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01	memo	Johnson to Bundy <i>open 4/09</i>	S	1	3/17/64	A
01a	cable	Deptel 1382 Paris <i>open 4/09</i>	S	3	3/16/64	A
01b	cable	Deptel 1383 Paris <i>open 1/30/18 per RIAC 1/18</i>	E	4	3/16/64	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Charles E. Johnson**Folder Title** NUCLEAR - Freeze Strategic Nuclear Vehicles, US Views (Cmte of Principals)**Box Number** 33

Restriction Codes

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*A Freeze on Strategic
Nuclear Vehicles*

SECRET

March 17, 1964

file

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Mac --

This draft was superseded by the later draft dated March ¹³ 12, and that in turn by the changes in the subsequent cable to Finletter and Fisher dated March 16, which Spurgeon cleared on your behalf.

My feeling about the substance of the proposal is that it would be a policy of mutual benefit for both the U. S. and USSR -- in spite of how unhappy our respective satellites might be as a result of the adoption of such a policy. I know we are committed to consultation within NAC, but I can't help but feel that such consultation can only result in unproductive compromises and commitments of U. S. strength and resources to what effect would be a continuation of some kind of arms race in which we would continue to be the principal contributor to the Western side of the arms equation.

Charles E. Johnson

CC: Spurgeon Keeny, OST *(Ret'd to CEG 3/10)*

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cm/ky*, NARA, Date 3-17-09

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INDICATE: COLLECT
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Origin

ACTION:

Amembassy PARIS ~~NEWS~~ TOPOL 1382
US Mission GENEVA TODIS PRIORITY 1342

PRIORITY

MAR 16 8 38 PM '64

DAC
Info

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INFO:

Amembassy ANKARA (by pouch)
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" BONN 2545
" BRUSSELS (by pouch)
" COPENHAGEN (by pouch)
" THE HAGUE (by pouch)
" LONDON 5935
" LUXEMBOURG (bypouch)
" OSLO (by pouch)
" OTTAWA 820
" REYKJAVIK (by pouch)
" ROME 2143
" MOSCOW (by pouch)

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- BUNDY-SMITH
- ALEXANDER
- BELK
- BRUBECK
- CHASE
- DINGEMAN
- DUNGAN
- FORRESTAL
- GESSUP
- KEMER
- KOMER
- SALINGER
- SAUNDERS
- SCHLESINGER
- SMITH, WM. Y

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WHB

1. At MARCH 18 NAC MTG, US REP should make statement elaborating US views on freeze strategic nuclear vehicles. Draft of statement pouched USRO March 14 (Registry No. 1989371); changes being transmitted SEPTEL. Final text should be circulated, and we will pouch it all other addressees.

2. We are anxious exchange views with our allies and assume they also will wish matter be discussed after GOVTs have had opportunity study statement. We feel we should, however, proceed

Drafted by: **AAkalovsky**

ACDA/IR:SDePalma:cs 3/16/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: **EUR - William R. Tyler**

Clearances:

ACDA/D-Mr. Foster
DOD/ISA-Mr. Barber
GPM-Mr. Garthoff

ACDA/IR-Mr. Beam
EUR/RPM-Mr. Spiers

S/S - Mr. Baldwin

ACDA/WEC-Lt. Gen. Dean

WhHouse-Mr. Keeny (substance)

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13222, Sec. 3.4
By: chm/ly NARA Date 31709

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with elaboration of concept in Geneva before expected mid-April recess. You should accordingly express hope that this phase NAC discussion would be completed by end March on understanding we would be prepared continue discussion details or points raised by allies after that date and will x in any event keep NAC fully and promptly informed of developments at Geneva.

3. You should express readiness consider any points raised by allies and offer such further clarifications as may be possible in next two weeks; at same time you should make clear we strongly hope be able elaborate proposal at current/session along lines suggested by statement. At best we foresee long period elaboration with Soviets. Detailed discussion is not anticipated before resumed session mid-May and, hence, there will be ample opportunity consider matter more fully in NAC.

FYI: We would anticipate that at MARCH 18 MTG you would limit your presentation to reading US statement and indicating our readiness for substantive consultation at later date. In meantime, you should keep in mind that several issues relating to proposed freeze SNDVs still under study and consideration within US GOVT. You should therefore use extreme caution in

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answering possible questions or elaborating beyond pertinent exposition in statement, particularly with respect to following issues:

(a) Linkage of freeze to cut-off production fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

(b) Basis for replacement production.

