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09	cable	FBIS 66 open 1/23/18 RAC 1/18	PCI	1	12/28/66	A
13	cable	JAEIC Statement Sanitized 8.25.09 NLJ 09.202	S	1	5/13/66	A
15	cable	Deptel Circular 2195 Sanitized 8.25.09 NLJ 09.202	S	1	5/9/66	A
16	note	INR Intelligence Note 282	S	2	5/9/66	A
18	cable	Deptel Lima 1058 Sanitized 8.25.09 NLJ 09.202	S	1	5/10/66	A
24	cable	Deptel Circular 2220 Sanitized 8.25.09 NLJ 09.202	S	1	5/12/66	A
29	cable	Bulletin from Tokyo open 1/23/18 per RAC 1/18	PCI	1	5/9/66	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Charles E. Johnson
 Folder Title "NUCLEAR - Nuclear Detonation - CHICOM Bomb"
 Box Number 036

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3/19/2009


 Initials

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30	cable	FBIS 42 open 1/23/18 per RAC 1/18	PCI	1	5/9/66	A
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3/19/2009

Initials

China's Latest Atom Test Is Believed a Failure

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 3—Preliminary analysis by the United States indicated today that the latest Chinese Communist nuclear test was a failure.

The indications were that China was attempting to achieve a thermonuclear explosion in the test conducted on Dec. 24.

Two pieces of admittedly circumstantial evidence made public today by the Atomic Energy Commission pointed to a failure. One was the presence of thermonuclear material in the device; the other was the small explosive force of the detonation, indicating that the thermonuclear material had not ignited.

The apparent failure would help explain Peking's unusual and, to United States officials, perplexing silence about the latest nuclear test.

In contrast to the earlier explosions, which were widely publicized by China, Peking has made no public mention of the latest test, the seventh in a series since October, 1964.

Speculation that the test was a failure seemed to be borne out by chemical analysis of radioactive debris collected by United States high-altitude planes in the Far East and analyzed in a secret laboratory at Travis Air Force Base in California.

The Atomic Energy Commission announced today that preliminary analysis of the debris indicated that the Chinese device contained all the ingredients for a thermonuclear explosion.

It contained enriched

U.S. Notes a Discrepancy Between H-Bomb Material and the Low Yield

uranium (uranium-235), which is used as a fission trigger to set off a thermonuclear explosion. It contained lithium-6, a light metal used in compounds with hydrogen as the fusionable material for a thermonuclear explosion. And it contained natural uranium (uranium 238), which is made to fission by the neutrons given

New Duties Are Given Subversive Control Unit

SAN ANTONIO, Tex., Jan. 3 (AP)—President Johnson has signed a bill giving new duties to the dormant Subversive Activities Control Board but holding open the possibility that the agency may go out of business.

The measure empowers the board to hold hearings and declare organizations Communist-dominated and controlled. The board originally was empowered to order such groups to register with the Government, but the Supreme Court ruled this unconstitutional.

The bill, which Mr. Johnson signed last night at his ranch near here, provides that unless the five-member board holds at least one hearing and institutes one proceeding, it will go out of existence on June 1, 1969. It has held no hearings for two years.

off by a thermonuclear reaction, thus producing a triple-stage, or fission-fusion-fission, explosion.

It thus appeared that China was attempting to conduct a triple-stage explosion similar to its first hydrogen-bomb test June 17, estimated to have unleashed the force of at least three millions tons of TNT.

But what apparently happened was that the fission trigger of enriched uranium detonated and failed to set off the fusion reaction in the thermonuclear material.

The explosion, conducted in the vicinity of Lop Nor, the site of previous Chinese tests, had a force of about 20 kilotons, or 20,000 tons of TNT, or roughly the yield of a fission trigger. If thermonuclear material had been ignited, the force would have been at least hundreds and more likely several thousands of kilotons.

An A.E.C. spokesman acknowledged, in response to inquiries, that "it was possible the test was a dud." But he declined to elaborate.

It was speculated that in the latest test China attempted to improve the efficiency and weight of the device by including less thermonuclear material and reducing the size of the fission trigger.

The Chinese may have gone too far in reducing the amounts, with the result that the device was blown apart before the fusion reaction could occur. The components must be put together in such a manner that the thermonuclear materials will ignite in the microsecond before the entire device is blown apart by the explosive force of the fission trigger.

Webster & Hollinger

PRESS RELEASE

The United States has detected another Chinese Communist nuclear test in the atmosphere at their test site near Lopnor on the 28th of December Chinese time (27th of December U. S. time). The yield was a few hundred kiloton.

99

TOKYO--ADD CHINA NUCLEAR (93)



5

THE ANNOUNCEMENT MADE BY PEKING'S NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY DID NOT IMMEDIATELY SAY WHERE THE TEST HAD BEEN HELD. BUT U. S. OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON SAID THE TEST HAD BEEN CONDUCTED IN THE ATMOSPHERE AT LP NOR PROVING GROUND IN SINKIANG PROVINCE.

SR1250PES 12/28

PRESERVATION COPY

Johnson

WASHINGTON--ADD CHINESE NUCLEAR (76)

U. S. OFFICIALS SAID THE BLAST TOOK PLACE AT THE RED CHINESE PROVING GROUNDS AT LOP NOR, IN SINKIANG PROVINCE.

ON NOV. 29, PRESS OFFICER ROBERT J. MCCLOSKEY HAD SAID INDICATIONS POINTED TO A NEW BLAST AT THAT WESTERN CHINESE TEST SITE.

MCCLOSKEY SAID THEN THE CONTINUATION OF CHINESE TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE WOULD COME IN DEFIANCE OF WORLD OPINION EXPRESSED BY MORE THAN 100 NATIONS WHICH HAVE SIGNED THE THREE-YEAR-OLD NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY.

THE LAST CHINESE NUCLEAR TEST OCCURRED ON OCT. 27, WHILE PRESIDENT JOHNSON WAS TOURING THE FAR EAST.

IN THAT TEST, THE CHINESE LAUNCHED A NUCLEAR-TIPPED MISSILE WHICH REPORTEDLY FLEW 400 TO 600 MILES AND ACHIEVED AN ON-TARGET NUCLEAR EXPLOSION.

IT WAS IN THE LOW TO INTERMEDIATE YIELD RANGE, AND LIKE THE FIRST CHINESE EXPLOSION OF A NUCLEAR DEVICE, WAS RATED AT ABOUT THE POWER OF THE U. S. NUCLEAR BOMB DROPPED ON HIROSHIMA IN AUGUST, 1945.

THAT WAS ABOUT THE YIELD OF THE INITIAL RED CHINESE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION, ON OCT. 16, 1964.

JK1210PES 12/28

PRESERVATION COPY

WASHINGTON--ADD CHINESE NUCLEAR (83)

U.S. AUTHORITIES ANTICIPATED THAT THE FIFTH TEST WOULD NOT REPEAT THE GUIDED MISSILE OPERATION. INSTEAD IT WAS EXPECTED HERE THAT THE EFFORT WOULD CONCENTRATE ON TRYING TO PRODUCE A MORE POWERFUL TYPE OF WEAPON.

PEKING'S OCT. 26 NUCLEAR TEST WAS NOT OF THE HYDROGEN VARIETY AND DID NOT INVOLVE THERMONUCLEAR MATERIAL, A U.S. ANALYSIS REPORT SAID ON NOV. 2.

THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION SAID THE EXPLOSIVE WAS ENRICHED URANIUM 235. THAT HAD BEEN THE MATERIAL USED IN ALL THE RED CHINESE EXPLOSIONS.

WHEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT FORECAST A NEW EXPLOSION ON THE HEELS OF THAT TEST, THERE WAS IMMEDIATE SPECULATION THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNIST REGIME WAS STRIVING TO ACHIEVE A THERMONUCLEAR TEST EXPLOSION.

BUT OFFICIAL SOURCES DISCOUNTED PEKING'S ABILITY TO PUT TOGETHER A HYDROGEN BOMB AND A GUIDED MISSILE CAPABLE OF DELIVERING ONE.

ON MAY 8, 1966 THE CHINESE CONDUCTED A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION THAT CONTAINED THERMONUCLEAR MATERIAL. AN ANALYSIS OF THE FALLOUT INDICATED THE PRESENCE OF LITHIUM 6. THE MAIN TEST HAD A YIELD OF ABOUT 200 KILOTONS--THE EQUIVALENT OF ABOUT 200,000 TONS OF TNT. THE FOUR OTHER TESTS WERE ALL IN THE LOW YIELD CATEGORY OF ABOUT THE EQUIVALENT OF THE U.S. BOMB EXPLODED AT HIROSHIMA WITH A FORCE OF ABOUT 20,000 TONS OF TNT.

JK1223PES 12/28

PRESERVATION COPY

93

BULLETIN

CHINA NUCLEAR (TOPS 83)

TOKYO (AP)-COMMUNIST CHINA ANNOUNCED IT SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCTED ITS FIFTH NUCLEAR EXPLOSION IN THE WESTERN REGION OF CHINA TODAY.
CZ&SR1241PES 12/28

94

CHINA-NUCLEAR (TOPS 93)

WASHINGTON (AP)-COMMUNIST CHINA HAS DETONATED HER FIFTH NUCLEAR TEST EXPLOSION IN THE ATMOSPHERE OVER SINKIANG PROVINCE, U. S. OFFICIALS SAID TODAY.

THE UNITED STATES DETECTED A TEST AT THE CHINESE LOP NOR PROVING GROUND ON DEC. 28 CHINESE TIME, DEC. 27 ON AMERICAN CALENDARS.

THE YIELD WAS REPORTED AT A FEW HUNDRED KILOTONS.
SR1243PES 12/28

PRESERVATION COPY

Johnson Kerry
FBIS 54
CPR NUCLEAR ANNOUNCEMENT

PEKING NCNA INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN ENGLISH 1732Z 28 DEC 66 W

(TEXT) PEKING, 28 DECEMBER PRESS COMMUNIQUE: CHINA SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCTED A NEW NUCLEAR EXPLOSION IN THE WESTERN REGION OF CHINA ON 28 DECEMBER 1966.

COMRADE MAO TSE-TUNG HAS SAID: "THE HISTORY OF MANKIND IS ONE OF CONTINUOUS DEVELOPMENT FROM THE REALM OF NECESSITY TO THE REALM OF FREEDOM. THIS PROCESS IS NEVER-ENDING. IN ANY SOCIETY IN WHICH CLASSES EXIST CLASS STRUGGLE WILL NEVER END. IN CLASSLESS SOCIETY THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE NEW AND THE OLD AND BETWEEN TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD WILL NEVER END. IN THE FIELDS OF THE STRUGGLE FOR PRODUCTION AND SCIENTIFIC EXPERIMENT, MANKIND MAKES CONSTANT PROGRESS AND NATURE UNDERGOES CONSTANT CHANGE; THEY NEVER REMAIN AT THE SAME LEVEL. THEREFORE, MAN HAS CONSTANTLY TO SUM UP EXPERIENCE AND GO ON DISCOVERING, INVENTING, CREATING, AND ADVANCING."

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS TEACHING BY CHAIRMAN MAO, THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY, BROAD SECTIONS OF WORKERS AND FUNCTIONARIES, AND SCIENTISTS AND TECHNICIANS HAVE SET THEMSELVES (WORD INDISTINCT) PROPELLED BY THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND GIVING FULL PLAY TO OUR STYLE OF FIGHTING--COURAGE IN BATTLE, NO FEAR OF SACRIFICE, NO FEAR OF FATIGUE, AND CONTINUOUS FIGHTING--HAVE CARRIED OUT THIS NEW NUCLEAR EXPLOSION WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS AFTER THE SUCCESSFUL GUIDED MISSILE NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST, THUS RAISING CHINA'S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO A NEW LEVEL. THIS IS A GREAT VICTORY FOR THE INVINCIBLE THOUGHT OF MAO TSE-TUNG AND (WORD INDISTINCT) RICH FRUIT OF THE GREAT (PROLETARIAN CULTURAL) REVOLUTION.

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA, THE STATE COUNCIL, AND THE MILITARY COMMISSION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PARTY EXTEND WARM CONGRATULATIONS TO ALL THE COMMANDERS AND FIGHTERS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY, WORKERS, ENGINEERS, TECHNICIANS, SCIENTISTS, AND OTHER PERSONNEL WHO HAVE ENGAGED IN THE RESEARCH, MANUFACTURING, AND TESTING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND HOPE THAT IN THE UPSURGE OF THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION, THEY WILL FIRMLY RESPOND TO COMRADE LIN BIAO'S CALL AND CONTINUE TO MAKE VIGOROUS EFFORTS TO KEEP PROLETARIAN POLITICS TO THE FORE, HOLD HIGH THE GREAT RED BANNER OF MAO TSE-TUNG'S THOUGHT, BRING THE MASS MOVEMENT FOR THE CREATIVE STUDY AND APPLICATION OF CHAIRMAN MAO'S WORKS TO A NEW AND HIGHER STAGE, STUDY THE "THREE GOOD OLD ARTICLES" AS A CONSTANT REMINDER, FURTHER PROMOTE THE REVOLUTIONIZATION OF PEOPLE'S THINKING AND MAKE NEW AND STILL GREATER ACHIEVEMENTS IN STRENGTHENING OUR COUNTRY'S DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND ACCELERATING THE MODERNIZATION OF OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE.

THE SUCCESS OF THE THREE NUCLEAR TESTS CONDUCTED BY CHINA IN THE YEAR OF 1966 IS A HEAVY BLOW TO THE PLOT OF U.S. IMPERIALISM AND SOVIET MODERN REVISIONISM WHICH HAVE BEEN COLLABORATING IN A VAIN ATTEMPT TO ENFORCE THEIR NUCLEAR MONOPOLY AND SABOTAGE THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLES OF ALL OPPRESSED PEOPLE AND OPPRESSED NATIONS. IT IS A GREAT ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE HEROIC VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WHO ARE WAGING THE STRUGGLE AGAINST U.S. AGGRESSION AND FOR NATIONAL SALVATION AND TO ALL REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLES OF THE WORLD WHO ARE NOW ENGAGED IN HEROIC STRUGGLES, AS WELL AS AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEFENSE OF WORLD PEACE.

THE CONDUCTING OF NECESSARY AND LIMITED NUCLEAR TESTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY CHINA ARE ENTIRELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEFENSE, WITH THE ULTIMATE AIM OF ABOLISHING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE SOLEMNLY DECLARE ONCE AGAIN THAT AT NO TIME AND IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL CHINA BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AS IN THE PAST, THE CHINESE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO CARRY ON AN UNSWERVING STRUGGLE, TOGETHER WITH ALL OTHER PEACE-LOVING PEOPLE AND COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, FOR THE NOBLE AIM OF COMPLETELY PROHIBITING AND THOROUGHLY DESTROYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

28 DEC 1830Z CF/CP

ATOM SMASHER

*Johnson*8

WASHINGTON AP)-MAYOR RICHARD J. DALEY PLEDGED CHICAGO'S COOPERATION WITH ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION OFFICIALS TODAY IN PLANNING, CONSTRUCTION, AND OPERATION OF THE PROPOSED NEW \$375 MILLION ATOM SMASHER AT WESTON, ILL.

DALEY TOLD NEWSMEN AFTER A CLOSED MEETING WITH AEC OFFICIALS THAT HE PROMISED CHICAGO WOULD WORK WITH EVERYONE AND ANYONE ON THE VARIOUS PROBLEMS INVOLVED SO THAT "WE CAN GET THIS PROJECT GOING."

THE AEC RECENTLY SELECTED WESTON, ABOUT 30 MILES SOUTHWEST OF CHICAGO, AS THE SITE FOR A BIG 200 BILLION ELECTRON VOLT PROTON ACCELERATOR.

AEC CHAIRMAN GLENN T. SEABORG TOLD NEWSMEN, "WE HAD A VERY SUCCESSFUL MEETING" WITH DALEY AND HIS AIDES. IT WAS SIMILAR, HE SAID, TO A MEETING HE HAD LAST WEEK WITH ILLINOIS GOV. OTTO KERNER.

SEABORG SAID THAT CHICAGO "WILL PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN MAINTAINING THE NECESSARY ENVIRONMENT FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE NEW SCIENTIFIC LABORATORY, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO THE RECRUITMENT OF HIGH CALIBER PERSONNEL."

THE NEW ATOM SMASHER IS IN THE CHICAGO AREA, SEABORG SAID, AND NECESSARILY WILL UTILIZE CHICAGO AIRPORTS, COLLEGES, AND INDUSTRY AS WELL AS ITS LABOR FORCE.

"MANY OF THE EMPLOYEES CONNECTED WITH THE PROJECT WILL BE AFFECTED BY THE CITY'S PROGRAMS IN THE AREAS OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES AND NONDISCRIMINATION, CULTURAL ACTIVITIES, EDUCATION, HOUSING AND TRANSPORTATION," SEABORG SAID.

AS A RESULT OF THE MEETING, HE SAID, "WE BELIEVE CHICAGO WILL HELP US IN ALL OF THESE AREAS."

CZ1230PES 12/28

PRESERVATION COPY

WASHN--ADD ATOM SMASHER (90)

SEABORG SAID DALEY AND HIS AIDES HAD DESCRIBED AT THE MEETING THE CITY'S EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING.

DALEY TOLD NEWSMEN THAT CHICAGO'S MERIT EMPLOYMENT COMMITTEE, REPRESENTING COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, HAS OBTAINED THE COOPERATION OF MANY CONCERNS IN PLEDGING EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES.

"OUR EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM IS OUTSTANDING," DALEY SAID, "AND WE HAVE A FINE SUPPLY OF EXCELLENT LABOR."

HE ADDED THAT CHICAGO "WILL DO EVERYTHING IT POSSIBLY CAN TO COOPERATE IN THIS PROJECT."

SEABORG REITERATED THAT THE AEC HOPES TO OBTAIN MONEY FROM CONGRESS NEXT YEAR TO FINANCE THE ENGINEERING DESIGN FOR THE NEW PROJECT AND SAID CONSTRUCTION FUNDS WOULD BE SOUGHT IN THE 12 MONTHS STARTING JULY 1, 1968. ACTUAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE PLANT, HE SAID, WILL REQUIRE SIX TO EIGHT YEARS.

