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06	memo	C. Johnson to Rostow	C	1	7/15/66	A
08a	rpt	"An Initial Study of Ballistic..." 5 pgs. RAC 1/19	S	53	11/1/65	A
10	rpt	NIE 4-2-64 [Duplicate of #4, NSF, NIEs, "4, Arms & Disarmament," Box 1; exempt per RAC 9/04]	S	25	10/21/64	A
~~17a~~	~~ltr~~	~~Kratzer to C. Johnson~~ [Duplicate of #17b] open 11·12·09 NW 09·201	C	3	~~4/3/67~~	A
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18	cable	Deptel Circular 167165	S	4	4/1/67	A
19	cable	Deptel Circular 167155	S	11	4/1/67	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Charles E. Johnson
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3/19/2009
Initials

Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to this Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing

diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the

Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty.

ARTICLE V

Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to cooperate to insure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. It is understood that non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty so desiring may, pursuant to a special agreement or agreements, obtain any such benefits on a bilateral basis or through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States.

ARTICLE VI

Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures regarding cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

ARTICLE VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

ARTICLE VIII

1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of_____,

which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear-weapon States signatory to this Treaty, and 40 other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a Conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in_____at_____this_____

of_____.

tions. I do not see how, in conscience, we could fail to grant this request, which is as modest as it is urgent.

I feel certain the 90th Congress shall fully support the President's request and continue to support his efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons among the community of nations.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON, THE ARMS CONTROL AGENCY, AND THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

(Mr. BINGHAM (at the request of Mr. ALBERT) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, President Johnson's request to Congress to extend the life of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for 3 years deserves our overwhelming approval—for the Agency has been in the forefront in America's struggle for world peace.

Since the world looked down the nuclear gun barrel at the Cuban missile crisis, a new spirit of cooperation has arisen—nurtured by the President, recognized by the American people.

The Test Ban Treaty, institution of the "hotline," a new Outer Space Treaty, and a consular agreement between Russia and the United States are testament to this new trust. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, as spokesman for the President, has been a key factor in these accords.

Through the perseverance of the President and the diligence of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the two superpowers have reached agreement upon a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

For President Johnson, this document marks a milestone in his long search for a nonproliferation treaty. For the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, it marks a signal victory of reason over irrationality. And for the world, it offers the hope of a safer and saner tomorrow.

This treaty brings the brightest light into the world since the nuclear age cast a dark shadow over the globe. It prohibits the transfer—or acceptance—of nuclear weapons to nonnuclear nations, provides for careful verification procedures, and permits all nations to share in the peaceful uses of the atom.

This treaty does not—with the stroke of the pen—usher in a peaceful millennium. But it is dramatic evidence that the world is prepared to take a large step to prevent its own self-destruction.

NONPROLIFERATION TREATY HOAX

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, today we received a message from the President telling us what a great thing the recently negotiated Nonproliferation Treaty is supposed to amount to. Particular emphasis was laid on finally negotiating an article III of the treaty supposedly breaking the impasse on treaty provisions for inspections to verify compliance with the treaty's bans against nuclear proliferation.

Any allegation that article III as recently negotiated provides such enforcing mechanisms is a cruel hoax for the following reasons:

First, it provides no inspection procedures whatever. It only calls upon signatories to "undertake to accept safeguards as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency" and that such negotiations commence within 180 days after the treaty goes into effect. This is no more than an "agreement to make an agreement." No legal system recognizes as valid or enforceable any such ambiguous present promise to come to a future unspecified agreement. Article III is just as blank as if it remained without words. The words it contain mean nothing. The treaty remains without any provisions for enforcement whatever. Any contention otherwise is deliberately misleading and unconscionable.

Second, in any event, to speak of IAEA safeguards as something which exist and can be relied upon to enforce this treaty is ridiculous to the point of absurdity. Anyone familiar with the primitive capabilities, both technologically and financially, of IAEA in the safeguards area knows this. To assert or imply that IAEA safeguards are something which can be relied upon for the heavy purpose of policing this treaty is also misleading and unconscionable. It would take years for IAEA to achieve an adequate capability for the purpose. Thus, for this further reason, the treaty document as negotiated is a trap for the unwary insofar as the presence of necessary self-enforcing mechanisms are concerned.

DANGERS TO NATIONAL SECURITY

The purpose of an arms control treaty is to enhance national security; that is, the Nation should be safer after the treaty than before. Negotiation of the NPT has proceeded on the assumption that one or more additional nuclear powers in the world would prove more dangerous to the U.S. national security than denying the United States substantial defense options, which is exactly what the treaty does. It also proceeded on the assumption that the NPT actually would be effective in preventing proliferation.

Nowhere in the testimony of administration officials to House and Senate committees, including the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, can factual substantiation of these assumptions be found. On the contrary, much opining lays on the record, but no hard facts.

At no point do these records meet and overcome the issue I have raised relative to the ineffectiveness of IAEA policing capabilities.

The treaty absolutely excludes and denies the option of the United States to selectively proliferate purely defensive nuclear armaments to hard-pressed U.S. allies, even though changed and future circumstances could make this move vital to U.S. national security. Nowhere in administration testimony, speeches or written materials on the NPT is there to be found any sensible evaluation—or any evaluation at all—of the wisdom of surrendering this vital defense option. This is true despite the fact that tossing away this option violates the basic criteria by which almost every vital national security decision during this decade has been made.

That is, by the computer aided formulas of "systems analysis" which Secretary McNamara contends provides us the most "cost effective" defense establishment ever known to man. The key feature of this decision-making tool is an examination of every conceivable alternative to determine that most effective in relation to cost, while at the same time retaining the maximum possible open options for switches as the problem changes or becomes better defined.

Under a variety of foreseeable contingencies it could become very important to exercise our present option to proliferation selectively and defensively—which may be done because U.S. nuclear weapons can be rigged mechanically and electronically to fire only under the predetermined conditions of a defensive environment.

Absent this option the United States may be compelled itself to play a nuclear Sir Galahad role and rush to the defense of such allies, involving itself directly in any number of emergencies, police actions or wars. This possibility hardly enhances U.S. national security.

Absent this option nations such as India and Japan, for example, faced with the Red China threat, and faced with possible doubts that the United States actually would play the Sir Galahad role when the chips are down, may have to go nuclear on their own despite any treaty. And, when faced with the issue of survival, nations tend to do what is necessary to assure it, despite treaty obligations. This independent nuclear capability would necessarily include not only a defensive capability, but also a troublesome offensive capability. This is hardly a superior alternative to that of selective and defense U.S. proliferation.

Yet these disadvantages are part of the price for obtaining the illusion known as the NPT. A further price is the implied promises made time and again by President Johnson, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara and other administration stalwarts that the United States will move in to help any nonnuclear nation signing the treaty should it be threatened with nuclear blackmail, without any condition whatever that dangers to our own national security must be inherent in the situation. Already we are overextended in our commitments to others in the conventional context. Now this overcommitment and all the dangers inherent in it are being extended to the nuclear arena. How in the world can this state of affairs contribute to U.S. national security? Is not it a terrible price to pay for a pack of words which could be quite meaningless in terms of reward?

I say meaningless because only three of the five nuclear powers will sign the treaty in any event. The three who will sign are the United States, United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. The two who will not sign are France and Red China. France is not believed to view lightly the matter of giving away nuclear warheads, but its deficit internal security raises fear that its atomic know-how may diffuse in the same way in which U.S.

secrets escaped to Russia in the late 1940's. Red China's abrasive attitude toward the world at large hardly inspires confidence that the Chinese Communists will refrain from spreading nuclear weapons in tinderbox areas such as the Middle East. The treaty will be useless as to these two nuclear powers.

It also may be that the treaty will be quite useless as to the hundred or more nuclear "have not" nations, the vast majority of which lack the technological and industrial bases to go nuclear in any event. Their promises not to build bombs will be exercises in give-up-nothingmanship and there is zero expectancy that promises "not to receive" warheads by likely candidates for Chinese giveaway bombs will be worth the paper they are written on. Possibly two score nuclear "have nots" could go nuclear on their own, if they are willing to make the necessary sacrifices. Most of these have no reason for doing so anyway. The remaining few that do cannot be expected to refrain on the basis of useless promises from others.

Perhaps one observer overstated the case by declaring "all this nonproliferation tear jerking and hand wringing is an outrageously contrived hoax over a lot of useless nothing." But another, Dr. James Schlesinger of Rand Corp., hit close to the mark in a scholarly essay concluding: that if proliferation comes we can live with it "and presumably the politicians will find something else to view with alarm."

Schlesinger's essay pointed out that regional wars fought with primitive atomic weapons would not necessarily draw the nuclear superpowers into conflict with each other with any more certainty or any more quickly than the same wars fought with conventional weapons. Those who worry about the possible catalytic effect of regional wars should ponder conditions of instability which increase their frequency, rather than the weapons with which they may be fought.

There are other fallacies and pitfalls in the NPT which I shall discuss at a later time. I speak simply to warn the Members of the U.S. Congress that the NPT proposition presented today in the President's message calling for extension of the life of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for another 3 years is by no means uncontroversial. Too few in the Congress have studied the Nonproliferation Treaty and all its dangerous implications. Too many are accepting the words of the President and his aides without critical scrutiny as to the ultimate advantage or disadvantage of the proposition in terms of the basic survival of our country.

From both practical and technical standpoint, the nuclear genie is out of the bottle. Efforts like the NPT to ram it back in seem increasingly quixotic, futile, and even self-defeatingly hazardous. Since all indications are that there will be nuclear spread whether or not the NPT comes into effect, it is realistically possible that we are addressing ourselves entirely to the wrong problem. Instead of romantically engaging in high-flown treaty discussions to polish the administration's tarnished peace image, we should be devoting our time and brains to assessing practically the nature of a world with an inevitable degree of nuclear spread and determining realistic means to prevent undue peril from resulting.

Inasmuch as this particular product of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency may turn quite sour, I see no reason whatever for any hasty move to extend the Agency's life.

DONATION OF LAND FOR AND EXTENSION OF THE BLUE RIDGE PARKWAY, NORTH CAROLINA AND GEORGIA

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 1340) to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to accept donations of land for, and to construct, administer, and maintain an extension of the Blue Ridge Parkway in the States of North Carolina and Georgia, and for other purposes.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from North Carolina.

The motion was agreed to.

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill H.R. 1340, with Mr. RAINS in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

By unanimous consent, the first reading of the bill was dispensed with.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. TAYLOR] will be recognized for 30 minutes and the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. SAYLOR] will be recognized for 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs [Mr. ASPINALL].

(Mr. ASPINALL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ASPINALL. Mr. Chairman, H.R. 1340 which is now before the committee is a bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to accept donations of land for, and to construct, administer, and maintain an extension of the Blue Ridge Parkway in the States of North Carolina and Georgia, and for other purposes.

H.R. 1340 is by our colleague, the chairman of our Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation, the gentleman from North Carolina, Representative ROY TAYLOR. Identical bills were also introduced by the gentlemen from Georgia, Representatives LANDRUM and DAVIS. We would have been glad to report all of these bills but, since there is room for only one on the calendar of the House, we chose the one by our North Carolinian and thus avoided having to choose between two estimable Georgians.

H.R. 1340 provides for the construction of a 180-mile extension of the existing 469-mile Blue Ridge Parkway. The present parkway is the most used of all the National Park Service's 213 installations. I do not have the 1967 figures yet, but in 1966 over 8 million people used the Blue Ridge Parkway. The proposed addition will carry the present parkway from Beech Gap, N.C., to the vicinity of Atlanta, Ga., and will thereby open it up to additional hundreds of thousands of users each year.

An important feature of the bill is its provision that the Secretary of the Interior may accept donations of the right-of-way for the extension. This right-of-way will average 125 acres per mile in fee and 25 acres per mile in scenic easements. The Interior and Insular Affairs Committee was advised that the States of North Carolina and Georgia are ready to begin acquiring all the land that is necessary for this purpose and that is not already in the ownership of the United States and that they will deed it to the Government. This will amount to 15,000 acres more or less, or 23½ square miles of land.

Except for this I would hesitate to bring a bill of this sort to the floor at this time, since the construction costs are estimated at $67½ million at current price levels. But the sooner the two States can be assured that the United States is going to go forward with the project, the sooner the surveyors can get to work staking out a definite location for the road, and the sooner the States can begin acquiring the necessary land. This will save costs all around, for we are all familiar with the escalating cost of land acquisition.

Mr. Chairman, I respectfully urge the approval of this legislation by my colleagues. I think it is in keeping with our great national park effort.

Now I yield to my good friend and sometime critic from the great State of Iowa.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend for yielding.

The gentleman says that this money, the $37.5 million, as I understood him, is to come from the highway funds.

Mr. ASPINALL. As far as the construction program is concerned it is to be related to the construction programs of the Federal Bureau of Roads.

Mr. GROSS. How much of this $67.5 million is for construction and how much is something else?

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ASPINALL. I will be glad to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. TAYLOR. I will be glad to answer the gentleman's question. I checked this matter rather thoroughly. The general nationwide authorization is contained in the Federal Aid Highway Act. However, the appropriation comes as a part of the Interior Department's budget request from general funds. Not from the highway funds.

Mr. GROSS. I am still in the dark. This money comes from what source? From the highway funds or from the park funds controlled by the Department of the Interior?

Mr. TAYLOR. It comes from the latter source; that is, from park funds controlled by the Interior Department, but

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE JANUARY 18, 1968

Office of the White House Press Secretary

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THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE
PRESENTATION TO THE 18-NATION DISARMAMENT
COMMITTEE OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

The White House was informed at 4:25 a.m. this morning that the USSR would join the United States as Co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to submit to the Committee today a complete draft treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. The President issued the following statement:

I am most heartened to learn that the Soviet Union will join the United States as Co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, to submit a complete text of a treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and that this draft treaty will be submitted today to the Committee in Geneva. This revised text includes an agreed safeguards article and other revisions that will make the treaty widely acceptable.

We have worked long and hard in an effort to draft a text that reflects the views of other nations. I believe the draft presented today represents a major accomplishment in meeting these legitimate interests.

The text submitted today must now be considered further by all governments. Following its review by the Conference in Geneva, it will be considered by the General Assembly in the spring. It is my fervent hope that I will be able to submit it to the Senate of the United States for its advice and consent this year.

The draft treaty text submitted today clearly demonstrates an important fact. In the face of the differences that exist in the world, the two nations which carry the heaviest responsibility for averting the catastrophy of nuclear war can, with sufficient patience and determination, move forward. They can move forward toward the goal which all men of good will seek -- a reversal of the arms race and a more secure peace based on our many common interests on this one small planet.

I believe history will look on this treaty as a landmark in the effort of mankind to avoid nuclear disaster while ensuring that all will benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

This treaty will be a testament of man's faith in the future. In that spirit I commend it to all.

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November 9, 1967

NOTE FOR MR. ROSTOW

Walt--

I think you will be interested in the attached cable reporting a McGhee-Schnippenkoetter discussion that illustrates the level of confusion of German thinking about Article III of the NPT.

Ambassador McGhee reports that Ambassador Schnippenkoetter's real concern is that the French would raise legalistic objections concerning a EURATOM-IAEA agreement as their justification for withdrawing from EURATOM. This argument, which is repeatedly made by the Germans, insists on ignoring the simple fact that this action on the part of France would probably deny France future US supplies of U-235 and plutonium on which the French peaceful atomic energy program is dependent.

France presently purchases its supplies of U-235 and plutonium for civilian purposes from us through EURATOM with the assurance that the supplies will be subject to EURATOM safeguards. Quite aside from the question of the NPT, if France terminated its arrangements with EURATOM, existing contracts would terminate and future sales would depend on the negotiation of new bilateral arrangements between the US and France in which the French would be entirely dependent on our willingness to accommodate them. Moreover, a serious question would exist as to whether the French could retain the plutonium and U-235 that we have already sold to them. Partly at my insistence, the contract for the sale of plutonium that France now purchases from us through EURATOM was written in a form that gives us rights of recapture. The legal question as to our recapture rights on U-235 previously sold to France through EURATOM is not entirely clear.

McGhee was sent a special instruction to make this point clear when he delivered our aide memoire on Article III last month. From the attached cable, it appears that he missed a golden opportunity to get this point across to Schnippenkoetter and it is not entirely clear to me that McGhee understands the situation. I believe it is important that the Germans understand that we do not intend to make it easy for France

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to withdraw from EURATOM and that the easiest way to do this is to tell the Germans. While I don't necessarily object to McGhee's suggestion that we also make this rather self-evident point to the French (although in that case it might appear to be something of a gratuitous threat to the French since they have given no indication that they are in fact considering withdrawing from EURATOM), I don't think that discussions with the French would be a substitute for discussing this simple point directly with the Germans. I have suggested to EUR (and I think they agree) that in answer to McGhee's request for comments they suggest he clear up this particular point with Schnippenkoetter.

Spurgeon Keeny

Att.:
BONN 4957 dtd 11/8

cc: ERFried/RHUllman -w/att.
CEJohnson -w/att.

42

Department of State

SUMMARY

44

[redacted] 868

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BUD
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FRIED
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PAGE 01 BONN 04957 081614Z

43
ACTION EUR 20

INFO IO 15,SSO 00,NSCE 00,NSAE 00,CCO 00,USIE 00,ACDA 17,AEC 11,
NASA 04,SCI 05,P 04,INR 07,CIA 04,SP 02,SS 20,GPM 03,SC 01,
NSC 10,RSC 01,L 03,H 02,OST 01,RSR 01,DOD 01,NEA 15,/147 W

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AMEMBASSY LONDON 1536
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 999
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 577
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 202
INFO USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 554
USMISSION NATO 86
USUN NEW YORK 115

[redacted] BONN 4957

BUSEC/DISTO/IAEA

SUBJ: NPT

REF: BONN'S 4900, PARIS' 6210

1. IN OUR DISCUSSION YESTERDAY WITH AMB SCHNIPPENKOETTER (FONOFF DISARMAMENT REP), REPORTED IN REFTEL, WE MADE AN EFFORT TO GET TO BOTTOM OF THE GERMAN CONCERN OVER ARTICLE III OF NPT. WE HEARD MANY

PAGE 2 RUFHOL 4957 [redacted]
FAMILIAR ARGUMENTS WHICH, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS I BELIEVE, AMOUNTED

[redacted]

Department of State

[redacted]

PAGE 02 BONN 04957 081614Z

ONLY TO WORDS-- PARTICULARLY THOSE INVOLVING THE WORD "DISCRIMINATION
".
SCHNIPPENKOETTER'S ARGUMENT RAN--EURATOM IS BASED ON NON-DISCRIMINATI
ON.
ANY DISCRIMINATION INTRODUCED THROUGH ARTICLE III IN FAVOR EITHER OF
FRANCE OR RUSSIA WOULD CHANGE THIS BASIS. IN ANSWER TO MY QUERIES
SEEKING TO DETERMINE WHAT DISCRIMINATION WOULD INVOLVE IN PRACTICAL
TERMS-- THE ARGUMENT WAS USED THAT SUBJECTING EURATOM NUCLEAR
INDUSTRY TO "DOUBLE CONTROLS", WOULD FORCE IT TO GO WHERE THERE
IS LESS CONTROL, I.E., FRANCE WHERE THERE WILL BE ONLY EURATOM--
OR POSSIBLY SOME DAY NO CONTROL. IT WOULD INCREASE THE DANGER OF
INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE AND THE COST OF INSPECTION.

2. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION SCHNIPPENKOETTER FINALLY ADMITTED, HOWEVER,
THAT THESE ARGUMENTS WERE NOT VALID AND THAT THE REAL GERMAN CONCERN
WAS POLITICAL, I.E. WOULD A EURATOM-IAEA AGREEMENT PROVIDE A
JUSTIFICATION FOR FRANCE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE EURATOM TREATY?
SCHNIPPENKOETTER SEEMED TO BE DEEPLY TROUBLED BY A FEAR OF THE
POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF A FRENCH WITHDRAWAL FROM EURATOM--AS AN
INTERGRATED EUROPEAN ENDEAVOR. PERHAPS UNSAID WAS ALSO THE FEAR THAT
FRANCE WOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS SITUATION AND DO THINGS WHICH
GERMANY, HAVING SUBJECTED HERSELF TO IAEA AS WELL AS EURATOM CONTROLS

PAGE 3 RUFHOL 4957 [redacted]
COULD NOT DO. EURATOM COULD PUT UP WITH A DISCRIMINATION IMPOSED BY
THE FRENCH THEMSELVES, BUT IT COULD NOT PUT UP WITH ANY NEW
DISCRIMINATION IMPOSED BY NPT, I.E. PRESUMABLY GIVING FRANCE
FREEDOM FROM IAEA CONTROLS WHILE SUBJECTING THE OTHER FIVE TO THEM.

3. ONE OF SCHNIPPENKOETTER'S GREATEST FEARS WAS THE PRESENT AMBIGUITY
IN THE POSITION OF FRANCE. HE DID NOT CONSIDER FRENCH SILENCE
IN LUXEMBOURG ON OCT. 24 OR IN BRUSSELS AT THE NAC MEETING ON OCT 31
AS ASSURANCE OF FRENCH APPROVAL OF AN ARTICLE III BASED ON THE 5
PRINCIPLES. THIS APPEARS TO BE CONFIRMED BY PARIS'S REFTEL OF NOV.7
IN WHICH COUVE IS REPORTED BY AMB BOHLEN AS REFUSING TO MAKE
ANY COMMITMENT REGARDING FRANCE'S DECISION, ON THE EURATOM-
IAEA RELATIONSHIP PRIOR TO THEIR HAVING AN AGREED TEXT.ACCO
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[redacted]

Department of State

[redacted]

PAGE 03 BONN 04957 081614Z

TO SCHNIPPENKOETTER, THIS MEANS THAT THE FIVE WILL HAVE NO ASSURACE BEFORE COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO NPT, THAT FRANCE WILL NOT DECLARE IT IN VIOLATION OF THE EURATOM TREATY AND USE IT AS AN EXCUSE TO BREAK UP EURATOM.

4. ONE EXPLANATION FOR THE GERMAN SENSITIVITY ON THIS POINT MAY BE THE INCREASING CONCERN OVER THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH FRANCE, RECENTLY DESCRIBED IN BONN'S 4851 AND COMPANION AIRGRAM OF NOV. 3. ALTERNATIVELY, OR AS A COROLLARY, IT MAY BE THE FEAR THAT FRANCE,

0-&3 4 RUFHOL [redacted]
HAVING ACHIEVED ITS OWN MILITARY NUCLEAR CAPABILITY WHICH GERMANY CANNOT HOPE FOR WILL, IN ADDITION, BE FREED FROM CONTROL IN THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR FIELD. THIS THE GERMANS MIGHT REASON WOULD GIVE FRANCE ANOTHER ADVANTAGE VIS-A-VIS GERMANY AND THE OTHER NON-NUCLEAR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, BOTH IN FUTURE COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY AND AS A BASIS OF PRESTIGE AND INDEPENDENCE OF POLITICAL ACTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING.

COMMENT:
WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN EMBASSY PARIS'S COMMENTS ON OUR ANALYSIS OF THE GERMAN CONCERN ABOUT THE FRENCH POSITION ON NPT. DOES EMBASSY PARIS CONSIDER THIS CONCERN JUSTIFIED AS TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT FRANCE MIGHT UTILIZE AN NPT AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW FROM EURATOM? ARE THERE STEPS WHICH THE US MIGHT TAKE TO DISSUADE THE FRENCH FROM SO DOING, E.G. A CLEAR STATEMENT TO COUVE THAT THE SUPPLY OF US FUEL WILL REMAIN DEPENDENT ON ACCEPTANCE OF EITHER EURATOM SAFEGUARDS OR OTHER SAFEGUARDS ACCEPTABLE TO IAEA? IS THERE ANY WAY AN EARLY CLARIFICATION OF THE FRENCH POSITION CAN BE INDUCED--WHICH, IF FAVORABLE, WOULD GREATLY ASSIST IN OBTAINING GERMAN APPROVAL TO NPT?
MCGHEE

[redacted]

NP File
5

CONFIDENTIAL   July 1, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FRANCIS BATOR

Francis --

This draft of the NPT has a serious flaw from a psychological viewpoint. It creates new categories of states -- nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states. Although this cannot be entirely cured by language, I suggest that it could be at least somewhat helped if Articles I and II were revised to read as follows:

Rusk

Article I

Each of the states party to this treaty undertakes not to grant, or in any other way to assist any state not possessing nuclear weapons to achieve, physical access to nuclear weapons.

Article II

Each of the states party to this treaty not now possessing nuclear weapons undertakes not to manufacture, or otherwise to achieve physical access to, nuclear weapons.

Although there apparently is some political hocus-pocus involved in the term "physical access to", Spurgeon and I felt that if we were negotiating for real that a better term might be "custody or control."

Charles E. Johnson

CONFIDENTIAL

Note to FB

5a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2041

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

56

MEMORANDUM TO MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS

SUBJECT: Non-Proliferation Treaty

Attached is a revised draft of a non-proliferation treaty which is under consideration. I would very much appreciate your transmitting comments as soon as possible.

DR
Dean Rusk

Attachment:

Non-Proliferation Draft Treaty.

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5c

[redacted]

Proposed Revised Articles of U.S. NP Treaty

Article I

Each of the nuclear-weapon states party to this treaty undertakes not to grant, or in any other way to assist any non-nuclear-weapon states to achieve, physical access to nuclear weapons.

Article II

Each of the non-nuclear-weapon states party to this treaty undertakes not to manufacture, or otherwise to achieve physical access to, nuclear weapons.

Article III

Each of the States party to this treaty agrees not to take any of the actions prohibited in the preceding articles directly, or indirectly through third states or groups of states.

Article IV

Any party to the treaty shall have the right to withdraw from the treaty, upon six months notice, if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. Five years after the entry into force of this treaty, a conference of parties shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland in order to review the operation of the treaty.

[redacted]

SUGGESTED CHANGES

RUSK DRAFT

Article I

Each of the states party to this treaty undertakes not to grant, or in any other way to assist any state not possessing nuclear weapons to achieve, physical access to nuclear weapons.

Article II

Each of the states party to this treaty not now possessing nuclear weapons undertakes not to manufacture, or otherwise to achieve physical access to, nuclear weapons.

FISHER DRAFT

Article I

Each of the States party to this treaty now possessing nuclear weapons undertakes not to transfer nuclear weapons to any other State or to any group of States not possessing nuclear weapons, or to take any action, by granting physical access or otherwise, that will contribute to the capability of such State or group of States to design, develop or fabricate nuclear weapons.

Article II

Each of the States party to this treaty not now possessing nuclear weapons undertakes not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, either independently or together with other States.

Article III, IV and V

No changes.

Article VI

I would delete the definitions of the "nuclear-weapon state" and "non-nuclear-weapon state" and retain only the statement that "For the purpose of this Treaty a nuclear weapon includes any device capable of producing a nuclear explosion."

1

January 6, 1966

NOTE FOR MR. BUNDY

Mac --

F. Y. I.

Rusk has received the attached letter from Senator Clark and has not yet replied thereto. Meanwhile, the Joint Committee has agreed to cancel or suspend its hearings scheduled for the 12th to examine State and Defense witnesses on what agreements the U. S. reached with FRG concerning nuclear sharing. Ball persuaded Holifield that such a hearing would not be productive. In place of the hearing Ball will informally fill in the principal members on what the situation now is.

