~~C.C. Johnson~~
Indian Nuclear Matters File

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS June 10, 1966

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 351

TO: The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem

At the meeting of the National Security Council on June 9, 1966, the President noted the increased urgency of dealing with the Indian nuclear weapons problem following the third Chinese Communist nuclear test. He has directed the Secretary of State, in collaboration with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and heads of other departments and agencies, as appropriate, to study in greater depth the following interrelated issues emerging from the National Security Council review of the Indian nuclear weapons question:

a. The extent to which it might be in the U.S. interest to use our economic leverage more explicitly to discourage an Indian national nuclear program.

b. The effect which various arms control agreements might have on Indian nuclear intentions, and what price the U.S. should be prepared to pay for such agreements.

c. How far it is in the U.S. interest to go in meeting Indian security concerns, what form such action might take, and what the optimum timing might be.

d. Whether there are other approaches to the problem which need to be pursued.

The study should balance the price of each of these suggested courses of action against the damage resulting from India's choosing the independent nuclear path. For the purpose of this study, no change in our present position on a non-proliferation treaty should be assumed.

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The study should result in specific recommendations to the President as to measures which the U.S., in its own interest, should take to delay or prevent India's choosing that path.

The President requests that the first report of recommendations for his attention be presented to him no later than July 15, 1966.

W W Rostow
W. W. Rostow

Information copies:
Secretary of Defense
Director, ACDA

Sen Memo Chron

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HIGHLIGHTS OF NSC MEETING, JUNE 9, 1966

SUBJECT: The Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem: Current Issues

Those present:

~~The President~~
The Vice President
Mr. Ball
Mr. Alexis Johnson
Mr. McNamara
General Wheeler
Admiral Raborn
Ambassador Goldberg
Mr. Leonard Marks
Mr. Wm. Foster
Mr. Rostow
Mr. Bromley Smith
Howard Wriggins
George Christian
Francis Bator
Dr. Hornig
Mr. Kintner
Mr. John McNaughton
Mr. Farris Bryant
John Palfrey
David Bell
Richard Helms

1. The President indicated that this was the first of a series of NSC meetings ~~which would~~ to be devoted to the discussion of complex problems requiring careful exploration before they were to come to him for decision. He expressed his concern about the growing pressures in India favoring the nuclear route. Its own economic progress and the stability of the whole area depended on India not going nuclear. The paper admirably summarized the problems. He invited Mr. Ball to lay out the issues.

2. Mr. Ball briefly summarized the Interdepartmental paper of June 7, 1966 on this subject, giving the pros and cons of the suggested alternatives (Plowshare was not mentioned). Although his presentation was even-handed, he appeared to favor some form of multilateral approach

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which attempted to deal with India's ~~and~~ real security problems.

He recommended further --and urgent -- staff studies.

Mr. McNamara agreed and thought recommendations could come forward for Presidential consideration within two to three weeks.

Mr. Foster stressed the urgency, since disarmament meetings resume in Geneva in June, and the U.S. must have an improved position within a month or six weeks at the outside. He thought the 2 or 3 principal alternatives now under study (in the Committee of Principals) could easily be staffed out and recommended within a month.

Mr. Marks urged (a) a conference of world intellectuals to stress the economic costs and security liabilities of nuclear weapons; (b) using the 20th anniversary of the Baruch proposals as the occasion for a bold new U.S. initiative.

The Vice President stressed how little additional expenditure would be necessary beyond that already invested for India to go nuclear. He preferred a UN umbrella with private U.S. reassurances to India. This leaves the door open to the Soviets without forcing either the Indians or Russia to take a public stand.

Ambassador Goldberg: stressed the urgency of deciding on any such arrangement, since it would require soundings with the Russians well in advance of the opening of the UNGA in September. Also necessary would be precise commitments to the Indians.

Mr. Foster cited Minister Banerjee, the Indian Minister who had officially indicated that "for a period, a General Assembly resolution would be adequate."

Mr. Rostow urged

(a) the urgency of our own explorations but reminded the Council of the complexity of decisions countries must face before they chose to go nuclear. ~~and~~ Our problem was to buy time until the Indians came to accept the necessity for Western assistance;

(b) the nuclear issue was so complex that it could not be dealt with solely by the specialists concentrating on arms control or by the country or area specialists. We must find ways of combining these two types of specialists in the study of this problem.

The President instructed the Department to speed the study of the Indian nuclear problem and said he would issue a NSAM shortly.

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SECRET/DRAFT June 8, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We picked the Indian nuclear problem for the first NSC discussion in your new series of meetings because:

--India is one of the keys to preventing proliferation;

--keeping India off the nuclear track is crucial to its economic progress;

--while we can make no decision now, this problem will be at our elbows on a host of other decisions for some time to come.

You might want to open the meeting by explaining your reason for the new series. The Indian problem is an example of the kind of subject you want to discuss--not necessarily ready for immediate decision but one you will have to grapple with at some point.

The purpose of this meeting is to focus attention on how to keep India off the nuclear track. What we are doing now is insufficient. State's paper (attached) lays out a broader range of options. Each has its obvious limitations and costs. A good airing of these issues with you will give direction to further staff work.

Since everyone will have read the paper, maybe the best way to handle the meeting is for you to state the problem as you see it and then try to surface opinions on the tough questions.

The problem. India cannot afford an effective nuclear deterrent. But it may lose its race with China without one. Our Asian strategy is to buy time until India and Japan (we hope with Pakistan and Indonesia) can help

hold Free Asia against China. Can India do its share against a nuclear power without comparable nuclear power of its own?

The tough questions. India has three choices. We have to decide how we could meet Indian needs in each case and whether it would be worth the price.

1. India could rely on nuclear disarmament if the Chinese would join. Do any of our current proposals meet that need? The paper outlines ways we might try to lure India off the nuclear track. Some do not meet the need. Which are the most promising? Would a new push on non-proliferation and test ban treaties buy time?

2. India could rely on someone else's nuclear umbrella. How realistic is it for us to talk about offering security guarantees--nuclear or conventional? What would the US do if the Chinese Communists threatened a nuclear attack on India?

3. India could go nuclear. Some people feel this is inevitable and that the political costs of dissuading them are too great. Should we accept the "inevitable", or is non-proliferation a goal worth paying a big price for?

You may want to end the meeting by stating your own feelings and telling the departments to go back to work.

W. W. Rostow

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[redacted] THE WHITE HOUSE June 7, 1966
WASHINGTON

MEMO FOR MR. WRIGGINS
MR. JOHNSON
MR. KEENY

Here is a possible memo for Walt to send to the President as guidance for the Thursday NSC meeting. This may need a good deal of refining so please feel free to take it apart and put it together again. Howard had thought we might discuss this sometime tomorrow morning in plenty of time to give Walt a crack at the problem before day's end.

Hal Saunders

[redacted]

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[redacted]/DRAFT June 7, 1966

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The purpose of this meeting is to focus attention on the ~~best targets for further work on~~ how to keep India off the nuclear track. State's paper (attached) lays out a broader range of options. Each one has its obvious limitations and costs ~~and none solves the problem~~. A good airing will clarify these ~~limitations and underscore the need for more work.~~ Three issues with you give direction to further staff work.

Since everyone will have read the paper, maybe the best way to handle the meeting is for you to state the problem as you see it and then try to surface opinions on the tough questions.

