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NEWS CONFERENCE
of
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Robert S. McNamara

at

Pentagon

Friday, November 3, 1967

* * *

Mr. Goulding: Gentlemen, this is our normal Thursday backgrounder with a couple of exceptions: first, that we are holding it on Friday instead of Thursday, and second, we have a couple of announcements so the entire thing will be on the record.

Secretary McNamara: We do have two announcements that I want to make. Afterwards I'll be happy to take your questions. The first relates to what we call a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System, and in connection with this I want to discuss with you certain intelligence information we have collected on a series of space system flight tests being conducted by the Soviet Union. These relate to the possible development by the Soviets of something which, as I say, we call a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System, that I'll hereafter refer to as FOBS -- a rather inelegant term.

Let me distinguish the FOBS system from the traditional intercontinental ballistic missile. An ICBM, as you know, normally does not go into orbit, but rather follows a ballistic trajectory from launch point to impact point. On this trajectory it reaches a peak altitude of about 800 miles.

Now, unlike the ICBM and this ballistic trajectory, the vehicle launched in a FOBS mode is fired into a very low orbit about 100 miles above the earth. At a given point -- generally before the first orbit is complete -- a rocket engine is fired which slows down the payload and causes it to drop out of orbit. The payload then follows a re-entry path similar to the re-entry of a ballistic missile.

Even now it is impossible to be certain of what these Soviet tests represent. It is conceivable that the Soviet Union has been testing space vehicles for some re-entry program. But we suspect the Russians are pursuing the research and development of a FOBS. If this turns out to be true, it's conceivable that they could achieve an initial operational capability during the next year, 1968.

Some years ago we ourselves examined the desirability of the FOBS system, and there was agreement among civilian and military leaders that there was no need for our country to develop a FOBS system. While development of it could be initiated at any time for relatively rapid deployment, our analyses conclude that it would not improve our strategic offensive posture and consequently we have no intention of revising the decision made, some years ago.

Like other possible variations, the FOBS offers some characteristics which differ from traditional ICBMs. In our opinion, the disadvantages of the FOBS system are overriding.

Because of the low altitude of the FOBS' orbits, some of their trajectories would avoid detection by some early warning radars, including our BMEWS. Also, the impact point cannot be determined until ignition of the rocket engine that deboosts the payload out of orbit -- and that occurs roughly three minutes and some 500 miles from the target. And the flight path can be as much as 10 minutes shorter than that of an ICBM.

For these characteristics, severe penalties are paid in two critical areas -- accuracy and payload. The accuracy of the Soviet ICBM modified to a FOBS weapon would be significantly less, and the payload of the FOBS vehicle would be a fraction of the ICBM.

The FOBS weapon would not be accurate enough for a satisfactory attack upon United States Minutemen missiles, protected in their silos. Perhaps the Soviets might feel it could provide a surprise nuclear strike against U.S. soft land targets such as bomber bases.

However, several years ago, anticipating such Soviet capability, we initiated the deployment of equipment to deny that capability. For example, already we are beginning to use operationally over-the-horizon radars which possess a greater capability of detecting FOBS than do the BMEWS. These will give us more warning time against a full-scale attack using FOBS missiles than BMEWS does against a heavy ICBM launch.

As you know, our deterrent rests upon our ability to absorb any surprise attack and to retaliate with sufficient strength to destroy the attacking nation as a viable society. With three-minute warning, a 15-minute warning or no warning at all, we could still absorb a surprise attack and strike back with sufficient power to destroy the attacker. We have that capability today; and we'll continue to have it in the future.

Now in the second announcement, I want to tell you that we have approved the name SENTINEL for the Chinese-oriented anti-ballistic missile system. Moreover, Lieutenant General Alfred D. Starbird, USA, has been named as the Army's System Manager for the Sentinel System. General Starbird is currently serving as Director of the Defense Communications Agency as you know. He'll assume his new position on November 15.

The System when deployed will provide a defense against the Chinese ICBM force, (assuming they go ahead to deploy such a force), of the mid-1970's. As System Manager, General Starbird will be responsible for the Sentinel's development and deployment.

His organization will have three main elements. The first will be the System Office in this area. It will be an element of the Office, Chief of Staff of the Army. The second will be the Systems Command at Huntsville, Alabama. They will develop, procure, and install the Sentinel System and the third element will be an Evaluation Agency with headquarters at the White Sands Missile Range, responsible for the evaluation, review and testing of the system.

The Sentinel organization will be supported by existing Army agencies such as the Corps of Engineers, the Materiel Command, the Army Communications Command, the Continental Army Command, and the Air Defense Command.

The NIKE-X organization will continue separately from the Sentinel organization. NIKE-X will carry on research and development on systems, the objective of which would be to protect population centers against large-scale attacks. The NIKE-X program will also design equipment to be used for tests of the penetration capabilities of our offensive missiles. Lieutenant General Austin W. Betts, who as you know is Chief of Research and Development for the Army, will continue to be responsible for the NIKE-X program.

Now I will be happy to try to take your questions.

Question: Of the two possibilities you mentioned in the FOBS announcement, either the development of FOBS or a new re-entry program for space, to which do you give the greater weight at this stage?

Secretary McNamara: I think it more likely they are working on the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System than they are on new re-entry vehicles for space systems. It's too early to be absolutely sure, but the weight of evidence is in favor of the former.

Question: Would this stimulate our effort in Bambi type of concepts as interception by satellite?

Secretary McNamara: No, I think not.

Question: Why is that?

Secretary McNamara: We have other ways of obtaining warning and the problem of protecting the population by destruction of the warhead as we have said before cannot be met by technology available to us today, taking account of the almost certain reaction of the Soviets to any ballistic missile defense that we would put up.

Question: Mr. Secretary, is this the orbital bomb that the Russians themselves have referred to and if it is as bad as you say it is, sir, why on earth are they considering the thing? I don't mean to be facetious . . .

Secretary McNamara: Let me first say I don't know what they were referring to when Khrushchev made the statement. I believe it was Khrushchev who made the statement about an orbital bomb. I don't know whether this was what he had in mind or not. He didn't tell us, but secondly, why are they doing it? I think the most logical explanation is that we have maintained a very large bomber force in contrast to their bomber force, intercontinental bomber force, and as you know, we have plans to continue to maintain such a force in the future. They have perhaps thought that this force was a problem to them and that they could reduce the effectiveness of the force by designing a weapon that would eliminate the warning that the force needs to survive. As you know, our bomber force is highly vulnerable to missile attack, and we have protected a percentage of the bomber force against missile attack by putting it on an alert status such that it could take off and advance into the atmosphere during the period of warning of the missile attack. That is the primary advantage of BMEWS.

What the FOBS does is circumvent BMEWS. So if you were a Soviet planner, possibly concerned about the bomber element of our force, this might be one action you would take to meet that threat.

We countered their action with a reaction which is our over-the-horizon radar to recapture the warning time necessary to preserve a portion of our bomber force.

Question: Mr. Secretary, some of us met this morning with Senator Jackson and he brought up this Fractional Orbital device problem, and he is not all as sanguine as you are about our ability to detect. In fact, he made that statement it would completely confound our defense and would come in by the back door. Do you have any comment on that?

Secretary McNamara: He hasn't said that to me so I don't want to try to read what was in his mind, but we do have as I say an over-the-horizon radar system which we have been working on for some time, which we are beginning to use operationally at the present time and which will be fully operational early next year. And which does provide warning of potential attacks of this kind. Whether he is aware of that or remembered it when he made the statement he did, I can't say. Perhaps he can raise the question again. Mr. Nitze is appearing in public session before his Committee on the subject of ABMs on Monday.

Question: What you have on your hands here -- I know what the headlines are going to be -- that they have a three-minute bomb. It's not going to make any difference about whether it's aimed at a soft target like our bombers, as far as the American public is going to be concerned, is possibly a terror weapon. Is this the kind of irresponsible act that perhaps the German scientists did on the V-2 when they were sending these things over London?

Secretary McNamara: I think any such headline, of course, would be a false statement of the characteristics of the weapon and a misleading indication to the American people of the character of that weapon. This is a less accurate, less efficient weapon than the intercontinental ballistic missile. It does have the characteristics of flying, if you call it that, at an altitude and in certain areas of space such that it perhaps would not be detected by our Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. In anticipating that possibility several years ago, we developed a supplementary warning system -- the over-the-horizon radar. I recall speaking of it publicly, I believe in 1964, so we've had it under development for a long period of time for exactly this purpose. It's becoming operational at the present time, it will be fully operational before their FOB system is in effect, and therefore the FOB system is just what we indicated -- a system in which the disadvantages far outweigh the advantages as far as the attacker is concerned.

Question: There are four parts to this. (a). does this make an attack from over the South Pole far more likely? (b). how long have we known about their development of the FOBS? (c) where are they testing it? (d) what do we think of it as our main defensive weapon against it -- the Thor-based system you referred to in '64, anti-satellite, or the NIKE-X?

Secretary McNamara: Taking the last one first, as we have said before, we don't believe that there is a defense today in their hands or ours against a large-scale intercontinental ballistic attack on population centers. That, of course, is why we decided against deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system designed to protect population centers against heavy missile attacks.

Secondly, it's only been in the past month or two that we've seen enough evidence of testing to lead us to believe that it's more likely than not that these space shots are associated with a FOBS system in contrast to a possible re-entry development of the space system.

Thirdly, where are they testing from? I'd rather not discuss that. It exposes some of our intelligence gathering information.

Fourthly, does this make an attack from the south more likely than not? I think not because there are severe penalties, as I have indicated, they pay for a FOBS orbit. A FOBS orbit need not come from the south. It could come from the north. But in any case, where it's to come from the south, it would be a far less efficient way of delivering their warhead than an intercontinental missile trajectory, and I think that if they were to use it, it would be a specialized form of attack against such soft targets as, such time-urgent soft targets, as bomber bases.

Question: Will you go into why you are announcing it at this point? Is it in some way an effort to convey something to the Russians?

Secretary McNamara: No. It's only been in the last month or two that we've seen enough tests, enough evidence of tests, to lead us to this conclusion, and it's only been in the matter of the past few days that we've finished classified briefings on the subject of Congressional Committees. It was quite appropriate, therefore, I think, that we announce it publicly at this time.

Question: Could you describe how far along they are, Mr. Secretary, in an advanced stage of experimentation?

Secretary McNamara: As I indicated to you, we think it could become operational, if they choose to deploy it, sometime in 1968.

Question: Is this tied in with the 7 Cosmos shots in the past week? Are they related?

Secretary McNamara: I don't think they are related.

Question: Are these connected with the mystery shots?

Secretary McNamara: Let me just take this. I'll come to you next.

Question: I was going to ask that, too. Also, what do you estimate the payload is of these things? In terms of megatons?

Secretary McNamara: I don't whether to give that out or not. I'd say one to three megatons.

Question: Are they multi-warheads, sir?

Secretary McNamara: No.

Question: Is our third stage, the new stage for the sufficient to counteract this?

Secretary McNamara: The Chinese-oriented ABM system is designed to protect against a Chinese attack in the mid-70s and not a Soviet attack.

Question: We are developing a new third stage against the FOBS system?

Secretary McNamara: The Chinese-oriented ABM system is designed to effect against the Chinese and not against the Soviets. Yes?

Question: I asked earlier whether these recent space shots were described as so-called mysteryshots that we were not discussing, were those so-called FOBS tests, there were about eight or nine?

Secretary McNamara: Let me ask Phil to check this. I'm not entirely sure that I know which shots you're talking about -- the mystery shots. Well let me ask Phil to ask the question. I don't think of these shots as mystery shots. I hope there aren't any mysteries.

Question: Talking about over-the-horizon radar and warning. What kind of warning will you be able to get if this takes only about a few minutes for the warhead to come down?

Secretary McNamara: We will have warning of the movement to us, toward us, of objects.

Question: How will we know if it is one of the FOBS?

Secretary McNamara: When we see the kind of the FOBS attack that would be designed against our model bases, we'll know it's that, it's a FOBS, and over-the-horizon radar.

Question:Do you have this over-the-horizon radar deployed all around the city too?

Secretary McNamara: The over-the-horizon radar warns of the incoming objects whether they be targets against cities or bombers. There's no particular reason for them to use a FOBS as opposed to an ICBM against the city. The only purpose of using FOBS instead of ICBM's would be to avoid the warning, reduce the warning time and this becomes important only in relation to time-urgent targets. Cities aren't going to move in the next ten minutes, we can't do anything to move them. The bombers can move and we can act to move them and it's this characteristic of the target that leads to this choice of weapon to be used against it and we counter that charge as I say by a new type of warning that recaptures the warning time.

Question: But my question sir is do you have enough of this over the horizon radar to protect the countries residents --

Secretary McNamara: To warn of attacks on any part of the country and the answer is yes.

Question: Mr. McNamara, is it possible, though... I want to get one thing straight on this thing, when you speak of an orbit. Is it possible for them to put this thing up in orbit and go around and around the earth several times before they fire this rocket off?

Secretary McNamara: The answer it is possible, but there is no advantage to it. As a matter of fact, there is a penalty to them for doing that. It exposes the weapon to destruction, it's a violation of an agreement they've entered into, it gives additional warning and for all of these reasons it's a very unlikely tactic.

Question: But if this thing is capable of orbit, how are you going to know when they put this thing up and it starts orbiting that they are not simply orbiting some sort of satellite and that they are actually orbiting a FOBS. Couldn't they orbit this thing, let it go around once, and then fire the damn thing off. And you only have 3 minutes warning.

Secretary McNamara: And of course it isn't one you are thinking about. One is of no value to them. We have roughly 40 SAC bomber bases. It would take a very substantial number of warheads targeted on those bases to destroy them and quite clearly they are not going to put that substantial number X into orbit.

Question: Mr. Secretary, you said they were destroyable? What would you destroy them with?

Secretary McNamara: We have systems that are capable of destroying them -- Satellites. We can put objects in orbit if that becomes desirable or necessary.

Question: Sir . . .

Secretary McNamara: Let me take someone else, yes.

Question: On the over-the-horizon radar, I understand this is one of the first developments in which we were actually using it as we were developing it. What I want to get clear is whether this is what you mean by saying it has become operational and also is it still confined to the test area -- whether it be Florida or wherever?

Secretary McNamara: No. The over-the-horizon radar has been in development for several years. In a test made, we have been actually using it to --

Question: Where is that?

Secretary McNamara: We don't disclose the sites of it.

Question: Is this airborne radar?

Secretary McNamara: No. Ground-based radar. A ground-based system. I'm not going to discuss any more than I have. It has been in development for a number of years. It's been in use as a test system for a number of years, measuring and obtaining flight information on Soviet launches for that period of time, and within the last 60 days -- am I right on that -- within the last 60 days we've put it in the operational status. It's not yet fully operational. It won't be fully operational until February of next year.

Question: Can I ask you a question of

Secretary McNamara: I'll take this one.

Question: What kind of warning time does it give us on the FOBS?

Secretary McNamara: Roughly the same as the BMEWS. Slightly more, but roughly the same.

Question: Fifteen minutes?

Secretary McNamara: Roughly fifteen minutes.

Question: On the warhead itself, just to get it into perspective, you say that the payload of the FOBS would be a fraction of the ICBM and you put the actual as between one and three megaton. Isn't that about equivalent to Polaris or Minuteman?

Secretary McNamara: They have to use a very large launch vehicle, and the large launch vehicle would carry larger warhead on an intercontinental ballistic missile flight. But you degrade the capability in order to use it for this purpose, and you degrade it in two respects, One, as in reducing the payload, and the other, and far more important, degradation, is in reducing the accuracy.

Question: Well, actually the warheads would be equal to our own warheads?

Secretary McNamara: Yes, roughly so. The accuracy, of course, is far, far less than our warheads and therefore the destruction capability which is a function of accuracy and payload is far, far less.

Question: As a follow-up on that, would they be capable of using MIRV in these bombs to get really messed up, multiple warheads in the bombs? And why couldn't they increase the accuracy?

Secretary McNamara: They have a number of inaccurate objects, possibly.

Question: Can't they increase -- just like everything else is perfected, just increases accuracy where it would be.

Secretary McNamara: The length of the flight and the characteristic of the orbit -- they will never be able to get the accuracy in this kind of a system that they could get, applying the same technology to an intercontinental ballistic missile system. The object, therefore, is to reduce warning time. That's why you sacrifice payload, why you sacrifice accuracy, and our counter to that, as I say, is to develop a new warning system. I am correct in saying, Phil, Dan, and I announced this in 1964, am I not?

Mr. Goulding: It was before I was on board, sir.

Question: How do they get them in orbit? Doesn't that imply improved accuracy?

Secretary McNamara: No. Low orbit is one of the things that takes additional power.

Question: Isn't that a new reentry vehicle?

Question: There are so many important questions asked about this today, won't you please give us a little more time and a few more questions?

Secretary McNamara: No. I have a terribly busy day. Let me just take this question here. I can't answer the question of yours about the new re-entry vehicle, but Phil, will you get the answer to that?

Question: Will your satellite observation station network at Hawaii and, will they be able to identify those objects?

Secretary McNamara: These objects are identified by the over-the-horizon radar system, the sites of which are classified, and I just don't want to get into a discussion that throws any light at all on where these sites are, or the character of the over-the-horizon system.

