

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Will say
1

@. Johnson

USIB dealt with

this on Thurs.

Can we get
whatever document
they came out with?

BKS

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Saturday, May 28, 1966
11:45 a. m.

Mr. President:

This is a reflection of the dark side of the French problem. But I cannot emphasize strongly enough that we are examining here "suspensions," not "indications."

W. W. Rostow

VC support etc.

4
MEMORANDUM FOR: Charles Johnson

Chuck —

In accordance with our telephone conversation, I am attaching as you requested an excerpt of one item from the preliminary draft of the minutes of the 2 June USIB meeting. As I explained, these draft minutes are still subject to approval by the Board at its Thursday meeting.

Jimmy Lay

7 June 1966

(DATE)

~~SECRET~~

4a

7. Review of Intelligence Guidance
Regarding France in the Quarterly
Supplement to the PNIOs
(USIB-D-25.1/21, 26 May 1966)

USIB-M-435
2 June 1966

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Mr. Kent made an oral report with reference to the State Department message from the United States Mission to NATO (USRO) and the Board's request in USIB-D-25.1/21, as well as a subsequent message from the U. S. Embassy in Paris. He noted that BNE review disclosed that the basic PNIOs had already served the Collection Guidance Staff in CIA which had been very busy providing collection guidance on the general area of concern to USRO for the past year.

25X1C

25X1C

be included in the next Quarterly Supplement to the PNIOs. BNE would prefer to state broad collection requirements in this area rather than limiting collection guidance solely to such information derived from the United States.

The Director, DIA did not feel that any drastic action was justified on the basis of the specific evidence cited to date. General Carroll believed that we should take account only of the broader problem in stating intelligence guidance.

The State Member said that he agreed, but that he did have an obligation to inform the USRO that the guidance in the next Quarterly Supplement to the PNIOs will be amplified in the general area outlined in the USRO message.

25X1C

The Board then noted Mr. Kent's comments and concurred in

next Quarterly Supplement to the PNIOs.

In connection with the above discussion, Mr. Parrott reported that a State Department group looking into the operations of the U. S. Military Information Control Committee (US-MICC) has been re-examining the whole problem related to release of military information to foreign governments. He understood that a group in Defense was also engaged in such a re-examination. Mr. Parrott noted that one State proposal would appear to put the USIB in the position of inspector general, charging it with preparing damage assessments in any case of suspected compromise of U. S. classified information. He referred to the paper which has been circulated for Board consideration as USIB-D-17.1/22 on the general problem of the relative responsibilities of the USIB and the US-MICC, and said that Board action on this paper would be helpful in connection with the review of the US-MICC now underway in State and Defense. He added that in view of the State proposal mentioned above, it would appear to be important to frame any revision of PNIO guidance in strictly positive collection terms, and to avoid any counterintelligence or security flavor.

Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : NLJ-030-032-1-2-3

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ 030-032-1-2

By JP NARA, Date 1/14/09

5

MEMORANDUM FOR: Charles Johnson

In accordance with our telephone conversation, I am attaching as you requested an excerpt of one item from the preliminary draft of the minutes of the 2 June USIB meeting. As I explained, these draft minutes are still subject to approval by the Board at its Thursday meeting.

7 June 1966

(DATE)

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INCL. COLLECT
 □ CHAS. TO

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ACTION: Ambassador PARIS

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1. USIB discussion possible French agreement pass US technology to Russians supports Embassy's invalidation of allegations reported USRO intel 1330. Available evidence points to limited scope likely Franco-Soviet space co-operation and concern of French not to risk their more valuable space co-operation with US.

2. Re Chicoms, ONI informed USIB Sec Nitse was not given indication that US technology being passed Sovs and Chicoms but himself merely wondered as QTE personal suspicion UNQTE whether there might not be danger of this happening.

3. Although no evidence now points to French transmission of classified technical data to Sovs or Chicoms, and although this unlikely develop for number reasons, Embassy [REDACTED] should continue monitor subject.

PNIO's will be appropriately revised.

END

~~As available to the press~~

GP-3.

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 09-195 and RAC

By isl NARA Date 8-3-09

BALL.

Drafted by:
 EUR:WE:REBarbour/INR:REJ:DEMark:mas
 6/3/66

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: INR/REJ - David E. Mark

Clearance

DIA - Cmdr Satterwaite

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 PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

file

February 19, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Alsop Column in Washington Post 2/18/63 on
the French Mirage Bomber

According to Robert N. Margrave, Director of Office of Munitions Control, State Department, the Department has no firm information that the French are trying to buy super-precise terrain avoidance radars in the United States, as reported by Alsop. There have been some hints that the French may be interested in acquiring the FPS-7, a major permanent type fixed radar costing approximately \$25 million each. Margrave is seeing Capt. Senner (Navy), Head of the French Materiel Mission in Washington, tomorrow and anticipates some conversation on this subject.

Col. Legere is touching bases in the Pentagon to see what can be discovered in the way of French initiative on this matter.


Charles E. Johnson

cc: Mr. Smith
Col. Legere

Wash. Post Feb 18 1963

file Frank
mes.

Matter of Fact By Joseph Alsop

The Mirage of the Mirage

ON FRIDAY, coldly defying warning of a plotted assassination, Gen. Charles de Gaulle went to the French War College to lecture the student body. His subject was the military power and the political significance to the French nuclear force.



Alsop

The incident once again underlines a key fact—just possibly, the key fact—in the Europe of 1963. The fact is that de Gaulle genuinely believes that his new deterrent will deter.

What then is the nature of this French "force de frappe," and why is it doomed not to fulfill Gen. de Gaulle's expectations?

In the first phase, the "force de frappe" is to be composed of light, fast Mirage IV bombers, which will carry free-falling atomic bombs with a power of between 50 and 150 kilotons. Seven Mirages are to become operational this year. The entire force of 50 Mirages is to be ready in 1965.