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Mr. Johnson 35

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THE INDIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROBLEM: CURRENT ISSUES

~~SECRET~~/LIMDIS

Introduction: Key Issues

1. What would be the effects of an Indian national nuclear program on US interests? (See para 2 of attached paper.)

2. Is there anything more that we can and should do to acquaint India with the costs and difficulties of a nuclear program? Should we be prepared to go further than we have so far in using economic leverage to deter such a program? (See para 3a of attached paper.)

3. How effective would a non-proliferation treaty, a comprehensive test ban, and/or a threshold test ban be in deterring an Indian nuclear program? What price should we be prepared to pay for such agreements? (See para 3b of attached paper.)

4. How far is it in the US interest to go in seeking to meet Indian security concerns, what form should such action take, and what might be the timing? (See para 3c of attached paper.)

5. Is there any dramatic new approach which would have greater effect on Indian nuclear intentions than the courses of action discussed in the attached paper? (See para 4 of the paper.)

6. Should the NSC direct State, the DOD, and ACDA be directed to undertake a study, in greater depth, of the issues raised above? (See para 5 of the paper.)

THE INDIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROBLEM

1. The Situation. In the wake of the third Chinese Communist nuclear test, domestic pressures for India to embark on a nuclear weapons effort have mounted sharply. Government leaders are continuing to hold the line against such a course. But a decision point is likely to be reached within a few years and, unless there is some new development, India almost certainly will go nuclear.

Such a decision could start a nuclear proliferation chain reaction. This would be contrary to basic US national interest. It is therefore imperative that we take all possible promising actions to prevent it.

This paper surveys steps to this end which have been generally considered in this government. It does not address the question of whether even more far-reaching actions may be necessary and feasible in dealing with this problem. It recommends further study of this and other aspects of the problem.

2. Effects of an Indian Weapons Program. An Indian effort to achieve a credible national nuclear deterrent against Communist China would do great damage to Indian development prospects. The damage would increase as India sought an adequate stockpile and a suitable delivery system.

Should India go down this line, the Paks would be critically concerned about their own security and would probably turn to the US, Communist China, or the Soviet Union either for assistance in acquiring nuclear weapons or for support in deterring India.

The likelihood of further proliferation (e.g., Japan and Israel) would be increased, and nuclear pressures might be set in train in Germany.

A different kind of consideration is that if India should "go nuclear", and achieve an independent deterrent to Chinese nuclear power, India might look less to the US (and the USSR) for defense against Chinese Communist nuclear blackmail.

3. Courses of Action

a. Economic Pressures. Among the basic factors having a bearing on India's decision are the cost of a nuclear weapons program and the effect which such a program might have on foreign aid to India.

Data on costs and on the difficulties of acquiring a credible and reliable deterrent force have been forwarded to Ambassador Bowles, for use with India's leaders. Additional data will be supplied, which India's leaders may use publicly to support their stand against nuclear weapons.

The related question of the level of India's defense expenditures has been raised with Indian Planning Minister Mehta and will be pursued. Points being emphasized include: (i) the need for a reasonable limit on defense expenditures as a prerequisite to economic development; and (ii) our intention to take defense expenditures into account in determining future aid policy. This dual emphasis on the cost of "going nuclear" and the need to hold down defense expenditures can be expected, within limits, to influence India's decision.

We could go further and threaten to cut off economic assistance and to withdraw all assurances of political and military aid, if India decided to develop its own nuclear weapons. US fulfillment of this threat would probably impel the Indians to look at once to their own means to meet their security needs, and probably also to turn to the Soviet Union. Even making the threat could have an adverse effect on Indian-American relations and on Indian confidence in the US. Perhaps the threat, and certainly the cutoff of aid, would greatly reduce American influence and enhance Soviet influence in India, and would subject India to heavy economic and political strains, which would threaten its viability as a democratic state and an Asian counterweight to China.

On the other hand, less drastic use of aid, as one of a number of levers, might effectively influence an Indian decision.

b. Arms Control Agreements. In addition to the more specific effects of particular arms control agreements, any progress in disarmament which indicated growing US-Soviet detente could have a dampening effect on pressures for a national Indian nuclear program.

(i) Non-Proliferation Treaty. The US is at present continuing its efforts to reach agreement on a non-proliferation treaty, as its first priority arms control measure.

While such a treaty would inhibit proliferation, it is not clear whether agreement can be achieved. There have been suggestions that the Soviets would sign a non-proliferation treaty which would permit consultation and allow the USSR to take the public position that new collective hardware arrangements are excluded. This must be weighed against the effects that this approach would have on our policy toward Europe and Germany.

Should India adhere to a non-proliferation treaty, it is possible that she would later withdraw if she felt her national interests required such an action. Such a treaty would not mitigate the Indian security problem, unless it were coupled with other measures of the sort discussed in this paper.

(ii) Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The US continues to support an adequate, verified comprehensive test ban treaty.

Such a treaty would have a major political and technical impact on proliferation. However, the principal effect would be political. A nation which had agreed not to conduct any nuclear tests would not lightly withdraw from this obligation. While only testing would be prohibited, and a nation could develop and stockpile weapons without withdrawing from the treaty, this course seems unlikely. A comprehensive test ban would thus have an impact on an Indian decision to acquire nuclear weapons.

The Soviets continue to reject inspection. Recently, however, they have indicated that they would be willing to consider making available information from internal Soviet sites. If this would significantly reduce the number of unknown events, a compromise solution to the inspection problem might become possible.

Because of their estimate of the over-all adverse impact on US national security, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are opposed to a comprehensive test ban.

(iii) Threshold Test Ban. The likely effect and security implications of a "threshold" test ban, which would extend the present limited test ban to underground tests above a seismic magnitude of 4.75, are now being considered via the Committee of Principals route. Such a treaty would materially inhibit an Indian decision to acquire nuclear weapons. It would have less effect, of course, than a comprehensive test ban; but it would be more responsive than a non-proliferation treaty to Indian desires for restraints on nuclear, as well as non-nuclear, countries.

c. Security Arrangements. Security against nuclear attack is becoming an increasingly important factor in the Indians' calculations regarding their nuclear policy. In determining whether to try to secure this security through outside assurances or their own nuclear deterrent, the Indians can be expected to seek a policy which is consistent with non-alignment. The Indians will do this for two reasons: (i) Because they consider that their security interests require good relations with the Soviet Union, from whom they receive economic and military aid and support against Communist China; (ii) because they want to maintain their position among the Afro-Asians.

In responding to Indian security concerns, the key question we have to ask ourselves is: What would the US, in fact, do if the Chinese Communists were to mount (or threaten imminently to mount) a nuclear attack on India?

If we believe that our interest in Indian independence, in preventing Communist expansion, and in maintaining some reasonable semblance of world order would move us to stand by India in this circumstance, then the problem is how to make this clear to the Indians ahead of time, so as to affect their nuclear intentions, without involving either commitments which go beyond our likely response to nuclear attack on India or insuperable Congressional difficulties. Possible steps to this end are considered below.

(i) Nuclear Power Guarantee. The Indians would welcome a joint US-USSR guarantee to all non-nuclear states. (The UK would certainly join, but this is of secondary importance to the Indians. France might not join and, of course, Communist China would not.) The Soviet Union, however, has made clear that it does not wish (at least at present) to join the US in any such assurances, much less in a joint guarantee obviously directed against China. If the situation should so change that the USSR were ready to take part in joint assurances, this would probably defer an Indian decision to acquire its own nuclear weapons. We should consider, at an appropriate time, attempting to determine privately the conditions, if any, under which the USSR might be interested in joint or parallel assurances, either in or out of the UN framework.