ON THE POLITICAL FRONT, MAYOR DALEY, WHOSE PRESENT TERM ENDS NEXT YEAR, SAID HE HAD NO ANNOUNCEMENT TO MAKE AT THIS TIME AS TO WHETHER HE WILL SEEK REELECTION.

HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT HE IS TO MEET WITH THE COUNTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE TOMORROW AND CONCEDED THAT THE QUESTION OF WHETHER HE WILL BE A CANDIDATE FOR REELECTION "PROBABLY WILL BE DISCUSSED."

HE SAID HE WAS NOT JOINING IN ANY CRITICISM OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON, ASSERTING THAT MANY IMPORTANT PROGRAMS HAD BEEN ENACTED UNDER THE PRESIDENT'S LEADERSHIP AND THAT NEVER BEFORE HAS SO MUCH FEDERAL HELP BEEN EXTENDED.

"WHAT WE MUST DO," DALEY SAID, "IS TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT THESE PROGRAMS WORK. IT IS EASY TO CRITICIZE -- I DO NOT JOIN IN ON THIS. I PREFER TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE."

ASKED IF HE WERE SUPPORTING PRESIDENT JOHNSON FOR REELECTION, DALEY SAID, "IF HE IS A CANDIDATE FOR REELECTION, CERTAINLY I WILL SUPPORT HIM."

CZ1237PES 12/28

Johnson-Peung

FBIS 66

LUNA 12 REPORT

MOSCOW TASS INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN ENGLISH 1750Z 28 DEC 66 L

(TEXT) MOSCOW--THE ARTIFICIAL SATELLITE LUNA 12 HAS BEEN CIRCLING THE MOON FOR MORE THAN TWO MONTHS AND RELIABLE RADIO COMMUNICATION IS BEING MAINTAINED WITH IT.

TRAJECTORY MEASUREMENTS WERE MADE DURING THE 195 RADIO SESSIONS WITH THE STATION AND INFORMATION ON THE WORK OF THE SCIENTIFIC EQUIPMENT ON BOARD THE STATION WAS RECEIVED. THE DATA THUS OBTAINED IS BEING PROCESSED.

THE STATION WAS PUT ON THE ORBIT OF A LUNAR SATELLITE ON 25 OCTOBER THIS YEAR. DURING THIS PERIOD LUNA 12 HAS TRAVELED ABOUT 7.5 MILLION KILOMETERS, MAKING 445 REVOLUTIONS AROUND THE MOON.

28 DEC 2023Z AM/CP

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAc 03M -36-3-2-5

By JDL vARA Date 1/10/18

TOKYO -- ADD CHINA-NUCLEAR (110)

1 Johnson
2 Kern 10

THE ANNOUNCEMENT, MADE BY PEKING'S OFFICIAL NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, HINTED AT FURTHER DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA'S STRUGGLE TO BECOME A NUCLEAR POWER ALONG WITH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

"THE SUCCESS OF THE THREE NUCLEAR TESTS CONDUCTED BY CHINA IN THE ONE YEAR OF 1966 IS A HEAVY BLOW TO THE PLOT OF U.S. IMPERIALISM AND SOVIET MODERN REVISIONISM WHICH HAVE BEEN COLLABORATING IN A VAIN ATTEMPT TO ENFORCE THEIR NUCLEAR MONOPOLY AND SABOTAGE THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLES OF ALL OPPRESSED PEOPLE AND OPPRESSED NATIONS," SAID PEKING.

THE CHINESE DID NOT SAY HOW POWERFUL THE EXPLOSION WAS AND WHAT DEVICE WAS USED.

THE EXPLOSION CAME TWO DAYS AFTER PARTY CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG CELEBRATED HIS 73RD BIRTHDAY.

THE ANNOUNCEMENT REITERATED THAT "AT NO TIME AND IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL CHINA BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS."

"AS IN THE PAST," THE STATEMENT SAID, "THE CHINESE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO CARRY ON AN UNSWERVING STRUGGLE . . . FOR THE NOBLE AIM OF COMPLETELY PROHIBITING AND THOROUGHLY DESTROYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS."

"THE CONDUCTING OF NECESSARY AND LIMITED NUCLEAR TESTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE ENTIRELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEFENSE, WITH THE ULTIMATE AIM OF ABOLISHING NUCLEAR WEAPONS."

THE CHINESE SAID THE TEST "IS A GREAT ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE HEROIC VIETNAMESE PEOPLE . . . AS WELL AS AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO WORLD PEACE."

JA345P 12/28

11

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 25, 1966

NOTE FOR

Mr. Bromley K. Smith

→ Mr. C. E. Johnson

The attached Newsweek article is not nearly so bad as Howard Brown had led me to expect. As frequently happens, I think the AEC was over-reacting. I hesitate to ask whether the wish was father to the thought. The question remains of how Rosen of the JCAE staff knew that the News-week correspondent had the detailed information on the isotopes in the bomb, particularly since this information was supposedly not given to the Joint Committee. However, I am afraid there is no profit in pursuing this matter.

S
Spurgeon

Newsweek

MAY 30, 1966 40c

© A MAY 1966



War Within a War

Buddhists Tri Quang and Phap Tri

MISS JAMES JAMES
324 EXECUTIVE OFF BLDG
COUNCIL ECON ADV
WASHINGTON DC 20006
JUNE 3240 XXX SF 0966 D

INTERNATIONAL

Communist bloc. "The Rumanians have long been underestimated by the West and by Russia," one American diplomat said. "Actually they are sharp diplomats. They also have plenty of guts."

CHINA:

Double Take

As minute bits of radioactive debris from China's recent nuclear explosion began to drift across U.S. skies last week, AEC analysts revised their judgment of how powerful it was. The evidence now points to a blast of about 250 kilotons—almost double the 130 kilotons estimated earlier. Investigators discovered considerable quantities of deuterium in the debris, which strongly suggests that the Chinese had all the makings—lithium-6, deuterium and an atom-splitting trigger—to set off a full-fledged thermonuclear explosion, which for some reason they failed to achieve.

EGYPT:

Defining the Limit

"Friendship," President Gamal Abdel Nasser last week solemnly told the Egyptian National Assembly, "is when each party knows how far the other can go along with it, and where the limit is beyond which it can advance no further." All of which seemed to be Nasser's way of saying that, in conversations with visiting Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin, he had discovered that Russian support had its limits.

Kosygin apparently never got around to making any major new economic concessions during his eight-day stay in Egypt, and did not even relax credit payments (Nasser owes Russia \$2 billion) which are straining Egypt's already hair-thin economy. His chief efforts were diplomatic and were aimed at ending the feuding between nominally socialist Arab states, especially Egypt and Syria. "The unified efforts of certain countries, such as the U.A.R., Algeria, Syria and Iraq may have great importance in the reinforcement of the anti-imperialist front," Kosygin told the Egyptian National Assembly.


In the Wind: Actually, rapprochement between Damascus and Cairo has been in the wind ever since the Syrian military coup last February; all Kosygin had to do was nudge it along. In this, he was apparently successful. Two days before he left Egypt, the Syrians dispatched a known pro-Nasser official to represent them in the Arab League headquarters in Cairo, and declared that they would soon send a Syrian economic mission to Cairo to get trade between the two countries rolling again. Furthermore, there were strong sugges-

tions that Damascus was already dickering to resume diplomatic relations, which have been severed since the collapse of the Egypt-Syrian union in 1961.

■ If Kosygin's visit had been primarily directed at patching up inter-Arab quarrels, he received help from an unexpected quarter last week as the Israelis announced the purchase of tactical jet bombers from the U.S. The State Department had kept the sale a secret since February for obvious diplomatic reasons—the planes, A-4 Skyhawks, are the first strictly offensive weapons supplied by the U.S. to Israel. With the news out, the State Department—which has also supplied arms to Arab countries

ment ever made by South African whites.

The uproar began two weeks ago when the government, invoking South Africa's sweeping Suppression of Communism Act, placed Cape Town law student Ian Robertson, 21, under virtual house arrest for the next five years and banned him from any further activities in the National Union of South African Students. Although the administration has yet to say why it suddenly took such harsh action against the NUSAS president, his fellow students were convinced that the Verwoerd government was simply out to intimidate the anti-segregationist students' union, whose most publicized gesture of defiance had been



Russia's Kosygin in Egypt: All it took was a little nudge

—argued that the sale was the best way to "avoid serious arms imbalances" in the Mideast. A less sanguine view came from the newspaper Al Ahram, mouthpiece of the Nasser government. It was, the paper noted ominously, a "dangerous development."

SOUTH AFRICA:

We Shall Overcome

Student leaders harangued their classmates, youthful bodies lay sprawled across sidewalks, there were leaflets, placards and talk of all-night vigils and even a chorus of "We Shall Overcome"—sung to the accompaniment of the inevitable guitar. If the style was familiar, the campus site was not. It was, of all places, Cape Town University in South Africa where student protest is about as rare as active outcry about the nation's dwindling civil liberties. Yet it was exactly the issue of civil liberties that last week triggered demonstrations at Cape Town and other universities, marking the most widespread attack upon the govern-

ment ever made by South African whites.

to invite Sen. Robert Kennedy to visit South Africa as their guest in June. The "banning" action taken against Robertson, from which there is no appeal, was lamented by some of South Africa's most respected citizens. Opposition leader Sir de Villiers Graaff, for instance, warned that it might lead to "serious international repercussions."

The most violent reaction, however, came from the students at South Africa's four English-language universities—long hotbeds of simmering opposition to apartheid. At Witwatersrand University in Johannesburg, 3,000 students, garbed in their academic gowns, marched through the streets of the city waving banners demanding Robertson's freedom and plastering autos with protest stickers. In Durban, students sang civil-rights songs and lit a "flame of freedom" to burn until the arrival of Senator Kennedy. At Rhodes University in Grahamstown, students threatened to boycott local shops if authorities interfered with their protest marches. Shouted one campus leader at a meeting of some 2,000 Cape Town students and faculty



Mr. Johnson
File
RECEIVED
IN.S.C.

MAY 16 8 30 AM '66

12

Research and Reference Service

WORLDWIDE REACTION TO COMMUNIST CHINA'S
THIRD NUCLEAR EXPLOSION

R-87-66

May 12, 1966

This is a research report, not a statement of Agency policy

cc Keen

HIGHLIGHTS

Prominent and attentive news coverage was given Communist China's third nuclear explosion in the world press, followed by considerable editorial discussion. Peking's Asian neighbors accounted for a high volume of editorial comment. Latin Americans, sensitized by France's upcoming tests in the Pacific, voiced anxiety at developments.

The news out of Peking was generally seen as bad. A mood of concern generally marked comment around the world, as editors stressed the view that Communist China posed a growing threat to peace by her rapid emergence as a nuclear power. Although it was pointed out that the immediate military significance of the event was limited by the fact that Peking as yet has no effective delivery system for its nuclear devices, there was little disposition to dismiss the achievement on this ground. A widespread belief that Red China had made a dramatic and sensational nuclear "leap forward" intensified impact and the feeling that "time was running out." Dangers of nuclear proliferation were frequently stressed.

Communist China's motives were variously assessed as ambition to enter the nuclear club posthaste, to recoup losses in esteem among the Afro-Asian nations, to intimidate dissident homefront elements, and to "upset the equilibrium of fear" resulting from the current U.S. and Soviet nuclear stalemate. There was little expectation that Peking would respond favorably to Western (or Soviet) overtures in the field of non-proliferation or nuclear disarmament.

Many commentators continued to urge, however, that Peking be brought into the U.N. and the "community of nations." Others, deploring the folly of the arms race, urged that the nuclear nations, especially the U.S. and the USSR, act urgently now to forge the machinery for effective cooperation in nuclear control. The U.S. was often advised to end its "isolation of China."

Regional or national concerns emerged early in comment. Indian papers debated whether India should make its own bomb.

Japanese writers and experts were preoccupied with supposed immediate peril to Japan. Various countries were cited as presumably spurred by the Chinese example to become nuclear powers.

Soviet media did not react except in brief and non-committal notation of the event. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia condemned the test and Albania hailed its Asian ally's achievement.

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FAR EAST

The Far East news media treated Communist China's third nuclear detonation as an event of the highest significance. Japanese media, in particular, reacted swiftly with heavy coverage, background material in depth, and extensive editorial analyses. Leading newspapers in the capital cities of Taipei, Manila, Seoul, Saigon and Kuala Lumpur prominently featured wire service reports and exclusive stories on the test-explosion and accorded it moderate editorial attention.

Most Far East commentators voiced widespread apprehension, distrust, condemnation and protest over Peking's unilateral nuclear action, which many considered to be in defiance of prevalent world opinion. There was a broad consensus that Communist China's nuclear coming-of-age, as evidenced by the latest test, represented a three-pronged military-political-psychological threat. Few, however, foresaw precisely the form it would take.

Japanese press opinion was preoccupied with Japan's own peril and security in light of Peking's nuclear capacity, and in vague terms stressed the need for immediate disarmament measures. Most Tokyo newspapers noted the quick tempo with which Communist China had entered the nuclear age and the attendant political and psychological ramifications for neighboring Asian nations. Commentators found little comfort in Peking's pledge not to trigger a nuclear conflict. They likewise shared an overriding fear of nuclear proliferation.

Cutting across the area as a whole, editorials amplified four other salient points: (1) that Peking's latest test would aggravate the cold war confrontation between the United States and Communist China, (2) that it would harden policy lines on both sides and impede a peaceful settlement, (3) that it might result in even greater isolation of the Peking regime, and (4) that it could produce economic repercussions in Communist China. Editorials from Japan, Malaysia and Burma failed to see eye-to-eye on whether Peking's current nuclear accomplishment would upset the existing U.S.-Soviet monopoly and balance in the nuclear field.

Peking's Nuclear Coming-of-Age

Assessment of the nuclear bomb feat itself and its technical potential drew a mixed response. At one extreme, the Guardian (Burma) credited China with having "blasted the 'balance of terror' the nuclear powers of the West have hitherto held" and predicted that "Peking now has the know-how, if not the capability yet -- which she will acquire in the course of not many years -- to retaliate massively in nuclear war."

Sankei (Japan) conceded that "the recent success in the A-test has given Peking a lift in prestige and has elevated its position as a nuclear power." In Kuala Lumpur, the Straits Times (Malaysia) resigned itself to the eventuality of Peking's arrival as an advanced nuclear power "whether great powers like it or not, in no more than a decade and perhaps less."

At the other extreme, Tokyo Shimbun's (Japan) "Fusei" column glossed over the Chinese H-bomb as "a mere firecracker" with no delivery system. Kuala Lumpur's Berita Harian (Malaysia) considered the present stage of Chinese development "too primitive to threaten us," while the South China Morning Post (Hong Kong) thought it represented "scarcely more than an enormously expensive propaganda gesture." Mainichi's (Japan) analysis noted that "it may take 20-30 years for China to reach the scientific standards of a formidable power" with real "nuclear fangs" to counter the "imperialist camp."

Peking's Pledge Doubted

Peking's pledge not to trigger the first nuclear strike failed to alleviate the apprehensions of Tokyo, Kuala Lumpur and Hong Kong commentators. Mainichi, for example, said: "This is no assurance for Japan, inasmuch as no nuclear power has announced it would strike first." Sankei (Japan) shared the same distrust: "When you think of the abnormal efforts Peking has put in the development of nuclear weapons and of its revolutionary principles, you can never trust its words." In the same vein, Berita Harian had this to say: "Even though she claimed the H-bomb would not be used in any nuclear war, the world is not convinced she would not use it for aggressive purposes. In other words, Peking will not hesitate to harass other nations and will not even hesitate to destroy the world."

On the other hand, the Guardian expressed reassurance that China "would not under any circumstance be the first to employ nuclear weapons, although it might not put all those striving for world peace quite completely at ease." The Malay Mail, while placing little credence in the "goulash" theory of Communist China becoming less bellicose when it has its own nuclear arsenal declared that "the clear need exists to attempt to talk Communist China out of its arrogant isolation and back into the community of nations."

Nuclear Disarmament

Fearful of Peking's nascent nuclear might, editorials areawide dwelled on the themes of nuclear disarmament, a total nuclear ban, nuclear proliferation, and world peace. Atomic-sensitive Japan was logically the most vociferous in this regard.

Asahi, for instance, called for "supra-partisan national diplomacy" for the "positive promotion of world nuclear disarmament," while Yomiuri typically urged the United States and Soviet Union to make "earnest efforts to realize the prevention of nuclear proliferation and a total ban on nuclear tests as well as to assume the initiative in convening a world disarmament conference with the participation of Communist China."

In Malaysia, the Straits Times declared that "the danger of proliferation grows" and warned that "in another year or two, the opportunity of any treaty at all virtually will have disappeared." In South Korea, the Chosun Ilbo declared that "Communist China is inciting the spread of nuclear weapons and is flagrantly opposing the worldwide disarmament effort." In Burma, the Guardian warned that "The time has come for the urgent task of outlawing nuclear weapons." And in Taipei, Hsin Sheng Poh concluded that "The danger Peking's third nuclear explosion poses for world peace and the security of millions of living souls is a matter that defies description."

Political and Psychological Impact

A number of editorials focused on the political ramifications in the wake of the test. Most of these subscribed to the belief that the latest bomb would have a profound effect on the international scene. Nihon Keizai (Japan), for example, feared Peking's international diplomacy would become "firm" in the future, whereas Tieng Vang (South Vietnam) claimed China's new device "will only make the USSR adopt a more rigid attitude toward Peking." Asahi reasoned "Peking probably intends to use its developing nuclear weapons capacity to drive a wedge between other powers and to increase psychological and political impact on its neighbors." Some editorials suggested that the bomb would be used to support national liberation struggles and to gain Peking the leadership in Asia. And others, such as Mainichi, expected that Peking intended "to blackmail Japan and SEATO nations and seek thereby to blackmail the United States into making concessions."

Nuclear Power Balance

There was scattered Far East comment on the implications of Peking's bomb for the existing U.S.-Soviet nuclear stalemate. Taipei's Central Daily News felt that Peking's latest achievement would upset the nuclear balance currently in force among the nuclear giants. The Guardian conjectured: "Chinese nuclear power could radically alter the policies of the Western nuclear nations." Yomiuri, however, did not believe China would play the nuclear deterrent game.

Internal Economic Pressures

Several editorials questioned whether China's current economic level could sustain Peking's nuclear development program and, if so, at what cost. Hong Kong's South China Morning Post advised Peking's leaders "it would be wiser for the regime to apply such scientific and technical resources as it possesses to the betterment of a faltering economy." Japan's Sankei submitted that Peking's nuclear progress would bring pressure to bear on the livelihood of the Chinese people.

NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Apprehension over the increasing danger to area security resulting from Communist China's "truly remarkable" speed in developing a nuclear capacity colored widespread Indian press comment on the third Chinese nuclear detonation. This was also apparent in the one available Tehran comment, which -- like most Indian dailies -- expressed fear that the test would set off a chain reaction of nuclear proliferation elsewhere and thereby play havoc with evolving plans for nuclear disarmament.

There was widespread Indian press agreement that China's increasing A-bomb capacity would increase its expansionist aims and its belligerency towards India. This has made the issue of an A-bomb for India's defense the key topic of editorials there, with opinions decidedly mixed.

Elsewhere, a Syrian editorial hailed Communist China's "huge achievement." Karachi's vernacular dailies likewise welcomed the bomb test, accepting the Chinese declaration that it would be used solely for defense. The U.S. was blamed for the test blast because of its efforts to keep Red China out of the UN. And the western nations were accused of depriving the eastern nations of nuclear secrets in order to "keep them subdued."

An Istanbul daily viewed with alarm the probability of radioactive fallout on Turkey from the Chinese bomb. Cairo papers, preoccupied with the Kosygin visit, have not yet reacted editorially to the Chinese nuclear test, but news stories about the Chinese announcement and followup stories about the nuclear fallout on Japan were played prominently on inside cable pages.

In India, need for reappraisals by Washington, Moscow and New Delhi of their nuclear policies in view of the "change in regional balance of power" received wide comment, especially in the context of India's nonnuclear bomb policy.

Indian opinion was mixed on the need for India to shift from its official position of refraining from developing its own nuclear bomb. There was an almost even division among the papers favoring an Indian A-bomb, those opposing it, and those still sitting on the fence.

A number of influential Calcutta dailies came out strongly for bomb manufacture. This also held true for New Delhi's Urdu dailies. In Madras, opinion was mixed, but Andhra Prabha felt that "undoubtedly,

nuclear weapons production by India is the only alternative" to the present situation. The English-language press was generally more moderate, with most favoring continuation of the "no bomb" policy. Several, however, such as the Indian Express of New Delhi, advised reassessments of the government's anti-bomb policy to protect India's security interests, but cautioned against any "brash" moves.

A number of Indian dailies, in viewing the "diminishing chances" for a test-ban treaty, spoke of the "responsibility" of the U.S. and the USSR to provide nuclear protection for those countries not possessing the A-bomb. This should come in a "comprehensive way" through a "joint Soviet-American guarantee," said Dinamani of Madras and Madurai. The Times of India expressed itself similarly, saying that neither the U.S. nor the USSR has tried seriously to work out a joint guarantee for India against "nuclear blackmail" by China. The Statesman of New Delhi and Calcutta felt likewise.

The Chinese bomb test will speed nuclear proliferation and endanger disarmament, many papers in the area said. Communist China's A-bomb blast "will set off a chain reaction" of nuclear bomb development that may "shove all this disarmament talk down the drain," said the Tehran Journal. Influential Hindu of Madras likewise expected that the Chinese atomic bomb would lead other countries such as Japan into manufacture of the bomb and pleaded for no further delay in reaching a nonproliferation agreement.

Andhra Patrika of Madras and Vijaywada opined that China had plans to become a world nuclear power by 1971, and that this must be averted. Swadesamitran of Madras said that despite its claims to the contrary, China "would be first to unleash the atom bomb," which would probably fall on India. The Mail of Madras asserted that Communist China was now well down the "road of nuclear blackmail" and predicted that the U.S. "would try to play down the significance" of the Chinese achievement. The Indian Express of Bombay said that China was "clearly determined" to become an "operational" nuclear power, and that the effect "psychologically and politically" of the Chinese bomb test would be "profound" throughout the world. Statesman of New Delhi felt similarly, but was specifically preoccupied with China's "increased potential" for political and military "blackmail."

WESTERN EUROPE

Although anticipation of Communist China's third nuclear explosion somewhat reduced its impact, it received prominent news and editorial attention in the West European press. As in the case of the two previous detonations, much of the comment focused on its political and psychological significance, particularly for China's Asian neighbors. While commentators generally sought to deflate the immediate military importance of the test, many clearly were apprehensive over the rapid strides Communist China was making in developing a nuclear weapons capability. A considerable number of papers expressed anew their oft-repeated belief that the best way to cope with the Chinese "threat" was to bring Peking into the community of nations.

Most West European papers agreed that the Chinese nuclear tests posed no immediate military threat. "There is a long and costly road from testing a weapon to having it and the means of delivering it in production," noted Copenhagen's conservative Berlingske Tidende. China, it continued, would probably follow a cautious foreign policy in the next several years in order not to provoke the United States into a preemptive attack upon its nuclear potential. The fact that China presently lacked a nuclear weapons delivery system, however, provided little comfort to such influential papers as Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung which said that the time would be better used if the other atomic powers would "seriously consider how they will get the Chinese to stick to the rules of the atomic club." Britain's conservative Birmingham Post similarly asserted that the important question was "what sort of neighbor will China be to the world when she does reach parity within a decade or 15 years?" For "what is immensely dangerous for world peace," it concluded, "is that China's millions are being brought up with an intense hatred of America ..."

Considerable concern was voiced that the Chinese tests would lead to an imbalance in the world's shaky nuclear equilibrium. Financial Les Echos of Paris wrote that, although the latest explosion "does not yet modify the world balance of forces, the event nevertheless has a capital political significance" because it confirms China's determination "to pursue strenuously an atomic armament program which, in the long run, is bound to place People's China on an equal footing with the U.S. and Russia." West Berlin's independent BZ called China a "nuclear dwarf," but added that Peking was going ahead "with great effort and cost to build weapons of terror to upset the 'equilibrium of fear' between the Soviet Union and U.S.A." Rightist L'Aurore of Paris described the Chinese "bomb" as "a diplomatic weapon and an instrument of blackmail and pressure" which Peking was developing for three reasons: to attain the status of a great power, to "crack open"

the atomic club, and to have all colored people rally behind "the radioactive signal of the yellow bomb."

News reports that the device "contained thermonuclear material" prompted several papers to stress the apparent speed with which China was moving ahead in development of nuclear weapons. The liberal Guardian of London described the detonation as "a remarkable scientific achievement for a country still in the early stages of industrialization." Conservative Figaro, Paris, called the explosion "a nuclear leap forward" and added that China had made "fantastic progress in scarcely eighteen months." The mass circulation London Daily Mail asserted that "the estimates of how long it would take China to become fully nuclear are being hastily revised."

Observers felt that the recent Chinese test demonstrated the urgent need for an international treaty to ban the spread of nuclear weapons. Otherwise, it was argued, nations such as India and Japan would increasingly be subject to pressures to develop their own nuclear armaments. An even more prevalent theme was the feeling that the new Peking explosion underlined the importance of ending China's isolation from the world community. "The Americans will have to ask themselves," wrote pro-socialist Westfaelische Rundschau, Dortmund, "whether the policy of isolating China is still appropriate, whether China should be kept out of the UN, and whether a world power should be prevented from assuming responsibility?" This view was echoed by France's leading elite daily, Le Monde, which contended that the world must become used to reckoning with a new atomic power. "The whole effort of diplomacy, the whole pressure of public opinion," the paper said, "should tend from now on to calm down the conflicts between China and the West and to lower the walls of hatred and mutual misunderstanding." In Italy, Socialist Party organ Avanti took a similar line and declared that the Chinese experiment was "a danger signal" that tensions will increase if China continues to be ignored. The sooner the U.S. policy of isolation is abandoned, wrote independent Spandauer Volksblatt of West Berlin, "the faster China will lose its reputation of being a youngster with rude manners..." A somewhat different attitude was taken by London's conservative Daily Telegraph which argued that China's isolation was self-imposed. "Six weeks ago," the daily noted, "the U.S. declared its readiness to participate with Peking as a thermonuclear power in an effort to prevent the spread of these weapons; yesterday's big bang has been China's only answer."

LATIN AMERICA

Sensitized by the recent publicity given the forthcoming French nuclear tests, Latin American media have responded widely and adversely to the latest Communist Chinese nuclear bomb explosion. Commentaries emphasize that China is becoming a great power and a threat to humanity, and they express fear of nuclear proliferation.

In Chile, radio Emisoras Nuevo Mundo commented that "if the French experiment deserved much thought yesterday, the defense of life in Latin America is even more urgent today." Referring to the foreign policy implications, it added that "it can no longer be denied that Communist China is coming close to or may have reached the level of a great nuclear power. The fact of Communist China's development as a first-rate military power in itself weakens the power of the United States in the world."

The nuclear power theme was also stressed by Bogota's liberal El Espectador: "China continues its efforts to place itself among the so-called 'nuclear powers.' Unfortunately it is almost certain that Communist China will ignore any suggestion /to suspend tests/ which doubtless would collide with the 'nuclear eagerness' of which great powers are possessed, risking their own and the world's destruction." In a later commentary an El Espectador article noted that the West is at least partially responsible for China's present action. The article stressed that the world is "frightened" by Communist China's nuclear weapons "because it is the Communists who have them." The article recalled the plunder of China by western powers and noted with irony that a western philosophy /Marxism/ has taken root in China. "Mao is vital, fat and positive; not ascetic, thin and negative like Chiang. Along with Churchill, Mao is one of the greatest figures of modern history." The article went on to say that Mao has a "persecution complex which is understandable if China's history is reviewed. From 'a hundred flowers' an atomic rose germinates; but the seed was introduced by the West."

The Mexican press has given prominent coverage to the Chinese bomb and editorials unanimously condemned the action. The moderate Excelsior observed that "there is little value in Peking's declaration that China will not be the first to use atomic weapons, if it is taken into account that the world knows the motives that impel the atomic efforts of the Red dragon." El Herald (moderate), referring to the planned French tests, said, "Now Communist China boastfully announces the explosion of its first thermonuclear bomb."

Mexico's moderately conservative Novedades stressed China's "blind intransigence to the possible consequences" of its action. "There is no reason at all to justify boasting of being a nuclear power." Conservative El Sol de Mexico noted the "paradox" that the Chinese explosion comes at a time when the "Chinese masses are suffering extreme shortages, including food. It is surprising that western nations supply wheat to the fanatical Chinese Red regime without conditions that would impede its ominous nuclear arms race which causes anxiety to Russia, India and other Asiatic countries." The independent Ovaciones expressed concern over the proliferation of nuclear weapons: "As the number of atomic bomb tests increase we come closer to a nuclear war."

Lima's conservative El Comercio Grafico recognized that the "thermonuclear arms race is being intensified in spite of the danger to world peace and the survival of mankind. Communist China, with its defiant attitude that characterizes its policy," has exploded a third nuclear device "in less than two years." This accomplishment "indicates that in spite of the problem of underdevelopment, the Communist Chinese Government continues in its eagerness to arm itself militarily, investing funds in that program that should be used to improve the standard of living of its large population which will suffer the consequences of contamination in a large part of its territory. Consequently, radio-activity in the world has increased also and the anti-nuclear Pact of Moscow becomes inoperative. With this explosion, the one planned by France, and the underground /tests/ that are conducted by the powers that signed the Moscow Pact, recognition is given to the increased threat that Latin American people wish to see disappear for the benefit of humanity."

In Argentina, Buenos Aires' leftist tabloid El Mundo said that "perhaps" admission of Red China into the United Nations would be the best way of averting a major world crisis.

AFRICA

Available African media comment on the third Chinese nuclear test is limited to Tunisia and Zambia. The press coverage in Tanzania referred to it as the "first Chinese H-bomb explosion."

In Tunisia, the ruling party daily L'Action called Communist China's attempt to overtake the two nuclear superpowers a "hopeless folly" -- and one which is being pursued at the expense of the common people, "burdened with misery and backward in all domains." The editorialist also termed the big powers "irresponsible" for dissipating in an unproductive armaments race resources that could be used to solve the "real problems of our age."

"Why is the world racing toward destruction?" asked Al-Amal, L'Action's Arabic-language counterpart. The editor wondered if, after this latest nuclear explosion, the world could still delude itself with the "myth" of its search for peace.

The pro-government Times of Zambia said that the Americans and "presumably" the Russians treated the Chinese "H-bomb" with "quick contempt" because of its small size. "To ridicule Peking is short-sighted," the editorial continued, because "it is only a matter of time before they produce bigger versions ... and ... acquire the skills to deliver their bombs." The Chinese Communists' "fanatic hostility" to the rest of the world renders the appeals of Senator Robert Kennedy for some attempt at an understanding "increasingly relevant," the writer concluded.

SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE

Initial Soviet media reaction to the third Chinese nuclear test was limited, brief, and noncommittal. While Moscow promptly commented on the recent U. S. test in Nevada where radiation had escaped into the atmosphere and charged that "the tragic event has aroused a new wave of angry indignation in the world," the Chinese explosion has not yet drawn any media comment at all. Pravda, TASS, and Radio Moscow (in its domestic broadcasts) carried only brief reports summarizing the Peking announcements, including its reference to the inclusion of thermonuclear materials.

Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria apparently followed Moscow's lead and reported the Chinese test without comment. Czechoslovak and Yugoslav media rapped the explosion, while Albania, expectedly, hailed the Chinese feat.

Prague's Rude Pravo pointed to the "negative world reaction" to the test and scored Peking for hindering Moscow's disarmament efforts. Belgrade's Borba saw a new threat to world peace in the Chinese test. "By carrying out its third nuclear experiment, China has once again ignored the interests of mankind," the daily charged. Earlier, the Yugoslav news agency TANJUG claimed that the news of the Chinese explosion "was received with indignation among the Soviet public."

Tirana also promptly commented on the Chinese test. Only three hours after the explosion, the Albanian radio informed its domestic audience of the "nuclear explosion containing thermonuclear substances in the western region of CPR." It termed the feat "a great victory for the general line of the Party in socialist construction" and "a great victory of Mao Tse-tung's ideas." Its aim "is to oppose the blackmail and nuclear threats of American imperialism and its collaborators, as well as American-Soviet cooperation to preserve the nuclear monopoly and to sabotage the revolutionary struggles of all oppressed peoples and nations."

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*File
Chinese
Nuclear
Tests*

JOINT ATOMIC ENERGY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

JAEIC STATEMENT, 1145 HOURS (EDT), 13 MAY 1966

[redacted]
the Communist Chinese nuclear test,
occurred on 9 May 1966

that

[redacted]

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Further intensive analyses and evaluation will be
required to determine [redacted]

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[redacted] It is anticipated that the analysis will
require several months to complete.

DONALD F. CHAMBERLAIN
Chairman

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automatic downgrading
and declassification.

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NLJ 09-202
By *isl* NARA, Date 7-10-09

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
(Friday, May 13, 1966)

STATEMENT BY AEC ON THIRD CHINESE NUCLEAR TEST *file*

Preliminary debris analysis indicates the third Chinese nuclear test on May 9 was not a thermonuclear weapon. The test was probably an experimental device, either attempting to increase the yield of the previous low-yield fission device or looking toward an eventual thermonuclear capability. Specifically, the device employed enriched uranium, the same fissionable material that was used in the previous Chinese tests. It did not contain any plutonium. The thermonuclear material, lithium-6, was present, although its specific function in the device is not yet clear. It will be some time before more definitive information is available.

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INFO BY POUCH: ALL OTHER DIPLOMATIC POSTS AND POLADS

REF: DEPT CIRCULAR 2081

SUBJECT: Chicom Nuclear Test

1. The Chinese Communists conducted their third nuclear test at 0800 GMT today. Peiping subsequently announced that

Drafted by: PM: RGarthoff: lsh Ext. 2579

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: G/PM - Jeffrey C. Kitchen

Clearances: ACDA - Mr. Weiler (subst) P - Mr. Magruder (subst) WH - Mr. Keeney (subst)
DOD - Mr. Yarmolinsky (subst) DOD/P - Gen. Liebman (subst)

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it had conducted a QUOTE nuclear test which contained thermonuclear material UNQUOTE.

2. At the regular noon briefing, Department press spokesman Wright read following statement: ~~QUOTE~~

QUOTE. Nearly a year has passed since Communist China exploded its second nuclear device. The latest test, which occurred today in Sinkiang, comes as no surprise. A Department of State spokesman noted, on April 28, that such a test should be expected soon. It was an atmospheric test, with a yield in the same general range as the previous Chinese tests. Further evaluation must await collection and analysis of the debris. This test is part of the deliberate, and costly, Chinese Communist program to acquire a nuclear weapon.

The United States Government continues to deplore the disregard of the Chinese Communist leaders for the desires and well-being of people throughout the world who may suffer from the ill effects of atmospheric nuclear testing, which most of the world has banned by adhering to the limited test ban treaty.

The United States reaffirms its defense commitments in Asia, and the assurances given by President Johnson on October 18,

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1964, of our strong support to nations that do not seek national nuclear weapons, if they need it ~~ag~~ against any threat of nuclear blackmail. END QUOTE

3. Department is making no further comments on the test or on the Chinese claim that their test involved thermonuclear materials until we can collect and analyze debris from the test. In answer to questions, Wright indicated the test was in the range of QUOTE small to medium END QUOTE, after reporter identified small as meaning up to 20 KT and medium as 20 to 200 KT. We do not plan make further statements at this time.

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1. Ambassador authorized inform ~~FORNIN~~ in confidence that nuclear. USC had knowledge of latest CHICOM ~~missile~~ test prior to ~~public~~ public disclosure [REDACTED] Con-
tents of refdepcirtel should NOT repeat NOT be revealed nor should implication be left with GOP that it will be apprised of subsequent nuclear events in advance of public disclosure.

2. FYI - We are anxious that Ambassador's action in this case NOT repeat NOT be regarded by GOP as a precedent. - END FYI.

