say we have 200-300 megatons here? Mr.

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Holifield asked if there would be any objection to saying that we have (say) 6,000 weapons in Europe, and no one raised any objection to this.

Mr. Holifield said that on a slightly different subject he would have no objection at all to telling the Soviets how to put the PAL System on their weapons. Mr. Howard subsequently asked for clarification, saying he assumed the Chairman was not suggesting that we tell the Soviets how we build PALs. The Chairman said this was not his intention, that he meant only to explore the possibility of telling the Soviets in general terms what the PAL System is, what it is designed to achieve, and the general principles of its operation.

The discussion next turned directly to the MLF and, in particular, to nuclear submarines. Mr. Holifield observed that he had sat next to the Netherlands Permanent Representative Boon at dinner the previous evening, and that Boon had brought up the desire of the Netherlands to build a nuclear submarine. Mr. Holifield said he had asked Mr. Boon why a country would want only one submarine, what use would it be? Mr. Holifield's conclusion was that the Dutch want a nuclear submarine solely for reasons of prestige. Turning more directly to the nuclear submarines and ANF, Mr. Farley said the UK is obviously interested in getting someone to help them pay for their submarines. They would also get considerable political capital in the world and domestically by giving up their national capability by putting the submarines into an ANF. The Germans have made two main points with the UK, one having to do with the equality in the method of voting on use of weapons, the other on mixed manning of the submarines. On the latter point, the Military Working Group is now making a Military Technical Feasibility Study.

At this point, Admiral Small gave a presentation on the status of his Working Group operation. He said we have agreed to the discussion. One important background fact is the recent mixed manned demonstration on the RICKETTS. His position in the Working Group will be to show the differences and the difficulties of mixed manning of submarines as compared to surface vessels. We all realize, however, that it will be impossible to prove that mixed manning of submarines will not work if sufficient emphasis and attention is given to it. We will have to emphasize two things:

1. The difference between operations in two dimensions and operations in three dimensions. He would expect to point out, for example, the great and critical importance of split second reactions here on the part of crew members and the increased difficulty of being able to count on such reactions from a mixed manned crew.

2. The security problem, i.e., from a practical point of view, it is simply not possible to segregate parts of a submarine so that some can be visited by crew members and others not.

Ambassador Cleveland said we were keenly aware of the importance of this matter. At the same time, the political stakes were very high also, and the Committee should understand that his instructions were not to act in such a way as to foreclose any options which the President might later want to have available.

Mr. Holifield said Admiral Rickover feels strongly that the men who operate nuclear submarines must have a good deal of knowledge about the design and operational features of the whole plant in order to do a

satisfactory job. This means that it would really be impractical to have a mixed manned crew operate a submarine without divulging some design information.

Ambassador Cleveland said it has never been quite clear to him how mixed manning can satisfy the desires of governments for political participation in a nuclear force. His point was that nations do not "participate" by having their citizens working on a mixed manned submarine any more than by having them work for such international organizations as NATO or the UN. If a given individual is serving in effect as a "spy" for his own government aboard a submarine, he is not really a member of the crew, because if he were a member of the crew, his primary loyalty would have to be to the boat, the skipper and his fellow crew members. This seemed to him to be an insoluble dilemma.

Mr. Farley said that it was very important to keep in mind that in the conduct of the Military Working Group, we have completely decoupled feasibility and desirability. The Group is to look solely at technical feasibility; even if mixed manning were to be found technically feasible, there is no commitment whatsoever as to political desirability.

Mr. Holifield concluded by reminding the Group that this is a very sensitive subject with the Joint Committee and that real U.S. security interests are involved in our nuclear submarines. He asked that this be kept very much in mind as the work here in Paris proceeds. His suggestion is that the most fruitful possibilities lie in exploring the idea of better command and control arrangements for the nuclear power already in Europe, and that we should work toward establishing some better sort of decision-making body within NATO.

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Mr. Roback asked whether anyone present believes this problem can be solved, and if so, how. Ambassador Cleveland replied that a certain act of faith is involved here. The problem simply must be solved because we can not accept a Germany which has independent national nuclear power. The problem is that the Germans, as a great power, must feel equal to somebody. They don't expect to be equal with the U.S. but perhaps they can be made to feel equal with the UK. Mr. Conway asked why they aren't equal enough already under the QRA arrangements. They have more nuclear power right now than the UK.

Ambassador Cleveland said the problem is that we must find a better way to decide jointly on the management of that portion of U.S. nuclear power which is in Europe, emphasizing that U.S. nuclear power outside Europe remains solely the responsibility of the U.S. to manage.

Mr. Holifield concluded the discussion by saying that he, himself, and the Joint Committee as a whole were desirous of being as helpful as possible. They would like to meet further in Washington or in Paris or anywhere else they might be helpful, that the ^{Comm. itself} {country's} wish and intention was to do whatever might strengthen NATO. He said he assumed some sort of record of this meeting would be prepared and said that if such a record were prepared, he would appreciate a chance to review it, in order to be sure that his own remarks were accurately recorded.

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October 30, 1965

CONGRESSIONAL

Dear Mr. Holifield:

The President has asked me to acknowledge with thanks your thoughtful letter of October 26, with its comments on the IAEA meeting and your visit to Bombay. Your suggestions for dealing with the problem of security in the non-nuclear nations will be very carefully considered -- and we are grateful to you for writing them down.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

McGeorge Bundy

Honorable Chet^X Holifield
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

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JOINT COMMITTEE ON
ATOMIC ENERGY
CHAIRMAN

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

CARDED

Washington, D.C.

NOV 1 1965

October 26, 1965

Dear Mr. President:

In late September, I attended the Ninth International Conference on Atomic Energy in Tokyo, Japan and stopped in Bombay, India October 2 - 5. While in India, I spent about a day and a half visiting the Tarapur Reactor site and the atomic laboratory at Trombey. I spent some time with Dr. Baba and other top Indian atomic scientists.

Dr. Baba and his friends were careful not to state their position in regard to making an atomic weapon. I do believe, however, Dr. Baba is a very ambitious man who realizes his personal fame would be greatly increased if he were authorized to make such a weapon. There is no doubt in my mind that these people in Dr. Baba's group believe they must offset Red China's weapon with one of their own. Of course, they will have to persuade Shastri and other top Government officials this policy and expense is justified. I cannot predict Shastri's attitude.

During our conversations they asked me what the attitude of the United States would be in regard to their (India) making an atomic bomb. I am sure they thought I would immediately urge them to abstain from an atomic effort in line with our policy of non-proliferation. I decided to play it on a low key, however, and said, "Of course, this is a question for India to answer. If they think it necessary and wise to divert from their domestic needs the capital it would take to make even the first crude bomb, then I suppose they will do it. There is no doubt Dr. Baba and his colleagues have high scientific capability and certain facilities which might insure success in the project".

But I pointed out, "...it was a race they could never win. Always they would lag behind Red China, further behind France, far behind the Soviets, and much farther behind the United States". I assured them they would never catch up, but left it up to them to make their own decision. They seemed to be somewhat impressed by my reasoning on their question.

I doubt if our present policy of non-proliferation will prevent India, Israel, or any other capable nation which may arise, from doing just what France and Red China have done. If their

national interests indicates such an effort, I believe they will make it unless the nuclear umbrella can be extended to protect them against nuclear attack.

I wonder if it would be worthwhile for you to take the initiative and propose that the United States would be willing to extend nuclear protection to India against a nuclear attack by any other nation, providing the Soviets would extend the same type of protection? Admittedly, this would put the Soviets on the spot and drive the wedge deeper between them and Red China, if they agreed. If they would not agree, would it not be a plus for the United States and a minus for the Soviets in their relations with India?

A further thought: Would it be wise for the President to advance the idea of the four western world nuclear nations to join in a compact agreement offering nuclear protection to any non-nuclear nation against a nuclear attack? Would this not be

- (1) A constructive move toward removing the national pressure of Nth nation development of nuclear weapons, if the present four nuclear powers in Europe and America really want to stop proliferation?
- (2) If the Soviets or the French refuse (as one or both very well may) would not our position for peace and non-proliferation be stronger in world opinion and would not the nuclear nation refusing to join in the effort to stop proliferation be weaker?

In my opinion, there is a common interest in the four nuclear nations having a policy of stopping additional Nth nations from developing their own atomic-hydrogen weapons. I do not believe the Soviets, any more than the United States, want to aid or assist non-nuclear nations into the club. Certainly France and the United Kingdom are not thinking about aiding other nations in an atomic-hydrogen weapons development project.

Could this common selfish interest be used as a cement to join the four nations together in the following:

- (1) Joining the forces of the Western World (U.S. and Europe including U.S.S.R.) in a multi-nuclear-weapon-owning nation compact. A nuclear weapon compact that would stop proliferation on the basis of eliminating the need for nationally owned nuclear weapons.
- (2) Would it not isolate Red China and remove from India and other non-nuclear nations the fear of nuclear attack by Red China?

One might say, "We offered the Baruch plan and there were no takers". True, but was it not a noble offer in the eyes of the world? What do we have to lose in the eyes of the world, if another attempt is made to stop proliferation of the present more powerful and more dangerous weapons?

Mr. President, I know you have many brilliant advisors and it is with some trepidation I write this letter. As a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy during its entire life of nineteen years, I have worked to make our Nation strong in atomic weapon capability and deliverability. We are strong, but so are and will be other nations.

If there is any way to join together the destructive capability of the four western world nuclear nations so their collective atomic strength can serve to develop, not a Pax Romano but a Pax Atomica for the presevation of peace in the world, we should find that way.

May God bless you and give you strength to achieve His purpose.

Most sincerely yours,



Chet Holifield

The President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

cc to:

Secretary of State Rusk
Mr. McGeorge Bundy

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THE MULTILATERAL FORCE: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

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The Multilateral Force¹

I

THE CONTROL of nuclear strategy has presented a problem for the Western allies with which they have been attempting to grapple, by fits and starts, ever since the advent of the missile age made final nonsense of any simple policy of massive strategic action in response to any form of aggression in Europe. Many factors and arguments have been thrown into the debate as to whether and how the European allies should share with the United States the responsibility for strategic decisions whose implementation still depends overwhelmingly on American owned and based weapons: they have included the revived economic strength and potential political strength of Western Europe; the danger that the nuclear weapons programmes of Britain and France may lead to imitation on the part of the Federal German Republic; the problem of the credibility of the American response to a serious attack on Europe in the light of the growing vulnerability of her own civilization; the military requirement to offset by some means the growing Soviet MRBM threat to Europe; the need to share the burdens of strategic deterrence more equitably between the United States and her European allies.

Out of these debates, official and non-official, three possible courses of action for the alliance began to emerge in the early 1960s. The first was to recognize that NATO is a coalition of sovereign states (even though it has a standby international command system for certain kinds of forces), and to accept the fact that the principal nations in it are not prepared to delegate major decisions of policy, let alone of peace and war, to each other or to a central system. This is the so-called multinational approach, and those who have advocated it believe that the central problems of confidence and co-ordination could be met by a reorganization of the machinery of NATO, both to give those responsible for civil policy a greater control over military action and to give the European allies a more constructive relationship to American planning. Certainly a permanent solution involves bringing more and more national nuclear forces

within the scrutiny and authority of the alliance itself, working towards a distant day when the whole of the American strategic force as well as the British and French forces are within the system.

The second solution, which emerged out of the acceleration of the ECC, and of the Kennedy Administration's encouragement of this development, would be to create an analogous relationship in the strategic field to the unfolding trans-Atlantic economic relationship, one of partnership between units of roughly equal strength and importance. This would involve the development of a European strategic nuclear force under the control of an authority evolved by the Community itself. Though the European force might not be as large as the American, it would be of sufficient importance in both American and Soviet eyes to enable Europe to develop its own strategic conceptions, and to co-ordinate its force fully with the American forces on the basis of right rather than of grace. If it were to grow from European resources and internal European confidence it would require the participation of the United Kingdom.

The third alternative is to create within the framework of an alliance of sovereign states a new force owned, operated and controlled jointly by the nuclear and non-nuclear powers – the so-called multilateral solution.

None of these solutions is foreclosed, but it is the third which holds the day at present, which has been most exhaustively explored by governments, and on which active negotiations will take place between the United States and the seven European countries interested in the proposal once the British and American elections are over. It is in many ways curious that this should be the case since this third solution meets few of the anxieties which have found expression in the various allied countries since the control of nuclear strategy became a problem. Since France under President de Gaulle has expressed disinterest in the proposal, a multilateral force could not, in the foreseeable future, be considered a European Community force even if the American veto on its control were withdrawn. It does not, of itself, dispose of the British, let alone the French, nuclear force, and therefore, if European nuclear forces are prestige symbols, it does not eliminate the danger of a

¹ This paper is adapted from an article in *International Affairs* (Vol. 40, No. 4, October 1964), the quarterly journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, for whose permission to reprint it in this form I am extremely grateful.

German national force, however remote in reality such a contingency may always have been.

As the proposal now stands, the multilateral force does not heighten the credibility of the American response to attack in Europe, since the United States, like all the other participating countries, will have a veto on its operational release: the problem of the credibility of the American response has in any case been less in the forefront of European anxieties since the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 and the end of the Soviet diplomatic offensive against Berlin. Nor can the force proposed, 200 *Polaris* missiles, be considered a strategic counterbalance (even if such a concept has any real validity) to the 800 Soviet MRBM's targeted on Western Europe. And a European share of 60 per cent of the finance of a force costing about £150 million a year cannot alleviate more than about one and a half per cent of the cost of the American strategic nuclear forces even if planned American force levels are reduced *pari passu* with the development of the MLF.

The reasons why the solution which most dispassionate students of the alliance problem would regard as the least satisfactory is now being pressed with such vigour are complex. The essential one is that the other two alternatives, the multinational system and the European-American strategic partnership, have become impossible to pursue – largely, but not entirely, as a result of French maintain a continuing private dialogue with the Soviet Union has made it essential for the United States to make a special effort to retain the confidence of the Federal German Republic. Though the MLF may be a left-handed means of doing this, many people in Europe and the United States have come to regard it as the best instrument available.

It is true that some progress has been made towards the development of NATO and the commitment of nuclear forces to enable it to function more successfully as a multinational coalition in the missile age. But the enormous task of reorganizing institutions and adjusting national habits to develop a better system of joint planning, force commitment and crisis management, has not only been inhibited by President de Gaulle's dislike of the degree of military integration which is involved. The will is still lacking in London and Washington, as well as in Paris, to confront the problems of giving allies a certain degree of control over a hitherto sovereign area of policy. As the brief historical sketch which follows suggests, such

a transformation might have occurred, and the conclusion will suggest that it may yet have to come.

The concept of a European force has proved less attractive, and its difficulties more formidable, the more closely it has been studied, except to certain French spokesmen and writers and to the dogmatic European Federalists. The idea has in any case been shelved as a matter of practical politics for the immediate future by the exclusion of Britain, the only European country with an existing military nuclear and thermonuclear potential, from the EEC; by the distaste of both parties in Britain for the idea; by the preference of the German Government for the MLF solution; and by increasing American doubts about the soundness of the concept or about the inevitable identity of European and American interests, now that the first euphoria about 'the twin pillars' of European-American partnership has given way to longer thoughts. Although the situation has been complicated by the tendency of some American officials to talk of the multilateral force as the eventual nucleus of a European force, only the election of Senator Goldwater and a policy of old-fashioned American isolationism are likely to revive significant European enthusiasm for the idea in the immediate future.

II

The idea of creating a multilaterally owned and has a mixed ancestry. It got its first impetus from certain studies conducted at SHAPE in the 18 months after the meeting of the NATO heads of government which took place in December 1957. These studies were conducted against the background of a still unresolved technological question of whether and when the United States could find a dependable long-range missile to match the apparent Soviet lead in this weapon. They suggested that there was a military requirement for a force of mobile *medium* range missiles in Western Europe, mounted on trucks, railway cars or barges, and the conclusion was soon reached that a missile made relatively invulnerable by this means could not, by reason of its mobility, be operated under the bilateral agreements covering tactical nuclear weapons, but would require a genuine mix-manned allied force to run it.²

² This possibility was, I think, first publicly explored in the first edition of my book *NATO in the 1960s* (ISS Studies in International Security No. 1) published in March 1960.

These studies did not commend themselves to the American, British or French Governments, but they did lead those, especially in the State Department, who had begun to become sensitive to the political disadvantages of the American nuclear preponderance, to think that, if there were a serious military requirement for such mobile missiles, here was an opportunity to bring the non-nuclear powers within a more integrated system of allied planning and control than had been achieved thus far. The United States Government began the study of a 'NATO Deterrent' as it was then called, in April 1960. In October a rudimentary plan was aired for a force of 300 *Polaris* missiles – some in submarines, some on mobile land mountings – under the control of the NATO Council. It was argued at that time that by thus making NATO into 'the fourth atomic Power' the danger of further national nuclear forces in Europe would be averted and faith in the credibility of Western nuclear weapons would be enhanced. The offer was formally made by Mr Christian Herter, the outgoing Secretary of State, at the NATO ministerial meeting in December 1960.

The American proposal met with a cool reception in every country except Germany and Italy, and when the new Kennedy Administration took office it looked as if it might be dropped altogether. One of the President elect's first moves had been to set up an informal commission of inquiry under Mr Dean Acheson to examine the relative merits of schemes for strengthening NATO as a multinational alliance or of introducing a new multilateral component within it, alternative approaches whose leading counsel were Mr Albert Wohlstetter, the distinguished strategic analyst from the RAND Corporation, for the multinational solution, and Professor Robert Bowie, Director of the Harvard Center for International Affairs, for the multilateralists. The evidence at that time told against the multilateralists: the Pentagon had lost whatever interest it had earlier had in European based missiles; Herr Strauss, the German Defence Minister, appeared more preoccupied with a better German association with decisions affecting tactical than with strategic nuclear weapons; President de Gaulle had not yet begun to use the French nuclear force as a diplomatic instrument; and American strategic analysis was becoming increasingly preoccupied with centralizing control over nuclear weapons in the interests of a more flexible war strategy of controlled response.

This situation was reflected, not only in press reports that the new President intended to bury the idea of a NATO deterrent,³ but also in the President's first major policy move when he committed five American *Polaris* submarines to NATO 'subject to any agreed guide-lines on their control and use. . .'.⁴ However, he did not close the door on a NATO deterrent though he hedged it with the formidable condition that the European allies should meet their goals in conventional forces before 'we look to the possibility of eventually establishing a NATO seaborne missile force which would be genuinely multilateral in ownership and control'.⁵

Thereafter the multilateral proposal simply dropped out of sight for over a year. There was little reaction in Europe to the President's hint, certainly no united one, and it had little effect upon the endemic arguments about the level of European conventional forces. The Berlin crisis of 1961 gave the leaders of the alliance other things to think about. At the same time there were signs of an attempt in both London and Washington to withdraw some of the veil of secrecy that surrounded nuclear targeting and planning, and to operate the multinational system more successfully. However, there were certain pressures operating on the United States Government below the surface which became more evident and harder to resist, during the second half of 1962.

One of these pressures was generated by the preoccupation of the Action Committee for a United Europe and its American supporters with finding a political role for the European Community that was not exclusively tied to French nuclear potential and that would provide an inducement for Britain to enter it: this had the effect of reviving the idea of a multilateral force as the foundation of a European one and of altering the American condition for launching it from the fulfilment of Europe's conventional force goals to the eventual achievement of a politically united Europe.

A second pressure was provided by the dismay of the German government at realizing that the strategy of massive retaliation had been abandoned (it had in fact been abandoned years earlier, if indeed it ever was the real American strategy, but

³ e.g., Henry Brandon in *The Sunday Times*, 2 April, 1961.

⁴ Speech in Ottawa, 17 May, 1961. The figure was reduced to three in 1962.

⁵ *Ibid.*

it was not publicly buried until Mr McNamara's speech to the NATO Council in Athens in April 1962). This development revived doubts about the credibility of the American response and began to increase German enthusiasm for a multilaterally controlled NATO force (although German leaders continued to insist in private that they were more concerned with some sort of control over nuclear weapons on German soil than with long-range missiles).

A third pressure, in some American eyes at least, was the need to prevent the arguments used to justify the British, and still more the French, nuclear force from eroding the confidence of all the non-nuclear powers in the American sense of commitment to NATO and the integrity of Europe.

A fourth pressure was created by the fact that, as 1962 wore on, depressing evidence began to accumulate of the difficulties of improving the existing multinational machinery of NATO. There were unresolved arguments between governments about the move of the Standing Group from Washington to Paris, about the strengthening of the NATO Secretariat, and about the role of the Council. Though President de Gaulle was the most openly obstructive, neither Mr McNamara nor the British government appeared ready to take any significant step towards giving the other NATO allies greater control over American and British planning or decisions. As far as can be observed, the new Nuclear Committee of the NATO Council, created in April 1962, in which the nuclear powers were to discuss their strategic policy with greater confidence and candour than hitherto, was still-born.

Last, but by no means least, there was the pressure exerted by the presence in the State Department of a small number of senior officials who had early made up their minds that the multilateral solution was the correct one, and who have since displayed a degree of missionary zeal, not normally to be found in diplomatic offices, to convert – 'lobby' is not too strong a word – others to their view.

In consequence, various American emissaries began to tour the Western European capitals in the summer of 1962 to canvass the merits of a multilateral force. They came from the State Department and their arguments were based partly on the need to provide a Europe that was surging towards unity with a worthy strategic role, partly on the need to prevent proliferation. The line of reasoning was based on President

Kennedy's famous Declaration of Interdependence made at Philadelphia on 4 July, and in contradiction of the major presentation of the new American strategy of controlled response which Mr McNamara had made at Ann Arbor a month earlier. Judging from the impressions of those who talked to President Kennedy at this time it would appear that he had made up his mind that one serious European nuclear force would be more easily reconciled in the long run with his Defence Secretary's insistence on centralized control than two small European national forces and the possibility of more.⁶ He was not, however, prepared to try and force Britain out of the nuclear weapons business.

One would have thought that the vindication of American firmness and decision in the Cuban missile crisis, and its beneficent effect on American prestige in Europe, might have set the question aside for a while. But, in fact, so strong was the American urge to make Europe strategically respectable and to find a formula that would enfold the British and French national nuclear forces within a larger framework, that less than three weeks after the height of the Cuban crisis Mr George Ball was informing a European audience that:

From a strictly military standpoint, we do not feel that the Alliance has an urgent need for a European nuclear contribution. But should other NATO nations so desire, we are ready to give serious consideration to the creation of a genuine multilateral medium-range ballistic missile force fully co-ordinated with the other deterrent forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is not for us – indeed, it would be out of keeping with the spirit of the Atlantic partnership – to dictate how such a force should be manned, financed or organized. But it is a proper responsibility of the United States, which has had so much experience in the nuclear field, to make available to others our information and ideas with respect to the characteristics and

⁶ President Kennedy clearly had a private nightmare about nuclear proliferation which can have borne very little relation to the kind of scientific advice which was available to him. Consider this statement from his television interview of 18 December, 1962: 'If the French decide they want to become a nuclear power themselves, that is their decision. The question is whether the US should join in helping make France a nuclear power, then Italy, then West Germany, then Belgium. How does that produce security when you have 10, 20, 30 nuclear powers who may fire their weapons off under different conditions?'

capabilities of a multilateral force. And we are now in the process of doing so.⁷

In reality, Mr Ball was being somewhat modest and disingenuous: the United States had by then a plan for a multilateral force which she was about to insist that her allies consider. This plan was unveiled just before the December meeting of the NATO Ministers in Paris in the form of a force that would consist partly of *Polaris* submarines and partly of a new medium-range mobile land-based missile known as 'Missile X', which the Pentagon had been somewhat reluctantly developing for the past two years.⁸ The assumption behind Mr Dean Rusk's exposition of this proposed force was that if it materialized the British and French forces would become part of it, but that its employment would remain subject to an overriding American veto for the time being.

III

At this point a different issue became entangled in the discussion over a multilateral solution which profoundly affected its later development and caused much of the confusion in which the question subsequently became enshrouded. The history of Anglo-American military relations and the tensions caused by the decision to cancel the *Skybolt* missile belong to a different story. The point that is relevant here is that when Mr Macmillan travelled to Nassau on 18 December, 1962, to negotiate on a replacement, the United States Government had become too deeply committed to broadening the basis of co-operation on nuclear control to conclude a straightforward bilateral arrangement with Britain. President Kennedy's formula (as he made clear in a background news conference a fortnight after Nassau)⁹ was to pursue both the multilateral and the multinational principle jointly and simultaneously, in order to see which would prove the most successful. The Prime Minister's thoughts appear to have been concentrated solely on the multinational solution.

Unfortunately, both delegations got their terminology muddled, and their final communiqué reflected two soliloquies rather than an understanding. Thus paragraphs 6 and 8 of the communiqué include the British offer to assign Bomber Command, British tactical nuclear forces

in Europe, and the eventual British *Polaris* 'as part of a NATO nuclear force targeted in accordance with NATO plans', *pari passu* with a similar American contribution. In the subsequent months the British government elaborated this proposal to suggest that all NATO countries with tactical nuclear weapons should similarly be drawn into a new command and planning system within NATO. In paragraph 8 of the Nassau communiqué this was described as a *multilateral* force. The British impression was that the Americans agreed with them that the future structure of NATO should be organized around a closer commitment of existing national forces rather than on a new force, a view that was strengthened by the fact that an offer of American *Polaris* missiles was immediately made to President de Gaulle.

But the State Department officials had a different concept of a multilateral force. In their view it was to be a new force, consisting of submarines or surface ships, jointly financed, planned, owned and controlled by the participants in which the non-nuclear allies would win their right to participate by their financial contribution. In paragraph 7 of the communiqué, which spoke of joint support for the development 'of a multilateral NATO nuclear force in the closest consultation with other NATO allies, they thought they had got British agreement, to participate but in fact the question of British participation was not settled at Nassau. The British, moreover, were led to think, by the tenor of the discussions there, that this was to be regarded only as a distant aspiration and a secondary American objective.

They were wrong. Less than three weeks after Nassau, President de Gaulle struck a heavy blow at the multinational solution when he rejected the American offer of *Polaris* and made it clear that France would continue to develop a wholly independent nuclear force, as well as excluding Britain from the Community. Mr Macmillan, for reasons of British domestic politics, weakened his own position considerably when, in defending the Nassau agreements in the House of Commons on 31 January, 1963, he laid such stress on the continuing national command of British nuclear weapons as to rob their assignment to NATO of much of its significance, at least in European eyes. By the beginning of February 1963 the American proposal for a new multilaterally owned and controlled nuclear force had become a prime objective of American policy: detailed plans were unwrapped, influential emissaries were dispatched

⁷ Speech to NATO Parliamentarians' Conference in Paris, 16 November, 1962.

⁸ *Missile X* was finally dropped from the American R. and D. programme in August 1964.

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They were wrong. Less than three weeks after Nassau, President de Gaulle struck a heavy blow at the multinational solution when he rejected the American offer of *Polaris* and made it clear that France would continue to develop a wholly independent nuclear force, as well as excluding Britain from the Community. Mr Macmillan, for reasons of British domestic politics, weakened his own position considerably when, in defending the Nassau agreements in the House of Commons on 31 January, 1963, he laid such stress on the continuing national command of British nuclear weapons as to rob their assignment to NATO of much of its significance, at least in European eyes. By the beginning of February 1963 the American proposal for a new multilaterally owned and controlled nuclear force had become a prime objective of American policy: detailed plans were unwrapped, influential emissaries were dispatched

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to Europe, and any suggestions that the proposals for developing a better multinational command and planning system should first be studied and discussed tended to be treated in Washington as irrelevant diversions from the main issue.

Why, one must ask, did the United States launch the MLF proposal with such vigour and haste, despite the fact that the 'grand design' of a partnership between the United States and a European nuclear force had seldom stood higher, and that Britain had just made an important *beau geste* to the solidarity of the alliance? The answer lies partly in the American view of German policy. It is true that the alarming Herr Strauss had fallen from office in November 1962 and that Herr Erler, the widely respected deputy leader of the Social Democrats, and other German commentators, had expressed their preference for the multinational solution, though not condemning the MLF. But the Franco-German pact, signed in January 1963, profoundly alarmed the United States, and had aroused a spectre of an eventual Franco-German nuclear co-operation. No time, it was argued in Washington, must be lost in European request for participation in nuclear planning; the right solution must be sold to Europe before French influence spread.

There was a second reason why the British attempt to create a NATO nuclear force out of the assigned weapons of the nuclear powers, plus the nuclear armed aircraft and other tactical weapons in Europe, received only nominal American support. McNamara had become concerned about the drain of overseas military expenditure on the American balance of payments, and the latter had made clear that he equated an ally's right to influence NATO strategy with its readiness to make a special financial contribution to the costs of deterrence.¹⁰ This the contribution of European allies to a multilateral force carried some promise of doing, while a re-grouping of the existing nuclear forces did not.

IV

It is a tribute to the amount of staff work on the MLF which had been quietly undertaken before it

became a major premise of American policy that the proposal presented to the allies in March 1963 is substantially that on which they are still negotiating a year and a half later. It called for a fleet of 25 mixed-manned surface ships to be jointly owned, financed and controlled by those countries willing to participate, each armed with eight *Polaris* A3 missiles. The cost was estimated at \$5,000 million, and it was agreed to be established that the United States and Germany were prepared to pay 75 per cent of this sum between them. (The US Joint Atomic Energy Committee had firmly refused to contemplate American nuclear submarines passing out of American hands. The new proposal was for a straightforward medium range missile force but based on international waters, rather than the terrain of Western Europe, to avoid complications with both France and the Soviet Union.)

The first reaction in Europe to the MLF proposal was civil but not enthusiastic. The smaller governments who were approached (Canada, Norway, Denmark and Portugal, as well as France, expressed no interest in participation) were worried about demands to strengthen their conventional forces; naval staffs were sceptical about the operational viability of such a fleet, and public opinion was sceptical or disinterested. And no one, except Herr von Hassel, the German Defence Minister, who early suggested a form of majority voting which was unacceptable to the United States, could see how the problem of control was going to be solved.¹¹ But it became increasingly tepid as Washington made it clear that British participation was expected. When President Kennedy embarked on a 'tour of exploration' in Europe in June there were many who thought, and not only in London, that the MLF proposal would run into the sands, more especially as the President himself had never displayed the same enthusiasm for the idea as the ardent spirits in the State Department, particularly if it did not carry wholehearted

¹⁰ Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, January 1963.

¹¹ 'We shall certainly do our best, with the United States and Europe, to bring a NATO nuclear force into being, and as a first step we have offered to assign the whole of our V-bomber force to it. This has been widely welcomed in Europe. We shall support, too, the efforts which the Americans are engaged upon to bring about a mixed manned force as well.' - Mr Peter Thorneycroft, House of Commons, 4 March, 1963.

British support. However, two developments had occurred which were about to give it a fresh lease of life.

One was the slow strangulation of the idea of strengthening the political machinery of NATO on the basis of multinational forces. The United States loyally supported such an idea at the Ottawa meeting of the NATO Ministers in May 1963 where it was agreed that allied officers should be stationed at the headquarters of Strategic Air Command in Omaha, and that a new Deputy Supreme Commander in Europe should be appointed to co-ordinate European nuclear planning (a Belgian general was appointed four months later). But this did not presage a serious reform of the alliance structure in the direction of strategic planning, and the cold bearing of M. Couve de Murville made it clear that, while she did not object to tinkering with it, France was not prepared to see the alliance machinery recast in a more integrated design.

Moreover, from the spring of 1964 British Ministers themselves began to demolish the foundations of their own position. As the British election began to loom over the horizon, and as they sensed that the future of the British deterrent might become an election issue, they began to lay increasing stress on the theoretic independence of British nuclear weapons rather than on the assignment of those weapons to the planning control of NATO. Even in Ottawa, where lay the best hope of convincing the non-nuclear Powers of the significance of Britain's change of policy towards NATO, the then Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, found it necessary to make a speech stressing the national aspects of Britain's nuclear force.¹²

The other development was in Germany. There for the previous two years increasing doubts about American policy had been accumulating, even in the hearts of the most judicious Germans. The McNamara strategy of controlled response, enunciated without any consultation with Bonn, hardly seemed to fit the security requirements of an exposed country like Germany. Exercise 'Big Lift' Europe exposed Germans to a drumfire of French propaganda that the United States would eventually pull out of Europe. Above all, the increasing American emphasis on arms control had made the

German government nervous, ever since the opening of bilateral Soviet-American discussions on Berlin, that the United States might, in order to meet her own security requirements, have to make agreements with the Soviet Union which conflicted with German interests. It was almost certainly the signature of the Test Ban Treaty in July 1963, handled by London and Washington with the minimum of consultation with Bonn, that convinced the German government that the MLF proposal must be firmly embraced as the only modification in alliance arrangements that was available; partly to bind American military power inexorably and permanently to Europe; partly to ensure a stronger German voice in Washington; partly to compensate for the Pentagon's declining

the pleas of two successive *SACEURS*. In the depths of German thought the MLF had been, and still is, conceived as the German equivalent of the British and French independent deterrents. These additional stimuli meant that by the end of the summer of 1963 the German position on the MLF had changed from one of intelligent interest to something more closely resembling a demand.¹³

There was also a second reason for the interest of the new Erhard Administration in the MLF. Since leaving office Herr Strauss, the leader of the Bavarian party affiliated to the CDU had become increasingly the spokesman of a form of German Gaullism which advocated a reorientation of German policy away from its Atlantic and American affiliations towards a Franco-German partnership, and which has offered increasingly vocal opposition to a policy of *détente* and movement in respect of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The political future of Herr Schroeder, the Foreign Minister, Herr von Hassel, the Defence Minister, and even perhaps the new Chancellor himself, became entangled with the future of the MLF as a touchstone of Atlanticism. Consequently, when the United States began to re-exert pressure on the European countries, in the autumn of 1963, to accelerate a decision on the

¹³ This judgment is based on my own observations and ~~assessments~~ *assessments* in the *Germany* *Times* in September, 1963. Just over a year later the Bonn correspondent of *The Times* noted that German enthusiasm for the MLF derived from the fact that 'Although the Americans will retain a right of veto, the fact that their European partners will have a voice on the "board of governors" will give them far more weight in forcing a decision in time of crisis than at present, through merely being able to ask for United States assistance.'—*The Times*, 6 October, 1964.

¹² Speech to the Canadian Club, 21 May, 1963.

MLF, the importance of retaining the confidence of Germany was more in the forefront of American arguments than before. The American arguments about the MLF as a device to arrest nuclear proliferation had by this time come to mean the arresting of Franco-German nuclear co-operation not as in 1958-62 the offer of an alternative to the French national force.

At the beginning of September 1963 the only countries ready to enter into close negotiations with the United States were Germany, Italy, Greece and Turkey. Throughout September heavy American diplomatic pressure was applied to others to join the discussions on the MLF which were to begin the following month. This had the interesting and unusual effect of producing in Britain a public and endemic difference of opinion between two major Departments of State, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence. The former argued that Britain could not afford to stand aside from an important development in the relations between the United States and Germany, while the Ministry of Defence resolutely opposed the MLF as costly, vulnerable, unnecessary, destabilising, and likely to encourage a German appetite for nuclear weapons. The consequence of this official schizophrenia was an announcement by the Prime Minister on 1 October that Britain would join the discussions but without commitment. It had by then become established that if Britain did join her share should be 10 per cent of the cost. Belgium had joined the group earlier; the Netherlands, taking her cue from Britain, joined with equal reluctance in January 1964.

The following six months were spent mostly in official discussions, in Washington on the military problems, in Paris on the legal and political ones. A number of outline agreements, on the relative invulnerability of a seaborne force, and on methods of financing it were reached. The only practical action was the American offer of a ship to experiment with mixed-manning, to which every country participating in the discussions, with the exception of Belgium, sent a contingent. Without doubt the MLF began to gain official and political support during these months in all the countries concerned.

In April and May 1964 a new note entered the United States Government's exposition of its MLF proposal. The day when Mr Ball could suggest that this was an idea on which the Americans would lend advice only if the European countries wanted such a force belonged, of course, to the

dim past. But what had been a proposal now became a demand. The driving enthusiasts in Washington had got a commitment to the MLF from President Johnson, who is essentially a man of action, which they had never got from his more analytic predecessor, and the word went out from there that all the relevant arguments had been thoroughly explored and that the time had now come for action. Once the American and British elections were over it was essential to conclude an agreement, by December 1964 at the latest, so that the necessary treaty legislation could be completed by next spring. Time was now of the essence, for the particular reason that the German legislative process is almost as complex, where treaty ratification is concerned, as the American, and that if the MLF treaty were not presented to the Bundestag early in 1965 it might not be completed before next September's elections and would either become delayed into 1966 or become a prey to the growing dispute between the right and the moderate centre in Germany, or both.

It was apparent by the spring of 1964 that the United States was now determined to go ahead with the MLF, if need be with Germany as the only major European member. It then became clear that Washington gave the demands of German internal politics priority over those of Britain; for the effect of demanding an agreement in principle by December 1964 would be to give the incoming British administration - a Labour government assuming office for the first time in 13 years - ten, or, at the most twelve weeks, to reach a final decision. In view of the prevarications of British policy there might well be some justice in this, were it not for the fact that Labour has certain proposals on NATO organization - akin to the multinational approach, but not necessarily predicating a British nuclear force - which it has the right to ask the United States and its European allies to examine before committing itself to the MLF.

One further development occurred in July 1964, before the opening of the campaigning season in Britain and the United States temporarily becalmed the MLF. One source of opposition to the MLF, in the United States as well as in London, has been the American insistence since early 1963 that it must take the form of a force of surface ships. Two variants have been suggested. One is that the European allies should finance and control a part of the central American strategic force, namely the *Minuteman* missiles in hardened silos in

the Middle and Far West. Though just as logical as the sea-borne force, and though commanding the support of the late Secretary-General of NATO, Mr Stikker, and some influential Americans, the idea has never been popular in the Pentagon or in Congress. The other idea is to group part of the multilateral force around the longer range interdiction aircraft and missiles already in service in Europe, or scheduled for that purpose. This idea has always appealed more to the British government, partly because of naval objections to a large fleet of surface ships, partly from a belief that it is Europe-based weapons whose use or non-use would be of prime concern to the Europeans in the early stages of a nuclear crisis, and partly because Britain would play a larger part in such a mixed force than in a purely seaborne one.

In July the British government submitted to the other MLF powers a detailed plan for the mixed manning, joint finance and control of the strike aircraft and missiles in Europe. RAF Bomber Command in the last war is an example of the only mixed manned strategic force in modern times. The first American reaction to regard this plan as a diversionary tactic has given place to a decision to take the proposal seriously as a complement to, not as an alternative to, the seaborne force. There are no signs of any great enthusiasm for it in Europe partly from doubts about the role and importance of tactical aircraft in the long run, partly because they are not part of the strategic system of deterrence against the Soviet Union itself and therefore carry less deterrent weight and diplomatic prestige.

V

My reason for imposing this historical retrospect on the reader is my own conviction that it contains the clues to the five questions which will dominate discussion of the MLF proposal among the NATO allies over the coming months. Will the multilateral force in fact be launched? How will it be controlled? What sort of force will it be? To what developments in alliance relationships will it lead? What effect will it have on East-West relations?

If one examines the reasons why the United States decided to revive the MLF proposal at the beginning of 1963, on quite different grounds from those first used – namely fear that Germany might succumb to French arguments about the desirability of a separate Franco-German diplomacy and strategy – there is no reason to feel that

the argument is less valid almost two years later. It can reasonably be argued that American policy is itself responsible for building up France as an alternative pole of attraction in the alliance. It is also true that President de Gaulle seems now to be deeply disillusioned about the Franco-German alliance. But the United States has acquired a vested interest in the political future of the moderate centre in Germany (she openly used her diplomatic influence on behalf of Dr Adenauer in earlier German elections); and the collapse of the MLF would now be a setback to the Erhard government which the United States could not afford, since a strengthening of the German right wing might not only revive the Franco-German entente but might jeopardize the policy of *détente* with the Soviet Union and of 'movement' in regard to Eastern Europe.