(ii) Public US Call for Nuclear Guarantees. Congressman Holifield has proposed privately that, if the USSR is unwilling to join us in giving assurances, we should nonetheless publicly declare US readiness to join with the other nuclear powers in guaranteeing all non-nuclear states against nuclear attack, and let the onus fall on the USSR for failing to agree.

This ploy, would, however, be attacked by the Soviet Union and Communist China, and would probably be ignored or rejected by France. The Indians would regard such a move as undesirable and, from their point of view, unhelpful. Moreover, by demonstrating the inability of the nuclear powers to provide joint assurances, it might well persuade many in India (and perhaps elsewhere) that they would, indeed, have to rely on themselves.

The Soviets would probably use such a US proposal as the occasion to reaffirm their counterproposal for the nuclear powers to pledge never to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state not having nuclear weapons on its territory.

(iii) US Assurances Under Umbrella of UN Resolution. In 1965 the Committee of Principals approved the draft of a possible UN Resolution, the operative language of which expressed the intention of UN Members "to provide or support immediate assistance to any State not possessing nuclear weapons that is the victim of an act of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used."

In the fall of 1965, we sounded out the Soviets and were told that the Soviet Union considered the question of assurances "premature", and that the matter might be considered after the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty. Subsequently, the Soviets advanced their counterproposal (noted above) calling for nuclear powers not to employ nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries on whose territory no nuclear weapons were stationed.

If the Soviet Union should reconsider its position, a UN Resolution of the type we have offered could serve as an "umbrella" which would be consistent with Indian non-alignment and under which more specific US-Indian arrangements might be pursued.

Under this "umbrella", the US could offer firm private assurances of support to India, which could be buttressed by such steps as describing to the Indians our nuclear capabilities directed at the Communist Chinese threat. The Soviets would, of course, be free to do likewise, if they wished, -- secretly, and without having to assume the public stance of cooperating with the US.

This UN umbrella cum private US assurances might offer at least an interim solution to the problem.

There is a question, however, as to whether such secret assurances would have the needed impact on Indian non-governmental opinion, which is the source of most of the present pressure for India's "going nuclear." It is doubtful, in any event, that these assurances could, in fact, be kept secret.

Moreover, to have any hope of satisfying the Indians, these US assurances would have to be quite specific. Yet such specificity would bind the US to involve itself in a nuclear conflict under at least partially unforeseen circumstances and without the ability to control India's actions.

(iv) US Assistance to a Limited Defensive Indian Deterrent. Ambassador Bowles has suggested that consideration be given to US assistance to India in such measures as: installation of an effective early warning system and other measures for defense against manned bombers, expansion of joint US-Indian efforts to detect Communist Chinese nuclear and missile capabilities, secret scientific consultation on ballistic missile defenses, and secret studies of integrated air defense against Communist Chinese nuclear attack - which might include consideration of an Indian manned bomber force for use against Communist Chinese launching sites.

We have assisted Indian air defenses since 1962, and could conceivably extend this effort. However, it is doubtful that this would allay Indian concern over the Communist Chinese nuclear threat, which will include missiles.

Consultation on ballistic missile defenses (which we could not now provide) might well convince the Indians that their only real defense would be a nuclear deterrent, and thus stimulate Indian desires for nuclear weapons of their own.

In the same way, studies of an Indian conventional manned bomber force could well convince the Indians that what they really need are missiles with nuclear warheads.

(v) US-Indian Alliance. A formal military alliance would offer the most convincing means of engaging the American deterrent in India's defense. There are strong reasons against our undertaking a formal alliance commitment. In any event, the issue is hypothetical, at least for the present, since the Indians wish to retain their non-aligned status. If such a US-Indian alliance were concluded, it might result in a complete US break with Pakistan and in a Pakistan-Chinese Communist alliance.

(vi) Nuclear Sharing. The US might offer to assist India in acquiring the capability to deter or retaliate against Communist Chinese nuclear attack with its own delivery means, using American nuclear warheads which would be made available to India at the time of a Chinese attack. The advantages, in comparison with a strictly unilateral US guarantee, would include a less direct military commitment for the US (in the sense that the Indians, not the US, would strike Communist Chinese targets) and yet, from the Indian standpoint, a more tangible US commitment to give essential assistance.

This course of action faces a number of difficulties: (a) India's desire to remain at least formally non-aligned, and to avoid alienating the Soviet Union; (b) the dilemma of fashioning a nuclear sharing arrangement that would provide enough -- but from the US standpoint not too much -- of a nuclear role; (c) the impact of such an arrangement on others (Pakistan, Japan, and other US Asian allies) and on the UK role East of Suez; (d) the over-all effect on US military commitments and on US aid for India, since we might have to bear much of the cost; and (e) the question of Congressional attitudes.

The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not believe a nuclear sharing arrangement would do more than delay an Indian pro-nuclear decision. While this may be true, there may come a time when such delay would be well worth seeking. The Director of ACDA does not consider a nuclear sharing arrangement desirable.

d. The Plowshare Loophole. There is some pressure on the Indian Government for a peaceful (PLOWSHARE) explosion to demonstrate India's technical capabilities. Such a "peaceful" Indian explosion would, however, be widely viewed (in Pakistan and elsewhere) as the beginning of an Indian nuclear weapons program and, from the technical standpoint, would be virtually indistinguishable from weapon development. The Committee of Principals is, therefore, considering steps to dissuade India from "peaceful" nuclear explosive development.

4. Conclusion

4. Conclusion. A number of the courses of action discussed above are now underway:

-- We are already seeking to impress the Indians with the cost and difficulty of acquiring a nuclear deterrent.

-- We are trying to make clear to India the inter-relation between external aid and levels of Indian military expenditure.

-- We are seeking to negotiate arms control proposals, including a non-proliferation agreement, and we are examining new proposals, notably a threshold test ban.

-- We are exploring the problem of general security assurances, particularly action that can be taken in the UN.

Each of these approaches has potentialities, limitations, and costs.

Achieving even delay in an Indian decision to go nuclear would be extremely useful. At their present pace, however, these courses of action are likely to secure such delay for only a relatively limited period. To achieve more substantial effect, approaches not now underway (whether discussed in this paper or otherwise) would be needed.

5. Recommendation. State, DOD, and ACDA should be directed to study in greater depth the following inter-related issues, emerging from recent review of the Indian nuclear question:

a. The extent to which it might be in the US interest to use our economic leverage more explicitly to discourage an Indian national nuclear program.

b. The effect which various arms control agreements might have on Indian nuclear intentions, and what price the US should be prepared to pay for such agreements.

c. How far it is in the US interest to go in meeting Indian security concerns, what form such action might take, and what the optimum timing might be.

d. Whether there are other approaches to the problem which need to be pursued.

Such study should balance the price of each of these suggested courses of action against the damage resulting from India's choosing the independent nuclear path.

Such study should thus provide a basis for deciding whether there are specific recommendations that can be made to the NSC as to measures which the US, its own interests in mind, should take to delay or prevent India's choosing that path.

Plowshare Procedure

1. Formal notice to UN
   a. At least 6 mos in advance
   b. Location
   c. Purpose
   d. Yield to be used
   e. Safety measures

2. International observations
3. Report to UN after fact

Note

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

May 23, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTIES TO THE COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS

SUBJECT: Development by India of Nuclear Explosive Devices for "Peaceful" Purposes (C)

Several reports have indicated current interest in Indian political circles in designing and testing a nuclear explosive device with a stated "peaceful" objective, such as digging a canal or harbor. Then, on May 19 Prime Minister Gandhi was reported by the Washington Post to have said that exploding an underground device allegedly for peaceful purposes "would be a high price to pay for just a little bit of prestige." Whether this is in fact the Indian Government's position, and, if so, how long Prime Minister Gandhi will be able to adhere to it in view of mounting pressure in Parliament to go nuclear, is not clear.

