

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Page 1

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
001	memo	Rostow to SecDef, AEC Chairman	S-	1	undated	A
002	memo	duplicate of #1	S-	1	undated	A
003	memo	duplicate of #1	S-	1	undated	A
004	memo	Rostow to the President	C	1	undated	A
005	memo	duplicate of #4 Sanitized 12/14/09 NLW 09-76	C	1	1/5/67	A
006	memo	duplicate of #1	S-	1	1/6/67	A
007	memo	C. Johnson to Rostow Sanitized 12/14/09 NLW 09-76	C	1	1/5/67	A
008	memo	duplicate of #4	C	1	undated	A
009	memo	duplicate of #1	S-	1	undated	A
010a	ltr	McNamara to Seaborg	S-	2	1/4/67	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Charles E. Johnson**Folder Title** "NATO - US Atomic Information to"**Box Number** 005**Restriction Codes**

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 13292 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

1/9/2009


Initials

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Page 2

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
010b	memo	McNamara to President	S-	2	1/4/67	A
010c	rpt	"Additional US Information"	S-	1	undated	A
011	draft	Rostow to SecDef, AEC Chairman	S-	2	1/5/67	A
012	memo	Rostow to SecDef & AEC Chairman <i>Sanitized 12-14-09 NLJ 09-76</i>	C	2	10/3/66	A
014	memo	Rostow to the President Duplicate of #15 <i>open 12-14-09 NLJ 09-76</i>	C	1	9/30/66	A
015	memo	Duplicate of #14 <i>open 12-14-09 NLJ 09-76</i>	C	1	9/30/66	A
017	cable	Paris 4126 <i>open 6-16-09 NLJ 09-78</i>	C	2	9/22/66	A
021	memo	Seaborg & McNamara to President <i>Sanitized 12-14-09 NLJ 09-77</i>	C	2	8/25/66	A
022	rpt	"US Atomic Information..."	S-	4	undated	A
023	cable	Paris 4812	S	2	10/3/66	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Charles E. Johnson

Folder Title "NATO - US Atomic Information to"

Box Number 005

Restriction Codes

(A) Closed by Executive Order 13292 governing access to national security information.

(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.

(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

1/9/2009

Initials

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Page 3

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
024	cable	Deptel 58222 to Paris <i>open 1/23/18 per RAC 12/17</i>	S	3	10/1/66	A
025	cable	Paris 4639 <i>open 1/23/18 per RAC 12/17</i>	S	3	9/30/66	A
026	cable	Paris 4422 <i>open 1/23/18 per RAC 12/17</i>	C	1	9/27/66	A
027	memo	Deptel 53033 to Paris <i>open 10.16.09 NLJ 09.78</i>	C	1	9/23/66	A
028	airgm	Paris TONAT A-14	S-	8	9/23/66	A
029	cable	Deptel 59112 to Paris <i>open 1/23/18 per RAC 12/17</i>	S	2	10/4/66	A
030	memo	Rostow to SecDef <i>sanitized 12.14.09 NLJ 09.76</i> Duplicate of #32	C	1	9/30/66	A
031	memo	Rostow to the President Duplicate of #33 <i>open 12.14.09 NLJ 09.76</i>	S	1	9/30/66	A
032	memo	Duplicate of #30	C	1	9/30/66	A
033	memo	Duplicate of #31 <i>open 12.14.09 NLJ 09.76</i>	S	1	9/30/66	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Charles E. Johnson

Folder Title "NATO - US Atomic Information to"

Box Number 005

Restriction Codes

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 13292 governing access to national security information.
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

1/9/2009

Initials

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Page 4

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
035	memo	McNamara to the President [Duplicate of #39] Same sanitization 9/17/11 NLJ 10-433	S	2	9/14/66	A
036	memo	C. Johnson to Bator & Keeny open 12-14-09 NLJ 09-76	S	1	9/16/66	A
037	memo	Duplicate of #36 open 12-14-09 NLJ 09-76	S	1	9/16/66	A
039	memo	Duplicate of #35	S	2	9/14/66	A
040	memo	Bundy to SecDef & AEC Chairman	S-	1	2/14/66	A
040a	memo	Smith to the President	S-	1	2/14/66	A
040b	memo	C. Johnson to Bundy	S-	1	2/11/66	A
040d	memo	Seaborg & McNamara to the President	S-	3	2/9/66	A
040e	rpt	"US Atomic Information..."	S-	7	[2/66]	A
041	memo	Bundy to SecDef & AEC Chairman	TS-	1	1/29/66	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Charles E. Johnson

Folder Title "NATO - US Atomic Information to"

Box Number 005

Restriction Codes

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 13292 governing access to national security information.
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

1/9/2009

Initials

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Page 5

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
041b	memo	Seaborg & McNamara to the President	TS-	2	1/19/66	A
041c	rpt	"Information for Communication to the Netherlands"	S-	1	[1/66]	A
041d	memo	Bundy to SecDef & AEC Chairman	S-	1	1/29/66	A
041e	memo	Seaborg & McNamara to the President	S-	2	1/19/66	A
041f	rpt	"Information for Communication..."	S-	1	[1/66]	A
041g	draft	Bundy to SecDef & AEC Chairman	S-	2	[1/66]	A
041h	memo	C. Johnson to Bundy	TS-	1	1/27/66	A
042a	memo	C. Johnson to M. Bundy open 1/23/18 per RAC 12/17	S	1	10/27/65	A
042b	memo	Vance to NSA Spec Asst to President sanitized 12-14-09 NW 09-77	S	1	10/26/65	A
042c	memo	Vance to the President sanitized 12-14-09 NW 09-77	S	1	10/7/65	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Charles E. Johnson

Folder Title "NATO - US Atomic Information to"

Box Number 005

Restriction Codes

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 13292 governing access to national security information.
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

1/9/2009

Initials

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Page 6

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
043	memo	Bundy to SecDef & AEC Chairman <i>open 12-14-09 NLW 09-76</i>	S	1	9/19/65	A
043a	memo	C. Johnson to Keeny & Bundy <i>Sanitized 12-14-09 NLW 09-76</i>	S	1	9/17/65	A
043b	memo	Seaborg & McNamara to President <i>Sanitized 12-14-09 NLW 09-77</i>	S	1	9/16/65	A
043c	rpt	"US Information Proposed for Communication"	S-	1	[1/66]	A
043g	memo	Howard to C. Johnson	S-	1	9/21/65	A
043h	memo	Duplicate of #43g	S-	1	9/21/65	A
044	memo	Bundy to SecDef <i>sanitized 3/19/18 per NLJ/RAC 12-406</i>	S	2	5/27/65	A
044b	memo	Bundy to the President <i>open 3/19/18 per NLJ/RAC 12-406</i>	S	1	5/27/65	A
044e	memo	McNamara to the President	S-	2	5/26/65	A
044g	ltr	Seaborg to McNamara	S-	2	5/26/65	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Charles E. Johnson

Folder Title "NATO - US Atomic Information to"

Box Number 005

Restriction Codes

(A) Closed by Executive Order 13292 governing access to national security information.

(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.

(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

1/9/2009

Initials

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Page 7

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
045b	rpt	"US Atomic Information Proposed for Communication"	S-	4	undated	A
046	memo	Bundy to DepSec Dept. of Defense <i>open NLJ 99-277 (1/09)</i>	S	1	6/14/65	A
046a	memo	Vance to NSA Spec Asst to President <i>Sanitized 12-14-09 NLJ 09-77</i>	S	1	6/7/65	A
046b	memo	Vance to Seaborg <i>Sanitized 12-14-09 NLJ 09-77</i>	S	2	4/16/65	A
046c	rpt	"Atomic Information Proposed for Communication"	S-	3	undated	A
046d	ltr	Seaborg to Vance	S-	1	5/25/65	A
047	memo	M. Bundy to Deputy Secretary, Dept. of Defense	S	1	5/4/65	A
047b	memo	Vance to SpecAsst M. Bundy	S-	1	4/29/65	A
047c	ltr	Vance to Seaborg	S-	2	3/6/65	A
047d	ltr	Seaborg to Vance	S-	1	4/12/65	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Charles E. Johnson
Folder Title "NATO - US Atomic Information to"

Box Number 005

Restriction Codes

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 13292 governing access to national security information.
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

1/9/2009

Initials

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Page 8

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
049b	ltr	McNamara to Seaborg <i>open 12/15/15 per NLJ 15-200</i>	S	2	11/25/64	A
049c	rpt	"Information Proposed for Released" <i>sanitized 12/15/15 per NLJ 15-200</i>	S-	2	[11/64]	A
050	memo	Bundy to SecDef & AEC Chairman	TS-	1	12/11/64	A
050c	memo	duplicate of #50	TS-	1	12/11/64	A
051	memo	Bundy to SecDef & AEC Chairman	TS-	1	12/14/63	A
051a	ltr	Seaborg to McNamara <i>open 7-13-15</i>	TS-	1	12/14/63	A
054	memo	Bundy to DepSecDef	S-	1	4/23/64	A
055	memo	Bundy to DepSecDef	S-	1	2/4/64	A
061	memo	Miller to JCS Chairman <i>sanitized 6/11/19 per NLJ/RAC 15-219</i>	S	2	2/11/63	A
062	cable	London 3193 <i>open 7-13-15</i>	S	2	2/18/63	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Charles E. Johnson

Folder Title "NATO - US Atomic Information to"

Box Number 005

Restriction Codes

(A) Closed by Executive Order 13292 governing access to national security information.

(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.

(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

1/9/2009

Initials

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Page 9

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
064	memo	Shane to C. Johnson	S	1	2/11/63	A
		open 7-13-15				
066	rpt	"Modification to NATO..."	TS	3	[1963]	A
069	notes	Handwritten notes	PCI	1	[1963]	A
074	memo	M. Bundy to McNamara	S	1	2/12/63	A
079	ltr	President Kennedy to McNamara	S	2	2/7/63	A
		Near duplicate of #80 & 81				
		open 1/23/18 per RAC 12/17				
080	ltr	Near duplicate of #79 & 81	S	2	2/7/63	A
		open 1/23/18 per RAC 12/17				
081	ltr	Near duplicate of #79 & 80	S	2	2/7/63	A
		open 1/23/18 per RAC 12/17				
083	cable	Paris TOPO 927	S	4	1/15/63	A
		open 1/23/18 per RAC 12/17				
086	cable	Paris 2744	TS	2	1/10/63	A
089	memo	U.A. Johnson to Bundy	S	2	1/9/63	A
		open 6-16-09 NLJ 09-78				

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Charles E. Johnson

Folder Title "NATO - US Atomic Information to"

Box Number 005

Restriction Codes

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 13292 governing access to national security information.
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

1/9/2009

Initials

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Page 10

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
089a	memo	"Background Memorandum" <i>open 6.16.09 NLJ 09.78</i>	S	6	12/31/62	A
092	memo	U.A. Johnson to Bundy <i>open 6.16.09 NLJ 09.78</i>	S	7	[12/62]	A
093	memo	CK to M. Bundy <i>open 1/23/18 per RAC 12/17</i>	PCI	1	12/26/62	A
094	ltr	Gilpatric to Bundy	S-	2	12/14/62	A
094a	ltr	Gilpatric to Seaborg	S-	2	8/22/62	A
094b	rpt	"Atomic Information Proposed..."	S-	5	[1962]	A
094c	ltr	Seaborg to McNamara	S-	3	11/13/62	A
094d	rpt	"Atomic Information Proposed..."	S-	6	[1962]	A
094e	ltr	McNamara to Seaborg	S-	2	11/21/62	A
094f	ltr	Seaborg to McNamara	S-	1	11/27/62	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Charles E. Johnson

Folder Title "NATO - US Atomic Information to"

Box Number 005

Restriction Codes

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 13292 governing access to national security information.
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

1/9/2009

Initials

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Page 11

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
097a	memo	McNamara to JCS Chairman <i>Sanitized 12-14-09 NL 09-77</i>	TS	1	12/3/62	A
100a	ltr	Seaborg to McNamara	S-	3	11/13/62	A
100b	ltr	Seaborg to Rusk	S-	2	11/13/62	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Charles E. Johnson**Folder Title** "NATO - US Atomic Information to"**Box Number** 005

Restriction Codes

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 13292 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

1/9/2009

Initials

Jan 5, 1967

~~SECRET~~
~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

**SUBJECT: Additional U. S. Atomic Information Proposed for
Communication to NATO and NATO Member States**

Secretary McNamara and Acting Chairman Ramey have signed a formal determination that would permit Ambassador Cleveland to make available certain essential information concerning the [REDACTED] a need-to-know basis to the NATO Nuclear Weapons Assignment Sheet Conference. Ambassador Cleveland has requested this determination as a matter of great urgency because the conference is scheduled to begin on January 9, 1967.

6.2(4)
3.3(6)(4)

The action has been reviewed and concurred in by the Department of State.

I recommend that you approve the proposed determination and request your permission to sign the attached memorandum for the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

W. W. Rostow

___ Approved
___ Disapproved
___ See me

~~SECRET FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 09-76
By iel, NARA, Date 10-17-09

This document regraded
CONFIDENTIAL when
separated from enclosures.

~~SECRET~~

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

January 5, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. W. W. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Additional U. S. Atomic Information Proposed for Communication
to NATO and NATO Member States

Walt --

I believe this proposed action is self-explanatory. Cleveland is requesting a routine Presidential action as a matter of urgency to permit him to release information on a need-to-know basis [REDACTED] at the Nuclear Weapons Assignment Sheet Conference scheduled for January 9. A copy of his cable is attached.

6.2(a)
3.3(b)(4)

It is recommended that you request the President's concurrence in this action.

Charles E. Johnson

~~SECRET-FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

~~This document regarded
CONFIDENTIAL when
separated from enclosures.~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 09-76
By isl NARA, Date 10-17-09

~~SECRET~~

368

10

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

5 January 1967

MEMO FOR Mr. Charles Johnson

Attached herewith is the paper we discussed on
the phone. It is now being acted upon by the
Commission.



F. Costagliola
Captain, USN
Principal Military Assistant
to the ATSD(AE)

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

Handle as Restricted Data in Foreign Dissemination
Section 144b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS THIS
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

C. Johnson
12

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 3, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE CHAIRMAN, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

SUBJECT: U. S. Atomic Information Proposed for Communication
to NATO Member States and ACCHAN

Reference is made to your memorandum for the President of August 25, 1966, informing him that the Department of Defense has a requirement to extend the dissemination of atomic information within NATO member states and the Channel Command and, concurrently, provide a more common basis for atomic cooperation between NATO member states and military elements. Your memorandum further informed him that pursuant to Executive Order 10841, as amended, the Secretary of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission have joined in a statutory determination that the proposed cooperation and the proposed communication of atomic information as set forth in the enclosure to your memorandum will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense security. It is understood that the Department of State has been informed of and concurs in the above action.

It has been noted that previous determinations have been made which permit limited dissemination of the atomic information involved to NATO member states and the Channel Command and that the proposed determination would permit member states and CINCHAN to disseminate internally information received to the extent required for NATO planning purposes and provide a more common basis for atomic cooperation throughout NATO under provisions of the NATO Agreement and supporting Administrative Arrangements. It has further been noted that all NATO countries, [REDACTED] will by the terms of this statutory determination receive information on

6.2(a)
3.3(b)
(5)(6)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 09-76
By isl, NARA, Date 10-17-09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

numbers, yield and locations as specified in paragraph 3(a) of the determination. Countries with whom we have existing bilateral agreements will receive additional information as listed in paragraph 3(b).

The statutory determination as proposed has been concurred in, subject to the conditions and understandings contained in the memorandum for the President of August 25 referred to above.

It is understood that the Department of Defense will notify the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of this determination prior to communication of this information.

W W Rostow
W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 30, 1966

NOTE FOR MR. W. W. ROSTOW

Walt --

Here is a draft note to the President
on the Atomal Information crisis. Also
FYI a Paris cable. Nat Davis has seen
and concurs in the draft note.

C. E. Johnson

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By *clm/ly*, NARA, Date 12-10-06

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

not used 14

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 30, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Atomic Information to NATO

Our Embassy in Paris reports that unless an immediate Presidential approval is received to authorize the transmittal of certain atomic information to the members of the NATO international staff, members of delegations and national staff not heretofore certified by the Secretary General for access to such information, it will be necessary to either cancel Fallex 66, the NATO exercise scheduled to begin October 12, or to eliminate atomic play therefrom. The time urgency is due to the fact that the U. S. security authorities concerned must make final determinations covering procedures and regulations for transmitting and handling the atomic information and also to determine in detail the extent to which individuals have a need to know and have access to the atomic information involved.

The Presidential approval referred to is the action requested by Secretary McNamara and Chairman Seaborg which I referred to you last week and which you asked me to take up with you.

These approvals have been made routinely in implementation of the NATO 1964 Agreement. Section 144b of the Atomic Energy Act authorizes Defense and AEC to make Restricted Data available pursuant to an active Cooperation Agreement provided however that the President approves their action as not constituting an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.

The information to be conveyed under this determination relates only to numbers, locations and yields of weapons, all of which is needed to make the nuclear planning exercise realistic. No information of a sensitive nature relating to the design or manufacture of weapons will be transmitted.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 09-76
By *id.*, NARA, Date *10-17-09*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Not
Used
Bks*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 30, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Atomic Information to NATO

Our Embassy in Paris reports that unless an immediate Presidential approval is received to authorize the transmittal of certain atomic information to the members of the NATO international staff, members of delegations and national staff not heretofore certified by the Secretary General for access to such information, it will be necessary to either cancel Fallex 66, the NATO exercise scheduled to begin October 12 or to eliminate atomic play therefrom. The time urgency is due to the fact that the U. S. security authorities concerned must make final determinations covering procedures and regulations for transmitting and handling the atomic information and also to determine in detail the extent to which individuals have a need to know and have access to the atomic information involved.

The Presidential approval referred to is the action requested by Secretary McNamara and Chairman Seaborg which I referred to you last week and which you asked me to take up with you.

These approvals have been made routinely in implementation of the NATO 1964 Agreement. Section 144b of the Atomic Energy Act authorizes Defense and AEC to make Restricted Data available pursuant to an active Cooperation Agreement provided however that the President approves their action as not constituting an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.

The information to be conveyed under this determination relates only to numbers, locations and yields of weapons, all of which is needed to make the nuclear planning exercise realistic. No information of a sensitive nature relating to the design or manufacture of weapons will be transmitted.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 09-76 (#14)
By *id* NARA, Date *10-19-09*

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 23, 1966

16

PHW
Did this paper
come back

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BROMLEY SMITH *S*

Brom --

On Monday Walt sent to the President a request for a statutory determination to make certain atomic information more widely available in NATO in response to a request from McNamara. I understand that the request was returned to Walt without approval and I would appreciate knowing anything more on this matter that you can find out for me. I have had a followup needle from Defense as to the status of this action.

CEJ
→ Charles E. Johnson

175 Note Paris 4126 attached. (Confidential)

Chuck:

*Paper came back to Rostow checked "see me."
Rostow has not yet checked.*

B/KS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 1.12 Sec 3.4
By *clm/h* NARA Date *12/10/08*

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

46-81

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

EUR

Info

SS

G

SP

L

SAL

NEA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

ACDA

MC

OC

RSR

NNNNVV FHE720
PP RUEHC RUEKDA RUEPWZ RUEPXG
DE RUFNCR 4126 2651600
ZNY CCCCC
P 221537Z SEP 66
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKDA/OSD DOD WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEPWZ/JAIEG WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEPXG/AEC GERMANTOWN
STATE GRNC
BT

020574

1966 SEP 22 PM 3 57

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 4126

NATUS

SEPTEMBER 22

SUBJECT: ATOMAL INFORMATION IN FALLEX 66

REF: PARIS 3900

1. US DELEGATION RECEIVED LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY NATO SUBJECT AS ABOVE DATED 21 SEPT 66. TEXT IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QTE THE HEAD OF THE SECURITY BUREAU, MR. FLINN, HAS JUST RETURNED FROM WASHINGTON WHERE HE DISCUSSED AT GREAT LENGTH THE PROBLEMS WHICH WILL ARISE IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OF ATOMAL INFORMATION IN THE COURSE OF FALLEX 66.