The Mirage is an excellent aircraft, almost identical with the best and newest American light bomber, the Navy's A3J. It has a speed close to Mach 2, or about 1200 miles an hour at altitude, and it can do 600 miles an hour, or perhaps a little better, when flying on the deck.

Its range is an important limitation. Following the proposed French attack plan, in fact, a Mirage can barely reach Moscow one-way, even after being refueled by tanker in the very border of the Soviet bloc.

NONETHELESS, since there is no lack of French pilots brave enough to have a one-way strike, the original concept of the "force de frappe" was entirely sound. The concept was to attack at very low altitude, thus taking advantage of the low altitude gap which then existed in the Soviet air defense system.

The concept is sound no longer, however, for the quite simple reason that the low altitude gap is now rapidly filled by the so-called Soviet Sam-3 missile. The Sam-3, comparable to the American Hawk missile, is specifically designed to kill low-flying planes.

The French Defense Minister, Pierre Messmer, has recently claimed that the Mirages will fly too low and too

fast to be killed by Sam-3s. But this is demonstrably incorrect.

To begin with, the Mirages cannot literally traverse Russia at tree-top level, or if they attempt this, there will be no Mirages soon after the flight begins. The lowest the bombers can practically fly is somewhere between 300 and 500 feet, except, of course, just over target.

The French Defense Ministry is clearly aware that it will be far from easy to cross the vast Russian spaces at this altitude, for they have been trying to buy super-precise terrain avoidance radars in the United States.

Flying at 300 to 500 feet, at close to the speed of sound, a Mirage will present a target to a Sam-3's elevated radar for about two minutes.

Two minutes will give the Sam-3 an unfortunately ample margin to "lock onto" and destroy the Mirage. The American Hawk missile can "lock on," launch itself, and kill a low-flying jet plane within 30 seconds. It must be assumed that the similar Russian weapon can do the same.

A LAST-MINUTE descent to true tree-top level will not save the Mirages, either. Being so short-ranged, they will be forced to fly straight courses, down well defined corridors, from the Soviet bloc borders to almost every significant urban target in western Russia. Hence the Soviets will find it easy to organize their Sam-3 defenses, not only ring-fashion around their cities but also in depth along the inevitable attack-corridors.

It may be taken as certain that the Soviet air defense command will do just this. Already, they have quite literally deployed many thousands of their high altitude anti-aircraft missiles, the Sam-2s. The Sam-3 deployment is known to be going forward with comparable scale.

The high-altitude Sam-3s foreclose the Mirages from extending their range, and thus escaping from their attack-corridors, by flying at high altitudes during part of their journey. The light weight of the Mirages precludes their carrying anything like the supply of missile-fooling devices which the far heavier American B-52s are able to carry.

Nor is this the whole answer to Defense Minister Messmer's reported remark that French bombers can be

counted on to do as well as American bombers.

Despite the B-52's superior missile-fooling equipment and their vastly superior numbers, it is known that the American attack plans have been revised because of the Sam-3s. They now call for preliminary missile barrages, to beat pathways through the Soviet air defenses for the more vulnerable B-52s. The "force de frappe" will not be supplemented by operational missiles until 1969 at the earliest.

IN THE PRESENT phase, therefore, the position is quite clear. By the most conservative expert estimate, the Mirage will have a 40 per cent chance of surviving a single encounter with a Sam-3. When the Soviet Sam-3 defense-in-depth is in place, in 1965 or thereabouts, any attacking Mirage may be expected to encounter at least four Sam-3s.

After four Sam-3 encounters, a Mirage will have no better than a 2 per cent chance of reaching its target. Make the unlikely assumption that all 50 Mirages are operational for a pre-emptive strike. Allow for no aborts whatever for other causes. Even then, only a single bomber of the whole "force de frappe" can be expected to defeat the new Soviet low-altitude defense and reach its target.

It is easy enough to see why Gen. de Gaulle and even Defense Minister Messmer are able to ignore all these grim facts. Much pride; a little wishfulness; the deepest suspicion of the American intelligence concerning the Soviet Sam-3s; above all, advice from air generals who repeat technology-defying incantation of our own Curtis LeMay, "The bomber will always get through"—these are the elements of the delusion.

But although Gen. de Gaulle thinks his deterrent will deter, what of the man to be deterred? Can one imagine Nikita S. Khrushchev's being deterred, even for an instant, by a force which he will consider lucky to put a single old-model A-bomb on target? Here, in truth, are all the elements of one of those gigantic misunderstandings between national leaders that lead to equally gigantic historic tragedies—which is the justification of this long, thorny, technical essay.

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New York Herald Tribune, Inc.

Civil Cooperation -
Peaceful Uses of A.E.



May 21, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOWARD MYERS,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Here is the memorandum I mentioned this morning. I repeat that I have no doubts whatsoever about AEC's judgment that the export of this material is consistent with U. S. policy. But, I am curious as to whether or not there is need for a procedure that would ensure that borderline cases involving these exotic chemicals would receive some type of interagency review in addition to the AEC determination.

I am giving a copy of this memorandum to Mr. Wells so he will be aware of my interest.

Charles E. Johnson

Enclosure

Copy of memo for C. E. Johnson from A. A. Wells
dated 5/18/64 re export of chemicals to France. CEG 1784

cc: A. A. Wells, AEC

Mr. Mary ¹¹ ~~rowe~~
is ~~in~~ Director
of the Office
of Munitions
128-3931 Control
- State

F. D. Lockersmith
from Commerce
is in charge
of Export Control
112-4293

May 12, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Mac --

No reply is required to this letter from the Chairman. I have checked it against the earlier program described in Seaborg's letter of January 18, 1963 and also against the terms of NSAM No. 294. The action described, in my opinion, would not violate existing U. S. Policy. We are interested in any experiments furthering reactor safety and should obtain useful information from the French experiment.