(c) Method and extent of controlling launchers, and relationship this subject to possibilities for protecting MLF and Nassau agreement program. (In any event, we do not wish discuss in NAC bearing of freeze on implementation NASSAU agreement. We intend discuss this directly with UK, along lines PARA RE protection of MLF contained in statement.)

(d) Extent of possible restrictions on prototype (operational development) testing. END FYI.

For immediate INFO all addressees, following is paraphrase portion US statement dealing with protection MLF:

US recognizes alliance's interests not limited to maintenance favorable balance; it essential that creation of MLF be protected and US determined protect it. This could be done in variety of ways, timing of freeze being important factor. Soviets have

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not yet shown favorable interest in freeze concept. Even should they do so, substantial period would be needed reach agreement, obtain ratification, and have verification system in state of readiness before freeze implemented. Accordingly, unnecessary now attempt decide on or specify ways of safeguarding MLF. If at some future time it became necessary consider specific methods, matter would be considered by NAC and MLF participants.

FOR USDEL GENEVA: At Western Four MTG MARCH 17, you should distribute final text of statement and inform allies we intend present it in NAC Wednesday. FYI PARA above also applies.

GP-3.

END

NOTE: Pouched by OCT

RISK

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INDICATE: COLLECT
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Origin

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Info

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ALEXANDER

BELK

BRUBECK

CHASE

DINGEMAN

DUNGAN

FORRESTAL

JESSUP

LEWIS

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS, TOPOL 1383 PRIORITY
deliver Finletter 8:00 AM

MAR 16 9 09 PM '64

US Mission GENEVA, TODIS 1343 PRIORITY
deliver Fisher 8:00 AM

Following changes should be made in March 13 draft statement re nuclear vehicle freeze (pouched USRO March 14 Registration No. 1989371) prior to circulation in March 18 NAC meeting.

1. Parenthetical reference to policy paper on first page should of course be omitted.
2. Para 2, last sentence. Should read: QUOTE Moreover, there would also be special advantages which would accrue from opening the Soviet Union to inspection. UNQUOTE
3. Para 3, first sentence. Change to read, QUOTE We recognize that the interests of the Alliance are not limited to maintenance of a favorable balance. We consider it essential that the MLF be protected and we are determined to protect

it. UNQUOTE

4. Para 3, present third sentence. Insert QUOTE favorable UNQUOTE between QUOTE indicated UNQUOTE and QUOTE interest UNQUOTE.

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Authority NLJ-0302-33-3-1
By CTS, NARA, Date 1/4/18

5. Para 3.

ACDA/DD:L.D.Weiler:sv 3/16/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EUR/RPM - David H. Ropper

Clearances: ACDA-Mr. Foster (substance)

SAUNDER G/PM-Mr. Garthoff

SCHLESING White House-Mr. Keeny

SMITH, V DOD/ISA-Mr. Barber

SOV - Mr. Valdes

RPM - Mr. VanHollen

S/S - Mr. Baldwin

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5. Para 3, last sentence. Insert after QUOTE consideration by UNQUOTE QUOTE NAC as well as by UNQUOTE.

6. Para 4, first sentence. Delete QUOTE any indication of UNQUOTE.

7. Para 5, last sentence. Change QUOTE It does UNQUOTE to QUOTE It may UNQUOTE.

8. Para 6. Delete bracketed sentence beginning with QUOTE The latter measure UNQUOTE and footnote.

9. Para 7, fourth and fifth lines should read: QUOTE in the light of these discussions before presentation of our views in Geneva. UNQUOTE

10. Para 13, second sentence. Should read: QUOTE The 100 kilometer range would include in the freeze existing Soviet missiles associated with strategic bombers. UNQUOTE

11. Para 14. Delete last sentence.

12. Para 15, third line. Should read: QUOTE aircraft whose primary mission is tactical rather than strategic UNQUOTE.

13. Para 15. Add following after present last sentence: QUOTE Also we have defined the categories to insure that non-strategic vehicles such as ASW and reconnaissance aircraft would be excluded even though they might fall within the weight specifications. UNQUOTE

14. Para 17, line 8. Change QUOTE armaments should UNQUOTE to QUOTE armaments would UNQUOTE.

15. Para 18,

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15. Para 18, first line. Should read: QUOTE Production for authorized missile firings would not UNQUOTE.

16. Following para 21, delete the subtitle QUOTE Limitations on launchers. UNQUOTE

17. Para 24, second line. Change QUOTE or UNQUOTE to QUOTE and UNQUOTE.

18. Para 26, third line. Delete QUOTE other UNQUOTE.

19. Para 27, last line. Change to read: QUOTE This subject continues to be under study. We intend to restrict ourselves only to the extent that the Soviet Union is also effectively restricted. UNQUOTE

20. Para 29b, third line. Change QUOTE prohibiting UNQUOTE to QUOTE prohibited UNQUOTE.

21. Para 32, second line. Between QUOTE against UNQUOTE and QUOTE illegal UNQUOTE insert QUOTE undeclared production facilities and UNQUOTE.

22. Para 33, tenth line. Should read: QUOTE greatly reduce the scope of inspection coverage required. UNQUOTE

23. Para 34, fifth line. Change to read: QUOTE (1) periodically, or at the call of any party to the agreement UNQUOTE.

24. Para 35. Delete this para since question of procedure
for

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handling matter in NAC dealt with in paras 2 and 3 of guidance telegram.

GP-3

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This document consists of
12 pages. No. 41 of 175
copies, Series A.

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

February 6, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS

SUBJECT: Verification of a Freeze on Strategic Nuclear
Vehicles

Attached is a paper outlining the arrangements and procedures for verification of a freeze on strategic nuclear vehicles. Initially, this paper will be useful as background for further consideration of the paper on the basic elements of a strategic nuclear vehicle freeze circulated to Principals on January 24. It is anticipated that following approval of that basic paper, formal coordination of an agreed version of the attached paper will be undertaken.

Adrian S Fisher

Adrian S. Fisher
Acting Director

Attachment:

Verification of a Freeze on Strategic Nuclear Vehicles

Group 3

Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not auto-
matically declassified.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NET RAC 030-033-3-1
By gp, NARA, Date 10/8/02

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GROUP 3
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matically declassified.

VERIFICATION OF A FREEZE ON
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR VEHICLES

A. Introduction

This paper discusses the verification procedures and arrangements of the freeze on strategic nuclear vehicles as proposed to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee on January 21, 1964, and as further described in the Memorandum to the Committee of Principals on "The Basic Elements of a Verified Freeze on the Number and Characteristics of Strategic Nuclear Offensive and Defensive Vehicles", dated January 24, 1964. Section B of this paper, which is based on the January 24, 1964 memorandum, restates those provisions of the measure which affect the verification procedures. The succeeding sections develop procedures which relate to verification that would be followed during each phase of the negotiation and implementation of the agreement. The specific procedures for verifying the steps discussed in Sections C, D, and E are presented together in Section F.

B. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT

1. Armament Categories

The strategic categories included in the proposal are as follows:

a. Ground-based missiles having a range of 5,000 kilometers or greater, together with their associated launching facilities; and sea-based missiles having a range of 100 kilometers or greater, together with their associated launchers.

b. Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 40,000 kilograms or greater, together with any associated air-to-surface missiles having a range of 100 kilometers or greater.

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Authority NIS RAC 030-033-3-1
By 82, NARA, Date 198102

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c. Missiles not included in category (a) having a range between 1,000 kilometers and 5,000 kilometers, together with their associated launching facilities.

d. Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of between 20,000 kilograms and 40,000 kilograms together with any associated air-to-surface missiles having a range of 100 kilometers or greater.

e. Anti-missile missile systems, together with associated launching facilities.

2. Production Limitations

Production of all armaments and major subassemblies for all armaments* within the strategic categories described above would be halted except on a one-for-one replacement basis to cover maintenance and losses due to accidents, and, in the case of missiles, agreed limited annual quotas of confidence firings.

3. Replacement Regulations

Any replacement production within the specified strategic categories would be by the same type of armament but could be by any model in production at the time of agreement. This production would not in any event be permitted to exceed an agreed annual number representing, in effect, a small percentage of the inventory of the armaments existing at the effective date of the treaty. For types that were out of production, the parties would agree on mutually acceptable phase-out rates or an acceptable replacement substitute from among weapons in production. Production lines for armaments out of production could be reopened only if it proved impossible to agree on an alternative.

* Investigation since preparation of the January 24 memorandum has led to the conclusion that armament components need not be controlled in the context of a freeze.

4. Restrictions on Launching Facilities

Any increases in the total numbers of launching facilities in each of the categories affected would be prohibited.

5. New Weapons Prohibitions

The production or testing of new types or models of armaments within the strategic categories would be prohibited. The construction or equipping of facilities for the production of new types or models of such armaments would be prohibited.

C. MATTERS TO BE NEGOTIATED

1. Armaments Affected by the Agreement

It would be necessary to agree on which armaments in the specified categories deployed and/or in production on the effective date of the agreement were of the same type. Each party would submit a list indicating which of its armaments it considered to be of the same type. Any differences in opinion would be negotiated, based upon the ground rule that different types of armaments should be distinguishable by gross external characteristics such as major dimensions and gross configuration. However, the various models within a type might differ in certain limited aspects of configuration or internal characteristics not readily observed from the outside.

2. Armament Subassemblies to be Controlled.

Agreement would be reached on the "controlled armament subassemblies", i.e., those subject to limited production within agreed quotas. The following subassemblies would be controlled:

a. For ballistic missiles,

-- Engines

-- Stage assemblies

bb. For cruise-type missiles and aircraft,

-- Fuselages.

3. Acceptable Replacements

Parties would agree on acceptable replacements for armament types in the specified categories subject to the regulations of the agreement (Section B-3). If necessary, agreement would also be reached on acceptable replacements for the controlled armament subassemblies indicated above.

Once agreement had been reached on the allowable replacements, only these could continue to be produced, on a one-for-one replacement basis. Thereafter, no new models could be introduced, i.e., the external configuration of the armaments and subassemblies would have to remain unchanged.

4. Production Quotas

Parties would agree on annual production quotas for each of the allowed armament replacement models by deciding upon:

a. An annual number of permitted confidence firings for each type of missile;

b. An estimate of the number of vehicles lost annually by accident for each type of vehicle (this number should be small);

c. The anticipated number of replacements due to degradation or wearout for each type of armament.

Production quotas could be applied to each controlled sub-assembly in order to permit separate replacement of worn-out subassemblies on a one-for-one basis. Quotas would be updated annually.

5. Verification Arrangements

Parties would agree upon rules and regulations relating to verification, such as the annual quota of spot-inspections of undeclared facilities and the rights of inspectors. (Verification procedures are described in Section F.)

D. DECLARATIONS TO BE MADE UPON EFFECTIVE DATE OF AGREEMENT

1. Armament Production Facilities

Each party would describe and give the location of facilities presently or formerly used in producing the armaments in the specified categories, with identification of those intended to be used for allowed replacement production, and those to be converted to peaceful uses or closed down.

The facilities to be declared would include*:

a. Facilities performing final production line assembly of the armaments. (This would not be interpreted to include military installations not engaged in manufacturing at which partial assembly or disassembly might be performed for operational or maintenance purposes.)

b. Facilities producing the controlled subassemblies of these armaments, that is:

-- Those producing or testing ballistic missile engines

-- Those fabricating and assembling missile stages

-- Those manufacturing aircraft or cruise-type missile fuselages.

2. Armament Production Scheduling

The yearly amount and type of each specified armament or controlled subassembly to be produced at each of the above

* The following description is a refinement of the description given in the January 24 memorandum.

operating facilities would be declared. Each party would be responsible for scheduling its production in conformance with its annual quota.

3. Non-military Production Facilities

Each party would declare the location and name of facilities involved in space or civilian aircraft programs which have a present capability to produce completed armaments or major subassemblies of armaments in the specified categories. These facilities would be allowed to continue to perform their declared activity.

4. Launch Sites

Parties to the agreement would declare all installations to be used for space vehicle launchings and confidence firings of missiles affected by the agreement.

E. DISCLOSURES DURING COURSE OF AGREEMENT

1. Destruction of Worn-out Armaments

Parties would give advance notice of armaments and controlled subassemblies in the specified categories to be destroyed because of degradation or wear-out. Parties would supply the date and location of the destruction and the items involved in order to permit observers to be present at the destruction. (See F.3)

2. Launcher Replacement

Where guided missile launchers are to be replaced on a one-for-one basis, parties would give advance notice of the launcher to be destroyed giving date and site of destruction and indicating the type of replacement launcher involved. If the replacement is by fixed launcher, the approximate location of the new launcher would be given. If replacement is by mobile launcher, this launcher would be subject to inspection at an agreed location.

3. Space Booster Production

Parties would give appropriate notice of planned production of space boosters, including the anticipated use of each booster in the space program.

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4. Space Launchings and Confidence Firings

The parties would give advance notice of space launchings and missile confidence firings. Information to be provided would include the location of the launch site, and identification of the booster designated for each space launching.

5. Overall Scheduling

Each party would be responsible for scheduling armament destruction and allowed missile confidence firings so as to balance (or possibly exceed) the scheduled annual production. That is to say, for each year and for each type of armament the number of armaments destroyed or lost through confidence firing or accident must equal or exceed the number produced. A similar balance would be required for each controlled subassembly.

6. Additional Disclosures

Each party would also be under the obligation to notify the others of any event which it believed might be construed as a failure to observe the provisions of the agreement, and would be expected to provide reasonable evidence that the event was not a violation, or that it was an unintentional occurrence that was being corrected.

F. VERIFICATION PROCEDURES

1. Negotiations and Declarations

Intelligence would be used to check the validity of information exchanged during the negotiating period concerning the affected armaments and subassemblies. There is generally good information on the characteristics of major subassemblies, armaments, and launchers in the proposed categories, and good cumulative production data on such items as aircraft and submarines is also available. Total missile production is not well known; however, estimates of the number of fixed launchers appear reliable.

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The declarations regarding production facilities could probably be verified or negated by unilateral intelligence in some cases. For example, the location of bomber aircraft plants covered by the measure are known. However, the types of missiles produced at suspect plants are generally not well known, and the status of activity at a plant at the time the measure becomes effective may not be known. Declarations of missile and space launching centers would be verifiable by intelligence. There is good information on likely locations of major civil aircraft production facilities and some information on space booster production with which to check declarations.

In general, intelligence can be used to check on the veracity of declarations and help establish the authenticity of statements of parties.

2. Launcher Inventories

Verification that the number of launchers in each category does not increase would be accomplished through both on-site observation of launcher destruction prior to replacement and verification of new launcher construction by unilateral means. Newly produced mobile launchers would be inspected at an announced location.

3. Armament Destruction

Destruction would be performed by the party owning the armament. Inspectors stationed at the designated depots would verify by visual observation that the armaments and subassemblies submitted for destruction were of the declared type and would record the numbers and types destroyed.

4. Space Launchings and Confidence Firings

Observers would witness announced missile and space firings to ensure that the proper types and quantities of vehicles were being launched and to guard against illegal R&D testing by visual observation of the type of vehicle tested. Pre-launch inspection would consist simply of visual observation of the gross characteristics of the vehicles being launched.

In general, national detection systems would provide assurance that announced space objectives were in fact attempted. Unilateral detection systems have in the past been able to monitor long-range missile and space firings. In the future, missile or space flights which traverse distances of more than a few thousand kilometers would probably be detected. While some research could be accomplished covertly under the guise of space or confidence firings, the development of significant improvements in characteristics applicable to missile or space weapons would probably be recognized.

5. Accidents

There would be no explicit verification of accidental losses of vehicles because of the physical difficulty, and sometimes impossibility, of carrying out such verification. The accident rates in these categories are sufficiently low (of the order of a few percent of the inventory per year) that this would not pose a significant threat to any other party. If a party could demonstrate that its accident rate had exceeded that allowed in any annual period, it could produce additional replacement vehicles during the succeeding year.

6. Declare Production Facilities

Inspectors would monitor the allowed production of armaments and controlled subassemblies at declared facilities. Their function would be to verify that only agreed numbers and replacement types were being produced.

Inspectors would check the external characteristics of the armaments or major subassemblies being produced. For the armaments and subassemblies involved, inspection could be accomplished by observation from a reasonable distance and would not require detailed information such as engineering drawings. The inspected country would be required to expose production processes and internal characteristics of armaments and controlled subassemblies only in so far as this is necessary to permit the inspectors to confirm the number and type of items produced.

