

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
03	memo	"Review of Intelligence..." [Exempt per RAC, 9/00]	S	2	5/26/66	A
03a	cable	USRO Paris to SecState [Exempt per RAC, 9/00]	S	4	5/26/66	A
04a	memo	"Review of Intelligence Guidance..." [Duplicate of #5a; sanitized per RAC, 9/00]]	S	1	6/2/66	A
05a	draft	Duplicate of #4a	S	1	6/2/66	A
06	cable	Deptel 6496 to Paris [Sanitized per RAC, 9/00] <i>sanitized 11-10-09 NLW 09-195</i>	S	1	6/6/66	A
07	memo	Keeny to Bator	S	1	3/11/66	A
07a	memo	Howard to AsstSec of Defense	TS-	3	3/11/66	A
07b	list	"Support of French NATO Forces"	TS-	0	[3/66]	A
11a	memo	Wells to C. Johnson	PCI	2	5/18/64	A
13a	memo	Seaborg to Bundy	PCI	2	5/12/64	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Charles E. Johnson

Folder Title "NUCLEAR - French Cooperation"

Box Number 32

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[Signature]
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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
20c	memo	Orwick to Klein open 11/4/18 per RAC 12/17	S	2	3/19/64	A
20d	report	"Sharing of Nuclear...."	S	12	3/18/64	A
20e	report	"Analysis of Nuclear..."	S	3	3/20/64	A
21	memo	Bundy to State Exec Secretary open 11/4/18 per RAC 12/17	S	1	5/27/64	A
21a	memo	Read to Bundy open 11/4/18 per RAC 12/17	S	1	5/22/64	A
22	memo	Klein to Bundy open 11/4/18 per RAC 12/17 [Duplicate of #31, NSF, Subject File, "Nuclear Weapons, France, Vol. I," Box 33; sanitized 2/07]	S	7	3/20/64	A
23a	memo	Intelligence Memorandum	S-	4	11/7/63	A
24	letter	U. Johnson to Bundy	S	4	10/5/63	A
28	memo	U. Johnson to Bundy	TS	5	8/7/63	A
30	letter	Seaborg to McNamara	C	2	7/12/63	A

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
32a	report	"Military Cooperation..."	S-	4	undated	A
35	cable	Paris 447 (1 of 2) Open '14/18 per RAC 12/17	S	2	7/24/62	A
35a	cable	Paris 447 (2 of 2) Open '14/18 per RAC 12/17	S	2	7/24/62	A
36	cable	FBIS 74 Open '14/18 per RAC 12/17	PCI	1	7/24/62	A
38	cable	Paris 6345 Open '14/18 per RAC 12/17	S	2	6/30/62	A
40	cable	Intelligence Cable [Sanitized per RAC, 9/00]	S	1	6/20/62	A
41	cable	Intelligence Cable [Exempt per RAC, 9/00]	S	6	6/18/62	A
43a	report	"Possible Scope for UK..."	S	2	[1962]	A
44	cable	Athens SECTO 80 Open '14/18 per RAC 12/17	TS	2	5/6/62	A
46	memo	Seaborg to Bundy	PCI	2	4/19/62	A

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
51	memo	Gerald Johnson to Ramey Open '1/4/18 per RAC 12/17	TS	2	7/5/63	A
51a	memo	"Proposed Information Communication..." Open '1/4/18 per RAC 12/17	TS	2	[7/63]	A
53	memo	Seaborg to U. Johnson Open 1/4/18 per RAC 12/17	C	1	6/27/63	A
54a	memo	U. Johnson to Bundy [Duplicate of #56a] Open 1/4/18 per RAC 12/17	S	2	6/24/63	A
56a	memo	Duplicate of #54a Open '1/4/18 per RAC 12/17	S	2	6/24/63	A
56b	memo	U. Johnson to Secretary Open '1/4/18 per RAC 12/17	S	2	[6/62]	A
58	memo	Ramey to C. Johnson Open '1/4/18 per RAC 12/17	G	1	6/10/63	A
59	memo	Duplicate of #58	C	1	6/10/63	A
60	memo	Ramey to Tyler	C	2	6/6/63	A
61	memo	Seaborg to Rusk	C	2	3/14/63	A

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
62	memo	Duplicate of #61	C	2	3/14/63	A
63	report	"Possible Cooperation with the French"	S-	46	2/13/63	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Charles E. Johnson**Folder Title** "NUCLEAR - French Cooperation"**Box Number** 32

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March 19, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KLEIN

FROM : G/PM - Mr. Orwick

SUBJECT: Policy Statements on Sharing of Nuclear
Information and Equipment

In preparing the attached, I tried to avoid the appearance of any prejudices other than the plea for clarity and rationality. I succeeded in putting together such a bland statement that I'm afraid it doesn't even make my desired point very well.

While our basic policy statements and arms control context statements (sections one and two) state rather clearly the thesis of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities - i.e. the warhead and delivery means - many subsequent specific actions and policy modifications cast doubt on whether non-proliferation is the basis or whether it is something else, such as political pique with de Gaulle. For example, if we wish to inhibit achievement of French Force de Frappe objectives, why do we assist their aircraft delivery development; why do we sell tankers so that the MIRAGE IV can reach its desired target; why do we keep trying to offer nuclear propulsion for submarines?

These inconsistencies and uncertainties make it most difficult to assure the desired support of a widespread bureaucracy and industry. They also encourage probing and challenge of "the policy" by adherents of quite supportable points of view favoring cooperation for research and development, balance of payments, etc. benefits. I, of course, recognize that for a variety of political and

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- 2 -

diplomatic reasons we will and must express from time to time various nuances on the policy theme. However, when we do, we need also to repeat to the bureaucracy a clear signal as to our intentions in the on-going day to day implementation actions.

G/PM:DOrrick:fem

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5/27/64

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT: NSAM No. 241 on Report on French Gaseous
Diffusion Plant

Authorization is granted to **discontinue** reporting under the
subject NSAM in response to the request contained in your memo-
randum of May 22, 1964.

It is understood that the Department of State will continue to
monitor this matter from an intelligence standpoint and report any
unusual developments that may be of interest to the White House.
In addition, the general policy contained in NSAM No. 294, in
part, deals in a more comprehensive way with this Government's
procedures designed to avoid giving any assistance to the develop-
ment of any French nuclear weapon capabilities.

McGeorge Bundy

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By CTS, NARA, Date 12/20/17



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 22, 1964

2/a

1. C. Johnson

2. Klein

3. Du

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: NSAM 241 on Report on French
Gaseous Diffusion Plant

The situation which gave rise to NSAM 241 and the subsequent 5/30 memo to holders of this NSAM has significantly ameliorated. During the past year there has been no indication of any attempts by the French to enlist German or Italian cooperation in the Pierrelatte project. There also is no evidence that the Germans or Italians have been giving serious consideration to such cooperation.

While we shall continue to monitor the situation from an intelligence standpoint, in view of these facts, I request authorization to discontinue reporting on this NSAM, including possible measures for inhibiting bilateral cooperation.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

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By CTS, NARA, Date 12/10/11

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C.F. Johnson

22

March 20, 1964

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McGB-

SUBJECT: Military Cooperation with the French

file

In a series of meetings with State, Defense and NASA, we have collected this information -- some of it confused and contradictory -- about military sales to, and the exchange of military information with, France of possible significance in the development of France's nuclear deterrent.

1. Aircraft

a. Mirage III-V and Mirage IV

According to State and Defense, the French are interested in TF-30 engines for the development of their Mirage III-V (Mach 2 VTOL fighter-bomber with a range of 290 miles). The present Mirage III-V engine is a Snecma TF-106 which along with the TF-30 is an outgrowth of the Pratt and Whitney TF-10. Pratt and Whitney began exchanging unclassified information with Snecma on the TF-10 in 1959. And in 1962 the French asked for classified information on the TF-30 because Snecma was having trouble with its TF-106. The State Department approved this request in November 1963. As far as the Departments know, there have been technical conversations between Pratt and Whitney and Snecma, but no classified documents have yet been exchanged.

As matters stand, Snecma has arranged for the purchase of two prototype TF-30 engines, less some afterburner parts, and Pratt and Whitney has promised delivery of these engines in December 1964 and January 1965. In addition, the French want four complete prototype engines (with afterburners), and have asked for price quotations on eight production models of the type to be delivered to U.S. forces. If they do not get them from us, Defense believes they will consider buying the British Rolls Royce Spey engine. The French apparently can use one or the other and our refusal to sell would not seriously hurt them.

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The French might also use TF-30s for the Mirage IV. In fact, Dassault has made designs for replacing the present Atar engine of the Mirage IV with the TF-106 or the TF-30, for upgrading the aircraft's performance. Even if the French wanted to use the TF-30 in the Mirage IV, DOD does not believe this would provide a quick fix for the problems of Atar, since it would probably be two and a half to three years before the TF-30s could be in series production. In fact, Defense knows of no need for any quick fix. It considers the problems which the French are having with the Atar usual for new engines and unlikely to hold up significantly Mirage IV operational capabilities.

In summary, State and Defense believe that French interest in the TF-30 is intended for Mirage III-V and not Mirage IV. CIA has reached the same conclusion independently (Tab A). The one dissent comes from Dr. Fubini who thinks the French could use the TF-30 in the Mirage III-F, a proposed redesign of the Mirage III-V, which would trade VTOL capabilities for greater range.

b. TFX

There is apparent confusion about this item -- first, as to its desirability and utility in a wholly non-nuclear mode, and second, as to the briefings and sales programs. The Pentagon insists the TFX is salable as a non-nuclear weapons system. Keeny believes that the characteristics of the TFX make it an ideal strategic nuclear bomber for NATO nations. For example, it will have a radius of action on a Hi-Lo-Hi flight profile of about 1900 n.m. with a 2000# payload or almost 4000 miles on a one-way mission. The TFX also is specifically designed to have penetration capabilities far in excess of any previous attack aircraft. Keeny also believes that the very high cost of the TFX makes it a questionable non-nuclear weapons system for close support in the NATO theater.

Although we have been assured that there have been no French sales briefings thus far (despite French requests for them), a Pentagon staff paper is less than precise as to whether or not there have been any.

As for sales, an agreement has already been reached with the Australians for the TFX. In addition, DOD plans to ask White House approval to brief NATO countries (with the exception of France), with the expectation that the briefings will lead to sales.

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In this connection, you might want to look at the draft memorandum to you from the Pentagon (which was bootlegged to me), including the deleted paragraph (Tab B).

c. C-135 Tankers

The French ordered twelve and these will all be delivered by September, the first ones already having been handed over.

