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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
01a	rpt	"Report to the President in response to NSAM 354" open 4/15/12	S	23	[7/66]	A
02	memo	Wriggins to Rostow open 8.21.09 NLJ 09-198	S	1	7/27/66	A
03g	memo	Godfrey to Garthoff and others [Sanitized per RAC, 8/02]	S	1	6/22/66	A
03i	rpt	"Annex: Response to Enquiries..." [Exempt per RAC, 3/02] exempt 11/18/14 per NLJ/RAC 14-59	S	9	[6/66]	A
04a	draft	"Section C: India's Motivations..." open 4/15/12	S	5	6/15/66	A
05	memo	Godfrey to Garthoff and others [Exempt per RAC, 5/03] exempt 12/7/12 per NLJ/RAC 12-200	S	1	6/15/66	A
05a	rpt	Intelligence Report [Exempt per RAC, 5/03] exempt 12/7/12 per NLJ/RAC 12-200	S	41	6/15/66	A
06	memo	Brown to Participants in 16 June Policy Planning Meeting exempt per RAC 10/3/12	TS	1	6/15/66	A
06a	rpt	"Working Paper" exempt per RAC 10/3/12	TS	1	[6/66]	A
06b	rpt	"Working Paper" exempt per RAC 10/3/12	TS	46	[6/66]	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Charles E. Johnson

Folder Title "NUCLEAR - Indian Nuclear Problem"

Box Number 033

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
09c	rpt	"Index" open 8.21.09 NL 09.198	S	13	[6/66]	A
10b	cable	Deptel 2296 to New Delhi	S	5	5/24/66	A
10d	draft	"Index - Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem..." open 8.21.09 NL 09.198	S	15	[5/66]	A
12a	rpt	"The Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem..." [Possible duplicate of #1a, NSF, CEJ, "Nuclear-Indian Nuclear Matters," Box 34] open 6/15/12	S	6	[5/66]	A
14a	rpt	"Contingency Planning" open 1/30/18 per RAC 1/18	S	5	[5/66]	A
15	memo	Wriggins for the Record open 3/14/14	S	2	5/25/66	A
16	memo	Wriggins to Rostow open 3/14/14	S	1	5/25/66	A

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July 25, 1966

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C. Johnson

W. J. J.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Report to the President on the
Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem

In accordance with NSAM 351 there is trans-
mitted herewith a report on the Indian Nuclear
Weapons Problem. The report has been approved
by the Senior Interdepartmental Group, by the
Secretary of Defense and by the Director of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The report recommends no dramatic steps
to discourage the Indians from starting a
nuclear weapons program; this is because we have
been unable to devise anything dramatic which
would not cost us more than any anticipated
gain. The report does, however, recommend that
a number of further studies be made, as this
is a developing rather than a static situation.
We have all agreed that our purpose with respect
to the Indians is to buy time during which,
hopefully, we can move forward on broader fronts
to bring under more permanent control the dangers
inherent in the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

/s/ Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

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REPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT
IN RESPONSE TO NSAM NO. 351:
THE INDIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROBLEM

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By PC, NARA, Date 6/12/12

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REPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT
IN RESPONSE TO NSAM NO. 351:
THE INDIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROBLEM

I. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Economic Pressures and Inducements

1. We should continue indirect pressures designed: (a) to focus India's attention on improving economic performance; and (b) to limit over-all defense expenditures. We should stress the political as well as economic importance to India of successfully carrying out the present five-year plan.

2. In support of the foregoing, we should make available both to Indian governmental leaders and to non-governmental opinion leaders additional materials designed to make clear: (a) the difficulties and costs of achieving and of maintaining the continuing effectiveness of a militarily useful nuclear deterrent force; and (b) the drain such an effort would impose on scientific, technical, and managerial personnel sorely needed for development. We should utilize both official and unofficial channels and should prepare such special materials (including classified and unclassified materials) as may be necessary.

3. We should avoid direct threats that we would cut back (or eliminate) economic aid in the event of a pro-nuclear decision. However, if India's leaders should ask us what our reaction would be, we should consider expressing the view that we doubt that the U.S. Congress would agree to subsidizing, even indirectly, an Indian nuclear weapons program.

4. If India's leaders should come to us in a year or two seeking increased aid levels, and if we were prepared to respond favorably in the light of India's actual economic performance, we should consider making continuation of India's "no bomb" policy an implicit part of the deal.

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B. Security Aspects

1. We should make available privately to India's leaders such information and analyses as might, without falsely discounting ChiCom progress, make clear difficulties and limitations still confronting the ChiCom nuclear weapons program and aid in keeping the potential ChiCom nuclear threat in strategic perspective as far as India's interests are concerned.

2. In our own public statements, we should avoid magnifying the ChiCom nuclear threat.

3. We should make a further determined effort to interest the Soviet Union in a UN resolution of assurances for non-nuclear countries along the lines of our 1965 draft.

4. When it becomes clear whether or not such a resolution can be achieved, we should address the question of whether to offer India a private security assurance. In order to facilitate prompt future consideration of this possibility, detailed studies should now be mounted of: (a) the circumstances in which we might be called upon to prevent the Chinese from using "nuclear blackmail" in that part of the world, a policy enunciated in connection with the explosion of the first Chinese nuclear device; (b) how we would be likely to react in the event that Communist China were to mount (or threaten imminently to mount) a nuclear attack against India; (c) what tangible steps might eventually need to be taken to bolster the credibility of a private security assurance; and (d) what further steps in the security field might need to be considered if it should become apparent that India, nevertheless, was determined to have a nuclear role.

C. Arms Control Measures

While we should not expect arms control agreements alone to prevent an Indian nuclear decision, we should

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continue our efforts to seek agreements in this area. In assessing costs and benefits to the U.S., due regard should be given to the fact that a comprehensive or threshold nuclear test ban would be likely to help restrain an Indian decision to go nuclear.

D. Political Prestige of Non-Nuclear Countries

1. Although it will be difficult to deflect the widespread trend toward speaking in terms of "five nuclear powers," we should ourselves avoid this term and try to blunt this tendency. We should adopt a negative attitude toward proposals based on the assumption that the five nuclear countries which have tested nuclear weapons have in common some special interest not shared by others.

2. Henceforth, in documents and public statements on this subject, we should refer to "civil nuclear powers" (including India and all others not having nuclear weapons) in contradistinction to "military nuclear powers" (i.e., the five powers which now have nuclear weapons) as a means of alleviating the unpleasant effects derived from differentiating between "nuclear and non-nuclear powers."

3. We should encourage the view that the several countries (including India) which have achieved advanced peaceful nuclear capabilities but have refrained from seeking nuclear weapons are entitled not only to respect for their restraint, but to a special voice in nuclear matters.

4. We should emphasize the relevance of economic strength to political influence.

5. We should bear in mind that, if the U.K., as a former colonial power, were to phase out of national nuclear deterrence, the impact on India's thinking about nuclear weapons would be highly significant.

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6. A special study should be made of more specific steps, including scientific and technical projects, that might be taken to enhance India's political prestige.

E. Intelligence Requirements

In order to have as much warning as possible of any impending shift in India's present no-bomb policy, increased priority should be assigned to the collection and analysis of relevant intelligence data.

F. Contingency Planning

A long-term planning study should be initiated of alternative approaches it might be in the U.S. interest to adopt in the event India should decide to proceed with a national nuclear weapons program.

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II. THE INDIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROBLEM

A. Background

NSAM No. 351 requested a report and recommendations concerning the following interrelated issues emerging from the National Security Council review of June 9, 1966, concerning the Indian nuclear weapons problem:

-- The extent to which it might be in the U.S. interest to use our economic leverage more explicitly to discourage an Indian national nuclear program.

-- The effect which various arms control agreements might have on Indian nuclear intentions, and what price the U.S. should be prepared to pay for such agreements.

-- How far it is in the U.S. interest to go in meeting Indian security concerns, what form such action might take, and what the optimum timing might be.

-- Whether there are other approaches to the problem which need to be pursued.

B. Basic Considerations

1. In examining specific actions bearing on the Indian nuclear weapons problem, four basic considerations need to be recognized.

a. The source of the problem is basically two-fold:

-- The problem arises in part from political and prestige concerns to which a nuclear capability may be pertinent. These concerns relate importantly

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to India's future position vis-a-vis Communist China in Asia, and to whether an effort to "go it alone" militarily (including nuclear as well) will come to be regarded as essential to exerting independent political influence.

-- The problem also stems in part from security concerns--the need to deter or to counter future Communist Chinese nuclear blackmail or attack.

The situation is complicated by public pressures generated by those who neither fully understand nor coolly weight political and security considerations. Because the problem has more than a single root, no single action we might take can be expected to provide a full answer.

b. Both political and security aspects will change over time. Political and prestige concerns are already much in evidence and will be sharpened by any move that appears to enhance Communist China's status as a result of its entry into the "nuclear club". Security concerns will continue to mount as Communist China's nuclear weapons program proceeds. Because we are confronted with a moving rather than a fixed target, steps we might take in the short-term will not necessarily add up to a long-term solution.

c. We cannot accurately predict when the issue may come to a head. We do not believe a decision is "imminent" in the sense of confronting us this week or this month. Nor do we now expect that a decision to go nuclear will be made this year--although conditions could change rapidly if further Communist Chinese tests should arouse even stronger Indian anxieties. However, we cannot gauge the need for action solely in terms of the periodic rise and fall of Indian public sentiment. Consequently, we will

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need to keep under continuing review both what can usefully be done at any particular time, and also what might be done if and as the issue appears to be reaching an acute stage.

d. Too much direct and pointed U.S. pressure in the short-term could lead to the growth of a "go it alone" philosophy in India for the long term. Although our ability to influence India's decision is limited, we do hold some important cards; but our effectiveness will depend not only on these cards but also on how we play our hand. India's leaders continue to hew to a policy of foregoing a national nuclear weapons capability. At least for the present, our stance should be that of supporting an existing Indian policy which serves India's interests, rather than one of questioning the sincerity of that policy and of preparing to battle possible change. Unless a basis of mutual confidence and respect can be constructed, there will be virtually no chance of averting an eventual pro-nuclear decision.

2. If these considerations suggest the difficulties of finding "permanent solutions", the fact remains that an Indian nuclear decision would adversely affect our own interests:

-- By imposing an increasing burden on India's economy, thereby jeopardizing the development of the economic base required for future political stability;

-- By stimulating Pakistan's fears, encouraging the Paks to seek nuclear weapons of their own, and opening further opportunities for Communist China to seek to pose as Pakistan's "protector";

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-- By aggravating the nuclear weapons issue in Japan, since an Indian nuclear weapons program would directly confront the Japanese with the question of how best to ensure their own future political position; and

-- By indirectly encouraging proliferation elsewhere to the extent that existing inhibitions would be further reduced.

3. It can be argued that a successful Indian nuclear weapons program might relieve us of future military burdens we might be called upon to bear if India refrains from "going nuclear". Nevertheless, we believe adverse effects such as those identified above outweigh this consideration. Moreover, certain of these adverse effects of an Indian pro-nuclear decision would be felt immediately. Continued Indian restraint would provide further time for developing long-term approaches, for permitting more favorable evolution in India-Pak relations and perhaps within Communist China, and for taking steps which might ease the impact of an Indian decision if our efforts to prevent it should not prove successful.

4. Accordingly, even if we cannot now describe a "permanent solution", delaying actions will be useful. Because we cannot be sure over the long-term of effecting more than a delay, we will want to bear in mind the need to protect our continuing interests in India even in the event it should eventually go nuclear, and to study what our reactions should be in this contingency.

C. Course of Action

1. Economic Pressures and Inducements

a. Discussion

We are currently using our economic aid leverage with India to insist on major internal economic reforms which

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are moving the country much closer to economic policies advocated by the U.S. than the Indians have heretofore been prepared to go. India's leaders have recognized that these reforms are in their country's interest, and they have taken courageous and publicly unpopular steps to introduce them. If these steps are to pay off, India will need to concentrate its resources on development. This creates pressures against going nuclear.

Although we have not directly insisted that India remain non-nuclear as part of the bargain, we have made clear that our willingness to follow through is contingent not only on continued peace with Pakistan, but on limitation of India's (and Pakistan's) defense expenditures. This adds to pressures on India to forego—or at least delay—a nuclear weapons effort.

It seems clear that economic considerations loom large in the present decision of India's leaders against going nuclear. However, we believe they have submitted to about as much direct economic pressure from us as the political situation within the country will tolerate at this time. Under existing circumstances, a direct warning that we would have to cut back (or even eliminate) our economic aid would be received by India's leaders as a challenge to their sincerity, an inducement to demonstrate their independence, and a spur toward a policy of "going it alone" while perforce relying more on the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, depending on the circumstances existing at the time, we might be able to prolong India's non-nuclear weapons policy by levying an implied no-bomb requirement if, in another year or two, India's leaders would come to us seeking increased aid levels on the grounds that increases were warranted in the light of economic performance. If this were indeed the case and if we were prepared to respond, continuation of India's "no bomb" policy might be made an implicit

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part of the deal. This would not be construed as an attempt to "buy off" the Indians since the determining considerations would clearly be economic performance and promise.