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END

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NLJ 09-202
By ind, NARA, Date 7-10-09

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ARA: IAS: <u>FDSharp:hjb</u> 5/10/66		ARA: IAS - <u>Sandy N. Pringle</u>	
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SUBJECT: CHICOM BOMB TEST

1. EDITORIAL REACTIONS TO CHICOM BOMB TEST IN CALCUTTA'S THREE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE DAILIES FOLLOWED LINES PREVIOUSLY ESPOUSED BY THESE PAPERS, WITH STATESMAN COUNSELING CAUTION, HINDUSTAN STANDARD CALLING FOR BOMB AND AMRITA BAZAR PATRIKA TEMPORIZING. EDITS IN BENGALI PRESS FOLLOWED MUCH SAME TREND: JUGANTAR URGED INDIA TO COMPLETE PREPARATIONS AND AVOID DANGERS OF UNPREPAREDNESS SHOULD INDIA "RELUCTANTLY" HAVE TO GO AHEAD WITH MAKING

OF BOMB; ANANDA BAZAR WANTED DETERMINED INDIAN BOMB-MAKING EFFORT NOW; WHILE BASUMATI CALLED FOR "SELF-RELIANCE" AND FOR CONVERTING INDIAN ECONOMY FROM PROFIT MOTIVE TO SOCIALISM, SINCE CHINA'S "ACHIEVEMENT" DERIVED FROM SOCIALIST NATURE HER ECONOMY.

2. SAMPLE QUOTES FOLLOW. STATESMAN EDIT URGED: "IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE NUCLEAR THREAT CERTAINLY NEED TO BE CLEARLY AND CONSTANTLY ASSESSED AND THIS COUNTRY'S EFFORTS FOR SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY AND RESOURCES SHOULD ALSO CONTINUE. BUT IN NEITHER TASK WILL GOVERNMENT BE HELPED BY ILL INFORMED OUTBURSTS BY POLITICIANS OR EXCITED PUBLIC CLAMOUR FOR THE BOMB." HINDUSTAN STANDARD LEADER VOICED "CLAMOUR FOR BOMB": "NO ASIAN COUNTRY, INDIA LEAST OF ALL, COULD NOW SAFELY DESIST FROM PRODUCING NUCLEAR ARMS. RELIANCE ON FOREIGN POWERS IN MATTERS OF WEAPONS IS RISKY; IN CASE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IT IS EVEN MORE SO. INDIA ALREADY POSSESSES NUCLEAR KNOW-HOW; SHE HAS ALSO TECHNICAL CAPACITY. AND NOW THERE CAN BE NO VALID OBJECTION IN PRINCIPLE AGAINST PRODUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS...A FIRM DECISION TO STEP UP PLANNED EFFORTS FOR PRODUCING ATOMIC WEAPONS SHOULD NO LONGER BE DELAYED." PER USUAL ON BOMB THEME, AMRITA BAZAR PATRIKA REACHED

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-2- 257 May 11 from CALCUTTA

NO CONCLUSION. PAPER'S EDIT DESCRIBED BOMB TEST AS "VERY SIGNIFICANT STEP ON PART OF CHINA TO REACH PARITY IN ATOMIC WEAPONS WITH USA, RUSSIA AND BRITAIN." DEVELOPING THEME ABP LINKED TEST AND "MILITARY MOVEMENTS" BY CHICOMS AND PAKS-" THIS COORDINATION ... CAN HARDLY BE REGARDED AS ACCIDENTAL COINCIDENCE." REPORTED WESTERN ECONOMIC AID FOR CHICOM STEEL MILL THEN WAS ADDED TO MIX--"ZVIS DEAL...IS POSITIVE STEP TOWARD DISINTEGRATION OF WESTERN ALLIANCE, (AND) WASHINGTON IS NOT PERTURBED TO FIND ITS ALLIES ENTERING INTO OPPOSITE CAMP." EDIT CONCLUDES CHINA IS TRYING STRENGTHEN INDUSTRIAL Base WITH WESTERN ECONOMIC AID; SHE IS SEEKING...TO ATTAIN FULL MEMBERSHIP IN NUCLEAR CLUB. OVERALL POTENTIALITIES OF THIS DUAL DEVELOPMENT NEED FRESH ASSESSMENT IN CONTEXT CHINA'S REITERATED EMPHASIS ON AGGRESSIVE POLICY IN HIMALAYAN WORLD."

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1. CHICOM NUCLEAR EXPLOSION AND REACTIONS TO IT DOMINATED NEWS AND EDITORIAL COLUMNS LAST TWO DAYS.

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2. IN ADDITION TO HASHIMOTO'S STATEMENT (EMBTTEL 3869) LDP SECGEN TANAKA ISSUED STATEMENT FOR LDP EXPRESSING SHOCK AT CHICOM DISREGARD OF WORLD FEELING AND SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH JAPAN IS CAPABLE OF DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IT IS PROMOTING NUCLEAR SCIENCE FOR PEACE. HE ADDED GOJ WOULD NOT PERMIT THIRD COUNTRY TO BRING NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO JAPAN.

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3. FONMIN SHIINA IN UPPER HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE MAY 10 SAID THAT CHICOM TEST DID NOT CHANGE BALANCE OF POWER IN ASIA AND DID NOT REQUIRE JAPAN CHANGE POLICY CONCERNING REFUSAL ALLOW ANY NATION BRING NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO JAPAN. SHIINA REAFFIRMED NECESSITY FOR U.S. SECURITY TREATY AND SAID GOJ HAD NO INTENTION OF CHANGING POSITION ON CHIREP. HE NOTED TEST HAD DEMONSTRATED CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITY IN NUCLEAR FIELD.

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4. JSP STATEMENT, ANNOUNCED BY SECGEN NARITA, SAID CHINA FORCED DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS BECAUSE OF U.S. POLICY OF CONTAINMENT, BUT IT MATTER OF EXTREME REGRET TO SEE CHINA CONDUCT THIRD TEST. NARITA SAID JAPAN WILL ALWAYS BE FACING CHICOM NUCLEAR THREAT AS LONG AS JAPAN IS UNDER U.S. NUCLEAR UMBRELLA AND CALLED FOR CANCELLATION OF SECURITY TREATY AT EARLIEST DATE, A MEASURE WHICH WOULD ALSO PROMOTE SINO-JAPANESE TRADE AND ECONOMIC TIES. HE CALLED FOR WORLD CONFERENCE FOR COMPLETE ABOLITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

/5. DSP

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-2- 3906, MAY 11, FROM TOKYO

5. DSP STATEMENT SAID CHICOM TEST COMPLETELY INEXCUSABLE, THE BIGGEST THREAT TO ASIA, AND ADDS FUEL TO POLITICAL TENSION.

6. KOMEITO, EXPRESSING OPPOSITION TO ALL NUCLEAR TESTS, SAID CHICOM TEST CONSTITUTED MAJOR THREAT TO ASIAN PEACE AND WOULD CAUSE U.S. TO INCREASE ITS NUCLEAR STRENGTH.

7. JCP FULLY SUPPORTED THE POSITION OF CHINA AND SOUGHT TO BLAME THE U.S. FOR NECESSITY TO TEST AND SUBSEQUENT FALLOUT.

8. JAPANESE PRESS UNANIMOUSLY REGRETTED AND CONDEMNED CHICOM TEST. ASAHI SAID DETONATION OF NO GREAT FORCE, DEVICE IS FAR FROM COMBAT-READY HYDROGEN BOMB, AND DEVELOPMENT OF DELIVERY SYSTEM WILL TAKE CONSIDERABLE TIME. HOWEVER, CHICOMS APPARENTLY ARE NOW AHEAD OF FRANCE. WHILE ONE MAY BELIEVE CHICOM STATEMENT THAT THEY WILL NOT BE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, STILL FACT THAT SUCH WEAPONS ARE IN HANDS OF HIGH-HANDED GOVT IS EXTREMELY GRAVE MATTER CONCERNING PEACE AND SECURITY OF JAPAN. GOJ SHOULD MAKE STRONG EFFORTS PROMOTE DISARMAMENT AND SHOULD GUARD AGAINST POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL THREAT BY BUILDING JAPANESE NATIONAL SELF-CONFIDENCE AND PRIDE THROUGH MAINTENANCE FAR HIGHER ECONOMIC GROWTH THAN COMMIE COUNTRIES. GOJ SHOULD ALSO EMPHASIZE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY AND SPACE DEVELOPMENT AS EVIDENCE JAPANESE TECHNICAL ABILITY. ALSO JAPAN SHOULD NOT BE DRIVEN TO TAKE SIDES IN CONFRONTATION BETWEEN U.S. AND CHINA BUT SHOULD WORK TOWARD ALLEVIATING THAT CONFRONTATION OR ELSE DANGERS OF NUCLEAR COMPETITION BETWEEN U.S. AND CHINA WILL INCREASE DANGERS TO JAPAN.

9. MAINICHI SAID TEST POSES SERIOUS THREAT TO JAPANESE SECURITY AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES WILL BE FAR REACHING. ONE CANNOT TAKE AT FACE VALUE CHICOM CLAIM IT WILL NOT BE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. PAPER FEARED THE TEST WOULD ENCOURAGE CHICOMS TO HARDEN POLICY TOWARD U.S. AND SOVIETS. TEST INDICATED CHICOM SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL LEVELS MUCH HIGHER THAN
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ORIGINALLY THOUGHT AND THAT TOTAL CHICOM NATIONAL STRENGTH SHOULD BE EVALUATED.

10. YOMIURI, IN EDITORIAL ENTITLED "PEKING DEFIES WORLD HOPES," SAID THAT TEST NOT LIKELY AFFECT WORLD BALANCE OF POWER BUT THAT POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS ON WORLD SITUATION COULD BE CONSIDERABLE. TEST WOULD PROBABLY AGGRAVATE TENSION BETWEEN U.S. AND CHINA. EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO CONVOKE GLOBAL DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE TO SCRAP ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PRESENT NUCLEAR POWERS SHOULD BE FIRST ONES TO MAKE SACRIFICES TO REALIZE NUCLEAR DISARMEMENT.

11. NIHON KEIZAI SAID CHICOM CONTENTION THAT IT MADE NUCLEAR WEAPON BECAUSE CHINA MENACED BY U.S. AND SOVIETS CANNOT BE JUSTIFICATION FOR DETONATING NUCLEAR DEVICE. TEST WILL SERIOUSLY AFFECT SITUATION IN VIETNAM, INDIA AND JAPAN. PAPER HOPED WORLD'S MAJOR POWERS WOULD CONCLUDE TOTAL TEST BAN TREATY.

12. TOKYO SHIMBUN SAID IT IS CERTAIN THAT RED CHINA OUT TO GET MISSILES AND MEANS TO DELIVER THEM. JAPAN WILL BE PLACED WITHIN RANGE OF CHICOM MISSILES. TEST HAS MADE CLEAR THAT NO DISARMAMENT PLAN CAN BE EFFECTIVE IF CHICOMS EXCLUDED.

13. ENGLISH-LANGUAGE JAPAN TIMES SAID CHICOM STATEMENT ANNOUNCING DETONATION REVEALED ALARMING CHICOM INTENTION TO USE NUCLEAR POWER AS FACTOR IN EXTENSION OF WORLD REVOLUTION AND TO USE NUCLEAR ARMS AS POLITICAL INSTRUMENT IN GLOBAL ARENA.

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UNCLAS MAY 11.

1. DELHI PRESS MAY 11 FRONT PAGES ONE HOUR
PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE RE GOI NUCLEAR POLICY FOLLOWING THIRD
CHINESE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION WHICH SUMMARIZED HEREIN. FON MIN
TOLD PARLIAMENT "DEFENSE OF OUR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY WILL BE
PARAMOUNT TO OUR POLICY" POINTING OUT INDIAN NUCLEAR POLICY WOULD
REMAIN UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW. IN RESPECT DEMANDS FROM SOME
MPS FOR DEVELOPMENT INDIAN NUCLEAR BOMB PRI MIN SAID "I DO NOT
UNDERSTAND HOW PRODUCTION OF ONE BOMB CAN HELP US. MANY
QUESTIONS ARISE OUT OF THIS. THE BELIEF THAT CHINA CAN
ATTACK ANY COUNTRY WITH NUCLEAR BOMBS WITH IMPUNITY IS
MISCONCEPTION."

PAGE 2 RUDSND 649 UNCLAS

2. IN FACE DEMANDS FROM BOTH CONGRESS AND
OPPOSITION BENCHES FOR REVISION GOI POLICY BOTH PRI MIN AND FON
MIN REPEATED GOI SUPPORT FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLI-
FERATION AS BEST WAY TO SERVE WORLD PEACE. ACCORDING TO PRESS ONLY
ONE MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT SUPPORTED GOI NUCLEAR POLICY AND
HE WAS HOOTED DOWN. NO. 3 PRESS REACTION MIXED. STATESMAN
SUPPORTED GOI PRESENT NUCLEAR POLICY WHILE CALLING FOR ITS CONSTANT
REASSESSMENT. INDIAN EXPRESS STATES "TIME HAS COME FOR GOI TO
DECIDE WHETHER INDIA'S DEFENSE AND SECURITY VIS-A-VIS CHINA SHOULD
CONTINUE TO BE MORTGAGED TO THE US AND BRITAIN. PATRIOT LIMITED
COMMENTS TO FEARS CHINESE TEST MIGHT PUT END TO ALL HOPES FOR

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-2- 3078, MAY 11, FROM NEW DELHI

NON-PROLIFERATION WHILE CRITICIZING US FOR BLOCKING
NEGOTIATIONS BY INSISTING ON MLF. TIMES OF INDIA
WARNED THAT IN ABSENCE JOINT US/USSR GUARANTEE TO PREVENT
CHINESE NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL PRESSURE FOR BOMB WOULD GROW IN
INDIA AND GOI WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO WITHSTAND PRESSURES
INDEFINITELY. _____ TIMES ALSO FRONTPAGES ARTICLE BY VOHRA WHICH

PAGE 2 RUDSND 649 UNCLAS
INTER ALIA POINTS OUT "TRANQUILIZING STATEMENTS" FROM USG AIMED
AT KEEPING INDIA "NUCLEARLY UNARMED AND DEPENDENT ON
ITS NOT TOO FIRM PLEDGE THAT NON-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES CAN COUNT ON
USA ON ANY THREAT OF NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL". BOWLES
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1. FONOFF ISSUED FOLLOWING STATEMENT MAY 11 REGARDING CHICOM NUCLEAR TEST: QUOTE IN VIEW RECENT EXPLOSION NUCLEAR DEVICE BY SOCIALIST REPUBLIC CHINA GOC REITERATES ITS OPEN OPPOSITION ATOMIC EXPERIMENTS AND USE NUCLEAR ARMS FOR WARLIKE PURPOSES. HAVING ADHERED TO TREATY OF MOSCOW ON PROHIBITION ATOMIC TESTING IN ATMOSPHERE, OUTER SPACE AND SEA AND HAVING BEEN SPONSOR RESOLUTION 17 OF SPECIAL COMMISSION FOR DENUCLEARIZATION LATIN AMERICAN WHICH MET IN MEXICO, CHILE DENOUNCES THIS NEW EXPLOSION NOT ONLY AS BEING AGAINST AUTHENTIC POLICY OF PEACE BUT ALSO FOR THE DANGER

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PAGE 2 RUESNA 12 UNCLAS

IT INVOLVES FOR ALL HUMANITY. UNQUOTE

2. FONOFF SUBSECRETARY DROQUETT SAID STATEMENT COORDINATED IN ADVANCE WITH PERU, ECUADOR AND COLOMBIA. DUNGAN

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1. LATEST CHINESE EXPLOSION MAY WELL HAVE TRIGGERED A SECOND ROUND IN INDIA'S GREAT DEBATE ON NUCLEAR POLICY. A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN PARLIAMENTARY OPINION HAS CLEARLY TAKEN PLACE, PARTICULARLY AMONG CONGRESS MEMBERS. AT CONGRESS PARLIAMENTARY PARTY EXECUTIVE MEETING YESTERDAY, THOSE CALLING FOR IMMEDIATE CONSTRUCTION OF BOMB (NINE OF THE ELEVEN WHO SPOKE, OTHER TWO LEANED IN DIRECTION BOMB BUT WANTED ONLY REEXAMINATION OF POLICY) INCLUDED SEVERAL WHO HAD EITHER BEEN OPPOSED TO

EARLIER OR HAD HAD WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE. THEY MAY HOPE THAT SOME OF THE SENIOR CONGRESS LEADERS GATHERED THERE MAY SUPPORT THEIR STAND.

2. WE GET IMPRESSION FROM DISCUSSIONS WITH SEVERAL PRO-BOMB MPS THAT PROPONENTS OF BOMB SENSE THAT MRS GANDHI MAY NOT BE AS FIRM AS SHASTRI ON ISSUE. THEY ARE READING INTO PM'S STATEMENTS AND HERE INFORMAL COMMENTS IN EXECUTIVE SUBTLE SHIFT IN POSITION POSSIBLY SIGNALLING WILLINGNESS ON HER PART REEXAMINE QUESTION. THIS IS LIKELY TO EMBOLDEN THEM IN THEIR EFFORTS SECURE CHANGE IN POLICY.

3. FORTUNATELY FOR THOSE WHO WANT TO MAINTAIN PRESENT POLICY, PARLIAMENT WILL ADJOURN NEXT TUESDAY, AND AFTER AICC MEETING LATER IN WEEK THERE WILL BE NO WELL-PUBLICIZED FORUM AVAILABLE FOR BOMB PROPONENTS UNTIL BEGINNING OF NONSOON SESSION IN MID-AUGUST.

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Clearances: ACDA/ST - Mr. Risley gaw G/PM - Mr. Garthoff gaw EUR - Mr. Staples gaw
NEA - Mrs. Perry gaw AF - Miss Montague gaw IO/UNP - Mr. Tul gaw FE - Mr. Taylor gaw
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1966 MAY 11 PM 12 05

CHICOM NUCLEAR EXPLOSION

1. MAY 10 PRESS HEADLINED CHICOM NUCLEAR EXPLOSION, USUALLY AS H-BOMB DETONATION. MOST OF PRESS CARRIED CHICOM ANNOUNCEMENT AND DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT IN SAME ARTICLE. MAY 11 PRESS FRONTPAGED CHOU EN LAI SPEECH TO ALBANIAN DELEGATION. MRS GANDHI'S MAY 10 STATEMENT TO PARLIAMENT TO EFFECT CHICOM BOMB POSED DANGER TO INDIAN SECURITY ALSO FRONTPAGED. REUTERS REPORTS ON REACTION IN WORLD CAPITALS INSIDE PAGES.

