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42	memcon	Gilpatric and Messmer open '14/18 per RAC 12/17	TS	2	9/7/62	A
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15a	report	Attachment to #15	S	9	12/6/62	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Charles E. Johnson**Folder Title** "NUCLEAR - French Nuclear Submarines"**Box Number** 32**Restriction Codes**

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3/25/2009

Initials 

*French
Submarine*

1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 22, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR

1. Mr. Francis Bator
2. Mr. W. W. Rostow

Here is a file of documents to bring you up to date on the French nuclear submarine prototype fuel.

As of today Secretaries McNamara and Rusk still hold to the agreement they reached last June that the action on the French request should be indefinitely postponed.

Charles E. Johnson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cbm/8 NARA, Date 3-13-04

AIRGRAM

DEF 12-1 FR ²
INCO URANIUM FR
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RM/R 1	REP 1	AF
ARA 5	EUR 5	FE
NEA 5	CU 5	INR 5
E 4	H 1	IO 3
L 1	FBO 1	AID 12
AGR 3	COM 10	FRB 5
INT 1	LAB 1	TAR 5
TR 3	XMB 10	AIR 5
ARMY 3	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 3	USIA 10	NSA 3
NSF 2	AEC 8	NSC 6

20

A-2501

UNCLASSIFIED

TO : Department of State
PASS : AEC (for Kratzer, DIA)
INFO : Paris (for Biles, AEC); Brussels (for Iltis, AEC)
FROM : AmEmbassy LONDON
SUBJECT : US Enriched Uranium for France
REF :

1966 APR 21 AM 11 06

DATE: April 20, 1966

RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

Following publication of the John Finney article in the Paris edition of the New York Times on April 18, British press coverage of the subject was very light. Attached are articles appearing April 19 in the Daily Telegraph and The Guardian, and also the Paris edition of the Herald Tribune.

The Telegraph, in a dispatch from its Washington correspondent, merely stated that the US acknowledged holding up action on a French request for uranium for its submarine development program, and attributed the hold-up to US "reluctance to assist France develop her own nuclear deterrent force".

The Guardian carried a press wire service dispatch from Paris stating that the French confirmed that the US had stopped enriched uranium shipments to France but that Pierrelatte production is sufficient to avoid affecting the French submarine program. It also stated that "there is some resentment at the US action which, according to some French officials, is a breach of contract".

The light UK coverage contrasted with a long article on the front page of the Herald Tribune Paris edition, which stated that the US feels that it was "misled" by France.

For the Ambassador

S. G. Nordlinger
Attache (Atomic Energy)

Encl att. in m.

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☒ In ☐ Out

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by:

AEC:S.G.Nordlinger:nw:4/19/66

Contents and Classification Approved by:

S. G. Nordlinger

Clearances:

19:5 APR 21 PM 1 37

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~~The Telegraph~~ FRENCH URANIUM PLEA HELD UP

Daily Telegraph Staff Correspondent
WASHINGTON, Monday.

The United States acknowledged today that it is holding up action on a French request for enriched uranium. The French, who would like the uranium for use in their nuclear submarine development programme, made the request over a year ago.

A State Department spokesman said today that the matter was still "under consideration." There is no doubt that the hold-up is due to America's reluctance to assist France develop her own nuclear deterrent force.

Delivery of US uranium to *Guadeloupe* France halted *April 19*

Paris, April 18

The French Atomic Energy Commission confirmed today that the United States had stopped enriched uranium shipments to France. It was pointed out, however, that French nuclear reactors at Pierrelatte were producing enough uranium and the French atomic-powered submarine programme would not be affected.

There is some resentment at the US action which, according to some French officials, is a breach of contract. Under an agreement concluded in 1959 the US contracted to supply France with enriched uranium for use in an experimental submarine nuclear engine.—British United Press.

HERALD TRIBUNE (Paris Edition) 4/19/66

U.S. Misled On French A-Sub? *Herald Tribune (Paris) April 19* Model Altered To Offense Type

By Ronald Koven

PARIS, April 18.—The United States feels that France misled it after getting a pledge of American help for the French nuclear submarine program.

