

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Page 1

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
01	memo	C. Johnson to Rostow	S-	1	6/23/67	A
01a	memo	Rostow to the President	S-	2	6/27/67	A
01b	memo	Rostow to SecDef	S-	1	6/29/67	A
01c	memo	Vance to SpecAsst to Pres. For NS Affairs	S-	2	6/15/67	A
01d	memo	Morrill to C. Johnson	S-	2	5/17/67	A
01e	memo	C. Johnson to Rostow	S-	1	5/31/67	A
01f	memo	Rostow to SecDef	S-	1	5/31/67	A
01g	memo	Vance to the President	S-	2	5/9/67	A
02	memo	Keeny to Bundy	S	1		A
open 12:30-09 NLJ 09.14.9						
03	memo	Keeny to Bundy	TS-	1	10/4/65	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Charles E. Johnson

Folder Title "NUCLEAR - British Based U.S. Nuclear ASW Weapons, Use of (NATO)"

Box Number 30

Restriction Codes

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 13292 governing access to national security information.
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Page 2

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
04	memo	Keeny to Bundy	S	2	10/28/65	A
05	memo	Keeny to Bundy	TS	2	8/26/65	A
06	memo	Bundy to the President	TS-	2	9/1/65	A
06a	memo	Bundy to SecState & SecDef [Duplicate of #6b]	S-	1	9/2/65	A
06b	memo	Duplicate of #6a	S-	1	9/2/65	A
07	draft	to Prime Minister Wilson	TS-	1	undated	A
08	draft	to Prime Minister	TS	1	undated	A
09	cable	Deptel 174 to London	C	3	7/12/65	A
10	memo	NSAM 197 [Sanitized per NLK 94-5]	TS-	3	10/23/62	A
12a	draft	to President Johnson	TS-	3	undated	A

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Page 3

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
13	memo	"Report to the President & the Prime Minister"	TS	2	6/7/58	A
13a	memo	"Annex A"	TS	2	[6/58]	A
13b	memo	"Annex B"	TS	2	[6/58]	A

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November 1, 1965

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Subject: Letters to Prime Minister Wilson

Mac --

Following up the discussion in the staff meeting this morning, I have reviewed the attached letters from the President to Prime Minister Wilson and find that they give us a free hand to inform the Dutch in the future of these arrangements if we so desire. I have rewritten the covering memorandum to the President to make clear that a decision on the question of notifying the Dutch has been deferred. (See penultimate paragraph.)

Also attached are copies of the memoranda you sent to Rusk and McNamara on Sept. 3, 1965, suggesting that this subject be discussed at a future Tuesday luncheon, and my memorandum to you discussing my meeting last week with David Bendall, Counselor, UK Embassy.

Spurgeon Keeny

Atta.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 09-149
By SP, NARA, Date 12-11-09

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SMKeeny:jb:11-1-65
bcc: Mr. CEJohnson ✓
SMK file and chron

To Klein
+ Keeny
w/ drafts 7-7-65

11



11K/LBJ

10 Downing Street
Whitehall

#7

116

March 12, 1964.

~~SECRET~~

John F. Kennedy

I was glad to receive your letter of February 23 in which you reaffirmed the Understandings of our two Governments with regard to consultation on the use of nuclear weapons. I confirm that the Memorandum of Understanding enclosed with your letter correctly represents the position of my Government. At the same time I note your reference to the continuing validity of the undertakings given by our two Governments in 1962 to consult the North Atlantic Council, if time permits, on the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world.

My wife and I warmly reciprocate your feelings about our visit to Washington. The understanding we reached there and the work we are doing together

EX-115

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Authority FRUS, Vol. XII, #224, fn. #3
By *4* NARA, Date 1-13-09

- 2 -

round the world are the most cheering feature of
the international scene and the surest guarantee of
the success of our efforts.

Wm. L. G. King
Wm. L. G. King

The President of the United States of America.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 28, 1964

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~~TOP SECRET~~


Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

In our talks in Washington we agreed that we would reaffirm together the understandings of our two Governments with regard to consultation in the use of nuclear weapons. I now confirm this agreement in the attached Memorandum of Understanding. It is very much like the one which President Kennedy sent to Prime Minister Macmillan in February 1961, except for minor but necessary editorial changes and the deletion of references to the IRBM (Thor) force which is no longer operational.