Question: Your whole presentation here seems to be based on the assumption that the Russians don't think much of our over-the-horizon radar. If this thing works, then it knocks the hell out of their reason for using it.

Secretary McNamara: It negates the advantage that they may have hoped to get from it. It's exactly the reason why we decided not to go ahead with it. On the other hand, they are faced with the bomber threat that is very substantial and they are quite clearly taking action to counter that bomber threat. There's no question but what if you are sitting in the Soviet shoes and you look at our bomber force as it has been, and as it is, and as it will be, it's a much larger bomber force than they have.

Question: We're not developing a new bomber?

Secretary McNamara: We have today how many bombers?

Voice: 600.

Secretary McNamara: 500 to 600? How many are we going to have tomorrow?

Question: We're phasing out the B-52s.

Secretary McNamara: Oh, no, we're going to have hundreds of bombers as far in the future as any of you can look. . . . If you are looking at this problem from a Soviet point of view, you are going to be concerned about it. Particularly you would have been concerned about it 4 or 5 years ago. I don't think there is any doubt but that is what is behind the Tallinn system. For our planning, we must assume the Tallinn system has an ABM capability. There's an uncertainty whether it does or doesn't. But it's very clear indeed that it is an advanced air defense system. It was designed to take account of the stated plans of the United States to maintain a large bomber force for a number of years. So it's very clear that our decision to maintain a bomber force has led to their reaction.

There's no argument about that. This is simply another illustration of the theme I tried to advance in San Francisco, that in strategic force planning, action leads to reaction. It's absolutely fundamental to each party that they maintain a deterrent, so long as technology and financial capability permits, and technology and financial capability both the Soviets and the U.S. make possible the reaction of one to the action of the other. So this is -- you are seeing it every day. You see it in our action, Our Posiedon is in part a reaction to their potential ABM force, we said so at the time we introduced the Posiedon into the research and development program two or three years ago; we said it again when we introduced it into the deployment schedule this past year.

You can continue to expect that, and this is the reason why this government so strongly believes that it is in our national interest to engage in discussions of this subject with the Soviets.

Question: Did we have an agreement with them -- I've forgotten the status of the agreements -- did we have an agreement with the Soviets that we wouldn't get into using weapons in space?

Secretary McNamara: No. They have agreed not to place warheads in full orbit. That is why this is a fractional orbit, not a full orbit, and therefore not a violation of that agreement.

Question: You said a moment ago, it could go around the earth.

Secretary McNamara: I said they could, but they haven't.

Question: Well now, maybe they will.

Secretary McNamara: Maybe they will violate and if they will we will observe it, but the point is that this Fractional Orbit Bombardment System is not a violation of that agreement.

Question: You are going to say this is not a violation of that agreement?

Secretary McNamara: Read the agreement and you will see why it isn't. I will be happy to give you a copy of the text.

Question: You say we have systems which are capable of destroying satellites of this nature. I take that to mean, the very limited installations we have out in the Pacific.

Secretary McNamara: Yes, that is right.

Question: This doesn't provide very much coverage, does it?

Secretary McNamara: I don't want to imply that we can defend population centers of this country against heavy Soviet attacks. We can't.

Question: Is your position now that we are still relying on deterrent as your basic defense against it?

Secretary McNamara: Yes, very, very, definitely so. We are still relying on the deterrent and that is what they are relying on. There is no other basis on which to rely at the present time and no technology, either ours nor theirs, would permit any other basis. One more question.

Question: We would like to have you characterize your concern, whether this means a new round in the arms race. . . .

Secretary McNamara: I'm not concerned for the reasons I have outlined to you.

Question: Should our European allies be concerned, Mr. Secretary, who don't have over-the-horizon radar?

Secretary McNamara: The European allies face different problems. They face the medium-range ballistic missiles and the intermediate-range ballistic missiles and they did not have and cannot obtain the period of warning that we have. Theirs is quite a different problem.

Thank you very much.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Nov. 9, 1967

NOTE FOR MR. JOHNSON

Chuck--

Attached for your information is a statement on FOBS that I prepared for Dick Moose for possible use in the Senate.

Att.

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Spurgeon
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STATEMENT ON FOBS

I have been very troubled by the many alarmist statements in the last few days concerning the Soviet Fractional Orbit Bombardment System (FOBS). Certainly, any Soviet commitment to a major new strategic weapons system is a matter of importance and concern. I believe, however, that an objective review of the facts relating to this development leads to the conclusion that it will not constitute a major new factor in the strategic balance.

In developing the FOBS, the Soviets may have been attempting to achieve an element of surprise by underflying or circumventing our BMEWS radars. The FOBS, however, involves a major sacrifice in both the yield and the accuracy of delivery that can be obtained with a given missile booster as compared with its use as an ICBM. New developments in technology, however, have deprived the Soviets of the advantage of surprise that they might have hoped to achieve with this system. We are already operating new over-the-horizon radars which can give us more warning time against a full-scale attack with FOBS missiles than BMEWS would against an ICBM attack. Moreover, if the Soviets should attack from the south or put weapons in multiple orbits, these new radars (which detect at launch) would give us even greater warning of an impending attack. There is a real possibility, therefore, that rather than increase their military capabilities, the

Soviets ^{would} ~~have~~ actually reduced their net capabilities ^{if they el} ~~by~~ deploying FOBS rather than ICBMs. I believe it important for us to recognize that the fact that something is different does not make it good and the fact that something has been done by the Soviets does not dictate that we must follow their lead.

I am also concerned that the charge has been made that the Soviet FOBS program constitutes a direct violation of the Outer Space Treaty. While I wish to emphasize that I do not in any way condone or excuse this unnecessary action on the part of the Soviets that further escalates the nuclear arms race, I do think that we must recognize that their action does not constitute a violation of the Outer Space Treaty.

Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty states:

"States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. . . ."

The wording of this Article makes it absolutely clear that the Treaty is intended to prohibit the "carrying of nuclear weapons." The Treaty does not and was not intended to in any way prohibit the development or even the testing of systems capable of carrying nuclear weapons. I understand that there is no evidence of any kind or any reason to

believe that nuclear weapons were associated with any of the Soviet tests of the FOBS.

Beyond this fundamental consideration that excludes a violation of the Treaty, I believe it important to recognize that the intent of this Article was to outlaw military systems that would station nuclear weapons in orbit above the earth as a terror or blackmail threat during peacetime. To this end, the wording in the Article, "not to place in orbit around the earth," was chosen with the intent of covering a system that would circle the earth many times. The wording was not intended to cover ICBMs or systems such as the FOBS which presumably would only be used with nuclear weapons in time of war.

I believe that the Outer Space Treaty is an important international obligation to which most of the major countries of the world have solemnly committed themselves. This Treaty can serve a most important role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to the new environment of outer space. If we wish to develop the stature of this Treaty, we must be prepared to insist that its true obligations are honored. At the same time, we must be careful to avoid vague charges which cannot be substantiated that the Treaty has been violated. Such hasty actions can lead to counter charges that we are interested in employing the Treaty for a tactical, political

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advantage when it so serves our purpose. This can only serve to degrade the Treaty in the eyes of the world.

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11-9-67

November 8, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Subject: FOBS and the Outer Space Treaty

I agree with Ed Welsh's basic point in the attached memo that the fundamental reason FOBS is not in violation of the Outer Space Treaty is that there is no evidence that it was carrying a nuclear warhead. I do not, however, agree with his additional technical point that a FOBS is in orbit within the meaning of the Treaty.

Incidentally, the confusion on this issue appears to have been created in part by the fact that McNamara was quoted (as reported by Ed Welsh) out of context. While McNamara's statement was still not very clear, what he actually said, in answer to a question as to whether this was a violation of the Outer Space Treaty, was:

"No. They have agreed not to place warheads in full orbit. That is why this is a fractional orbit, not a full orbit, and therefore not a violation of that agreement."

Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty states:

"States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. . . ."

It is completely clear from the wording of the Article that it is meant to prohibit "carrying nuclear weapons." It does not in any way prohibit the development or even the testing of systems capable of carrying nuclear weapons. It is certainly implicit from the wording, "place in orbit around the earth," that the Article was meant to cover systems that would orbit the earth at least once and presumably many times. Considering the legislative history of the Treaty, the threat that it

sought to outlaw was clearly that of stationing of nuclear weapons in space as a terror or blackmail threat during peacetime. The Treaty specifically avoided dealing with the question of military delivery systems such as ICBMs which might go into space.

Ed Welsh makes an interesting technical point that a FOBS has in fact been placed in an orbit (as its name indicates). However, I believe that it is clear that it was not the meaning or intent of Article IV to cover this case. For Treaty purposes FOBS should be considered as an extension of the ICBM problem. At the same time, I think McNamara and his interpreters have confused the issue and possibly created a problem for us by making such a sharp distinction between a FOBS and a MOBS since the Soviet system is clearly capable of multiple orbits. A MOBS would also clearly not be in violation of the Treaty unless it contained a nuclear weapon. However, in making a major point of the distinction between FOBS and MOBS, we are at least suggesting that a MOBS would be a Treaty violation. I do not believe we have really thought through how we would deal with a future Soviet MOBS firing in the absence of any evidence that it contains a nuclear warhead. I would therefore recommend soft pedalling this point until we know where we are going.

I have discussed the problem with Len Meeker, Ray Garthoff, and Mort Halperin, and I believe all would agree with my interpretation of the Treaty. I have asked ISA and G/PM to prepare a cable of instructions to the field on this subject. I believe that the preparation and clearance of this cable will help clear up the policy issue on this question. Although I have not yet seen the transcript, I understand that Nitze's testimony on Monday before the Joint Committee has helped clear up the confusion on the relation of FOBS to the Outer Space Treaty.

Spurgeon Keeny

Attachment:

Returned - Welsh memo dtd 11/4

SMKeeny:jb:11-8-67

bcc: SMK file and chron

CEJ

Del'd by jb to ln -1:00pm, 11-8.



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE COUNCIL
WASHINGTON 20502

JK
look at
+ report back
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
20

November 4, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WALT ROSTOW

Subject: FOBS

I have not yet seen the actual transcript of Secretary McNamara's press conference in which he is reported to have spoken at length regarding a Soviet fractional orbit bombardment system. However, from what I have read in the newspaper and on the AP ticker, I would have to register disagreement with the interpretation regarding the space treaty.

The Secretary is reported as having said, "This is a fractional orbit, not a full orbit, and therefore not a violation of that agreement."

Article 4 of the treaty says nothing about a "full orbit." Rather, it expresses a prohibition against placing weapons of mass destruction "in orbit around the earth . . . on celestial bodies . . . or in outer space in any other manner."

Obviously, if the Soviet system contains no warhead, putting the object into space is not a violation of the treaty. Just as obvious, however, if an object is put into space with a warhead of mass destruction, it is violating the treaty.

It is incorrect to conclude that a space object has not attained orbit until it has made a complete revolution of the earth. Once having been launched, a spacecraft is in orbit as soon as it attains an altitude and speed which would permit it to make a complete revolution of the earth. To bring down such an object before it has made a complete revolution does not amend in any regard a statement that it was an object in orbit around the earth.

E. C. Welsh



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PAGE 01 BONN 04927 100544Z

ACTION EUR 20

INFO IO 15, OIC 05, H 02, NEA 15, NSC 10, NASA 04, INR 07, P 04, CIA 04,
DOD 01, SP 02, SCI 05, SS 20, AEC 11, AF 18, ACDA 17, GPM 03, SC 01,
SAH 03, L 03, ARA 15, EA 15, USIA 12, OST 01, RSC 01, NSAE 00, RSR 01,
/215 W

R 071545Z NOV 67
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5862
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 1931
AMEMBASSY PARIS 2324
USMISSION NATO 082
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 657
USMISSION GENEVA 553
DOD

CONFIDENTIAL BONN 4927

DISTO/BUSEC

SUBJ: FOREIGN OFFICE INTEREST IN FOBS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, SEC 3.4
By *clm/jy* NARA, Date *12-11-08*

1. A MEMBER OF THE FONOFF DISARMAMENT SECTION (GESCHER) INFORMED
US THAT BOTH BRANDT AND STATE SEC DUCKWITZ HAD EXPRESSED STRONG
INTEREST IN SECRETARY MCNAMARA'S NOVEMBER 3 PRESS CONFERENCE
STATEMENTS ON FOBS ADDING, THAT THEY WOULD "UNDOUBTEDLY APPRECIATE"

PAGE 2 RUFHOL 4927 CONFIDENTIAL
ANY BACKGROUND INFORMATION ADDITIONAL TO THE TEXT OF THE PRESS
CONFERENCE. (THE TEXT WAS SENT TO BRANDT, DUCKWITZ, KNIEPER



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AND CARSTENS BY THE AMBASSADOR.)

2. ON THE BASIS OF INFORMATION AVAILABLE SO FAR, GESCHER THOUGHT THAT SOVIET FOBS HARDLY REPRESENTED A STEP TOWARD DISARMAMENT AND DID NOT BODE WELL FOR SOVIET INTENTIONS ON THE NPT. HE ALSO EXPRESSED CURIOSITY WHY THE US DECIDED "TO ANNOUNCE" THAT FOBS WERE NOT IN VIOLATION OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY, A POINT THE FONOFF WAS NOW STUDYING.

3. COMMENT: IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE DEPT PROVIDE FOR TRANSMISSION TO BRANDT, DUCKWITZ AND OTHER GERMAN OFFICIALS ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE FOB SYSTEM, INCLUDING OUR VIEWS ON ITS TECHNICAL, STRATEGIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS.

MCGHEE

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 67963

2
ORIGIN GPM 03

INFO SS 20, SP 02, SC 01, L 03, H 02, NEA 15, EUR 20, EA 15, ARA 15, AF 18,
RSC 01, IO 15, P 04, USIA 12, NSC 10, INR 07, CIA 04, NSA 02, DOD 01,
ACDA 17, SCI 05, AEC 11, NASA 04, OST 01, /208 R

DRAFTED BY DOD/ISA"DR HALPERIN/MR ANDERSON
APPROVED BY G/PM PHILIP FARLEY
ATSD/AE DR WALSKE
JCS COL VANHOZER
OSD MR ALMOND
WHITE HOUSE MR KEENY
OSD DR SELIN
L MR MEEKER
G/PM MR GARTHOFF
OSD MR BROCKWAY
G/PM MR TRIPPE
ACDA MR VAN DOREN

.....
R 102125Z NOV 67
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TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS
USMISSION NATO 0212

UNCLAS STATE 67963

SUBJECT FOBS

1. ON 3 NOVEMBER SECRETARY MCNAMARA ANNOUNCED THAT THE SOVIETS
APPEAR TO BE DEVELOPING A FRACTIONAL ORBITAL BOMBARDMENT SYSTEM
(FOBS). DEFENSE CABLE 1993 (BEING REPEATED TO ALL ADDRESSEES)
QUOTES THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT WHICH PROVIDED DETAILS OF THE

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SYSTEM. TRANSCRIPT OF SECRETARY MCNAMARA'S PRESS CONFERENCE WAS TRANSMITTED IN USIA WIRELESS FILE EUP 135 AND 138 AND EPF 110 AND 114 DATED 3 NOVEMBER 1967. SINCE THE ANNOUNCEMENT THERE HAS BEEN WIDESPREAD PUBLIC INTEREST IN THIS DEVELOPMENT. SOME OF THE MORE FREQUENT QUESTIONS THAT HAVE ARISEN ALONG WITH RELEVANT FACTS AND US VIEWS WHICH MAY BE DRAWN ON WHERE

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RESPONSE IS NECESSARY ARE LISTED BELOW:

A. DOES THE SOVIET FOBS VIOLATE THE SPACE TREATY ?

1. ARTICLE IV OF THE TREATY REQUIRES THAT "STATES PARTIES TO THE TREATY UNDERTAKE NOT TO PLACE IN ORBIT AROUND THE EARTH ANY OBJECTS CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR ANY OTHER KINDS OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, INSTALL SUCH WEAPONS ON CELESTIAL BODIES OR STATION SUCH WEAPONS IN OUTER SPACE IN ANY OTHER MANNER." THE WORDING OF THIS ARTICLE MAKES IT CLEAR THAT THE TREATY IS CONCERNED WITH "THE CARRYING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS"; THE TREATY DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE DEVELOPMENT OR EVEN TESTING OF SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OR REASON TO BELIEVE THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH ANY OF THE SOVIET FOBS TESTS. MOREOVER THE FOBS IS A LAND-BASED SYSTEM WHICH ACTS ESSENTIALLY AS AN INTERCONTINENTAL MISSILE AND DOES NOT GO INTO A COMPLETE ORBIT AROUND THE EARTH BEFORE LANDING ON TARGET (HENCE THE NAME "FRACTIONAL ORBITAL BOMBARDMENT SYSTEM" FOBS). AN ORBITAL BOMBARDMENT SYSTEM ON THE OTHER HAND WOULD INVOLVE WEAPONS BASED ON DEPLOYED IN SPACE FOR LONGER

0-83 3 RUEHC 67963 UNCLAS
PERIODS OF TIME.

2. BOTH THE LANGUAGE AND THE INTENT OF THE TREATY HAVE THE PURPOSE OF PREVENTING THE STATIONING OF MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS IN SPACE. THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF ANY SPACE WEAPONS AT GROUND INSTALLATIONS ARE NOT RPT NOT PROHIBITED. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD TEST FOBS WITH A

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LIVE NUCLEAR WARHEAD. HOWEVER, EVEN IF THEY WERE TO DO SO, IT WOULD NOT BE A VIOLATION OF THE TREATY SINCE THE WARHEAD WOULD NOT COMPLETE AN ORBIT AROUND THE EARTH.

