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Page 1

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10	memo	Van Doren to Farley open 1/4/18 per RAC 12/17	G	2	12/29/67	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Charles E. Johnson**Folder Title** "Cooperation in Space, U.S. - Japan"**Box Number** 13**Restriction Codes**

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4/7/2009


Initials



Department of State

TELEGRAM

U.S.-Japan

Spec. Cons.

6

UNCLASSIFIED 225

PAGE 01 TOKYO 05369 070704Z

9

ACTION E 15

INFO EA 10, L 03, OC 06, CCO 00, DTM 02, FCC 02, NASA 04, GPM 03, INR 07,
CIAE 00, NSAE 00, NSC 10, DODE 00, OST 01, COM 08, SCI 05, RSR 01,
RSC 01, MM 01, /079 W

R 060707Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8599
INFO CINCPAC

UNCLAS TOKYO 5369

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: SPACE COOPERATION

REF: A. STATE 108419; B. TOKYO 5298; C. TOKYO 5302.

1. MAINICHI ARTICLE, REF B PARA 3, APPEARED ONLY IN ENGLISH LANGUAGE EDITION. BECAUSE OF LENGTH, TEXT BEING POUCHED.

2. FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF VERNACULAR SANKEI SHIMBUN ARTICLE, FEB 5, 1968, WHICH GIVES MUCH MORE BALANCED TREATMENT THAN DID ASAHI ARTICLE, REF C, AND EDITORIAL.

PAGE 2 RUALOT 5369 UNCLAS
BEGIN TEXT.

HEADLINES: SPEEDUP IN SPACE DEVELOPMENT; U.S. COOPERATION

~~BOWDLER~~
~~BUDGET~~
~~DAVIS~~
~~FRIED~~
~~GINSBURGH~~
~~HAMILTON~~
~~JESSUP~~
~~JOHNSON~~
~~JORDEN~~
~~KEENE~~
~~LEONHART~~
~~ROCHE~~
~~SAUNDERS~~
~~TAYLOR~~

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 TOKYO 05369 070704Z

TO BE RECEIVED.

SUBHEAD: COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE IN 1970 -- GOVERNMENT-LDP
POLICY.

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC (LDP), WHICH HAD BEEN STUDYING A RECENT U.S. PROPOSAL FOR BILATERAL COOPERATION IN SPACE DEVELOPMENT, HAVE SOLIDIFIED THEIR POLICY OF POSITIVELY ACCEPTING U.S. TECHNICAL COOPERATION AND HAVE DECIDED TO HAVE THE LDP SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON SPACE DEVELOPMENT (CHAIRMAN: MR. KIICHI AICHI) DISCUSS CONCRETE MEASURES AT A MEETING TO BE CONVENED ON THE 5TH. THEY HAVE STRENGTHENED THEIR VIEW THAT IF U.S. COOPERATION IS OBTAINED IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR JAPAN TO GREATLY REDUCE ITS LAG IN SPACE DEVELOPMENT AND TO LAUNCH AN EXPERIMENTAL COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE IN 1970 AS ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED, WITHOUT POSTPONING IT FOR ONE YEAR.

PAGE 3 RUALOT 5369 UNCLAS

THE PROBLEM OF JAPAN-US COOPERATION IN SPACE DEVELOPMENT CAME TO THE FORE WHEN PRIME MINISTER SATO AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON IN THEIR JOINT COMMUNIQUE LAST NOVEMBER STATED THEIR AGREEMENT THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD STUDY MORE CLOSELY THE POSSIBILITIES OF COOPERATION, FOCUSING ON THE DEVELOPMENT AND LAUNCHING OF EARTH SATELLITES FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE.

ON THE BASIS OF THIS, THE U.S. SIDE ON JANUARY 17 CONVEYED ITS INTENTIONS TO JAPAN -- IN A DOCUMENT DELIVERED TO PRIME MINISTER SATO BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON -- TO THE EFFECT THAT IF ACCEPTABLE TO JAPAN THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXPERIMENTAL COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES. ACCORDING TO THIS DOCUMENT, THE U.S. SIDE IS SAID TO HAVE CONVEYED ITS THINKING ON SUCH MATTERS AS (1) LAUNCHING JAPANESE-MADE SATELLITES WITH U.S. ROCKETS AND (2) COOPERATION IN ROCKET-RELATED TECHNOLOGY, PARTICULARLY IN GUIDANCE AND TRACKING SYSTEMS IN WHICH JAPAN LAGS.

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PAGE 4 RUALOT 5369 UNCLAS

ON JANUARY 19, THE CABINET MEMBERS CONCERNED WITH SPACE DEVELOPMENT MET TO DISCUSS HOW TO DEAL WITH THE U.S. PROPOSAL AND AS A RESULT DECIDED TO HAVE THE VARIOUS AGENCIES CONCERNED, SUCH AS THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGENCY AND THE MINISTRY OF POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS, STUDY THE PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL. IN PARALLEL WITH THIS, CHAIRMAN AICHI OF THE LDP'S SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON SPACE DEVELOPMENT HAS BEEN WORKING TO COORDINATE VIEWS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND LDP.

AT THE MOMENT, THE VPVW IS STRONG WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND LDP THAT JAPAN SHOULD ACCEPT U.S. TECHNICAL COOPERATION IF SHE IS TO REDUCE HER LAG IN SPACE DEVELOPMENT. THE MOOD IS STRONG IN FAVOR OF JAPAN LAUNCHING AN EXPERIMENTAL COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE IN 1970 WHEN THE PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT ON INTELSAT WILL BE CONVERTED INTO A PERMANENT ONE. FROM THIS VIEWPOINT, CHAIRMAN AICHI AND OTHERS ALSO ESTIMATE THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR JAPAN TO LAUNCH AN EXPERIMENTAL COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE IN 1970 INSTEAD OF 1971 IF U.S. COOPERATION WERE OBTAINED -- BY RETURNING TO THE ORIGINAL PLAN WHICH WAS MODIFIED LAST YEAR BECAUSE OF JAPAN'S LAG

PAGE 5 RUALOT 5369 UNCLAS

IN SPACE DEVELOPMENT. THEY HAVE THUS FIRMED-UP THEIR POLICY FOR CLOSER BILATERAL COOPERATION IN SPACE.