The assumption that Britain can kill the MLF, either by downright opposition or by proposing a different political solution for consultation and crisis management within NATO – views that are held in British service circles and in the Labour Party respectively – is at best debatable. But the Macmillan Government and its successor have failed in the past four years to put forward any proposals for the reorganization of planning and control in NATO which have captured the imagination of the smaller European allies, and those constructive steps that have been proposed remain stillborn by reason of the attitude of France. Whether a Labour government prepared to abandon British nuclear weapons (some £200 million is already committed in the British *Polaris* programme), or to commit them to NATO as integrally as the multilaterally owned forces themselves, can revitalize the political approach to NATO reform depends partly on France and partly on the willingness of Germany and the United States to turn aside from the MLF proposal for a complete reappraisal of all alternative solutions – something that is now not very probable. A Labour government, with its strong views about the importance of the Anglo-American relationship, cannot long stand outside a development to which the United States attaches the highest importance despite the hesitations of the Labour party in regard to Europe. To oppose the MLF categorically on grounds of its vulnerability, cost, incredibility and effect on Soviet policy, as many service advisers would like, might risk exposing the relative weakening of the Anglo-American, as compared to the American-German connection

— a risk that any British government would be most unwilling to take.

However, the American handling of the multilateral proposal has created an ambiguity about the control of the force which could still wreck it. This ambiguity has two sources, Washington and Bonn. As a study of the record has suggested, American support for a multilateral force was originally engendered by the passionate enthusiasts for European unity in the days before President de Gaulle put paid to the 'grand design'. And a number of senior American officials and their advisers have gone on talking about the MLF as a basis of an eventual European force, even though the American motive for securing the MLF has altered.¹⁴ This view is anachronistic in terms of American interests; it is a form of nuclear proliferation which the United States strongly condemns, and it also tends to undermine the position of Herr von Hassel and the German enthusiasts for the MLF, who justify their attitude almost solely in terms of binding the United States indissolubly to Europe and disposing of any talk of a purely European force. This is true of every other European government concerned except Italy; there the fear that the country is going neutralist, combined with the desire to keep on reasonably good terms with France, leads senior officials to argue that Europe must acquire collective nuclear responsibility as soon as possible. But Italian arguments aside, the readiness of European governments to translate the MLF proposal into treaty form (Germany for fear of France; Britain, Belgium and Holland for fear of Germany) depends absolutely on the United States being a member and having a veto on its use for the indefinite future. Fortunately, the dogmatic 'dumbbell' men now appear to be losing

their influence in Washington and the President and the Secretary of State seem anxious, in their most recent statements, to eliminate this source of ambiguity. No doubt the United States Congress will make the position even clearer.

The kind of ambiguity to be found in Bonn concerns suggestions that Germany would be prepared to accept an American veto on the use of the force but not that of any minor European subscriber — a position which conceals either the distaste of certain German officials at the prospect of Mr Harold Wilson's finger on the safety catch or a desire to make Britain buy a larger share of the MLF by scrapping her *Polaris* programme. But any proposals for decision by majority voting in the MLF control group on operational issues, however ingeniously devised, cannot — in my view at least — survive the process of treaty ratification by national parliaments, including those of the small participants.

There is also a disturbing belief in the minds of some German officials that the MLF could somehow be used in a European crisis independently of the main American strategic forces. Such arguments play, of course, straight into the hands of the opponents of the MLF in London and elsewhere, but the fact that they are put forward suggests that in their anxiety to retain German support for the project, American officials have been disingenuous in not confronting their German colleagues with the very stringent principles of control on which the Administration will in fact insist — that it should be based on the unanimity principle if the smaller participants wish it and that it must be directly integrated with the American command and crisis control system. Since there is no dispute about this in Britain, it is possible that the closing phases of the MLF negotiations may require greater internal debate and clarification in Washington and Bonn, and probably Rome as well, than in London. For it can only emerge as a multi-veto, integrated, Atlantic force, though perhaps some very general provision for the revision of the arrangements by the consent of all concerned, if Europe should achieve political unity, could be written into the treaty.

The form of control has a direct bearing on the nature of the force. The 25-ship, 200-missile force proposed by the United States represents a compromise between the desire of the German government and the Supreme Commander, Europe, to have missiles with a strategic range directly committed to the defence of Europe, and

¹⁴ Thus: 'The multilateral force would also inevitably make easier the eventual development of a European nuclear force. . . . ' Mr Robert Schaezel, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Atlantic Affairs, at Ditchley, 27 September, 1963.

'A united Europe may one day acquire control of the multilateral nuclear missile fleet.' Vice-President Johnson at Brussels, 8 November, 1963.

'Such a force might evolve in either of two ways: it might become an integrated Atlantic force with the United States still a member but without a veto. Or it might develop into an integrated European force without the United States as a member. . . . ' Professor Robert Bowie at the WEU Assembly, 3 December, 1963.

'We have wished to leave the structure of the MLF sufficiently flexible to adjust as Europe moves towards unity.' Mr Walt Rostow, Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, State Department, to the WEU Assembly, 24 June, 1964.

the reluctance of the United States to base missiles of such range on the land in Western Europe. The British contention is that the proposed force is too large and will be too long range to put at the disposal of a regional commander and that, since it will have a fairly low credibility by reason of its control system, its size will constitute an unnecessary drain on the resources of the participants. Hence the proposal to extend the principle of multilateral control to the interdiction weapons which must be developed in any case and which are a central part of SACEUR's responsibility: the difficulty with the British proposal is that these interdiction weapons must have a high degree of credibility which is somewhat harder to conceive under a system of multiple vetoes than under the present double key arrangement. But since Britain is the most sophisticated military power in Europe, her entry into the MLF discussions has had the effect of challenging a number of American assertions about the manpower, finance and training requirements of the seaborne force, and it is possible that the final discussions may well reduce the seaborne element to more modest proportions (10 or 15 ships), extend the multilateral principle to certain interdiction weapons, and leave provision for the inclusion of others if the initial experiments satisfy the participants.

Fourth, what effect will the MLF have on the structure of the Atlantic relationships? Anyone who examines the record of gradually mounting support for the MLF in European foreign offices, or who talks to politicians and officials in Bonn, Brussels, the Hague and even Rome, becomes aware that the real desire for this force does not arise out of any serious fear of nuclear proliferation in Europe nor from any overwhelming desire either to be associated with the firing control of nuclear weapons or to influence their targeting, or in any way to share the awesome responsibilities of the President of the United States. It reflects, rather, a wish to gain a more effective and influential role in the development of NATO's long term strategic and diplomatic policy, especially as it affects relations with the third world and the Soviet Union as well as to play a more decisive role in crises. In other words, to achieve exactly the objectives for which the reform of NATO along multinational lines was first mooted several years ago.

The question which one must therefore ask is whether the United States government under-

stands where its own policy is leading. If it treats its MLF allies merely as technical collaborators, and confines the discussions of the control group to such relatively uninteresting subjects as missile targeting or finance, it will cause grievous disappointment, particularly in Bonn, which might lead to the kind of German irredentism which the MLF is specifically designed to prevent. Nothing could be more fatal to American influence as the leading power in Europe if the MLF were seen in Europe to be merely a military toy to keep the children quiet. Consequently, it seems to me that the United States will find herself speedily having to accord to the MLF powers a right of scrutiny into wider aspects of her policy which she has by and large refused to give to NATO—into strategic concepts, into force levels, into arms control proposals, even into Far Eastern policy. But can the United States afford to place this 'Little Entente' in such a favoured position without drawing in Canada and the Scandinavian powers?¹⁵ Can she indeed do so without France, unless she is prepared to face a virtual French withdrawal from the Western alliance which would overturn the whole of the defence of Europe and, indeed, the power structure of the Northern Hemisphere? Some Americans have seen the MLF as giving the United States greater autonomy in the Far East and in her relations with the Soviet Union: in fact it is likely to have exactly the reverse effect.

It may well be, therefore, that the MLF will in the end prove to have been nothing but an expensive and time consuming detour on the road to a more effective system of political and strategic planning among the Western allies, centred perhaps in Washington rather than Paris: a solution which became blocked by reason of French chauvinism, British hesitations and a series of false American judgments about the nature of Europe and about the strength of her own position there, during the earlier years of this decade.

Finally, what effect will the decision on the MLF have on relations between the United States and the Soviet Union? To this a study of its history provides no clear answer since the Soviet Union has only recently become a partner to the debate, and even now has not deployed its full diplomatic strength on the subject. There

¹⁵ Fear that the MLF may drive a wedge between the West European and the Scandinavian members of NATO was one of the principal reasons for the hesitation of the Netherlands in supporting the project. Norway is now as flatly opposed to the MLF as France.

has been a noticeable tendency on the part of American officials to write off Soviet hostility to the MLF as merely captious or as ritualistic. Some have even maintained that they have succeeded in convincing their Soviet opposite numbers that the MLF, by binding Germany even more closely into the NATO system, serves a Russian interest. Certainly the whole American position on the MLF has rested on a calculation that the Soviet Union would prefer to see a moderate German government with a limited degree of control over some nuclear weapons than a more intransigent one, probably working closely with France, and no MLF.

But if this calculation is proved wrong then a new situation arises for the United States must give its relations with the Soviet Union as high a priority as those with any ally. Some who have talked to Soviet officials closely and privately on this question have derived the impression that the Soviet opposition to the MLF is not ritualistic and is based on a fear that important technical information on warheads and missile systems will pass gradually into German hands and will broaden the option of some nationalistic German government of the future, either for developing a national nuclear force or for some co-operative venture with France. This is what the Soviet Union means by proliferation.

This view may be wholly misguided, but if it is maintained it must present the United States with several awkward choices. For one thing the Soviet Union has made it quite clear in the Geneva negotiations that the abandonment of the MLF is her price for serious negotiations on a nuclear non-dissemination agreement. Such an agreement may be higher on the list of American than of Soviet priorities, and may rise still further if a Chinese nominal bomb is tested in the near future and it becomes important to prevent powers like India from shopping for a nuclear programme of their own. Moreover, if a non-dissemination agreement falls by the wayside through dogged American adherence to the MLF this means alienating the more liberal and pro-American section of public opinion in the countries of NATO Europe which looks to the United States to maintain the momentum towards arms control agreements initiated by the nuclear test ban. But the United States has placed so much emphasis on the MLF that to abandon it now would create a grave political crisis in Germany. It has been suggested one possible way out of this dilemma would

be to carry through the full provisions of the Irish resolution and initiate a treaty among the non-nuclear powers whereby they would agree not to manufacture or to acquire control of nuclear weapons. It is possible that if Germany were to take the lead in collecting signatures to such a treaty it might prove successful, though again the advent of the Chinese bomb makes this a difficult moment to ask India or Japan for their signatures without stringent security guarantees on the part of the United States (and perhaps the Soviet Union as well).

Alternatively if the Soviet Union is adamant, the United States may have to regard the MLF more as a bargaining card than as fixed policy. The difficulty here is that the purpose of the MLF has been considered so much in German terms that the Soviet concession against which it is to be traded must be one that fully satisfies Germany. The displacement of Mr Khrushchev by Mr Kosygin and Mr Brezhnev adds a new element of uncertainty to the Soviet reaction.

There is a danger that a diplomatic initiative undertaken originally to reconcile Germany to the existence of a Soviet-American dialogue may either endanger the dialogue itself or the influence of the United States with its allies. The coming crisis on the MLF is likely to illustrate once again that for the strengthening of allied cohesion and the pursuit of a stable relationship with the adversary cannot be separated, since they are two facets of the same problem.

At the beginning of November 1964, the leaders who had been associated with the policies of the early 1960s had been replaced in every major country that is a partner to the old East-West confrontation, except France. This can hardly be the appropriate moment to apply a plan that was evolved in quite different circumstances to those of today. If the MLF proves, after more profound discussion than has yet been attempted among the NATO powers (including France whose unwise abstention from earlier debates has provided so much of the proposal's impetus) to be the soundest solution to the problem of allied confidence and control, then a year's delay will not diminish its soundness. If it gives way to proposals, emanating as much from Germany, Britain and, one hopes, France, as from the United States, which are more suited to the international climate of the late 1960s and the 1970s, then nothing – except a few diplomatic and academic reputations – will have been lost.

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November 24, 1964

THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT

Text of the speech by the Prime
Minister, The Rt. Hon. Harold
Wilson, O.B.E., M.P., in the House
of Commons, November 23, 1964.

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Collective Defence Measures	7
Commonwealth	8
Defence	9
Economic Situation	2
Mixed Manned Surface Fleet	12
Nassau Agreement	6
Trade	9
United Nations	8
Visit to Washington	5, 10
Western Alliance	7

PRESERVATION COPY

The Right Honorable Gentleman, the Leader of the Opposition, following the line which he intimated last week devoted his speech to Defence policy. He referred at one point in his speech, and I think it was central to what he was arguing, to the need for this country to have the maximum influence, authority and power. I think that those were his words, and no one will quarrel with them. Now that we are in a position to know more of the facts of what has been going on, I think that the mistake which his Government made was the thought that, provided one follows whatever is the right line in weapons policy, no matter what one does about economic strength, a nation will have influence, authority and power.

The Economic Situation

Although the Right Honorable Gentleman did not deal with the economic situation at all I believe, and I am sure that the whole House believes that it is impossible to separate these issues. Since this is a free-range debate on the adjournment, I believe that it will be considered for the convenience of the House if I first spend a little time on the economic position before I come to Defence, which I will do, and then deal with the points which the Right Honorable Gentleman made.

The House will be aware that before the Government's economic measures to restrain imports and stimulate exports had time to operate, at any rate before they had time to be reflected in the monthly trade figures, a fairly formidable speculative attack was mounted on sterling in certain continental centers. When this occurs - and we had one of similar virulence in 1961 and 1957, as the House recalls - little purpose is served by refuting the analysis, whatever it may be, of our basic trading position by those responsible. We are dealing with a situation where what matters is not what our trade and payments position is but what people overseas think it is. The House will agree that speculative expectations apart, there is nothing in our current economic position which justifies these widespread desires to convert sterling into other currencies. I am sure that the House will agree on the basis of the facts.

Of course, they must agree when the late Chancellor himself said of the estimated payments deficit for 1964, "three quarters of the year was over - three quarters of the year - when this large deficit had been taken care of", he said, "by us". He omitted to mention that it had been taken care of by borrowing, including increasing sterling balances, to the tune of some £2 million a day, double the estimate which I was so passionately rebuked for stating during the Election campaign. But there it was, and no one will cavil at what he said: it had been taken care of.

Mr. Charles Marshall, Jr.
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Room 712 - New State
Washington, D.C.

Mr. Charles Marshall, Jr.
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/Equally ...
Name: ...
The President

Equally, no one will deny that we had the resources to take care of the remainder of the estimated deficit for the rest of the year for the two-and-a-half months from the 16th October. [Of] the swap arrangements, the borrowing facilities negotiated with European Central Banks and with the United States, our reserves and the \$1,000 million stand-by arrangements, the arrangement for which he asked [the] I.M.F. now in process of activation were ample, several times over, to cover the remaining part of the estimated 1964 deficit which had been left still to be covered.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I apologize to the Prime Minister but I do not know whether there is some misunderstanding here. I think that the Right Honorable Gentleman knows the parliamentary conventions very well. The proposed subject for debate is the Nuclear Deterrent and the discussion of the Nassau Agreement at Washington that is on the Order Paper. We have the whole of tomorrow to discuss the economic situation. It is quite in order for the Prime Minister to draw attention to the economic reasons for what he is doing with the Defence forces but surely we ought to concentrate our debate on the subject on the Order Paper.

The Prime Minister: The Right Honorable Gentleman must get out of the idea that he can dictate other peoples speeches for them. I told the Right Honorable Gentleman that I intended to deal fully with the points which he made.

The Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. William Ross): [It] would not take long.

Mr. Goodhew (St. Albans): On a point of order, is it not the case that the House is to discuss the Finance Bill tomorrow? Is not that the occasion on which the economic position of the country should be discussed rather than today when we have the subject of nuclear defense on the Order Paper?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Samuel Storey): The motion before the House is, that this House do now adjourn, it is in order for Honorable Members to discuss any subject, but I hope that Honorable Members will concentrate on the subject which has been agreed for discussion.

The Prime Minister: Certainly. I have made it clear that I intend to begin with a short reference to this subject. Honorable Members opposite were only too ready to jibe in a few minutes ago on this question. This is why they are most unwilling now to hear of the responsibilities with which they have left us. I will deal fully with the points made by the Leader of the Opposition but I was saying on - and I intend to finish this part of my speech - that the measures which we took a month ago were aimed to act directly on the problem of exports and imports. The measures that we took this morning

/were ...

were designed to operate directly on that problem which has arisen in the course of the last few days, a purely speculative monetary phenomenon. The measures that we have taken at present are relevant to that and we believe that they have shown the determination of the Government and I hope of the entire House to deal with this problem of defending sterling.

Sir Cyril Osborne (Louth): Has this pressure arisen only since last Thursday?

The Prime Minister: I said "in the course of the last few days". As has been said we are debating this matter tomorrow. Of course, if Honorable Members would like to have the whole story now they can have it. They had better make up their minds what they want. The fact is, as the Right Honorable Gentleman recognizes, that so far as the trade gap is concerned whatever the trade gap or the payments gap - whatever has been estimated as having to be met there were reserves and borrowings more than adequate to meet this, but in the course of the past week there has been this new development arising from confidence factors and it was decided that we must take these measures decisively and at the right possible moment.

Mr. Nigel Fisher (Surbiton): Does the Right Honorable Gentleman now acknowledge that the pressure upon Sterling derives not from what he calls the economic inheritance but from the total irrelevance of his Right Honorable Friend's Budget.

The Prime Minister: No, Sir, because as I made absolutely plain, the measures that were introduced a month ago to operate on exports and imports which were the inheritance of Right Honorable Members opposite, and which the then Prime Minister went on denying when he was pathetically proclaiming on the hustings - I know that he does not want to listen to this now but he is going to get it - when he went round the country saying that the country has never been stronger - this had already been dealt with. We are now dealing with a purely financial factor. I hope - and I am going to say this before I leave the subject - we shall get from Right Honorable Members opposite, today and tomorrow, concern for and recognition of the fact that sterling is not a party asset of any party but an all party and a national asset. There are some Honorable Members opposite who are not in a position to treat either the pound or defense as a serious matter. I would remind Right Honorable Gentleman opposite - I want to leave the subject on this point - that in 1956, when sterling was at its weakest because of the Suez operation which we in our party had opposed bitterly - it was the most controversial conflict of the post-war world in this House I think - when as a result of that operation - no one will deny these facts - sterling came under very heavy attack even to the point where the operation had to

/be ...

be called off and when the then Chancellor announced at the dispatch box the bitter measures that he was going to take to defend sterling we in Opposition said that whatever our feelings about Suez, we would give him 100 per cent backing of the measures that he took about sterling. I will not weary Honorable Members with the actual quotation, but I can give them the date. It was 4th December 1956, in column 1057 of Hansard. Honorable Members can look it up for themselves. They will then see that we said that sterling was a national asset. It is not for me to lecture the Right Honorable Gentleman, as he tries to advise me, on how he should comfort himself. In his new position it is entirely a matter for him to decide what his attitude will be on this vital question of sterling. I take it in any case that Right Honorable Gentlemen opposite do not oppose the measures taken this morning because we had the warm support of the Right Honorable and Learned Member for St. Marylebone (Mr. Hogg) in the statement that he made on behalf of his party this morning. Of course I would have preferred someone of a little more substance.

Mr. Quintin Hogg (St. Marylebone): I said that I was speaking entirely for myself. But it is perfectly true if the Right Honorable Gentleman challenges me, that I think his Government were failing in their duty in not having taken the step a month ago.

The Prime Minister: Yes, I read that and it made me wonder why if it was right to take the step four weeks ago it was not right to take it six weeks ago.

Mr. Hogg: Because there was not a Labour Government in power six weeks ago.

The Prime Minister: We can always rely upon the Right Honorable and Learned Gentleman at all times. I would simply say this to him. There was nothing that happened in our trade or payments situation between now minus six weeks and now minus four weeks to justify any suggestion that if it was right to take this step four weeks ago it was wrong to take it six weeks ago. The only reason that it was not taken six weeks ago was that it was before 15th October.

Visit to Washington

With regard to the speech of the Right Honorable Gentleman, the Leader of the Opposition, we intend to take the advice given to us by the Right Honorable Gentleman in the spirit in which it was offered. The House knows that within a fortnight we shall be engaged in important discussions with the President of the United States and I should like to say a word or two about our objectives in those talks. First we need urgently to strengthen the Alliance and to make it more effective.

/I ...

I do not think any words of mine are needed to emphasize the anxiety that we all feel about the stresses and strains, the divisive and centrifugal tendencies which have developed in the last few years. The fact that in some ways the world situation is more fluid and more unpredictable provides reason for hope, but it does not provide any reason for weakening the collective measures to which all parties in this House have made their contribution.

Nassau Agreement

We may differ in our analysis of the cause of the present strains of the Alliance. To a considerable extent they date from Nassau. I am not going to repeat our criticisms of that Agreement. They have been very fully deployed in this House before, notably in the two day debates on Nassau on 30th and 31st January, 1963. Of course on that occasion after the Nassau Agreement, the then Government provided time for a full discussion on Nassau and as the Right Honorable Gentleman knows - he has suggested this and we have agreed - there will be a full debate here after the Washington talks. I do not recall that there was any debate in this House before the Nassau negotiations. Before that extremely fateful set of negotiations there was no attempt on the part of the Opposition to debate the principle or to insist on certain assurances and no attempt to divide the House on the eve of those negotiations. But we do not complain. The Right Honorable Gentleman is entitled to use what is in effect a Supply Day for any purpose he wants. But he will understand that on the eve of those negotiations all that one could say in the interests of the nation is extremely limited and I am sure that he and all Honorable Members will understand that.

Partly for that reason I do not want to go back over all the arguments that we then used about Nassau, nor to exaggerate matters by repeating our analysis of some of the factors which were related not to national defense or the strength of the Alliance. Some of the factors which motivated Right Honorable Gentlemen to salvage what they could from the wreckage of the Skybolt project. Nassau was a salvage operation after the bitterly contested breakdown in the supply of Skybolt. But the effect of the Nassau Agreement in encouraging tendencies in French policy, both in defense and also in the wrecking of those policies of the then Government which had centered on their hopes of entering the Common Market - I do not think that the consequences of Nassau have in fact been disputed. Equally it is our view that the action that followed from the agreement had two other grave consequences. First, it set back - we may not have wished it to set back and we may have deplored it - for two years the world's hope of an anti-dissemination agreement to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, the need for which the Right Honorable Gentleman has on so many occasions stressed.

... D.C.

Secondly, ...

Secondly, it stimulated nuclear appetites in other members of the Alliance including - I am bound to say we have been told this many times - Germany and this of course then led to the costly proliferation of efforts and energies in proposals for the mixed-manned surface fleet. All this provides good reason - the Right Honorable Gentleman quoted my words in the Guildhall about going back to first principles - for going right back to first base, to first principles in looking again at Nassau and, while not ignoring all that has happened since, all the momentum that some of the post-Nassau ideas have gained. We cannot ignore the fact that these proposals for the mixed-manned surface fleet have gained some momentum - there is good reason now for retracing our steps and getting back to these first principles in all these questions affecting the unity and strength of the Alliance and affecting equally our hopes of stopping the spread of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons.

The Western Alliance

First, then, our objective - I am sure that the whole House would agree about this - is to do all that we can in these talks to ensure that the Alliance, which is at present subject to very great strains and stresses should be strengthened in every manner possible.

Collective Defence Measures

Our second objective is this: we want to play our part in turning the present negative posture of the Alliance into something more positive and outward-looking. The purpose of collective strength in defense is to make fruitful negotiations possible for the easing of East-West tension. Let me refer to something that was said in the House last July. The talks that the then Foreign Secretary and I had in Moscow this year underlined the view that we expressed in Moscow and which we brought back from it. Quite apart from our hopes of further progress towards general and comprehensive multilateral disarmament - nuclear and conventional, the most hopeful area for agreement lay, despite all its present difficulties, in an anti-dissemination pact to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and in certain measure, if the necessary confidence could be created, for arms control in Europe and for the proposal of President Johnson for a standstill on the nuclear delivery system. Therefore, in all the measures that we shall be proposing in Washington for strengthening the effectiveness of our collective defenses it is paramount that all we do shall not only not make disarmament measures more difficult but we must, so far as possible, actively contribute our defense proposals to making these measures easier to achieve. A Defence policy which does not contain within itself the seeds of further progress towards disarmament is one which in the present state of the world we can no longer regard as appropriate.

/The....

The House will know that today that today my Right Honorable and Noble Friend, the Minister for Disarmament, has left for important discussions with the Head of the United States Government Disarmament Agency and with others of our allies. That is the second of our objectives.

The Commonwealth

Thirdly, we hope to ensure that in Washington we can present our plans for increasing our effectiveness in areas other than Europe, including our ability to assist Malaysia in resisting infiltration and aggression. There is no difference between the two parties I think on this question. No one will underrate the importance of tightening the Alliance in Europe and discouraging diversionary tendencies, but in a world where the center of gravity is shifting more and more to areas outside Europe we need not only ourselves but with our Allies, particularly the Commonwealth, to ensure that we have the strength and mobility to move quickly to stop small troubles from escalating into bigger ones, especially where the interests of the Commonwealth partners are involved.

The United Nations

Fourthly, we want to use these talks to concert those of our policies which aim - British and American and Canadian - at strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations, of the collective security, which I said at the Guildhall represents the hope of mankind. There may have been a feeling abroad in the world that this country has not been so enthusiastic in its support of the United Nations as it might have been. I think that it is essential, particularly with an American administration which is going a long way to strengthen the power, influence and authority of the United Nations, that we must do all in our power to ensure that our efforts are coordinated to strengthen the United Nations not only on the peace-keeping side, but in economic and development questions as well. We certainly want to make real progress towards strengthening the peace-keeping functions of the United Nations, and we are very ready as a Government not only to pledge our general support to this but to make an effective British contribution. I know that this is very close to the heart of the late Foreign Secretary and we all remember the time when he had a speech ready to give, there was a very powerful paragraph on this which was unfortunately cut out at the last minute and never delivered. We were never told why or who cut it out, but we feel it was a pity that what he intended to say on that occasion was not said. It will now be said.

/Mr. ...

Mr. R.A. Butler (Saffron Walden): The Right Honorable Gentleman knows perfectly well I have made a similar statement at Geneva. The sole reason why that paragraph was cut out was in the cause of brevity.

The Prime Minister: We all have to do that sometime. I think that there was a very great desire that while the Right Honorable Gentleman was in Washington and New York that this statement should have been made on behalf of the Government and still more that the unfinished exchanges across the floor of this House between the Right Honorable Gentleman and myself, when he was at this box about the earmarking of British forces for possible United Nations peace-keeping action were never concluded. Well they are going to be concluded now.

Trade

The fifth objective to which I can refer only very briefly is of course the urgency, which has been underlined by the events of the past week for closer cooperation and for a more concerted approach on problems of world liquidity. Obviously, we shall be discussing trade. Clearly it will be understood that we shall be discussing in Washington the question of trade matters and while all of us would wish to see the maximum of speed and effectiveness through the Kennedy Round and other ways in free world trade, all of us would, I think, regard it as a tragedy if that greater volume of world trade that resulted then ground to a halt through lack of monetary lubrication. These are the five objectives that I wanted to mention before the Washington talks.

The Right Honorable Gentleman, the Leader of the Opposition, knows that some of my Right Honorable Friends and I and our advisers have spent this past weekend in an exhaustive but extremely constructive look at the issues which we shall need to discuss in Washington and also at the realities of our defence situation as bequeathed to us by Right Honorable Gentlemen Opposite. The two obviously go very closely together. Everything that the Right Honorable Gentleman was saying earlier about the bombers and the power of Polaris and so on depends on the factual situation which we have inherited from Right Honorable Gentlemen Opposite.

Defence

The results of the weekend's examination will guide and inspire us in our talks in Washington. I shall come to that subject in a moment and, as I have said, we shall make a full report after the Washington talks. The other part of what we were doing, this weekend's examination of our own Defence situation, will unfold progressively between now and the Spring Defence Debates. I can certainly promise Honorable and Right Honorable Members that between now and those Defence Debates

a great deal more will be disclosed about the results of our examination of the defense situation. I shall not today anticipate either those policies or those debates, but the House will understand that we now have access to the books. We can read and we have been diligent in our reading.

Right Honorable Gentlemen Opposite can read. They have not only read those books, they wrote them. In view of their undoubted ability to read and write I am confused now by some of the recollections of some of the statements and denials made by some Right Honorable Gentlemen Opposite as compared with the facts and figures now available to me. I have some difficulty in reconciling some of the statements and, above all, some of the figures then quoted. I am even compelled to speculate, and I am sure that the House and the country will be compelled to speculate when the facts are revealed, about the motives that led to some of these misleading statements.

I knew that I need not tell the House about the relevance of the high cost of certain sections of the Defence program to our economic situation and the Chancellor's need and intention to enforce retrenchment. Not only were the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the First Secretary involved in these talks, but the entire talks were conducted by everybody present in a novel and refreshing spirit of cost effectiveness and value for money. It must have been about the first time ever and, speaking for myself, I had the advantage of having been chairman of the Public Accounts Committee for three-and-a-half years.

Having said that, about which the House will hear a good deal more in the next few months, I will deal with certain points raised by the Leader of the Opposition about the conduct of negotiations. The Right Honorable Gentleman has sufficient experience in this field to know that the purpose of negotiations is not advanced by putting in advance every detailed proposal, every point on which we are prepared to make an offer if, and only if, we receive a commensurate return. Obviously, because these negotiations are about to take place, I cannot be [as] specific as I intend to be when we come back from Washington. We intend then to give the Leader of the Opposition and the House a pretty full statement, but I should like to repeat the principles.

Visit to Washington

First, on the question of our ability to prevent and deter a nuclear attack. I cannot do better than repeat the wise words used by the Leader of the Opposition in May 1963, when he said that thousands of Soviet nuclear missiles "are trained on our islands" and that this "colossal threat" could be deterred only by the combination of United States and British nuclear power. There was no suggestion then that a separate nuclear

/deterrent ...

deterrent by Britain could deter those thousands of missiles trained upon our island. They were very wise words and we would do well to be guided by them; but they were of course uttered by the Right Honorable Gentleman before the purity of his apperception of these matters was clouded by his conversion to the view that these issues had other values.

The Leader of the Opposition has repeated today arguments which we have heard him repeat before with great consistency, and we all know his sincerity, in almost every speech before and during the Election campaign. His failure to get a fuller response from the electorate on them certainly cannot be blamed on any lack of assiduity on his part. They have not in any way shifted my Right Honorable and Honorable Friends from the views which we have expressed in debates in the House and in the country over the past two years, views - and I must repeat this - which have been the acknowledged policy of this party, not for a few months or a year or two but since they were endorsed by a very large majority by the party conference at Blackpool in 1961. The policy then endorsed was the policy of this party in our remaining opposition years and it is equally now the policy of this Government.

In following that policy I stress the paramount need of this country to do everything in its power to promote measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and equally to strengthen the Alliance in its nuclear as well as in its conventional power. Our approach to these problems is dominated by the need to ensure that if we are to have effective defenses - and I have quoted the Right Honorable Gentleman's figures - that it is vital to strengthen the effectiveness of the deterrent power of the Alliance, and then to contribute from a situation of unchallengeable strength and cohesion within the Alliance, which we have not got today, to urgent measures to reduce East-West tension.

In this context I must refer to the situation within NATO to which Her Majesty's Government, like their predecessors, are unequivocally committed until a situation is created, as we all hope it will be some day, when effective world authority makes it possible for East and West alike to dispense with defensive alliances and groupings of this kind. It is our aim to move towards a system in these negotiations - because Washington is only a beginning - not of more fingers on NATO's nuclear trigger but of fuller sharing and consultation in the deployment of NATO's nuclear strength. We on this side of the House are irrevocably committed against more fingers on the trigger. We have made it clear on the Opposition benches. We made it clear during the Election and unfortunately we have never succeeded in extracting a similar and unambiguous statement from the Leader of the Opposition and his colleagues. /Honorable Members: "M.L.F."/ I shall come in a moment to the whole question

/of ...

of the mixed-manned fleet on which we have never had a clear statement from the Leader of the Opposition. I do think that the Right Honorable Gentleman wants to mislead the House.

Sir A. Douglas-Home: We have always said that an essential part of any multi-lateral force was the retention of the veto by the United States and if we were a member we would of course insist upon the veto ourselves.

The Prime Minister: I will come to the question of the veto and I agree with the Right Honorable Gentleman that it is important. I can remember very clearly first in a debate on 30th and 31st January, 1963, when the Right Honorable Gentleman was not at that time with us, I made a specific challenge to his predecessor on this question and his refusal to answer that challenge several times at question time. We have never had a specific statement by the Right Honorable Gentleman, particularly in relation to Germany, except to say that the Brussels Treaty did not provide for Germany to make her own nuclear weapons which the Right Honorable Gentleman knows is not the issue at all.

Mixed Manned Surface Fleet

We have throughout the discussions over the past two years expressed our full support of the clause in the Nassau Agreement which envisages the collective principle, and equally, we have expressed our opposition to the particular proposal put forward under that clause which envisaged a mixed-manned surface fleet. We believe that a mixed-manned surface fleet adds nothing to Western strength, is likely to cause a dissipation of effort within the Alliance, and may add to the difficulties of East-West agreement. There is the question whether the mixed-manned surface fleet - and this is the proposal which at the moment holds the field - involves a German finger on the trigger. In Moscow this year as I told the House in July, my Right Honorable Friend the Foreign Secretary and I sought to dispel the Soviet view [that the proposal] in its present form meant, as they put it, a German finger on the trigger. In its present form and as long as the American veto remains absolute, it does not mean in our view additional fingers on the trigger. I suspect and always have suspected that the Soviet fear relates not so much to the present proposal but more to the possibility sometimes canvassed that the American veto might be replaced by a system of majority voting capable of overriding American opposition to the bomb being used. To such a development we are irrevocably opposed and such, I gather, is the view of the Leader of the Opposition.

Throughout all our discussions on the mixed-manned proposal there have been difficulties in finding out what was the view of the then Government, now the opposition. The Right

/Honorable ...

Honorable Gentleman and the Foreign Office appeared to support the mixed-manned proposal. His Right Honorable Friend the former Minister of Defence - I think that he is very clear in his mind about this - opposed the mixed-manned proposal and their two Departments - when the Right Honorable Gentleman was Foreign Secretary and his Right Honorable Friend was at the Ministry of Defence - were at loggerheads and unprecedentedly for this country - I do not think it has ever happened before - allowed the battle to be carried through press briefs into the newspapers including the foreign press. We had a situation a year and more ago when the foreign press was being given totally different briefings by the Foreign Office from those which it was getting from the Ministry of Defence. I hope that their move to the opposition benches will lead to a greater unity in this matter. I hope that the Right Honorable Member for Monmouth (Mr. Thorneycroft) will win. As an encouragement to them and to him let me say that there is no difference of view on this question in Her Majesty's Government, but just to remove uncertainty let me categorically deny a Sunday newspaper story that at Chequers or elsewhere we had decided to accept some given percentage participation in such a project. We have not. But, as the House is aware, there is a wider willingness to await any proposals Her Majesty's Government may put forward. A British initiative is awaited and we shall not fail them in this country. We are as anxious as any nation to move to a more collective system, and we are prepared to make our own contribution in the shape of V-bombers and whatever Polaris submarines which Right Honorable Members opposite had, through postponing the Election, taken past the point of no return. But we are prepared to do this only as part of a wider settlement which secures commensurate advantages for our own defences and in the wider setting that we shall be discussing.

I do not think the House will expect me at this moment to go further, but I would say this. What we are debating today is the strength of Britain's defences - we are agreed on it - our collective ability to deter nuclear attack and the wider question of Britain's influence in the world. We start from the position which we have inherited. We start, if one likes, from the weapons which we have inherited, including those which have gone past the point of no return.

Sir C. Osborne (Louth): Every Government starts from where their predecessors left off, obviously.

Mr. Wilson: Very helpful. The Honorable Gentleman can be very perceptive about these matters.

I want to make this clear about these important negotiations. We shall be prepared to contribute these weapons to the system of collective security in NATO. If we receive advantages

/commensurate ...

commensurate in terms of our own and indeed the Free World's defences. What we are debating is a wider question and where I think Right Honorable Gentlemen opposite have gone wrong is to think [that] a policy based on the possession, or the alleged possession of a partially independent, or allegedly partially independent weapon confers influence and authority without the economic strength and the independence which goes with economic strength. The Leader of the Opposition has talked incessantly of this conferring a ticket to the conference room. We heard the phrase very many times in his Election broadcasts. We are in the conference room now, and I doubt whether ever since the war a British initiative has been so eagerly awaited - not because of what the Right Honorable Gentleman left us with, but mainly because I believe that there is a widespread realization in the world that we have a new Government with Twentieth Century ideas. I am bound to say that the Right Honorable Gentleman's speech this afternoon, although it had familiar rings of speeches we have heard before, was beginning already to sound a little dated. If one looks at all the discussion going on in the world's press at present about the future of Western defence, it did not seem as though it belonged to the same age as the discussion - a discussion not started by ourselves. I must say this to the Right Honorable Gentleman because we have all been through it. I remember that on arriving on the opposition benches one still goes on trying to make ministerial speeches of six months ago. I made some very powerful ones on monopolies, but nobody wanted to listen because they were outdated. One felt that about the Right Honorable Gentleman's speech this afternoon.

Since I have referred to the fact that we are in the conference room, I am sure that the House will understand my feelings about the position in which some of my Right Honorable Friends have been placed in certain recent international conferences - a position of great embarrassment due not to our measures but to the measures which were forced on us. The Right Honorable Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) said that the tariff charges were in fact his diagnosis and his remedy. So there cannot be any complaint by Right Honorable Members opposite that we introduced that remedy. The Leader of the Opposition in a speech to the Cambridge University Conservative Undergraduate Society the other evening said that all the trouble arose from the fact that we did not consult before we imposed those measures. That is a rather funny argument is it not? What he says is that if we are to give somebody a black eye - and nobody denies that it hurts - if we tell them first that we are going to do it, it makes it more tolerable.

Sir A. Douglas-Home: I honestly did not say that. I said that you made an infernal muck of it and that is about right.

Mr. Wilson: That was a little less constructive than we normally expect from the Right Honorable Gentleman. He did not criticize the measures themselves. He criticized the fact that we did not consult. Does he think that if we consulted and then did it, it would have been any easier, or that we should not have had these conferences? By "consult" does he mean inform and then do it within 24 hours, or ask them whether they thought that we should do it? This is an extraordinary argument. We should have had a month of continuous negotiation. Does not the Right Honorable Gentleman think that we should not have had it anyway if we had asked permission first? What does he think would have happened to sterling and our imports during that period? The Right Honorable Gentleman's approach on this is totally - (interruption) - we shall not be faced with the situation which we inherited in October. The situation does not arise. - I hope that I may describe the position of my Right Honorable Friends in these conferences without a note of bitterness, although that would be understandable, because they were placed in an intolerable situation by the fact that these measures had to be taken because of a steadily worsening economic situation, because nothing was done about it, and because the Election was postponed for entirely different purposes.