Charles E. Johnson

*Sent Original
to Klein and
then Bundy 5/12/64*



2477
12a

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

MAY 8 1963

C. Johnson

Dear Mr. Bundy:

In a letter to you of January 18, 1963, I summarized our program of cooperation with France in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. I wish to bring to your attention another example of our cooperation with France which we intend to undertake shortly.

This has to do with the supply of three kilograms of plutonium containing approximately 10% plutonium-240 for use in connection with the criticality experiments mentioned in my letter to you of June 17, 1963.

We believe, as in the case of the uranium-233, that providing the plutonium containing 10% plutonium-240 for a period of six months would be in the furtherance of the Commission's program. As a condition to the supply, we would expect to receive full details on the French experimental program.

Plutonium containing 10% plutonium-240 is fissionable and it can be employed in the manufacture of a nuclear weapon. The quantity to be transferred to France, however, is relatively small, particularly in comparison to the capability of the French to produce plutonium in their own G-series and EDF-1 dual purpose reactors. Further, following completion of these relatively short-term experiments, the three kilograms of plutonium involved will be returned to the United States.

Upon transfer the plutonium will be subject to the safeguards and controls contained in our Agreement for Cooperation with

Mr. Bundy

- 2 -

France Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy. These safeguards will provide us with the necessary independent assurance that the material will be used solely for peaceful purposes.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Henry E. Stimson". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long, sweeping underline that extends to the right.

Chairman

The Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
The White House

file
13

Mr. Klein

Mr. Keeney

Mr. Bundy

FYI

No reply required.

This transaction is
within existing policy.

5/13

dyf

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

JUN 17 1963

Thorp. France 14
Recy 6/17
O. Bundy
(2) Johnson

Dear Mr. Bundy:

In a letter to you of January 13, 1963, I summarized our program of cooperation with France in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. I thought you might be interested in another affirmative example of our cooperation with France which we intend to undertake shortly.

This has to do with the supply of three kilograms of separated U-233 which the French have requested for use in two critical experiments. As you may know, our supply of separated uranium-233 is quite limited and the material available is carefully allocated to those projects of greatest technical interest. When the French request was first received in 1962 we were compelled to turn it down due to more pressing demands originating in our domestic program. We agreed, however, to keep the matter under continuing review. As our program has progressed, we now feel that we should be able to make the desired material available to the Commissariat on a lease basis, over a six-month period. Our decision has been dictated by a deferral of other requirements which were anticipated in the foreign program as well as our belief that the experiments planned by the French will have technical merit. As a condition to the supply, we would expect to receive full details on the French experimental program.

Uranium-233 is fissionable and it can be employed in the manufacture of a nuclear weapon. The quantity to be transferred to France, however, is modest and is well

PRESERVATION COPY

1762

Mr. Bundy

- 2 -

within the amounts of highly enriched U-235 which are customarily made available, under safeguards, for comparable small scale research purposes. Upon transfer, the uranium-233 will be subject to the safeguards and controls contained in our Agreement for Cooperation with France Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy. These safeguards will provide us with the necessary independent assurance that the material will be used solely for peaceful purposes.

Sincerely,

(Signed) Glenn T. Seaborg
Chairman

Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to
the President
The White House



UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Frank Chap 343
S
V. Bundy 15
→ ~~2~~ *Kearney*

January 18, 1963

Dear Mac,

During our discussion the other afternoon, you indicated an interest in the extent of our cooperation with the French in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

The enclosed paper is an up-to-date summary of our co-operation and I hope you will find it useful.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature, likely of J. Edgar Hoover, is written in dark ink. The signature is stylized and cursive, with a prominent initial 'J'.

Chairman

Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
The White House

Enclosure:
Summary

(241)
1762

CIVIL COOPERATION IN THE ATOMIC ENERGY FIELD
WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF FRANCE

Beginning with the negotiation in 1956 of our comprehensive Agreement for Cooperation with France in the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, cooperation between the Commission and its French counterpart, the Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique (CEA) has grown to a point where it now encompasses almost the total breadth of the French civil program. This program is the largest in continental Europe outside of the Soviet Union. Cooperative activities have included exchange of information, short term and long term reciprocal visits in a variety of fields, the provision of atomic energy materials and joint irradiation testing programs to mention some of the more important examples.

Our Agreement for Cooperation authorizes the transfer to France of up to 2500 kgs. of U-235 contained in uranium for fueling defined reactor projects. In addition, it provides for the transfer of research quantities of highly enriched uranium, plutonium and U-233. To date the Commission has transferred 355 kgs. of U-235 contained in enriched uranium to France. This material is being used for the purposes of the agreement in French research laboratories and for fueling 11 French reactor projects. The Commission has provided the CEA with 102,295 lbs. of heavy water including the heavy water inventory for the first French reactor and the EL-3, the French designed and built high flux materials testing reactor. Approximately 1,190 grams of plutonium and 75 grams

of U-233 have been made available for research purposes. More than 943 unclassified visits have been made by French scientific and technical personnel to AEC installations and 88 French nationals have been assigned to Commission facilities for training purposes.

Regular visits at the Commission level have been a feature of our cooperation over the past several years, and the French have been most forthcoming in showing facilities such as their plutonium production and extraction facilities at Marcoule, and the pilot gaseous diffusion plant at Saclay when the parallel U.S. facilities could not be shown to them. In the last year, Chairman Seaborg, Commissioner Wilson and Commissioner Ramey all visited CEA facilities and held discussions with their counterparts in the Commissariat. Professor Perrin, French High Commissioner for Atomic Energy, during his customary annual visit to this country this year was one of the first individuals to tour the Rover project site.

The Commission maintains a scientific representative in Paris to conduct liaison with the French Commissariat and the Commissariat has a scientific representative stationed in Washington.

There follows a description in somewhat greater detail of some of the more important specific areas of cooperation.