Charles E. Johnson

COPY

7a

United States Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations

December 16, 1965

The honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

It was reported in a dispatch by Anatole Shub in this morning's Washington Post under the headline "Accord Seen on 5-Nation Atom Force for NATO" that much of the detailed planning for a joint NATO nuclear force, of the MLF or ANF variety, has already been agreed to by Britain and West Germany, and that the creation of such a force with United States adherence is rated by United States diplomats as a three-to-one probability.

The article suggests that mixed manning of nuclear armed Polaris submarines would be an ultimate, although not an initial characteristic of the force. It also states that "another potential obstacle -- the conflicting claims of a treaty with Russia on nuclear nonproliferation -- no longer seems to impress American leaders," and goes on to assert that "the United States now has no intention of revising its basic draft for the nonproliferation accord -- which leaves the possibility of such an allied nuclear force open."

As you will probably recall, the problem of nuclear proliferation and its relationship to proposals to create a joint NATO nuclear force was given particular consideration by the citizen panel on Arms Control and Disarmament of the recent White House Conference on International Cooperation. In its report that committee, headed by Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner and made up of such highly regarded experts as Roswell Gilpatric and Dr. Carl Kaysen, stated that "the United States should lead its allies in the search for means to reduce, rather than increase, the buildup of nuclear weapons in and near Central Europe. In this connection, solutions to the nuclear problem of the Alliance should be sought in arrangements that do not result in the creation of new nuclear forces."

C O P Y

You have yourself pointed out on several occasions that the threat of further nuclear proliferation is one of the gravest our nation faces. No one can say for certain whether the Soviets would be prepared to agree to a treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons if we were to agree to forego the creation of a joint NATO nuclear force with West German participation, as they have said. But it is at least possible that by rushing into an agreement to create such a force we might well forfeit our last chance to obtain a nonproliferation pact.

In view of the responsibility of the Congress to assure the American people that a step of such magnitude -- which could have the most serious consequences for our own security from nuclear attack and the peace and tranquility of all nations -- will not be taken rashly, precipitously and without due deliberation, I would urge the Administration to take no further steps toward the creation of such a force until Congress reconvenes in January. The Committees concerned would then have an opportunity to explore in appropriate depth the questions raised by the creation of a joint nuclear force with West German participation and, in particular, its implications for the successful negotiation of a treaty to halt the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Sincerely,

Joseph S. Clark

JSC:hse

76

COPY

Congress of the United States
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

December 18, 1965

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I note that articles in the December 18 issue of the New York Times by Thomas J. Hamilton and in the Washington Post of the same date by Anatole Shub report in considerable detail on the plans for forthcoming NATO discussions between President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard pertaining to nuclear weapons and nuclear submarine matters. These articles both refer to official sources in Bonn for the information presented.

Please supply the Committee with information on the conditions concerning the release of any such information and the accuracy of the information presented in these articles, copies of which I am sending you attached. This is a subject in which the Joint Committee is most interested and in which I wish to be kept fully and currently informed.

Sincerely yours,

Chet Holifield
Chairman

The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Attachments: (2)
New York Times article by Hamilton
Washington Post article by Shub

cc: Secretary McNamara
Department of Defense

C O P Y

Congress of the United States

JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY

December 18, 1965

(Rec'd 12-22-65)

23559

ACTION
is assigned to
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Sincerely yours,

Chet Holifield

Chet Holifield
Chairman

The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.

27624

(3) 10/22/65

Attachments: (2)
New York Times article by Hamilton
Washington Post article by Shub

cc: Secretary McNamara
Department of Defense

DEF 12 notes

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

20306

7d

December 16, 1965

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Secretary
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

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In view of the responsibility of the Congress to assure the American people that a step of such magnitude -- which could have the most serious consequences for our own security from nuclear attack and the peace and tranquility of all nations -- will not be taken rashly, precipitously and without due deliberation, I would urge the Administration to take no further steps toward the creation of such a force until Congress reconvenes in January. The committees concerned would then have an opportunity to explore in appropriate depth the questions raised by the creation of a joint nuclear force with West German participation and, in particular, its implications for the successful negotiation of a treaty to halt the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Sincerely,

Joseph S. Clark

JOSEPH S. CLARK

JSC:hse

ERHARD TO PRESS FOR ATOMIC ROLE

To Ask Johnson to Assure Bonn of Place in Force

By THOMAS J. HAMILTON
Special to The New York Times

BONN, Dec. 17—Chancellor Ludwig Erhard plans to ask President Johnson for an assurance that West Germany will be included in a joint nuclear force under the Atlantic Alliance whenever it is established.

However, the Chancellor does not intend to ask Mr. Johnson for the establishment of either the mixed-manned nuclear force originally proposed by the United States in 1960 or the variant subsequently proposed by Britain, the Atlantic nuclear force.

The highest political source here gave this forecast today of what Dr. Erhard would say to the President during their talks in Washington Monday and Tuesday. Dr. Erhard will leave Sunday.

Seeks Nuclear Assurance

According to this source, Dr. Erhard would also like an assurance from Mr. Johnson that the establishment of such a force would not be ruled out by the conclusion of an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union prohibiting the spread of nuclear weapons.

The Chancellor, it was reiterated, does not consider West Germany's membership in the newly formed working group on nuclear planning—the group proposed originally by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara—a substitute for a new "weapons combination" giving European powers the right of consultation regarding the use of nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, Dr. Erhard will not ask for the right to veto the use of United States weapons based on West German territory.

According to authoritative sources, Dr. Erhard plans to discuss with Mr. Johnson his conception of a "formed" or "advancing society," alongside Mr. Johnson's goal of a Great Society.

Common Market a Topic

According to persons in touch with his thinking, an other question the Chancellor intends to take up with the President is the Common Market.

Dr. Erhard believes the chances for Britain's admission to the Common Market have improved. One of the reasons, he believes, is that if there is to be a European nuclear force there must first be a European political federation.

West Germany, over French opposition, has backed the use of the Common Market to foster political integration.

West Germany's relations with Eastern Europe will also be discussed in Washington, according to the Germany informants. Despite recent Soviet attacks on West Germany, Rumania is ready to establish diplomatic relations with Bonn. However, West Germany does not intend to do so.

West Germany, it was added, does not plan to establish diplomatic relations with Poland because of the dispute over the Oder-Neisse frontier, or with any Eastern European country.

Erhard to Press U.S. For Wider Atom Role

By Anatole Shub
Washington Post Foreign Service

BONN, Dec. 17—Chancellor Erhard will present President Johnson next Monday with a five-point program of West German nuclear demands, including co-ownership of Polaris submarines.

Highest official sources here today confirmed the Erhard program, arrived at after long, secret discussions with American and British diplomats as well as with Erhard's leading political opponents in West Germany.

Erhard will urge Mr. Johnson to agree, and to persuade America's other Western allies, on the following basic principles:

1. The creation of an allied nuclear force, built around six American and four British nuclear-powered Polaris submarines, to be jointly owned by the United States, Britain, West Germany, the Netherlands and Italy. The force would be under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR). It would not initially be mixed-manned. It would, however, be so organized as to permit the member nations to add "new generation" weapons systems in the future.

2. Exclusive veto over the use of the force's atomic missiles would rest with the President of the United States. Presumably, however, the treaty or agreement setting up the force would include a "Europe clause" — permitting the transfer of the force, and perhaps a partial veto over the use of the force, to the government of a United States of Europe should such unity be achieved.

3. Enlarged powers for, and an enlarged German role in, the NATO "special committee" organized under Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's aegis last month. West Germany wishes to participate not merely in atomic targeting and formation of nuclear strategy, but in "crisis management." While welcoming a seat on the McNamara "working group" for planning, Bonn would also like to take part in the groups on intelligence and communications, which relate to "crisis management."

See ERHARD, A10, Col. 2

4. Formal U.S. rejection of any Soviet or neutral-nation draft for a treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons that did not permit establishment of either the allied or eventual "European" nuclear force. The West would argue that such forces did not constitute proliferation so long as a veto remained with one of the present nuclear powers.

5. Speedy implementation of the German demands on nonproliferation and nuclear planning, but a leisurely approach to the actual creation of the allied nuclear force.

Series of Compromises

The five points represent a series of compromises not only between West Germany and Britain, but also between German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder and his arch political foe, Franz-Josef Strauss.

Thus, the kind of force Erhard will propose is a slightly modifed, scaled-down version of the "Atlantic nuclear force" urged by Britain a year ago—except that Britain is now apparently agreeable to command by SACEUR rather than a separate command structure.

The "European" features of the Erhard proposals represent a long-term commitment to the "grand design" recently outlined by Strauss—in which a separate "European deterrent" might eventually be created by merging British and French atomic weaponry.

Informed German press reports, uncontradicted in official circles today, declare that the terms of the proposals have been approved by all members of the Cabinet as well as highest leaders of Erhard's Christian Democratic Union. These include not only Strauss but Heinrich Krone, Special Minister for National Security and close friend of former Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. No reaction has, however, been reported from Adenauer himself.

Cost Is Factor in Delay

There are three reasons why Erhard is prepared to delay actual creation of the force. First West Germany in 1966 will not be prepared to make the sizable financial contribution necessary to buy its share of ownership. Second, a number of German leaders consider the threat of creating such a force more useful as a bargaining counter with the Russians than the actual force would be. The "pause," therefore, could be utilized for intensive German-Soviet negotiations.

Finally, some Bonn officials as well as the governments of Italy and the Netherlands would prefer to resolve the

Washington Post
12/18/65

for planning, Bonn would also like to take part in the groups on intelligence and communications, which relate to "crisis management."

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Finally, some Bonn officials, as well as the governments of Italy and the Netherlands, would prefer to resolve the crisis in the Common Market before provoking French President de Gaulle in the nuclear field. Therefore, a number of allied officials hope that—even if Mr. Johnson and Erhard reach agreement next week—the program will not be publicly unfurled for at least several months.

Both Erhard and Schroeder, however, appear perfectly prepared for a complete break with France should they achieve U.S. endorsement of their nuclear program. According to highest official circles, for example, West Germany is prepared — if France does not accept current Common Market compromise terms—to move ahead with the "Kennedy Round" tariff negotiations and other projects on the basis of the "majority rule" provisions of the Rome Treaty.

In other words, Erhard stands ready to see France leave the Common Market altogether, and to proceed with five instead of six members. Erhard has always made plain that he preferred a broad free-trade area, including Britain, to the present organization of the Common Market Six.

Bonn officials appear confident that they can win approval of their program by the United States and Britain, and thereby will be in a strong position to "outbluff" or defeat Gen. de Gaulle in the contest for the leadership of Europe. However, both diplomatic and unofficial German observers fail to share Bonn's confidence in any of these respects.

With regard to the United States, Bonn has been strongly encouraged by an important faction of the State Department — namely, the so-called Theologians who devised the abandoned scheme for a mixed-manned surface fleet, and who are largely identical with the group that considers the isolation of Gaullist France the supreme aim of American policy in Western Europe.

West German leaders have apparently been led by this group to believe that, if Erhard insists strongly on the current program in his talks with Mr. Johnson, the President will assent to it and give it the full weight of American backing in further dealing with Britain, France and other allies.

However, persistent reports from Washington in the German press this week assert that while President Johnson is willing to consider German ideas, he sees no great urgency in the issue—especially so long as Prime Minister Wilson's attitude is unclear and French policy remains so decidedly hostile. It is thought that Mr. Johnson will prefer to await a meeting with de Gaulle, possibly next spring before reaching such weighty and controversial agreements with the Germans.

Question of Britain

As for Britain, Bonn officials believe that because they have essentially accepted the British design for an allied nuclear force, the British — especially in their financial difficulties —will have to go along if Mr. Johnson makes that design his own.

However, senior British diplomats have made plain here that, in all their dealings with the Germans on the force, they were developing the details of only one policy option under consideration by Wilson. No British diplomat has professed to speak the Prime Minister's final judgment on the matter, and several have indicated that he may be more interested in a non-proliferation agreement, a personal journey to Moscow, or even an East-West summit meeting.

With a precarious majority in Parliament (including a strongly anti-German left wing), few British observers consider it likely that Wilson would bind himself now to much more than continued discussion of the German ideas.

As for French reaction, opinions differ only as to how violent and effective de Gaulle's reaction will be. Optimistic Bonn officials believe that, as a result of the first round results of the French presidential election, the power of Gaullism is ended.

Lower Percentage

Erhard personally has been elated by the fact that de Gaulle on the first round polled a lower percentage of the vote than he polled in the recent German election.

It is argued that, faced with the combined resolve of America, Germany and Britain, the aging French President will have no choice but to yield gracefully.

Outside official quarters, on the other hand, there are fears that the Erhard-Schroeder nuclear drive could undo 15 years of allied policy in Western Europe and the French-German life work of former Chancellor Adenauer. For de Gaulle might, it is argued, be driven not only to wreck Western and inter-allied cooperation in the political, economic and military fields but recognize East Germany and conclude a pact with the Soviet Union.

WH -
Mr. Johnson

295

ACTION
is assigned to
NEA

THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

December 13, 1965
(Rec'd 12-20-65)

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Some time ago I was privileged to receive a copy of a letter that was addressed to the President by Congressman Chet Holifield, Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Congressman Holifield had mentioned to me that he had written to the President on the matter of nuclear proliferation. I understand that he gave a very thoughtful and provocative address before a recent meeting of the Nuclear Industrial Conference here in Washington. I asked the Congressman if he'd be willing to share with me some of the thoughts that he had expressed to the President. He then dropped me a note and attached a copy of the letter that he had addressed to the President on October 26.

It is worthy of the most thoughtful consideration of the highest authorities of our government. Possibly the President brought it to your attention but, if he didn't, permit me to share it with you. It should be carefully considered, and I know that the Congressman will have something more to say on this matter in the months ahead.

I pass it along for your information.

(3) 12/20/65

Sincerely,

Hubert H. Humphrey

The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

21478

7h

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

October 26, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

In late September, I attended the Ninth International Conference on Atomic Energy in Tokyo, Japan and stopped in Bombay, India October 2 - 6. While in India, I spent about a day and a half visiting the Tarapur Reactor site and the atomic laboratory at Trombay. I spent some time with Dr. Baba and other top Indian atomic scientists.

Dr. Baba and his friends were careful not to state their position in regard to making an atomic weapon. I do believe, however, Dr. Baba is a very ambitious man who realizes his personal fame would be greatly increased if he were authorized to make such a weapon. There is no doubt in my mind that these people in Dr. Baba's group believe they must effect Red China's weapon with one of their own. Of course, they will have to persuade Shastri and other top Government officials this policy and expense is justified. I cannot predict Shastri's attitude.

During our conversations they asked me what the attitude of the United States would be in regard to their (India) making an atomic bomb. I am sure they thought I would immediately urge them to abstain from an atomic effort in line with our policy of non-proliferation. I decided to play it on a low key, however, and said, "Of course, this is a question for India to answer. If they think it necessary and wise to divert from their domestic needs the capital it would take to make even the first crude bomb, then I suppose they will do it. There is no doubt Dr. Baba and his colleagues have high scientific capability and certain faciliti which might insure success in the project".

But I pointed out, "...it was a race they could never win. Always they would lag behind Red China, further behind France, far behind the Soviets, and much farther behind the United States". I assured them they would never catch up, but left it up to them to make their own decision. They seemed to be somewhat impressed by my reasoning on their question.

I doubt if our present policy of non-proliferation will prevent India, Israel, or any other capable nation which may from doing just what France and Red China have done. If their

national interests indicates such an effort, I believe they will make it unless the nuclear umbrella can be extended to protect them against nuclear attack.

I wonder if it would be worthwhile for you to take the initiative and propose that the United States would be willing to extend nuclear protection to India against a nuclear attack by any other nation, providing the Soviets would extend the same type of protection? Admittedly, this would put the Soviets on the spot and drive the wedge deeper between them and Red China, if they agreed. If they would not agree, would it not be a plus for the United States and a minus for the Soviets in their relations with India?

A further thought: Would it be wise for the President to advance the idea of the four western world nuclear nations to join in a compact agreement offering nuclear protection to any non-nuclear nation against a nuclear attack? Would this not be

(1) A constructive move toward removing the national pressure of Nth nation development of nuclear weapons, if the present four nuclear powers in Europe and America really want to stop proliferation?

(2) If the Soviets or the French refuse (as one or both very well may) would not our position for peace and non-proliferation be stronger in world opinion and would not the nuclear nation refering to join in the effort to stop proliferation be weaker?

In my opinion, there is a common interest in the four nuclear nations having a policy of stopping additional Nth nations from developing their own atomic-hydrogen weapons. I do not believe the Soviets, any more than the United States, want to aid or resist non-nuclear nations into the club. Certainly France and the United Kingdom are not thinking about aiding other nations in an atomic-hydrogen weapons development project.

Could this common selfish interest be used as a coment to join the four nations together in the following:

(1) Joining the forces of the Western World (U.S. and Europe including U.S.S.R.) in a multi-nuclear-weapon-owning nation compact. A nuclear weapon compact that would stop proliferation on the basis of eliminating the need for nationally owned nuclear weapons.

(2) Would it not isolate Red China and remove from India and other non-nuclear nations the fear of nuclear attack by Red China?

One might say, "We offered the Baruch plan and there were no takers". True, but was it not a noble offer in the eyes of the world? What do we have to lose in the eyes of the world, if another attempt is made to stop proliferation of the [illegible] more powerful and more dangerous weapons?

Mr. President, I know you have many brilliant advisors and it is with some trepidation I write this letter. As a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy during its entire life of nineteen years, I have worked to make our Nation strong in atomic weapon capability and deliverability. We are strong, but so are and will be other nations.

If there is any way to join together the destructive capability of the four western world nuclear nations so [illegible] collective atomic strength can serve to develop, not a Pax [illegible] but a Pax Atomica for the preservation of peace in the world, we should find that way.

May God bless you and give you strength to achieve His purpose.

Most sincerely yours,

Chet Holifield

The President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

cc to:

Secretary of [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]

No release to the [illegible]

White House - Mr. Johnson

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

To

December 16, 1965

The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

It was reported in a dispatch by Anatole Shub in this morning's Washington Post under the headline "Accord Seen on 5-Nation Atom Force for NATO" that much of the detailed planning for a joint NATO nuclear force, of the MLF or ANF variety, has already been agreed to by Britain and West Germany, and that the creation of such a force with United States adherence is rated by United States diplomats as a three-to-one probability.

The article suggests that mixed manning of nuclear armed Polaris submarines would be an ultimate, although not an initial characteristic of the force. It also states that "another potential obstacle -- the conflicting claims of a treaty with Russia on nuclear nonproliferation -- no longer seems to impress American leaders," and goes on to assert that "the United States now has no intention of revising its basic draft for the nonproliferation accord -- which leaves the possibility of such an allied nuclear force open."

As you will probably recall, the problem of nuclear proliferation and its relationship to proposals to create a joint NATO nuclear force was given particular consideration by the citizen panel on Arms Control and Disarmament of the recent White House Conference on International Cooperation. In its report that committee, headed by Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner and made up of such highly regarded experts as Roswell Gilpatric and Dr. Carl Kaysen, stated that "the United States should lead its allies in the search for means to reduce, rather than increase, the buildup of nuclear weapons in and near Central Europe. In this connection, solutions to the nuclear problem of the Alliance should be sought in arrangements that do not result in the creation of new nuclear forces."

You have yourself pointed out on several occasions that the threat of further nuclear proliferation is one of the gravest our nation faces. No one can say for certain whether the Soviets would be prepared to agree to a treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons if we were to agree to forego the creation of a joint NATO nuclear force with West German participation, as they have said. But it is at least possible that by rushing into an agreement to create such a force we might well forfeit our last chance to obtain a nonproliferation pact.

In view of the responsibility of the Congress to assure the American people that a step of such magnitude -- which could have the most serious consequences for our own security from nuclear attack and the peace and tranquility of all nations -- will not be taken rashly, precipitously and without due deliberation, I would urge the Administration to take no further steps toward the creation of such a force until Congress reconvenes in January. The committees concerned would then have an opportunity to explore in appropriate depth the questions raised by the creation of a joint nuclear force with West German participation and, in particular, its implications for the successful negotiation of a treaty to halt the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Sincerely,

JOSEPH S. CLARK

JSC:hse

Congress of the United States

JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY

December 18, 1965

(Ltr 12-22-65)

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I note that articles in the December 18 issue of the New York Times by Thomas J. Hamilton and in the Washington Post of the same date by Anatole Shub report in considerable detail on the plans for forthcoming NATO discussions between President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard pertaining to nuclear weapons and nuclear submarine matters. These articles both refer to official sources in Bonn for the information presented.

Please supply the Committee with information on the conditions concerning the release of any such information and the accuracy of the information presented in these articles, copies of which I am sending you attacked. This is a subject in which the Joint Committee is most interested and in which I wish to be kept fully and currently informed.

Sincerely yours,

Chet Holifield

Chet Holifield
Chairman

The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

(A) 12/22/65

Attachments: (2)
New York Times article by Hamilton
Washington Post article by Shub

cc: Secretary McNamara
Department of Defense

WH -
Mr. Johnson

5

ACTION is assigned to INEA

THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

December 13, 1965
(Rec'd 12-20-65)

7K

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Some time ago I was privileged to receive a copy of a letter that was addressed to the President by Congressman Chet Holifield, Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Congressman Holifield had mentioned to me that he had written to the President on the matter of nuclear proliferation. I understand that he gave a very thoughtful and provocative address before a recent meeting of the Nuclear Industrial Conference here in Washington. I asked the Congressman if he'd be willing to share with me some of the thoughts that he had expressed to the President. He then dropped me a note and attached a copy of the letter that he had addressed to the President on October 26.

It is worthy of the most thoughtful consideration of the highest authorities of our government. Possibly the President brought it to your attention but, if he didn't, permit me to share it with you. It should be carefully considered, and I know that the Congressman will have something more to say on this matter in the months ahead.

I pass it along for your information.

(3) 12/20/65

Sincerely,

Hubert H. Humphrey

The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

21478

71

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington
October [illegible]

Dear Mr. President:

In late September, I attended [illegible] Conference on Atomic Energy in [illegible] and [illegible] Bombay, India October 2 - 5. [illegible] I [illegible] a day and a half visiting the Trombay reactor [illegible] atomic laboratory at Trombay. I [illegible] time with Dr. [illegible] and other top Indian atomic scient[illegible]

Dr. Baba and his friends were careful not to state their position in regard to making an atomic weapon. I do believe, however, Dr. Baba is a very ambitious man who realizes his personal fame would be greatly increased if he were authorized to make such a weapon. There is no doubt in my mind that people in Dr. Baba's group believe they must offset Red China's weapon with one of their own. Of course, they will have to persuade Shastri and other top Government officials that such a purpose is justified. I cannot predict Shastri's [illegible]

During our conversations they asked me what the attitude of the United States would be in regard to their (India) making an atomic bomb. I am sure they thought I would immediately urge them to abstain from an atomic effort in line with our policy of non-proliferation. I decided to play it on a low key, however, and said, "Of course, this is a question for India to answer. If they think it necessary and wise to divert from their domestic needs the capital it would take to make even the first crude bomb, then I suppose they will do it. There is no doubt Dr. Baba and his colleagues have high scientific capability and certain facilities which might insure success in the project".

But I pointed out, "...it was a race they could never win. Always they would lag behind Red China, further behind [illegible], far behind the Soviets, and much further behind the United States". I assured them they would never catch up, but left it up to them to make their own decision. They seemed to be somewhat [illegible] by my reasoning on their question.

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(1) A constructive move toward removing the national pressure of each nation development of nuclear weapons, if the present four nuclear powers in Europe and America really want to stop proliferation?

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4.

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May God bless you and give you strength to achieve [illegible] purpose.

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The President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

White House - Mr. Johnson

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

December 16, 1965

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Secretary
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

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Sincerely,

Joseph S. Clark

JOSEPH S. CLARK

JSC:hse

Congress of the United States
JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY

December 18, 1965

(Rec'd 12-23-65)

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I note that articles in the December 18 issue of the New York Times by Thomas J. Hamilton and in the Washington Post of the same date by Anatole Shub report in considerable detail on the plans for forthcoming NATO discussions between President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard pertaining to nuclear weapons and nuclear submarine matters. These articles both refer to official sources in Bonn for the information presented.

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Chairman

The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

(12/23/65)

Attachments: (2)
New York Times article by Hamilton
Washington Post article by Shub

cc: Secretary McNamara
Department of Defense

ERHARD TO PRESS FOR ATOMIC ROLE

To Ask Johnson to Assure Bonn of Place in Force

By [illegible] HAMILTON
Special to The New York Times.

BONN, Dec. 17—Chancellor Ludwig Erhard plans to ask President Johnson for an assurance that West Germany will be included in a joint nuclear force under the Atlantic Alliance whenever it is established.

However, the Chancellor does not intend to ask Mr. Johnson for the establishment of either the mixed-manned nuclear force originally proposed by the United States in 1960 or the variant subsequently proposed by Britain, the Atlantic nuclear force.

The highest political source here gave this forecast today of what Dr. Erhard would say to the President during their talks in Washington Monday and Tuesday. Dr. Erhard will leave Sunday.

Seeks Nuclear Assurance

According to this source, Dr. Erhard would also like an assurance from Mr. Johnson that the establishment of such a force would not be ruled out by the conclusion of an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union prohibiting the spread of nuclear weapons.

The Chancellor, it was reiterated, does not consider West Germany's membership in the newly formed working group on nuclear planning—the group proposed originally by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara—a substitute for a new "weapons combination" giving European powers the right of consultation regarding the use of nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, Dr. Erhard will not ask for the right to veto the use of United States weapons based on West German territory.

According to authoritative sources, Dr. Erhard plans to discuss with Mr. Johnson his conception of a "formed" or "advancing society," alongside Mr. Johnson's goal of a Great Society.

Common Market a Topic

According to persons in touch with his thinking, an other question the Chancellor intends to take up with the President is the Common Market.

Dr. Erhard believes the chances for Britain's admission to the Common Market have improved. One of the reasons, he believes, is that if there is to be a European nuclear force there must first be a European political federation.

West Germany, over French opposition, has backed the use of the Common Market to foster political integration.

West Germany's relations with Eastern Europe will also be discussed in Washington, according to the Germany informants. Despite recent Soviet attacks on West Germany, Rumania is ready to establish diplomatic relations with Bonn. However, West Germany does not intend to do so.

West Germany, it was added, does not plan to establish diplomatic relations with Poland because of the dispute over the Oder-Neisse frontier, or with any Eastern European country.

Erhard to Press U.S. On W. German Role

By Anatole Shub
Washington Post Foreign Service

BONN, Dec. 17—Chancellor Erhard will present President Johnson next Monday with a five-point program of West German nuclear demands, including co-ownership of Polaris submarines.

Highest official sources here today confirmed the Erhard program, arrived at after long, secret discussions with American and British diplomats as well as with Erhard's leading political opponents in West Germany.

Erhard will urge Mr. Johnson, of course, and to persuade American other Western allies, the following basic principles:

1. The creation of an allied nuclear force, built around six American and four British nuclear-powered Polaris submarines, to be jointly owned by the United States, Britain, West Germany, the Netherlands and Italy. The force would be under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR). It would not initially be mixed-manned. It would, however, be so organized as to permit the member nations to add "new generation" weapons systems in the future.

2. Exclusive veto over the use of the force's atomic missiles would rest with the President of the United States. Presumably, however, the treaty or agreement setting up the force would include a "Europe clause" — permitting the transfer of the force, and perhaps a partial veto over the use of the force, to the government of a United States of Europe should such unity be achieved.