Sir A.V. Harvey (Macclesfield): Would not the Right Honorable Gentleman agree that his Minister of Aviation and himself might have had a much easier passage with France if they had handled the Concord affair rather more delicately...

Mr. Wilson: The extraordinary thing there is that we said that we would consult them, and we have been doing it ever since. Honorable Members opposite cannot have it both ways. The Leader of the Opposition complains that we took the tariff surcharge measures without having consultations over a long period, and the Honorable Member for Macclesfield (Sir A.V. Harvey) complains because we did have a long period of consultation. They had better sort themselves out. Of course, they are both right in saying that life would have been a great deal easier if we had not had to do either of these things. The fact that we did arise entirely from the irresponsibility of Members of the Opposition Front Bench.

The Leader of the Opposition understands that on the advance of these negotiations in Washington it is not possible to go into more detail on the points he raised. We shall be prepared to do so after the negotiations have begun, after we have returned from Washington, and before the further round which will be necessary in Europe and indeed again in Washington. The Right Honorable Gentleman understands why, because he has had long experience of this type of negotiation.

I end as I began, by reminding the Right Honorable Gentleman that the influence, authority and power, to use his words, which this country can command will not depend on clinging or not clinging to some particular weapon which we may or may not have or which it has been intended to produce. That is why, despite the challenging opportunity - we regard it as a challenging and exciting one - which faces us in the round of successive negotiations on which we are shortly embarking, we shall not exert our full influence until we are able to assert our great potential economic strength, which has been neglected. I would say to Right Honorable Gentlemen Opposite - some of them realize it - that Defence Policy, on which the Right Honorable Gentleman concentrated, Foreign Policy and Economic Policy are facets of a single unity. That is why a Britain which means to be great in its influence for peace can do so only on the basis of unity and a sense of common purpose between its policies for Defence, its policies for peace and its policies for economic strength: and that is what we intend to do.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

7

File
MLF

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State***SUMMARY**84
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NOVEMBER 5, 1964
8:39 PM

FROM: PARIS

ACTION: SECSTATE 2768 PRIORITY

DATE: NOVEMBER 5, 7 PM

LIMDIS

FROM BOHLEN AND FINLETTER

FULL TEXT COUVE SPEECH TRANSMITTED EMBTEL 2730 AND TRANSLATION
PORTION ON MLF SENT EMBTEL 2741

IN OUR OPINION USG SHOULD NOT FAIL RESPOND TO COUVE REMARKS AND PARTICULARLY PARA BEGINNING "ALL THIS LEAVES US WONDERING AND AWAITING INDISPENSABLE EXPLANATIONS." WHILE WE THINK THIS IS PROBABLY WINDOW-DRESSING DESIGNED TO PLACE FRENCH GOVT IN LIGHT OF RIGHTEOUS AND AGGRIEVED PARTY, WE NEVERTHELESS BELIEVE WE SHOULD TREAT IT AT FACE VALUE AND INTERPRET IT AS INVITATION TO USG AS WELL AS TO OTHERS CONCERNED WITH MLF, TO EXPLAIN RATIONALE OF MLF TO GOF.

IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD FIRST THAT MUCH OF THIS HAS ALREADY BEEN DONE. AMB SMITH AND ADM LEE EXPLAINED OUR INITIAL THINKING ON PROJECT TO NAC ON OCT 22, 1961 AND THERE WERE BILATERAL AND NAG DISCUSSIONS AFTER NASSAU. SINCE WORKING GROUP SET UP, FRENCH LIKE ALL OTHER MEMBERS NATO HAVE STANDING INVITATION TO JOIN PARIS WG. REPORTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO NAC ON THREE OCCASIONS, NAMELY OCT 9, 1963 (POLTO 421); DEC 11, 1963 (WG/DOC 12); MAY 6, 1964 (WG/DOC 32/ADD.1). AMB BOHLEN HAS TALKED TO COUVE ABOUT POSSIBLE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS (EMBTEL 2384) AMB FINLETTER HAS TALKED TO SEYDOUX (POLTO 595), EMPHASIZING US ATTACHES SPECIAL IMPORTANCE TO UNDERSTANDING BY FRENCH OF US DESIRE FOR CORDIAL CONSULTATION WITH FRENCH CONCERNING VARIOUS NUCLEAR DETERRENTS. AMB FINLETTER HAS MADE THIS CLEAR TO SECRETARY.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-165

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~~JOHNSON~~
~~KLEIN~~
~~KOMER~~
~~MOODY~~
~~REEDY~~
~~SAUNDERS~~
~~SAYRE~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- 2768, NOVEMBER 5, 7 PM FROM PARIS.

NEVERTHELESS IT SEEMS TO US THAT FONMIN ASSEMBLY SPEECH GIVES USG OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE USEFUL INITIATIVE WITH GOF AT THIS TIME, EVEN THOUGH WE MAY HAVE NO ILLUSIONS REGARDING WILLINGNESS OF GOF TO BUDGE ON THIS ISSUE.

FRENCH DID MOVE ON IANF AT OTTAWA IN 1963 FOLLOWING INFORMAL APPROACH FINLETTER WITH COUVE. MLF SEEMS TO US TO HAVE BECOME BLOWN UP AS POLITICAL ISSUE OF FAR GREATER PROPORTIONS, IN WHICH DE GAULLE BELIEVES THAT WHAT IS AT STAKE IS ENTIRE MILITARY AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF GERMANY, AND INDEED EUROPE, VIS-A-VIS US. IF PERCHANCE THERE WERE SOME BASIS FOR UNDERSTANDING, WE SHOULD THOROUGHLY PURSUE ANY SUCH OPPORTUNITY, BUT EVEN IF WE VIEW COUVE DISINGENUOUS PROTESTATION THAT FRANCE HAS NOT BEEN PROPERLY INFORMED AS MANEUVER IN COLD WAR AGAINST MLF, WE STILL BELIEVE WE SHOULD PROTECT OURSELVES BY MAKING FURTHER APPROACH TO GOF FROM OUR SIDE.

WE RECOMMEND THAT YOU INSTRUCT BOHLEN TO SEE COUVE AND INQUIRE AS TO MEANING OF ASSEMBLY STATEMENT, POINTING FIRST TO RECORD OF APPROACHES TO GOF INDICATED ABOVE. AMB COULD THEN RECALL INFORMAL SUGGESTION ALREADY MADE TO FONMIN (EMBTel 2384) AND ASK WHETHER GOF WISHES TO ESTABLISH ARRANGEMENTS FOR DETAILED EXPLANATION OF RATIONALE OF MLF AND STEPS RELATING THERETO. THIS COULD TAKE FORM OF FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN WG, BRIEFING OF SEYDOUX, OR OTHER MUTUALLY AGREED ARRANGEMENT. IF COUVE RESPONDED POSITIVELY, WE COULD IMMEDIATELY SET TO WORK TO DEVISE SUITABLE FORMULA. IF COUVE RESPONDS NEGATIVELY OR EVASIVELY, BOHLEN WOULD INDICATE THAT UNLESS GOF WISHES TO DISCUSS MATTER SERIOUSLY, USG HAS NO CHOICE BUT TO RESPOND TO ASSEMBLY STATEMENT WITH PUBLIC DECLARATION SETTING RECORD STRAIGHT REGARDING OUR PREVIOUS EFFORTS TO EXPLAIN MLF TO GOF AND TO ELICIT THEIR INTEREST AND SUPPORT.

ABOVE HAS OBVIOUS BEARING ALSO ON BOHLEN'S FUTURE REQUEST TO SEE DE GAULLE, BUT WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE BEST IF POSSIBLE TO CLEAR GROUND FIRST WITH COUVE AS AUTHOR OF STATEMENT. APPROACH TO DE GAULLE WOULD IN ANY CASE APPEAR TO CALL FOR SOMEWHAT
/LESS DETAILED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 2768, NOVEMBER 5, 7 PM FROM PARIS.

LESS DETAILED AND MORE PHILOSOPHIC APPROACH, ON WHICH WE WOULD WISH TO RESERVE RECOMMENDATIONS TILL WE HAVE DEPT REACTION TO THIS MESSAGE.

DEPT ATTENTION INVITED TO POMPIDOU REMARKS TO PARLIAMENTARY JOURNALISTS TODAY WHICH DELIVERED SUBSEQUENT TO DRAFTING ABOVE AND WHICH ACCENTUATE NEGATIVE ATTITUDE EXPRESSED BY COUVE.

ADVISE SOONEST.

GP-1.

BOHLEN

JMH/25

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

- ~~BUNDY-SMITH~~
- ~~BATOR~~
- ~~BELK~~
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FOLLOWING IS FULL FRENCH TEXT OF FOREIGN MINISTER'S SPEECH
TO NATIONAL ASSEMBLY NOVEMBER 3:

Speech delivered by Mr. Couve de Murville, Minister of Foreign
Affairs on November 3, 1964 before the National Assembly.

The foreign policy debate in this Assembly, which is now being opened
by the statement I have the honor to make to you, in the name of the Govern-
ment, is situated within an international context dominated by recent events
or situations that everyone well knows will have very important consequences
in the near, or perhaps in the distant, future. From the former, parti-
cularly from the two that concern Russia and China, I shall endeavor to
draw certain conclusions in order to state, at this time, the broad lines
of our international action. Of the latter, that is to say, the present
state of Europe and of European policy, I shall speak more in detail and
shall endeavor to define, as precisely as possible, the position of the
government and the immediate objectives it has set for itself.

With respect to the budget, I shall attempt in another address to

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-2-2730, NOVEMBER 4, FROM PARIS

answer the questions that have been put to me, and, especially to give, in so far as necessary, some particulars about the essence of the new provisions it contains, that is to say, concerning cultural relations, technical cooperation, and information.

Of the recent events, the first in date is the change in the British Government. Obviously I can do no more than mention it and add that, in any case, we wish to maintain trusting, cordial relations with that great country, our neighbor, and our very old ally. In this connection, the measures recently taken or announced in London have naturally caused considerable emotion. It does not rest with me to discuss the effect that abandonment of the "Concord" project would have on our aviation industry. However, we cannot but regret profoundly to see the hopes to which that great undertaking had given rise, both with respect to the maintenance, in Europe, of a capital industrial activity for the development of modern techniques, and with respect to effective Franco-British cooperation, threatened, and perhaps disappointed. As for the commercial measures that have already been applied, their effect on trade will surely be serious. International talks are now in progress, but it is still too soon to make a definitive judgment or decide on the action to be undertaken.

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-3- 2730, NOVEMBER 4, FROM PARIS

The change in government in Russia was, certainly, more unexpected than the change in England and has, for that reason and for many others, given rise to comments and interpretations. The new Soviet leaders immediately informed us, as they did most of the other countries of the world, that the effacement of Mr. Khrushchev meant no change in Moscow's foreign policy, particularly with respect to what is customarily known there as peaceful coexistence, that is to say, the maintenance of peaceful relations with other States. Along with the rest of the world, we took due note of this, desirous as we are to maintain normal relations with the Soviets, and, in so far as our mutual interests permit, to develop our economic, cultural, and technical relations. Moreover, the Government has just concluded with the Soviet Government a long-term agreement, which should result in a substantial increase in our exports, particularly capital goods.

It is not possible, however, in the face of the events that have occurred, and taking into account the circumstance in which they have occurred, not to ask oneself certain questions concerning the essence of the situation of that vast country, I mean, its institutions, its economy, and its foreign relations.

As for its institutions, it is clear that the political changes launched by what has been called destalinization are far from complete. The evolution that will unavoidably continue, even though it may still suffer some setbacks, will certainly have profound consequences, even

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-4- 2730, NOVEMBER 4, FROM PARIS .

among the Communist parties other than the Soviet Communist Party.

As for the Russian economy, one is struck by the continued agricultural difficulties, that is to say, in the last analysis, the continued crop shortages. One is also struck by the chronic shortages in light industry and in consumer goods. There is involved here, it seems, something that is inherent in an economic setup founded on a rigid system, which leaves nothing to Man and his natural healthy, creative reactions. Here again, changes are unavoidable, and they will have political consequences.

Lastly, as for foreign relations, everything, with respect to Russia, still appears to be dominated by the dispute with China. Whatever may happen in the coming months, national disputes, power struggles within the Communist world, the inevitable incompatibility existing between a relatively well-endowed nation such as the Soviet Union and the vast proletarian mass of China is going to persist for a long time, and consequently, renders any true cooperation quite hazardous.

The announcement of the first Chinese nuclear explosion and, hard on its heels, the announcement of another nuclear test in Russia have pointed up this situation, even though, naturally, there is no common measure of the importance of these two events. The explosion at Sin Kiang is a surprise only in the matter of the date. The Peking Government itself had never made a mystery of its intentions and plans, but the fait accompli always has its significance. From now on, China will be classed as the fifth

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-5- 2730, NOVEMBER 4, FROM PARIS

nuclear power. If the road it still has to travel before it truly possesses the atomic weapon is long, it is now manifest that, politically speaking, things have changed suddenly for China also. The impression is so strong throughout the world that once again the scope of just the atomic fact is being measured, even if that fact is not expected to translate itself into effective power for some time to come.

World conscience is thereby again confronted with the question of nuclear weapons, i.e., the question of their abolition. A great deal is being said with regard to China, as was done previously with regard to France, about the dangers of proliferation, about the necessity of doing everything possible immediately to obstruct it. The Government, for its part, has always thought that this was the wrong way to approach the problem. Certainly one could only approve an action that would tend to prevent the admission of new states to the nuclear club. But, considering that the club would be preparing for its own destruction at the same time, how can one seek to deny others, barring voluntary renunciation on their part, what one permits oneself? Furthermore, experience proves that this cannot be done without resorting to force, which to my knowledge has never been contemplated. The solution, the only solution, is the total destruction of existing armaments and a prohibition against the manufacture of new weapons, both under effective control. We have noted that the Secretary General of the United Nations recently expressed himself along these same lines. At the same time he suggested a direct discussion

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-6- 2730, NOVEMBER 4, FROM PARIS

between all the present nuclear powers. This is what the French Government has always requested, for there is absolutely no other practical method of progressing, provided the desire to progress exists.

The same holds true for nuclear weapons as for general equilibrium in the world, that is, the terms and conditions for the peaceful organization of international relations. We must manage--and this is what is happening, little by little--to consider the questions and the facts by themselves, not by the mechanical processes of the thought of certain conveniences or certain influences. France for its part is convinced that, even if fundamental differences between the countries of freedom and those of totalitarianism continue to exist, and will for a very long time, the years of sharp division between rigidly organized blocs have come to an end. In the totalitarian field, matters are already going very far. Emancipation is clearly taking form; it is even being transformed, in one essential case, into violent antagonism. The free countries will never have reasons for such extremities. Their mutual relations have always been of another kind. Nevertheless it is natural, and inevitable besides, that those relations should undergo change in the direction of each one's rediscovery of its own responsibilities. From that transformation, from that of the communist world and of the accession to full sovereignty

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-7- 2730, NOVEMBER 4, FROM PARIS.

of dozens of previously colonized countries, some of which are of major importance, there is bound to come a new world equilibrium which will assuredly be more stable than that of the cold war, because it will have more natural foundations, and the final form of which is perhaps being foreshadowed by certain regional regroupings that are beginning to appear. This at least is what one has reason to think about Europe, and what can also be imagined for Latin America.

I have mentioned Latin America. In the course of this year, the President of the Republic will have visited most of the countries of that immense continent: Mexico in the spring, and the ten nations of South America in September and October. Two journeys the exceptional importance of which is evident. Everyone also knows of the unforgettable welcome given General de Gaulle and France, without exception, in all the countries visited. The far-reaching consequences of that extraordinary demonstration of friendship and understanding will gradually become apparent in the political sphere and in all the other spheres. A few conclusions may be drawn from it at this time.

The first, obviously, is that after the eclipse of the last war, and also after a relative absence that in fact goes back to the first world war, that is, fifty years, General de Gaulle's visit meant that France had returned to Latin America. The incredible demonstration of friendship, and even affection, which took place showed in striking fashion that sentiments remained, after all the trials, astonishingly faithful; that our political

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-8- 2730, NOVEMBER 4, FROM PARIS

and cultural presence had never been impaired in depth; that France was still awaited and still welcome, because the meaning of its human mission is everywhere understood. It did not behoove us, of course, on the occasion of such a visit, also to represent that Europe which in South America continues to be the source of all civilization. Nevertheless, it was clear that France and Europe were spontaneously associated during that voyage, and that the latter was always apparent through the former.

However much these countries differ and however strongly marked the personality of each of them is, they have fundamental problems in common: that of political stability, that of economic stability, that of the training of men. In other words, they must, all at one time, consolidate the foundations of a nation and a state by drastic reforms relating to the ethnic and social questions, beginning with the agrarian question; put an end to the instability of the national revenue resulting from too much dependence, particularly in the one-crop countries, on fluctuating international prices; and, lastly, educate and technically train men, without whom it would be purposeless to speak of development and progress. This triple task can be undertaken and successfully performed only ^{by} the countries themselves and on their own full responsibility. But they can be helped by all the forms of cooperation that do not affect their independence and their national dignity. Who can fail to see that France is naturally qualified to participate in providing such aid? Politically, France offers

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-9- 2730, NOVEMBER 4, FROM PARIS.

its inspiration, the example of its own efforts, and a friendship without ulterior motive or restraint. Economically, it is without doubt the only one of the principal powers that has espoused, and very recently again at the big trade conference in Geneva, the cause of stabilization of the prices of basic products, just as inside the Common Market it is the champion of a genuine organization of agricultural markets based on reasonable international prices. Finally, the molding of human beings is its calling above all others.

This is what has been said during this trip, and this is the action that we must now continue and develop. That will be to the advantage of our friends in Latin America. That will likewise be good for France. In the first place, its international position will thereby be strengthened. Then, a more vigorous, more stable and more prosperous Latin America would become a major element in the general equilibrium. And for this reason, furthermore, what would be good for it and for us would also be good for all the others, for it would tend to promote peace.

It is in this same spirit that France has always viewed European policy, that is, the prospects of forming a genuine Western European Union in all spheres--policy, economy, defense and culture. To form such a union

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-10- 2730, NOVEMBER 4, FROM PARIS

which would be the master of its economy, which would be made up of closely linked sister cultures, which would endeavor to define and practice the same international policy, which would succeed in coordinating its defense effort--is not this the undertaking we have in mind, which would at the same time make it possible to give Europe the position it has lost, for its capabilities would thereby be increased tenfold, and to form an irreplaceable world factor of equilibrium, of wisdom and of peace? For years these have been and still are our objectives and our hope. Much has been achieved in an important field, that of trade and the economy, in other words, the Common Market. However, it must be acknowledged that the essential thing still remains to be done, not only because the most difficult questions regarding the European Economic Community still remain to be settled, but also because in the field of policy and defense the problem remains almost wholly unsolved.

It is not hard to understand the reasons for this. As long as one remains in the area of generalities--especially when they are pleasant ones--agreement is easy, even if everyone reserves his own interpretation. When one comes down to brass tacks, everything is different. This is the stage that Europe has reached. Immediately the real difficulties arose--those which result from the involvement, in the name of the Community, of national interests which are essential, or at least considered to be such,

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-11- 2730, NOVEMBER 4, FROM PARIS.

and those which result from the effects that the development of the Community itself may have--not only from the point of view of trade, but also that of policy and defense--on the interest or the policies of third countries, beginning with the friendly countries.

That, of course, is a sign that the undertaking is making progress, for obstacles are encountered only when one advances. The worst course would be to try to conceal it, at the price of remaining in uncertainty, for that would be depriving oneself of all means of finding solutions jointly. Such a facile policy would perhaps be favored by many. It would undoubtedly be favored by the skeptics and by all those who in their hearts do not want a united Europe to become some day what I tried to define a moment ago. I mean a Europe which is truly united and truly European.

Everyone is, or at least was for a long time, convinced that an indispensable precondition for such a policy is reconciliation, then the establishment of friendly cooperation between France and Germany. Such was, and still is, the sincere feeling of the Government, and in its view the Treaty of January 1963 has no other raison d'être:

Reconciliation has been achieved; it had never, moreover, been questioned by the reason of the two peoples. Cooperation was organized on the terms fixed by the Treaty. Good collaboration has now been established between the administrations on the two sides, and governmental contacts are taking place regularly. Here again, however, it would be vain to equivocate: the defining of a common policy and systematic

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-12- 2730, NOVEMBER 4, FROM PARIS

cooperation in defense have not been attained. Here again the reasons are the same: as soon as one enters the domain of essential realities, obstacles arise which are due not only to differences of position and points of view but also to opposition of interests or different conceptions of foreign relations. Later I shall give some explanations on the political and military aspects of the question.

However, I shall say right now that it was above all in connection with the completion of the Common Market, that is to say, in connection with agriculture, that the difficulties appeared a long time ago and took definite form six months ago.

The Government in no wise concludes from this that the idea of the Treaty was a bad one even if the Treaty has, in its time, aroused the opposition of many of those who have long been advocating reconciliation to us and have nevertheless appeared to value it less as soon as it was achieved.

Franco-German cooperation is just as necessary as ever. If it encounters difficulties, it is not the Treaty that must disappear, it is the difficulties that must be settled. This is the objective toward which we intend to work with determination. And above all in so far as the Common Market is concerned, for that is the only European reality for the time being.

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-13- 2730, NOVEMBER 4, FROM PARIS

On April 28 last, I remarked before the National Assembly that the "European Community was found, at the end of the year, to be vigorous and strong, since it had been able to reach agreement on the second part of its common agricultural policy. Therefore," I went on to say, "this year started under good auspices: a positive, well-defined attitude with a view to the important tariff discussions of the Kennedy Round.... . The Customs Union is gradually becoming a genuine economic Union."

Six months have gone by, six months in which events have, unfortunately, not come up to our expectations. Therefore, I owe it to the Assembly to explain how the Government must view the situation today. It is, of course, once more a matter of the common agricultural policy and of the Geneva tariff negotiations, known as the Kennedy Round.

Indeed, things are going along normally in the industrial sector. It is, to be sure, unfortunate that the Customs Union is progressing more rapidly than the Economic Union, but there are complex problems involved, which it is to be hoped the member countries will solve in time.

In contrast, in the agricultural sector we have every reason to be seriously worried. We see that, after the great effort made at the end of last year, the work in Brussels is no longer progressing. The European Community has not yet established the regulations for sugar and vegetable oils. Had it done so, and had those regulations been added to the list

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-14- 2730, NOVEMBER 4, FROM PARIS

of those already adopted, the big question of common prices would then have arisen, as it has for the other commodities.

Without common prices, the work accomplished in Brussels since 1961, which is considerable, has scarcely any economic significance. It is a highly technical framework, to be sure, but it is only a framework, within which, in the absence of these prices common to the six member countries, no true common agricultural policy can develop. Further, it is a framework within which there is danger that, instead of a common agricultural policy, policies which are often excessively protectionist will be carried out. It is a framework within which unprofitable productions develop at the expense of the normal outlets of the more competitive partners of the Common Market.

The Chicken War clearly demonstrated this.

This means that it is necessary to fix a common indicator price for milk, a price bracket for beef, and even, if possible, since a delay has already occurred, a single guiding price.

Since the common agricultural policy is founded on the idea that, if the Six import foodstuffs from third countries instead of consuming those they have produced locally, the surpluses thus artificially created are a common financial burden, it goes without saying that the financial regulations adopted on the night of January 14, 1962, certain parts of which are effective until June 30, 1965, must be completed in time.

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-15- 2730 NOVEMBER 4, FROM PARIS

The most difficult point, that of fixing a common price for grains, still remains. The Assembly knows that the Commission has proposed that this price be fixed now, and that the alinement of national prices be done all at once, and not by successive adjustments, as the 1962 regulations provide.

The Assembly also knows that, in order to take into account difficulties encountered by the governments whose farmers would see their sale prices drop owing to the single price, certain temporary compensations have been contemplated. This is what is known as the Mansholt Plan. Naturally, the common price should be an intermediate price for reasons of general economic policy and so as not to make the Europe of the Six a systematically surplus area.

The German Government announces that it cannot now make a decision regarding the price of grains, but it does not give any guaranty that it will be willing or able to make a decision later.

What has happened in 1964 gives food for thought. At first, the Federal Government considered fixing prices so that the Community might be in a position to negotiate on agriculture in Geneva. Then, it gave up that plan when it became clear that the United States really wanted to

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-16- 2730, NOVEMBER 4, FROM PARIS

negotiate, not on the amounts of support, according to the formula proposed by the Six and for which common prices were absolutely essential, but on quantitative guaranties of access to the market of the Six. These changes show that it is not even certain that common prices will be fixed

Under these conditions, should we now say that a theory that was expounded at great length at the time of the ratification of the Rome Treaty by the National Assembly in 1957, namely that, since it had not been defined in the treaty itself, the agricultural policy would never be implemented, has been borne out? Indeed, it was maintained at that of an automatic character, we would one day be without any means of exerting pressure on partners hesitating to take the decisive step in the establishment of European unity which a common agricultural policy would constitute. Must we, therefore, bring a charge of failure, which would call into question the European community itself?

All that I can say is that we shall see how the Brussels discussions will go, not only with respect to grain, but with respect to milk products, meat, the financial regulations, and the regulations for products that are still to be determined.

Meanwhile, it is advisable that France act in terms of the risks of dispersion that the conduct of some makes it necessary for us to envisage

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-17- 2730, NOVEMBER 4, FROM PARIS

and which will certainly continue to be a factor until the completion of a common agricultural policy. This means that we can only regard the period that is beginning as a temporary situation, and that, if our hopes are realized, the European community can be fully confirmed only at the end of the period.

In particular, with respect to the plans for acceleration submitted by the commission or to be submitted by member countries, the precautions of which I speak would tend to eliminate any measure that was not, stricto sensu, provided for in the treaty. I am thinking, in particular, of how inconsistent it would be for us to agree to an acceleration of the intra-community customs disarmament and the setting by this means of an irrevocable date for the end of the transition period, while the fate of the common agricultural policy would still remain to be settled.

As regards the tariff negotiations in Geneva, on December 23, last we gave a mandate to the commission headed by Mr. Hallstein, which is in effect the mouthpiece of the Community, as provided in the treaty. We remain faithful to this mandate.

It is obvious that in agricultural matters this mandate can lead to positive results only if the Community is capable of setting common prices. If the Community is unable to do so, it is not France's fault.

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-18- 2730, NOVEMBER 4, FROM PARIS

Before concluding, it would be advisable, therefore, to wait, for we are not prepared to change the positions adopted in common, for the sole reason that the German Government hesitates to assume its responsibilities.

In the industrial field, the measures that the British Government has just taken by instituting a 15 percent tax on all industrial imports will obviously have a marked effect and will, in certain respects, make the undertaking itself unrealistic. Furthermore, the uncertainty which will continue to prevail in the European Economic Community, so long as we don't know where we stand as far as the common prices are concerned, prevents us from committing ourselves irrevocably, even if we do not for that reason refuse to consider, without any commitment on either side, what a reasonable solution might be. In addition to these reasons, which are sufficient in themselves, there is another one, which seems important to me. The difficulties encountered in the attempt at political cooperation among the Six cause one to think that the day has not yet come when, in a firmly established Common Market, there will be great European enterprises capable of competing, on an equal footing, with the giant enterprises of the United States. Therefore, a marked lowering of the common external tariff seems, under such circumstances, to involve undeniable risks. The Government wishes that there might soon be a resumption of the progress of a memorable enterprise, which has up to now proven to be beneficial for the Member Countries, just as it has for third countries, whatever may have been said. But let no one be mistaken about the firmness of our determination. When the basic interests of the nation are at stake--and the Government

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-19- 2730, NOVEMBER 4, FROM PARIS

considers that the difficulties encountered by the agricultural policy involve these basic interests and the very equilibrium of the arrangements concluded in Rome eight years ago--we are compelled to show that we have had enough. We are willing to reserve the future, and we hope it will be more favorable. But we also intend to reserve France's cards.

I spoke just now of the difficulties being encountered in the attempt at political cooperation among the Six. That is the other panel of the diptych of European policy. France submitted proposals at one time, that is, in 1961 and 1962. Accepted by some, rejected by others, no action was taken on them. Then came the breaking off of negotiations with Great Britain and the ordeals, finally overcome in December 1963, of the second stage of the agricultural policy. Since that time, although that policy has, in the circumstances I have mentioned, actually made no further progress, the problems of political union have, on the other hand, come again to the forefront. For three months they have been the subject of many comments and statements. The reason for this, it seems to me, is twofold. On the one hand, the evaluations made concerning the aptitude or the determination of Great Britain really to participate now in the construction of [a united] Europe have become increasingly pessimistic. On the other hand, a more objective view seems to have been taken of the ideas that we had put forward; I mean the ideas to the effect that one can start only from what already

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-20- 2730, NOVEMBER 4, FROM PARIS

exists, that is to say, the countries and their governments, which should be associated in a well-organized cooperative effort until the ultimately necessary institutions can be created.

To date, no negotiations have been started as far as France is concerned. We have merely had, recently, interesting conversations with qualified representatives of the Federal Republic and Belgium, who let us know the present state of their thoughts. We hope to hold conversations soon with Italy. We think however that it would not be well to begin a new stage unless it has been carefully considered, for a new failure would run the risk of being irreparable. We think also that the question should not be considered alone, but rather in a broader political context from which it would be useless to attempt to disassociate it. This context, at the present juncture, is composed of two elements:

The first is the agricultural policy: I have explained my views on that subject sufficiently. The second is the agreement on objectives. These objectives, as I have already said, are, as regards France, to define and then to put into practice a common foreign policy and, furthermore, cooperation in the field of defense, which would also lead toward a common policy.

A common foreign policy, that is to say, a European policy. It is

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-21- 2730, NOVEMBER 4, FROM PARIS

frequently being said, with respect to Europe, that it must find its place in an Atlantic world the other pillar of which would be the United States of America. A dialogue would then be held between Europe and the United States, the dialogue between continents. I am not saying no, but if there is to be a dialogue this means that there are two policies, one emanating from Europe, the other from Washington. The two policies would not, by definition, be either hostile or contradictory or irreconcilable but there must be two of them. Otherwise the dialogue would give place to a monologue.

As for defense, we were being told not so long ago that NATO would see to it, and that Europeans, as such, were not supposed to concern themselves about it. Here again ideas have evolved and are evolving toward our position. But some ambiguities remain.

Let us take for example the matter of the so-called "multilateral" nuclear force. No one has yet told us what its true objectives are. All concur in thinking that, from a military standpoint, its value is far from having been demonstrated. Now then, of what use would it be from a political standpoint? It is readily understandable that Germany would perhaps derive, psychologically, some satisfaction from it. It is apparent that the Soviets

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-22-. 2730, NOVEMBER 4, FROM PARIS

would, rightly or wrongly, be worried by it. It is to be foreseen that it would constitute inside NATO a cause of division for which it would, furthermore, be difficult to hold France responsible. Above all, and this is perhaps for us the essential point, what would its consequences be from the standpoint of the construction of a true European union?

All this leaves us perplexed, while we await the necessary explanations. And we are also led to think that, regarding this point, just as in the matter of defense in general and the concept of a European policy, we must hold discussions with our partners, seek to understand one another and if possible reach agreement with one another. Such is the preliminary task to which we must devote ourselves if, all of us together, we are determined to follow the path that leads to political union.

France, for its part, is ready to do so. It believes that, once that has been done, the problems of organization will appear in their true light, that is to say, that they will be found to be relatively minor and easy to solve as soon as the partners achieve basic agreement on intentions. Perhaps that will take time, but it will not be time lost, especially if meanwhile the Common Market has resumed its march forward.

Such are, in this matter of capital importance to Europe, the present

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-23- 2730, NOVEMBER 4, FROM PARIS

situation, the positions and dispositions of the Government. I have not concealed anything from the Assembly of the difficulties that arise, for one must not, when interests as vital as these are involved, either harbor illusion or create misunderstandings. The Government, for its part, has always been careful not to do so, and I believe that it cannot be accused of having ever concealed its intentions or been lacking in determination. A union of Europe is in the interest of France. It is, and, to an equal degree, in the interest of our partners, beginning with Germany, for, otherwise, who can guarantee that others might not some day control their destiny without them? Europe is necessary to itself. It is also necessary to the world. Those are too good reasons which perhaps explain the obstacles that it is meeting on its way, but also which justify our hopes.

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UNCLAS ACTION WASHINGTON (2769) INFO ROME 233 LONDON 434 BRUSSELS
122 LUXEMBOURG 59 THE HAGUE 137 BONN 259 MOSCOW UNN FROM PARIS
FIFTH

DOD

BRUSSELS FOR USEC; LUXEMBOURG FOR LUXCO

SMF

DAC

REF: EMBTEL 2744

E

RMR

SUBJ: FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENT

COUVE DE MURVILLE TOOK FLOOR AGAIN ON NIGHT NOV 3
TO ANSWER QUESTIONS RAISED DURING DEBATE FOLLOWING HIS
INITIAL STATEMENT. HE BEGAN BY SAYING SUBJECTS RAISED CONCERNED
MOSTLY ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, EUROPE AND EUROPEAN POLICIES AND SPOKE
AS FOLLOWS:

CFN 2769 233 434 122 59 137 259 2744 3

PAGE 2 RUFJC 232 UNCLAS

--NATO--: HE HAD EARLIER, WHILE SPEAKING OF MLF, REFERRED
TO "ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, THAT IS NATO", ONLY BY ALLUSION BECAUSE
THERE DID NOT SEEM TO BE ANY "BURNING" PROBLEMS IN THIS AREA OR
ANY ON WHICH FRANCE HAD TAKEN NEW POSITION. HE KNEW OF "A
CERTAIN PRESS CAMPAIGN" BUT HAD NOT SPOKEN OF IT SINCE IT WAS
OF FOREIGN ORIGIN AND FRENCH PRESS HAD MERELY ECHOED IT. WHAT FRENCH
INITIATIVES OF WORDS IN LAST FEW WEEKS COULD HAVE JUSTIFIED IT.
COULD IT BE ANYTHING ELSE BUT AWARENESS THAT FRANCE IS WONDERING WHAT
REAL INTENTIONS ARE BEHIND MLF? NOW IS FIRST TIME
GOF "HAS OFFICIALLY EXPRESSED ITSELF ON MATTER". QUESTION

BUNDY-SMITH

0040007

1964 NOV 5 PM 3 03

BRUBECK

CHASE

FORRESTAL

JESSUP

JOHNSON

KEENE

KLEIN

KOMER

MOODY

REEDY

SAUNDERS

SAYRE

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-2- 4017, NOVEMBER 5 FROM PARIS

IS WHETHER MLF, FAR FROM (#)
INSTEAD, FOR MOTIVES FRANCE DOES NOT UNDERSTAND, HAVE
DIVISIVE EFFECT. THERE IS ALSO QUESTION OF WHAT RESULTS
MLF WOULD HAVE ON EUROPEAN CONSTRUCTION, WHETHER THERE
WOULD REMAIN POSSIBILITY OF WORKING FOR THAT POLITICAL
UNITY, WHICH ALL SAY THEY WANT BUT WHICH NO ONE BUT FRANCE

PAGE 3 RUFJC 232 UNCLAS
HAS AGREED TO DEFINE, EXCEPT TO SAY THAT ROAD TO EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY IS BY WAY OF ATLANTIC COMMUNITY. FRANCE ASKS THESE
QUESTIONS AT THIS TIME BECAUSE MLF SEEMS TO BE MOST
IMPORTANT FOREIGN POLICY ELEMENT FOR CERTAIN OF FRANCE'S
ALLIES.

FRANCE BELIEVES HEALTH OF ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IS BASED
ON HEALTH EACH MEMBER. FRANCE NOW MUCH HEALTHIER, ARMY
UNIFIED, BETTER ABLE DEFEND WESTERN CAUSE IN FRAMEWORK
ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. ARMED FORCES BEING ORGANIZED AS WHOLE
AND NOT CONTINGENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ARMY AND MUCH BEING
SPENT ON MODERN WEAPONS. THESE OBJECTIVES IN NO WAY INCOMPATIBLE
WITH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE.

--CAP--: (BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY).

--POLITICAL UNION--: AFTER REPEATING PREVIOUS ARGUMENTS
IN FAVOR STRONG, INDEPENDENT, EUROPEAN EUROPE, COUVE NOTED
DEPUTIES CRITICIZING GOVT NOT FOR POLICY BUT FOR
NOT/APPLYING IT. YET IT SEEMS CRITICISM IS ON CONTRARY

PAGE 4 RUFJC 232 UNCLAS
FOR STUBBORNLY SEEKING TO TRANSLATE WORDS INTO ACTION.
REAL PROBLEM IS TO MAKE "OUR VIEWS OF EUROPE ACCEPTED BY OUR
PARTNERS". CRITICS, IF INDEED THEY AGREE WITH GOVT ON POLICY AND
PRINCIPLES, HAVE PERHAPS NOT DISCUSSED SUBJECT SUFFICIENTLY WITH
COLLEAGUES FROM OTHER EEC COUNTRIES TO REALIZE THAT THEY SHARE
GOVT'S SO-CALLED ISOLATION.
IT IS HOPED THIS DEBATE WILL STRENGTHEN HANDS OF FRENCH REPRE-
SENTATIVES IN FORTHCOMING SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS, SO IMPORTANT
FOR FATE OF COMMON MARKET. BOHLEN
BT

(#) OMISSION, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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1-28252/64

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PRESENT: SYG Brosio, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Ambassador Finletter, Mr. Bendall, Mr. McNaughton, Mr. Nitze, General Wheeler, Mr. Rowen, Mr. Getz

Time and Place: Pentagon - 28 September 1964

The Secretary opened by asking Mr. Brosio his impression of the state of NATO. Brosio said that the first month of his term in office was very agitated because of Cyprus. However, there was good cooperation in the Council on this subject.

He has talked with General Lemnitzer and the Standing Group about the few misunderstandings of secondary seriousness that exist between the military and civil authorities in NATO. These can be overcome with good will if not too much fuss is made about procedure and formalities.

Opening up the subject of the Force Planning Exercise, he said that it was a slow and difficult process. He wanted to solicit US views on where we are. It has taken six months to get the goals from the Commanders and they might be plausible and logical according to a certain rationale, but they certainly were unattainable in practice. Not in quantity, for both ALPHA and BRAVO goals of SACEUR do not exceed earlier goals by much, but rather in quality. They call for a fundamental change in aviation, missiles and mobility; they were all assumed to be in the context of general war; and the cost of these forces would be between \$20 and \$30 billion a year depending upon the assumptions. This is simply unattainable. The Working Group is putting questions to the Commanders on these goals. In part these have to do with economic issues, but for the most part they have to do with the rationale for the forces. The military are not enjoying these criticisms, and this is understandable. For one thing the Working Group is very heterogenous in its competence. In any event, the work is going slowly.

He sees two alternatives. The first is to get a new political directive. The second is to stick to the confrontation between requirements and resources, with the obvious result that force goals will descend to levels supportable by governments. We can then discuss what improvements in the quality of the smaller forces are appropriate, and can draw conclusions on strategy adapted from the forces we will have.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-168

By C6, NARA Date 7-19-99

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Turning to the procedural side, he asked how it was possible to speed up and reach tentative conclusions in the months ahead; unless something is done there will be very little to report by December. There will have to be a progress report and it will be necessary to ask for Ministerial direction. We might ask the Standing Group to look at the work of the Working Group, giving them at least a month; if there is a status report, it should be presented to the Ministers in December, with agreement to make decisions on force goals later.

Brosio added that he didn't feel competent to have an opinion on just how to proceed; his ideas have not matured enough. He asked if we should have a special MOD meeting in December? Would it be convenient, or advantageous, and to what purpose? What is the US intent in this regard? It might give a new impulse to the Exercise but, on the other hand, it might be better to have these issues decided earlier and at a lower level than the Ministers.