AS ROCKET GUIDANCE AND TRACKING SYSTEMS ARE CLOSELY RELATED TO MISSILE DEVELOPMENT, IT IS EXPECTED THAT JAPAN MAY BE ASKED TO "PROTECT SECRETS" TO A CERTAIN EXTENT, BUT THE GOVERNMENT AND LDP HOPE TO REACH AN AMICABLE SETTLEMENT IN TALKS WITH THE U.S. SIDE, WHILE MAINTAINING THE POSITION "THAT JAPAN-U.S. COOPERATION IN SPACE DEVELOPMENT IS LIMITED 'TO PEACEFUL USE'".

END TEXT. JOHNSON

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*U.S.-Japan Space Coop*²

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PAGE 01 TOKYO 05302 030933Z

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ACTION EA 15

INFO MM 01, GPM 03, SC 01, RSC 01, USIA 12, H 02, NSC 10, L 03, INR 07, P 04,
CIAE 00, DODE 00, SP 02, SS 20, SCI 05, NSAE 00, ACDA 16, NASA 04,
OST 01, E 15, AEC 11, SAH 03, MC 01, GDP 01, RSR 01, /139 W

P 030807Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8565
INFO CINCPAC

UNCLAS TOKYO 5302

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: ASAHI ARTICLE ON SPACE COOPERATION

REF: A. TOKYO 5191; TOKYO 5298

B. STATE 108419

I. FOL IS EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF VERNACULAR ASAHI
ARTICLE, JAN 31, 1968

BEGIN TEXT.

PAGE 2 RUALOT 5302 UNCLAS

HEADLINE: SECRETS PROTECTION AGREEMENT IN SPACE DEVELOPMENT

SUBHEAD: U.S. AMBASSADOR SUGGESTS CONCLUSION

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PAGE 02 TOKYO 05302 030933Z

SUBHEAD: ASKS AS PRICE FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION
UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR JOHNSON PROPOSED US-JAPAN
COOPERATION IN SPACE DEVELOPMENT TO PRIME MINISTER SATO IN
WRITING ON JAN 17. THE DOCUMENT, WHICH HAS NOT YET BEEN
MADE PUBLIC, IS FILLED WITH THE INTENT TO ASK THE GOVT. OF
JAPAN TO PROTECT THESE SECRETS IN THE EVENT THAT THE U.S.
DOES PROVIDE ROCKET GUIDANCE AND CONTROL TECHNOLOGY AND THE LIKE,
AND IT REPORTEDLY SUGGESTS THAN AN "OFFICIAL SECRETS PROTECTION
AGREEMENT" BE CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. IT HAS NOT
YET BEEN DECIDED HOW THE GOVERNMENT WILL RESPOND TO THIS, BUT,
DEPENDING ON THE ATTITUDE OF GHE GOVERNMENT, IT IS THOUGHT THAT
THIS WILL INVITE DEBATE AS A PROBLEM RELATED TO AN OFFICIAL
SECRETS ACT.

2. AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S PROPOSAL IS BEING KDPT SECRET FOR REASONS
SAID TO BE "AT THE WISH OF THE SAID AMBASSADOR" BUT REPORTEDLY IT

PAGE 3 RUALOT 5302 UNCLAS

PROPOSED RATHER BROAD COOPERATION, INCLUDING (1) A JAPANESE-MADE
ARTIFICIAL SATELLITE MAY BE LAUNCHED WITH AN AMERICAN ROCKET,
(2) A LAUNCH VEHICLE MAY BE PROVIDED, AND (3) TECHNOLOGY MAY BE
PROVIDED ON THE MANUFACTURE OF ROCKETS, INCLUDING, FOR EXAMPLE,
ROCKET CONTROL AND GUIDANCE TECHNOLOGY. HOWEVER, WITH RESPECT TO
THIS COOPERATION, PARTICULARLY ROCKET MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY,
IT REPORTEDLY ASKS THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN TO GUARANTEE THAT
INFO PROVIDED BY THE U.S. NOT LEAK TO THIRD COUNTRIES.

3. ACCORDING TO A REPORT COMPILED BY THE SPACE DEVELOPMENT
COUNCIL AT THE END OF LAST YEAR, JAPAN IS TO LAUNCH SCIENTIFIC
SATELLITE NO. 1 DURING 1968 AND A SYNCHRONOUS ORBIT COMMUNICA-
TIONS SATELLITE BY 1973, BUT JAPAN'S ROCKET TECHNOLOGY, PAR-
TICULARLY ROCKET GUIDANCE AND CONTROL TECHNOLOGY, IS AT AN
EXTREMELY LOW LEVEL AND OPINION IS STRONG IN ALL QUARTERS THAT
THE INTRODUCTION OF TECHNOLOGY, TO A CERTAIN DEGREE, IS UN-
AVOIDABLE TO CATCH UP QUICKLY WITH U.S. AND THE EUROPEAN NATIONS.

4. MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, WITH A VIEW TO QUICKLY RE-
GULARIZING OUR NATION'S SPACE DEVELOPMENT HAD ALREADY CONCLUDED

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PAGE 4 RUALOT 5302 UNCLAS
A TECHNICAL AGREEMENT WITH NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION LAST YEAR BUT THE U.S. GOVT. ATTACHED THREE CONDITIONS, INCLUDING ONE THAT THE GOVT. OF JAPAN WOULD GUARANTEE THE SECRETS-PROTECTION OF TECHNOLOGY DATA. FOR THIS REASON, MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES PROBED GOVT. SOURCES FOR THEIR INTENTIONS, BUT THE GOVT. SIDE SHOWED ITS DISAPPROVAL AND ITS REPLY REPORTEDLY HAS ALREADY BEEN POSTPONED TO THE EXTENT OF HALF A YEAR.