2. WE HAVE THEREFORE CONCLUDED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT VIOLATED THE TREATY.

B. WHAT ARE THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF FOBS ?

1. FOBS TRAVEL AT ALTITUDES MUCH LOWER THAN THE HIGH PORTION OF ICBM TRAJECTORIES AND BECAUSE OF THEIR GREATER RANGE THEY COULD ATTACK TARGETS FROM DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS. A SOVIET FOBS FOR EXAMPLE COULD ATTACK THE US FROM THE SOUTH. THESE CHARACTERISTICS

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MIGHT ENABLE A FOBS TO AVOID SOME OF OUR RADARS SUCH AS THOSE OF THE BMEWS. THE US HOWEVER HAS RECENTLY DEPLOYED OVER-THE-HORIZON RADARS WHICH CAN DETECT FOBS LAUNCHES. SOME ARE ALREADY IN OPERATION. WARNING TIME OF A FOBS ATTACK FROM THESE RADARS WOULD ACTUALLY BE GREATER THAN THE WARNING TIME OF AN ICBM ATTACK FROM THE BMEWS.

2. ON THE DEBIT SIDE, THE FOBS HAVE TWO SEVERE DRAWBACKS. THE ACCURACY OF ICBMS MODIFIED INTO A FOBS WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY LESS THAN ICBMS AND THEIR PAYLOAD WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY REDUCED. THUS THERE ARE PENALTIES IN BOTH PAYLOAD AND ACCURACY THAT EXACT A HIGH PRICE FOR USE OF THIS WEAPONS SYSTEM.

C. DOES THE US PLAN TO DEVELOP A FOBS ?

1. SOME YEARS AGO THE EXAMINED THE DESIRABILITY OF THE SYSTEM AND DECIDED THAT THE DISADVANTAGES WERE OVERRIDING. WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF REVISING THIS DECISION BUT WE WOULD IN NO WAY FEEL OURSELVES CONSTRAINED BY THE SPACE TREATY FROM SUCH DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT IF WE CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS IN

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OUR INTEREST.

0. IN VIEW OF THE DRAWBACKS WHY ARE THE SOVIETS DEVELOPING THIS SYSTEM ?

1. THEY MAY OF COURSE COME TO THE SAME CONCLUSION THAT WE HAVE AND NEVER DEPLOY THESE WEAPONS.

2. SOME YEARS AGO THEY MAY HAVE CONSIDERED THAT THIS SYSTEM OFFERED A MEANS OF ATTACKING ELEMENTS OF THE US Bomber Force BY SURPRISE BY AVOIDING THE US RADAR WARNING SYSTEM WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE ALERT THE BOMBERS ALLOWING THEM TO BECOME AIRBORNE AND SO REACH SAFETY. OUR NEW RADARS OBVIATE THIS POSSIBILITY. IF THEY DO DEPLOY IT, IT WILL SIMPLY BE A LESS EFFECTIVE USE OF THE RESOURCES EXPENDED THAN WOULD A COMPARABLE INVESTMENT IN THEIR ICBM FORCE. RUSK

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October 18, 1967

NOTE FOR COL. GINSBURGH

Here are the documents I promised
to send you.

I understand ^{the} conference of the interested
members of the Intelligence Community
may be convened to discuss this matter.

CEJohnson

~~SECRET~~ Attachment

~~SECRET~~

October 17, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. E. C. WELSH

Subject: Soviet One-Orbit Space Operations

The October 16, 1967, TIMES article by Evert Clark, concerning the possible significance of the recent flurry of Soviet one-orbit space operations, may mislead the readers.

The orbits used in these tests have an apogee of about 115 n. miles, a perigee of 73 n. miles, an inclination of 49.6° , and a period of about 87.8 minutes. The launch is conducted from Tyuratam in a due east direction. The Recovery takes place just prior to completing one orbit at Kapustin Yar. The following discussion identifies a variety of possible test objectives for these operations.

Possibility I - (Fractional) Orbital Bombardment System

Such a system could approach every target on the surface of the earth from any direction. While the information available on these tests is not necessarily in conflict with this objective, the SL-11 launch vehicle, as modified for these tests, does not have the payload carrying capability to carry this payload in a weapon system. With a launch due east, this vehicle thrusts until fuel exhaustion. In order to strike targets in the United States, a launch to the north or south is needed. This reduces the earth rotation advantage inherent in an easterly launch. Therefore, an upgraded or new launch vehicle will be needed to make this system operational. Such a change requires a major launch vehicle-payload integration task.

Contrary Arguments -

1. In the absence of a northward viewing U. S. ABM system, no plausible void exists in the Soviet weapon spectrum which could be filled by a FOBS.
2. The need to substitute a new or modified launch vehicle for operational deployment raises a serious question of why the recent flurry of tests.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 09-75
By isl, NARA, Date 6-4-10

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- 2 -

Possibility II - Low Altitude Ballistic Missile System

Such a system would use an orbital or near-orbital velocity, low 100 n. mile altitude trajectory and then de-orbit as the warhead approaches the target area from the usual minimum-distance trajectory direction. A weapon of this type could evade early detection by BMEWS and thereby reduce the warning time available to the U. S. to launch its counter strike. This would presumably increase the probability of destroying the U. S. missiles while still in their silos.

Contrary Arguments - The need to retro-thrust during the re-entry phase increases the complexity of the vehicle system and the operation, thereby degrading its accuracy, and increasing the probability of missing the target.

Possibility III - A Penetration-Aids Development or Other Warhead Re-entry Development Program

The United States has been conducting an extensive Penetration Aids and Warhead Re-entry Development Programs by launching re-entry test payloads into the highly instrumented Kwajalein complex. The Soviets have no long range test target complex with equivalent instrumentation. Therefore, in order to conduct tests of this type, it may be necessary to bring the test re-entry body all the way around the globe and conduct the actual experimental measurements near the highly instrumented Kapustin Yar launch complex.

Contrary Arguments - Intelligence sources, to my knowledge, have not detected signals which support this possibility. The low altitude of the final phase of the re-entry operation may preclude this detection.

Possibility IV - Earth Re-entry System Development for Lunar Operations

Because of the high northern latitude of the Soviet mainland and the primary lunar tracking and control station in Crimea, the Soviets have an exceedingly difficult problem in their prospective lunar return operation. Because of the particular moon-earth geometry, a ballistic re-entry to earth favors landing in the lower latitudes. A landing in the Soviet Union requires shooting for a very narrow re-entry window. If the window is "over-shot,"


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- 3 -

a retro-fire can save the operation. If the window is "under-shot," the landing will fall short. The footprint of this probable landing area includes the Western Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, and the Soviet mainland to the north. Recent representations by the Soviets to the U. K. and Malagasy Republic indicate that they are concerned with the possibility of an emergency operation in this part of the Indian Ocean.

Contrary Arguments - The signals intercepted during these one-orbit operations indicate that the terminal phase uses instruments similar to or are the same as are being used during the warhead re-entry tests of the conventional ballistic missile systems.

Conclusion - In order for the Soviets to conduct lunar return operations within the constraints imposed on them by geography, the earth-moon geometry, their desire for land recovery in the Soviet mainland, and their restricted access to a global tracking system, I conclude that the most likely possibility is Possibility IV, the development of Earth Re-entry System for Lunar Operations.


Winfred E. Berg

~~SECRET~~

9 Soviet One-Orbit Shots Hint Testing for Warhead Re-Entry

By EVERT CLARK

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 16—The mystery of what the Soviet Union is trying to achieve with a series of one-orbit space shots has deepened since the first flight 13 months ago.

Most analysts here now believe the flights are exploring the techniques of bringing down a nuclear warhead from an orbiting platform.

Until recently there had been considerable disagreement about the purpose of the shots. But the analysts believe they have narrowed down the possible explanations.

Nine shots have been fired in the series since Sept. 17, 1966.

At first, Western experts thought the Soviet Union was attempting to disguise the fact of the flights as well as their purpose. Now, however, they believe the Soviet wants the United States to be aware of the flights, but they do not know why.

Ironically, the Soviet tests would not violate the space treaty put into effect in a White House ceremony last week, even if they are military tests of warhead re-entry techniques.

The treaty, signed by 84 nations, prohibits the stationing in orbit of weapons of mass destruction. But it does

not prohibit the engineering tests necessary to learn how to station weapons in orbit and call them down at will on specific targets.

Nor does the treaty prohibit the explosion of conventional weapons in orbit. While the Russians have not done this in the series of nine single-orbit shots, they might eventually want to do so, to stimulate destruction patterns of a nuclear weapon, some observers here believe.

The treaty does not define "outer space." This task was left to later negotiations. But the treaty is clear on the point that an object is not considered to be in outer space unless it remains in orbit.

Thus the payloads sent aloft in the nine Soviet shots, which have been returned to earth before they completed one cir-

cuit of the earth, would not be subject to limitations of the treaty, even if they were live nuclear weapons.

There is no indication that live weapons, either nuclear or conventional, have been used in the Soviet tests. Experts here point out that it would not be necessary to use live weapons, since dummy warheads could test methods for sending weapons to almost complete orbits and guiding them down to precise targets.

The Soviet flights began with unannounced shots on Sept. 17 and Nov. 2, 1966. Both launching vehicles apparently exploded in orbit, accidentally or on command from the ground.

Since then there have been seven shots, the last on Sept.

22. The Soviet Union announced each of them, disguising them as Cosmos scientific satellites but using an announcement format different enough from that used for ordinary Cosmos satellites to convince Western experts that the difference was intended to call attention to the shots.

The experts here say they will not be certain of the purpose of this test series until some new flight characteristics are exhibited—perhaps a greater number of orbits before re-entry or the use of a larger launching vehicle.

Cosmos Vehicle Orbited

MOSCOW, Oct. 16 (UPI)—The Soviet Union today put into orbit the 182d unmanned satellite in its Cosmos series of space experiments.



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ACTION EUR 20

INFO SP 02, SS 20, GPM 03, SC 01, NSC 10, RSC 01, L 03, H 02, SAH 03, P 04,
USIE 00, CIA 04, INR 07, NSA 02, RSR 01, ACDA 17, MC 01, GDF 01, SCI 05,
AEC 11, NASA 04, /122 W

R 061820Z NOV 67
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5033
INFO SECDEF US MISSION NATO 21
USCINCEUR

UNCLAS ROME 2397

SUBJ: PRESS REACTION: SECDEF'S FOBS DISCLOSURE

JOINT EMBASSY/USIS MESSAGE

1. SECRETARY McNAMARA'S NOV 3 NEWS CONFERENCE RECEIVED PROMINENT COVERAGE IN NOV. 4 PRESS, WITH NO. 5-6 EDITIONS ALSO REPORTING SUBSEQUENT REACTIONS IN US AND UK. ALTHOUGH HEADLINES WERE PREDICTABLY SENSATIONAL, A THOROUGH READING OF MOST PIECES IN RESPONSIBLE PRESS REVEALED REASONABLY ACCURATE REPORTING OF SECDEFJ'S CAREFULLY BALANCED STATEMENTS -- I.E. STORIES INCLUDED REASSURANCES RE OVER-THE-HORIZON RADAR, US NUCLEAR DETERRENT, ETC.

2. INDEPENDENT /CORRIERE DELLA SERA/ REPORTED NOV 5 THAT US

PAGE 2 RUFJAB 2397 UNCLAS
APPEARED MORE CONCERNED OVER IMPLICATION OF NEW ROUND IN NUCLEAR ARMS RACE THAN WHETHER FOBS WOULD DISRUPT PRESENT BALANCE OF

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POWER.

3. IN FRONT PAGE STORY ENTITLED "WASHINGTON'S WARNING TO MOSCOW - IMMEDIATE AMERICAN NUCLEAR REPRISAL IF RUSSIANS PLACE SPACE WEAPON IN ORBIT", CENTER /IL MESSAGGERO/ NOV 5 SAID PURPOSE OF SECDEF'S ANNOUNCEMENT WAS THREEFOLD: A) TO INFORM US AND WORLD PUBLIC OF NEW WEAPON; B) TO FORESTALL PROPAGANDA EFFECT OF MOSCOW'S "IMMINENT" ANNOUNCEMENT; AND C) TO AVOID "PANIC" WHICH MIGHT ENSUE IF SOVIETS DECIDED TO ANNOUNCE THAT SYSTEM WAS ALREADY OPERATIONAL. IN NOV. 4 EDITION, /MESSAGGERO/ SAID SECDEF HAD TRIED TO PLAY DOWN DRAMATIC NATURE OF ANNOUNCEMENT BY "REFUSING" TO CALL SOVIET FOBS EXPERIMENTS A VIOLATION OF OUTER SPACE TREATY.

4. CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC /IL POPOLO/ REPORTED NOV. 4 THAT SOVIETS WERE APPARENTLY PREPARING TO PLACE NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN ORBIT "DESPITE SPACE AGREEMENT".

5. CONSERVATIVE /LA NAZIONE/ NOV 5 TERMED MCNAMARA ANNOUNCEMENT "A HARSH REMINDER OF THE REALITY OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS." IN NOV. 6 LEAD EDITORIAL ENTITLED "MCNAMARA-MYTH AND REALITY",

PAGE 3 RUFJAB 2397 UNCLAS

/NAZIONE/ SUGGESTED US NUCLEAR STRATEGY HAS RELIED TOO STRONGLY ON "SECOND STRIKE" CAPABILITY IN LIGHT OF RECENT INDICATIONS SOVIETS ARE "CLOSING NUCLEAR GAP." EDITORIAL CONCLUDES WITH QUESTION: "IS US DETERRENT STILL CAPABLE OF DISSUADING RUSSIANS FROM THE MAD ADVENTURE OF NUCLEAR WAR?"

6. CENTER-LEFT /LA STAMPA/, BASING ITS INFORMATION ON BRITISH PRESS AND INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES DIRECTOR BUCHAN, REPORTED SOVIET /SPACE BOMB" HAS BEEN TESTED NINE TIMES SINCE SEPT. 1966 DURING "COSMOS" SERIES.

7. WHILE SCARCELY NOTED IN SOCIALIST /AVANTI/, "MCNAMARA'S REVELATIONS", SAID REPUBLICAN /LA VOCE REPUBBLICANA/ ON NOV 5, "CONFIRM THE DRAMATIC URGENCY OF A DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT".

8. COMMUNIST PARTY ORGAN /UNITA/ SAID NOV. 6 "ITU'S HIGH

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TIME THAT THE AMERICAN UNDERSTAND THAT USSR IS CAPABLE OF
RESPONDING TO EVERY ONE OF THEIR NEW MOVES IN THE ARMS
RACE, AND THAT THEY GIVE UP THEIR BOASTFUL CLAIMS OF SUPERIO-
RITY".

REINHARDT

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PAGE 01 BONN 04907 062109Z

80
ACTION EUR 20

INFO USIE 00,P 04,NSA 02,CIA 04,RSC 01,INR 07,DOD 01,SP 02,SS 20,
GPM 03,SC 01,NSC 10,EA 15,RSR 01,1091 W

R 061835Z NOV 67
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5856

BOWLER
BUDGET
DAVIS
FRIED
GINSBURG
HAMILTON
JESSUP
JOHNSON
JORDEN
KEENE X
LENNHART
RUCHE
SHANDERS
TOLSON

UNCLAS BONN 4907
SUBJECT: PRESS REACTION TO SECRETARY McNAMARA'S FRIDAY ANNOUNCEMENT ON FOBS
JOINT EMBASSY/USIS MESSAGE

SECRETARY McNAMARA'S ANNOUNCEMENT, ON FRIDAY, THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS WORKING ON A FACTIONAL ORBIT BOMBING SYSTEM (FOBS) MADE FRONT-PAGE NEWS IN MOST PAPERS AND WAS CARRIED WIDELY ON RADIO AND TELEVISION. IT WAS ALSO THE MAJOR TOPIC FOR EDITORIAL IN MONDAY'S PRESS.