The success of indirect economic pressures and the usefulness of economic inducements will depend, in part, on whether we can convince Indian leaders--both within and outside the government--that a nuclear weapons program would in fact represent an increasing burden, not only in terms of the financial strains it would impose (including demands on foreign exchange) but also in terms of the drain on scientific, technical, and managerial talent which might be increasingly diverted from the priority task of economic development.

It should be recognized that a "demonstration" weapons test or "token" capability would not be costly. On the other hand, achievement of a useful capability would not only mean development and production of warheads, but also development (or procurement if feasible) of relatively long-range delivery vehicles, of communications systems, and of warning systems. Moreover, the experience of all countries which have entered the nuclear weapons field shows that major continuing effort is required to keep all these elements of an effective capability up to date. There is no reason to suppose that India's experience would prove to be different.

Such points need to be gotten across to a broad spectrum of governmental officials and non-governmental opinion leaders. If this can be done, there will be a better chance of convincing India to stick with economic development as the most promising route to a strong international political position, and the best ground on which to challenge Communist China.

b. Recommendations Respecting Economic Pressures and Inducements.

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(1) We should continue indirect pressures designed: (a) to focus India's attention on improving economic performance; and (b) to limit over-all defense expenditures. We should stress the political as well as economic importance to India of successfully carrying out the present five-year plan.

(2) In support of the foregoing, we should make available both to Indian governmental leaders and to non-governmental opinion leaders additional materials designed to make clear: (a) the difficulties and costs of achieving and of maintaining the continuing effectiveness of a militarily useful nuclear deterrent force; and (b) the drain such an effort would impose on scientific, technical and managerial personnel sorely needed for development. We should utilize both official and unofficial channels and should prepare such special materials (including classified and unclassified materials) as may be necessary.

(3) We should avoid volunteering direct threats that we would cut back (or eliminate) economic aid in the event of a pro-nuclear decision. However, if India's leaders should ask us what our reaction would be, we should consider expressing the view that we doubt that the U.S. Congress would agree to subsidizing, even indirectly, an Indian nuclear weapons program.

(4) If India's leaders should come to us in a year or two seeking increased aid levels, and if we were prepared to respond favorably in the light of India's actual economic performance, we should consider making continuation of India's "no bomb" policy an implicit part of the deal.

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2. Security Aspects

(a) Discussion

The Communist Chinese political and military threat to India is real.

The military threat today is, of course, conventional, and for the present, India's military as well as political leaders are giving priority to conventional defense.

The nuclear "threat" will be low at least for several years, and even when Communist China achieves a militarily significant nuclear capability, there will be political inhibitions against using it as well as the military risks such an action might entail.

Nonetheless, against the background of past Sino-Indian conflict, and given the leadtime problems involved in all defense efforts, pressures in India to meet the potential ChiCom nuclear threat will mount. These pressures will be larger to the extent that the Indians form an exaggerated impression of Communist China's nuclear progress. Since public attention is claimed by each ChiCom nuclear test, such an impression of progress tends to emerge regardless of hurdles that remain to be overcome before Communist China can actually achieve and deploy a capability that might be effectively directed against India.

Although U.S. information and estimates on Communist China's nuclear weapons and delivery vehicle program are by no means as complete as we would like, they are undoubtedly better than India's. We should use them privately vis-a-vis the Indians to encourage a more objective view which, without falsely discounting such progress as Communist China is making, would take into account remaining difficulties and

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limitations. Moreover, we should seek to keep the problem in perspective by helping Indian opinion leaders to develop an increasingly clear understanding of strategic problems.

Such U.S. efforts will, however, fail if our own public statements exaggerate the ChiCom nuclear threat. For example, public discussion of the view that we should ourselves deploy anti-ballistic missiles as a defense against Communist China can have the effect of magnifying and "accelerating" the emergence of the ChiCom nuclear threat in India's eyes.

The fact remains that Communist Chinese nuclear capabilities will increase. So long as India refrains from seeking nuclear weapons of its own, the Indians will, whether publicly admitting it or not, count on us to deter ChiCom nuclear aggression. During the period when the threat will be negligible or low, such implicit reliance should not present an unacceptable burden for either country.

Over the longer-term, more concrete arrangements would be needed if some degree of continuing reliance on the U.S. is to provide an alternative to an Indian national nuclear capability. It may be possible--but it will not be easy--to work out a mutually acceptable balancing of the political and military interests of the two countries, including India's interests in pursuing politically independent policies while maintaining good relations with the U.S. and Soviet Union, and our own interest in limiting our commitments.

The short-term problem would be eased by adoption of our 1965 draft resolution, which would express the intention of UN members "to provide or support immediate assistance to any state not possessing nuclear weapons that is the victim of an act of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used."

Although the necessarily vague and generalized language of such a resolution would probably not provide sufficient

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assurance from India's standpoint, a resolution of this character could provide an "umbrella" under which private security assurances might more easily be offered by the U.S., and also by the Soviet Union if and when it may be prepared to take that step. Within limits, the resolution could also provide a framework facilitating steps to bolster private assurances over the longer-term.

However, the Soviet Union has not shown any interest to date either in offering private security assurances to India or in joining us in a multilateral assurance along the lines of our draft UN resolution.

We should make a further effort to interest the Soviets in supporting such a resolution. It should be noted, however, that the prospect of winning Soviet support is not good, partly because they have been pushing their own approach-- a pledge by nuclear countries not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries which have no nuclear weapons on their territory. This Soviet proposal, which seems designed specifically to try to undercut U.S. nuclear deployments abroad, is likely to be popular in the UN.

In order to capitalize on the U.S. draft resolution, if it can be achieved, we should be prepared to consider promptly at that time approaching India's leaders with a private security assurance. This is because although a UN resolution along the lines we have drafted should have a useful impact on public opinion in India, India's leaders would be well aware of its practical deficiencies. Accordingly, the resolution would not substitute for private security assurances.

In the more likely event that the Soviet Union continues not to support a useful UN resolution, we will still need to consider offering a private security assurance, and to do

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so before pro-nuclear trends in India pass the point of no return. For in the absence of a UN resolution, India's leaders might have a more difficult task in coping with public concerns about security. However, even then the task of holding public pressures in check might not be impossible, and a private security assurance on which India's leaders felt they could rely would give them more incentive and justification for vigorously addressing the task.

In either of the foregoing circumstances (that is, under the "umbrella" of a UN resolution or without such a resolution if it cannot be achieved) a private U.S. security assurance of the type envisaged here would involve going beyond our general offer of October, 1964, to support non-nuclear countries threatened by nuclear blackmail. In defining its terms, the following factors should be taken into account.

(1) The objective would be to discourage ChiCom nuclear blackmail efforts and deter ChiCom nuclear aggression.

(2) The assurance would apply only to cases where Communist China threatened or initiated nuclear aggression.

(3) The deterrent to such threats or aggression would not rest on a unilateral public commitment (which we would not want to give a non-ally, and which a non-aligned India would not want), but on evident U.S. interest in India and evident U.S. opposition to ChiCom aggression.

(4) In the event of actual nuclear attack, our response would be measured; possible responses would include selective retaliation (presumably nuclear retaliation) focussed on ChiCom nuclear delivery, support and production capabilities.

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(5) In the event of ChiCom conventional attack only, we would, of course, stand by our 1963 commitment to consult with India on air defense.

Such an arrangement would entail possible involvement in a nuclear conflict under unforeseeable and perhaps ambiguous circumstances. This risk will be low during the period when Communist China's nuclear capabilities are limited. However, as Communist China's capabilities grow, the possible risks would be more significant from India's standpoint and our own. Unless such an assurance were bolstered by tangible steps to increase its credibility, it would probably not be effective in delaying an Indian pro-nuclear decision for as long as, say, five years.

If the U.S. should decide to offer a private security assurance, an effort might be made to encourage the Soviet Union to follow a similar course.

We are not at this time recommending approval of the type of private assurance discussed here. A decision need not be considered until the outcome of further efforts to secure a UN resolution has become more clear; the question will need to be reviewed in the light of circumstances existing at that time. In order to be prepared to consider the matter on a timely basis then, three aspects of the problem should now receive further, detailed analysis:

-- How we would be likely to react if, in fact, the Communist Chinese should mount (or threaten imminently to mount) a nuclear attack on India: What political and military considerations would be involved; how these might change depending on the circumstances; what risks would be entailed in supporting India or in standing by.

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— What steps might eventually be taken to bolster the credibility of a private security assurance, if one were offered and proved of interest to the Indians.

— What further steps in the security field might still need to be considered if it should become apparent that India was, nevertheless, determined to have a nuclear role.

b. Recommendations Respecting Security Aspects.

(1) We should make available privately to India's leaders such information and analyses as might, without falsely discounting ChiCom progress, make clear difficulties and limitations still confronting the ChiCom nuclear weapons program and aid in keeping the potential ChiCom nuclear threat in strategic perspective as far as India's interests are concerned.

(2) In our own public statements, we should avoid magnifying the ChiCom nuclear threat.

(3) We should make a further determined effort to interest the Soviet Union in a UN resolution of assurances for non-nuclear countries along the lines of our 1965 draft.

(4) When it becomes clear whether or not such a resolution can be achieved, we should address the question of whether to offer India a private security assurance. In order to facilitate prompt future consideration of this possibility, detailed studies now should be mounted of: (a) the circumstances in which

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we might be called upon to prevent the Chinese from using "nuclear blackmail" in that part of the world, a policy enunciated in connection with the explosion of the first Chinese nuclear device; (b) how we would be likely to react in the event that Communist China were to mount (or threaten imminently to mount) a nuclear attack against India; (c) what tangible steps might eventually need to be taken to bolster the credibility of a private security assurance; and (d) what further steps in the security field might need to be considered if it should become apparent that India, nevertheless, was determined to have a nuclear role.

3. Arms Control Measures.

a. Discussion

Within the U.S. Government, the following approaches, listed here in order of the stage of consideration they have reached, are being reviewed:

— A threshold test ban. This proposal has been considered by the Committee of Principals, and arguments for and against are being forwarded. (Pending the outcome of consideration of a threshold test ban, no specific action is now being proposed on a comprehensive test ban.)

— Non-proliferation agreement. A revised draft is under consideration by the Committee of Principals.

— Non-use of nuclear weapons. ACDA has suggested consideration (in the context of a non-proliferation agreement) of a prohibition against using nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear country except in defense against an act of aggression in which a state owning nuclear weapons is engaged.

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At present, there is little prospect of U.S.-Soviet agreement on a non-proliferation agreement or extension of the test ban, unless a marked change should be made in the position of one country or the other.

From the standpoint of the Indian nuclear weapons problem the potential significance of an extension of the nuclear test ban and achievement of a non-proliferation agreement would vary considerably.

Either would help buy time. This is true in part because of the political (and to a lesser extent technical) inhibitions that such agreements would create. In India's case, an additional factor would be India's view that, as a general matter, its own interests are served by any steps which seem to bring the U.S. and Soviet Union closer together and which, conversely, deepen the Sino-Soviet split. Further arms control agreements would serve this function.

However, with respect to a non-proliferation agreement, Indian spokesmen have expressed the following views (also expressed by spokesmen of several other "nuclear capable" countries): (i) that a "have" versus "have not" issue is involved, and (ii) that there should be a balance of "sacrifices" military nuclear and civil nuclear countries are called upon to make. An extension of the nuclear test ban would come closer than a non-proliferation agreement to meeting these views and would, in India's view, have the added attraction of implying international criticism of continued nuclear testing by Communist China. Against the background of public debate on the nuclear issue in India, an extension of the test ban would, for these reasons, give India's leaders a stronger position domestically than a non-proliferation agreement.

If the U.S. and Soviet Union should agree on either proposal, India would feel under pressure to adhere. However, both agreements will have escape clauses, and it should be

recognized

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recognized that continuing Indian adherence would depend in large measure on subsequent events.

b. Recommendation Respecting Arms Control Measures

While we should not expect arms control agreements alone to prevent an Indian nuclear decision, we should continue our efforts to seek agreements in this area. In assessing costs and benefits to the U.S., due regard should be given to the fact that a comprehensive or threshold nuclear test ban would be likely to help restrain an Indian decision to go nuclear.

4. Other Factors: Political Status and Prestige.

a. Discussion

Given the high political content of India's interest in nuclear weapons, we should: (i) seek to avoid aggravating the "have" versus "have not" aspects of the issue, particularly as regards India's status vis-a-vis that of Communist China, (ii) see whether any specific steps can be taken to bolster the political status and prestige of India (and of other countries which have achieved advanced nuclear capabilities but have not sought nuclear weapons).

b. Recommendations Respecting Political Prestige of Non-Nuclear Countries.

(1) Although it will be difficult to deflect the widespread trend toward speaking in terms of "five nuclear powers," we should ourselves avoid this term and try to blunt this tendency. We should adopt a negative attitude toward proposals based on the assumption that the five countries which have tested nuclear weapons have in common some special interest not shared by others.