5. AMBASSADOR JOHNSON REPORTEDLY CAME TO SUGGEST THE CONCLUSION OF AN "OFFICIAL SECRETS PROTECTION AGREEMENT" WITH THIS SPECIFIC EXAMPLE AS BACKGROUND. WITHIN THE GOVT. THERE IS A VARIETY OF OPINION, SUCH AS (1) NO REAL GUARANTEE CAN BE GIVEN THE U.S. GOVT. BECAUSE THERE IS NO OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT IN OUR COUNTRY, (2) AN AGREEMENT MIGHT BE CONCLUDED IF IT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO ENDORSE SECRETS PROTECTION CONTRACTS ON A COMMERCIAL BASIS, AND (3) A COOPERATION RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE CONCLUDED ONLY WITHIN THE AREA NOT CLASSIFIED AS SECRET. MOREOVER, THERE IS EVEN AN OPINION IN ONE SECTOR THAT "WE SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS OPPORTUNITY, TO PASS AN OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT TO PREVENT THE LEAKAGE OF JAPAN'S SPACE DEVELOPMENT TECHNOLOGY

PAGE 5 RUALOT 5302 UNCLAS
TO SUCH THIRD COUNTRIES AS COMMUNIST CHINA AND ITS USE IN MISSILE TECHNOLOGY."

6. THE GOVT. HAS ORDERED A STUDY OF THIS PROBLEM BY ALL MINISTRIES, INCLUDING TRANSPORTATION AND POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT AGENCIES, BUT SINCE IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY SOW THE SEEDS OF DEBATE IF IT WERE MADE PUBLIC WHILE THE DIET IS IN SESSION, THE GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION, REPORTEDLY, IS TO KEEP IT HIDDEN FOR THE TIME BEING AND LET IT LIE WITHOUT TAKING ANY SPECIFIC MEASURES.

END TEXT. JOHNSON

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U.S.-Japan Space
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PAGE 01 TOKYO 05298 030750Z

7

ACTION EA 15

INFO GPM 03, SC 01, RSC 01, MM 01, USIA 12, H 02, NSC 10, L 03, INR 07, P 04,

CIAE 00, DODE 00, SP 02, SS 20, SCI 05, NSAE 00, ACDA 16, NASA 04,

OST 01, E 15, AEC 11, SAH 03, MC 01, GDP 01, RSR 01, /139 W

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R 030409Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8561
INFO CINCPAC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOKYO 5298

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: SPACE COOPERATION

REF: A. TOKYO 5191
B. STATE 108419

1. SUBSEQUENT TO ARTICLE MENTIONED REFTEL (TEXT BEING TRANSMITTED BY SEPTTEL, ASAHI CAME OUT WITH EDITORIAL IN BOTH JAPANESE AND ENGLISH EDITIONS (BECAUSE OF LENGTH TEXT BEING POUCHED), WHICH CONTAINED SEVERAL BOTHERSOME POINTS SUCH AS ALLEGATION WE WERE URGING JAPAN TO ENACT AN OFFICIAL

PAGE 2 RUALOT 5298D ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECRETS LAW AND CONFUSING "MILITARY SECRETS" WITH CIVIL TECHNOLOGY. EDITORIAL WHICH WAS BASICALLY UNFRIENDLY WAS BASED UPON APPARENT MISUNDERSTANDING OF FACTS.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cm/h* NARA, Date 3-12-09

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 TOKYO 05298 030750Z

2. I THEREFORE SPOKE TO USHIBA ON MATTER AND HE SAID HE PLANNED TO DISCUSS WITH ASAHI.

3. SUBSEQUENTLY MAINICHI HAS CARRIED A CONSIDERABLY MORE ACCURATE AND INTRINSICALLY FRIENDLY ACCOUNT WHICH ALSO BEING TRANSMITTED BY SEPTTEL. JOHNSON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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TELEGRAM

*U.S.-Japan Space
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PAGE 01 TOKYO 05369 060819Z

7
ACTION E 15

INFO EA 10, L 03, OC 06, CCO 00, DTM 02, FCC 02, NASA 04, GPM 03, INR 07,
NSC 10, CIAE 00, NSAE 00, DODE 00, OST 01, COM 08, SCI 05, /076 W

R 060707Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8599
INFO CINCPAC

UNCLAS TOKYO 5369

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: SPACE COOPERATION (#)

LUMAMBUN ARTICLE, FEB 5, 1968, WHICH GIVES MUCH MORE BALANCED
TREATMENT THAN DID ASAHI ARTICLE, REF. C, AND EDITORIAL.

PAGE 2 RUALOT 5369 UNCLAS
BEGIN TEXT.

HEADLINES: SPEEDUP IN SPACE DEVELOPMENT: U.S. COOPERATION
TO BE RECEIVED.

SUBHEAD: COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE IN 1970 -- GOVERNMENT-LDP
POLICY.

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC (LDP), WHICH HAD
BEEN STUDYING A RECENT U.S. PROPOSAL FOR BILATERAL COOPERATION
IN SPACE DEVELOPMENT, HAVE SOLIDIFIED THEIR POLICY OF POSITIVELY
ACCEPTING U.S. TECHNICAL COOPERATION AND HAVE DECIDED TO HAVE THE
LDP SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON SPACE DEVELOPMENT (CHAIRMAN: MR. KIICHI

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PAGE 02 TOKYO 05369 060819Z

AICHI) DISCUSS CONCRETE MEASURES AT A MEETING TO BE CONVENED ON THE 5TH. THEY HAVE STRENGTHENED THEIR VIEW THAT IF U.S. COOPERATION IS OBTAINED IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR JAPAN TO GREATLY REDUCE ITS LAG IN SPACE DEVELOPMENT AND TO LAUNCH AN EXPERIMENTAL COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE IN 1970 AS ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED, WITHOUT POSTPONING IT FOR ONE YEAR.