2. I. H. USMANI, CHAIRMAN OF PAK AEC, MADE STATEMENT TO PRESS

MAY 10 THAT H-BOMB EXPLOSION PROOF OF REMARKABLE TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS AND TRIBUTE TO ASIAN SCIENTIFIC SKILL. SAID ANALYSIS OF FALLOUT AT Dacca AND LAHORE MIGHT REVEAL CHARACTERISTICS OF EXPLOSION. NO HARMFUL EFFECTS FROM FALLOUT ANTICIPATED. USMANI SAID CHICOMS BEGAN 12 YEAR PLAN FOR DEVELOPMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN 1958, GIVING FULL FREEDOM TO SCIENTISTS. RESULT WAS FIRST ATOMIC BOMB EXPLODED IN 1964 AND HYDROGEN BOMB NOW. EVEN FRENCH HAVE NOT YET REACHED THIS STAGE. USMANI SAID CHINESE PERFORMANCE SHOWS LAWS OF NATURE TRULY UNIVERSAL AND TECHNOLOGY CANNOT BE PRESERVED FOR FEW COUNTRIES. CHICOM ADVANCE SHOWS ASIAN SCIENTISTS CAN RISE TO ANY LEVEL GIVEN SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGEMENT.

3. ALL KARACHI VERNACULAR PAPERS WELCOMED H-BOMB EXPLOSION, CALLED IT VICTORY FOR ASIA. EDITS TOOK PEKINGS WORD THAT IT WOULD NOT USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FIRST AS TRUTH AND ACCEPTED CHICOM STATEMENT NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPED SOLELY FOR DEFENSE. LEFTIST JANG SAID CHINA PRINCIPLED NATION WHICH KEEPS

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-2- 2053, May 11 from Karachi

PLEDGES AND THEREFORE THERE NO REASON FEAR CHINA

S NUCLEAR
MIGHT. BLAMED US EFFORT KEEP CHINA OUT OF UN AND DISARMAMENT
TALKS FOR CHINESE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION. ANJAM ACCUSED WEST OF
DEPRIVING EASTERN NATIONS OF NUCLEAR SECRETS IN ORDER KEEP
THEM SUBDUED. HOPED CHINA READY TO PROTECT SMALLER NATIONS
FROM TRADITIONAL COLONIALISTS AND NEO-COLONIALISTS (INDIA).
MANY PAPERS USED OCCASION TO CALL FOR CHICOM ENTRY INTO UN.

MACCONAUGHY

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— KOPPEL
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1. PRESS ATTENTION CHICOM NUCLEAR EXPLOSION SPARSE SO FAR, BUT TREATMENT BY TWO ARMY PAPERS WHICH HEADLINED WIRE SERVICE STORIES AND COMMENTED EDITORIALY APRIL 10-11 INDICATES OFFICIAL LINE WILL BE TO CONDEMN AND DEPLORE EVENT. ARMY-CONTROLLED BERITA YUDHA AND PELOPOR BARU UNDER HEADLINE "CHINESE EXPLODE NEW HELL-BOMB" GAVE PROMINENT TREATMENT TO DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN'S REMARKS ON CCNE AND NOTED POINTEDLY THAT THEIR INFORMATION ON HARMFUL EFFECTS OF EXPLOSION CAME FROM REPORTS ON BBC AND VOA.

2. PELOPOR BARU EDITORIAL ASSERTS PURPOSE OF CCNE WAS TO (1) DEMONSTRATE TO CHINESE PEOPLE MAO STILL IN CHARGE, (2) FRIGHTEN US INTO CANCELLING PROJECTED SEATO MANEUVERS IN SOUTH CHINA SEA, (3) INTIMIDATE USSR IN CONTEXT SINO-SOVIET SQUABBLE ON MERITS OF VIOLENT REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE VS. PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND (4) INTIMIDATE WEAKER POWERS ON CHINA'S RIMLANDS INTO KNUCKLING UNDER TO CHINESE EXPANSIONISM. PELOPOR RECOMMENDS THAT THOSE COUNTRIES BAND TOGETHER AND "REPLY TO CHINESE THREAT PROPORTIONATELY."

3. FOREIGN MINISTRY'S HERALD NOTES CHINA JOINED NUCLEAR CLUB WITHOUT FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND COMMENTS THAT DUE CHINA'S LOCATION "IN MIDST OF WORLD'S COUNTRYSIDE," PRINCIPAL THREAT OF NUCLEAR DEVICE IS POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL RATHER THAN MILITARY. EDITORIAL ASSERTS ADDITIONAL NUCLEAR ACHIEVEMENT WILL INCREASE SELF-CONFIDENCE AND FANATICISM OF CHICOM LEADERS AND "WORLD CAN EXPECT MORE DIFFICULT TIMES AHEAD IN RELATIONS WITH PEKING REGIME." GREEN
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NUCLEAR-RUSK

WASHINGTON, (AP)-SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK SAID TODAY HE DIDN'T THINK RED CHINA'S THIRD NUCLEAR EXPLOSION WOULD HAVE ANY MORE SERIOUS EFFECT ON THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN SITUATION THAN THE FIRST OR SECOND EXPLOSION DID.

HE MADE THAT COMMENT AT A HEARING BY THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE WHEN INFORMED OF THE NEW CHINESE TEST.

PE142PED 5/9

111

U.S.-NUCLEAR

WASHINGTON, (AP)-A STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN SAID TODAY THAT THE ATOMIC DEVICE DETONATED EARLY TODAY BY RED CHINA "WAS IN THE SAME GENERAL RANGE" AS THE TWO PREVIOUS CHINESE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS.

STATE DEPARTMENT PRESS OFFICER MARSHALL WRIGHT SAID THE THIRD CHINESE TEST OCCURRED AT 8 P.M., EDT, IN SINGKIANG PROVINCE IN WESTERN CHINA. (3)

"FURTHER EVALUATION MUST AWAIT THE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DEBRIS IN THE ATMOSPHERE," WRIGHT SAID.

WRIGHT DID NOT SAY WHETHER THE TEST WAS OF A THERMONUCLEAR DEVICE.

HE NOTED THAT ON APRIL 28 A STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN HAD PREDICTED THAT SUCH A TEST WAS IMMINENT.

MEANWHILE, SECRETARY RUSK, QUERIED ABOUT THE CHINESE TEST AT THE END OF AN APPEARANCE BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, SAID HE DOUBTED IT WOULD HAVE ANY MORE SERIOUS EFFECT THAN THE FIRST TWO EXPLOSIONS.

PE157PED 5/9

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119

WASHINGTON--ADD U.S.-NUCLEAR (111)

THE FIRST CHINESE NUCLEAR DEVICE WAS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN EQUIVALENT TO 20,000 TONS OF TNT. THE SECOND WAS SLIGHTLY LARGER.

IN DISCUSSION OF THE NEW NUCLEAR TEST THE STATE DEPARTMENT REAFFIRMED THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO DEFENSE OF ASIAN NATIONS BY RECALLING PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S STATEMENT OF OCT. 15, 1964, CONCERNING THE FIRST CHINESE NUCLEAR TEST.

THE PRESIDENT SAID THEN THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO GIVE STRONG SUPPORT TO NATIONS THAT DO NOT SEEK NUCLEAR WEAPONS IF THEY NEED OUR SUPPORT AGAINST ANY THREAT OF NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL.

WRIGHT SAID THE UNITED STATES "CONTINUES TO DEPLORE THE DISREGARD OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERS FOR THE DESIRES AND THE WELL-BEING OF PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD WHO MAY SUFFER FROM THE ILL EFFECTS OF ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTING WHICH MOST OF THE WORLD HAS BANNED BY ADHERENCE TO THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY."

PE212PED 5/9

120

WASHINGTON--ADD U.S.-NUCLEAR (119)

SECRETARY MCNAMARA IN RECENT TESTIMONY BEFORE CONGRESS HAS SAID THAT COMMUNIST CHINA DISPLAYED A CAPACITY TO PRODUCE URANIUM 235 IN ITS FIRST TWO NUCLEAR TESTS AND WILL PROBABLY SEEK TO DEVELOP A THERMONUCLEAR DEVICE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

IN THE LONG RUN HE SAID THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO PRODUCE LONG RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS AND ARM THEM WITH THERMONUCLEAR WARHEADS.

HE TOLD A JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY LAST MARCH THAT WITHIN TWO OR THREE YEARS COMMUNIST CHINA WOULD BE ABLE TO DEVELOP A MEDIUM RANGE MISSILE SYSTEM. THIS WOULD GIVE PEKING AN ABILITY TO STRIKE A NUCLEAR BLOW WITHIN A SEVEN HUNDRED MILE RANGE.

PE215PED 5/9

134

ATOM SMASHER

WASHINGTON (AP)-SEN. LONG, D-MO., SAID TODAY THE SEARCH FOR A SITE FOR A \$375 MILLION ATOM SMASHER HAS TURNED OUT TO BE "A MISERABLE DECEPTION."

HE TOLD THE SENATE THAT THE SIX SITES REMAINING FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION ARE "SERIOUSLY INADEQUATE."

AT THE SAME TIME LONG CALLED ON THE AEC FOR A "COMPLETE REVIEW OF ALL PROPOSED SITES--NOT JUST THESE SIX."

SITES STILL IN THE RUNNING, GLEANED FROM MORE THAN 200 ORIGINALLY OFFERED--ARE ANN ARBOR, MICH.; BROOKHAVEN, N.Y.; CHICAGO, DENVER, MADISON, WIS., AND SACRAMENTO, CALIF.

LONG SAID THAT ORIGINALLY THE GOVERNMENT NEVER BEFORE HAD SO MANY PROSPECTIVE CONSTRUCTION SITES TO CHOOSE FROM "BUT SOMETHING HAS GONE WRONG. WHAT BEGAN AS A SEARCH FOR THE BEST SITE HAS TURNED OUT TO BE A MISERABLE DECEPTION."

"THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES HAS INTERFERED AND THE GOOD FAITH OF ALL THOSE WHO SUBMITTED SITE PROPOSALS HAS BEEN VIOLATED."

WE241PED 5/9

NUCLEAR (TOPS 107)

TOKYO, TUESDAY (AP)-RED CHINA SET OFF A NUCLEAR BLAST YESTERDAY CONTAINING "THERMONUCLEAR MATERIAL," RADIO PEKING SAID TODAY. WITHOUT SAYING SO, THE CHINESE SEEMED TO BE SUGGESTING THEY HAD EXPLODED THEIR FIRST HYDROGEN BOMB.

BUT THE JAPANESE METEOROLOGICAL AGENCY REPORTED NO NORMAL ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE FOLLOWING THE BLAST AND A SPOKESMAN SAID: "THEREFORE, WE DON'T BELIEVE THAT THE LATEST CHINESE DEVICE WAS A HYDROGEN BOMB OF A MEGATON CLASS."

A BROADCAST IN ENGLISH SAID THE DEVICE WAS SHOT OFF OVER WESTERN AREAS OF CHINA. BUT A CHINESE LANGUAGE BROADCAST DECLARED THE TEST WAS MADE IN THE AIR, LEAVING THE IMPLICATION A PLANE DROPPED THE BOMB.

A STATEMENT IN ENGLISH BROADCAST BY THE NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY SAID: "AT 1600 HOURS (4 P.M. PEKING TIME) ON MAY 9, 1966, CHINA SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCTED OVER ITS WESTERN AREAS A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION WHICH CONTAINED THERMONUCLEAR MATERIAL."

WASHINGTON SAID THE TEST SITE WAS REMOTE SINKIANG PROVINCE OF CHINA'S NORTHWEST, AN AREA NEXT TO THE SOVIET UNION RICH IN URANIUM. THIS IS WHERE THE FIRST TWO TESTS WERE CONDUCTED.

CR244P 9

TOKYO--ADD NUCLEAR (135)

PEKING MADE PROPAGANDA OF THE NEWEST BLAST, ASSERTING CHINA WAS CONDUCTING "LIMITED NUCLEAR TESTS AND . . . DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS . . . TO OPPOSE THE NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL AND THREATS BY U. S. IMPERIALISM AND ITS COLLABORATORS.

PEKING DECLARED THE CHINESE TESTS WERE DESIGNED "TO OPPOSE THE U.S.-SOVIET COLLUSION FOR MAINTAINING NUCLEAR MONOPOLY AND SABOTAGING THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLES OF ALL OPPRESSED PEOPLES AND NATIONS."

"THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS A GREAT ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE PEOPLES WHO ARE FIGHTING HEROICALLY FOR THEIR OWN LIBERATION AS WELL AS A NEW CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEFENSE OF WORLD PEACE."

CR247P 9

95

Johnson

BULLETIN

NUCLEAR (TOPS 87)

TOKYO (TUESDAY) (AP)-COMMUNIST CHINA ANNOUNCED TODAY IT HAD EXPLODED A DEVICE CONTAINING "THERMONUCLEAR MATERIAL," INDICATING IT HAD SET OFF ITS FIRST HYDROGEN BOMB.

THE ANNOUNCEMENT SAID THE TEST WAS CONDUCTED YESTERDAY SOMEWHERE IN WESTERN CHINA. PEKING PREVIOUSLY HAD DISCLOSED TWO ATOMIC TESTS.

PE111PED 5/9

96

TOKYO--ADD NUCLEAR (95)

"IT IS A GREAT VICTORY FOR THE THREE GREAT REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN CLASS STRUGGLE, THE STRUGGLE FOR PRODUCTION AND SCIENTIFIC EXPERIMENT," RADIO PEKING SAID.

THE ANNOUNCEMENT SAID THE TEST WAS CONDUCTED IN THE AIR, BUT WHETHER THE DEVICE WAS ON A TOWER OR DROPPED FROM A PLANE WAS NOT INDICATED.

PE113PED 5/9

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 11AC030A-36-3-4-3
By JPH NARA Date 1-10-18

TOKYO--ADD RED CHINA-NUCLEAR (77)

CHINA EXPLODED ITS FIRST NUCLEAR DEVICE ON OCT. 16, 1964, AND ITS SECOND MAY 14, 1965. THE FIRST WAS BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN SET OFF ATOP A TOWER AT A DESERT TEST CENTER IN SINKIANG PROVINCE, AND THE SECOND WAS BELIEVED DROPPED FROM A PLANE.

PEKING RADIO, IN A CHINESE LANGUAGE BROADCAST MONITORED HERE, SAID THE THIRD TOOK PLACE AT 4 P.M. YESTERDAY AT A TEST SITE IN WESTERN CHINA.

CR1232P 9

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 100-0308-36-3-4-3
By JOL ARA Date 1-10-18

TOKYO--ADD NUCLEAR (79)

296

THE BROADCAST SAID IT WAS A THERMONUCLEAR TEST CONDUCTED IN THE
AIR.
PE1255PED 5/9

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Authority AMC 030R-36-3-4-3

By Joh ARA Date 1-10-18

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FBIS 44 (SEE 42)

B U L L E T I N

FOR YOUR INFORMATION W

THE PEKING DOMESTIC SERVICE IN MANDARIN ITEM BROADCAST AT 1614
GMT STATED THAT THE EXPLOSION OF THE NUCLEAR DEVICE TOOK PLACE
IN THE AIR IN WESTERN CHINA AT 1600 HOURS PEKING TIME ON 9 MAY.
9 MAY 1640Z JLS/TN

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAF 030A-36-3-4-3

By SDV vARA Date 1-10-18

FBIS 46 (SEE 42)

NUCLEAR EXPLOSION

PEKING NCNA INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN ENGLISH 1637Z 9 MAY 66 W

(TEXT) PEKING--PRESS COMMUNIQUE:

AT 1600 HOURS (PEKING TIME) ON 9 MAY 1966 CHINA SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCTED OVER ITS WESTERN AREAS A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION WHICH CONTAINED THERMONUCLEAR MATERIAL.

THIS EXPERIMENTAL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION IS A NEW IMPORTANT ACHIEVEMENT SCORED BY THE CHINESE PEOPLE IN THEIR EFFORTS TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THEIR NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SAFEGUARD THE SECURITY OF THEIR COUNTRY AND THE PEACE OF THE WORLD.

THE COMPLETE SUCCESS OF THIS NUCLEAR TEST WAS INSURED BY THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY AND CHINA'S SCIENTISTS, TECHNICIANS, AND BROAD SECTIONS OF WORKERS AND FUNCTIONARIES WHO, UNDER THE CORRECT LEADERSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA AND HOLDING STILL HIGHER THE GREAT RED BANNER OF MAO TSE-TUNG'S THOUGHT, GAVE PROMINENCE TO POLITICS, ADHERED TO THE FOUR FIRSTS, CREATIVELY STUDIED AND APPLIED CHAIRMAN MAO'S WORKS, CARRIED OUT THE POLICY OF SELF-RELIANCE AND HARD WORK FORMULATED BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PARTY AND CHAIRMAN MAO, AND GAVE PLAY TO THE SPIRIT OF COLLECTIVE WISDOM AND EFFORTS AND WHOLEHEARTED COOPERATION BY COMBINING THE LEADERSHIP, THE EXPERTS, AND THE MASSES AND INTEGRATING EDUCATION, RESEARCH, AND PRODUCTION. IT IS A GREAT VICTORY FOR THE PARTY'S GENERAL LINE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION. IT IS A GREAT VICTORY FOR THE THREE GREAT REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS OF CLASS STRUGGLE, THE STRUGGLE FOR PRODUCTION, AND SCIENTIFIC EXPERIMENT. IT IS A GREAT VICTORY FOR MAO TSE-TUNG'S THOUGHT.

(MORE)

9 MAY 1704Z JLS/TN

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Authority RAC 0309-36-3-4-3

By JDN vARA Date 1-10-8

292

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REACTION TO CPR EXPLOSION

TOKYO JIJI IN ENGLISH 1629Z 9 MAY 66 W

(TEXT) TOKYO--JAPANESE GOVERNMENT SOURCES TUESDAY EXPRESSED DEEP REGRET OVER COMMUNIST CHINA'S THIRD NUCLEAR EXPLOSION. JAPAN, THEY SAID, HOPES THAT PEKING WILL STOP SHOWING OFF ITS "NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY" AND START EXERCISING MODERATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL TREND OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AND IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN ASIA.

AT THE SAME TIME, THEY REAFFIRMED THAT THIS COUNTRY WOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE MAXIMUM EFFORTS TO HELP ACHIEVE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT.