3. Enlarged powers for, and an enlarged German role in, the NATO "special committee" organized under Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's aegis last month. West Germany wishes to participate not merely in atomic-targeting and formation of nuclear strategy, but in "crisis management." While welcoming a seat on the McNamara "working group"

See ERHARD, A10, Col. 2

for planning, Bonn would also like to take part in the groups on intelligence and communications, which relate to "crisis management."

4. Formal U.S. rejection of any Soviet or neutralist-nation draft for a treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons that did not permit establishment of either the allied or eventual "European" nuclear force. The West would argue that such forces did not constitute proliferation so long as a veto remained with one of the present nuclear powers.

5. Speedy implementation of the German demands on nonproliferation and nuclear planning, but a leisurely approach to the actual creation of the allied nuclear force.

Series of Compromises

The five points represent a series of compromises not only between West Germany and Britain, but also between German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder and his arch political foe, Franz-Josef Strauss.

Thus, the kind of force Erhard will propose is a slightly modified, scaled-down version of the "Atlantic nuclear force" urged by Britain a year ago—except that Britain is now apparently agreeable to command by SACEUR rather than a separate command structure.

The "European" features of the Erhard proposals represent a long-term commitment to the "grand design" recently outlined by Strauss—in which a separate "European deterrent" might eventually be created by merging British and French atomic weaponry.

Informed German press reports, uncontradicted in official circles today, declare that the terms of the proposals have been approved by all members of the Cabinet as well as highest leaders of Erhard's Christian Democratic Union. These include not only Strauss but Heinrich Krone, Special Minister for National Security and close friend of former Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. No reason has, however, been reported for Adenauer himself.

Cost Is Factor in Delay

There are three reasons why Erhard is prepared to delay actual creation of the force. First, West Germany in 1967 will not be prepared to make the sizable financial contribution necessary to buy its share of ownership. Second, a number of German leaders consider the threat of creating such a force more useful as a bargaining counter with the Russians than the actual force would be. The "pause," therefore, could be utilized for intensive German-Soviet negotiations.

Finally, some Bonn officials as well as the governments of Italy and the Netherlands would prefer to resolve the

Washington Post
12/18/65

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Finally, some Bonn officials, as well as the governments of Italy and the Netherlands, would prefer to resolve the crisis in the Common Market before provoking French President de Gaulle in the nuclear field. Therefore, a number of allied officials hope that—even if Mr. Johnson and Erhard reach agreement next week—the program will not be publicly unfurled for at least several months.

Both Erhard and Schroeder, however, appear perfectly prepared for a complete break with France should they achieve U.S. endorsement of their nuclear program. According to highest official circles, for example, West Germany is prepared — if France does not accept current Common Market compromise terms—to move ahead with the "Kennedy Round" tariff negotiations and other projects on the basis of the "majority rule" provisions of the Rome Treaty.

In other words, Erhard stands ready to see France leave the Common Market altogether, and to proceed with five instead of six members. Erhard has always made plain that he preferred a broad free-trade area, including Britain, to the present organization of the Common Market Six.

Bonn officials appear confident that they can win approval of their program by the United States and Britain, and thereby will be in a strong position to "outbluff" or defeat Gen. de Gaulle in the contest for the leadership of Europe. However, both diplomatic and unofficial German observers fail to share Bonn's confidence in any of these respects.

With regard to the United States, Bonn has been strongly encouraged by an important faction of the State Department — namely, the so-called Theologians who devised the abandoned scheme for a mixed-manned surface fleet, and who are largely identical with the group that considers the isolation of Gaullist France the supreme aim of American policy in Western Europe.

West German leaders have apparently been led by this group to believe that, if Erhard insists strongly on the current program in his talks with Mr. Johnson, the President will assent to it and give it the full weight of American backing in further dealing with Britain, France and other allies.

However, persistent reports from Washington in the German press this week assert that while President Johnson is willing to consider German ideas, he sees no great urgency in the issue—especially so long as Prime Minister Wilson's attitude is unclear and French policy remains so decidedly hostile. It is thought that Mr. Johnson will prefer to await a meeting with de Gaulle, possibly next spring before reaching such weighty and controversial agreements with the Germans.

Question of Britain

As for Britain, Bonn officials believe that because they have essentially accepted the British design for an allied nuclear force, the British — especially in their financial difficulties —will have to go along if Mr. Johnson makes that design his own.

However, senior British diplomats have made plain here that, in all their dealings with the Germans on the force, they were developing the details of only one policy option under consideration by Wilson. No British diplomat has professed to speak the Prime Minister's final judgment on the matter, and several have indicated that he may be more interested in a non-proliferation agreement, a personal journey to Moscow, or even an East-West summit meeting.

With a precarious majority in Parliament (including a strongly anti-German left wing), few British observers consider it likely that Wilson would bind himself now to much more than continued discussion of the German ideas.

As for French reaction, opinions differ only as to how violent and effective de Gaulle's reaction will be. Optimistic Bonn officials believe that, as a result of the first round result of the French presidential election, the [illegible] Gaullism is ended.

Lower Percentage

Erhard personally has been elated by the fact that de Gaulle on the first round polled a lower percentage of the vote than he polled in the recent German election.

It is argued that, faced with the combined resolve of America, Germany and Britain, the aging French President will have no choice but to yield gracefully.

Outside official quarters, on the other hand, there are fears that the Erhard-Schroeder nuclear drive could undo years of allied policy in Western Europe and the Franco-German life work of former Chancellor Adenauer. De Gaulle might, it is argued, be driven not only to wreck Western and inter-allied cooperation in the political, economic and military fields but recognize East Germany and conclude a pact with the Soviet Union.

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

8

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

This document consists of 1 pages.
Number 18 of 76 copies, Series A

November 9, 1965

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Charles Johnson

FROM: ACDA/ST - Herbert Scoville, Jr.

SUBJECT: Staff Study on Ballistic Missile Proliferation (U)

The further spread of nuclear weapons is recognized as a threat to U.S. and world security. However, the dissemination of systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons interacts with nuclear proliferation and is also a serious issue. Both of these related problems have been of concern to ACDA in our continuing efforts to understand and deal with the overall question of proliferation.

Attached for your information is a staff study which focuses on perhaps the most important class of nuclear delivery systems--ballistic missiles. The purpose of the study is to identify and define the problem of ballistic missile proliferation, and provide an initial analysis of the subject from an arms control viewpoint. Any personal comments you may have would be appreciated.

Attachment:

Staff study

When separated from attachment, handle this Document as UNCLASSIFIED

...matic ... declassification

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ST 3920

SECRET - NOFORN

8a

This document consists of 53 pages.
Number 18 of 80 copies, Series A

AN INITIAL STUDY OF BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION (U)

by

Jerome H. Kahan

Science and Technology Bureau

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

November 1, 1965

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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SECRET - NOFORN

TABLE OF CONTENTS

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN

I. BACKGROUND

The problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been clearly recognized as a threat to the security of the U.S. and as a serious danger to world peace and security. However, the question of nations acquiring the means of delivering nuclear weapons is also serious, and, of the various means of delivery, ballistic missiles are of prime importance.

Once a nation has developed nuclear weapons and even if aircraft are available, the military and political significance of its nuclear capability will be considerably increased if associated with a missile delivery system. Conversely, if a nation can acquire a missile delivery system, the probability that it would decide to pursue an indigenous nuclear weapons program--or even attempt to purchase nuclear weapons--may well increase. If the further spread of nuclear weapons could be controlled, it could be argued that missile proliferation would be relatively unimportant; however, since this result is not certain, retarding the spread of nuclear forces by considering ballistic missiles is a vital part of the overall non-proliferation effort.

The bulk of the effort expended by the U.S. Government in the arms control and security area has been vis-a-vis the Soviet Union; lately the Nth country proliferation problem--nuclear weapons and delivery systems--has received increased attention. In particular, the acquisition of ballistic missiles by Nth countries, when related to the spread of nuclear weapons, has many dangerous ramifications for world stability, such as increasing the chance of a nuclear war occurring (through accident or miscalculation) and making it less likely that arms control agreements can be reached. In addition, the question of missile proliferation interacts with future U.S. (and Soviet) decisions on ABM deployment.

Although ballistic missile proliferation has undesirable aspects, the development of rockets for peaceful space purposes constitutes a growing and legitimate worldwide activity, and more and more nations are finding space a significant field for national and cooperative efforts. Basic space rockets and technology, however, can provide potential missile capabilities to nations. This problem of accepting, and even furthering, the spread of peaceful technology which also leads to increased military capabilities has been faced with regard to nuclear energy but has not been explored to nearly the same degree from the viewpoint of missiles and rockets. The question of safeguarding transfers of rockets and related technology has, for instance, not been systematically examined.

To help cope with the problems raised by missile proliferation, arms control measures and modifications in unilateral policies which affect Nth country ballistic missiles and space rockets will probably be required. Furthermore, presently developed measures affecting nuclear delivery vehicles, such as the SDV "freeze", will necessitate continuous re-evaluation with respect to including additional countries on the basis of their missile and rocket capabilities.

II. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this study is to identify and define the problem of ballistic missile proliferation, and provide an initial analysis of the problem from an arms control viewpoint.

In order to limit the scope of the initial effort, this study focuses on surface-to-surface ballistic missiles which are capable of delivering nuclear weapons over distances that are strategically significant for Nth countries. The proliferation of large space rocket systems which increase a nation's ability to produce nuclear-capable ballistic missiles is also of interest. All countries other than the Soviet Union and the U.S. are defined as Nth countries; the U.S. and the Soviet Union are considered from the viewpoint of their technical, military, and political influences.

Specifically, the central concern of this study is with the kinds of surface-to-surface ballistic missile systems (vehicle and ground-support equipment) which are capable of carrying payloads of 1,000 lbs. or more distances of at least 200 miles. Distances down to 200 miles encompass most "strategic" Nth country situations, and the constraint on payload weight represents a reasonable lower limit for early generation Nth country nuclear weapons.

Although beyond the scope of this study, it is nevertheless recognized that the problems associated with the spread of advanced aircraft capable of carrying nuclear bombs, the possible use of cruise (i.e., non-ballistic) missiles by Nth countries, and the role of small ballistic missiles with non-nuclear payloads in Nth country situations are all issues which deserve serious attention.

III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The following is a summary of the most pertinent aspects and principal conclusions of the study; the first four paragraphs relate to the Nth country missile problem, while the last three deal with U.S. policies and the role of arms control:

1. Nth countries desire ballistic missiles for military and political reasons, and tend to be particularly concerned with developing "credible" nuclear strategic missile forces to further national goals. The desire for nuclear missiles is particularly heightened by the growing tendency to classify nuclear powers into first-class and second-class powers depending upon whether or not they have missile delivery systems. Many nations are presently producing small rockets, but very few are developing satellite-launch vehicles or nuclear-capable missiles. The proliferation of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, in the context of possible nuclear weapons proliferation, has dangerous implications for U.S. and world security.

2. Although basic rocket technology has already spread, even relatively advanced nations encounter difficult, costly, and time-consuming problems when attempting to develop, test, produce, and deploy ballistic missile systems in significant quantities. Moreover, nations will have difficulty developing nuclear payloads for ballistic missiles, even if they have a basic nuclear weapons capability. A typical "partially industrialized" nation could produce a modest quality IRBM in 8 to 10 years and develop compatible nuclear payloads in a comparable period of time. Thus, because missile production is difficult and requires extensive effort, proliferation through this mode is not necessarily inevitable, and the prevention or control of missile proliferation appears feasible.

3. If a nation pursues an advanced space rocket program, it will be in a better position to develop nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and could retain this option. In general, conversion of large space rockets could provide a nation with a missile system more easily than direct production, but a fairly advanced scientific and industrial base is needed to

perform the conversion; conversion of small rockets to nuclear-capable missiles involves virtually complete production. Conversion programs can proceed quite far within the scope of peaceful space activities, either legitimately or by design, but, at some point, military characteristics such as flight testing, construction of many launch facilities, or some other indicator or combination of indicators would probably reveal a missile program.

4. Nth countries could acquire missiles (or easily convertible space rockets) through direct purchase, assuming there is a willing seller. Only a few nations are presently in a position to transfer nuclear-capable ballistic missiles or satellite-launch vehicles. These transfers are generally made on the basis of complex military, political, and economic factors in the same way as sales of other advanced weapons. Due to limited supplier capabilities and some recognition of proliferation problems, the present missile-transfer situation is not critical. Furthermore, nations do not acquire significant incremental capabilities for indigenous missile production through the ownership and operation of missile or space rocket systems. However, it is possible that regional or perhaps worldwide "missile-seller" races could occur as more nations develop missile production industries and as the demand for missiles and rockets increase.

5. The commercial export of missiles and rocket-related items from the U.S. requires government licensing, and U.S. export laws and procedures are in general adequate. Nevertheless, the U.S. is the world's largest supplier of these items through the cumulative effect of commercial exports of large quantities of dual-purpose or individually innocuous missile-related hardware and data, and through connections between U.S. and foreign firms. DOD military sales do not provide other nations with missile production capabilities, and although no explicit controls over the use of end-items exists, unauthorized use does not seem to be a present danger. Future cooperative ballistic missile production arrangements, if established, could present problems by proliferating indigenous production capabilities. NASA's international cooperative rocket programs do not incorporate the transfer of rocket production technology, and, because of this and other factors,

no missile proliferation problems are involved. However, controlling missile proliferation through "safeguarded" multilateral rocket cooperation might offer possible benefits.

6. NSAM 294 provides an excellent basis for U.S. missile proliferation policies, but it would be useful to redraft the NSAM to express formally its present application to all nations (not only France). The efficacy of U.S. missile non-proliferation policies depends primarily upon the priority assigned to the policies themselves. However, among the technical problems which should be investigated in order to help formulate and adequately implement these policies are: the systematic identification of "critical aspects" of Nth country missile programs; the question of "reverse engineering" for rockets (i.e., learning to produce purchased items by analyzing them); and the feasibility of a "two-key" system for ballistic missiles. There is, moreover, room for improvement on such legal matters as controlling work on foreign weapons programs by personnel under U.S. jurisdiction. U.S. unilateral information regarding Nth country missile and rocket programs is vitally important in support of unilateral policies and possible arms control measures.

7. Obtaining formal and informal multilateral arms control arrangements affecting missiles and rockets could help ensure the success of U.S. missile non-proliferation efforts. Examples of arms control measures which might be explored are: regional missile supplier/receiver arrangements; a missile non-dissemination agreement; and attempts to increase the priority and effectiveness of the missile export policies of other nations. In addition, the feasibility of "safeguarding" the transfers of rockets and technology in support of unilateral policies and with possible application to regional or international "space agencies" should be studied. The concept of an international satellite launch facility should also be examined as a means of complementing and reinforcing non-proliferation efforts.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. FACTORS AFFECTING MISSILE PROLIFERATION

This section highlights the political, military, and scientific factors related to missile proliferation, and examines the reasons why missiles proliferate. Section B describes the various modes of missile proliferation--that is, how missiles proliferate--and amplifies the more technical aspects of this section. The present Nth country missile situation is summarized in the Annex; readers desiring such background information might refer to the Annex at this point.

1. Importance of Ballistic Missiles

The importance of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles in a great power context has been underscored by the U.S. and the Soviet Union through the development and justification of their strategic missile forces. However, this view has been transferred to Nth countries as well. The U.S. has indicated, for instance, that the Communist Chinese nuclear threat will not become "significant" until China acquires a ballistic missile delivery capability. And, by denigrating the Force de Frappe, the U.S. and the Soviet Union have assigned additional prestige to French missile efforts.

On strategic grounds, nations recognize the value of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. While many Nth countries already own, or can obtain, aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons, there are relatively good means of defense against aircraft available, while effective ballistic missile defense in an Nth country context is virtually impossible for most nations to achieve without major external assistance. Even a few nuclear-armed missiles in the hands of an Nth country increase the political and military significance of its nuclear capabilities regionally and, to a lesser extent, vis-a-vis the major powers.

Thus, the extent to which nuclear weapons have been viewed as "the great equalizer" among large and small powers appears to be changing. There is a growing realization that it is the nuclear-armed missile which is the "ultimate weapon," and that there are two classes of existing, or potential, nuclear powers--those with ballistic missiles and those without them. This makes it more likely that ballistic missiles will proliferate in conjunction with nuclear weapons, and suggests that there are important interactions between the two problems.

Ballistic missiles with non-nuclear warheads have some political and psychological value but limited military utility in most Nth country contexts. Nevertheless, as suggested by the UAR situation, nations having no nuclear capability might desire missiles for these reasons or on the assumption that nuclear warheads might eventually be "acquired." Also, efforts by a country to obtain nuclear delivery vehicles, particularly ballistic missiles, could cause increased suspicions of its intent to acquire nuclear weapons, which could in turn stimulate nuclear and missile activities. Additionally, through sheer momentum, arms races in the area of advanced conventional weapons (e.g., aircraft or non-nuclear missiles) might tend to carry over into the nuclear delivery vehicle (and nuclear weapon) field, and could reinforce missile proliferation pressures.

Due to economic reasons or because of military or political factors (such as alliance membership or possible nuclear guarantees from the major powers), certain Nth countries might decide not to undertake strategic nuclear programs in the future. However, some nations might still wish eventually to develop ballistic missiles for political and prestige reasons, although some goals could be pursued through peaceful space rocket programs. On the other hand, even Nth countries with nuclear capabilities might find it more in their interest to rely on aircraft delivery only or to develop "bypass" weapons (e.g., nuclear-armed cruise missiles or delivery by ships) rather than to undertake ballistic missile programs.

Finally, possible ABM deployment against Nth country threats by the U.S. and/or the U.S.S.R. interacts with the problem of missile proliferation. ABM deployment could dissuade nations from acquiring ballistic missiles by decreasing the utility of missiles vis-a-vis the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and increasing the credibility of assurances by the major powers. On the other hand, ABM deployment could stimulate the desire for missiles among Nth countries by starting a new round in the strategic arms race, and ABM systems themselves might begin proliferating.

2. Relation to Nuclear Weapons

From a technological viewpoint, a combined nuclear warhead/missile delivery capability requires considerable missile technology (i.e., reasonably accurate and relatively powerful missiles) plus an advanced nuclear weapons capability (i.e., small and light nuclear weapons), each of which is difficult and time-consuming to achieve. A nation might not consider starting a large missile development program unless it undertook a parallel nuclear weapons program which could "converge" at the appropriate point in time with the missile program.

If a nation is far from a nuclear weapons capability it might choose not to undertake a missile program since ballistic missiles with conventional warheads are of marginal utility and producing a ballistic missile force is a time-consuming, costly, and uncertain undertaking. Additionally, since the nuclear weapons initially developed by Nth countries would be large and heavy, aircraft delivery might be the only feasible mode until and unless a small, lightweight nuclear payload is acquired. It should be noted that constraints in nuclear weapons testing, such as the partial test ban, would increase the difficulty and time involved in the development of nuclear weapons more conducive for use with missiles.

To the extent that a nation would find it difficult to acquire a missile capability, it might well be dissuaded from undertaking a nuclear program which would result in a "second-best" (i.e., aircraft only) deterrent force. On the other hand, since acquiring nuclear-capable ballistic missiles increases the significance of nuclear weapons, a potential (or existing) missile capability might stimulate a nation's desire for obtaining nuclear weapons.

With increasing space rocket developments, certain nations may be in a position to acquire a missile capability (through conversion) more easily and rapidly than they could develop nuclear warheads. The Japanese are approaching this situation, for example. On the other hand, many nations which could produce nuclear weapons relatively easily might not have the industrial and scientific capabilities needed to develop a large space rocket or ballistic missile system in a reasonable period of time--or at all. India, for instance, is, and will probably remain, closer to a nuclear weapons than to a missile capability.

3. Nth Country Missile Requirements

Powerful nations, such as France (which is well along in an IRBM program) and China (which is developing and testing ballistic missiles), tend to acquire fairly sophisticated missiles in order to gain maximum military credibility, political leverage, and world prestige. This tendency would probably be reflected in most Nth country situations. Additionally, from a strictly military point of view, it would be in the interest of an Nth country to deploy a reasonably invulnerable missile force (through concealment, hardening, or even sea basing) in order to decrease the chance that it might be pre-emptively attacked by an Nth country adversary--which might be able to do this without using missiles--or by a major power.

Thus, even if a nation could produce or acquire a "primitive" missile (i.e., low reliability, accuracy, etc.), it might not deploy such a system. Rather, a nation might continue missile development efforts and/or pursue a large-scale space rocket program in order to achieve a "standby" capability for sophisticated missile production.

Since unguided missiles at ranges of 200 miles or more are inaccurate (i.e., CEPs of 10-20 miles), Nth countries will have to incorporate some type of guidance in their missiles. Simple guidance systems, such as autopilots, can improve accuracy somewhat, but more sophisticated radio and/or inertial guidance systems would most likely be utilized.

It should be recognized, however, that many Nth countries do not require high quality missile performance. Reliabilities of even 50% and accuracies of a few miles would suffice for countercity deterrent roles. Applying U.S. and/or Soviet weapons standards or strategic criteria to other nations could result in misinterpretations of Nth country missile threats, particularly in regional contexts.

4. Scientific and Technological Aspects

Following the lead of the great powers, and based upon genuine scientific and prestige considerations, almost every nation of the world is involved in some sort of space research. Although basic space rocket and missile technology are similar, only nations with advanced space rocket capabilities are able easily to develop ballistic missiles by utilizing their space capabilities and "converting" space rocket systems to ballistic missile systems.

While many nations are presently producing sounding rockets, small battlefield rockets, SAMs, etc., few are undertaking large space rocket programs. Most nations are engaged only in support and experimental space activities, not in rocket production. However, during the next five to ten years, more nations will undertake advanced, more extensive space programs for a variety of reasons.

Nations could and might pursue space rocket programs on purely peaceful grounds, while at the same time retain the option to utilize their technological base and rockets for military purposes should the need ever arise. Japan is virtually in this position now. While this situation would appear to be optimal from the point of view of the Nth country, it leads to problems with respect to the larger powers, who recognize and wish to assist other nations in achieving a peaceful space capability but also realize that this may result in an increased military rocket capability.

Nations might undertake more extensive space rocket programs to obtain industrial and scientific side-benefits from such activities. Furthermore, economic factors may contribute to greater rocket production by industrialized Nth countries, as worldwide commercial markets open up and exports increase.

B. MODES OF MISSILE PROLIFERATION

There are three principal ways by which nations acquire ballistic missiles--production, conversion, and purchase. Although these proliferation "modes" are not completely unrelated, each has its own characteristics and is discussed separately.

1. Indigenous Missile Production

a. Production Difficulties

Basic rocket technology has already proliferated, and in this sense one could argue that the "missile Genie" is out of the bottle, and nothing can be done. Missile and rocket principles are well known; design and engineering information is available in open sources; and materials, components, and production equipment are relatively widely available. In addition, many nations already have some sort of indigenous rocket production capability, generally involving small research rockets or battlefield missiles, and a few nations are already developing powerful space rockets or ballistic missiles. Theoretically,

then, given enough time, resources, and money, almost any nation could develop a short-to-medium range ballistic missile system (capable of carrying a nuclear warhead) or powerful space boosters which can be easily converted. Dr. A. J. Hibbs has pointed out in his paper, "The Proliferation of Rocket Technology," that any partially industrialized nation could, in about eight to ten years, develop a modest quality missile capable of carrying a 1,000 lb. (i.e., nuclear) warhead a distance of 1,500 miles.

However, the fact that technology has proliferated does not mean that it is an easy or certain undertaking for a nation to develop a ballistic missile or large space rocket system, any more than the widespread knowledge of basic nuclear weapons technology and the existence of many nuclear reactors implies that producing nuclear weapons is easy. The costs and resources involved in developing, testing, and deploying even a small, modest quality ballistic missile force are great, and a major national commitment is required. The view that an indigenous ballistic missile program is in fact a difficult undertaking is supported by the history of the early U.S. missile and space efforts, the present technical problems being encountered by the ELDO and French national programs, the economic and other factors besetting UAR missile production, and the U.K.'s abortive attempt at deploying an IRBM force. Additional aspects which compound the situation are the uncertainties as to the estimated time and cost of a proposed system, and the possibility that the system will not be as good as anticipated or, even if it is, that it will be militarily obsolete or politically impotent.

The relative difficulty of producing ballistic missiles clearly depends upon the particular country involved--its scientific, military, and industrial base, and the numbers and kinds of missiles desired. Nations already producing small sounding rockets, battlefield or defensive missiles, or advanced aircraft would be better able to undertake a ballistic missile prgram than nations which do not have these kinds of capabilities. However, as will be discussed subsequently, only an advanced space rocket production capability will significantly reduce the time and effort associated with an indigenous ballistic missile program. External help from major powers in providing needed components and equipment and in establishing and operating

production and test facilities could, on the other hand, substantially reduce an Nth country's burden, and acquiring the services of rocket production experts can be extremely helpful.

b. Elements of Missile Production

In order to indicate more specifically the difficulties associated with missile production and the nature and scope of the effort required, the following discussion highlights the more important aspects of a ballistic missile production effort which might be undertaken by a typical "relatively industrialized" Nth country having no ongoing large-scale space rocket development program.

For both solid and liquid-fueled rockets a broad industrial base for design, development, production, testing, and deployment is required--even broader than that needed for producing nuclear weapons. This base includes advanced metal-working facilities, chemical industries, propulsion capabilities, and sophisticated electronics and test equipment. Initially hundreds and eventually possibly thousands of skilled scientific, engineering, management, and operating personnel are needed, and large-scale training programs might be required.

The bulk of the time and effort (but not necessarily cost) associated with a ballistic missile program is spent on development, more specifically on the research, development, testing, and evaluation sequence. Once a missile system has been developed and a number of prototypes have been produced and successfully tested, so-called "series production" can begin. Developing a guidance and control system would present the single most difficult problem to almost any nation indigenously producing its own advanced space or ballistic missile system, even though accuracy requirements may not be as stringent as those of the U.S.* In the initial phases of series production,

*France and Japan, two nations with advanced rocket capabilities, appear to be finding guidance the "pacing item" in their programs, despite the fact that many modest quality inertial and radio guidance components are available on the world market.

some design changes or modifications may be incorporated, but eventually a relatively steady production rate can be achieved (e.g., two, three, or perhaps ten missiles per month). Deployment of these missiles depends, of course, upon the availability of launch sites.

In addition to the need for testing and quality assurance associated with missile development and production, flight testing must be undertaken to verify system performance, detect design errors, gather empirical data on such critical factors as accuracy and reliability, and for purposes of crew training. For missiles of ranges greater than that of about 1,000 miles, flight testing is particularly critical in terms of understanding and solving re-entry problems. Flight test ranges would have to be established, and this might require small nations to look elsewhere for ranges of adequate size. Range instrumentation and support facilities would be required, but the exact equipment used would vary depending upon flight test objectives and number of flight tests required.*

The time needed to develop, test, produce, and deploy a ballistic missile or space rocket system depends upon many factors including the existing industrial and rocket base of the particular nation involved, the amount of effort and resources applied, and the type and number of missiles programmed.** In general, even with a crash program, a country inexperienced in rocket technology could not deploy 20 or 30

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*The number of flight tests needed essentially depends upon the degree of reliability and quality control desired. On the average, for short-to-medium range ballistic missiles, between 15 and 25 flight tests would be necessary. Initial tests could be carried out at reduced range, but later tests would most likely be at full range.