He then asked the Secretary for his views on the ultimate purpose and outcome of the Exercise and on how he felt we should proceed. The Secretary replied by saying that the reconciliation of strategy, forces, and budgets has three objectives:

One, and most important, is to provide a foundation for linking the US to Europe indefinitely. He said that we don't have this today. Out of a thorough analysis of strategy, forces, and budgets, we can get a firm foundation.

Two, to disclose weaknesses and conflicts among current strategy, forces, and budgets which stand in the way of a truly effective defense of Europe. Not just against massive attack, for it is well deterred, but against lower levels of attack where our defenses are not adequately developed. The Secretary stated that he believed that we can get an effective defense within politically feasible budgets.

Three, to prevent waste, and there is much waste today, with so many countries going part way, but not to the critical point, in their budgets and forces.

The first of these objectives is the most important because the imbalance that exists is causing the US gradually to move away from Europe.

He went on to say that NATO has four strategic alternatives open to it:

1. Sole reliance on strategic nuclear forces. This was our strategy for the decade of the 1950's and especially in the early 50's. This was an acceptable strategy when the Soviets had little nuclear power. It is now suicidal to have a strategic nuclear exchange. There would be 100 million fatalities in each of three areas: the Soviet Union, Western Europe and the US. NATO can deter a strategic nuclear strike through superior nuclear forces. The Soviets know we are not likely to make a strategic nuclear

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response for less than a major attack on the West. Therefore, the Soviets will move at a lower level if this is all we have. This alternative is not being proposed by anyone, with the possible exception of de Gaulle. In any event, the US is opposed to it. Brosio intervened by saying that de Gaulle favors this alternative entirely for reasons of deterrence. The Secretary replied that the French say they want this for deterrence, but it is not credible if they are not willing to fight with it. This is a bankrupt strategy. It is necessary but not sufficient to have a strategic retaliatory force for NATO.

2. A tactical nuclear strategy to deter and to combat Soviet aggression. This has many of the defects of Alternative 1. The current tactical nuclear plans depend upon current weapons. The average yield of the tactical nuclear weapons in NATO today is 98 kilotons. The average yield of the tactical nuclear ground weapons is 18 kilotons. The Hiroshima bomb had a yield of between 14 and 19 kilotons. Reliance on these weapons would mean that a substantial part of Western Europe would be destroyed. This should not be the sole power of NATO. This alternative is favored by many Europeans. Brosio replied that some were in favor and some not. de Gaulle was not. The Secretary said that the Germans were in favor. Brosio pointed out that they were in favor of the battlefield nuclear weapons, the smaller ones. The Secretary said that this subject needed a great deal of thought. He added that current plans are based on a full range of weapons. This was an unsound foundation.

3. A "trip-wire" strategy. This has forces up front; a plate glass window. If this is broken, it will lead to general war. It calls for a limited stock of tactical nuclear weapons, not thousands as in Alternative 2. This is the UK view, and it is very dangerous. It has many or most of the disadvantages of Alternative 2. It appeals to the UK because of its relatively low cost.

4. A U.S. preferred strategy based on strategic superiority and on substantial numbers of tactical nuclear weapons, but with a much more sophisticated plan for their use. This strategy demands a conventional option to stop the Soviet Union in an initial drive to convince it that if it persists, general war will result. This alternative is not beyond Western European resources, taking account of political limitations.

It is the purpose of this exercise to analyze these alternatives in terms of forces and defense budgets.

The Secretary stated that he was well aware of political differences. France, the UK, Germany, and the US favor somewhat different strategies. We must resolve these differences. If not, there will be continuing pressure on this country to withdraw; not today but in two, three, or five years. The feeling will grow in the US that we are doing too much if we fail to face and resolve these issues. de Gaulle already says that we are not needed.

Brosio asked the Secretary what immediate procedures we should follow. The Secretary said that he didn't know

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exactly where we stood at this time. He would like to see a comparison of the ALPHA and BRAVO goals versus what the countries have said they can support. He would like to see this by December. The Secretary then asked if it would be desirable to hold a separate MOD meeting, or would a combined foreign and defense ministers meeting suffice? This meeting needn't be controversial and, in any event, neither meeting need try to settle the subject. He added that General Wheeler was going to a Military Committee meeting in mid-October to discuss this subject.

General Wheeler said that the Chiefs support the importance of having a conventional option. Brosio suggested that General Wheeler might come to a Defense Planning Committee meeting. Ambassador Finletter agreed that this might be a good idea. The Secretary said that this could be decided after the Military Committee's meeting in October. General Wheeler added that our Standing Group representative reports that the military side of NATO was quite interested in the SHAPEX of last June. SACEUR says that his general war posture must be maintained and his major subordinate commanders say that they can spare very few forces to meet lesser contingencies; only a few battalions. General Strother reports that the subject will be discussed in the Military Committee. He, General Wheeler, proposes to bring this subject up in a low-key way; in short, that the US favors a NATO having a conventional option backed by a US strategic nuclear force.

Brosio said that the Secretary's remarks confirmed his view that this exercise has a deep significance and that it is not intended just to cut down the military goals to reality. Cutting down the goals without having a rationale for them makes no sense. He said that he understands that the Secretary wants to come to the basic strategy issues. The Secretary replied that these facts must be faced, but not necessarily by December. If they are not faced, most of our forces must continue to be wasted.

Brosio said that both the ALPHA and BRAVO force goals are justified in general war context, as given in NATO's political directive. The French even objected to the very limited concessions made in the goals to the possibility of limited conflict. The French will object to any change, saying that they favor immediate counter-city nuclear strikes. All of this is for deterrence. He agrees that if we aren't prepared to fight, we won't have a deterrent. He added that he came to understand the Secretary's view of strategy by reading Kaufmann's book, which is very good. What the Secretary said about public opinion in the US is important and made him reflect. He added that we should be careful in the Military Committee. We don't want another clash such as the one over MC 100/1 last year. Wheeler should approach this subject carefully. In any event, it was important to try to get the French to look at the alternatives in a practical way. He went on to say that he understood the fourth alternative. The first is a strategy of weakness; the second might be worth consideration. He understands from Kaufmann's book the difficulties that we have had with the problem of tactical nuclear war. Most Europeans are against it; for them it is a strategic nuclear war. If the yields are low enough, however, it might work out. In any event, he could never accept a concept which would result in the destruction of Europe.

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He asked what the separate MOD meeting would be about and wondered if we should have it.

* The Secretary replied that we should tentatively plan on it. He said we could make the final decision in late November. By then the DPWG will have progressed further in its examination of the ALPHA and BRAVO goals and of politically acceptable goals. Also, the Military Committee will have met. It is important that the discussions continue, for they are likely to shed some light on these issues. It is especially important for the Germans to think through these problems more deeply. The German battlefield nuclear concept of a year ago was quite unacceptable. The UK plate glass view is equally unacceptable. If the Europeans think the US believes that large increases in European defense budgets are needed, we should correct this view, because there simply are not going to be any major increases in European budgets.

Brosio asked if present levels of defense effort would require early use of strategic weapons. The Secretary said "No"; present levels could not handle 100 divisions but could handle lesser aggression. Brosio said that we should try to get French to join in the discussion. He asked for Finletter's and Bendall's views. The Secretary said Brosio should propose a MOD meeting, but he should say that it might have to be deferred.

Finletter said we were talking mostly about the US input to the Exercise. He thought that a confrontation is possible, but that we should pay little attention to the French. In any event that we could avoid a confrontation if we moved carefully.

He went on to say that it is important to state that the purpose of all of this was to link the US to Europe. He added that he thought we should stop fiddling around in the Planning Exercise, that the Military Committee should discuss the real issues and that the MODs should meet soon and frequently afterwards. He added that the Ministers should submit the US and other inputs to the Exercise for consideration.

Brosio asked if there is a US position yet. The Secretary replied that he wanted to see the interim report from the Working Group first. He would plan in December to outline the alternatives, not to present US conclusions. Brosio said that by Nov 20 at the latest, the DPC would have an interim report from the DPWG. Bendall added that how much would be in the report is uncertain. It would not make profound comparisons but would present some gross facts.

The Secretary said that if Bendall would present a paper by 20 Nov. we could prepare comments by 14 Dec. at the Ministerial meeting. These comments would extend the analysis without arriving at a definite conclusion but rather would point out directions for future work. Brosio said he preferred no separate MOD meeting, but favored setting aside an afternoon during the

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regular meeting. It would not be good from a publicity viewpoint to have a separate meeting. The Secretary said this was entirely possible, and he did not disagree. Bendall added that nations would certainly not have unanimous views on the rationale for the forces in the general war context. The Secretary replied that unanimity was not needed since we would not be making hard recommendations based on definite conclusions.

Brosio said that if we succeeded in bringing the French to discuss alternatives analytically, it would be an important achievement. Although not convinced that this will happen, he will explore all of ways of securing a meeting of minds with the French.

At this point, the Secretary asked Brosio to summarize his meeting with DeGaulle. He summarized the DeGaulle views as follows: First, that the Alliance is needed. Second, that the Soviet threat remains because war may come by miscalculation, or by crisis in Eastern Europe, or for economic reasons, and we must be prepared to fight. Third, that NATO is different now; conditions have changed since it was formed and Germany, the UK, France and the US are all in different positions. The US is more concerned about the Far East than about Europe. The communion of position of ten years ago no longer exists, and so the organization today does not fit the situation. Brosio said that he asked DeGaulle to suggest changes, but there was no answer. He said he told DeGaulle that in modern times one cannot agree to fight tomorrow without planning today, whether planning is called integration or coordination. DeGaulle replied that the Europeans do not agree among themselves, and, until agreement is reached, they cannot do anything constructive. He disagreed with the US strategy and believed that the US would not use nuclear weapons in or for Europe.

Returning to the period ahead, Brosio said we should explore alternatives. The Secretary asked if DeGaulle had said that he wanted to use nuclear weapons. Brosio replied that this was not clear, since they had not discussed deterrence versus use. DeGaulle said tactical weapons implied the destruction of Europe, and that if Europe was destroyed, he would prefer to see everything destroyed. With regard to rest of the world, DeGaulle said that conditions are too uncertain and that he doesn't care to consult about them. Brosio went on to say that DeGaulle may in his mind link NATO strategy to his grand view of world strategy -- somehow. He concluded by saying that it would be difficult to move DeGaulle on strategy.

The Secretary stated that one of the motives for the MLF is our desire to see the US linked to Western Europe or at least to some members of Western Europe. The Germans desire this also. We want to counter the French view that the US will pull out. Brosio replied that the French will never accept the MLF which they see as a device for splitting Europe.

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He went on to say that if we want to fit France into an agreed concept (and he thought it difficult to imagine the Alliance without France), we would need to get the French to talk and say what they want. If the French won't say what they want, we must initiate proposals in order to get them to express their views. Brosio went on to say that one of his assets was that he was trusted by the French. Although there is a limit to how useful he can be with the French, for the time being he has some usefulness.

Prepared H. S. Rowen/28Sept1964
Deputy Assistant Secretary, ISA

straight on the action of the Republican National Convention in San Francisco in rejecting certain proposed amendments to the platform on the subject of extremism.

The action of the Republican Convention on Tuesday, July 14, in connection with these amendments has been interpreted by many commentators as a refusal to repudiate views and tactics commonly called extremist.

A fair reading of the two amendments presented to the convention makes it clear that the issue was not presented in the terms in which it is generally described in the press. The effect of the amendments was to express the view that the Republican Party is in danger of being infiltrated by "totalitarian" groups and to "repudiate" the efforts of such groups to seize positions of responsibility in the Republican Party and to attach themselves to Republican candidates for office. At the same time, these amendments absolved the Democratic Party from any connection with extremism.

That such was the purport of the amendments is made clear in the supporting document issued in connection with them. This document contained the following assertions:

It is imperative that our party assure the American people that we do not countenance the reckless totalitarian activities of those who seek to undermine the basic freedoms of our Nation and have settled upon our party as the vehicle for the achievement of this goal.

We recognize the problems experienced by the Democratic Party in the past, in the case of the Ku Klux Klan after World War I, and of the Communists and fellow travelers who were painfully purged over a period of years.

The amendments proposed were rejected because they were not based on fact. The great majority of delegates to the Republican convention were not convinced that their party is in peril of being subverted by extremists and they rightly refused to say so. The great majority of delegates to that convention were not convinced that the Democratic Party has no problem with extremist elements in its ranks, and they rightly refused to say so.

The gentleman from Wisconsin, Congressman JOHN BRANES, clearly stated the reason for rejecting the two amendments in question when he declared to the convention:

Are we to accept the charge implicit in this amendment that the Republican Party is in danger of being taken over by the very ideas its platform denounces? Is this party going to demean itself by insinuating in its platform that irresponsible and extreme ideas can prevail among us? I flatly reject those views.

If the question of repudiation of the views and activities of irresponsible groups had been fairly and squarely presented to the Republican convention, I do not know what the outcome would have been. I suspect that many delegates would have considered such a resolution unnecessary, finding in the positive provisions of the platform ample repudiation of the views and the tactics which sponsors of the amendments wished to condemn.

The specific objects which those who offered amendments to the platform on the subject of extremism wished to repudiate fall into three groups:

First. Racial discrimination and prejudice.

Second. Slurs upon President Eisenhower and other leading figures of his administration.

Third. The use of such tactics as lies, deception, smear, and harassment against political opponents.

All of the foregoing are repudiated in unmistakable terms in the 1964 Republican platform.

Arranged below are provisions incorporated in the 1964 Republican platform repudiating these views and tactics:

1. DISCRIMINATION AND PREJUDICE

We pledge full implementation and faithful execution of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and all other civil rights statutes, to assure equal rights and opportunities guaranteed by the Constitution to every citizen; improvements of civil rights statutes adequate to changing times; such additional administrative or legislative actions as may be required to end the denial, for whatever unlawful reason, of the right to vote; continued opposition to discrimination based on race, creed, national origin, or sex.

In all matters relating to human rights, it will be the Republican way fully to implement all applicable laws and never to lose sight of the intense need for advancing peaceful progress in human relations in our land. The party of Abraham Lincoln will proudly and faithfully live up to its heritage of equal rights and equal opportunities for all.

2. PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND HIS ASSOCIATES

Republican Presidents from Abraham Lincoln to Dwight D. Eisenhower stand as witness that Republican leadership is steadfast in principle, clear in purpose, and committed to progress. The many achievements of the Eisenhower administration in strengthening peace abroad and the well-being of all at home have been unmatched in recent times. A new Republican administration will stand proudly on this record.

3. TOTALITARIAN TACTICS

We condemn bigotry, smear, and other unfair tactics in political campaigns.

MORE ON THE MLF

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Mr. HALPERN) is recognized for 20 minutes.

Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Speaker, on June 17 in this body I raised the issue of the proposed multilateral nuclear force, attempting to focus upon the various elements involved and questioning the validity of the concept.

Since then I have been pleased to note that media of communication have begun to debate the subject and devote more attention to it. In this week's New Republic, Mr. Alastair Buchan writes a profound piece on NATO and the MLF. Mr. Buchan is somewhat of an expert on NATO, its military and political meaning, and has written widely in this area.

On June 17, I warned that, unless appropriate diplomatic representations were undertaken, the multilateral force, a substantially new project, could sabotage or undermine this country's endeavor to reach meaningful accords on

disarmament and arms control. On July 12, the Soviet Government dispatched notes to the United States, West Germany, Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and Greece underlining its concern. Moscow Radio was beamed to Italy on July 13 with the following message:

The Soviet Union has warned in all seriousness against thoughtless and adventurous steps which can aggravate the danger of thermonuclear war and give the West German revenge seekers the opportunity of coming into possession of nuclear weapons. A double danger hangs over West European peoples: not only the aggravation of the danger of war, but also the danger of being pushed into an adventure which can be undertaken by West German revenge mongers.

The Governments of the United States and other Western powers, by undertaking steps to create a multilateral nuclear force, are thus contributing to the proliferation of atomic weapons. (If) the Bundeswehr obtained access to these arms, it would represent an ugly aggravation of the danger of thermonuclear conflict. Many countries, including major Western states, could be pushed into this conflict even against their will. It is also necessary to observe that the German Federal Republic Government activities designed to equip the Bundeswehr with nuclear missile weapons represent a brutal violation of Bonn international obligations which derive from unconditional capitulation of Hitler's Germany and postwar (covenants?) still in force.

There are two aspects to the question here. In the first place, earlier in July, Valerian Zorin, speaking at the General Disarmament Conference, harshly threatened that launching of the Polaris fleet would mean an end to meaningful disarmament possibilities. Second, the Soviet Union has restated its complete opposition to permitting West German participation in any nuclear undertaking, hinting that it would take appropriate retaliatory action.

Soviet anxiety and hostility on this score was repeated again to Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns during his recent visit to Moscow.

Now, I am not one to say that Soviet feelings should influence our decisionmaking conclusively. There are other factors involved. It may very well be that Khrushchev, understanding American and British policy vis-a-vis Germany, is simply bluffing. What I do contend is this: Since the MLF is not really a military necessity, essential to the security of the free world, I would want full assurance that this project, a new and unique venture, does not doom disarmament prospects, undermine Eastern Europe's disengagement from Moscow, renew a Moscow-Peking front, and conflict with other long-range objectives of American policy.

Mr. Buchan raises another question. He states that the people behind this program want a full and decisive reckoning by the turn of the new year. It will come in the form of a treaty. I have never stood for indefinite delay, but the prospects will not look good unless the Congress has adequate opportunity to survey all aspects of this complex and significant concept. And the Congress, if this timetable is correct, will be adjourned. Certainly, we will not be able to examine the issue in appropriate

Mrs. Johnson

committees on even a preliminary scale during this session.

Most especially, I hope that we can now launch into a constructive and responsible public review of this venture. This is necessary. I fervently urge appropriate officials of our Government to bring this subject to the forefront of public discussion.

I would like to include at this point in the Record Mr. Alastair Buchan's article from the New Republic:

IS THIS NATO CRISIS NECESSARY?

(By Alastair Buchan)

For the first time in 40 years there are to be British and American elections within a few weeks of each other. And there is now a serious risk that both the pre- and the post-election period will feature a major allied row over the proposal for a multilateral force, which may seriously divide Britain, America, and Germany from one another and drive De Gaulle further into a corner. This risk has been created by the Johnson administration's decision to seek final agreement on the MLF by December of this year, to get the enabling treaty legislation through the various national parliaments by the summer of 1965, ostensibly so that the issue shall not become a political football in the German general elections of next summer. Given the degree of doubt and perplexity about the MLF proposal, particularly in Britain, but also in the Netherlands and Italy, there is a danger of NATO suffering a self-inflicted wound at the very moment when scars of earlier battles are beginning to heal.

The American proposal is to create a multilaterally owned fleet of 25 surface ships with 200 Polaris missiles. Eight countries (the United States, Britain, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Greece, and Turkey) have been discussing it for many months. The proposal has a tangled history. Ever since the advent of the missile age began to create doubts about the credibility of the American commitment to Europe, and the advent of the British and French nuclear forces began to create tensions within Europe, two basic approaches to strengthening the cohesion of the alliance without weakening its strength or spreading the ownership of nuclear weapons have been conceivable.

One is to accept that NATO is an alliance of sovereign powers that cannot relinquish ultimate control of their own weapons; to commit the forces of the nuclear allies to NATO for planning purposes; and to reorganize the institutions of the alliance so as to give all the nonnuclear allies the maximum degree of influence over strategic and political planning, but leaving operational decisions in a nuclear crisis in the hands of the nuclear powers. This is the so-called multinational solution. The other is to associate the nonnuclear allies more intimately with the planning, finance, and operational control of part of the overall Western strategic forces, by creating an allied owned, mixed manned, jointly controlled nuclear force—the so-called multilateral solution.

The project for a multilateral force arose from the conjunction of military studies that had been made on the mixed manning of nuclear forces in Europe, and the political proposals to commit American missile-firing submarines to NATO. In the middle of 1962 a small number of enthusiasts in the State Department, allied to a still smaller number in the U.S. Navy, began work on a plan for a mixed manned seaborne force (originally of Polaris submarines) which would be manned, financed, and controlled jointly by the United States

and those European allies who were interested. Throughout the summer of 1962 their emissaries toured the European capitals to propound the merits of their idea.

Until early last year they made only limited progress in Washington, despite a public relations campaign to gain official, political, and academic support, of an energy and ruthlessness unknown since Harriet Beecher Stowe and the antislavery movement. President Kennedy, in particular, was unwilling to adopt their plan as a central objective of official American policy until he was quite certain that no other solution—some form of European-American strategic partnership or a reorganization of NATO itself—was viable.

But after Cuba the pressures began to multiply. The prospect of serious negotiations with Moscow, which later culminated in the test ban and the hot line, brightened. In December 1962 Adenauer agreed in principle to the Franco-German pact, which carried the alarming implication of some Franco-German deal on nuclear sharing. In the vacuum left by Britain's failure to gain entry to the Common Market and the collapse of the Kennedy grand design, the ideas of the multilateralists began to make some headway in the United States and considerable headway in Germany, Italy, Belgium, and even Britain.

The historian will have a tough time deciding whether there ever was a real demand for the MLF in Germany, or whether the offer of a major share in the MLF forced the German Government to play the role the State Department had already assigned it, namely a country eager for physical association with the control of nuclear weapons; whether, as the defense correspondent of the London Times phrased it, "the problem has in fact been created by passionate advocacy of the solution." Certainly it is ironic that by the time the MLF project was publicly launched, the German leaders whom Washington most distrusted in this connection, Chancellor Adenauer and Defense Minister Strauss, had disappeared from office. But by the fall of last year, not only the Erhard government but intelligent Social Democrats like Herr Fritz Erler, the vice chairman of the party, had become reluctantly convinced that the MLF was the best way to combat American nuclear isolationism.

Shortly after President Kennedy's death the multilateralists got from President Johnson a firm endorsement of the project as a central objective of American policy which they had never received from his predecessor. And with this the European political reaction has become gradually more explicit. In Paris it is no longer regarded as a joke, but as a threat to put France in the position of eventually having to join an organization of which it is not a founder member. In Germany, it is seen by most people as a means of emphasizing the priority of the Atlantic over the European connection (in which many Germans are beginning to lose interest), while giving Germany greater status in the councils of the alliance than she has hitherto possessed. In Belgium and in Holland it is seen in much the same terms, and also as a means of keeping Gaullism at bay. In Italy views are more muddled: The left-wing members of the Government fear its effect on relations with the Soviet bloc and on the domestic political scene, the right see in it the eventual nucleus of a European force. Only the two Scandinavian governments, Norway and Denmark, have held aloof from the discussions; they are not disposed to join the MLF even if it becomes a reality and they fear that it will increase the strength of neutralist sentiment in their own countries.

The MLF proponents argue that since France—and perhaps the U.S. Congress as

well—blocks the path to a more comprehensive reorganization of NATO, the MLF provides an alternative to a gradual fragmentation of the alliance. It would give the European countries which decide to participate some responsibility as well as knowledge about nuclear targeting, force levels and general policy. They would also be financially involved, which would have the dual merit of forcing them to take their responsibilities seriously and of taking a small share of the burden of Western deterrence off American shoulders.

One of the strongest arguments in favor of the MLF is that it could provide a focal point for the growth of a more organic system of alliance cooperation. The European Coal and Steel Community did not have a very important practical function when it was first founded in 1950, but became the seed of other European institutions. Many European supporters of the MLF see it as essentially an Atlantic, not a European, force, and they are alienated by such speculations as those of Mr. Walt Rostow, director of the policy planning staff, who in a speech to the Western European Union Assembly in Rome on June 24, thought aloud about the eventual withdrawal of the U.S. veto on the control of the force, and of the MLF as a dowry to a politically united Europe. Such statements, which are probably meaningless in terms of what Congress would accept and are certainly contrary to American policy about nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, are presumably intended to provide a bait for France.

The military and economic arguments for confining the principle of multilateral forces to a seaborne fleet of 25 ships and 200 Polaris missiles make little more sense today than when the project was first discussed. True, the problem of mixed manning is not a serious one; and the operational research that has been carried out on the problem of the vulnerability of the ships shows that this too is a manageable problem. The cost to the European participants (about \$260 million a year if the United States pays 40 percent of the bill) is supportable, even though it necessarily involves some diversion of resources from stronger armies in Europe, an equally cherished objective of American policy, and even though the cost in terms of skilled manpower is considerably higher for the small European navies and the strategic cost of justifying Soviet missile fleets in the Western Atlantic may be higher still. But the real question is whether a force of this kind, which is marginal to American or allied strategic requirements, will in fact provide a better European association with American nuclear planning and decisions. Where does it fit into the American policy of "controlled response"? What relevance would it have to real crisis bargaining in another nuclear confrontation like Cuba, and what influence therefore would it give the European allies?

TWO OTHER PROPOSALS

It is because of such doubts about the military relevance of such a seaborne force that two other proposals have been considered. One, which was advocated by the retiring Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Dirk Stikker, is for a direct European contribution to the cost, manning, and control of the Minuteman ICBM's, a force that is a central part of the Western deterrent. There is nothing inherently stranger about an international missile crew in the middle of Wyoming or North Dakota than there is about one in the middle of the North Atlantic. But so far Stikker's idea has received little serious attention, and it might well be that Congress would find this too much to digest.

The other proposal, which was officially put forward by Britain at the end of June, is to have the MLF combine a small seaborne

element with another element built around the strike aircraft and missiles in Europe. Drawing on her wartime experience when the RAF bombers were successfully manned by mixed crews of Australians, Canadians, Czechs, Poles, and Frenchmen, Britain has proposed that part of the allied interdiction forces in Europe should be converted into a single force, jointly financed, owned, and controlled.

This idea has certain clear advantages. It concerns the weapons on which the immediate security of Europe depends, and is a much more suitable focus for joint European-American finance and control than the seaborne fleet. Moreover, it does not involve creating new forces, and should therefore prove less costly in terms of money and specialized manpower. It has not, however, had a warm reception in Washington, partly because the Johnson administration is so passionately committed to the seaborne force that it regards any alternative proposal as a diversionary tactic, partly because it has been so long delayed by interservice arguments in London that it threatened, if it is assimilated into the existing negotiations, to throw out the time schedule which Washington has now laid down.

The British position is a difficult and unhappy one. At the Nassau meeting of December 1962 both the British and American participants got their terminology and the issues seriously confused. The British Government thought it had full American backing in pursuing the multinational solution by committing all its nuclear weapons to the planning control of NATO, and realized only late in the day that it was the multilateral solution which was going to win out.

There is growing support in London for the MLP as a political idea because it offers Britain an opportunity, which is not open in the economic field, to enter a close form of association with Germany and four or five other European countries, and thus to face post-De Gaulle France rather than post-Macmillan Britain with a choice between isolation from European support or participating in a development which she herself has not originated.

But Britain is expected to have only a 10-percent share in the seaborne force, which in the eyes of the German Government entitles her to be treated only as a minor European power on questions of planning and control. This she cannot accept if she is to participate at all. Therefore, if the MLP is to become a reality Britain must fight for parity with Germany. She has to persuade her allies to extend the plan to aircraft and missiles in Europe, of which she is a major contributor. Or else Britain must buy a larger share in the seaborne force, which would mean either scrapping her own Polaris program or drastically increasing her defense expenditure, something which the government to be elected in October, whether Tory or Labor, would find it politically very difficult to do, especially as a great deal of money has already been committed to the Polaris program for several years ahead.

The situation is complicated by the fact that Labor, which is likely to form the next government, has been consistently hostile to the MLP, preferring to try to negotiate in Washington some new form of political machinery within the alliance in return for abandoning the British Polaris program. The fact that neither Bonn, Paris, nor Washington is very likely to be interested in any such proposal will not make it any easier for Labor to switch its position if it is asked to take an irrevocable decision about the MLP within a few weeks of taking office, as would be demanded by the present American timetable.

In my view, we can only avoid a serious crisis within the alliance, and one which will have direct repercussions on East-West relations, if all concerned use their heads on

three subjects in particular. The first is the question of timing. To use the German elections as a deadline is essentially phony, since the MLP is not an election issue in Germany. It is being used as an excuse by those who want to crowd on sail for fear that their project may lose momentum.

EASTERN EUROPE'S FEARS

The second concerns the operational control of the force. Until the question of whether it is to be an Atlantic force or eventually a European force is settled in equivocal language, it is impossible to tell who the true supporters of the proposal are, for if there is any serious idea that the Europeans would one day buy out the American share, then Britain, Germany and Holland lose their interest, while, if it is to remain a permanent Atlantic force, the Italians may lose theirs. To talk, as some of the American protagonists do, of leaving room for either solution, is as unrealistic as it would have been to expect the Founding Fathers to have written the principles of secession into the American Constitution. Nor do German ideas on weighted voting have any realism when it comes to such grim issues as peace and war.

Finally, there is the question of MLP's effect on the new Western relation with the Communist bloc. There is a serious danger that misunderstandings about the force, and the German role in it, may create such misgivings in Eastern Europe as to permit the Soviet Union to reestablish much tighter control over countries that are on the edge of ceasing to be satellites. There is need for a less hasty study of the problem. This might convince all concerned, British, German, and Americans, that, in terms of diplomacy, of which strategy and missiles are merely servants, a considerably firmer commitment of present British and of larger American nuclear forces to the full planning control of NATO, and the evolution of better machinery for peacetime planning and crisis management for all the allies, may serve better in the future than the MLP itself.

THE WILLIAM WIELAND CASE

THE SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LISONATI). Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. BROMWELL) is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. BROMWELL. Mr. Speaker, I asked for this time on the spur of the moment because of a startling article which appeared in the Des Moines Register on yesterday, August 3, 1964, which has just come to my attention.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to include that article at this point in the RECORD.

THE SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There was no objection.

The article is as follows:

[From the Des Moines Register, Aug. 3, 1964]

RUSK'S TOUCHY CHORE: DECIDING FATE OF CONTROVERSIAL UNDERLING

WASHINGTON, D.C.—Secretary of State Dean Rusk is faced with the touchy political chore of deciding whether to oust William Wieland as a security risk or restore him to full status as a Foreign Service officer.

The State Department said Saturday a special three-man panel made a decision in the last few weeks. Its press office declined, however, to state whether the panel ruled for or against the Latin American expert.

Richard Phillips, department press officer, said Rusk must make the final decision.

The Wieland case has been one of the most controversial in recent years. It is among those that caused the fight between State Department security evaluator Otto Otepka

and his superiors. Otepka contended there was laxity in handling the Wieland case and others.

The original Wieland security case was up for decision in 1961 when the Kennedy administration took office. Otepka had made a decision there was not sufficient evidence to label Wieland disloyal or a Communist, but he had found that Wieland had given incorrect information to Government officials on several matters.

Otepka ruled Wieland should be forced to resign because of this questionable integrity.

Despite this finding by Otepka, Wieland was cleared by Secretary of State Rusk's office. Wieland was about to be assigned to a highly sensitive post in Germany when FBI Chief J. Edgar Hoover went to Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy to express concern.

PAPER SHUFFLING

It was on Kennedy's orders that Wieland then was blocked from the assignment to Germany and given an administrative job in the State Department where, it was reported, he was not permitted to handle security cases.

The State Department press office stated at that time that Wieland was in a "paper shuffling" job and that he was to be retained in that type of post.

Wieland had held posts in the U.S. embassies in a number of Latin American countries, including Cuba, and in the late fifties was Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs at the State Department.

During that time, the FBI and other agencies submitted voluminous reports on Fidel Castro's Communist connections, some of them indicating he was a Communist. However, most of this information was stopped at Wieland's desk and did not go to higher officials.

Not having this information, President Dwight Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and later Secretary of State Christian Herter were of the opinion Castro was not a Communist—at least until a man at a White House party made some remarks to Mr. Eisenhower about Castro's Communist background. President Eisenhower was disturbed, and asked the Secretary of State to contact FBI Director Hoover.

Hoover then informed the President and Secretary of State that he had submitted much information to them that had been stopped at a lower level.

OTEPKA TESTIFIED

Otepka testified about the details of the Wieland case and the decision by superiors to overrule his finding that Wieland was unsuitable for employment in the State Department.

Since that time, new information has been developed in the State Department Security Division indicating Wieland was in error in contending he had met Castro only on two occasions. Investigators developed evidence indicating he had been with Castro on at least a half dozen occasions.

On the basis of these meetings and the fact they did not regard his initial answers as frank or correct, other security officials last March recommended that Wieland be fired.

This time the recommendation was that Wieland was "unsuitable" and was also a security risk because of his lack of frankness on his contacts with Castro.

This recommendation was made last March—more than 6 months after Otepka had been removed from control of the security evaluation division as a result of charges of "insubordination" brought by superiors.

The Wieland case was one of a number of cases involved in the dispute between Otepka and his superiors, who contended Otepka should not have given certain security information to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

Mr. Johnson

POLITICAL ADVERTISING—GOP FOREIGN POLICY?

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, it seems to me that with the debate taking place this week in the Chamber on our foreign assistance program it is proper for me to invite the attention of the into possession of a number of gold-tipped matches, in attractive red and silver matchbooks, which were used in connection with the nomination of our colleague the Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER], in his drive for the Republican presidential nomination. I received in a beautiful red and silver matchbook. It was a matter of surprise to me to note on the back of each matchbox the printed notation, "Made in Sweden."

Officials and employees of the Ohio Match Co. of Wadsworth, Ohio, and other match companies in my State take a dim view of this, and they wonder why their companies or some other American match companies were not selected as being good enough for the Goldwater campaign braintrust—or should I term it "brainless trust"—for the manufacture of the beautiful matchbooks urging the nomination of our colleague the Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER].

At any rate, it seems to me that in view of the foreign assistance bill which is being considered in the Senate this week, it is of interest to note that the Republican candidate for President has apparently already become entangled in foreign affairs by his followers in the purchase and distribution of these matchbooks.

The question occurs to me, Mr. President, Is this Goldwater campaign gimmick, or advertising with matchbooks made in Sweden, some Goldwater campaign committee leaders' view of the proper policy of the Grand Old Party—the Republican Party—for foreign aid? Is it also indicative of their views regarding the serious problem of the outflow of gold from our Nation?

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator from Ohio yield?

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Pennsylvania.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The time of the Senator from Ohio has expired.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 1 additional minute.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CLARK. I wonder whether the Senator does not believe that the fact that these matchbooks were manufactured in Sweden would be some indication that the GOP standard bearer is now going to go all out for President Kennedy's trade expansion program?

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. This does help the trade expansion program to some extent. It also helps the prosperity of an already prosperous Sweden—a great and friendly nation.

THE PROPOSED MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR FORCE—MLF

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, yesterday, my colleague and seatmate, the senior Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH], made what I thought was a very valuable suggestion. He said that there is a great State Department, and in other parts of the administration, for the adoption of a multilateral nuclear force which would provide for the creation of naval vessels carrying Polaris missiles to be manned by mixed crews of our NATO allies, which would carry nuclear warheads, but would retain its veto with respect to their firing.

I believe that the Senator from Idaho was wise in urging that the question of the multilateral force be explored fully and in the open, not only by Members of Congress, but also by the public generally.

In order to follow the wise suggestion of Senator CHURCH, I ask unanimous consent that an address delivered on April 22, 1964, by Hon. Gerard C. Smith, special adviser to the Secretary of State, before the U.S. Naval Academy Foreign Affairs Conference at Annapolis, Md., entitled "Problems of Foreign Policy in Connection with the Nuclear Defense of NATO" be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN POLICY IN CONNECTION WITH THE NUCLEAR DEFENSE OF NATO
(Address by the Honorable Gerard C. Smith, special adviser to the Secretary of State, before the U.S. Naval Academy Foreign Affairs Conference, Annapolis, Md., Wednesday, April 22, 1964)

I. INTRODUCTION

Admiral Minter, distinguished guests, delegates, faculty, midshipmen, I am honored to be here to join with you in opening the Fourth Naval Academy Foreign Affairs Conference, attended by outstanding young men and women from all over the United States.

This year's conference considers "Problems of U.S. Foreign Policy in the European Community."

I would like to discuss with you tonight a project which is designed to meet one of the most pressing of these problems: How can the United States share strategic deterrent responsibilities with its NATO allies without promoting independent national nuclear forces?

The solution we propose to this problem has much to do with the sea; naval officers have contributed greatly to it. I speak of the MLF—the multilateral force—the proposed missile fleet for NATO.

II. THE SETTING

First, let us look briefly at the problem to which this MLF project is addressed.

Since the war, we have been trying to create a working partnership between a uniting Western Europe and North America.

That partnership, though not yet fully realized has been more successful than we once dared to hope.

The reconstruction of Europe under the Marshall plan, the development of NATO, the creation of three European communities, the Coal and Steel Community, the Common Market, and Euratom have all contributed

to this success. They have helped European countries to draw closer—to each other and to North America, and to progress further toward higher levels of economic and social well-being, more stable and promising relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and a somewhat more durable peace.

Obstacles to continuing progress of such movement toward European integration and Atlantic partnership will not be smooth. The long-term prospect is favorable; but the inevitable only comes to pass, as Justice Holmes wisely observed, through human effort.

I am told that a British Army manual used to advise that the best way to avoid token, the way for Europeans and Americans to avoid being sidetracked or blocked by the obstacles to European integration and Atlantic partnership is by going forward in new joint programs.

For Europeans: In programs which follow the classic pattern of European integration, affording every interested country an opportunity to join on a basis of equality, without any suggestion of first- or second-class membership.

For Europeans and Americans: In programs which follow the classic pattern of Atlantic partnership—close association with the United States while leaving open the opportunity for an ever larger European role as Europe moves toward political unity.

Such new joint ventures are needed just as much in defense as in other fields. Neither European integration nor Atlantic partnership will rest on a solid basis if they extend only to the economic area.

A relapse into nationalism would be particularly disruptive in the field of nuclear weapons. If each industrially qualified ally should build its own nuclear weapons, a harvest of division and allied friction would result, weakening the Atlantic Alliance, seriously prejudicing the efficiency of the alliance nuclear deterrent, and adding complications in the field of arms control. Alternatively, if the European Community were to be divided into first and second class citizens, with some countries claiming special status by reason of national nuclear programs which other countries lack, this would not be conducive to a cohesive community.

III. THE PROBLEM

Against this background, we now face the question of how best to respond to European nuclear concerns.

Over the past 7 years the Soviet Union has been deploying hundreds of rockets aimed at Western Europe. This array is still growing.

Although programmed U.S. forces would be adequate to meet the threat, there is a good case for replacing some of these programmed forces with medium range missiles.

On military grounds, two successive NATO Supreme Commanders, Generals Norstad and Lemnitzer, have urged deployment of such missiles to help cover Soviet forces directly threatening Europe.

Broader political and psychological considerations are also involved.

The Soviet leaders have not hesitated to put their rockets to political use. They have reminded European countries from time to time how easily the U.S.S.R. could destroy the Acropolis or the orange groves of Italy or, for that matter, all of England or France. Nuclear blackmail addressed to Europe lay at the heart of Moscow's pressure on Berlin over the period 1958-62.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Europeans living so near this Soviet nuclear power have been anxious to have a larger role in long range strategic deterrence, to comple-

ment their existing manning, ownership, and share in control of shorter range missiles.

IV. CRITERIA GOVERNING AN EFFECTIVE RESPONSE

For years leaders of the alliance have been seeking to devise an effective response to this European concern. There is a good measure of agreement on the criteria which any response should meet:

- (1) It should achieve its immediate political purpose. It should respond to the concerns of our European friends.
- (2) It should achieve its military purpose. It should be a credible and substantial component of the alliance nuclear deterrent.
- (3) It should be a stable and responsible form of deployment. It should not add to the complex disarmament problem or make it more difficult to bring the arms race under international safeguarded restraints.
- (4) It should be financially manageable. It should not retard needed economic growth, social reform, or buildup of conventional military forces.
- (5) It should strengthen the prospects for European unity and trans-Atlantic partnership.

V. ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES

Three possible responses to the European nuclear/MRBM problem have been considered:

- (1) Strategic nuclear weapons needed to cover the direct threat to NATO Europe could be provided by U.S. forces, with the Europeans having a larger consultative role about their use.
- (2) The United States could supply medium range missiles to allied forces for national manning and ownership.
- (3) The United States and interested allies could jointly own, man, and control medium-range missiles deployed to the European theater.

The first course—virtually exclusive U.S. coverage of the threat—does not seem likely to respond fully to European concerns.

It would not provide medium range missiles close at hand to offset Soviet rockets, unless such missiles were deployed to U.S. forces only. We would be hard put, in this case, to explain to our allies why we proposed to deny them any role in ownership, manning, and control of such missiles. This kind of discrimination could not fail to be politically divisive.

Some people believe that increased consultation between the United States and its allies about the use of U.S. strategic power would constitute an adequate response to this problem.

Discussion and exchange of information about strategic forces is, indeed, now taking place within the NATO framework. This process has increased in pace within the last year and we favor continuing efforts to extend such consultation. Improved arrangements for doing so were agreed upon at the Ottawa NATO meeting only last year.

If consultation about alliance strategic forces remain imperfect, it is not for lack of good will or machinery. Rather it is because the consultation is one-sided. So long as consultation means other countries advising the United States about what to do with American strategic power, to which they have made little contribution, I have the feeling that it will, while useful, remain limited in effect. The effectiveness of consultation is apt to be in direct proportion to the degree of participation, by the consulting nations, in the operation they are consulting about.

Moreover, participation in nuclear matters within Europe is unequal. Some countries already have national nuclear weapons programs. The nonnuclear powers in Europe may not be prepared to accept indefinitely this inequality in participation. Improved nuclear consultation will not cure that inequality.

For all these reasons, European leaders are likely to find nuclear consultation with

the United States an inadequate substitute for a role of active participation in operation of strategic weapons.

I turn now to the second course of action: deployment of medium-range missiles to allied national forces.

We followed this course in deploying first generation IRBMs to the maritime flank area of NATO Europe: United Kingdom, Italy, and Turkey. Under this system, the missile was nationally owned and manned by the allied country in question. Any wartime decision to fire the missile would have required the agreement of the United States and the owning country, under the so-called two key system.

These first generation missiles were highly vulnerable to attack, and therefore have been phased out as obsolescent.

In deploying new medium range missiles, it has seemed to us, as well as to some of our European partners, that this pattern of national deployment should not be extended to new strategic weapons. New nationally owned and manned strategic missile forces could be devised within the alliance and unsettling in terms of East-West relations. We ought rather to be moving toward forms of ever closer integration in the ownership, manning and control of such weapons.

If the answer lies neither in a near monopoly of U.S. responsibility in the strategic field, even with improved consultation, nor in U.S. bilateral sharing with other national forces of the alliance, what is left?

The creative answer that has emerged, and is beginning to assume concrete form, is the MLF.

VI. MLF: THE PREFERRED RESPONSE

Here is our present concept of the MLF. It is, of course, subject to refinement in the process of arriving at an international agreement. It would be a fleet of surface warships, armed with Polaris missiles, owned, controlled, and manned jointly by a number of NATO nations.

The force would be under the military command of an allied officer and under the general policy direction of a board of high officials of the participating nations. The force would be open to any NATO member willing to assume a fair share of the costs and responsibilities. No nation's share could exceed 40 percent.

The force would be manned by a mix of officers and crews from participating nations. Each ship would be manned by nationals of at least three countries, with no nation providing more than 40 percent of the personnel in any ship.

Major participants—that is, those countries underwriting a significant percentage of the costs—would undoubtedly enjoy a position of special influence, not only on control but on such other matters as budgets, size, and future developments of the force.

Firing of the missiles in wartime would be by decision of an agreed number of participants, including the United States.

In the longer term, as President Johnson said at Brussels last November, "evolution toward European control as Europe marches toward unity is by no means excluded." Any change in the control formula would, of course, require the approval of all the participants. It would hinge not only on European unity but also on sufficiently wide European participation so that no single country could play a dominant role. All this would not come about quickly. In the case of the United States, participation in the force as well as any change in the control formula would require congressional consent.

The concept of a multilateral force was first suggested by then Secretary of State Herter, with the approval of President Eisenhower, at the NATO Council meeting in December 1960. It was reaffirmed by President Kennedy in a speech at Ottawa the following year. Since then it has generated increasing interest.

A working group representing the United States, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Holland, Greece, and Turkey has been meeting in Paris since October 1963. Its aim is to reach general understanding of what the MLF would involve, and of its technical and political feasibility. Encouraging progress is being made. There seem to be no insuperable difficulties.

A naval demonstration of mixed-manning is about to start on a U.S. guided missile destroyer, U.S.S. *Biddle*. Personnel from the United States, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Greece, and Turkey will take part. In about a month's time European officers and men will start to take over about half the ship's billets. It is good to be able to report that the officers and men of the *Biddle* are deeply interested and confident of success in working out this promising possible prototype of future allied cooperation.

It long has been standard practice to have crews of many nationalities on merchant ships.

Crews of a number of European allied nations manned some British ships in World War II.

And mixed-manning has been successfully carried out for prolonged periods in the turnover of U.S. naval vessels to foreign navies.

Our Navy and all allied naval experts who have examined the problem have concluded that, with skillful training and good motivation, efficient and happy ships can be jointly manned by crews made up of men from allied navies.

VII. EUROPEAN INTERESTS

Let us now look at the MLF against the criteria which, as I mentioned earlier, must govern any response to the European missile problem.

To take the political criterion first: Would the MLF respond to European concerns?

We believe that it would do so in several ways:

- (1) It would deploy medium range missiles to the European area. European countries which agree with General Lemnitzer, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, in favoring such deployment would be encouraged. They would expect these missiles' presence to help not only to deter aggression but also to frustrate attempts at ballistic blackmail.

(2) It would, as a high European defense official said recently, be "a clamp holding the United States and Europe together." Because the force would be jointly owned, it should further strengthen the profound U.S. commitment to the common defense of Europe symbolized and given substance by the presence of our forces in Berlin, in Germany, and elsewhere in Europe.

(3) It would narrow the present gap between nuclear and nonnuclear powers in Europe. All members of the MLF would share in ownership, managing, and manning the force.

(4) It would increase the effectiveness of consultation about use of alliance nuclear forces. MLF would afford its members the knowledge, sense of responsibility, and participation needed to make nuclear consultation effective. The mere existence of MLF, and the need for decisions about its targeting, deployment, and future evolution, are bound to improve the depth and significance of such consultation. Far from being an alternative to improved allied nuclear consultation, MLF may well be an essential component to a more meaningful form of consultation.

(5) It would be a nuclear defense program in which Europe's role and influence could grow as Europe moved toward unity. The eventual possibility of such a larger European role is an important element in making the MLF a viable alternative to national nuclear weapons programs.

Obviously, MLF does not offer what national nuclear programs purport to do: national nuclear status. It is intended to move in exactly the opposite direction. It offers a collective approach to the nuclear weapons problem.

While the present appeal of MLF is thus largely to major nonnuclear European powers, we can hope that in the long run countries now having programs of their own may also come to see the merits of the MLF.

VII. MILITARY QUESTIONS

A SURE SIGN OF THE DEGREE OF THE PROBLEM which any proposed response to the European missile problem must be tested: What about the military utility of MLF?

The U.S. Navy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense, after close study, have concluded that MLF would be militarily effective and a useful element of NATO's strategic deterrent forces.

General Lemnitzer has stated he would welcome MLF because it would help to meet his military requirement.

As presently planned, the MLF would have Polaris A-3 missiles of great penetration capacity. These missiles would be usable for all the purposes of deterrence and defense of Europe for which the weapons of U.S. Polaris submarines are capable. They would be effective against many missile sites, airfields, and other targets threatening European nations of the NATO Alliance. These missiles would be assigned to NATO and placed under the operational control of SACEUR. They would be targeted by SACEUR and be included in NATO strategic plans.

The U.S. Navy has studied the survivability of the MLF from the standpoint of possible surveillance and attack on MLF warships by submarines, surface vessels, aircraft, and missiles. It conducted this study under contingencies of cold war, limited war, and general war.

It concluded that MLF's survivability would be high—more than sufficient to insure its effectiveness as a deterrent, an operating force, and a reliable second strike retaliatory system.

MLF warships would be almost indistinguishable from thousands of other ships in the same area; they would, in peacetime, be lost in 3 to 4 million square miles of Atlantic and Mediterranean waters surrounding NATO territory; they would be able to outrun most trailing vessels and able to scrape off shadowing submarines in friendly coastal waters too shallow for submarine operation; they would operate behind the shield of the NATO land mass over which attacking planes could not fly unopposed; they would benefit from protection by NATO air and surface forces during hostilities; and they could exploit the blanketing effect of islands and restricted passages for protection from radar detection and tracking.

The fact that the United States is prepared to devote resources and manpower to MLF is the best evidence of our confidence in its invulnerability and military effectiveness.

A question may arise as to the relation of the MLF to the level of existing and programmed U.S. forces.

Certainly, the United States now has strategic forces of immense powers. But future increases in U.S. missile strength are being programmed for two reasons:

1. Present U.S. strategic delivery systems rely to a large degree on manned bombers. As some of these bombers become obsolescent, they must be replaced.

2. The Soviet rocket inventory is not static—it continues to grow. If effective deterrence is to be maintained, NATO forces must keep pace, until safeguarded international arms control arrangements are achieved.

As I indicated earlier, the increased Western missile strength that is needed could be

made up either of wholly U.S. forces or a mix of United States and Allied forces. If the latter course is followed, the MLF could substitute for some of the presently programmed U.S. forces. At the December meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Secretary McNamara said:

"If the members of the alliance should wish, we are prepared to join other interested allies in substituting sea-based medium-range missiles for some of the longer range systems now included in our program should take the form of the multilateral surface-ship force now under discussion."

The MLF could thus not be a net addition to, but a substitution for, some of the increased strength the United States now plans to build.

Would the MLF be a credible part of NATO's deterrent to war?

As a strategic weapon system with a high degree of survivability, the MLF is likely to be fired by the participating governments, which would have to act at the highest level, only in one of two circumstances.

(1) In response to Soviet nonnuclear attack, so strong that it could not be contained by nonnuclear forces. The NATO governments have already agreed on guidelines for such circumstances.

(2) Under second-strike conditions, after a Soviet nuclear attack. In this event, the prior fact of Soviet nuclear attack should, in effect, make the decision. Nuclear war would already have begun.

Their decision would be facilitated by experience in working together in the MLF. The process of continuous consultation and planning which will be required for peacetime operation of the MLF should widen the area of agreement among MLF members about strategic matters. It would thus permit them to decide more readily on the wartime conditions under which these missiles would be fired.

There is thus little doubt that Moscow will regard the MLF as a credible component of Western nuclear armament.

IX. EFFECT ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS

I turn now to the third criterion: A strategic missile deployment to the European theater should not have a damaging effect on the chances for disarmament and for improving relations with the Soviet bloc.

A central and persisting security problem of the alliance is how to build and maintain an effective defense posture in such a way as to reinforce, rather than weaken, efforts to bring military power under safeguarded international control.

While prosecuting our defense programs, we must stay alert to any opportunities for realistic arms control arrangements. Especially when dealing with nuclear weapons systems of unimaginable destructive potential, we must resist the natural mental callousness that tends to accumulate in those who have to deal for long periods with awful but necessary things.

I can assure you that these considerations weigh heavily on the planners who are putting together the program to carry out the MLF concept.

It is fair to say that the MLF would constitute the first weapons system in history especially designed with arms control considerations in mind.

It is especially designed not to result in the national proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Recently Secretary Rusk pointed out that "the detailed arrangements for the MLF will include mutually agreed strong and enduring safeguards against any one nation's securing control of any of the MLF weapons. We believe that when the Soviet Government understands this it will recognize that the MLF does not constitute a proliferation of national nuclear systems but, on the contrary, is an alternative to it."

Let me be more specific:

The missiles in the MLF will be manned, owned, and controlled multilaterally, rather than nationally, as was the case with earlier model strategic missiles deployed in Europe. The MLF will thus not involve nuclear missiles in the hands of any individual state.

Any wartime decision to fire the missiles would be by multilateral agreement, rather than by bilateral agreement as in the case of these earlier strategic missiles. The MLF will thus increase the number of states with the nuclear trigger.

There would be no increase of risk of compromise of weapons design data under MLF. Multilateral custodial procedures would assure that individual countries had no greater access to information about how to design and manufacture weapons than at present under the NATO Atomic Stockpile. Stringent protection against espionage and sabotage will also be provided.

All of this is not to say that MLF will be welcomed by the U.S.S.R. It will do its best by propaganda and diplomacy to forestall MLF. This must be expected because MLF would not only constitute an offset to Soviet rockets opposing Europe, but would also evidence a new degree of Atlantic unity which Soviet policy has long sought to prevent.

Nevertheless, it is clear that it is in the interest of the United States and the U.S.S.R. not to pursue a policy of proliferation, whatever may or may not be recorded in formal agreements on this subject. And the MLF—by offering a viable alternative to national nuclear weapons programs—should improve the chances for limitation of national weapons producing centers.

Even though the MLF would not result in proliferation of nuclear weapons, a question is sometimes put as to whether it is sensible to continue with a major new weapons system while negotiating about disarmament. The answer is simple: The U.S.S.R. continues to strengthen its missile arsenal targeted on Western Europe. So long as these hundreds of Soviet rockets are arrayed against Europe, effective European participation in strategic deterrence should not be precluded.

This participation need not, moreover, increase the presently planned level of Western missile strength. For, as I have already indicated, the MLF could substitute for some of the now programmed U.S. weapons. This is one reason the U.S. Government has said publicly that the MLF would be consistent with a missile freeze.

This European participation could, moreover, be helpful in efforts to bring nuclear armaments under international control. For the MLF would not only give its members, as coowners of significant nuclear power, a good claim to participate in disarmament negotiations; it would also give them the strategic understanding required to play an effective role in such negotiations.

And now a special word about the relation of the MLF to recently announced fashionable material cutbacks. These cutbacks are welcome steps. But, as President Johnson and Premier Khrushchev have said, this is not disarmament. The U.S. cutback is designed to bring production in line with need, and to reduce tension while maintaining necessary power. President Johnson has reaffirmed all the safeguards against weakening our nuclear strength which we adopted at the time of the test ban treaty. The cutbacks do not ease the specific problem MLF is designed to meet.

X. COST

Another important criterion is that the costs of a missile force should be economically manageable. It should not retard economic and social progress or the development of needed conventional forces.

During the first 5 years of construction of the force we estimate that the average an-

nual costs to European nations becoming major participants in the MLF would be between 1 percent and 4 percent of their average annual defense expenditures. The cost to the smaller countries would be an even smaller percentage of their defense budgets. In later years the annual cost would be very much less for all these countries.

These are costs well below those of other major military programs being carried out by these NATO countries. They seem well within the margin of adjustment in the defense budgets and the national economies involved.

XL EUROPEAN UNITY AND ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP

The last of the criteria that I mentioned is that any approach to the European missile problem should contribute to our political goals: Atlantic partnership and European unity.

Political and military cooperation in NATO has been a good start toward the Atlantic partnership. Economic cooperation in OECD, and increased trade opportunities now being sought in the Kennedy round will, we trust, constitute a second functional base. MLF offers the nucleus of a transatlantic nuclear defense association which could be an additional political military underpinning for a concrete Atlantic partnership.

The MLF would also contribute to European integration. It would do so in three major ways:

(1) It should reduce the attraction and apparent rewards of national nuclear programs—thus diminishing the likelihood that such politically divisive programs will spread.

(2) It would narrow the present gap between nuclear and nonnuclear powers in Europe—a gap which cannot fail to impede the European community's progress toward unity.

(3) It would require joint European work, and create a venture in which European countries would find it advantageous to concert common positions.

European unity will thus be furthered by the need for the European nations to come together in order to achieve specific purposes. The common control of nuclear energy for deterrence, sought under the shadow of a threat peculiarly addressed to Europe, is such a purpose.

If MLF can reduce the obstacles to European integration and Atlantic partnership that nuclear weapons nationalism is causing, it would be well worth its costs many times over.

We must go forward toward European and Atlantic unity on a broad front if we are to achieve our goals. The MLF can be one part of this broad movement.

XII. CONCLUSION

These are the important reasons why President Johnson said in his speech at the Associated Press luncheon on April 20: "We realize that sharing the burden of leadership requires us to share the responsibilities of power. As a step in this direction we support the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force composed of those nations which wish to participate."

The MLF is a new concept. It is designed to meet a new need: closer integration within the alliance in the strategic nuclear field—accomplished in a way that will not hinder progress toward arms control.

Because it is a new concept, a wrench to accustomed ways of thinking will be needed to bring it about. But we are moving into changing times. Bold innovation is needed in these times. We must seize the opportunities open to us with vigor and courage.

Mr. CLARK. This address is what might be called the standard case in support of MLF. Ambassador Smith

makes his points cogently and well. However, there is another side of the case. It has been discussed by the well-known and able Washington lawyer, John Silard, in a study for the Council for a Livable World. His article is entitled "Should the United States Continue To Promote the Multilateral Nuclear Force?"

This paper forms the arguments in opposition to MLF. I think they deserve serious consideration. I ask unanimous consent that the paper entitled "Should the United States Continue To Promote the Multilateral Nuclear Force?", written by John Silard, be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SHOULD THE UNITED STATES CONTINUE TO PROMOTE THE MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR FORCE?

(By John Silard)

In 1960 Secretary of State Herter first proposed creation of a NATO multilateral strategic nuclear force. When Premier de Gaulle made manifest his break with the United States and his determination to develop a French nuclear capacity, the administration's response was a strong espousal of the Multilateral Nuclear Force. The MLF was intended as a face-saving device for the United States, which would quiet claims in England and Germany for independent nuclear capability by the offer of a nuclear partnership among the allies who hold out against De Gaulle's unilateralist policy.

The initial lukewarm reaction among our NATO allies and here at home, has induced the belief within the last year that the MLF is a dormant proposal. That belief is erroneous. Having won the formal approval of the administration, plans to activate the MLF have progressed under the leadership of a contingent in the State Department for whom MLF is a major commitment. The Navy, too, has become interested because of the potential accretion to its operations with the fleet of nuclear vessels contemplated by the MLF. Meanwhile, President Johnson's proposal for a nuclear freeze to be negotiated with the Soviets has been stalled at Geneva by the Russians who point out that we cannot coincidentally activate a freeze and build a strategic nuclear fleet. Moreover, while it was anticipated that the opposition of the Labor Party in Great Britain would preclude activation of the MLF, there is growing doubt whether the Labor Party will hold to its present position if it wins the elections. In sum, MLF plans are proceeding in the face of disinterest both among our allies and at home, while opponents within our own Government cannot effectively exert their influence as long as our official policy remains wedded to the MLF.

What is the MLF? Essentially, it is a partnership in the operation of a fleet of vessels equipped with strategic nuclear weapons. The Polaris-armed vessels would be manned by mixed forces from various NATO participants, with a veto by anyone of the major participating nations on the firing of the weapons. Of course, the veto renders the partnership unequal, since the United States with its nuclear forces in Europe thereby remains the only country which can independently of its allies activate a nuclear exchange. Accordingly, some German advocates of the MLF hope that ultimately the veto will be removed, and Germany will thus obtain its own nuclear force through the MLF. We have encouraged this hope by assurances that MLF is only the beginning of a true European force. That was the suggestion made by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

Schaetzel in a presentation in September 1963 in Oxfordshire, England. Yet such a veto-free MLF would be quite contrary to our present proposals at Geneva for a nuclear freeze and an agreement against further proliferation, with the result that there exists a present inconsistency in our overt representations to the Soviets and our thinly veiled promises to NATO countries.

This memorandum examines the principal arguments advanced by the proponents of the MLF, reviews countervailing considerations, and suggests some alternative courses of conduct for the administration, should it be determined that the present insistent U.S. advocacy of the MLF is not in the national interest:

A. THE PROPONENTS' MAJOR ARGUMENT: STOPPING NATIONAL NUCLEAR FORCE DEVELOPMENT

A principal argument advanced by proponents of the MLF is that England, Germany, and possibly other nations will follow De Gaulle's independent force example unless we can offer these nations a larger nuclear role within the NATO Alliance. Initially, it might be questioned whether the modest nuclear capability which France will attain is more troublesome in its military and political implications than the prospect of a large European strategic force with Germany a predominant participant. Exposition of the view that such a development would be less disturbing than the political and military implications of the MLF appears in the March 1963 issue of the Reporter in an article by Henry A. Kissinger, and it will not be repeated here. We examine here in its short and its long-term implications the antiproliferation argument made for the MLF:

1. MLF in the short run

It is clear that, for the 1960's, MLF proponents vastly overestimate European desire for a larger nuclear role. It is said that without MLF the Germans would soon follow the example of De Gaulle in developing an independent nuclear capacity. But with respect to Germany, not only would an independent nuclear force violate the existing treaties, it would cause a reaction by the Russians, as well as the United States, of a dimension which would give the Germans serious pause before entering on a provocative and expensive nuclear program.

There is, in fact, no evidence that the Germans presently desire a nuclear force of their own. What the Germans do desire in the short run is assurance that the United States is committed to employing its nuclear forces in Europe to forestall any form of aggressive action from the East, and that our weapons are targeted so as to assure that a nuclear exchange would also involve Russian territory, not just German soil. Yet for this modest German concern, the MLF goes too far. Bringing technical personnel from European nations into a second-level role in the targeting and deployment of our existing strategic missiles would go most of the way toward meeting existing German concern about the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The MLF, on the other hand, will create an entirely new nuclear force at sea, which is both expensive and unnecessary in strategic military terms. Moreover, it may kindle rather than quiet nuclear aspirations among our European allies, and thus propel the very sentiment it is claimed the MLF would foreclose—the aspiration for independent nuclear capability. If we espouse the view that our allies' self-respect requires parity of nuclear participation with us, it will not be long before they espouse the same view. By contrast, without our active salesmanship, nuclear arms development may remain unpopular in Germany, England, and other nations.

2. MLF in the long run

meet the present concern of our allies, on the other hand it is inadequate to meet what are likely to be the long-term aspirations of NATO nations. As Kissinger's analysis points out, the force of De Gaulle's position for independent nuclear capability is based upon the realization of some fundamental differences of outlook between the United States and Europe. *Europe must* preserve our close relations with allies and to hold the line for our positions vis-a-vis the Soviets, we may yet be increasingly disinclined actually to use these weapons in an exchange which could precipitate an all-out war of annihilation between the United States and the Soviets.

Moreover, the glue in the NATO alliance has been the existence of the common enemy in the East, but a predictable progression of closer relationships with the Soviets, fear of a resurgent Germany, and conflicting economic interests such as those reflected in the split over the Common Market, may radically alter the present community of interest between the United States and some of its NATO allies.

To the extent that anticipations of such changes exist in Europe, there will be growing interest in independent nuclear forces or a European nuclear force not subject to a U.S. veto. In the case of Germany, there will be the added incentive of the role of swing-nation which the pseudopartnership will not satisfy. In sum, as much as the MLF exceeds the presently manifested desire for NATO-nation participation in the nuclear deterrent, it will fall short of the long-term European demand for independent nuclear capability.

It may therefore be anticipated that the strongest pressures will ultimately arise for abandonment of the U.S. veto on the use of the MLF, and that such pressures may in time succeed with the result that the MLF will have paved the way for the very proliferation of nuclear weaponry which it is supposed to forestall. Alternatively, if NATO countries cannot attenuate or force abandonment of the U.S. veto, they may then proceed with the development of their independent nuclear forces, with the added stimulus and know-how which we ourselves have provided through the MLF. It seems clear, therefore, that the MLF is not a proper answer either to the existing or to the longer range nuclear aspirations of our NATO allies, and will more likely hasten than retard the spread of nuclear weapons in Europe.

B. SUBSIDIARY ARGUMENTS FOR THE MLF

1. MLF as a bargaining device

Some administration officials who are not advocates of the MLF would nevertheless continue on our present course on the theory that in future bargaining with the Soviets over arms control in Europe, the MLF would provide an additional pawn for trading. Yet as an experienced negotiator knows, one may bargain with assets, but it is difficult to bargain to an advantage with liabilities. If MLF is a free world liability, it cannot become a bargaining asset with the Soviets.

Even more importantly, the bargaining pawn argument disregards the fact that if the MLF actually comes into being, it may be impossible to convince our own allies to give it up for an arms control agreement. Once a strategic European force is in existence, our NATO allies may say with some credibility that if it was worth creating for the collective security, it is worth keeping and ought not to be surrendered short of a complete and general disarmament agreement. It is therefore probable that while creation of the MLF may provide an additional pawn for trading with the Soviets in

a European arms control agreement, it will refuse to trade.

2. MLF as a mere multilateral substitute for bilateral controls

Proponents urge that the MLF multilateral control with vetoes by major participants, is not materially different from the existing bilateral control over tactical and medium range nuclear weapons in Europe. To the present nuclear weapons in Europe there is already a system of shared control with the situs nation, and that all the MLF will do is to add more trigger fingers whose concurrence would be necessary for the firing of the weapons.

Apart from some question whether the MLF controls will in fact not give increased leverage to other nations with respect to the use of nuclear weapons, this argument blurs the critical distinction between strategic and tactical weapons. The decision that our NATO allies should share in the deployment and control of tactical weapons located in Europe may have been right or wrong, but it was a radically different decision from that posed by MLF. For a decision to fire the missiles in the MLF would be to launch an attack on the Soviet Union with weapons of medium range so deployed as to be able to reach Soviet targets. In such an event there would ensue a nuclear war in which countless millions of Soviet and American citizens would perish. By contrast, the decision to give our NATO allies bilateral controls over tactical weapons was only a determination that a nuclear exchange initiated within the boundaries of NATO nations properly requires their participation in the decisional process. Accordingly, the MLF cannot be passed off as a mere extension of a bilateral control system to a multilateral control system, for the weapons of strategic war deployed in the MLF have radically different significance for the United States from the nuclear weapons over which we presently share controls with NATO allies.

3. MLF as step toward a Western European strategic force

A final argument made by some proponents, is the converse of the principal non-proliferation rationale for the MLF. Under this argument, it would be desirable to move toward a Western European alliance possessing its own strategic nuclear weapons free of U.S. control and U.S. responsibility. The proponents who welcome such a force, urge that the MLF is desirable not because it will end the spreading of nuclear weapons but because it will promote it.

To the extent that this view rests on the desire for a Western European unity it may, for sake of argument, be conceded that such a force would in fact promote some accretion in the unity of the NATO alliance. Yet the chief reason for such unity would be not fear of the Soviets, but fear of the Germans—the anticipation that without participation by other allies, the MLF would be a German-American nuclear alliance. Certainly, this is a fragile base for European unity. Moreover, the price paid in the proliferation of nuclear weapons to more countries and the destabilization of the nuclear balance between the Soviets and the United States by this third force, is a price too high to be paid. In the last analysis, the integrity of the MLF proposal itself becomes subject to question when it is advertised simultaneously as a device which will contain and a device which will promote strategic nuclear weapons in Europe.

C. UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES OF OUR MLF SUPPORT

There are five major unfavorable aspects to the continuing U.S. insistence upon creation of the MLF:

1. Nuclear freeze and nonproliferation

President Johnson's proposals at Geneva for nuclear freeze and nonproliferation agreements, have been imperiled by our support of the MLF. The Rumanians quickly seized upon the MLF, pointing out that we could not both stand still and move ahead at the same time, and would have to abandon the MLF if we are serious about the non-proliferation. This was somewhat confirmed by William Foster's quoted statement in the Herald Tribune of January 24, 1964 that the U.S. freeze proposal would not include the MLF. And as the editorial in the Washington Post of February 12, 1964 points out, there is some inconsistency between our offering NATO the MLF as the beginning of a European force and our asserting to the Soviets that it is consistent with a nuclear freeze.

2. Deemphasis of conventional force expansion in Europe

Replacement of nuclear with conventional defensive capability in Europe has been a major policy of the administration. To the extent that the MLF will be costly to our NATO allies and emphasize their continued protection through nuclear response, it militates against the administration's stress on the need for conventional capability among our NATO allies.

3. Production of European rift rather than unity

Our European allies are not requesting the MLF but are having it forced upon them by our insistence.¹ With the exception of some element in Germany, the MLF is not welcomed among the other nations, who must join it from fear of German predominance. The MLF is thus a rift-producing issue among our allies. And it is also causing serious internal political friction in NATO countries since it requires them to cast their lot unequivocally either with the United States or De Gaulle. Such a sharp choice situation has unfavorable consequences upon West Germany, and by drawing another divisive line among our allies, deserves the European unity and settlement aspirations entertained by many within our administration. As the Kissinger analysis in the Reporter pointed out: "The effort to isolate France by developing in the nuclear field a structure in which West Germany would be the key European member may in fact overstrain the fabric of European cohesion and

¹ "USIA Research and Reference Service" report, dated April 5, 1963: "The reaction of the Western European press to U.S. Ambassador Merchant's recent trip indicated an overwhelming rejection of the kind of multilateral nuclear force (MLF) envisaged by the United States. Editorial comment was heaviest and most negative in West Germany. The rejection of the multilateral nuclear force within the NATO framework was commonly based on the belief that the United States was offering a hastily improvised and confused politically motivated and exorbitantly expensive device which would afford West Europe neither increased security nor increased voice in nuclear decisions. Supporters of the U.S. suggestion, for the most part a minority of Italian, British, and Scandinavian voices, saw it as the lesser of two evils and a possible starting point for discussions. By the end of the Merchant trip, most papers were openly speculating that the multilateral nuclear force plan in its present form would be scrapped with the debate continuing on the central issue of nuclear interdependence within the Western Alliance. Hopes were also expressed that the United States would find a way to dispel the confusion aroused by its original multilateral force proposals."

Atlantic solidarity, and also undermine the domestic stability of West Germany. It is in nobody's interest—least of all West Germany's—to set in motion events that can only end with suspicion and concern in most of the countries of the West about Germany's nuclear role. This is bound to aid the Soviet thrust to divide the West through the fear of Germany. A divided country, which in the space of 50 years has lost two wars, experienced three revolutions, suffered two periods of extreme inflation and the trauma of the Nazi era, should not, in its own interest, be placed in a position where, in addition to its inevitable exposure to Soviet pressure, it becomes the balance wheel of our Atlantic policy."

4. Political repercussions in the Congress

It also seems clear that the MLF is not presently favored in the Congress, or likely ultimately to win its support. It probably violates or strains the McMahon Act by giving nuclear information to other countries. It gives concern to those who have worried about a reemerging Germany as a predominant European power which controls European fortunes. It is not favored by those who value our nuclear monopoly and the direct controls which we have retained upon the strategic weapons of potential annihilation. Meanwhile, the administration has completely bypassed the Congress. The closer we approach activation of MLF, the larger congressional concerns.

5. Nuclear race escalation

Following the test ban, there have been widespread hopes that a way would be found to reach a plateau in the nuclear arms race in which there would be a leveling off of nuclear forces within present limits, and no expansion of weaponry to countries which are nuclear free today. Apart from the additional numbers of strategic weapons and nations with such weapons which the MLF would involve, it is today the single proposal for a new advance which stands in the way of a leveling off of the nuclear arms race. This is a serious new ground for a reassessment of the MLF proposal.

D. THE LARGER CONTEXT: ENDING THE EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY OF ARMAMENTS

Almost all current debates about the MLF are limited to the existing political and military relationship in Europe. All are predicated upon the assumption that there remains a military threat in Europe from the east which requires degrees of nuclear capability in Western Europe. First, however, it must be noted that, except for the special problem of Berlin, conventional forces are demonstrably adequate for the defense of Western Europe against conventional force attack. Moreover, the very hypothesis of an attack upon Western Europe becomes less and less credible as the years pass. Without Soviet participation, such an attack would be meaningless in military terms and therefore unlikely of initiation; with Soviet participation it would unquestionably initiate a world war, which again provides a highest level deterrent. Nor is it clear just what Soviet hope would impel such an attack. Our present military posture in Europe is based on a threat which no one believes.

The fact is that we have continued to give a preemptive position to military policy and nuclear power in Europe, in an era when the real problems of Europe are economic and political rather than military. Our continuing diplomacy of weaponry, both against the Soviets and vis-a-vis De Gaulle, stands in the way of the traditional diplomacy, prevents desired economic and cultural exchange, and other normal adjustments between countries as well as the necessary political developments within them. The MLF perpetuates obsession with military response to rifts with the Soviets and between the Allies, in an era

which calls not for an arms polemic but for the progression of relationships between sovereign states.

Those who would promote a detente and ultimately a settlement in Europe, must look beyond such merely military alignments such as the pseudopartnership of the multilateral nuclear force. For the nuclear arms race and the diplomacy of armaments in Europe will not cease as long as the United States itself is the chief promoter of new nuclear weapons systems. On the other hand, a return to the traditional international diplomacy in Europe would foster a climate in which national possession of nuclear arms would appear less vital either for national prestige or national security. As long as the United States remains ready to employ its nuclear strength against a nuclear attack in Europe, there is in fact no security necessity for national nuclear forces. And the demand for nuclear arms in NATO countries attributable to the desire for national prestige and self-esteem, reflects a desire which we ourselves are fostering when we proclaim by devices such as the MLF that our NATO allies must have a first-ranking role in the operation of a strategic weapons system. In short, the only way in which our NATO allies can be induced not to strive for a strategic nuclear system of their own is if we ourselves cease our obedience to nuclear power as the cornerstone of European policy.

Today we welcome agreements to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to Latin America and other areas where they are not presently deployed. One may hope that tomorrow we may recognize that in Europe, too, the proper goal is not an accretion in nuclear armaments but the replacement of the nuclear confrontation by political and economic settlements and conventional forces adequate to assure that they are honored. At a time when we should seek to move away from the nuclear arms race, the multilateral nuclear force is a move in precisely the wrong direction.

E. ALTERNATIVES TO U.S. PROMOTION OF THE MLF

There are essentially three alternatives to the present U.S. position:

1. Abandoning the MLF

While this may constitute long-term wisdom for the United States, it is unlikely that we would renounce the MLF in the near future without at least a serious quid pro quo from the Soviets. It should be noted that if the United States abandons the MLF, it may continue to adhere to its opposition to the independent development of nuclear capability by Germany, and other nations, and we may expect some success in holding our allies to that position at least for the next few years.

2. Initiating a slowdown of MLF activation

This seems the most desirable immediate step, but there is always difficulty in taking the first step away from an established course. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings might serve as a temporary brake. A slowdown should pave the way toward ultimate recession by the United States from the MLF proposal.

3. A replacement for MLF

A more modest nuclear partnership might be proposed to meet the present concerns of NATO allies. Second level technical people could be brought into the targeting and planning phases of our existing strategic nuclear force, to give added assurance of our readiness to employ the nuclear umbrella. To the extent that we are, in fact, ready to employ that umbrella, it seems highly desirable that our allies be assured that this is so. By this means we may satisfy some present concerns among our NATO allies without creating a new strategic striking force in Europe and opening the door to an

independent European nuclear third force with its troublesome political and military implications.

COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS BY SENATOR MARGARET CHASE SMITH AT HAHNEMANN MEDICAL COLLEGE AND HOSPITAL

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, I am happy to say that at its commencement exercises on June 4, Hahnemann Medical College, of Philadelphia, Pa., conferred on our colleague, Senator MARGARET CHASE SMITH, the honorary degree of doctor of humane letters. Surely no one more richly deserved the honor than did Senator SMITH. As chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Health, I want to say that there has been no member of the committee more devoted to the cause of the health of our people and of all peoples. She has made many fine contributions to the cause. She has, indeed, been a leader and a valiant warrior in the battle for medical research, medicine, rehabilitation, hospitals and other health facilities, and the advancement of health and medical education. I am proud to be associated with all members of this body when I congratulate Hahnemann Medical College on the honor it has done Senator SMITH, and say how proud we are that this richly deserved honor has come to her. I ask unanimous consent that Senator SMITH's remarks at the commencement exercises be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

REMARKS OF SENATOR MARGARET CHASE SMITH, AT COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES AT HAHNEMANN MEDICAL COLLEGE AND HOSPITAL, PHILADELPHIA, PA., JUNE 4, 1964

President Cameron, members of the board of trustees, members of the faculty, members of the graduating class, students and friends, I am deeply appreciative of the honor awarded me by your distinguished and highly esteemed institution. It is a coveted distinction to be associated with you for I am keenly aware of the great contribution that Hahnemann Medical College makes to the field of medicine, medical research, and health.

It has been my privilege for a decade to have made sustained efforts in support of the cause of medical research in my capacity as a member of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Health. Prior to my Senate service, it was my good fortune to be chairman of the House Armed Services Medical Subcommittee and in that capacity to have been the sponsor of several medical bills, including those for the nursing corps in the armed services.

With the exception of spiritual well-being, there is nothing more important in life than our health, both physical and mental, and happiness, which is essentially good mental health. And it is to this that your medical profession is dedicated.

Sometimes I think that Members of Congress are made whipping targets by the public more than any other group. But now and then I wonder when I hear some complaint about the various professions including yours. And when I hear those complaints I feel a kinship with you—and I try to answer the complainants with my own simple observations of "thank God for the doctors and the nurses and all that they do for us."

ing by the Chinese of a major and very damaging ground operation.

As for full strategic bombing of mainland China that is another story. It would have to be judged with another standard of effectiveness than tactical air strikes, and in the light of the possibility that it would launch World War III.

The occasion for these statements is a dispatch from a correspondent of this newspaper in southeast Asia. He reports that the Communists "apparently are convinced that the techniques they have evolved over 40 years—what they call 'people's revolutionary war'—cannot be defeated no matter how sophisticated and advanced a system of weapons and military technology is brought to bear on the struggle."

This is the challenge. It was compared by Henry Cabot Lodge with having a battleship and needing to do a job in the desert. There should be no illusions about the fact that guerrilla war on the terms set by the Communists will take a heavy commitment of resources, ground and air, and that no bright flash of silver in the air can win a quick victory and return home.

CREATION OF PROPOSED MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR FORCE (MLF)

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, the creation of the proposed Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) is a major foreign policy step, one which could have lasting effect on our relations with our Western European allies, the Soviet bloc, and our conduct of arms control negotiations.

If an MLF treaty is to be presented to this body in the near future, there is great need to have an adequate discussion of the merits of the proposal before the time of requested ratification.

Up to now, there has been little discussion about the MLF, either in the Congress or in the press. Recently, Murrey Marder, the distinguished diplomatic correspondent of the Washington Post, wrote a worthwhile feature on the MLF which explored some of the problems connected with this proposal. I ask unanimous consent to have this article printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, July 19, 1964]
POLITICS CAN BUFFET NUCLEAR FLEET—TARGET DATE FOR MULTILATERAL FORCE PUTS MANEUVERING BETWEEN EUROPE AND UNITED STATES IN THICK OF CAMPAIGN
(By Murrey Marder)

Out of the Cow Palace last week came a theme that will reverberate in discord against some of the most sensitive strings of U.S. foreign policy, including its nuclear strategy.

That was the intention of Senator BARRY M. GOLDWATER: to present an alternative to "me-tooism" in both domestic and foreign affairs.

No matter how American voters react in November to the Republican choice for President and his determination to launch a bolder, more-risk-taking brand of foreign policy, Senator GOLDWATER's nomination itself may have some effect on the current policies of America's allies.