PAGE 3 RUALOT 5369 UNCLAS

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ON THE BASIS OF THIS, THE U.S. SIDE ON JANUARY 17 CONVEYED ITS INTENTIONS TO JAPAN -- IN A DOCUMENT DELIVERED TO PRIME MINISTER SATO BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON -- TO THE EFFECT THAT IF ACCEPTABLE TO JAPAN THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXPERIMENTAL COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES. ACCORDING TO THIS DOCUMENT, THE U.S. SIDE IS SAID TO HAVE CONVEYED ITS THINKING ON SUCH MATTERS AS (1) LAUNCHING JAPANESE-MADE SATELLITES WITH U.S. ROCKETS AND (2) COOPERATION IN ROCKET-RELATED TECHNOLOGY, PARTICULARLY IN GUIDANCE AND TRACKING SYSTEMS IN WHICH JAPAN LAGS.

PAGE 4 RUALOT 5369 UNCLAS

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PAGE 03 TOKYO 05369 060819Z

TO COORDINATE VIEWS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND LDP.

AT THE MOMENT, THE VIEW IS STRONG WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND LDP THAT JAPAN SHOULD ACCEPT U.S. TECHNICAL COOPERATION IF SHE IS TO REDUCE HER LAG IN SPACE DEVELOPMENT. THE MOOD IS STRONG IN FAVOR OF JAPAN LAUNCHING AN EXPERIMENTAL COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE IN 1970 WHEN THE PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT ON INTELSAT WILL BE CONVERTED INTO A PERMANENT ONE. FROM THIS VIEWPOINT, CHAIRMAN AICHI AND OTHERS ALSO ESTIMATE THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR JAPAN TO LAUNCH AN EXPERIMENTAL COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE IN 1970 INSTEAD OF 1971 IF U.S. COOPERATION WERE OBTAINED -- BY RETURNING TO THE ORIGINAL PLAN WHICH WAS MODIFIED LAST YEAR BECAUSE OF JAPAN'S LAG

PAGE 5 RUALOT 5369 UNCLAS

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END TEXT. JOHNSON

OTE: (#) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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FYI -

see p. 2.

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Thanks
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Please return to C&L



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PAGE 01 TOKYO 04765 171142Z

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ACTION : GPM 03

INFO EA 10, SC 01, RSC 01, USIA 12, H 02, NSC 10, L 03, INR 07, P 04, CIAE 00,
DODE 00, SP 02, SS 20, SCI 05, MM 01, NSAE 00, ACDA 16, NASA 04, DST 01,
E 15, AEC 11, SAH 03, OC 06, DTM 02, FCC 02, CCO 00, EUR 15, RSR 01,
/157 W

R 171008Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8207
INFO CINCPAC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOKYO 4765

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: SPACE COOPERATION WITH JAPAN

REF: STATE 93721

1. GREATLY APPRECIATE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE AND HELPFUL INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN REFTEL. I FELT THIS MATTER WAS OF SUCH FAR-REACHING IMPORTANCE IN OUR RELATIONS, AND SO TIMELY WITH RESPECT TO DISCUSSIONS NOW GOING ON WITHIN GOJ CONCERNING ORGANIZATION AND FUTURE THRUST OF ITS OWN SPACE PROGRAM, THAT INITIAL PRESENTATION SHOULD BE MADE TO PRIME

PAGE 2 RUALOT 4765D ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
MINISTER. THIS I DID TODAY. MEETING LASTED OVER ONE HOUR
AND A HALF, AT WHICH CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY KIMURA AND VICE
FOREIGN MINISTER USHIBA WERE PRESENT. I MADE PRESENTATION

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By dm/s NARA, Date 3-12-09



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IN CONTEXT OUR PREVIOUS BROAD DISCUSSIONS OF SPACE COOPERATION, THE VISIT OF DIET MEMBERS TO WASHINGTON LAST SEPTEMBER AND VARIOUS OUTSTANDING LICENSE REQUESTS AND INQUIRIES FROM COMMERCIAL SOURCES THAT HAVE COME UP. I ALSO NOTED PRESENT DISCUSSION IN JAPAN OF SPACE ORGANIZATION AND FUTURE PROGRAMS WITH THEIR TREMENDOUS FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS. I NOTED THE UNIQUE NATURE OF COOPERATION WE WERE OFFERING TO JAPAN, THE MEANING THIS COULD HAVE IN TERMS OUR FUTURE OVERALL RELATIONSHIP AND THE FINANCIAL SAVINGS THAT COULD ACCRUE TO JAPAN. I THEN GAVE TO AND DISCUSSED IN DETAIL WITH PRIME MINISTER A "TALKING PAPER" INCORPORATING MAIN ELEMENTS IN OUR PROPOSAL.

2. PRIME MINISTER WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE, OBVIOUSLY INTENSELY INTERESTED AND, AS I EXPECTED, SAID THAT BECAUSE THIS INVOLVED SO MANY ELEMENTS AND AGENCIES OF HIS GOVERNMENT HE WOULD WANT TO DEFER GIVING ME A CONSIDERED REPLY UNTIL HE HAD OPPORTUNITY

PAGE 3 RUALOT 4765D ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
TO CONSULT WITH THEM. HE INDICATED THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THEIR CONTINUING TO COOPERATE WITH INTELSAT AND, AS I ALSO EXPECTED, NOTED THE DIFFICULTY GOJ WOULD HAVE (IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY OFFICIAL SECRETS LAW) OF ASSURING TECHNOLOGY WOULD NOT BE TRANSFERRED TO THIRD COUNTRIES. I SAID I APPRECIATED THEIR PROBLEM IN THIS REGARD BUT THIS WAS OBVIOUSLY AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF COMMON CONCERN.