I note also that our two Governments have a continuing commitment to consult with the North Atlantic Council concerning the use of nuclear weapons anywhere, if time permits.

Let me take this occasion to say again how much Mrs. Johnson and I enjoyed your visit, and how clear its value is as we continue to work together on hard problems all around the world.

Sincerely,



The Right Honorable
Sir Alec Douglas-Home, M. P.,
Prime Minister,
London, England.

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2/28/64 (wah per JM)

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Authority: FRUS, Vol. XXII, # 226
By: *18* NARA, Date: 1-13-09

EXDIS

2488

TAD
C#1
11a
N. Johnson
Consultation

116

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

EXDIS

~~TOP SECRET~~

Understandings with the British on the Use
of British Bases and Nuclear Weapons

1. Our understanding on the use of British bases is that the President and Prime Minister will reach a joint decision by speaking personally with each other before certain forces equipped with U. S. nuclear weapons and operating from bases in the United Kingdom will use nuclear weapons, namely SAC, British Bomber Command*, [SACEUR-assigned forces in the UK,] and U. S. Polaris submarines in British territorial waters. The basic understanding is contained in the communique of January 9, 1952 covering the Truman-Churchill talks:

*forces in the U.K.
which are assigned
or earmarked
for assignment
to a NATO
commander,*

"Under arrangements made for the common defense, the United States has the use of certain bases in the United Kingdom. We reaffirm the understanding that the use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by His Majesty's Government and the United States Government in the light of circumstances prevailing at the time."

Procedures for carrying out this basic understanding were agreed upon in the Murphy-Dean Agreement of June 7, 1958, which was approved by the President and the Prime Minister. The covering document, the Report to the President and the Prime Minister, repeats almost literally the language of the Truman-Churchill communique:

"2. The basic understanding between the United Kingdom and United States Governments, regarding the use of bases in the United Kingdom by United States forces, provides that such use in an emergency shall be a matter for joint decision by the two Governments in the light of the circumstances at the time."

*Excluding aircraft of such Command equipped with British nuclear weapons.

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Authority: FRUS, Vol. XII, #2204 WH, Declass
By: *14* NARA, Date: 1-13-09

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

2. There is a second, more general understanding with the British that we will consult with them before using nuclear weapons anywhere, if possible. The basic understanding on this point is contained in a memorandum of conversation of a meeting between the President and Eden on March 9, 1953. Eden had asked for an assurance of consultation by the President with the Prime Minister prior to U. S. use of any nuclear weapon.

"He (the President) said that the United States would, of course, in the event of increased tension or the threat of war, take every possible step to consult with Britain and our other allies."

The President reaffirmed this understanding when he wrote to the Prime Minister on October 27, 1960, in connection with the Holy Loch berthing:

"With reference to the launching of missiles from U. S. Polaris submarines, I give you the following assurance, which of course is not intended to be used publicly. In the event of an emergency, such as increased tension or the threat of war, the U. S. will take every possible step to consult with Britain and other Allies. This reaffirms the assurance I gave Foreign Secretary Eden on March 9, 1953."

3. It should be noted that the agreement for joint decision by the President and the Prime Minister does not extend to all U. S. forces under SACEUR and SACLANC but only covers those [SACEUR-assigned forces (strike squadrons based in the UK)]** The other U. S. nuclear forces under SACEUR and SACLANC would only be covered by the more general understanding to consult if time permits.

Forces based in the UK which are assigned or earmarked for assignment

Footnote to be deleted

** (This should not be taken to exclude U. S. nuclear forces based in the UK which might be assigned to a NATO commander in the future. In such event such forces would be brought within the terms of the Murphy-Dean Report by appropriate amendment of that Report.)

TO A NATO commander

~~TOP SECRET~~

EXDIS

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

12

Messrs. Klein & Keeny

Do either of you have any
problems with these drafts?

Tell me for any more
background you may not
have.

7/7

dy