Last December, General Ezanno indicated to Henry Kuss French interest in twelve additional C-135s. And on December 23, 1963, Kuss offered the twelve additional tankers and proposed various credit arrangements. The order would have amounted to \$40 million. Although no reply has been received to Kuss' letter which called for reply not later than February 1, it is not certain whether this means the French are no longer interested. There evidently are differences within the French Government about the need for the additional tankers.

d. B-57s

The French have shown interest in buying several reconditioned B-57s for high altitude atmospheric samplings. The value of the order would be in the neighborhood of \$9.2 million. This is something we ought to know more about since these aircraft would be useful for French atmospheric tests.

e. The HU-16 ALBATROSS

The French asked for a price offer on this amphibious reconditioned aircraft and an offer was made. However, the French withdrew their request after we began asking about the possible use of the aircraft in the French Pacific nuclear test area.

2. Missile Cooperation

The situation here is quite unclear. The DOD and State representatives do not seem to be aware of CIA's information that the French are planning to develop a land-based hardened IRBM system becoming operational in 1966-67. According to the report, the French are discouraged about the Mirage IV's capabilities and, given the scheduling of the Polaris-type system, they have decided on this interim system. (Tab D)

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At our first meeting with the State and Defense Departments, considerable concern was expressed that the real problem here was our indirect support for the French missile program. Subsequently, several of the DOD people stepped back and denied categorically that such assistance was being given France. However, the consensus was that no one really knew how much information was actually being passed since the commercial and industrial channels were wide open.

1. Nuclear Submarines

Since the suspension of the Skipjack discussions last year, there has been no further contact between us and France in this area.

4. Research and Development Arrangements

The research and development cooperative arrangements between us and France are extensive. Defense has assured us that this cooperation is limited largely to the exchange of information, but clearly this is one area that should be looked into to see just how much real assistance we may be giving France intentionally or otherwise. The McNamara-Messmer agreement of 1963 provides wide areas of possible cooperation, but thus far, Defense insists little has been done to implement the agreement. In this connection, you should look at DOD's paper on this subject (Tab C).

5. Space Cooperation

a. Joint Satellite

NASA is party to an agreement signed February 18, 1963, with the French space agency, CNES, according to which NASA will utilize a SCOUT booster to launch a French satellite some time in 1965. (The agreement is not covered by an exchange of notes between governments.)

b. Space Technology

French technical, industrial and government personnel involved in the French space program are aggressively seeking information of NASA research in the total spectrum of space research from

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advanced propulsion to solar cells for spacecraft. Repeated and varied contacts are sought at NASA Headquarters, NASA space centers and contractor plants. A variety of "preliminary" procurement possibilities is constantly broached to American contractors, few of which mature as commercial agreements. It appears reasonable that some of these discussions are "fishing" expeditions designed to elicit useful leads with technical implications. Recently French space interests have turned toward advanced satellite technology (e. g., pointing and stabilisation techniques, such as are provided in NASA's Orbiting Astronomical Observatory, gravity gradient systems such as might be useful in communications satellites).

c. These arrangements may be of far greater importance than the facts would seem to indicate since space technology can be fed into missile technology.

6. Actions

We have set up an NSAM 270 meeting for Monday at 4:30 P. M. to discuss the range of questions related to military sales to France affecting French nuclear developments.

It is clear from the information we have gotten (or failed to get) there are fuzzy areas. These perhaps might be identified and, if possible, the facts tied down more precisely.

Of course, the more basic problem is that our policy has fuzzy areas which give the bureaucracy the license it would like to have, including the right to arrange wider research and development co-operation, sell military hardware, balance international payments, etc. Our general posture, for example, is not to assist France in developing the force de frappe. Yet, we have authorized the C-135 tankers to enable to French Mirage IV to reach its desired target. This, in turn, has given the Sullivans and the Kusses their hunting licenses. While our policies will probably never be neat and tidy as we would like, guidelines clearly are needed to make our purposes clear to the bureaucracy and procedural controls established to assure that the daily bureaucratic actions are ^{not} inconsistent with our broader political purposes.

The major issues, as we see them, are:

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a. TF-30 engine

Will this contribute to the development of the French nuclear deterrent? Specifically, does the Mirage IV require this engine for successful operation or important product improvement? According to the answers we have gotten, this does not appear to be the case. Therefore, unless someone can establish that this isn't so, or that the French plan to use it on a new Mirage III-F that has strategic value, there would seem to be little maneuvering ground for us here.

b. TFX

This is perhaps the most interesting single problem. There is no clear consensus on what the TFX really is -- Defense representatives claim that it really is a "non-nuclear system." Keeny considers that in the hands of NATO it is an advanced strategic bomber and that it doesn't make much sense as a "non-nuclear" system for NATO.

There is also some confusion, for example, as to who has been briefed. One DOD paper indicates the French might have been; another says they haven't.

A logical follow-on question is whether it makes sense to brief the NATO members and the SHAPE staff while refusing to brief the French.

And perhaps more important than the question of briefing, is the matter of sales. According to DOD, the Department of State has concurred in our "proceeding with procurement discussions with all NATO countries [with the exception of France] having modernization requirements for these aircraft . . . Due to the unique policy considerations involving France, it is not under consideration here as a possible customer for either the F-4 or TFX, but will be considered for submission on a separate case basis, at a later date."

Would TFX sales to France affect her nuclear capabilities?

Would the denial of the TFX to France alone of all the NATO countries be feasible and/or useful?

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In addition, the proposed sales policy opens the broader issue as to whether we wish to offer to sell NATO countries (other than France) our missiles or aircraft capable of strategic missions deep inside the Soviet Union.

c. C-135

Where do we stand? Are present procedural controls adequate?

d. Space Cooperation and Other Research and Development Cooperation

Is such cooperation useful for technical or political reasons? Should existing arrangements be modified? Answers to both these questions obviously require better information on the extent of the present arrangements and the scope of information and technology being exchanged than we now seem to have.

Should the end product of this exercise be the preparation of a NSAM setting up machinery to assure that arrangements for military sales and exchange of information with France are consistent with our over-all policy toward France?

David Klein

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June 6, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Mac--

At Glenn Seaborg's luncheon today Minister Palewski asked me to express to you his pleasure over his informal meeting with the President Tuesday evening, and to convey to you his greetings and thanks for your part in arranging for the interview.

At the luncheon he also expressed his hopes for greater U. S. - French cooperation in both the "constructive and destructive" aspects of nuclear energy. He looks forward to another visit to the United States next year when he might have more time to spend with the AEC staff and visiting AEC facilities.

I told him I could not refrain from saying that I knew you had great fondness for France and the French people, and would second his hope for greater cooperation between our two countries.

Charles E. Johnson

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UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

FEB 1 1963

Mr. Casper
Enc - for your info
intablog
Return to him
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Dear Mac,

On January 18, in response to your indicated interest, I forwarded to you a summary of our cooperation with the French in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

It has occurred to me that, although our cooperation with France on the military side has been quite limited, you might find the enclosed summary of this type of cooperation of interest in its relationship to future planning.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Glenn T. Seaborg

Chairman

Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
The White House

Enclosures:
Cys 1A and 2A of Military
Cooperation Summary

When separated from enclosures, handle this document
as **UNCLASSIFIED**
(Insert proper classification)

DOCUMENT TRANSMITTED
HEREWITH CONTAINS CLASSIFIED
DEFENSE INFORMATION

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UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON

33

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

December 26, 1962

NOTE FOR : Mr. Charles Johnson
Office of the Special Assistant
to the President for
National Security Affairs
Rm 368 - EOB

Chuck,

This is the matter about which I telephoned
you today.

Perhaps we can chat about it upon your
return.



Howard C. Brown, Jr.
Executive Assistant
to the Chairman

Enclosure:

Cy of ltr dtd 12/26/62 - fr Seaborg
to Perrin (French AEC)



UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

DEC 26 1962

Dear Professor Perrin:

During our recent meeting in Washington we talked about the possibility of developing a closer association between the programs of France and the United States for the detection of underground nuclear tests.

You will recall I indicated then that the Commission is not the Agency of the United States Government having primary responsibility for this work, but that I would look into the matter and advise you further.

We have now had an opportunity to raise this matter with the appropriate personnel of the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense and they have indicated that they would be sympathetic to a more formalized exchange with your Government within, of course, the requirements of classification and security.

In these circumstances, I would hope that the people concerned in France and this country could be in touch promptly through diplomatic channels to work out a mutually beneficial arrangement. I have provided copies of this letter to the Department of State and the Advanced Research Projects Agency.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Glenn T. Seaborg

Chairman

Professor Francis Perrin
High Commissioner
Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique
Boite Postale 307
Paris VII, France

French Set '70 Goal For a Missile Force NATO Could Use

By ROBERT C. DOTY

Special to The New York Times

PARIS, Sept. 21—France has adopted blueprints for modernized armed forces of 700,000 men whose weapons will include thermonuclear strategic missiles. The plan is to be in effect by 1970.

A Ministry of Defense report says the future strategic force will free France from dependence on any exterior force. The report also notes the possibility that the force could be employed "within the framework" of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance.

The plan calls for grouping forces of the army, navy and air force, under three headings—nuclear strategic force, force of intervention and force of defense.

The nuclear force is planned in two phases. One, now under way, is designed to give France by 1964 a "first generation" nuclear capacity of fission bombs carried by supersonic Mirage 4 manned bombers capable of in-flight refueling to extend their range. In the second phase, 1964 to 1970, it is planned that long-range missiles with hydrogen warheads will become operational.

Major Policy Instrument

This force, the report says, will be "a major instrument of the policy of the Government, freed of any external dependence, but capable of employment within the framework of the alliance. It can act at any moment, any place."

This was one more proclamation of President de Gaulle's determination to proceed with an independent French nuclear force despite efforts to dissuade him by United States people in France. Mr. de Gaulle believes that Europe cannot find protection indefinitely from United States nuclear forces under Washington's exclusive control.

When Secretary of State Dean Rusk visited Paris last spring, French officials termed "premature" his request for assurances that the future French force would be integrated with those of the

United States and Britain for operational purposes.

The Ministry of Defense statement left open this possibility. It was unclear whether the term "employment within the framework of the alliance" could be stretched in the future to cover transformation of the purely French force into a European one, as advocated by some French and European opinion.

Uses Troops in NATO

Ground elements of the intervention force would be built around modern mechanized divisions stationed in Germany, under NATO command, and in northern and eastern France under national command.

The navy is to be equipped with modern units and a "floating logistical base" to compensate for the loss of bases in former colonial areas. The tactical air force will receive improved interceptor and ground support aircraft, including the vertical take-off type, and increased transport capacity.

The defense force would be made up of reserve divisions filled by call-ups, of coastal vessels, minesweepers and minelayers, submarines and similar light forces, and by the gendarmerie, the special branch of the army that serves most of rural France.