WHEN COMMUNIST CHINA CARRIED OUT TWO PREVIOUS NUCLEAR DETONATIONS, JAPAN ASKED PEKING TO EXERCISE SELF-REFLECTION, CALLING THE TESTS PARTICULARLY UNDESIRABLE SINCE THEY DISREGARDED THE LIMITED NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY. THE FACT THAT COMMUNIST CHINA AGAIN SHOWED OFF ITS NUCLEAR MIGHT BY THE LATEST EXPLOSION, THE SOURCES SAID, INDICATES THAT PEKING IS STILL FOLLOWING THE OUT-DATED NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY. THIS, THEY ADDED, WILL HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON COMMUNIST CHINA ITSELF.

THEY SAID THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO TAKE A "WAIT-AND-SEE" ATTITUDE REGARDING ITS POLICY TOWARD COMMUNIST CHINA FOR THE TIME BEING, AS PEKING'S DIPLOMACY HAD BECOME RATHER "HYSTERICAL" SINCE LAST YEAR.

9 MAY 1708Z JLS/TN

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Authority AEC 030R-36-3-4-3

By Jov WARA Date 1-10-88

FBIS 48

ONLY ADD 46 (NUCLEAR EXPLOSION)

X X X FOR MAO TSE-TUNG'S THOUGHT.

(TEXT) THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA, THE STATE COUNCIL, AND THE MILITARY COMMISSION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PARTY EXTEND THEIR WARM GRATULATIONS TO ALL THE COMMANDERS AND FIGHTERS OF THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY WHO TOOK PART IN THIS TEST AND TO ALL THE WORKERS, ENGINEERS, TECHNICIANS, SCIENTISTS, AND OTHER PERSONNEL WHO CONTRIBUTED TO IT, AND EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THEY WILL REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS AND ACHIEVE NEW AND CONTINUOUS SUCCESSES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE FURTHER STRENGTHENING AND THE MODERNIZATION OF OUR COUNTRY'S NATIONAL DEFENSE.

CHINA'S PURPOSE IN CONDUCTING NECESSARY AND LIMITED NUCLEAR TESTS AND IN DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS TO OPPOSE THE NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL AND THREATS BY U.S. IMPERIALISM AND ITS COLLABORATORS AND TO OPPOSE THE U.S.-SOVIET COLLUSION FOR MAINTAINING NUCLEAR MONOPOLY AND SABOTAGING THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLES OF ALL OPPRESSED PEOPLES AND NATIONS. THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS A GREAT ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE PEOPLES WHO ARE FIGHTING HEROICALLY FOR THEIR OWN LIBERATION AS WELL AS A NEW CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEFENSE OF WORLD PEACE.

AT THE TIME OF THE EXPLOSION OF CHINA'S FIRST AND SECOND ATOM BOMBS, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ALREADY ISSUED STATEMENTS EXPLAINING CHINA'S FUNDAMENTAL STAND ON THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND CONCRETELY PROPOSED THE HOLDING OF A SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD TO DISCUSS THE COMPLETE PROHIBITION AND THOROUGH DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

SINCE THEN, IN DISREGARD OF THE STATEMENTS OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT, U.S. IMPERIALISM HAS CONTINUED TO DEVELOP AND MASS PRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF VARIOUS KINDS, FURTHER EXPANDED ITS NUCLEAR BASES ALL OVER THE WORLD, AND STEPPED UP ITS NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL AND THREATS AGAINST CHINA AND THE WHOLE WORLD. CHINA'S SOLE PURPOSE IN DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS DEFENSE AND ITS ULTIMATE AIM IS TO ELIMINATE THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

WE SOLEMNLY DECLARE ONCE AGAIN THAT AT NO TIME AND IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL CHINA BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE CHINESE PEOPLE SINCERELY HOPE THAT A NUCLEAR WAR WILL NEVER TAKE PLACE.

WE ARE DEEPLY CONVINCED THAT A NUCLEAR WAR CAN BE PREVENTED PROVIDED THAT ALL THE PEACE-LOVING PEOPLE AND COUNTRIES WORK TOGETHER AND PERSIST IN STRUGGLE. AS IN THE PAST, THE CHINESE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO CARRY ON AN UNSWERVING STRUGGLE, TOGETHER WITH ALL THE OTHER PEACE-LOVING PEOPLE AND COUNTRIES, FOR THE NOBLE AIM OF COMPLETELY PROHIBITING AND THOROUGHLY DESTROYING THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

(NCNA EDITOR'S NOTE: THE FOUR FIRSTS MEAN GIVING FIRST PLACE TO MAN IN THE CORRECT HANDLING OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MAN AND WEAPONS; GIVING FIRST PLACE TO POLITICAL WORK IN THE CORRECT HANDLING OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL AND OTHER WORK; GIVING FIRST PLACE TO IDEOLOGICAL WORK IN THE CORRECT HANDLING OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IDEOLOGICAL AND ROUTINE TASKS IN POLITICAL WORK; AND GIVING FIRST PLACE TO LIVING IDEAS IN THE CORRECT HANDLING OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IDEAS IN BOOKS AND LIVING IDEAS IN IDEOLOGICAL WORK.)

(ENDALL)

9 MAY 1720Z JLS/TN

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Authority: PAC 030R-36-3-93
By: JDL WARA Date: 1-10-18

FBIS 42

BULLETIN

FOR YOUR INFORMATION W

PEKING DOMESTIC SERVICE IN MANDARIN AT 1614 GMT ON 9 MAY 1966
ANNOUNCES THE EXPLOSION OF A NUCLEAR DEVICE BY THE CPR. DETAILS
AS AVAILABLE.

9 MAY 1219Z DEW/TN

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By SDC Date 1-10-18

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Mr. Johnson
NIE 13-2-65 31
10 February 1965
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 13-2-65 ✓

Communist China's Advanced Weapons Program

CONCLUSIONS

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

As indicated overleaf
10 FEBRUARY 1965

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Authority *NLT* RAC 030-036-3-2
By *gfw* NARA, Date *3/19/09*

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The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, AEC and NSA.

Concurring:

Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 13-2-65

**Communist China's Advanced
Weapons Program**

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COMMUNIST CHINA'S ADVANCED WEAPONS PROGRAM

THE PROBLEM

To assess the current state of Communist China's nuclear weapons and missile program and, insofar as possible, estimate the future course and size of that program.

NOTE

Although we have obtained a considerable amount of new information in the past year or so, there remain serious gaps in our information and we are therefore not able to judge the present state or to project the future development of the Chinese program with any high degree of confidence. The specific judgments in this paper should be read in the light of this general caution.

CONCLUSIONS

A. Communist China's first nuclear test on 16 October 1964 was of an implosion fission device with U-235 as the fissionable material and a probable yield of 19 kilotons (KT). We cannot estimate with confidence its weight or dimensions but believe it was relatively large and heavy. The most likely source of the U-235 was uranium first brought to partial enrichment in the gaseous diffusion facility at Lanchow and then further enriched by the electromagnetic process. We cannot, however, rule out the possibility that the U-235 was of Soviet or other non-Chinese origin though we believe this to be highly unlikely.

B. Although we have no good basis for estimating the current level of production of fissionable material, we believe that the Chinese will have enough material during the next two years to conduct a test program, with enough left over to stockpile at least a few bombs. The

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Chinese could now build bombs based on the results of their first test which could be carried by their two TU-16 medium jet bombers or their 12 or so TU-4s.

C. The evidence leads us to estimate that the Chinese Communists are developing a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). We believe this system is essentially a Soviet design, probably the SS-4, perhaps with some Chinese modifications. It is possible that the Chinese could have a few MRBMs ready for deployment with compatible fission warheads in 1967 or 1968. A weapon in bomb configuration could be available somewhat earlier and could be delivered by the Chinese air force's light jet IL-28 bombers of which they have about 290.

D. The Chinese have a submarine closely similar in outward appearance to the Soviet G-class submarine which is designed to launch 350 n.m. ballistic missiles while surfaced. We do not know whether the Chinese built this submarine or assembled components supplied by the USSR, or what missile they expect to put in it. We have no evidence that the Chinese are constructing any more of this type submarine and it would be at least several years before any units could be operational with Chinese-produced missiles.

E. The Soviets provided the Chinese with some surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) by mid-1960. We have no evidence to confirm or deny that the Soviets have furnished any more since then and we do not know how many such missiles are now in China. The Chinese have a urgent requirement for SAMs and we believe are working hard on a production program. There are indications that the Chinese are now producing some kind of surface-to-air missile, either Soviet-type SAMs or prototypes of a Chinese version. The evidence is not sufficient to permit a firm judgment but we think it highly unlikely that either will be produced on a large scale for two or three years.

F. It is unlikely that the Chinese will develop a deliverable thermonuclear weapon for several years, and there is little chance of an intercontinental capability until after 1970.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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American Opinion Summary

Department of State

FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT USE

October 7, 1964

PROSPECTIVE CHINESE A BOMB
(2nd Report)

Additional comment on Secretary Rusk's announcement that Communist China may soon detonate a nuclear device reflects the view that the immediate results of such a detonation would be mainly political and psychological rather than military.

Political Effect

This does not mean that the expected effect was minimized. There "is no room for complacency," the Los Angeles Times warned, "the political and psychological implications of any demonstrated nuclear potential are immediate and vast." The Chicago Sun-Times asserted that if China "does explode a nuclear device it will have a profound psychological effect on the nations of the East" (somewhat similarly, Business Week, Hanson Baldwin in N.Y. Times).

More specifically, the effects most commonly expected were that: 1) China's prestige and influence would be increased; 2) China might become more arrogant or bellicose.

The "delicate international political balance" could be "affected almost over night," the Chicago News warned. "Proof that the Asian giant is catching up with the United States and Europe in harnessing the atom could have profound effects."

The Denver Post said: "The immediate effect will almost surely be to increase Peking's prestige, especially in the view of those Communist nations and individuals who are teetering between paying their allegiance to Moscow or to Peking. A Chinese nuclear explosion would certainly also influence some of the non-aligned nations to take the Red Chinese at their word when they say they have a rapidly developing and powerful nation which will increasingly make its voice heard in international politics."

There was some fear that the effect on the Chinese might be significant. An explosion "will almost certainly make the Chinese Communists even more belligerent," the Denver Post warned, adding: "The Red Chinese would be likely to get tough specifically in Southeast Asia after they exploded a nuclear device." The Chicago Sun-Times said: "Red China could, conceivably, become much more arrogant." The Los Angeles Times predicted: "Almost certainly Red China will step up its already intensive efforts to divide the world along color lines."

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By g/jm, NARA, Date 3/19/09

Foreseeing a wide range of possible results of a Chinese detonation, Scripps-Howard's Washington News asserted that it "will frighten China's Asiatic neighbors, increase tensions with the Soviets, probably increase pressures for admission of the Red Chinese to world councils," and: "Chinese tests and further tests planned by the French for next year, will increase strain on the treaty forbidding further tests in the atmosphere to which neither France nor Red China is a party."

What A number of suggestions were made as to what should
To Do be done in face of the impending Chinese nuclear accomplishment. In general they fell into two categories: 1) calling for a policy directed toward international cooperation or control; 2) assuming only that Communist China must be held in check by power.

Among those who favored an international cooperation approach, the Chicago Sun-Times said: "A system of international authority to control proliferation of nuclear power should be arrived at....A start was made with the nuclear test-ban treaty.... With Red China probably close to possession of nuclear power a fresh start toward world control of such power should be made."

The New Republic, holding that the West "ought to continue trying for a detente" with Russia, "and for disarmament," asserted: "The giant Chinese firecracker has made this still more imperative, if that is possible. At the same time, it also makes it plainer than ever that sooner or later the Chinese will have to be included in those discussions."

Walter Lippmann advocated a policy toward Communist China similar to that which has been followed toward Russia. His view was: "If Mao can be contained in the 1960's as Stalin was contained in the 1950's, it is a reasonable bet that the small and weak states in the Chinese borderland...will go Titoist,--that is to say they will find ways to remain independent of Chinese domination in international affairs. It is also a reasonable bet that China will come to want coexistence in order to live and to grow richer."

"At best, Red China's knock on the door of the 'nuclear club' will require thorough restudy of Western policies and perhaps moves to counter a changing situation in Asia," the Chicago News said. "The probability that Red China has built a bomb reinforces our belief that Americans would be wise to retain Mr. Johnson in the Presidency," this paper said. "The

alternative is to place foreign policy in the hands of a man who seems to understand neither nuclear weapons nor the differences between Russia and China.

Apparently placing little faith in international cooperation as a way out, William Randolph Hearst, Jr. suggested that China posed a great danger to Russia, and that Russia might launch a preventive attack on China. If this happened, he concluded: "We should let them fight it out, to the death of communism."

Scripps-Howard's Washington News called for a U.S. policy of nuclear strength and diplomatic isolation of would-be aggressors, it said: "We must rely on our own superiority in this field to keep the peace, adapting our defenses as new threats develop and continuing the patient efforts of diplomacy which are designed to isolate those who would use these weapons in aggressive war."

Why U.S. Both domestic and foreign relations reasons were given
Spoke Out for the timing of the Secretary's statement. "Rusk's intention...was not only to muffle Peking's propaganda guns but also to disarm those critics of the Johnson administration who contend that we never are aware of major world events until after they happen," the Denver Post stated. To U.S. News & World Report: "It is clear that the U.S. deliberately beat China to the announcement in the hope of keeping the rest of Asia from being kept off guard and running to the side of China in panic."

Jack Anderson wrote that the "advance announcement...should give some assurance to those worried by Barry Goldwater's scaremongering."

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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INFO: Department of Defense WASHINGTON

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : American Embassy LONDON

DATE: Oct. 3, 1964

SUBJECT: Initial U.K. Press Reaction to Prospect of Chinese Nuclear Detonation

REF :

Very heavy, although restrained, coverage was given by the British press to Secretary Rusk's statement of September 29 concerning the possibility of a Chinese Communist explosion of a nuclear device in the near future. (See also Daily Press Summaries for September 30 and October 1 from USINFO London to USINFO Washington.) Most papers assumed that the Secretary's statement was predicated upon hard intelligence information and speculated that the detonation could occur as early as October 1, the 15th anniversary of the Chinese Communist regime. In general, the press felt that the Secretary had made his statement to remove the element of surprise from the anticipated Chinese nuclear explosion. He had sought to do this, the press thought, in order to minimize any panic effect that an apparent Chinese Communist nuclear success might have upon U.S. voters in the forthcoming Presidential elections, as well as upon international opinion generally, particularly that of China's neighbors to the south and east.

The British press broadly concluded that no significant military change in the world balance of power would accompany a Chinese test explosion. Mention was made of the necessarily long period of time between the detonation of a test device and the possession of a meaningful stockpile of nuclear weapons. All papers recognized that Communist China's means of delivery were inadequate, if not "primitive."

In contrast to their conclusions that the immediate military implications of a Chinese detonation were slight,

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Drafted by:

Contents and Classification Approved by:

PM:RVHennes:bjr 10/1/64

PM - George S. Newman

Clearances:

Clearances: PAO-Mr. Pettus (in draft)

POL/F - Mr. Wood (in draft)

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By [Signature] NARA, Date 3/19/09

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most papers felt that the political and psychological consequences of an explosion would be considerable. Frequent mention was made of the impact upon India and upon Japan and the probability that both those countries would have to review their previous policy against developing a nuclear capability. The smaller countries of Southeast Asia (South Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Burma) were expected to be impressed by Communist China's entry into the nuclear club and sympathetic communist parties throughout the area were expected to exploit this accomplishment as evidence of the irresistible strength of communism as practiced by the Chinese.


The Times, the Daily Express and The Daily Telegraph in their editorials of October 1 gazed somewhat apprehensively into the future. The Times observed that "the prospect of China as a nuclear power sends most countries into chilled apprehension" although China is a long way from "equality in defense, whatever reward a first nuclear explosion may bring." (Copies pouched to ACA - Mr. Lindsay Grant.) The Daily Express alleged that the imminent Chinese action served to expose the folly of the argument that the U.K. give up its independent nuclear deterrent; consequently, it should lead the Labor Party to "some hard re-thinking." What was needed, the Express argued, was to bridge the gulf between the isolation of a modern, awakened China and the rest of the world. This might well be a major mission of the next British Government. (The same theme of British action toward reducing China's isolation, e.g., by bringing Communist China into the United Nations, was sounded editorially in the pro-Labor Sun) In its editorial, the Telegraph warned that unless China changed its belief that the triumph of communism was worth a nuclear war, the principle of deterrence "may come to have dubious validity."

In its collection of vignettes, "London Day by Day," The Daily Telegraph led off on October 1 with the gossip item that Mao Tse-tung wished the Chinese detonation as soon as possible so that he could witness the "explosion ceremony" before his failing eyesight made this impossible. Similarly unreported elsewhere was the statement by Michael Lake, Diplomatic Correspondent of the Sun, that British Intelligence reports tend to qualify Secretary Rusk's view that a Chinese detonation might occur in the near future. These sources, according to Lake, doubt that China has enough fissile material to detonate a nuclear device in a year. Thus, Lake observed, an explosion on October 1 would mean that China had made faster progress than Britain had thought possible. On the other hand, Victor Zorza on September 30 in The Guardian estimated that China had had sufficient nuclear explosives for a test "by the end of 1962." Zorza speculated that more than one Chinese detonation would now take place. "It is not likely," he wrote, "that China would have decided to go ahead with a test if it were not able to follow it up with others."

Rondon

COMMENT: Press reporting and editorial comment on the possibility that the Communist Chinese would detonate a nuclear device in the near future has been sufficiently intensive to prevent the British public's being surprised at this event if it should soon occur. However, press comment does reflect a wide-spread journalistic apprehension at the political and psychological impact of a Chinese test upon opinion in the Afro-Asian world.

For the Ambassador:



Richard V. Hennes
First Secretary of Embassy

American Opinion Summary

Department of State

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FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT USE

October 2, 1964

PROSPECTIVE CHINESE A-BOMB

Comment on Secretary Rusk's announcement that Communist China may detonate a nuclear device in the near future reflects the view that this will be an ominous development. The immediate results are expected to be psychological and political rather than military, but both the expected immediate and long-range results are viewed with concern.

Propaganda Effect The immediate impact is expected to be felt most strongly on attitudes in Asia. Some observers also mention Africa and Latin America as areas likely to be influenced. Expecting "the political and propaganda consequences" of a Chinese explosion to be "formidable," the New York Times warned: "Peking can be expected to argue that it has broken the 'white man's monopoly' of nuclear weapons and that this is one more reason why the underdeveloped nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America should look to the Chinese for leadership and support." The Baltimore Sun saw the Chinese bomb as "an item for boasting in the Communist councils, a thing to be waved with pride before the Africans, a vague threat to be brandished over Asia."