1. Fast Reactor Exchange

In 1959 the U.S. and France began specific cooperative activities in the field of fast reactors to the subsequent and continuing benefit of both atomic energy programs. Two French fast reactor experts have been assigned to U.S. laboratories in the past and two more are expected to be assigned in the future principally in connection with a joint experimental program in the U.S. ZPR III reactor. Four U.S. scientists are working in France in various aspects of the French fast reactor program. This program consists of a theoretical group, a plutonium fabrication technology development laboratory, extensive sodium component test facilities, the Rapsodie experiment (a 10 MWt fast neutron, sodium-cooled prototype breeder reactor under construction at Cadarache), and a large fast critical assembly also to be built at Cadarache. The Rapsodie experiment is a bold and imaginative one and should provide extremely valuable data of great interest and use to fast reactor development.

Because of a requirement for uranium enriched to 60% in the isotope U-235 for Rapsodie fuel, our Agreement for Cooperation was amended in 1960 to permit the transfer of a net amount of 300 kilograms of U-235 to France at this enrichment and for this purpose.

Recently, the AEC agreed, contingent upon obtaining the necessary Congressional and Presidential authorizations, to provide (within the framework of U.S.-EURATOM fast reactor cooperation presently being

discussed, and with which the French effort is associated), the plutonium needed for the second core of the Rapsodie fast reactor (80 kgs.) as well as the fuel loading of about 350 kgs. of plutonium (to be shared with a fast critical at Karlsruhe) for fueling the French fast critical facility to be built at Cadarache. Our disposition to supply this plutonium is based on our interest in the excellent fast reactor development program being planned in the Community and assumes that we will develop mutually satisfactory arrangements for a comprehensive exchange of information in this area. The French share in the work undertaken by EURATOM through an association contract.

2. Beryllium Oxide Exchange

In late 1961 an exchange of unclassified information in the field of beryllium oxide technology was initiated, involving long-term visits and detailed information which each Government is developing on the technology of unfueled BeO. Specifically, this exchange includes unclassified information on (1) purification, (2) characterization, preparation, and fabrication, (3) basic chemical, physical and thermal properties and (4) irradiation behavior. Information on additives (except uranium bearing additives) in any given amount which may be placed in the BeO for the express purpose of enhancing the basic material also is included in the exchange. Coordinators have been named on both sides and it is expected that this cooperation will result in considerable benefit to both the U.S. and France.

3. Criticality Experiments

In 1962 an amendment to our Agreement for Cooperation was concluded in order to permit the transfer to France of up to 100 kilograms of U-235 enriched up to 90% for the performance of certain criticality experiments which are of importance to the French civil program. Specifically, the French were interested in receiving this material for use in a series of criticality experiments which would be performed over a three year period at its central criticality station at Dijon. This experimental program will include a series of basic investigations in several areas which have not been developed to date as well as several applied experiments specifically designed to establish and verify the safety characteristics of fabrication and fuel processing plants being constructed as part of the French civil program including shipment, handling and storage problems associated with such facilities.

4. Proposed Reactor Destruction Exchange

The French plan to build a destruction reactor experiment called CABRI similar to the U.S. SPERT IV at NRTS. The French have proposed that a cooperative exchange program be developed under which there would be visits and possible extended personnel exchange arrangements between the two projects as well as an exchange of information. The procedures remain to be developed. Arrangements have been completed, however, for two French teams to visit the SPERT IV site during late January

and early February. It is expected that there will result from these two visits a more definitive cooperative arrangement.

5. Third Country Fabrication

Also in 1962 the French wanted to avail themselves of the opportunity to receive special nuclear materials from the United States for conversion or fabrication in France for subsequent transfer to third countries with which the United States has effective Agreements for Cooperation. The Amendment which was concluded in 1962 included permissive language for this purpose.

In summary, the record shows that our cooperation in civil uses of atomic energy with France has certainly been (in company with our cooperation with the United Kingdom) one of the two most comprehensive and active of all our programs in this field.

Nuclear
Cooperation

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 20, 1964

Secret
~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM 294

TO: ~~The Secretary of State~~
~~The Secretary of Defense~~
~~The Secretary of Commerce~~
~~The Director of Central Intelligence~~
~~The Administrator, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration~~
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director, Office of Science and Technology

SUBJECT: U.S. Nuclear and Strategic Delivery System
Assistance to France

It is the policy of this government to oppose the development of nuclear forces by additional states, other than those whose forces would be assigned as part of a NATO nuclear force, targeted in accordance with NATO plans and, except when supreme national interests were at stake, used only for the defense purposes of the Alliance.

Given current French policy, it continues to be in this government's interest not to contribute to or assist in the development of a French nuclear warhead capability or a French national strategic nuclear delivery capacity. This includes exchanges of information and technology between the governments, sale of equipment, joint research and development activities, and exchanges between industrial and commercial organizations, either directly or through third parties, which would be reasonably likely to facilitate these efforts by significantly affecting timing, quality or costs or would identify the U.S. as a major supplier or collaborator. However, this directive is not intended to restrict unduly full and useful cooperation in non-strategic programs and activities.

TOP SECRET

Secret

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 97-137 (#3)
By ip/ NARA, Date 3-12-01

Logged 4-28-64

*Downgraded per
Memo dtd 4-28-64*

Secret
~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

Therefore, the President has directed that effective controls be established immediately to assure that, to the extent feasible, the assistance referred to above is not extended either intentionally or unintentionally.

To this end, specific technical guidance is to be developed and issued at the earliest possible time for the use of the agencies that control the export of equipment and technology, including data exchange arrangements. Responsibility for the development of such guidance, and when necessary the revision of these guidances, will be vested in the Departments of State and Defense, in consultation as appropriate with the Department of Commerce, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Office of Science and Technology, and under the leadership of the Department of State. The approved guidance documents will be cleared at the White House and issued as technical appendices to this National Security Action Memorandum. Necessary guidance will be requested before specific commitments are made by any agency.

McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

cc:

Mr. Bundy
Mr. Klein
Col. Smith
Mr. Johnson ✓
NSC Files

R. Amory - Budget
Mr. Hale - 4/20
Spec Council 5/31

Secret
~~TOP SECRET~~

Dispatched 4/21/64

April 23, 1964

NOTE TO HOLDERS OF NSAM 294, April 20, 1964

The above referenced National Security Action

Memorandum is downgraded to SECRET.

/s/

Bromley Smith

Copy for:

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director, Office of Science and Technology

cc:

Mr. Bundy
Mr. Klein
Col. Smith
Mr. Johnson✓
NSC Files
R. Amory-Budget 4-29

20

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY

G/PM

March 26, 1964

Mr. Charles Johnson

Chuck:

Attached for your information
pursuant to our discussion this
morning.

Dana

I apologize for the fuzziness
of some of the pages - but they are
my last copies.

1659

~~SECRET~~

March 24, 1964

A 4:30 Monday meeting of DoD, State, NASA, CIA and Office of Science and Technology representatives convened by ~~Mac~~George Bundy discussed military cooperation with France, particularly:

1. TF-30 Engine -- MIRAGE III-V, IV and III-F
2. Missile Cooperation
3. Space Cooperation
4. Research and Development Arrangements
5. TFX

The following conclusions were reached:

- 1) Policy of non-assistance to the French ballistic missile development and nuclear program is reaffirmed
- 2) Cooperation which extends the range and penetration capability of aircraft delivery systems is inconsistent with this policy and should also be constrained
- 3) Efforts should be made further to constrain the escape through informal industrial channels of advanced technology of assistance to the French Force de Frappe. Care should be exercised, however, to avoid any appearance of the emergence of a new anti-French line.
- 4) We should avoid, if possible, this subject being taken up for discussion by the newspaper columnists

~~DECLASSIFIED~~Authority NJ 30-032-1-5By NY NARA, Date 3-2-89~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Following action assignments were made:

- a) White House staff will draft and circulate for clearance draft NSAMs to give effect to conclusions one, two and three.
- b) DoD will consider whether our own planning for the utilization of the TFX will permit us to deny its deployment to the NATO area. In this case we could offer the TFX only to countries such as Australia (already so offered) and Canada who have requirements for a long-range conventional fighter-bomber.
- c) In the event the self-denial of TFX deployment to NATO is unacceptable to US military planning, State will attempt to formulate the conditions of an offer of sale to NATO members which would confine its employment either to conventional (non-nuclear) roles or under agreed NATO nuclear defense plans.
- d) In the interim, all sales briefings on the TFX (including its engine - the TF-30) are in suspense.

ORWICK

~~SECRET~~

G/PM

~~SECRET~~

March 29, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO : G - U. Alexis Johnson

FROM : G/PM - Jeffrey C. Kitchen

SUBJECT: Nuclear Delivery System Cooperation with France

We understand Mr. McGeorge Bundy has convened an expanded NSAM 270 Committee meeting for 4⁰⁰ p.m. Monday, March 23. We have understood his interest is to ascertain whether we are doing all we should to inhibit the development of the French Force de Frappe.

In anticipation of this meeting, members of his staff have held a series of fact-finding sessions with concerned State, DoD and NASA staff. As a contribution to this fact-finding exercise, we contributed the paper at TAB A on Highlights of US Policy Statements and Actions. As indicated in the prefatory note, our policy statements and actions convey an uncertain and erratic signal.

Review of the question of a nuclear sharing (or non-proliferation) policy requires a consideration of several conflicting, but quite supportable, points of view.

1. Balance of Payments - Sell the maximum hardware to offset the drain of overseas military expenditures.
2. Research and Development - Export the maximum technology for US desired research and development data in order to conserve our own limited research and development budgets.

~~SECRET~~

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec 3.4
By *cm/y* NARA, Date *3/22/01*

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3. The Military Interest - The strictly military point of view is that if you're involved in an alliance with any expectation of some day being involved together in a hot war, you'd like that ally to be as militarily effective as possible - i.e. trained and equipped with the most modern tools available.

4. The Security Interest - Concern with the escape of our technology advantages over the Soviets. There are strong and articulate doubts, particularly held by the membership of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, as to internal security in France - particularly in the Atomic Energy Commissariat.

5. The Political Interest - To maintain the maximum independence of US action in East-West negotiations short of war and to assure maximum US control over use of nuclear weapons in the event of hostilities. The UK as a nuclear power has exercised certain constraints on US independence of action. A de Gaulle-led France as a nuclear power would not likely be a lesser limitation.

Two policy choices deserve consideration:

A. Withhold any information, technology, componentry or equipment in any way pertinent to the development or modernization of the French Force de Frappe if such withholding by the US would cost the French additional time and money. (We would perhaps gain about a two year retardation of the French program).

B. Sell the French anything not constrained by legislation or Treaty obligations provided we obtain reasonable and immediate compensation therefor. (We should not delude ourselves that we can gain influence or buy cooperation from de Gaulle's France).

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- 3 -

The advantages and liabilities of each are discussed at TAB B. Either is susceptible of reasonably clear communication to the bureaucracy and industry and hence more likely of sympathetic understanding and support than our present uncertain and inconsistent posture. Any path between these alternatives tends to accumulate the liabilities of both and gain the advantages of neither.

If the current review does not produce a clear signal of Administration intentions, the review itself will have contributed to further uncertainty throughout the bureaucracy as to the basis and validity of "the policy".

Also attached are a series of papers prepared by DoD and NASA on various facets of current sales and cooperation programs.