3. I DO NOT EXPECT TO HEAR ANYTHING DEFINITIVE FROM GOJ ON THIS MATTER FOR SOMETIME, WHILE THEY WRESTLE WITH THEIR OWN INTERNAL PROBLEMS, BUT BELIEVE OUR ABILITY TO MAKE THIS OFFER NOW WAS MOST TIMELY AND WILL HAVE HEALTHY EFFECT ON GOJ THINKING.

4. AS A FOOTNOTE, PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT IT WAS CURIOUS COINCIDENCE THAT IN HIS TALK WITH BAIBAKOV (SOVIET DEPUTY PREMIER) THIS MORNING PRIME MINISTER'S MENTION OF SOVIETS'S PROGRESS IN SPACE AND HOW HE HOPED THAT SOVIETS WOULD SHARE THIS WITH OTHERS WAS MET BY DEAD SILENCE.

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PAGE 4 RUALOT 4765D ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. AS ANOTHER FOOTNOTE, IN INSTRUCTING KIMURA TO SET UP MEETING OF INTERESTED AGENCIES ON THIS SUBJECT PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT THERE WAS "TOO MUCH NATIONAL PRIDE AND DESIRE TO RELY EXCLUSIVELY ON DOMESTIC RESOURCES IN JAPANESE SPACE PROGRAM."

GP-3 JOHNSON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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ORIGIN GPM 03

INFO EA 10, SC 01, RSC 01, USIA 12, H 02, NSC 10, L 03, INR 07, P 04, CIAE 00,
DODE 00, SP 02, SS 20, SCI 05, MM 01, NSAE 00, ACDA 16, NASA 04, OST 01,
E 15, MC 01, GDP 01, AEC 11, SAH 03, OC 06, DTM 02, FCC 02, CCO 00, /143 R

DRAFTED BY: G/PM:JCTRIPE/PMH

APPROVED BY: EA/J - RICHARD L. SNEIDER

R 090103Z JAN 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1145
INFO CINCPAC

~~BOWDLER~~
~~BUDGET~~
~~DAVIS~~
~~FRIED~~
~~GINSBURGH~~
~~HAMILTON~~
~~JESSUP~~
~~JOHNSON~~
~~JORDEN~~
~~KEENE~~
~~LEONHART~~
~~ROCHE~~
~~SAUNDERS~~
~~TAYLOR~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 95304

REF: STATE 93721

SUBJECT: SPACE COOPERATION WITH JAPAN

1. FOLLOWING CORRECTIONS SHOULD BE MADE IN REFTEL:

A. PARA 3 B SHOULD READ QTE THEREFORE, TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT ARE NOT INTENDED TO BE EXCLUDED AUTOMATICALLY ON GROUNDS THAT THEY MIGHT ASSIST A POSSIBLE JAPANESE BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM. UNQTE

B. PARA 4 A SHOULD READ QTE WE ANTICIPATE SPACE

PAGE 2 RUEHC 95304 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Authority NLY030R-B-5-1
By CTS, NARA, Date 12/10/17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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PAGE 02 STATE 95304

COOPERATION COULD BE EXTENDED AT TWO LEVELS: (1) GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT; (2) SUBSEQUENT AGENCY/LEVEL AGREEMENTS IN SPECIFIC JOINT PROJECTS, INCLUDING PROVISION OF REIMBURSABLE LAUNCH SERVICES, AND INDUSTRY-TO-INDUSTRY LICENSING ARRANGEMENTS REQUIRING GOVERNMENT APPROVAL UNDER MUNITIONS CONTROL PROCEDURES AND CONSISTENT WITH PROVISIONS OF NSAM 338. UNQTE.

C. PARA 5 SHOULD READ QTE WE SUGGEST YOU UNDERTAKE APPROPRIATE DISCUSSIONS WITH GOJ. IF, IN YOUR JUDGMENT, GOJ SINCERE ON END-USE TECHNOLOGY CONSISTENT WITH INTEL SAT ARRANGEMENTS, WE WILL BE IN POSITION TO MOVE AHEAD VIS-A-VIS NSAM 338 ON GOVERNMENT, AND LATER ON AGENCY AND INDUSTRY LEVELS AS APPROPRIATE. ACTION ON PROPOSALS INVOLVING NSAM 294 WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN FOLLOWING APPROPRIATE AGREEMENT AS SET FORTH PARA 4 D ABOVE, WHEN IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE JAPANESE, WE WOULD WANT TO UNDERTAKE APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION PRIOR TO FORMALIZING AGREEMENT WITH THE JAPANESE. UNQTE

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ORIGIN GPM 03

INFO SC 01, RSC 01, USIA 12, H 02, NSC 10, L 03, INR 07, P 04, CIA 04, DOD 01,
SP 02, SS 20, SCI 05, MM 01, NSAE 00, ACDA 16, NASA 04, OST 01, E 15,
MC 01, GDP 01, AEC 11, SAH 03, EA 15, OC 06, NSA 02, DTM 02, FCC 02,
CCO 00, /155 R

DRAFTED BY: G/PM: JTRIPPE/EA/J: RLSNEIDER
APPROVED BY: M: EUGENE V ROSTOW, THE SECRETARY
E/TT: MR. LOY (DRAFT)
SCI: MR. PACKARD
OSD/ISA: DR. HALPERIN (DRAFT)
NASA: MR. FRUTKIN
H: AMB. TORBER
G/PM: MR. FARLEY
WHITE HOUSE
RM-MC: MR. SIPES
ACDA: MR. FISHER
S/S: MR. PARKER
EA: MR. BERGER

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Authority NLJ-0302-13-5-2
By CTS, NARA, Date 12/20/17