Since World War II, American political nominations have little impact on the world's foreign policies. Even after the subsequent election, because of "me-tooism," or what others prefer to call "bipartisanship," friend and foe alike usually expect no dramatic

upsets if the White House changes hands. That assumption is now gone.

THE LONG VIEW

No matter how convinced they may be that President Johnson will win reelection, foreign offices around the world now are obliged to take a more serious look at Senator GOLDWATER's candidacy. They may well conclude that his nomination alone will have no great impact on American policy but they undoubtedly will be reexamining their positions on ventures that would take years to develop.

A current major project fits that classification, although few Americans have more than the haziest notion of it. One simple reason is its official name, Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF), which opponents deride as a multilateral nuclear "farce."

Despite the bureaucratically obscure title, the plan touches the nerve ends of West Germany's nuclear future; Britain's, Italy's, and other European nations' political and military evolution; the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; the struggle between the United States and French President De Gaulle over the shape of Western Europe and its relationship to the United States, and the prospects for East-West arms control and disarmament.

TWENTY-FIVE NUCLEAR WARSHIPS

All this is imbedded in a debate that has been going on for 4 years in allied foreign offices over the creation of a fleet of 25 surface ships armed with 200 nuclear-tipped Polaris missiles, to be jointly financed, manned, controlled, and operated by those allied nations that can be induced to join. It would be assigned to NATO's defense.

Its cost would be about \$2.5 billion to launch, about \$160 million a year to operate, with the United States and West Germany as the main contributors.

It is a "first step" plan. On that one point, its supporters and critics agree. They disagree totally on what it is a first step toward.

Its advocates now have the positive support of President Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and all the machinery of the U.S. Government, plus the backing of many of the leaders of Western Europe. They see it as a force for Atlantic unity and as a way of checking the spread of nuclear weapons by assuaging any German military appetite for a greater voice in the use of nuclear power. They believe that it will accomplish other long-range gains without risk to other nations.

Its critics, here and abroad, are not organized and are relatively weak, but they are counting on British and Italian hesitation over the plan and they hope affirmatively to build a backfire on Capitol Hill that will cause President Johnson at least to delay it.

To these opponents, who include foreign policy, scientific and military specialists and political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic, including Johnson administration officials who are now in a distinct minority, the mixed-manned nuclear fleet could do exactly the opposite of what its supporters claim.

They say that it is more likely to intensify than diminish German and other nuclear ambitions, to hasten the fragmentation of the Atlantic Alliance, to damage arms control and disarmament prospects, to impede the growth of national independence inside the Soviet bloc and to cause other harm.

What makes this backstage Allied debate of special consequence now is the time factor.

Originally a mere suggestion by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, the plan got more active Kennedy backing after the 1962 Anglo-American conference at Nassau and De Gaulle's subsequent rejection of British entry into the Common Market.

As one American critic puts it, the MLF "made the long leap from the technical to the policy level" when, "to counter De Gaulle,

the United States felt obliged to assert its leadership, especially in the ultrasensitive politico-military area where De Gaulle himself might move."

Last month, the communique issued after President Johnson's meeting with West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard set an official target date: to try to get the MLF pact ready for signature "by the end of the year" so it might be presented to Congress in 1965 as a treaty or in other legislative form.

LESS THAN A SOLUTION

Since October 1963, a working group representing the United States, West Germany, Britain, Italy, Holland, Greece and Turkey has been examining the plan in Paris. Additional political talks have gone on in Washington and other capitals.

None of these nations is officially committed to it but support for it is growing steadily, not as a cure-all but, as one critic-turned-supporter described it, "as the least damaging way of mitigating the absence of a solution."

Some would join, notably West Germany, because of deep belief in it. Others, like Britain, might join only to avoid missing the boat. They would want to prevent Germany from being its dominant European partner. Still others are interested for a combination of these reasons.

This creates what amounts to an international squeeze play on joining. If Britain does not join, or if Italy does not, the plan will go ahead anyway, American planners maintain. They also would like to raise the ante in this diplomatic poker game by suggesting that the United States might go ahead without both Britain and Italy. But that is not official policy.

The critical maneuvering period between now and the end of the year will parallel the presidential election campaign, and this coincidence is important because the ultimate shape of the mixed-manned fleet depends on long-range American foreign policy.

THE QUESTION OF A VETO

Initially, at least, the United States would have a veto over the use of the fleet's nuclear weapons, because they could be fired only by unanimous agreement. But Mr. Johnson said as Vice President that "evolution of this fleet toward European control, as Europe marches toward unity, is by no means excluded."

Administration officials have assured congressional leaders, however, that ultimate surrender of the American veto has never been even implied. There are other ways of widening European control without touching the veto, they have noted.

Now with Senator GOLDWATER a nominee, political charges that he is irresponsible and "shoots from the hip" tend to underline among Europeans De Gaulle's charges that American foreign policy is unpredictable. This reaction is bothering administration officials.

Senator GOLDWATER has made some criticism of the MLF concept of a nuclear force with mixed crews, but he has not yet been briefed on it by MLF proponents. He advocates a direct NATO nuclear force under NATO's Supreme Commander in Europe, who is an American. Nevertheless, his variable comments about giving NATO greater authority to fire tactical nuclear weapons, and his remark that Germany might have won both World Wars with stronger military leadership, frighten Europeans, even some who want more authority over nuclear weapons.

It is not odd that Senator GOLDWATER's position on the MLF is not well known. One Congressman who has followed it closely estimates that not more than a dozen Members in both Houses have more than a superficial knowledge of the plan, although

Mr. Johnson

administration officials say that congressional leaders and members of key committees have been briefed on it, along with a number of other Senators and Representatives.

Critics charge that a small, determined "cabal of fanatics" pushed the plan through the Government. It is a fact that the MLF enthusiasts were spanked by the White House for overselling the plan last spring. But in April, President Johnson gave the MLF the go ahead. He overrode the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's concern about its effect on arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. On balance, the President ruled, those misgivings were outweighed by political and military arguments for trying to create the force.

Instead of being slipped through the Government by the State Department, its proponents insist, the plan received unusual study by three administrations. Its original formulators or advocates included three former or present members of what is now the State Department Policy Planning Council: Robert R. Bowie, now Director for the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University; Gerard C. Smith, now in charge of MLF negotiations; and Walt W. Rostow, present head of the policy staff.

In addition, prime movers included Henry D. Owens, deputy to Rostow; Livingston T. Merchant, former special negotiator for MLF; Foy D. Kohler, now Ambassador to Moscow; J. Robert Schaetsel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; and Under Secretary of State George W. Ball.

At the Defense Department, the principal early advocate was the late Adm. Claude V. Ricketts. His name soon will be given to the U.S.S. *Biddle*, the Navy's nonnuclear guided missile destroyer. The ship is being used to demonstrate the feasibility of manning vessels with crews of several nations, overcoming the complexities of differing food, training, and other national characteristics.

The idea of a mixed-manned nuclear fleet developed because of a military problem, but its motivation was and is mainly political. The concept arose from a request by the then Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Gen. Lauris K. Norstad, for medium-range nuclear missiles to counter Soviet nuclear missiles aimed at Europe.

Instead of agreeing to that request by extending the "two key" system under which tactical, or smaller battlefield, nuclear weapons are operated by NATO members, with the United States controlling the nuclear warheads, the MLF seaborne fleet was conceived.

The real American military preference was, and still is, on purely military grounds, to meet the Soviet medium-range missile challenge with the huge American strategic nuclear arsenal. However, to offset what American diplomats foresaw as inevitably rising protests against U.S. military domination of the alliance, the political palliative of MLF was offered.

With Italy interested in joining it, but preoccupied with internal political woes, the MLF's future can turn on the outcome of the British election in October. Britain's Labor Party, favored to win, is on record as opposed to continuing the British nuclear force or joining the MLF. It advocates combining Britain's nuclear strike capacity in a NATO force.

But American officials believe that Labor Party Leader Harold Wilson may change his position after exploring other choices. Britain's Conservative government has suggested expanding the MLF by adding to it land-based American Pershing missiles now in NATO and the proposed British TSR-2 and American FTX supersonic nuclear strike planes.

The United States has agreed to a joint study of the offer but there are strong sus-

picious here that London may be engaged in a delaying action.

One specialist in this political-military-psychological maze, Henry A. Kissinger, an MLF opponent, recently wrote: "The novelty of modern weapons systems gives the disputes a metaphysical, almost theological, cast."

The Washington-based Council for a Livable World, campaigning against the MLF, charged in a paper by John Sillard that the MLF "goes too far" to "meet the present concern of our allies" while it is "inadequate" to meet their long-term aspirations.

On the powerful pro-MLF side, however, the Influential Action Committee for the United States of Europe, headed by Jean Monnet, a leader in transatlantic unity, has lauded the MLF as a major contribution to the present "confused and difficult" situation in Europe.

Despite the metaphysical or theological nature of the arguments, if the proposal is sent to Capitol Hill by a reelected President Johnson, the odds will be with it. But first it must weather the political uncertainties on both sides of the Atlantic.

REVIEW OF SENATOR FULBRIGHT'S BOOK: "OLD MYTHS AND NEW REALITIES"

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the Sunday, August 2, 1964, book review section of the Washington Post carries an excellent review of Senator FULBRIGHT's new book entitled "Old Myths and New Realities." The reviewer, Mr. Ronald Steel, contends that Senator FULBRIGHT's recent foreign policy speeches, which comprise the bulk of the book, have "opened the gates of free discussion on all the tired old verities of the cold war."

I ask unanimous consent that the review be printed at this point in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the review was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

OLD MYTHS AND NEW REALITIES

(By Ronald Steel)

("Old Myths and New Realities: And Other Commentaries," by Senator J. W. FULBRIGHT. Random House; 144 pages; \$3.95; paperbound, \$1.45.)

In four eloquent essays, drawn from speeches he has delivered in the Senate during the past year, Senator FULBRIGHT has opened the gates of free discussion on all the tired old verities of the cold war. He has made dissent not only respectable once again, but even imperative as Americans try to grapple with the new realities of a radically changed world.

In an impassioned plea for political realism FULBRIGHT has asked us to recognize that many of the things we have imagined to be "self-evident truths" are not truths at all, but simply attitudes which no longer explain the facts. The most dubious of the "self-evident truths" of the post-war era—that, just as the President resides in Washington and the Pope in Rome, the Devil resides immutably in Moscow—is perhaps the hardest one to shake, for on it hinges all the assumptions that have governed our diplomacy and dominated our national life for nearly two decades. It is for our own sake that Senator FULBRIGHT urges us to drop the myth "that every Communist state is an unmitigated evil and a relentless enemy of the free world" and to accept the reality that "some Communist regimes pose a threat to the free world while others pose little or none."

By challenging some of the most tiresome platitudes with which we have been burden-

ing our diplomacy and our personal vocabularies during these long years of the cold war, he has clearly triggered the foreign policy debate that was his intention. While the wheels of innovation grind slowly, official Washington can never be quite so complacent as it was before Senator FULBRIGHT rose in the Senate last March 25 to charge that as a nation "We are confronted with a complex and fluid world situation, and we are not adapting ourselves to it. We are clinging to old myths in the face of new realities, and we are seeking to escape the contradictions by narrowing the permissible bounds of public discussion, by relegating an increasing number of ideas and viewpoints to a growing category of 'unthinkable thoughts'."

Those words have already become part of the national political vocabulary, as the tortuous reappraisal of American foreign policy—stimulated in large part by the Senator's shock tactics—slowly seeps through the cloistered halls of the Department of State. That key speech, from which this volume draws its title, has been joined to three others—dealing with national security, the Gaullist challenge, and the cold-war in American life—by an alert publisher who has saved them from the oblivion of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD and who has had the good sense to bring out a companion paperback edition that puts them within the reach of everyone.

Among the "unthinkable thoughts" singled out by Senator FULBRIGHT are the "fact that the boycott policy is a failure as an instrument for bringing about the fall of the Castro regime," that "the historical odds are probably against the prospect of a peaceful social revolution in Latin America, that 'there are not really two Chinas' but only one, mainland China, and that it is ruled by Communists and likely to remain so for the indefinite future," and that "the Soviet Union, though still a most formidable adversary, has ceased to be totally and implacably hostile to the West."

As if this were not enough for a timid Washington bureaucracy and a Congress still bravely slaying yesterday's dragons, he has even suggested that we question "the master myth of the cold war"—that the "Communist bloc is a monolith composed of governments which are not really governments at all, but organized conspiracies"—and, perhaps most relevantly of all, that the American people must "come to terms, at last, with the realities of a world in which neither good nor evil is absolute."

Despite all this heady iconoclasm, J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT is no phrase-throwing radical. Former Rhodes scholar, university president, veteran of 24 years in Congress, and now chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he is a man of calm temper, exquisite manners, and eminent moderation. Yet he is a man who is deeply troubled by what he believes to be a failure of American practicality: a failure abroad to adapt to the world as it is rather than as we would like it to be; a failure here at home to deal with the urgent social problems that threaten American democracy far more than the irrelevant ideology of communism.

It is with evident reluctance and even a twinge of sadness that Senator FULBRIGHT holds the mirror of reflection to our portrait of national virtues, for he is a patriot whose sensibilities are clearly pained by our inability to live up to our ideals. "In a perverse way," he comments in a disturbing essay on the cold war in American life, "we have grown rather attached to the cold war. It occupies us with a seemingly clear and simple challenge from outside and diverts us from problems here at home which many Americans would rather not try to solve." If the image that emerges from this scrutiny of American life and diplomacy is not always a flattering one, it is all the more worthy of our attention, for these are the reflections

of a man who has thought long and deeply about the problems facing this Nation, who is worried by much of what he has seen, and who has had the courage to say what he believes.

In deliberately setting out to tell us that we don't really know much of what we think we know, Senator Fulbright steps on a great many sensitive toes. Not everyone will find it easy to accept his view that the near hysteria that has afflicted many Americans over Cuba comes more from wounded pride than anything else, or even his observation that if Cuba were to sink below the Caribbean tomorrow, and if Moscow were suddenly and miraculously to recall all of its agents in the Western Hemisphere, much of Latin America would still be agitated by unrest, radicalism, and revolution. But these are simple truths, and it is time someone of Senator Fulbright's stature had the courage to state them plainly.

One cannot help but wish that the Senator had applied some of his admirable iconoclasm to the crisis in southeast Asia where he believes that we have no choice but to support the South Vietnamese Government and Army, however inept and deprived of its own people's allegiance—a counsel which does not seem to accord with the Senator's warning. In another context, against our tendency to place excessive faith in military solutions to political problems. One might also wish that in his enthusiasm for an Atlantic community built upon NATO, Senator Fulbright might entertain the possibility that the Gaullist vision of a confederated Europe with its doors open to the satellites is not necessarily profoundly reactionary in the historical sense; or, indeed, that current French policy may be based on something more than an excess of pride and assertiveness.

But everyone has his own conception of the new realities, and Senator Fulbright's purpose in demolishing some old myths was not to inspire total agreement but to unblock the clogged channels of our thinking and our diplomacy. In these elegantly phrased and bitingly heretical essays he has made his point brilliantly, and no thoughtful reader is likely to put down this slim volume of political dynamite without questioning a good many of the self-evident truths he has always taken for granted.

For that matter, no one who reads these essays can help but speculate on the political future of a man whose views on foreign affairs are scrutinized by the world press as though they were semi-official pronouncements of the U.S. Government, and whose talents have long seemed to call for an outlet closer to the heart of foreign policymaking than the Senate. But such speculation immediately raises the question of whether Senator Fulbright's civil rights record, reaffirmed only a few weeks ago by his negative vote on the civil rights bill, might not compromise his role as a potential architect of the Nation's diplomacy. While such things as stature in the world community are hard to measure, it seems unlikely that Senator Fulbright's has been diminished by his stand on civil rights for the simple reason that most people understand perfectly well that his votes on this issue are dictated by the reality of Arkansas politics. So long as he represents the voters of that Southern State, Senator Fulbright is likely to be torn by the conflicting demands of equity and political realism, a conflict which, judging from the final pages of this book, is as troubling to him as to his admirers. It would be a self-defeating logic, indeed, that would deprive the Nation of Senator Fulbright's wisdom in forging an enlightened diplomacy because of a principle he could challenge only by committing political suicide.

In reexamining the stale slogans of the cold war, Senator Fulbright reveals not only the mind of a great statesman, but something even more rare, the heart of a public philoso-

pher who has the courage to question the massive diversion of energy and resources from the creative pursuits of civilized society to the conduct of a costly and interminable struggle for world power, who has the humanity to ask why it is that so much of the energy and intelligence that men could use to make life better for themselves is used instead to make life difficult and painful for other men, and who has the wisdom to remind us that we must dare to think about unthinkable things because when things become unthinkable, thinking stops and action becomes mindless.

THE THEODORE ROOSEVELT TRADITION AND CAMPAIGN OF 1964

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, today's New York Times carries and interesting, incisive letter written by Prof. William Harbaugh, chairman of the department of history at Bucknell University, and one of the Nation's leading authorities on Theodore Roosevelt. In his letter, Professor Harbaugh comments on the analysis advanced by another writer, who has compared the views of Senator Goldwater with those of Theodore Roosevelt.

I was privileged to attend graduate school with Professor Harbaugh, at Northwestern University, following World War II. I know him as a personal friend, and I admire him as one of the Nation's most respected younger historians.

Believing that his letter is an important contribution to the national debate of 1964, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed at this point in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Aug. 3, 1964]
GOLDWATER NOT SECOND T.R.—THEIR VIEWS ON DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONTRASTED

(The writer is chairman of the Department of History, Bucknell University, and the author of "Power and Responsibility: The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt.")

To the Editor:

The effort of Hamilton Fish in his letter of July 23 to link Senator Goldwater with Theodore Roosevelt is a disservice to history.

Whatever Senator Goldwater stands for, there is no question of what Theodore Roosevelt stood for once he conquered the Sturm und Drang impulses of his youth: He stood for a foreign policy based on a shrewd and realistic assessment of our own and our potential adversaries' power; and he stood for a domestic policy grounded on the realization that the rise of a nationwide communications and industrial system made the expansion of Federal power envisioned by Alexander Hamilton and Chief Justice John Marshall as desirable as it was inevitable.

The great issue in foreign affairs during Roosevelt's Presidency was American relations with Japan. On this, if not always on the minor issues, Roosevelt worked quietly for an accommodation of interests.

ROOSEVELT AND JAPAN

He silenced west coast demagogues by negotiating a gentleman's agreement on immigration. He recognized Japanese "sovereignty over" Korea in return for Japan's disavowal of designs on the Philippines. And he recognized Japanese economic ascendancy in Manchuria in return for little more than Japan's good will.

After he left office he urged President Taft at least twice to abandon commercial ambitions in Manchuria and China—to give up, in effect, the Open Door—in exchange for Japanese concessions on immigration.

Roosevelt's domestic policies were even more incompatible with Goldwaterism. His first annual message sounded the deathknell on States rights, and an avalanche of later messages and actions virtually buried them. Roosevelt perceived that opponents of his plan to put all big business under Federal control were invoking States rights "because they do not venture to express their real wish, which is that there shall be no control at all."

He defended his calls for steeply graduated income (eventually 90 percent) and inheritance taxes with statements that "no amount of charity in spending [ill-won] fortunes . . . compensates for misconduct in making them," and that huge fortunes "rarely do good and . . . often do harm to those who inherit them."

And he failed juries for failing to send reputable businessmen to jail "for doing what the business community has unhappily grown to recognize as well-nigh normal in business."

GOLDWATER'S STAND ON TVA

Senator Goldwater's attitude toward the TVA contrasts still more sharply with T.R.'s basic views. Roosevelt believed passionately that the Nation's natural resources belonged to all the people, that the Federal Government should foster multipurpose river valley developments (he vetoed a bill in 1903 that would have opened Muscle Shoals to piecemeal private development), and that the utilities monopoly was "the most threatening which has ever appeared."

Nor can the Goldwater wing of the GOP take succor in T.R.'s postpresidential domestic policies. In 1912 Roosevelt stormed out of the Republican Party with the assertion that it had become "the cause of the political bosses and of special privilege in the business world."

And in 1916, after calling for farm subsidies, public housing and social security, he vainly warned the Republicans against allowing "the Romanoffs of our social and industrial world" to return to power.

WILLIAM H. HARBAUGH.

GULFORD, CONN., July 23, 1964.

BANK FAILURES

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, in view of the fact that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation now carries insurance on approximately \$180 billion of bank deposits, and has built up a fund of \$2.7 billion with which to meet liabilities, I—as one of the early sponsors of that helpful legislation—have carefully watched the rapid expansion of bank credit during a rather inflationary period of some 20 years, with a view to ascertaining whether our insured banks are being safely operated and whether the premium they pay for the insurance of deposits up to \$10,000 is enough to make the insurance fund actuarially sound. I am gratified to report to the Senate that, on the whole, insured banks of this Nation are well managed and are in a sound condition; and that when a failure occurs, it is the exception that proves the rule of good management.

The closing of the Frontier Bank, in Covelo, Calif., on Friday, July 31, marks the fifth bank failure this year, and the third in the past 30 days. I have reviewed every one of these failures with

OUTGOING
MESSAGE

VIA POUCH

U. S. INFORMATION AGENCY

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USIA CA-183 July 17, 1964

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Attached is a Talking Paper on the Multilateral Nuclear Force, for use as outlined in Infoguide No. 62-32 of April 26, 1962.

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July 17, 1964

THE MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR FORCE (MLF)

(1) QUESTION: Why have an MLF at all?

ANSWER: For a number of years, as the economies of our European allies have become revitalized and as the threat of Soviet rockets targeted on them has continued, many of our European allies have wanted a larger role in the nuclear deterrence of and defense against Soviet power.

As a way of meeting that desire, without increasing national nuclear forces, the U. S. proposed the Multilateral Nuclear Force.

(2) QUESTION: What would such a force consist of?

ANSWER: It would be a force of up to 25 surface warships, with each ship carrying eight nuclear missiles. It would be multilaterally owned, manned and controlled by the participating NATO nations. No more than 40% of the personnel on each ship would come from any one nation. The force would be committed to SACEUR, NATO's supreme allied commander in Europe.

(3) QUESTION: Which nations would take part?

ANSWER: MLF would be open to any NATO member. Eight NATO nations are now (July 1964) studying the proposal without commitment: Belgium, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Turkey, West Germany, the U. K. and the U. S.

(4) QUESTION: The U. S. proposed MLF some years ago. Why is it not yet in existence?

ANSWER: From the outset the U. S. made clear that the proposal depended on the extent of allied interest in the project.

The allied show of interest has been sufficient for the U. S. to support the concept of an MLF composed of those NATO members which wish to take part, and to assign a non-nuclear guided missile destroyer--the U.S.S. RICKETTS--as a demonstration ship for the MLF mixed-manning concept.

(5) QUESTION: MLF is an American proposal. Doesn't that mean it would serve American purposes, primarily? What advantages does it have for West Europeans?

ANSWER: MLF would serve the common purposes of its participants and the common interests of NATO members. For West Europeans, it would:

-- Give participating countries a basis for a more significant role in formulating NATO strategic and nuclear policy, and a greater share of responsibility in the nuclear defense of the Alliance;

-- Diversify, fortify

-- Diversify, fortify and modernize the nuclear strategic weapons systems serving NATO's deterrent and defensive needs;

-- Strengthen the cohesion of cooperating members in NATO, and narrow the gap between its nuclear and non-nuclear members;

-- Reinforce the present U. S. commitment to the common defense exemplified by the existing U. S. military presence in Europe;

-- Institute a program in which the European role could grow as the European members move toward increasing unity, thus contributing toward the goals of European integration and Atlantic partnership.

(6) QUESTION: Isn't this nuclear project provocative, especially in a time of "detente"?

ANSWER: MLF is a justified response to the Soviet nuclear threat--which has in no way abated--rather than a provocation to the Soviets.

Over the past years the Soviet Union has deployed hundreds of rockets aimed at Western Europe. This array is still growing. The Soviet leaders have not hesitated to put their rockets to political use. They have reminded European countries how easily the USSR could destroy the Acropolis or the orange groves of Italy or, for that matter, all of England or France. Nuclear blackmail of Europe lay at the heart of Moscow's pressure on Berlin over the period 1958-62.

The defensive strength of the Atlantic Alliance is a sine qua non of whatever there is of improved East-West relations. MLF would help to maintain NATO's deterrent role and thus could help to lead to mutually advantageous international agreements on arms control and disarmament.

(7) QUESTION: Isn't MLF inconsistent with the professed U. S. pursuit of such agreements?

ANSWER: On the contrary. MLF is not inconsistent but compatible with efforts to bring nuclear armaments under control. It would:

-- Help to counter the Soviet threat without relinquishing control of nuclear weapons to any one state, and thus creating new centers of national nuclear decision-making.

-- Offer an alternative to, instead of promoting, the proliferation of national nuclear weaponry;

-- Be consistent with the "freeze" on nuclear delivery vehicles which the U. S. proposed to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva. Within agreed limitations of any freeze, each side would be free to organize and deploy its defenses as it deems best. MLF could substitute for at least some U. S. missiles now projected for construction.

(8) QUESTION:

(8) QUESTION: Some critics call MLF a "costly luxury." Aren't they right?

ANSWER: MLF would cost participants but a small percentage of their current annual defense budgets. A nation undertaking 10% of MLF costs would spend an average of \$46 million per year on MLF in the first five years, about \$16 million thereafter. Costs to participating nations would equal from 0.75% to 4.0% of their average annual defense budgets in the first five-year period, and only 0.2% to 1.0% thereafter. The European members could meet part of their costs by providing vessels built in Europe.

(9) QUESTION: Wouldn't it be better to use submarines for MLF?

ANSWER: Surface ships are quicker and cheaper to build and operate, and easier to man with unified crews than submarines. Submarines offer no significant advantages justifying the great expense and loss of time to a force with the mission of the MLF.

(10) QUESTION: Aren't surface ships vulnerable?

ANSWER: MLF warships would be hard to find in the three-to-four million square miles of water surrounding NATO territory. These merchant-type hulls would be almost indistinguishable from thousands of other ships in Atlantic and Mediterranean waters. They could outrun most trailing vessels. They could operate close to friendly shores in coastal waters too shallow for enemy submarines. They would be shielded from attacking airplanes by the NATO land mass and NATO land and air defenses. They would exploit the protection which islands and restricted passages afford against radar detection and tracking.

(11) QUESTION: Aren't most West Europeans satisfied with the existing protection of U. S. nuclear strength?

ANSWER: A number are satisfied. As they continue to prosper and regain strength and self-respect, however, others appear to be reaching the conclusion that "Europe cannot turn its back on problems upon which depend the security and survival of the West . . . Europe must participate in and contribute to nuclear defense, undertaking its burdens, using its resources, and making its effort" (Jean Monnet, 2/25/64).

The U. S. has increased and improved consultations with its allies on NATO nuclear defense and will continue to do so. But this is not a substitute for the type of partnership implicit in MLF, where actual operating and planning responsibilities will be shared.

Two West European nations have sought to build national nuclear forces. This option does not meet NATO's need. A credible Atlantic deterrent must be as near to indivisible as possible. National nuclear forces encourage development of other national nuclear forces; thus they are inefficient, costly, duplicative and divisive of NATO unity and strength.

The multilateral

The multilateral force would bind the U. S. more closely to Europe, Europeans more closely together, and Europe more closely to the U. S. It would confront NATO's enemies with an Alliance stronger because unified. Thus it would discourage aggression and be a force for peace.

(12) QUESTION: Aren't the Soviets right in saying MLF would give West Germany control over strategic nuclear weapons?

ANSWER: No. The MLF provides for ownership, manning and control by several participating NATO nations. Neither Germany nor any other single nation could fire any of the weapons by national decision. By providing for multilateral control, the MLF avoids the dangers inherent in the development of new national nuclear forces. We believe--and the leaders of the German Federal Republic's major parties agree--that multilateral arrangements represent the best way to forestall possible pressures for nationalistic actions.

The USSR will no doubt continue to oppose MLF and any other NATO moves designed to counter the Communist threat. But the USSR should recognise that the MLF does not represent proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(13) QUESTION: Wouldn't 25 nuclear-armed ships increase the chance of accidental war or nuclear accident?

ANSWER: No. No single individual or member nation would have authority to fire the missiles. Safeguards would make it impossible for any or all the personnel aboard an MLF ship to fire any MLF missile except on explicit order of a multilateral control group, external to the MLF ships.

(14) QUESTION: Isn't it true that MLF simply puts a number of NATO fingers on the safety catch, but does not bring them closer to the trigger? How can that meet legitimate European defensive concerns?

ANSWER: NATO governments studying the MLF have agreed that use of its missiles would require concurrence of the U. S. and other participants in a formula still to be agreed on.

The U. S. has not foreclosed possible future increase in the European role in MLF: "Evolution of this missile fleet toward European control, as Europe marches toward unity, is by no means excluded" (Lyndon B. Johnson, Brussels, 11/8/63).

The U. S. Congress and parliaments of other MLF member nations would have to approve any change involving amendment of the MLF Charter.

(15) QUESTION

(15) QUESTION: Wouldn't progress in disarmament make the MLF proposal obsolete, or cause the U. S. to withdraw its support of MLF?

ANSWER: No. We have seen no signs that the Soviet Union is about to scrap its nuclear arms. At the disarmament conference in Geneva the U. S. discusses MLF only as an established U. S. policy. MLF is not up for negotiation, modification, or bargaining with the USSR. No disarmament agreement affecting the MLF could be reached without the agreement of the MLF participants.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY Italy/Western Europe

REPORT NO.

SUBJECT Views of Adolfo Alessandrini, Chief of the Italian Representation, NATO, in Paris, on the MLF, as expressed in a Report to the Italian Foreign Ministry

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The following is a translation, from the Italian, of a report, dated 25 January 1964, from Adolfo Alessandrini, Chief of the Italian Representation, NATO, in Paris, to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the second phase of negotiations for the Multilateral Force (MLF). Although somewhat dated, the report appears to contain valuable background information on the MLF in general and reflects Italian impressions concerning the position of the United States in particular.

1. As I have already reported, negotiations on the Multilateral Force have gone beyond the initial "first reading" stage towards a second phase in which the problem will be gone into in greater depth. Even though this second stage has been christened the "second reading," it is my impression that the moment has arrived in which the positions of the participating countries will have to be defined and clarified in order to make it possible to have a concrete and clearer image of that which the Multilateral Force may become; only a vague and approximate design emerged from the "first reading."
2. At the beginning of this second phase, I desire to present to Your Excellency some considerations and, especially, any impressions gained during the course of the first reading concerning United States reluctance to guide negotiations at Paris and to avail themselves of their weight in order to give them a specific character. Thus far Finletter has remained largely a spectator. At times he has given proof of understanding towards us, and one must admit that this first reading has permitted some positive working results which I have reported to Your Excellency from time to time.

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Nevertheless, the negotiations were lacking in direction, in that guidance which only the Americans would have been able to provide, thanks to their specific experience and their status as the Alliance's major nuclear power.

3. In support of my impressions, I should like to call Your Excellency's attention to what follows. During last year's orientation contacts, the Americans presented MLF to us as, above all, an instrument to obtain the flanking participation in negotiation of the Alliance's nuclear problems of the countries which had agreed to assume the resulting new political responsibilities, as well as to take on the necessary additional financial outlay. This was also for the purpose of facilitating a process of political evolution of the Alliance (as was stated by the Americans in Rome at the beginning of 1963, during the course of which certain countries could pass to a new "status" of nuclear responsibilities for the added purpose of blocking and neutralizing France's foolish neutralistic aims. Thus conceived, MLF should have been capable of acting not only in the NATO area, but also in "external zones".⁴ This even led Hall to state in the Council in January 1963 that in order to discipline such a possible eventual "external" use of MLF, a special accord among participating members would have been necessary, an agreement, for example, analogous to that on plans for Berlin action.
4. Control of MLF would have been "effectively exercised" by the states which had participated effectively in defraying MLF expenses (as Finletter stated in Rome); for this reason the eventual creation of a carefully weighed voting system was considered, in which votes would have had weight proportional to the amount contributed. In sum, it is undeniable that the Paris negotiations were initially set in motion by the United States under an aura of reaction to the French attitude and with the aim of constituting a force in which countries willing to undertake the considerable expenses involved in its creation and support would acquire a status different from that of countries abstaining from participation, but opting for only a symbolic participation.
5. Now, during the first phase of the Paris negotiations, I repeat, these premises, in the absence of initiative on the part of the only country with the cloak and the authority to clinch them, have been dangerously beclouded and pushed a little too far into the background; this despite the efforts which we, Italians especially, have reiterated for the purpose of bringing them back to the forefront.
6. As negotiations proceeded little by little, even during the "first reading" phase, there was no discussion, first of all, of aims or eventual use of forces "external" to the NATO zone, with the consequence of reducing the planning and targeting concepts to the limits of the demands arising from the missile deficiencies complained of by SACEUR. The tone thus set, indeed, has actually raised the problem of whether the operational objectives of MLF should be tactical or strategic. This is a problem which can be posed only if operational use is restricted to cover SACEUR land objectives, while it would not be possible to speak of a deterrent capacity covering the entire NATO zone, let alone areas external to NATO.

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7. On these points, I repeat, we have hammered the point that the MLF concession remains as it was at the outset, and that the question of strategic force must be discussed. The Americans, however, have not raised questions in this regard. The problem naturally remains open to discussion in every sense; but, in reality, its first presentation was insipid, because of American reluctance to define its terms exactly.
8. Another substantial point was the matter of financial contribution required for participation. As I reported previously, the British introduced the concept of "in kind" participation, a view with which the Greeks and the Turks immediately fell in line. As a result the initial conception lost in clarity; there was, that is, a certain sliding away from the original American view that not only should participation be based on new financial contributions, but directive rights, as well as the relative weights of participants' votes, should be proportional to the new burdens assumed. In this part of the discussion, the Greeks and the Turks maintained certain impudent positions, as I have already reported to Your Excellency, stating, in fact, that furnishing men and equipment or officers should of itself be considered a contribution! Thus confronted, the American side did not undertake any initiative to clarify this extreme and delicate point.
9. Connected with contributions and to voting, there was also the problem of the Control Commission, the MLF keystone if it is true, as we clearly understood at the outset, that MLF should be an instrument to facilitate the evolution of Alliance countries towards those nuclear positions which they themselves wish to gain, which, to put it baldly, they wish to "buy for themselves" within the Alliance.
10. In that regard, the British have supported the concept of participation by right in the Control Commission on the basis of prior existence of status as a nuclear power, although they assert that they do not intend to contribute financially to MLF. Such a position, if accepted, would totally change the terms of the problem, because it had been understood that one would have to earn the right to take part in the Control Commission by making an additional financial effort. Greeks and Turks, as a result of this, have declared themselves, expressly or "in pectore", in favor of British participation in the Control Committee and, at most, German participation, but they have let it be implicitly understood that they do not favor extending participation to Italy. In all of this, I repeat, there is a desired and substantial equivocation; this because participation in the Commission was to have been acquired on the basis of effective new financial efforts and not on the basis of existence of a prior nuclear status.
11. This fundamental equivocation has thus far deflected discussion of the very functions of the Control Commission. In fact, if conceived of not only as MLF's deciding organ, but also as its motor force, the Control Commission should undoubtedly contribute to stabilizing, controlling, or modifying directive lines, that is, the "planning" (evidently, and there is hardly need to state it, in harmony with the Athens guidelines). There has been observed, instead, the tendency to reduce Control Commission functions to giving the order to "fire;" this would considerably reduce its importance.

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17. I find proof of my assertions in the fact that Belgium immediately and cheerfully agreed to the constitution of a control commission with Italian membership if the functions of that organism were limited to "firing." If, indeed, the guidelines for its use were rigidly decided at a level above that of the Commission, exclusively by the Board of Governors, that is, in which everyone has a position of parity, the question of "firing" would resolve itself as an executive rather than a directive function. It cannot now be denied that approval of the guidelines, which involve the interests and commitment of all, may be a matter definitely within the jurisdiction of the Board of Governors; but their preparation and elaboration should be the work of the Commission, of, that is, the countries which decide on the matter of use. Instead, I repeat, there has been a manifest tendency to remove planning in its entirety from the Control Commission. On this point, too, the Americans failed to make a constructive contribution of clarifying issues.

15. In an attempt to determine the causes of the American attitude, I submit the considerations which follow:

- a. From the time immediately following the Nassau Communique, as we well know, a difference in tone and accent has been observed between the United States and the United Kingdom in their very conceptions of MLF. While the Americans intended it to be a substantially new instrument destined to trigger an important evolutionary transformation in the Alliance, the British tended more markedly to see it as a sort of "transformation" of NATO nuclear armament. This was allowed to be fully understood by the British representative in Council on 11 January 1963 when he introduced the well-known concept of "interdependence in independence"; with this, in effect, notice was given the other allies that the United Kingdom had no thought of giving up the autonomy of her own national nuclear deterrent in the spirit of the Nassau Communique's exceptive clause, which provides that the British nuclear contribution can be automatically withdrawn from NATO and employed in the event of national emergency.
- b. It is now clear that if the United Kingdom definitely decided today to take part in an MLF organization, it should give up the idea of autonomous employment of means which might be supplied as its contribution; this is based on the same premise which makes MLF a multi-lateral property. Here I am particularly desirous of pointing out a United Kingdom tendency which I believe is again blossoming in these negotiations with regard to the points listed above: to change as little as possible that which already exists in order to avoid definite transformation of the physiognomy and conditions of its special status as a nuclear power on a level with the United States.
- c. With this I do not intend to say that the Americans have shown themselves hastily receptive to the British conception, and that, therefore, they have thus far avoided "leading" discussions along the lines which they themselves had laid down. Nevertheless, I believe I can affirm that United Kingdom participation in the negotiations has constituted a disturbing element, not only because, in a sense, the Americans found their hands tied vis-à-vis their British allies, but also because, as a consequence, the small countries which hope to enter MLF to gain advantages without making substantial contributions have found simple and authoritative support of their theses in the British attitude.

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- d. That attitude is not the sole element, however, which has influenced this evolution of the American position. In my opinion, it has been colored to a large extent by the ease with which Germany, in her desire to be accommodating and not to arouse suspicions as to her motives in entering MLF, agreed to join the organization. One is entitled to believe that the United States, even firmly believing in Germany's eventual agreement, may well have expected that country to make her participation conditional on acceptance of certain demands, in the field of control matters, for example, and that the Americans were prepared to meet Germany half way and, in other words, to pay a certain price. Instead, finding Germany already substantially in agreement and at the lowest possible price (the German representative recently went so far as to declare that he had no preferences for a particular type of force), the Americans had already reached one of their principal goals, that of bringing to an end the Franco-German integrative process which had appeared towards the end of 1962. And since that operation seems at this point to have been successfully completed at a low price, there is no difficulty in explaining American impatience to strike while the iron is still hot in order to launch the Force and to up the largest possible number of crew members, be they Greeks, Turks, Belgians, or Dutch.
- e. One might ask whether the American evolution and the Finletter silence are not also the result of fear that Great Britain and Italy, even for diverse reasons, might end up by not joining MLF, and, hence, whether it had not been thought to keep the lesser countries as cover for the creation of a Force which would be substantially German-American.
- f. With regard to the smaller countries, as I have reported on numerous occasions, I recall that the Germans declared they did not approve that planning be reserved to the Control Commission, but that all participating nations should be allowed to take part therein.

I have thought it advisable to set forth the above considerations, emerging from my continuing reporting, on the work of the MLF Group in order to illustrate the situation which has been created, as it appears to me from here, and to point out to Your Excellency my own agreement with our current views which are designed to assert unequivocally our intention to take part in the Control Commission.