Lower Indian officials have been quoted in the press as believing that a nuclear explosive for "peaceful purposes" would not violate India's formal commitment to Canada to use plutonium from the CIR reactor "for peaceful purposes only." The Canadian Government's position on this question has not been made clear either to us or, reportedly, to the Indians. The fact that the Canadians are currently negotiating an additional agreement with the Indians relating to a nuclear power reactor makes the desirability of clarifying this position now even greater.

The information contained in this document may not be disseminated outside the receiving department or agency without the consent of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

GROUP 3
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Rec'd Reeves's copy Wilson

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Use with AEC on RD argument

If any non-nuclear country were to explode a nuclear explosive device for any purpose, that country would have the actual capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. Regardless of the intended application of the device, the country would have, for all practical purposes, joined the nuclear club. It would be so regarded throughout the world. The effect on triggering further nuclear proliferation by neighbors or adversaries would be essentially the same as the effect from testing an admitted nuclear bomb.

The United States should therefore make a vigorous effort to head off any such possible development in India or any other potential Nth power. We should make known our firm position that any nuclear explosive development by a non-nuclear-weapon country is unavoidably equivalent to nuclear weapons development. We should make known our view that the explosion by India of an allegedly peaceful device made from products of the Tarapur reactor which we have provided to India would be wholly inconsistent with the purpose of the US-Indian Tarapur agreement that the material and equipment provided be used "solely for peaceful purposes."1/ The statements of purpose in our other agreements for cooperation generally contain this phrase or "solely for civil purposes." In any event, their purpose is clear: to prevent the materials and equipment we provide from being used to make nuclear weapons. This purpose would be wholly frustrated if recipient countries could avoid the provisions of these agreements by saying that any nuclear explosion they set off was for peaceful uses. Since such an explosion would be essentially the same as explosion of a weapon, it should not be regarded as "solely" for peaceful or civil purposes.

1/ The agreement contains a general statement of "common interest" that the reactor and material made available be used "solely for peaceful purposes." (Art. VI, TIAS 5446, emphasis added.) Since Indian explosion of a peaceful nuclear device would be essentially the same as Indian explosion of a bomb regardless of what the Indians said about it, such an explosion would not, objectively, be "solely for peaceful purposes." Under the agreement, the U.S. has the legal power to enforce this understanding because any plutonium produced which is surplus to the Tarapur reactor must be stored at the reactor station unless the U.S. agrees otherwise (or unless it is transferred pursuant to other provisions of the agreement not here relevant) (Art.VI, B.3.).

We should urge that the Canadians adopt the same view with respect to the Canadian-Indian agreement covering the CIR reactor. This agreement imposes a clear obligation upon India to "ensure that the reactor and any products resulting from its use will be employed for peaceful purposes only." Unlike the US-Indian agreement, this agreement does not provide for inspection. In our view, however, it would be violated by Indian explosion of a peaceful nuclear device.

I propose that the U.S. pursue the following course of action:

1. Try privately to obtain agreement with this position by Canada, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R.

2. Depending on the results of (1), consider making our position public, perhaps in a statement at the ENDC, and/or making private approaches to key non-nuclear states. If this is done, state our existing position concerning making "Plowshare" available to other countries: If and when peaceful applications of nuclear explosives (that are permissible under test ban treaty limitations) prove technically and economically feasible, the U.S. would be prepared to consider making available a nuclear explosive service; i.e., supplying the device and performing the detonation with the device under U.S. custody and control, at a cost far below that at which other countries could develop and produce devices for themselves, especially in the case of excavation projects where only highly sophisticated thermonuclear explosives are really useful.

3. Try to make future provisions in cooperation agreements, nuclear-free zone treaties, the draft non-proliferation treaty, etc., more explicit in their impact on explosions for allegedly peaceful purposes. At the same time make clear our view that the lack of an explicit reference in any relevant existing agreement does not imply that the agreement permits development of "Plowshare" nuclear explosives.

Whether our approach to India is direct or indirect, I believe it is desirable to embark on the above course of action soon, while Indian planning is hopefully still fluid. If we wait for clear evidence of the intentions of the Indian Government, it would become much harder to influence Indian policy.

I recommend that we meet to discuss this problem as soon as conveniently possible.

Adrian S. Fisher

Adrian S. Fisher

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C. Johnson

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Acting Counselor and Chairman
Policy Planning Council
Washington

June 3, 1966

[redacted]/LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

MEMORANDUM FOR:

State: NEA - Mr. Schneider
G/PM - Mr. Garthoff
ACDA - Mr. Fisher
DOD - Mr. Yarmolinsky
DOD - Mr. Wyle/Mr. Barber
JCS - General Goodpaster
NSC Staff - Mr. Keeny
- Mr. Wriggins

Forwarded herewith is the revised draft paper on the Indian nuclear weapon problem for possible use as the basis of discussions at the NSC meeting, Thursday, June 9.

The present draft is intended to be self-contained. Except for minor changes required for updating, underscored portions have been drawn directly from the previously cleared language of the courses of action section (pages 5-8) of Secretary Rusk's Memorandum of March 16 to the President.

As discussed at the Planning Group meeting of June 2, we have included new material covering: (1) the question of a threshold test ban; (2) the possibility of a UN "umbrella" for US-Indian bilateral arrangements; and (3) Ambassador Bowles' recent recommendations.

In order to meet the schedule set by the White House, we would appreciate receiving your comments by noon tomorrow, Saturday, June 4. The final paper should be presented for approval by the Secretaries of State and Defense Monday morning, June 6, and forwarded to the White House c.o.b. that date.

Henry Owen

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THE INDIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROBLEM:
CURRENT ISSUES

THE INDIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROBLEM: CURRENT ISSUES

1. The Situation

In the wake of the third Chinese Communist nuclear test, domestic pressures for India to embark on a nuclear weapons effort have mounted sharply. Government leaders are continuing to hold the line against such a course. However, it is unlikely that a decision will be postponed for more than a few years.

2. Effects on an Indian Weapons Program

An Indian effort to achieve a credible national nuclear deterrent against Communist China would do great damage to Indian development prospects. The damage would increase as India sought an adequate stockpile and a suitable delivery system.

Should India go down this line, the Paks would be critically concerned about their own security, and would probably turn to the U.S., Communist China, or the Soviet Union either for assistance in acquiring nuclear weapons of their own or for support to deter India.

The likelihood of further proliferation (e.g., Japan and Israel) would be increased, and nuclear pressures might be set in train in Germany.

A different

A different kind of consideration is that if India should "go nuclear", the U.S. (and the USSR) will be less committed to Indian defense, and it is possible that an independent deterrent to Chinese nuclear power would develop.

3. Courses of Action

a. Economic pressures

Data on costs and on the difficulties of acquiring a credible and reliable deterrent force have been forwarded to Ambassador Bowles for use in contacts with India's leaders. Additional data will be supplied which India's leaders may use publicly to support their stand against nuclear weapons.

The related question of the level of India's defense expenditures has been raised with Indian Planning Minister Mehta and will be pursued. Points being emphasized include: (i) the need for a reasonable limit on defense expenditures as a prerequisite to economic development; and (ii) our intention to take defense expenditures into account in determining future aid levels. This dual emphasis on the cost of "going nuclear" and on the need to hold down defense expenditures can be expected, within limits, to influence India's decision.