U.S. help, pledged in a 1959 agreement, was given on the understanding that the French were building a defensive submarine—a hunter-killer for use against Soviet attack subs.

But several years after the program started, the French turned around and designed an offensive vessel, the Polaris-type submarine it is now working on for delivery by 1970.

There is no difference between the nuclear engine for the two types of submarine.

The change in plans is considered one of the main reasons the United States is refusing to sell France any more enriched uranium for the land-bound prototype of its nuclear submarine engine now being tested at Cadarache, in

France Got 418 Lbs.

The Americans have already sold France 418 pounds of 90 percent enriched uranium, over half the 726 pounds France was to have bought under the ten-year agreement.

In 1959 Washington had no firm policy on nuclear proliferation. By the time of the latest French purchase request in late 1964, the U.S. had come out against proliferation and decided against aiding France further in atomic delivery systems.

The French are thought to be producing enough enriched uranium of their own to complete the Cadarache program, but at a somewhat slower rate. They had originally planned to have a Polaris submarine in service by 1970 and two more in the next five years.

U.S. Law

American sources said U.S. law requires that each sale of enriched uranium be individually approved by the president. The rule requires that the Americans make a judgment each time on whether the French actually need the uranium for their program. The Americans do not therefore feel their agreement binds them to fill each French order.

The uranium was strictly limited to use in the Cadarache prototype. Representatives of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission periodically inspected it to make sure no uranium was being diverted for other purposes. The French have been complaining for some time that such distrust was "unjustified."

France Sees U.S. Delay No Reprisal

By Waverley Root
Washington Post Foreign Service

PARIS, April 19 — French official sources professed today to see no connection between the NATO crisis and American failure to respond to a French request for enriched uranium for a nuclear submarine prototype, promised under a 1959 agreement.

But there seemed to be an undercurrent of feeling that the current raising of the question is not entirely foreign to U.S. displeasure with President de Gaulle's disengagement from NATO.

The French disavowal is based on the timetable of the affair. The request for 20 per cent-enriched uranium was made in 1964, for on-shore tests of the atomic power plant to be placed eventually in French submarines.

The French had already obtained 171 kilograms of 90 per cent-enriched uranium for experiments that had started years before.

Presumably the 1964 request was for the balance of the 440 kilograms covered by the 1959 agreement. The agreement does not obligate the United States if it prefers not to provide the uranium.

(Enriched uranium refers to a stock of the mineral in which the natural U-238 is mixed with a proportion of the U-235 isotope, which is more efficient in producing nuclear reactions and makes the stock more suitable for nuclear weapons.)

If the NATO crisis was not the original reason for holding up the requested uranium, some officials seem to feel that the publicity given the matter now may be a result of the NATO disagreement — to remind France that failure to cooperate on NATO can be balanced by American "failures" in other fields.

There have been reports that the American failure to supply the requested enriched uranium was motivated by a change in French plans from the construction of defensive nuclear submarines to offensive craft with Polaris-type missiles.

A French spokesman did not explicitly admit that such changes had been made, but said the power plant for which the uranium was needed "is the same no matter what kind of submarine you put it in."

4/20/66
Post

NEW YORK, SUNDAY, APRIL 17, 1966.

ATOM FUEL DENIED TO PARIS SINCE '64 DESPITE U.S. PACT

Action Apparently Intended
to Penalize the French
for Stand on NATO

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 16 —

For more than a year the United States has refused to comply with a 1959 agreement to provide France with enriched uranium fuel for the development of an atomic submarine.

French diplomatic sources disclosed the refusal today. American officials confirmed that since late in 1964 the United States had ignored French requests for additional uranium fuel under the agreement, but they declined to discuss the reasons.

The French disclosure sheds a new light on the American role in the current crisis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Washington has depicted itself in a passive role, waiting for specific proposals from President de Gaulle. But it appears that in at least this instance, the United States has been taking punitive measures against President de Gaulle for seeking French "independence" from the military alliance.