THE NEW YORK TIMES
Saturday, September 22, 1962

file

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Action

Control: 18128

Rec'd: July 25, 1962
12:43 AM

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Info

FROM: Paris

SS

TO: Secretary of State

SR

G

NO: 447, July 24, 7 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 447, INFORMATION LONDON 46, BONN 28,
BRUSSELS 22.

We believe important trends in French thinking on nuclear strike force have emerged from recent confusing French Parliamentary debate.

1. Definite Parliamentary and popular consensus developing in favor of European defense arrangement to which France would make nuclear contribution. Many of 206 deputies who voted for censure motion July 17 were motivated more by their irritation with De Gaulle's governing methods than by opposition to nuclear strike force. Important remember that while censure motion called national strike force militarily illusory, it also stated that between defense based on US nuclear monopoly and proliferation national forces of dissuasion to which Government policy leading, there was place for community (i.e., European) solution. Thus censure motion itself gave implicit approval for De Gaulle's nuclear program to extent latter presented as evolving toward eventual merger in European effort. Moreover, most opposition spokesmen (including Mollet and Maurice Faure) made clear they did not favor halting current French effort but only wished see it adapted along European lines. Speaking on behalf of Government, Pompidou, Couve, and Messmer all gave modest encouragement to this approach.

2. Atlantic Community (i.e., NATO) as basis for US-European nuclear cooperation now largely discarded by French as unrealizable because of US insistence on control or veto over any Atlantic nuclear force. President's July 4 speech on

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-2-447, July 24, 7 PM

From Paris

interdependence being interpreted by French commentators as belated US recognition of new European resolution to proceed with organization of European nuclear force.

3. It almost universally recognized that France and Europe must depend on US support and protection for their survival. French consider what they are doing is to create more equitable sharing of defense roles by US and Europe and thus bring about partnership advocated by President Kennedy. French Government leaders at pains point out France intends coordinate its nuclear force with US when development French force makes this appropriate.

4. Support for French development of nuclear technology is virtually unanimous in Parliament and press. Although gas diffusion plant at Pierrelatte will serve largely military purposes, Government spokesman shrewdly played up scientific and technological benefits already being obtained and in prospect. As result nuclear weapons program received Parliamentary approval and even though presented partially and with best foot forward. It will be much more difficult for opposition in future to mount major objections either to entire program or to significant portions. At same time acceptance of force de frappe will for many French be conditional upon some degree of European defense cooperation. Present and successor Governments will doubtless be willing make gestures in direction European co-operation as required to push nuclear weapons program Parliament.

LYON

WGM

~~SECRET~~

35

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Action

Control: 18105

EUK

Rec'd: July 25, 1962
12:23 AM

Info

FROM: Paris

SC

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 447, July 24, 7 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 447, INFORMATION LONDON 46, BONN 28, BRUSSELS 22.

Embassy considers that evolving French views on nuclear problem have significant implications:

1. Critics of De Gaulle who say that present French nuclear policy is purely De Gaulle's are on weak ground, as for example Spaak at White House meeting June 9. Nuclear program, which begun under Fourth Republic, now widely accepted. While is true that many important French believe nuclear force should eventually become part of broader European defense effort, De Gaulle himself probably determined to proceed with national program with open mind re some European cooperation on acceptable terms. In any case, however, few people in France today would agree France should give up what it has developed independently or abandon French control of its nuclear force at least until effective alternative force is in immediate prospect.

2. It evident many French impressed by arguments, mainly advanced by US officials and strategists, that national nuclear forces are inefficient and dangerous. These arguments have spurred trend in France toward idea of supranational military cooperation with European partners. At same time French thinking on nature and roles of possible European nuclear force, and its relation to NATO, is practically non-existent.

3. We believe French evolution toward European nuclear approach has promising aspects. Politically, it reinforces trend toward European unity. Militarily, it recognizes requirement for close

coordination

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By: CTS, NARA, Date: 12/10/17

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-2-447, July 24, 7 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO) From Paris

coordination of nuclear forces although it must be pointed out that De Gaulle highly unlikely agree to surrender of national control over French forces contributed to any European nuclear force.

4. We consider key aspects for US to be:

A) Continuing stress by quiet and diplomatic means on ineffectiveness and danger of national nuclear forces operating independently.

B) Position we take regarding UK nuclear cooperation with Europe assuming UK entry into Common Market. In our view liberal US position would facilitate European nuclear cooperation under UK and French leadership and eventual integration of European force within NATO. Restrictive US position would accelerate French national program and possible French-German nuclear cooperation.

C) Firm but discreet pressure for close coordination of all nuclear forces within alliance, recognizing that French will almost certainly not merge their national nuclear force in any larger grouping until they are sure French interests are protected and also recognizing that France will probably insist on its legal right to use French nuclear force for national interest.

D) Position US takes regarding degree of US control over use of US-European nuclear force will be crucial in efforts to establish such force. Embassy believes we should at appropriate time indicate privately and at high level to European allies our willingness to attempt to work out control mechanism acceptable all participants.

LYON

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~~SECRET~~

file

July 24, 1962

FBIS 74

NUCLEAR TEST DETECTION

MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH TO EUROPE 2049 24 JUL 62 L

(TEXT) NEW YORK--UNTIL YESTERDAY THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT KEPT IT A SECRET THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD DETECTED THE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION SET OFF IN THE SAHARA BY FRANCE ON 1 MAY, JOHN FINNEY THE NEW YORK TIMES WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT WRITES. HE REPORTS THAT THE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION WAS CARRIED OUT IN THE HOGGAR MOUNTAINS IN THE SOUTHEAST SAHARA AND WAS CLEARLY DETECTED BY SEISMIC INSTRUMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, MORE THAN 3,000 MILES AWAY.

IT IS QUITE CLEAR WHY THE PENTAGON DELIBERATELY KEPT THE DETECTION OF THE UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSION SECRET. THE UNITED STATES AT THE 12-NATION DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE IS STUBBORNLY INSISTING ON INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OVER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS WITH ON-THE-SPOT INSPECTION, THUS THWARTING THE CONCLUSION OF A TEST-BAN AGREEMENT.

BUT WHAT MADE THE PENTAGON NOW DECIDE TO MAKE THE DETECTION OF THE EXPLOSION PUBLIC? THE LATEST ACHIEVEMENTS OF SCIENTISTS, INCLUDING AMERICAN, SHOW THAT NATIONAL FACILITIES ARE QUITE SUFFICIENT FOR DETECTING UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. IN FACE OF THESE FACTS THE PENTAGON DECIDED TO TAKE THE "INITIATIVE" SO AS TO TRY AND EVENTUALLY DISCREDIT THE NATIONAL MEANS OF DETECTION. INDEED, AS FOLLOWS FROM FINNEY'S REPORT, THE PENTAGON ACCOMPANIED ITS STATEMENT WITH NUMEROUS RESERVATIONS. FINNEY POINTS OUT THAT THE DETECTION OF THE FRENCH EXPLOSION IS REGARDED IN THE UNITED STATES AS "NOT CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE THAT SMALL UNDERGROUND EXPLOSIONS COULD BE DETECTED BY SEISMIC STATIONS OUTSIDE THE SOVIET UNION."

IN THIS CONNECTION FINNEY'S CLAIM THAT THE UNITED STATES IS INCLINED TO AGREE TO "SOME FORM OF NATIONAL CONTROL SYSTEMS" APPEARS IN ITS TRUE LIGHT: HINTING AT THE POSSIBILITY OF A CONCESSION, THE UNITED STATES IS TRYING TO RETAIN THE ESSENCE OF ITS DEMAND FOR INTERNATIONAL CONTROL THE AIM OF WHICH IS KNOWN TO BE ESPIONAGE ON THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION.

24 JUL 633P FRK/DF

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Authority NW-0302-32-1-11
By CTS, NARA, Date 12/10/17

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

01374

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~

42

Origin

ACTION:

Amembassy BONN

29

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Info:

INFO:

Amembassy LONDON

63

Amembassy PARIS

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~~XXXX~~ Embtel 6, rptd info London 2, Paris 2.

Concur in Embassy views as stated reftel to be provided UK Embassy.

Would, however, suggest you add two points:

- 1) If US were to change policy to provide nuclear assistance to France this would in time promote pressures within FedRep for comparable treatment.
- 2) If multilateral solution not found to nuclear problem, a solution in which FedRep can participate on basis of full equality with other European countries, FedRep may be increasingly attracted to other approaches to problem, e.g., national program or Franco-German collaboration.

END

RUSK

EUR/RPM:RHKranich;mck 7/3/62

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

RPM - Russell Fessenden

Clearances: S/P - Mr. Owen (substance)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13202, Sec. 3.4

By *Cam/fj* NARA, Date *3-2-09*~~SECRET~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

38

59

Action

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Info

SS

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FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 6345, JUNE 30, 2 PM

RETAIN OR DESTROY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 6345, INFORMATION LONDON 999.

RECENT U.S. STATEMENTS THAT LIMITED NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES ARE DANGEROUS AND THAT U.S. CONSIDERS FRENCH NUCLEAR PROGRAM INIMICAL TO COMMUNITY INTEREST OF ATLANTIC ALLIANCE ARE HAVING UNFORTUNATE EFFECT ON OUR RELATIONS WITH FRANCE. THESE STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN FULLY REPORTED IN FRENCH PRESS AND ON RADIO. THEIR IMPACT IS GREATER BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN FORCEFUL AND REPEATED.

OFFICIAL GOF REACTION HAS BEEN CAREFULLY CONTAINED. FONOFF SPOKESMAN HAS REPLIED "NO COMMENT" TO QUESTIONS. FRENCH OFFICIALS HAVE, HOWEVER, ADVISED EMB THAT THEY BELIEVE TIMING OF THESE STATEMENTS VERY BAD, PARTICULARLY THOSE MADE JUST PRIOR TO SECRETARY'S EUROPEAN TRIP, AND THAT CUMULATIVE EFFECT IS INDUCING REACTION OF CONSIDERABLE HOSTILITY IN FRANCE.

RUMOR IS CURRENT IN PARIS THAT USG SEEKING GO OVER HEAD OF GOF AND PERSUADE FRENCH PEOPLE THAT INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR FORCE IS FOOLISH AND DANGEROUS. EXPRESS JUNE 28 CARRIES ARTICLE TO THIS EFFECT. SOME FRENCH BELIEVE U.S. TIMING STATEMENTS TO AIM AT FRENCH PARLIAMENTARY TO DEBATE ON SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET REQUEST INCLUDING FORCE DE FRAPPE PROGRAM, WHICH IS SCHEDULED FOR JULY 10-12. SEVERAL FONOFF OFFICIALS HAVE GIVEN THEIR VIEW U.S. STATEMENTS MAY WELL STRENGTHEN PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT FOR FRENCH STRIKE FORCE, AND THAT THESE STATEMENTS WILL INEVITABLY HAVE EFFECT OVER TIME OF INCREASING FEELING IN FRANCE THAT EUROPEANS MUST SOMEHOW DEVELOP MORE EQUAL DEFENSE RELATION WITH U.S. WE RECALL

~~SECRET~~~~SMITH~~ Control: 24175~~DUNCAN~~ Rec'd: JUNE 30, 1962~~KAVSEN~~ 1:15 PM~~KILDUFF~~~~PETERSEN~~~~SCHLESINGER~~~~TAYLOR~~~~BELK~~~~FORRESTAL~~~~JOHNSON~~~~KLEIN~~~~KOMER~~~~RASKIN~~~~SAUNDERS~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NY-0302-32-1-12
By CTS, NARA, Date 12/10/17

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 6345, JUNE 30, 2 PM: FROM PARIS

SIMILAR PROBLEM RE SUSPICIONS OF U.S. EXERTING PRESSURE DURING PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON FORCE DE FRAPPE OCCURED LAST YEAR.