Murrey Marder wrote that a detonation "could give Red China a propaganda weapon of raw accomplishment among other backward nations, provided they are not repelled by the whole idea of new nuclear weaponry" (in Wash. Post). Scripps-Howard's R. H. Shackford predicted that "even a modest entrance of China into the nuclear club" will scare "unsophisticated Asians and Africans and tempt them to lean toward Communist China."

Asia was believed by some to be especially vulnerable. The principal effect will be "political and psychological, particularly in Asia," the Washington Post said, adding: "Even now, before China has exploded a nuclear device, there is growing fear and respect for her in Asia." And David Lawrence wrote: "For the moment, the big danger lies in the Far East, where the possession of nuclear bombs by Red China will generate a wave of fear and apprehension in Japan, the Philippines and Southeast Asia."

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Long-range Effect Some foresaw portentous results beyond the psychological impact on underdeveloped countries and neighbors of the burgeoning Red giant. "The great questions to be raised," said the Baltimore Sun, "are whether the response to China will be a new acceleration in the arms race, whether new and longer-ranged Western military planning is prescribed and whether China is forcing the whole world to take a new look at the place of Peking in world affairs." The Philadelphia Inquirer warned that it "would be foolhardy for us in America to console ourselves with the knowledge that it probably will be many years before Peking can develop a first-rate nuclear weapons system," for years "have a way of passing quickly" (somewhat similarly, Providence Journal, Wash. Star).

The New York Times saw the possibility that the U.S.-Soviet-British effort "to end the nuclear arms race and to prevent the spread of these weapons through the limited nuclear test ban could collapse." It concluded: "A new nuclear arms race could erupt, one that would not only impose enormous costs and further foul the atmosphere, but also make all of mankind more insecure than ever before."

The New York Herald Tribune declared that "increased capacity to inflict injury must be accompanied by increased responsibility if the world is not to become an impossible place to live in." The Herald Tribune saw in the failure of the Communist Chinese regime to display a sense of responsibility when it was weak, reason to fear that it "may continue this moral failure when it becomes strong."

U.S. Policy Suggestions as to what should be done were mainly along two lines:

- 1) strive for international control, and for better relations with Communist China;
- 2) provide protection for Asian countries.

"Clearly, there is need to intensify and expedite efforts to achieve world-wide control and, eventually, abolition of nuclear weapons," the Philadelphia Inquirer declared. The Washington Post suggested that we might "launch a 'peace campaign' directed toward Communist China and all of Asia," and said: "We could offer Communist China another opportunity to accede to the nuclear test ban agreement and invite her to participate in disarmament discussions."

The Providence Journal declared that the explosion of the first Chinese nuclear device should make "crystal clear": "There can be no controlling the nuclear menace to civilization, no disarmament, no peace, no international order under law, no

security for the United States as long as a nuclear-armed China is kept outside the world community. China's coming of nuclear age compels us to do what we should have done long ago--abandon our negative China policy provided that Red China can be persuaded to ease her intransigence in international affairs."

With an eye on the immediate problem of fear in Asia, the Washington Post suggested that some situations may involve an increase of American commitments "if they are requested, to defend Asian countries against the threat of an attack by China." David Lawrence said that "Japan, the Philippines, Thailand and other countries in Southeast Asia will probably have to be given immediate protection such as NATO members enjoy."

More militantly, the New York News asserted that it would like to know "what, if anything, Washington is doing toward insuring the free world against this future Peking menace." After raising the possibility of "trying to wangle Soviet Russia and Red China into leaping at each other's throat," and "beefing up and backing Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek" in his raids on the mainland, this paper said: "Let us hope" that our leaders "aren't depending on the--nuclear test ban treaty--to avert a nuclear war."

The Washington Star suggested that "it will be exceedingly dangerous to insist forever that this powerful state can in no way or shape be accepted as a fully recognized part of the world community." But the Star added: "It will, of course, also be exceedingly dangerous to permit China to become a major nuclear power." The Star concluded: "In 1964 we have to start considering, perhaps in conjunction with Russia, whether we will permit this to happen," recalling that in 1962 the U.S. was prepared to accept war with Russia to prevent a less serious threat of missile bases in Cuba.

Secretary's The Secretary's announcement was made at this
Timing time for political reasons, several writers suggested (e.g. Philip Geyelin in Wall St. Journal, Marguerite Higgins in Phila. Inquirer, Ted Lewis in N.Y. News, Murrey Marder in Wash. Post). The Administration did not want to be charged by the Republicans with being surprised when the detonation comes, according to these writers. The suggestion was also made that it was hoped to diminish the psychological effect in Asia (e.g. Bernard Gwertzman in Wash. Star, and Philip Geyelin).

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FUSION TEST SEEN FOR CHINA'S BOMB

U.S. Experts Expect Blast
to Be Thermonuclear

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 5 — Some atomic-energy experts in the Government believe it is possible that the first atomic test by Communist China will be a thermonuclear explosion.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk said last week the Chinese might soon explode a nuclear device. American officials still expect the test to come off soon.


A combination of technical and psychological considerations underlies the speculation in the Administration that Red China will use the thermonuclear method.

Technically, it is no longer a big step, as it was originally for the United States and the Soviet Union, to develop a thermonuclear device. Once a nation has developed a fission device, it is a relatively straightforward step to use this device as a "trigger" for setting off a thermonuclear explosion.

Psychological Factor Seen

If China has mastered the fission process, as now seems apparent, officials believe, it might seek maximum psychological impact from its first test by incorporation of the fission device as a trigger for a thermonuclear explosion.

The explosion not only would be much larger than one based on fission—perhaps in the megaton range (equivalent to a million tons of TNT)—and thereby more impressive in its psychological impact. China



Eastfoto

COMMUNIST CHINA MARKS ANNIVERSARY: This parade in Peking, at Tienanmen (Gate of Heavenly Peace) Square was a highlight last Thursday of the celebration of the 15th anniversary of Chinese Communist regime.

Guards of honor carried national emblem and sign: "Celebrate the 15th anniversary of the founding of People's Republic of China." Photo is of Mao Tse-tung, Red leader.

would also become the first nation to make its debut as a nuclear power with a thermonuclear explosion.

In the cases of the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union, their first thermonuclear tests did not come until several years after their first fission explosions. The first thermonuclear test of the United States was in 1952, of Russia in 1953 and of Britain in 1957. France is preparing for her first thermonuclear explosion next year in the Pacific.

Atomic officials recall, however, that the technical problems of developing a thermonuclear device have been greatly reduced by the experimental work of the United States and the Soviet Union.

When these two powers, about 15 years ago, set out on their race to develop a thermonuclear device there was still considerable uncertainty over how to achieve the fusion process. In fact, the appraisal of

American scientists in 1950 was that there was only a 50-50 chance of developing a thermonuclear bomb.

While the details remain secret, the basic procedures for making a thermonuclear bomb rare now well established and known generally within the scientific community. In undertaking development of a thermonuclear device, therefore, China would not have to repeat much of the exploratory, experimental work that the United States and the Soviet Union were forced to do.

The biggest problem is development of the fission device, which supplies the intense heat needed to trigger the fusion reaction of the thermonuclear bomb.

As a trigger, China could use a fission device fabricated from plutonium, which it is believed to be producing in a reactor near Paotow in Inner Mongolia. In some ways a fission trigger made from enriched uranium has certain technical advan-

tages, but United States experience has shown that a plutonium device can serve satisfactorily.

The speculation also is supported by the fact that China has ample supplies of lithium, a light metal that is one of the basic ingredients for a thermonuclear device. In fact, until recently China exported large quantities of lithium to the Soviet Union, presumably for use in atomic weapons. Last February the Chinese Communist party's Central Committee disclosed that 100,000 tons of lithium concentrates had been shipped to Russia.

Lithium can be made into thermonuclear weapons material in two ways. It can be irradiated in a reactor, thereby being transmuted into tritium, a heavy isotopic form of hydrogen, which is used as fusible material in hydrogen bombs. Tritium, however, has the disadvantage of being radioactive, with the relatively short radioactive "half life" of 12.4 years.

China and the Atom

U.S. Believes First Blast Will Leave Peking's Major Handicaps Unaltered

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

The first nuclear test by Communist China will undoubtedly send a shock wave around the world.

But the event has more political and psychological impact than immediate military importance.

Its intangible effects may be profound—immediately in Southeast Asia, India and Taiwan and eventually in Moscow. It will

News

Analysis

complicate the Vietnam situation and may further restrict United States options there. It was because of these expected effects

that Secretary of State Dean Rusk said on Tuesday that a blast might come "in the near future." He intended to take the propaganda edge off the actual event.

China's detonation of a nuclear device has long been expected; it is already much later than was originally forecast.

If Soviet technical and scientific aid had not been withdrawn, China's entry into the nuclear club might well have occurred closer to 1960 than to 1965.

Contingency plans or studies to dampen the effects of the actual event have long been ready. Washington plans such actions as Voice of America broadcasts and reassurances that the United States intends to remain a force in the Western Pacific.

The major thrust of the United States effort will be an attempt to show that one or two nuclear detonations do not basically alter Communist China's military position.

As a nuclear power China lacks—and will long lack, unless it receives major outside help—major industrial facilities, adequate scientific and engineering resources and the inexpensive power required for the rapid manufacture of large quantities of fissionable material.

Peking also lacks, and is likely to lack for a long time, modern means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets. And finally, Peking's defensive capability against air or missile attack is obsolete and inadequate.

Up to now, Mao Tse-tung, chairman of the Chinese Communist party, has expressed contempt for nuclear weapons. China, he has said, can easily afford to lose 300 million people and yet with its vast population emerge victorious. Col. Robert B. Rigg, in an article in the October issue of Army magazine, reports that after the first United States tests, Chairman Mao said that "even at Bikini atomic bombs did not kill all the pigs."

"Mao," Colonel Rigg writes, "appears to retain and to pro-

ject for the immediate future his traditional reliance on masses of military manpower."

China's lack of broadly based industrial facilities and its inadequate technological and scientific resources cannot be remedied quickly. It will take time, probably considerable time, for China to produce enough fissionable material to become even a small operating nuclear power. A test device is usually more bulky than a weapon, and it may be several years before actual operating weapons are available in small quantities.

In five years China may have enough weapons to destroy or to damage severely one or a few major Asian cities—New Delhi, Tokyo, Vladivostok or others within range of the Chinese delivery capabilities. When that time arrives, Peking will have a nuclear-deterrent capability, though restricted and limited. It will probably make itself felt in inhibiting ways upon Asian politics, and in turn upon United States freedom of action.

Today and for some time to come, the weakest element in China's nuclear power is its inadequate delivery capability. That capability is far from nonexistent, but it is certainly obsolete and very restrictive in range and power.

The Chinese Communist Air Force probably numbers about 2,500 planes. If a nuclear bomb can be reduced sufficiently in size and bulk—and this requires time and technology—nearly any plane can carry one.

But the MIG-15 and MIG-17 fighters in the Chinese Air Force are extremely short-legged. It would probably be years before Chinese technology was able to develop an externally carried nuclear weapon that could be fitted on these planes.

For the next few years the principal carriers would be 125 to 150 Soviet IL-28 Beagle twin-jet light bombers, and a few old propeller-driven TU-4 medium bombers.

The IL-28 is a four-man subsonic aircraft with a maximum radius of action, with bomb load, of 700 to 800 miles.

The TU-4 is simply the Russian copy of the United States B-29 four-engine superfortress, used at the end of World War II. It is slow and has a limited ceiling, but it has range enough to reach large parts of the Asian mainland and most of the offshore islands.

As far as is known, China has no long-range missiles. It may have small battlefield tactical missiles, and there have been reports that it has a number of Russian-winged bombardment missiles, with a 10-to-15-mile range, of the same type carried by Soviet Komar missile ships.

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Draft Presidential Standby Statement for Use in Event of ChiCom
Detonation of a Nuclear Device

I can announce that we have detected the long-anticipated detonation of a nuclear device by the Chinese Communists. Of course, this comes as no surprise and no one should be misled as to the small military significance of this development. There is a long, long period of development and the expenditure of vast financial and human resources between the detonation of a first nuclear device and the acquisition of a stockpile of reliable nuclear weapons and appropriate delivery systems that would importantly affect the world military balance. If and when the Chicoms ever attain a true nuclear weapon capability, the Free World will still be and will continue to be enormously stronger. The possibility that the Chicoms could ever catch up with the Free World is indeed small.

Nevertheless, this is a sad moment for the Chinese people and indeed for all mankind. The Chinese people under the yoke of a callous and brutal tyranny have had to devote their meager resources in this wild pursuit of the nuclear weapon instead of devoting their intelligence and resources to meeting their minimum civilian requirements, or to contribute to scientific and industrial progress through the peaceful use of the atom.

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Last year the Chinese Communist regime refused to become signatories to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Now by a flagrant and conscienceless act it has asserted its sovereign right to pollute the atmosphere by the radioactive fallout from its weapons tests. It is indeed deplorable that the Chinese Communists could not see their way clear to join with most of the rest of the world in halting atmospheric pollution and discouraging the spread of nuclear weapons.

This sad event brings home to all of us the overriding importance of finding practical concrete steps that will lead us away from the specious security of nuclear weapons and the whole arsenal of hellish armaments toward a new era of peace and cooperation among all men in a great effort to achieve the shining goal of the great society that has been the dream of the philosophers throughout the ages. This is the goal to which we and all the world shall become dedicated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Johnson 39

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 1, 1964

Mac,

I am concerned about the final sentence in this statement. It introduces an essentially new thought (disarmament) that is not adequately related to the rest of the text and might even appear contradictory to the rest of the message. I believe that this subject should be treated as a new penultimate paragraph explaining that this action places greater urgency on the achievement of a non-proliferation agreement and does not in itself effect the efforts of the major powers to take steps to control the arms race in view of the limited military capabilities of the Chinese military force. The last sentence should also be modified to eliminate the idea that this Chinese action will not "interfere" with our efforts toward disarmament, peace, etc. I am afraid that this will sound a little like whistling in the dark to the man in the street.

Spurgeon Keeny



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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1. Kenny
To coordinate
our staff


September 30, 1964

J. R. L.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

SUBJECT: Standby Statement for Chinese Communist
Nuclear Test

Attached is the current draft of a public statement in the event that the Chinese Communists should test a nuclear device. It has been cleared in draft within the Department and by DOD, USIA, ACDA, and CIA. It has not as yet been cleared by the Secretary and should therefore not be cleared with the President in its present form. It will need to be reviewed and revised as necessary in the light of any Chinese Communist announcement.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Public Statement Draft re
ChiCom Nuclear Device.

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Draft Standby Statement for Use in Event of ChiCom Detonation
of a Nuclear Device

(The length and desired emphasis of such a statement will depend on the nature of the detonation, the international situation at the time, and the manner of issuance.)

1. As Secretary Rusk noted on September 29, we have long known that the Chinese Communists had a nuclear ^{weapon} development program which was approaching the point of a first detonation of a test device. By our own means of detection we can today confirm that such an explosion has in fact taken place. (State when and where, and any available details on size, type, and effects.)

2. This is a sad moment for the hopes of mankind. Just a year ago a first step towards the control of nuclear weapons was taken with the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which has been signed by over 100 nations. Communist China strongly opposed the treaty and refused to sign it. It was hoped that this treaty would halt the spread of nuclear weapons to additional nations, and would put an end once and for all time to the pollution of the atmosphere by radioactive fallout. This act by Communist China runs contrary to those hopes.

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E.O. 13202, Sec. 3.4
By *com/ls* NARA, Date 3-19-09

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- 2 -

3. In view of our foreknowledge of the likelihood of this event the fact of this explosion comes as no surprise. It has long been taken into account in the planning of our own defense program and nuclear capability. Nor should its military significance be over-estimated. The initial testing of a first nuclear device is a long way from the acquisition of a stockpile of reliable weapons, with appropriate delivery systems.

4. More basic, however, is the fact that if and when the Chicomos develop nuclear weapons systems, Free World nuclear strength will continue to be enormously greater. Even the most casual calculation should demonstrate to Peiping that possible direct military gains that might result from use of nuclear weapons would be far outweighed by the potential costs to Communist China of such use.

5. The United States will continue to remain firm in its defense commitments in Asia. Even if Communist China should develop an effective nuclear capability, that capability would have no effect upon the willingness of the United

States

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- 3 -

States to respond to requests from Asian nations for help in dealing with Communist Chinese aggression. The United States will also continue its current efforts to support Asian nations in developing their ability to meet the continuing threats to their independent existence which arise not out of Communist China's eventual token nuclear capability, but from its support of wars of insurgency and more limited non-nuclear aggression. The United States will also not be diverted by this nuclear test from its long-term efforts to help the nations of Asia develop their basic strength and improve the welfare of their people through economic development.

6. The Chinese Communist nuclear weapons program is also a tragedy for the Chinese people who have suffered so much under the Communist regime. Instead of utilizing its scarce technical and industrial resources to improve the well-being of the Chinese people, the regime has used these valuable resources to produce a crude nuclear device which can only increase rather than decrease the sense of insecurity of the

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- 4 -

of the Chinese people. Other Asian nations would also be capable of developing nuclear weapons, but they have wisely chosen not to use their scientific and industrial resources for this purpose. Instead they have chosen to use their resources to promote the well-being of their people through economic development and peaceful use of the atom. By so doing they have also made an important contribution to the peace and security of the world.

7. While the Chinese Communist nuclear detonation is symbolic of policies which do not serve the cause of peace, there is no reason to fear that it will itself lead to new and immediate dangers of war provided that the nations of the Free World recognize its true significance and persevere in their determination to preserve their independence. [Nor *We shall continue* will it interfere with] our efforts to ^{achieve} [take] concrete practical steps down the road that leads away from nuclear armaments and war and toward a world of disarmament, cooperation, development and peace.

Cleared in substance October 1963

" " " May 1964

" " draft September 30, 1964.

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Rusk Views on Atom Test Termed Aid to China

Statement Considered Filippine for Peking's Propaganda

By SEYMOUR TOPPING

Special to The New York Times

HONG KONG, Sept. 30—The Chinese Communist regime is believed to have received a propaganda filippine from Secretary of State Dean Rusk's statement yesterday that it might detonate a nuclear device soon.