A Blow to Paris

French inability to obtain additional enriched uranium fuel could represent a serious blow to the de Gaulle Government's plans for a fleet of atomic-powered submarines equipped with intermediate-range missiles.

At this point, France depends on the United States for fuel for the submarine reactor, being developed at Cadarache.

For General de Gaulle personally, the American action touched on a sore point; past American refusals to help France develop atomic weapons and submarines have been a principal divisive issue between Washington and Paris, and a major underlying reason for the French campaign to end military "subordination" to NATO and the United States.

The differences go back to 1957, when the Eisenhower Administration decided to help Britain—but not France and the other Atlantic allies—to manufacture atomic weapons. To mollify the allies, the United States offered to help them develop atomic submarines much as it had agreed to help Britain develop submarine reactors.

This proposal drew a favor-

able response from France and some other allies, such as Italy and the Netherlands. But it ran into objections from the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, which was concerned about protecting submarine secrets.

As a result, the Administration was forced in effect to withdraw the offer. It entered into a limited compromise agreement with France under which the United States would provide enriched uranium fuel for a land-based reactor prototype but no information—unlike the case of Britain—on how to build the reactor.

Under the 1959 agreement, the United States agreed to sell France up to 968 pounds of enriched uranium, essential as a fuel in a compact reactor such as the one used in a submarine. At the time of the agreement, France was beginning the construction of a separation plant at Pierrelatte to produce enriched uranium. The plant is still not completed.

Cooperation under the 1959 agreement proceeded satisfactorily until 1964, with the United States delivering 374 pounds of enriched uranium—about enough for three fuel loadings. But, late in 1964, difficulties began developing. They have still not been explained to the French Government.

New Request in '64

In November, 1964, the French Government requested additional uranium. The request was never answered, according to French diplomats.

When pressed for an explanation of their inaction, American officials were reported to have alluded vaguely and unofficially to "over-all developments" within the Atlantic Alliance. In the preceding months, President de Gaulle had withdrawn French naval units from allied forces in the Atlantic and the English Channel and had recalled French naval officers from the alliance's integrated commands.

These French actions were apparently interpreted as violations of a basic provision of the agreement and of the Atomic Energy Law, specifying that military atomic assistance may go only to a nation that is making "substantial and material contributions" to an international arrangement for mutual defense and security.

N.Y. Times

7325

FOR THE NOON BRIEFING

April 18, 1966

Subject: U-235

QUESTION: What about the story that we have broken an agreement to supply France with U-235 for their submarine project?

ANSWER: We concluded an agreement with France on this subject in 1959. Under the agreement the French may request the sale and delivery of U-235 from time to time. Pursuant ~~ex~~ to the agreement, itself, the U.S. has authority to determine whether the request will be met. ~~Some~~ One such request is pending and is still under consideration within the U.S. Government. There has been no violation of the agreement.

Clearances:

EUR/P:A0lsen:pt

EUR - Mr. Schaetzel
L - Mr. Meeker

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
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Origin
EUR
Info

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS

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APR 18 5 52 PM '66

P
USIA

Following is from Dept. spokesman's press briefing of April

18:

QUOTE ... Q. It concerns the report ~~x~~ about the U.S. refusal to supply France with enriched uranium, and there have been stories back and forth on both sides of the Atlantic. Do you have anything on that?

A. Yes. We concluded an agreement with France on this subject in 1959. Under the agreement, the French may request the sale and delivery of U-235 from time to time. Pursuant to the agreement itself, the United States has authority to determine whether the request will be met. One such request is pending, and is still under consideration within the United States Government. There has been no ~~xxxx~~ violation of the agreement.

Q. Pending since when?

Q. No violation because the agreement left you the option of deciding whether to fulfill it? Is that correct?

A. Well for--

Q. When was that request made?

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

EUR/P:AOlsen:pt 4/18/66

EUR - Mr. Olsen

P - Mr. McCloskey (in substance)

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A. For BACKGROUND, it is my understanding that, while this set a possible ceiling, there was no contractual arrangement for specific amounts in fixed times.