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 4126 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

QTE I WILL NOT BOTHER YOU WITH THE DETAILS OF THESE DISCUSSIONS AND THE SOLE OBJECT OF THIS NOTE IS TO INVITE YOU TO URGE THE UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES CONCERNED TO LET US HAVE, WITH THE MINIMUM DELAY, THEIR FINAL VIEWS ON HOW ATOMAL INFORMATION SHOULD BE HANDLED DURING THE COURSE OF THE EXERCISE. ONE OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH WILL CLEARLY ARISE IS THE EXTENT TO WHICH INTERNATIONAL STAFF, MEMBERS OF DELEGATIONS AND OF ADMINISTRATIONS IN MEMBER STATES, NOT PRESENTLY CERTIFIED TO OR BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOR ACCESS TO ATOMAL INFORMATION, WILL NOW HAVE TO BE ADDED TO THE APPROPRIATE LISTS. ALL THIS WILL CLEARLY TAKE TIME.

- ~~BATOR~~
- ~~BOWDLER~~
- ~~BUDGET~~
- ~~DAVIS~~
- ~~GINSBURGH~~
- ~~HAMILTON~~
- ~~JESSUP~~
- ~~JOHNSON~~
- ~~JORDEN~~
- ~~KEENE~~
- ~~KOMER~~
- ~~MOYERS~~
- ~~TAYLOR~~
- ~~WRIGGINS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 09-78

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By id, NARA, Date 6-2-09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- Paris 4126, September 22

QTE IN ADDITION THERE IS THE PRESENTLY UNRESOLVED PROBLEM OF ACCESS TO ATOMAL INFORMATION BY THE FRENCH COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL SERVING THROUGHOUT ACE AND, INDEED, IN THE COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE REPRESENTATIVE HERE AT THE PORTE DAUPHINE. UNQTE

2. USRO HAS BEEN ADVISED BY US ELEMENT SHAPE THAT SO MUCH OF THE PROBLEM AS INVOLVES ACCESS TO ATOMAL INFORMATION BY FRENCH PERSONNEL SERVING IN FRENCH COMMUNICATIONS RELAY POINTS DOES NOT REALLY ARISE SINCE SWITCHING IS AUTOMATIC AND THAT THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATO, HAS BEEN SO ADVISED. USRO IS AWARE

PAGE 3 RUFNCR 4126 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THAT US AUTHORITIES ARE ENDEAVORING TO SOLVE THE OTHER PROBLEMS REFERRED TO BY COLERIDGE. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF THE LATE DATE AND THE NEED TO PROVIDE NATO AGENCIES AND NATIONAL AUTHORITIES WITH APPROVED PROCEDURES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF THE EXERCISE, EARLY RESOLUTION IS MANDATORY. THE ALTERNATIVES TO PROMPT AND COMPLETE RESOLUTION ARE THE CANCELLATION OF FALLEX OR THE ELIMINATION OF ATOMAL PLAY THEREFROM; EITHER OF WHICH IS COMPLETELY UNDESIRABLE AND WOULD BE EXTREMELY EMBARRASSING TO THE US GOVT AND ITS MILITARY AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES.

3. US ELEMENT AT SHAPE CONCURS.

GP-4. FARLEY
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Atomic Info
to NATO

18

September 23, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BROMLEY SMITH

Brom --

On Monday Walt sent to the President a request for a statutory determination to make certain atomic information more widely available in NATO in response to a request from McNamara. I understand that the request was returned to Walt without approval and I would appreciate knowing anything more on this matter that you can find out for me. I have had a followup needle from Defense as to the status of this action.

Charles E. Johnson

9/27 Still on
WWR's desk.

*Atomic Info
to NATO*

19

September 15, 1966

NOTE FOR MR. W. W. ROSTOW

Walt --

I believe this proposed action is self-explanatory. It is a routine Presidential action authorizing the wider dissemination of atomic information on a need to know basis within NATO. It is required to facilitate the work of the nuclear planning group and other military elements concerned with atomic matters.

Charles E. Johnson

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

**SUBJECT: U. S. Atomic Information Proposed for Communication
to NATO Member States and ACCHAN**

Secretary McNamara has requested a statutory determination that will permit a wider dissemination of certain essential atomic information among the officials and military officers that have a genuine need to know to permit them to participate in NATO nuclear planning. He and Chairman Seaborg have signed a formal determination which has been presented for your concurrence. The determination has also been reviewed and concurred in by the Department of State.

I recommend that you approve the Secretary's recommendation and request your permission to sign the attached memorandum for the Secretary of Defense and AEC Chairman.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me ☒ _____

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By chm/5, NARA, Date 12-10-08

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

AUG 25 1966

Henry Johnson 3076
2 Ref Johnson
21
SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 09-77
By *isl*, NARA, Date *10-28-09*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U. S. Atomic Information Proposed for Communication to
NATO Member States and ACCHAN (U)

(C) The Department of Defense has a requirement to extend the dissemination of atomic information within NATO member states and the Channel Command and, concurrently, provide a more common basis for atomic cooperation between NATO member states and military elements.

(C) We have set forth the atomic information and additional access requirements in the inclosure to this memorandum. Previous determinations have been made which permit release of the atomic information involved to NATO member states and the Channel Command, but with dissemination limited to high level officials and a limited number of advisors to each as are certified to the Secretary General of NATO as requiring the information concerned for NATO purposes. Approval of the proposed determination will permit an authorization for member states and CINCHAN to disseminate information received internally to the extent required for NATO planning purposes and provide a more common basis for atomic cooperation throughout NATO under provisions of the NATO Agreement and supporting Administrative Arrangements.

(C) We propose as a minimum that all NATO countries, [redacted]

[redacted] numbers, yields and locations as specified in paragraph 3(a) of the determination. [redacted]

[redacted] Countries with whom we have existing (active) bilateral agreements [redacted]

[redacted] Recipients will be required to protect the atomic information released under this determination in accordance with the 1964 Agreement and its supporting Annexes.

When separated from inclosures

handle this document as

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

~~SECRET~~

DOCUMENT TRANSMITTED
HEREWITH CONTAINS
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

4784

~~SECRET~~


2

(C) In view of NSAM 197 concerning commitments to support NATO forces with atomic weapons, communications to member states and CINCHAN will be handled so as to avoid the interpretation of a U.S. commitment to subsequently provide weapons or delivery systems beyond those presently authorized by the President.

(U) Pursuant to Executive Order 10841, as amended, the Secretary of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission have determined that the proposed cooperation and the proposed communication of atomic information set forth in the attachment will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.

(U) As required by Executive Order 10956, amending Executive Order 10841, the determination is hereby referred to the President.

(U) The Department of Defense will notify the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of this determination, subject to any qualifications the President may impose, prior to communication of this information.


Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

AUG 25 1966


Secretary of Defense

JUL 30 1966

1 Attachment

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

85-81

~~SECRET~~

Origin
EUR

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS

IMMEDIATE

Info:

STATE 58222

OCT 1 3 17 AM '66

SS
G
SP
SAH
L
H
SAL
NEA
GDP
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
ACDA
SCI
MC
OC
AEC

NATUS

REF: Paris 4639

SUB: Transmittal of ATOMAL Information During Fallex 66

1. We concur your suggestion to present text to Secretary General. ATOMAL control procedures are limited to Fallex 66 as you suggest. Following text can be used as basis of working group meeting scheduled for Monday, 3 October 1966 on Exercise Fallex 66; however, final approval of statutory determination not yet received. Authority to implement these procedures will be issued upon receipt of final approval of pending statutory determination.
2. We believe following procedures meet needs of Fallex 66. Substantive changes which we have made from your draft result from limitations under statutory determinations and desires of Member States as expressed at Washington meetings (see JAIEG letter N-147/66 dated 26 September 1966).
3. Rationale for exclusion of France for Fallex 66 will be provided later.

BEGIN TEXT

PASS TO SECRETARY GENERAL

SUBJECT: Communication of ATOMAL Information During Fallex 66

BATOR
BOWLER
BUDGET
DAVIS
GINSBURGH
HAMILTON
JESSUP
JORDEN
KEENE
KOMER
MOYERS
TAYLOR
WRIGGINS

Drafted by:

IR/RPM:WBoggs/DMA/AEL:BFulton/JAIEG:Col Gaskin

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

Classification approved by:

EUR/RPM - John I. Getz

Clearances:

MLC - Col Bruce (draft)
JAIEG - Mr. Goure (draft)
ATSDAE - Mr. Walske (draft)

G/PM - Mr. Trippe (draft)
OSD/ISA - Captain Hanks (draft)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: PAC 030R-5-1-2-1

By: JPH ARA Date: 12/18/77

~~SECRET~~

1. References:

- A. C-M(64)39 - NATO Agreement
- B. C-M(65)11 - Administrative Arrangements
- C. C-M(65)135 - Guidance on ATOMAL Information (Inclosure 1 only)

2. For Fallex 66 the US Government authorizes communications by oral, visual, electronic and documentary means, ATOMAL information concerning yields, numbers and location for the Marks (FYI Omit Mark numbers until you receive notification SD approval. END FYI) weapons to, between and within member states (less Iceland and France) and NATO elements as follows:

a. Within Member States (less France and Iceland).

(1) Personnel of Ministries of Defense and subordinate military units and activities (including administrative and communications personnel).

(2) Other Member State personnel as previously authorized (see reference C).

b. North Atlantic Council personnel as previously authorized (see reference C).

c. Military Committee personnel as previously authorized (see reference C).

d. SACEUR, SACLANT and CINCHAN and personnel within their immediate headquarters international and subordinate/headquarters and commands, and within national forces assigned to, or earmarked for ACE, ACLANT and ACCHAN.

3. Access may of course be granted only to personnel who have security clearances required by reference A and who are determined by appropriate authorities to have responsibilities for NATO matters to which the information pertains.

4. The information specified above may be communicated between Member States and NATO elements through existing channels and such additional channels as may be

/necessary

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

necessary without advance JAIEG approval of such additional channels, provided that within 30 days after completion of the exercise:

- a. Each sender of ATOMAL information to another Member State/NATO element notifies the administering agency of the receiving Member State/NATO element as to the communications that have been made.
 - b. Each Member State and NATO element provides JAIEG with a list of units which received ATOMAL information from other Member States and NATO elements. The JAIEG will, in turn, notify the Secretary General and the Military Committee.
5. Electronic communication of Top Secret and Secret ATOMAL information should be accomplished through cryptographic means approved by the Military Committee to the extent that such means are available. During the exercises where NATO approved cryptographic systems are not available, the US has no objection to use of Member State cryptographic systems which afford at least the level of security provided by NATO ~~per~~ approved systems. Each Member State would of course, be responsible for assuring that only such systems are used. (FYI, see Section VII, Paragraph 17 of C-M(55)15).
6. Exercise documents containing ATOMAL information may be exempted from accountability reporting requirements if destroyed within 30 days following completion of the exercise. Destruction certificates for all exercise documents will be retained on file in all elements that receive ATOMAL documents during an exercise.
7. Reproductions and generation of documents containing ATOMAL information within the scope specified in paragraph 2 above are authorized without further reference to the US.

END TEXT

GP-3

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

25

46
Action
EUR

Info
SS
G
SP
SAH
L
H
SAL
NEA
P
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
MC
ACDA
SCI
OPR

RSR

~~SECRET~~

O 301339Z SEP 66

2 8 1 9 2

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

SEPT 30, 1966, 10:42 A.M.

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

IMMEDIATE

RUEKDA/OSD WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUEPAE/AEC GERMANTOWN MARYLAND IMMEDIATE

INFO RUEPWZ/JAIEG WASHDC IMMEDIATE

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 4639

SEPTEMBER 30

NATUS

REF: TONAT A-14

~~BATOR~~
~~BOWDLER~~
~~BUDGET~~
~~DAVIS~~
~~GINSBURGH~~
~~HAMILTON~~
~~JESSUP~~
~~JOHNSON~~
~~JORDEN~~
~~KEENE~~
~~KOMER~~
~~MOYERS~~
~~TAYLOR~~
~~WRIGGINS~~

1. PROPOSED PROCEDURES FORWARDED AS ATTACHMENT TO ABOVE REFERENCE IMPOSE REQUIREMENTS ON MEMBER STATES AND NATO ELEMENTS FOR CONTROL OF AND ACCESS TO ATOMAL INFORMATION WHICH ARE NOT IN CONSONANCE WITH C-M(64)39 AND C-M(65)11 (E.G., PARAGRAPHS 3, 5, 6, 7 AND 10). FOR THIS REASON, USRO DOES ANTICIPATE OBJECTIONS FROM NATO ELEMENTS AND MEMBER STATES TO THE US CONVEYING DIRECTLY REQUIREMENTS WHICH ARE TO BE GENERALLY APPLICABLE AND OF A CONTINUING NATURE TO ATOMAL CONTROL THROUGHOUT

PAGE 2 RUEFNCR 4639 ~~SECRET~~

NATO. COUNCIL HAS GIVEN MANDATE TO AC/228 WORKING GROUP TO SORT OUT THIS PROBLEM AND TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COUNCIL ON THE NATO ATOMAL CONTROL PROGRAM. THE US DRAFT FOR THIS PROGRAM IS ANXIOUSLY AWAITED. IF AN EXTENSIVE DELAY IS ANTICIPATED IN THIS DRAFT, THE AC/228 WG CAN BE CONVENED TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO COUNCIL ON INTERIM PROCEDURES ALONG THE LINES OF THE ATTACHMENT TO ABOVE REFERENCE. USRO WILL PROVIDE BY SEPARATE MESSAGE DETAILED COMMENTS ON THE ATTACHMENT TO REFERENCE.

2. IT IS STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT THE US AUTHORITIES CONCERNED ADDRESS AT THIS TIME ONLY THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF FALLEX 66 AND RELATED EXERCISES. IN THIS RESPECT, NATO SECURITY BUREAU, INTERNATIONAL STAFF EXERCISE ADVISOR AND USRO ARE CONVINCED THAT TIME DOES NOT PERMIT MEMBER STATES AND NATO ELEMENTS TO ASSIMILATE, TRANSLATE, PUBLISH AND IMPLEMENT THE COMPLEX PROCEDURES ATTACHED TO REFERENCE. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE UNREALISTIC AND EMBARRASSING TO THE US TO IMPOSE AT THIS LATE DATE REQUIREMENTS THAT ARE IMPRACTICAL FOR NATO TO IMPLEMENT, ESPECIALLY AS A SOLUTION TO THE FALLEX 66 PROBLEM THAT WAS DISCUSSED WITH STATE, OSD AND AEC REPRESENTATIVES IN THE FORUM OF THE AC/228 WG MEETING ON 24 FEBRUARY 1966. THERE FOLLOWS

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: RAC 030R-5-130

By: JOL WARA Date: 12-18-17

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 4639, SEPTEMBER 30

PAGE 3 RUFNCR 4639 ~~SECRET~~

THE TEXT OF A PROPOSED MESSAGE TO BE SENT BY THE DEPARTMENT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL, OUTLINING THE ATOMAL CONTROL PROCEDURES TO BE APPLICABLE FOCFALLEX 66.

TEXT: BEGIN VERBATIM TEXT OF PROPOSED JOINT STATE-OSD-JDC MESSAGE:

FROM: SECSTATE WASHDC

TO: USRO PASS TO SECRETARY GENERAL NATO

SUBJECT: ATOMAL CONTRIA PROCEDURES FOR FALLEX 66 AND RELATED EXERCISES

1. REFERENCES:

A. C-M(64)39 AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY FOR COOPERATION REGARDING ATOMIC INFORMATION.

B. C-M(55)15 (FINAL)

2. THE US GOVERNMENT, IN RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF FALLEX 66 AND EXERCISES RELATED THERETO, HEREBY AUTHORIZES MEMBER STATES (LESS ICELAND AND FRANCE) AND NATO ELEMENTS TO COMMUNICATE BY ORAL, VISUAL AND DOCUMENTARY MEANS ATOMAL INFORMATION CONCERNING YIELDS, NUMBERS AND LOCATIONS FOR THE (MARK NUMBERS SAME AS PARAGRAPH 2 OF ATTACHMENT TO REFERENCE) WEAPONS TO THE EXTENT REQUIRED FOR THE CONDUCT AND SUCCESS OF THE EXERCISE.

PAGE 4 RUFNCR 4639 ~~SECRET~~

3. MEMBER STATES AND NATO ELEMENTS ARE RESPONSIBLE TO ENSURE THAT:

A. THE INFORMATION IS CLASSIFIED, CONTROLLED, MARKED, ACCOUNTED FOR AND PROTECTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCES.

B. ACCESS TO ATOMAL INFORMATION SPECIFIED IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE IS AUTHORIZED ONLY TO THOSE PERSONNEL WHO HAVE BEEN GRANTED SECURITY CLEARANCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCES AND WHO ARE DETERMINED BY APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES TO HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR NATO ATOMIC MATTERS TO WHICH THE INFORMATION PERTAINS.

C. REPRODUCTIONS AND GENERATION OF DOCUMENTS CONTAINING ATOMAL INFORMATION WITHIN THE SCOPE SPECIFIED IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE ARE AUTHORIZED WITHOUT FURTHER REFERENCE TO THE UNITED STATES. SUCH DOCUMENTS WILL BE CONTROLLED, ACCOUNTED FOR AND PROTECTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCES.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- PARIS 4639, SEPTEMBER 30

D. ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION OF ATOMAL INFORMATION WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH CRYPTOGRAPHIC MEANS APPROVED BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE TO THE EXTENT THAT SUCH MEANS ARE AVAILABLE.

DURING THE EXERCISES WHERE APPROVED NATO CRYPTOGRAPHIC MEANS ARE NOT AVAILABLE, OTHER CRYPTOGRAPHIC MEANS WHICH AFFORD AT LEAST THE LEVEL OF SECURITY PROVIDED BY NATO APPROVED SYSTEMS MAY BE UTILIZED. PROVISIONS OF SUB-PARAGRAPH B ABOVE APPLY TO ALL

PAGE 5 RUFNCR 4639 ~~SECRET~~
PERSONNEL WHO HAVE ACCESS TO ATOMAL INFORMATION SO COMMUNICATED.

E. EXERCISE DOCUMENTS CONTAINING ATOMAL INFORMATION ARE NOT REQUIRED TO BE INCLUDED IN THE ANNUAL ACCOUNTABILITY REPORTS IF DESTROYED WITHIN 30 DAYS FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF THE EXERCISE. DESTRUCTION CERTIFICATES FOR ALL EXERCISE DOCUMENTS WILL BE RETAINED ON FILE IN ALL ELEMENTS THAT RECEIVE ATOMAL DOCUMENTS DURING AN EXERCISE. END VERBATIM TEXT.

4. A MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP ON EXERCISE FALLEX 66 IS SCHEDULED FOR MONDAY, 3 OCTOBER 1966, AT 1515 HOURS. US DELEGATION HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO CIRCULATE U-PAPER IN ADVANCE, OR MAKE AN ORAL REPORT AT THE MEETING, ON THE PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING ATOMAL INFORMATION DURING FALLEX. FAILING THE ABOVE TWO ALTERNATIVES, A STATEMENT IS REQUIRED BY THE US ON WHERE WE STAND ON THIS PROBLEM AND WHEN A FINAL US POSITION MAY BE EXPECTED.

5. REQUEST APPROVAL OF THE RECOMMENDATION AND TEXT CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE OR YOUR ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL PRIOR TO 0900 3 OCTOBER, AND AUTHORITY TO DRAW ON YOUR RESPONSE TO BRIEF THE EXERCISE FALLEX WORKING GROUP.
GP-3 CLEVELAND

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 9--30-66, 11:20 A.M.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE & USIA 11:20 A.M.

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

26

86

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action
EUR

NNNNVV FNE376VV HPA887

RR RUEHC RUEKDA

DE RUFNCR 4422 2702120

Info

ZNY CCCCC

R 271933Z SEP 66

SS

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

G

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2936

L

INFO RUEKDA/DOD WASHDC

H

STATE GRNC

NEA

BT

NSC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 4422

INR

SEPT 27

CIA

NATUS

NSA

ACDA

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF ATOMAL TO NATO

SCI

MC

REF: TONAT A-14

OPR

AEC

RSR

1. INITIAL USRO STUDY OF ATTACHMENT TO REF AIRGRAM, WHICH WAS RECEIVED YESTERDAY, AND CONSULATIONS WITH US ELEMENT SHAPE AND NATO SECURITY BUREAU ARE UNDERWAY. USRO SECURITY ADVISOR RETURNING FROM ROME SPECOM MEETING CUB SEPT 28.