SENIOR FRENCH OFFICIAL STATED IN CONFIDENCE THAT TWO OTHER EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES IN PARIS TOLD HIM THEY SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BY WHAT THEY CONSIDER U.S. DESIRE TO MONOPOLIZE STRATEGIC ARMS. FRENCH OFFICIALS AND PRESS ALSO NOTING OBVIOUS U.K. EMBARRASSMENT OVER STATUS IT BOMBER FORCE.

EMB APPRECIATES NEED FOR CLARIFICATION OF U.S. POLICIES IN THIS IMPORTANT AREA. MANY THINKING FRENCH IMPRESSED BY COGENCY OF SECY MCNAMARA'S SPEECH OF JUNE 16 BUT FEELING IS STRONG HERE THAT U.S. IS PUSHING ITS THESIS TOO HARD. REACTION IN FRANCE IS DEFINITELY BECOMING ADVERSE NO MATTER HOW BENEFICIAL EFFECTS OF THESE STATEMENTS MAY BE ELSEWHERE.

(CY SULZBERGER TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT AT SOCIAL GATHERING IN MY HOME LAST EVENING A NUMBER OF FRENCHMEN SPOKE TO HIM ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S COMMENTS AT PRESS CONFERENCE AND EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE BITTERNESS OVER WORDS HE USED IN CONDEMNING FRENCH NUCLEAR PROGRAM. THE WORD "INIMICAL" UNFORTUNATELY HAS A MUCH STRONGER CONNOTATION IN FRENCH THAN IS CUSTOMARY IN ENGLISH USAGE. FEELING IN GENERAL HERE, IN WAKE OF RUSK VISIT, WAS THAT U.S. AT LAST RECOGNIZES THAT FRANCE IS GOING AHEAD WITH ITS OWN NUCLEAR PROGRAM. FOR THIS REASON IT IS PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT TO RECONCILE THIS VIEW WITH ABOVE STATEMENT. IT IS MY FEELING, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF EXCHANGE OF IDEAS THAT TOOK PLACE DURING RUSK'S VISIT AND PROBABILITY OF U.K. ENTRY INTO COMMON MARKET THAT WE RE-EXAMINE OUR PRESENT NUCLEAR SITUATION VIS-A-VIS THE SIX NATIONS AND NATO USING CURRENT DISCUSSION OF MRBM'S IN NATO AS REFERENCE POINT. WE HAVE BEEN STUDYING THIS PROBLEM, WITH THIS ASPECT OF IT IN MIND AND WILL SUBMIT COMMENTS SHORTLY.)

GAVIN

JTC

~~SECRET~~

France's Nuclear Force

President de Gaulle's insistence that France must acquire nuclear capability of her own has been met by an understandable reluctance on the part of the Kennedy Administration to assist in the dispersion of nuclear weapons.

American policy has been to restrict these weapons to as few powers as possible and to tighten controls over them in order to reduce the danger of accidental war and to prevent irresponsible rulers or countries from acquiring weapons which, once used, might destroy us all. There have also been worries about French security and fears that if we aided France to become a nuclear power, Germany would be next, and Russia might then assist Red China—thus accelerating the arms race. But the logic of this position, once irrefutable, has been eroded by time.

In the first place, anticipating Britain's entry into the European Economic Community, France herself appears to be moving away from the concept of an "independently operated" national nuclear force and is beginning to envisage a combined European force that would include the British and be linked to the American within a reconstituted North Atlantic alliance. This approach would meet both Europe's demands for its own nuclear force and the American insistence that the Western deterrent be "indivisible" lest others start a nuclear war that we would have to finish.

In the second place, whether we like it or not, France has, or soon will have, the capability of delivering a few nuclear weapons. She has achieved this capability not because of us but despite us. We cannot prevent this development by pretending it will not happen. The French nuclear development effort is now so large, the investment in it so great and the stakes so huge that it will certainly outlive de Gaulle. The French nuclear program did not start and certainly will not terminate with de Gaulle; it is here to stay. We cannot prevent France from becoming a nuclear power; we can only help or hinder.

In the third place, French security is far better than it was in pre-de Gaulle days; and in any case, we have been withholding from France "secrets" which Russia already knows.

In the fourth place, France has not, ~~at least~~ recently, asked us for nuclear weapons or for direct aid to make them. The information she has sought has been ancillary to her main effort. It would provide much the same kind of aid—but less of it—than we have given to Britain. The French have asked for jet tankers to refuel their attack bombers. They have asked for missile nose cones and some components of guidance systems. And they specifically requested—something that it would seem in our special interest to give them—safety devices to prevent the accidental explosion of nuclear weapons.

To all these, and many other similar requests, a cold shoulder has been turned in Washington. While proliferation of atomic weapons in independent forces could dangerously upset the tenuously existing international balance of power, it must be recognized that conditions have been changing in respect to French nuclear development in the last few years. We think some cognizance should be taken in Washington of this change. It would be especially ironic if this Administration showed itself guilty of the charge of inflexibility in foreign policy which its spokesmen so effectively leveled against its predecessor.

French nuclear file

Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : NLJ-030-032-1-12-2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

40

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~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY FRANCE

SUBJECT FRENCH NUCLEAR TEST PROGRAM

REPORT NO. 25X1A

DATE DISTR. 21 JUNE 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

RETAIN OR DESTROY
25X1G

DATE OF INFO.

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

~~FORRESTAL~~
~~TAYLOR~~
~~SCHLESINGER~~
~~PETERSEN~~
~~KAYSER~~
~~GILDNER~~
~~DUNGAN~~

REFERENCES

IN 15388

25X1A

25X1X

1. FRENCH PLAN FURTHER UNDERGROUND ATOMIC TESTS IN SAHARA
LATE THIS YEAR.

2. FRENCH DEFINITELY PLAN TO CONDUCT ATOMIC TESTS IN PACIFIC
NEAR TAHITI. MOOREA ISLAND NEAR TAHITI IS TO BE INVOLVED AND
ALSO ISLANDS SOUTH OF TAHITI. SOURCE DOES NOT KNOW EXACT DATE BUT
HIS IMPRESSION IS TESTS WILL NOT BEGIN BEFORE MID-1963. 25X1A
COMMENT. MOOREA ISLAND IS APPARENTLY TO BE USED AS A BASE. ISLANDS
REFERRED TO SOUTH OF TAHITI MAY POSSIBLY BE THE TUBUAI GROUP OR
MURUROA.)

3. SHIP FOR USE IN THESE TESTS IS BEING OUTFITTED WITH NECESSARY
GEAR. 25X1A

4. DISSEM: STATE AIR GEN NORSTAD AEC. (END OF MESSAGE)

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO DISSEM ABROAD

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : NLJ-030-032-1-12-2

SANITIZED
Authority: NLJ 030-032-1-12
By: [Signature] 1/14/09

INCOMING TELEGRAM

United States
Information Agency

42

file

807
725a

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Action

Classification

Control: 4490

Rec'd: JUNE 6, 1962
5:56 PM

IAE

FROM: PARIS

Info

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IRS
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IPS
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TO: United States Information Agency

NO: TOUSI 504, JUNE 6

PRIORITY

PASS STATE

CIA
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OSD

HAVE JUST CABLED FOLLOWING TO FOREIGN EDITOR NY TIMES, NEW YORK:

STATE
EUR

"I AM DEEPLY DISTURBED BY JACK RAYMOND'S STORY THIS MORNING THAT IMPLIED AMBASSADOR GAVIN ADVOCATES CERTAIN VIEWS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES."

P

SS

SA

SAE

"I WAS PRESENT AT THE BACKGROUND BRIEFING WHICH MR. RAYMOND CITED AS THE SOURCE FOR HIS STORY. THE PURPOSE OF THE BRIEFING WAS TO GIVE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESENT STATE OF FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS TO A GROUP OF VISITING AMERICAN NEWSMEN. THE BRIEFING OFFICIAL SPOKE OF U. S. POLICY TOWARD FRANCE AND EXPLAINED THE RANGE OF VIEWS HELD BY REPRESENTATIVE FRENCH GROUPS CONCERNING CURRENT FRANCO-AMERICAN ISSUES."

"I CAN SAY THAT AT NO TIME WAS THE SUGGESTION MADE THAT AMBASSADOR GAVIN WAS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES. NOR WAS IT SUGGESTED THAT AMBASSADOR GAVIN PLANS TO GO TO WASHINGTON WITH "A NEW ARGUMENT FOR NEGOTIATING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGREEMENT WITH FRANCE. FURTHERMORE I AM AUTHORIZED TO STATE CATEGORICALLY THAT AMBASSADOR GAVIN HAS NEVER HAD ANY SUCH INTENTION. WOULD APPRECIATE PUBLICATION ABOVE TEXT. JOHN MOWINCKEL, PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER, AMERICAN EMBASSY PARIS."

END TEXT.

BACKGROUND BRIEFING WAS ORGANIZED AT REQUEST OF EUCOM FOR VISITING GROUP AMERICAN NEWSMEN ON TRIP SPONSORED BY DOD.

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-2-504, JUNE 6, FROM PARIS

BRIEFING OFFICIAL REFERRED TO WAS AMBASSADOR WHO SPOKE
FOR THIRTY MINUTES IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS.

MOWINCKEL

COT

NOTE: Miss Crawley (USIA) and Mr. James (EUR) notified 6/6/62
CWO-M

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6/28-1091

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

JC
File

May 9, 1962

French-UK
Cooperation

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGRATH JURY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Possible Scope for U.S. Assistance
to French Nuclear Weapons Program

This morning you asked Mr. Farley what the United Kingdom could do to help the French nuclear weapons program even though the United States continued to refrain from cooperating with the French. After checking with Mr. Seaborg and some of his staff at AEC and with Mr. Johnson at Defense, as well as our own lawyers, Mr. Farley has prepared the enclosed memorandum commenting on this question.