**The time referred to covers the entire development-production-deployment sequence; once series production begins the time per missile is relatively short (on the order of a few months), and, if hardened sites are involved, the launcher associated with each missile is the longest lead-time item.

modest quality missiles capable of carrying nuclear-weight payloads over 200-1,000 mile distances in less than four to five years. The eight-year period represented by the German V-2 schedule is probably more realistic, while a ten-year allowance would be conservative. The Japanese space rocket program, for example, is in its tenth year and Japan has not yet launched its first satellite.

The cost associated with a space rocket or ballistic missile system can be considered to consist of the development cost plus the additional cost (per item) for each missile produced during series production. Development costs encompass production facilities and related equipment, missile hardware, flight test facilities, and ground support equipment (which generally accounts for more than half the total cost). Although quite substantial, the absolute cost or percent of the GNP of a missile or space rocket system, however, is not necessarily an accurate measure of its impact on the economy of an Nth country. Since these programs utilize industrial capabilities and scientific talent which might be applied elsewhere, there could be a greater adverse economic impact than might be expected. On the other hand, because of the breadth and depth of engineering and scientific capabilities associated with the development of large rocket systems, nations can enhance their technological base and gain industrial side-benefits.

Instead of presenting general cost estimates, the following examples indicate the range of figures involved for a variety of Nth country situations:

(1) The cost of developing, producing, and operating the French land-based IRBM program over the ten year period from 1960 to 1970 is estimated to total between $1.25 and $1.75 billion. The bulk of this cost will be for series production of between 50 and 200 missiles with associated hardened launch sites. This cost represents an average of about 1% of the French GNP.

(2) The Japanese solid-rocket space program is an example of a 10 year development effort to achieve a sattelite

launch rocket. The total 10 year cost to date is estimated at $50 million; a possible $120 million additional is estimated for the next five years (for production and support of satellite rockets.) If the Japanese were to use their space rocket capabilities and develop ballistic missiles, the development effort associated with "conversion" would cost about $500 million ($200 to $300 million could be part of the advanced space program.) It is estimated that a force of 200 IRBMs and 100 soft sites could be produced and deployed by Japan at a cost of anywhere between $1 and $2 billion (by 1969); this would be below 1% GNP.

(3) As an example of a nation with a modest industrial base and no ongoing rocket program of any significance, consider India. It is estimated that the development of a satellite launch rocket (minus the satellite) would cost India about $55 million over a period of eight years.

(4) Although figures are not available, the UAR, in attempting to develop a 200 mile range nuclear-capable ballistic missile of an accuracy (CEP) of 5-10 miles, has experienced serious technical and financial difficulties and has felt adverse economic effects.

c. Interaction with Nuclear Weapons

Since the principal significance of ballistic missiles from the viewpoint of this study is related to their use with nuclear payloads, it is important to consider the time Nth countries would require to develop missile-compatible nuclear warheads. Although again generalizations are difficult, and each nation is different, "partially industrialized" nations which could, as discussed, develop a nuclear-capable missile in about eight years would need about this same time period to develop a nuclear weapon weighing about 1,000 lbs. which could be carried by the missile. This assumes that a primitive nuclear "device" could be developed in about four years. Clearly, for nations with advanced nuclear capabilities this time would be reduced.

More specifically, based on the U.S. nuclear program and the French and Chinese experiences, it is fair to state that the first device which a nation tests weighs about 5,000 to 10,000 lbs. (including the case or re-entry body) and that about four more years are needed to reduce this weight by a factor of 10 to 1,000 lbs., assuming fission bombs are involved. Further improvements in yield-to-weight ratios are difficult to achieve, and have been achieved by the U.S. and the Soviet Union but with great effort and sophistication. Development of thermonuclear weapons can, of course, significantly reduce yield-to-weight ratios, but a 1,000 lb. fission device would most likely precede a fusion device of comparable weight (but far greater yield).

2. Conversion of Space Rockets

a. Basis for Conversion

The scope of space research and exploration programs has been expanding in depth and in the number of nations involved. Hundreds of sounding rockets for meteorological research are launched each year, and many bilateral and multilateral cooperative programs are underway around the world in the space field. The United States, through NASA and its cooperative programs, is working with nations in many peaceful space activities. The U.N. and organizations such as COSPAR are also active in the space area. These programs involve data exchange, project coordination, or scientific experimentation; they do not provide Nth countries with rocket production capabilities.

Many nations already have limited space rocket programs, and a few have relatively advanced space programs (e.g., Japan). European nations in particular, through national efforts and cooperative programs such as ELDO and ESRO, have a growing interest in space.

The basic industrial capabilities and skills for the production of space rockets are generally applicable to the production of missiles. As a nation develops more sophisticated

and larger sounding rockets, perhaps attaining a satellite launch capability, it builds up a broader indigenous base of facilities and expertise from which to undertake a ballistic missile program. Nations can build larger and larger rocket capabilities by progressing in steps from small and modest space rockets to larger and larger rockets as manifested by the Japanese solid-rocket program.

b. Conversion Effort

Most space rockets--particularly the widespread class of small sounding rockets and small military rockets, SAMs, etc.--would not satisfy the range/payload requirements for the ballistic missiles considered "strategic" and of interest in this study. If an Nth country has the capabilities to produce small rockets, obtaining ballistic missiles or powerful space rockets (which are relatively easily converted to ballistic missiles) would require a substantial effort. Extensive developmental work, testing, and virtually new production facilities would be required. More powerful rockets could be developed through a number of techniques, including staging and/or clustering smaller boosters, increasing the energies of rocket fuels associated with smaller rockets, or, of course, directly developing larger and more powerful boosters. Appropriate guidance systems would, in general, also have to be developed (or acquired) and tested.

The conversion effort needed to develop ballistic missiles or powerful space rockets starting from small rockets and associated capabilities essentially amounts to production, and would involve approximately the same time, cost, and resource factors discussed above. Moreover, if a nation with no indigenous rocket capability and an unsophisticated industrial base acquires small space rockets, conversion would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.

Conversion of certain powerful space rockets to ballistic missiles, can, on the other hand, be more easily accomplished. All satellite launch rockets and some high-energy sounding rockets have innate capabilities in terms of thrust and, for some rockets, guidance that allow them to be utilized, with minor modifications, as short-to-medium range (e.g., 200-1,000 miles) missiles with nuclear payload capabilities. These modifications may include structural changes,

engine recalibration, guidance and control adjustments, and elimination of excess telemetry components.* In addition, missile launch facilities would have to be established, and series production undertaken on an increased scale to mount the desired force.

As an example, the Japanese space program provides a base for the development of a missile effort. Assuming that a MU-type vehicle for satellite launching is successfully developed in 1965 and allowing an additional two to three years for a missile flight test program and the incorporation of changes in the guidance and ground support system, it is estimated that a nuclear-capable (2,000 lb. payload) IRBM based on this vehicle could reach initial operating status in 1968 or early '69. Cost estimates for this conversion were given in the previous discussion of missile production.

It should be recognized, however, that a conversion effort is relatively easy for nations which have actually produced the space vehicle or have equivalent advanced industrial capabilities. If a nation with a primitive rocket program and unsophisticated industries acquires a powerful space rocket, conversion would not be easy or certain, and maintaining a missile force would present problems. (These and other facets of rocket purchases are discussed below.)

c. Space Rocket Versus Missile Characteristics

Although powerful space rockets can, in general, be relatively easily converted to ballistic missiles, this does not mean that space rocket and ballistic missile systems are identical. On the contrary, there are a number of important differences in terms of both basic characteristics and performance requirements which complicate and provide indications of a conversion effort:

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*As in the case of indigenous production, development of an adequate guidance and control system, if not available or able to be purchased, would probably be the most critical factor in conversion.

(1) Military systems utilize many launching sites; this differs from space systems where even the major powers have relatively few launch facilities. Additionally, many nations would not be satisfied with constructing soft pads, but would desire to attain some degree of missile survivability through hardening or mobility (aside from reliance on numbers).

(2) The shape and nature of military re-entry vehicles are different from space payloads and, in general, there are no space applications for missile R/V's and no ballistic missile applications for space payload packages. Most scientific space payloads do not return to earth and none generally returns at steep re-entry angles (i.e., high speeds). Ballistic missiles of ranges greater than about 1,000 miles require that the R/V's have proper heat shielding because of high speed re-entry; missiles of ranges below 1,000 miles do not encounter significant re-entry heating problems.

(3) Most satellite launch vehicles utilize radio guidance because of its flexibility; however, inertial guidance may be preferable in some situations. Although both radio and inertial guidance systems are used in ballistic missiles, inertial systems are more desirable in a ballistic missile program. Unguided space rockets have almost no military utility in Nth country situations.

(4) Although in the initial phases of both space and military programs the flight test conducted follow similar patterns, military systems require additional and somewhat different flight testing for re-entry body development, accuracy and reliability refinements, and crew training.

(5) Both liquid and solid-fueled rockets can be used in advanced space or ballistic missile systems, but liquids tend to be preferred in space work since they are presently capable of achieving higher specific impulse and provide greater flexibility. In a military role, where quick-reaction and survivability are more important, solids or storable liquids rather than non-storable (cryogenic) rockets would probably be utilized.

The characteristic differences between space and military systems discussed above should be considered in any evaluation of the feasibility of conversion and the military capabilities of space rockets. These differences become even more important when considering the problem of a nation attempting to develop a missile system under the guise of a space program since, at some point, certain military indicators such as re-entry testing, construction of large numbers of launch sites, and an increased production rate could arise. On the other hand, by the time certain indicators are observed, the effort could be fairly well advanced and appropriate responses might be less possible.

3. Purchasing Missiles

a. Missile Suppliers

Although many kinds of missile-related components and equipment and small sounding rockets are commercially available from the U.S., France, Japan, and other countries, larger rockets and ballistic missiles of interest in this study are not widely available.* This is due, in part, to the fact that most nations have not yet developed their own indigenous capability, but appears also to reflect some recognition by the suppliers of the potential dangers associated with indiscriminate missile transfers. At the present time, the possibility of misuse is low since supplier nations generally are aware of the location and use to which the missiles are put.

Indications are that from the viewpoint of Nth countries, France and Japan appear to be emerging as potential missile and rocket suppliers. Israel has arranged to purchase short-range nuclear-capable ballistic missiles being produced by a French firm. Whatever one might think about French policy, this sale might not necessarily indicate that the French intend

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*Missiles such as SAMs are fairly widespread, but are usually part of military sales or assistance arrangements and involve missiles which do not have offensive nuclear capabilities.

to sell missiles in large quantities to many nations; our Ambassador in Paris attributes the Israeli arrangement to the "special relationship" between the nations involved. Japan has sold ten small Kappa sounding rockets to Indonesia, but present indications are that exports of more powerful rockets such as Lambdas or Mus are not planned, and that Japan appears to recognize the problem of missile proliferation.

The U.S. and the Soviet Union are by far more advanced in the missile and space rocket fields than other nations, and are considered in this study from the viewpoint of their present and potential influence on missile proliferation.* In terms of supplying missiles, the Soviets have not, in general, been following a policy of exporting significant offensive missile or rocket-related technology or components outside their borders, nor have they significantly helped other countries (including the satellites) to develop large rockets or missiles by exporting related technology. While the Soviets tend to seek markets for their obsolescent armaments, they have <u>not</u> assisted nations in ballistic missile or space rocket R&D or production.

To be sure, Soviet assistance to China in the 1950's is an important exception, but this was terminated in mid-1960, and does not invalidate the general pattern. Cuba appears to be a dramatic exception but in that case the missiles were under <u>Soviet</u> control. Rumors of the introduction of Soviet IRBMs into Indonesia have not been substantiated. The Soviets have supplied FROG and SCUD missiles to Hungary, East Germany, and Poland. Of these two rockets, the SCUD (SS-1) missile is the most powerful with a range of about 150 miles; the nuclear warhead is under Soviet control. The Soviets have provided devensive surface-to-air missiles to a number of countries in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. Soviet arms shipments to the Middle East, although extensive, have not been related to the UAR ballistic missile program in any direct way.

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*A discussion of U.S. policies and programs related to missile proliferation including such matters as training and assistance provided under cooperative space or military assistance programs, the implications of U.S. commercial exports, and the ability to detect Nth country missile programs is presented in Section C.

b. Dissemination Pressures

Nth country purchases of ballistic missile systems could become the principal mode of missile proliferation, and could cause serious problems. The French-Israeli missile arrangement is an example of this, primarily because of Israel's potential nuclear capability and the entire Middle East situation. U.S. sales of Pershing missiles to Italy and the FRG do not constitute nearly as serious a problem, although it also represents "missile proliferation." The associated nuclear warheads are under U.S. control and, due to many political and military factors, these nations are far from acquiring independent nuclear weapons.

The problem of indiscriminate missile transfers is not yet critical. However, there appear to be commercial, military, and scientific pressures building up towards missile proliferation. Unless major supplier nations are willing and able to establish and enforce appropriate policies, exports of rockets and rocket-related components may increase dramatically in the next five years. As an additional aspect of the problem, it should be noted that, even though missiles will become more easily obtainable, many nations might nevertheless prefer to develop an indigenous missile production capability in spite of its cost and difficulty in order to remain as independent as possible in the face of changing political and military factors.

A brief analysis* of the export laws of other nations indicates that virtually all nations with advanced technology have some procedures to control missile and rocket-related hardware. However, only a few control shipments of technical data, and only one has control over shipments by subsidiary firms located abroad and over transshipments to non-Communist nations. To the extent that nations desiring to prevent the export of missiles, rockets, and related items and data have inadequate control mechanisms, control of missile proliferation will be made more difficult. Moreover, there does not seem to be an opprobrium on transferring missiles or missile technology comparable to that on nuclear weapons. In part, this could be due to the peaceful and scientific aspects of space research, and in part due to the fact that missiles without nuclear warheads tend to be viewed as "conventional" weapons such as aircraft.

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*Performed by ACDA's General Counsel's Office

c. Utility of Purchased Missiles

A nation purchasing or otherwise obtaining ballistic missiles or space rockets, does not acquire the ability to produce missiles. Some useful design and engineering knowledge can be obtained by disassembling rockets and analyzing propellant and material composition.* However, much of this sort of information is available in open sources. It should also be recognized that the principal problem faced by nations with fairly advanced rocket capabilities in undertaking a missile program is establishing the specific production facilities and investing their resources in a large-scale program. Knowledge of basic design and engineering data would not therefore appear significantly to increase the ability of such nations to produce ballistic missile systems. Alternatively, nations with primitive rocket capabilities, limited resources, and an unsophisticated industrial base are so far away from being able to produce a nuclear-capable ballistic missile, that the knowledge acquired would not appreciably affect this situation. Moreover, such nations would have difficulty analyzing the items.

Joint production and testing programs involving conventional missiles (e.g., NATO Hawk) and general R&D cooperation with nations in the missile field transmit some information and operational skills to Nth countries. Nations purchasing and utilizing space rockets acquire operating capabilities, including tracking, data processing, launching, and maintenance capabilities. Missile transfer arrangements, under NATO for example, usually involve operational training and maintenance assistance, and limited facilities for overhaul, support, and maintenance have been established under U.S. military sales and grant arrangements. However, in view of the kinds of missiles and rockets involved and the fact that production capabilities are not transmitted, no significant missile proliferation problems seem to be raised by the above kinds of activities as they are presently structured.

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*DOD/ODDR & E, in analyzing the Pershing missile, has concluded that no significant incremental ability actually to produce the items could be acquired by the FRG; however, the general question of "reverse-engineering" for rockets--i.e., producing a rocket by working from the end item only without having blueprints, production specifications or equipment, etc.--has not been studied.

In considering the implications of missile and rocket sales, the question of how receiver nations might utilize the end-items arises. Missiles supplied by the U.S. or the Soviet Union do not represent significant problems, because of the nature and context of the transfers involved. With respect to the future French sale of missiles to Israel, nothing can be said at the present time. However as suggested earlier, potential "missile" suppliers show indications of concern with the problem of the use of supplied items. In the space field, the U.S.* and some other suppliers account for the appropriate expenditure of the rockets provided. In the U.S. case, U.S. personnel either perform or assist in the launchings, or are present at the launch site in most instances.

Thus, it appears that if the present patterns continue, Nth countries might not be able easily to "stockpile" or even misuse supplied rockets or missiles. However, if some space rocket stockpiling does occur, conversion to ballistic missiles would not easily or automatically follow (as discussed above). If large ballistic missile systems are purchased directly, such systems are difficult to maintain and operate, particularly with respect to the ground support equipment. Therefore, Nth countries might not be able to utilize acquired missiles, and might find it necessary to ask for assistance.

C. RELEVANT U.S. PROGRAMS

This section discusses U.S. programs and activities in the commercial, military, space, and intelligence areas, with emphasis on rockets and missiles.

1. Commercial Exports

Rocket-related components, equipment, and technical data are exported from the U.S. through commercial channels. Most

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*Section C discusses relevant aspects of U.S. space rocket and missile transfers.

such items are subject to export control in which each shipment must be licensed by the government. Missiles, components, and technical data, if not subject to security restrictions, come within this control.* All space research rockets and many related items are subject to export control and are generally transferred as part of agreed NASA programs. Powerful space rockets are subject to export control and are not generally commercially available from the U.S., except in limited numbers or as part of cooperative space programs.** Ballistic missiles (e.g., Pershings) are not exported privately but by DOD under military sales arrangements with other governments.

The U.S., because of its advanced capabilities, exports more rocket-related items than any other nations. Even though obvious commercially available rocket items are subject to control and are generally exported only selectively, there is a cumulative proliferation effect due to the outflow of large quantities of missile-related items which are either dual-purpose or which appear unrelated to missile production or testing when viewed individually.

Detailed export figures are difficult to obtain. About half of the $3 billion in military-related sales orders in the period 1962 through 1964 were directly related to aerospace industries, but the bulk of these exports were in the aircraft area. The volume of private (i.e., "commercial") sales of all military-related equipment compared with DOD sales is generally small, and this is probably true of missile-related items as well.

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*This does not apply if the government is the source of the shipment and/or handles transportation, as would be the case for items subject to security restrictions.

**A well-known example of a commercially available rocket is the Cubic Corporation's Forrester satellite launch vehicle; none has yet been exported.

However, assessing the significance of U.S. commercial rocket exports on the basis of gross military sales quantities and dollar values may be misleading. Rather, the kinds of items exported are significant, since missile and rocket production is based on sophisticated technology and tends to be critically dependent on particular components or test equipment--not necessarily on the quantities of items obtained.

The magnitude and impact abroad of U.S. missile-related exports and assistance through company channels may be inferred by considering the dependency of the missile programs of other nations on U.S. exports. 25x1 Western European nations, particularly the French over the past years, depend heavily on the support they receive from the U.S. through purchases of U.S. equipment and technology and interactions with U.S. firms.

25x1

2. Military Sales

The present planned military sales and assistance programs do not appear to be a major problem with respect to

25x1

proliferation of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. The emphasis is on aircraft, tanks, and associated logistics, and providing SAMs and other battlefield missiles to complete NATO force requirements. There are no joint R&D programs affecting nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. All U.S. military sales programs are coordinated within the government and are subject to high-level policy decisions. Exports associated with these programs may flow either through approved commercial or military channels.*

With respect to missile exports, the only U.S. missiles which have nuclear delivery capabilities of concern in this study are the Pershings which have been sold to Italy and the FRG to satisfy NATO Force goals, and the POLARIS, which are to be supplied to the U.K. under the Bermuda agreement. The nuclear warheads for the Pershing missiles are under U.S. control, and the U.S. is aware of the deployment of these missiles. This situation could be considered "controlled" proliferation, since there is little danger of the missiles being used in a nuclear role without U.S. consent, and no conventional role seems feasible. Furthermore, no production capabilities have been transferred; U.S. training programs provide our allies with the capability to operate and maintain, but not to produce, these missiles.

During the last five years, U.S. military transfer efforts have shifted from reliance on grant aid to emphasis on bilateral sales arrangements. The major exception to this policy is the cooperative NATO production of ASMs, AAMs, and SAMs, which was established about four years ago. The NATO Hawk production consortium did, in its early days, considerably help to provide Western European nations, particularly France, with the basis for advanced missile production, but the level of technology in Europe has now exceeded this. Of late, however, the U.S. has been considering moving in the direction of increased emphasis on joint weapons production. European nations in particular and other fairly industrialized nations

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* Concerning classified data, the U.S. Military Information Control Committee (U.S. MICC) establishes classification guidelines and declassification criteria.

of the world are now interested in developing indigenous weapons production capabilities and do not wish to continue to rely on external suppliers. Secretary McNamara, consistent with this movement, has recently suggested that NATO undertake a weapons production-sharing program.

If, in the future, the concept of joint arms production is implemented on a large scale and joint production of ballistic missiles is undertaken, it could have an adverse effect on missile proliferation unless appropriately controlled. It might be more desirable for the U.S. to sell complete missile systems rather than to enter into production arrangements whereby other nations could acquire from the U.S. specific skills and special-purpose equipment and thus develop an indigenous missile production capability (as in the case of the Hawk program in France). Limited numbers of certain kinds of missiles could, when necessary for political and/or military reasons, be provided to other nations and placed under some sort of "two-key" arrangement or subjected to deployment restrictions as a method of "safeguarding" their use.* This approach could help dissuade a nation from investing its own resources in production and would help limit the number of missile suppliers in the world.

3. NASA International Programs

NASA's cooperative international space rocket programs involve sounding rocket probes and satellite experiments using U.S. launch vehicles. Projects with other nations do not involve collaboration in booster technology, and rocket production information is not transmitted. The programs are bilateral, with both U.S. and the cooperating nation providing its share towards a mutually beneficial space research experiment through supplying hardware and equipment; no transfer of funds occurs, and no U.S. aid or assistance (as in military assistance) is given.

Most of NASA's rocket experiments utilize small research rockets which do not have the "strategic nuclear" payload capabilities of interest in this study, and most of these rockets have virtually no military capability in any sense. NASA verifies the expenditure of each sounding rocket, often by having

*The Thor missiles once deployed in Europe were controlled by a "two-key" system.

observers present at the launch site, and there is no "stockpiling" of these rockets by recipient nations. With regard to satellite launch vehicles, the general pattern has been for nations to provide satellites for launching by U.S. owned and operated rockets. The recent San Marco Project with Italy, on the other hand, involved the orbiting of a satellite by an Italian crew (trained by U.S. personnel) using a U.S.-supplied rocket (a Scout) and a "floating" launch platform developed by Italy. U.S. observers were at the launch site, and expenditure was verified.

Due to the nature and scope of present NASA programs, there appear to be no dangers from the viewpoint of missile proliferation. Nations do not acquire the ability to produce rockets, stockpiling does not occur, and knowledge gained by learning how to launch research rockets does not contribute significantly to the technology and skills needed to develop missiles or convert rockets. In the NASA context as well as the military sales context, it is acquisition of rocket production capabilities which constitutes the most significant proliferation problem. In its advisory role with respect to export cases, NASA has recognized this and suggested numerous "conditions" which should or could be applied to export approvals.

On the other hand, from the viewpoint of utilizing peaceful space rocket cooperation as a means of "controlling" or "sublimating" potential missile proliferation, current U.S. programs and policies might be improved. The bilateral approach now emphasized tends more to encourage national space programs with greater potentials for diversion to military uses than do multilateral arrangements. Moreover, through multilateral space rocket cooperation, nations can profit from the pooling of resources leading to more extensive programs which can result in greater benefits to each participant than if each undertook its own small-scale project.

Cooperative space programs could be expanded to include transfers of rocket technology under "safeguarded" arrangements to guard against diversion of the equipment and facilities to military purposes (i.e., the development of missiles.) This kind of cooperation, in contrast to the present experimental orientation, can open up opportunities for arrangements with advanced nations

or groups of nations (e.g., ELDO) where the problems of both nuclear and missile proliferation are more critical, and where nations could profit greatly from the prestige of a successful large-scale space program. The U.S. could take the lead in establishing precedents and procedures for safeguarded rocket cooperation. Finally, to reinforce the foregoing, it would appear useful to consider providing credit arrangements or grants to nations in order to help them further their space endeavors, while offering increased opportunities to help direct Nth country rocket efforts along peaceful lines through U.S. involvement in their programs.

4. Unilateral Intelligence

Knowledge of the status and potentialities of Nth country rocket and missile programs is an important aspect of the missile proliferation question, since such information can assist U.S. policymakers in deciding on courses of action which might be taken to retard the spread of missiles. Intelligence analysis can support U.S. unilateral policies by pointing out, where possible, the technical or economic problems in Nth country missile or rocket programs, and by assessing, however grossly, the magnitude and impact of U.S. exports and assistance. And, technical analyses of the possible significance of particular items--in light of specific Nth country rocket programs--contribute to the evaluation of individual export license cases. Intelligence can also assist in gaining an understanding of the policies and practices of Nth countries regarding their export and assistance programs. Additionally, unilateral intelligence will contribute to U.S. requirements for and ability to verify arms control measures affecting Nth country missiles.

U.S. capabilities for detecting and monitoring Nth country rocket programs are generally good, but uneven on a worldwide basis. It would, however, be extremely difficult for an Nth country to hide a missile program. In addition to the broad base of intelligence which can be drawn upon and has been used to detect rocket and missile programs, one of the more useful set of indicators arise from the necessary flight testing of missiles * during the development-production phases.

* Detection of missile flights can be difficult, depending upon the range of the missile tested and the location of the range, although it might be possible, with enough effort, to detect flight tests at any given place.

The intelligence community also receives information from sources within U.S. industry which helps monitor the commercial relationships between foreign and U.S. companies and anticipate possible transactions.

In view of the foregoing discussion, it would be in the interest of the U.S. Government to improve as much as possible our Nth country missile and rocket intelligence capabilities and to give higher priority to these concerns within the intelligence community. The Non-Soviet Working Group of GMAIC* should continue to assign increasing priority to the missile proliferation problem.

D. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This section discusses present U.S. unilateral policies relating to missile proliferation, and highlights the purpose and nature of arms control in this context.

1. Missile Proliferation Policies

The single, most relevant unilateral policy affecting missile proliferation is contained in NSAM 294 which states that U.S. policy is not to provide significant direct assistance to national strategic nuclear forces, specifying France in particular. This policy is now being interpreted as applying to all nations,** although the NSAM has not yet been redrafted formally to express this expanded interpretation. NSAM 294 policy affects nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles (including ballistic missiles, rocket components, and related data). Within its scope are relevant U.S. commercial exports, cooperative space programs, and military assistance and sales arrangements.

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*Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee of USIB.
**In practice, this policy is not applied to the U.K.

There exists a number of more or less ad hoc U.S. policies related to missile proliferation. Present U.S. policy toward the Middle East is to refrain from becoming a major supplier of arms to the area, to oppose proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles, and to make occasional exceptional sales to meet defense needs and preserve stability (e.g., sales of Hawk air-defense missiles to Israel). U.S. policy toward Latin America is to attempt to avoid introducing into the region sophisticated offensive weapons, particularly advance aircraft (but, by inference, also ballistic missiles). The Indian and Japanese Working Groups of the Thompson Committee on Non-proliferation also deal with matters bearing on missile proliferation policies.

It would appear that the concerted effort of the U.S. Government growing out of NSAM 294 could become the central unilateral mechanism for implementing missile proliferation policies and coordinating the various commercial, political, military, and space aspects. Furthermore, for purposes of policy clarification and to enhance its impact, it would be useful to redraft the NSAM to express formally its applicability to all countries.