2. OUR ANALYSIS UPON RECEIPT INFORMAL VIEWS THESE AGENCIES CANNOT RPT NOT BE COMPLETED IN TIME DISPATCH OUR VIEWS BEFORE

PAGE TWO RUFNCR 4422 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SEPTEMBER 29. SINCE WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED SOME INITIAL CONCERN ABOUT IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPOSED JAIEG PROCEDURES ON PART OF NATO SECURITY BUREAU, WE URGE DISSEMINATION THESE PROCEDURES TO APPROPRIATE NATO AND NATIONAL AUTHORITIES BE DEFERRED UNTIL WE HAVE CONSULTED FURTHER HERE AND SUBMITTED OUR VIEWS.

GP-3. FARLEY
BT

025054

1966 SEP 27 PM 5 33

~~BATOR~~
~~BOWDLER~~
~~BUDGET~~
~~DAVIS~~
~~GINSBURCH~~
~~HAMILTON~~
~~JESSUP~~
~~JOHNSON~~
~~JORDEN~~
~~KEENE~~
~~KOMER~~
~~MOYERS~~
~~TAYLOR~~
~~WRIGGINS~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 030R-5-14.9

By JOW vARA Date 12-18-17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

53033

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

46

Origin

EUR

Info:

SS

G

SP

L

SAL

NEA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

ACDA

MC

OC

AEC

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS

PRIORITY

SEP 23 4 14 PM '66

STATE 53033

NATUS

REF: Paris 4126

SUB: Atomic Information in Fallex 66

~~BATOR~~
~~BOWLER~~
~~BUDGET~~
~~DAVIS~~
~~DEAN~~
~~HAMILTON~~
~~JESSUP~~
~~LOWERY~~
~~OWEN~~
~~RENTY~~
~~ROWER~~
~~ROWERS~~
~~TAYLOR~~
~~WIGGINS~~

1. It is imperative that no repeat no members French delegation be present when Atomic information discussed in Fallex 66. It is ~~our~~ our understanding that French do not repeat not plan participate.

Please take any steps you deem necessary to assure that this is the case.

2. Procedures controlling Atomic information in Fallex 66 have been worked out and will be transmitted in Septel.

END

GP-4

BALL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 09-78
By isl NARA, Date 6-2-09

Drafted by:

EUR/RPM: WDR/gg/G/PM: JTR/gg:gc

Clearances:

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

EUR/RPM - John I. Getz

OSD/ISA - Captain Hanks (substance)
JAIEG-Mr. Goure (substance)

L/EUR - Mr. Berlack *ERB*

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

59112

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~

48-40

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS IMMEDIATE

L

Info

STATE 59112

OCT 4 1 58 PM '66

SS

NATUS

G

SP

REF: PARIS 4812

H

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Atomal Information During Fallex 66

SAL

EUR

NEA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

ACDA

SCI

MC

GDP

OC

AEC

1. Following are Washington proposals on changes recommended reftel on Atomal information communication procedures for Fallex 66 contained in State 58222:

a. We agree with deletion recommended in reftel para 2A.

b. Re reftel para 2B, we propose para 4 of procedures now read as follows:

"4. The information specified above may be communicated between administering agencies listed in paras. 2 and 3 of Section II of ref B (less France and Iceland) and through such additional channels as may be necessary without advance JAIEG approval of such additional channels. Within forty-five days after the completion of the exercise each administering agency will:

a. Notify other administering agencies of the identity of

Drafted by: JAIEG:Mr.Goure (para.4) telegraphic transmission and
L/EUR:ERBerlack:AEC:RFulton jdd:10/4/66 Classification approved by:

EUR/RPM - John I. Getz

Clearances:

G/PM - Mr. George OSD/ISA - Capt.Hanks (subs.) JAIEG - Mr. Goure (subs.)
MLC - Col.Bruce (subs.) ATSDAE - Mr.Walske (subs.)
EUR/RPM - Mr.Boggs (subs.)

~~SECRET~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: 64-0308-5-1-5-8
304 VARA Date: 12-18-17

~~SECRET~~

all documentary and electronic communications of Atomic information made by it, and by units for which it is responsible, to units under the responsibility of such other administering agencies.

b. Provide to JAIEG a list of units which received Atomic information by documentary and electronic means from units under the responsibility of other administering agencies. The JAIEG will, in turn, notify the SecGen and the Military Committee."

2. It should be understood that for purposes of this exercise earmarked and assigned units continue to come under the responsibility of the major NATO commands insofar as Atomic information is concerned.

3. Statutory Determination authorizing these procedures has been approved and mark numbers contained in attachment to TONAT A-14 may therefore be inserted in text of procedures as foreseen in STATE 58222.

4. JAIEG Case No. "N147/66NAA5" is assigned to transmission of document containing procedures to International Staff. Appropriate markings as required by the 1964 agreement must be affixed prior to such transmission. Reproduction of document is hereby authorized and reporting should be in accordance with the 1964 agreement.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9/30/66

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Release of Restricted Data to NATO on Atomic
Demolition Munitions (ADM's)

The President has noted your memorandum of September 14, 1966, on the above subject and has approved the release of relative information to SACEUR, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] as you have recommended and for the purposes you described in your memorandum.

3.3
(b)(5)(6)
6.2(a)

W W Rostow
W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 09-76
By int, NARA, Date 10-17-09

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9/30/66

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Release of Restricted Data to NATO on Atomic Demolition
Munitions (ADM's)

Secretary McNamara has requested your approval for the release of certain Restricted Data on atomic demolition munitions principally to SACEUR and the FRG but also to certain other NATO countries for which ADM support may be required. The Secretary has worked out an agreement with Minister von Hassel under which our Joint Chiefs will work with the FRG military authorities to make a new joint study of the potential military effectiveness of ADM's. The Secretary's request has been concurred in by State and AEC.

Your approval of the Secretary's recommendation is endorsed because the pros and cons of ADM's have been debated in this Government and within NATO without a consensus having been reached as to the desirability of deploying them as a regular part of the nuclear arsenal for the defense of the Alliance. The Secretary's study should go a long way in settling this issue once and for all.

If you agree, I will sign the attached memorandum for the Secretary authorizing him to make certain Restricted Data needed for the study available to those who will be participating therein.

Walt Rostow

Approved ✓

Disapproved _____

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 09-76
By il NARA, Date 10-21-09

~~SECRET~~

9-30-66

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Release of Restricted Data to NATO on Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM's)

Secretary McNamara has requested your approval for the release of certain Restricted Data on atomic demolition munitions principally to SACEUR and the FRG but also to certain other NATO countries for which ADM support may be required. The Secretary has worked out an agreement with Minister von Hassel under which our Joint Chiefs will work with the FRG military authorities to make a new joint study of the potential military effectiveness of ADM's. The Secretary's request has been concurred in by State and AEC.

Your approval of the Secretary's recommendation is endorsed because the pros and cons of ADM's have been debated in this Government and within NATO without a consensus having been reached as to the desirability of deploying them as a regular part of the nuclear arsenal for the defense of the Alliance. The Secretary's study should go a long way in settling this issue once and for all.

If you agree, I will sign the attached memorandum for the Secretary authorizing him to make certain Restricted Data needed for the study available to those who will be participating therein.

W. W. Rostow

Approved ☒Disapproved ☐See me ☐

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 09-76 (#31)
By id. NARA, Date 10-21-09

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 28, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. W. W. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Release of Restricted Data to NATO
on Atomic Demolition Munitions

Francis, Spurgeon and I concur in recommending that you endorse the Secretary's proposal for a new study of the military effectiveness of ADM's under various conditions and circumstances. State and AEC have concurred in the Secretary's recommendation and it has been verified that both McNamara and McNaughton are personally interested in having this study proceed.

C. E. Johnson

SECRET Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cm/y* NARA, Date 12-10-08

~~SECRET~~

3317

35

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

14 SEP 1966

By isl NLJ 10-433
NARA, Date 5-13-11

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Release of RESTRICTED DATA to NATO on Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADMs)

NSAM 197 required the Department of Defense to "submit to the President, for approval in principle, proposed programs of cooperation with other nations which will involve communication of RESTRICTED DATA ... together with the views of interested agencies, including the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission, on those parts of the proposed programs which will affect their responsibilities."

An ADM program of cooperation for our NATO Allies has been discussed with the Department of State and AEC, but I am not yet prepared to recommend your approval in principle of such a program. Since ADMs occupy a special place in the nuclear arsenal, and because of their unique capabilities, I have asked that further study efforts be initiated to assist me in formulating a final NSAM 197 program recommendation to you in accordance with the usual procedures. Studies so far completed on a bilateral basis with the Federal Republic of Germany have been relatively ineffective, partially because of our inability to disclose RESTRICTED DATA on ADMs, and partially because the study was subject to unrealistic restrictions and assumptions that made the studies of little or no value.

Pursuant to an agreement with Minister von Hassel, I have asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to cooperate with the military authorities of the Federal Republic of Germany in a new joint study of the potential military effectiveness of ADMs. The study will be conducted in two parts, the first being an analysis free of any political guidelines or constraints, of the maximum possible military effectiveness of ADMs as compared with conventional demolition munitions; the second part of the study will be an analysis of the extent to which that maximum possible military effectiveness will be affected by observance of a likely set of political guidelines or constraints regarding the control and use of ADMs. This two-fold study will enable us to examine the cost in terms of military effectiveness of political constraints which may be imposed in any ultimate ADM program of cooperation.

In order to perform an adequate study it will become necessary to release RESTRICTED DATA on ADMs to SACEUR, the FRG, and to certain other countries

585 11

DOWNGRADED AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

Sec Def Cont Nr. X-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

having forces for which ADM support may be required. Accordingly, I request your approval for release of relevant information to the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] as well, as an exception to the usual NSAM 197 procedures.

3.3
(b) (6)

The Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission concur in this request.

Signed
ROBERT S. McNAMARA

~~SECRET~~

Release of ADM's

36

~~SECRET~~

September 16, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Francis Bator
Mr. Spurgeon Keeny

Would you please advise me as to what action we should recommend on this McNamara proposal? It is a most unusual request in view of the fact that although he is not ready to recommend a program of cooperation under NSAM 197, he is in effect recommending the same sort of release of atomic information that he would have requested as a 197 action. What it boils down to obviously is that the Pentagon hopes that the FRG can figure out a useful mission for ADM -- apparently we have been unable to do it by ourselves.

C. E. Johnson

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 09-76
By *id* NARA, Date *10-21-09*
10-21-09

~~SECRET~~

September 16, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Francis Bator
Mr. Spurgeon Keeny

Would you please advise me as to what action we should recommend on this McNamara proposal? It is a most unusual request in view of the fact that although he is not ready to recommend a program of cooperation under NSAM 197, he is in effect recommending the same sort of release of atomic information that he would have requested as a 197 action. What it boils down to obviously is that the Pentagon hopes that the FRG can figure out a useful mission for ADM -- apparently we have been unable to do it by ourselves.

C. E. Johnson

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 09-76
By id, NARA, Date 10-21-09

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 28, 1966

~~SECRET~~

FOR MR. CHARLES JOHNSON

Mr. Bator asked me to tell you that he has no particular comment to make on the attached, but that he would like to be certain that Secretary McNamara and Assistant Secretary McNaughton both personally think the recommendation makes sense.


L. S. Eagleburger

cc: Spurgeon Keeny

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By dm/4 NARA, Date 12-10-04



40c

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

11 February 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES JOHNSON, STAFF MEMBER
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Reference is made to our telephone conversation this date.

The Statutory Determination concerning information for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was signed by the Secretary of Defense on 2 February and by the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission on 9 February, was coordinated with State Department.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "F. Costagliola", is positioned above the typed name.

F. Costagliola
Captain USN
Principal Military Assistant
to the ATSD(AE)

C. Johnson

1. The attached Top Secret document contains information, the defense aspect of which is paramount and unauthorized disclosure of which could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation.
2. This document shall be circulated only to the minimum number of persons authorized to have and requiring the information in the performance of their duties.
3. This document may not be reproduced without the authority of the official whose authenticating symbol appears thereon or higher authority in the Atomic Energy Commission.
4. Handling, storage and destruction of this document must comply with specific procedures set forth in security regulations.
5. This is NOT A RECEIPT but a record of persons who have read or had disclosed to them any part of the document identified above.
6. Except for Department of Defense personnel who shall submit semiannual inventories for AEC Top Secret documents as prescribed by appropriate Department of Defense directives, inventory reports of possession for Atomic Energy Commission Top Secret documents shall be submitted by the custodian to the Central Document Control Section, Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C., 20545, as of April 30 and October 31 of each year.

[illegible]

OCT 27 1965

~~SECRET~~

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

**SUBJECT: Statutory Determination for Providing Information to
the North Atlantic Council**

Reference is made to your memorandum for the President of October 7, 1965, as amplified by your memorandum to me of October 26, 1965, informing him that pursuant to Executive Order No. 10841, as amended, the Department of Defense and Atomic Energy Commission, with the concurrence of the Department of State, have determined that certain proposed cooperation and proposed communication of U. S. atomic information to the North Atlantic Council as described in the attachment to your memorandum for the President and further qualified in your memorandum to me will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.

The statutory determination as proposed has been concurred in and this concurrence constitutes a waiver of the restrictions set forth in President Kennedy's memorandum of January 12, 1963. The waiver of the 15-day waiting period requested in the October 7 memorandum for the President is no longer needed in view of the fact that the time has already elapsed.

It is understood that you will promptly inform the Joint Atomic Information Exchange Group and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the above statutory determination.

McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *Chm/s* NARA, Date 12-10-08

~~SECRET~~

October 27, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Statutory Determination for Providing Information
to the North Atlantic Council

Mac --

This is a routine determination that should not require the attention of the President. I held up action on the October 87 memorandum because the views of the State Department were not recorded. There was a split between AEC and Defense as to whether or not Iceland should be excluded from access to the information. In the subsequent discussions among the three agencies, an acceptable compromise was developed as set forth in Vance's memorandum to you and I believe we are now in good shape to proceed.

The determination is needed shortly in order to permit Defense and Harlan Cleveland to plan the final arrangements for the November meeting of the Select Committee and I recommend your signature on the attached memorandum.

Charles E. Johnson

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC030R-5-1-7-6

By JOL vARA Date 12/8/17

Changed date
from 10/8 to 10/7
per conversation
w/col. Byers



~~SECRET~~

428

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

26 OCT 1965

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS**

**SUBJECT: Statutory Determination for Providing Information to the
North Atlantic Council**

Reference is made to my memorandum to the President which forwarded the Statutory Determination for providing information to the North Atlantic Council.

I have checked with the Department of State, and they and the Atomic Energy Commission have no objection to qualifying the determination as follows:

"Until the NATO Security Bureau or USMICC finds [REDACTED] has in effect a security program which complies with the security requirements of the new NATO Agreement, this determination may be effective (1) only for the [REDACTED] Permanent Representative or Acting Permanent Representative to NAC and such other ministerial officials attending NAC meetings as are certified by the [REDACTED] (as appropriate) as having been cleared for access to Top Secret information in light of the requirements of the Security Annex, (2) only for the communication on an 'Eyes Only' basis of such [REDACTED] as is specifically defined and determined by the U. S. Ambassador to NATO to be essential to the achievement of overriding U. S. objectives within NATO."

6.2
(u)

SIGNED
CITRUS VANCE

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 09-77
By *ish*, NARA, Date *10-28-09*

~~SECRET~~

Sec Def Cont Nr. X- 6102





~~SECRET~~

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
McGEORGE GANDY'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

1965 OCT 8 PM 3 19

7 OCT 1965

4441

42c

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Statutory Determination for Providing Information
to the North Atlantic Council

Pursuant to Executive Order 10841, as amended, the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission have determined that the proposed cooperation and proposed communication to the North Atlantic Council attached hereto will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.

The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission has excluded [REDACTED] under the access limitations of the enclosure and feels that it is particularly important to make this exclusion in view of the scope of information involved and the continuing nature of the proposed determination. The exclusion was made subject to any overriding national policy which may apply. In the interest of the Alliance, I consider that [REDACTED] should not be excluded from this determination. I, therefore, recommend that you make that determination.


6.2
(a)

It is requested that restrictions placed on transmission of Restricted Data to NATO by President Kennedy's memorandum of January 12, 1963 be waived. It is also requested that the 15-day waiting period be waived.

SIGNED
CYRUS VANCE

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 09-77
By *id* NARA, Date 10-28-09

~~SECRET~~
RESTRICTED DATA-ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954,
AS AMENDED
Upon removal of attachments
this document becomes



Sec Def Cont Nr. X -

~~SECRET~~

September 19, 1965

**MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission**

**SUBJECT: Communication of U. S. Atomic Information to NATO's
Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic (U)**

Reference is made to your memorandum for the President of September 16, 1965, informing him that pursuant to Executive Order 10841, as amended, the Department of Defense and Atomic Energy Commission have joined in a statutory determination that certain U. S. atomic information on actual numbers, yields, and locations of U. S. atomic weapons described in the attachment to your memorandum be communicated by the Department of Defense under the 1964 Agreement for Cooperation with NATO to Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic. It is noted that communication of this particular information is for use in the development of NATO defense plans and is essential for those commands in maintaining their respective nuclear operational capabilities.

It is further noted that the Department of Defense and Atomic Energy Commission have determined that the communication of this atomic information under the terms set forth in the attachment to your memorandum, will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.

The statutory determination has been concurred in, and in view of the need to communicate the information as soon as possible, the 15-day waiting period specified in Executive Order 10956, amending Executive Order 10841, has been waived.

It is understood that you will promptly inform the Joint Atomic Information Exchange Group and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the above statutory determination.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 09-76
By *id.* NARA, Date 10-21-09

/s/
McGeorge Bundy~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

September 17, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: 1. Mr. Keeny
2. Mr. Bundy

SUBJECT: Communication of U. S. Atomic Information to NATO's
Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic (U)

This is another routine statutory determination similar to the two you signed in June, which does not require the attention of the President.

The urgency is due to a military requirement to have this essential information in the hands of appropriate NATO commanders without delay.

The net effect of this statutory determination is to permit the dissemination of [REDACTED] of the "planning" figures that had previously been used and which have always made the field commanders nervous. Although this will be a net improvement, we still have a long way to go in achieving procedures that will completely satisfy military requirements. Jack Howard is now working on revised procedures that may further improve the situation but we may ultimately have to face up to the need for revising the Atomic Energy Act.

3.3(b)(5)
6.2(e)

Charles E. Johnson

Charles E. Johnson

~~SECRET~~

SANTIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 09-76
By isl, NARA, Date 10-17-09

~~SECRET~~

4018

436

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

RECEIVED
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

SEP 16 1965

1965 SEP 16 PM 4 43

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 09-77
By isl, NARA, Date 10-28-09

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Communication of U. S. Atomic Information to
NATO's Allied Command Europe and Allied Command
Atlantic (U)

As required by Executive Order 10936, amending Executive Order 10841, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission are hereby referring the determination described below to the President.

The attachment hereto specifies certain U. S. atomic information on [REDACTED] which the Department of Defense has proposed be communicated under the 1944 Agreement for Cooperation with NATO to Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic. Communication of this particular information is for use in the development of NATO defense plans and is essential for those commands in maintaining their respective nuclear operational capabilities.

6.2(a)

Accordingly, under the authority of Executive Order 10841, as amended, the Secretary of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission have determined that such communication of that information under the terms set forth in the attachment will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.

In view of the need to so communicate the information as soon as possible, it is recommended that you waive the 15-day waiting period specified in Executive Order 10936.

~~Original Copy~~

Signed
ROBERT S. McNAMARA

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

Secretary of Defense

DOCUMENT TRANSMITTED HERewith
CONTAINS ~~SECRET~~ RESTRICTED DATA

When separated from inclosure,
handle this document as

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 Attachment

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGISTRATION; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOCS NOT APPLY

~~SECRET~~

Sec Def Cont Nr. X- 5171

2548

File

43d

September 22, 1965

NOTE FOR MISS BOYCE

Alice --

Would you please substitute the attached sheet for the one that I sent over with My September 17 memo. After Mr. Bundy had approved the statutory determination, the Defense Department learned that they had unwittingly omitted the word "or" between "CHINCHAN" and the word "in" in the last line of the information sheet.