ATTACHMENTS.

g/vn:borwick:fm

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C.F. Johnson

March 20, 1964

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McGB-

SUBJECT: Military Cooperation with the French

file

In a series of meetings with State, Defense and NASA, we have collected this information -- some of it confused and contradictory -- about military sales to, and the exchange of military information with, France of possible significance in the development of France's nuclear deterrent.

1. Aircraft

a. Mirage III-V and Mirage IV

According to State and Defense, the French are interested in TF-30 engines for the development of their Mirage III-V (Mach 2 VTOL fighter-bomber with a range of 290 miles). The present Mirage III-V engine is a Snecma TF-106 which along with the TF-30 is an outgrowth of the Pratt and Whitney TF-10. Pratt and Whitney began exchanging unclassified information with Snecma on the TF-10 in 1959. And in 1962 the French asked for classified information on the TF-30 because Snecma was having trouble with its TF-106. The State Department approved this request in November 1963. As far as the Departments know, there have been technical conversations between Pratt and Whitney and Snecma, but no classified documents have yet been exchanged.

As matters stand, Snecma has arranged for the purchase of two prototype TF-30 engines, less some afterburner parts, and Pratt and Whitney has promised delivery of these engines in December 1964 and January 1965. In addition, the French want four complete prototype engines (with afterburners), and have asked for price quotations on eight production models of the type to be delivered to U.S. forces. If they do not get them from us, Defense believes they will consider buying the British Rolls Royce Spey engine. The French apparently can use one or the other and our refusal to sell would not seriously hurt them.

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By *isl*, NARA, Date 2-15-07

The French might also use TF-30s for the Mirage IV. In fact, Dassault has made designs for replacing the present Atar engine of the Mirage IV with the TF-106 or the TF-30, for upgrading the aircraft's performance. Even if the French wanted to use the TF-30 in the Mirage IV, DOD does not believe this would provide a quick fix for the problems of Atar, since it would probably be two and a half to three years before the TF-30s could be in series production. In fact, Defense knows of no need for any quick fix. It considers the problems which the French are having with the Atar usual for new engines and unlikely to hold up significantly Mirage IV operational capabilities.

In summary, State and Defense believe that French interest in the TF-30 is intended for Mirage III-V and not Mirage IV. CIA has reached the same conclusion independently (Tab A). The one dissent comes from Dr. Fabini who thinks the French could use the TF-30 in the Mirage III-F, a proposed redesign of the Mirage III-V, which would trade VTOL capabilities for greater range.

b. TFX

There is apparent confusion about this item -- first, as to its desirability and utility in a wholly non-nuclear mode, and second, as to the briefings and sales programs. The Pentagon insists the TFX is salable as a non-nuclear weapons system. Keeny believes that the characteristics of the TFX make it an ideal strategic nuclear bomber for NATO nations. For example, it will have a radius of action on a Hi-Lo-Hi flight profile of about 1900 n.m. with a 2000# payload or almost 4000 miles on a one-way mission. The TFX also is specifically designed to have penetration capabilities far in excess of any previous attack aircraft. Keeny also believes that the very high cost of the TFX makes it a questionable non-nuclear weapons system for close support in the NATO theater.

Although we have been assured that there have been no French sales briefings thus far (despite French requests for them), a Pentagon staff paper is less than precise as to whether or not there have been any.

As for sales, an agreement has already been reached with the Australians for the TFX. In addition, DOD plans to ask White House approval to brief NATO countries (with the exception of France), with the expectation that the briefings will lead to sales.

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- 3 -

In this connection, you might want to look at the draft memorandum to you from the Pentagon (which was bootlegged to me), including the deleted paragraph (Tab B).

c. C-135 Tankers

The French ordered twelve and these will all be delivered by September, the first ones already having been handed over.

Last December, General Ezanno indicated to Henry Kuss French interest in twelve additional C-135s. And on December 23, 1963, Kuss offered the twelve additional tankers and proposed various credit arrangements. The order would have amounted to \$40 million. Although no reply has been received to Kuss' letter which called for reply not later than February 1, it is not certain whether this means the French are no longer interested. There evidently are differences within the French Government about the need for the additional tankers.

d. B-57s

The French have shown interest in buying several reconditioned B-57s for high altitude atmospheric samplings. The value of the order would be in the neighborhood of \$9.2 million. This is something we ought to know more about since these aircraft would be useful for French atmospheric tests.

e. The HU-16 ALBATROSS

The French asked for a price offer on this amphibious reconditioned aircraft and an offer was made. However, the French withdrew their request after we began asking about the possible use of the aircraft in the French Pacific nuclear test area.

2. Missile Cooperation

The situation here is quite unclear. The DOD and State representatives [redacted]

[redacted] the French are discouraged about the Mirage IV's capabilities and, given the scheduling of the Polaris-type system, they have decided on this interim system. (Tab D)

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(b)(1)

At our first meeting with the State and Defense Departments, considerable concern was expressed that the real problem here was our indirect support for the French missile program. Subsequently, several of the DOD people stepped back and denied categorically that such assistance was being given France. However, the consensus was that no one really knew how much information was actually being passed since the commercial and industrial channels were wide open.

3. Nuclear Submarines

Since the suspension of the Skipjack discussions last year, there has been no further contact between us and France in this area.

4. Research and Development Arrangements

The research and development cooperative arrangements between us and France are extensive. Defense has assured us that this cooperation is limited largely to the exchange of information, but clearly this is one area that should be looked into to see just how much real assistance we may be giving France intentionally or otherwise. The McNamara-Messmer agreement of 1963 provides wide areas of possible cooperation, but thus far, Defense insists little has been done to implement the agreement. In this connection, you should look at DOD's paper on this subject (Tab C).