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 93721

FOR AMBASSADOR

SUBJECT: SPACE COOPERATION WITH JAPAN

REFERENCE: TOKYO 3837

1. AGREEMENT IN NOVEMBER 15 COMMUNIQUE BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PRIME MINISTER SATO (PARA 9) OPENS WAY FOR EXPANDED SPACE COOPERATION WITH JAPAN AND WE WOULD LIKE TO INITIATE DISCUSSION WITH GOJ TO THIS END. WE CONSIDER CLOSE COOPERATION WITH JAPAN IN FIELD OF SPACE VERY MUCH IN US INTEREST. SUCH COOPERATION, FIRST, ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH OUR BASIC RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN AND NATIONAL POLICY OF CLOSEST POSSIBLE PARTNERSHIP WITH JAPAN IN BOTH BILATERAL RELATIONS AND JOINT ACTIONS TO STRENGTHEN NON-COMMUNIST POSITION IN EAST ASIA. FURTHERMORE, GIVEN JAPANESE CAPABILITY TO DEVELOP -- IF IT CHOSE TO CHANGE CURRENT POLICY -- NUCLEAR WEAPONS DELIVERY SYSTEM UNILATERALLY AND WITHOUT FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, WE CONCLUDE THAT FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE ON SPACE COOPERATION WITH JAPAN WILL BETTER SERVE US POLICY OBJECTIVES OF BOTH DISCOURAGING PROLIFERATION TENDENCIES IN JAPAN AND ENCOURAGING CONTINUED JAPANESE FOCUS ON EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL EXPLOITATION OF SPACE. IN FACT, WE ASSUME THAT DENYING TO JAPAN CERTAIN UNCLASSIFIED TECHNOLOGY RELATING TO SPACE EXPLOITATION WILL ENCOURAGE UNILATERAL PROGRAM, AND VERY NATIONALISTIC TENDENCIES AND SUSPICION OF US WHICH COULD STIMULATE DECISION BY GOJ OVER NEXT DECADES TO EXERCISE ITS NUCLEAR OPTION. ON OTHER HAND, CLOSEST COOPERATION IN SPACE FIELD WILL AFFORD US SOME INCREASED INFLUENCE ON DECISIONS IN THIS AREA.

2. THEREFORE, ON BASIS OF DISCUSSIONS WITH YOU HERE, WE HAVE DEVELOPED FOLLOWING POLICY REGARDING SPACE COOPERATION WITH JAPAN:

A. UNDER NSAM 338, WE ARE PREPARED TO COOPERATE IN ALL ASPECTS OF COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE DEVELOPMENT AND LAUNCH ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT BOTH GOVERNMENTS WILL CONTINUE TO ACT IN THIS SPHERE IN CONFORMITY WITH THEIR INTELSAT COMMITMENTS.

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THEREFORE, WE WOULD APPROVE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS ONLY AFTER DETERMINING TO OUR SATISFACTION THAT IT WOULD BE USED ONLY IN (I) PURELY EXPERIMENTAL (AS OPPOSED TO OPERATIONAL) SYSTEMS OR (II) OPERATIONALLY DOMESTIC SYSTEMS COMPATIBLE WITH INTELSAT ARRANGEMENTS AS THEY EVOLVE. FYI - NEITHER JAPANESE NOR WE ARE IN POSITION TO PREDICT JUST WHAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR SATELLITE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OTHER THAN BY INTELSAT WILL BE REFLECTED IN RENEGOTIATED INTELSAT AGREEMENTS. HOWEVER, PRESIDENT JOHNSON, IN HIS MESSAGE OF AUGUST 14 (CA 1299, DATED AUGUST 15), COMMITTED US TO SUPPORT CONTINUATION OF INTELSAT AND TO AVOID COURSE OF ACTION WHICH IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH OUR SUPPORT FOR A GLOBAL SYSTEM. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT IS NOT UNREASONABLE TO INDICATE TO JAPANESE THAT WE COULD NOT ASSIST THEM IF THEIR POLICY IS TO CONTRARY. END FYI.

B. UNDER NSAM 294, JAPANESE CASE DIFFERS FROM FRENCH CASE IN THAT THERE IS NO JAPANESE PROGRAM FOR DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR DELIVERY SYSTEMS. THIS BEING KNOWN JAPANESE POLICY, EXPLICIT PREMISE OF LAUNCH VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION SHOULD BE A JAPANESE GOVERNMENT REAFFIRMATION THAT LAUNCH VEHICLE COOPERATION IS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES ONLY. TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT WILL NO LONGER BE EXCLUDED AUTOMATICALLY ON GROUNDS THAT IT MIGHT ASSIST A POSSIBLE JAPANESE BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM. WE DO NOT WANT TO BE GRUDGING IN SPACE COOPERATION, BUT SHOULD AVOID ASSISTANCE IN AREAS THAT APPEAR TO BE PRIMARILY BALLISTIC MISSILE ORIENTED.

C. ONLY UNCLASSIFIED US TECHNOLOGY IS INVOLVED.

D. THERE MUST BE JAPANESE GOVT COMMITMENT ON THIRD COUNTRY CONTROLS. TRANSFERS OF TECHNOLOGY DERIVED FROM US COOPERATION TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND SOVIET UNION MUST BE EXPLICITLY EXCLUDED. SALES OR TECHNICAL EXCHANGES INVOLVING OTHER THIRD COUNTRIES WILL REQUIRE PRIOR USG/GOJ AGREEMENT, BASED ON COMMON POLICY FOR US AND GOJ SUPPLIERS.

E. OUR COOPERATION WOULD HAVE TO BE REVIEWED IF THERE WERE AT ANY TIME REASON TO BELIEVE THAT JAPAN WAS UNDERTAKING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM OR PERMITTING TECHNOLOGY DERIVED

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FROM COOPERATION WITH US TO GO TO COMMUNIST CHINA.

3. GUIDELINES FOR REVIEW OF APPLICATIONS FOR LICENSES, EXPORT OF EQUIPMENT OR TECHNOLOGY WILL BE:

A. WE DO NOT WANT TO BE GRUDGING IN SPACE COOPERATION, BUT SHOULD AVOID ASSISTANCE IN AREAS THAT APPEAR TO BE PRIMARILY BALLISTIC MISSILE ORIENTED.