Charles E. Johnson

Charles E. Johnson

~~SECRET~~

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~ Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13202, Sec. 3.4
By *clm/fjs* NARA, Date *12-10-01*



43e

~~SECRET~~
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301


22 September 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES E. JOHNSON, STAFF MEMBER,
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: U. S. Atomic Information Proposed for Communication
to Allied Command Europe/Allied Command Atlantic

Reference is made to Mr. Howard's memorandum of 21 September and the telephone conversation of 22 September concerning U. S. atomic information proposed for communication to Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic.

Attached herewith is the revised information sheet.


F. Costaghola
Captain, USN
Principal Military Assistant
to the ATSD(AE)

Attachment

~~SECRET~~
~~RESTRICTED DATA-ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954,~~
AS AMENDED

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS THIS
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED



~~SECRET~~

435

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

22 September 1965

**MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES E. JOHNSON, STAFF MEMBER,
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS**

**SUBJECT: U. S. Atomic Information Proposed for Communication
to Allied Command Europe/Allied Command Atlantic**

Reference is made to Mr. Howard's memorandum of 21 September and the telephone conversation of 22 September concerning U. S. atomic information proposed for communication to Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic.

Attached herewith is the revised information sheet.

SIGNED

**F. Costagliola
Captain, USN
Principal Military Assistant
to the ATSD(AE)**

Attachment

~~SECRET~~
RESTRICTED DATA-ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954,
AS AMENDED

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS THIS
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

May 27, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Statutory Determination for Providing Information
to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Reference is made to your memorandum to the President of May 26, 1965, informing him that you consider it desirable to provide information concerning the numbers of nuclear weapons dispersed, both actual and planned, in direct support of NATO forces (both U. S. and non-U. S.).

It has been noted that pursuant to Executive Order 10841, as amended, the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission have determined that the proposed cooperation and the proposed communication to the North Atlantic Council, the Military Committee, and Standing Group NATO, subject to the terms and conditions of the 1964 NATO Agreement for Cooperation and subject to the access limitations specified in Section I of the enclosure to your memorandum, of the following information will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security:

The total number of nuclear weapons by categories
in or planned for Europe through FY 1966.

It is further noted that the Chairman, AEC has [redacted] under the access limitation specified in Section I of the enclosure to your memorandum due to security reasons which exist, subject to any overriding national policy for including [redacted] representatives in the audience. You have recommended that in the interest of the Alliance, [redacted] representatives should be permitted to participate as members of the audience.

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
Authority NY/RAC 12-406
By CRS, NARA, Date 2/8/18

~~SECRET~~

-2-

The President has approved your recommendation that [redacted] representatives should be permitted to participate as members of the audience.

It has also been noted that pursuant to Executive Order 10841, as amended, the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission have also determined that the proposed cooperation and the proposed communication separately to [redacted]

[redacted] Federal Republic of Germany, [redacted] and the United Kingdom, subject to the terms and conditions of the 1964 NATO Agreement and subject to the access limitations specified in Section 2 of the enclosure to your memorandum, of the following information will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security:

To each of the above member states the numbers of nuclear weapons by type on the soil of that nation and/or nuclear weapons located in Europe in support of the NATO committed forces of that nation as of May 18, 1965.

The President has concurred in the two statutory determinations as proposed and this concurrence constitutes a waiver of the restrictions set forth in President Kennedy's memorandum of January 12, 1963, to the extent necessary to implement the joint determinations. Also, because of stringent time limitations the President has waived the 15-day waiting period.

It is understood that you will promptly inform the Joint Atomic Information Exchange Group and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the above statutory determinations.

McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/4a

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

1 JUN 1965

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS**

SUBJECT: Access Limitations

Reference is made to Secretary of Defense McNamara's memorandum for the President of 26 May 1965.

Pursuant to Executive Order 10841, the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission have determined that the amendment of paragraph 1. e of the enclosure to the referenced memorandum to read as follows will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security:

"The Supreme Allied Commander Europe and not to exceed eight of his advisors; The Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic and not to exceed two of his advisors; and the Commander-in-Chief Channel Command and not to exceed one of his advisors. The advisors will be certified to the Chairman Standing Group by the respective Commander as having a need-to-know."

It is requested that the appropriate action be taken.

Signed: W. J. Howard

W. J. Howard
Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense (Atomic Energy)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4
By clm/ly NARA, Date 12-10-08

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

SECRET

May 27, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

**SUBJECT: Statutory Determination for Providing Information
to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation**

Secretary McNamara has requested your concurrence in two statutory determinations by Defense and AEC to provide the total number of nuclear weapons in or planned for Europe through 1966 in a speech he will make at the forthcoming NATO Ministerial Meeting.

AEC has excluded Iceland from the audience because of certain technical security considerations. Secretary McNamara would like you to override the AEC objection.

In view of the fact that the Secretary is speaking on either Monday or Tuesday, he urgently requests your earliest approval. If you concur, I shall sign the attached memorandum to Secretary McNamara.

McGeorge Bundy

____ Approve

____ Disapprove

____ See me

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

By CTS NLJ/RAC/12-406
NARA, Date 2/7/18



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

44c

27 MAY 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES JOHNSON

SUBJECT: Access Limitations

Reference is made to Secretary of Defense McNamara's memorandum for the President of 26 May 1965.

It is requested that the enclosure, Access Limitations, paragraph 1c be revised to read:

- c. The Secretary General, Deputy Secretary General, DSG/ASG for Economics and Finance, Executive Secretary, and Deputy Executive Secretary, the Head of the Security Bureau and his Deputy, the Chairman of Defense Planning Working Group, and the Director of the Office of the Secretary General.

(Signed: W. J. Howard)

W. J. Howard
Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense (Atomic Energy)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By clm/ly NARA, Date 12-10-08

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

2444

SECRET

May 27, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Statutory Determination for Providing
Information to the NATO

Mac --

Spurgeon and I have gone over this request and consider it in order. McNamara needs this authorization regardless of how we handle the dispersal request that is now before you.

I did not handle this routinely as we have in the past because it involves a Presidential decision to override an AEC objection. Otherwise, we would have made it for your signature without taking the time of the President.

Charles E. Johnson

SECRET

*cy of entire
package
to Keeney 5/31*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Dec 31, 64
By *CDM/hy* Date 12-10-08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

445

ACCESS LIMITATIONS

1. North Atlantic Council (excluding Iceland*) and Military Committee/Standing Group NATO.

Access will be limited as follows:

- a. The NATO Chiefs of State, Heads of Government, Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers, and Finance Ministers.
- b. Permanent Representatives to the NAC, their deputies, and members of NATO national delegations (including those individuals accompanying representatives identified at a. above) certified to the Secretary General by Permanent Representatives as having a need-to-know.
- c. The Secretary General, Deputy Secretary General, DSG/ASG for Economics and Finance, Executive Secretary, and Deputy Executive Secretary, and the Head of the Security Bureau and his Deputy.
- d. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of each of the Member States, the Chairman of the Military Committee in permanent session, the members of the Standing Group NATO, and three advisers for each as certified to Secretary General by the respective Chief of Staff, Chairman, or Member as having a need-to-know.
- e. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe and not to exceed three of his advisers; The Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic and not to exceed two of his advisers; and the Commander-in-Chief Channel Command and not to exceed one of his advisers. The advisers will be certified to the Chairman Standing Group by the respective Commander as having a need-to-know.

* See covering memorandum

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec 3.4
By dh/ NAVA, E.O. 127008

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING: 3.1 EIP 0200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

1. Interpreters, translators, and recorders as certified by the Secretary General.

2. NATO Member States

Access to atomic information transmitted to Belgium, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom will be limited to the following officials within each state:

- a. Chief of State, Head of Government, Foreign Minister, Finance Minister, Defense Minister, and armed forces and service Chiefs of Staff.
- b. Three advisors to each of the officials identified at a. above whose official duties are such as to require that they personally advise these officials.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

44h

ACCESS LIMITATIONS

1. North Atlantic Council (excluding Iceland) and Military Committee/
Standing Group NATO.

Access will be limited as follows:

- a. The NATO Chiefs of State, Heads of Government, Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers, and Finance Ministers.
- b. Permanent Representatives to the NAC, their deputies, and members of NATO national delegations (including those individuals accompanying representatives identified at a. above) certified to the Secretary General by Permanent Representatives as having a need-to-know.
- c. The Secretary General, Deputy Secretary General, DSG/ASG for Economics and Finance, Executive Secretary, and Deputy Executive Secretary, and the Head of the Security Bureau and his Deputy.
- d. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of each of the Member States, the Chairman of the Military Committee in permanent session, the members of the Standing Group NATO, and three advisors for each as certified to Secretary General by the respective Chief of Staff, Chairman, or Member as having a need-to-know.
- e. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe and not to exceed three of his advisors; The Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic and not to exceed two of his advisors; and the Commander-in-Chief Channel Command and not to exceed one of his advisors. The advisors will be certified to the Chairman Standing Group by the respective Commander as having a need-to-know.
- f. Interpreters, translators, and recorders as certified by the Secretary General.

2. NATO Member States

Access to atomic information transmitted to Belgium, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom will be limited to the following officials within each state:

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4
By *Chm/lf* NARA, Date *12-10-08*

This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

- a. Chief of State, Head of Government, Foreign Minister, Finance Minister, Defense Minister, and armed forces and service Chiefs of Staff.
- b. Three advisors to each of the officials identified at a, above whose official duties are such as to require that they personally advise these officials.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

June 14, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Statutory Determination for Providing Information to
the Military Committee and Standing Group NATO

Reference is made to your memorandum for the President of June 11, 1965, informing him that pursuant to Executive Order 10841, as amended, and in order to better carry out the objectives of NATO to develop defense plans, the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission have determined that certain proposed cooperation with the Military Committee and Standing Group NATO and the proposed communication to these two organizations of certain information as set forth in the enclosure to the memorandum cited above will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.

The statutory determination as proposed has been concurred in and this concurrence constitutes a waiver of the restrictions set forth in President Kennedy's memorandum of January 12, 1963. Also, because of stringent time limitations involved, the 15-day waiting period is waived.

It is understood that you will promptly inform the Joint Atomic Information Exchange Group and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the above statutory determination.

/s/

McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By dm/7 Date 12-10-08

~~SECRET~~

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

11 JUN 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Statutory Determination for Providing Information to the Military Committee and Standing Group NATO

Under the terms of the new NATO Agreement for Cooperation which became effective on 12 March 1965 a wider dissemination of atomic information with NATO became possible.

In order to better carry out the objectives of NATO to develop defense plans and pursuant to Executive Order 10841, as amended, the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission have determined that the proposed cooperation and the proposed communication to the Military Committee and Standing Group NATO of the information outlined in the enclosure will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.

It is requested that the restrictions placed on the transmission of Restricted Data to NATO by President Kennedy's memorandum of January 12, 1963 be waived.

The Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff session is meeting in Paris next week. In order to permit a briefing involving Restricted Data scheduled for 18 June to this group, it is requested that a waiver of the 15 day waiting period be granted.

Enclosure

[SIGNED]

Cyrus Vance~~SECRET~~

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, 12958-34
By *Com/ry* 12-10-68

2459

June 14, 1965

NOTE FOR MR. BUNDY

Mac --

These are routine statutory determinations that do not require the attention of the President.

One of them is urgent in view of the fact that the discussions in Paris start this week and the waiver is needed in order to permit the people who have a need to know sit in the discussions.

Charles E. Johnson

SECRET Attachments

CEJ # 2459 - Signed 6-14-65
2456 - Signed 6-14-65

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By Chm/h NARA, Date 12-10-08

~~SECRET~~

June 14, 1965

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

**SUBJECT: Atomic Information Proposed for Communication to
France, Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom (U)**

Reference is made to your memorandum for the President of June 7, 1965, informing him that pursuant to Executive Order 10841, as amended, the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission have joined in a statutory determination to authorize the release of certain atomic information on the MK-28, Mk-43, and MK-57 nuclear weapons, as specified in the enclosure to attachment 1 of the above-cited memorandum, to France, Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom for the development of defense plans, the training of personnel in the employment of and defense against atomic weapons, and the development of delivery systems compatible with the atomic weapons which they carry. The Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission have determined that the proposed co-operation and communication of this atomic information will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.

The statutory determination has been concurred in.

It is understood that you will promptly inform the Joint Atomic Information Exchange Group and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the above statutory determination.

/s/

McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLT 99-277
By Gpk6 NARA, Date 1/14/09



~~SECRET~~

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

7 JUN 1965

2455

46a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Atomic Information Proposed for Communication to
[REDACTED] (U)

6.2(a)

The Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission have
joined in a statutory determination to authorize the release of
certain [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] for the
development of defense plans, the training of personnel in the
employment of and defense against atomic weapons, and the develop-
ment of delivery systems compatible with the atomic weapons which
they carry.

The determination was proposed by the DoD as outlined in Attachment 1
and the AEC concurrence is reflected at Attachment 2.

I am advising you of this action in accordance with Executive
Order 10956. If the President concurs in this action as proposed,
the Joint Atomic Information Exchange Group and the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy will be notified promptly of the completion of the
statutory determination.

SIGNED
CYRUS VANCE

2 Attachments

When separated from inclosures,
handle this document as
UNCLASSIFIED

~~DOCUMENT TRANSMITTED HERewith CONTAINS RESTRICTED DATA~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 09-77
By isl, NARA, Date 10-28-09

~~SECRET~~

Sec Def Cont Nr. X- 3078

2452

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 09-77
By isl, NARA, Date 10-28-09 46b

C O P Y

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

16 APR 1965


Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg
Chairman,
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission

Dear Glenn:

The Department of Defense has a requirement to release [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] for defense planning, training and delivery systems compatibility purposes. The first units are scheduled to complete training and compatibility modifications in the first quarter of FY 1966; therefore, it is requested that this statutory determination be handled in an expeditious manner. The atomic information proposed for release is at Inclosure 1. Some of this information is covered in existing determinations; however, it is included here in order that all atomic information required to support this program can be presented for your consideration. The requirements of NEAM 197 have been satisfied for systems involved as follows:

b.2
(u)



11

I have determined that the atomic information outlined in the inclosure is required for the purposes stated above. Pursuant to Executive Order 10841, as amended, I have also determined that the proposed cooperation and communication of atomic information will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.

If the Commission joins me in this determination, I shall advise the President of this proposed communication with [REDACTED] and in the absence of any qualifying executive action, subsequently notify the Joint Atomic Information Exchange Group

11

~~DOCUMENT TRANSMITTED HEREWITH~~
~~CONTAINS RESTRICTED DATA~~

When separated from inclosure,
handle this document as
UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

that transmission, to the above mentioned nations, of the information outlined in the inclosure is authorized.

In addition, the Department of Defense will notify the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of this determination prior to the transfer of the specified information to [REDACTED]

6.2(a)

Sincerely,

/s/ Cy

1 Inclosure

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

May 3, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Mac --

This is another fairly routine statutory determination by Defense and AEC that I propose be handled in the same way that you recently approved the communication of certain Restricted Data to NATO for use in a study of requirements for ballistic missiles for NATO. Your memo approving the action was signed April 6.

Charles E. Johnson

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec 2.4
By Chad/6 Date 12-10-08

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

48

4/6/65

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

**SUBJECT: Atomic Information Proposed for Communication
to NATO**

Reference is made to your memorandum of March 23, 1965 informing me that the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission have joined in a statutory determination to authorize the transmission of a study (Parts I and II) of requirements for ballistic missiles for NATO to the NATO Military Committee in Permanent Session and the NATO Standing Group. The study to be transmitted is described in the attachment to the copy of a letter dated November 25, 1964 from the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, which letter was appended to your memorandum to me of March 23.

The action is concurred in as proposed and this concurrence constitutes a waiver of the restriction set forth in the President's memorandum of January 12, 1963 to the extent necessary to implement the joint determination.

It is understood that you will promptly inform the Joint Atomic Information Exchange Group and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the statutory determination.

151

McGeorge Bundy

DECLASSIFIED
EO 12958, Sec. 3.4
By *Chalky* L. PA, Date 12-10-08

~~SECRET~~

C. Johnson
~~SECRET~~

April 5, 1965

49
WJ
NATO
File

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Mac:

Defense and AEC are still not able to convey information to NATO under the new NATO Agreement for Cooperation because all the loose ends are not yet tied up. Meanwhile, Defense would like to transmit certain information in the near future that will ultimately be made available to the North Atlantic Council and representatives in the national capitals. Defense and AEC have jointly recommended that we authorize the transmission on an ad hoc basis.

I have prepared a memorandum for your signature that I believe would do the job without wasting the time of the President. This is following the procedure we successfully used last December when we authorized communication to NATO of certain atomic information to be contained in McNamara's speech to the NATO Ministerial Meeting. I recommend that you sign the draft memorandum to Vance.

Charles E. Johnson

Attachment.

**THIS DOCUMENT IS UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED
FROM ATTACHMENT.**

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

23 MAR 1965

1180
499

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Atomic Information Proposed for Communication to NATO

The Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission have joined in a statutory determination to authorize the transmission of a study (Parts I and II) of requirements for ballistic missiles for NATO to the NATO Military Committee in Permanent Session and the NATO Standing Group. This determination was proposed by the Department of Defense as outlined in attachment 1 and the Atomic Energy Commission concurrence is reflected at attachment 2.

I am advising you of this action in accordance with Executive Order 10956. If the President concurs in this action as proposed, the Joint Atomic Information/Exchange Group and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy will be notified promptly of the completion of the statutory determination. If the President concurs in this action as proposed, I would also understand that this concurrence will constitute a waiver of the restrictions set forth in the President's memorandum of January 12, 1963, to the extent necessary to implement this joint determination.


Cyrus Vance

2 Attachments

DOCUMENT TRANSMITTED HERewith CONTAINS RESTRICTED DATA

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13202, Sec. 3.4
By clm/ly NARA, Date 12-10-01



Sec Def Cont Nr. X-

1338

2368

~~SECRET~~

496

C O P Y

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

25 November 1964

Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg
Chairman
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C.

Dear Glenn:

The Department of Defense has a requirement to provide to the Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO (MC/SGN) a study (Parts I and II) of requirements for ballistic missiles for NATO. This study will be used as the United States input to the international study of NATO ballistic missile requirements which was directed by the Military Committee, in Chiefs of Staff Session, in December 1962. If the study is to be fully useful it will eventually be necessary for its content to be made available to the North Atlantic Council and representatives in the National Capitals. However, the current review of SACEUR's 1970-74 force goals during the next several months makes mandatory the early consideration by the MC/SGN, in Permanent and Chiefs of Staff Sessions, of all pertinent data concerning MRBM requirements. In order that the study can be made available to the MC/SGN at the earliest possible time, the following is proposed:

a. Approval of the proposed atomic information outlined in the inclosure.

b. Your agreement that CM(62)50(Final) (CABAL Procedures) do not apply to transmission of atomic information to the MC/SGN.

Subject to your concurrence in the above and the provisions of Executive Order 10956, the Department of Defense would understand that the atomic information contained in the missiles study is eligible for authorized communication only to SACEUR, SACLANC and their subordinates, and to the MC/SGN with no further dissemination authorized at this time. However, when the new Agreement becomes effective the Department would take necessary action to extend dissemination authority to the extent permitted under the new Agreement, subject, of course, to any dissemination limitations considered applicable under the new Agreement.

I have concluded that the release to NATO of the atomic information indicated in the inclosure is required for the purpose of the development of defense plans. I have also concluded that provisions of NSAM 197 do not apply to this cooperation.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLI 15-200

By uu3 NARA, Date 11-06-2015

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

~~SECRET~~
NO FORN DISSEM
11-11-1964

Sec Def Cont Nr. X-

1338

2368

~~SECRET~~

Pursuant to Executive Order 10841, as amended, and Section 144B of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, I have determined that the proposed cooperation and the proposed communication to NATO will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security. Further, I have determined that this proposed communication will not reveal important information concerning the design, development or fabrication of the nuclear components of an atomic weapon.

If the Commission joins me in the above, I shall advise the President of the proposed communication and request appropriate action thereon. On receipt of approval, I shall notify the Joint Atomic Information Exchange Group accordingly.

In addition, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy will be notified of this determination prior to the communication of the specified information to NATO.

Your early consideration of this request will be appreciated.