We could go further and threaten to cut off economic assistance, and to withdraw all assurances of political and military

and military aid, if India decided to develop its own nuclear weapons. Such drastic action would probably impel the Indians to look at once to their own devices to meet their security needs, and probably also to turn to the Soviet Union. It would greatly reduce American influence in India, and enhance Soviet influence in India, and would saddle the Indians with heavy economic and political strains which would threaten the viability of India as a democratic state and Asian counterweight to China. On the other hand, less drastic use of aid, as one of a number of levers, might effectively influence an Indian decision, as suggested above.

b. Arms Control Agreements

(1) Non-Proliferation Treaty. The US is at present continuing its efforts to reach agreement on a non-proliferation treaty, as its first priority arms control measure. While such a treaty would inhibit proliferation, it is not clear whether agreement can be achieved. Should India adhere to a non-proliferation treaty, it is possible that she would later withdraw if she felt her national interests required such an action.

(2) Comprehensive

(2) Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The U.S. continues to support an adequate, verified comprehensive test ban treaty. Such a treaty would have a major impact on proliferation, both political and technical. However, the principal effort would be political. A nation which agreed not to conduct any nuclear tests would not lightly withdraw from this obligation. While only testing would be prohibited and a nation could develop and stockpile weapons without withdrawing from the treaty, this possibility seems unlikely. A comprehensive test ban would have an impact on an Indian decision to acquire nuclear weapons. However, the Soviet Union continues to reject inspection. Because of their estimate of the over-all adverse impact on U.S. national security, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are opposed to a comprehensive test ban.

(3) Threshold Test Ban. The question of a "threshold" test ban, which would limit but not completely prohibit underground testing, is now being considered through the mechanism of the Committee of Principals. This would help to inhibit proliferation.

It would

It would have less effect, of course, than a comprehensive test ban; but it would be more responsive than a non-proliferation treaty to Indian desires for restraints on nuclear, as well as non-nuclear, countries. These considerations, as well as security implications, are now being reviewed.

c. Security Arrangements

(1) U.S.-Indian Alliance. A formal military alliance would seem to offer the best means of engaging the American deterrent in India's defense. It is, however, not certain that we would want to assume this commitment. It is also only hypothetical at this time, since the Indians wish to retain their non-aligned status. It would, of course, involve a complete U.S. break with Pakistan, and the likelihood of a Pakistan-Chinese Communist alliance.

(2) Nuclear Power Guarantee. The Indians would welcome a joint U.S.-USSR guarantee to all non-nuclear states. (The UK would certainly join, but this is of secondary importance to the Indians. France

and, of

and, of course, Communist China would not.) The Soviet Union, however, has made clear that it does not wish (at least at present) to join the U.S. in any such assurances, much less in a joint guarantee obviously directed against China. If the situation should so change that the USSR were ready to join us in such joint assurances, that would probably at the least help defer an Indian decision to acquire its own nuclear weapons.

(3) Public U.S. Call for Nuclear Guarantees. Congressman Holifield has proposed privately that if the USSR is unwilling to join us in giving assurances, we should nonetheless publicly declare U.S. readiness to join with the other nuclear powers in guaranteeing all non-nuclear states against nuclear attack, and let the onus fall on the USSR for failing to agree.

This ploy, would, however, be attacked by the Soviet Union and Communist China, and probably ignored or rejected by France. The Indians would regard such a move as distinctly undesirable and from their point of view unhelpful. Moreover, by demonstrating the inability of the nuclear

the nuclear powers to provide joint assurances, it would probably tend to persuade many in India (and perhaps elsewhere) that they would, indeed, have to rely on themselves and thus might well make nuclear proliferation more, rather than less, likely. Also the Soviets would probably simply reaffirm their counterproposal for the nuclear powers to pledge never to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state not having nuclear weapons on its territory.

(4) U.S. Assurances Under Umbrella of UN Resolution. In 1965 the Committee of Principals approved the draft of a possible UN Resolution, the operative language of which expressed the intention of UN Members "to provide or support immediate assistance to any State not possessing nuclear weapons that is the victim of an act of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used."

In the fall of 1965, we sounded out the Soviets and were told that the Soviet Union considers the question of assurances "premature", and that the matter might be considered after the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty. Subsequently, the Soviets advanced their counterproposal

(noted above)

(noted above) calling for nuclear powers not to employ nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries on whose territory no nuclear weapons were stationed. If the Soviet Union should reconsider its position, a UN Resolution of the type we have offered could serve as an "umbrella" which would be consistent with non-alignment and under which more specific U.S.-Indian arrangements might be pursued.

Under this "umbrella", the U.S. could offer firm private assurances of support to India. If this private approach included such steps as describing our nuclear capabilities directed at the Communist Chinese threat and an expression of our willingness to enter joint contingency planning, this alternative might offer at least an interim solution to the problem.

As India's security concern becomes greater and if joint U.S.-Soviet assurances are not possible, India may come to be more interested in such private unilateral U.S. assurances. There is a question, of course, as to whether such secret arrangements would have the needed impact on Indian non-governmental opinion which is the source of

most

most of the present pressure for India's "going nuclear." This question may be academic, however, since it is doubtful that joint Indian-U.S. contingency planning could be kept secret.

In addition, to have any hope of satisfying the Indians, such private assurances would have to be quite specific; yet such specificity would bind the U.S. to involve itself in a nuclear conflict under at least partially unforeseen circumstances, and without the ability to control India's actions.

The key questions we have to ask ourselves here is what the U.S. would, in fact, do if the Chinese Communists were to mount (or threaten imminently to mount) a nuclear attack on India. If we believe that our interest in Indian independence, in preventing Communist expansion, and in maintaining some reasonable semblance of world order would move us to stand by India in this circumstance, then the problem is how to make this clear to the Indians in any private assurances, so as to affect their nuclear intentions, without involving commitments which go beyond our likely response to nuclear attack on India, or involving us in undue Congressional difficulties.

(5)

(5) U.S. Assistance to a Limited Defensive Indian Deterrent. Ambassador Bowles has suggested that consideration be given to U.S. assistance to India in such measures as: (a) installation of an effective early warning system and other measures for defense against manned bombers; (b) expansion of joint U.S.-Indian efforts to detect Communist Chinese nuclear and missile capabilities; (c) secret "scientific" consultation on ballistic missile defenses; and (d) secret studies of "integrated" air defense against Communist Chinese nuclear attack, possibly including an Indian manned bomber force for use against Communist Chinese launching sites.

We have assisted Indian air defenses since 1962, and could conceivably extend this effort. However, it is doubtful that this would allay Indian concern over the Communist Chinese nuclear threat, which will include missiles.

Consultation on ballistic missile defenses (which we could not now provide) could well convince the Indians that

that their only real defence would be a nuclear deterrent. Accordingly, this might actually stimulate Indian desires for nuclear weapons of their own.

Studies of an Indian conventional manned bomber force could well convince the Indians that what they really need are missiles with nuclear warheads.

(6) Nuclear Sharing. The U.S. might offer to assist India in acquiring the capability to deter or retaliate to Communist Chinese nuclear attack with its own delivery means, using American nuclear warheads which would be made available to India at the time of a Chinese attack. The advantages in comparison with a strictly unilateral U.S. guarantee would include a less direct military commitment for the U.S. (in the sense that the Indians, not the U.S., would strike Communist Chinese targets), and yet from the Indian standpoint a more tangible U.S. commitment to give essential assistance.