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(2) Henceforth, in documents and public statements on this subject, we should refer to "civil nuclear powers" (including India and all others not having nuclear weapons) in contradistinction to "military nuclear powers" (i.e., the five powers which now have nuclear weapons) as a means of alleviating the unpleasant effects derived from differentiating between "nuclear and non-nuclear powers."

(3) We should encourage the view that the several countries (including India) which have achieved advanced peaceful nuclear capabilities but have refrained from seeking nuclear weapons are entitled not only to respect for their restraint, but to a special voice in nuclear matters.

(4) We should emphasize the relevance of economic strength to meaningful political influence.

(5) We should bear in mind that, if the U.K., as a former colonial power, were to phase out of national nuclear deterrence, the impact on India's thinking about nuclear weapons would be highly significant.

(6) A special study should be made of more specific steps, including scientific and technical projects, that might be taken to enhance India's political prestige.

D. Special Recommendation Respecting Intelligence Requirements.

In order to have as much warning as possible of any impending shift in India's present no-bomb policy, increased priority should be assigned to the collection and analysis of relevant intelligence data.

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E. Special Recommendation Regarding Contingency Planning.

A long-term planning study should be initiated of alternative approaches it might be in the U.S. interest to adopt in the event India should decide to proceed with a national nuclear weapons program.

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Mr. Johnson
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July 27, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Pakistan accusations against India -- it has decided to go nuclear via Plowshare.

On July 19 Pakistan sent a letter to U Thant, accusing the Indians of having decided to go nuclear via Plowshare. They requested U Thant to bring it to the attention of the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee. Thant then sent it to Fisher and Roshchin as Co-Chairmen.

Fisher recommended the Co-Chairmen circulate it to the ENDC members, since it demonstrated the urgency of a non-proliferation treaty, and underlined that non-members had easy access to the committee's members.

ACDA and State here demurred and sent different instructions, which Spurge, Chuck Johnson and I concurred in. Fisher was instructed as Co-Chairman, to take the position that the letter should not be circulated (since to circulate it would give it a status we did not want to give it), while letting members know it was available in the event they wanted to see it (in order to avoid the position of blocking non-members' communications from going to the members). To Rawalpindi went a strong message, instructing Cargo to make clear to Pindi our belief that such charges, unless based on solid evidence, only provoke the Indians further and are likely to light up those very fires the Pakistanis would like to damp down. If they have solid evidence, we would be glad to see it.

Meanwhile, I have alerted Dick Helms to this Pakistani move, and his boys will be watching with particular care for new evidence of an Indian "decision." Probably the best information is still Wiesner's on his return from India, that the GOI is still holding firm against a decision to go nuclear, though the Plowshare route may well be preferred (unless we take a firm position against Plowshare soon).

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 09-198
By isl, NARA, Date 7-22-09

Howard Wriggins

cc: Mr. Keeny
Mr. Johnson ✓

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Memorandum for Mr. Wyle

Subject: PREVENTING AN INDIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

Preventing an Indian nuclear program will require an effort focused on strengthening the political influence of those in India who oppose the development of nuclear weapons. Such an effort depends not on appeals to abstract principles involving the evils of the spread of nuclear weapons nor on international guarantees and nuclear disarmament. An optimum strategy in light of the current Indian political situation would be as follows:

1. The United States should seek to persuade India to postpone any decision on nuclear weapons for five years rather than make a once and for all commitment not to make nuclear weapons.

The main arguments in India for a nuclear weapons program are: 1) the fear that China's prestige will grow as her nuclear weapons develop and, 2) the belief, which many draw largely from the French experience, that in the long run the United States cannot guarantee Indian security once China has the capability of attacking the United States. For the short run, most Indians are prepared to concede that the United States guarantee is effective. The debate now in India tends to be in terms of, should India make a bomb or not. Changing the focus to can we afford to wait five years to decide will undercut most of the arguments for the bomb.

A proposed five-year moratorium on the decision also makes sense in the context of Indian economic development. The United States could quite reasonably say that it finds it hard to see how India can make its own economic development plans or expect others to support them when the question remains hanging as to whether the plans will be substantially changed by the launching of a nuclear program. Without prejudice to any later decision, the United States could reasonably ask for an understanding that active consideration of the issue be postponed until the end of the new five-year plan.

While a commitment on the part of India to delay a decision for five years might seem less satisfactory than a permanent Indian decision, perhaps ratified in a proliferation treaty, never to make nuclear weapons, the reverse is probably the case. A once and for all decision would, in fact, have very little meaning as the previous Indian statements that India would never make nuclear weapons make clear. Moreover the very act of taking a "permanent" decision will generate active opposition on the part of those who are prepared to concede that a bomb is not necessary now but are reluctant to foreclose the option for all time. In five years the Indians may have learned that China in fact gets very little prestige from her bomb. Moreover, the evolution of Soviet-American relations and the ending of the Vietnam war during the next five years might make possible closer Soviet-American cooperation in India which would, in the Indian view, make a nuclear program less necessary. Finally, if we can find ways to stop India and Israel for five years, we will have succeeded in reducing the expectations in a great many countries that nuclear weapons are going to spread.

2. The greatest contribution which the United States can make toward preventing an Indian nuclear program is to strengthen the hands of those in India who would give priority to economic development over various military programs, including an Indian bomb.

The most helpful sign indicating that the Indians are in fact not close to a decision to make nuclear weapons was the devaluation of the rupee and the other Indian accommodations to proposals of the World Bank. The devaluation apparently was preceded by an intense debate within the Indian government and with the leaders of the Congress party. Those opposed to devaluation took the view that foreign aid could not be relied on, that India had to go it alone and take whatever steps she could toward development without outside assistance. The mood reflected by this group, which apparently included Karamaj, would probably have led to a decision to produce a bomb as a substitute for economic development and as a way of holding the country together. On the other side, Mrs. Gandhi and those who supported her argued that foreign aid was reliable, that India's first obligation was to her own economic development and that this should not be sacrificed on the altar of excessive concern for national prestige. Moreover, the Indian government clearly

feels that it has a commitment from the United States for a substantial increase in economic assistance of various kinds. Everybody in India seems to understand that such assistance depends on India not diverting her resources into a nuclear weapons development program. Without feeling that the American government would cut off aid if India made nuclear weapons, Indian officials recognize that the difficulties of getting an aid appropriation through Congress and of persuading the World Bank and the Consortium countries to participate depends on the demonstration that India is giving first priority to economic development and not wasting her resources and her foreign exchange on a nuclear program.

Mrs. Gandhi has paid a considerable domestic price for the freedom to devalue and to take other steps which will stimulate Indian economic growth. It is very unlikely that she would jeopardize the fruits of these actions by taking a decision to build a bomb. Certainly anything that the United States does to sweeten the pot of economic development, to give the Indian government greater confidence that development over the next five years will be substantial and will justify the decisions taken, will make it more likely that the Indian government remains on this course and is not diverted by a nuclear program. It is worth pointing out to the Senate, which is on record overwhelmingly as concerned about the problem of proliferation, that the greatest single contribution it can make to non-proliferation is a more generous appropriation for Indian economic development clearly conditioned on India herself giving top priority to development issues.

3. It would be extremely useful to take steps to make available to wide Indian audiences accurate estimates of the cost of a nuclear weapons program.

While most Indians are suspicious of the very low estimates presented by Bhabha, there are apparently no accurate estimates available for general distribution within the Indian government. It would be extremely useful for the United States to prepare its own cost estimate and to make it available to American officials and others traveling to India for use on a background basis in discussing the problem with Indian officials and private citizens. Moreover, it might be worth encouraging some private group in the United States to prepare a public cost estimate of an Indian program.

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4. The United States, in its public statements and in its actions, should avoid appearing to exaggerate the nature of the Chinese threat or giving excessive prestige to China as a nuclear power.

Indian officials are deeply concerned about the extent to which the United States and other countries appear to have accommodated themselves to China's status as a nuclear power and accorded China prestige and influence which it had previously been denied. While much of this perception results from extreme Indian sensitivity and is likely to dissipate on its own, as it becomes clear that China has in fact gained little from her nuclear program, it is important for the United States to avoid seeming to accord special status to China because of her nuclear weapons. The United States should resist any proposals for nuclear power conferences. We should make clear that changes in our China policy which may appear to be concessions to China are not in fact stimulated by the Chinese development of nuclear weapons.

The Indians are listening very carefully to what American officials say about the development of Chinese nuclear weapons. The Indians are reading our discussions, including consideration of deployment of a limited ballistic missile defense against the Chinese, as indicating that the Chinese nuclear program is very far along and that China is likely to have a capability which threatens the United States in the near future. While it is important not to present a distorted picture of the Chinese nuclear program, it is equally important to avoid the impression of excessive concern in the United States with Chinese nuclear developments.

The effort to have the Indians postpone a decision for five years would be enhanced by any indications we can give them that China is unlikely to have an operational capability vis-à-vis India during this period. It may be worth pointing out to the Indians that the Chinese are very unlikely to deploy their first operational missiles within range of India. The first priority Chinese targets are almost certain to be Taiwan, Japan, Korea and American bases in the Far East as well as perhaps the Soviet Union. It is likely that the Chinese will install a great many missiles in the Eastern part of their country before they are prepared to build any in Tibet to threaten Indian cities. This suggests that a real Chinese threat to India may be ten years away.

The United States should also seek positive ways of increasing the status of India (and Japan). We should talk, for example, about the eight or nine countries in the world which now have the capability of making nuclear weapons and, therefore, bear a special responsibility for world security and for disarmament negotiations. If the opportunity arises for a change in the composition of the disarmament conference, we might propose the participation of all "nuclear nations" (that is, nations with advanced nuclear programs whether or not they have chosen to detonate a nuclear device). It also might be useful for the United States to state publicly at a high level its belief that ultimately the Security Council should be reorganized to include eight or perhaps nine permanent members, the additional members being India, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany and perhaps Brazil. In the context of announcing any change in American UN policy on the China question, the United States should propose a general reorganization of the United Nations, including an enlargement of the Security Council in acknowledgment of the "nuclear status" of India, Japan and Germany. American statements in general should avoid talking about five nuclear powers and talk about the eight or nine nuclear nations.

5. It does not appear that guarantees of any kind can play a useful role in preventing an Indian nuclear program.

The Indian interest in nuclear guarantees seems to have declined appreciably over the last several months. This is apparently in large part because the Indians have become convinced that at least under present circumstances, the Soviet Union is unwilling to participate in such a guarantee. Moreover, guarantees appear to some Indians to be a humiliating acceptance of India's inferior status, particularly vis-à-vis China. The Indians have no doubt that they have as firm a guarantee as they can get from the United States. They believe that if Chinese power grows substantially, the United States might be unwilling to defend India, but since this perception comes from what the French tell them about NATO, the Indians do not believe that formal guarantees can alleviate the problem. If we listen carefully to Indian officials, it will become clear that guarantees are no longer a high priority Indian item if, in fact, there is any interest at all.

6. The United States should accept a tacit or explicit moratorium on efforts to negotiate a non-proliferation treaty.

The Indians look upon a non-proliferation treaty as establishing institutionally and legally that China has the right to be a nuclear power and India does not. The Indians resent the implication which comes from Western efforts to negotiate a treaty that the United States is prepared to grant nuclear status to China and, at the same time, put pressure on India to make a decision not to make nuclear weapons. Many Indians, particularly those now in charge of the Indian nuclear program, are opposed to an Indian nuclear capability, but equally opposed to a non-proliferation treaty. They believe a treaty would imply that India was not making nuclear weapons, not because she had decided in her own interests not to do so, but because she was under pressure from the world community to accept inferior status.

The disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union about an MLF clause in the non-proliferation treaty looks to the Indians as a highly parochial debate which undercuts American assertions that stopping the spread of nuclear weapons is the highest priority international item. In effect we are saying to the Indians that it is very important for them to renounce the right to make nuclear weapons and we will have a treaty ready for them to sign just as soon as we can settle with the Russians on what appears to be a highly esoteric dispute about a future option which American officials assert that they are not going to exercise. Even if there were no other reason to do so, it would appear important to withhold public effort to negotiate a non-proliferation treaty until and unless we have reason to believe that a joint Soviet-American draft could be agreed upon.

It is possible and perhaps likely that India would sign a non-proliferation treaty if one were negotiated. However, this action would precipitate an extensive and bitter debate in India, a debate which whatever the outcome on the immediate issue would almost certainly contribute to the pressures in India to produce nuclear weapons. A signed treaty would stand as a festering sore, as a symbol of Indian submission to the United States and of India's status as inferior to China, Britain, and France. It is unlikely that the treaty itself would play a major

role in preventing an Indian decision to make nuclear weapons and may in fact precipitate just such a move.