Sincerely,

/s/ Bob

Inclosure 1

~~SECRET~~

RESTRICTED DATA
Atomic Energy Act of 1954

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGISTRATION; DOD USE 5-00.10
DOES NOT APPLY

~~SECRET~~

Copy 1 of 1 copies each
of 2 pages series D

49c

ATOMIC INFORMATION IN MRBM STUDIES PART I AND PART II (REVISED) PROPOSED
FOR RELEASE TO NATO

The information outlined below is proposed for communication to NATO insofar as it applies to the nuclear warheads in association with the following systems, except as indicated:

1. Yields:

[Redacted area]

2. Capacity and capability of an aircraft, squadron, naval vessel, or special weapon organization in terms of the number of the following specific types of weapons and weapons systems which can be stored or handled for those types of units programmed or planned in support of NATO:

MINUTEMAN	MK-7
POLARIS	TITAN
MISSILE X	MK-28
PERSHING	

3. Planned numbers of weapons and weapons systems programmed through FY 1970:

a. Allocated to CINCLANT, CINCSAC, and CINCEUR:

MK-28	MINUTEMAN
MK-7	PERSHING
MISSILE X	TITAN
POLARIS	Unidentified weapons to be carried by strategic and tactical aircraft

b. MISSILE X for possible deployment in:

Federal Republic of Germany	France
Turkey	England
Greece	Belgium
Italy	Netherlands

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGISTRATION; DOD DIA 5200.10
DOCS NOT APPLY

~~SECRET~~
RESTRICTED DATA
Atomic Energy Act of 1954

SANITIZED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 15-206
By UCL NARA, Date 11-06-2015

~~SECRET~~

c. PERSHINGs for deployment in:

Federal Republic of Germany

4. The total number of allied worldwide nuclear storage sites.
5. Operational reliability, to include the probability against dud or abort:

MINUTEMAN
POLARIS
MISSILE X
PERSHING
MK-28
MK-7

6. The fact that certain specific weapons listed in paragraph 1 above may use a re-entry vehicle consisting of a cluster of a specific number of re-entry bodies each of which may contain a nuclear warhead.

7.* The following information concerning the MK-12L re-entry vehicle:

- a. The association of the MK-12L re-entry vehicle with the POLARIS and MINUTEMAN.

The MK-12L re-entry vehicle is conceptually a slender cone, high speed re-entry body for improved penetration.

- c. A new configuration re-entry vehicle (MK-12L) would provide for improved penetrability.
- d. Preliminary studies have indicated that, if required, the POLARIS B3 concept with a modest increase in accuracy could provide a weapon system capable of achieving a high probability of damage (PD) against AEM defended hard (300 PSI) targets.

* It should be noted that the classification of the Mk 12 re-entry vehicle is under discussion and inclusion of information related to it in this listing should not be considered as prejudicial to the outcome of these discussions.

~~SECRET~~

RESTRICTED DATA

Atomic Energy Act of 1954

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION: DED DIB 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

~~SECRET~~

Copy 1 of 4 copies each
of 2 pages series E

C O P Y

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

49d

February 20, 1965

Dear Bob:

Since receipt of your request that we join in a determination to communicate the MRBM Study to NATO, our staffs have been examining the extent to which we could disseminate this study in NATO in light of the security problems that have existed in SHAPE including those identified in the most recent United States Military Information Control Committee (USMICC) report.

This will confirm the understandings reached in the discussions which Commissioners Ramey and Tape had with Deputy Secretary Vance on February 12. We concur in the desirability of authorizing transmittal of the MRBM report to the Military Committee Standing Group NATO (MC/SGN), subject, of course, to the controls recommended by the USMICC in their most recent report on that NATO element.

The Commission's action in this matter is influenced by the consideration that substantial improvements have been made in the security program of the MC/SGN. The Commission notes, however, that the most recent USMICC survey of the SHAPE security program indicated that certain of the significant deficiencies, which were initially identified in 1961, continue to exist. The Commission is hopeful that action recently initiated by the Departments of State and Defense will result in early correction of SHAPE security deficiencies and thereby enable the Commission to join in a determination permitting further dissemination of the MRBM report within NATO.

Accordingly, pursuant to Executive Order 10841, as amended, the Commission has determined that the proposed cooperation and proposed communication to MC/SGN of the information described in Enclosure 1 of your letter of November 25, 1964, subject to the controls recommended by USMICC in MIC 206/157, Section IV, paragraphs A, B.1, C and D, will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security. Further, the Commission has determined that this proposed cooperation and communication will not reveal important information concerning the design or fabrication of the nuclear components of an atomic weapon.

The Commission also agrees that the provisions of National Security Action Memorandum 197 do not apply, provided that in the transmission

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

~~SECRET~~

"This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U. S. C., Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law."

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By 14 NARA, Date 12-10-08

2368

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

of the information the U.S. makes it clear that the transmission of the information does not commit the U.S. to making the weapon systems or nuclear weapons referred to available in support of NATO or its member states.

In advising the President of the proposed communication, we recommend that you request the necessary waiver of the restrictions set forth in the President's memorandum of January 12, 1963, to the extent necessary to permit communication of the information to the MC/SGN in accordance with this joint determination.

The Commission understands that you will notify the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of this proposed transmission.

Finally, in his letter of February 12, 1965, the Deputy Secretary of Defense set forth some views as to how we might address future joint determinations under Executive Order 10841 when communications are proposed under the new NATO Agreement for Cooperation. We intend to provide our comments on this matter by separate letter shortly.

Cordially,

/s/ Glenn

Chairman

The Honorable Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense

~~SECRET~~

December 11, 1964

NOTE FOR MR. BUNDY

Mac --

McNamara needs this routine release to cover him with respect to the one paragraph of his speech to the NATO Ministerial Meeting attached herewith.

The draft approval for your signature is identical with the one you signed under similar circumstances last year.

Hopefully, this is the last one you will have to sign. The new NATO 144-b procedure will cover this kind of case as soon as all the affected countries have complied with the requirements and the agreement comes into effect.

C. E. Johnson

TOP SECRET
RESTRICTED DATA ATTACHMENT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
B. chm/ky NARA, Date 12-10-08



~~TOP SECRET~~

506

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DEC 1¹ 1964

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS**

**SUBJECT: Authorization for Transmission of Atomic Information
to NATO**

Reference is made to the President's letter of January 12, 1963 which places certain restrictions on the transmission of atomic information to NATO.

The Secretary of Defense will make a speech to the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Paris on December 16, 1964, in which he plans to include the attached paragraph containing atomic information considered to fall under the restrictions imposed by the referenced letter.

A waiver of the limitations is requested along the lines of the attached draft.

The Atomic Energy Commission concurs in this waiver.

Signed: W. J. Howard


W. J. Howard
Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense (Atomic Energy)

Attachments 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

RESTRICTED DATA-ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954,
AS AMENDED

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS THIS
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED



~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

This document consists of 1 pages

No. 3 of 18 Copies, Series 4

51a

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS.030.005.001/1

DEC 14 1963

By jc NARA. Date 7-2-15

DOCUMENT TRANSMITTED
HEREWITH CONTAINS
RESTRICTED DATA

Dear Bob:

The Commission by correspondence of November 13, 1962, joined the Department of Defense in authorizing the transmittal of certain atomic information, NATO Defense Data Program (NDPP), to NATO. We believe the information you propose for presentation to the NATO ministerial meeting in Paris on December 17, 1963, as attached, is transmissible under the NDPP determination, provided it discloses only approximate numbers of weapons. However, the President, by letter of January 12, 1963, advised the AEC of his decision to release the information for the initial NDPP briefings only, pending the satisfactory implementation of the CABAL security procedures. The Commission has no information indicating that CABAL procedures have been satisfactorily implemented.

The Commission understands that you propose to request waiver of the restriction previously imposed by the referenced Presidential letter and to request authorization of the proposed transmittal. The Commission concurs in this action with the understanding that the information is to be used only for the NATO ministerial meeting of December 17, 1963, and that the Presidential restriction will otherwise continue to apply until CABAL procedures are implemented satisfactorily. The Commission assumes that persons authorized to attend the ministerial meeting are eligible under the CABAL procedures to receive the information and that records of such attendance will be available to the AEC.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Glenn T. Seaborg

Chairman

The Honorable Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense

Enclosure

When separated from enclosures, handle this document

as

~~SECRET~~

(insert proper classification)

This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Secs. 793 and 794, and its transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.


cc: Mr. Charles Johnson, National Security Council
The White House
w/8 attachment

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

1366

done by
Bundy
memo
12/14



<p>Form AEC-126 (July 14, 1947)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION</p> <p style="text-align: center;">CLASSIFIED MATERIAL RECEIPT</p>		<p>POSTAL REGISTRY NO.</p> <hr/> <p>DATE MAILED</p> <p style="text-align: center;">December 14, 1963</p>	
<p>TO</p> <p>Mr. Charles Johnson National Security Council The White House Room 368 Exec. Office Building</p>		<p>FROM</p> <p>Dwight A. Ink Assistant General Manager, USAEC Room B-310 Washington 25, D.C.</p>	
<p>INSTRUCTIONS:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Original of this receipt to be signed personally by recipient and returned to 2. Duplicate to be retained by recipient. 3. Triplicate to be retained by sender in suspense file. 4. Avoid Identifying Material Below in Any Manner Which Might Necessitate Classification of This Receipt. 			
<p>DESCRIPTION (CHECK OR INDICATE)</p> <p>Ltr. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> X</p> <p>Rpt. _____</p> <p>Dwg. _____</p> <p>Other _____</p> <p>Nature of copy:</p> <p>SO _____</p> <p>CC _____</p> <p>TC _____</p> <p>PC _____</p> <p>Other _____</p> <p>Number of enclosures and attachments:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">None</p>	<p>DATE OF DOCUMENT LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Dec. 14, 1963</p>	<p>FROM—</p> <p>Glenn T. Seaborg Chairman, USAEC</p> <p>Re: NATO</p>	<p>REFERENCE OR FILE NO.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">cy 3A</p>
<p>ADDRESSED TO—</p> <p style="text-align: center;">The Hon. Robert S. McNamara</p>			
<p>CERTIFICATE</p> <p>I have personally received from the sender the material, including enclosures and attachments, as identified above. I assume full responsibility for the safe handling, storage, and transmittal elsewhere of this material in full accordance with existing regulations.</p>			<p>DISPATCHED</p>
<p>SIGNATURE OF COURIER</p>		<p>SIGNATURE OF RECIPIENT</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>[Signature]</i></p>	
<p>DATE RECEIVED</p>		<p>DATE RECEIVED</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>December 16, 1963</i></p>	

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

AUGUST 10, 1961

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

EXECUTIVE ORDER #10956

AMENDMENT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10841,
RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
UNDER THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954,
AS AMENDED

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

Executive Order No. 10841 of September 30, 1959, entitled "Providing for the Carrying Out of Certain Provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amended, Relating to International Cooperation," is hereby amended by changing the period at the end of paragraph (2) of section 2(a) thereof to a colon and adding to such paragraph the following: "Provided, that each determination made under this paragraph shall be referred to the President and, unless disapproved by him, shall become effective fifteen days after such referral or at such later time as may be specified in the determination."

JOHN F. KENNEDY

THE WHITE HOUSE,

August 10, 1961.

#####

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

September 30, 1959

James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President

file -
exec
orders

THE WHITE HOUSE

53

The President today issued an Executive Order entitled "Providing for the Carrying Out of Certain Provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amended, Relating to International Cooperation."

The purpose of the order is principally to provide for the carrying out of certain amendments of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 which were enacted by the Congress during its 1958 session.

The statute authorizes cooperation with other nations with respect to the sale, lease, or loan to other nations of materials for military applications and with respect to the communication to a cooperating nation of Restricted Data concerning a number of matters. Such international cooperation (1) is subject to an international agreement entered into in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, (2) is, for the most part, subject to determination by the President that the cooperation will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and (3) requires authorization by the President to cooperate with the other nation.

The primary effect of the Executive Order is to authorize the Secretary of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission, acting jointly, to make the necessary determination that the proposed international cooperation will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense. The order also provides that the approval by the President of a proposed international agreement providing for cooperation and his authorization to execute such an agreement shall constitute the President's authorization to cooperate to the extent provided for in that agreement and in the manner provided for by the statute.

more

10841

9-30-59

PROVIDING FOR THE CARRYING OUT OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS
OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954, AS AMENDED,
RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act, and section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

Section 1. Whenever the President, pursuant to section 123 of the Act, has approved and authorized the execution of a proposed agreement providing for cooperation pursuant to section 91c, 144a, 144b, or 144c of the Act (42 U.S.C. 2121(c), 2164(a), 2164(b), 2164(c)), such approval and authorization by the President shall constitute his authorization to cooperate to the extent provided for in the agreement and in the manner provided for in section 91c, 144a, 144b, or 144c, as pertinent. In respect of sections 91c, 144b, and 144c, authorizations by the President to cooperate shall be subject to the requirements of section 123d of the Act and shall also be subject to appropriate determinations made pursuant to section 2 of this order.

Section 2. (a) The Secretary of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission are hereby designated and empowered to exercise jointly, after consultation with executive agencies as may be appropriate, the following-described authority without the approval, ratification, or other action of the President:

(1) The authority vested in the President by section 91c of the Act to determine that the proposed cooperation and each proposed transfer arrangement referred to in that section will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.

(2) The authority vested in the President by section 144b of the Act to determine that the proposed cooperation and the proposed communication of Restricted Data referred to in that section will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.

(3) The authority vested in the President by section 144c of the Act to determine that the proposed cooperation and the communication of the proposed Restricted Data referred to in that section will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.

(b) Whenever the Secretary of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission are unable to agree upon a joint determination under the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, the recommendations of each of them, together with the recommendations of other agencies concerned, shall be referred to the President, and the determination shall be made by the President.

Section 3. This order shall not be construed as delegating the function vested in the President by section 91c of the Act of approving programs proposed under that section.

Section 4. (a) The functions of negotiating and entering into international agreements under the Act shall be performed by or under the authority of the Secretary of State.

(b) International cooperation under the Act shall be subject to the responsibilities of the Secretary of State with respect to the foreign policy of the United States pertinent thereto.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE,

September 30, 1959.

#####

**NATO
DEFENSE
DATA
PROGRAM**



PRESENTED BY

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1963**

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NATO DEFENSE DATA PROGRAM (NDDP)

FIRST SESSION

OPENING REMARKS (5 MINUTES)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL UNDERHILL, USAF
CHIEF OF STAFF, HEADQUARTERS, UNITED
STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (45 MINUTES)

COL WILLIAM A. PURDY, USA, OFFICE
OF DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR
MILITARY OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT
OF THE ARMY

TYPES OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS (45 MINUTES)

LT COL ROBERT E. JOHNSON, INSTRUCTOR,
NATIONAL ATOMIC CAPABILITIES BRANCH,
FIELD COMMAND, DASA, SANDIA BASE,
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO

SAFETY OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS (25 MINUTES)

CAPTAIN GORDON C. FACER, USN,
WEAPONS DIVISION, RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT, DEFENSE ATOMIC SUPPORT
AGENCY, WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECOND SESSION

WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND EMPLOYMENT - TACTICAL (30 MINUTES)

COL WILLIAM A. PURDY, USA

WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND EMPLOYMENT - ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE (30 MINUTES)

CAPT GORDON C. FACER, USN

THIRD SESSION

WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND EMPLOYMENT - NAVAL (25 MINUTES)

CAPTAIN CHARLES H. CARR, USN,
STRATEGIC PLANS DIVISION, OFFICE
OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND EMPLOYMENT - STRATEGIC (35 MINUTES)

COL LESTER E. GUNTER, USAF, DEPUTY
CHIEF, COMBAT PLANS BRANCH, HQ,
STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND, OFFUTT
AFB, NEBRASKA

WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND EMPLOYMENT - POLARIS (15 MINUTES)

CAPT CHARLES H. CARR, USN

FOURTH SESSION

STRATEGIC TARGETING AND PLANNING (45 MINUTES) COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS (15 MINUTES)

COL LESTER E. GUNTER, USAF
COL WILLIAM A. HUNTER, USAF, CHIEF
ARMS POLICY BRANCH, DIRECTOR OF
PLANS, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD

LIEUTENANT GENERAL UNDERHILL, USAF

* APPROXIMATE TIME FOR PRESENTATION IN ENGLISH

**NATO DEFENSE DATA PROGRAM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
BRIEFING TEAM**

LIEUTENANT GENERAL EDWARD H. UNDERHILL, USAF

COLONEL JAMES T. AVERY JR., USA

COLONEL WILLIAM A. HUNTER, USAF

COLONEL WILLIAM A. PURDY, USA

CAPTAIN CHARLES H. CARR, USN

COLONEL LESTER E. GUNTER, USAF

CAPTAIN GORDON C. FACER, USN

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT E. JOHNSON, USAF

YEOMAN FIRST CLASS JOHN H. STROHMEYER, USN

SPECIALIST FIFTH CLASS DAVID W. WEATHERBEE, USA

ELECTRICIAN MATE THIRD CLASS JOHN P. GILLEN, USN

April 18, 1963

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KAYSEN

Carl--

Following the NATO Defense Data Presentation Briefing the other day at State, I talked with Orwick and Mackay about the possibility of trying to get a similar briefing on the conventional weapon capability of NATO. I have just learned that there is some interest in Defense in having such a briefing developed, initially by the DOD staff and then checked out with the Joint Staff. I also learned that a little push from our direction, at the Secretary level, would be very helpful and probably result in a decision that such a briefing should be developed to see what it might look like.

I think this is one way in which attention could be focused on the extent to which the nuclear side has pre-empted the planning, logistics, and doctrine of our military and take the fig leaf off the position that dual-capability has no real meaning.

Charles E. Johnson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Cat. 3.4
By *cbm/g* NARA, Date *12-10-08*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

58

Mr. Johnson

Church,

Thanks.

I don't think I will
go to the briefing. Tell
me how it comes up
and.

Mr / Canyon

Carl -

are you
going? 2
plan to go.

Very

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM

MAR 29 1963

TO: G/PM - Mr. Kitchen
 EUR - Mr. Holloway
 GER - Mr. Brandin
 WE - Mr. Meloy
 WE - Mr. Stone
 GTI - Mr. Bowling
 INR - Mr. Hitchcock
 L - Mr. Trippe
 AEC - Mr. O'Donnell
 White House - Mr. Johnson ✓

FROM: EUR:RPM *RPM* Donald I Spiers

SUBJECT: NATO Defense Data Program Briefing

We have planned a presentation of the NATO Defense Data Program briefings for certain officers of the Department, the AEC and the White House staff who have indicated an interest in and who have a need-to-know the information contained in the briefings. This is the same presentation which was given to the North Atlantic Council and is now being given to senior officials at the NATO capitals. The briefing will take place in the Operations Center Briefing Room, room 7511, Department of State commencing at 2 p.m. on Tuesday, April 9, 1963. The presentation will take approximately four hours.

In consultation with the interested Bureaus we have compiled the following list of officers who are invited to attend the briefing. Both an AEC "Q" and "Sigma 3" clearance is required. It has been determined that all of the officers listed below (except as noted) have active "Q" clearances; AEC has been requested to assist in completing action on applications still pending. Officers concerned will be notified as soon as possible. Sigma 3 clearances, on a one time basis, have been requested of the Atomic Energy Commission. Should the Bureaus or Offices indicated above desire to include additional participants, they are requested to contact Mr. Conroy on extension 4683 at the earliest opportunity.

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
 not automatically declassified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
 By *Chm/4*, NARA, Date *12-10-89*

474

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

G/PM	- Mr. Jeffrey Kitchen Mr. George Newman Mr. Dana Orwick Mr. Howard Meyers Mr. Seymour Weiss Col. Wallace Magathan Mr. Raymond Garthoff Mr. Duncan McKay	AEC	- Mr. Dwight Ink Mr. A. A. Wells Mr. Lawrence O'Donnell Mr. William T. Riley Mr. Franklin Parks
		INR:REU	- Mr. William Hitchcock Mr. Arthur Foley
MC	- Mr. Robert Margrave Mr. Mansfield Hunt	Pentagon-	Mr. Robert L. Burns (Foreign Service Exchange Officer)
L	- Mr. Jerry Trippe		
EUR	- Mr. William Tyler Mr. Richard H. Davis Mr. J. Robert Schaetzel Mr. William C. Burdett Capt. Ross Freeman, USN		
EUR:RPM	- Mr. Ronald I. Spiers Mr. Glenn Blitgen Mr. Richard D. Belt		
EUR:RPE	- Mr. Robert E. Kaufman Ambassador John W. Tuthill		
EUR:WE	- Mr. Galen Stone (pending AEC clearance) Mr. Edgar Beigel (pending AEC clearance)		
EUR:GER	- Mr. Robert Brandin		
EUR:BNA	- Mr. Willis Armstrong (pending AEC clearance) Mr. Gordon Knox		
NEA:GTI	- Mr. John Bowling (pending AEC clearance)		
WHITE HOUSE-	Mr. Carl Kaysen Mr. Charles Johnson		

EUR:RPM: JJConroy: jlg
3/29/63

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. u. for speed
2. min. wind. ind.