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The inspectors would have access at all times to all manufacturing, testing, and assembly areas of the declared armament, space booster and commercial aircraft production facilities. Suitable production schedules would be provided. In some cases the inspectors would not have to be resident at a particular factory but could visit several plants periodically.

There will be of the order of twenty such facilities in the Soviet Union to be monitored. The number of inspectors required at each facility cannot be finally determined without an examination of the plant. It can depend upon the nature of the production activities being conducted, the size and configuration of the manufacturing areas, the actual manufacturing rate and the maximum capacity of the facility, and the number and characteristics of the items to be monitored. Teams composed of three to five men will probably be adequate in most cases.

The inspectors would conduct an initial check of those facilities no longer producing the affected armaments and subassemblies to ensure that they had been dismantled, closed or converted to other production activities. This initial inspection probably could be accomplished at each facility in several days and would include an examination of all manufacturing areas of the facility. Since many months are required to establish the production lines of armaments and subassemblies being considered here and to attain a reasonable production rate, unannounced spot checks of facilities subsequent to the initial inspection should be adequate.

7. Undeclared Production

Inspection teams would visit, in accordance with a pre-established annual quota, small numbers of undeclared industrial facilities to ensure that such facilities are not engaged in prohibited production activities. Where possible, the inspectors monitoring declared facilities would be used for this purpose. The inspectors would have at their disposal appropriate transportation, including aircraft and road vehicles, to ensure that inspections could be conducted

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without delay, that is, within several days, upon determination that they are appropriate. All industrial facilities would be subject to such inspection, and "facility" would be considered to include all areas of an industrial complex associated in any way with the manufacturing activity of the complex.

Inspection tours would be initiated on an adversary basis. Inspections could be denied only if the inspected country could demonstrate by other means to the satisfaction of the inspectors that the facilities to be inspected were not engaged in prohibited armament production.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

BUNDY-SMITH
ALEXANDER
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BRUBECK
CHASE
DINGEMAN
DUNGAN
MAR 30 1964
JESSUP
JOHNSON
KERRY
SAUNDERS
SMITH, WM. Y

Intelligence Note

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *TW*

Subject: Renewed Soviet Advocacy of a Near Eastern Nuclear-Free Zone

After a lapse of two years, Moscow has again officially endorsed the idea of a Near Eastern nuclear-free zone. On March 25 Pravda published the text of the joint communique signed at the end of Yemeni President Sallal's visit. In it both parties called for the "creation of nuclear-free zones, in particular in the Near and Middle East."

Unusual Reference. Soviet advocacy of an atom-free zone in the area had its heyday after the Soviet Union made its first proposal on the subject in the TASS statement of January 21, 1958. Though the idea is still mentioned now and again in routine propaganda, the last previous official reference to it was in Gromyko's letter to U Thant of March 10, 1962. There was no reference to the idea of a broader nuclear-free zone in the Soviet-Iranian exchange of notes on September 15, 1962 in which Moscow accepted Tehran's assurance that missiles would not be deployed on Iranian soil. The May 20, 1963 proposal for a Mediterranean nuclear-free zone would apply only to the coasts of Near Eastern countries but not to their land areas.

Group 5
Declassified one year after
date of origin.

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Khrushchev's Visit to Cairo. Khrushchev may be preparing to broach the idea of a nuclear-free zone with Nasser when he visits the UAR in May. If Nasser is favorably inclined, the Soviets may pursue this now dormant issue more vigorously.

Complex Questions Remain. If the Soviets renew active pressure for a nuclear-free zone, they will have to address some tricky questions of detail which had not arisen when the idea was promoted before. For example, the growth of indigenous nuclear energy and rocket programs will create new political problems and make it more difficult to devise an appropriate control system. Moreover, the old problem of the area to be included will arise again, though under somewhat changed circumstances. For example, changes in Western missile deployments could make the Soviets less insistent upon including Turkey in the area. On the other hand, Moscow may wish to broaden the zone in other directions, and attempt to capitalize on Libyan agitation over Wheelus or Algerian resentment of French testing. Conceivably, Moscow might even attempt to extend the zone into South Asia in order to encourage opposition to the Indian Ocean Task Force.