Walter D. Bailey
L. A. Bailey
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Scope of U.S. Assistance

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *dm/149* NARA, Date *5-2-09*

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

E. Johnson 44

46-L

Action

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Info

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FROM: Athens

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 80, May 6, 10 p.m.

ACTION DEPARTMENT SECTO 80, BONN 39, BRUSSELS 17, LONDON 63, PARIS 188, MOSCOW 60

POUCHED ALL OTHER NATO CAPITALS

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Reference: SECTO 24

In connection with reference telegram re nuclear sharing policy toward France, should be understood that points listed were intended to be illustrative of specific political and political-military difficulties in our relations with France. Our basic policy with respect to not assisting national nuclear capabilities is firmly established and is applicable generally. The rationale for this policy was made clear in Secretary McNamara's speech to the NATO Council in which he stated: "... our analyses suggest rather strongly that relatively weak nuclear forces with enemy cities as their targets are not likely to be adequate to perform the function of deterrence. In a world of threats, crises, and possibly even accidents, such a posture appears more likely to deter its owner from standing firm under pressure than to inhibit a potential aggressor. If it is small, and perhaps vulnerable on the ground or in the air, or inaccurate, it enables a major antagonist to take a variety of measures to counter it. Indeed, if a major antagonist came to believe there was a substantial likelihood of it being used independently, this force would be inviting a pre-emptive

/first strike

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Authority: NLY-0302-32-1-13
By: CTS, NARA, Date: 12/10/11

TOP SECRET

Control: 4143

Rec'd: May 7, 1962

3:38 a.m.

French nuclear capability

file

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- SECTO 80, May 6, 10 p.m., from Athens

first strike against it. In the event of war, the use of such a force against the cities of a major nuclear power would be tantamount to suicide, whereas its employment against significant military targets would have a negligible effect on the outcome of the conflict. In short, then, weak nuclear capabilities, operating independently, are expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent."

While our policy with respect to denying any aid to French nuclear deterrent program is thus firm and unchanged, we are also being careful not to let that policy be transferred to other fields. Our policy is strictly limited to denying aid to French nuclear weapons and MRBM program. In spite of French unwillingness to cooperate on many matters of basic importance to US, we continue to remain willing to work with French toward constructive solutions in these fields and do not retaliate against France for its failure to cooperate with us.

RUSK

DLW

TOP SECRET

file " French
Nuclears"

45

MISSILES FOR FRANCE?

Malcolm W. Hoag

June 1962

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P-2594-1

MISSILES FOR FRANCE?

Malcolm W. Hoag^{*}

The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California

I.

Our refusal to aid France in developing her nuclear deterrent has never lacked American critics. Should we not seek an accommodation with General de Gaulle, trading missile technology and components for some other cooperation? Lately more seem to be saying that we should. They note that France is well on the road toward her force de frappe, despite our opposition which has embittered French officials and made their program slower and more expensive. The bitterness and higher cost leave France both less willing and less able to support common enterprises, including modern French divisions to NATO and toleration of American-controlled nuclear weapons upon her territory. These are unpleasant consequences of American policy, especially when inflicted upon one honored major ally and not another. If we supply Skybolt missiles to the United Kingdom for Bomber Command, should we not assist France in some comparable way? Especially if France pays for it and eases our troubled balance of payments?

So the critics argue, and with considerable force. But far more

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important than Franco-American relations is America's arms policy toward NATO and the world, which seeks to arrest the proliferation of nuclear powers, not to speed it. To this end we seek many means, with none more important than persistence in one message to would-be aspirants: "If you go toward independent nuclear capabilities, you will go it alone. Then the road promises to be long, costly, and bitter. And for what?" If this be our theme, the painfulness of the French experience is a forceful example to others. For France we regret the burdens, and no doubt seek to lessen their impact by any compromises that can be accommodated within our basic arms policy. But abandonment of this policy can hardly be acceptable. Are we now to give evidence to the cynics who say that it is stubbornness that pays? Should other nations be induced to get into like nuclear programs nearly as onerous to us as to them in the expectation that we will bail them out with military aid? The real test of our policy toward France is measured in reactions elsewhere. Beyond the incentives it may supply for emulating or not emulating France, what we do will speak eloquently for the constancy of American foreign policy.

One doubts that American arms policy has been ideal, or that its many spokesmen have expressed clearly the same philosophy toward NATO and nuclear arms. So probably we have affronted France more than we needed to, and should articulate one consistent philosophy better. If some of its implications are unpleasant to our allies, then it is all the more important to show these implications within the full context that embodies others. Where we seem inflexible we must be seen to be thoughtfully resistant, not just stubborn. Also we need to hunt for constructive alternatives that, unlike an independent national deterrent, meet legitimate French needs without an unacceptable compromise of our deeper mutual interests. These criticisms, however, should be tempered by appreciation of what is being done, and by awareness of how intractable some of the problems are. While our publicly expressed nuclear philosophy may be incomplete, there is more to it than is commonly recognized. One has only to read the defense statements and speeches of President Kennedy, Secretary Rusk, and Secretary McNamara to perceive much of a unified doctrine. A responsible critic of our policy on nuclear diffusion can no more neglect this doctrine than he can the stated or implied French doctrine. The key strategic issues that lie behind foreign policy are posed neatly in the French expressions: What converts a force de frappe into a force de dissuasion? How is nuclear force to be used, under what circumstances, in order to dissuade what nation from doing what?

One prominent feature in American doctrine is that nuclear force not be used at all save in direct retaliation in kind or where the defense of freedom leaves no feasible alternative. We have not forsworn the nuclear initiative; ours is not the "no first use" policy that some strategists have proposed. But the change from 1954 simplicity about "massive retaliation" is as unmistakable as it is natural. To shrink from unleashing nuclear violence is not cowardly where alternative defense is available; it is prudent when retaliation and counter-retaliation can cycle easily to excessive levels of damage; and it is politic when even those we propose to defend are likely to view nuclear weapons as symbols of their destruction rather than their defense. Hence the emphasis upon strong conventional arms to raise the "threshold" of violence above which we are driven to use nuclear weapons first. Conventional arms are not to be viewed exclusively as alternatives to nuclear arms, however, for an enemy is likely to find a nuclear response more credible when he must crash through a thick shield of conventional forces in an unmistakably major attack.

Thus the United States favors a complete deterrent for NATO, and naturally find most lacking the conventional component that older doctrine disavowed. When our allies plead scarce resources, our doctrine suggests concentration upon neglected Shield forces. Diverting resources to a series of national nuclear forces is serious when Shield deficiencies are glaring, and when France, for example, appears to be spending about one per cent of her GNP upon the force de frappe. Interdependence is more than a nice word when aversion to it is this costly. Nonetheless, the financial aspect is distinctly

secondary. If the military function of the force de frappe promised to harmonize with our strategic retaliatory forces in all respects, we could do less of the same strategic job as they did more. Then an American Secretary of Defense could himself offset much of the added financial burden by reductions in American strategic forces, and inter-allied would become merely inter-service rivalry. But such a trade is not in prospect. The force de frappe promises acute disharmony. Militarily, it threatens to interfere with the functioning of our nuclear deterrent; politically, it erodes the basis for allied trust in this deterrent.

NATO members must be confident that their allies will honor their pledges to aid attacked countries. The greater the threat, the greater the need for confidence. Yet if one French motive is prestige, another is open doubt that America can be relied upon to invoke the supreme deterrent after Soviet attacks that are confined to Europe, no matter how aggressive and destructive they are. The dread logic is familiar: because a big nuclear strike risks suicide for its launcher, it is not credible that it will be launched when one's homeland has not been attacked. If not credible, it will not deter a bold enemy from attacks elsewhere. Clearly there is something in the argument, but no such misleadingly simple formulation can be allowed to stand. For if defense of one's homeland is the only key to nuclear credibility, the force de frappe also yields no credible defense for attacks confined to Germany, or to Turkey, and so on. Members are driven back to self-defense where it matters most, while

enjoined somehow to preserve collective defense where it matters least.

West Germany is commonly cited as the next likely claimant for help toward a national deterrent, because she is an exposed and major power. No prospect arouses greater passions in NATO, for World War II memories run deep, as do apprehensions about Soviet reactions that are likewise founded in scarred memories. Beyond inflamed emotions, moreover, lies the perception that Berlin, unification, boundaries, and unrest in East Germany are unresolved problems. These can trigger violence whether coldly intended by the Soviets or not; and violence can grow, especially because the West is driven to join in the distasteful business of threat and counter-threat in order to maintain its position. Should control over strategic nuclear arms then be put in the hands of West Germany where war in Central Europe is least unlikely, with the act itself constituting a tacit acknowledgment by the United States that the big deterrent is no longer sufficiently credible? Even if such a course made strategic sense, it would certainly arouse intense quarrels within NATO. Opposition to such a course throughout British and Scandinavian political parties and peoples is apparent, but is not confined to them. If one wants to cater to the Soviet aim of splitting NATO, here is a way to do it.

And what about lesser powers in NATO who would find nuclear strike forces for themselves, even with generous help, less feasible or more abhorrent? Beyond fears aroused by nuclear diffusion to others, there is the affront to prestige. The French claim that a force de frappe is needed for first-class status in the alliance, and if we should appear to agree, we stigmatize the others. In an alliance where all members are proud, what could be more divisive?

II

NATO unity demands a better answer for nuclear defense, and American policy and prospective capabilities already supply one. There is, first and foremost, our pledge. That we view and express ourselves as part of NATO, and not apart from NATO, is mandatory, as are the deeds that back the words. Our military presence in Europe must not be forgotten. An effective Soviet surprise attack upon West Germany could hardly avoid some of our nuclear capabilities and would probably kill more American than German soldiers, and certainly many more Americans than Frenchmen. To further enhance the credibility of American nuclear response after so direct an attack upon us and our allies, if that response be needed, our strike capabilities greatly exceed those required to cover only Soviet cities. We can employ the strategy of a rich nuclear power, not a poor one; and contrary to popular belief, there remains a vast difference between the two.

The difference lies not so much in greater numbers of retaliatory instruments, although these are important, as in their greater protection and more sophisticated planning and continuing control. We obviously could and might launch the all-out strike that fits the usual image. This strike would be designed to minimize Soviet capabilities to counter-retaliate, which implies that we would not shrink from killing Russian civilians where such grisly damage was a by-product of smashing Soviet retaliatory capabilities. But in cold self-interest, as well as moral revulsion, we might well choose to do otherwise. What our strategic plenty buys is the ability to choose among alternative tactics,

each of which poses so formidable a threat to Soviet interests that it is a compelling deterrent even where self-imposed restraint is involved. What strategic poverty would buy is a capability so much smaller and less sophisticated that, in order to pose a formidable deterrent, it must credibly promise to be used in as blunt and bloody a manner as possible. City-killing is commonly assumed to be the easy job, and to this end proposed small national deterrent forces are directed. City-sparing in otherwise full-scale general nuclear war is a heresy that, consistent with formidable deterrence, can be entertained only by a big nuclear power. Here lies the novelty of an American policy that NATO, above all, needs to understand. At Ann Arbor on June 16th Secretary McNamara stated bluntly that, "principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population."