Charles Johnson

60

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

MAR 29 1963

TO: G/PM - Mr. Kitchen
EUR - Mr. Holloway
GER - Mr. Brandin
WE - Mr. Meloy
WE - Mr. Stone
GTI - Mr. Bowling
INR - Mr. Hitchcock
L - Mr. Trippe
AEC - Mr. O'Donnell
White House - Mr. Johnson ✓

FROM: EUR:RFM *RFM* Donald I Spiers

SUBJECT: NATO Defense Data Program Briefing

We have planned a presentation of the NATO Defense Data Program briefings for certain officers of the Department, the AEC and the White House staff who have indicated an interest in and who have a need-to-know the information contained in the briefings. This is the same presentation which was given to the North Atlantic Council and is now being given to senior officials at the NATO capitals. The briefing will take place in the Operations Center Briefing Room, room 7514, Department of State commencing at 2 p.m. on Tuesday, April 9, 1963. The presentation will take approximately four hours.

In consultation with the interested Bureaus we have compiled the following list of officers who are invited to attend the briefing. Both an AEC "Q" and "Sigma 3" clearance is required. It has been determined that all of the officers listed below (except as noted) have active "Q" clearances; AEC has been requested to assist in completing action on applications still pending. Officers concerned will be notified as soon as possible. Sigma 3 clearances, on a one time basis, have been requested of the Atomic Energy Commission. Should the Bureaus or Offices indicated above desire to include additional participants, they are requested to contact Mr. Conroy on extension 4683 at the earliest opportunity.

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13202, Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/f* NARA, Date 12-10-08

491

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

G/PM	- Mr. Jeffrey Kitchen Mr. George Newman Mr. Dana Orwick Mr. Howard Meyers Mr. Seymour Weiss Col. Wallace Magathan Mr. Raymond Garthoff Mr. Duncan McKay	AEC	- Mr. Dwight Ink Mr. A. A. Wells Mr. Lawrence O'Donnell Mr. William T. Riley Mr. Franklin Parks
MC	- Mr. Robert Margrave Mr. Mansfield Hunt	INR:REU	- Mr. William Hitchcock Mr. Arthur Foley
L	- Mr. Jerry Trippe	Pentagon-	Mr. Robert L. Burns (Foreign Service Exchange Officer)
EUR	- Mr. William Tyler Mr. Richard H. Davis Mr. J. Robert Schaetzle Mr. William C. Burdett Capt. Ross Freeman, USN		
EUR:RPM	- Mr. Ronald I. Spiers Mr. Glenn Blitgen Mr. Richard D. Belt		
EUR:RPE	- Mr. Robert E. Kaufman Ambassador John W. Tuthill		
EUR:WE	- Mr. Galen Stone (pending AEC clearance) Mr. Edgar Beigel (pending AEC clearance)		
EUR:GER	- Mr. Robert Brandin		
EUR:BNA	- Mr. Willis Armstrong (pending AEC clearance) Mr. Gordon Knox		
NEA:GTI	- Mr. John Bowling (pending AEC clearance)		
WHITE HOUSE-	Mr. Carl Kaysen Mr. Charles Johnson		

EUR:RPM: JJConroy: jlg
3/29/63

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office of the United States Representative
Military Committee and Standing Group
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Washington

C O P Y

SECRET

USM-39-63

11 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Reaction of Military Representatives, MC/PS, to NDDP
Briefings, 7 - 8 February 1963 (U)

1. Initial reaction to the NDDP presentation for the Military Committee in Permanent Session was quite favorable; the program obviously achieved its objectives. Several Military Representatives expressed the opinion that Free World interests must be protected, if at all feasible, without resort to nuclear warfare, recognizing that the nuclear deterrent must remain. The Military Representatives were pleased that the NATO political authorities were to receive the briefings: they were convinced -- now to convince their political masters.

SECRET


SANITIZED

Authority NU/PAC F5-219
By CTS, NARA, Date 9/2/19

307

*Destroyed
by rec'd.
from
Kenny
057302*

SECRET



3. General Heusinger, Chairman of the MC/PS, obviously pleased by what he had heard, summarized the meeting. He noted the complexity and urgency of the ASW problem; he emphasized the need for an adequate question period following the briefing to be given the political authorities; he acknowledged the enormous effort that had been made by the U. S. in money, time, and manpower in providing the present U. S. nuclear capability and; he noted how the U. S. research and development programs continually strive to update our weapons and delivery systems.

For the United States Representative:

E. S. Miller
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
Acting U. S. Representative

SECRET

-2-

*Copy made for Pres. weekend
reading; copy furnished
Spurgeon Keeny, CS+T*

*Mr. Brady has incoming
"burn" copy.*

file N to DDP
Department of State *briefing*

62

Action
EUR

Info
SS
SR
G
SP
L
H
RTF
NEA
SMT
DAC
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR
RMR

FROM: London

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 3193, February 18, 5 p.m.

~~SECRET~~

~~FORREST~~

~~HYRSCH~~

~~JOHNSON~~

~~KILBUFF~~

~~KOMER~~

~~PARROTT~~

~~SAUNDERS~~

~~SCHLESINGER~~

~~WISNER~~

Control: 12371

Rec'd: February 18, 1963
5:51 p.m.

ACTION DEPARTMENT 3193, PARIS 532; INFORMATION BONN 208.

PARIS ALSO FOR USRO

TOPOL 1154 REPEATED LONDON 4389

CONROY SENDS FOLLOWING TO POPPER:

QUOTE: NDDP PRESENTATIONS TO COUNCIL FEBRUARY 12-13 WELL RECEIVED. PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGING WAS FACT THAT, WHILE ALL DELEGATIONS WERE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST ONE PERSON FEBRUARY 12, SECOND DAY'S SESSIONS DREW 100 PER CENT ATTENDANCE ALL DELEGATIONS.

FROM COMMENTS RECEIVED BETWEEN SESSIONS AND AT BRIEF RECEPTION HOSTED BY SEC GEN AFTER CLOSING, WOULD APPEAR NAC DELEGATIONS FOUND BRIEFINGS INTERESTING AND WORTH WHILE AND WERE PROBABLY REPORTING FAVORABLY TO CAPITALS. THIS CONFIRMED IN CASE OF UK BY COURTNEY CONVERSATION LONDON WITH GREENHILL WHO HAD SEEN SHUCKBURGH. COMMENTS REFLECTED PLEASURE WITH SCOPE AND DETAIL OF FACTUAL INFORMATION PRESENTED, PARTICULARLY THOSE PORTIONS DEALING WITH NUMBERS, TYPES AND YIELDS OF WEAPONS AND WITH NUMBER AND VARIETY OF DELIVERY SYSTEMS. BECAME APPARENT THAT AUDIENCES CONSIDERED US FORTHCOMING IN GIVING THEM FOR FIRST TIME TYPE OF INFORMATION THEY HAD HOPED RECEIVE. AT CLOSE OF FINAL SESSION SEC GEN THANKED TEAM FOR SHARING VALUABLE DATA WITH ALLIES AND EXPRESSED HOPE SIMILAR PROGRAMS MIGHT FOLLOW IN FUTURE. STIKKER COMMENTED THAT "EVEN AFTER REFRESHING DRINK A THIRSTY MAN ALWAYS WANTS MORE."

IN BRIEF QUESTION PERIOD NAC POLITELY SKIRTED POLITICAL ISSUES. INTEREST SHOWN IN WHETHER JUPITER BEING RETIRED FROM US ARSENAL AND WHETHER IT IN FACT OBSOLETE. SOME CONCERN EXPRESSED OVER TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ATOMIC DEMOLITION MUNITIONS IN HANDS OF

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NWJ. 630R.005.00V/9

By jc NARA. Date 7-2-15

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-2- 3193, February 18, 5 p.m., from: London

SUBORDINATE UNITS. ONE PERMREP EXPRESSED OPINION THAT MOST GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE MORE FULLY CONSULTED RE PRESENCE SUCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THEIR SOIL. SOME CONSIDERED TARGETING INFORMATION TOO THEORETICAL AND EXPRESSED HOPE CAPITALS WOULD BE GIVEN MORE DETAIL ON ACTUAL TARGET COVERAGE.

FRENCH REQUESTED AND RECEIVED FULL 8-HOUR PRESENTATION FEBRUARY 14-15. FRENCH GROUP APPEARED HESITANT TO ASK QUESTIONS, BUT AFTER ICE FINALLY BROKEN SOME 40 MINUTES QUESTIONING ENSUED. AS IN NAC, FRENCH AVOIDED CONTROVERSIAL POLITICAL OR POLICY QUESTIONS. SPECIAL INTEREST WAS SHOWN IN FOLLOWING AREAS: MAXIMUM TIME ON STATION FOR POLARIS SUBMARINES; NEED FOR ADDITIONAL REPLENISHMENT BASES; WHETHER US INTENDS REPLACE ALL TACTICAL AS WELL AS STRATEGIC AIRCRAFT WITH MISSILES; DETAILS ON HOW SACEUR AND SIOP TARGETING IS COORDINATED AND EXTENT TO WHICH SAC IN FACT TARGETS WEAPONS ASSIGNED TO HIM. ACCURACY OF INITIAL MINUTEMAN AND DAMAGE RADIUS DAVEY CROCKETT ALSO DISCUSSED, AS WAS VULNERABILITY OF NIKE TO ELECTRONIC COUNTER MEASURES.

BELIEVE REMAINDER OF SCHEDULE WILL FALL IN PLACE WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS. SEEMED APPARENT SOME GOVERNMENTS AWAITING REPORTS FROM PERMREPS RE VALUE OF BRIEFINGS AND INDICATIONS OF APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF ATTENDANCE BEFORE MAKING FINAL DECISIONS CONCERNING TEAM VISIT, AUDIENCE LEVEL AND LENGTH OF PRESENTATION DESIRED.

REQUEST USRO AND EMBASSY PARIS FURNISH DEPARTMENT ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON NAC AND FRENCH REACTIONS OBTAINED TO DATE AND ON PRESENT STATUS TEAM SCHEDULE.
UNQUOTE

MRJ/9

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Johnson

63

This document consists of 1 pages.
Number 9 of 12 copies, Series A.

February 5, 1963

File

~~SECRET~~

Dear Paul:

The revised NATO Defense Data Program which you forwarded with your letter of February 2, 1963, has been reviewed by the appropriate offices in the Department of State.

We believe that the presentation in its present form meets the criteria established by the President in NSAM 147, and recommend that it be presented to the North Atlantic Council, The Military Committee, and to selected officials in certain NATO capitals under the conditions approved by the President in his letter of January 12, 1963, to State, Defense, and AEC. We agree that it should make a substantial contribution to the understanding of nuclear matters by our NATO Allies.

With respect to the additional section on Soviet weapons systems and capabilities which you propose to add to the briefing at some later date, we agree that it would tend to balance the presentation, and in addition, perhaps make even more convincing the present capability of the US and NATO to meet the Soviet threat. I assume that the Department of State would have an opportunity to review and comment on this proposed additional section before it were presented to NATO.

Clearances:

Sincerely,

EUR/RPM - Mr. Conroy

E/MC - Mr. Hunt

G/PM - Mr. Orwick

Mr. Garthoff

Jeffrey C. Kitchen

Deputy Assistant Secretary

cc: Above plus,

White House, Mr. C. Johnson
The Honorable G. Donnell

Paul H. Nitze,

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA),

Department of Defense.

C/WM, DAF, Mackay, etc

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13202, Sec. 3.4

By *cbm/ly*, NARA, Date *12/10/08*

258

~~SECRET~~

64



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

11 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES E. JOHNSON, National Security Staff

Confirming our conversation of Friday afternoon, it is understood that in view of General Power's urgent request, you have given White House approval to the following change in the NATO Defense Data Program:

Item 6A, page 16, last paragraph: Delete the following two sentences:

"Although at present we have every confidence in our manned bomber penetration capabilities, in the future it will become increasingly difficult for these same manned bombers to penetrate. We can expect attrition rates to increase unless we employ suitable defensive systems and tactics coupled with defense suppression attacks to clear the way for our deep penetrating bombers."

Substitute therefor:

"There has been a continuing increase in the defensive capability of the enemy. We can reasonably expect this trend to continue requiring additional tactics and countermeasures to improve the penetration probability of both manned aircraft and missiles."

C N Shane

C. N. SHANE
Captain, USN
Policy Planning Staff

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NIJ.030R.005.001/10

By yc NARA. Date 7-2-15

~~SECRET~~

281

64a

RECEIPT FOR CLASSIFIED MATERIAL			
ADDRESSEE Mr. C.E. Johnson Room 368, Exec. Ofc Bldg.		PLEASE SIGN AND RETURN TO OSD IMMEDIATELY	NUMBER D- 66368
ORIGINATOR OR CUSTODIAN Capt. C.N. Shane, Pol Plng, ISA		CLASSIFICATION <input type="checkbox"/> TS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> S <input type="checkbox"/> C	DATE OF TRANSFER 11 Feb 63
TELEPHONE NUMBER 79675			
SUBJECT (Use short title, i.e. short title for Subject "Shipment of Shoes and Dresses" would be "SOSAD.") (Including date of Document). Memo for Mr. Johnson dtd 11 Feb 63			
COPIES			
ORIGINAL 1	CC	OTHERS	ENCLOSURES none
DATE RECEIVED 2/11/63	RECEIVED BY (Signature) <i>Marie Johnson</i>		

SD FORM 1 AFM 53 120

white copy - Custodian. Pink copy - Recipient.
Post Card - Office of the Secretary of Defense.

GPO 15-57908-1

Johnson

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

OK
65

Mr. Kayser

Carl - I've checked
the items on which I
compromised your
suggested changes.
The REASONS are
shades too full
explanations - not
mine. Chuck

66a

RECEIPT FOR CLASSIFIED MATERIAL			
ADDRESSEE Mr. C. Johnson, Rm 368 Exec. Sec. Bldg		PLEASE SIGN AND RETURN TO OSD IMMEDIATELY	NUMBER D- 66367
ORIGINATOR OR CUSTODIAN Capt. C. N. Shane, USA, Pol Plng		CLASSIFICATION <input type="checkbox"/> TS <input type="checkbox"/> S <input type="checkbox"/> C	DATE OF TRANSFER 7 Feb 63
TELEPHONE NUMBER 79675		SUBJECT (Use short title, i.e., short title for Subject "Shipment of Shoes and Dresses" would be "SOSAD.") (Including date of document). Modification to NATO DDP	
COPIES			
ORIGINAL	CC	OTHERS Cy #14	ENCLOSURES
DATE RECEIVED 2/7/63	RECEIVED BY (Signature) <i>Marie Trainor</i>		

SD FORM 1 APR 53 120

White copy - Custodian. Pink copy - Recipient.
Post Card - Office of the Secretary of Defense.

2/5/63
4:30

67

Mr Kaysen:

Mr Johnson returned this. Said he had just talked with Shane; Conroy has the comments from Shane. Shane thinks the Joint Chiefs will accommodate all these changes, but will let Mr Johnson know if there is any problem.

Mr Johnson was leaving.
Sarah

Staff mtg. 68
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 4, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Defense Data Program -- Message
from Chuck Johnson

Chuck Johnson called to say that the State Department has not yet signed off on the Defense Data Program briefing material.

The Military Committee will be briefed on February 7 and the NAC will be briefed on February 13. The briefing material will be cleared with Mr. Kaysen before February 7.

GF

GC
Gordon Chase

~~SECRET~~

31 January 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KAYSEN

SUBJECT: Security Procedures for NATO Defense Data Program
Briefings

The NATO Defense Data Program is finally just about ready to go. The JCS have approved a final version which was prepared by the Joint Staff in collaboration with State, and it is ~~practically~~ enroute to McNamara for his final approval. Everything points to a presentation for the NATO Military Committee here in Washington next week, with the briefing team leaving for Europe the following week in order to brief the North Atlantic Council and then proceed on to all the NATO capitals except Luxembourg and Reykjavik.

I was speaking this afternoon with Colonel Jim Avery, who is the father and godfather within the Joint Staff of this whole NATO Defense Data Program. He tells me that the "Cabal" arrangements, which are special security procedures for the handling of this material, have had a most unfortunate result. For administrative and bureaucratic reasons, it appears that, the way things now stand, the NAC briefing will permit attendance by each permanent representative, his Deputy, and one other adviser (along with a couple of administration security types); however, the Military Committee briefing will be restricted to each country's single senior representative, without any Deputy or adviser.

I don't know exactly how this happened, but I think it is most unfortunate because those old crusty 4 star generals on the Military Committee really do need to have some assistant-adviser with them who is somewhat hep to the quite technical nature of the presentation. Avery tells me that the decision in this matter rests somewhere at a rather low level in the AEC. I therefore wonder if you could not pick up your telephone and simply tell one of your high level contacts in AEC that you think each Military Committee "Number One" should be allowed to bring with him to the NDDP briefing at least one assistant-adviser. I am sure that if you sounded tough and told them

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13202, Sec. 3.4
By cbm/ly NARA, Date 12-10-08

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

not to bother you with details the desired result would be forthcoming, regardless of how the administrative worker bees may have themselves and everyone else boxed in on this matter.


LEGERE

~~SECRET~~

Look at

Opening remarks
page 2 - Item 1

Item 6a

" 6b

" 7

Standard Form 63
Nov. 1961 Edition
63-104

MEMORANDUM OF CALL

Date
2/4/62

Time
12:35 pm

TO— Mr. Johnson

☐ YOU WERE CALLED BY— ☐ YOU WERE VISITED BY—

Mr. Mackay

TELEPHONE:	Number or code	Extension
------------	----------------	-----------

<input type="checkbox"/> PLEASE CALL	<input type="checkbox"/> WAITING TO SEE YOU
<input type="checkbox"/> WILL CALL AGAIN	<input type="checkbox"/> WISHES AN APPOINTMENT
<input type="checkbox"/> RETURNING YOUR CALL	
<input type="checkbox"/> IS REFERRED TO YOU BY:	

LEFT THIS MESSAGE: Re your conversation today
re NDDP, Capt. Shane, ISA, Defense, is
sending you a copy today along with the
letter Nitze sent to Kitchen on Feb. 2.
You should receive it sometime today.

rec'd 1:30 Received By— Marie

~~TOP SECRET~~

73

In reply refer to: I-35144/63

2 Feb 63

Dear Jeff:

I am forwarding for State Department review two copies of the revised NATO Defense Data Program which we have just received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Advance copy has been forwarded to Mr. Conroy of your department.)

Our initial opinion is that the revised program is generally satisfactory and should make a substantial contribution to the understanding of nuclear matters by our NATO Allies. We feel, however, that although the program is sufficiently objective in its treatment of US and NATO nuclear capabilities, it may still tend to leave an unbalanced impression with our Allies in that it does not address Soviet capabilities. It is therefore our present intention, subject to Mr. McNamara's approval, to ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare, as soon as possible, an additional section which will go into considerable detail as to Soviet nuclear weapons systems and capabilities. We do not intend that the preparation of this additional section should hold up presentation of the program but rather that it be added to the program as soon as possible.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff would like to make the initial presentation of the Defense Data Program to the Military Committee/ Standing Group here in Washington the week of 4 February or as soon thereafter as possible and propose to send their presentation team to Europe on 11 February. We would therefore appreciate your comments on the program as soon as feasible.

Sincerely,

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec 3.4
By *clm/ly*, NARA, Date 12-10-08

/s/ Paul H. Nitze
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

Attachments
NDDP (2 cys)

Mr. Jeffrey C. Kitchen
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Politico-Military Affairs
State Department
Washington 25, D. C.