Q. Sir, what was it set, a possible ceiling on what?

A. On the amount of enriched uranium.

Q. You mean the agreement limited the amount? You couldn't be above a certain volume?

A. For BACKGROUND, that is my understanding, yes.

Q. So what you're saying is that anything negotiable on amount or on time or on whether to do it or not is at a level lower than that agreement, than the amount fixed in the agreement?

A. Well, I think the better answer is that any decision on a specific request--on that, the U.S. Government reserves the right, as I have said here, pursuant to the agreement, the U.S. has the authority to determine whether the request will be met.

Q. Well, now, does this mean that if the United States had decided not to meet any requests at all, it would still have--it would not have violated the agreement? I'm just trying to get how broad this is.

A. Well, that is academic because some amounts have been supplied.

Q. When was this request received, this pending request?

A. I'd have to check that. I have an idea, but I would want to be precise on it.

Q. When does the agreement expire? ...

A. I don't know what the terminal date on it is. ...

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Q. You say that some amounts have been supplied under the agreement?

A. That is my understanding, yes.

Q. Prior to this request?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell us how much?

Q. I don't know.

Q. Can you cite me the clause in the bilateral agreement on which you base your argument that we have the right to determine whether to supply the uranium?

A. I cannot. I have given you what I have been able to, based on what I consider to be good guidance.

Q. Is the agreement public, as ~~many~~ many of these are?

Q. Yes?

A. Let me check that. UNQUOTE END.

Dept. later confirmed that agreement is a public document.

END.

RUSK

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file - "Skipjack"

January 22, 1963

8

Dear Chet:

The President asked me to thank you for your thoughtful letter of January 11th and the appended letter dated October 1, 1962, both of which presented your views and those of several other members of the Joint Committee concerning the Skipjack matter.

As you know, the President discussed this subject with the Committee last Friday, at which time he assured the Committee that if the proposal took on new life, the White House would be in touch with them to discuss the matter in the light of the circumstances then existing. Meanwhile, the President is glad to have a full statement of your views.

Sincerely,

15

McGeorge Bundy

The Honorable Chet Holifield
Vice Chairman
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
Congress of the United States

Pending

DRAFT/CEJ
1/22/63

Dear Mr. Holifield:

The President has asked me to thank you for your thoughtful letter of January 11, 1963, and the appended letter dated October 1, 1962, both of which presented your views and those of several other members of the Joint Committee concerning the Skipjack matter.

As you know, the President discussed this matter with the Committee last Friday, at which time he assured the Committee that if the proposal took on new life the White House would be in touch with the Joint Committee ~~again~~ to discuss the matter in the light of the circumstances then existing.

Your views are on record and will be taken under consideration in formulating any future plan of action on this matter.

Sincerely yours,

McGeorge Bundy

Vice- Honorable Chet Holifield
Chairman
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
Congress of the United States

1/25/63 Ellen said she would send you
copy of dispatched ltr. mdy

CHET HOLIFIELD, CALIF.
CHAIRMAN
MELVIN PRICE, ILL.
WAYNE N. ASPINALL, COLO.
ALBERT THOMAS, TEX.
THOMAS G. MORRIS, N. MEX.
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CRAIG HOSMER, CALIF.
WILLIAM H. BATES, MASS.
JACK WESTLAND, WASH.
JOHN T. CONWAY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Congress of the United States
JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY

January 11, 1963

240
10
JOHN O. PASTORE, R.I.
VICE CHAIRMAN
RICHARD B. RUSSELL, GA.
CLINTON P. ANDERSON, N. MEX.
ALBERT GORE, TENN.
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~~SECRET~~

This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Dear Mr. President:

My concern over press reports in regard to the acquisition of a nuclear submarine by the French under some type of arrangement with the United States caused me to prepare a letter to you under date of October 1, 1962. I did not deliver this letter to you because of a consultation with Secretary Gilpatric in which I showed him the proposed letter to you and, after reading the letter, he urged me very strongly not to send it. I explained to him that I wanted you to have my viewpoints on this matter along with such viewpoints as might be expressed by members of the Defense Department. I pointed out to him at that time that I did not want this matter to be accelerated to the point where it would become a partisan issue in the then pending political campaign. He agreed with me that this was undesirable and stated that if I did not send my letter to you at that time that no presentation would be made through the Defense Department until after he and the Committee could meet in January and discuss the problem and, in any event, no proposal would be put before you until I had an opportunity to present my views to you.