14. Nevertheless, I permit myself to insist on the necessity that the Control Commission's structure and the assignment of functions within it be defined with an equal degree of clarity, even if outside the text of the future treaty. It is evident that the small countries could not accept our participation in the Control Commission if that body alone were responsible for nuclear planning and they were excluded from it. It is a question of finding formulas adequate in terms of the fact that those countries which, in reality, have "bought" the right of membership in the Commission - even if its function were "institutionally" limited to that of "firing" - should automatically acquire the right of participating in a substantial and determinative manner - through a corresponding representation in the key posts of MLF organs - in planning and in the formulation of employment directives which, finally, the Board of Governors should sanction. And this, in my opinion, is the important point.

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16. If this were not so, I believe that mere participation in the Control Commission would be dangerously futile. In this regard, I refer Your Excellency to a very frank statement by our Belgian colleague, de Staercke, a known man who speaks in the name of Speer. After having laid down the premise that the Control Commission should limit itself to deciding on firing, he said: "Since planning and guidelines will be decided by the Board of Governors, Belgium stays calmly outside the Control Commission; the Commission, in any case, will be bound by the guidelines which we will all have formulated and decided within the Board of Governors. "I would gladly make you a present of such a Commission," he concluded.
16. I should like to conclude these brief observations by mentioning to Your Excellency the difficulty of speaking explicitly of these problems within the Working Group. In that circle one must take into account the extreme susceptibilities of the small countries who thus far feel themselves flanked by Great Britain, and it is not easy - it might, in fact, have the opposite effect - to tell the truth if the Americans do not take over the negotiations and guide them with a strong hand. As concerns the German, they count on offering a contribution of such weight as compared to that which we would be able to make, that they will be automatically assured of a satisfactory position of prestige beside the Americans.
17. Specifically, I believe that bilateral contacts here in Paris and in other capitals - not only in Washington, but also in Bonn - can be the means best suited to give weight to our concepts and our views during this delicate period, because our interests demand the taking up of positions which cannot be accurately reflected in formulas or official declarations. We are attempting to achieve a position of political importance which cannot be fully sanctioned by written regulations, but which must also be the result of de facto power, to be agreed upon with our major allies even outside the official framework.
18. From what I read, initial reactions in the various capitals to our firm request to take part in the Control Committee appear encouraging. The case requires that in dealing with the other participating governments, however, we insist on affirming our own expectations of taking part in planning and, therefore, on participating effectively in the direction of N.F. And in my opinion, finally, there is need to sensitize Bonn on a matter in which our interests can be parallel and our positions can be mutually advantageous.

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FROM : Department of State DATE: Jan 27 11 14 AM '54

SUBJECT: The Multilateral Force (MLF)

REF : CA-8624

CA-8624 included (Part D) a statement on "Particular Arguments of Labor Leaders," which was based on public statements of Labor leaders up to that date.

Subsequent developments make it possible to issue a revision of this Part, which gives a fuller listing of questions raised by Labor members and press, and some of the comments which have been found helpful in discussing these questions. It is attached. In some cases both the main and subsidiary questions are shown. They are indicated by underlining.

For readier use, a summary of the comments which relate to five of the key questions is also attached.

RUSK

Attachments:

1. Questions Raised by Labor Members and Press, and Comments.
2. Summary of Comments.

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Dated:

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S/MF - Howard Furnas

Clearance:

S/P - Mr. Owen/p RFM - Mr. Spiers

S/S - Mr. Moose WH - Mr. Klein

DOD - Capt. Carter/p

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1

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE1. Is there any military utility to MLF?

(a) Would it not be better militarily to have the increased missile forces which SACEUR has said are needed to cover targets threatening Europe consist of only external (i.e., U.S.) forces?

Comment: General Lemnitzer told the Paris MLF Working Group that he would prefer, from a military standpoint, to cover targets threatening Europe (e.g., airfields and Soviet MRBMs aimed at Europe) with a mix of MRBMs and external forces.

(b) Would MLF be a superfluous add-on to programmed US forces?

Comment: Secretary McNamara told the last NATO meeting the US is prepared to join other interested allies, if they wish, in substituting MLF missiles for some of the longer-range systems now included in the US program.

(c) Would MLF be ineffective militarily because of multilateral manding and control?

Comment: Secretary McNamara's remarks re MLF substituting for programmed US forces are the best proof that the US accepts the recent finding of a military sub-group, made up of officers of seven European navies and the US, that the MLF would be militarily feasible and effective.

(d) Would MLF be ineffective militarily because Polaris is only good as a city-busting weapon?

This is not true.

Comment: / It is the opinion of US military experts that in the time period in which MLF weapons would come into existence, there would be enough significant military targets suitable for Polaris A-3 missiles and in range of the MLF ships to offer occasion and need for effective use of the entire fleet, as now planned.

-2. Would MLF

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2. Would MLF involve more of a national allied (e.g., German) role in operation, ownership, and control of nuclear weapons than has hitherto existed?

Comment: The reverse is true. There would be less of a national allied role in MLF than under existing NATO Atomic Stockpile procedures. Under these existing procedures, there is:

(a) National allied manning and ownership of the missile, as contrasted with the multilateral manning and ownership of missiles which would obtain in MLF.

(b) Bilateral decisions on use of warheads by the US and the country owning the missile; as contrasted with the multilateral control of use of the warhead by a larger grouping of major participants which would exist in MLF.

Thus there would be more fingers on the safety catch in the case of MLF than under existing NATO procedures; and we would expect the Soviets to be more concerned about deployment of MRBMs under existing procedures than via MLF.

Nor will allied nations learn more about how to make nuclear weapons (design data) via MLF than via existing NATO Atomic Stockpile procedures.

3. Was MLF hastily conceived after Nassau?

Comment: The MLF was first presented to NATO in December 1960. Its origins were as follows: In 1959-60 SACEUR proposed deployment of "second generation" MRBMs to allied forces to help cover Soviet targets threatening Europe. At that time, the US and allied countries discussed this MRBM program on the assumption that it would be carried out via the existing procedures described above, which had been used in the "first generation" IRBM program (Thors and Jupiters). In 1960 the US proposed that MRBMs be deployed, instead, via a new procedure (MLF); one factor in this US decision was a desire to avoid extending the larger allied national role inherent in present procedures, described under 2, above, to MRBMs.

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4. If SACEUR and the Germans insist that MRBMs be deployed, could not this be done exclusively on US, rather than allied, ships or submarines?

Comment: Yes, but this would not give the European nations the opportunity to participate directly in the ownership or manning or control of the deterrent against Soviet nuclear weapons directed at their own population centers. US unwillingness to extend this opportunity could, given past precedent in allied manning and ownership of other delivery systems, be politically divisive within the Alliance.

5. Would allied resentment of US insistence on this pattern of MRBM deployment exclusively on US ships be dissipated if the UK had given up its proposed national Polaris deterrent?

Comment: The desire of the European nations to see MRBMs deployed against Soviet targets threatening them and to participate in manning and controlling such weapons does not spring from envy of British Polaris submarines. It antedates that program and springs from their desire to help create and participate in MRBM forces which they consider vital to their defense, as they already participate in other nuclear forces.

6. Is MLF inconsistent with the proposed missile freeze?

Comment: We do not believe so. Within agreed limitations imposed by any freeze, each side would be free to organize and deploy its defenses as it deems best for its security. Therefore, this question should not interfere with the exploration of the freeze concept in the Geneva negotiations.

7. Will the Soviets refuse to negotiate seriously about disarmament or anything else till MLF is removed?

Comment: There is no evidence that the MLF will have any appreciable effect on Soviet willingness to negotiate on disarmament. While the Soviets have at times characterized the

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MLF as an obstacle to a non-dissemination agreement, this has been the extent of their attack. We do not believe this position is either logical or immutable. If the Soviets are truly concerned about the MLF as a way-station to purely national nuclear capabilities, our proposal for a non-dissemination agreement should commend itself since it would rule out evolution of the MLF in such a direction.

8. Will MLF divert attention from what some have proposed as the main remedy: improved nuclear consultation?

Comment: Nuclear consultation is more likely to be a serious endeavor, if countries take part as responsible co-owners, rather than bystanders. Therefore, the MLF and improved consultation are not so much alternatives as complementary courses of action. Moreover:

(a) There have been indications that improved consultation, although helpful, would not fully meet the desire for participation in strategic deterrence unless accompanied by some share in ownership, manning, and control of strategic weapons.

(b) Improved nuclear consultation would not meet the SACEUR and European desire for MRBMs referred to above. The MLF would help to meet it.

9. Would the MLF's cost detract from the conventional buildup?

Comment: The cost to the UK (assuming 10% share) would be 10-20 million pounds annually, or about 1% of the UK Defense budget, at the peak. Part of this might be in goods and services. ~~for example, the cost of the MLF would be less than 1% of the UK Defense budget, at the peak.~~ The probable cost to major Continental countries would be less than 5% of Defense budgets annually, at the peak.

10. Is not

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10. Is not the US committed to give up the veto on the MLF?

Comment: The US has made no agreement to make such a change. It has said that as Europe moves toward unity evolution of the MLF toward European control is not excluded. Even if this change were made, control would still be exercised by a multilateral grouping; national control of nuclear weapons would not result.

11. Would it not be better to have an MLF which consisted wholly of tactical nuclear weapons, since these are already programmed?

Comment: The possibility of future expansion in the MLF can be studied, on its merits, once MLF is established. We have not yet studied the matter and so it would be premature for us to comment substantively. Nor do we know our allies' views. But it is highly unlikely the FRG would agree to have the tactical nuclear weapons in Germany put into MLF, if it did so at all, unless MRBMs -- now lacking -- were also provided as part of the deal. The way for countries interested in future evolution of MLF to influence the matter is to join MLF, since such evolution could be a matter of joint and continuing study and decision once MLF is established.

12. Is there any German desire for national nuclear weapons? If not, why MLF? If so, will the MLF satisfy it?

as we understand it

Comment: The German desire/is not for a national nuclear program but for;

(a) self-respecting participation in strategic nuclear deterrence, -- which they take to mean more than advising other countries what to do with weapons in whose ownership and operation they do not share;

(b) some

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-6-

- (b) some action to meet the MRBM problem;
- (c) a close inextricable link with the US in the nuclear field -- a "clamp," as Defense State Secretary Hopf put it, "holding the US and Europe together;" and
- (d) the possibility of eventually moving toward European control.

These are legitimate purposes and they are at least partly met by MLF.

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MLF1. The MLF would play a useful and effective military role.

(a) Greater Western missile strength than now exists must be programmed in order, among other things, to maintain effective coverage of targets threatening Europe, such as airfields and the hundreds of Soviet MRBMs aimed at Europe.

(b) SACEUR wants some part of the increased missile forces to consist of MRBMs deployed in the European theater. He and his staff believe a mix made up of such MRBMs and of external forces would be the most effective military means of covering targets threatening Europe. There will be more than enough such targets, to which the yield and accuracy of Polaris MRBMs are suited, fully to absorb the MLF's projected strength.

(c) In this event, MLF^c would substitute for some programmed US forces. Secretary McNamara said at the last NATO meeting that "if the members of the alliance should wish, we are prepared to join other interested allies in substituting sea-based medium range missiles for some of the longer range systems now included in our programme."

(d) This is the best evidence that the US accepts the recent finding of a military working group, made up of officers of seven European navies and the US, that the MLF would be militarily feasible and effective.

2. The MLF would be consistent with non-dissemination, since it would involve even less of a national role in manning and ownership of nuclear missiles than other NATO procedures. Until mid-1960 it was generally assumed that a "second generation" MRBM program would be carried out via the NATO procedures which had been used in the "first generation" IRBM program (Thors and Jupiters). Under these procedures, which are now used for deployment of shorter range missiles:

(a) Missiles are nationally owned and manned by allied countries, whereas in the MLF they would be multilaterally owned and manned.

(b) The

UNCLASSIFIED

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-2-

(b) The warheads are controlled bilaterally by the US and the country owning the missile, whereas in the MLF they would be controlled by a larger grouping of major participants, according to the agreed formula.

Thus there will be more fingers on the safety catch on the MLF than under existing procedures.

3. The MLF would be a useful complement, not an alternative, to proposals for improved NATO nuclear consultation. There have been indications that improved consultation, although helpful, would not fully meet major continental countries' desires for self-respecting participation in strategic nuclear deterrence. Such consultation (quite aside from the fact that it would not meet the MREM problem referred to in para 1, above) is unlikely fully to grip the participants if they lack any share in ownership and operation of the strategic weapons about which they are consulting. If the MLF existed, consultation would take on increased meaning for these countries because they would be taking part as responsible participants, rather than bystanders.

4. The MLF's cost would not be so great as to detract from needed conventional build-up. The annual peak cost to the UK (assuming 10% share) would be somewhere between 10 and 20 million pounds, or about 1% of the UK defense budget. Part of this might be in goods and services. ~~(e.g., new bases)~~. The annual peak cost to Continental countries would probably be less than 5% of their defense budgets. The fact that the main items (missiles and warheads) are already being developed or produced to meet US needs makes it possible to predict costs with some accuracy.

5. The MLF would not intensify the arms race, since it could, as indicated above, substitute for some of the programmed US forces.

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(substance same as previously cleared by Capt Carter)

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE1. Is there any military utility to MLF?

(a) Would it not be better militarily to have the increased missile forces which SACEUR has said are needed to cover targets threatening Europe consist of only external (i.e., U.S.) forces?

Comment: General Lemnitzer told the Paris MLF Working Group that he would prefer, from a military standpoint, to cover targets threatening Europe (e.g., airfields and Soviet MRBMs aimed at Europe) with a mix of MREMs and external forces.

(b) Would MLF be a superfluous add-on to programmed US forces?

Comment: Secretary McNamara told the last NATO wish, meeting the US is prepared to join other interested allies, if they/ in substituting MLF missiles for some of the longer-range systems now included in the US program.

(c) Would MLF be ineffective militarily because of multilateral manning and control?

Comment: Secretary McNamara's remarks re MLF substituting for programmed US forces are the best proof that the US accepts the recent finding of a military sub-group, made up of officers of seven European navies and the US, that the MLF would be militarily feasible and effective.

(d) Would MLF be ineffective militarily because Polaris is only good as a city-busting weapon?

This is not true.

Comment: / It is the opinion of US military experts that in the time period in which MLF weapons would come into existence, there would be enough significant military targets suitable for Polaris A-3 missiles and in range of the MLF ships to offer occasion and need for effective use of the entire fleet, as now planned.

2. Would MLF

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DECONTROL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

(2)

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-2-

2. Would MLF involve more of a national allied (e.g., German) role in operation, ownership, and control of nuclear weapons than has hitherto existed?

Comment: The reverse is true. There would be less of a national allied role in MLF than under existing NATO Atomic Stockpile procedures. Under these existing procedures, there is:

(a) National allied manning and ownership of the missile, as contrasted with the multilateral manning and ownership of missiles which would obtain in MLF.

(b) Bilateral decisions on use of warheads by the US and the country owning the missile, as contrasted with the multilateral control of use of the warhead by a larger grouping of major participants which would exist in MLF.

Thus there would be more fingers on the safety catch in the case of MLF than under existing NATO procedures; and we would expect the Soviets to be more concerned about deployment of MRBMs under existing procedures than via MLF.

Nor will allied nations learn more about how to make nuclear weapons (design data) via MLF than via existing NATO Atomic Stockpile procedures.

3. Was MLF hastily conceived after Nassau?

Comment: The MLF was first presented to NATO in December 1960. Its origins were as follows: In 1959-60 SACEUR proposed deployment of "second generation" MRBMs to allied forces to help cover Soviet targets threatening Europe. At that time, the US and allied countries discussed this MRBM program on the assumption that it would be carried out via the existing procedures described above, which had been used in the "first generation" IRBM program (Thors and Jupiters). In 1960 the US proposed that MRBMs be deployed, instead, via a new procedure (MLF); one factor in this US decision was a desire to avoid extending the larger allied national role inherent in present procedures, described under 2, above, to MRBMs.

4. If SACEUR

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

3

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-3-

4. IF SACEUR and the Germans insist that MRBMs be deployed, could not this be done exclusively on US, rather than allied, ships or submarines?

Comment: Yes, but this would not give the European nations the opportunity to participate directly in the ownership or manning or control of the deterrent against Soviet nuclear weapons directed at their own population centers. US unwillingness to extend this opportunity could, given past precedent in allied manning and ownership of other delivery systems, be politically divisive within the Alliance.

5. Would allied resentment of US insistence on this pattern of MRBM deployment exclusively on US ships be dissipated if the US had given up its proposed national Polaris deterrent?

Comment: The desire of the European nations to see MRBMs deployed against Soviet targets threatening them and to participate in manning and controlling such weapons does not spring from envy of British Polaris submarines. It antedates that program and springs from their desire to help create and participate in MRBM forces which they consider vital to their defense, as they already participate in other nuclear forces.

6. Is MLF inconsistent with the proposed missile freeze?

Comment: We do not believe so. Within agreed limitations imposed by any freeze, each side would be free to organize and deploy its defenses as it deems best for its security. Therefore, this question should not interfere with the exploration of the freeze concept in the Geneva negotiations.

7. Will the Soviets refuse to negotiate seriously about disarmament or anything else till MLF is removed?

Comment: There is no evidence that the MLF will have any appreciable effect on Soviet willingness to negotiate on disarmament. While the Soviets have at times characterized the

MLF as

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

4

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-4-

MLF as an obstacle to a non-dissemination agreement, this has been the extent of their attack. We do not believe this position is either logical or immutable. If the Soviets are truly concerned about the MLF as a way-station to purely national nuclear capabilities, our proposal for a non-dissemination agreement should commend itself since it would rule out evolution of the MLF in such a direction.

8. Will MLF divert attention from what some have proposed as the main remedy: improved nuclear consultation?

Comment: Nuclear consultation is more likely to be a serious endeavor, if countries take part as responsible co-owners, rather than bystanders. Therefore, the MLF and improved consultation are not so much alternatives as complementary courses of action. Moreover:

(a) There have been indications that improved consultation, although helpful, would not fully meet the desire for participation in strategic deterrence unless accompanied by some share in ownership, manning, and control of strategic weapons.

(b) Improved nuclear consultation would not meet the SACEUR and European desire for MRBMs referred to above. The MLF would help to meet it.

9. Would the MLF's cost detract from the conventional buildup?

Comment: The cost to the UK (assuming 10% share) would be 10-20 million pounds annually, or about 1% of the UK Defense budget, at the peak. Part of this might be in goods and services. ~~xxxxxx~~ The probable cost to major Continental countries would be less than 5% of Defense budgets annually, at the peak.

10. Is not

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

5

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-5-

10. Is not the US committed to give up the veto on the MLF?

Comment: The US has made no agreement to make such a change. It has said that as Europe moves toward unity evolution of the MLF toward European control is not excluded. Even if this change were made, control would still be exercised by a multilateral grouping; national control of nuclear weapons would not result.

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

6

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-6-

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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-2-

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

SUMMARY

19

45

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Action

Control: 11852

EUR

Rec'd: April 14, 1964
9:42 p.m.

Info

FROM: Paris

SS

ACTION: Secstate POLTO 1458

G

SP

INFO: London POLTO 243

L

Bonn POLTO 208

H

Rome POLTO 88

SAL

Brussels POLTO 83

NEA

Athens POLTO 88

SMF

Ankara POLTO 64

DAC

Manila POLTO 1

P

The Hague POLTO 41

USIA

NSC

DATE: April 14, 9 p.m.

NR

CIA

NSA

MANILA FOR SECRETARY RUSK

OSD

ARMY

Reference: TOPOL 1534

NAVY

AIR

AEC

RMR

1. After careful reflection I cannot help but be disturbed by possibility misinterpretation may be given to proposition that in discussion with Europeans no attempt will be made to force solution upon them. This of course has always been and always will be, I take it, our policy. It is self-evident that any forcing of MLF solution is out of question, and could not be done even if we wanted to. However, emphasis on this fact will be misinterpreted by Europeans who will see in it only determination of US to continue with policy which has prevailed in past and before April 10 White House meeting, namely, that US will not take action to achieve MLF except to extent that allies affirmatively ask for it.

2. Previous policy which Harold Wilson in our meeting with Bruce on April 2 characterized as US "diffidence" was understood by Europeans as being only study phase pending decision

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-165

By Cb, NARA Date 6-29-99

/by US

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~~BUNDY-SMITH~~
~~ALEXANDER~~
~~BELK~~
~~BRUBECK~~
~~CHASE~~
~~DINGEMAN~~
~~DUNGAN~~
~~FORRESTAL~~
~~JESSUP~~
~~JOHNSON~~
~~KLEIN~~
~~KOMER~~
~~SAUNDERS~~
~~SMITH, WM. Y~~

044

~~SECRET~~

-2- POLTO 1458, April 14, 9 p.m., from Paris

by US to move to create MLF. European activities during study phase have ranged from (A) desire for MLF and hope that US would get going on it (German attitude and that of Greeks and Turks) down through varying degrees to (B) other extreme (British attitude, probably followed by Holland and Belgium) of willingness to go along with it only if US succeeds in winning acceptance of other governments and shows determination to create MLF without British if necessary. In all cases from one extreme to other, there has been attitude of waiting for US decision to move. It is my understanding this decision was made at White House meeting referred to in reference telegram. However, reference in reference telegram that no solution is to be "forced" on allies has already raised doubts among those who have seen message in this mission, and will, I am sure, have same effect in various missions to whom reference telegram has been sent.

3. Various moves by US in disarmament field have, I believe unreasonably, raised doubts in minds of our allies as to whether we ever will be serious about MLF. Particularly is this true of move for freeze of missiles. I repeat I believe this unreasonable because if MLF is going to come into existence, in all probability it will be in being before Russians agree to really effective system of verification of freeze and because we have always said MLF was exception to freeze. However, simple logic of matter to Europeans is that if we are going to freeze missiles, we are going to have to freeze all of them -- MLF as well as others -- and at moment and for some time in future MLF missiles would be frozen at zero. I mention this only as adding weight to necessity that nothing be done to cloud decision of point three of reference telegram that "effort will be made to reach agreement on MLF Charter by end this year".

/Any such

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-3- POLTO 1458, April 14, 9 p.m., from Paris

Any such effort is certainly going to be unsuccessful if simultaneously with making it we raise doubts in minds of our allies about seriousness of our own intentions.

As bearing on above I was told by Stikker yesterday that study has been made by IS and submitted to him which states view of IS that US nuclear freeze will in fact make MLF impossible. Stikker seemed to agree with this. I have argued with him and will continue do so. This view is, however, significant because plainly it will radiate out from IS throughout alliance. This underlines high importance our making unmistakably clear that we are really pursuing MLF vigorously.

4. I must make obvious point which, as reported I made to Harold Wilson and repeated in April 10 meeting, that US attitude has been and I should think always should be middle ground between extremes of (A) trying to "force" policy on independent sovereign allies, and (B) saying that we won't do anything unless allies in effect initiate it. Middle ground, it seems to me, is to believe in policy, to urge courteously and without pressures that it be accepted by our allies for common good, to explain policy as best we can, and to use reasonable persuasion to ask our allies to work in common with us. I repeat that anything less than this middle ground will be misunderstood by allies who cannot understand that most powerful member of alliance is as diffident as all that. They have seen this very same ally take some pretty tough attitudes on other matters, such as credits to Cuba, and they have never resented these strong attitudes because they have been put forward courteously and with full respect for sensitivities of allies. If we act differently about MLF, they will pay little attention to us because they will think we are not serious.

/As I

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-4- POLTO 1458, April 14, 9 p.m., from Paris

As I have informed Under Secretary, Germans are already taking this position, and it will be necessary do something to correct it. But before doing so, I want to be sure I have properly understood what we are trying to do about MLF between now and end this year.

GP-1.

FINLETTER

DLW

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**file*
MLF
20
~~SECRET~~

BUNDY-SMITH

ALEXANDER

BELK

BRUBECK

CHASE

DINGEMAN

DUNGAN

FORRESTAL

JESSUP

JOHNSON

KEDIN

KOMER

SALINGER

SAUNDERS

SCHLESINGER

SMITH, WM. Y.

Action C ONTR CL: 10262
EUR RECD: FEBRUARY 14, 5:20 PMinfo FR OM: PARIS

SS ACTI ON: SECSTATE POLTO 1125

G INF Q: LONDON POLTO UNNUMBERED
SP BONN POLTO UNNUMBERED
L ROME POLTO UNNUMBERED
D BRUSSELS POLTO UNNUMBERED
NEA THE HAGUE POLTO UNNUMBERED
S ANKARA POLTO UNNUMBERED
AC ATHENS POLTO UNNUMBERED
P MUNICH POLTO UNNUMBERED

USIA DATE: FEBRUARY 14, 10: P.M.

NSC

NR

LA

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AEC

MR

~~SECRET~~

PASS DEFENSE

13TH MLF WG MEETING

FILE COPY

1. PROCEDURAL ACTIONS. WG MET FEB 14. UK PERM REP IN CHAIR. AGREED TO WG MINUTE 12. PRINCIPAL SECRETARY SAID HE WAS DEVELOPING IN ACCORDANCE WITH DECISION PREVIOUS MEETING TECHNICAL MILITARY QUESTIONS IN CONSULTATION WITH OTHER DELS WHICH HE HOPED SUBMIT TO NEXT MEETING WG. HE REPORTED US PREFERENCE FOR DEALING WITH SUCH QUESTIONS IN WG RATHER THAN SUB GROUP. WG CONCURRED. NETHERLANDS PERM REP NOTED GOVTS VIEWS NOT SUFFICIENT AND AT SOME STAGE SACEUR'S VIEWS WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL. WG DEFERRED CONSIDERATION.

WG SENT REPLY TO MILTO 8 WHICH WELCOMED PRESENTATION BY CHAIRMAN MILITARY SUB-GROUP OF REPORT DURING WEEK MARCH 2. WG NOTED MILTO 9, SECRETARIAT POINTED OUT PARA 14 OF AGREEMENT ON MIXED MANNING DEMONSTRATION SUGGESTED NATIONAL NAVAL REPS REPLY DIRECTLY TO US CNO. NO OBJECTION RAISED. TURK PERM REP RESERVED POSITION ON PARA 2E RE EXPENSES. IN RESPONSE GERMAN DEL QUESTION RE NEED CONTINUE MIL SUB-GROUP, US REP POINTED OUT WISDOM OF NOT DISBANDING MIL UNTIL AFTER CHAIRMAN'S PRESENTATION IN CASE ADDITIONAL WORK REQUIRED.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-165

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-2- POLTO 1125, February 14, 10 PM, from Paris.

RE MILITARY DISCIPLINE ITEM, US REP NOTED NO DECISION HAD BEEN MADE HOW TO DEAL WITH IT AND SUGGESTED LEGAL SUB-GROUP AS LOGICAL BODY. GERMAN PERM REP NOTED LEGAL SUB-GROUP NOT ANXIOUS TAKE ON SUCH SPECIALIZED CHORE BUT WOULD DO SO. MIGHT BE NECESSARY HAVE LEGAL SUB-GROUP MEET IN DIFFERENT COMPOSITION. CHAIRMAN EXPRESSED CONSENSUS WG LEGAL SUB-GROUP TAKE UP MILITARY DISCIPLINE.

RE TECHNICAL SUB-GROUP ON SECURITY AND SAFETY, US REP SAID SUGGESTED TERMS OF REFERENCE (TOPCL 988) WOULD BE CIRCULATED SHORTLY. WHILE AS GENERAL PRINCIPLE SUB-GROUPS SHOULD MEET IN PARIS, US THOUGHT THERE WERE COMPELLING TECHNICAL ARGUMENTS FOR GROUP TO MEET IN WASHINGTON. US RECOGNIZED NO DECISION COULD BE TAKEN UNTIL TERMS OF REFERENCE STUDIED.

NEXT MEETING OF WG: PM FEBRUARY 24. US IN CHAIR.

II. SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION. WG CONTINUED WITH CHECKLIST ON AIMS AND PURPOSES (WG SECRETARIAT 21). WHEN IN RESPONSE CHAIRMAN'S QUESTION THERE NO FURTHER COMMENTS ON MILITARY POINTS (1-5), SHUCKBURGH OBSERVED THEY WERE STILL LIVE TOPIC AND WOULD REMAIN BEFORE WG.

ITALIAN PERM REP SAID FOR REASONS NATIONAL NECESSITY MLF SHOULD GIVE ITALY GREATER VOICE IN ALLIANCE AND DROIT DE REGARD IN NUCLEAR MATTERS. ITALIAN PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY OPINION REQUIRED THIS. ALESSANDRINI REQUESTED DELETION POINT 9 RE POSSIBLE EVOLUTION OF MLF INTO EUROPEAN NUCLEAR FORCE ON GROUNDS IT "PREMATURE." RE POINTS NO. 6, ALESSANDRINI ASKED THAT WORDS "NON-NUCLEAR" BEFORE "MEMBER" READ "EUROPEAN." THIS PRODUCED LENGTHY DISCUSSION UPSHOT OF WHICH WG DID NOT ACCEDE TO ALLESANDRINI'S REQUESTS. GERMAN PERM REP THOUGHT TOO MUCH WEIGHT SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN TO WORDING OF POINTS. PERHAPS ITALY'S CONCERN COULD BE MET IN PREAMBLE OF CHARTER. NETHERLANDS PERM REP THOUGHT THAT THERE WERE TWO ASPECTS OF THIS QUESTION — ONE EUROPEAN AND THE OTHER NON-NUCLEAR. MLF SHOULD NOT EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY CANADA'S ADHERENCE.

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-3- POLTO 1125, February 14, 10 PM, from Paris.

BELGIAN PERM REP THOUGHT ISSUE COULD BE DEALT WITH WHEN IN DISCUSSION QUESTION 8. THE MLF SHOULD BE PROOF OF THE INDIVISIBILITY OF THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE AND THE US. US AND UK PERM REPS SUPPORTED BELGIUM. TURKEY THOUGHT EACH GOVT COULD PUT OWN INTERPRETATION ON MLF TREATY AND CARE MUST BE TAKEN NOT TO SPLIT ALLIANCE INTO "IN" AND "OUT" GROUPS.

GERMAN PERMREP SUGGESTED ADDITIONAL ITEM OF WORK PROGRAM ON HOW MLF WOULD INCREASE THE ROLE OF THE NON-NUCLEAR MEMBERS OF ALLIANCE IN OVERALL NUCLEAR STRATEGY OF ALLIANCE.

CHAIRMAN OBSERVED THERE AGREEMENT ON POINT 6 THAT VOICE NON-NUCLEAR MEMBERS OF ALLIANCE SHOULD BE INCREASED IN PLANNING AND DECISION. WG STILL HAD TO CONSIDER HOW THIS WOULD BE DONE.

US REP SAID MLF, IF CREATED, WOULD HAVE INESCAPABLE EFFECT DESCRIBED IN POINT 6.

CHAIRMAN OBSERVED US REMARK COULD BE BEGINNING INTERESTING STATEMENT. PERHAPS MLF WOULD NOT ADD ANYTHING NEW BUT WOULD INCREASE STATUS AND INFLUENCE OF MEMBERS IN ALLIANCE.

US REP POINTED OUT MLF WOULD BE PART OF OVERALL NUCLEAR DETERRENT OF ALLIANCE. AS IT WAS INTEGRAL ELEMENT, IT WOULD BE PROGRAMMED WITH OTHER FORCES AND NEED TO MAKE DECISION TO USE MLF WOULD GRANT MEMBERS GREATER SHARE IN PLANNING AND DECISION.

CHAIR OBSERVED POINT 7 TRUISM. ANSWER TO 7(A) WAS "NO". DURING DISCUSSION 7(B), IT WAS DECIDED DROP CONCEPT OF "NATO AGENCY." NETHERLANDS PERM REP POINTED OUT NECESSITY OBTAINING ACCEPTANCE NON-MLF MEMBERS OF ASSIGNMENT TO SACEUR. GERMAN PERM REP OPPOSED FORMULATION OF THIS QUESTION SINCE IT MIGHT EMBARRASS NON-PARTICIPANTS SUCH AS FRANCE. TURKISH PERM REP POINTED OUT MLF WAS OPEN-ENDED PROPOSITION.

US REP THOUGHT MLF MEMBERS WOULD TAKE ATTITUDE THERE SHOULD BE CONTINUED STRENGTHENING OF CONSULTATION ON NUCLEAR MATTERS THROUGH NAC, NUCLEAR COMMITTEE AND SHAPE.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 4 - POLTO 1125, February 14, 10 PM, from Paris.

NUCLEAR PLANNING AND TARGET COORDINATION. THERE WOULD BE NO DIVISION IN ALLIANCE EXCEPT FOR UNAVOIDABLE PHYSICAL NECESSITY OF MANAGING MLF. IN WG THERE WAS GENERAL AWARENESS THAT MLF SHOULD NOT SPLIT ALLIANCE INTO MEMBERS AND NON-MEMBERS.

COMMENT: FOREGOING DISCUSSION DEMONSTRATED THAT WG HAS EXHAUSTED FOR TIME BEING AIMS AND PURPOSES. WE PLAN, AND UK CONCURS, BEGIN NEXT MEETING WITH DISCUSSION SPECIFIC LANGUAGE ON ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE WITH AIMS AND PURPOSES LISTED AS A SECONDARY ITEM OF CONTINUING INTEREST.

GP-1.

FINLETTER]

NOTE: RELAYED DEFENSE 2/14/64 AT 9:05 PM.

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ACTION: Amembassy PARIS TOPOL 1434

INFO: Amembassy LONDON 6146
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 " THE HAGUE 2551
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RE: MLF Sub-Group on Security and Safety

Following draft agenda of MLF Sub-Group on Security and Safety should be given to members Working Group for information to assist respective governments in planning for participation and selection of representatives. Do not consider it necessary secure approval of this draft by Working Group since, as is noted in item 3 of draft agenda, Sub-Group will develop its own plan of work at later date. Text as follows:

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4
 By R/HW, NARA, Date 1/28/96

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by S/MF-Howard Furnas

DOD - Capt. Cotten S/S - Mr. McKesson
 AEC - Mr. C. B. Smith White House - Mr. B. L. ...

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SUB-GROUP ON SECURITY AND SAFETY

DRAFT AGENDA

1. Initial Briefing
 - a. Review of Paris Working Group consideration and instructions concerning MLF weapons security, safety, and command and control.
 - b. Review of relevant Military and Legal Sub-Group recommendations.
 - c. Review of NATO stockpile security arrangements.
 - d. Review of nuclear weapons safety considerations.
2. Briefing on main steps in the stockpile-to-target sequence including a description of the re-entry system and weapon system installation.
3. Consideration and approval of agenda or plan of work.
4. Drafting of Basic Security Standards and Procedures (Order to be determined by group)
 - a. Purpose and objectives of the MLF security organization and program.
 - b. Personnel clearance program.

c. Human

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- c. Human reliability program.
 - d. Physical security program.
 - e. Document and information control.
 - f. Violations of regulations or loss or compromise of classified information or material.
 - g. Industrial or contractor security program.
 - h. Transportation and storage of weapons.
 - i. Inspections.
 - j. Communications security.
 - k. Develop security organization.
5. Drafting of Basic Safety Standards and Procedures (Order to be determined by Sub-Group)
- a. Purposes and objectives of MLF safety organization and program.
 - b. Safety standards applicable to MLF.
 - c. Non-nuclear safety objectives and standards (missile propellant, pyrotechnics, etc.).
 - d. EOD standards and organization requirements.
 - e. Safety organization and responsibilities.
 - f. Inspection

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- f. Inspection requirements and objectives.
- 6. Formulation of recommendations on command and control concepts.
- 7. Preparation of summary of considerations underlying the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Sub-Group.
- 8. Preparation of report to Working Group.

END

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REF: POLTO 1124

(A) Representatives to technical sub-groups on safety and security should have had association with military security programs, preferably in connection with present or past atomic systems, e.g., QRA, MAC, or Jupiter. No technical atomic energy experience required.

(B) Representatives could be either military or civilian. U.S. will have both.

(C) We do not anticipate a need for more than three representatives from each participant, but would not object to more. In some instances one qualified person probably would be sufficient.

(D) Names and security assurances should be forwarded by foreign governments to their Embassies in Washington for transmittal to the U.S. Government through JAEIG (Joint

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Drafted by: L:L/EUR:JCR:ippe:
 2/18/64 VBaker:mfl 2/18/64
 cleared

Telegraphic transmission and
classification marked by **SAP** - Howard Furnas

Mr. Spiers TDD - Capt. Cotton
Mr. O'Donnell S/S - Mr. Head

DOD - Cdr Goodberlet

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NLJ 97-165

By Cb, NARA Date 6-29-99

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Atomic Energy Information Group which is agency of U.S. Government which maintains liaison with embassies of each of countries concerned on matters in this field. These assurances should be the same as those required under the 144b Agreements for Cooperation.

While representatives from all members WG would be welcome, participation by every country is not necessarily required since WG will have opportunity become thoroughly acquainted with nuclear security problem in course of consideration of report.

END

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action
EUR CONTROL: 17233
RECD: FEBRUARY 25, 1964, 5:31 P.M.

Info
SS FROM: PARIS
G ACTION: SECSTATE POLTO 1188

SP INFO: ROME POLTO 74
L LONDON POLTO UNN
H BONN POLTO UNN
NEA BRUSSELS POLTO UNN
IO ATHENS POLTO UNN
SMF ANKARA POLTO UNN
DAC THE HAGUE POLTO UNN

P DATE: FEBRUARY 25, 8 P.M.

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PASS DEFENSE

MLF WG MEETING 14 - FEBRUARY 24.

I. MAJOR PROCEDURAL ACTIONS

A) WG MINUTE 13 APPROVED.

B) CHAIRMAN (FINLETTER) ANNOUNCED FOLLOWING UP ON EARLIER SUGGESTION NETHERLANDS PERMREP, HE HAD ASCERTAINED SACEUR WOULD BE WILLING TO MEET WITH WG IN ORDER LATTER MIGHT STATE HIS VIEWS ON MILITARY ASPECTS MLF. WG AGREED EXTEND INVITATION AND MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE AFTERNOON MARCH 2. WITH BELGIAN PERMREP IN CHAIR.

C) DRAFT TECHNICAL MILITARY QUESTIONS CIRCULATED (WG SECRETARIAT 25). CHAIRMAN INVITED DELEGATIONS TO SUBMIT ANY FURTHER SUGGESTIONS FOR REVISED DOCUMENT TO BE RECIRCULATED BY SECRETARIAT, AFTER WHICH GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE INVITED SUPPLY ANSWERS.

D) CHAIRMAN LEGAL SUB-GROUP (GREWE) SOUGHT AND WAS GRANTED AUTHORITY HAVE LEGAL SUB-GROUP CONSIDER PROBLEM OF NOT HAVING MLF APPEAR CIRCUMVENT UN CHARTER, A MATTER SUGGESTED BY UK. GREWE HOPED PRESENT LEGAL SUB-GROUP'S REPORT AFTER CONSULTATION WITH GREECE AND TURKEY WHICH WERE NOT AT

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~~SMITH, WM. Y.~~

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-2- POLTO 1188, FEBRUARY 25, 8 P.M. FROM PARIS

AT MUNICH MEETINGS. LEGAL SG TO MEET MARCH 18 AND 19 IN PARIS.