It would also be desirable for U.S. missile and advanced weapons transfer policies toward particular regions of the world, such as Latin American and the Middle East, to be brought within common policy guidelines, with due recognition of regional and country differences. This would necessitate appropriate definitions of "strategic" in small-power situations where nations are in close proximity. If "strategic" is only taken to be "nuclear", however, there could be problems in terms of narrowly interpreting this U.S. policy by not applying it to missiles and rockets which, though not nuclear-capable, can contribute to a nuclear missile capability. It would, therefore, seem advisable to cause a systematic review to be undertaken of this entire area, dealing with conventional missiles and research rockets.

In defining and enforcing unilateral policies affecting missile transfers, numerous factors are taken into account by U.S. policymakers. These factors include the technical capabilities of the foreign nation involved; the alternative

availability of components and assistance; U.S. hardware and data currently in the hands of the foreign countries; ongoing data exchange and military agreements; the situation of foreign subsidiaries and licensees of the U.S. companies; and the effect on the U.S. economy in terms of competitive position and balance of payments. The interpretation and implementation of these policies vary from country to country, and decisions tend to be made on a case-by-case basis.

The NSAM 294 Working Group has analyzed U.S. export laws and mechanisms, relevant programs, and the various factors affecting enforcement. The Working Group has highlighted many problems relating to enforcing U.S. unilateral policy under NSAM 294. For instance, agencies involved had differing interpretations and used different criteria, and interagency coordination was not adequate. Nevertheless, a number of matters relating to enforcement of missile proliferation policies have not been adequately dealt with and are discussed below. However, it should be recognized that the success of U.S. missile non-proliferation efforts depends less on enforcement mechanisms than on the policies guiding the application of these mechanisms. In particular, the priority given to the actual "non-proliferation" thrust of our policies needs to be increased in comparison with other high-level (but sometimes counter-vailing) policy considerations such as our balance-of-payments situation.

2. Policy Effectiveness

The NSAM 294 Working Group concluded that U.S. export laws governing the control of export of missiles and related items and information from the U.S. are generally adequate, and no additional regulations are needed. Certain legal "holes" in U.S. export mechanisms have been identified and actions are being taken. For instance, the problem of proliferation of missile technology through connections between U.S. firms, subsidiaries abroad, and foreign companies is being studied as dictated by NSAM 326. However, the legal aspects of re-export controls and transhipment have been only briefly examined under NSAM 294, and more study is needed. Also, the export laws of other nations were not analyzed, and, in the case of

both the U.S. and other advanced nations of the West, it appears necessary to explore possible loopholes in transhipment and re-export laws to non-bloc areas, where many of these regulations have not heretofore been successfully applied.*

There are proliferation problems caused by the availability of unclassified rocket information and rocket experts visiting and working in other nations. Although companies and individuals are required to report all contacts concerning potential military sales to foreign nations to the Office of Munitions Control, there appears to be some room for improvement in the controls over foreign weapons work by personnel under U.S. jurisdiction.** Also, there could be a danger that the U.S. is declassifying missile-related information on the basis of Soviet capabilities and consistent with U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union, and that not enough attention is being given to the Nth country missile situation.***

In order to increase the efficiency of U.S. export control mechanisms, it might be advisable to review periodically the various export lists to incorporate technological changes, and to prepare "handbooks" which could serve as policy guidelines. Furthermore, recognition should continue to be given to controlling equipment and information relevant to ground support, testing, and production associated with rockets, in addition to rockets and components per se. It would also seem advisable to consider establishing a centralized filing system for rocket-related export data to improve inter-agency coordination, facilitate statistical analyses, and help estimate the cumulative impact of U.S. rocket exports.****

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*There are existing multilateral export arrangements directed towards the Middle East (which are not too successful) but there are no multilateral restrictions directed toward non-bloc countries such as those directed toward the Soviet bloc countries.
**ACDA's General Counsel's Office is studying this problem in addition to the question of export laws of other nations.
***The recent export license case concerning the Douglas Corporation assisting the Japanese company of Mitsubishi in liquid-rocket technology indicated, for example, that virtually all of THOR missile technology has been declassified; U.S. MICC would appear to be the mechanism best suited to examing the broad issue involved.
****The erstwhile State-Defense Coordinating Committee on Military sales was

Technical studies are needed to support U.S. enforcement of rocket exports and as part of the overall missile non-proliferation effort. A broad study of the question of "reverse-engineering" for rockets (i.e., the extent to which analyses of end-items provides knowledge relating to the production of the item) can assist in our understanding of the spread of rocket production capabilities through rocket sales. The feasibility of applying "two-key" systems to ballistic missiles transferred to other nations should also be explored along with the possibility of developing ways of helping to verify that rocket components sold commercially or transferred under military arrangements are used for agreed purposes.* In addition, based on ACDA's work in describing "critical items" in the context of the freeze and other arms control agreements, a comprehensive study of the applicability of this concept to export control should be undertaken.**

A final factor relating to the effectiveness of U.S. unilateral policies deals with the question of the dependency of other nations on U.S. exports and assistance. In certain instances the U.S. may decide that it is in its net interest selectively to "proliferate" particular missile items or technology to specific nations because alternate suppliers are available or the nation involved is self-sufficient. Export decisions also tend to be made by balancing whether U.S. export denials would "significantly" affect another nation's missile or space capabilities against the possibility of such prohibitions having a marginal technical effect with counter-productive political or economic results.

It could well be, however, that the relative inability of the U.S. to prevent missile proliferation is given unwarranted

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*ACDA's Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau is performing an initial study of controls over the use of armaments provided through U.S. military assistance.

**In support of recent NSAM 294 activities, DOD/ODDR&E has already suggested six "critical areas" of technology which can be well-defined and which would appear to be significant if allowed to flow to France.

weight in policy decisions. It was concluded earlier that it is difficult for Nth countries to produce ballistic missiles for their own use and to sell to other nations. This point has been further underscored by the degree of dependence on the U.S. by advanced nations of Western Europe in the missile and rocket field. Additionally, as suggested in the previous discussion of Soviet policy, the argument that the Soviet Union will be an alternate supplier for a wide variety of weapons if the U.S. fails to provide support does not necessarily apply in the area of offensive ballistic missiles. Thus, in more instances than presently assumed, it is probable that U.S. prohibitions can adversely affect Nth country missile programs and, alternatively, selected and "safeguarded" U.S. involvement in peaceful rather than military programs can help ensure the success of the former.

3. Arms Control Policies

Unilateral U.S. policies alone cannot be expected to achieve desired missile non-proliferation goals. Bilateral and multilateral efforts must be pursued as a complementary part of unilateral policies. U.S. policies cannot always prevent certain nations from obtaining missile systems, related components, or production capabilities from other suppliers; therefore, it would be in our interest to attempt to enter into formal or informal arms control arrangements. Efforts to retard or control missile proliferation appear feasible on the basis of this study, which concludes that it is difficult to produce ballistic missiles, and, because of this and other factors, missile proliferation may not be inevitable. The desirability of undertaking such efforts has also been indicated.

In attempting to pursue multilateral solutions to the missile proliferation problem, the question of allowing for and defining "good" missiles (i.e., space rockets and defensive and small tactical missiles) versus "bad" missiles must be considered. Focusing on strategic nuclear ballistic missiles seems reasonable, even though the interpretation of "strategic" varies. In addition, the kinds of proliferation which are of concern should be articulated; controlled or "safeguarded" missile transfers might not present the dangers associated with uncontrolled, indiscriminate proliferation. Furthermore, it should be recognized that efforts by the U.S. in concert

with other major powers to restrict the freedom of action of smaller countries in the field of missiles and rockets--in addition to nuclear weapons--runs the risk of being counter-productive and exacerbating feelings on the part of non-nuclear nations that they are being discriminated against.

Some examples of arms control measures which might be explored are as follows:

--Supplier/receiver arrangements which would freeze the offensive missile situation in critical regions such as the Middle East.

--Missile-free zones in Latin America and Africa, perhaps associated with nuclear-free zones.

--A non-dissemination agreement affecting strategic missiles only (this could be within the broader context of an SDV non-dissemination measure), or a non-dissemination agreement affecting all nuclear-capable surface-to-surface ballistic missiles: these could be separate measures or coupled with a nuclear-non-proliferation agreement.

--A U.S.-Soviet "bonfire" of obsolete missiles and rockets to be included as part of the "bomber bonfire" proposal.

--A U.N. resolution calling for international cooperation to prevent the indiscriminate spread of nuclear-capable missiles (and aircraft) to reinforce nuclear non-proliferation efforts; associated with this could be informal attempts by the U.S. to convince other suppliers to increase the policy priority and effectiveness of their export controls over missile (and aircraft) components.

It is also important to examine the question of "safeguarding" the transfers of rockets and technology as another aspect of missile non-proliferation. Nations have legitimate desires in the space field, and many nations will eventually obtain rocket capabilities. Safeguarded rocket assistance and cooperation can offer peaceful alternatives to military missile programs, while at the same time, through appropriate technical, economic and political involvements,

can make it difficult, costly, or unattractive for nations to divert their space programs. Even though safeguarded arrangements might not be able to prevent a determined nation from pursuing military designs, at worst it can provide "early warning" and offer some deterrence to nations. Moreover, safeguarded rocket programs can strengthen non-proliferation efforts by establishing the principle that arms control can be constructive and positive, not only prohibitive, and thus help alleviate the discrimination problem.

With respect to the technical feasibility of rocket safeguards, ACDA and NASA have begun to study the question of technical controls over rocket proliferation.* Such controls could be used to support unilateral export enforcement and bilateral cooperative efforts as well as multilateral space rocket arrangements. Systematic studies of the military, political and legal ramifications of safeguarded rocket transfers, however, are needed.

To the extent that the United States and other supplier nations pursue vigorously peaceful multilateral and international space rocket programs under safeguarded arrangements they can offer peaceful alternatives to potential military programs.** As one suggestion, the concept of an International Space Agency which could provide sounding rockets and satellite launch vehicles under safeguarded arrangements and/or regional agencies along the same lines should be investigated. Also, the U.S. should study the question of establishing international satellite launching facilities,*** and might also investigate the

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*The Arms Control Group at Jet Propulsion Laboratories is undertaking a study of this problem.

**Precedents for international space cooperation already exist; in addition to the many activities of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UNESCO has discussed the idea of selling sounding rockets to nations for research purposes, and world-wide coordinated sounding rocket programs have been instituted through COSPAR.

***The Thumba international sounding rocket launch site in India, sponsored by the U.N., is already functioning; however, it is not well-located for satellite launchings.

desirability and feasibility of developing a worldwide network of tracking stations under U.N. auspices for purposes of data exchange and to help verify peaceful uses arrangements. In addition, the U.S. should place renewed emphasis on full, worldwide utilization of the U.N. resolution calling for declarations and registrations of space launchings, and might consider extending it to include invitational launch site visits.

ACDA/ST:JHKahan

ANNEX: SURVEY OF Nth COUNTRY MISSILE CAPABILITIES

To provide background for the main paper on missile proliferation, this Annex briefly describes the missile and space rocket capabilities of selected Nth countries. Present (and, where applicable, future) capabilities are discussed, and related matters of particular importance are highlighted. Nations not discussed do not have a missile or rocket capability which could lead to the development of nuclear-capable surface-to-surface ballistic missiles within the next decade.

France

The French Mirage aircraft will be supplemented by a hardened land-based IRBM which is under development and will probably be deployed beginning in late 1967. By 1975, this missile force will probably grow into a mixture of land-based IRBMs and sub-launched ballistic missiles. The land-based IRBM will probably be a two-stage solid rocket missile, and it is believed that by the end of 1967 the French will have nuclear warheads capable of being carried by these missiles. These missiles, although not as accurate or reliable as U.S. missiles, are felt by the French to be sufficient for a second-strike countervalue deterrent. The French are developing a satellite launch vehicle, the Diamant, and are developing the second stage booster for the ELDO satellite launch vehicle. It is expected that the French will attempt to place satellites into orbit sometime during 1965 or early '66. Although the French missile programs are now formally separated, they still remain intertwined through an industrial network and as a result of dual-purpose technical developments (e.g., boosters).

The French have received past support--both directly and indirectly--from the United States in the development of their rocket and missile capability, but the impact of the NSAM 294 policy has reduced this support to a minimum. French policy is to attempt to develop an indigenous capability and to purchase equipment from the U.S. only where absolutely necessary, but the French pursue the acquisition of information from U.S. firms and subsidiaries. The French facility now producing

solid propellants was involved in the NATO Hawk missile production program and assistance was given by U.S. engineers; the French gained considerably in the solid propellant field from this program. In March of 1964, the French purchased in the U.S. a large, modern, glass filament case winding machine capable of winding cases for large solid rocket motors. Although present French missile capability is high, French firms connected with the IRBM program are encountering major technical problems but will not overtly admit being in trouble. These problems seem to be in the general areas of guidance, re-entry, tracking, and hardened silo construction.

Under NSAM 294 policy, the U.S. has been attempting to stop contributing to the French nuclear force. At this stage, however, there is probably little that the U.S. can do to affect significantly the eventual attainment by France of a ballistic missile capability. The U.S. can retard and make more costly the French program, and perhaps have an effect on reducing the quality of the resultant missiles. The U.S. continues to have joint scientific space experiments with the French, (e.g., orbiting a French satellite using a U.S. booster), and continues to selectively release data and equipment, particularly in the area of non-storable liquid rocket technology (since this is clearly for the French space program).

The French, having a missile production capability, are potential suppliers of missiles and rockets to other nations. The Israeli government has arranged to purchase surface-to-surface missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead (1,300 lb. payload) over 250 miles now being developed by a French firm. Israel appears to be assisting this development program by supplying certain components.

China

It is estimated that the Chinese are developing an MRBM similar to the Soviet SS-4, and that a few such missiles could be ready for deployment, with associated fission warheads, by 1967 or 68. Although the Chinese may have a submarine which appears to be able to launch (from the surface) 350 n.m. ballistic missiles, it is not known what missiles they expect to use. It is also estimated that the Chinese could not deploy an operational ICBM system before 1970 nor could

they develop a significant missile-capable submarine threat to the U.S. until well into the 1970's.

Japan

Since 1955 the Japanese have been developing solid-fueled sounding rockets, from the small KAPPAs to the larger LAMBDAs. They have continued booster development and, having progressed through four generations of rockets, now have a still more powerful solid booster (the MU), which will give the Japanese a guided rocket capable of placing satellites in orbit; a satellite launch attempt is planned in late 1965. Japan has spent a total of $50 million thus far in its space program, and might spend an additional $120 million by 1970 as satellite rocket systems are produced and utilized.

The diameter and thrust of the MU booster would place the vehicle in the IRBM/ICBM category. Although it does not appear that any official Japanese "requirements" for a long range missile exist, a plan for conversion of space rockets to MR/IRBMs is being considered by a group of Japanese scientists who are influential in strategic policy planning. Conversion of the new booster and rocket into a military missile is particularly dependent upon developing guidance and control systems, modifying ground support equipment, and undertaking a two to three year period of extensive flight testing. It is estimated that a military version of the MU rocket could not reach operational status before 1969. The development cost of conversion would be about $500 million ($200 to $300 million of development and test could be done as part of the space effort), and a force of 200 IRBMs with 100 soft sites could be produced and deployed for $1-2 billion. (Of course, since much missiles would probably not be useful for Japan in a conventional role, developing or obtaining a nuclear warhead would be an obvious problem.)

The Japanese have proceeded through many generations of rockets and are anxious to obtain an independent space capability. Although some military stirrings exist in Japan, Prime Minister Sato and Professor Itokawa both have agreed that an acceleration of the Japanese satellite project would be a non-military method of demonstrating Japanese scientific superiority in Asia. Itokawa himself has said that this development would

be a "safe, sane, peaceful, dramatic, non-controversial, manageable, and rational method."

The proposed arrangement between Douglas Aircraft Company and the Mitsubishi Corporation, involving THOR (non-storable, liquid-fueled) missile technology, has been approved by the U.S. Government. This is the first instance of Japan asking for substantial U.S. support, and reflects the relatively primitive state of Japanese liquid-rocket capabilities.

Since Japan has a fairly advanced indigenous capability, she has already begun looking for markets for her smaller sounding rockets. In general, the Japanese seem to be responsibly considering the potential military impact of their smaller rocket sales and appear to realize the potential problems associated with sales of large rockets. Indonesia has purchased 10 KAPPA sounding rockets from Japan, and at least two have been fired. In agreeing to this sale, Japan has asked Indonesia to join COSPAR and declare that the rockets will be used only for peaceful, scientific purposes; also, there are indications that the Japanese have considered sending "observers" to the KAPPA launches. The Indonesians also requested LAMBDA rockets; no sales of LAMBDA's have been made, and present Japanese policy appears to be opposed to such sales in general. Yugoslavia has received KAPPA rockets and other countries have negotiated with the Japanese but no other transactions have occurred. Solid propellants for small research rockets are being manufactured in Argentina under special permit from the Japanese.

West Germany

In the larger rocket area, German industrial and Governmental interest is currently focused on the development of a third stage liquid-booster for the ELDO space vehicle. In addition to having the industrial facilities for production of the stage for the booster and the propellants, West Germany has relatively advanced guidance and control capabilities, and a small testing range. Germany is also equipped with a number of American military missile systems under NATO arrangements and for fulfilling NATO force goals. Some missiles are co-produced, and there are repair and maintenance facilities for

certain missiles. However, these latter missiles are AAMs and SAMs, such as Sidewinder and Hawk; production facilities for nuclear-capable surface-to-surface missiles, such as Pershings, do not exist in Germany.

The Germans have recently expressed interest in a cooperative program with the U.S. to develop advanced inertial guidance systems. These guidance systems would be of ICBM quality, although not packaged for use in missiles. The Department of State and DOD, after considering the implications of such a cooperative program when broadly interpreting NSAM 294, nevertheless decided that the U.S. should cooperate with the FRG. In addition, the West German Defense Ministry has contracted with a French firm for the development of two medium range air-to-surface guided missiles for the F-104 aircraft. This missile is not a significant ballistic missile threat of course, but represents the potential movement of the Germans away from the U.S. if we do not supply appropriate weapons for them.

It is estimated that the FRG could develop a liquid-fueled ICBM in from three to four years. However, production of "guided missiles and components" (surface-to-surface type) are renounced by the FRG in the Brussels Treaty (WEU restrictions) in addition to prohibitions on the manufacture of CB and nuclear weapons. There has, however, been concern expressed over the last two years in the U.S. Government and by NATO nations, and of course, the Soviet Union that the FRG has already violated--or at least severly "eroded"--the WEU restrictions on the basis of its missile programs.

It is clear that the West Germans have the capability to produce larger military missile systems if they so desired. However, in a fairly detailed evaluation of the situation, our Ambassador in Germany has stated that there is no evidence of any serious thought or developments in West Germany leading to a program for the research, development, and production of long-range guided military missiles. The nuclear weapon restrictions of the WEU, it could be argued, make it unlikely that the FRG would consider developing nuclear-capable missiles. And, blatant violation of missile production restrictions would probably have serious repercussions (unless the WEU members might want the FRG to produce missiles in support of some European

nuclear force). Moreover, it appears that as long as the German leaders are convinced that U.S. missiles will be deployed to protect German territory and/or that U.S. missiles can be purchased by the FRG, the question of German production of such delivery systems may not be serious at the present time.

The United Kingdom

The U.K.'s major national program is organized around cooperative arrangements with NASA involving instrumented sounding rocket launchings and launchings of British satellites. Except for the Blue Streak project, which is no longer part of a military program but involved in ELDO, there are no indications that the U.K. will expand its existing large rocket programs. Due to company connections and British involvement in ELDO, virtually all of the technology and experience associated with the Blue Streak which was obtained from the U.S. is probably known to most European countries.

The U.K.'s adverse experience in attempting to develop the Blue Streak into an MRBM indicates that even such a technically advanced nation finds it extremely difficult, and in this instance, undesirable and unfeasible, to produce its own nuclear-capable ballistic missile system. Britain will apparently satisfy her nuclear force goals by continued reliance on bomber aircraft, purchasing POLARIS missiles from the U.S., and attempting to establish the ANF.

India

India's rocket capabilities are decidedly inferior to her nuclear capabilities. India has no rocket production capability to speak of, and does not have the broad, sophisticated (e.g., electronics) industrial base of a country like Japan needed for development of a rocket system of appreciable size.

With possibly increased emphasis since the Chinese nuclear test, India has begun to be more concerned with the rocket question. The French are to build a production facility for solid-fueled meterologic rockets (the Centaure) in India, and Professor Itokawa, a major Japanese rocket expert, has recently become a "consultant." About six months ago while

visiting the United States, Homi Bhabha, head of the Italian AEC and space effort, inquired as to the cost of an Indian space program. NASA estimated that an Indian satellite launch capability (rocket plus satellite) would take about eight years to develop and would cost about $70 million, while the satellite alone could be developed in a few years at a cost of $15 million.

The U.S. has a bilateral agreement with India involving launchings of meteorological rockets. Establishing more extensive cooperative space programs which might provide India with a peaceful show of strength (e.g., satellite launch) have been considered within the U.S. Government. India has already achieved international prestige benefits from having the UN-sponsored Thumba sounding rocket launch facility on her soil. NASA has considered working out an arrangement to launch an Indian satellite with a U.S. vehicle.

Israel

The Israelis have contracted with the French to purchase a two-stage solid-propellant missile employing inertial guidance and having a range of about 270 nautical miles. The vehicle can carry a 1,300 lb. conventional warhead and is large enough to accommodate a French nuclear warhead. About 25 missiles have been ordered. The earliest date of deployment on Israeli soil would be sometime in 1966. The means of deployment is not clear, although indications are that some type of mobile deployment will be used. It is also not clear whether the Israelis intended to purchase the missiles completely or to purchase the major components for final assembly in Israel. The Israelis have the capability to assembly missiles from purchased components and even to manufacture some components themselves. During the past few years they have purchased items abroad which are obviously missile-related, such as plugs, tungsten nozzles, and guidance components. Indications are that the Israelis may be developing a native missile system as a "back-up" in the event that the French arrangements fail to materialize.

The Israelis have been interested in a surface-to-surface missile as early as 1961. They developed a Shavit

sounding rocket, and it is believed that this rocket would be used as a basis for developing a short-range ballistic missile. However, this program has been cancelled (or delayed) due to quite a few launch failures and other problems. Israel has displayed considerable interest in securing missile technology, equipment, manpower, and related information from the U.S. In fact, in December 1962, Israel openly attempted to recruit U.S. missile scientists and engineers, and technicians to work on a crash Israeli ballistic missile program. The U.S., of course, has provided Israel with Hawk air-defense missiles.

The history of the Israeli missile program underscores the difficulties an Nth country can encounter in attempting to develop and produce a complete ballistic missile system of modest capabilities. The Israelis, although well developed technically and able to draw on a variety of external assistance, essentially discontinued their indigenous program and chose to arrange to purchase missiles from the French. This is not to say that the Israelis could not have eventually developed their own missile, but merely to indicate that although rocket technology has spread the actual development of a missile system would be a difficult and costly undertaking.

The military and political ramifications of the armaments situation in the Middle East needs no elaboration. Although the U.S. Government is concerned about this significant problem, no solutions have yet seemed feasible. Prime Minister Eshkol of Israel recently said that he would welcome an agreement whereby both the Western and Eastern nations might agree not to supply nuclear or conventional weapons to the Middle East. It should be noted that the Federal Republic has stated its intention not to negotiate further deliveries of armaments to areas of tension, particularly the UAR and Israel.

The UAR

The UAR, with the assistance of German missile experts, has been developing three types of liquid-fueled ballistic missiles, one of which (the Conqueror) could be capable of carrying a nuclear-weight, payload (e.g., about 2,000 lbs.)

a distance of 200 miles with a CEP of 5-10 miles. From open sources it appears that the deployment of the UAR missile force is imminent; however, recent indications are that the program is running into significant costing and technical difficulties. For example, the missile fuel tanks leak, (fuel cannot remain longer than 30 minutes), there are difficulties in obtaining adequate guidance components, and test firings have been unsuccessful. The UAR is attempting to purchase bits and pieces of missile-related components and other needed materials from all around the world, but acquisition is becoming increasingly difficult. In addition, the FRG has become concerned about its rocket experts, and many are returning to Germany. In past years, German firms have sold key equipment to the UAR in support of the missile programs, and British, American and Swiss firms have also assisted the missile program. Such support is diminishing, however.

It is difficult to assess the exact status of the program at this point, although it is fairly clear that technical and economic factors are causing program slippage and could have adverse affects on the quality and quantity of missiles produced. Indications are, for example, that missile flight testing has been suspended as of April, 1965, and that there have been critical financial problems associated with the missile program. It is believed that the UAR does not have a nuclear-capable missile system at this time, and is not likely to deploy such a system (or any offensive missile system) within the next few years. The UAR experience indicates that even with the help of experts and a national decision, it is not easy for an Nth country to develop, produce, and deploy even a modest surface-to-surface missile system.

The UAR does not have a feasible nuclear weapons capability, but the potential deployment of conventionally-armed ballistic missiles against Israel would be extremely destabilizing. Israel recognizes that it presents a small, dense target, although the actual military threat of such missiles is small, and views these missiles as weapons against which it will be unable to provide a defense. Israel fears that possession of such weapons may encourage the UAR leaders to take greater risks. Prime Minister Eshkol has stated, for example, that the UAR missile program presents a danger since it is leading to the development of a "delivery vehicle for

nuclear weapons if the UAR ever makes or obtains the warheads." President Nasser views the missile program as a source of world prestige in addition to its value vis-a-vis Israel. With the forthcoming Israeli purchase of French missiles, a Middle East missile race is developing.

Other Nations

Except for the San Marco project in which an Italian satellite was launched by Italians from a floating platform utilizing a Scout missile provided by the U.S., there do not appear to be any Italian space or rocket programs involving launch vehicle development. There are indications, however, that Italy is considering requesting U.S. assistance in producing a short-range solid-fueled tactical missile.

Neither Belgium nor the Netherlands has a national space program involving large sounding rockets or satellite launch vehicles, and neither produces ballistic missiles. Sweden has a fairly advanced short-range, conventional warhead missile production capability (SAMs, AAMs, ship-to-ship rockets, etc.) and has been given some U.S. assistance in developing these items. Sweden has also been conducting a small sounding rocket program in cooperation with NASA.

South Africa, Switzerland, Poland, and Australia have rocket capabilities but in the areas of short-range sounding rockets and air-to-surface and surface-to-air type small military rockets. Argentina has a small native solid-fueled rocket program, capable of launching sounding rockets up to 40 miles with payloads of five or ten pounds. Indonesia, Yugoslavia, and Mexico have extremely limited sounding rocket programs and capabilities.

ACDA/ST:JHKahan

WH - 20387 9/5
Mr. Johnson

ACTION is assigned to NEA

THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

December 13, 1965
(Rec'd 12-20-65)

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Some time ago I was privileged to receive a copy of a letter that was addressed to the President by Congressman Chet Holifield, Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Congressman Holifield had mentioned to me that he had written to the President on the matter of nuclear proliferation. I understand that he gave a very thoughtful and provocative address before a recent meeting of the Nuclear Industrial Conference here in Washington. I asked the Congressman if he'd be willing to share with me some of the thoughts that he had expressed to the President. He then dropped me a note and attached a copy of the letter that he had addressed to the President on October 26.