The Indians seem particularly unhappy about the prospect that China might sign a non-proliferation treaty and hence have her status as a nuclear power sanctioned by the world community. It is possible that the Indian pressure for a production cutoff as part of a treaty is designed primarily to make it certain that China will not sign the agreement. This would put China in the position of violating another international agreement when she produces fissionable material. While they may be reluctant to say so publicly or even privately, the Indians would much prefer an agreement which China could not sign and which China would be forced to violate. This may explain the otherwise apparently irrational Indian pressure for an enlarged non-proliferation treaty.

It is likely that before the end of their five-year moratorium, the Indians would be in a more receptive mood to sign a non-proliferation treaty, particularly if in the meantime the NATO nuclear issue were resolved in a way that made possible a treaty acceptable to the Soviet Union and the United States. Moreover, improvements in Soviet-American relations would make such a treaty seem more tolerable. The treaty also then might be presented as being directed at other countries and not at India, which for reasons of its own had decided not to become a nuclear power. Just as nobody in Canada views the non-proliferation treaty as an anti-Canadian measure, the Indians may come over the course of several years to view the treaty as directed at other "irresponsible" countries which might take the decision to make nuclear weapons unless checked by the international community.



Morton H. Halperin

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This document consists of 7 pages.

Number 9 of 31 copies, Series A

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

6-22-66

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DOD - Mr. Yarmolinsky
- Mr. Barber
- Mr. Wyle
- Mr. Hoffman
JCS - Gen. Brown
ACDA - Mr. Fisher
CIA - Mr. Godfrey
NSC - Mr. Wriggins
- Mr. Keeny
- Mr. Johnson

G - Mr. Johnson
S/AL - Amb. Thompson
G/PM - Mr. Weiss
NEA - Mr. Schneider
INR - Mrs. Tait
S/P - Mr. Owen
Mr. Gathright

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Planning Group Meeting of June 23

Attached is a paper for the Thursday discussion meeting prepared by ACDA


Samuel De Palma

Attachment:

Effective Arms Control Agreements

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

ACDA/IR:RHKranich:bf

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Authority NSA 030-033-9.2
By 1 NARA, Date 3-17-06

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EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

A. The pressures or inducements which the U.S. can realistically bring to bear to prevent nuclear proliferation by India would have more promise if taken under the umbrella of the following international agreements which would tend to reinforce the political and technical inhibitions against proliferation:

- Threshold Test Ban Treaty
- Non-Proliferation Treaty
- Agreements or assurances limiting use
of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
states

B. India would probably adhere to or associate itself with a threshold test ban treaty agreed by the US and USSR. Such adherence or association would serve to defer an Indian decision to go nuclear in two ways:

1. The treaty would impose significant technical and political restraints on an Indian nuclear weapon test program as described in ACDA paper for the Committee of Principals dated May 26, 1966.

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2. While the Indians realize that the U.S. is interested in protecting India against any Chinese nuclear threat, they are uncertain whether we would actually do so if it meant risking Soviet attack. This is the heart of the growing feeling of insecurity in India, and of the pressure to build an Indian bomb. Therefore, any movement of the Soviets away from China and/or toward the U.S., whether through arms control agreements, a UNGA security assurances resolution, or in some other manner, helps to alleviate Indian insecurity and thus defer a decision to go nuclear.

C. In considering what price the US should be prepared to pay for a threshold test ban, it would appear that a 4.75 seismic threshold should be acceptable to the US because --

1. Recent improvements in detection permit monitoring with greater confidence a 4.75 threshold; and

2. there appears to be an equitable balance of military advantages and disadvantages as between the US and USSR.

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D. Even more effective than a threshold test ban in curbing Indian nuclear weapons aspirations, would be a general non-proliferation treaty. Such a treaty would provide a means whereby the US and the Soviets could most effectively reinforce those political elements which are opposing a decision to manufacture nuclear weapons.

E. In order to achieve a non-proliferation treaty, it would be necessary, of course, to find an acceptable way out of the current US-Soviet impasse in the non-proliferation treaty negotiations. Assuming no change in the Soviet or US position concerning NATO nuclear arrangements, there is no prospect of US-Soviet agreement on a non-proliferation treaty and, accordingly, it will not be possible in this assessment to take into account the bearing of such a treaty on the Indian situation.

F. Consideration of possible ways to reformulate the present US draft non-proliferation treaty to meet Soviet objections and yet not at the same time prejudice the kind of options for NATO nuclear sharing we actually seem to have in mind are not included in this paper in view of the NSAM injunction not to assume, for the purpose of this study, changes in the present US position on a non-proliferation treaty.

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G. Neither a threshold test ban, nor a non-proliferation treaty, nor the two together, would fully meet Indian security needs vis-a-vis Communist China. These measures may have to be accompanied by some form of general assurances to assist India in the event of Chinese threat or attack. Ideally, Indian leaders would like joint or parallel US-Soviet-UK security guarantees, which do not appear obtainable at this time.

Three types of proposals concerning assurances or guarantees of non-use require consideration:

1. The Kosygin Proposal -- which prohibits the nuclear parties to a non-proliferation treaty from using nuclear weapons against any signatory non-nuclear power which does not have nuclear weapons deployed on its territory. This approach is objectionable to the US because it does not afford protection against nuclear powers not party to the treaty, and discriminates against non-nuclear-weapon parties in alliances. As such it is aimed at Western alliance arrangements, and specifically US overseas nuclear deployments. Moreover, it is concerned with the type of weapon being used without regard to who may be the aggressor.

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2. UN Type Resolution -- under which, in a manner less binding than a treaty commitment, signatories would undertake to provide or support immediate assistance to any party that: a) does not possess nuclear weapons, b) is the victim of an act of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used. This type of approach is the current US position, but it does not appear negotiable with the Soviets at this time.

3. Non-Use Variant -- an approach previously proposed by ACDA for governmental consideration which attempts to join elements of both non-use and aggression by prohibiting parties to a non-proliferation treaty from using nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the treaty, except in defense against an act of aggression in which a state owning nuclear weapons is engaged. This may have possibilities as an approach which could be presented as a compromise between the two types of proposals indicated above, and should be considered as an adjunct to, or if necessary, a part of a non-proliferation treaty. While this would by itself

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still not provide India with the assurances of the type discussed immediately above, it would help indirectly by demonstrating a US-Soviet accord on non-use.

/More extensive treatment of the assurances problem is contained in a separate State Department paper.7

ACDA/IR:RHKranich:bf
6-22-66

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY

G/PM

MEMORANDUM FOR:


June 21, 1966

DOD - Mr. Yarmolinsky
- Mr. Barber
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- Mr. Hoffman
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ACDA- Mr. Fisher
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NSC - Mr. Wiggins
- Mr. Keeny
- Mr. Johnson✓

G - Mr. Johnson
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NEA - Mr. Schneider
INR - Mr. Tait
S/P - Mr. Owen
S/P - Mr. Gathright

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Planning Group Meeting of June 23

Attached are the three papers for the Thursday discussion meeting for which the State Department assumed initial drafting responsibility.


Raymond L. Garthoff

Attachments:

1. Economic Pressures and Inducements
2. Possible Security Assurances for India
3. Bilateral US-Indian Defense Cooperation

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

G/PM:RLGarthoff:pep

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NW 030-033-9-3
By 4 NARA, Date 3-17-09

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THE INDIAN NUCLEAR PROBLEM

Economic Pressures and Inducements

I. The Problem

This paper examines various types of economic pressures and inducements which the US might use to inhibit an Indian decision to develop an independent nuclear weapons program, and endeavors to assess not only their probable impact on Indian nuclear policy but also their compatibility with other US interests.

II. Discussion

A question of tactics: India is a large, proud, and sensitive nation. The degree to which it is amenable to US influence varies enormously depending on the skill and understanding with which that influence is applied. In this context it is essential to bear in mind that India's present leadership is still committed in principle to non-proliferation, and is still hewing to a policy of foregoing an independent nuclear weapons program.

Under these circumstances a US stance of quietly and sympathetically supporting an existing Indian policy will be more effective than a stance which seems to be questioning the sincerity of that policy and preparing to battle impending change.

U.S. Economic Aid Leverage: India faces massive economic problems and depends heavily on external assistance to provide the margin between development and stagnation. The US is by far the largest single source of India's external assistance. The extent to which India depends on Western economic aid in general and US economic aid in particular has been brought home by the events of the past year, not only to India's government but also to substantial elements of the Indian public.

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By g NARA, Date 3-17-09

This year we have used our economic aid leverage with India to insist on certain major internal economic reforms. India's present leaders have recognized that these reforms are in India's interest and have taken courageous and politically unpopular steps to introduce the key elements; in response we recently announced resumption of our economic aid to India (and Pakistan) on about the pre-hostilities level. In so doing we have made it clear to the GOI that our willingness to follow through on this decision continues contingent on peace with Pakistan in general and on a gradual downward trend in India's (and Pakistan's) defense expenditures in particular. While we have not told India that our future economic aid might be affected if India should embark on a nuclear weapons program, our stance on defense spending and the priority which is essential for development has undoubtedly made our attitude clear to them.

In a sense, therefore, we have already used our considerable aid leverage to strike a bargain with India, the terms of which bear at least indirectly on India's nuclear policy.

Direct pressures and indirect ones: There is considerable evidence that India's leaders have submitted to about as much direct economic pressure from us as the political situation within the country will tolerate at this time. The nation as a whole is committed both to socialism and to non-alignment (as between the US and the USSR); and the economic reforms in particular have clearly moved the country much closer to economic policies advocated by the US than India has ever been willing to go before.

Even though we did not directly insist on India's remaining non-nuclear as part of the aid bargain, however, the net effect of that bargain has been indirectly to increase economic pressures on India to eschew the bomb. India

is once again focusing on the primary task of development, expecting results and persuaded that aid will be contingent in future on performance. The knowledge that future defense budgets will be carefully scrutinized by aid donors should, in particular, dampen the enthusiasm of Indian planners contemplating the costs of a start on nuclear weapons.

The Indian attitude toward the US: Whether the new and closer Indo-US relationship is sustained and develops roots depends on many immediate factors but ultimately on the extent to which Indians accept the US as a wise and disinterested friend with objectives in Asia that harmonize with India's own. There is some correlation between Indian confidence in the US and the Indian attitude toward an independent nuclear deterrent, deriving from the widely shared Indian assumption that under present circumstances India's best defense against Chinese nuclear blackmail rests with the U.S.A. Conceivably a hard US line on India's nuclear policy could boomerang through weakening Indian confidence in the US, and thereby strengthening pro-bomb elements claiming India cannot afford to rely on its so-called friends in a future showdown with China.

The USSR Factor: The USSR has invested heavily in India and continues to have major interests there. It is clearly unhappy at present about what it considers India's recent drift to the right and would like to reverse the trend. Although it presumably shares our interest in non-proliferation to some degree, it might on balance prefer to see India develop an independent limited nuclear weapons capability than to see India develop an intimate defense relationship with the U.S. as a means of ensuring its nuclear security vis-a-vis China.

If we changed our tactics with India and conditioned our aid on India's avoiding a change in nuclear policy, the Soviets might be receptive to India's requests for greater aid without such a condition as a way of strengthening their influence in India.

U.S. Military Aid Policy to India and Pakistan: Resumption of substantial military aid to India would tend to relieve some of the financial pressure militating against a nuclear weapons program. Probably it would thus have at least a marginal negative effect on our nuclear objective.

Resumption of significant military aid to Pakistan would have a major adverse effect on Indian confidence in the US and would significantly strengthen Indian advocates of "go-it-alone" policies, involving an independent nuclear weapons program.

III. U.S. Options

1) Indirect economic pressures:

a) Self-help: By insisting on a high level of performance as a prerequisite for our economic aid, we can help keep India focused on the need to devote maximum possible resources to economic development, and thus make it more difficult for India to find and justify the funds it would need for a nuclear weapons program.

b) Downward trend in defense expenditures: We have already put the Government, of India and Pakistan on notice that we have no intention of fueling an arms race between them and to this end we expect their defense budgets to show a downward trend over the next few years. If we stick to our guns, this can substantially inhibit any Indian reversal of the no-bomb policy.

c) Keep India guessing: The Indians know we have a major stake in India , but they also know we have strong feelings on nonproliferation. They are also aware of our attitude towards defense spending. While we have not threatened to cut off aid if they opt for the bomb, they must be doubtful regarding what we would do. This doubt in itself operates as a substantial disincentive to such action. We should do nothing to dispel such doubt.