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DCD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

Cy 1 of 1 copies
Series B

(252)

I-35144/63 & I-35139/63

RECEIPT FOR CLASSIFIED MATERIAL			
ADDRESSEE Mr. Charles Johnson Room 368, EOB, Wash, DC		PLEASE SIGN AND RETURN TO OSD IMMEDIATELY	NUMBER D- 54649
ORIGINATOR OR CUSTODIAN Capt Shane 4EB43/Pol Plng/SA		CLASSIFICATION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TS <input type="checkbox"/> S <input type="checkbox"/> C	DATE OF TRANSFER 4 Feb 63
TELEPHONE NUMBER 79675			
SUBJECT (Use short title, i.e. short title for Subject "Shipment of Shoes and Dresses" would be "SOSAD.") (Including date of Document). NATO DDP, Ltr to Mr. Kitchen w/1 Incl, NDDP			
COPIES			
ORIGINAL	CC Cy 1, Series B	OTHERS	ENCLOSURES 1 - Cy 26
DATE RECEIVED 2/4/63	RECEIVED BY (Signature) <i>John Holtzschuster (for C.E.J.)</i>		

SD FORM 120
1 APR 53

white copy - Custodian. Pink copy - Recipient.
Post Card - Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Johnson:

file - NDDP

The only distribution was to the addressees.

75

If there should be further distribution would
you let me know.

Ellen Pritt

January 12, 1963

~~SECRET~~

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have noted the Department of State Memorandum, dated January 9, 1963, in which the Department of Defense concurred, recommending that for important reasons of national policy the initial NATO Defense Data Program (NDDP) briefings, which were prepared to implement NSAM 147, be presented to the North Atlantic Council, to the Military Committee and to selected officials in NATO capitals as soon as the North Atlantic Council gives its approval to the revisions in the CABAL security system which were requested by the United States.

I have noted further that the AEC has informed the Department of State that it has no objection to this recommendation, and that both the Departments of State and Defense agree with the AEC on the procedure to be followed with respect to transmittals of restricted data by the U. S. to NATO beyond the initial NDDP briefings.

I find that the release of this restricted data to NATO, under the conditions set forth in the Department of State Memorandum dated January 9, 1963, will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.

Sincerely,

/s/ John F. Kennedy

Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *clm/fj* NARA, Date 12-10-05

Dispatched 1/14/63

~~SECRET~~

January 12, 1963

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have noted the Department of State Memorandum, dated January 9, 1963, in which the Department of Defense concurred, recommending that for important reasons of national policy the initial NATO Defense Data Program (NDDP) briefings, which were prepared to implement NSAM 147, be presented to the North Atlantic Council, to the Military Committee and to selected officials in NATO capitals as soon as the North Atlantic Council gives its approval to the revisions in the CABAL security system which were requested by the United States.

I have noted further that the AEC has informed the Department of State that it has no objection to this recommendation, and that both the Departments of State and Defense agree with the AEC on the procedure to be followed with respect to transmittals of restricted data by the U. S. to NATO beyond the initial NDDP briefings.

I find that the release of this restricted data to NATO, under the conditions set forth in the Department of State Memorandum dated January 9, 1963, will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.

Sincerely,

/s/ John F. Kennedy

Honorable Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By com/g NARA, Date 12-10-08

Dispatched 1/14/63

SECRET

Dear Mr. Chairman:

January 12, 1963

I have noted the Department of State Memorandum, dated January 9, 1963, in which the Department of Defense concurred, recommending that for important reasons of national policy the initial NATO Defense Data Program (NDDP) briefings, which were prepared to implement NSAM 147, be presented to the North Atlantic Council, to the Military Committee and to selected officials in NATO capitals as soon as the North Atlantic Council gives its approval to the revisions in the CABAL security system which were requested by the United States.

I have noted further that the AEC has informed the Department of State that it has no objection to this recommendation, and that both the Departments of State and Defense agree with the AEC on the procedure to be followed with respect to transmittals of restricted data by the U. S. to NATO beyond the initial NDDP briefings.

I find that the release of this restricted data to NATO, under the conditions set forth in the Department of State Memorandum dated January 9, 1963, will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.

Sincerely,

Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg
Chairman
Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C.

/s/ John F. Kennedy

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/ys* NARA, Date *12-10-01*

Dispatches 1/14/63

2/7/63

~~SECRET~~

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have noted the Department of Defense letter to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, dated January 30, 1963, recommending the communication, under the bilateral agreements, to the appropriate representatives of Italy and Germany of information on numbers of United States weapons dispersed for use by their nation's NATO committed forces.

Specifically, the letter recommends that authorization be given for release of the following information for each nation:

- a. For Italy: The numbers of United States atomic weapons by type and location dispersed for use by Italian forces assigned to or earmarked for NATO.
- b. For Germany: The numbers of United States atomic weapons by type and location dispersed for use by German forces assigned to or earmarked for NATO.

Note: It is noted that the above will apply to those weapons which have been dispersed at any future date when a requirement to provide such information arises.

I have noted further the letter from the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, dated February 1, 1963, notifying the Secretary of Defense that the Commission has noted

~~SECRET~~*Dispatched 2/8*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: AEC 030A-5-1-14.8
By: JDL vARA Date: 12-18-17

~~SECRET~~

that the above information is required for the purpose of development of defense planning and has concurred in the Secretary's recommendation.

Accordingly, I find that the release of this Restricted Data, as indicated above, will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and further find that the release of this information is required for the purpose of the development of defense plans.

Sincerely,

/s/ JFK

Honorable Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

2/7/63

~~SECRET~~

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have noted the Department of Defense letter to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, dated January 30, 1963, recommending the communication, under the bilateral agreements, to the appropriate representatives of Italy and Germany of information on numbers of United States weapons dispersed for use by their nation's NATO committed forces.

Specifically, the letter recommends that authorization be given for release of the following information for each nation:

- a. For Italy: The numbers of United States atomic weapons by type and location dispersed for use by Italian forces assigned to or earmarked for NATO.
- b. For Germany: The numbers of United States atomic weapons by type and location dispersed for use by German forces assigned to or earmarked for NATO.

Note: It is noted that the above will apply to those weapons which have been dispersed at any future date when a requirement to provide such information arises.

I have noted further the letter from the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, dated February 1, 1963, notifying the Secretary of Defense that the Commission has noted

~~SECRET~~

dispatched 2/8

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: RAC-030R-5-1-14-8
By: JOV vARA Date: 12-18-01

~~SECRET~~

that the above information is required for the purpose of development of defense planning and has concurred in the Secretary's recommendation.

Accordingly, I find that the release of this Restricted Data, as indicated above, will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and further find that the release of this information is required for the purpose of the development of defense plans.

Sincerely,

1/s/ J7K

Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

2/7/63

~~SECRET~~

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have noted the Department of Defense letter to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, dated January 30, 1963, recommending the communication, under the bilateral agreements, to the appropriate representatives of Italy and Germany of information on numbers of United States weapons dispersed for use by their nation's NATO committed forces.

Specifically, the letter recommends that authorization be given for release of the following information for each nation:

- a. For Italy: The numbers of United States atomic weapons by type and location dispersed for use by Italian forces assigned to or earmarked for NATO.
- b. For Germany: The numbers of United States atomic weapons by type and location dispersed for use by German forces assigned to or earmarked for NATO.

Note: It is noted that the above will apply to those weapons which have been dispersed at any future date when a requirement to provide such information arises.

I have noted further the letter from the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, dated February 1, 1963, notifying the Secretary of Defense that the Commission has noted

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 030R - 5-1-14-8

By JON VARA Date 12-18-17

dispatched 2/8

~~SECRET~~

that the above information is required for the purpose of development of defense planning and has concurred in the Secretary's recommendation.

Accordingly, I find that the release of this Restricted Data, as indicated above, will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and further find that the release of this information is required for the purpose of the development of defense plans.

Sincerely,

151 GFK

Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg
Chairman
Atomic Energy Commission
Washington 25, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CALL

1/17/63

12:20 p. m.

TO: ☐ YOU WERE CALLED BY: ☐ YOU WERE VISITED BY:

Mr. Mackay called. Asked that you see Paris TOPOL 927 and POLTO 815.

815 takes care of the one remaining condition which the President agreed to in his letter of January 12, on NDDP.

Ina

file - NDDP

Received By:

SMITH-BUND:
BELK
BURRIS 6183
DAVIS
DUNCAN
FERRELLAN
FERNANDEZ
GILBERT
HARRIS
KOHIN
LEWIS
PARROTT
PETERSEN
SAUNDERS

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE-TO

55-52

Origin
G
Info:
SS
SR
SP
L
EUR
NEA
MC
TIR
CSD
AEC
RMR

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS TOPOL
927

FILE COPY

President on January 12 approved memorandum Department dated January 9 recommending that, for reasons of national policy, the initial NATO Nuclear Defense Data Program (NDDP) briefings be presented to the North Atlantic Council (NAC), to the Military Committee and to selected officials in NATO capitals as soon as NAC approves revisions in CASAL security system which have been requested by US.

Copies of Department's January 9 memorandum and President's letter being air mailed.

President's finding that release of the restricted data in the briefing material to NATO under conditions set forth in Department's January 9 memorandum would "promote and not constitute unreasonable risk to common defense and security" paves way for initial NDDP briefings to be presented (1) provided NAC acts favorably on CASAL revisions January 16 and (2) whenever substance of initial NDDP briefings are agreed upon within USA.

Drafted by: G/PM:DMackay/1/12/50		Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: G/PM - Dana Orrick	
Clearances: Defense - Capt. Bennett (subs.) - Mr. Carrett (subs.) EUR/PM - Mr. Connor (draft) AEC - Mr. O'Donnell (subs.) - Mr. Riley (subs.)		G/PM - Dana Orrick G/PC - Mr. McGrave (draft) L/EUR - Mr. Trippe (draft)	

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".

PRESERVATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: RA-030R-5-1-15-7
By: JDL WARA Date: 12-18-17

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Any further release of RD rpt RD to NATO beyond initial NDDP briefings will not be automatic. In presenting recommendation to President, Department, AEC and Defense agreed that release of any subsequent data beyond NDDP briefings would be contingent upon the interested agencies of USG being assured that newly instituted CABAL security system was being ^{satisfactorily} ~~satisfactorily~~ implemented in case of all governments who would receive it.

An important element in reaching decision on this matter within USG, would be assurance that agreed CABAL procedures are being satisfactorily implemented in the alliance. Department considers that as donor nation of this data it is both appropriate and necessary for US to seek and obtain cooperation of ^{officials} appropriate NATO/in this important matter.

Although Department fully appreciates fact that approval of revised CABAL procedures requested by US carries with it implied commitment to implement them, interested US agencies nevertheless agree that full compliance with CABAL security procedures should be expected from those NATO countries who expect to receive this sensitive data.

Accordingly, as soon as revisions in CABAL system requested by US are adopted by IAC, you should advise ^{Secretary General} or in your discretion Executive Secretary of importance, US requirement regarding ^{further} satisfactory implementation of CABAL system before any further RD can be given to NATO beyond initial NDDP briefings.

~~SECRET~~

Classification

~~SECRET~~

If for any reason Executive Secretary considers that NATO Security Bureau unable convey to US advice regarding extent of satisfactory implementation of CABAL procedures within alliance, you should advise Department immediately with appropriate recommendations, in order that interested agencies may determine what steps are necessary in order obtain with least possible delay necessary assurance of compliance within NATO.

While you should not in making above point to Executive Secretary refer to specific case of Iceland, there has been ~~as~~ as you know evidence that Iceland has not complied with NATO security regulations. Department considers vital that data which it is prepared give NATO be protected by all NATO members who expect to receive it in manner which was agreed to by NAC. Department assured President in January 9 memorandum that "a special effort will be made to verify that security practices in Iceland, will have been satisfactorily resolved".

FYI Department prepared make direct approach to any government which ~~who~~ cannot demonstrate that it is protecting data within CABAL system in manner agreed by NAC, with a view to restricting transmittal of any further RD data ^{to country} concerned beyond initial NDDP briefings until full compliance with CABAL system has been established to US satisfaction EMD FYI

L.T.

RUSH

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Pouch to Diplomatic Missions in NATO capitals:

LONDON	OSLO
THE HAGUE	REYKJAVIK
LUXEMBOURG	BRUXELLES
BONN	ATLANTA
ROME	WASHINGTON
LISBON	OTTAWA
COPENHAGEN	

NOTE: Pouched by DCT

[The following text is extremely faint and largely illegible due to heavy noise and degradation in the original document. It appears to be a series of lines of text, possibly a list or a paragraph, but the specific words cannot be reliably transcribed.]

SECRET

PARIS TOPOL

53

Action
EUR~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control:

9892

Rec'd:

January 16, 1963
7:34 p.m.

Info

FROM: Paris

SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

NEA

NO: POLTO 815, January 16, 10 p.m.

MC

P

USIA

PASS DEFENSE

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

SY

AEC

TRSY

RMR

Reference: TOPOL 919

Part I. NAC this date approved revised CABAL Security Regulations. All members agreed in Council to pass these new regulations set out C-M62(50) (Revised) and Corrigendum 18 December 1962 to their capitals for implementation. Because press for initial NDDP presentation NAC this message supplements normal reporting airgram.

Part II. Pertinent sections of TOPOL 927 will be discussed with Executive Secretary and/or Secretary General at earliest opportunity and you will be advised of results by separate message.

DURBROW

aa/3

~~SMITH-BUNDY~~
~~BELK~~
~~BURRIS~~
~~DAVIS~~
~~DUNCAN~~
~~FELDMAN~~
~~FORRESTAL~~
~~HIRSCH~~
~~JOHNSON~~
~~KAYSEN~~
~~KILDUFF~~
~~KLEIN~~
~~KOMER~~
~~LEGERE~~
~~PARROTT~~
~~PETERSEN~~
~~SAUNDERS~~
~~SCHLESINGER~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cbm/s NARA, Date 12-10-08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

PRESERVATION COPY

85

file
NDDP

January 11, 1963

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

THROUGH: MR. KAYSEN

Mac--

NATO Defense Data Program

Here at long last are the ~~other~~ letters for the President's signature that are required by the Atomic Energy Act to permit giving the briefings to the Standing Group--Military Committee and the North Atlantic Council.

There is a memorandum for you from Alex Johnson indicating that Defense, State and AEC are now in agreement on the security aspects of this matter. For your information this happy result required some arm twisting in AEC but, fortunately, success attended the effort to keep the record from showing any serious disagreement within the Presidential family.

The background memorandum attached to Alex Johnson's memorandum is generally accurate except with respect to the timetable. It now appears that the NAC briefing will take place on the 16th. The Standing Group--Military Committee briefing will take place prior to that date in order to give the military an opportunity to brief the permanent representatives on an individual country basis.

Charles E. Johnson

*Attachments: 3 letters for Pres. sig and
Alex Johnson's memo to Bundy*

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/ry* NARA, Date 12-10-08

~~SECRET~~

88

DRAFT EXECUTIVE LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO STATE, AEC AND DEFENSE

Dear (Mr. Secretary) (Mr. Chairman):

I have noted the ~~concurrence of the Department of~~
~~Defense in a State Department~~ ^{7 State} Memorandum dated January 9,
1963, ^{in which the Department of Defense concurred} recommending that for important reasons of national
policy the initial NATO Defense Data Program (NDDP) briefings,
which were prepared to implement NSAM 147, be presented to
the North Atlantic Council, to the Military Committee and
to selected officials in NATO capitals as soon as the
North Atlantic Council gives its approval to the revisions
in the CABAL security system which were requested by the
United States.

I have noted further that the AEC has informed the
Department of State that it has no objection to this
recommendation, and that both the Departments of State
and Defense agree with the AEC on the procedure to be
followed with respect to transmittals of restricted data
by the US to NATO beyond the initial NDDP briefings.

I find that the release of this restricted data to
NATO, under the conditions set forth in the Department
of State Memorandum dated January 9, 1963 will promote and
will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common
defense and security.

Sincerely,

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By clm/s NARA, Date 12-10-08

John F. Kennedy

~~SECRET~~

163

is document consists of 2 pages.
number 5 of 13 copies, Series A

JAN 9 - 1963

00438

89~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Release of Atomic Restricted Data to NATO

The Department of State believes that there are important reasons of national policy which require that the NATO Defense Data Program briefings be given to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and to selected military and civil officials in NATO without delay.

This memorandum recommends that, as soon as the NAC gives its expected approval to the revisions in the CABAL security system requested by the United States, the United States undertake to present the initial NATO Defense Data briefings to the NAC, as well as to the Military Committee and to selected officials in certain NATO capitals.

The AEC has informed the Department of State that it has no objection to this recommendation, provided that prior to the transmittal of any restricted data to NATO beyond the initial NDDP briefings, the interested agencies of the United States Government be assured that there was satisfactory implementation of the newly instituted CABAL security system in the case of all governments who would receive it. The Department of State and the Department of Defense are in entire agreement with this procedure.

A special

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 09-78
By isl, NARA, Date 6-2-09

~~SECRET~~

(167)

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

A special effort will be made, in this connection, to verify that security practices in Iceland, which have reportedly not been in accordance with NATO security regulations, will have been satisfactorily resolved.

The President is asked to find that the transmittal of the initial NATO Defense Data briefings to the NAC, to the Military Committee and to authorized officials at NATO capitals will, under the conditions outlined in this memorandum, promote and not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.

/s/ U. Alexis Johnson
U. Alexis Johnson
Deputy Under Secretary

Enclosure:

Secret memorandum,
dated 12/31/62, subject
"Release of Atomic Restricted
Data to NATO."

Clearances:

OSD/AE - Col. Hooper (in draft)
AEC - Mr. O'Donnell (informed)
EUR/RPM Mr. Conroy (in draft)
E/MC - Mr. Margrave (in draft)
L - Mr. Trippe (in draft)

G/PM: DADMackay:sle
1/7/63

~~SECRET~~

S/S - RO

JAN 10 1963

A true copy of signed original

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OUT

1963 JAN 10 AM 11 20

December 31, 1962

894

BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Release of Atomic Restricted Data to NATO

The Department of State believes that there are important reasons of national policy which require that the NATO Defense Data Program briefings be given to the North Atlantic Council, to the Military Committee and to selected officials in NATO capitals without delay.

In National Security Action Memorandum 147 of April 18, 1962, the President approved a "Suggested NATO Nuclear Program," and assigned to the Secretary of State the "responsibility for handling tactics on this topic."

It was clearly stated in NSAM 147 that both the NAC and the Standing Group--Military Committee should be given greater information about US nuclear strategy and greater participation in the formulation of that strategy. In this connection it was recognized that in order for NATO's participation to become effective, certain measures and procedures would have to be instituted. One preliminary measure, taken in recognition of the requirement of NSAM 147 that the NDDP Program be transmitted through the civil as well as military channels in NATO, was an executive order issued by the President authorizing the State Department to communicate restricted data to NATO.

The NAC was informed at the Athens Ministerial Meeting in May 4-6, 1962, of the US intention to furnish its NATO allies with the fullest amount of information on nuclear weapons and external forces compatible with the requirement of security. The NAC welcomed this offer

of

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 09-78
By id NARA, Date 6-2-09

~~SECRET~~

167

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

of cooperation by the US, and drafting commenced on a "NATO Defense Data Program" designed to fulfill this purpose. Highly restrictive security procedures known as CABAL were drawn up and approved by the NAC to limit access to highly sensitive information given to NATO by member governments. Some modifications in the CABAL procedures, which were later requested by the US in order to meet requirements relating to the release of US atomic information are now ready for the approval of the NAC.

In a letter dated September 22, 1962, from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Commission was requested to join in a determination that the release of the atomic information outlined in NSAM 147 to the North Atlantic Council, the Military Committee, the NATO Standing Group, and to other designated individuals under the jurisdiction of NATO, would promote and would not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the US.

The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission informed the Secretary of Defense in reply on November 13 that, with the exception of a "relatively small portion" of the atomic information which was proposed to be presented to NATO under the NATO Defense Data Program (NDDP) which does not qualify for communication under the NATO Agreement for Cooperation, the Commission found no objection to the transmission of this information to NATO. The Commission made the effectiveness of its determination conditional however upon an assurance to the US Permanent Representative by the NATO Security Bureau that the CABAL procedures as revised at the request of the US had been implemented by those NATO governments who were to receive this information.

Dr. Seaborg

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

Dr. Seaborg explained that this qualification was considered necessary because the Commission had been informed as to the infeasibility of limiting the access of representatives of any one country to only a portion of the proposed NDDP presentation. He stated that he was aware that "The effect of this qualification may be that Iceland will be unable to receive atomic information included in the NDDP.", and expressed the hope that "Iceland will be able to demonstrate that it has taken the necessary steps to fulfill its commitments to NATO with respect to safeguarding classified information." He concluded by saying that there may be other factors of national policy beyond the cognizance of the AEC which the President may need to consider in determining whether NATO member nations should be given access to atomic information under the NDDP "even though they have not adopted security systems consistent with their commitments to NATO."