5. Space Cooperation

a. Joint Satellite

NASA is party to an agreement signed February 18, 1963, with the French space agency, CNES, according to which NASA will utilize a SCOUT booster to launch a French satellite some time in 1965. (The agreement is not covered by an exchange of notes between governments.)

b. Space Technology

French technical, industrial and government personnel involved in the French space program are aggressively seeking information of NASA research in the total spectrum of space research from

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- 5 -

advanced propulsion to solar cells for spacecraft. Repeated and varied contacts are sought at NASA Headquarters, NASA space centers and contractor plants. A variety of "preliminary" procurement possibilities is constantly broached to American contractors, few of which mature as commercial agreements. It appears reasonable that some of these discussions are "fishing" expeditions designed to elicit useful leads with technical implications. Recently French space interests have turned toward advanced satellite technology (e. g., pointing and stabilization techniques, such as are provided in NASA's Orbiting Astronomical Observatory, gravity gradient systems such as might be useful in communications satellites).

c. These arrangements may be of far greater importance than the facts would seem to indicate since space technology can be fed into missile technology.

6. Actions

We have set up an NSAM 270 meeting for Monday at 4:30 P. M. to discuss the range of questions related to military sales to France affecting French nuclear developments.

It is clear from the information we have gotten (or failed to get) there are fuzzy areas. These perhaps might be identified and, if possible, the facts tied down more precisely.

Of course, the more basic problem is that our policy has fuzzy areas which give the bureaucracy the license it would like to have, including the right to arrange wider research and development co-operation, sell military hardware, balance international payments, etc. Our general posture, for example, is not to assist France in developing the force de frappe. Yet, we have authorized the C-135 tankers to enable to French Mirage IV to reach its desired target. This, in turn, has given the Sullivans and the Kusses their hunting licenses. While our policies will probably never be neat and tidy as we would like, guidelines clearly are needed to make our purposes clear to the bureaucracy and procedural controls established to assure that the daily bureaucratic actions are ^{not} inconsistent with our broader political purposes.

The major issues, as we see them, are:

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a. TF-30 engine

Will this contribute to the development of the French nuclear deterrent? Specifically, does the Mirage IV require this engine for successful operation or important product improvement? According to the answers we have gotten, this does not appear to be the case. Therefore, unless someone can establish that this isn't so, or that the French plan to use it on a new Mirage III-F that has strategic value, there would seem to be little maneuvering ground for us here.

b. TFX

This is perhaps the most interesting single problem. There is no clear consensus on what the TFX really is -- Defense representatives claim that it really is a "non-nuclear system." Keeny considers that in the hands of NATO it is an advanced strategic bomber and that it doesn't make much sense as a "non-nuclear" system for NATO.

There is also some confusion, for example, as to who has been briefed. One DOD paper indicates the French might have been; another says they haven't.

A logical follow-on question is whether it makes sense to brief the NATO members and the SHAPE staff while refusing to brief the French.

And perhaps more important than the question of briefing, is the matter of sales. According to DOD, the Department of State has concurred in our "proceeding with procurement discussions with all NATO countries /with the exception of France/ having modernization requirements for these aircraft . . . Due to the unique policy considerations involving France, it is not under consideration here as a possible customer for either the F-4 or TFX, but will be considered for submission on a separate case basis, at a later date."

Would TFX sales to France affect her nuclear capabilities?

Would the denial of the TFX to France alone of all the NATO countries be feasible and/or useful?

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- 7 -

In addition, the proposed sales policy opens the broader issue as to whether we wish to offer to sell NATO countries (other than France) our missiles or aircraft capable of strategic missions deep inside the Soviet Union.

c. C-135

Where do we stand? Are present procedural controls adequate?

d. Space Cooperation and Other Research and Development Cooperation

Is such cooperation useful for technical or political reasons? Should existing arrangements be modified? Answers to both these questions obviously require better information on the extent of the present arrangements and the scope of information and technology being exchanged than we now seem to have.

Should the end product of this exercise be the preparation of a NSAM setting up machinery to assure that arrangements for military sales and exchange of information with France are consistent with our over-all policy toward France?

David Klein

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Mr. Johnson
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Charles Johnson 23
White House Staff
Executive Office Building

This is our current judgment on the status of the French advanced weapons program. The memo evaluates recent public statements in France which have created some confusion.

RSC
RAY S. CLINE
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

DECLASSIFIED

8 November 1963
(DATE)

Authority NWT 030-032-19
By NY NARA, Date 3/2/01

1264

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DOCUMENT RECEIPT		NOTICE TO RECIPIENT Sig d Return as Shown on Reverse Side		COURIER REF NO. RL /-11	DATE SENT
SENDER OF DOCUMENT(S) RD/SI		ROOM 5046	BLDG. HQ	DATE DOCUMENT(S) SENT 12 Nov 63	
DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT(S) SENT					
CIA NO.	DOCUMENT DATE	COPIES	DOCUMENT TITLE	ATTACHMENTS	CLASS
	7 Nov 63	thermo cy 3	OCI 2384/63	none	S-RD
<p style="text-align: center;">RECIPIENT</p> <p style="text-align: center;">By <i>h</i> NARA Date 3-22-85</p>					
ADDRESS OF RECIPIENT Mr. Charles Elmer George Johnson White House Staff Executive Office Building			SIGNATURE (ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF ABOVE DOCUMENT(S)) <i>Sra Holtzschewer</i>		
			OFFICE <i>WC</i>	DATE OF RECEIPT <i>11/12/63</i>	

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

✓
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Mr. Bundy ✓

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CEG
Shall
I file this?
Florence

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yes

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G/PM: DAD Mackay: fem: 10/11/63

(Drafting Office and Officer)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: October 8, 1963

SUBJECT: French Interest in Plowshare Experiment and Vela Uniform Program; Visit to US of Dr. Perrin, Director of French CEA.