I understand that under date of December 10, at your request, Mr. Gilpatric did forward to you a presentation which gave some of the arguments for and against the proposal. Shortly after that I was notified by Mr. Gilpatric that he had furnished you this memorandum at your request and he was kind enough to send me a copy of the memorandum. I received this notification shortly before the Christmas holidays.

BETH

The President

The White House

When separated from enclosure,
handle this document as

Unclassified

(211)

COPY

I have now returned to the Capitol and have this day gone through my files of correspondence on this matter and believe that I should send to you the letter which I withheld on October 1, 1962 at the request of Mr. Gilpatric. In my opinion, it presents more completely my position, and I believe the position of most of the members of the Joint Committee, than the arguments posed in Mr. Gilpatric's memorandum with his answers thereto. I am forwarding this letter after a phone conversation with Mr. McGeorge Bundy and with his acquiescence. The letter will be hand-delivered in his name and brought to your attention.

Along with other members of the Committee I am looking forward to meeting with you on this matter. I wish to assure you of my continued desire to cooperate with you in this vital matter.

Sincerely yours,

Chet Holifield
Chairman

Enclosure:

Classified Secret Defense
Information letter to the
President, dated Oct. 1,
1962

The President

The White House

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Between
SECRETARY GILPATRIC and MINISTER OF DEFENSE MESSEMER

September 7, 1962

During his discussions with Secretary Gilpatric, Mr. Messemmer conveyed his reactions to the six points presented in the US Talking Paper utilized for the meeting.

(1) Research and Development Committee. Minister Messemmer stated that the French were ready to proceed as suggested by the US. Their representatives will be ready to meet in Paris with Messrs. Abel and Robinson and General O'Neill, and they will send their two basic research representatives to Washington for further discussion with Dr. Fahini and others. This follow-up action will be in consonance with the Lovani-Kitas agreement.

(2) Procurement and Production. The French MOD stated that the French will review the specific list of items presented by Secretary Gilpatric and within one month's time would indicate those in which they are interested.

(3) Nuclear Submarine. Minister Messemmer said that any decision as to this proposal on the part of the French would have to be made at the Governmental level. He indicated that personally he was in favor of this project for two reasons. First, there is a military need for French naval forces to have a nuclear submarine capability, and the second was the matter of timing. He observed that US-produced subs would be available long before the time that the French will be able to build theirs independently. He stated that this time element had been discussed publicly, and it was known that no French-produced submarine would be completed before 1969. Mr. Messemmer concluded by stating that if the French Governmental position is favorable on this subject, he would follow the US suggestion of sending a technical and naval mission to the US.

(4) Logistic Support. The MOD said that it was true that progress in this area has lagged and that he personally would look into the matter and see to it that Generals Ailleret and Gallot pursued the subject. (This means that the highest level of the French military will now become actively interested in this program).

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Authority NYJ-030R-32-4-3
By CTS, NARA, Date 12/20/17

TOP SECRET

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196

(5) Follow on Purchase of EFTAC. Minister Messmer stated there were two aspects to the problem. One related to balance of payments which would of necessity involve consideration at the governmental level because of the possible purchase by the French of items manufactured in the US. The other had to do with the technical aspects of EFTAC, namely whether it would be feasible, time- and cost-wise, to subcontract parts outside of France.

(6) BSMA. In substance Minister Messmer agreed with the approach suggested by the US in the Talking Paper. It was agreed that US and French representatives would meet again in an attempt to reach accord without regard to the exact wording contained in the US position paper on BSMA.

(7) Supersonic Air Transport. This matter was raised by the French MOD. He asked Mr. Gilpatrick if there might possibly be US interest in the medium-range version of the Mach-2 transport. The British and French have now agreed to proceed with the development of both medium and long range versions of such an airplane, although there has been as yet no formal governmental approval. Mr. Gilpatrick has reported this conversation to Mr. Halaby who indicated that he has already been in discussion with General Pugot of Sud Aviation.