C) RE TECHNICAL SUB-GROUP ON SAFETY AND SECURITY, DRAFT TERMS REFERENCE (TOPOL 988) CONSIDERED ALONG WITH DESIRED CRITERIA FOR PERSONNEL (TOPOL 1182). ITALY SUGGESTED THAT: THIS NEW COMMITTEE BE SUBORDINATE TO MILITARY SUB-GROUP RATHER THAN TO PARIS WG; TERMS OF REFERENCE BE CLARIFIED; EXPERIENCE US NAVY IN THIS FIELD BE UTILIZED; AND PUBLICITY, ESPECIALLY AS TO POSSIBLE DANGERS OF ACCIDENTS, BE MINIMIZED. WG CONSENSUS WAS THAT BODY SHOULD MEET IN WASHINGTON AS SUB-GROUP PARIS WG. TERMS OF REFERENCE APPROVED AD REFERENDUM. RE PERSONNEL SECURITY ASSURANCES, WG REQUESTED NOTIFICATION BE THROUGH WG RATHER THAN WASHINGTON EMBASSIES. CHAIRMAN PROMISED TECHNICAL SUB-GROUP WOULD BEAR IN MIND ITALY'S OTHER POINTS RE US NAVY AND PUBLICITY.

RE PUBLICITY, US REP OBSERVED THERE NO NEED ANNOUNCE CREATION TECHNICAL SUB-GROUP. IN EVENT ITS EXISTENCE LEAKED, MEMBERS COULD LAY STRESS ON SECURITY WHICH IS PROMINENT CONSIDERATION IN EXISTING BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND AVOID REFERENCE TO SAFETY PROBLEMS.

F) WG WILL HEAR CHAIRMAN MILITARY SUB-GROUP (ADM. WARD) AT 4 PM MARCH 5.

II. SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION.

WG DISCUSSED PAPER ON ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE (WG/SECRETARIAT 24) PREPARED BY SECRETARIAT. DOCUMENT COINED IN PRECISE, TREATY-LIKE LANGUAGE AND DRAWN FROM SUMMARY 1963 (WG/SECRETARIAT 20) WITH SUPPLEMENTARY IDEAS IN BRACKETS.

ITALIAN PERMREP (DUCCI ALSO PRESENT) READ PREPARED STATEMENT (SEE SEPTOL) IN WHICH ITALY PROPOSED CONTROL COMMITTEE OF GROUP OF MLF PARTICIPANTS BASED ON FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS WHICH WOULD TAKE DECISION TO FIRE WITHIN GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY BOARD OF GOVERNORS. COMMITTEE MIGHT ALSO ACT AS EXECUTIVE BODY OF BOARD ON QUESTIONS OF MODERNIZATION, ABSORPTION OTHER NUCLEAR FORCES, ETC.

CHAIRMAN WELCOMED ITALIAN CONTRIBUTION OF IDEAS AND SUGGESTED SUBMISSION SPECIFIC LANGUAGE WHICH COULD BE INCLUDED UNDER SECTION II, B 5 "CONTROL COMMITTEE." IN DISCUSSION SECTION II "A" OF PAPER, ALESSANDRINI RECALLED HIS STATEMENT AND SAID ITALY BELIEVED DIRECTOR GENERAL AND FORCE COMMANDER HAD TOO MUCH POWER. GERMAN PERMREP POINTED OUT II "A" MERELY ILLUSTRATIVE TABLE OF CONTENTS AND IT NOT EXHAUSTIVE. WG NOTED II "A" OF PAPER.

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-3- POLTO 1188, FEBRUARY 25, 8 P.M. FROM PARIS

MAJOR DISCUSSION SECTION II B AND C CONCERNED AUTHORITY OF DIRECTOR GENERAL AND FORCE COMMANDER FORMER, AND VOTING FORMULA. RE ITALY RETURNED TO CONTROL COMMITTEE IDEA. CHAIRMAN OBSERVED IT ONLY SENSIBLE THAT BOARD AS SUPREME BODY HAVE SINGLE EXECUTIVE AGENT SUCH AS DIRECTOR GENERAL AND WAS SUPPORTED BY MOST OF PERMREPS. HE ADDED THIS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO POSSIBLE CONTROL COMMITTEE. CHAIRMAN INSTRUCTED SECRETARIAT REWRITE II B (2) SO AS TO MAKE CLEAR BOARD WOULD NOT BE RESTRICTED BY CHAIN OF COMMAND AND COULD OPERATE DIRECTLY AT ANY LEVEL IT DESIRES.

RE VOTING, GREECE AND TURKEY EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS OVER WEIGHTED VOTING PROVISION ON BASIS COST-SHARING II B (3). SECRETARIAT EXPLAINED RATIONALE SUGGESTED LANGUAGE AS DESIGNED HAVE AS LIBERAL A SYSTEM AS POSSIBLE. NETHERLANDS PERMREP POINTED OUT EEC COUNCIL AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS HAD QUALIFIED VOTING PROCEDURES. TURKEY THOUGHT THIS WAS NEW PRINCIPLE DESIGNED DISCRIMINATE AGAINST POOR. NETHERLANDS POINTED OUT SYSTEM WORKED BOTH WAYS AND IT MEANT POOR MEMBERS, BY VOTING TOGETHER COULD BLOCK RICH. NETHERLANDS VOLUNTEERED PREPARE STUDY ON QUALIFIED VOTING PROCEDURES IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

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FINLETTER

NOTE: RELAYED TO DEFENSE, 2-26-64, 4 A.M.

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Proposed procedures governing the exchange of atomic information required for discussions envisaged in the MLF Sub-Group on Security and Safety are set forth in the attached document, Annex A, entitled "Channels, Procedures and Authority for the Exchange of Atomic Information Required for Discussions of a Multilateral Force (MLF) in Support of NATO".

In accordance with these procedures letters have been prepared for transmission through the Washington embassies of participants in the Working Group on or about March 23. The text of the communication to the UK is enclosed as Annex B, and the text of the communication which will be sent to the other governments is enclosed as Annex C. These communications will be sent in accordance with existing procedures, through the Ministries of Defense of the respective governments. Replies to these communications will be transmitted by the Ministries of Defense through the Washington embassies of the respective governments to JAIEG in accordance with the procedures established for administration of the bilateral agreements under which the exchange of atomic information is to be conducted.

In accordance with arrangements already agreed by the Working Group, names of the representative of each country in the Sub-Group will be given to the Paris

S/MF

15 extra copies

FORM DS-323

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 Working
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 In Out

Dated by:

S/MF:VBaker:mfl/mes:3/24/64

 Contents and Classification Approved by
 S/MF - Howard Furnas

Clearances:

DOD - Capt. Cotten

AEC - Mr. O'Donnell

G/PM - Mr. Orwick

RPM - Mr. Spiers

L/EUR - Mr. Trippe

S/S-Mr. Rowe White House

Mr. Kline

 GROUP 4 - Downgraded at 3-year intervals. Declassified 12 years
 after date of origin.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-165

By CB, NARA Date 6-29-99

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-2-

Working Group and reported to the Department of State. Names, security assurances, and other documentation relating to these and any other individuals expected to participate in any of the meetings will be sent through JAIEG channels, as set forth in the annexed documents.

Paris should inform other members of Working Group in at least general terms of these procedures and embassies other capitals should inform Fonoffs to facilitate their cooperation with respective MODs.

In view of necessity of obtaining approval of eight nations involved of procedures in Annex A, effort should be made as appropriate to discourage changes, in interest early agreement. Should also seek encourage prompt action since we hope Sub-Group can begin work in April.

RUSK

Enclosures:

- Annex A - "Channels, Procedures and Authority for the Exchange of Atomic Information Required for Discussions of a Multilateral Force (MLF) in Support of NATO".
- Annex B - Draft Letter to Dr. Panton (UK) from Brig. Gen. Dawalt
- Annex C - Text of Letters to Representatives of Greece, Germany, Turkey, Netherlands, Italy and Belgium.

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ANNEX B

DRAFT LETTER TO DR. PANTON

Doctor F. H. Panton
British Defense Staff (ACO(W))
British Embassy
3100 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Doctor Panton:

The Department of Defense proposes the establishment of a joint special transmission channel for the exchange of atomic information during forthcoming discussions concerning the establishment of a Multilateral Force (MLF). A draft of the proposed channel, procedures and authority has been prepared and copies are forwarded herewith for your comment and/or approval. The Department of Defense requests early consideration of this matter in view of the fact that the first meeting of the MLF Sub-Group on Security and Safety, which will report to the Paris Working Group, is tentatively scheduled for April 1964.

The following may be of assistance in your consideration of the channels and procedures:

a. Paragraph 5. The atomic information anticipated for release will pertain to the POLARIS weapons system and will be confined to that necessary for discussion and consideration of security and safety requirements applicable to the MLF. It is further anticipated that the highest classification of the information will be SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA.

b. Paragraph 6a. As indicated, the atomic information concerned may be provided to all governments and third nation transmission between designated representatives will be authorized.

c. Paragraph 6d. It is requested that security assurances for designated U.K. representatives be forwarded to JAIEG with your reply to this letter, if appropriate. It is also requested that these security assurances not be forwarded to the other governments indicated pending further notification from JAIEG. Exceptions to normal

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ANNEX B

-2-

dissemination procedures stated in this paragraph are for use by participating governments other than the United Kingdom.

d. Paragraph 5, 6f, g and h. Direct documentary transmissions are essential in this instance. We will be pleased to provide appropriate JAIEG reference numbers when requested by your office.

Upon receipt of your concurrence, we will advise you when the channel is placed into effect, provide the scope of atomic information authorized for transmission and the applicability of security assurance exchanges with other participating governments.

Please advise us of any question or assistance required regarding this request.

Brigadier General Kenneth F. Dawalt
Chief, Joint Atomic Information
Exchange Group

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ANNEX C

TEXT OF LETTERS TO REPRESENTATIVES OF GREECE, GERMANY, TURKEY,
NETHERLANDS, ITALY AND BELGIUM

The Department of Defense proposes the establishment of a joint special transmission channel for the exchange of atomic information during forthcoming discussions concerning the establishment of a Multilateral Force (MLF). A draft of the proposed channel, procedures and authority has been prepared and copies are forwarded herewith for your comment and/or approval. The Department of Defense requests early consideration of this matter in view of the fact that the first meeting of the MLF Sub-Group on Security and Safety, which will report to the Paris Working Group, is tentatively scheduled for April 1964.

For your information, the atomic information anticipated for release in connection with the proposed channel will pertain to the POLARIS weapons system and will be confined to that necessary for discussion and consideration of security and safety requirements applicable to the MLF. The highest classification of the information will be SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA.

It is requested that security paragraphs for the attached draft be forwarded with your reply to this request, if applicable. It is also requested that security assurances not be forwarded to the other governments indicated pending further notification from JAIEG.

Upon receipt of your concurrence, we will advise you when the channel is placed into effect, provide the scope of atomic information authorized for transmission and applicability of security assurance exchanges with other governments.

Please advise us of any question or assistance required regarding this request.

Brigadier General Kenneth F. Dawalt
Chief, Joint Atomic Information
Exchange Group

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23 MAR 1964

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CHANNELS, PROCEDURES AND AUTHORITY
FOR THE EXCHANGE OF ATOMIC INFORMATION REQUIRED
FOR DISCUSSIONS OF A MULTILATERAL FORCE (MLF) IN SUPPORT OF NATO

1. REFERENCES:

Terms of the following references apply to exchanges of atomic information under provisions of this document:

a. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Belgium for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes, dated 7 May 1962, and the supporting Administrative Arrangements, dated 15 March 1963.

b. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes, dated 5 May 1959, and the supporting Administrative Arrangements, dated 19 June 1961.

c. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Greece for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes, dated 6 May 1959, and the supporting Administrative Arrangements, dated 20 October 1960.

d. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Italy for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes, dated 3 December 1960, and the supporting Administrative Arrangements, dated 17 July 1962.

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NLJ 97-165
By is, NARA Date 4-27-00

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e. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes, dated 6 May 1959, and the supporting Administrative Arrangements, dated 20 October 1960.

f. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Turkey for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes, dated 5 May 1959, and supporting Administrative Arrangements, dated 28 April 1961.

g. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes, dated 3 July 1958, and supporting Administrative Arrangements, dated 13 December 1960.

2. PURPOSE:

To establish channels, procedures and authority for the exchange of atomic information (Restricted Data/Formerly Restricted Data) concerning the MLF between the United States Government and allied governments indicated by references.

3. MISSION:

The Department of Defense, with the assistance of other U.S. agencies, is assigned the mission of maintaining necessary liaison with designated representatives of the allied governments named in paragraph 1

and, subject to requirements stated herein, the communication of U.S. atomic information necessary to the discussion and consideration of a MLF in support of NATO. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (ASD(ISA)) will administer this program for the Department of Defense and coordinate participation by representatives of other appropriate U.S. agencies.

4. DIRECT LIAISON AND CHANNELS:

Direct oral, visual and documentary liaison by the ASD(ISA) and other U.S. representatives designated by him is hereby authorized with allied government representatives designated by the agencies listed below. Channels are established accordingly.

a. Belgian Ministry of Defense (MDN) acting through the Office de Coordination Atomique BELGIQUE (BRUXELLES) OCABE(B) or OCABE(W).

b. German Atomic Information Center (AIZ), Bonn or Washington.

c. Greek Office for Exchange of Atomic Information (OEAI) Athens or Washington.

d. Italian Sezione Coordinamento Atomico (Se.C.A.) Rome or Washington.

e. Netherlands Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (NJCSC) in the Netherlands or the Chairman of the Netherlands Joint Staff Mission, Washington (NJSM).

f. Turkish Joint Atomic Information Exchange Group (MUSAT), Turkey or Washington.

g. United Kingdom Atomic Coordinating Office, Washington or London (ACO(W)) - (ACO(L)).

5. AUTHORIZATIONS:

United States atomic information required in the performance of the mission stated in paragraph 3 shall be submitted to JAIEG by the ASD(ISA) or his designated representative, for appropriate processing and release authorization. After such authorization, release may be oral, visual, and documentary (including extracts or summaries) on a continuing basis without further JAIEG approval.

6. PROCEDURES AND REQUIREMENTS:

a. The atomic information authorized for transmission under this channel and procedures may be provided to all allied governments concerned with reference to third nation transmission provisions described in references.

b. Transmissions will be accomplished only to and amongst allied government representatives designated by the agencies named in paragraph 4. The transmissions may be accomplished on any date and at any location determined to be mutually acceptable to participants concerned.

c. The ASD(ISA) or his designated representative will provide JAIEG with security assurances in the format required by references, for all U.S. representatives who are to participate in the MLF exchange program. JAIEG will provide copies of these assurances to the foreign government agencies named in paragraph 4.

d. Allied government agencies named in paragraph 4 will provide each other and JAIEG with security assurances for all representatives who are to participate in the MLF exchange program. It is understood that representatives from other than defense establishments will participate

in discussions of the MLF program and that nominations will be forwarded accordingly. Participation by such personnel will be authorized provided their official duties require participation and they have been security cleared in accordance with standards prescribed in references.

e. Any question as to security clearance status of any individual desiring access hereunder will be referred to JAIEG for U.S. personnel and to the agencies named in paragraph 4 for representatives of allied governments.

f. All U.S. atomic information documents (including extracts and summaries) transmitted to designated allied government representatives under provisions of this document will be confined to the atomic information authorized for transmission and contain appropriate U.S. security and atomic (Restricted Data/Formerly Restricted Data) markings. In addition the following marking shall be entered on all such documents:

"This document contains atomic information released by the Government of the United States to the (appropriate allied government) in accordance with the Agreement entered into between the Government of the United States and the (appropriate allied government) on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes. This document will be handled in accordance with the terms of that Agreement."

g. When representatives of allied governments receive U.S. atomic information documents in accordance with these procedures, complete details of such will be provided by recipients to agencies of their governments named in paragraph 4.

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h. Any allied government reproduction of documents received pursuant to paragraph 6f will be accomplished in accordance with provisions of references.

i. Reports must be submitted by all concerned in accordance with instructions contained in paragraphs 7 and 8.

7. U.S. REPORTS:

Effective upon implementation of this channel, the ASD(ISA) will provide JAIEG with quarterly reports as follows:

a. Oral and visual transmissions: A summary report of the atomic information transmitted will be submitted in ten (10) copies and will include dates, locations, names of allied government participants and other information considered necessary for record purposes.

b. Documentary Transmissions: One (1) copy of all documents, including summaries and extracts, transmitted and the names of allied government representatives to whom transmission was accomplished will be forwarded. The number of copies provided to each participating government will be indicated in all instances.

c. JAIEG will provide participating allied governments with one (1) copy of each oral and visual summary report and accurate advice regarding documentary transmission for accounting and reporting purposes (See paragraph 6h).

8. FOREIGN GOVERNMENT REPORTS:

Foreign governments concerned will provide JAIEG with third nation transmission reports in accordance with instructions contained in references, as appropriate.

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9. DURATION:

This channel and procedures will remain in effect until
cancelled by mutual agreement of the parties concerned.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-169
By WJ, NARA Date 9-25-98

file MLF 26
April 11, 1964

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Memorandum of Discussion of the MLF at the White House, at
5:30 P.M., on Friday, April 10, 1964

Present:

The President, Acting Secretary of State Ball, Ambassador
Finletter, Messrs. Foster, Rostow, G. C. Smith, W. R.
Tyler, McG. Bundy and Klein

Acting Secretary of State George Ball started the discussion by reviewing the progress of the MLF. He discussed the rationale of the concept, stressing the danger of perpetuating German discrimination and emphasizing the need for giving the Germans a legitimate role in the defense of the Alliance, but "on a leash." He thought there was substantial possibility of reaching informal agreement on the terms of a charter this spring and summer and charter-signing ceremonies by the end of the year. He said the Department had been conducting informal consultations with Congressional leaders and the results were favorable. Thus far, there was no evidence of opposition. Therefore, he felt the time had come for broader consultations with the key Congressional committees concerned.

Ambassador Finletter supplemented Secretary Ball's remarks by reporting on the progress of the Paris Working Group. He told the President the educational phase had about reached its end and the time had come to move into the action phase. The way had been prepared for drafting the charter and if the President would give the go-ahead sign, the MLF would be accepted by a number of countries.

Responding to the President's question about the views on MLF within the United States Government, Mr. Bundy said there was a consensus supporting it, but that Secretary McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Mr. Foster had serious reservations. The MLF, he said, could provide an Atlantic solution to the problem of the nuclear defense of the West and weaken French and British determination to hold on to their national nuclear establishments provided it were not forced upon the Europeans.

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Ambassador Finletter said it was his view that the U.S. had to stop being diffident about the MLF. Harold Wilson told him bluntly the British had the impression that President Johnson, as President Kennedy, was not really interested in the project. Saragat also expressed concern about the situation. He said the American attitude had complicated the problem for the Italians, since Harold Wilson kept insisting that the U.S. really did not want the MLF. Therefore, Saragat asked Finletter to urge the President to give specific endorsement to the project so there would be no misunderstanding the American position. Moreover, it was Ambassador Finletter's view that even a Wilson government would join the MLF. He was sure that in the long run Wilson would do what the U.S. wanted and therefore it was important to tell him that the MLF was good for the Alliance.

In this connection, Secretary Hall added that the British in general, and Harold Wilson in particular, wanted to discourage the MLF, preferring instead to run the U.S. deterrent. But the British would go back to the MLF if the United States made it clear that the MLF was the only alternative for them.

In this connection, Mr. Bundy pointed out that we had to take cognizance of the forthcoming British elections and did not want to handle the MLF in such a way as to complicate the campaign.

Mr. Foster interjected to say the President ought to be aware of the Soviet Union's strongly negative views on the MLF, citing Soviet attacks on the project at Geneva. He also warned against tying U.S. hands in such way that it could be immobilized in future disarmament and non-dissemination discussions. Mr. Foster said he would be happy if we could move on the MLF with "all deliberate speed." As for Ambassador Kohler's view (as described in the Secretary's memorandum to the President) -- that "the Soviet leaders find MLF less objectionable than the kinds of MRBM arrangements that might come about in its absence. There is no evidence MLF is preventing conclusions of disarmament agreements that the Soviets might otherwise favor and that would be in our interest," -- Mr. Foster said he disagreed with that estimate. It did not coincide with his impressions from his talks with the Soviets at Geneva.

At the conclusion of the meeting the President directed that:

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- (1) The Department of State broaden its discussions with the Congress on the MLF and begin informal briefings of the committees concerned.
- (2) The Europeans be told that in his judgment the MLF was the best way to proceed. The President also felt the MLF could satisfy the pride and self-respect of the Europeans but warned against trying to shove the project down the throats of the potential participants.
- (3) If possible, agreement on the MLF be reached by the end of the year.

As for the public presentation, the President asked Ambassador Finletter to talk with the press immediately after the White House meeting and explain that he reported to the President on the problems of the Alliance and the progress on the MLF. The President cautioned Ambassador Finletter against giving the press the details of the discussion in advance of Congressional briefings. However, he thought the Ambassador ought to refer to the MLF portions of Secretary Rusk's speech of April 7, citing it as the expression of this Administration's policy on the MLF.

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27

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

July 25, 1963

Mr. Johnson:

Per my telephone conversation.

Carol C. Moor
S/S-S
Ext. 5262

called Carol Moor. This
definitely not to be
NSAM.

(879)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON272~~SECRET~~

July 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-169

By ica, NARA Date 7-25-98Subject: The Next Steps on the MLF

The President has read and approved your undated memorandum to him on the subject of follow-up on the June 24th meeting with Chancellor Adenauer.

I reported to the President your supplementary comment that it would be useful in these discussions to keep before the participants the set of considerations from which the proposal of the MLF has emerged. The President expressed his cordial agreement with this view. He believes that lack of enthusiasm for the MLF in many cases can be traced to a failure to work through the alternatives, and he believes that alternative proposals should be tested by discussion in the same way as the MLF itself, wherever there is apparent support for them.

The President desires that these talks be conducted in such a way as to fulfill all the understandings into which he entered in his European trip. At the same time, he does not wish the negotiations to go forward in a way which would recreate any impression that the United States is trying to "sell" the MLF to reluctant European purchasers. We support the MLF and believe that it is a sound answer to a very difficult political-military problem; we have taken the leading role in developing and testing this proposal which our special responsibilities make necessary; we will continue to use our best efforts in support of this proposal; but the decision on participation will have to be made by each nation for itself.

The President wishes us to be particularly on guard against the development of any notion that if the MLF should fail, there might be some implied obligation to proceed with land-based

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- 2 -

MRBMs. Our negotiators should make it very clear that in the view of the United States land-based MRBMs are not a good answer to the problem of deterrent missile strength for NATO.

The President is also doubtful about the early practicability of any "European" deterrent, but in this area he is quite willing to let discussion and analysis test the case; he does not believe it wise for the United States to appear to oppose any such force if in fact the nations of Europe can find the political instruments of control which would make such a force genuinely European.

Finally, the President agrees that it would be very useful to organize the discussions this summer in such a way as to include British participation, and he would be willing to see the subject matter of the talks as set out in paragraph 2 of your memorandum broadened and softened if necessary to ensure British participation.

inquiry Bm f

McGeorge Bundy

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 11, 1963

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file
~~SECRET~~

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The President wishes us to be particularly on guard against the development of any notion that if the MLF should fail, there might be some implied obligation to proceed with land-based MRBMs.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-169

By vic, NARA Date 9-25-98

- 1 -

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/s/ McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~

June 7, 1963

MLF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Mac--

1. I passed the word to State with respect to the MLF briefing for the Committee. I gather that some of the briefers (particularly Henry Owen) have become evangelists and are hard to keep under control. I specifically requested that Alexis Johnson again remind those concerned of the President's dictum regarding any appearances before the Committee. I also talked with Jim Ramey and he suggested it might be useful if he took Palfrey and Abe Chayes up to fill so that they would decrease their pressure for the more formal appearances. I think this is a good idea but told Ramey I would clear

2. Another Joint Committee item--The Joint Committee is considering extending its annual authorizations to the entire AEC program. They now authorize only the construction items. This would put the AEC program in the same category as AID and NASA. Kermit Gordon has this problem and I have asked to be informed of any specific action that Gordon feels the White House should take. This is a matter you may wish to bring to the President's attention.

Charles E. Johnson

cc: Mr. Kaysen
Mr. Smith

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-169
By cs NARA Date 9-25-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MAY 15 1963

This document consists of 1 page

5 of 25 Working Paper A

30

MLF

Dear Bob:

This acknowledges receipt of correspondence dated May 1, 1963, from the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, which forwarded U.S. Navy comments dated April 30, 1963, on "Ownership and Custody of Nuclear Weapons Within the Surface Missile Warship Multilateral Force."

The AEC staff has examined the proposed plan in terms of the requirements for and security measures designed to protect Restricted Data and the arrangements that should be developed to assure safe handling of atomic weapons in possession of the Force. The results of this review are enclosed.

This enclosure is largely a summary of a working draft of an AEC staff study of the MLF concept as developed by the U.S. Navy, which was forwarded to Mr. McGeorge Bundy on May 2, 1963, with copies to Mr. John T. McNaughton and the State Department.

In the analysis by the Commission of the MLF concept, as developed by the U.S. Navy, certain additional security and safety arrangements are specified which the Commission believes should be incorporated. These are consistent, in principle, with the concept developed by the Navy and would serve to reinforce contemplated arrangements in those areas of special concern to the Commission.

Sincerely yours,

Signed: Glenn T. Seaborg

Chairman

The Honorable Robert S. McNamara
The Secretary of Defense

Enclosures:
Cys 1A and 2A, Commission Analysis

cc: The Honorable Dean Rusk
The Secretary of State, w/encl. 3A
The Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, w/encl. 3A

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This document contains restricted data as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Its transmittal or the disclosure of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-369

By CB, NARA Date 6-29-99

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~~SECRET~~
UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

31

MLF

May 2, 1963

DOCUMENT CONTAINS
HEREWITH CONTAINS
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

Mr. Charles Johnson
National Security Council
Executive Office Building
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Chuck:

Attached is a draft analysis of the security and safety aspects of the proposed MLF arrangements.

This analysis was based upon an advanced Navy draft of MLF procedures and could be affected by changes which emerge in the official DOD approach. Further, we have spent most of the last two days developing and analyzing the procedures, with very little time spent on literary efforts. I should think there will be need within the next week for a shorter, more carefully developed, AEC document. Commissioner Palfrey is looking at this matter.

Our analysis leads us to conclude that, with certain assumptions, adequate safety and security arrangements can be developed within the MLF framework. These assumptions retain a special U.S. role in the area of safety, but, ~~rather~~ ^{rather} almost no special position for the U.S. in the security area. It is my personal viewpoint that it is very important that the MLF safety and security standards and procedures be enforced rigorously to minimize the problems of effective operation and control inherent in joint international responsibility.

Finally, I have urged most strongly that we have an opportunity to undertake analyses of this type at an earlier stage in the developing of future plans.

Sincerely yours,

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-369
By C6, NARA Date 6-29-99

Dwight
Dwight A. Ihl
Assistant General Manager

Enclosure:
Palfrey is preparing a memo for Bundy which should be delivered by mid afternoon
-SD

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UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

3/4

May 2, 1963

Mr. Charles Johnson
National Security Council
Executive Office Building
Washington 25, D.C.

DOCUMENT TRANSMITTED
HEREWITH CONTAINS
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

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Finally, I have urged most strongly that we have an opportunity to undertake analysis of this type at an earlier stage in the developing of future plans.

Sincerely yours,

(Signature) A. Ink

Dwight A. Ink
Assistant General Manager

Enclosure

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-369
By cb, NARA Date 6-29-99

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178

Form AEC-126
(July 14, 1947)

U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
CLASSIFIED MATERIAL RECEIPT

POSTAL REGISTRY NO.

DATE MAILED


TO

**Mr. Charles Johnson
National Security Council
Room 368
Executive Office Building
Washington 25, D. C.**

FROM

**Mr. Dwight Ink
Assistant General Manager
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington 25, D. C.**

INSTRUCTIONS:

1. Original of this receipt to be signed personally by recipient and returned to 
2. Duplicate to be retained by recipient.
3. Triplicate to be retained by sender in suspense file.
4. Avoid Identifying Material Below in Any Manner Which Might Necessitate Classification of This Receipt.

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Nature of copy:				
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		Atomic Energy Commission position on MLF		
		SECRET RD		

CERTIFICATE

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DATE RECEIVED

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Donner
Dwight Ink
May 2, 1948

5/2/63

33

~~Orig to Bundy because of MLF meeting tomorrow.~~

file - MLF

~~SECRET~~

May 2, 1963

This document consists of 2 pagesNo. 2 of 7 Copies, Series A

Dear Mac:

The AEC has examined the security aspects of the proposed Multilateral Force with particular reference to the question of the protection of the weapons and of weapons design data.

Recognizing that the proposal contemplates the transfer of U.S. warheads to the MLF by sale, lease, or other arrangement, authorized by Congress, the Commission nevertheless believes that security measures can be developed which would provide protection of weapon design data and protection against unauthorized use of nuclear weapons comparable to that provided under current NATO agreements involving aircraft on quick reaction alert (QRA).

The type and degree of sensitivity of Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data that would have to be disclosed to establish an effective force would not be appreciably different from that communicated under current agreements for cooperation. One possible exception is under current study.

On board ship, protection of the weapons and weapons design from unauthorized access could be secured through the presence at all times of U.S. personnel along with personnel from other participating nations in an MLF security force. These and other measures involving personnel clearance and physical security could be worked out as part of an MLF security system that would be rigorously enforced to minimize the problems of effective operation and control inherent in joint international responsibility.

Progress in technology should permit the development of devices for use with the MLF weapon system (such as permissive links and integrity sensing systems) which would provide further protection against unauthorized use or access to the weapon or to weapon design data. In that

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

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~~SECRET~~By CB, NARA Date 6-29-99

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-2-

Hon. McGeorge Bundy

May 2, 1963

connection, we recommend bringing in top technical personnel from AEC laboratories to consider various technological means of achieving those objectives.

We believe it is important to establish in the course of negotiations that since the U.S. is manufacturer of the weapons, it should be responsible for substantial maintenance and repair of weapons, and for their replacement, and further that the MLF should adopt and enforce U.S. weapon safety rules and practises.

For your information, we enclose several working papers on specific components of the security question.

Sincerely yours,

Chairman

Enclosures
as stated

Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

CC; Amb. L. T. Merchant

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

34

Mr Bundy

Mac

This is the Navy memo
on proposed sequence of
operations re SLF 2
mentioned this AM.

Chuck



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

IN REPLY REFER TO
Ser 00366

30 APR 1963

~~SECRET~~ RESTRICTED DATA
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT-1954

From: Chief of Naval Operations
To: Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission,
Attn: Director of Military Application
Via: Secretary of Defense

Subj: Ownership and Custody of Nuclear Weapons Within the
Surface Missile Warship Multilateral Force (S)

Encl: (1) Stockpile-to-Target Sequence (Separate Cover)
(2) Restricted Data required by the MLF Personnel

1. Inherent in the concept of the Surface Missile Warship Multilateral Force (MLF) is joint ownership, support, and manning of the missile warships, missiles, nuclear weapons and other facilities of the MLF by all the countries participating in the force. If the nuclear warheads of the MLF are to be manufactured by the United States then such joint warhead ownership will require a change in the present Atomic Energy legislation. The purpose of this letter is to propose a plan under which such joint warhead ownership, if authorized, could be safely carried out.

2. Under this proposed plan all repair and maintenance of the warheads would be conducted at United States bases and solely by U.S. personnel. Thus no critical weapons design data would be released to other nations. The warheads would, however, be issued from U.S. custody to MLF custodial teams for the purpose of mating them to MLF missiles and transporting the mated missile-warhead combinations to the MLF ships. The MLF custodial teams would also, when necessary, remove the mated missile-warhead combinations from the MLF ships, return them to the MLF base, disassemble, and re-deliver the warhead to U.S. custody for the necessary maintenance work. It would be necessary to make certain Restricted Data available to these MLF custodial teams in order for them to properly perform these duties. It should be noted, however, that this Restricted Data is such that it may be authorized for transmission to the interested MLF nations under existing Agreements for cooperation. A tabulation of the specific Restricted Data required to be released is contained in enclosure (1).

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NLJ 12-178

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NARA, Date 05-29-2014

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3. Joint ownership of the nuclear warhead by MLF nations must provide certain basic assurances and safeguards. Specifically, such ownership and custody of the warhead must provide for:

a. Adequate multilateral ownership and custodial procedures throughout the MLF stockpile-to-target sequence.

b. Safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure of Restricted Data and classified defense information required by MLF personnel.

c. Physical security of the nuclear warhead.

d. The use of enabling systems to prevent unauthorized operation of the weapons system.

4. Ownership. Nuclear warheads fabricated by the United States would be sold to MLF nations. These warheads would be jointly owned by the participating nations.

5. Custody. Implicit in joint ownership is custody of the warhead. Adequate custodial procedures must be provided throughout the MLF stockpile-to-target sequence (STS) to insure continuation of authorized ownership and physical security on a multilateral basis. For these purposes arrangements must be made to provide MLF custodial teams to maintain warhead custody and provide physical security throughout the STS. Personnel assigned to these teams need to be carefully selected, non-security risks and highly trained. These teams should be comprised of a minimum of three persons from different participating states, one of which would be the U.S. Under no circumstance, should any European participant have more personnel on a team than the U.S. Warheads when delivered to the MLF, would be turned over to the custodial teams of the MLF ship or base, at which the warhead is located. The MLF custodial team at each activity would be responsible to the Commanding Officer for the physical security of the warhead at all times, mating the warhead to the missile (MLF bases only), and performing required routine inspections. These inspections do not reveal weapon design data. On the basis of these custodial arrangements, continuing custody of the jointly owned warhead in the MLF stockpile-to-target sequence could be provided as follows:

a. MLF Base. It is proposed that a U.S. financed and manned DOD storage site be established at the MLF bases. It would be the function of these sites to:

- (1) Effect delivery of warheads to the MLF at the base on a one-for-one basis with MLF missiles.
- (2) Storage of U.S. owned warheads as back-up for MLF requirements.
- (3) Temporary storage of MLF warheads which have been removed from the missiles.

Custody of warheads when delivered to the MLF would be assumed by a MLF base custodial team for the Commanding Officer of the base.

b. MLF Missile Warship. The warhead will be mated to the missile and encapsulated in the launch tube at the MLF base prior to transfer to a MLF missile warship. At time of transfer of the encapsulated missile, custody of the warhead will be transferred from the base custodial team to the ship custodial team acting for their respective commanding officers. Physical security of the warhead and access to weapon spaces would be provided as follows:

- (1) In the MLF missile ship, assembled missiles remain in their launcher tubes. These tubes are located inside the weapons system module. Access to the module would be limited to personnel authorized by the Commanding Officer.

- (2) After installation in the ship, batteries would be installed in the warhead. In addition, access to the warhead area would be required for routine warhead inspection and for installation and, when necessary, replacement of the missile guidance capsule. In all cases, access to launcher tube should require the presence of not less than three equally knowledgeable persons from different participating states, one of which shall be the U.S. Under no circumstances, should any European participant have more personnel on a team than the U.S. This "three-man" system, comprised of knowledgeable personnel to conduct necessary warhead inspections or missile inspections and repairs, should be designated from qualified weapons department personnel and be responsible to the ship's Commanding Officer for maintaining warhead security during such inspections and repairs.


In summary, custodial procedures, as outline above for the MLF stockpile-to-target sequence, should provide adequate safeguards for security of the warhead, and unauthorized disclosure of weapons design data through the requirement that access to the warhead storage location on any occasion be with the consent and under the supervision of at least three persons, one of whom is a U.S. national.

6. Unauthorized Disclosures. Unauthorized disclosures of Restricted Data and classified defense information by MLF custodial and weapons system personnel, which knowledge is required by them to properly perform their duties, must be avoided. To prevent unauthorized disclosure, adherence to thorough personnel selection and clearance procedures is a prerequisite. In addition, periodic review of personnel assignments and clearances should be conducted.

7. Enabling Systems.

a. In the absence of a positive electronic PAL development which will not reduce the reliability of the weapon system to an unacceptable degree, adequate substitute procedures are necessary. Therefore, use of an alternate PAL to prevent unauthorized operation of the POLARIS surface warship weapon system must be agreed to by participating states. In addition, other positive safety features to prevent inadvertent arming and launching of missiles are inherent to the weapon system. Implementation of these features, plus employment of agreed procedures and doctrines, all of which are to be supervised by properly selected and trained personnel, will make unauthorized operation of the weapon system extremely remote.

b. In the absence of a positive electronic PAL, the following alternate PAL is proposed:



(2) The key required to operate the above weapon enabling lock is to be maintained in a combination safe in a secure location in the ship. The combination for this safe would not be known to any one individual or group of individuals on board the ship.

(3) Three designated officers on board the ship, each of a different nationality, would be provided a separate formula

to which a number to be contained in the weapons release message would be applied.

(4) The weapons release message would provide the numbers which, when applied to the formula held by each of the three designated officers, would reveal the combination of the safe.

c. The following positive safety features are within the weapon system to prevent inadvertent arming and launching of the missiles:

(1) The Commanding Officer "Permission to Fire" switch is remotely located from the module. This switch, which is locked open, is an integral part of the fire control system and must be closed before a missile can be launched from a tube. The key to this switch should be under the direct custody of the Commanding Officer and maintained in a three lock combination safe requiring three individuals, each of a different nationality, to open.

(2) The weapon system officer's switch must be unlocked before a launching is possible. The key to this switch could be held in the custody of the Commanding Officer as in (1) above.

(3) The launcher cannot be operated without the Launch Firing Unit Key. In this system each launch tube must be unlocked by its individual key, before that firing unit can be activated. These keys would be safeguarded as in (1) above.

d. In summary, in the absence of a positive electronic PAL, unauthorized activation and launch of the weapon would be prevented by:

(1) The alternate PAL, and

(2) Positive safety features inherent in the weapon system. These safety features at different locations within the system require a team of highly trained personnel for activation and launch of a weapon. Such features include, but are not limited to:

(a) Missile prepared from the fire control officer station (key required).

(b) Launch prepared from the launch control station (key required for each missile tube).

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(c) Intent to fire from the fire control officer station.

(d) Fire command from Commanding Officer (key required).

Thus, the MLF shipboard system as planned would provide adequate measures to prevent unauthorized firings by distribution of the combination of the "Key Safe" to officers from participating countries, one of whom would be a U.S. national.

8. Therefore, if legislation is enacted to permit joint ownership and custody of U.S. nuclear weapons by the MLF nations, it is considered that adequate security of nuclear weapons design information, classified defense information and assurance against the performance of unauthorized operation could be provided by:

a. Establishing a U.S. nuclear warhead storage site at the MLF bases.

b. The application of custody and security procedures throughout the stockpile-to-target sequence of the warhead as outlined herein.

c. Employing security clearance procedures for MLF personnel equivalent to those in effect for U.S. personnel.

d. Extension of the principle of the "two-man rule" to provide that persons having access to nuclear weapons, and critical areas in the launching and firing systems thereof, shall not be of the same nationality and that at least three knowledgeable persons, one of whom must be a U.S. representative, shall always be present.

ORIG: CAPT R. G. ANDERSON, Op-605E, x55733
TYPED: K. L. RENKE YNL 4-30-63



ADM CLAUDE RICKETTS, USN
VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Copy to: (With encl (2))

Op-60

Op-75

Op-31

Director, Special Projects Office
SECNAV

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954

RESTRICTED DATA REQUIRED []

[] will require certain information classified as Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data for planning, employment, training and proper operation [] All of the Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data that is considered necessary []

[] under the existing Agreements for Cooperation made under Article 144(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended. This may be accomplished without additional legislation provided appropriate statutory determinations are made. The following information in the Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data categories would have to be approved by statutory action:

- a. The fact that the [] reentry system has a cluster of [] warheads.
- b. Yield of the [] warhead.
- c. Fact that the [] warhead contains tritium and that certain monitoring of weapons spaces for this substance is necessary.

[]

- e. Fact of utilization of PAL system. (when provided)

- f. Numbers and location of nuclear warheads []

[]

Encl (2) to CNO ltr ser
00366 of []

~~SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 12-178

NARA, Date 05-29-2014

565