Why spare enemy cities in a nuclear attack prompted by extreme Soviet attack upon Europe? The answer is as simple as it is upsetting to established patterns of strategic thought. Our ultimate deterrent power is that we hold enemy cities as hostages, and the enemy knows it. The bargaining power over him that these hostages give us is an asset we should be loath to throw away. We surely want to compel restraint in whatever retaliation he is capable of after our attack, and the way to compel restraint is to bring home to the enemy that most of his civilization remains hostage to us, and that it survives contingent upon his own restraint. With great and secure strategic power, we can withhold enough from an initial counter-military attack

to keep his cities always under an overriding threat. To leave his war industry alive another day or two is, contrary to yesterday's dogma, a trivial price. To leave untouched those military control facilities that are in cities may, in contrast, be costly because it permits him to retaliate; or it may yield enormous benefit, because only then can enemy political leaders stop or restrain retaliation. The measure of this last gain or cost must be left open. But we may choose, by city-sparing, to carry the power to deter powerfully through nuclear war, rather than deem deterrence wholly to have failed if nuclear war occurred. And for this element of American policy and capabilities, as with emphasis upon conventional forces, our seriousness is demonstrated in the most tangible way. We are spending billions of dollars to purchase the necessary capabilities.

In describing this novel possibility in our nuclear policy, the term "Counterforce" is best avoided. Traditionally this term has implied the all-out strike, with city destruction regarded as bonus rather than bane. The opponents of traditional Counterforce, therefore, find it attractive only when it can confidently be expected to be nearly 100 per cent effective, forecast dimmer and dimmer hopes for such effectiveness, and so dismiss the strategy. But city-sparing becomes more important, not less, as enemy retaliatory capability becomes less vulnerable to the classic counterforce strategy. If a nation is sure that hitting the enemy all-out will lead to intolerable counter-retaliation, then it must gamble on inducing restraint in the

enemy rather than on reducing his capability. It may well choose to do so by restrained counter-military attack even when most enemy forces are thought to be vulnerable, as the best of bad gambles in a situation desperate by assumption. The novel aspect of possible American nuclear strategies rests firmly upon a non-obsolescing concept of what not to hit. What specifically it is feasible to hit instead may change, although common sense suggests that no collection of military targets is likely to be composed entirely either of easy or hard targets. At any moment of time there will be a mix. Consider the strategic retaliatory program that we know most about, which is the American. Now and in the foreseeable future it contains some soft, fixed elements that are expected to be vulnerable as well as some that are hard or mobile; and no doubt it contains some elements that are not expected to be vulnerable that will unfortunately turn out to be. Unless the enemy is in magically better shape, a city-sparing attack against him will not lack for important targets.

Given its ability to hit both enemy capability and intent, American nuclear protection for NATO continues to have great comparative political appeal. Note where the hypothetical situation now ends that begins, implausibly, with extreme Soviet attack confined to Europe, and proceeds to an American retaliatory attack upon Russia. If this be a damaging but city-sparing attack, it is Khrushchev, not President Kennedy, whose military decision then comes closest to facing the exaggeration of "suicide" as an alternative. The risk that the Soviets might face such a paralyzing choice is itself a great deterrent to any such extreme attack upon Europe in the first place. Barring always

that the Soviet leaders are blind or mad, this makes such an attack exceedingly unlikely. Yet even if it happened, an American city-sparing reaction is the best remaining chance that deterrence for Europe will be replaced by meaningful defense. The restraining power upon the Soviets will be tremendous to keep the Red Army and medium-range missiles in check.

If America supplies the best ultimate deterrent, plus the last best hope in war for stopping short of a holocaust, Europeans more than anyone should wish to make sure that this deterrent is able to perform. But could our strategic forces fulfill their promise if concurrently a force de frappe were doing what it will presumably be designed to do? Suppose it destroys Soviet cities while American forces are taking pains to spare them! Would Soviet political leaders then have reason to be restrained? In their rage and dismay would they have time to reason? Indeed, would they be alive to order any restraint? What hope there would be depends crucially upon tight operational control of all striking forces, designed and coordinated to supply maximum leverage to one concurrent offer of terms. Both politically and militarily NATO nuclear policy requires what General de Gaulle so publicly despises--Integration. A world with such terrible weapons is too small for anything else.

Granted, general war is improbable; and even if it comes a force de frappe might cooperate in operations, might even have become formally integrated to insure coordination, or might be simply inactive or ineffective. The worst situation is unlikely to arise. Where the fate of all NATO may hang in the balance, however, even very small

probabilities need to be taken seriously. Independent nuclear operations have become anachronisms to be consistently opposed, not subsidized. This proposition applies as much to Bomber Command, of course, as to a force de frappe. But with Bomber Command we have operational coordination through the same unified target planning that coordinates our services, and Britain's 1962 White Paper on Defense speaks no longer of a British Deterrent, but of British "contribution to the Western strategic deterrent."

General de Gaulle speaks otherwise, and surely we should accord him the honor of believing that he means exactly what he says, especially when he takes such pains to be clear and eloquent. And we should respectfully disagree. About our nuclear aid to Britain, which is so galling to France, we can try not to exacerbate matters in the future and reasonably explain the past. Born of shared wartime nuclear and bomber programs, and nurtured by the earliest postwar governments, the origins of cooperation are not hard to explain. It is far easier not to create a Bomber Command than to kill one that flourished in victorious war. Also Anglo/American cooperation took place in the context of strategic thought that moved but slowly from consideration of cities as the natural targets to cities as bonus targets to, possibly, exempt targets. Consequently integration in operations used to appear easy and desirable, rather than hard and imperative. Finally, aid has been continuously reciprocal, without the distressing spectacle of an ally conspicuously withholding needed facilities until America has been bludgeoned into assistance. Hard bargaining there undoubtedly was, but bases have been continuously

available to our airplanes, complete with nuclear storage, and very recently we have the Polaris base in Scotland and use of Christmas Island. For all these reasons, past aid to Bomber Command can be rationalized as a special case. Continuance of special cooperation is nonetheless a pity, and certainly we should not replace the Bluestreak missile whose production the British have cancelled with Polaris or its equivalent. Our policy toward the United Kingdom should likewise not be treated in narrowly Anglo-American terms, but should be made compatible with our global arms policy.

III

If American opposition to independent national deterrent forces elsewhere is well-based in global arms imperatives, these should also constrain American independence. We cannot simultaneously preach Atlantic community and practice unimpaired sovereignty on life-and-death matters. If we should try to dismiss vulnerable and proud allies with but vague and secretive reassurances, we shall provoke anxiety and resentment rather than cooperation. We must somehow square the circle, and reconcile the operational need for unitary nuclear control with allied political participation and partnership.

To repeat, the most important step is the one we took a long time ago to pledge ourselves to common defense so that, for example, a nuclear bomb on West Germany would provoke an appropriate American counter no less than would a bomb on Maine. We are now taking other steps to reassure and inform our NATO allies about our defense policies and capabilities, and these could be very important. For instance, if we fail to provide data sufficient for our allies thoroughly to criticize and review our strategic capabilities relative to the Soviets, they may doubt Western superiority. If one globally integrated force is to be the ultimate custodian of their interests, our allies are surely entitled to know that this force is ample and securely protected. Yet even this minimum of reassurance involves information about what the Soviets have, estimates about how it might be used in the manner worst for the West, and about likely outcomes given the ability of our forces to survive and respond. Such information is not lightly held nor given, but, with appropriate security safeguards, its

sharing fulfills a deep political obligation. Our allies are also entitled to be convinced that we are not skimping in our strategic budget at their expense, for example, by failing to cover a known Soviet medium-range missile site in our target planning while we do cover a known intercontinental missile site. Such information is still more delicate, but the worst for a security officer is yet to come. Our allies ought to know and influence the general outlines of plans for various contingencies, so that the intellectual core of our policies is as reassuring to them as our capabilities.

How much is being done about sharing such information cannot be publicly known, although the Communique after the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Athens this Spring made clear that some progress has been made. Secretary McNamara's policy statement at Ann Arbor is explicit: "We want and need a greater degree of alliance participation in formulating nuclear weapons policy to the greatest extent possible." The United States has shared more knowledge with its partners about the What and How of our nuclear power, and is open to counsel about the When. Here arises that dilemma summed up in each ally's desire to possess both a trigger and a safety catch, while denying them to other allies so that strategic power be neither too loosely controlled nor paralyzed by multiple vetoes. Perhaps this dilemma is best resolved along the lines apparently now being attempted, which seem to involve no diffusion of physical control but an attempt to achieve a consensus about the general circumstances for nuclear employment. A skeptic may find the United States here cast in the role of the dictatorial secretary of a committee who guards jealously his prerogative to write

what the "sense of the meeting" was. Nonetheless, NATO consultations about what should govern nuclear employment matter deeply to all, and, incidentally, should serve to bring home to others that it is not America alone that blocks some aspirants from uniquely influential positions. Even where consensus in NATO cannot be achieved, participation in moving toward partial agreement should satisfy some national desires and clarify matters for all.

An Atlantic Deterrent requires no less than this, but does it require more? If more is needed beyond shared understanding and as full political consultation as possible, allied physical participation is possible, even extending to a role in the most sensitive area of Command and Control. A component of the Atlantic Deterrent could be European, and could be organized as a symbol of unity in the West. Any one of many technological alternatives is possible for this component in terms of various basing and delivery-vehicle combinations, but technical discussion can be minimized here. The political image should be the dominant one, provided only that suitable protection and secure control be supplied in any one of several ways. One possible combination was suggested by President Kennedy in May last year when he spoke at Ottawa about "the possibility of eventually establishing a NATO sea-borne missile force which would be truly multilateral in ownership and control, if this should be desired and found feasible by our allies once NATO's non-nuclear goals have been achieved."

Clearly this suggestion is conditional, as it should be. The United States does not need such a force for any overriding military reason, and the test of its need should be European enthusiasm. If

European NATO members are satisfied with new assurances and a greater political voice in nuclear matters, splendid. Or even if dissatisfied, they disagree more than they agree about further steps, it is only prudent that we not push for measures that breed more discord than harmony. But if there are deep-seated pressures in Europe for a nuclear force that is not wholly American, here is a way to meet them. The American offer is unprecedented for all its necessary caution, and Europeans need only agree in order to achieve such a force.