2) Direct economic pressures:

We could frankly warn the GOI that we would have to cut back (or even eliminate) our economic aid in the event of an Indian decision to go nuclear. This would presumably clarify the point for some Indians, but it would also provoke a sharply adverse reaction within the Government of India, create opportunities for the USSR, and put pressure on the Government to take tangible steps to demonstrate its independence (see Section II, Discussion). It would be of dubious credibility since many Indians would argue that our stake in Asia would not permit us to carry out such a threat when and if the chips were down. Of greatest importance, it would imply that we were questioning the sincerity of the Government's present policy and cause many Indians to question our judgement, our good faith, and our support to India's security. This in turn might cause India to attempt a more self-reliant defense through a nuclear weapons program. Furthermore, it is by no means certain that it lies within our power to keep India from going nuclear. If, despite our best efforts India should do so, it is difficult to predict how we might wish to react; this would have to be judged in light of prevailing circumstances. We would still have important interests in India which would be served by rapid Indian economic development. We should not, therefore, foreclose our economic options in

3) Economic Inducements:

a) Having just struck an aid bargain, we are now in the process of reestablishing aid at about the pre-hostilities level. In another year or two the situation might conceivably suggest a need to raise that level. In discussing the possible provision of such additional resources with the GOI, we might, depending on circumstances, find it practicable to levy a continued no-bomb policy as an implied requirement, using tactics similar to those we have employed of late in discussing Indo-Pak defense expenditures.

b) It appears rather less practicable to attempt to "buy" a continuing no-bomb policy through a more direct application of the inducement principle. US action that could be construed as an attempted bribe to induce India to act against what would be considered basic security interests would give Indian opponents of a close Indo-US relationship almost as strong an emotional argument as US action that could be construed as aid blackmail.

4) Supplementary Actions:

a) Provision of Cost Data: We should continue to provide India with credible data, based on our own experience and known cost figures for other nuclear powers, of the economic, technical and managerial costs India would face if it embarked on an effort to achieve a credible nuclear deterrent force of its own.

b) Related education efforts: To supplement the foregoing we might expose Indian opinion leaders visiting the US to selected facilities to give them some first-hand grasp of the complexities and magnitude of the task of creating an effective nuclear weapons system.

c) Third country or agency actions: We might encourage the British to take a lead in circulating cost data (4 a and b above). Similarly, the IBRD, and perhaps some of the Governments represented on the Indian Consortium, ought to be able to play a helpful supporting role in sustaining the indirect pressures and inducements described in sections 1 a, b and c, and perhaps 3 a above

IV. Conclusions

We can and should maintain the indirect economic pressures bearing on India as described in Section III. 1) above. It will be particularly important that we bear in mind the effect on India's nuclear policy of our policies relating to economic and military aid in the subcontinent as they are evolved and articulated in the months ahead.

We should, however, avoid the sort of direct economic pressure described in III. 2 above. It would certainly have serious adverse effects on our other interests in the area and quite possibly would prove counterproductive in terms of its effect on Indian nuclear policy.

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Possible Security Assurances for India

National security considerations are central to Indian thinking about the question of developing nuclear weapons. Insecurity arises from perception of a threat and, assuming that the threat really exists, "security" for a nation can be gained through any of three ways: Removal of the threat, neutralization of the threat through one's own counteraction or counterthreat (deterrent), or neutralization of the threat by engaging the deterrent of another power. The Chinese Communist threat to India is real, both in terms of Chinese Communist intentions (objectives and aspirations) and capabilities (geostrategic location and impending nuclear and missile weapons). Proceeding from the conclusion that Indian development of an independent nuclear capability would not in net be in our national interest, our task would appear to be finding some way of developing external security assurances sufficient to convince the Indian leadership that it need not acquire its own nuclear weapons in order to offset the Chinese nuclear capability.

There are, however, two important qualifications to this framing of our task. First, while security concerns are central they are not the only elements entering Indian decision-making on the nuclear weapons question, and even security is not entirely reducible to military deterrence. In particular, the international political posture and power of India is involved. Indian political leaders are concerned not only with deterring Chinese nuclear blackmail or attack, but also with a wide range of other foreign

GROUP 3

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policy objectives with respect to which a nuclear capability is pertinent. The 1965 war with Pakistan highlighted one situation of vital interest to India where the Indians became painfully aware of the need to rely chiefly on themselves. To note one other example, any move to enhance the status of Communist China since it has entered the "nuclear club" prompts the conclusion that if India is to contest Chinese leadership in Asia, or indeed even to lay claim to regional great power status in South Asia, it too must become a nuclear power. Reliance on the security assurances of a third power or group of powers not only fails to serve the interest of enhancing Indian international political status, it may in fact reduce it. Second, if external security assurances depending on the United States can be devised which would meet security needs of India as seen by the Indian leadership, they must also involve a commitment which the United States Government is prepared to accept. And it will not be easy to find a mutually acceptable balance.

In the final analysis, it is the Indian Government which will decide whether it is prepared to rely on external assurances or feels concerned to acquire its own nuclear deterrent. In approaching the question, the Indians will seek a policy which is consistent with continued non-alignment both because they want to maintain their

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position among the Afro-Asians, and still more because they believe that their security interests require good relations both with the United States and the Soviet Union. Indian non-alignment, coupled with the obvious Soviet unreadiness to enter any explicit alignment with the United States against Communist China, and with the Indian requirement for the firm support of at least one of the two super-powers, leads to the conclusion that any assurances given by the US or USSR must be either tacti or in a generalized framework involving multilateral assurances to all non-nuclear states.

Tacit parallel American and Soviet guarantees to India do not appear to be feasible at the present time. The United States can, of course, make nown to India its readiness to participate in providing joint or parrallel assurances, but in a situation in which the Soviet Union has rejected participation in such assurances the Indians would if anything feel less rather than more reassured, and might therefore be more inclined to turn toward an independent nuclear deterrent. It would be possible at some appropriate time to approach the Soviet Union again to determine whether the USSR might no longer consider the question "premature," but there is no basis to conclude that this would be the case at present, and in fact that prospect in the foreseeable future is not good. Accordingly, we conclude that while the United States should favor a joint or agreed parallel assurances if these should become feasible, the prospect for Soviet

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agreement is so dim that we should not count upon this possibility in seeking timely ways to head off an Indian nuclear decision.

The two principal ways in which multilateral assurances could be given would be in a non-proliferation treaty or a UN General Assembly resolution. In considering any generalized assurance there is an evident problem in finding a balance between providing too great a commitment to all states, and too little a commitment for any one. The United States would not be prepared to provide an unambiguous commitment of American military support to all non-nuclear countries, yet an unambiguous commitment may well be required in order to affect an Indian decision. This problem of tailoring the commitment is much greater in a treaty than in a UN resolution. There are two other reasons why incorporation of assurances into a non-proliferation treaty would be much less satisfactory to the United States than would be their inclusion in a resolution. First, the treaty may not be agreed upon and thus would not affect India and other countries whom we wish to influence with the assurance. Second, the Russians have introduced the unacceptable concept of non-first use of nuclear weapons into consideration of a non-proliferation treaty, greatly complicating the question of assurances. Thus a UN resolution is clearly the best vehicle for providing generalized assurances of support against nuclear attack or blackmail to non-nuclear countries.

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The prospects for the UN resolution are uncertain. In the fall of 1965, when we sounded out the Soviet reaction, we were told that the Soviet Union considered the question of assurances "premature," and that the matter might be considered after the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty. (As noted above, the Soviets subsequently advanced their counterproposal on non-first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries on whose territory no nuclear weapons were stationed, in the context of a non-proliferation treaty.) Nonetheless, it is possible that the Soviet Union would support a UN resolution embodying assurances, without insisting on the inclusion of an unacceptable non-first use provisions, and it would seem desirable to sound out the Soviet reaction again, emphasizing the importance of this question to curbing proliferation.

In 1965 the Committee of Principals approved the draft of a possible UN General Assembly resolution, the operative language of which expressed the intention of UN members "to provide or support immediate assistance to any state not possessing nuclear weapons that is the victim of an act of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used." It is doubtful whether this language would provide sufficient assurance to the Indians to impede an Indian decision to go nuclear. It is, however, doubtful whether the United States should go beyond this degree of commitment in a generalized assurance, even in the form of a recommendatory General Assembly resolution. Suggestions have been made for

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broadening this assurance to cover any aggression by a nuclear power, and not simply acts of aggression in which nuclear weapons were actually used. However, we do not believe that it would be desirable for the US to extend such a broad guarantee. The principal concern of the countries threatened is with nuclear blackmail or nuclear attack. Moreover, it would not be in the best interests of the United States to offer even a non-binding implied commitment to come to the aid of any non-nuclear country which became embroiled in hostilities with any nuclear powers, irrespective of the circumstances. In addition, in view of the widely varying views of different countries on what constitutes "aggression," it would not be in our interests to provide a platform for Soviet "justification" of their assistance to North Vietnam in the conflict with us. For all these reasons, we do not believe that the operative language of the 1965 draft resolution should be changed.

It has also been suggested that a UN resolution on assurances might go further to call for the creation of a committee of states to consider "more effective guarantees" than those embodied in the resolution. Such a provision would, however, seriously depreciate the value of the assurances conveyed in the resolution itself. In addition, it would probably not be possible to insure the composition of such a committee

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in such a way that it would consider the question in a balanced way. Moreover, while it is unlikely that such a committee could agree on more effective guarantees--thereby further depreciating the value of the assurances in the resolution itself--the proposals of some members could generate pressures for more far-reaching assurances than we are willing to grant.

A multilateral assurance to all non-nuclear countries would not specify the precise conditions committing the US "to provide or support assistance," or the nature of such "support." In some circumstances we might even limit our action to diplomatic statements of support in the UN, although we would no doubt wish to go well beyond that to meet any actual Chinese Communist aggression. Such generalized assurances would not and should not, however, prejudice this question; they would not obligate the US to any particular contingent military action. At the same time, we would wish to accentuate the positive in expressions of our position, and it would be better to warmly support a vague guarantee than to have to hedge _____ on a stronger one.

There is another reason for not making generalized assurances too comprehensive or too precise. If the US were to appear to offer "free" commitments equivalent to those of an alliance to all non-nuclear states, in some countries presently allied to us sentiment might rise to the

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conclusion that the benefits of American support could be retained without the obligations of alliance. In addition, a potential nuclear power might cite the generalized assurance as grounds for expecting and demanding more concrete assurances. While there might well be cases where the United States would itself wish to provide more concrete bilateral guarantees under the umbrella of the broad generalized assurances, specifically the case of India, we do not wish to encourage "blackmail" by potential nuclear powers seeking either one-sided semi-alliances, or if we decline then using this fact as an excuse for going nuclear.

Broad generalized multilateral assurances embodied in a UN General Assembly resolution could provide a framework under which a unilateral US guarantee to India and bilateral contingency plans could be elaborated. Such a framework would be useful, but would probably not be required. While the Indians would wish to retain the support of both the USSR and the US, they have in the past entered into private bilateral military arrangements with us in 1962 and 1963, and if they believe additional guarantees necessary to their national security there is no reason why such arrangements cannot be made without jettisoning a public posture of "non-alignment," and with continued military supply arrangements with the USSR.

We recommend that the United States seek adoption of the UN General Assembly Resolution drafted in 1965 as the backdrop for more extensive

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private assurances. If such a Resolution does not appear feasible, we should proceed with whatever private assurances and arrangements may be agreed upon. If the international political situation changes sufficiently to make joint or parallel Soviet and American assurances to India possible we should consider that course of action as well, and we should not oppose any Soviet assurances to India against Communist China paralleling our own.

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BILATERAL US-INDIAN DEFENSE COOPERATION

If India refrains from seeking nuclear weapons of its own, the Indians will, as a practical matter, rely primarily on the U.S. to deter ChiCom nuclear aggression.

India's policy of non-alignment would preclude openly avowed reliance. However, India might for a time be prepared to "bend" its policy to accommodate an approach along the following lines:

- Reliance on private U.S. assurances;
- Some way of dramatizing a U.S.-Indian relationship which would convey (to the Chinese Communists as well as others) a high degree of U.S. interest in India's fate; and
- A continuation of close relations with the Soviet Union to meet requirements of non-alignment; to encourage the Soviet Union at least to stand aside in any future conflict; and to enable India's leaders to say for domestic purposes that "the U.S. and Soviet Union won't let us down."

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Because the character of Communist China's nuclear capabilities will change over time and because, in any event, India's interest in nuclear weapons derives from political as well as security interests, an arrangement along the foregoing lines would not represent a long-term "solution." How long a delay might be achieved in this way would depend in part on whether U.S.-Indian relations evolve in a way that would encourage mutual confidence and more extensive collaboration in defense matters.

* * * *

Without attempting here to suggest language which might be employed with the Indians, the central elements of a private U.S. assurance would be along the following lines.

-- We would provide firm assurance that we would retaliate against Communist China in the event that the latter initiated aggression against India in which nuclear weapons were employed.

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-- Determination of the best specific military response would depend on the circumstances prevailing at the time; and the character of the specific response would be conditioned by the magnitude of the attack and the manner in which nuclear weapons were actually employed (i.e., tactically or strategically).

-- Any response would be measured, and possible responses would include selective retaliation (presumably nuclear retaliation) focussed on ChiCom nuclear delivery, support, and production capabilities.

-- With respect to conventional phases of conflict, we would, of course, stand by our 1963 commitment to consult on air defense.

The objective of such an assurance would be to deter ChiCom use of nuclear weapons. However, a private assurance to India would entail possible involvement in a nuclear conflict under unforeseeable and possibly ambiguous circumstances over which we might at best have only limited control.