B. THEREFORE, TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT IS NOT TO BE EXCLUDED AUTOMATICALLY ON GROUNDS THAT IT MIGHT SIGNIFICANTLY ASSIST JAPANESE BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM;

C. LICENSES FOR EXPORT OF EQUIPMENT OR TECHNOLOGY WILL BE GRANTED IF EQUIPMENT OR TECHNOLOGY IS UNCLASSIFIED AND RELATED TO AN IDENTIFIED JAPANESE PEACEFUL SPACE PROGRAM OR OBJECTIVE; AND

D. WE ARE SATISFIED THAT END-USE OF TECHNOLOGY APPLIED TO COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES WILL BE CONSISTENT WITH INTELSAT ARRANGEMENTS AS THEY DEVELOP.

4. ON BASIS ABOVE, WE PROPOSE MOVING AHEAD WITH GOJ ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

A. WE ANTICIPATE SPACE COOPERATION COULD BE EXTENDED AT TWO LEVELS: (1) GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT AND/OR AGENCY/LEVEL AGREEMENTS IN SPECIFIC JOINT PROJECTS, INCLUDING PROVISION OF REIMBURSABLE LAUNCH SERVICES AND (2) INDUSTRY-TO-INDUSTRY LICENSING ARRANGEMENTS REQUIRING GOVERNMENT APPROVAL UNDER MUNITIONS CONTROL PROCEDURES AND CONSISTENT WITH PROVISIONS OF NSAM 338.

B. WE ARE PREPARED TO ADOPT POSITIVE POSITION IN ALL AREAS OF PEACEFUL SPACE COOPERATION - INCLUDING TECHNOLOGY, RE-IMBURSABLE LAUNCH SERVICES, AND ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPMENT OF LAUNCH VEHICLES NECESSARY FOR APPLICATION SATELLITES.

C. THE JAPANESE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT WE TAKE OUR COMMITMENT TO INTELSAT SERIOUSLY AND WOULD NOT ACT INCONSISTENTLY WITH IT. THEREFORE, WE WOULD APPROVE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS

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PAGE 05 STATE 93721

ONLY AFTER DETERMINING TO OUR SATISFACTION THAT IT WOULD BE USED ONLY IN (I) PURELY EXPERIMENTAL (AS OPPOSED TO OPERATIONAL) SYSTEMS OR (II) OPERATIONALLY DOMESTIC SYSTEMS COMPATIBLE IN INTELSAT ARRANGEMENTS AS THEY EVOLVE.

D. WE WOULD WANT AN AGREEMENT WITH JAPANESE GOVERNMENT (PREFERABLY THROUGH EXCHANGE OF NOTES) COVERING TWO POINTS:

(1) TECHNOLOGY OR EQUIPMENT TRANSFERRED UNDER EITHER GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT AGREEMENTS OR INDUSTRY-TO INDUSTRY ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES EXCEPT AS MAY BE OTHERWISE MUTUALLY AGREED; AND,

(2) TECHNOLOGY OR EQUIPMENT DERIVED FROM US COOPERATION CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES TO COMMUNIST CHINA OR THE SOVIET UNION AND CAN BE TRANSFERRED TO OTHER THIRD COUNTRIES ONLY AFTER MUTUAL AGREEMENT BASED ON COMMON EXPORT POLICIES.

5. WE SUGGEST YOU UNDERTAKE APPROPRIATE DISCUSSIONS WITH GOJ. IF, IN YOUR JUDGMENT, GOJ SINCERE ON END-USE TECHNOLOGY CONSISTENT WITH INTELSAT ARRANGEMENTS, WE WILL BE IN POSITION TO MOVE AHEAD VIS-A-VIS NSAM 338 ON GOVERNMENT, AGENCY, AND LATER ON INDUSTRY LEVELS AS APPROPRIATE. ACTION ON PROPOSALS INVOLVING NSAM 294 WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN FOLLOWING APPROPRIATE AGREEMENT AS SET FORTH PARA 3 D ABOVE, WHEN IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE JAPANESE, WE WOULD WANT TO UNDERTAKE APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION PRIOR TO FORMALIZING AGREEMENT WITH THE JAPANESE.
GP-3. RUSK

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Major
file *8*
January 4, 1967

~~SECRET~~
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Subject: Space Cooperation with Japan

The attached memorandum from Ben Read forwards for White House clearance instructions on space cooperation with Japan. The cable instructs Alexis Johnson to explore with the Japanese arrangements whereby we would supply them advanced space equipment and technology, subject to agreement that the Japanese would use them for peaceful purposes, under third country controls, and consistent with INTELSAT. Alexis Johnson is very interested in this proposal and would like to get a go-ahead as soon as possible.

The cable, which has now been cleared by the interested offices in State, Defense, ACDA, and NASA, involves some important issues on our policy toward INTELSAT and the diffusion of missile technology. Therefore, when it was decided not to have SIG review the matter, I asked that the cable be cleared with the White House in view of its policy and political implications.

On balance, I agree that we should go ahead with this although I believe it may well present more problems -- including domestic politics -- than are apparent from the cable. Some action is clearly called for as a result of the recent Johnson-Sato Joint Communique (relevant paragraph attached). Moreover, unless we take some action, the Japanese will probably go it alone which would be undesirable. One can also argue that this will not really undercut our policy of not assisting Nth countries to develop strategic nuclear forces since the Japanese are formally committed against doing so. (In this connection, I would note that the broader technological coverage of NSAM 294 was specifically directed at France with its existing strategic nuclear program.)

I am somewhat troubled by the fact, however, that the arrangements would permit direct industry-to-industry licensing of space technology (such as advanced rocket guidance) since the Japanese want to build the equipment themselves rather than purchase it from us.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13272, Sec. 3.4
By *cm/jg* NARA, Date *3-12-09*

Whatever the limitations of the proposed agreement, the development of this indigenous Japanese capability to produce advanced missile equipment will raise questions as to whether it will get to other countries, including Communist China.