It is worthy of the most thoughtful consideration of the highest authorities of our government. Possibly the President brought it to your attention but, if he didn't, permit me to share it with you. It should be carefully considered, and I know that the Congressman will have something more to say on this matter in the months ahead.

I pass it along for your information.

(3) 12/20/65

Sincerely,

Hubert H. Humphrey

The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.
October 26, 1965

Dear Mr. President:

In late September, I attended the Ninth International Conference on Atomic Energy in Tokyo, Japan and stopped in Bombay, India October 2 - 5. While in India, I spent about a day and a half visiting the Tarapur Reactor site and the atomic laboratory at Trombay. I spent some time with Dr. Baba and other top Indian atomic scientists.

Dr. Baba and his friends were careful not to state their position in regard to making an atomic weapon. I do believe, however, Dr. Baba is a very ambitious man who realizes his personal fame would be greatly increased if he were authorized to make such a weapon. There is no doubt in my mind that these people in Dr. Baba's group believe they must offset Red China's weapon with one of their own. Of course, they will have to persuade Shastri and other top Government officials this policy and expense is justified. I cannot predict Shastri's attitude.

During our conversations they asked me what the attitude of the United States would be in regard to their (India) making an atomic bomb. I am sure they thought I would immediately urge them to abstain from an atomic effort in line with our policy of non-proliferation. I decided to play it on a low key, however, and said, "Of course, this is a question for India to answer. If they think it necessary and wise to divert from their domestic needs the capital it would take to make even the first crude bomb, then I suppose they will do it. There is no doubt Dr. Baba and his colleagues have high scientific capability and certain facilities which might insure success in the project".

But I pointed out, "...it was a race they could never win. Always they would lag behind Red China, further behind France, far behind the Soviets, and much farther behind the United States". I assured them they would never catch up, but left it up to them to make their own decision. They seemed to be somewhat impressed by my reasoning on their question.

I doubt if our present policy of non-proliferation will prevent India, Israel, or any other capable nation which may arise, from doing just what France and Red China have done. If their

national interests indicates such an effort, I believe they will make it unless the nuclear umbrella can be extended to protect them against nuclear attack.

I wonder if it would be worthwhile for you to take the initiative and propose that the United States would be willing to extend nuclear protection to India against a nuclear attack by any other nation, providing the Soviets would extend the same type of protection? Admittedly, this would put the Soviets on the spot and drive the wedge deeper between them and Red China, if they agreed. If they would not agree, would it not be a plus for the United States and a minus for the Soviets in their relations with India?

A further thought: Would it be wise for the President to advance the idea of the four western world nuclear nations to join in a compact agreement offering nuclear protection to any non-nuclear nation against a nuclear attack? Would this not be

(1) A constructive move toward removing the national pressure of Nth nation development of nuclear weapons, if the present four nuclear powers in Europe and America really want to stop proliferation?

(2) If the Soviets or the French refuse (as one or both very well may) would not our position for peace and non-proliferation be stronger in world opinion and would not the nuclear nation refusing to join in the effort to stop proliferation be weaker?

In my opinion, there is a common interest in the four nuclear nations having a policy of stopping additional Nth nations from developing their own atomic-hydrogen weapons. I do not believe the Soviets, any more than the United States, want to aid or assist non-nuclear nations into the club. Certainly France and the United Kingdom are not thinking about aiding other nations in an atomic-hydrogen weapons development project.

Could this common selfish interest be used as a cement to join the four nations together in the following:

(1) Joining the forces of the Western World (U.S. and Europe including U.S.S.R.) in a multi-nuclear-weapon-owning nation compact. A nuclear weapon compact that would stop proliferation on the basis of eliminating the need for nationally owned nuclear weapons.

(2) Would it not isolate Red China and remove from India and other non-nuclear nations the fear of nuclear attack by Red China?

One might say, "We offered the Baruch plan and there were no takers". True, but was it not a noble offer in the eyes of the world? What do we have to lose in the eyes of the world, if another attempt is made to stop proliferation of the present more powerful and more dangerous weapons?

Mr. President, I know you have many brilliant advisors and it is with some trepidation I write this letter. As a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy during its entire life of nineteen years, I have worked to make our Nation strong in atomic weapon capability and deliverability. We are strong, but so are and will be other nations.

If there is any way to join together the destructive capability of the four western world nuclear nations so their collective atomic strength can serve to develop, not a Pax Romana but a Pax Atomica for the preservation of peace in the world, we should find that way.

May God bless you and give you strength to achieve His purpose.

Most sincerely yours,

Chet Holifield

The President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

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cc to:

Secretary of State Rusk
Mr. McGeorge Bundy

No release to the press.

White House - Mr. Johnson

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

96

December 16, 1965

The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

It was reported in a dispatch by Anatole Shub in this morning's Washington Post under the headline "Accord Seen on 5-Nation Atom Force for NATO" that much of the detailed planning for a joint NATO nuclear force, of the MLF or ANF variety, has already been agreed to by Britain and West Germany, and that the creation of such a force with United States adherence is rated by United States diplomats as a three-to-one probability.

The article suggests that mixed manning of nuclear armed Polaris submarines would be an ultimate, although not an initial characteristic of the force. It also states that "another potential obstacle -- the conflicting claims of a treaty with Russia on nuclear nonproliferation -- no longer seems to impress American leaders," and goes on to assert that "the United States now has no intention of revising its basic draft for the nonproliferation accord -- which leaves the possibility of such an allied nuclear force open."

As you will probably recall, the problem of nuclear proliferation and its relationship to proposals to create a joint NATO nuclear force was given particular consideration by the citizen panel on Arms Control and Disarmament of the recent White House Conference on International Cooperation. In its report that committee, headed by Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner and made up of such highly regarded experts as Roswell Gilpatric and Dr. Carl Kaysen, stated that "the United States should lead its allies in the search for means to reduce, rather than increase, the buildup of nuclear weapons in and near Central Europe. In this connection, solutions to the nuclear problem of the Alliance should be sought in arrangements that do not result in the creation of new nuclear forces."

You have yourself pointed out on several occasions that the threat of further nuclear proliferation is one of the gravest our nation faces. No one can say for certain whether the Soviets would be prepared to agree to a treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons if we were to agree to forego the creation of a joint NATO nuclear force with West German participation, as they have said. But it is at least possible that by rushing into an agreement to create such a force we might well forfeit our last chance to obtain a nonproliferation pact.

In view of the responsibility of the Congress to assure the American people that a step of such magnitude -- which could have the most serious consequences for our own security from nuclear attack and the peace and tranquility of all nations -- will not be taken rashly, precipitously and without due deliberation, I would urge the Administration to take no further steps toward the creation of such a force until Congress reconvenes in January. The committees concerned would then have an opportunity to explore in appropriate depth the questions raised by the creation of a joint nuclear force with West German participation and, in particular, its implications for the successful negotiation of a treaty to halt the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Sincerely,

Joseph S. Clark

JOSEPH S. CLARK

JSC:hse

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Congress of the United States

JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY

December 18, 1965

(dtd 12-22-65)

ACTIO
is c[illegible]

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I note that articles in the December 18 issue of the New York Times by Thomas J. Hamilton and in the Washington Post of the same date by Anatole Shub report in considerable detail on the plans for forthcoming NATO discussions between President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard pertaining to nuclear weapons and nuclear submarine matters. These articles both refer to official sources in Bonn for the information presented.

Please supply the Committee with information on the conditions concerning the release of any such information and the accuracy of the information presented in these articles, copies of which I am sending you attached. This is a subject in which the Joint Committee is most interested and in which I wish to be kept fully and currently informed.

Sincerely yours,

Chet Holifield

Chet Holifield
Chairman

The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.

(12/22/65

Attachments: (2)
New York Times article by Hamilton
Washington Post article by Shub

cc: Secretary McNamara
Department of Defense

ERHARD TO PRESS FOR ATOMIC ROLE

To Ask Johnson to Assure Bonn of Place in Force

By THOMAS J. HAMILTON
Special to The New York Times

BONN, Dec. 17—Chancellor Ludwig Erhard plans to ask President Johnson for an assurance that West Germany will be included in a joint nuclear force under the Atlantic Alliance whenever it is established.

However, the Chancellor does not intend to ask Mr. Johnson for the establishment of either the mixed-manned nuclear force originally proposed by the United States in 1960 or the variant subsequently proposed by Britain, the Atlantic nuclear force.

The highest political source here gave this forecast today of what Dr. Erhard would say to the President during their talks in Washington Monday and Tuesday. Dr. Erhard will leave Sunday.

Seeks Nuclear Assurance

According to this source, Dr. Erhard would also like an assurance from Mr. Johnson that the establishment of such a force would not be ruled out by the conclusion of an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union prohibiting the spread of nuclear weapons.

The Chancellor, it was reiterated, does not consider West Germany's membership in the newly formed working group on nuclear planning—the group proposed originally by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara—a substitute for a new "weapons combination" giving European powers the right of consultation regarding the use of nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, Dr. Erhard will not ask for the right to veto the use of United States weapons based on West German territory.

According to authoritative sources, Dr. Erhard plans to discuss with Mr. Johnson his conception of a "formed" or "advancing society," alongside Mr. Johnson's goal of a Great Society.

Common Market a Topic

According to persons in touch with his thinking, an other question the Chancellor intends to take up with the President is the Common Market.

Dr. Erhard believes the chances for Britain's admission to the Common Market have improved. One of the reasons, he believes, is that if there is to be a European nuclear force there must first be a European political federation.

West Germany, over French opposition, has backed the use of the Common Market to foster political integration.

West Germany's relations with Eastern Europe will also be discussed in Washington, according to the Germany informants. Despite recent Soviet attacks on West Germany, Rumania is ready to establish diplomatic relations with Bonn. However, West Germany does not intend to do so.

West Germany, it was added, does not plan to establish diplomatic relations with Poland because of the dispute over the Oder-Neisse frontier, or with any Eastern European country.

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Erhard to Press U.S. For Wider Atom Role

By Anatole Shub
Washington Post Foreign Service

BONN, Dec. 17—Chancellor Erhard will present President Johnson next Monday with a five-point program of West German nuclear demands, including co-ownership of Polaris submarines.

Highest official sources here today confirmed the Erhard program, arrived at after long, secret discussions with American and British diplomats as well as with Erhard's leading political opponents in West Germany.

Erhard will urge Mr. Johnson to agree, and to persuade America's other Western allies, on the following basic principles:

1. The creation of an allied nuclear force, built around six American and four British nuclear-powered Polaris submarines, to be jointly owned by the United States, Britain, West Germany, the Netherlands and Italy. The force would be under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR). It would not initially be mixed-manned. It would, however, be so organized as to permit the member nations to add "new generation" weapons systems in the future.

2. Exclusive veto over the use of the force's atomic missiles would rest with the President of the United States. Presumably, however, the treaty or agreement setting up the force would include a "Europe clause" — permitting the transfer of the force, and perhaps a partial veto over the use of the force, to the government of a United States of Europe should such unity be achieved.

3. Enlarged powers for, and an enlarged German role in, the NATO "special committee" organized under Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's aegis last month. West Germany wishes to participate not merely in atomic targeting and formation of nuclear strategy, but in "crisis management." While welcoming a seat on the McNamara "working group" for planning, Bonn would also like to take part in the groups on intelligence and communications, which relate to "crisis management."

See ERHARD, A10, Col. 2

4. Formal U.S. rejection of any Soviet or neutral-nation draft for a treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons that did not permit establishment of either the allied or eventual "European" nuclear force. The West would argue that such forces did not constitute proliferation so long as a veto remained with one of the present nuclear powers.

5. Speedy implementation of the German demands on nonproliferation and nuclear planning, but a leisurely approach to the actual creation of the allied nuclear force.

Series of Compromises

The five points represent a series of compromises not only between West Germany and Britain, but also between German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder and his arch political foe, Franz-Josef Strauss.

Thus, the kind of force Erhard will propose is a slightly modifed, scaled-down version of the "Atlantic nuclear force" urged by Britain a year ago—except that Britain is now apparently agreeable to command by SACEUR rather than a separate command structure.

The "European" features of the Erhard proposals represent a long-term commitment to the "grand design" recently outlined by Strauss—in which a separate "European deterrent" might eventually be created by merging British and French atomic weaponry.

Informed German press reports, uncontradicted in official circles today, declare that the terms of the proposals have been approved by all members of the Cabinet as well as highest leaders of Erhard's Christian Democratic Union. These include not only Strauss but Heinrich Krone, Special Minister for National Security and close friend of former Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. No reaction has, however, been reported from Adenauer himself.

Cost Is Factor in Delay

There are three reasons why Erhard is prepared to delay actual creation of the force. First, West Germany in 1965 will not be prepared to make the sizable financial contribution necessary to buy its share of ownership. Second, a number of German leaders consider the threat of creating such a force more useful as a bargaining counter with the Russians than the actual force would be. The "pause," therefore, could be utilized for intensive German-Soviet negotiations.

Finally, some Bonn officials as well as the governments of Italy and the Netherlands would prefer to resolve the

Washington Post
12/18/65

planning. Bonn would also e to take part in the groups intelligence and communications, which relate to "crisis nagement."

4. Formal U.S. rejection of y Soviet or neutral-nation aft for a treaty on the nonaliferation of nuclear weapns that did not permit establishment of either the allied eventual "European" nuear force. The West would ogize that such forces did not nstitute proliferation so long s a veto remained with one f the present nuclear powers.

5. Speedy implementation f the German demands on onproliferation and nuclear planning, but a leisurely approach to the actual creation f the allied nuclear force.

Series of Compromises

The five points represent a series of compromises not only between West Germany and Britain, but also between German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder and his arch political foe, Franz-Josef Strauss.

Thus, the kind of force Erhard will propose is a slightly modified, scaled-down version of the "Atlantic nuclear force" urged by Britain a year ago—except that Britain is now apparently agreeable to command by SACEUR rather than a separate command structure.

The "European" features of the Erhard proposals represent a long-term commitment to the "grand design" recently outlined by Strauss—in which a separate "European deterrent" might eventually be created by merging British and French atomic weaponry.

Informed German press reports, unconfirmed in official circles today, declare that the terms of the proposals will be presented to former Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. No reaction has, however, been reported from Adenauer himself.

Cost Is Factor in Delay

There are three reasons why Erhard is prepared to delay actual creation of the force. First, West Germany in 1963 will not be prepared to make the sizable financial contribution necessary to buy its share of ownership. Second, a number of German leaders consider the threat of creating such a force more useful as a bargaining counter with the Russians than the actual force would be. The "pause," therefore, could be utilized for intensive German-Soviet negotiations.

Finally, some Bonn officials, as well as the governments of Italy and the Netherlands, would prefer to resolve the crisis in the Common Market before provoking French President de Gaulle in the nuclear field. Therefore, a number of allied officials hope that—even if Mr. Johnson and Erhard reach agreement next week—the program will not be publicly unfurled for at least several months.

Both Erhard and Schroeder, however, appear perfectly prepared for a complete break with France should they achieve U.S. endorsement of their nuclear program. According to highest official circles, for example, West Germany is prepared — if France does not accept current Common Market compromise terms—to move ahead with the "Kennedy Round" tariff negotiations and other projects on the basis of the "majority rule" provisions of the Rome Treaty.

In other words, Erhard stands ready to see France leave the Common Market altogether, and to proceed with five instead of six members. Erhard has always made plain that he preferred a broad free-trade area, including Britain, to the present organization of the Common Market Six.

Bonn officials appear confident that they can win approval of their program by the United States and Britain, and thereby will be in a strong position to "outbluff" or defeat Gen. de Gaulle in the contest for the leadership of Europe. However, both diplomatic and unofficial German observers fail to share Bonn's confidence in any of these respects.

With regard to the United States, Bonn has been strongly encouraged by an important faction of the State Department—namely, the so-called Theologians who devised the abandoned scheme for a mixed manned surface fleet, and who are largely identical with the group that considers the isolation of Gaullist France the supreme aim of American policy in Western Europe.

West German leaders have apparently been led by this group to believe that, if Erhard insists strongly on the current program in his talks with Mr. Johnson, the President will assent to it and give it the full weight of American backing in further dealing with Britain, France and other allies.

However, persistent reports from Washington in the German press this week assert that while President Johnson is willing to consider German ideas, he sees no great urgency in the issue—especially so long as Prime Minister Wilson's attitude is unclear and French policy remains so decidedly hostile. It is thought that Mr. Johnson will prefer to await a meeting with de Gaulle, possibly next spring before reaching such weighty and controversial agreements with the Germans.

Question of Britain

As for Britain, Bonn officials believe that because they have essentially accepted the British design for an allied nuclear force, the British — especially in their financial difficulties —will have to go along if Mr. Johnson makes that design his own.

However, senior British diplomats have made plain here that, in all their dealings with the Germans on the force, they were developing the details of only one policy option under consideration by Wilson. No British diplomat has professed to speak the Prime Minister's final judgment on the matter, and several have indicated that he may be more interested in a non-proliferation agreement, a personal journey to Moscow, or even an East-West summit meeting.

With a precarious majority in Parliament (including a strongly anti-German left wing), few British observers consider it likely that Wilson would bind himself now to much more than continued discussion of the German ideas.

As for French reaction, opinions differ only as to how violent and effective de Gaulle's reaction will be. Optimistic Bonn officials believe that, as a result of the first round results of the French presidential election, the power of Gaullism is ended.

Lower Percentage

Erhard personally has been elated by the fact that de Gaulle on the first round polled a lower percentage of the vote than he polled in the recent German election.

It is argued that, faced with the combined resolve of America, Germany and Britain, the aging French President will have no choice but to yield gracefully.

Outside official quarters, on the other hand, there are fears that the Erhard-Schroeder nuclear drive could undo 15 years of allied policy in Western Europe and the French-German life work of former Chancellor Adenauer. For de Gaulle might, it is argued, be driven not only to wreck Western and inter-allied cooperation in the political, economic and military fields but recognize East Germany and conclude a pact with the Soviet Union.

11

RISKS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

ATOMS FOR PEACE, OR WAR

By John A. Hall

FOR a decade, American foreign policy in the field of atomic energy has energetically supported the transfer of uranium, information, equipment and complete reactors to many countries abroad. Has this Atoms for Peace Program unwittingly contributed to the development of an atomic-weapon capability throughout the world and thereby encouraged nuclear proliferation? This basic question has been brought into focus by the Red Chinese nuclear explosions and by the realization that several countries now have the necessary knowledge, materials and technicians to make nuclear weapons if they want to.

Since 1946, American policy has been based on a recognition of the fact that atomic energy is capable of both peaceful and military uses and that certain of the processes used in its development are essentially the same regardless of the final application. Early in the postwar period, then, it became our avowed purpose to establish some international control of the development of atomic energy to assure its peaceful use and, in particular, to limit and perhaps ultimately eliminate any military use.

In its continuing effort to make the atom benign through international action, American policy has gone through two distinct phases in the past 20 years. The first phase was established and governed by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which placed an embargo on the export of nuclear information and materials. In the same year the United States brought before the United Nations the proposals formulated by Bernard Baruch for international control of atomic energy. The principal thesis behind these early U. S. proposals was that atomic energy was so dangerous in terms of its potential military applications that international "ownership" and "supervision" were required. For example, the Acheson-Lilienthal report, which served as an important basis for the Baruch proposals, included the following statement: "We have concluded unanimously that there is no prospect of security against atomic warfare in a system of international agreements to outlaw such weapons controlled only by a system

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which relies on inspection and similar police-like methods." The proposed solution to the political problem of control was supranational ownership and operation of atomic energy activities, and this was explicit in the United Nations majority plan.

Read in 1965, this conclusion is a bit startling. Disarmament plans and systems to assure the peaceful use of atomic energy both rest today in large part on the assumption that scientific inspection and verification will provide the necessary assurances of compliance. Why was the concept of international control thus limited or narrowed?

The Baruch Plan was, of course, rejected, and by 1953 the United States no longer had a monopoly of atomic technology. Despite the embargo imposed by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, several countries, including the Soviet Union, were developing substantial atomic energy programs for both war and peace. The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission had been abandoned and essentially merged into the Commission for Disarmament. No progress was being made in disarmament, the Soviet Union had entered a thermonuclear arms race with the United States, and discussions to bring about a reduction of tensions had reached a complete impasse. At the same time, the progress made by scientists exploring the peaceful uses of atomic energy had stimulated a growing interest in the benign uses of the atom both in the United States and overseas.

It appeared to the Administration in 1953 that the American people should be informed in frank and realistic terms of the ominous consequences of the impasse on disarmament. But at the same time it was thought desirable to place some new and constructive proposals before the world, preferably in the atomic field, with the aim of converting the then dismal climate to one of optimism. It was hoped that in the process a new channel of communication could be developed between the United States and the Soviet Union. This was the background of President Eisenhower's speech before the U.N. General Assembly in 1953.

The President there recognized the important and growing promise of atomic energy in contributing to human welfare and the eagerness of many nations to avail themselves of these benefits. His Administration had come to feel that these aspirations and developments could best be contained in peaceful channels by a program of positive international coöperation under safeguards rather than continued adherence to a policy of em-

bargo. He was also aware that within the United States there was a growing interest in the peaceful side of nuclear technology and that greater progress, particularly in the field of power, might be achieved if U. S. industry were permitted to contribute.

II

Thus, the United States established a new atomic policy. It included a sharing of peaceful nuclear technology and a proposal to establish an International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.), related to the United Nations. Domestically, it involved permitting the growth of a peaceful nuclear industry by authorizing such steps as the construction and operation, under license, of private reactors. In effect, a new Atomic Energy Act was created to give substance to what became known as the Atoms for Peace Program. The Senate report on the draft 1954 atomic energy legislation stated the rationale for the new approach:

> Today we are not alone in the drive to achieve peacetime atomic power. Eight years ago, besides the United States, only the United Kingdom, Canada, and—as we have recently come to find—the Soviet Union had major atomic energy projects in being. The possibility of coöperation with other nations to gain mutual advantage in the areas of peacetime power appeared far in the future. As against this, however, more than 20 countries now have vigorous atomic energy programs, and several of them are pressing toward the construction of atomic power plants to turn out useful amounts of electricity.
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> In 1946, our Nation earnestly hoped that worldwide agreement on international control of atomic energy might soon be secured. It was reasonable, therefore, that the original Act should prohibit an exchange of information on commercial uses of atomic energy with other nations until such time as the Congress declared that effective and enforceable international safeguards against the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes had been established.
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> But our hopes of 1946 have been thwarted by unremitting Soviet opposition to the United Nations' plan for the control of atomic energy. Although we would be morally derelict if we abandoned our hopes for the eventual effective international regulation of all armaments, legislative policy cannot now be founded on the expectation that the prospect of such control is either likely or imminent.

The 1954 policy was one of international coöperation based on a system of verification to assure that the uses in view were peaceful. While the Atomic Energy Act of that year does not specify that inspection and verification must be established as a condition for international coöperation, the Act does require that "an agreement of coöperation must include terms, conditions,

duration, nature, and scope of the coöperation by the coöperating nation; that the security safeguards and standards as set forth in the agreement will be maintained; that any material transferred under the agreement will not be used for atomic weapons, research and development, or any other military purpose. . . ."

The elements of an effective system of safeguards and verification designed to assure peaceful use were subsequently developed by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State. Safeguard rights, including rights of inspection, have been incorporated in our bilateral agreements and, after considerable negotiation, many of these conditions were included in the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1956. The I.A.E.A. has the right and obligation to apply these safeguards when granting assistance to its members. It also is empowered to apply them to arrangements and facilities voluntarily placed under its control. In general, these procedures for bilateral and international inspection and verification are similar to those which the Acheson-Lilienthal report and the first report to the Security Council considered insufficient alone to provide fully adequate international control and security.

Before examining the safeguards we need to look first at the programs themselves. There have been four major programs under the new atomic policy: the exchange of technical information, the transfer of materials (uranium, plutonium, etc.), the transfer of equipment (including complete reactors), and finally, institutional coöperation through and with the I.A.E.A., Euratom, the European Nuclear Energy Agency and the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, plus a more liberal policy on the part of the A.E.C., permitted a substantial declassification of information useful for the development of peaceful applications of atomic energy. The way was thus prepared for making the first United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy at Geneva in 1955 an enormous success. Aided, too, by the warm glow which followed the Summit Meeting in May of that year, the conference saw more relevant information more broadly exchanged than ever before. Because of unified policies stemming from their wartime collaboration, the United States, Britain and Canada had declassified substantially the same type of information on their respective programs. And it became apparent at Geneva that the Soviet Union had declassi-

fied a vast amount of information which for the first time disclosed that East and West were operating on basically the same principles of declassification.

The convening of the Geneva Conference of 1955 prompted the establishment in many countries of new and separate governmental organs to promote and administer peaceful atomic development, and many of the delegates were the new chairmen or administrators of these bodies. The statistics on the conference are impressive. There were 1,428 delegates present, of whom 485 were Americans. The Soviet delegation consisted of 67 members, the largest number of Soviet scientists ever to attend an international conference up to that time. The exchange of information that occurred through the presentation of papers and subsequent discussions in the various sessions of the conference was important and substantial. The majority of the scientists and administrators present were convinced that within a few years there would be a significant reduction in the cost of atomic power which would permit the construction of many nuclear generators throughout the world. This early optimism was not justified.

A second and even larger Geneva Conference was held in 1958. The commercial and governmental exhibits were huge and gave the impression of a three-ring circus. But reactor technology had not developed at the pace expected in 1955, and despite the many papers given at the conference and the further declassification of information by many countries, there was very little of significance to add to what had been known and revealed in 1955. Except in the area of plasma physics, which held long-range promise of great developments, a spirit of pessimism characterized the 1958 conference. However, by the time of the third Geneva Conference in September 1964, important progress had been made in the field of atomic power. This conference demonstrated that nuclear technology had come of age and that nuclear activity was becoming more conventional and could be discussed in more conventional terms. Clearly, we were on the threshold of competitive atomic power.

It can be argued that the massive release of information which took place at the three Geneva Conferences and through U. S. coöperative activities with other countries has contributed in some degree to a better understanding of certain military applications of atomic energy. As noted at the outset, this is an inherent problem of nuclear technology. But in order to put the issue in

perspective, two points need to be emphasized. First, as we have seen, it became evident at an early stage that even by adhering to a policy of strictest secrecy the United States could not prevent other countries from using the brains of their own scientists to identify and perfect the fundamentals of producing special nuclear materials for weapons development. Indeed, it was apparent that this basic knowledge became generally available at a very early date. Second, it cannot be stressed too strongly that the overwhelming bulk of the information that has been declassified has had very little bearing on military programs, but has been exceedingly useful in promoting peaceful uses. For example, the very great portion of the information that has been released in the field of nuclear power has concerned reactors designed primarily for the production of power rather than plutonium. The United States has retained, in secrecy, information on weapons design and sensitive production processes such as the gaseous diffusion technology in use at Oak Ridge and other A.E.C. facilities.

III

The second aspect of the new atomic policy provided for the transfer of uranium and other materials under statutory agreements for coöperation. The transfer of fissile material from the United States to another country was quite impossible before the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. In fact, the unique quality of uranium and, particularly, of uranium in its isotopic form of U-235, goes to the core of our problem of the potentially dual use of atomic energy for war and peace. Uranium-235 in a research reactor produces neutrons for research; uranium in a large reactor produces not only heat but also plutonium, which is potentially useful in atomic weapons.