This possibility faces a number of difficulties: (a) India's desire to remain at least formally non-aligned, and to avoid alienating the Soviet Union; (b) the dilemma of fashioning a nuclear sharing arrangement that

that would provide enough -- but from the U.S. standpoint not too much -- of a nuclear role; (c) the impact of such an arrangement on others (Pakistan, Japan, and other U.S. Asian allies) and on the UK Role East of Suez; (d) the over-all effect on U.S. military commitments and on U.S. aid for India since we might have to bear much of the cost; and (e) the question of enabling legislation to permit us to turn nuclear weapons over to the Indians.

The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not believe a nuclear sharing arrangement would do more than delay a Indian pro-nuclear decision. While this may well be true, there may come a time when such delay would be well worth seeking to achieve. The Director of ACDA does not consider a nuclear sharing arrangement desirable.

Some very preliminary investigations have been made of several illustrative possibilities. The problems remain formidable.

d. The Plowshare Loophole.

There is some pressure on the Indian Government for a peaceful (PLOWSHARE) explosion to demonstrate India's technical

technical capabilities. Such a "peaceful" Indian explosion would, however, be widely viewed (in Pakistan and elsewhere) as the beginning of an Indian nuclear weapons program and, from the technical standpoint, would be virtually indistinguishable from weapon development. The Committee of Principals is, therefore, considering steps to dissuade India from "peaceful" nuclear explosive development.

4. Conclusion

The course of action outlined above -- economic pressures, arms control agreements, and security arrangements -- suggest the general range of approaches that are either underway or are currently being examined. There may be other courses of action, which further examination will uncover.

Each of the approaches developed above has potentialities, limitations, and costs. No single approach seems likely to accomplish more than a delay in an Indian decision to "go nuclear." However, even delay can be useful, and some combination of these approaches may be more promising -- at least from the standpoint of delay -- than any single approach.

We

We intend, therefore, to take three further steps in studying this problem:

First, to continue to examine specific combinations of the courses of action described above, especially ones which pose most difficulty;

Second, to determine whether still other approaches can be developed; and

Third, to weigh the costs involved in such of these courses of action as may appear to hold promise against the costs of India's "going nuclear."

→ Mr. Johnson

SECRET

June 1, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Henry Owen
Mr. Wreatham E. Gathright

SUBJECT: Preparations for NSC meeting on the Indian Nuclear Problem

We have examined the proposed papers for the NSC on June 9 and have the following recommendations:

1. The two papers as now presented are too diverse, too extensive, and do not together form an adequate base for the President's perusal.

2. We believe one paper should be put forward, making the following argument:

(a) Growing pressures in India:
Pressures are mounting in India as Chinese tests proceed; these in turn generate internal political pressures which will be increasingly hard to resist.

(b) Why do we care?

-- India's going nuclear will have consequences (March 17 memo for Indira Gandhi's visit, p. 11)

-- India, subject to nuclear blackmail or defeat, would have a range of consequences.

(c) Alternative U. S. approaches:

-- March 16 memo, pp. 5-8, with a somewhat larger discussion of nuclear sharing than in the formulation in paragraph 7, top of page 8.

-- Mr. Bowles' alternative "Limited Defense Program", (p. 2 of May 31 memo, but compressed).

3. Conclusion: It might conclude by commending the three alternative approaches which you consider the USG should most seriously study further.

Howard Wriggins

cc: Smith
Keeny
Johnson
Saunders

SECRET

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Acting Counselor and Chairman
Policy Planning Council
Washington

May 31, 1966

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

State Department: NEA - Mr. Schneider
G/PM - Mr. Garthoff
ACDA - Mr. Fisher
DOD - Mr. Yarmolinsky
Mr. Wyle
JCS - General Goodpaster
NSC Staff - Mr. Keeny
Mr. Wriggins

1. The package which we were asked to prepare as a possible basis for NSC discussion Thursday, June 9, will consist of:

a. The paper on "Possible Assurances and Nuclear Support Arrangements for India", transmitted to the President by Secretary Rusk's memorandum of March 3, 1966, in the form previously cleared by interested Departments and agencies except that the recommendations are not included. (This paper is not attached, since copies are already available to all addressees).

b. A summary discussion of current issues, based on the discussion at the Planning Group meeting of May 26, and keyed to Ambassador Bowles' telegram of May 22 (New Delhi's LIMDIS 3204), as has been requested. (This paper is attached.)

2. We will need to get any suggested changes on the attachment no later than Thursday noon, and hopefully before then. A final draft will be circulated Friday or Saturday, which we hope can be signed by the Secretaries of State and Defense for transmittal to the President.

Henry Owen

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THE INDIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROBLEM: CURRENT ISSUES

1. The Situation. In the wake of the third Chinese Communist nuclear test, domestic pressures for India to embark on a nuclear weapons effort have mounted sharply. Government leaders are continuing to hold the line against such a course. However, it is unlikely that a decision will be postponed for more than a few years.

2. Ambassador Bowles' Alternatives. Ambassador Bowles outlines three possible ways of trying to avert an Indian nuclear program:

a. A unilateral US guarantee; India, he indicates, is not ready to accept this. Are we ready to give one?

b. A worldwide agreement involving a comprehensive test ban, a limitation on nuclear stockpiles, and a joint US-UK-Soviet guarantee against nuclear blackmail. The Ambassador comments that he gathers the Soviets are not prepared to proceed along this line. What degree progress would satisfy the Indians?

c. US help to India in building a "limited deterrent defensive system."

There is not much to add to the discussion of the first two alternatives in the attached memorandum of March 3 from

Secretary Rusk to the President. The third alternative is considered below, and in the attachment.

3. Limited Defense Program. Ambassador Bowles recommends the following steps to increase India's ability to defend itself against Chinese nuclear attack:

a. Installation of an effective early warning and control system and other measures for defense against manned bombers; and expansion of joint US-Indian efforts to detect ChiCom nuclear and missile capabilities. Comment: Steps along these lines might be considered; however, unless accompanied by other arrangements, they would not get at the question of the future ChiCom missile threat.

b. Scientific US-Indian consultation regarding ballistic missile defense. Comment: This might whet India's appetite for defenses it could not afford and which we could not, in any event, make available in the foreseeable future. Since such studies would necessarily focus on ChiCom missile attack capabilities, the net result could be a heightening of India's interest in acquiring a national deterrent force.

c. Secret studies of "integrated" air defense against ChiCom manned bomber and missile attack, possibly including an Indian conventional bomber force which could be used

against ChiCom launching sites. Comment: Exploration of the utility of a conventional disarming strike against ChiCom attack capabilities could well serve primarily to convince the Indians of the futility of sole reliance on conventional weapons and manned bombers in the nuclear-missile age. It might thus intensify their nuclear desires.

d. Use of the contacts envisaged in this program quietly to persuade the Indians of our willingness and ability to back them up in case of Chinese pressure or attack. Comment: If these "quiet assurances" went beyond what we are now saying, the question arises as to what their form and substance should be. This poses difficult problems for both the US and India:

- For the US, the problem is twofold: (i) What would the US, in fact, do if the Chinese Communists were to mount (or threaten imminently to mount) a nuclear attack on India? (ii) If our interest in Indian independence in preventing Communist expansion, and in maintaining some reasonable semblance of world order would move us to stand by India in this circumstance, how can this prospect now be dramatized, so as to affect Indian nuclear intentions,

without further narrowing our freedom of action or involving us in undue Congressional difficulties?