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Key question in considering the acceptability of such a commitment to the U.S. are:

-- What would the U.S., in fact, do if the Chinese Communists were to mount (or threaten imminently to mount) a nuclear attack on India?

-- Would the risk of nuclear conflict (and U.S. involvement) be greater if India attempted to achieve a national deterrent?

* * * *

One way of dramatizing a U.S.-Indian relationship would be cooperation in strengthening India's conventional capabilities within the limits dictated by economic considerations. Such cooperation would not be -- and should not be portrayed as -- a response to the ChiCom nuclear threat. However, any ChiCom use of (or threat to employ) nuclear weapons would presumably be in connection with -- or grow out of -- conventional conflict, and an adequate Indian conventional capability can be viewed as one approach to deterring ChiCom conventional attack.

Given present conditions within the sub-continent, U.S.-Indian collaboration should probably be limited

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initially to improving India's air defense capabilities. If and as conditions within the sub-continent should permit, other types of collaboration might be considered.

In connection with the foregoing, the U.S. might offer to explore with the Indians various contingencies which might arise vis-a-vis the ChiCom's. Such efforts would not necessarily amount to joint contingency planning as such but could afford a basis for better planning by the Indians and for a deeper Indian appreciation of the flexibility of U.S. forces.

* * * *

From our own standpoint -- and India's -- it would be essential to hold to the minimum any risk that the Soviet Union might in an extremity seek to intervene on Communist China's side. In part, this would be a function of Indian-Soviet relations, and none of the arrangements suggested above would preclude Indian-Soviet defense collaboration. In part, the issue would hinge on the character of the Sino-Soviet split, and on continuing Western efforts to improve relations with the Soviets as this may be feasible.

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In addition, the risk of adverse Soviet reaction in an actual contingency would be limited if Communist China were clearly the aggressor, if the U.S. response were measured, and if it were evident that no direct threat were posed to the Soviet Union itself.

One question that arises in this connection is whether the U.S. should have a clearly identified portion of its strategic force specifically designated as a deterrent against Communist China.

* * * *

The Paks have already opposed the idea of nuclear assurances apparently on the assumption that there is some value to Pakistan in Communist China's ability to threaten India with nuclear attack. Accordingly, we would have to expect an adverse Pak reaction to such steps as the foregoing.

We would necessarily have to offer the Paks a similar private assurance, and possibly also assistance in air defense. Basically, however, we would need to try to convince the Paks: (a) that any use of nuclear weapons against the sub-continent by Communist China would be
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costly to Pakistan; and (b) that a strong U.S.-Indian relationship which deterred ChiCom nuclear attack would be better from Pakistan's standpoint than an Indian national nuclear effort.

* * * *

Although the foregoing approach might conceivably delay an Indian nuclear weapons effort, India's desire for a nuclear role can be expected to increase. Accordingly, three further possibilities will need to be considered:

-- Whether the U.S. might offer to assist India in acquiring the capability to deter or retaliate against Communist Chinese nuclear attack with its own delivery means, using American nuclear weapons which would be made available to India at the time of a Chinese attack.

-- Whether, if an Indian pro-nuclear decision appeared imminent, the U.S. might offer non-warhead (presumably delivery vehicle) support of an Indian nuclear weapons program if India were prepared to delay its decision, if definite progress were made in Indian-Pak relations, and if no progress were

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made in finding better ways of meeting India's security needs.

-- Whether the U.S. might offer nuclear sharing or other assistance to a joint India-Pak deterrent effort whenever the two countries have come close enough to make this possible.

In effect, the first of these possibilities would attempt to meet India's interest in a nuclear role through a nuclear sharing arrangement. The second and third possibilities would seek to delay further an Indian decision but would acquiesce in the idea of an additional nuclear capability.

Of the three possibilities, a nuclear sharing arrangement would present the least difficulties from the standpoint of our non-proliferation policy and would retain for the U.S. the greatest degree of control. For that reason, however, it might prove unacceptable to the Indians unless India were prepared to "bend" non-alignment to an extreme degree. From the U.S. standpoint, questions would arise concerning the detailed character of any such arrangement and the reactions and expectations of U.S. allies.

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The second possibility would be more attractive to the Indians since it would involve both the eventual prospect of an Indian capability and the promise of some U.S. aid which would relieve India's leadtime problems in achieving a national deterrent. From the U.S. standpoint, the approach would represent a major departure from past policies. Such a departure would be acceptable only if we were convinced that India was indeed determined to "go nuclear" and that the damage to our own interests would be lessened if further delay could minimize the impact of an Indian effort on Indo-Pak relations. Again, reactions and expectations of U.S. allies would be a major factor.

An offer of U.S. support for a joint deterrent for the sub-continent would be less abrasive than the preceding approach. However, the political basis for such an arrangement does not now exist and is not likely to materialize during the period of decision for India.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

22 JUN 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR:

G/PM - Mr. Garthoff	Mr. Barber
NEA - Mr. Schneider	OSD/SA - Mr. Hoffman
S/P - Mr. Gathright	JCS - Gen. Goodpaster
Mr. Brewer	Gen. Brown
INR - Mrs. Tait	NSC - Mr. Wriggins
ACDA - Mr. Fisher	Mr. Keeny
OSD/ISA - Mr. Yarmolinsky	Mr. Johnson ✓
Mr. Wyle	

SUBJECT : Costs to India to Develop a Credible Nuclear Deterrent

1. The attached material is supplementary to the CIA study submitted on this topic for the 16 June meeting of the Policy Planning Council. Its purpose is to provide further detail on a number of points raised at the 16 June meeting.

2. In order to simplify its incorporation into the 15 June draft, we have prepared the attached material in the form of a new summary and an annex to the earlier draft. You should therefore replace the former summary with the new one and attach the annex to the end of the paper. The old summary should be destroyed.

3. Identical copies have been forwarded to the other panel members and to Ambassadors Johnson and Thompson.

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E. DREXEL GODFREY, JR.
Director of Current Intelligence

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By JP NARA, Date 3/19/09

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COSTS TO INDIA TO DEVELOP A CREDIBLE NUCLEAR DETERRENT

Summary and Conclusions

International political reactions to an Indian nuclear weapons effort -- except as they affect foreign aid -- would be less damaging to India today than they would have been several years ago. India's position as a neutralist leader in disarmament and in the peaceful settlement of disagreements has declined greatly in recent years. The Indian government appears to be more concerned with regional affairs than with regaining the world position it held under Nehru. Regionally, Pakistan would be likely to seek Chinese Communist nuclear guarantees if India pursues a nuclear weapons program. There would also be some risk of preventive measures by China and Pakistan. On balance, however, it is the spectre of internal economic costs -- complicated by Indian uncertainties as to the aid programs -- that is more likely to influence an Indian decision than the value India places on its world image in areas of morality and neutralism.

India is at present faced with severe economic problems created by shortages of financial, technological, and administrative resources. These difficulties were intensified by the economic and military crises of 1965 and the diminution of aid that occurred at that time. Overly ambitious economic goals and greatly increased defense programs in recent years promise a continuation of these

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strains. Military competition for available resources has intensified at a time when the health of the economy and the democratic process in India are increasingly dependent on the continuation of investment for economic growth and for the improvement of living standards. The present non-nuclear military threat from China and Pakistan -- as evaluated by India -- makes it unlikely that any sacrifice would be acceptable in India's conventional military forces to permit the diversion of resources from present defense efforts to the pursuit of a nuclear warhead and delivery capability that would take several years to achieve.

A serious effort to develop more than a token nuclear weapons capability* would thus seem to require increased levels of external financial and technological aid at the same time that such a decision might jeopardize the future of foreign aid. There are, however, two factors which taken together may permit India to continue on the path toward achieving a credible nuclear deterrent without incurring immediate additional financial burdens or unduly increasing other risks.

The first of these factors derives from apparent logic that the quickest path to a credible Indian deterrent, as defined:

- a. would require only the continuation of present plans for nuclear power generation -- with perhaps a speed-up of

* The exclusive focus of this paper -- on the costs of an Indian program to acquire a meaningful nuclear capability -- does not reflect a judgment that this is a more likely course than an alternative token nuclear weapons effort pursued for political or psychological effects. See Section I, pp. 1-2, for further discussion of the key considerations and assumptions governing the analysis contained in this study.

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plans to build an Indian designed and produced reactor without safeguards;

b. would not create dependence on the acquisition of an expensive delivery system until after 1973 or 1974;

c. would only ambiguously signal that nuclear weapons considerations were dominating some decisions; and

d. would minimize the financial costs during the first five years.

This option would permit India in effect to hold the final decision open for three or four more years with minimum penalty and with the easy possibility of abandoning the path at any time in that period.

The second factor concerns the uncertainty as to whether the costs of this option would be excessive or whether the steps taken by India would raise any risk that foreign financial or technological aid would be affected in the immediate future.

The USSR would probably oppose a clearly identified Indian nuclear weapons program as part of its program against nuclear proliferation. It is doubtful, however, that the Soviet Union would react even to an identifiable weapons program by discontinuing aid to India and it almost certainly would not react to an ambiguous one. Of the western countries (including Japan) which have provided India with economic aid, it is likely that only the US and possibly West Germany would react to an Indian nuclear weapons program by discontinuing such aid. US aid, exclusive of PL-480, granted during

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the period 1961-65 was about half of that provided by the Free World consortium. The loss of US aid would be a real blow to the economic development plan and to available foreign exchange. It would seriously hamper India's ability to pursue a nuclear weapons program. The pursuit of the option identified above, however, would probably not create undue risks to India even with regard to US aid.

Under the Indian program identified, approximately \$300 million-\$600 million would be incurred in direct financial costs during 1966-70. Most of this money -- from about \$250 million to as much as \$500 million -- would be required to begin a domestic Indian effort to create a missile development and production base, and to design and begin the early stages of missile development. Such an effort would require substantial foreign technological assistance in order to have even a modest chance of success. Initially at least the missile aspects of the program could be considerably muted. The remainder of about \$60 million to \$80 million would be required for construction of a nuclear power reactor and to conduct initial research and development for warhead production that could cumulate to about 50 weapons plus test devices by the mid-1970's.

If this program were pursued during 1966-70, toward the end of the period India would face the decision of the actual warhead production and test program that would probably cost between \$300 million and \$400 million during 1971-76. The delivery system decision would also be reopened at about the same time. If an effective delivery system could then be purchased, India might accept this as

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a least-cost option and cancel its domestic effort. If such systems were not available for purchase, India would at least have completed about five years of development work -- although even then a deployable system would still require several years of additional effort and might not be available before 1980. The probable cost difference between these two possibilities is not sufficiently distinct to show a clear financial advantage between the two programs. Costs of between \$1.0 and \$1.5 billion for the purchased system are indicated, and India would probably still have to spend an additional \$1.5 billion to \$2 billion to complete its domestic program -- beyond that already invested during 1966-70.* In any event, considerations of time to deployment would probably predominate.

The approximately \$300 million to \$600 million that India might spend during 1966-70 to pursue a nuclear weapons goal appears relatively small in comparison with the approximately \$10 billion military budget for the five-year defense period (FY 65-69). The foreign exchange component of the nuclear weapons costs, however, could reach \$200 million to \$400 million. For comparison, this is between about 15 and 30 percent of the total planned foreign exchange content of the defense budget. Although the magnitude of foreign exchange is a factor that India must consider, the impact of this cost element cannot be measured precisely enough to reach a confident

* Probable costs for procurement of a foreign system, or for production and deployment of a domestic mission some 7-12 years in the future are conditioned by great uncertainty. Some of the major factors contributing to this uncertainty are discussed in the Annex to this report.

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conclusion as to the feasibility of the program. Pledged Free World economic aid during 1961-65 averaged about \$1 billion a year. These levels will probably increase during the coming five years, particularly if India does not take steps in the nuclear weapons field that might lead to cut-backs in foreign aid programs.

Administrative and technological repercussions during 1966-71 that would follow an Indian decision to pursue the nuclear option outlined would also intensify the manpower strains in the economy. Administrative and technical personnel diverted from the peaceful nuclear power program would probably result in some loss of efficiency in Indian projects to develop electric power projects. In the delivery system program, the most appropriate personnel for the initial missile R & D work are now engaged in the jet aircraft industry of India. Strains have already been created in this sector by the simultaneous Indian efforts to acquire a capability to produce Soviet MIG-21's while continuing development of the domestic Indian HF-24 jet fighter. Initially some 200-400 scientists, engineers and skilled technicians would probably be required for the early missile R&D effort. By 1971 this figure would probably be increased to between 1500 and 2000, exclusive of requirements in supporting industries such as electronics, chemicals and metallurgy.

Foreign technical assistance to an Indian missile development program might conceivably come from France, Japan, or the USSR, although the latter two would probably be less willing than France to

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support an effort that would so clearly be designed to meet a future requirement for a nuclear delivery vehicle. However, in the first few years the space aspects of the program could be emphasized. Development of a suitable guidance system would probably be the most difficult aspect of the program and would also be the one aspect that from the beginning would be clearly identifiable as a missile related effort.