RHEINISCHE POST REFLECTS A FEELING OF UNEASINESS WHICH PERVADES GENERAL EDITORIAL COMMENT. THE PAPER CLAIMS THAT FOUR WEEKS AGO, WHEN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW RATIFIED THE TREATY BARRING THE USE OF SPACE FOR MILITARY PURPOSES, THERE WAS A DEGREE OF RELIEF. TODAY, DESPITE SECRETARY McNAMARA'S ASSURANCES, THERE IS A FEELING OF RENEWED CONCERN. THE PAPER EXPRESSES IT BY

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ASSERTING THAT MANY AMERICANS DO NOT AGREE WITH THE SECRETARY'S ASSURANCES, AND THAT UNREST AND MISTRUST ARE MOUNTING IN THE CONGRESS.
FRANKFURTER NEUE PRESSE BELIEVES THAT "THE CONCERN CREATED BY FOBS IS NOT ALLAYED BY CERTAIN WEAKNESSES ATTRIBUTED BY McNAMARA TO THIS SYSTEM." THE PAPER SEES IN FOBS A MAJOR INCENTIVE TO

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PAGE 02 BONN 04907 062109Z

PUSH AHEAD WITH NPT, BECAUSE NPT MIGHT CONSTITUTE A MAJOR U.S.-SOVIET BRIDGE. BY IMPLICATION FRANKFURTER NEUE PRESSE SUGGESTS THAT IMPROVED U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS ARE THE BEST GUARANTEE AGAINST NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS AS WELL AS THE POTENTIAL NUCLEAR THREAT OF CHINA. BONN'S GENERAL-ANZEIGER TAKES A RATHER PESSIMISTIC NOTE WHEN IT CLAIMS THAT CHANCES FOR SURVIVAL FROM A "SPACE ATTACK" HAVE BEEN REDUCED. THE PAPER COMMENTS THAT MCNAMARA HAD TO ADMIT THAT THE WARNING PERIOD OF A NUCLEAR ATTACK HAD BEEN REDUCED BY FOBS TO THREE MINUTES. GENERAL-ANZEIGER CONCLUDES THAT SHOULD THE FOB SYSTEM MATERIALIZE, CHANCES FOR U.S.-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS ON ABM WILL BE DASHED FOR THE ARGUMENT THAT THE SOVIET FOB WAS ONLY CHINESE-ORIENTED COULD HARDLY BE ACCEPTED AT FACE VALUE IN THE WEST. OF ALL EDITORIALS, THE KOELNER STADT-ANZEIGER IS THE MOST ALARMING. IT SAYS THAT MCNAMARA'S ANNOUNCEMENT "RAISES THE MOST

PAGE3 RUFKC 4907 UNCLAS
ALARMING PERSPECTIVES", AND THE PAPER PESSIMISTICALLY PREDICTS THAT THE SEARCH FOR THE ULTIMATE WEAPON WILL CONTINUE. THE PAPER CONCLUDES THAT IT MAY BE WELL FOR MCNAMARA TO REASSURE AMERICANS, BUT "WE EUROPEANS HAVE EVERY REASON TO BE ALARMED."
MCGHEE

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NEWS RELEASE

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301

PLEASE NOTE DATE

Johnson ⁶

HOLD FOR RELEASE
UNTIL DELIVERY OF ADDRESS
EXPECTED AT 9 AM (MST) - 11 AM (EST)
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1967

NO. 1061-67
OXford 7-3189 (Copies)
OXford 5-3176 (Info.)

ADDRESS BY
HONORABLE ROBERT S. McNAMARA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
AT NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATION BROADCASTERS
FORTY-THIRD CONVENTION
DENVER, COLORADO
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1967 - 9 AM (MST) - 11 AM (EST)

Remarks by Secretary McNamara to the
National Association of Educational Broadcasters
7 November 1967

Ladies and Gentlemen:

I want to talk to you this morning about the unused potential of the Department of Defense -- a potential for contributing to the solution of the social problems wracking our nation.

The Defense Department is the largest single institution in the world: an institution employing directly four and a half million men and women, indirectly employing several million more, and directing the use of nearly 10 percent of the nation's wealth.

The question I want to put to you is this: can these vast resources be used to contribute to our nation's benefit beyond the narrow -- though vitally necessary -- role of military power?

As a basis for exploring this question, I want to describe to you three projects that are currently under way:

- . An Open Housing Program, to break through the barriers of racial discrimination in off-base housing for military personnel.
- . PROJECT 100,000, a program to salvage the poverty-scarred youth of our society at the rate of 100,000 men each year -- first for two years of military service, and then for a lifetime of productive activity in civilian society.
- . And finally, PROJECT TRANSITION, a program to assist the three-quarters of a million men leaving military service each year to select and train for the role in civilian life that will contribute most to their personal fulfillment and to the nation's benefit.

But before discussing these programs, let me make it unmistakably clear that our primary responsibility and our clear mandate from the President and from the Congress is to procure and maintain in a high state of combat readiness whatever military forces are necessary to protect this nation from external attack, keep our commitments to our allies, and support the objectives of our foreign policy.

We are meeting that responsibility.

Since 1961, excluding those forces added because of operations in Vietnam, we have increased our military capability in every essential category:

- . A 45% increase in the number of combat assigned Army divisions -- from 11 to 16.
- . A 73% increase in the funds for general ship construction and conversion to modernize the fleet.

- . A 200% increase in the number of guided missile surface ships -- from 23 to 72.
- . A 300% increase in our inventory of nuclear-powered ships -- from 19 to 77.
- . A 40% increase in the number of Air Force tactical fighter squadrons -- from 67 to 94 -- and a 100% increase in the total payload capability of all our fighter and attack aircraft, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.
- . A 300% increase in helicopter troop lift capability.
- . A 340% increase in our fixed-wing airlift capability -- an increase which will reach 1000% in the 1970s with the introduction of the mammoth new C-5A transport.
- . A 100% increase in the number of nuclear weapons deployed in NATO Europe.
- . A 160% increase in the number and total megatonnage of nuclear weapons in the strategic alert forces.

Nor do these increases tell the full story. We have developed in the past several years a broad new array of weapons which include:

- . The SR-71: a highly sophisticated reconnaissance aircraft that can fly three times the speed of sound.
- . The POSEIDON intercontinental missile which has five to ten times the destructive power of the POLARIS missile it replaces.
- . The MBT-70, a new main battle tank, providing increased firepower, protection and mobility.
- . The CH-54 flying crane: our first heavy-lift helicopter, which has paid for itself many times over in recovering battle-damaged helicopters, as well as performing an expanded range of supply and logistic functions in support of our troops.
- . The family of F-111 aircraft: the most sophisticated and effective attack aircraft in the world today -- and recognized as such by foreign governments who are buying it in preference to aircraft produced in their own countries.

- . The multi-warhead ballistic missile re-entry system which multiplies the effectiveness of our missile force.
- . The WALLEYE guided bomb, which uses a television guidance system, enabling aircraft and conventional explosives to hit targets in Southeast Asia today with extreme accuracy and effectiveness.
- . The LANCE tactical surface-to-surface missile, equipped with both nuclear and non-nuclear warheads, which has greater range, accuracy and reliability than the missiles it will replace.
- . The SPARTAN and SPRINT anti-ballistic missiles which will provide defense against a possible Chinese attack in the 1970s.
- . The PHOENIX air-to-air missile system, providing us with the capability of destroying formations of enemy aircraft in the air at substantially greater distances.
- . The SRAM air-to-surface missile, increasing the effectiveness of our strategic bombers, and enabling us to penetrate advanced enemy defenses.
- . The COBRA attack helicopter, providing faster, more flexible support of our ground troops.
- . The A-7 attack aircraft, giving our Navy and the Air Force an improved capability to support our ground forces, with its greater bomb capacity and longer range.
- . And scores of other weapon systems and sub-systems -- many of them, of course, still highly classified.

Now, obviously, the real test of combat readiness is not simply to have an adequate arsenal of advanced weaponry -- which we have greatly added to over the past six years -- but to be able to respond rapidly and effectively to an emergency.

Such an emergency faced us in the summer of 1965, when it became apparent that Hanoi was on the verge of cutting South Vietnam in half by overwhelming force.

If we in the United States were to prevent that defeat, we had to respond rapidly and effectively.

That is what we did -- and our accomplishments in the face of that emergency are the most realistic measure of our combat readiness.

In the first crucial months of the crisis we moved over 100,000 men to Southeast Asia in 120 days. We supplied them with hundreds of thousands of different items, at the end of a 10,000 mile pipeline -- which at the time had only one deepwater port, and neither roads nor rail line to move the supplies inland.

In those first critical months we saved South Vietnam from complete and final defeat.

Today we are supporting some 600,000 men in Southeast Asia -- at a standard of proficiency never before equalled in the history of warfare -- and we are doing so without wage controls, without price controls, without profit controls -- and indeed without the serious dislocation of the economy that has been the inevitable accompaniment of every other war we have fought in this century.

What is more, we are accomplishing this without calling up our reserve forces; without any significant movement of our men and equipment out of Western Europe; without any important change in our forces in South Korea; and without jeopardizing our ability to meet additional emergencies that might occur elsewhere in the world.

Now, how has all this been possible?

It has been possible because we have met our first and overriding responsibility in the Defense Department: we were, we are, and we will continue to remain in a high state of combat readiness.

Combat readiness is our primary responsibility.

But I want to stress that responsibility is not inconsistent with other goals.

We have been concerned, for example, with obtaining and operating the required level of military power at the lowest possible cost. That goal is clearly sensible in a Department that is spending over \$70 billion per year.

Efficient, economical management does not detract from combat readiness. On the contrary, it strengthens it.

Our defense expenditures today -- even including the full cost of our commitments in Southeast Asia -- constitute a smaller percentage of the Gross National Product than they did in any fiscal year from 1952 through 1959.

That is due in part to the five-year Cost Reduction Program, which we initiated in 1962. Over the five years we saved the taxpayers in excess of 14 billions of dollars. Now that the initial phase has been completed,

we have established the Cost Reduction Program as a permanent annual procedure -- with stated goals and carefully audited results.

As part of reducing costs, we have to date initiated actions to consolidate, reduce, or close over 950 Defense installations or activities -- all over the world -- involving property that has become surplus to foreseeable peacetime or wartime needs.

The base closure program understandably created, in the beginning, a great deal of local apprehension and political pressure. And yet we have not reversed a single base closure decision due to pressure; nor has it been necessary to reopen a single installation to take care of the 25% expansion of our forces which has occurred in the past two years. The recurring annual savings of the base closure program alone, when completed -- including the elimination of 200,000 jobs -- will total \$1.5 billion.

Furthermore, the usual pattern of these base closures is that the local communities -- ultimately -- benefit from the action. Our Office of Economic Adjustment works closely with the community leaders from the day a base closure is announced, and helps explore fully the growth potential of the area.

Now, just as efficient management and cost reduction are not the Defense Department's primary goals -- but are nevertheless entirely consistent with our central responsibility of combat readiness -- so it is becoming clear there are other measures that we can take that benefit the economy, and the social profile of the nation, which are equally consistent with our primary objective.

As I said at the outset, we are currently conducting three programs which are directed toward alleviating certain social inequities in the nation.

First, the Open Housing Program:

Racial discrimination -- granting the great legislative advances that have been achieved in the past six years -- remains a festering infection in our national life.

The Defense Department, beginning with the courageous executive order of President Truman in 1948 integrating the armed services, has been a powerful fulcrum in removing the roadblocks to racial justice -- not merely in the military, but in the country at large.

But clearly the nation's road to equality is still strewn with boulders of bias.

Shortly after I became Secretary of Defense, I asked Mr. Gerhard A. Gesell, a leading member of the bar, to organize a committee to review the progress of equal opportunity in the Armed Forces.

That committee took a hard, realistic look at the problem. It reported that substantial improvement had been made on military bases. But it found that there remained severe off-base discrimination affecting thousands of Negro servicemen and their families. This discrimination was most destructive in the field of housing.

Open housing is a serious issue throughout our society. It is not confined to the Armed Forces. Too many of our citizens cannot live in the homes of their choice, on the streets of their choice, in the neighborhoods of their choice.

But this intolerable racial discrimination affects military personnel even more severely than it does the population at large. The serviceman and his family, on limited compensation and under military orders, must move every few years. While defending their nation, they are singularly defenseless against this bigotry.

My response to the Gesell Committee findings was to issue a directive incorporating its recommendations. Commanders everywhere were asked to organize voluntary programs to eliminate housing discrimination in the communities surrounding their bases.

In the Pentagon we turned our minds to other problems.

Early this year we reviewed the results of that four-year-old directive. We sent teams to a dozen bases to look into every aspect of equal opportunity. A special task force was set up for the greater Washington area. Seventeen thousand service families were surveyed. Their answers were analyzed.

One fact became painfully clear. Our voluntary program had failed, and failed miserably.

This failure we found intolerable. I put the matter to you bluntly: our nation should not, and will not, ask a Negro sergeant, for example, to risk his life, day after dangerous day, in the heat and hardship of a jungle war; and then bring him home and compel him to remain separated from his wife and his children because of the hate and prejudice that parades under the pomposity of racial superiority.

And yet, that is precisely what has been happening in this country.

The color of the blood that our men shed in the defense of Asia is all the same shade.

But when these men return home, it is not the color of their blood that matters: it is the color of their skin.

There are thousands of our Negro troops, returning from Vietnam, who are being discriminated against in off-base housing. When there is adequate housing on the base, Negro men in uniform are treated as all Americans should be treated. When there is not, and the Negro must depend on the civilian community for housing, he all too often is denied this equality of treatment.

Because of his color he suffers a penalty; his family suffers a penalty; and our national security suffers a penalty because of the impaired morale of our fighting forces.

We are talking here about a group of men who have distinguished themselves in the service of their nation. It is a fact that Negroes often volunteer for the most difficult and hazardous assignments. It is a fact that 20 percent of Army deaths in Vietnam last year were Negroes.

Earlier this year, in a visit to his home State of South Carolina, General Westmoreland paid tribute to the superb performance of these men.

"I say to the people of my native State and my country," the General noted, "that the performance of the Negro serviceman has been particularly inspirational to me. He has served with distinction equal to that of his white comrade in arms. The Negro serviceman, like all servicemen, has been a credit to our country. He has been courageous on the battlefield, proficient in a cross section of technical skills. Like his white colleague, he understands what the war is all about, he is loyal to his country and supports its policies, and is carrying out his responsibilities with a sense of responsibility."

The Negro serviceman has been loyal and responsible to his country. But the people of his country have failed in their loyalty and responsibility to him. The country which sent him to hazardous duty abroad refuses to permit him to live in the midst of the white civilian community when he returns.

Our original voluntary program to correct off-base housing discrimination floundered and fell apart. It lacked sufficient leadership from the top -- starting with me, and going right on down through the senior echelon of the Defense establishment. And it lacked appropriately stiff sanctions for the violation of our anti-discrimination policy.

We have forged, therefore, a whole new set of tools to deal with this failure.

We have mapped out a two-pronged campaign. The first phase was to compile a nation-wide census of open off-base rental housing for military personnel. That we have completed.

The second phase is to mobilize -- throughout the entire country -- effective community support for non-discriminatory military off-base housing. That is now well under way.

We selected the greater Washington metropolitan area, including Maryland and Virginia, as our first objective. We wanted to make the area surrounding the nation's capital a model program -- as it should be -- and we wanted to learn quickly all the lessons we could that would assist us in the country at large.

Officials from the highest levels of the Defense Department -- the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries, and senior commanders -- met with realtors and landlords of the area and put the matter to them squarely.

The extent of off-base housing discrimination was appalling. The morale of our Negro servicemen and their families was being severely eroded. We told the landlords the Defense Department could no longer tolerate the situation.

We appealed to the landlords for voluntary compliance with our non-discriminatory housing policy.

But we pointed out that the situation as it stood was so unjust that, whether we secured their voluntary compliance or not, we simply could not permit the conditions to continue. If, then, the landlords felt they would not or could not comply, we were going to have to prohibit any of our men -- regardless of their race -- from signing rental agreements in housing units where such discrimination was practiced.

Many proprietors complied voluntarily. Too many did not.

Let me say that in many instances their position -- while shortsighted -- was understandable. Some faced genuine economic pressures.

In any event, they did not comply. And so we were compelled to take the only action open to us. We prohibited all military personnel, both white and Negro, from signing new leases or rental agreements in their facilities.

This had the effect of applying a countervailing economic pressure, and our open housing program took on an altogether new and positive direction.

In Northern Virginia and Maryland, within 120 days, we more than trebled the number of non-discriminatory units -- from about 15,000 to 53,000 units.

Now we are at work elsewhere throughout the nation. We have, for example, an intensified program going on in California at the moment. We are giving particular emphasis to this State, not merely because of the large number of

Defense installations and military personnel there; but because of the 14 states with open housing regulations and laws, California has the lowest percentage of apartment facilities open to all races.

Indeed, we have plans to extend the program in a dozen additional states in the near future.

Everywhere our approach will be the same. We will survey the local situation of each military base. We will meet with the realtors and landlords and explain the problem fully. We will request their cooperation and seek their voluntary compliance. We will do everything possible to see that our military families act as good tenants: that they pay their obligations promptly, and that they respect the property of private owners. We will enlist the help of local and State officials. And only when, and if, all other actions fail, will we apply the appropriate sanctions.

I want to emphasize that I am fully aware that the Defense Department is not a philanthropic foundation or a social-welfare institution. But I want to emphasize just as strongly that I do not propose to let our Negro servicemen and their families continue to suffer the injustices and indignities they have in the past.

It is said that there are no atheists in foxholes. I can assure you that in South Vietnam there is no segregation in foxholes.

There is no segregation of our servicemen in on-base housing.

And the Defense Department cannot tolerate segregation of our servicemen in off-base housing.

Where we must use stiff sanctions, we will.

What we prefer, hope for, and expect is an overwhelming measure of voluntary compliance.

Now let me discuss with you for a moment our second program in the social field. It is called PROJECT 100,000, and I first announced it in a speech in New York in August of last year.

I pointed out, at the time, that though there were roughly 1.8 million young men reaching military service age each year in the United States, some 600,000 -- a full third -- were failing to qualify under our draft standards. Some had medical problems, but I was particularly concerned about those thousands who failed because of educational deficiencies.

In some areas, the failure rate for draftees ran as high as 60 percent; and for Negroes in some states it exceeded 80 percent.