Unlike a force de frappe, such a force would symbolize interdependence rather than national dependence, especially if the meaning of "truly multilateral" were made clear. A sea-borne force could be made international in ownership and operation, down to and including mixed ship crews of different nationalities, so that not even one ship with its missiles could revert as an operable force to any nation in time of crisis or internal unrest. People worry little today about "Ultras" coming into power over SAC or Bomber Command, but if the number of national nuclear powers grows large, the specter of bellicose control, like those of heightened risks of accidental and catalytic war, cannot be ignored. If there is to be any growth in the number of nuclear powers, better a safeguarded collective addition than many national ones.

Nor should the possibility be dismissed that a European force could lessen the number of nuclear powers rather than increase it. This year Great Britain has V-Bombers, and next year France will have some Mirage IV fighter-bombers. On the other hand, Bluestreak has been cancelled and the British speak only of prolonging the life of

the V-Bombers for a few years with air-to-surface missiles. What then follows? France says that she will have an operational missile force before the decade is out, but this is years away. Perhaps French governments will persevere in seeking missiles of their own, perhaps not. Surely their future choices will not be totally independent of costs and alternatives. Is it beyond the ingenuity of such experienced powers as France and Great Britain to devise a political compromise in terms of a NATO deterrent acceptable to all, while they gracefully phase out outmoded airplane forces?

If they try, the awkward question will, of course, be that of control. We must return to the multi-trigger and safety-catch dilemma. The symbols of European uniforms on ships that carry part of the ultimate deterrent are important, as is the assignment of American Polaris submarines to a NATO Commander. Control over firing missiles from a multilateral force is more important still, but so hard an issue that many find it impossible. Yet it can be solved, if necessary, along familiar lines. What most worries some Europeans is that there would be no guaranteed nuclear response by America after a Soviet attack on Europe that overwhelms non-nuclear defense possibilities. If we let a multilateral NATO force be designed to insure European control over some nuclear response in this worst case for them, we give them a trigger for the case where we already expect to respond. Consequently we give nothing away if the nature of the response fits our global operations. This vital proviso can be simply met, for example, by keeping the missiles of the European force aimed at key vulnerable Soviet military installations. These installations are

almost certain to be included as targets within any strike we launch, unlike less vulnerable military targets that we may not be able to hit and very vulnerable people that we may not want to hit. So the requirements for integrated operations can be met, although doubtless far more complex variants for targetting and other operational aspects would be better than this illustrative crude one.

The political essentials are more troublesome. Assured response implies that the North Atlantic Council will pre-authorize the Commander of a multilateral force to retaliate against overwhelming Soviet attack, for time will not permit consultation then and the enemy must not be allowed to expect that the most reluctant among fifteen nations would stop retaliation. Do Europeans really want control made so grimly explicit, with its feared automaticity in any nuclear response? Perhaps they do not, in which case their public admissions will be clarifying to them in their own parliamentary debates. If they shrink from assured response in the worst cases of Soviet attack, what are national deterrents credible against? NATO debates should also be illuminating, for the more restrictive our allies care to make any nuclear response the more they must admit the utility of non-nuclear alternatives in credibly facing Soviet challenges. Facing the issue will be unpleasant but educational. Probably restraints upon any automatic element in response that NATO will authorize will be severe, which is good. There must be an irreducible element, for no sudden removal of the White House and related top political echelons can be allowed to promise immunity to the Soviets. A little more is dangerous, but not unthinkable. What could safely be allowed,

although left to European initiatives for advocacy, would be a firing pre-authorization that falls far short of response based either upon fallible radar warning systems or sweeping military autonomy. Yet such authorization can still insure against paralysis of the NATO multilateral force by any one of fifteen nations in the worst of military contingencies for Europe.

Constructive alternatives to a proliferation of national nuclear forces thus are possible for NATO, up to and including a militarily meaningful NATO deterrent if it be necessary to go this far. The United States has made these alternatives possible, perhaps not fully, clearly, or consistently, but nonetheless publicly, and at the cost of renouncing any narrow interpretation of purely national interests. We have a policy, and it is a good one. Now is not the time to abandon the policy and please France, but to improve and solidify it as we move toward greater Atlantic partnership.

Mutual Defense
Arrangements



UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MAY 14 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Charles Johnson
The White House

You are probably familiar with the Mutual Defense Agreement for Cooperation which the U.S. has with France under which we have agreed to supply up to 440 kilograms of U-235 for use by France for the development and operation of a land-based, prototype nuclear submarine reactor. The Agreement, which was signed May 7, 1959, provides for no communication of any U.S. submarine reactor information - whether classified or unclassified. The safeguards inspections under this agreement would, in addition to verifying the presence of the inventory of material, determine that the material is not being used for any other purpose.

The Commission has recently approved a formulation which would provide for four annual inspections of the facilities in France in which the U.S. material is stored or used, unless unforeseen circumstances develop requiring additional visits. Two of these inspections will be full audits of records and verification of inventories and use of the material. The other two will be limited to determine the location of the inventories and a review of the use of the supplied material. The Commission is satisfied that an inspection program of this nature, taking into account guarantees from the French Government and the nature of our relationship with France, provides adequate assurance that material supplied under this Mutual Defense Agreement will be used only for the intended purpose.

In a related matter, which the Commission took into consideration in reaching this conclusion, members of the Commission staff have recently met with staff members of the French Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique to discuss inspection problems arising out of the classified nature of the French submarine nuclear propulsion program. In these discussions the French representatives were

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Mr. Charles Johnson

extremely cooperative not only in identifying areas of sensitive information but in suggesting alternate means by which information necessary to account properly for material could be obtained in these circumstances. An inspection of the French prototype submarine project is scheduled for this month and, as a consequence of these discussions, it is our expectation that it will proceed without difficulty.

We have worked very closely with the Department of State in this matter and the Commission's decision is consistent with the advice provided by the Department.

I have considered that this information would be of interest to you in light of the considerable quantities of uranium 235 which are being transferred and, reflecting as it does one particular phase of our cooperation with France.


A. A. Wells, Director
Division of International Affairs

NOTE: Carbon copy (trans w/orig) to Mr. Kaysen, 5/15/63
Typed copy to Mr. Klein, 5/15/63
Typed copy to Mr. Chester Cooper, SitRm, WH, 5/15/63
Repro copy to Mr. Dana Orwick, State, 5/15/63



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UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MAY 14 1963

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Cooperation on Weapon
Study & Control (Safety)



~~TOP SECRET~~

Copy 3 of 4 copies each
of 2 pages series A

3670

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

51

5 JUL 1963

Johnson
Copy with Fr

Dear Jim:

This is in reference to our recent phone conversation in regard to the proposed outline of possible U. S. cooperation with the French in the area of nuclear safety.

While the scope of the outline as attached, covers the major procedural and technical considerations in a nuclear safety program, I think it desirable that we examine in advance of any further communication to the French, the details of cooperation which might be involved in any expanded discussions under the various sub-headings of the outline.

I understand that staff members of the Division of Military Application and my office have been working closely on this matter and that arrangements have now been made for the Sandia Corporation and the Field Command, DASA, to jointly develop a written program in expansion of the proposed outline of U. S. cooperation with the French in nuclear safety. I am also given to understand that this joint program will be developed in three gradations of information; an unclassified version, another covering Defense Information only, and a third will be expanded to include Restricted and Formerly Restricted Data but not significant design information.

When we have these versions in hand, I believe we will then be able to evaluate at what level we can develop a meaningful program which will be consistent with the provisions of the present U. S. -French Agreement for Cooperation. I am informed that the program details will be available for review, due in Washington on July 22, 1963. At that time the Department of

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NW-030-32-1-5
By CTS, NARA, Date 12/10/17

~~TOP SECRET~~

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING SCHEDULE 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

867

~~TOP SECRET~~

Defense will be prepared to discuss this matter in further detail.

In view of Executive interest in this matter, I am forwarding a copy of this letter to Mr. McGeorge Bundy for his information.

Signed: Jerry

Gerald W. Johnson
Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense (Atomic Energy)

1 Inclosure

**Proposed Outline of U. S.
Cooperation with the French
in Nuclear Safety**

James T. Ramey
Mr. McGeorge Bundy w/Inclosure
Commissioner
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington 25, D. C.

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5/a

Proposed Information Communication to the French Government

It appears that the following are areas in which exchange of information would be useful with regard to weapon safety and control matters:

1. Administrative Control

- a. Personnel control in preventing access by unauthorized persons.
- b. Nuclear weapon safety organizational structure.
- c. Training of personnel.

2. Technical Safety Features

- a. Identification of nuclear safety hazards.
 - (1) Spontaneous equipment malfunction.
 - (2) Environmentally induced equipment malfunction.
 - (3) Accidental human action.
 - (4) Deliberate unauthorized human action.
- b. Generalized weapon system safety design, including generalized discussions of:
 - (1) Delivery vehicle
 - (2) Weapon arming and fusing system.
 - (3) Electrical system.
 - (4) High explosive problem

General design requirements applicable to certain weapon components and specific design requirement for independent components such as: Electrical test equipment, handling safety devices, launching and releasing control, etc.

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Authority NLJ-030-32-1-15
By CTS, NARA, Date 12/10/17

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~~TOP SECRET~~

We would appreciate initial discussion on each of the foregoing topics without the necessity of discussing weapon internal design information as controlled by the US-AEC action.

Due to the availability of US technical personnel in Europe toward the end of July, we would be prepared to hold 2- or 3-day discussions with appropriate French personnel as early as the last week in July. If this date is not convenient, we will of course, be pleased to work an alternate time. In the interim, we would appreciate to see any French comments on the outline to reflect topics of particular interest or to express topics of concern we have overlooked.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

file
"loop with
Henderson"
Safely

June 28, 1963


OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

Dear Chuck:

With reference to our recent telephone conversation I am supplying the following information as a supplement to Dr. Seaborg's letter to Mr. Bundy dated June 17th, on the loan of three kilograms of separated U-233 to the French. This small amount of material would be used in the French Proserpine reactor and the Alecto critical assembly.

The experiments in Alecto are concerned with criticality as it might be affected by various materials or conditions in a reactor, and are related to questions of reactor safety. Proserpine is a reactor physics experiment which will permit a comparison of plutonium, enriched uranium and U-233 as reactor fuels under various conditions. Experiments of this nature are basic to civil reactor design and to evaluating competing reactor concepts; while conceivably a small fraction of this information might be of military interest, its value would probably be marginal for such application. The material would be transferred pursuant to our Civil Agreement with France and would be subject to the safeguards contained in that Agreement which are designed to assure the peaceful use of such material.

Sincerely,


Chris L. Henderson
Special Assistant
to the Chairman

Mr. Charles Johnson
National Security Council
The White House

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

8562
53
file
JUN 27 1963

Dear Alexis:

I have just received your letter of June 24 concerning possible assistance to the French on safety and control of nuclear weapons.