The new Act permitted special nuclear material to be distributed to foreign countries in accordance with the scope and terms of each specific agreement. To assure a careful, judicious review of these transfers by the appropriate arms of the Government, the Act required that each agreement had to be submitted to the President for review and approval and then placed before the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee for 30 days before coming into force. The new legal framework, therefore, liberalized the opportunities for such transfers but under conditions which provided for the most careful consideration of each arrangement.

In 1955, the President authorized the first bilateral agreements

for coöperation with Brazil, Turkey and Colombia. They provided for the transfer of small quantities of enriched uranium to the coöperating country for use in a research reactor. At the start, most countries decided to acquire research reactors which were useful for a variety of purposes, and our initial agreements were designed to be responsive to these needs. These early agreements provided for the transfer of up to six kilograms of U-235 contained in enriched uranium, but with the proviso that the U-235 not exceed 20 percent of the total by weight. Subsequently, as foreign programs expanded, this six-kilogram limit was increased in certain instances and, when technical or economic considerations warranted, coöperating countries were permitted to receive material of higher enrichment in the isotope U-235—up to 90 or 93 percent. However, as previous limits were removed or increased, more comprehensive and stringent safeguards were provided in the bilateral agreements.

In the late 1950s a few countries decided to construct nuclear power plants. In contrast to the small quantities of uranium needed in research reactors, power reactors require hundreds of kilograms. They are potentially dangerous, as we have noted, in that they produce sizeable quantities of plutonium. Accordingly, the uranium transferred for power reactors has been subject to the most comprehensive and careful safeguard procedures.

The policy of assisting countries in this manner under bilateral agreements was announced to the United Nations General Assembly by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge on November 5, 1954. The United States regarded its bilateral procedure in part as an interim measure pending the establishment and effective operation of the proposed International Atomic Energy Agency. It hoped that at an early stage the I.A.E.A. could assume the responsibility for administering the safeguards and control arrangements which had been created.

Under the terms of these bilateral agreements, 225,440 kilograms of natural uranium and 169,410 kilograms of enriched uranium containing 6,210 kilograms of U-235 have thus far been sent abroad. In addition, some 26 kilograms of plutonium and more than 650 tons of heavy water have been transferred under these agreements. One of the largest recipients of enriched uranium has been the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). Additional arrangements were concluded in 1964 for the transfer of between 400 and 500 kilograms of plutonium for joint research

on fast reactors to be done in Euratom laboratories in France and Germany, and subject to Euratom safeguards.

A third feature of the new atomic policy was to send abroad equipment, including reactors—again under statutory agreements. In the early stages, the reactors were small and the possibility of their misuse to develop plutonium for military purposes was insignificant. In the late 1950s, we sold about 25 research reactors abroad, and the Soviet Union also made reactors available to several countries including Ghana, Egypt, Jugoslavia and many of the East European countries. As an incentive, we contributed up to $350,000, but not more than half the cost of the reactor project, as an outright grant to qualifying countries. While this program is now completed, it was one of the more controversial aspects of the Atoms for Peace Program. There has been criticism that this financial incentive might have stimulated some countries to procure a reactor earlier than could reasonably be justified. Also, many developing countries did not have trained personnel or clear-cut research programs. On the other hand, a research reactor is a very useful instrument not only for basic research and the production of radioisotopes but for training and education. In the long run, therefore, these facilities could make important contributions.

It should be emphasized that the decision to purchase a reactor, including the timing of acquisition, has in all cases been made by the receiving countries. In some countries, to be sure, reactors were built primarily as status symbols designed to indicate scientific achievement. In most others, while the element of prestige may have had a bearing, they have been regarded as they should be—as tools designed to accomplish a specific research program. While a few countries have clearly gone too far too soon, let us never assume that the capability for imaginative research and scientific development is limited to a few developed countries in the West. As a case in point, one can cite the impressive research facilities at Trombay in India, which have been very productively used. India has distinguished itself by its ability within a few years to muster a large research establishment that is highly competitive in a wide variety of fields. It is significant that, in spite of the provocation of the Chinese bomb, India has reiterated its intention to devote itself to peaceful rather than military programs. Perhaps, in the last analysis, the best restraint against proliferation is found in such self-imposed limitations.

IV

The fourth aspect of the new atomic policy has been to support actively those international organizations which have as their main purpose the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Two are of particular importance—the International Atomic Energy Agency and Euratom. I.A.E.A. was an American idea. One of the original purposes of the Agency was to accumulate and distribute fuel for reactors under safeguards. This purpose has never been fully realized. The availability of uranium in large quantities and the ease with which it can be procured under bilateral arrangements has made it unnecessary for the Agency to become a major distributor of nuclear fuel, although it remains an important source of supply for nations that prefer to receive their fuel from a multilateral group. On the more positive side, the development of East-West technical contacts and discussions has been effective, and in Vienna (the Agency's headquarters) the recent support for safeguards brightens the Agency's prospects for useful service.

The I.A.E.A. looks upon itself as a technical bridge between East and West. There are 91 member states, and 45 nationalities are represented in a secretariat of about 600. The executive policy body, the Board of Governors, consisting of 25 member states, meets several times a year to review budgets and program proposals made by the chief executive, the Director General. The atomic powers have permanent seats on the Board. The Agency's ability to disseminate information and equipment is modest because its budget is one of the smallest in the United Nations family. However, in the past two years the importance of the safeguard and inspection responsibility of the Agency has increased significantly. In 1963 the Board of Governors, with the affirmative vote of the Soviet Union and the United States, extended the system which had previously been applicable to small facilities to cover reactors greater than 100 thermal megawatts in size.

In February 1965, the system was revised and clarified, and received the unanimous support of the Board (Switzerland and South Africa abstaining). For the first time in postwar negotiations, we have at last seen strong East-West adherence to an international inspection system, limited though it is. In addition, the Agency is assuming a greater number of the safeguard respon-

sibilities contained in bilateral agreements. For example, 20 countries receiving assistance from the United States have agreed to submit these arrangements to I.A.E.A. safeguards. The increasing burden on the Agency has already led to serious discussions as to whether it should bear all costs of inspection.

In the late 1950s when the United States was negotiating bilateral agreements, the I.A.E.A. was in existence but as yet no agreed system of safeguards had been established. There were many critics then—and perhaps are still—who felt that the United States undermined its international position in Vienna by continuing bilateral arrangements. It was said that instead we should channel all information, fuel and safeguards through the International Agency. While this view had merit, it did not come to grips with the fact that between 1957 and 1963 many countries wanted to continue coöperation on a bilateral basis, until the International Agency proved it was viable and equipped to apply effective safeguards under agreed procedures. As long as the bilateral arrangements contained specific provisions for safeguards, inspections and verification, there was no substantive contradiction in policy.

The experience of the last few years indicates that it was sound policy to treat the Agency as a small but growing and potentially important organization rather than to give it a major responsibility from the beginning. It has, among other things, allowed time for the needs of the international community and the principal purposes of the Agency to become clear. These have grown out of a recognition that atomic energy has implications which transcend national boundaries, that the controls and regulations required range from the prevention of diversion to military use to the development of standards for the protection of the populace, including those engaged in international commerce, from the harmful effects of radioactivity.

The European Atomic Energy Community—Euratom—was established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. It was designed to coördinate and ultimately to integrate the national programs of its member states—France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg—and to take on selected functions that the member states felt could be performed more effectively by a joint effort. An important political purpose behind Euratom was to accelerate the integration of Europe.

The first United States-Euratom agreement, concluded in

1958, provided for a joint reactor program as well as a joint program of research and development. For a number of reasons, including the unanticipated decline in the cost of fossil fuels, the reactor program fell short of its initial goal of installing 1000 megawatts of nuclear capacity by 1965.

At the time our agreement with Euratom was negotiated, the United States had bilateral agreements with the countries who were members of the Community. It was expected that when the bilateral agreements expired they would not be renewed and the supply function would be performed solely through Euratom, which would also take over the safeguard responsibilities. In light of the guarantees provided in the American agreement with Euratom, the United States feels that this arrangement provided adequate assurances, but it has led to some criticism. As long as Euratom is made an exception, it is argued that other regional groups or large states should be given similar responsibility. Again, the answer is that the arrangements with Euratom were concluded before the I.A.E.A. had an operative system. Moreover, Euratom is unique; and the system of safeguards applied is such that the six nations of the Community are in effect inspecting each other. Therefore, the United States has felt that Euratom provides exceptional guarantees. Nevertheless, as a general matter of policy, we have favored the more broadly based international system of safeguards administered by the I.A.E.A.

The efficacy of any safeguards system depends on access and the availability of measurement techniques to verify that all of the materials involved are in fact being put to peaceful use. This is not easily accomplished. However, over the past 20 years, a greater appreciation of the need for strict internal accountability of fissile material has helped to develop techniques which can be adapted to international verification. These increasingly sophisticated methods have both reduced the possibility of deliberate diversion or misuse of equipment and material, and also developed a psychology of deterrence which has made the possibility of diversion very remote.

Despite a variety of techniques for taking material inventory (piece counting, sampling, weighing, chemical analysis, radioactivity checks), verification by direct means is not always feasible. For example, the amount of nuclear material contained in an operating reactor or in a highly radioactive fuel element cannot be measured directly. In some cases, indirect assurance can

be gained by a continuing review of an installation's operations and records, and direct assurance is finally obtained from data which becomes available when the fuel is submitted for chemical reprocessing and the amount of plutonium produced can be determined by chemical analysis.

Inspection is no longer a hypothetical or academic matter. The United States has been engaged in inspection in this field since 1955. In 1964 the A.E.C.'s safeguards staff inspected 98 facilities in 14 countries. Six of the 14 countries and 23 of the installations were inspected twice during this period, in accordance with regulations applying to larger facilities with larger quantities of material. The International Agency in 1963–64 inspected 23 facilities in seven countries.

There is no doubt that, had the United States been able to control all the variables and successfully secure adoption of the Acheson-Lilienthal proposals, we might have realized a more sure and comprehensive control over the subsequent development of atomic energy. This would have been accomplished by an international authority which itself owned and controlled a large proportion of the world's nuclear installations and research activity. However, the Baruch proposals did not find universal support, and by the mid-1950s the West was confronted with the prospect of uncontrolled traffic in atomic fuels and materials. As technology developed it also became apparent that ownership and control of atomic energy were really two discrete functions and that effective control did not necessarily depend on ownership per se. Moreover, the concept of centralized international ownership of anything as vast and complex as atomic energy was proven impracticable. The application of safeguards by on-site inspection was therefore accepted by most countries as a preferred alternative. This acceptance widened until in 1963 the Soviet Union and the United States agreed in the International Atomic Energy Agency that the safeguards system should be supported. Having reached an understanding on the procedures to be followed, the next step is to apply them as widely as possible throughout the world.

V

What, then, are the answers to the basic questions we have posed?

There is no doubt that our atomic policy of the past ten years

has contributed substantially to the spread of knowledge of nuclear energy throughout the world, and that some of this information may have contributed to an understanding of its military applications. However, it is extremely difficult to argue that the program has contributed to the earlier proliferation of nuclear weapons, since the United States has safeguarded its weapons information and, even without American involvement, many nations would have been able to proceed with either peaceful or military programs on their own. Both the Soviet Union and France developed weapons programs without any assistance. Indeed, a persuasive case can be made that the program has in fact retarded proliferation, since it has satisfied the aspirations of most nations and discouraged military programs while at the same time extending the application of safeguards. Further, it has created a general atmosphere of openness which has made it less likely that nations avowedly committed to peaceful programs might clandestinely pursue military purposes.

On balance, the United States has felt it more desirable to coöperate under safeguards than not to coöperate at all. As Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, recently stated in an address in Los Angeles:

> The story of how nuclear safeguards came about is the story of careful foresight in the establishment of the U. S. Atoms for Peace Program and of the continuing conscientious efforts of many scientists, administrators and diplomats, both in this country and abroad, over a period of several years. The Atoms for Peace program began with the fundamental thesis that the plentiful benefits of the peaceful atom must be shared with all mankind if we are to live up to our belief in an open community of nations free from the specter of poverty. . . .
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> There were many who felt in those early days, as some feel today, that we could somehow hold back the hands of time—arrest scientific progress—and not coöperate with other countries in providing this nuclear technology and materials for peaceful purposes. Science cannot for long be kept under lock and key. We knew that other countries could independently achieve a nuclear capability. We also knew that many countries of the world had their own supplies of natural uranium and, perhaps more importantly, their own scientists. We also considered that if we did not coöperate in sharing our peaceful nuclear technology and nuclear materials, there would be other countries—not all of which necessarily would agree to the need for safeguards—other countries which might be willing to provide nuclear materials and technology without a firm assurance as to their eventual peaceful end use. We also recognized that a multilateral control system would be more efficient and objective than bilateral safeguards and that it would contribute in the long run to the evolution of a broader system of arms limitation or disarma-

ment. It was these simple facts that led us, at an early date, to see the urgent need for a system of international safeguards and for the United States to take a major role in its evolution.

Looking to the future, the aim should therefore be not so much to stop further international assistance and commerce in this area, but rather to place all of this growing traffic under effective international safeguards. Efforts also should be made to apply safeguards increasingly to national programs that are not dependent on outside assistance. This is the big gap in the present security system and the area in which weapons development and proliferation can be foreseen. Fortunately, there is a workable solution at hand—namely, the International Agency's existing safeguards system—which has the political support of East and West.

Twenty years ago atomic activity was limited to the United States, Britain, Canada and the Soviet Union. In 1965, there are approximately 300 research reactors and 45 power reactors throughout the world. Ten years ago the United States was the principal supplier of uranium, equipment and reactors. In 1965, there are many suppliers, actual and potential. One important step to limit proliferation is to urge all suppliers of atomic materials to subject their bilateral traffic to the accepted safeguards of the I.A.E.A., as the United States has done.

A further measure, more drastic in its effect, would be to urge all countries with peaceful atomic-energy programs voluntarily to place their installations under Agency safeguards. The United States took a symbolic step in this direction last year by asking the I.A.E.A. to assume responsibility for the safeguards at the large Yankee Atomic Power Plant in Rowe, Massachusetts. Other nuclear powers ought to follow suit.

These two measures—placing international traffic as well as national programs under effective safeguards—can help control the problem of weapons proliferation and permit us to realize with growing confidence the full advantages of the peaceful atom. They obviously are not, however, panaceas for the world's security problem, nor should they be confused with more fundamental measures such as arms control. They do represent important steps that should provide useful experience for greater progress to follow.

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NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TREATY

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, on May 17, 1966—nearly 2 years ago—the Senate passed Senate Resolution 179, by a vote of 84 to 0.

Senate Resolution 179 was a resolution for nonproliferation of nuclear weapons which carried the following words:

Resolved, That the Senate commends the President's serious and urgent efforts to negotiate international agreements limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and supports the principle of additional efforts by the President which are appropriate and necessary in the interest of peace for the solution of nuclear proliferation problems.

As the sponsor of that resolution, I am particularly pleased today with the excellent news received from Geneva, where the International Disarmament Conference is meeting. After many long months of hard, difficult negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union have reached agreement on the language to be incorporated in a proposed nonproliferation

treaty to be tabled in Geneva before representatives of the nations of the world who have been engaged in an effort to negotiate a nonproliferation treaty.

Mr. President, I have just received word from Mr. Adrian Fisher that the treaty has been tabled. I received the call 10 minutes ago in the cloakroom. I am also happy to say that Mr. Fisher told me he thought the resolution that passed unanimously 2 years ago was quite instrumental in bringing about agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union.

For many months, Ambassador William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Mr. Adrian Fisher, Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, have been diligently and competently exploring ways and means of reaching agreement among our allies, representatives of the U.S.S.R. and representatives of other nations. The principal area of difficulty has centered on the language to be contained in article III of the proposed treaty, which has to do with the safeguards provisions. There have been those who desire a nonproliferation treaty to such an extent that they would have eliminated any requirements for safeguards. I am not one of those. As I have pointed out on numerous occasions in the past, any treaty entered into must have assurances that the agreements contained therein are being honored. Accordingly, I have strongly advocated the need for international safeguards.

At one point the U.S.S.R. insisted that the safeguards would be administered exclusively by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

A number of our allies in Western Europe, for a time, insisted that Euratom safeguards alone would suffice within their territory and were not willing to recognize International Atomic Energy Agency responsibility.

As I have pointed out time and time again, I do not believe we have to make a choice between one or the other. In my opinion it can be, and it should be, a cooperation and understanding between the two civilian agencies that we have supported these many years—the International Atomic Energy Agency and Euratom. Article III of the treaty as it has been tabled is directed toward this objective, I am very happy to say.

Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is too important a matter. The world needs any and all assistance we can receive to assure nuclear material and nuclear equipment are not diverted from civilian to military uses. I have been informed that technical representatives from the International Atomic Energy Agency who have responsibility for safeguarding material under the International Atomic Energy Agency's jurisdiction have visited Euratom facilities and have conferred with technical personnel responsible for developing improved safeguard techniques. It is my understanding that safeguards personnel of both agencies can, and do, work well together. There is no doubt in my mind that these technical people can and will be able to work out methods by which Euratom can continue its safeguards system and International Atomic Energy Agency can conduct appropriate verification to assure its safeguard personnel that it is properly being conducted. Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and proper safeguard systems are too important to permit failure because of squabbling amongst administrative bureaucrats in International Atomic Energy Agency and Euratom who may be more interested in the protection of their own little official position than in solving a major international problem. I am certain that with encouragement from the highest positions in Euratom and in the International Atomic Energy Agency we can, and will, work out an appropriate and proper safeguards arrangement.

Mr. President, I am very optimistic that we will have submitted to us this session by the President of the United States a nonproliferation treaty for our advice and consent.

Here again I might say parenthetically that the President of the United States, in his state of the Union message to Congress and to the people of the country, said exactly that last evening.

This hour at Geneva is cause for optimism. In order to assist my colleagues in the Senate and for the information of the public at large, I ask unanimous consent to have printed the RECORD the text of the treaty tabled by the United States in Geneva, and suggest that particular attention be given to the proposed article III.

There being no objection, the treaty was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological byproducts which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosives devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to this Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of

this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

ARTICE IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty.

ARTICLE V

Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to cooperate to insure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. It is understood that non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty so desiring may, pursuant to a special agreement or agreements, obtain any such benefits on a bilateral basis or through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States.

ARTICLE VI

Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures regarding cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

ARTICLE VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

ARTICLE VIII

1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the parties to the treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of ----------, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear-weapon States signatory to this Treaty, and 40 other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national soverignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a Conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in.....at.....this.....of.....

Mr. PASTORE. In conclusion, let me say that we went a long way toward achieving a rapport between ourselves and another major nuclear power, the Soviet Union, when we brought about the consummation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. It is my prayerful hope today that, now that this treaty has been tabled, it will be signed by all the nations of the world, because I believe that would be another step toward eliminating the likelihood and the peril of a nuclear or thermonuclear holocaust which could well destroy this entire world.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT—APPROVAL OF BILLS

The Secretary of the Senate, on January 2, 1968, and January 3, 1968, respectively, received messages from the President of the United States, which announced that, on the dates indicated, he had approved and signed the following acts:

On December 29, 1967:

S. 174, an act for the relief of Dr. Eduardo Gonzalez;

S. 294, an act for the relief of Eloy C. Navarro;

S. 1477, an act to amend section 301 of title III of the act of August 14, 1946, relating to the establishment by the Secretary of Agriculture of a national advisory committee, to provide for annual meetings of such committee;

S. 2119, an act for the relief of Dr. Octavio Suarez-Murias;

S. 2153, an act for the relief of Dr. Jose Rafael Montalvo y Urrutibeascoa;

S. 2206, an act for the relief of Dr. Jorge Rolando Guerra-Reyes; and

S. 2265, an act for the relief of Christopher Nicholas Rushton.

On January 2, 1968:

S. 866, an act for the relief of Giuseppe Pacino Biancarosso;

S. 1566, an act to amend sections 3 and 4 of the act approved September 22, 1964 (78 Stat. 990), providing for an investigation and study to determine a site for the construction of a sea-level canal connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans;

S. 1722, an act to amend the wheat acreage allotment provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended; and

S. 2171, an act to amend the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 so as to accord with certain decisions of the courts.

HOUSE BILLS REFERRED

The following bills were severally read twice by their titles and referred as indicated:

H.R. 4892. An act to provide for the conveyance of certain real property of the United States to the city of Leavenworth, Kans.; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

H.R. 7042. An act for the relief of Dr. Jose Del Rio; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 8364. An act to amend the joint resolution of March 24, 1937, to provide for the termination of the interest of the United States in certain real property in Allen Park, Mich.; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

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AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 442
AMEMBASSY LONDON 1146
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 533
AMEMBASSY PARIS 1370
AMEMBASSY ROME 733
US MISSION NATO 113
USUN NEW YORK 1561

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ON CONTINGENCY THAT SOVIETS WILL BE AUTHORIZED TO TABLE REVISED NPT DRAFT TREATY ON BASIS AUTHORIZED FOR US DEL IN STATE 98934 AND 99821: FOLLOWING IS TEXT WHICH WE WOULD TABLE AS ENDC DOCUMENT 192/REV 1. PURSUANT LAST PARA STATE 99821, TEXT MUST BE HELD IN STRICT CONFIDENCE.

BEGIN TEXT:

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
By [illegible] Date 3-19-09

Department of State TELEGRAM

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DRAFT TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

THE STATES CONCLUDING THIS TREATY, HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS THE "PARTIES TO THE TREATY";

CONSIDERING THE DEVASTATION THAT WOULD BE VISITED UPON ALL MANKIND BY A NUCLEAR WAR AND THE CONSEQUENT NEED TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO AVERT THE DANGER OF SUCH A WAR AND TO TAKE MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD THE SECURITY OF PEOPLES,

BELIEVING THAT THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD SERIOUSLY ENHANCE THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR,

IN CONFORMITY WITH RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY CALLING FOR THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF WIDER DISSEMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,

UNDERTAKING TO CO-OPERATE IN FACILITATING THE APPLICATION

OF INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY SAFEGUARDS ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES,

EXPRESSING THEIR SUPPORT FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND OTHER EFFORTS TO FURTHER THE APPLICATION, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM, OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SAFEGUARDING EFFECTIVELY THE FLOW OF SOURCE AND SPECIAL FISSIONABLE MATERIALS BY USE OF INSTRUMENTS AND OTHER TECHNIQUES AT CERTAIN STRATEGIC POINTS,

AFFIRMING THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE BENEFITS OF PEACEFUL APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, INCLUDING ANY TECHNOLOGICAL BY-PRODUCTS WHICH MAY BE DERIVED BY NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES FROM THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES, SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES TO ALL PARTIES TO THE TREATY, WHETHER NUCLEAR-WEAPON OR NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES,

[redacted]

CONVINCED THAT IN FURTHERANCE OF THIS PRINCIPLE, ALL PARTIES TO THIS TREATY ARE ENTITLED TO PARTICPATE IN THE FULLEST POSSIBLE EXCHANGE OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION FOR, AND TO CONTRIBUTE ALONE OR IN CO-OPERATION WITH OTHER STATES TO, THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE APPLICATIONS OF ATOMIC ENERGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES,

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DECLARING THEIR INTENTION TO ACHIEVE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE THE CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE,

URGING THE COOPERATION OF ALL STATES IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECTIVE,

DESIRING TO FURTHER THE EASING OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION AND THE STRENGTHENING OF TRUST BETWEEN STATES IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE CESSATION OF THE MANUFACTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE LIQUIDATION OF ALL THEIR EXISTING STOCKPILES, AND THE ELIMINATION FROM NATIONAL ARSENALS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE MEANS OF THEIR DELIVERY PURSUANT TO A TREATY ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT UNDER STRICT AND EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL,

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

ARTICLE I

EACH NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE PARTY TO THIS TREATY UNDERTAKES NOT TO TRANSFER TO ANY RECIPIENT WHATSOEVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES OR CONTROL OVER SUCH WEAPONS OR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES DIRECTLY, OR INDIRECTLY; AND NOT IN ANY WAY TO ASSIST, ENCOURAGE, OR INDUCE ANY NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE

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TO MANUFACTURE OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES, OR CONTROL OVER SUCH WEAPONS OR

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EXPLOSIVE DEVICES.

ARTICLE II

EACH NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE PARTY TO THIS TREATY UNDERTAKES NOT TO RECEIVE THE TRANSFER FROM ANY TRANSEROR WHATSOEVER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES OR OF CONTROL OVER SUCH WEAPONS OR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES DIRECTLY, OR INDIRECTLY; NOT TO MANUFACTURE OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES; AND NOT TO SEEK OR RECEIVE ANY ASSISTANCE IN THE MANUFACTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES.

ARTICLE III

1. EACH NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE PARTY TO THE TREATY UNDERTAKES TO ACCEPT SAFEGUARDS, AS SET FORTH IN AN AGREEMENT TO BE NEGOTIATED AND CONCLUDED WITH THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND THE AGECY'S SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM, FOR THE EXCLUSIVE PURPOSE OF VERIFICATION OF THE FULFILLMET OF ITS OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED UNDER THIS TREATY WITH A VIEW TO PREVENTING DIVERSION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FROM PEACEFUL USES TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES. PROCEDURES FOR THE SAFEGUARDS

REQUIRED BY THIS ARTICLE SHALL BE FOLLOWED WITH RESPECT TO SOURCE OR SPECIAL FISSIONABLE MATERIAL WHETHER IT IS BEING PRODUCED, PROCESSED OR USED IN ANY PRINCIPAL NUCLEAR FACILITY OR IT OUTSIDE ANY SUCH FACILITY. THE SAFEGUARDS REQUIRED BY THIS ARTICLE SHALL BE APPLIED ON ALL SOURCE OF SPECIAL FISSIONABLE MATERIAL IN ALL PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF SUCH STATE, UNDER ITS JURISDICTION, OR CARRIED OUT UNDER ITS CONTROL ANYWHERE.

2. EACH STATE PARTY TO THE TREATY UNDERTAKES NOT TO PROVIDE: (A) SOURCE OF SPECIAL FISSIONALBE MATERIAL, OR (B) EQUIPMENT OR MATERIAL ESPECIALLY DESIGNED OR PREPARED FOR THE PROCESSING, USE OR PRODUCTION OF SPECIAL FISSIONABLE MATERIAL, TO ANY NON-

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NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES, UNLESS THE SOURCE OR SPECIAL FISSIONABLE MATERIAL SHALL BE SUBJECT TO THE SAFEGUARDS REQUIRED BY THIS ARTICLE. GP-3. TUBBY

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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AMEMBASSY PARIS 1371
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3. THE SAFEGUARDS REQUIRED BY THIS ARTICLE SHALL BE IMPLEMENTED IN A MANNER DESIGNED TO COMPLY WITH ARTICLE IV OF THIS TREATY, AND TO AVOID HAMPERING THE ECONOMIC OR TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARTIES OR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING THE INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT FOR THE PROCESSING, USE OR PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES IN

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ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ARTICLE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SAFEGUARDING SET FORTH IN THE PREAMBLE.

4. NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES PARTY TO THE TREATY SHALL CONCLUDE AGREEMNTS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THIS ARTICLE EITHER INDIVIDUALY OR TOGETHER WITH OTHER STATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. NEGOTIATION OF SUCH AGREEMENTS SHALL COMMENCE WITHIN 180 DAYS FROM THE ORIGINAL ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THIS TREATY. FOR STATES DEPOSITING THEIR INSTRUMNTS OF RATIFICATION AFTER THE 180-DAY PERIOD, NEGOTIATION OF SUCH AGREEMENTS SHALL COMMENCE NOT LATER THAN THE DATE OF SUCH DEPOSIT. SUCH AGREEMENTS SHALL ENTER INTO FORCE NOT LATER THAN EIGHTEEN MONTHS AFTER THE DATE OF INITIATION OF NEGOTIATIONS.