- For India, the problem is how such US assurances, even under a UN umbrella, could be reconciled with the conflicting needs for secrecy and for political impact. Very private discussions and perhaps even secret contingency planning might fit in with non-alignment; they would not -- by that same token -- meet political concerns outside the Government, which is where most of the pressure for India's going nuclear comes from. It may well be, therefore, that an optimum approach in this field cannot be devised, even if all obstacles on the US side should somehow be overcome, so long as India holds to non-alignment.

e. An educational effort to convince India's leaders and people of the prohibitively high cost of "going nuclear."

Comment: Data on costs and on the difficulties of acquiring a credible and reliable deterrent force have been forwarded to Ambassador Bowles for use in contacts with India's leaders. Additional data will be supplied which India's leaders may use publicly to support their announced policy against "going nuclear." As a related matter, the question of excessive defense expenditures has been raised with Indian Planning

Minister Mehta and will be pursued with Mehta and other Indian officials. Points being emphasized are:

- The need for a reasonable limit on (and reduction of) defense expenditures as an essential prerequisite of economic development.

- Our intention not to place ourselves in the future in the position of fueling an arms race in the subcontinent.

- The fact that defense expenditures will be taken into account in determining future aid levels.

Although such points are being advanced in the context of India's present economic state, dual emphasis on the cost of "going nuclear" and on the need to hold down defense expenditures can be expected to encourage India's leaders to hold the line against nuclear weapons. At the same time, unless ways can be found of meeting India's security needs, this approach is not likely to deter an Indian nuclear weapons program indefinitely.

4. Possibility of a "Peaceful" Explosion. There is one other immediate issue worth noting at this time:

There is support in India for a peaceful (PLOWSHARE) explosion to demonstrate India's technical capabilities. Such a "peaceful" Indian explosion would, however, be widely viewed (in Pakistan and elsewhere) as the beginning of an Indian nuclear weapons program and, from the technical standpoint, would amount to that. The Committee of Principals is, therefore, considering steps to make clear to India that a "peaceful" nuclear explosive development would be considered as equivalent to a nuclear weapons development, -- and thus as a violation of "peaceful" undertakings accepted in securing nuclear reactors.

5. Conclusion. The actions which this memorandum recommends or indicates we are now carrying out will, at best, buy time. They will not provide the "dramatic alternative" without which, the attached paper suggests, India will probably decide to become a nuclear power in the next few years. The search for other possible courses of action will, therefore, need to be continued -- as will the question of how the US should react if India is clearly about to choose, or chooses, the nuclear road.

Butch

We sent a comparative analysis of the 2 identical bodies treaties to the President last night - Meeker produced it.

Would you like a comparative analysis of the two non-proliferation treaties A & 7 and 6 B will produce.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Counselor and Chairman
Policy Planning Council
Washington

Harry Rowan
(from el Worldstetter)

Copy # 11

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Clark Johnson

[redacted]

May 19, 1966

TO: Planning Group Members

SUBJECT: Planning Group Meeting, Thursday, May 26, 1966, 12:00 noon

At the Planning Group Meeting next Thursday, May 26, 1966, we will discuss the attached paper, Contingency Planning for an Indian Decision to "Go Nuclear": Questions and Issues, by Mr. Wreatham Gathright, Member, Policy Planning Council.

WRO
Henry Owen

Attachment

Deptel - New Delhi
2296
5/24

Yes -

No -

[redacted]

This documents consists of 5 pages. No. 11 of 25 copies. Series A.

CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR AN INDIAN DECISION TO "GO NUCLEAR": QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

The questions below concern steps the U.S. might take: (1) to forestall or otherwise influence an "imminent" Indian decision to "go nuclear"; and (2) to cushion the impact of such a decision on other major countries or areas.

* * *

A. "Last Ditch" Steps to Avert an Indian Decision

1. Threat of drastic economic penalties such as termination or curtailment of economic aid and food assistance.

   (a) How credible would such threats be?

   (b) How effective?

   (c) What would be the costs in terms of future U.S.-Indian relations of making such threats? -- Of implementing them?

2. Offer of "firm" unilateral security guarantees.

   (a) If India were already on the brink of decision, why would it be interested?

   (b) How could acceptance be squared with non-alignment?

   (c) How could U.S. make "firm" commitment of this character to a non-ally? How much risk? Deploy ABM in U.S.?

   (d)

(d) Could risks be lessened -- for both India and U.S. -- by U.S. conventional arms assistance against Communist China?

(e) How would Paks react?

3. Offer of increased economic aid plus firm interim security guarantee (during low threat period) in return for: (1) delay of Indian decision for 3-5 years; and (2) determined Indian effort to effect reconciliation with Pakistan.

(a) How much of an increase in aid, if any amount, might arouse India's interest?

(b) Would an "interim" guarantee by any easier for India to accept and the U.S. to offer?

(c) If India were interested except for Pak angle, what would we do?

(d) After 3-5 years, what?

4. Offer similar to foregoing but (in order to relieve Indian leadtime problems vis-a-vis ChiCom nuclear program) with promise of non-warhead support of Indian nuclear weapons effort if: (1) decision delayed 3-5 years; (2) no progress made in finding better ways of meeting India's security needs; and (3) definite progress in Indian-Pak relations.

(a) What kind of non-warhead support might we offer? Delivery vehicles?

(b) What would the implications be for U.S. relations with others?

(c) How much "definite" progress in Indian-Pak relations should be a pre-condition?

5.

5. Offer to acquiesce in Indian decision at any time basis has been laid in Indian-Pak relations. (Possibility of offering aid for joint Indo-Pak nuclear weapons program, whenever two countries have come close enough together to make this possible?)

6. Concede defeat but encourage Indians to conduct "peaceful" PLOWSHARE test rather than openly avowed weapons test.

* * *

B. Steps for Cushioning Impact

1. India - What should be our policy toward India after an Indian decision to "go nuclear"?

2. Pakistan

(a) What would main objectives be:

(1) Avoiding Pak nuke effort?

(2) Precluding Pak-ChiCom Alliance?

(3) Precluding any remote possibility of early Pak hostilities to recover Kashmir before India actually get nukes or Pak air strike against Indian nuclear facilities?

(b) What could be done in addition to what we're now doing:

(1) More economic or conventional arms aid?

(2) Nuclear guarantee against India?

(3) Additional pressures or persuasion to adjust?

(4) Some nuclear sharing with Pakistan? Two-key system?

(c)

(c) Any prospect of success?

(d) What would be costs to U.S.-Pak relations? U.S.-Indian relations?

3. Japan

(a) What would main objectives be:

(1) Avoiding or delaying Jap nuke effort?

(2) Preserving U.S.-Jap relations regardless of Jap decision?

(b) What could be done:

(1) Accelerate re-negotiation of security treaty or of preparatory steps?

(2) Tighten consultation on political, security, and nuclear matters?

(3) Offer technical partnership in some non-nuclear area?

(4) Offer nuclear sharing? With Japan or with wider Asian grouping?

(5) Offer ABM's to Japan (may be available 1975-1980)?

(6) "Last ditch" offer to give non-warhead assistance to Jap nuke program in return for delay? How long a delay?

(c) How urgent? How much now? How much later?

4. Western Europe

(a) How much cumulative strain would be added by:

(1)

(1) Indian decision only?

(2) Indian decision plus other - e.g., Japan?

(b) What would main objective be:

(1) Avoid rising sense of discrimination in FRG?

(2) Avoid West German nuke program?

(3) Avoid European nuclear force?

(c) Possible courses of action?