What this clearly meant was that the burden of military service was not being shouldered equally. Inequities were serious: inequities by region; inequities by race; and inequities by educational level.

What was even worse was the obvious implication. If so massive a number of our young men were educationally unqualified for even the least complicated tasks of military service, how could they reasonably be expected to lead productive and rewarding lives in an increasingly technological and highly-skilled society?

Our studies confirmed that a great number of these draft rejectees were the hapless and hopeless victims of poverty: a poverty that is not the mere absence of American middle-class affluence, but something infinitely more complex: a corrosive and decaying mix of social, educational, and environmental deprivation.

What these men badly need is a sense of personal achievement -- a sense of succeeding at some task -- a sense of their own intrinsic potential.

They have potential, but the slow and silent poison of the poverty virus has paralyzed it in many of them. They have grown up in an atmosphere of drift and discouragement. It is not simply the sometimes squalid ghettos of their external environment that has debilitated them -- but an internal and more destructive ghetto of personal disillusionment and despair: a ghetto of the human spirit.

Poverty in America pockmarks its victims inwardly.

If unchecked and unreversed, that inner ghetto of the poverty-scarred personality of these men can fester into explosive frustrations of bitterness and violence.

Chronic failures in school throughout their childhood, they are destined to a downward spiral of defeat and decay in a skill-oriented nation that requires from its manpower pool an increasing index of competence, discipline, and self-confidence.

Poverty destines thousands of young men today to a dismal future. Destines them, yes. But dooms them, no.

These young men -- and they are typified by those who in the past have failed to qualify for military service due to educational deficiencies -- can be saved from that futile future. They can be rehabilitated, both inwardly and out. They are men, we concluded, who given the benefits of the Defense Department's experience in educational innovation and on-the-job training, and placed in an atmosphere of high motivation and morale, could be transformed

into competent military personnel. Beyond that, after their tour of duty they could return to civilian life -- equipped with new skills and attitudes -- and thus break out of the self-perpetrating poverty cycle.

The Defense Department is the world's largest producer of skilled men. We provide enlisted men with highly professional training in 1,500 different skills, in more than 2,000 separate courses. And each year we return about three-quarters of a million men to the nation's manpower pool.

The goal of PROJECT 100,000 was, therefore, to take in 40,000 rejectees the first year, and 100,000 each year thereafter. The program completed its first year on September 30.

I want to report to you on its progress.

Our goal was to take 40,000 men; we took 49,000.

They entered all of the services: Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Marine Corps.

Now, what sort of backgrounds do these men come from? About 60 percent are whites; about 40 percent Negroes. Their average age is 21. Thirty percent of them are unemployed at the time they come to us, and an additional 26 percent are earning less than \$60 a week.

What this means is that more than half of these men are gripped in poverty. Nor is that surprising. Their average reading score is a bare sixth-grade level; and 14 percent of them read at a third-grade level or less. Many are poorly motivated when they reach us. They lack initiative. They lack pride. They lack ambition.

If nothing were done to give them a strong sense of their own worth and potential, they, their wives and their children would almost inevitably be the unproductive recipients of some form of the dole 10 years from now.

I want to repeat: we have taken these men into the service because we are convinced that, given the proper environment and training, they can contribute just as much to the defense of their country as men from the more advantaged segments of our society.

Has that belief been borne out by the facts?

We now have had a full year's experience with this program, and let me tell you the results.

Ninety-eight percent of our traditional categories of recruits successfully graduated from basic training during the year. And the successful graduation rate of these 49,000 new category men was 96 percent -- only two percentage points less than our traditional recruits.

I have insisted that these men should never be singled-out or stigmatized as a special group. Technically -- and for our own internal record-keeping -- men who would have formerly been draft rejectees are termed New Standards men. But the men themselves are never informed that they are in this category.

It is absolutely imperative that they believe in themselves and their own potential. They obviously cannot do that if we treat them with anything remotely suggesting condescendence.

The plain fact is that our PROJECT 100,000 is succeeding beyond even our most hopeful expectations. Many of our commanders report that these men are turning out to be even more highly motivated than some servicemen with a much more privileged background.

Now these are the initial results, and we are immensely encouraged. But obviously the real test is going to come later, when these men move back into civilian society. How will they fare then?

Will the vital sense of achievement and self-confidence they have experienced in their military service, as well as the skills they have learned, move them forward in society -- or will they return to the depressing downward-spiraling, poverty-in-the-midst-of-plenty phenomenon that plagues our urban ghettos and our rural pockets of economic stagnation?

We cannot say for certain. But we intend to find out.

We are launching a careful follow-up study to test conclusively the ultimate outcome of PROJECT 100,000. At least a decade of careful measurement of the performance of the men both in and out of the service will be required. We won't know until the end of that period what the definitive study will prove. But I am willing to make a prediction. I am convinced that the PROJECT 100,000 men will continue to do a fully creditable job in the service; and that on return to civilian life, their earning capacity -- and their over-all achievement in society -- will be two or three times what it would have been had there been no such program, and had they remained rejectees.

Hundreds of thousands of men can be salvaged from the blight of poverty, and the Defense Department -- with no detriment whatever to its primary role -- is particularly well equipped to salvage them.

We not only can do it. We are doing it. And the benefit to our society -- and to the ultimate roots of our security -- will be immense.

Now, let me describe to you briefly our third program in this field. We call it PROJECT TRANSITION.

As I mentioned, we return some 750,000 men from the services annually to civilian life. Some of these men can move readily into civilian jobs without difficulty, but a significant number of them are faced with genuine problems.

We surveyed the situation, and found that some 50 percent of the men about to leave the services need and want some degree of help to make the transition to a productive civilian life.

To provide that help, we have created a voluntary program -- PROJECT TRANSITION -- for men with 30 to 180 days of service time remaining. The project gives priority to certain groups: to those disabled in battle; to those with no previous civilian occupation; to combat arms servicemen with no civilian-related skill; to those who have such a skill, but who require additional training or upgrading; and finally to those who desire a completely new civilian skill, regardless of their current training status.

The program meets four basic needs of the man leaving the service: counseling, skill enhancement, education, and job placement.

We now have pilot programs -- for each of the services -- at five bases. I can report to you today that within sixty days PROJECT TRANSITION will be in operation at all eighty of the major installations in this country.

We have enlisted the cooperation of other federal agencies -- the Labor Department, HEW, the Postal Service -- as well as a number of State and local agencies that can assist with training, and offer employment to these men. A number of police departments around the nation, for example, are participating, not only with professional advice and technical assistance but with solid job offers as well.

Though the program is still in its pilot stage, it clearly has tremendous potential, and industrial leaders throughout the nation have already expressed enthusiasm for the idea. Further, the Ford Foundation has offered to work closely with us in solving the problems connected with placing the right veteran in the right job.

We are going to be able to give the returning Negro veteran -- particularly the Negro veteran who without help might be compelled to drift back into the stagnation of the urban ghetto -- an opportunity for valuable training and satisfying employment.

Every veteran -- regardless of color, creed, or class -- who has served his country in the Armed Forces deserves the opportunity to move back usefully and productively into civilian life. PROJECT TRANSITION will help give him the opportunity.

I think the point we must realize is this. There is no question but that the economic, social, and educational legislation of the current period eventually will transform American society immensely for the better.

But the very magnitude of the task will require a decade or two for the full effects to be felt.

This means that the present generation of the under-privileged youth of all races, caught in the self-perpetuating trap of poverty, are in danger of being left out of these eventual benefits.

The President has made clear that the United States cannot be satisfied with that situation. We must find ways to assist people now -- even before our present legislation can reach its full potential for economic and social improvement.

This is manifestly a national responsibility -- not primarily a Department of Defense responsibility.

Our primary responsibility -- to repeat -- is the security of this nation. But in the ultimate analysis, the foundation of that security is a stabile social structure. I suggest to you that the Defense Department can find ways to contribute to the development of such a structure without compromising the combat readiness of its forces.

The three social programs I have described to you today are the kinds of programs that will bolster the security of this nation. They are the kinds of programs that will reduce the criticism, some of it justified, that we are often bludgeoned with internationally: criticism that grows out of the discrepancy between our traditional preaching of the principles of liberty and equality -- and our obvious lapses in the practice of those two bedrock constitutional guarantees. They are partial answers to the basic question: can our present American society afford to meet simultaneously its responsibilities both at home and abroad?

Can we continue to meet our commitments to contain aggression internationally, and at the same time take the measures necessary to cure our urban and racial ills here at home?

I say definitively that we can.

This nation is immensely powerful -- both in material and human resources.

Our current Defense expenditures -- as heavy as they are -- are only 9 percent of the GNP. That is a lesser percentage of the GNP than defense spending in most of the years of the 1950s. The taxes we pay today are billions of dollars less than the taxes we would be paying under the tax rates of the 1950s. The modest surcharge that the President is recommending -- and which makes eminent sense in our highly charged economy -- will represent a recision of less than half of the tax cuts this Administration has achieved.

And yet, we appear to believe that we cannot afford to achieve all that genuinely needs achieving.

We appear to believe that we are stretching our resources too thinly.

We appear to believe that we cannot simultaneously wage war against aggression abroad, and a war against poverty, urban decay, and social injustice here at home.

That we cannot afford it is a myth.

That we may choose not to attempt it, is another matter entirely.

But if we make that choice, let us make it deliberately and rationally.

Let us not make that choice because of a mere mythology -- the mythology that America is not strong enough to do all that needs doing.

We are strong enough materially and technologically. We do have the resources in both money and manpower.

What we may lack is the will power.

If we do lack it, so be it. But let that be our conscious choice. Let us face the issues honestly, and admit to ourselves that we simply do not want to make the effort.

Let us not blame the lack of effort on the myth that we cannot do all that needs doing.

For the fact is, we can.

We can curb aggression abroad. And we can meet our pressing social problems here at home. And we can do both at the same time if we will use wisely existing institutions and available resources.

The simple question is this: do we have the requisite faith in ourselves?

Do we have the requisite confidence in our constitutional objectives?

Do we have the requisite resolve to complete the achievements that the United States was founded less than 200 years ago to secure?

I, for one, say we do.

Ladies and Gentlemen, what say you?

Thank you, and good morning.

E N D

SOVIET FOBS (FRACTIONAL ORBIT BOMBARDMENT SYSTEM)

QUESTION: Are you concerned by the new military threat posed by the Soviet FOBS development, which was recently announced by Secretary McNamara; and does the Soviet testing of this system constitute a violation of the Outer Space Treaty?

ANSWER: I am naturally concerned about the possible implications of any Soviet commitment to a major new military system. However, as Secretary McNamara has already explained in detail, the Soviet FOBS development does not really pose a new threat or alter the present military balance. I believe it important to recognize that the fact that something is different does not make it good or the fact that something has been done by the Soviets dictate that we should follow their lead.

The Soviet testing of FOBS does not represent a violation of the Outer Space Treaty. The treaty was clearly designed to prohibit the carrying of nuclear weapons in orbit around the earth. The treaty does not prohibit the development or testing of systems that might be capable of carrying nuclear weapons. There is no evidence that the Soviet FOBS have carried nuclear weapons. Moreover, the treaty was not intended to cover systems such as ICBMs or FOBS that are not in full orbit around the earth.

PAO: Mr. Pettus

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Page 2 Airgram
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desire to decrease American numerical superiority in nuclear capacity. In rather convoluted reasoning, Kenneth Gatland, Sunday Telegraph Space Correspondent, opined that the FOB is really part of a Soviet political-economic war to "again force America to spend heavily on new complex defenses." By Monday, press was covering ramifications of FOB, especially repercussions in US. Noteworthy is Daily Telegraph's report that RAF had known about FOB for six years.

The first editorial comment appeared Monday. The Daily Telegraph editorial saw McNamara's announcement as a move to limit "already severe pressure on him to out-build the Russians in every aspect of the nuclear arms race." This editorial was most sympathetic toward the American Government, terming it "a model of patience and restraint," but suggested that Russia is playing a dangerous poker game in the nuclear weaponry field.

The theme that Russia is trying to cut down the US lead in nuclear weaponry again occurs in a rather detached editorial in Monday's Guardian. Although somewhat critical of the Russians, most of the editorial outlines the facts of the nuclear weapons race in general and the FOB in particular. The editor does believe that, since the 1962 missile crisis, the Russians have been committed to catching up with the US "by building enough long-range missiles and by developing new weapons, such as the orbital bomb," but the editor also remarks "how much more constructive, in retrospect, would have been a committed attempt to secure agreed nuclear disarmament."

Articles enclosed.

BRUCE

Enclosures: As stated

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GUARDIAN, November 6, 1967

American argument over space bombs

✓ From RICHARD SCOTT: Washington, November 5

Congress, which is already deeply critical of Mr McNamara for failing to match the Soviet antiballistic missile defence, is liable to be equally critical of his reluctance to provide the US with a new space missile comparable to that which he announced on Friday the Russians are now developing.

Senator Jackson opens a hearing tomorrow on the subject of offensive and defensive missiles, and he has said that this will include an inquiry into the new Soviet space bomb. He personally believes that, by this development, the Russians have violated at least the spirit, if not the substance, of the international agreement banning the putting of nuclear weapons in orbit around the earth.

Mr McNamara, however, surprised some people on Friday by saying that the Soviet project would not violate the treaty because the new weapons would presumably only make a partial orbit of the earth. He did, however, admit that the missile would be capable of making several orbits of the earth before being directed on to its target.

Different route

The new Soviet weapon was labelled by Mr McNamara a "fractional orbital bombardment system" (FOBS). It would differ from an intercontinental ballistic missile in reaching a height of up to 100 miles, as opposed to some 800 miles for an ICBM. It would thus evade most existing US radar screens. It would also approach the US from the South, after flying three-quarters of the way round

the earth, instead of over the North Pole, as would a Soviet or Chinese ICBM.

The new Soviet missile or orbital bomb would, according to Mr McNamara, be considerably less accurate than an ICBM, and would carry a smaller payload. It could conceivably be in operation next year.

The US itself contemplated development of a similar weapon several years ago but decided that it was not necessary. Mr McNamara clearly still takes that view even after the Russians have gone ahead with the development of their FOBS. He said on Friday that the US could develop an orbiting weapon "at any time for relatively rapid deployment" but that "we have no intention of revising the decision made years ago."

The over-the-horizon radar, which the US has already begun to use operationally and which will be fully operational next year, should be able to give at least a three-minute, 500-mile warning of the approach of a Soviet FOBS. Mr McNamara does not believe that the development of this new Soviet weapon affects the continued ability of the US to absorb a surprise Soviet attack and still to be able to retaliate on such a scale as to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union.

New problems

In other words, the American nuclear deterrents, on which the US ultimately depends for its security, has not, in Mr McNamara's view, been affected by the development of the Soviet FOBS. But Congress is likely to think differently and so are the US military leaders.

Senator Jackson has already said that in his view this latest Soviet development "has opened up a whole new dimension of problems." Once again Mr McNamara is likely to be under lively attack in Congress when Senator Jackson's committee begins its hearings tomorrow.

The US has been monitoring and assessing the significance of 11 Soviet space shots during the past 13 months which are now related to the development of the FOBS. Mr McNamara believes the Russians intend to use their FOBS primarily against US strategic bomber bases. They would not be accurate enough to use against hardened US ICBM sites.

UNCLASSIFIED

GUARDIAN, November 6, 1967

✓ Russian ingenuity misapplied

Anything called a "fractional orbital bomb system" is an abomination anyway. It is a new weapon in the nuclear armoury, and Mr McNamara says that the Russians are developing it. Whether he announced it to steal the Russians' own thunder or to stifle his critics in Congress is unclear. Either way he took care to indicate that it did not at present alter the strategic balance—which probably it does not. The United States has gone to great expense to make its "second strike" effective. Its missiles on land are widely dispersed over the North American continent, and most of them are in hardened silos. Its missiles at sea, in the Polaris fleet, are beyond reach of any known Soviet detection and attack. Add to this the vast American numerical superiority—at least two to one in land-based intercontinental missiles and probably ten to one in operational sea-based missiles—and the American power of counter-attack is plain. Even a massive surprise attack on the United States cannot at present save the attacker from appalling retaliation.

Nevertheless an orbital bomb, if it has been developed, is a technical achievement. The system Mr McNamara mentioned is not for a weapon that remains in orbit for a long period. It is instead one that normally goes not more than half way round, or one and a half times round, the world. Its value, compared with the intercontinental ballistic missiles now in general service, is that it is more difficult to detect. It flies lower—only 100 miles instead of some 800 miles into space—and it can approach its target from almost any direction. It appears likely, however, to be less accurate than known ballistic missiles. Partly because it flies lower, it cannot be checked and controlled so readily from the launching country. In time, no doubt, means will be found to perfect its performance—either by tracking and control from vessels at sea or by improved "over the horizon" radar. But in that time, judging by

current progress, counter-measures will also have improved. All this is being achieved at enormous cost. Whether it is politically or strategically worthwhile is questionable. Part of Mr McNamara's case to Congress is that the United States must choose wisely where to concentrate its resources.