The Indian government has established a modest space rocket launch facility in Southern India with assistance predominantly from France, the USSR and the US. Efforts have also been made to obtain technical collaboration from Japan. A Franco-Indian agreement that provides for French assistance to an Indian sounding rocket program is reportedly to result in the first such Indian rockets later this year. Manufacture is being conducted at the Indian Atomic Energy Establishment at Trombay, in collaboration with the French firm of Sud Aviation. Japan has also offered to sell the Kappa series rockets to India, and India has attempted to procure a leading Japanese rocket specialist as a consultant. India is also obtaining assistance from the USSR in solid-fueled air-to-air rockets in connection with the Indian MIG-21 manufacturing program.

In developing a reactor or designing and fabricating a nuclear device India can use foreign technical and financial assistance from any quarter willing to supply such aid without restricting the results to peaceful purposes. Although France has indicated that for India to assume its proper role in Asia it should have nuclear strength, France has been less ready to assist in development of such strength.

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A recent Indian suggestion that the French Government finance approximately \$100 million worth of equipment and services to help in the construction of an Indian atomic powerplant in Madras met with a negative French response. The question of some French assistance to this project, however, remains under consideration in Paris.

In conclusion, while the directly attributable costs to India to pursue a program to acquire a credible nuclear deterrent would probably reach \$2 billion or more during the period 1966-76, less than one-fourth of that amount need actually be committed during the first five years. Many of the moral and diplomatic costs -- which in any event are probably not determining -- as well as the risks of losing foreign aid can also probably be postponed for several more years if no overt admission of plans for nuclear weapons is made. Nonetheless, the approximately \$300 million to \$600 million in direct financial costs - as well as the identifiable administrative and technological costs - that would be incurred during the first five years are still substantial. Competition for foreign exchange and for skilled administrators, scientists and technicians would markedly increase during 1966-70, and some present Indian programs for economic development would probably suffer. While India would be faced with many difficult choices in resource allocation, Indian determination to provide for nuclear weapons in the face of continued Chinese emphasis on advanced weapons might be sufficient to compel India to accept the necessary penalties in economic development. To a

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limited extent some of the costs of drawing off administrative and technological manpower into the nuclear weapons and delivery systems effort could be met by hiring more foreign technicians, but this in turn would entail additional foreign exchange costs. The foreign technological assistance most needed by India during the next five years to support the nuclear warhead program is in the construction of reactors -- preferably unsafeguarded. In the field of delivery vehicles India would require expanded foreign assistance in the fields of space technology and particularly guidance systems. By about 1970 India would face a new set of decisions - potentially much more costly than the ones faced in 1966. In the interim period, however, the Indian government would have gained greatly in experience and would be in a much improved position in this respect to assess their ability - both technologically and financially - to continue efforts to achieve a credible nuclear deterrent.

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June 10, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Planning Group on Indian Nuclear Problem, June 10, 1966

Henry Owen chaired the meeting. Assignments for back up and specific studies were as follows:

Part I. Preliminary Assessments:

1. Indian threats, as the Indians understand them. (CIA)
2. Military costs to the U. S. of a commitment to support India (JCS/ISA)
3. Assessment of Indian views on the net balance of pros and cons of going nuclear (INR)
4. Economic, political and administrative costs to India of going nuclear.

Part II. Approaches to blocking or making unnecessary an Indian nuclear capability:

1. Assessment of the possibility and limitation of economic leverage (SOA)
2. Various types of arms control -- their strengths and limitations (ACDA)
3. Various forms of security guarantees, with and without Soviet collaboration (Garthoff), in consultation with many others)
4. Various forms of U. S. -Indian security cooperation (various members)
5. Collective arrangements in Asia (State: S/P)

cc: Keeny
Johnson ✓
Saunders

Papers on Part I are due by next Thursday, with Ray Garthoff in the chair as Henry Owen will be in Japan. Other preliminary paper will be due the following week.

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By 44 NARA, Date 3-13-07

Howard Wriggins

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

Held ³⁴

June 13, 1966

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TO: Planning Group Members

SUBJECT: Planning Group Meeting, Thursday, June 16, 1966

The discussion of the Indian nuclear issue will be continued at the meeting of the Planning Group, next Thursday, June 16, 1966.

Because the 8th floor dining rooms will be occupied by luncheons for the Cabinet and for foreign visitors, there will be no luncheon on that date for the Planning Group.

J. A. Yager

J. A. Yager
Member, Policy Planning Council

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Acting Counselor and Chairman
Policy Planning Council
Washington

Copy # 16

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June 10, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR:

G/PM - Mr. Garthoff	OSD/SA - Mr. Hoffman
NEA - Mr. Schneider	JCS - Gen. Goodpaster
S/P - Mr. Gathright	Gen. Brown
Mr. Brewer	CIA - Mr. Godfrey
INR - Mrs. Tait	NSC - Mr. Wiggins
ACDA - Mr. Fisher	Mr. Keeny
OSD/ISA - Mr. Yarmolinsky	Mr. Johnson
Mr. Wyle	
Mr. Barber	

1. For next Thursday's meeting we will expect papers on:
 - a. The costs to India of going nuclear - CIA (Mr. Godfrey).
 - b. The costs to the US of fulfilling a military guarantee to India - JCS (Gen. Goodpaster/Gen. Brown).*
 - c. Indian attitudes toward the nuclear problem - INR -(Mrs. Tait).
 - d. Costs to the US of India going nuclear - OSD/ISA (Mr. Barber).
2. For the following Thursday, we will expect papers dealing with the following remedies:
 - a. Economic pressures and inducements - NEA (Mr. Schneider).
 - b. Arms control - ACDA (Mr. Fisher).
 - c. Joint or parallel nuclear guarantees or assurances - G/PM (Mr. Garthoff), in conjunction with DOD and others.
 - d. US-Indian bilateral cooperation (security, assurances, promise of non-warhead help if they'll hold off for X years, nuclear sharing, etc.) - S/P, Messrs. Gathright and Garthoff, in conjunction with NEA and G/PM, and DOD.

*CIA to furnish quickie to JCS on likely threats, as seen by India.

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These papers should see what can be said on these subjects additional to what was said in our earlier paper. They should be begun without awaiting the papers referred to in para 1. No idea worthy of the name should be excluded; this is the time for "far-out" thinking. In each case the drafting officer should concert with others who are interested in the question.

4. Distribution of all papers should be made by drafting officers to addressees of this memo, and to Ambassadors Johnson and Thompson.

5. Ray Garthoff will chair next Thursday's meeting and any questions that arise in the meantime should be put to him.

^{H-2}
Henry Owen



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

14 JUN 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN THE 16 JUNE POLICY PLANNING MEETING

The attached paper entitled "The Cost to the US of an Indian Decision to go Nuclear" is intended for discussion at the 16 June luncheon.

Arthur Barber

Arthur W. Barber
Deputy Assistant Secretary

Upon removal of attachments
this document becomes

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THE COST TO THE US OF AN INDIAN DECISION TO GO NUCLEAR

An Indian decision to develop nuclear weapons might possibly lead to major political steps to improve international security and limit further proliferation. However, in the absence of such dramatic steps, which appear unlikely, an Indian decision to go nuclear would be a setback for US foreign policy and security interests.

I THE DECLINE OF MILITARY ALLIANCES

Nuclear proliferation would probably encourage individual states toward military isolationism.

If India were to develop an independent nuclear weapon capability, the US would be faced with a difficult decision: either to continue US support at ever increasing costs or to withdraw assurances. Even an initial Indian capability, opposed by a limited Chinese MRBM capability which could target India, Okinawa, Japan, and the Philippines, would drastically increase the potential price of US support to India in any future conflict. A subsequent development by the Chinese of an ICBM capable of hitting the US would increase the cost of a US commitment even further. It is probable, in the event the Indians went nuclear, that the US would withdraw any security assurances which might have been given, in order to avoid involvement in any nuclear war which might be initiated by India.

If proliferation later extended to allies of the US, such as Japan, the same issue would rise again and the result might well be a breakdown in the network of US security agreements, with consequent reduction of US commitments and US influence abroad. Military alliances in which two or more powers had an independent nuclear capability would be increasingly

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difficult to maintain. It is possible, however, that in the case of major alliances such as NATO, the US might consider undertaking even more binding security agreements in return for some sort of veto over the strike capability of new nuclear states. We might thereby preserve an important alliance and avoid some of the dangers of proliferation. The price of obtaining such a veto would be high.

Not only nuclear states, but non-nuclear states as well would be forced to reexamine their commitments to military alliances as proliferation increased. Each would be forced to make the basic choice between growing isolation in security matters, on the one hand, and increased reliance on a nuclear power for protection, on the other. Any indication of major power reluctance to support principal threshold nations would probably encourage increased isolation on the part of smaller non-nuclear states.

The trend toward military isolationism might well take place in an atmosphere of increased internationalism in economic and technological areas. One result of proliferation might thus be to increase significantly the importance of US economic weapons in implementing our foreign policy.

II INCREASED DANGERS OF NUCLEAR WAR

The results of an Indian decision to develop a nuclear weapon capability would include:

a. Decline in the relative military influence of major powers.

US military influence is based not on absolute military strength, which is growing, but on relative strength. Both the US and Soviet military power suffered a relative decline in Asia when the Chinese acquired nuclear weapons.

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b. Additional proliferation. The pressures on other threshold nations to go nuclear would probably intensify greatly if India became the first of the middle-rank powers to acquire an independent nuclear capability.

c. Increased likelihood of nuclear war.

d. Increased likelihood of nuclear war in which the US is involved.

III CONCLUSION

We should urgently seek means to prevent an Indian decision to develop nuclear weapons.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
WASHINGTON

Memorandum for Participants in June 16 Policy Planning Meeting

The attached unclassified drafts on the attitudes of India, China and the USSR are INR's contributions for the June 16 meeting.

Susan T. Tait
INR/RNA

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By *cham/ky* NARA, Date 3-17-08

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6/15/66

State Department (INR)
DRAFT

Part I.

Section C. India's Motivations and Intentions

Indian policy considerations are dominated by fear of Communist China and complicated by adherence to non-alignment. The interaction of these basic motivating factors is pushing India toward an independent nuclear weapons decision.

Each successive Chinese nuclear test has served to heighten India's national security dilemma. Domestic reaction to the third test, with its forecast of thermonuclear developments, was sharper than it ever had been. This domestic trend is likely to continue and to mount in intensity. Indian leaders now clearly perceive the choices between continuing so far unproductive efforts to obtain external assurances against the Chinese nuclear threat or of making their own bomb. In the past 18 months, secondary concerns such as technological prestige or the moral onus of adding to the world's proliferation problem have diminished in importance. The view that a non-nuclear India could play only a second class power role in relation to a nuclear-armed China is also coming to the fore.

The Indian Debate Over Security

The Indians tend to regard themselves, perhaps with undue optimism, as the democratic counterweight in Asia to China's developing power. Psychologically they find it hard to accept a situation which finds their primary enemy making greater progress than they are in any field. The fact that this progress is in advanced weapons systems is both a threat and a challenge. The Indian people believe that they have the capabilities and the resources to match this challenge.

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India's leaders, however, are reluctant to alter their no-bomb policy because of the very large costs involved and because they apparently believe that the pace of the Chinese program still allows time to search for alternatives.

Supporters of India's no-bomb policy among whom apparently are leaders of the Army-dominated military services, argue that the real threat from Communist China is from conventional weapons. They believe that China will use its nuclear arsenal for political and psychological purposes rather than for direct military aggression which would risk US intervention. They argue that for these reasons India should concentrate on building up its conventional forces. However, they assert that India with its limited resources cannot do this and develop a nuclear weapons system simultaneously. Implicit in this thesis is acceptance of dependence upon external assistance should China launch a major attack upon India. A small minority view would openly acknowledge this assumption, but most of the Indian doves refuse to go this far and, instead, employ the still considerable (although waning) suasion concerning the evils of nuclear weapons and the Nehruvian vision of world disarmament.

Advocates of an Indian bomb are primarily concerned about long-range defense problems and are opposed to indefinite dependence upon outside assistance for defense against China. They admit that the threat of overt nuclear attack is long range, but they are most immediately worried about nuclear blackmail of the sort that would paralyze India in future border skirmishes with China. They see China's advanced weapons program as threatening India with a progressive erosion of its borderland positions. Over time, they are convinced that the development of an operational Chinese nuclear capability will not only pose a direct threat to India's cities, but they believe that if it goes unmatched,

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India will be relegated permanently to a second-class power status in Asia. The hawks are increasingly unwilling to depend on others for India's security. They point to the withdrawal of US military assistance in 1965 to support this view. And they note that despite the commitments of formal military alliances, neither France nor China has been willing to rest national defense alternatives solely upon external assurances. Many of the doubts familiar in NATO circles are being used now in India, including the argument that India cannot be sure the US would risk a general war with the USSR to defend India against China.