Al Jenkins believes that it is unrealistic to expect that unclassified information and equipment we give to Japan will not reach the Communist Chinese, one way or another. However, he believes we should take the chance in order to reap the benefits of cooperation with the Japanese and to discourage Japanese development of a possibly non-compatible, competitive Japanese satellite communications system.

I have also cleared the cable with General O'Connell who concurs "with mental reservations." He is concerned that by giving the Japanese a special position we may complicate our other international negotiations and that the unleashing of the aerospace industry abroad will accelerate the proliferation of missile and space technology to our disadvantage.

The present plan is for Alexis Johnson to explore this proposal with the Japanese first and then for us to take Congressional consultation prior to formal agreements. Although I am not able to judge whether there will be a Congressional problem here, this is clearly a more substantive issue than the usual debates with the Joint Committee on the export of technology with security implications, and I do not think this aspect of the problem has been given very critical attention.

I recommend that you clear the attached cable if you are willing to defer Congressional consultation until after we have made the offer to the Japanese.

Atts.:

1. Memo Read to Rostow
att'g draft cable to Tokyo
2. Excerpt fm para IX of
Johnson-Sato Communique

Spurgeon Keeny

SMK:jhl-4-68/6pm
bcc: CEJohnson
AleSJenkins

Approved

Disapproved

See me

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

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TELEGRAM
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~~SECRET~~ 071

Kerry

PAGE 01 TOKYO 04398 031330Z

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ACTION GPM 03

INFO EA 15, L 03, SS 20, NSC 10, SCI 05, ACDA 16, INR 07, MM 01, RSR 01,

RSC 01, /082 W

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R 031253Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7990

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 4398

FROM ROSTOW FOR FARLEY AND FISHER

SUBJECT: SPACE COOPERATION WITH JAPAN

AMBASSADOR JOHNSON TELLS ME HE HAS NOT YET RECEIVED CABLED INSTRUCTIONS ON SPACE COOPERATION WITH JAPAN. I AM SURPRISED SINCE I THOUGHT THIS MATTER HAD BEEN CLEARED AWAY BEFORE I LEFT. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR SEEING THAT MESSAGE GETS OUT SOONEST.

GP-3. JOHNSON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13282, Sec. 3.4
By *chm/ry* NARA, Date *3-12-09*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Charles Johnson
White House

10

December 29, 1967

MEMORANDUM

TO: G/PM - Mr. Farley

FROM: ACDA/GC - Charles N. Van Doren

In Mr. Fisher's absence, I was asked to follow up on the meeting he had with Mr. Rostow last Saturday on the cable to Tokyo on space cooperation, to insure that the final version of the cable reflected accurately the compromise reached at that meeting. In checking over the revised draft of the cable, the Acting Director of the Agency and I were concerned that paragraph 3(c) might be read out of context as meaning that the opportunity to show that a particular area of assistance appeared to be primarily ballistic missile oriented would be denied as irrelevant if the equipment or technology was unclassified and related to an identified Japanese peaceful space program or objective. Such a reading could nullify the effect of the compromise language in paragraphs 3(a) and 2(b).

Mr. Aaron has assured me that you agree that the cable is not intended to have this effect, and that paragraph 3(c) will not be construed to nullify the statement that we "should avoid assistance in areas that appear to be primarily ballistic missile oriented." He has also advised me that this cable will be followed by efforts to implement its general guidelines with more specific guidance, and that ACDA will have an opportunity to participate in such efforts.

With these understandings, we are satisfied that the cable reflects the compromise reached last Saturday, except that, to make the guidance in paragraph 3(b) consistent with the policy in paragraph 2(b) we recommend that 3(b) read as follows:

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Authority NJ-030R-13-S-3
By CTS, NARA, Date 12/10/17

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year
intervals, not
automatically declassified

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"(b) Technology and equipment are not intended to be excluded automatically on grounds that they might assist a possible Japanese ballistic missile program.

We also wish to point out that the reference on the last line of the cable should be to paragraph 4(d) rather than 3(d).

cc: Mr. Charles Johnson
The White House



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 706

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ACTION GPM 03

INFO EA 10, SC 01, RSC 01, MM 01, USIA 12, H 02, NSC 10, L 03, INR 07, P 04,

CIAE 00, DODE 00, SP 02, SS 20, SCI 05, NSAE 00, ACDA 16, NASA 04,

OST 01, E 15, AEC 11, SAH 03, MC 01, GDP 01, RSR 01, /134 W

R 310753Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8485
INFO CINCPAC

~~BOWDLER~~
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~~DAVIS~~
~~FRIED~~
~~GINSBURGH~~
~~HAMILTON~~
~~JESSUP~~
~~JOHNSON~~
~~JORDEN~~
~~KEENE~~ P
~~LEONHART~~
~~ROCHE~~
~~SAUNDERS~~
~~TAYLOR~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOKYO 5191

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: SPACE COOPERATION WITH JAPAN

REF: TOKYO 4765

I PRIVATELY SPOKE TO VICE FOMIN USHIBA TODAY OF MY UNHAPPINESS AT SEEING IN TODAY'S JAPANESE EDITION OF THE ASAHI A VERY FULL AND SUBSTANTIALLY ACCURATE ACCOUNT OF PRESENTATION I HAD MADE TO PRIME MINISTER ON SPACE. USHIBA EXPRESSED HIS OWN DISTRESS AND APOLOGIES, POINTING OUT THAT OF NECESSITY MATTER HAD TO BE DISCUSSED WITH A NUMBER OF GOJ AGENCIES AND I WELL KNEW ABILITY OF JAPANESE PRESS TO FERRET OUT THESE MATTERS.

GP-3. JOHNSON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By don/g, NARA, Date 3-12-09