The announcement comes just when the Soviet Union is celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution. In those fifty years the equipment and competence of the Soviet armed forces has been transformed. Some of the greatest changes have come since the war. In 1945 the Russians had virtually no long-range air force. They began to build one only in 1946. Even then—as Mr Malcolm Mackintosh sets out in the concluding chapters of "Juggernaut," a history of the Soviet forces published by Secker and Warburg at three guineas—Stalin's outdated thinking delayed reform. Stalin died in 1953; and in 1957, just ten years ago, the Russians tested their first intercontinental rocket and their first sputnik in space. Since then the Strategic Rocket Forces have become the senior arm of the Soviet forces.

The new orbital bomb raises an echo of the Cuban crisis of 1962. Because of Russia's inferiority in strategic weapons, Mr Khrushchev sought in the autumn of 1962 to establish a missile base in Cuba. From there medium-range missiles could have dominated the south-east of the United States and up into the Middle West, where America's strength in intercontinental missiles was then located. President Kennedy's determination stopped Mr Khrushchev. From then on the Russian strategists knew that they must catch up by building enough long-range missiles and by developing new weapons, such as the orbital bomb. How much more constructive, in retrospect, would have been a committed attempt to secure agreed nuclear disarmament.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DAILY TELEGRAPH, November 6, 1967

ATOMIC POKER

Mr. McNAMARA was not just being a spoilsport when, by disclosing that Russia would soon have an orbital bomb, he stole some of the thunder which the Kremlin was keeping up its sleeve for release with maximum effect at home and abroad at tomorrow's celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the Revolution. His aim was to prevent sudden consternation in America and a resulting increase in the already severe pressure on him to out-build the Russians in every aspect of the nuclear arms race that they care to initiate.

The non-Communist world has paid generous tributes to the achievements of the Revolution, often with lavish and indiscriminate use of romantic propaganda material supplied by the Russian Government. That menacing military displays, with increasing emphasis on atomic sabre-rattling, play the major part in Communist celebrations is so normal that they arouse far less alarm and interest than they should. Those not versed in Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist dialectics find it difficult to reconcile this with the Communist claim to be "peace-loving" while the capitalists are "warmongers."

Yet Governments of democratic countries have to take these actions of the Communist States at their face value; there is certainly nothing in the record of Communist expansion since the war, or in the Communist creed, to justify their doing otherwise. They are driven to look to their own defences while doing everything in their power to persuade the Russian leaders of the mutually ruinous and potentially destructive nature of the arms race.

The American Government, on whom the main burden falls, has been a model of patience and restraint. When Mr. KHRUSCHEV boasted of his 50 megaton bomb, Mr. McNAMARA dismissed this as pointless over-killing. Not until Russia had been building an anti-missile screen for three years did America—after fruitless appeals to Russia to avoid mutual escalation—begin building a limited screen. Mr. McNAMARA now asserts that defences against the special characteristics of the orbital bomb will be ready in time, and that it has many limitations. Yet Russia's continual pressure and the fresh evidence last week of her remarkable progress in rocketry are disconcerting. Is she trying to force America to economise by quitting Vietnam? Or to lick the American taxpayer? Or to build up a bargaining position for an arms limitation deal? One hopes, the latter. But she had better not delay too long, or overbid, in such an apocalyptic poker game.

UNCLASSIFIED

*file Room in
Orbit Johnson 9*

U.N. (TOPS 14)

UNITED NATIONS (AP)--A RESOLUTION OUTLAWING THE ORBITING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN OUTER SPACE WAS APPROVED UNANIMOUSLY TODAY BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S MAIN POLITICAL COMMITTEE.

THE PROPOSAL--SPONSORED BY THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION AND 15 OTHER COUNTRIES--NOW GOES TO THE 111-NATION ASSEMBLY ITSELF WHERE APPROVAL IS EXPECTED TOMORROW.

WHILE THE U.N. ACTION IS NOT LEGALLY BINDING, IT IS REGARDED AS A MORAL OBLIGATION SINCE THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION DRAFTED THE PLAN AND VOTED FOR IT.

ACTUALLY IT IS IN THE FORM OF AN APPEAL TO ALL COUNTRIES TO REFRAIN FROM PLACING IN ORBIT OBJECTS CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR ANY WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, OR FROM INSTALLING SUCH WEAPONS IN OUTER SPACE IN ANY MANNER.

LTNOON 10/16

*also the news
article in NY Times.*

U.N. ACTS TO BAR ARMS IN SPACE

Political Committee Adopts
Resolution Unanimously

By SAM POPE BREWER
Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Oct. 16—The General Assembly's Political Committee approved unanimously today a 17-nation resolution to prohibit weapons of mass destruction in space.

The agreement, originally reached by the United States and the Soviet Union as the only nations capable at present of orbiting such weapons, produced an unusual atmosphere of relief and almost jubilation in the committee.

The accelerated procedure adopted will put the resolution before the General Assembly for ratification tomorrow morning.

Representatives of 10 countries spoke briefly in enthusiastic support of the resolution. They were led off by those of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Hiroshi Hitomi of Japan made a strong plea for unanimous support. He said that though the resolution did not have the binding effect of a treaty, it was "an important step toward establishment of a peaceful and rational regime in outer space."

Formal Vote Waived

As the speakers finished, the committee chairman, Carl W. A. Schurmann of the Netherlands, said: "We are all so happy about this resolution that it will not be necessary to take a formal vote."

He asked whether there were any objections to this procedure, paused for an answer, and said that he considered it adopted. There was thunderous applause.

"The resolution has been unanimously adopted by acclamation," the chairman announced.

France had not joined with the other members of the 18-nation Disarmament Committee in sponsoring the resolution, but her chief delegate, Roger Seydoux, joined in the applause for the decision. He said later that if there was a rollcall tomorrow, France would vote for the resolution.

The resolution was described by Adlai E. Stevenson of the United States in a brief speech as "a simple one." He noted that "it does not require the cessation by governments of any present activity."

Mr. Stevenson remarked that governments simply "undertake to refrain from developing a new potential in the armaments field." He added: "Certainly it would seem easier not to arm an environment that has never been armed than to agree to disarm areas which have been armed." The text "welcomes" the expression by the United States

and the Soviet Union, announced Oct. 3, that they would not station weapons of mass destruction in space.

It "solemnly calls upon all states to refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any objects containing nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner."

To cover all possibilities, the resolution also calls on all countries to refrain from "causing, encouraging or in any way participating in the conduct of the foregoing activities."

Mr. Schurmann remarked as he opened the meeting that it was a "happy coincidence" that the agreement came as two Soviet cosmonauts, Lieut. Col. Yuri A. Gagarin and Capt. Valentina Tereshkova, were visiting the United Nations.

The importance attached to the resolution was shown by the Political Committee's action in setting aside its agreed agenda to take up the matter. It is also being put at the head of the General Assembly's calendar tomorrow.

The resolution will be taken up when President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon finishes an address to the Assembly, which is due to begin at 11 A. M.

Mr. Stevenson called the resolution "another decisive advance in the disarmament process" and "a positive step toward the goal of disarmament."

Nikolai T. Fedorenko of the Soviet Union told the committee that through the signing of the treaty for a partial test ban "a favorable atmosphere has been created for further steps toward disarmament and toward solving other problems awaiting solution."

"It is beyond doubt," he added, "that the adoption of this draft resolution will be another step in relaxing international tensions and improving relations between peoples."



United Press International
HAILS WEAPONS BAN
Carl W. A. Schurmann, the chairman of Political Committee of General Assembly.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5608
Johnson
10

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

October 10, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS

SUBJECT: Draft General Assembly Resolution and
Statement on Bombs in Orbit

With reference to the October 8 meeting of the Committee of Principals, I am forwarding herewith for your comment or concurrence drafts of a General Assembly resolution and an accompanying statement to be made in connection with adoption of the resolution. The drafts are similar to those presented under Tab B of my memorandum of October 4 for the Principals but have been revised in the light of further discussions within ACDA and the Department of State subsequent to the meeting of the Principals.

We have used the term "weapons of mass destruction" in the draft resolution on the basis of the understanding reached at the Principals' meeting that it would have to be interpreted as covering all nuclear weapons. Since that interpretation is contemplated, we believe that we could refer specifically to "nuclear weapons" should the Soviet Union prefer that approach.

The reference to "additional assurance" in the last paragraph of the statement is intended to provide a basis in the public record for re-opening the question of verification should we desire to do so at a future time. The reference to "extraordinary events" is designed to provide a basis for withdrawal should that become necessary.

I would appreciate it if Mr. Gathright (Code 182, Ext. 2952) could be notified promptly by your staff of any further comments or concurrences.

WCF
William C. Foster

Enclosures: Draft of General Assembly Resolution Draft of
U. S.

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GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4
By CB, NARA, Date 10-13-93

1170

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT GA RESOLUTION

The General Assembly,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 1721 (XVI) which expressed the belief that the exploration and use of outer space should be only for the betterment of mankind,

Determined to take steps to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space,

Welcoming the expressed intentions of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics not to station any weapons of mass destruction in outer space,

Solemnly appeals to all states:

1. To refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any weapons of mass destruction, installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner,
2. To refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in such activities.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cbm/4, NARA, Date 12-11-08

CONFIDENTIAL

INSERT FOR STATEMENT TO BE MADE IN
GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN CONNECTION WITH
ADOPTION OF RESOLUTION

On September 5, 1962, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Gilpatric, made the following statement of U. S. intentions respecting the placing in orbit of weapons of mass destruction:

"Today there is no doubt that either the United States or the Soviet Union could place thermo-nuclear weapons in orbit, but such an action is just not a rational military strategy for either side for the foreseeable future.

"We have no program to place any weapons of mass destruction into orbit. An arms race in space will not contribute to our security. I can think of no greater stimulus for a Soviet thermonuclear arms effort in space than United States commitment to such a program. This we will not do.

"At the same time that we are pursuing cooperative scientific efforts in space through the United Nations and otherwise, we will of course take such steps as are necessary to defend ourselves and our allies, if the Soviet Union forces us to do so. This is in accordance with the inalienable right of self-defense confirmed in the United Nations charter."

Our policy in this regard was made clear to the United Nations by Senator Albert Gore speaking as U. S. Representative to the First Committee on December 3, 1962. On September 20, 1963, President Kennedy reaffirmed our intention to keep weapons of mass destruction out of orbit.

Since that time, we have met with the representatives of the Soviet Union on this problem. We are glad that the intentions of the Soviet Union in this regard are the same as our own, and I am happy to report that the resolution which is before the Assembly has the support of both Governments.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By Chm/j, NARA, Date 12-11-08

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- 2--

Speaking on behalf of the United States, let me say what has been said many times before: the United States has no intention of placing in orbit around the earth any weapons of mass destruction, of installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or of stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner. The United States intends to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in such activities.

We all recognize that it is not possible to foresee today all events which may at a future time occur in the newly emerging field of space technology and in the exploration and use of outer space. Nor can we foresee fully the outcome of continuing efforts to achieve disarmament. Should events as yet unforeseen dictate the need for additional assurance against the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space, we would seek such additional assurance as might then be required. We would inform the U. N. should extraordinary events occur which would affect this matter.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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William C. Foster

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DECLASSIFIED

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By ab, NARA, Date 10-13-93

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108

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By clm/ly NARA, Date 12-11-08

1170

106

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By clm/ly NARA, Date 12-11-08

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- 2--

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED NATIONS--ADD NUCLEAR SATELLITES (7)

U.S. DIPLOMATS SAID TODAY THEY EXPECT THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA WILL SOON FOLLOW THROUGH WITH A FORMAL PUBLIC DECLARATION AGAINST ORBITING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THEY PREDICTED IT WOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT TO WORK OUT AN AGREED WORDING. THEY GAVE THIS EXPLANATION:

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION WILL BE THE ONLY NATIONS MAKING THE PLEDGE NOW BECAUSE THEY ARE THE ONLY POWERS ABLE TO SEND OBJECTS INTO ORBIT. OTHER STATES CAN JOIN AS THEY GAIN CAPABILITY FOR SPACE SHOTS.

A FULL-FLEDGED TREATY WOULD NOT DO BECAUSE IT COULD NOT BE POLICED. NEITHER NATION IS READY TO LET THE OTHER'S INSPECTORS SEE WHAT IS INSIDE AN OBJECT WHIRLING IN SPACE.

A PUBLIC PROMISE WILL BE SUITABLE BECAUSE, ACCORDING TO U.S. MILITARY OPINION, AN ORBITING WEAPON WOULD HAVE LITTLE MILITARY PURPOSE. EARTH-BASED MISSILES ARE MUCH MORE EFFICIENT.

THE NATION WHICH ORBITED A MASS-DESTRUCTION WEAPON WOULD HAVE A
PRIMARYLY PSYCHOLOGICAL AIM--TO THREATEN OTHERS. TO DO SO IT WOULD
HAVE TO ANNOUNCE THE LAUNCHING, THUS PUBLICLY VIOLATING THE PLEDGE.

BECAUSE THE U.S.-SOVIET STATEMENT WOULD NOT BE A FORMAL TREATY, IT WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE FOR RATIFICATION. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH IS EXPECTED TO CONSULT MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, HOWEVER.

JC936AED 10/4

12
October 7, 1963

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: "Bombs in Orbit" -- Meeting of the Committee
of Principals, October 8, 1963

1. I take it that there is no longer a policy question as to whether or not we reach some agreement with the Soviet Union mutually to refrain from placing of bombs in orbit. The remaining issue to be examined is the mode to be used.

2. I understand that the Secretary of State now leans in the direction of having an identical policy declaration issued simultaneously by the U. S. and the USSR following agreement on the text of such a declaration. The Secretary contemplates having the declaration appear substantially as Bill Foster's Tab A, but would add the thought that both countries agree to sponsor a resolution in the UN General Assembly on the same subject. This GA resolution would give other countries an opportunity to sign on.

3. The Secretary's reported line of action is appealing. It has certain definite advantages:

a. The United States and the USSR can act swiftly in reaching agreement on a joint declaration; in fact, it might be possible to have something for Gromyko this week.

b. It puts the matter back in the UN forum and would mollify the UN supporters who have criticized the tripartite Test Ban Treaty procedure for not having used the UN machinery.

c. Although it doesn't add any legal sanctions, it accentuates the moral commitment and gives the other nations a positive act to perform that will intensify their participation.

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4

By chm/y, NADA, Date 12-11-08

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

d. It will tend to blur the "secret understanding" angle that Senator Russell and his friends will be looking for.

e. It avoids the drawbacks of the formal treaty procedure and the risks attendant on Senatorial review. (The major risk is the probable insistence by certain Senators on "safeguards" to protect our military position in space -- particularly a major spending program for the development of an operational capability to detect, apprehend and destroy hostile satellites.)

4. There is only one aspect of the Secretary's reported preferred line of action that might be handled a little differently. Instead of having simultaneous and identical declarations, there might be a joint communique along the line that the two governments, "having agreed on principle that outer space shall be kept free of weapons of mass destruction, etc., etc."*, have agreed to sponsor jointly a resolution in the current session of the General Assembly declaring space to be a matter of concern for all people, and stating it to be the intent of the sponsoring powers and all other nations that may adhere to that resolution that no weapons of mass destruction will ever be placed in orbit. This variation in the Secretary's approach might get more mileage out of this particular subject by keeping it alive for a while longer and receive very good support at the UN. In addition the resolution might hint at the next steps in this "onion peeling" peace-making process.

Charles E. Johnson

* The Gromyko text has some rather good language.

CONFIDENTIAL

62
- Mr. Burns
10-10-63

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

file
"Bombers in Orbit"
October 9, 1963 *13*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Arrangement concerning the stationing
of weapons of mass destruction in
outer space.

The question of a U.S.-Soviet arrangement concerning the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space was reviewed by the Committee of Principals at its meeting of October 8. The Committee agreed to recommend to you that the following approach be taken to such an arrangement:

1. We should inform the Soviet Union that while we do not rule out the possibility of a more formal agreement at a future time, we believe that the most satisfactory approach under present circumstances would be the adoption of an appropriate resolution by the General Assembly with the full endorsement of both countries.

2. The text of such a resolution should be acceptable to both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and sponsorship of the resolution would be as agreed by the two countries. U.S. and Soviet support would be expressed through statements made in connection with consideration of the resolution by the General Assembly. Although these statements would not be identical, they would be coordinated in advance of presentation.

3. The U.S. statement should affirm that the resolution reflects the intentions of this country. The statement should also note that in the event that unforeseen developments should dictate the need for additional assurance,

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GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4
P/cbm/s, DDA, DDP 12-11-08

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- 2 -

we would seek such assurance as might then be required. In addition, we would inform the United Nations should there occur extraordinary events affecting this matter.

If you approve of this approach, you may wish to inform Foreign Minister Gromyko of the substance of the foregoing approach in your meeting tomorrow and advise him that a draft resolution together with a draft of the statement we would propose to make in connection with the resolution will be provided to Ambassador Dobrynin in a few days. At the appropriate time, the matter would be turned over to Ambassadors Stevenson and Fedorenko in New York. Uncleared drafts of the resolution and key portions of the U.S. statement are attached for your information but preferably should not be presented to Foreign Minister Gromyko since inter-agency coordination and Congressional liaison have not been completed and since there is need to alert our allies.

In considering the question of a U.S.-Soviet arrangement concerning this matter, the Committee was informed of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they continue to regard pre-launch notification and inspection of our spacecraft as unacceptable from the military standpoint but that there are no military objections to a U.S.-Soviet declaration prohibiting the placing in orbit of weapons of mass destruction. The Committee carefully considered two questions which had been raised by the JCS regarding the specific nature of such an arrangement.

The first of these questions related to the concern of the Joint Chiefs that a General Assembly resolution might be amended in a manner detrimental to our security interests. I believe that this hazard will not arise if the Soviet Union agrees to the approach recommended above. We will, of course, obtain Soviet assurance that no amendments to the resolution would be accepted unless they were acceptable to both of our countries.

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- 3 -

The second of these questions related to the interpretation of the term "weapons of mass destruction." The JCS expressed a preference for this term, in contrast with the specific reference to "nuclear weapons" which appears in the Soviet draft. The difficulties of interpreting the term "weapons of mass destruction" as excluding small nuclear weapons, which might some day be considered for use in orbital anti-satellite and anti-missile systems, were made clear at the meeting, and the representative of the JCS (General Hamlett) expressed agreement that we could not sustain such an interpretation should questions arise and that if the time should come when we might wish to place numbers of small nuclear weapons in orbit, the arrangement under consideration would no longer be viable. It was also made clear that development of nuclear propulsion systems for space would not be affected by the arrangement. Taking these factors into account, we could accept either the term "weapons of mass destruction" (which would be interpreted as including all nuclear weapons) or, should the Soviet Union prefer, a specific reference to nuclear weapons.

Regarding the question of sponsorship of a General Assembly resolution, there will be strong interest on the part of the UN membership and in particular on the part of the active members of the ENDC. Ambassador Stevenson recommends sponsorship by the seventeen active members of the ENDC, including the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Such sponsorship would meet our needs best, in that it would help channel the strong interest of the members of the ENDC and give them an opportunity to participate while at the same time providing us with control of the resolution. Since there would be fifteen sponsors in addition to the U.S. and Soviet Union, our own sponsorship would not be particularly highlighted. However, should the Soviet Union prefer some other arrangement, we should remain flexible on the question of sponsorship.

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- 4 -

At such time as prior U.S.-Soviet agreement is reached and sponsorship determined, the resolution could be considered in the First Committee within the framework of one of the disarmament items now on the agenda.

Subject to your approval, we will proceed with the further steps necessary to carry out the approach recommended above.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Attachments:

1. Draft CA Resolution.
2. Draft U.S. Statement.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT GA RESOLUTION

The General Assembly,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 1721 (XVI)

which expressed the belief that the exploration and use of outer space should be only for the betterment of mankind,

Determined to take steps to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space,

Welcoming the expressed intentions of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics not to station any weapons of mass destruction in outer space,

Solemnly appeals to all states:

1. To refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any weapons of mass destruction, installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner,
2. To refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in such activities.

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DRAFT

INSERT FOR STATEMENT TO BE MADE IN
GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN CONNECTION WITH
ADOPTION OF RESOLUTION

On September 5, 1962, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Gilpatric, made the following statement of U.S. intentions respecting the placing in orbit of weapons of mass destruction:

"Today there is no doubt that either the United States or the Soviet Union could place thermonuclear weapons in orbit, but such an action is just not a rational military strategy for either side for the foreseeable future.

"We have no program to place any weapons of mass destruction into orbit. An arms race in space will not contribute to our security. I can think of no greater stimulus for a Soviet thermonuclear arms effort in space than a United States commitment to such a program. This we will not do.

"At the same time that we are pursuing cooperative scientific efforts in space through the United Nations and otherwise, we will of course take such steps as are necessary to defend ourselves and our allies, if the Soviet Union forces us to do so. This is in accordance with the inalienable right of self-defense confirmed in the United Nations charter."

Our policy in this regard was made clear to the United Nations by Senator Albert Gore speaking as U.S. Representative

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to the First Committee on December 3, 1962. On September 20, 1963, President Kennedy reaffirmed our intention to keep weapons of mass destruction out of orbit.

Since that time, we have met with the representatives of the Soviet Union on this problem. We are glad that the intentions of the Soviet Union in this regard are the same as our own, and I am happy to report that the resolution which is before the Assembly has the support of both Governments.

Speaking on behalf of the United States, let me say what has been said many times before: the United States has no intention of placing in orbit around the earth any weapons of mass destruction, of installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or of stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner. The United States intends to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in such activities.

We all recognize that it is not possible to foresee today all events which may at a future time occur in the newly emerging field of space technology and in the

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-3-

exploration and use of outer space. Nor can we foresee fully the outcome of continuing efforts to achieve disarmament. Should events as yet unforeseen dictate the need for additional assurance respecting the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space, we would seek such additional assurance as might then be required. We would inform the U.N. should extraordinary events occur which would affect this matter.

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SPACE

MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH TO EUROPE 1632 4 OCT 63 L

(FROM THE IZVESTIYA REVIEW)

(TEXT) IZVESTIYA NEW YORK CORRESPONDENTS STANISLAV KONDRASHOV AND MIKHAIL MIKHAYLOV REPORT ANOTHER IMPORTANT AGREEMENT. MEETING ON THURSDAY, THE SOVIET, AMERICAN, AND BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTERS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE ON BANNING THE ORBITING OF VEHICLES WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BOARD. "THUS SPACE IS TO BE PROCLAIMED A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE," THE DISPATCH SAYS. "THIS STEP IS A LOGICAL COROLLARY TO THE MOSCOW TREATY AND A NEW MOVE IN THE RELAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION. MOREOVER, IT WAS BEGOTTEN BY THE SPIRIT OF THE MOSCOW TREATY."

KONDRASHOV AND MIKHAYLOV REMARK IN THIS CONNECTION THAT "THE AGREEMENT TO BAN THE NUCLEAR BOMB FROM SPACE DOES NOT OF COURSE MEAN DISARMAMENT. BUT IT FORMS A REAL OBSTACLE ON THE ROAD OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE."

4 OCT 240P REB/GS

Johnson
Konrad in
Orbit

14

Bomb in Orbit 15

COPY OF DRAFT DECLARATION HANDED BY SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER
GROMYKO TO SECRETARY OF STATE RUSK ON OCTOBER 2, 1963

Unofficial translation

DRAFT DECLARATION

PROHIBITING THE PLACING IN ORBIT OF OBJECTS CARRYING
NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and the United States,

Seeking to further the prompt achievement of an agreement
on general and complete disarmament under strict international
control in accordance with the purposes of the United Nations,

Determined forthwith to take steps to prevent the spread of
the arms race to outer space,

Desiring to generate the best possible conditions for the
exploration and harnessing of outer space to the good of man-
kind and to the benefit of all nations,

Solemnly declare that they have assumed the following
obligations:

1. To prohibit and not to carry out the placing in orbit
of any objects carrying nuclear weapons, the installation of such
weapons on celestial bodies or any other stationing of such
weapons in outer space.

2. To refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way
assisting in, the placing in orbit, the installation on celestial
bodies or any other stationing in outer space of nuclear weapons
by any other States, separately or jointly, or through interna-
tional organizations.

These obligations shall enter into force with the signing
of this Declaration, and shall be of unlimited duration.

For the Government of
the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics

For the Government
of the United States
of America

*Born in
D. C.*

Talks Called Most Important Since A-Pact

Rusk and Gromyko See Chance To Forbid Nuclear Arms in Space

By Lewis Gulick

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Oct. 2 (AP)—Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko indicated tonight there is a chance for an agreement on banning nuclear weapons in space.

The two talked for three hours at Gromyko's quarters—the only scheduled strictly U. S.-Soviet meeting in the current round of East-West discussions.

Shortly before they began the session, Rusk told newsmen "our policy is pretty much the same" against orbiting mass destruction weapons. But "we will discuss it to find out" whether a formal agreement can be reached, he said.

Gromyko told newsmen this afternoon he thought the United States and Russia are near agreement on banning nuclear weapons in space.

"Agreement is quite possi-

ble," Gromyko said. "In substance I think our views coincide."

But both Gromyko and Rusk were less sure of reaching a pact on exchange observers to guard against surprise attack.

According to Rusk, "We are also working on that—but of course it is something that is being discussed with NATO and other countries." There has been some difference of views among the Western allies on this.

Rusk then sat down to a working banquet with his Soviet counterpart in the large, office-like Manhattan building which houses the Soviet mission to the United Nations.

The session was the only scheduled purely United States-Russian parley in the East-West discussions that began last Saturday. However, Gromyko plans to go to Washington later and he, Rusk and Britain's Foreign Secretary Lord Home will have a second three-way parley Thursday night.

Both U. S. and Soviet sources described tonight's meeting as the most important of its kind since Rusk

was in Moscow in August to sign the limited nuclear test-ban treaty.

Rusk was expected first to raise the issue of the continued presence of Soviet troops in Cuba, making plain to Gromyko that the United States wants them out. Then they were to go on to a variety of items ranging from proposals for more U. S.-Soviet trade to cooperating in space.

Sitting in with Rusk were East-West Affairs advisers Llewellyn Thompson, U. N. Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, and William A. Tyler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

Among the eight men on the Soviet side were Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Semenov; Nikolai Fedorenko, Ambassador to the United Nations; Anatoly Dobrynin, Ambassador to Washington; and Anatoly Kovalev, chief counselor to Gromyko.

The Soviet Foreign Minister served his guests bouillon and a special Russian beef dish with Georgian wine from the Soviet Union.

Western diplomats warned against expecting any quick solutions to long-standing cold-war problems. They said neither side appears ready to move fast yet, but continuing the contacts is a good thing in itself and some potential area of agreement may yet be found.

Bringing up the U. S. dislike of the continued Russian presence in Cuba has been

standard U. S. diplomatic practice in talks with the Soviets since last fall's missile crisis. The usual Russian response is to accuse the United States of aggressive designs against Cuba.

United States sources listed these other items of possible U. S.-Soviet agreement which they said could come up in the Rusk-Gromyko session or later:

Trade expansion beyond any one-shot wheat deal; building of new embassies in Moscow and Washington; a private communications line to the West for the U. S. Embassy in Moscow; a compact covering consular activities; a New York-Moscow commercial air route; wider cultural exchanges; cooperation in space medicine; and sending a man to the moon.

Just before joining Gromyko for dinner, Rusk held an early evening reception in his hotel suite for the foreign ministers and delegation heads of 33 of the countries at the General Assembly session. This was part of Rusk's continuing program to meet all the foreign leaders here.

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

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OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

October 4, 1963


MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS

SUBJECT: Nature of Arrangement for a Prohibition of
Bombs in Orbit

Circulated herewith for your consideration is a Memorandum for the Secretary of State from me dated October 4, 1963. This memorandum relates to the Memorandum to the Committee of Deputies from Mr. Adrian S. Fisher dated October 1, Subject: Proposed US - Soviet Arrangement Concerning the Placing in Orbit of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

These two memoranda will be considered at a meeting of the Committee of Principals which is being arranged for 6:00 p.m., Tuesday, October 8, 1963, in the Secretary of State's Conference Room.

THE COMMITTEE OF DEPUTIES MEETING CALLED FOR 4:00 P.M., TUESDAY, OCTOBER 8, IS HEREBY CANCELLED.


William C. Foster

DECLASSIFIED
Authority Group 4
By cb, NARA, Date 10-13-93

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
declassified after 12 years.

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OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

OCT 4 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Nature of Arrangement for a
Prohibition of Bombs in Orbit

At your request I am forwarding herewith drafts covering three possible alternative courses of action. There are, of course, other alternatives. But, for the purposes of discussion, it seems best to focus on these three. They are as follows:

1. Declaration of Intentions.

Tab A is a draft unilateral policy declaration which could be issued after agreement on the text by both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. It is a statement of intention, not an agreement. A binding commitment would have to be expressed in the form of an executive agreement or a treaty. The purpose of the draft enclosed as Tab A was to go as far as possible in the direction of agreement with this form of document without producing an executive agreement or a treaty.

A joint declaration signed by both parties could be achieved with only slight drafting changes in Tab A.

2. General Assembly Resolution and U.S. Statement.

Tab B is the second possible alternative, a draft General Assembly resolution. Attached to Tab B is a draft statement that the U.S. representative could make at the time of passage of the resolution.

GROUP 4
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after 12 years


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Authority Group 4
By CB, NARA, Date 10-13-93

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The resolution could be easily modified to call upon the parties to negotiate an agreement on this subject if that was desirable.

3. Agreement.

Tab C is a draft of a binding commitment. It could be expressed as an executive agreement or as a treaty. It is of such a nature that the Foreign Relations Committee should be consulted on which form to use in view of past statements which the Executive Branch has made to that Committee.



William C. Foster

Attachments:

Tab A.
Tab B.
Tab C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~DRAFT UNILATERAL, PARALLEL POLICY DECLARATION

The Government of the United States of America,

Seeking to further the prompt achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations,

Determined forthwith to take steps to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space,

Desiring to generate the best possible conditions for the exploration and harnessing of outer space for the benefit and in the interests of all mankind,

Declares that it intends:

1. To refrain from the placing in orbit around the earth of any [nuclear weapons], [weapons of mass destruction], the installation of such weapons on celestial bodies, or the stationing of such weapons in outer space in any other manner.
2. To refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the placing in orbit around the earth of any [nuclear weapons] [weapons of

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By: cbm/ky NARA Date: 12-11-01

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mass destruction⁷, the installation of such weapons on celestial bodies or the stationing of such weapons in outer space in any other manner.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~DRAFT GA RESOLUTION

The General Assembly,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 1721 (XVI)

which expressed the belief that the exploration and use of outer space should be only for the betterment of mankind,

Determined to take steps to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space,

Welcoming the expressed intentions of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that they will not place in orbit around the earth any [nuclear weapons] [weapons of mass destruction], install such weapons on celestial bodies, or in any other manner station such weapons in outer space:

Solemnly enjoins all states:

1. To refrain from the placing in orbit around the earth of any [nuclear weapons], [weapons of mass destruction], the installation of such weapons on celestial bodies, or the stationing of such weapons in outer space in any other manner.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By Chm/s, NARA, Date 12-11-08

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2. To refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the placing in orbit around the earth of any /nuclear weapons/ /weapons of mass destruction/, the installation of such weapons on celestial bodies or the stationing of such weapons in outer space in any other manner.

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October 3, 1963

DRAFT INSERT FOR STATEMENT TO BE MADE IN
GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN CONNECTION WITH ADOPTION OF RESOLUTION

On September 5, 1962, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Gilpatric, made the following statement of U.S. intentions respecting the placing in orbit of weapons of mass destruction:

"Today there is no doubt that either the United States or the Soviet Union could place thermonuclear weapons in orbit, but such an action is just not a rational military strategy for either side for the foreseeable future.

"We have no program to place any weapons of mass destruction into orbit. An arms race in space will not contribute to our security. I can think of no greater stimulus for a Soviet thermonuclear arms effort in space than a United States commitment to such a program. This we will not do.

"At the same time that we are pursuing cooperative scientific efforts in space through the United Nations and otherwise, we will of course take such steps as are necessary to defend ourselves and our allies, if the Soviet Union forces us to do so. This is in accordance with the inalienable right of self-defense confirmed in the United Nations charter."

Our policy in this regard was made clear to the United Nations by Senator Albert Gore speaking as U.S. Representative to the First Committee on December 3, 1962. On September 20, 1963, President Kennedy reaffirmed our intention to keep weapons of mass destruction out of space.

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E.O. 13202, Sec. 3.4
BY Chm/f, NARA, Date 12-11-08

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- 2 -

Since that time, we have met with the representatives of the Soviet Union on this problem. We are encouraged that the views of the Soviet delegation are the same as our own. I am happy to report that the resolution which is before the Assembly has the support of both Governments.

Speaking on behalf of the United States, let me say what has been said many times before: The United States has no intention of placing in orbit around the earth any [nuclear weapons], [weapons of mass destruction], of installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or of stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner. The United States intends to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in such activities.

We all recognize that it is not possible to foresee today all events which may at a future time occur in the newly emerging field of space technology and in the exploration and use of outer space. Nor can we foresee fully the course of continuing efforts to achieve disarmament. Should events as yet unforeseen dictate the need for additional assurance respecting the placing of [weapons of mass destruction] [nuclear weapons] in orbit around the earth, we would seek such additional assurance as might then be required.

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DRAFT AGREEMENT

PROHIBITING THE PLACING IN ORBIT OF

/NUCLEAR WEAPONS/ /WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION/

The Governments of the United States of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Seeking to further the prompt achievement of an
agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict
international control in accordance with the objectives of
the United Nations,

Determined forthwith to take steps to prevent the
spread of the arms race to outer space,

Desiring to generate the best possible conditions
for the exploration and harnessing of outer space for the
benefit and in the interests of all mankind,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each of them undertakes:

1. To prohibit and not to carry out the placing in
orbit around the earth of any /nuclear weapons/, /weapons

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
1/21/08 NARA, Date 12/1/08

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of mass destruction⁷, the installation of such weapons on celestial bodies, or the stationing of such weapons in outer space in any other manner.

2. To refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the placing in orbit around the earth of any ⁷nuclear weapons⁷, ⁷weapons of mass destruction⁷, the installation of such weapons on celestial bodies, or the stationing of such weapons in outer space in any other manner.

3. To seek undertakings comparable to those contained in this Agreement from any state which might achieve the capability to conduct the activities referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

ARTICLE II

1. This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration.

2. The Parties will consult with each other should either of them consider additional assurance necessary in the light of changing technological conditions or further developments in the field of disarmament.