Prepared by:
Colonel Francis J. Roberts
Military Assistant

TOP SECRET

January 15, 1963

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Mac--

The sale of a nuclear powered submarine, which would be constructed in a U. S. shipyard for foreign account, would require no new legislation. Compliance with two specific statutes would be necessary--the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. The procedure is described in Tab B of the statement attached herewith and set forth at length in an appended annex containing applicable legislative and legal procedures.

This statement, which has been furnished by Mr. Gilpatric's office, gives a complete listing of the data with respect to the submarine, its construction, sale, and other factors, etc.

Charles E. Johnson

Attachment:

Statement re Transfer of a Nuclear Submarine (182) - Mr. Bundy has

Shipjack

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NL 0302-32-4-4
By CTS, NARA, Date 12/20/17

SECRET

(182)

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ OBJECT
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Dec 15 11:11:12

11
65
Info.

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS TOSEC

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PRIORITY

French nuclear sub.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

For your information, President spoke with Senator Anderson last week-end regarding nuclear submarine assistance to French. Anderson's reaction was favorable and he undertook to take matter up with other members of Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to "bring them around". Anderson stressed that terms of offer should make clear French would not acquire basic US propulsion information, including nuclear engineering, until 1967 -- that is approximately one year before delivery of ships under five-year construction schedule.

END

Smith
Johnson
Kayson
Legge

BAIL

Drafted by:

12/14/62

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

EUR - William C. Burdett

EUR/AFM:RIS:AFM:G/IN:JCKitchen:mck

Covered by:

G - Mr. U.A. Johnson

~~WHITE HOUSE WORKING COPY~~

Defense - Mr. Gilpatrick

White House-Mr. B. Smith

B/S - Mr. Johnson

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By *cbm/s* NARA, Date *3.13.09*

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Info:

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS TOSEC

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PRIORITY

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LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

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SCHLESINGER

END

BALL

Drafted by:

12/14/62

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

EUR - William C. Burdett

EUR/RPM:RISpiers:G/PM:JCKitchen:mek

Clearances:

G - Mr. U.A. Johnson

White House-Mr. B. Smith

White House-Mr. B. Smith

S/S - Mr. Johnson

Defense - Mr. Gilpatric

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 2.4

dmf NARA DUE 3.13.09

file

Holifield Assails Plan to Sell An Atomic Submarine to France

By JACK RAYMOND

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 — The chairman of the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee assailed today the Administration's plan to sell an atomic submarine to France.

The chairman, Representative Chet Holifield, Democrat of California, telephoned the staff of the committee from his office in Pico-Rivera, Calif., to issue a statement emphasizing that he had not changed his long opposition to the plan.

Mr. Holifield, without naming France, stressed also that he opposed the transfer of nuclear weapons and secrets "to nations whose political structure is unstable and whose security capability is questionable."

The committee chairman said that this statement was prompted by a dispatch in The New York Times today that reported the planned sale.

Mr. Holifield said that no proposal for the sale of an atomic submarine "has been made to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy . . . and the Joint Committee has not cleared such a proposal."

This appeared to be in conflict with the published version of the negotiations, which was based on information obtained from qualified sources. The dispatch said that the Administration had told the French it had "cleared its intentions with the appropriate Congressional committees."

Plans to provide the French with an atomic-powered submarine, or at least atomic-powered engines for such a submarine, have been frustrated by Congressional opposition in the past.

Mr. Holifield apparently meant no formal proposal had been made to the committee. A committee source said that an Administration "contact" had been made with the Congressional panel. The source indicated that the plan had been under discussion "for a long time."

Pentagon officials maintained official silence about the projected sale.

It was evident from available sources, however, that the Administration had undertaken the negotiations with the French in the belief that the Congressional leaders had relented in their past opposition to the plan. The proposed sale was confirmed in Paris today.

At issue is the sale of a Nautilus-type atomic-powered submarine, not the Polaris type armed with long-range ballistic missiles. The United States has a separate proposal before the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for the transfer of Polaris-type submarines to the Atlantic Pact forces.

Mr. Holifield's attack on the plan to sell the French a submarine was construed in some quarters as an effort to get his strong views on the record again.

Spread of Weapons Opposed

It was considered too early to tell whether the attack presaged future serious trouble for the Administration in obtaining Congressional approval for sale.

Mr. Holifield, in his statement, underscored Congressional prerogatives in opposing the transfer of atomic designs and



ATTACKS U.S. OFFER:
Representative Chet Holifield, California Democrat, who is chairman of Congressional Joint Atomic Energy Commission. He assailed plans for selling atomic submarine to France.

other information to foreign countries.

"It long has been the policy of the Joint Committee to oppose the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear submarines to other nations," the California Representative said.

"Before such a transfer could be made," he said, "the proposal would have to be presented to the Congress while it is in session and referred to the committee."

"Unless the time period were waived, it would have to lie before the Congress and the committee for 60 days. This is a safeguard to provide time for adequate consideration by the committee and the Congress."

"The Atomic Energy Act provides that such proposed agreements shall not become effective if during this period the Congress disapproved it by resolution."

"In addition and before such a transfer could be made, the President would have to deter-

mine and certify in writing that the proposed cooperation and the communication of classified information and material will not constitute an unreasonable risk."

Mr. Holifield cited the President's obligation to guard against "unreasonable risk" to United States secrets.

"Implicit in such a determination is that the nation receiving such cooperation is stable and can provide proper security for the sensitive information information involved," he said.

The Administration of former President Dwight D. Eisenhower indicated its desire to provide France with an atomic submarine in 1958. Opposition developed in Congress and in some quarters of the Federal Government and the plan was abandoned.

The failure to consummate the transaction contributed to strained United States-French relations. These relations became further strained as the United States, under the Kennedy Administration, rejected proposals to seek Congressional approval of assistance to France in the strategic nuclear weapons field.

According to the qualified sources, the latest offer to sell an atomic submarine was made in the hope of modifying the strained relations without reversing the policy against direct assistance to the French nuclear weapons program.

U.S. TO SELL PARIS ATOM SUBMARINE IN SHIFT OF POLICY

Accord on Nonrocket Craft
May Ease Rift on Issue
of Nuclear Capability

By JACK RAYMOND
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 16 — The United States is planning to sell France an atomic-powered submarine in fulfillment of a promise made four years ago.

The ship is a Nautilus-type attack submarine, not a Polaris-type armed with long-range ballistic missiles.

United States-French relations have cooled in recent years, in large measure because the United States had not assisted French nuclear ambitions.

The original promise of an atomic-powered submarine was made by the Eisenhower Administration in 1958 at the time of General de Gaulle's return to power in France.

Subsequently, the plan ran into opposition in the Congress and the State Department. In the meantime, President de Gaulle withdrew some French support of North Atlantic Treaty Organization nuclear forces.

Despite a visit to Paris by President Kennedy early in his Administration, the relations remained strained because the United States would not assist in a French effort to build a nuclear strategic force.

Opposition Continues

The newly agreed upon submarine sale will not directly change Washington's policy of opposition to a French nuclear strategic force.

It marks, however, an abandonment of the United States' unwillingness to provide France with designs and other information related to nuclear power for military use.

Moreover, for the first time in the years since the nuclear difficulties developed between Paris and Washington, Congressional leaders have indicated that they will not stand in the way of an agreement.

This is a reversal of the Congressional attitude. In at least one instance, two years ago, the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy called Administration officials to a secret meeting at the Capitol to protest any move to supply atomic secrets to France.

The submarine sale was arranged last month in Paris during meetings between Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell L. Gilpatric and the French Defense Minister, Pierre J. Messmer.

Asked about it today, Assistant Secretary of Defense Arthur Sylvester said, "No comment." Mr. Sylvester, who is Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, accompanied Mr. Gilpatric to the Paris meeting.