It came as Peking prepared to celebrate the 15th anniversary of the regime tomorrow.

Observers here said that statements from nonaligned countries gathered in the Chinese capital were more likely to have been impressed by the Rusk statement than by any generalized claims put forward by Peking itself.

In an editorial Jenmin Jih Pao, the Chinese Communist party organ, said: "We have achieved an important success of historic significance in scaling the high peaks of the latest developments in science and technology within a comparatively short period."

Risk in Propaganda Contest

The Rusk statement was viewed here as a calculated risk taken by the United States Government in its propaganda contest with Peking.

Although it is not known whether Peking intends to detonate a nuclear device soon, information reaching Western intelligence agencies has indicated that Communist China may have achieved earlier this year the technical and industrial capacity for such an experiment.

It was considered that tomorrow's celebration might present for a Chinese nuclear explosion. The opening of the conference of leaders of nonaligned countries in Cairo on Monday might also present such an opportunity.

The Rusk statement was viewed here as one calculated to blunt the impact of any Chinese Communist announcement of a nuclear exploit.

This may also have been the motive of William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, when he said in Tokyo earlier today that explosion of a nuclear device by Peking would not have great psychological or military significance.

Plants Believed Pimpotated

Information from various sources has indicated that China may be ready for a nuclear experiment.

What is believed to be a reactor capable of producing plutonium—possibly sufficient fissionable material for the explosion of two low-yield atomic devices annually—has been spotted in the vicinity of the city of Paotow in Suiyuan Province in Inner Mongolia.

There was no certainty that



The New York Times • Oct. 1, 1964

Plants for making nuclear material are reported to be situated in the areas of Paotow (1), Lanchow (2).

the reactor was operational. Experts believe that its capacity is inadequate to provide sufficient plutonium for a stockpile of nuclear weapons.

Another plant, where it is believed that Uranium 235 is produced, was said to be near Lanchow in Kansu Province. Uranium 235 is used in the manufacture of thermonuclear weapons.

Despite the heavy drain of nuclear and missile development on the country's scientific and industrial resources, Communist China has pressed forward with it, according to reliable reports received here.

Analysts believe that the regime is motivated more by a desire to impress developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America than by any expectations that China will become a major military power during this decade.

Peking is seeking to attract nonaligned peoples in competition with the United States and the Soviet Union by demonstrating what can be achieved through self-reliance by a militantly revolutionary society.

U.S. Network Aided Rusk

By JACK RAYMOND

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 30—

Secretary Rusk's statement yesterday served to call attention to the extensive intelligence operations of the United States.

Mr. Rusk did not say how

Two Nuclear Plants Believed Spotted on Mainland

this country learned that Peking might conduct a nuclear test soon. Other officials said that the information came from various sources, including other governments.

At a cost of many millions of dollars, the United States employs space satellites, airplanes, radar screens the size of football fields and electronic devices smaller than pins in its intelligence work. The exact cost of the operation is secret.

Many U-2 flights are believed to have been made over Communist China. U-2 planes are equipped with high-powered cameras as well as a wide variety of electronic equipment that can pick up radio and radar emissions.

Signals Picked Up

In addition, B-47's and B-52's, Navy patrol planes and surface ships have carried on similar electronic and photographic reconnaissance in flights outside Communist China's borders.

The electronic devices pick up Chinese radar signals and radio communications codes. The taped information is flown to the United States for study.

Word of China A-Prog

Secretary of State Dean Rusk announced on Tuesday that Communist China may explode its first nuclear device "in the near future." Here is a report, as far as it can be constructed from experts here and abroad, on China's atomic capability.


By Howard Simons
and Chalmers M. Roberts
Staff Reporters

Somewhere within Red China's 3,760,339 square miles of territory the Chinese Communists are building a giant gaseous diffusion plant—a factory for the mass production of the stuff that makes atomic bombs.

The diffusion plant was spotted by United States aerial cameras at least a year ago. A handful of American officials know its exact location but cannot reveal this information. The best guess is that the plant is near Lanchow on the Yellow River in north central China, where the Chinese set up a major science center in 1956.

An assumption is that the Soviets helped their former close ally to get started on the plant, which would have appealed to the Chinese concept of what it takes to be a first-rate nuclear power.

China has the competence to be such a power. It has the resources or can obtain them. It has the industrial, scientific and technical wherewithal even if it means that the Chinese people will have to go "without trousers," as Foreign Minister Chen Yi put it so figuratively in October last year. And, most significant, China has all the incentives to develop its own nuclear capability.



Associated Press

This photo, just released by a Communist Chinese source, shows electrical workers of the Shanghai Power Supply Bureau repairing high-power transmission lines.

In the beginning, Red Chinese interest in nuclear weapons was less than enthusiastic. Indicative of this early disinterest or lack of understanding about the consequences of atomic warfare was the grisly logic that Chinese Communist leaders often presented to Western leaders.

Would End Up Leader

It amounted to this: A thermonuclear world war would still leave more Chinese alive than any other nationality simply because there are more Chinese. Ergo, Red China would emerge from such a war as the world leader.

Until 1955, there were only sporadic reports and speculations about China and the bomb. In 1950, China and the Soviet Union became partners in a venture to mine uranium and other ores. In 1951, the Chinese Nationalists reported that an atomic research institute had been created on the mainland. There were unsubstantiated rumors that the brilliant defector-scientist Bruno Pontecorvo was on loan from the U.S.S.R. to direct a Chinese bomb effort.

By 1954, China and the Soviet Union agreed to a formal scientific and technical cooperation program that included nuclear research.

But 1955 really marked the year of the atom for Red China.

Research Centers Planned

China expert Alice L. Hsieh of the Rand Corp. suggests that until 1955 there was virtually a blackout in Red China on discussion of nuclear warfare. She indicates that the Soviets were slow "to evolve a doctrine on the subject" and the Chinese were depending upon the Soviets. Moreover, strategic thinking, then fashionable for nuclear warfare, did not match Mao Tse-tung's celebrated military thinking—insurgency.

Spring 1955 also brought an agreement between the two

giants of the Communist camp that committed the Soviet Union to supply research reactors and atom-smashers to China, along with the technicians and others needed to assemble the experimental devices. Soon thereafter, the Peking radio announced that China was going to establish "atoms-for-peace" research centers.

In March of the following year, the U.S.S.R. opened the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research at Dubna, 70 miles north of Moscow. This was to be a cooperative center where scientists from the Communist bloc could learn and experiment. China, at one time, was paying 20 per cent of the Dubna bill.

By 1957, all Chinese reluctance to acquire nuclear weapons had long since been dissipated. A group of Western scientists attending a conference in Peking in May, 1957, learned that the Soviets had made good their promise to give China a reactor and an atom-smasher.

The reactor, in Peking, was to be capable of generating 7000 kilowatts. It was to be a heavy water reactor fueled with enriched uranium. The atom-smasher, used for basic nuclear studies, was rated at 25-million electron volts. Both are modest nuclear instruments by Western and Soviet standards.

From time to time there have been reports of other reactors in China — the highest estimate gives China five reactors including the "made in U.S.S.R." one in Peking. In spite of continued references to reactors at Chungking, Shenyang and Sian, some Government officials are skeptical that that many exist.

Homemade Reactor

What American officials are not skeptical about, however, is the existence of a homemade Chinese reactor on the

mainland. It was the detection of this second known reactor some time ago that caused official estimates of when the Chinese would detonate their first bomb to be considerably foreshortened.

It was at the same May scientific meeting that Chinese Science Academy president Kuo Mo-jo thanked his Soviet colleagues for their help and said: "Research in the extraction and analysis of uranium, thorium and other fissionable materials from ore mined in China has already produced results."

By 1958, China seemed well on her way toward satisfying her urge for an atomic arsenal. In March, Marshal Yeh Chien-ying was named as commander of military applications of nuclear power at the newly created Military Scientific Institute in Peking. In May, China's air force chief Liu Ya-lou said:

"... China's working classes and scientists will certainly be able to make the most up-to-date aircraft and atomic bombs in the not too distant future ... By that time, another new turning point will be reached in the international situation."

Many Western observers have interpreted this statement, in the light of other events, as signifying China's decision to produce homemade bombs.

In Mrs. Hsieh's view, for example, this identification of China's future production of atomic weapons with "another new turning point" suggests that "the Chinese, at that time, were not relying on the Soviet Union to grant them an atomic capability but perhaps had decided that, if they were to have atomic weapons, they would have to make their own."

Disclosure Is Made

Meanwhile, halfway around the world in Geneva, atomic scientists meeting at the Second Atoms-for-Peace Conference were treated to a rare

Press Has Filtered Out Over the Years

disclosure about the Chinese nuclear effort when Soviet atomic energy official V. M. Emelyanov said the Russians had given the Chinese a 10,000-kilowatt experimental reactor and an atom-smasher (a 25 mev cyclotron) "but that the Chinese had to promise to keep all information on this atomic research equipment secret."

Two weeks later, on Sept. 28, 1958, the Russian-made reactor in Peking went critical—became effective.

Last Oct. 29, after the nuclear test-ban treaty had been negotiated without China's signature, Foreign Minister Chen Yi admitted that a series of economic disasters, the withdrawal of Soviet engineers, and the U.S. economic blockade of China would delay his country's production of an atomic bomb—and the means for delivering it—for several years.

In December, Chen was even more pointed. Taking the view that China must detonate an atomic bomb or risk becoming a second- or third-class nation, Chen said:

"Atomic weapons are in use by other powers, so, therefore, we need atomic weapons for our defense. We will not be a party to the tripartite treaty banning atomic tests. In fact, we regard this treaty as a form of blackmail applied to us."

'We Will Do It'

"It is not binding on its members. Any member can give three months' notice and begin tests again. It is merely a plot to prevent China from acquiring her own means of defense."

"It may be 10, 15 or 20 years before China can solve the technical problems involved in making atomic weapons, but however long it takes, we will do it!"

Can China do it? Yes.

The primary requirements beyond the know-how, which is already available, are manpower, materials and money.

The overall competence of Chinese scientists and engineers is given a very high rating by Western scientists and engineers. Many American scientists, when asked "How good are the Chinese?" often reply, "Ask Yang and Lee."

American residents, C. N. Yang and T. D. Lee were born in China and received their basic education there. In 1957, when both were in their twenties and working here, Yang and Lee received the Nobel Prize for physics. Today, they are at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N.J.

The technical manpower responsible for China's bomb effort comes in three varieties: those trained in the United States, those trained in the Soviet Union and those trained at home.

For the time being, the Chinese atomic effort is being directed, for the most part, by foreign-trained scientists, many of whom went back to the mainland after World War II.

Institute Scientists

The director of the Institute of Atomic Energy in Peking is Ch'ien San-ch'iang. His deputies are P'eng Huan Wu, Wang Kin-ch'ang and Chao Chung-yao. K. C. Wang worked in Germany in the 1930s and

more recently at Dubna, where he was a deputy director. C. Y. Chao was at Dubna, too, and before that had been a researcher at the California Institute of Technology in the early 1930s.

Two other names linked to the Chinese atomic effort are Ko Ting-sui, a Cal Tech student of yore, and Chien Hsueh-shen, a rocket propulsion specialist, who like so many of his colleagues received training in the United States.

The ingredients for making an atomic bomb are well known—uranium or thorium, which can be converted to either enriched uranium or plutonium. Also needed for reactors and separation plants is lots of power; special metals such as stainless steels and aluminum; water; concrete. Though China lacks for some metals, such as nickel, chromium and cobalt, she has ample supplies of uranium and thorium.

American geologists report rich uranium deposits in Sinkiang Province and possibly Tibet. There are low-grade uranium deposits in southern Manchuria. And there are thorium-bearing sands in Kwangsi Province in southern China.

Third Institute

Few American experts doubt that the Chinese have been processing their uranium and thorium ores for several years now. There have been reports of an ore processing plant at Urumchi in Sinkiang Province, where the Chinese have set up another Institute of Atomic Energy.

There is still a third Institute of Atomic Energy, at Wu-

han on the Yangtze River in eastern China.

The quickest route to a do-it-yourself atomic bomb is to convert uranium into plutonium in an atomic reactor and then save up enough of the plutonium to shape into a bomb. A rough rule of thumb is that 13.2 pounds of plutonium is enough for a Nagasaki-type bomb, which was pure plutonium.

A nation could get along on a stockpile of plutonium bombs produced in atomic reactors. But to be really a first-class nuclear power requires a gaseous diffusion plant that culls the fissionable uranium atoms from the more abundant nonfissionable uranium atoms in uranium ore.

One detonation does not make a nuclear power. Though the detonation can and most probably will distribute wide-ranging psychological fallout, it will have almost no military significance, per se. Indeed, one of the real problems for the Chinese will be to convince the rest of the world that she has more than a single or a few "primitive bombs."

Moreover, it took the United States seven years to set off its first hydrogen bomb after the July, 1945, test in New Mexico. And France, which set off her first "primitive" device in 1960, still has a considerable distance to cover before she will explode an H-bomb.

A rough rule of thumb is that after the development of a primitive weapon it takes at least five years to get an

efficient atomic bomb and then at least five more years to get a hydrogen bomb.

Bombs Are Not Enough

Even then, bombs are not enough today. There must also be the means to deliver them. Sure, the Chinese can tow a bomb out behind a junk and set it off near Taiwan. But that is a risky business. Aircraft and missiles are far surer means of delivery.

From time to time there are reports that China is developing its own missile capability. Though these reports are unsubstantiated, China appears to have the wherewithal to achieve this end. And, although the Russians apparently never gave the Chinese offensive missiles, at least of short and possibly of medium range, or bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons, they did give their once close ally defensive missiles such as the antiaircraft rocket batteries that have brought down Chinese Nationalist U-2 reconnaissance aircraft.

Moreover, some experts are convinced that a determined nation can convert civilian jet airliners to bomb carriers without too much difficulty. China is now dickering with France for the purchase of twin-jet Caravelle passenger planes.

All of these facts demonstrate the massive job Communist China has undertaken. It is the unanimous verdict of Western experts that, given time, China will indeed join the nuclear club and, given a lot more time, become a major nuclear power.

When is
Contingency
Statement?

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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JOINT STATE DOD USIA MESSAGE

Possibility ChiComs may detonate nuclear device or make important announcement re nuclear capability fifteenth anniversary their accession to power October 1. Evidence still somewhat highly speculative, but ChiComs in better relative position this year for detonation and would welcome memorable anniversary announcement. Potential for dramatic announcement on such occasions always present.

Assuming ChiComs have capability for detonation, Peiping has following reasons for immediate testing: (1) Apart from its hoped-for demoralizing impact on SVN and other free countries, testing could raise morale ~~at this critical moment~~ among Viet Cong, in Hanoi, and within Communist China by making threat US escalation in Indo-China seem less ominous; (2) Free World public opinion, conscious of possible ultimate consequences of broadened

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By *cbm/ly* NARA, Date 3-19-09

Drafted by:

M:RHWhite:hmf:9/28/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

M - William J. Jorden

Clearances: (in draft)

FE - Mr. Green
G/PM - Mr. Garthoff
P - Mr. Greenfield (subs)
ACDA - Mr. ~~XXXX~~ Scoville (subs)
NEA - Mr. Talbot
S/P - Mr. Johnson
INR - Mr. Spain
USIA - Mr. Anderson (subs)
DOD - Mr. Barber
EUR/RPM - Mr. Dean
DOD - Mr. McNaughton (subs)
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conflict, could help deter such escalation; (3) test would give forthcoming National People's Congress (probably November) and possibly forthcoming Party Congress (now three years overdue) a tangible success with great psychological ramifications; (4) in context Sino-Soviet rift, test could have definite influence favorable to Peiping on Moscow meeting of communist parties. Even if ChiComs still short actual capability to detonate, above reasons might persuade them to claim such capability on October 1.

Previous guidance re position and rationale to be taken by U.S. officials in pre-detonation period set forth in CA-715, July 19, 1963, remains valid for general discussions. FE posts should also review CA-43, July 2, 1964.

Within next few days, Administration spokesman ^{plans} ~~will~~ refer in routine manner to "well-known fact" that ChiComs have had program for development nuclear weapons for some time and "initial test first crude nuclear device could occur almost any time". Pertinent sections this speech will be furnished when made.

Draft standby statement in event ChiCom detonation for use by appropriate spokesman, probably White House, sets forth following

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points: (1) ChiComs have once again flouted majority mankind's interest; universal hope that spread nuclear weapons might be halted and health world population not be endangered by further radioactive contamination, reflected in signature by over 100 nations of Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; (2) detonation expected for some time; ChiComs concentrating significant portion their scientific and material resources on this program and presumably drawn on considerable information now in public domain; (3) US will remain firm in its defense commitments in Asia and detonation will have no effect on willingness US respond to requests from Asian nations for help in dealing with ChiCom aggression; (4) military significance of this test ~~xxxxxx~~ should not be overestimated; will make no change by itself in basic military situation in Asia; initial testing is long way from acquisition stockpile of weapons; development and production effective delivery system also much more complex than simple delivery means; ~~if and when ChiComs develop nuclear weapons system, ChiComs will have weapons system which will make our defense position~~ Free World nuclear strength will continue to be ~~enormously greater; Free World nuclear strength will continue to be~~ enormously greater; ~~power of Free World nuclear strength will continue to be~~; (5) ChiCom nuclear weapons program underlines tragedy of Chinese people who have suffered much under Communist regime; (6) ChiCom nuclear detonation is achievement of which other Asian nations would also

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be capable if they chose use their scientific and industrial resources for this purpose rather than promote well-being of their people through economic development and peaceful use of atom; (7) event does not serve cause of peace, but there is no reason to fear that it will itself lead to new and immediate dangers of war provided Free World recognizes its true significance and stands firm; (8) also should not deter concrete practical steps towards world of disarmament, cooperation, development and peace.

TAIPEI

ACTION: TOKYO and TAIPEI: You should draw on previous conversations with local officials to ascertain best method raise this subject without indicating undue concern.

INFO: ALL OTHER POSTS: In event of detonation, posts may use this material in conjunction with any subsequent instructions.

Action Posts: Tokyo
~~TAIPEI~~ TAIPEI

Info Posts: Bangkok
Canberra
Colombo
Djakarta
Hong Kong
Karachi
Kuala Lumpur
Manila
New Delhi
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Info by pouch all other diplomatic posts

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