ARTICLE IV

1. NOTHING IN THIS TREATY SHALL BE INTERPRETED AS AFFECTING THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ALL THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY TO DEVELOP RESEARCH, PRODUCTION AND USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION AND IN CONFORMITY WITH ARTICLES I AND II OF THIS TREATY.

2. ALL THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY HAVE THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FULLEST POSSIBLE EXCHANGE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL INFORMATION FOR THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY. PARTIES TO THE TREATY IN A POSITION TO DO SO SHALL ALSO COOPERATE IN CONTRIBUTING ALONE OR TOGETHER WITH OTHER STATES OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES, ESPECIALLY IN THE TERRITORIES OF NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES PARTY TO THE TREATY.

ARTICL V

EACH PARTY TO THIS TREATY UNDERTAKES TO COOPERATE TO INSURE THAT POTENTIAL BENEFITS FROM ANY PEACEFUL APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE THROUGH APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL

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PROCEDURES TO NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES PARTY TO THIS TREATY ON A NON-DISCRIMINATORY BASIS AND THAT THE CHARGE TO SUCH PARTIES FOR THE EXPLOSIVE DEVICES USED WILL BE AS LOW AS POSSIBLE AND EXCLUDE ANY CHARGE FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES PARTY TO THIS TREATY SO DESIRING MAY, PURSUANT TO A SPECIAL AGREEMENT OR AGREEMENTS, OBTAIN ANY SUCH BENEFITS ON A BILATERAL BASIS OR THROUGH AN APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL BODY WITH ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION ON NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES.

ARTICLE VI

EACH OF THE PARTIES TO THIS TREATY UNDERTAKES TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH ON EFFECTIVE MEASURES REGARDING CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND DISARMAMENT, AND ON A TREATY ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT UNDER STRICT AND EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL.

ARTICLE VII

NOTHING IN THIS TREATY AFFECTS THE RIGHT OF ANY GROUP OF STATES TO CONCLUDE REGIONAL TREATIES IN ORDER TO ASSURE THE TOTAL ABSENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES.

ARTICLEVIII

1. ANY PARTY TO THIS TREATY MAY PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THIS TREATY. THE TEXT OF ANY PROPOSED AMENDMENT SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO THE DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS WHICH SHALL CIRCULATE IT TO ALL PARTIES TO THE TREATY. THEREUPON, IF REQUESTED TO DO SO BY ONE-THIRD OR MORE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY, THE DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS SHALL CONVENE A CONFERENCE, TO WHICH THEY SHALL INVITE ALL THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY, TO CONSIDER SUCH AN AMENDMENT.

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2. ANY AMENDMNT TO THIS TREATY MUST BE APPROVED BY A MAJORITY OF THE VOTES OF ALL THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY, INCLUDING THE VOTES OF ALL NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES PARTY TO THIS TREATY AND ALL OTHER PARTIES WHICH, ON THE DATE THE AMENDMENT IS CIRCULATED, ARE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. THE AMENDMNT SHALL ENTER INTO FORCE FOR EACH PARTY THAT DEPOSITS ITS INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION OF THE AMENDMENT UPON THE DEPOSIT OF INSTRUMNTS OF RATIFICATION BY A MAJORITY OF ALL THE PARTIES, INCLUDING THE INSTRUMNTS OF RATIFICATION OF ALL NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES PARTY TO THIS TREATY AND ALL OTHER PARTIES WHICH, ON THE DATE THE AMENDMENT IS CIRCULATD, ARE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. THEREAFTR, IT SHALL ENTER INTO FORCE FOR ANY OTHER PARTY UPON THE DEPOSIT OF ITS INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION OF TH AMENDMENT.

PAGE 2 RUFHGV 2290/2 ~~SECRET~~

3. FIVE YEARS AFTER THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THIS TREATY, A CONFERENCE OF PARTIES TO THE TREATY SHALL BE HELD IN GENEVA, SWITZERLAND, IN ORDER TO REVIEW THE OPERATION OF THIS TREATY WITH A VIEW TO ASSURING THAT THE PURPOSES AND PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY ARE BEING REALIZED.

ARTICLE IX

1. THIS TREATY SHALL BE OPEN TO ALL STATES FOR SIGNATURE. ANY STATE WHICH DOES NOT SIGN THE TREATY BEFORE ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 3 OF THIS ARTICLE MAY ACCEDE TO IT AT ANY TIME.

2. THIS TREATY SHALL BE SUBJECT TO RATIFICATION BY SIGNATORY STATES. INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION AND INSTRUMENTS OF ACCESSION SHALL BE DEPOSITION WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF , WHICH ARE HEREBY DESIGNATED THE DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS.

3. THIS TREATY SHALL ENTER INTO FORCE AFTER ITS RATIFICATION

[redacted]

BY ALL NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES SIGNATORY TO THIS TREATY, AND 40 OTHER STATES SIGNATORY TO THIS TREATY AND THE DEPOSIT OF THEIR INSTRUMNTS OF RATIFICATION. FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS TREATY, A NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE IS ONE WHICH HAS MANUFACTURED AND EXPLODED A NUCLEAR WEAPON OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE PRIOR TO JANUARY 1, 1967.

GP-3 TUBBY

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 02290 03 OF 03 172228Z

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DISTO/BUSEC/NATUS

SUBJECT: DRAFT NPT TEXT AS IT MAY BE REVISED FOR TABLING AT ENDC

PAGE 2 RUFHGV 2290/3 [redacted]

4. FOR STATES WHOSE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION OR ACCESSION ARE DEPOSITED SUBSEQUENT TO THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THIS TREATY, IT SHALL ENTER INTO FORCE ON THE DATE OF THE DEPOSIT OF THEIR INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION OR ACCESSION.

5. THE DEPOSITIARY GOVERNMENTS SHALL PROMPTLY INFORM ALL SIGNATORY AND ACCEDING STATES OF THE DATE OF EACH SIGNATURE,

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

THE DATE OF DEPOSIT OF EACH INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION OR OF ACCESSION, THE DATE OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THIS TREATY, AND THE DATE OF RECEIPT OF ANY REQUESTS FOR CONVENING A CONFERENCE OR OTHER NOTICES.

6. THIS TREATY SHALL BE REGISTERED BY THE DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 102 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

ARTICLE X

1. EACH PARTY SHALL IN EXERCISING ITS NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY HAVE THE RIGHT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE TREATY IF IT DECIDES THAT EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS, RELATED TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS TREATY, HAVE JEOPARDIZED THE SUPREME INTERESTS OF ITS COUNTRY. IT SHALL GIVE NOTICE OF SUCH WITHDRAWAL TO ALL OTHER PARTIES TO

THE TREATY AND TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL THREE MONTHS IN ADVANCE. SUCH NOTICE SHALL INCLUDE A STATEMENT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS IT REGARDS AS HAVING JEOPARDIZED ITS SUPREME INTERESTS.

2. TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY, A CONFERENCE SHALL BE CONVENED TO DECIDE WHETHER THE TREATY SHALL CONTINUE IN FORCE INDEFINITELY, OR SHALL BE EXTENDED FOR AN ADDITIONAL FIXED PERIOD OR PERIODS. THIS DECISION SHALL BE TAKEN BY A MAJORITY OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY.

ARTICLE XI

THIS TREATY, THE ENGLISH, RUSSIAN, FRENCH, SPANISH AND CHINESE TEXTS OF WHICH ARE EQUALLY AUTHENTIC, SHALL BE DEPOSITED IN THE ARCHIVES OF THE DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS. DULY CERTIFIED COPIES OF THIS TREATY SHALL BE TRANSMITTED BY THE DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE SIGNATORY AND ACCEDING STATES.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF THE UNDERSIGNED, DULY AUTHORIZED, HAVE SIGNED THIS TREATY.

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 03 GENEVA 02290 03 OF 03 1722287

DONE IN AT THIS OF . END TEXT

TP-3. TUBBY

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE JANUARY 18, 1968

14

Office of the White House Press Secretary

- -

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE
PRESENTATION TO THE 18-NATION DISARMAMENT
COMMITTEE OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

The White House was informed at 4:25 a.m. this morning that the USSR would join the United States as Co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to submit to the Committee today a complete draft treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. The President issued the following statement:

I am most heartened to learn that the Soviet Union will join the United States as Co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, to submit a complete text of a treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and that this draft treaty will be submitted today to the Committee in Geneva. This revised text includes an agreed safeguards article and other revisions that will make the treaty widely acceptable.

We have worked long and hard in an effort to draft a text that reflects the views of other nations. I believe the draft presented today represents a major accomplishment in meeting these legitimate interests.

The text submitted today must now be considered further by all governments. Following its review by the Conference in Geneva, it will be considered by the General Assembly in the spring. It is my fervent hope that I will be able to submit it to the Senate of the United States for its advice and consent this year.

The draft treaty text submitted today clearly demonstrates ar important fact. In the face of the differences that exist in the world, the two nations which carry the heaviest responsibility for averting the catastrophy of nuclear war can, with sufficient patience and determination, move forward. They can move forward toward the goal which all men of good will seek -- a reversal of the arms race and a more secure peace based on our many common interests on this one small planet.

I believe history will look on this treaty as a landmark in the effort of mankind to avoid nuclear disaster while ensuring that all will benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

This treaty will be a testament of man's faith in the future. In that spirit I commend it to all.

# # # #

Return to Mr. Farrell

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME
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[redacted] GENEVA 3377
DISTO/NATUS/BUSEC/IAEA

SUBJECT: SOV DRAFT NPT ART III

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PAGE 2 RUFHGV 3377 [redacted]

IN" DRAFT NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY" HANDED FOSTER BY ROSHCHIN TODAY, FOLLOWING CHANGES (OTHER THAN MISSPELLING PUNCTUATION AND ABBREVIATIONS) APPEAR FROM MARCH 3, 1967 TEXT SET FORTH IN STATE CIRCULAR 148031:

1. SOV ARTICLE III READS AS FOLLOWS:
"EACH NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE PARTY TO THIS TREATY UNDERTAKES TO ACCEPT THE SAFEGUARDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY ON ALL ITS PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES. EACH STATE PARTY TO THIS TREATY FURTHER UNDERTAKES NOT TO PROVIDE SOURCE OR FISSIONABLE MATERIAL, OR SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT OR NON-NUCLEAR MATERIAL FOR THE PROCESSING OR USE OF SOURCE OR FISSIONABLE MATERIAL OR FOR THE PRODUCTION

OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES TO ANY NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE, UNLESS SUCH MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT ARE SUBJECT TO SUCH SAFEGUARDS."

[redacted]

3-19-09

2. PREAMBULAR PARAS HAVESOMEWHAT DIFFERENT ARRANGEMENT. THREE PARAS ON PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY SET FORTH END OF MARCH 3 DRAFT APPEAR IN SOV DRAFT IMMEDIATELY AFTER PARA STATING: "UNDERTAKING TO COOPERATE IN FACILITATING THE APPLICATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON

PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES." OTHERWISE PREAMBULAR PARAS ARE IN SAME ORDER.

3. IN THE DEFINITION OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON-STATE, APPEARING AS AN UNNUMBERED SECOND PARAGRAPH UNDER ART V, PARA 3, THE WORD "PRODUCED" APPEARS FOR "MANUFACTURED". ALSO "THE DATE THIS TREATY BECAME OPEN FOR SIGNATURE" APPEARS IN PLACE OF "JANUARY 1,1967."
GP-3 TUBBY
BT

DRAFT AGREEMENT ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty,

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of further dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, shall be available for peaceful purposes to all States Parties to this Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions shall be available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon Parties to this Treaty, on a non-discriminatory basis,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States, thus facilitating the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Noting that nothing in this treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices, either directly or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to produce or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices, either directly or indirectly; not to produce or otherwise

acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes to accept the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency on all its peaceful nuclear activities. Each State Party to this Treaty further undertakes not to provide source or fissionable material, or specialized equipment or non-nuclear material for the processing or use of source or fissionable material or for the production of fissionable material for peaceful purposes to any non-nuclear-weapon State, unless such material and equipment are subject to such safeguards.

Article IV

1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments, which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties to the Treaty upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to ensuring that the

Article V

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State that does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of_____, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty, and_____ Parties to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification.

For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has produced and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to the date this Treaty became open for signature.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification and instrument of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article VI

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party to this Treaty shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have

jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article VII

This Treaty, the Russian, English, French, Spanish, and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof, the undersigned duly appointed Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done in _____ copies, at _____on the ____ day of _____, 1967.

CERTIFICATION OF [illegible]

I hereby certify that the above
translation is [illegible]
prepared by the [illegible]
Department of [illegible]
and that it is [illegible] of State
to the best of my [illegible] knowledge and belief.

File

Nuclear weapons - non-proliferation

16

August 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

I told Dick Freund on August 7 that the August 5 contingency statement on OAU Non-proliferation Resolution appeared to be acceptable to the White House from the standpoint of substance. I suggested, however, the consideration might be given to the insertion of additional language at the beginning of the draft statement that would compliment the 34 member governments for their efforts on behalf of peace and their awareness of the problems of arms control. In addition, I suggested that the U. S. actions listed in our statement might be played down because it looked as though we were unduly complimenting ourselves on having taken a similar position starting in 1946.

Charles E. Johnson

cy to Spurgeon Keeny OST 8-11-64

FOR URGENT COMMENT

DRAFT
8/5/64

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Dr. Keeny

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT BASIS FOR U.S. PUBLIC RESPONSES TO PUBLICATION OF OAU RESOLUTION ON NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The following draft statement is suggested as a basis for U. S. public responses to the OAU Non-proliferation Resolution adopted by the OAU Heads of Government at their Cairo meeting of July 17-21. It is assumed, for planning purposes, that the draft we now have (attached) will prove to be the one actually adopted, or with no changes in substance. It is also assumed that the three OAU members of the ENDC will table the Resolution at Geneva and, therefore, the U.S. ENDC representative will need guidance as to his response. The Department of State, the Secretary, and/or the President, might also receive press questions. The proposed draft is as follows:

"The U. S. Government welcomes this important initiative on the part of the thirty-four (?) member governments of the Organization of African Unity as a major step toward the goal of stopping the spread of nuclear weapons.

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Group 3
Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not auto mstically declassified

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The OAU Resolution is a gratifying response to the will of the United Nations as unanimously expressed in the 'Irish Resolution,' Resolution 1665 (XVI), adopted by the Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly.

"I should also like to point out that the OAU Resolution is consistent with the long-established United States policy on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This firm policy was adopted in recognition of the grave threat to the security and peace of all nations, large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear, that the further dissemination of nuclear weapons would pose. A few examples of this consistency between United States policy and the OAU initiative are:

In 1946 the United States proposed through the Baruch Plan, when the U. S. held a monopoly on nuclear weapons, to place such weapons under the sole control of the U.N.

President Kennedy, in his speech on July 26, 1963, said that the spread of nuclear weapons would mean a world in which 'there would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security, and no chance of effective disarmament.'

In President Johnson's message to the re-convening session of the ENDC on January 21, 1964, he listed five basic steps necessary to achieve peace. Specifically, he stated, 'Fifth, and finally, to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now controlling them, let us agree: (a) That nuclear weapons not be transferred into the national control of States which do not now control them, and that all transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes take place under effective international safeguards; . . .'

In a speech at the ENDC on February 6, 1964, Mr. Foster, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, urged an agreement which would implement the terms of the 'Irish Resolution' and called for a number of practical steps that might be taken pending such an agreement. Specifically, he stated: 'As an immediate step and to facilitate progress in these discussions (on a formal agreement), the United States, for its part, does not intend to take any actions inconsistent with the terms of the Irish Resolution. That is the declared policy of the

United States.' That statement is clearly relevant to that part of the CAU Resolution which calls upon all nuclear powers to respect and abide by the CAU members' declaration of their readiness to undertake in an international treaty not to manufacture or acquire control of nuclear weapons.

"The United States Government notes that the members of the CAU have invited the next United Nations General Assembly to approve their declaration and take action leading to the conclusion of an international treaty consistent with the declaration. The United States Government may be counted upon to play a responsive and constructive role in the General Assembly's consideration of the CAU proposal, and hopes a similar attitude will be taken by the entire membership."

Clearance:
ACDA/D - Mr. Foster
ACDA/IR- Mr. Beam
ACDA/IR- Mr. Akalovsky
ACDA/PA- Mr. Nordness
ACDA/GC- Mr. Bunn
ACDA/ST- Dr. Scoville
ACDA/USC-Gen.Dean
S/P-Mr. Goodby
S/P - Mr. Cathright (also for [illegible])
AF - Mr. Hadsel
RPM -
The White House - Mr. Keamy
NEA - Mr. Talbot
P

ACDA/IR:RBFreund:em
Aug 5, 1964

166

COMMITTEE I (POLITICAL)
No 8
DENUCLEARIZATION OF AFRICA

We, the Heads of African States and Governments, CONSCIOUS of our responsibilities towards our peoples and our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity to exert every effort to bolster international peace and security;

DETERMINED that conditions conducive to international peace and security should prevail to save mankind from the scourge of any nuclear war;

DEEPLY CONCERNED with the disastrous effects resulting from the dissemination of nuclear weapons;

CONFIRMING the United Nations Resolution 1652 (XVI) which called upon all states to respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear free zone;

REAFFIRMING the resolution on general disarmament adopted by the Summit Conference of Independent African States in May 1963,

BEARING IN MIND that the United Nations General Assembly in its Sixteenth Session called upon "All States, and in particular upon the States at present possessing nuclear

Attachment

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weapons, to use their best endeavours to secure the conclusion of an international agreement containing provisions under which the nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons, and provision under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons;"

CONVINCED that it is imperative to exert new efforts towards achieving an early solution for the general question of disarmament.

(1) SOLEMNLY DECLARE their readiness to undertake in an International Treaty to be concluded under the auspices of the United Nations, not to manufacture or acquire control of nuclear weapons;

(2) CALL upon all peace-loving nations to adhere to the same undertaking;

(3) CALL UPON all nuclear powers to respect and abide by this declaration;

(4) INVITE the United Nations General Assembly, in its 19th

Regular Session, to approve of this declaration and take the necessary measures to convene an international conference with a view to concluding an International Treaty to this effect.

2. <u>Nuclear Energy</u> - We are proceeding with the negotiation of a ten-year extension of our Agreement with South Africa on peaceful uses of nuclear energy which will require a reaffirmation by South Africa that it will insist on international safeguards on future sales of uranium to countries which do not now have nuclear weapons. Agreement should be reached with South Africa and the IAEA prior to June 13 in order for the IAEA to authorize continuation of international safeguards in South Africa at its June meeting. We hope, however, to avoid public knowledge of the projected renewal until after the UN Session on African problems beginning April 21. We will undertake a careful program of Congressional consultations in an effort to anticipate and minimize adverse reactions to the renewal.

Hamilton
Keeny
Johnson

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CONFIDENTIAL

file

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UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

APR 3 1967

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Mr. Charles E. Johnson
Office of Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
The White House

Dear Mr. Johnson:

Pursuant to my letter of December 7, 1966, the offer of a two-year extension of the U.S.-South African Agreement for Cooperation was made to the South African Government. The South African response to this offer, together with developments relating to a Non-Proliferation Treaty, have lead to a reconsideration of this position. As a result, the AEC and Department of State have concluded that South Africa should be offered a normal ten-year extension of the Agreement.

In reply to the two-year proposal, South Africa has presented its initial reactions, at the departmental level, pending confirmation of the "formal decision" of the U.S. Government on the likelihood of a normal ten-year extension. The South African Government noted with regret that the U.S. continues to take the position that a normal extension of the bilateral is conditional upon South African compliance with terms which the U.S. seeks to apply to the export of South African uranium. In taking exception to the two-year proposal, South Africa pointed out that it has at all times honored the conditions of the existing agreement in every respect and has by virtue of the agreement committed itself to facilities which make it almost entirely dependent on the United States. With regard to sales of uranium, South Africa maintains that it has always followed a policy which rigorously observes the non-proliferation objective and, while it is prepared to enter into trilateral discussions with the United States and Canada to explore the possibility of reaching agreement on a common sales policy, it is willing to do so only after the bilateral agreement is extended. With respect to the extension, it is stated that South Africa did not have in mind an abnormal extension of only a few years, since this would not be conducive to the spirit of mutual trust necessary if the trilateral talks are to succeed.

The second factor bearing upon the consideration of the ten-year extension is the evolution which has taken place in the past few months with respect to the development of the safeguards article for the draft non-proliferation treaty. The discussions now being conducted in various capitals and in Geneva may conclude with U.S.

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intervals; not
automatically declassified

CONFIDENTIAL

acceptance of a formula containing safeguards requirements which are less restrictive for countries which already have nuclear weapons than for others. Such a development would clearly diminish the significance to U.S. objectives of the divergence of South African policy in the sales of uranium from that with Canada. With the U.S. position conforming more closely to the South African formula than to that of Canada, it is increasingly difficult to maintain that South Africa should adopt a more restrictive policy. On the other hand, tripartite discussions would continue to be highly desirable in order to ensure that the three major suppliers follow common policies in implementing any non-proliferation treaty provision.

In light of the foregoing, a ten-year extension offers certain advantages.

1. Should it not be possible to resolve the extension issue, South African reaction is likely to be such that it will be extremely difficult for the U.S. to continue to discuss safeguards issues with South Africa, which will nevertheless continue to remain as a major producer of uranium. South Africa has consistently supported most of our major objectives in these fields; and, should continued cooperation not be possible, South Africa will increasingly be drawn into closer ties with France which, in contrast, has not as firmly supported U.S. objectives. Prospects of cooperation with respect to both safeguards and non-proliferation objectives would thus be seriously undermined.

2. Proceeding with the two-year extension offer in the face of the evolution in U.S. thinking on the non-proliferation treaty will be interpreted by South Africa as applying to it political conditions in the peaceful uses of atomic energy which we do not apply to other countries. This in turn may have a broader adverse affect on U.S. efforts to extend our influence in the nuclear field and to create confidence in the U.S. as a dependable partner in the supply of materials and the development of peaceful nuclear cooperation.

3. Unless the bilateral agreement is extended, the trilateral agreement for the application of IAEA safeguards will be terminated. This would remove international contact with the South African atomic energy program and contribute to increasing isolation of South African activities in this field.

The necessity of moving ahead with arrangements for an extension of the bilateral, because of its expiration on August 21, does not allow time to await the full evolution of ENDC discussions on the non-proliferation treaty. Additionally, South Africa has stated that it feels obliged to inform the IAEA by the end of March of the expiration of the fuel supply contract with the United States and the consequent change in status of material being safeguarded.

In light of the foregoing factors, both the AEC and the Department of State consider that it would be in the overall interests of the United States to proceed with a ten-year extension of the Agreement. In the Department of State, Under Secretary Katzenbach and Deputy Under Secretary Kohler have approved the proposed action. Before proceeding, I wished to bring the matter to your attention for any views which you may have.

Sincerely yours,

Myron B. Kratzer, Director
Division of International Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

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UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

APR 3 1967

Mr. Charles E. Johnson
Office of Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
The White House

Dear Mr. Johnson:

Pursuant to my letter of December 7, 1966, the offer of a two-year extension of the U.S.-South African Agreement for Cooperation was made to the South African Government. The South African response to this offer, together with developments relating to a Non-Proliferation Treaty, have lead to a reconsideration of this position. As a result, the AEC and Department of State have concluded that South Africa should be offered a normal ten-year extension of the Agreement.

In reply to the two-year proposal, South Africa has presented its initial reactions, at the departmental level, pending confirmation of the "formal decision" of the U.S. Government on the likelihood of a normal ten-year extension. The South African Government noted with regret that the U.S. continues to take the position that a normal extension of the bilateral is conditional upon South African compliance with terms which the U.S. seeks to apply to the export of South African uranium. In taking exception to the two-year proposal, South Africa pointed out that it has at all times honored the conditions of the existing agreement in every respect and has by virtue of the agreement committed itself to facilities which make it almost entirely dependent on the United States. With regard to sales of uranium, South Africa maintains that it has always followed a policy which rigorously observes the non-proliferation objective and, while it is prepared to enter into trilateral discussions with the United States and Canada to explore the possibility of reaching agreement on a common sales policy, it is willing to do so only after the bilateral agreement is extended. With respect to the extension, it is stated that South Africa did not have in mind an abnormal extension of only a few years, since this would not be conducive to the spirit of mutual trust necessary if the trilateral talks are to succeed.

The second factor bearing upon the consideration of the ten-year extension is the evolution which has taken place in the past few months with respect to the development of the safeguards article for the draft non-proliferation treaty. The discussions now being conducted in various capitals and in Geneva may conclude with U.S.

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
automatically declassified

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acceptance of a formula containing safeguards requirements which are less restrictive for countries which already have nuclear weapons than for others. Such a development would clearly diminish the significance to U.S. objectives of the divergence of South African policy in the sales of uranium from that with Canada. With the U.S. position conforming more closely to the South African formula than to that of Canada, it is increasingly difficult to maintain that South Africa should adopt a more restrictive policy. On the other hand, tripartite discussions would continue to be highly desirable in order to ensure that the three major suppliers follow common policies in implementing any non-proliferation treaty provision.

In light of the foregoing, a ten-year extension offers certain advantages.

1. Should it not be possible to resolve the extension issue, South African reaction is likely to be such that it will be extremely difficult for the U.S. to continue to discuss safeguards issues with South Africa, which will nevertheless continue to remain as a major producer of uranium. South Africa has consistently supported most of our major objectives in these fields; and, should continued cooperation not be possible, South Africa will increasingly be drawn into closer ties with France which, in contrast, has not as firmly supported U.S. objectives. Prospects of cooperation with respect to both safeguards and non-proliferation objectives would thus be seriously undermined.

2. Proceeding with the two-year extension offer in the face of the evolution in U.S. thinking on the non-proliferation treaty will be interpreted by South Africa as applying to it political conditions in the peaceful uses of atomic energy which we do not apply to other countries. This in turn may have a broader adverse effect on U.S. efforts to extend our influence in the nuclear field and to create confidence in the U.S. as a dependable partner in the supply of materials and the development of peaceful nuclear cooperation.

3. Unless the bilateral agreement is extended, the trilateral agreement for the application of IAEA safeguards will be terminated. This would remove international contact with the South African atomic energy program and contribute to increasing isolation of South African activities in this field.

The necessity of moving ahead with arrangements for an extension of the bilateral, because of its expiration on August 21, does not allow time to await the full evolution of ENDC discussions on the non-proliferation treaty. Additionally, South Africa has stated that it feels obliged to inform the IAEA by the end of March of the expiration of the fuel supply contract with the United States and the consequent change in status of material being safeguarded.

In light of the foregoing factors, both the AEC and the Department of State consider that it would be in the overall interests of the United States to proceed with a ten-year extension of the Agreement. In the Department of State, Under Secretary Katzenbach and Deputy Under Secretary Kohler have approved the proposed action. Before proceeding, I wished to bring the matter to your attention for any views which you may have.

Sincerely yours,

Original signed by
Myron B. Kratzer

Myron B. Kratzer, Director
Division of International Affairs