3. Each Party shall have the right to withdraw from the Agreement if such assurance, satisfactory to it, is not received; or if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Agreement, have

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jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.

4. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the other Party to the Agreement three months in advance.

For the Government of
the United States of
America

For the Government of
the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY 18

October 1, 1963

MEMORANDUM TO THE COMMITTEE OF DEPUTIES

SUBJECT: Proposed U. S. -- Soviet Arrangement Concerning
the Placing in Orbit of Weapons of Mass Destruction

There is transmitted herewith for consideration
by the Committee of Deputies a paper on a possible U. S. --
Soviet arrangement concerning the placing in orbit of weapons
of mass destruction. It is proposed that this paper should
be discussed at a meeting to be held on October 8, 1963, at
4:00 P.M. You will be advised as to the location of the
meeting.

Adrian S. Fisher

Adrian S. Fisher
Deputy Director, ACDA

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UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS

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A U.S.-SOVIET ARRANGEMENT CONCERNING
THE PLACING IN ORBIT OF
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

REFERENCES

- (1) Minutes of Meeting of Committee of Principals;
September 19, 1962. (TOP SECRET)
- (2) Memorandum for the President from the Director,
USACDA; Subject: Report on a Separate Arms Control
Measure for Outer Space; September 27, 1962. (TOP
SECRET)
- (3) NSAM 192; October 2, 1962. (TOP SECRET)
- (4) Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of
State; Subject: U.S. Reaction to Soviet Placing of
a Nuclear Weapon in Space; May 8, 1963. (TOP SECRET)
- (5) NIE 11-9-63; July 15, 1963. (SECRET-LIMITED DISTRIBUTION - RESTRICTED DATA)

ISSUE

To determine the specific approach which the U.S.
should adopt in seeking an arrangement with the Soviet
Union concerning the placing in orbit of weapons of mass
destruction.

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GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 intervals;
not automatically de-
classified.

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Authority NW 030-011-3-1
By 14 NARA, Date 12-1-08

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. SCOPE

a. We should proceed to seek with the Soviet Union an arrangement reflecting the intention of the two countries to refrain from placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit about the earth or stationing such weapons in outer space.*

b. We should make clear that either country could call for further consultation if additional assurance were considered necessary in the light of technological change.

c. We should not agree to advance notification of space vehicle launchings in connection with this arrangement.

d. We should not accept pre-launch inspection in connection with this arrangement.

e. The arrangement should not apply to any uses of outer space other than the placing in orbit about the earth and stationing in outer space of weapons of mass destruction.

2. NATURE OF ARRANGEMENT

Prior to further discussion with the Soviet Union,

*Our understanding of the terms used in this formulation would be as set forth in the remainder of this paper.

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we should determine the nature of the arrangement we wish to seek. The following approaches should be considered in this connection:

- a. Parallel unilateral statements of intention by the two countries.
- b. A joint statement of intentions by the two countries.
- c. A resolution of the General Assembly.
- d. A resolution of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.
- e. An executive agreement or treaty.

3. CONSULTATION WITH ALLIES

At an early time, we should inform our NATO allies and other friendly powers of the character of the arrangement we envisage.

BACKGROUND

On September 5, 1962, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Gilpatric, made the following statement of U.S. intentions respecting the placing in orbit of weapons of mass destruction:

"Today there is no doubt that either the United States or the Soviet Union could place thermo-nuclear weapons in orbit, but such an action is just not a rational military strategy for either side for the foreseeable future.

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- 4 -

"We have no program to place any weapons of mass destruction into orbit. An arms race in space will not contribute to our security. I can think of no greater stimulus for a Soviet thermonuclear arms effort in space than a United States commitment to such a program. This we will not do.

"At the same time that we are pursuing cooperative scientific efforts in space through the United Nations and otherwise, we will of course take such steps as are necessary to defend ourselves and our allies, if the Soviet Union forces us to do so. This is in accordance with the inalienable right of self-defense confirmed in the United Nations charter."

Similar statements respecting U.S. intentions have subsequently been made by other U.S. spokesmen.

Pursuant to NSAM 192, the Director, USACDA, called statements by U.S. spokesmen to the attention of Foreign Minister Gromyko and Ambassador Dobrynin on October 17, 1962, and informed them of U.S. interest in an understanding not to place weapons of mass destruction in orbit. He noted that such an understanding might take the form of a joint declaration, simultaneous unilateral declarations, or an agreement, and that, depending on technological developments, inspection would not be required at least for some time. Gromyko signified his understanding that the suggestion concerned only the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space, not other military uses. While agreeing to give the matter further consideration,

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he recalled the previously stated Soviet position linking control of outer space with other aspects of disarmament. The Director, USACDA, raised the matter again with the Soviet Representative at the Geneva Conference (Tsarapkin) on March 2, 1963, but received no indication of Soviet interest.

In his address of September 19, 1963, before the General Assembly, Gromyko included the following statement respecting this matter:

"Being willing now to take steps in order to prevent the spread of the armaments race to outer space, and desiring to create the best possible conditions for the utilization and exploration of outer space to the benefit of all nations, the Soviet Government deems it necessary to reach agreement with the United States Government to ban the placing into orbit of objects with nuclear weapons on board.

"We are aware that the United States Government also takes a positive view of the solution of this question. We assume also that an exchange of views on the banning of the placing into orbit of nuclear weapons will be continued between the Governments of the USSR and the United States on a bilateral basis. It would be a very good thing if understanding could be reached and an accord concluded on this vital question. The Soviet Government is ready."

On September 20, 1963, the President informed the General Assembly:

"We must continue to seek agreement, encouraged by yesterday's affirmative response to this proposal by the Soviet Foreign Minister, on an arrangement to keep weapons of mass destruction out of outer space. Let us get our negotiators

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- 6 -

back to the negotiating table to work out a practicable arrangement to this end."

OBJECTIVE

The U.S. has previously made clear that it has no intention of precipitating a race to place weapons of mass destruction in orbit. Gromyko's statement of September 19 presents an opportunity to obtain greater assurance than the Soviet Union has previously been prepared to offer concerning its own intentions in this regard.

At the present time, a degree of assurance is inherent in the technical difficulties, economic costs, and military limitations of the types of orbital nuclear delivery vehicles which could be deployed at an early time. The incentive for either side to seek an operational force of such vehicles is low. Such incentive as may now exist for the Soviet Union is primarily related to the psychological impact of such weapons rather than their military effectiveness. The type of arrangement that it seems possible to achieve would increase the political and psychological disadvantage to the Soviet Union of an effort in this field.

Although such an arrangement would clearly pose no barrier if the Soviet Union should see decisive advantage in deploying a deterrent force in outer space, an arrangement respecting this matter might be useful for some

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years. While changes in technical, economic, and military factors may in time alter current assessments, they appear likely to do so only to the extent of making the orbital nuclear delivery vehicle a more practical and effective weapon, not a decisive one. As long as we maintain deterrent strength in other areas, there is no evident means by which this strength would be rendered ineffective through Soviet deployment of orbital nuclear delivery vehicles. Even if they were to take such a step, we would not necessarily desire to follow a similar course.

Both in the short term and the long, more especially in the latter, we will need to have the capability of taking action against Soviet spacecraft. In this regard, however, the principal current incentive for acquiring such a capability is to have a means of enforcing freedom of space by making possible Soviet action against our own satellites a costly proposition. Should a force of Soviet orbital nuclear delivery vehicles materialize at some future time, our principal reliance, as is now the case with ballistic missiles, would be placed on deterrence rather than on active defense. We would wish to be able to take defensive action, but perfect defense does not seem to be in the cards. It should be noted that such a defensive capability does not have to be spaceborne although we might in time desire to have that

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option.

Since these considerations were examined a year ago, at least three factors place us in a better position to proceed with an arrangement in this field:

a. Until recently, there was substantial uncertainty respecting the potential capabilities of a new booster which the Soviet Union was known to have under development. It now seems clear that this booster is not more powerful than those the Soviet Union already has available. This does not, of course, mean that the Soviet Union may not have under way other, more powerful boosters or that it could not improve its launching capabilities through various techniques employing existing capabilities. However, the early appearance of a major new capability appears less likely than was thought to be the case a year ago.*

b. The three-environment nuclear test ban has imposed a ceiling on nuclear weapons development which, from the standpoint of space weapons, should be particularly effective in the case of extremely high yield nuclear weapons such as those which might, at least in theory, be detonated at orbital altitudes with devastating effects on the earth.

c. We are proceeding at highest national priority with

*It should be noted that NIE 11-9-63 was prepared at a time when this issue was in greater doubt.

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acquisition of an anti-satellite capability.

None of these considerations is compelling, but they lend support to our determination of a year ago that an arrangement in this field would be acceptable. Since we ourselves are not prepared to accept advance notification of space vehicle launchings or pre-launch inspection at this time and since there is no reason to suppose that the Soviet Union is prepared to do so, we should proceed to obtain the type of arrangement that the Soviet Union now appears prepared to accept.

SCOPE OF ARRANGEMENT

Taking Gromyko's statement at face value, the Soviet Union appears to have shifted from its previous position which linked arms control for outer space to other aspects of disarmament. Gromyko's statement also implies that the Soviet Union is prepared to separate the question of the placing of nuclear delivery vehicles in orbit from questions related to other military uses of outer space. It remains to be seen whether these inferences are correct, but such an approach would fit the pattern of current Soviet interest in limited measures which can be secured at little or no cost. Should the Soviet Union re-introduce in private discussions the question of linkage to other measures, we should maintain

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our present position that the arrangement we have in mind would not affect other uses of outer space.

Even if the Soviet Union is prepared to proceed along the lines indicated by Gromyko's statement, we will need to clarify the scope of the arrangement. The following problems need to be considered in this regard.

a. The arrangement would be concerned with deployment, not development. While we have no current plans to develop specific systems for placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit, there is no way, in the presence of a continuing space effort, to curtail advances in space technology applicable to such systems.

b. We have used the term "in orbit" as referring to objects completing at least one orbit about the earth. Defined in this way, the arrangement would not raise any question respecting the status of ballistic missiles and would not be applicable to partial orbit nuclear delivery systems. We should avoid such terms as "placing weapons of mass destruction in outer space" which might lead to confusion respecting the status of objects which transit outer space but do not complete one full orbit about the earth.

c. Although it is exceedingly unlikely that the question of the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the moon will arise in practical form, it would be consistent with the

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type of arrangement considered here to cover this aspect. The term "stationing in outer space" would clarify intentions in this regard.

d. A more difficult problem arises in connection with the term "weapons of mass destruction." Although the Soviet draft disarmament treaty employs this term, Gromyko referred specifically to the placing in orbit of objects with "nuclear weapons" on board. Whereas "weapons of mass destruction" could be construed as not including low yield nuclear weapons which might be employed in spaceborne active defense (anti-satellite or anti-missile) systems, Gromyko's more specific language would rule out such an interpretation. Since the type of arrangement we have in mind relates to offensive systems, we should continue to seek acceptance of the term "weapons of mass destruction." However, we should face now the difficult position we will be in if we seek to differentiate in this connection between some types of nuclear weapons and others, and we should consider this problem carefully both from the standpoint of the negotiations and of subsequent public discussions concerning the purpose and effects of the arrangement.

e. Certain types of BW-CW agents also fall in the category of "weapons of mass destruction." Since the use of space vehicles for the delivery of such weapons appears remote, we

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should avoid raising this question. However, if the question is raised by others, we should take the position that the use of orbital vehicles for such a purpose would be inconsistent with our understanding of the arrangement.

f. The Soviet draft treaty refers to "special devices capable of delivering" weapons of mass destruction. If this language should be suggested by the Soviet Union, we should reject it on the grounds that it would be difficult to interpret without affecting space activities not intended to be covered by the arrangement. We should not object to such language as "objects with weapons of mass destruction on board" if the Soviet Union prefers such an approach.

FUTURE RECONSIDERATION

Our present position contemplates provision for further consultation if either side should consider additional assurance necessary in the light of changing technological conditions and in the event of delay in arriving at agreement on Stage I of a disarmament program (additional assurance being contemplated by both Soviet and U.S. disarmament proposals).

Whether this approach would provide an adequate political basis for a later change in our position should be further considered. It is based on the assumption that the failure of the other side to consult or the failure of such consultation

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to result in "additional assurance" would warrant termination of the arrangement. It also implies that the basis for re-opening the case would be some change in space technology.

On the whole, this approach appears adequate to meet the needs of the limited type of arrangement that is contemplated. The principal question that needs to be considered is whether we might wish to reconsider the arrangement if changes in fields other than space technology might make acquisition of a spaceborne deterrent more important. In that event, we would not, of course, be seeking additional assurance respecting the fulfillment of the arrangement but a basis for terminating it.

It should be noted that the Soviet Union is likely to resist language respecting reconsideration of the arrangement. However, since no provision for verification would be included in the arrangement, we will need to make clear that we would feel free to reopen the matter at a future time if we considered it essential to do so.

NATURE OF ARRANGEMENT

In putting the matter to Gromyko a year ago, we left open the question of the form of the arrangement. Gromyko's statement refers to an "agreement," and it is likely that the

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Soviet Union has a formal bilateral agreement in mind. Other things being equal, such an approach might be desirable. However, recent experience indicates that we would have great difficulty in securing domestic acceptance of the type of agreement now probably attainable.

From our own standpoint, the use of parallel unilateral statements of intention might be a defensible form for the arrangement. Such an approach would represent an extension and confirmation of the position we have already taken. Although reliance on two unilateral statements would smack of a "moratorium," such statements would differ substantially in character and form from the nuclear test "moratorium."

A joint declaration of intentions might offer a meeting ground between parallel unilateral statements of intention and the type of arrangement which may be preferred by the Soviet Union. From the domestic standpoint, there may be a fine line between a joint declaration and an executive agreement. However, if clearly limited to a statement of intentions, a joint declaration might be acceptable.

If the U.S. and Soviet Union were in agreement, the matter might be handled through a substantive resolution of the General Assembly with little hazard that it would be amended in a manner we could not accept. However, there might be some hazard that issues respecting other uses of outer space might be debated.

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A General Assembly resolution might be accompanied by statements by the U. S. and the Soviet Union indicating the significance they attach to the resolution. A similar approach might be taken in the ENDC where the co-chairmen might sponsor a resolution.

If a formal legal commitment is desired, it might be possible to negotiate a legally binding international agreement, either an executive agreement (either negotiated, as the Laos agreement, on the basis of executive authority, or based upon action of the Congress) or a treaty to be ratified by the Senate.

THE ISSUE OF INSPECTION

Whatever the form of the arrangement, it will be widely viewed (both internationally and domestically) as an "uninspected ban" and, therefore, as inconsistent with our general approach to the question of verification. Even if we are ourselves satisfied that we can accept the arrangement, we will need to respond to questions concerning the consistency of such an approach with our position in other cases and, more importantly, with our national security interests. The following considerations are relevant:

a. We are dealing in this case with refraining from an activity which is not yet under way. Neither side would gain decisive advantage from this activity. Both would be exposed

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to increased risk of accidental war. There appears to be a mutual interest in refraining from such a further extension of the arms race.

b. While we do not have the capability of determining whether a nuclear weapon is on board a particular spacecraft, we have a substantial capability for detecting the presence of spacecraft in orbit.* The functions of many of these spacecraft will be known. Further extension of cooperative arrangements and of exchange of information may be of assistance in this regard. The functions of some spacecraft may be unknown, and their orbits may present possible routes for the delivery of nuclear weapons. We should be able to detect a suspicious build-up in this category of spacecraft. Prior to this point, we should be able to observe the extensive development effort that would be required to develop a significant system.

c. In our outline treaty on disarmament, we have provided for pre-launch inspection. We continue to believe that inspection would be necessary in that context. It is apparent that if other types of delivery vehicles are being substantially reduced, an orbital capability could have

*We should be prepared to respond to questions respecting the comparative difficulty of defense against orbital nuclear delivery vehicles and ballistic missiles.

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greater significance than would be the case in the presence of deterrent forces of other types.

d. We consider this to be a problem of a different character than the problem of underground nuclear testing. Qualitative advances in weaponry which could be achieved through clandestine testing underground could give some advantage to the Soviet Union. We do not think this would be the case with the deployment of the orbital nuclear delivery vehicle.

e. As a general matter, we seek inspection when and to the extent it is essential for our security. If in our view, inspection becomes essential in this case, we will have to reconsider the matter. Meanwhile, we do not think we should reject such assurances as can now be obtained.

Although we thus rate the threat low for some time to come, we consider it desirable to take those steps which are now feasible to dampen, if not prevent, the possibility of the extension of the arms race to outer space. If one side or the other were to place weapons of mass destruction in orbit, the effects on the arms race as a whole might be considerable.

There is in the dynamics of the arms race a counterpart to what is known in the field of economics as the "multiplier effect." A new weapons system is introduced

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and is followed by a system intended to counter it. The first is then modified to evade the countermeasures, and the counter-ing system is itself subsequently improved. And so it goes.

We do not think it desirable for either side to embark on this grim game in outer space. We think both sides have an interest in avoiding the economic costs and the hazards which would be entailed. The type of arrangement that now seems attainable would not relieve us of the necessity of defensive precautions. However, it may assist in avoiding the opening of a new dimension in the arms race while we continue efforts to bring the race for existing types of weapons under control.

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