In view of your response, the Commission staff is giving consideration to what specific items of information might be provided under the applicable conditions. I hope that this will be far enough along within a very few days to make a meeting among State, AEC and Defense officials meaningful. We will be in touch with you soon on this matter.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy for his information and also a copy to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Sincerely,

(Signed) Glenn T. Seaborg

Chairman

The Honorable U. Alexis Johnson
Deputy Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

CC: Honorable Gerald W. Johnson
Honorable McGeorge Bundy

person in

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ-030-32-1-16
By CTS, NARA, Date 12/10/17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

725

3527

54

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

~~SECRET~~ (Attachment)

Johnson

June 25, 1963

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Mr. William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

*W.A. Henderson
for*

Attached for your information and files is a copy of a letter to Chairman Seaborg from Mr. U. Alexis Johnson regarding possible cooperation with the French on nuclear weapons safety and control dated June 24, 1963.

||

Attachment:

As stated.

file

~~SECRET~~ (Attachment)

762

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

54a

3957

COPIES TO:

JUN 24 1963

~~SECRET~~

Dear Glenn:

I am sorry for the delay in replying to your letter of March 14, 1963 to Secretary Rusk on possible cooperation with the French on nuclear weapons safety and control but, as you know through our staff contacts, we have been working on the question.

We agree that it would be in our national interest to assist the French and give them the benefit of our experience in nuclear weapons safety and control within the parameters set forth in your letter: that is, on an unclassified and Defense Information basis, and within the limits of the present Section 144B Agreement. Any such assistance should, of course, stop short of weapons design information.

We believe it important in our national interest that we should respond affirmatively and immediately to a firm request from the French for assistance on safety and control of nuclear weapons within the above limits. It is clear that an unauthorized use of French nuclear weapons or an accidental detonation could have an adverse effect on our ability to deploy United States nuclear weapons in the European theater and elsewhere.

We believe it highly significant that French Minister of State Gaston Palewski should recently have raised informally in Washington the question of receiving information and assistance on nuclear safety and control

measures,

The Honorable
Glenn T. Seaborg,
Chairman,
Atomic Energy Commission,
Washington, D. C.

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Authority NY-030R-32-1-15
By CTS, NARA, Date 12/10/11

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intervals; not
automatically declassified

PRESERVATION COPY

762

~~SECRET~~

-2-

measures, particularly against an unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, Ambassador Bohlen has been authorized in his discretion to inform the French Foreign Minister that (1) we have noted the French Government's interest as expressed by Palewski (2) we are prepared to consider assistance which we can give solely in the field of safety and control of nuclear weapons within the limits described above and (3) if the French Government desires to pursue the matter we should be prepared to follow up by discussion at the technical level either in Washington or Paris. We have informed Ambassador Bohlen, in this connection, that our willingness to provide such assistance does not represent any change in our attitude toward assisting France in developing its nuclear weapons capability, and should not be so interpreted by the French.

While awaiting the French Government's response, I believe that we should at the same time move ahead with the meeting of interested officials of State, AEC and Defense which you proposed, to agree on the specific type of information which can and should be conveyed to the French.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy for his information.

Sincerely yours,


U. Alexis Johnson

cc: Honorable Gerald W. Johnson
Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense for Atomic Energy

Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the
President for National
Security Affairs

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

55

34

~~SECRET~~

Action

Control: 20907

SS

Rec'd: June 25, 1963

Info

FROM: Paris

6:14 a.m.

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 5332, June 25, 10 a.m.

BUNDY-SMITH
 BELK
 CHASE
 DINGEMAN
 DUNGAN
 ELDMAN
 FORRESTAL
 HIRSCH
 JOHNSON
 KAYSEN
 KILDUFF
 KLEIN
 KOMER
 PARROTT
 SAUNDERS
 SCULLESINGER
 SMITH
 WIESNER

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

I took up with Couve de Murville yesterday afternoon the question of the safety and control of nuclear weapons (Department telegram 6104), mentioning that Palewski had made some reference to possible cooperation in this field, and outlining the three points contained in reference telegram. Couve said he was not familiar with this subject. Had not realized that Palewski had raised it but would look into it and let us know.

SCP-3.

BOHLEN

MM/16

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
 By Chm/s, NARA, Date 3-12-09

~~SECRET~~

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 PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

56

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY
G/PM

July 2, 1963

White House - Mr. Johnson

Chuck:

Per conversation.

Duncan

Duncan Mackay

*file Frank Co-Op.
under*

793

JUN 24 1963

~~SECRET~~

Dear Glenn:

I am sorry for the delay in replying to your letter of March 14, 1963 to Secretary Rusk on possible cooperation with the French on nuclear weapons safety and control but, as you know through our staff contacts, we have been working on the question.

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We believe it highly significant that French Minister of State Gaston Palewski should recently have raised informally in Washington the question of receiving information and assistance on nuclear safety and control

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The Honorable
Glenn T. Seaborg,
Chairman,
Atomic Energy Commission,
Washington, D. C.

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Authority: NLJ-030R-32-1-15
By CTS, NARA, Date 12/10/17

~~SECRET~~

793

~~SECRET~~

-2-

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While awaiting the French Government's response, I believe that we should at the same time move ahead with the meeting of interested officials of State, AEC and Defense which you proposed, to agree on the specific type of information which can and should be conveyed to the French.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy for his information.

Sincerely yours,



U. Alexis Johnson

cc: Honorable Gerald W. Johnson
Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense for Atomic Energy

Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the
President for National
Security Affairs

G/PH:DADMackay:mjf

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY

G/PM

566

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

THROUGH: S/S ~~MA~~

FROM: G - U. Alexis Johnson

SUBJECT: Possible Cooperation with the French Government
on Nuclear Weapons Safety and Control

Chairman Seaborg of the AEC wrote you a letter on March 14, 1963 (Tab C) informing you that the AEC had completed a study of possible cooperation with the French Government on nuclear weapons safety and control.

This study was initiated in March 1962 on the suggestion of Representative Chet Hollifield, then Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, following testimony by Dr. Harold Agnew, Scientific Adviser at SHAPE, of the adverse effects on NATO which would result from an accidental detonation in Europe of a French nuclear weapon. Hollifield asked both AEC and Defense to study the possibility of an exchange of information with France on this subject, both in our own self-interest and as a means of drawing France closer to the Alliance.

In his letter Dr. Seaborg indicates that, if such cooperation is found to be consistent with our present overall relations with France, he is prepared to recommend discussions with the French on two levels:

(1) an inter-agency team to discuss, on an unclassified and Defense Information basis with appropriate French authorities, problems in acquiring and maintaining safety on atomic weapons, including safety procedures and various safety controls and

(2) discussions with French military officials under Section 144 (b) of the bilateral Atomic Information Agreement, of certain safety features on U. S. weapons furnished in support of French NATO forces.

Last

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~~SECRET~~

-2-

Last week, French Minister of State Gaston Palewski who is in charge of atomic energy matters in the French Government, inquired informally during the course of his visit to Washington, regarding the possibility of U. S. cooperation with France to provide information and assistance on nuclear weapons safety and control, particularly on means of preventing unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. A letter on this subject from Commissioner Ramey of the AEC to Assistant Secretary Tyler is attached at Tab B.





It is suggested in the proposed reply (Tab A) that you inform Dr. Seaborg that (1) while we generally concur in the type of cooperation with the French which he proposes, we would wish to have prior agreement between AEC, State and Defense on specific types of information to be given, and the manner and timing of its presentation, before any discussions are held with French officials, and (2) we believe that any such program of cooperation should be limited to safety and control of nuclear weapons and not include any design information. The latter would require a 144 (c) agreement with France, and be contrary to present national policy.




We would make clear to the French, and any other interested parties, that this cooperation is in the field of safety, and does not signify any change in U. S. policy toward nuclear weapons cooperation.

Attachments:

As stated.

 
G/PM:DADMackay:mjf

Clearances: EUR/Mr. Tyler 
RPM/Mr. Popper 
G/PM - Mr. Kitchen 
Defense/ Col. Hopper 

WE/Mr. Meloy, Mr. Beigel 
MC/Mr. Margrave 
S/P - Mr. Owen 

U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
CLASSIFIED MATERIAL RECEIPT

POSTAL REGISTRY NO.

DATE MAILED

June 10, 1963

TO

**Mr. Charles E. Johnson
Senior Staff Member
National Security Council
Room 368 - Executive Office Bldg.**

FROM

**Commissioner James T. Ramey
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Room 1100-H D.C. Office
1717 H Street N. W.**

INSTRUCTIONS:

1. Original of this receipt to be signed personally by recipient and returned to
2. Duplicate to be retained by recipient.
3. Triplicate to be retained by sender in suspense file.
4. Avoid Identifying Material Below in Any Manner Which Might Necessitate Classification of This Receipt.

DESCRIPTION (CHECK OR INDICATE)	DATE OF DOCUMENT LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL	FROM—	REFERENCE OR FILE NO.	ADDRESSED TO—
Ltr. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rpt. _____ Dwg. _____ Other _____ Nature of copy: SO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CC <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TC _____ PC _____ Other _____ Number of enclosures and attachments: 3	6/10/63	above	AK	above
1. Staff paper re F. Weapons Safety 2/13/63 (SECRET) 2. Ltr from Seaborg to Rusk 3/14/63 (Confidential) 3. Ltr from Ramey to Tyler 6/6/63 (Confidential)				

CERTIFICATE

I have personally received from the sender the material, including enclosures and attachments, as identified above. I assume full responsibility for the safe handling, storage, and transmittal elsewhere of this material in full accordance with existing regulations.

DISPATCHED

SIGNATURE OF COURIER

SIGNATURE OF RECIPIENT

DATE RECEIVED

DATE RECEIVED

(15) by Marion Miller

6/10/63

707

~~SECRET~~

58



UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

June 10, 1963

Chuck

Dear Mr. Johnson:

In accordance with our conversation, attached for your information is a copy of a letter dated June 6, 1963, concerning possible cooperation with the French on weapons safety and control matters which I forwarded to Mr. William R. Tyler of the Department of State.

This subject has been under study for a considerable period of time as reflected in the attached letter dated March 14, 1963, from Chairman Seaborg to Secretary of State Rusk, and in the attached copy of an AEC staff paper on this same subject, dated February 13, 1963. I will appreciate it if you would return the staff paper to me after you have completed your review.

If you would like to discuss this matter further, we will be available at your convenience.

Sincerely yours,

Jim

James T. Ramey
Commissioner

Mr. Charles E. Johnson
Senior Staff Member
National Security Council
Room 368 - Executive Office Building

Attachments:

1. Staff Paper 2/13/63
2. Ltr fm Seaborg to Rusk 3/14/63
3. Ltr fm Ramey to Tyler 6/6/63

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By CTS, NARA, Date 12/10/17

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as ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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HEREWITH CONTAINS

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

~~SECRET~~

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