PARTICIPANTS: Lawrence O'Donnell, Division of International Activities, Atomic Energy Commission

G/PM - Duncan A. D. Mackay

COPIES TO: White House - Charles Johnson
WE - Ed Beigel
G/PM - Jeffrey C. Kitchen

ACDA - Sam DePalma
SCI - Charles Thomas

Mr. O'Donnell called this morning to inform me that Chairman Seaborg of the AEC expected to receive Dr. Perrin, Director of the French CEA, on October 10. Mr. O'Donnell explained that this was an annual visit paid by Dr. Perrin during the fall of every year to exchange views on nuclear cooperation between France and the United States.

According to O'Donnell, two of the principle items which Dr. Perrin has indicated he wishes to discuss on this occasion are (1) French participation as observers during the next Plowshare experiment and, (2) increased exchange of information in the techniques used in the detection of underground tests, such as the Vela Uniform Project.

Mr. O'Donnell stated that he was particularly anxious to have our views on the nature of the response which Dr. Seaborg should make to Perrin on these subjects, particularly in light of the ratification of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and the possible effect which this would have on our cooperation in these fields.

In

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified

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By dm/g, NARA, Date 3-2-88 000002

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- 2 -

In the briefing paper which the AEC is preparing for Dr. Seaborg, they propose to recommend to him that, with respect to the Plowshare experiment, he should inform Dr. Perrin that the next Plowshare experiment is not scheduled until the fall of 1964, and that at present there are no plans for foreign observers to participate in it.

On underground test detection, Mr. O'Donnell stated that, as we were aware, certain French officials in the CEA have already been given a substantial amount of information on this under an informal cooperative arrangement with the Defense Department's Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). Dr. Seaborg, in a letter which he wrote to Dr. Perrin on December 28, 1962, had offered the good offices of the AEC in obtaining this type of assistance for the French, but advised him to make his request through diplomatic channels. (No such formal request for assistance in underground test detection has ever been received, but ARPA recently informed Professor Rochard of the CEA that his cooperative arrangement with ARPA on monitoring underground tests would continue until July 1964). The AEC simply plans to have Dr. Seaborg inform Perrin that this type of cooperation is not precluded by the limited Test Ban Treaty, and that the US would be interested in knowing of the additional cooperation in this field in which the French are interested.

Mr. O'Donnell stated that Dr. Perrin would be in the US about ten days, and that the AEC would keep us informed of particular items of interest in regard to his visit.

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By _____
Signature & Title of Exempting Official

August 12, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Honorable
McGeorge Bundy
The White House

I understand that you are interested in French public attitude toward the nuclear test ban treaty. Here are the final results of a nationwide survey made by Gallup during July 17-26. The size of the sample was 2,000.

"A conference uniting representatives of Great Britain, the U. S. and the Soviet Union began July 15 in Moscow to discuss an agreement to halt nuclear tests. If this conference results in an agreement between the English, Americans and Russians, do you think that France should associate herself with it even if this would interrupt her own nuclear armament program? "

Favor joining treaty	70%
Oppose	9
No opinion	<u>21</u>
	100%


Also attached is a memo citing results of a survey in the first week of August that bear on the problem.

Donald M. Wilson
Deputy Director

Attachment

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cc: Mr. Charles E. Johnson



946

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Further evidence of a decline in popular support for President De Gaulle's force de frappe is provided in the results of a nationwide public opinion survey concluded in the first week of August by the French Institute of Public Opinion.

At present, supporters of the force de frappe (37 per cent) are evenly matched by opponents (38 per cent), with the rest offering no opinion. When the question was asked earlier, in January, there was a definite edge in favor of the idea: 42 per cent for compared to 31 per cent against.

The results on this direct question on the issue are foreshadowed by results reported earlier. In July, a total of 70 per cent favored French adherence to a test-ban treaty, even at the expense of the force de frappe. In April, a total of 52 per cent felt that France could not afford such a national nuclear capacity, while only 15 per cent believed the nation could support the expense.

Dissatisfaction with the Pompidou government has reached plurality proportions (43 per cent dissatisfied compared to 32 per cent satisfied). In June, the figures were 27 per cent dissatisfied and 38 per cent satisfied. Public opinion is rather evenly split on the government-sponsored strike-notice bill, with 45 per cent in favor and 41 per cent opposed. Nearly nine Frenchmen out of ten (86 per cent) feel that the farmers' discontent is justified, with only 6 per cent disagreeing.

Despite these unfavorable reactions to the Pompidou government in general

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and on specific issues, De Gaulle's popularity continues at the identical June level -- 50 per cent of the population are satisfied with him, compared to 34 per cent dissatisfied, in both surveys.

The results were provided to USIA on a confidential basis, prior to possible later press release. They are presumably known to the Elysee.

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OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

Exempted From WASHINGTON file Decontrol

By

Signature & Title of Exempting Official

August 12, 1963

Johnson

27

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Honorable
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The White House

8/12

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
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Attachment



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August 2, 1963

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Mac --

Two points came up this morning in a telecon with John Conway:

1. The President's statement that he was ready to recognize France as a nuclear power in the hard terms of the Atomic Energy Act as such. I told Conway that I did not believe that the President had in fact made up his mind as yet to make a Section 144c determination with respect to France to create a new "special relationship" with that country. I understood that the President was referring only to the offer to France stemming from the Nassau conference. Conway said that he was interpreting it in the same way, and was so advising those members of the Committee that were raising the same question.

2. The President's reference to recent suggestions for cooperation with the French in the event of a test ban. I said to Conway that there had undoubtedly been some general discussion at the political level, but that the only specific thing that I could tell him about was the discussions at the technical level of possible cooperation with the French on safety measures. I reminded Conway that this subject had been thoroughly discussed with the Joint Committee, and that as a matter of fact the Joint Committee had in part been responsible for initiative in this matter.

Jan has it right

hjs

ihj
Charles E. Johnson

conveyed to Howard Brown 3:00 PM 8/2

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *chm/ly*, NARA, Date *3-12-09*

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August 2, 1963

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Charles E. Johnson

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By dbm/ NARA, Date 3-12-09