Pursuant to this exchange of correspondence, the Deputy Secretary of Defense in a letter to Mr. Bundy dated December 14 informed him of the Commission's qualification with respect to the transmission of atomic information contained in the NDDP to NATO.

The President will undoubtedly recall that one of the principal objectives of this nuclear information program is to convey an awareness of the vast nuclear power which the United States is making available to the Alliance to the policy making officials of European NATO countries, so that, when faced with major policy questions involving NATO strategy, they will be able to draw upon this knowledge to guide them in their decisions. From the inception of this program, the Department of State has considered the Permanent Representatives in the NATO Council and senior officials at NATO capitals as primary targets of this educational effort.

While it

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

While it is highly important that every measure be taken to insure the protection of information included in these presentations, compliance with the added requirement of a NATO Security Bureau assurance that the revised CABAL procedures have been implemented would be impossible without occasioning delays which could vitiate the program, as far as attainment of basic US objectives is concerned. As stated above, the CABAL revisions are just now coming before the NAC for approval. This approval, which is expected to be given early in January, carries with it an assumption by each member government of the obligation to implement the agreed changes. However, the NATO Security Bureau would not be in a position to give assurances of this compliance without completing physical investigations of national security systems, not only at the delegation offices in Paris, but at each of the fifteen NATO capitals. This could mean a further delay of several months.

Defense plans to present the NDDP briefings to the NATO Military Committee and Standing Group in Washington about January 10. It is imperative that the information be presented to the Council immediately thereafter. In this regard it should be noted that the Secretaries of State and Defense, at the recent NATO Ministerial Meeting in Paris, reiterated the United States' previously announced intention to present these nuclear facts to NATO and announced that the presentations would be given shortly after the first of the year. Viewed in the light of expressions of interest from NATO allies which followed this announcement, and from the standpoint of what later occurred at Nassau, there is a compelling urgency that these presentations be made to the Council and at NATO capitals at the earliest practicable time. In view of the bearing which such information could have on what the United States hopes

to accomplish

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

to accomplish in carrying forward the Nassau agreements, it is clearly in the U. S. interest that this program proceed without further delay.

The steps which US Government agencies have taken independently to assure the security of classified information within the NATO Alliance--particularly the security reviews required in connection with the 144 (b) bilateral atomic information agreements which the US has with nine of the NATO Governments--provides a basis for reasonable assurance with respect to the capability of those NATO Governments to protect the security of the Nuclear Defense Data Program with the CABAL system.

With regard to Iceland NATO Security Officials reportedly established in June of 1961 that Iceland was not complying with the NATO Personnel Clearance Regulations. It has not been possible, because of political considerations, to conduct the customary SDMICC security survey to determine the present status of the Iceland security program. Additionally, it has not been possible to advance the security survey scheduled to be made by the NATO Security Bureau this year. However, the Department of State made a check of all available U. S. files with respect to the Icelandic officials who are likely to receive the NDDP information. No derogatory information was developed as a result of this check. In addition, the Permanent Representative of Iceland in NATO has assured our delegation that, under instruction from the Icelandic Prime Minister, no information received under the CABAL program will be sent to Iceland. Moreover, no NDDP briefing is contemplated in Iceland.

While the Department of State believes it essential that all participating governments enforce the NATO security regulations to which they have agreed, the Department recommends that in view of the foregoing considerations,

and for

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 6 -

and for the purpose of authorizing the US to transmit the initial NDDP briefings, the President be requested, upon acceptance by the NAC of the CABAL security procedures as modified at US request, to find that the transmittal of such information to the NAC and other NATO civil and military agencies and authorized officials in NATO capitals will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.

G/PM: DADMackay: EUR/RPM: JJConroy: slc

Concurrences:

MC - Mr. Margrave
L - Mr. Trippe
AEC - Mr. O'Donnell
Defense - Mr. Garrett

~~SECRET~~

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1963 JAN 10 AM 11:02

↓
7/6

NATO Defense
Data Program

new draft to
be prepared for
AEC conference.

cy

Being done
with AEC +
DOD.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Release of Atomic Restricted Data to the
North Atlantic Council

The Department of State believes that there are important reasons of national policy which require that the NATO Defense Data Program briefings be given to the North Atlantic Council and to selected civil officials in NATO without delay.

In National Security Action Memorandum 147 of April 18, 1962, the President approved a "Suggested NATO Nuclear Program," and assigned to the Secretary of State the "responsibility for handling tactics on this topic."

It was clearly stated in NSAM 147 that both the MAC and the Standing Group--Military Committee should be given greater information about US nuclear strategy and greater participation in the formulation of that strategy. In this connection it was recognized that in order for NATO's participation to become effective, certain measures and procedures would have to be instituted. One preliminary measure, taken in recognition of the requirement of NSAM 147 that the NDDP Program be transmitted through the civil as well as military channels in NATO, was an executive order issued by the President authorizing the State Department to communicate restricted data to NATO.

The MAC

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 09-78
By ist, NARA, Date 6-2-09

~~SECRET~~

Rec'd 1/2/63

(136)

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

The NAC was informed at the Athens Ministerial Meeting in May 4-6, 1962, of the US intention to furnish its NATO allies with the fullest amount of information on nuclear weapons and external forces compatible with the requirement of security. The NAC welcomed this offer of cooperation by the US, and drafting commenced on a "NATO Defense Data Program" designed to fulfill this purpose. Highly restrictive security procedures known as CABAL were drawn up and approved by the NAC to limit access to highly sensitive information given to NATO by member governments. Some modifications in the CABAL procedures, which were later requested by the US in order to meet requirements relating to the release of US atomic information are now ready for the approval of the NAC.

In a letter dated September 22, 1962, from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Commission was requested to join in a determination that the release of the atomic information outlined in NSAM 147 to the North Atlantic Council, the Military Committee, the NATO Standing Group, and to other designated individuals under the jurisdiction of NATO, would promote and would not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the US.

The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission informed the Secretary of Defense in reply on November 13 that, while the Commission had concluded that a "relatively small portion" of the atomic information which was proposed to be presented to NATO under the NATO Defense Data Program (NDDP) did not qualify for communication under the NATO Agreement for Cooperation, the Commission found no objection to the transmission of this information to the military element of NATO. The Commission concluded, however, that it could not join in a determination for the transmission of the atomic information contained in the proposed NDDP to the non-military

elements of

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

elements of NATO until the US Permanent Representative could be assured by the NATO Security Bureau that the revisions on the CABAL procedures requested by the US had been implemented by those NATO governments who were to receive this information.

Mr. Seaborg explained that this qualification was considered necessary because of the infeasibility of limiting the access of representatives of any one country to only a portion of the proposed NDDP presentation. He stated that he was aware that "The effect of this qualification may be that Iceland will be unable to receive atomic information included in the NDDP.", and expressed the hope that "Iceland will be able to demonstrate that it has taken the necessary steps to fulfill its commitments to NATO with respect to safeguarding classified information." He concluded by saying that there may be other factors of national policy beyond the cognizance of the AEC which the President may need to consider in determining whether NATO member nations should be given access to atomic information under the NDDP "even though they have not adopted security systems consistent with their commitments to NATO."

Pursuant to this exchange of correspondence, the Deputy Secretary of Defense in a letter to you dated December 14 has informed you of the Commission's qualification with respect to the transmission of atomic information contained in the NDDP to the non-military element of NATO. He stated the intention of the Department of Defense, in the premises, to notify the Joint Atomic Information Exchange Group, unless otherwise directed by the President, that "in view of the Commission's restriction...information sponsored for release to NATO may be authorized for military elements of NATO only (italics supplied) until the Commission's condition is satisfied."

It will recall that one of the principal objectives of this nuclear information

program

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

program is to convey an awareness of the vast nuclear power which the United States is making available to the Alliance to the policy making officials of European NATO countries, so that, when faced with major policy questions involving NATO strategy, they will be able to draw upon this knowledge to guide them in their decisions. We have, from the inception of this program, had in mind the Permanent Representatives in the NATO Council and senior officials at NATO capitals as primary targets of this educational effort.

While I fully share the concern that every measure be taken to insure the protection of information included in these presentations, I must say that compliance with the added requirement of a NATO Security Bureau assurance that the revised CABAL procedures have been implemented would be impossible without occasioning delays which could vitiate the program, as far as attainment of our basic objectives is concerned. As I mentioned above, the CABAL revisions are just now coming before the MAC for approval. This approval, which we expect will be given early in January, carries with it an assumption by each member government of the obligation to implement the agreed changes. However, the NATO Security Bureau would not be in a position to give assurances of this compliance without completing physical investigations of national security systems, not only at the delegation offices in Paris, but at each of the fifteen NATO capitals. This could mean a further delay of several months.

I am informed that Defense plans to present the NDDP briefings to the NATO Military Committee and Standing Group in Washington about January 10. It is imperative that the information be presented to the Council immediately thereafter. (In fact, our agreement to the reverse order was largely predicated on giving the briefing team a practice session before their European appearances.) To

withhold

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

withheld from the Council and NATO government leaders information intended primarily for them after it had already been passed to their military subordinates would invite political reactions which could nullify the effect we hope to obtain from the program. In this regard it should be noted that the Secretaries of State and Defense, at the recent NATO Ministerial Meeting in Paris, reiterated the United States' previously announced intention to present these nuclear facts to NATO and announced that the presentations would be given shortly after the first of the year. Viewed in the light of expressions of interest from NATO allies which followed this announcement, and from the standpoint of what later occurred at Nassau, we feel that there is a compelling urgency that these presentations be made to the Council and at NATO capitals at the earliest practicable time. Mindful of the bearing which such information could have on what the United States hopes to accomplish in carrying forward the Nassau agreements, I am confident you will agree that it is in the U. S. interest that this program proceed without further delay.

We believe the steps which US Government agencies have taken independently to assure the security of classified information within the NATO Alliance--particularly the regular security reviews required in connection with the 144 (b) bilateral atomic information agreements which the US has with nine of the NATO Governments--provides a reasonable assurance with respect to the security of the Nuclear Defense Data Program within the CABAL system. In fact, independent security checks which have been made by the State-Defense Military Information Controls Committee (S-DMICC) from 1958 through the present indicate that all NATO member states except Iceland have fully implemented NATO security regulations after their adoption by the NAC.

With regard to Iceland we understand that NATO security officials in 1961 noted that Iceland had not

fully

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

to NATO

In making this request, the Department of State does not recommend, and is not so requesting, that this waiver cover any future transmittals of restricted atomic information

and security. constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense authorized civil officials in NATO capitals, will not transmittals of such information to the MAC and other on the non-military element of NATO and find that the President waive the qualification imposed by the AEC the US to transmit the information to the MAC, the therefore requests, that for the purpose of authorizing In view of the foregoing, the Department of State,

is to be sent to Reykjavik. Minister, no information received under CABAL procedures tion that, under instructions from the Icelandic Prime Representative of Iceland in NATO has assured our delega- tied NATO information. In addition to this, the Permanent Icelandic Government officials requiring access to class- basis for granting personnel security clearances to as to the information needed by, and available to, him as a personnel security requirements, and felt no inadequacy found no difficulty in complying with the latest NATO recently informed the NATO Security Bureau chief that he that the chief of police of the Icelandic Government their personnel security investigation, it is relevant prescribed procedures on background checks as part of appears to be that they have not adopted fully the NATO more, since the basic problem with respect to Iceland would be likely to receive this information. Further- derogatory information on any Icelandic official who agency check made earlier this year developed no NATO security regulations, an independent US national Iceland is or is not fully complying with existing there has been no direct evidence since that time that fully implemented existing security procedures. While

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 7 -

to NATO under the CABAL system beyond the initial NDDP briefing unless compliance with the newly instituted CABAL procedures has been established to the satisfaction of the US.

U. Alexis Johnson
Deputy Under Secretary

G/PM; DADMackay/EUR/RPM: JJConroy

Concurrences:

MC - Mr. Margrave
L - Mr. Trippe
AEC - Mr. O'Donnell
Defense Mr. Gaovett

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 20, 1962

Mac:

This requires no action. Gilpatric's proposal is to tell our NATO allies that we have made operational tests of the DAVY CROCKETT. I don't see how we can avoid doing this. The result will automatically follow unless you have a different view and communicate it to Ros before Saturday.

C. K.

Attachment

Ltr to Bundy fm Gilpatric
dtd 12/14/62

OK
mclBB
check file

Noted
12/31/62
CJ

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NA 030R-5-1-16-6
By SPW VARA DMC 12-18-11

PRESERVATION COPY

Chou

December 12, 1962

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: NATO Defense Data Program

When I reported to you on this subject on Monday, I did not know how much progress State and Defense had achieved in reconciling their differences. You have a very general status report from Brubeck, dated December 5. Alex Johnson's people have supplemented this orally, telling me that the only issue remaining on the eleven presentations in the briefing relates to targeting (section 7). Although this is a major hurdle, both sides feel that a good solution is in sight, and they expect to have a revised section available for distribution tomorrow.

The opening remarks and the introduction, which are intended to put the full briefing in proper context, have gone through revisions, and they now look quite good.

I will keep you informed of further progress.

Charles E. Johnson

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By *dmf*, NARA, Date 12-10-08

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

96

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Charles E. Johnson

DATE: 12/10

FROM : Dana Quirk

SUBJECT: NATO Defense Data Program

Herewith copy of note discussing status subject briefing. Present indications are that most of our concerns are on way to being satisfactorily resolved. Expect to see revision of section 7 on Thursday. That is our last hurdle.

DEC 5 1962

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: NATO Defense Data (Nuclear
Information) Program.

This is a brief status report on the NATO Defense Data Program. As announced at the NATO Ministerial meeting in Athens last May, and as approved by the President in NSAM 147, the United States intends to conduct a nuclear information program designed to better acquaint our NATO partners with the nuclear capabilities which the United States is providing the Alliance. The JCS, in conjunction with the Departments of Defense and State and the Atomic Energy Commission, has for the past several months been compiling briefing materials, which include Restricted Data, to be presented to the NATO Council and selected officials of member governments at NATO capitals. Administrative delays, occasioned by the necessity for completing Council action on detailed security procedures, and substantive delays caused by the necessity to have portions of the presentation revised, will preclude the main program from being presented to the Council before the December Ministerial meeting.

We are informed by Secretary McNamara that the revisions will be completed in the very near future so that a final review of the presentations can be made by the interested U.S. Agencies by January 1, 1963.

In answer to any queries at the Ministerial meeting, the Secretary is prepared to inform the other NATO delegates that the extensive preparations for these briefings are now being completed and that we hope to make the presentations sometime during the month of January.

William M. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

PRESERVATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cbm/j, NARA, Date 12-10-08

~~TOP SECRET~~

December 7, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kaysen
Mr. Bundy

For your information I attach a McNamara memo to Taylor, dated December 3, 1962, re NATO Defense Data Program, outlining the agreement reached between State and Defense.

As I mentioned earlier, I encouraged the State Department to press for a January rather than a December date in order to give the policy people time to get their licks in. The final production should be much better than the first senario developed-- which was largely a military 'nuts and bolts' type briefing that demonstrated minimal salesmanship and created problems for AEC by including an entirely unnecessary amount of Restricted Data.

Charles E. Johnson

Attachment:

Copy Dec. 3, 1962 Memo to Chairman, JCS,
from Sec/Def McNamara re NATO Defense Data
(TS-Cpy 13)

~~TOP SECRET~~
(Unclassified when removed
from attachment)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Copy for Mr. Charles Johnson

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

Refer to:
I-26253/62

December 3, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: NATO Defense Data Program

Reference is made to JCSM-841-62, dated 2 November 1962, which forwarded a proposed presentation for the NATO Defense Data Program.

I understand that representatives of my office and of the Department of State met with the JCS (Operations Deputies) and members of the Joint Staff on 13 November 1962 to discuss the presentation and provide Departments of State and Defense views. The following modifications were suggested:

1. An introduction should be prepared by the Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA) which would set the stage for the factual presentations and indicate the strategic implications drawn by the US Government.
2. Section IV should be revised by the Joint Staff to avoid carrying the possible implication that the defense of Europe depends primarily on [REDACTED] and that conventional forces would play only a minor role.
3. The important contribution of external forces to the defense of the European Theater should be emphasized in appropriate sections of the briefing. In order to provide supporting data, Section VII should be revised to include considerably more detail as to the extent of coverage by external forces, both present and projected, of targets threatening Europe, including Soviet STRM's.
4. The Summary, Section IX, should be revised to emphasize again the strategic implications of the data presented and to indicate what the US considers to be the preferred NATO strategy.

The Department of State has advised that arrangements for the CABAL system will not be completed until 5 December. Because the NATO Ministerial Meeting will follow soon thereafter, they would prefer that the presentation of the Defense Data Program be delayed until after the first of the year. This should allow adequate time for revision and governmental clearance of the program which I should like to see completed by 1 January 1963. I see no objection to it being given to the Military Committee/Standing Group, NATO, in Permanent Session soon thereafter, before it is presented to the North Atlantic Council.

/s/ Robert S. McNamara

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE
DOD NOT APPLY

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 09-77
By isil, NARA, Date 10-28-09

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT
IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED
EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE
ISSUING OFFICE.

REPRODUCTION COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

Copy 3 of 13 Copies

Page 1 of 1 Pages

C & J has original
(sets from Kayser)

November 21, 1962

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOTE FOR MR. KAYSEN

SUBJECT: Presentation of Defense Data to the North Atlantic Council

Carl--

(Knowing that you are rushed I will put this down briefly for your information so that you may give me the word through Sarah if you have any particular reaction.)

State has about concluded that the presentation of Defense Data (nuclear weapons effects principally) to the North Atlantic Council should be postponed until at least January instead of trying to crowd it in before the Ministerial Meeting. ISr will agree - JSC might buck

This is why--

1. The Ministers and their principal staffs have other more important things on their minds and the time is just not good for the presentation in terms of getting the attention it should have.
2. The scenario is not agreed to. State and Defense and, to some extent, AEC are not in agreement.
3. The Cabal procedures have not been concurred in by all members of the Council. This is a condition precedent to giving the presentation.

I anticipated the above development when I saw how far apart Defense (principally the Joint Staff) and State were on the content of the presentation, and have encouraged State to feel that the White House ^{would not} insist on the original timetable in view of what has transpired since we committed ourselves at Athens to making the presentation, unless you feel that there are other important considerations entailed in maintaining the original schedule.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By chm/ty NARA, Date 12-10-08

Charles E. Johnson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc: Dana Orwick/State

28

THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

100

Office of the Chairman

11/13/62

Re Mr. Johnson's conversation
with Mr. Henderson

Mr. Karzen

FYI

Phone return to Ceph

11/15

U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
CLASSIFIED MATERIAL RECEIPT

100c
POSTAL REGISTRY NO.

DATE MAILED

11/13/62

TO


Mr. Charles Johnson
White House

FROM

Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg
Chairman

INSTRUCTIONS:

1. Original of this receipt to be signed personally by recipient and returned to ↑
2. Duplicate to be retained by recipient.
3. Triplicate to be retained by sender in suspense file.
4. Avoid Identifying Material Below in Any Manner Which Might Necessitate Classification of This Receipt.

DESCRIPTION (CHECK OR INDICATE)	DATE OF DOCUMENT LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL	FROM—	REFERENCE OR FILE NO.	ADDRESSED TO—
Ltr. _____		<p>Copy 9A - Ltr to Secretary Rusk from Chairman Seaborg, dd 11/13/62</p> <p>Copy 10A - Ltr to Secretary McNamara from Chairman Seaborg, dd 11/13/62</p> <p>(re: NATO)</p>		
Rpt. _____				
Dwg. _____				
Other _____				
Nature of copy: _____				
SO _____				
CC _____				
TC _____				
PC _____				
Other _____				
Number of enclosures and attachments: _____				

CERTIFICATE

I have personally received from the sender the material, including enclosures and attachments, as identified above. I assume full responsibility for the safe handling, storage, and transmittal elsewhere of this material in full accordance with existing regulations.

DISPATCHED

SIGNATURE OF COURIER

SIGNATURE OF RECIPIENT

DATE RECEIVED

DATE RECEIVED

John Holtschneider
November 13, 1962