Mr. Rostow
Mr. Johnson

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SECRET

May 25, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Al Wohlstetter's Reaction to Gathright's Paper

1. Offer of firm unilateral guarantees:

(a) We should distinguish private from public guarantees. A public guarantee would not be acceptable because it would require India to give up its so-called "non-alignment" posture. However a private guarantee combined with specific contingency planning would: (i) maximize India's reassurance; (ii) set limits to the causus belli.

(b) India will continue to be interested, even if she is on the brink, because the Indians will know that the decision will be very costly and they will be ambivalent to the very end.

(c) Acceptance can be squared with "non-alignment" if the guarantee is private and the specific contingency planning is strictly limited within the two Governments.

(d) As to the riskiness for the U.S., Wohlstetter wonders why it is riskier than what we have already extended to Japan or Western Europe.

(e) Wohlstetter believes we should make very clear that the guarantee would not hold if the Indians went nuclear.

2. Wohlstetter believes Gathright's point three would push India to be ready for the time when our guarantee would lapse. Moreover, as to Gathright's second point in paragraph 3, the Indians will fight any U.S. effort to influence them on Kashmir. Linking the guarantee to progress on Kashmir will confirm them in their view that only with their own nuclear capability will they be truly free (the Gallois thesis).

3. Gathright's fourth point, Wohlstetter believes to be the wrong thing to do. It makes it cheaper and easier for the Indians to go nuclear. It is bad enough that we have financed Tarapur for 40 years at 3/4 of one percent interest.

SECRET

4. Gathright's point 6 would be idiotic. It would clearly establish for the Japanese and Israelis that Plowshare tests are all right. Thus it would sponsor weapons development under the cover of peaceful uses.

5. Wohlstetter believes that in any case, the Japanese will await Chinese IRBM tests and will continue to hesitate so long as the U. S. shows firm continuing interest in Asia and Japan particularly.

Howard Wriggins

cc: Mr. Rostow
Mr. Saunders

Mr. Johnson

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SECRET

May 25, 1966

TO: W. W. Rostow

FROM: Howard Wriggins

SUBJECT: Al Wohlstetter on the Indian Nuclear Problem

1. In reading Gathright's paper, Wohlstetter thinks an important alternative is left out, to wit: a private guarantee, accompanied by specific contingency planning which would set limits to the types of contingencies we would agree to react to.

2. He stressed: (a) the acceptability of such a private guarantee to the Indians, despite their non-aligned posture, so long as it could be kept out of the public domain in India. (He believed the Russians would learn of it but would not publicly oject.) He found the more knowledgeable already aware of being under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, a fact which they believed contributed to Chinese caution during the war with Pakistan.

(b) The fact that if it were coupled with contingency planning specifying different kinds of responses to rather specific Chinese initiatives, our control over possible Indian provocation would be substantially greater than it is as we are presently positioned, with only a vague assurance against nuclear blackmail.

(c) Such planning should be sufficiently secret to ensure against public leaks, but the Chinese should become aware of it, and the terms of our understanding:

i.e. an unprovoked attack by a nuclear power on India would be met by appropriate U.S. action.

3. In his view, we must face the fact that if no such guarantee is offered, we have admitted we do not take this problem seriously and are prepared to let events take their course.

cc: Mr. Gathright
Mr. Saunders
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Keeny

SECRET

cc: Mr Johnson

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

file

SECRET

May 25, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Subject: Proposed NSC Meeting on Indian Nuclear Weapons Issue

I think that the Indian nuclear weapons issue is an excellent topic for next week's NSC meeting if you are looking for a broad issue on which Government policy is in the process of formulation. As you know, however, this is a complex issue involving some extremely controversial and sensitive issues.

After the staff meeting this morning, I discussed the problem with Wriggins and Johnson; and we agreed that you might find a list of the basic policy questions involved helpful in judging whether this would be an appropriate subject for the first NSC meeting in this new series. Accordingly, I have jotted down the following list of issues and questions for your consideration:

1. Non-Proliferation. The President has repeatedly stated that the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons is a cornerstone of US policy. Do we wish to change this policy? Are we prepared to make significant sacrifices financially or politically to accomplish it?

2. Assurances. In one form or another, guarantees would appear to be an inherent part of a non-proliferation policy. Is the US prepared to undertake formal military guarantees to India, either unilateral, bilateral (alliance), multilateral (nuclear powers), or international (such as a commitment in connection with the proposed non-proliferation treaty)? Is there any possibility of a joint US-Soviet guarantee to India; and, if so, are we prepared to take the initiative to achieve it?

3. Non-Proliferation Treaty. The non-proliferation treaty is now on dead center in Geneva ostensibly because of our insistence

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on the "European clause." While we cannot be certain that we will have a treaty if we abandon the "European clause," it is clear that we will not have a treaty as long as we insist upon it. This, of course, leads one into the center of the current Acheson Committee review. Will our new position on nuclear sharing make a non-proliferation treaty possible? Should our desire for a non-proliferation treaty influence the nature or timing of our decisions on nuclear sharing?

4. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This approach to the non-proliferation treaty has been on dead center for several years because of the inspection issue, and there is little likelihood that the Soviets will accept on-site inspection in the foreseeable future. Are we prepared to give up our requirement for on-site inspection? If not (as is presumably the case), should we attempt to bypass the on-site inspection issue by proposing a threshold treaty that would ban tests above a seismic threshold that hopefully would be low enough to place some inhibition on new nuclear powers?

5. Plowshare. It is becoming increasingly apparent that some Indians, stimulated by the AEC's enthusiasm, are suggesting that the Indians undertake a nuclear weapons program under the cover of Plowshare objectives. Should we attempt to preempt this path to an Indian nuclear capability by offering the world devices for Plowshare on generous terms, taking the risk that we will simply further stimulate the Indians and others to use Plowshare as a cover for weapons development? Should we, on the other hand, undertake a concerted program to identify clearly in world opinion Plowshare devices as nuclear weapons and to minimize the economic significance of this program in the foreseeable future?

6. Alternate Scientific and Technological Projects. Since a substantial part of the pressure for nuclear weapons in India is to establish their scientific and technological prestige vis-a-vis communist China, the Government has had under review for the past couple of years a series of alternative scientific and technical projects to establish the scientific prestige of India in Asia. Should we subsidize major Indian undertakings in nuclear reactors, space, or other

spectacular technological areas not associated with their immediate economic proposals in order to build up Indian scientific ability and prestige?

7. Aid Leverage and Threats. Although it could easily backfire, our strongest weapon to influence Indian policy is the threat to withhold aid. We obviously have leverage here even if we only indicate that we would have to reconsider our aid policy if the Indians develop nuclear weapons. Should we be more explicit than we have been in our public statements or private statements to Indian leaders that we intend to reconsider or withdraw aid in the event that the Indians undertake an expensive nuclear weapons program?

8. Nuclear Sharing. Finally, one could offer the Indians a variety of bilateral or multilateral (US-UK-USSR?) nuclear sharing arrangements which would give them a ready-made nuclear capability in the event that they were attacked by the Chinese. A number of the possible arrangements of this type were discussed in Rusk's memorandum for the President prior to Mrs. Gandhi's recent visit to the US. While some of these arrangements would be extremely advantageous to the Indians from a military point of view and would argue effectively against an independent Indian nuclear capability, the arrangements also obviously involve a great many problems for both us and the Indians. Should we seriously consider some form of nuclear sharing with India? What would be the effect of such an agreement on other Asian countries (Pakistan, Japan, Israel-UAR, etc.)? What would be the impact of this on our broader non-proliferation and Asian policies?

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