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Page 1

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Collection Title National Security File, Files of Charles E. Johnson**Folder Title** "NUCLEAR - Germany (Inertial Guidance Technology - National Policy NSAM 312)"**Box Number** 033

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Initials

S. Keeney
FBI
7
ps!
Return
CEG
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY

Thanks
Spurgeon

July 7, 1964

Dear Chuck:

I am passing this on to you in
accordance with our telephone conversation
this morning.

Sincerely,

Howard

Howard Meyers
Director for Operations
Office of Politico-Military Affairs

Attachment:

Memo dtd July 7.

Mr. Charles E. Johnson,
National Security Council,
Washington 25, D. C.

July 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Mac --

Bill Smith and I revised the first sentence of the draft supplied by the State Department. I checked the revision with State and they agreed to it.

Charles E. Johnson

12

7-10-64

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 312

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: National Policy on Release of Inertial Guidance
Technology to Germany

At the July 7 White House luncheon meeting, the President noted that the Secretaries of State and Defense have agreed that the U. S. could make available to the Federal Republic of Germany U. S. inertial guidance technology, at a level currently being considered for U. S. systems for 1966-67 production, for use by the FRG in certain programs of mutual US-FRG or NATO interest. The inertial guidance technology was intended for Naval vessel or aircraft guidance. It would be released at a controlled rate, in which the FRG would receive only the information needed in the particular phase of the program. The agreement with the Germans would contain explicit restrictions, assured by formal security arrangements, that the FRG would not employ this technology for ballistic missile use or development and that the information obtained could not be released to third parties without the express consent of the U. S.

/s/

McGeorge Bundy

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 93-45 (#1)
By isp/sg NARA, Date 3-17-09

~~SECRET~~

62575²⁶

128 Pence
22727 Cases

Mr. Johnson	church
Col. Smith	Thank
J. Y. A.	you
Be/return	for
tomorrow.	OK
	Wys

CEQ 7-9-64

~~SECRET~~ Attachment

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

S/S 10120

1. C. Johnson
2. R. [unclear]
July 9, 1964

Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

The attached draft language for consideration in recording White House views on National Policy on Release of Inertial Guidance Technology to Germany was drafted in G/PM and cleared by Ambassador Thompson and the Defense Department.

Mr. Ball recalled the discussion of July 7 as one in which he and Secretary McNamara informed the President of the agreement between State and Defense, but he says that the President did not express his views or agreement on the matter.

Accordingly, we assume you will want to clear the language at the beginning of the memorandum with the President directly.

BK
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~ Attachment

1953

*addition to State
Defense*

NSA 1

~~SECRET~~

SUGGESTED LANGUAGE FOR USE BY WHITE HOUSE STAFF

SUBJECT: National Policy on Release of Inertial Guidance Technology to Germany

at the July 7 White House luncheon meeting,
The President agreed July 7 with the views of the
noted that have agreed that the US
Secretaries of State and Defense ~~that we~~ could make available
1
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Concurrence: OSD/ODDR&E - Mr. Rowe *mr.*

Copy: G - Ambassador Thompson *mr.*

mr.
G/PM: HMeyers: 7/8/64

~~SECRET~~

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By *reg/chr* NARA, Date 3-17-09