The renewal of the offer of an atomic-powered submarine appeared to come as a surprise to some of the French negotiators. At one stage of the negotiations, either during Mr. Gilpatric's visit to Paris or immediately afterward, President de Gaulle indicated through his own French channels that he would heartily welcome the chance to buy the submarines.

An atomic-powered submarine of the Nautilus type costs about \$63,000,000. It is manned by ten officers and 90 enlisted men. There was no indication today when the submarine would be delivered.

Presumably, however, French officers and seamen would have to come to the United States for training. They probably would go through United States controlled training exercises at sea with the ship.

France has been building her own nuclear-powered submarine. But it was designed to be powered by a reactor that is considered "old-fashioned."

By obtaining a United States-built submarine, the French will speed their nuclear fleet capability by "years," according to one estimate.

The French also will be in a position to obtain design and other information on nuclear power that has been denied them for many years, a source noted.

The projected submarine sale was part of a broad agreement on French-United States military cooperation that included another arrangement involving support for France's nuclear forces.

This called for the sale to France of a dozen aerial tankers of the KC-130 type. The tankers would provide air-refueling capability for the French Mirage 4 bomber, which the Paris Government plans to arm with nuclear weapons.

THE NEW YORK TIMES
Wednesday, 10/17/62

French Policy Noted

At the time of the announcement of the tanker sale, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric said that the United States was still averse to supporting France's nuclear-weapons capability directly. He added, however, that the Administration "recognized" that the Paris Government was proceeding anyway.

Under these circumstances, Mr. Gilpatric indicated, the United States was ready to assist in certain cases of possible costly duplication. A factor in the United States policy, it was evident, was the United States gold drain in France of about \$250,000,000 to \$270,000,000 a year as a result of military spending.

Last year the French were bitter, when, in a proposed "shopping list" that contained nuclear support items, the United States ejected the sale of some of the most important items. It is understood that in the recent Paris talks, the United States resorted some of those items and included the submarine.

In making its proposal to the French, the Administration is understood to have taken the position that the submarine sale was not necessarily a fulfillment of the four-year-old promise but a new initiative under changed circumstances.

It was pointed out to the French that the Congress, as in the past, could intervene and prevent the sale. But this time, Mr. Gilpatric said in Paris, the Administration had cleared its intentions with the appropriate Congressional committees.

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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file
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J. Bundy
Z. C. Johnson

October 17, 1962

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In view of the unconfirmed, and at least in one case inaccurate, news stories regarding the French nuclear submarine proposal, I am writing you to say that here in Defense we are proceeding along the lines of the correspondence and discussion which you and I had before the close of Congress.

The subject of the submarine did not come up during the President's talk with the French Foreign Minister last week, and the President is aware of your desire to meet with him before any decision is reached.

We are working with Admiral Rickover and others to develop the kind of training cycle which would be followed should the proposal ultimately receive approval by the requisite Executive and Congressional authorities.

Sincerely yours,

Signed
ROSWELL L. GILPATRICK
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Honorable Chet Hollifield
Chairman
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

cc: Mr. McG. Bundy *←*
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson

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By *dm/ly* NARA, Date *3.13.09*

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SecDef Control No. *6652*

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October 3, 1962

FYI

Carl -

Dana Orwick told me that Gavin is uneasy over the question of Gilpatric adequately keeping the JCAE informed of developments concerning the French sub. Some other officers in the Department share Gavin's uneasiness.

In view of the very solid commitment the President made to the Committee a year ago, I suggest that it will be good insurance to ascertain that a consultation has been sufficiently complete so that there can be no future complaints from the Committee on this matter.

Also for your information, I attach a copy of a memorandum concerning a related problem that has arisen concerning the British supplying naval submarine propulsion parts to France. The inconsistency of our position with respect to the British sale in view of what we ~~propose to~~ ^{may} do is readily apparent.

/s/

Charles E. Johnson

Attachments:

- Cpy of (1) 9/16/61 letter from President to Chet Hollifield
- (2) 9/14/61 letter from Chet Hollifield to the President
- (3) 8/23/62 Memorandum for Dana Orwick, Department of State from Myron B. Kratzer of AEC.

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By dmk NARA, Date 3-13-09

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