The Complications of Non-Alignment

Events over the past year and a half have combined to strengthen the advocates of an independent Indian nuclear capability. The Chinese testing program has been and will continue to be the critical factor. But China's menacing posture along the Sino-Indian border and the Sino-Pakistani rapprochement have heightened India's feeling of isolation. Moreover, Indian assessments of multilateral efforts in Geneva to achieve an international agreement that would effectively remove or reduce the Chinese menace have not been encouraging. India's own efforts to obtain Soviet assurances have been unsuccessful.

India's leaders harbor few illusions about chances for getting China into an international disarmament agreement. In addition, the Indians are probably not optimistic about prospects for obtaining Soviet assurances since they realize that meaningful commitments would risk placing the USSR in unambiguous opposition to China and working in tandem with the West-- a role incompatible with Moscow's own view of its leadership of the communist world. Nevertheless, they value the large amounts of military and economic assistance they are receiving from the USSR and probably calculate that they could not survive without it. Above all, India does not want to become overly dependent upon either the East or the West.

The pragmatic political and economic advantages of non-alignment thus complicate estimated Indian attitudes toward unilateral US assurances. Many Indians are convinced that a US assurance would be tantamount to a de facto alliance and would risk the loss of Soviet support. For this reason, there would probably be considerable opposition in India to proposals for joint contingency planning or even for nuclear sharing unless the Indians could be assured in advance that such plans had the tacit consent of the USSR.

Indian Intentions

India's leaders do not want to enter the nuclear weapons field and they can probably make this decision stick for a while. The Gandhi government or its successor will not be able to hold to this policy indefinitely in the face of continued Chinese testing and without some move to relieve India's defense dilemma. Mrs. Gandhi is probably disposed to postpone a decision as long as she judges it to be politically feasible. She probably believes that she can get through the general elections scheduled for February 1967 without changing the bomb policy, but she or her successor will face the same problems after the election should the Indian Government's stalling policy prevail that long. If domestic pressures mount sharply, the government might attempt to reduce them by detonating a plowshare device.

As long as India's leaders do not feel directly and immediately threatened by Chinese nuclear weapons, they will probably continue to seek the greatest possible price for abstaining from detonating a device of their own. Under no foreseeable circumstances would they foreswear an independent nuclear capability for all time, but they would negotiate for further delay if they believed that they might thereby receive considerably greater economic and/or military

assistance. They would be most reluctant to accede to an international agreement that did not counter the Chinese threat and domestic pressures generated by debate on treaty issues could lead to a reversal of present policy. Should India opt for a bomb, its leaders would not expect to incur drastic penalties from either the US or the USSR and they might hope in time to persuade both major powers that it was in their mutual interests to strengthen India as a counterweight to China.

Soviet Attitude

Moscow has long appreciated its interest in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but Moscow has also given other, conflicting interests of precedence in consideration/possible steps to prevent proliferation. In the case of India's recurring consideration of the question of whether or not to start making nuclear weapons, Moscow has been unwilling for a variety of reasons to do very much to dissuade the Indians. Indeed, at times the Soviets have seemed to believe that, given the high costs and low chances of success in keeping the Indians from nuclear weapons, they would have to accept an Indian nuclear capability philosophically, finding perhaps some Soviet advantage in India's having a modest nuclear capability with which to balance giving Chinese power in the subcontinent.

Nonproliferation

Since 1963 Moscow has given primacy in its policy toward a nonproliferation treaty to its demands that West Germany not be allowed to participate in any new Western nuclear sharing arrangements. Whatever interest the Soviets may have in a nonproliferation treaty as a bar to India's acquisition of a nuclear capability, they were not prepared to relax their stand on European aspects in order to get a treaty.

Guarantees

The Indians have explored the idea of guarantees with the Soviets, and found Moscow reluctant to undertake any commitments which would in effect constitute a military understanding directed against Communist China. The Soviets did express willingness to consider a general declaration on non-use of nuclear weapons. And on February 2, 1966 Kosygin formally announced Soviet

willingness to include a provision in a nonproliferation agreement by which nuclear signatories would renounce use of nuclear weapons against those non-nuclear powers which has no nuclear weapons on their territory. In effect, Kosygin was proposing to include in a nonproliferation treaty the provision which had long appeared in bloc proposals for nuclear free zones--namely that nuclear powers agree not to use nuclear weapons against a denuclearized area. As a gesture toward India's desire for assurances, Kosygin's proposal was obviously of little significance in the absence of any indication that China would ever be a party to the nonproliferation treaty.

Extension of Test Ban

Moscow may have India as one of its considerations in its current renewal of emphasis upon the desirability of extending the present limited test ban treaty to ban underground nuclear tests as well as those already prohibited. So far Moscow's proposal for extending the test ban consists of an extension of the test ban treaty to cover large underground tests (those which produce seismic effects greater than 4.75 on the Richter scale) combined with a moratorium on all other underground tests. Rumors last fall that the Soviets might drop their linkage of the threshold and moratorium did not pan out, and it remains to be seen whether Moscow will modify its present position calling for the end to all underground tests without any provision for on-site inspection.

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The Chinese Communist Factor

Peking's Attitude Toward Arms Control

The Chinese Communists have come to equate arms control and disarmament
alleged (which they term a "monopoly")
with an/effort by the US and USSR to establish a duopoly/of power in the world.

To the Chinese, the attempt to get arms control agreement§is merely part of an attempt to establish a de^vtente - one which would mean the selling out of Chinese interest§by the Russians for the sake of their own European-oriented political objectives. The Chinese also feel that arms control and disarmament, as defined by Moscow and Washington, tend to exclude support of the "wars of national liberation" which Peking ~~xxxxxxx~~ is determined to champion. Finally, the Chinese view is that any emphasis on the need for a disarmament agreement with the "imperialist" countries is politically undesirable because it tends to reduce the morale of the peoples of the anti-imperialist nations and saps their will to oppose US "nuclear blackmail."

Peking, moreover, is determined to develop the weapons of a modern super-power - particularly nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems - and is thus most unwilling to accept any agreement which freezes the military status quo and interferes with its attempts to modernize China's conventional forces. It is most unlikely that this situation will change in the near future and that the Chinese will become interested in any limited or comprehensive arms control measures. It appears that only a major improvement in Sino-Soviet relations or the development by Peking over the long run of a capability which it felt was adequate to its security needs
~~sufficient to match that of the US and USSR~~ might lead the Chinese to be willing to discuss measures for arms stabilization and perhaps arms reduction.

Chinese Propaganda on Arms Control

Peking gives lip service to at least certain forms of disarmament and arms control as part of its appeal to the underdeveloped countries and also as part of its attempt to deter the US from using nuclear weapons (by raising the political cost of taking such a step). Indeed, at present, the primary Chinese incentives in the arms control and disarmament field concern political-propaganda problems. The Chinese failure to sign the Test Ban Treaty hurt them in their relations with some Afro-Asian and Latin American states and forced the Chinese

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By clm/ly NARA, Date 3-17-05

to counter-attack with their own proposal for more radical and comprehensive nuclear disarmament. With this proposal, Peking suggested - as a first step - a pledge by the nuclear powers not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Peking's officials have been able to fall back on the Chinese proposal as their answer to the test ban (as well as to subsequent suggestions like the WDC) and to argue that, as soon as other nuclear powers are prepared to give up nuclear weapons, the Chinese will do likewise. It does not appear that the Chinese expect their proposal to be adopted or - in view of the absence of control and inspection procedures - that they themselves would find it acceptable even if the West and the Soviet Union did.

Recent Chinese Pronouncements

The following public and private statements by Chinese authorities during recent months amply illustrate the points made above.

-- On a disarmament conference:

"It is true that China opposes and continuously exposes the disarmament proposals put forward by US imperialism and Soviet revisionism in collusion with each other. The reason is that their disarmament proposals are sham and are aimed at deceiving people....The US is conducting a sanguinary war of aggression against the Vietnamese people. In these circumstances, setting together with the US at a so-called disarmament conference only helps it to freely carry out its arms expansion and war preparations and its policies of aggression and war behind the smokescreen of disarmament talks. We will do nothing of the kind."

-- Foreign Minister Chen Yi's interview
with Scandinavian newsmen, April-May 1966

"Li Lien-pi [Deputy Chief of Mission, CPR Embassy Warsaw] said his side was not interested in a world disarmament conference or in over-all disarmament -- but was interested in an agreement on non-first-use and destruction of nuclear weapons. He said that progress on disarmament was impossible while the Vietnam situation

continued."

-- Embassy Warsaw's Telegram 2071, May 26 (SECRET-LIMDIS) reporting on meeting between Chinese and US Embassy officers on May 26, 1966.

"The Chinese Ambassador [to the UAR] said [to a UAR official] that in view of UN and US attitudes, the time was not propitious for a world disarmament conference, whether within ^{the} UN framework or outside, and that China would not attend such a conference."

-- Embassy Cairo's Telegram 3068, May 26 (CONFIDENTIAL) reporting a UAR official's account of a conversation on May 23 between the CPR Ambassador and UAR Foreign Office Under Secy El-Feki.

-- On a treaty to prevent proliferation:

"As for the so-called treaty for the prevention of nuclear proliferation being actively engineered of late by the US and USSR, it is another big fraud following the tripartite partial nuclear test ban treaty and is aimed at consolidating the US-Soviet nuclear monopoly and depriving other countries of their legitimate right to develop nuclear weapons for self-defense."

-- Foreign Minister Chen Yi's interview with Scandinavian newsmen, April-May 1966.

-- On a guarantee to non-nuclear powers against attack from a nuclear power:

"All such talk presupposes the 'prevention of nuclear proliferation.' That is to say, those nuclear powers would bestow protection upon non-nuclear nations on the condition that they themselves monopolize and produce nuclear weapons while others are forbidden to possess them. This is sheer fraud designed to induce non-nuclear nations to join a treaty 'preventing nuclear proliferation.' Far from having a genuine concern for the security of non-nuclear nations, those nuclear powers seek to gain control over it...The best way to ensure non-nuclear nations against a nuclear attack is the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. On

this question, the Chinese Government has already put forward its proposal. We believe our proposal remains the only rational one for solving the problem of nuclear weapons."

-- Premier Chou En-lai's interview with correspondent of Dawn, April 10, 1966

-- On proliferation involving India

"The US will help India develop atomic energy by selling it 100 million dollars' worth of enriched uranium under a contract signed by the two governments recently, according to Washington reports. The signing of the contract right after China's successful third nuclear test shows that the Johnson administration wants to step up its collusion with Indian expansionists to oppose China...The new US move once again exposes the hypocrisy of the US Government in its loud clamors for the 'non-proliferation' of nuclear weapons. Backed and aided by Washington, the Indian expansionists have started yelling for India's production of atomic weapons....Trying to conceal the anti-Chinese nature of the contract, the US Atomic Energy Commission said the uranium would be used for India's program of peaceful uses of atomic energy."

-- New China News Agency (Peking)
broadcast (international service
in English) on May 18, 1966.

Peking's Attitude Toward India

As illustrated by the last quotation above, Peking's hostility to India has an anti-US (as well as anti-Soviet) dimension; Peking's propagandists are linking India with the USSR, the US and our Asian allies in the chain of colluding enemies that purportedly "encircles" China. Basically, Peking feels that a democratic, developing, prestigious India is incompatible with China's communist and nationalist goals. The Chinese, therefore, are pressuring India from outside and trying to weaken India internally. The Sino-Indian border

dispute is a ready instrument for Peking's purposes. During the September 1965 hostilities between Pakistan and India, Peking stepped-up military pressures along the Sino-Indian border and threatened India with an ultimatum. In this way, Communist China hoped to win political favor with Pakistan and to strain India's military and economic resources. Although India's and Pakistan's acceptance of the cease-fire and the agreement at Tashkent ended that conflict, Peking remains in a position to renew Sino-Indian border tensions at will. The Chinese are also gleeful at India's current economic and food difficulties; those Indian communists who follow Peking's ideological lead are actively exploiting dissatisfaction in India's urban centers.

Chinese media portray the Indian people as suffering "excruciating misery and as obliged" to pay more and higher taxes to foot the huge bill for military expenditure as the Indian Government has persisted in its policy of arms expansion and war preparations." Peking alleges that the Indian Government, to tide over India's "grave difficulties" at home and abroad and to "divert the attention" of the Indian people, has let loose "unbridled attacks" on China so as to "beg" more aid from the US and USSR. In the words of a New China News Agency broadcast, "one can see clearly from the Indian Prime Minister's trip to Washington and Moscow how US imperialism and the revisionist Soviet leadership and Indian reaction are ganging up in their sinister machinations against China; it can also be seen that the Indian reactionaries have degenerated into docile lackeys of US imperialism and Soviet revisionism."

Against these alleged Indian activities, the Chinese vaguely warn of "grave consequences" that may befall India. However, the demands of the Vietnam conflict and the desire to avoid US intervention most likely will prevent China from translating these threats into anything more than limited military action,

i.e., action below the level of the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict.