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Page 1

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
10	memo	Howard for the Record <i>sanitized 1/23/18 per RAC 5/09</i>	S	2	7/31/67	A
10a	memo	Howard for the Record	S	1	7/28/67	A
10b	rpt	Attachment 1	PCI	1	[7/67]	A
10c	rpt	Attachment 2	PCI	1	[7/67]	A
10d	rpt	"Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Study..." [Near duplicate of #13b] <i>sanitized 3.23.11 NW 09.203</i>	PCI	6	[7/67]	A
13	memo	G. Johnson to Rostow <i>open 1/23/18 per RAC 9/09</i>	C	3	7/27/67	A
13b	rpt	Near duplicate of #10d <i>sanitized 3.23.11 NW 09.203</i>	PCI	6	[7/67]	A
13c	list	"Attendees" <i>sanitized 1/23/18 per RAC 1/18</i>	PCI	1	undated	A
14	memo	Keeny to Rostow [Exempt per RAC, 7/05]	PCI	2	7/17/67	A
14a	ltr	Helms to Pastore [Exempt per RAC, 7/05]	S	1	7/14/67	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Charles E. Johnson

Folder Title "NUCLEAR - Nuclear Detonation - Chinese Nuclear Tests, Joint Comm. Report on"

Box Number 036

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Page 2

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14b	rpt	"Excerpts from Briefing..." [Exempt per RAC, 7/05]	PCI	5	7/13/67	A

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Initials

IMPACT OF CHINESE COMMUNIST NUCLEAR
WEAPONS PROGRESS ON UNITED STATES
NATIONAL SECURITY

REPORT OF
JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

HOLD FOR RELEASE
THU AUG 3 1967 AM



JULY 1967

Printed for the use of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

81-861

WASHINGTON : 1967

JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY

JOHN O. PASTORE, Rhode Island, *Chairman*

CHET HOLIFIELD, California, *Vice Chairman*

RICHARD B. RUSSELL, Georgia

CLINTON P. ANDERSON, New Mexico

ALBERT GORE, Tennessee

HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington

BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, Iowa

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WILLIAM T. ENGLAND, *Professional Staff Member*

JOHN B. RADCLIFFE, *Technical Adviser*

IMPACT OF CHINESE COMMUNIST NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRESS ON UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is charged under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 with making continuing studies of problems relating to the development, use and control of atomic energy. In recognition of the important responsibility assigned to the Joint Committee, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 imposes upon the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense a mandatory obligation to "keep the Joint Committee fully and currently informed" on atomic energy matters. All other Government agencies are required by law to furnish any information requested by the Joint Committee with respect to the activities or responsibilities of that agency in the field of atomic energy.

One of the crucial matters affecting U.S. national security is the development by foreign nations of nuclear weapons and the accompanying delivery systems. The present nuclear threat to the United States and the free world comes from the Soviet Union and Communist China. In order properly to understand the scope and magnitude of this threat, the Joint Committee has over the years held executive hearings at which nuclear weapons experts have charted the progress of foreign nations as they developed and refined their nuclear arsenals.

The emergence of a serious threat from the Chinese Communists began in 1964. In a brief span of less than 3 years, Red China has had six nuclear tests. The last one on June 17, 1967, was in the megaton range and indicated that they were making rapid progress in thermonuclear design. They are also making progress in the development of delivery vehicles for megaton weapons. The internal strife in Red China appears to have had little, if any, effect on their nuclear weapons program to date.

The trends in nuclear weapons development by foreign nations have been followed closely by the Joint Committee. These trends have been borne out by subsequent events. Progress, particularly by Red China, has been more rapid and surprisingly more effective than had been expected or indeed predicted.

The nuclear and thermonuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union are generally well known and understood by the American public. The Joint Committee's intention in this report is to bring into perspective the accomplishments and possible future trends in the development of Red China's nuclear offensive force.

BACKGROUND

As the nuclear threat posed by the Chinese Communists became more pronounced, Chairman Pastore decided to conduct a special inquiry regarding Chinese Communist nuclear weapons development.

This probe began on January 11, 1967, and was formally announced at the Joint Committee's first public hearing of the 90th Congress on January 25, 1967.

In connection with this study the Joint Committee received the following testimony in executive session:

January 11, 1967: Richard Helms, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

February 1, 1967: Dr. Norris Bradbury, Director, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, and Dr. Michael May, Director, Livermore Radiation Laboratory.

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These witnesses presented testimony concerning advances being made by Communist China in developing nuclear weapons as well as their progress in developing the capability to deliver these weapons against neighboring countries or the United States.

Detailed technical presentations were heard concerning each individual Chinese Communist nuclear test and an assessment was made of future developments by Red China in the field of nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems.

An analysis of the impact of the emergence of Red China as a nuclear power on U.S. foreign policy with particular emphasis on the proposed nonproliferation treaty was also presented.

Information concerning French and Soviet nuclear weapons and delivery methods were also discussed but principal emphasis was on Red China.

CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of various hearings we have had and studies made by the Joint Committee, the following committee conclusions have been developed:

1. *Chinese Nuclear Weapons Capabilities*

The Chinese Communist test of June 17, 1967, at the Lop Nor Nuclear Test Site was her sixth nuclear test in the atmosphere and her first in the megaton range. Such a test was expected because of the success of the preceding thermo-nuclear experiment conducted on December 28, 1966. The Chinese purposely may have limited the yield of that test—their fifth test—to keep the fallout in China at an acceptable level. The fifth test indicated that the Chinese had taken a major step toward a thermonuclear weapon.

There is evidence that the sixth test device—with a yield of a few megatons—was dropped from an aircraft.

Analysis of the debris indicates use of U^{235} , U^{238} , and thermo-nuclear material. As in the other tests, there is no evidence that plutonium was used. The preliminary indication is that a considerable improvement accompanied the increase in yield. A large amount of U^{238} was used in the device.

The sixth Chinese nuclear test has confirmed the conclusion reached from the analysis of the fifth Chinese nuclear test that they are making excellent progress in thermonuclear design. They now have the capability to design a multimegaton thermo-nuclear device suitable for delivery by aircraft.

We believe that the Chinese will continue to place a high priority on thermonuclear weapon development. With continued testing we believe they will be able to develop a thermonuclear warhead in the ICBM weight class with a yield in the megaton range by about 1970. We believe that the Chinese can have an ICBM system ready for deployment in the early 1970's. On the basis of our present knowledge, we believe that the Chinese probably will achieve an operational ICBM capability before 1972. Conceivably, it could be ready as early as 1970-1971. But this would be a tight schedule and makes allowance for only minor difficulties and delays. We believe that the Chinese have already completed the development of a medium range ballistic missile. We have no indication of any deployment.

We also believe that by about 1970 the Chinese Communists could develop a thermonuclear warhead with a yield in the few hundreds of kilotons in the MRBM class and that they could develop an MRBM warhead with a megaton yield about a couple of years later. Meanwhile, should they desire a thermonuclear bomb for delivery by bomber, they could probably begin weaponizing the design employed in the sixth test.

The missile-delivered fourth Chinese test demonstrated that the Chinese now have the capability to design a low yield fission warhead compatible in size and weight with a missile. With a few tests, the Chinese could probably design an improved fission weapon for MRBM or bomber delivery. However, they may forego extensive fission weapon production in order to have materials and facilities available for thermonuclear weapon systems.

The Chinese bomber forces consist of a few hundred short-range jet bombers and a handful of somewhat longer range bombers. We have no knowledge of a Chinese plan to develop heavy inter-continental range bombers.

Earlier, the Communist Chinese conducted four other nuclear detonations:

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All of the Chinese detonations have utilized enriched uranium (U^{235}) as the primary fissionable material. Uranium-238 was also present in all tests. The detonation of any device which also contains U^{238} results in some fissioning of the U^{238} . The debris from their third and fifth tests indicated some thermonuclear reactions had involved lithium-6 in those devices.

We believe that the Chinese are interested in the development of submarines equipped with suitable relatively long-range missiles; at this time we have not determined the exact nature or status of the program.

2. French Nuclear Test Program

Turning to the French nuclear test program, in February 1960 the French tested their first atomic device. In 1966 the French conducted five nuclear tests. In 1967 they held a short series of three tests. Another series of tests is planned for next summer. All of the 1966 tests were plutonium fission devices. The last two tests in 1966 were experiments aimed at the thermonuclear development.

The year's tests were conducted on June 5, June 27, and July 2. They were suspended by balloons, above the Mururoa Lagoon. The tests all had low yields. The French announced that all of the tests were to be of triggers for thermonuclear devices which the French still have not tested.

Although French officials continue to state publicly that France will detonate her first thermonuclear device in 1968 when enriched uranium becomes available, there have been hints in the press that France is having difficulties with its program. Should this be true, the first generation of both the land-based and submarine-launched missile systems might have to use warheads developed in the 1966 series.

To recapitulate, the Chinese are well ahead of the French in thermonuclear weapon design. In 2½ years and six tests the Chinese have successfully tested a multimegaton thermonuclear device. The French, on the other hand, have conducted many more tests over a 7-year period and have not yet tested a true thermonuclear device or achieved a megaton size yield.

The French have developed higher yield fission weapons than the Chinese. The French have achieved yields of up to 250 kilotons while the Chinese fission devices have had lower yields.

The French now have an operational strategic force of about 60 Mirage IV aircraft with a stockpile of 60 to 70 KT nuclear weapons. At this time the Chinese do not have such an operational strategic force.

SUMMARY

The Joint Committee believes that the American public needs to know the threat that is posed by Red China. Communist China has emerged with a fledgling, but effective, nuclear weapons capability. This capability has and will continue to have a great effect on U.S. foreign policy in the Far East. It will have an effect on our relations with the South East Asia Treaty Organization. It will have an effect on the nonproliferation treaty principally because of the close connection between Chinese nuclear power and the national security of India. Its effect will also be felt by Japan. Moreover, the Chinese Communists could use nuclear blackmail to assert their position not only broadly in Asia, but specifically in Southeast Asia.

Perhaps most significant for the United States is the fact that a low order of magnitude attack could possibly be launched by the Chinese Communists against the United States by the early 1970's. At present we do not have an effective anti-ballistic-missile system which could repel such a suicidal (for the Chinese) but nevertheless possible strike.

It is for these reasons that the Joint Committee feels the assessment it has made, based upon information received in executive sessions, should be brought before the American public—not to overemphasize or to underplay but to state clearly and concisely with due regard for the protection of intelligence sources where we stand in relation to this emerging threat to our national security.

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Keeny borrowed the
draft NIE on China

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

Origin ACTION:

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Info STATE

ORIGIN ACDA 17

INFO: EUR 25, EA 19, NEA 19, IO 21, GPM 03, SC 01, RSC 01,
NSA 02, H 02, HRC 10, NSA 02, L 03, INR 07, F 04, CIA 04,
DOD 01, SF 02, SS 35, SAN 02, SCI 05, OIC 05, AEC 11, NASA 04
CAL 11, ARA 19, AF 21/240 R

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ACDA/IR:LN PALMA, G/FM: GARTHOFF

FM SECSTATE WASH D C

TO: ALL NATO CAPITALS PRIORITY

EMBASSY BANGKOK

EMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY

NO MISSION GENEVA PRIORITY

EMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

EMBASSY MANILA

AMCONSUL MELBOURNE

EMBASSY RAWALPINDI

EMBASSY SAIGON

EMBASSY SINGAPORE

EMBASSY PAPEI

EMBASSY TEHRAN

EMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY

INFO: AMCONSUL HONG KONG

EMBASSY MOSCOW

NATUS/DISTO

GATOR
BOWLER
BUDGET
DAVIS
DINSBURGH
HAMILTON
JESSUP
JOHNSON
JORDEN
JERRY
JAGGERS
JAGGERS
JAGGERS

Keamy
Riche
Jenkins

Drafted by:

ACDA: ANNE MARKS

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

ACDA H. SCOVILLE ACT DIR

Clearance:

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJ: REPORT ON CHINESE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY RELEASED BY JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY 6:30 P.M. TWO AUGUST. FOLLOWING IS TALKING PAPER PREPARED BY DOD FOR USE IN PRESS BRIEFING. ALSO Q.&A.'s PREPARED FOR STATE DEPT. SPOKESMAN.

TEXT OF DOD TALKING PAPER:

THE EMERGING CHINESE COMMUNIST NUCLEAR CAPABILITY HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF CONTINUOUS DEFENSE ANALYSIS, PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING. THE ESTIMATES REGARDING THE TIMING OF THIS THREAT CONTAINED IN THE JOINT ATOMIC ENERGY COMMITTEE'S REPORT ARE GENERALLY CONSISTENT WITH THOSE PRESENTED TO THE CONGRESS ~~KXXZ~~ BY SECRETARY MCNAMARA IN HIS ANNUAL "POSTURE STATEMENT" TO CONGRESS LAST JANUARY. THE SECRETARY DESCRIBED THE OBJECTIVES OF OUR DETERRENT POSTURE IN THESE WORDS: QTE. TO DETER DELIBERATE NUCLEAR ATTACK UPON THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES BY MAINTAINING, CONTINUOUSLY, A HIGHLY RELIABLE ABILITY TO INFLICT AN UNACCEPTABLE DEGREE OF DAMAGE UPON ANY SINGLE AGGRESSOR, OR COMBINATION OF ~~TE~~ AGGRESSORS, AT ANY TIME DURING THE COURSE OF A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR EXCHANGE, EVEN AFTER ABSORBING A SURPRISE ~~ZHAX~~ FIRST STRIKE. END QTE.

REFERRING BOTH TO THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST CHINA, HE ADDED: QTE. AS LONG AS DETERRENCE OF A DELIBERATE ~~SOVIET~~ SOVIET ~~E~~(OR RED CHINESE) NUCLEAR ATTACK UPON THE UNITED STATES OR ITS ALLIES IS THE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE OF OUR STRATEGIC FORCES, THE CAPABILITY FOR 'ASSURED DESTRUCTION' MUST RECEIVE THE FIRST CALL ON ALL OF OUR RESOURCES AND MUST BE PROVIDED REGARDLESS OF THE COSTS AND THE ~~KNOW~~ DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED. 'DAMAGE LIMITING' PROGRAMS NO MATTER HOW MUCH WE SPEND ON THEM, CAN NEVER SUBSTITUTE FOR AN ASSURED DESTRUCTION CAPABILITY IN THE DETERRENT ROLE. IT IS OUR ABILITY TO DESTROY AN ATTACKER AS A VIABLE 20th CENTURY NATION THAT PROVIDES THE DETERRENT, NOT OUR ABILITY TO PARTIALLY LIMIT DAMAGE TO OURSELVES. END QTE.

APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE TO THE PROBLEM OF A FUTURE RED CHINESE ATTACK, MR. MCNAMARA SAID: QTE. CHINA IS FAR FROM BEING AN INDUSTRIALIZED NATION. HOWEVER, WHAT INDUSTRY IT HAS

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HEAVILY CONCENTRATED IN A COMPARATIVELY FEW CITIES. WE ESTIMATE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT A RELATIVELY ~~SMALL~~ SMALL NUMBER OF WARHEADS DETONATED OVER 50 CHINESE URBAN CENTERS WOULD DESTROY HALF OF THE URBAN POPULATION (MORE THAN 50 MILLION PEOPLE) AND MORE THAN ONE-HALF OF THE INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY. MOREOVER, SUCH AN ATTACK WOULD DESTROY MOST OF THE KEY GOVERNMENTAL, TECHNICAL, AND MANAGERIAL PERSONNEL AND A LARGE PROPORTION OF THE SKILLED WORKERS. SINCE RED CHINA'S CAPACITY TO ATTACK THE U.S. WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL BE VERY LIMITED, EVEN DURING THE 1970's, THE ABILITY OF EVEN A VERY SMALL ~~RE~~ PORTION OF OUR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES TO INFLICT SUCH A HEAVY DAMAGE UPON THEM SHOULD ~~KEY~~ SERVE AS AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT TO THE DELIBERATE INITIATION OF SUCH AN ATTACK ON THEIR PART. END QTE.

THE UNITED STATES ~~XXXXX~~ STARTED DEVELOPMENT OF A BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM IN ~~1955~~ 1955. TECHNOLOGY AND OUR UNDERSTANDING OF SUCH DEFENSES HAVE ~~EXTRE~~ EVOLVED RAPIDLY.. SO FAR WE HAVE SPENT MORE THAN ~~\$4~~ \$4 BILLION FOR A HIGH-PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM ON BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES. WE ARE CONTINUING THIS EFFORT AT A LEVEL OF ABOUT \$400 MILLION A YEAR ON NIKE-X. WE ALSO SPEND ~~WELL~~ WELL OVER \$100 MILLION A YEAR ON NEW APPROACHES TO ABM DEFENSE AND ON DEVELOPMENT OF SOPHISTICATED PENETRATION DEVICES FOR OUR OFFENSIVE FORCES. IN ADDITION, VAST SUMS ~~W~~ HAVE BEEN SPENT FOR PENETRATION AIDS TO OUR EXISTING MISSILE FORCE.

A LIGHT ABM SYSTEM WHICH WOULD GIVE ADDITIONAL PROTECTION TO MINUTEMAN MISSILES IN THEIR SILOS WOULD ALSO HAVE THE EFFECT OF OFFERING PROTECTION AGAINST POSSIBLE CHINESE COMMUNIST IRRATIONALITY. THE ADVISABILITY OF ORDERING THE INSTALLATION IS UNDER CLOSE AND CONTINUING REVIEW.

ALTHOUGH THE CHINESE HAVE ON OCCASION TALKED BOLDLY ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THEY HAVE IN FACT CONDUCTED THEIR MILITARY POLICY WITH SOME CAUTION. CLOSE STUDY OF THEIR STATEMENTS INDICATES THAT THEY CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THE GREAT DESTRUCTIVE POWER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SPECIFICALLY, THEY UNDERSTAND THAT IT WOULD BE SUICIDAL FOR THEM TO USE NUCLEAR ~~WE~~ WEAPONS.X

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THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC OFFENSE FORCE DETERS AN ATTACK UPON THE UNITED STATES BY HUNDREDS OF SOVIET MISSILES. THIS OVERWHELMING POWER IS SIMILARLY DESIGNED TO DETER A FUTURE CHINESE ATTACK BY A HANDFUL OF MISSILES.

THE ESTIMATES OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY ON A POSSIBLE TIMETABLE FOR DEVELOPMENT OF CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE ~~CONSISTENT~~ CONSISTENT WITH THE STATEMENT MADE BY MR. MCNAMARA IN HIS POSTURE STATEMENT: QTE. WITH REGARD TO AN ICBM, WE BELIEVE THAT THE RED CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS ARE BEING PURSUED WITH HIGH PRIORITY. ON THE BASIS OF RECENT EVIDENCE, IT APPEARS ~~NO~~ POSSIBLE THAT THEY MAY CONDUCT EITHER A SPACE OR A LONG-RANGE MISSILE LAUNCHING ~~BEFORE~~ BEFORE THE END OF 1967. HOWEVER, IT APPEARS UNLIKELY THAT THE CHINESE COULD DEPLOY A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF OPERATIONAL ICBMS BEFORE THE MID-~~1970~~ 1970'S, OR THAT THOSE~~SEEN~~ ICBMS WOULD HAVE GREAT RELIABILITY, SPEED OF RESPONSE, OR SUBSTANTIAL PROTECTION AGAINST ATTACK. END QTE.

NOTE THAT SECRETARY MCNAMARA HAS REFERRED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF THE INITIAL LAUNCHING OF AN ICBM IN 1967 AND TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF A QTE. SIGNIFICANT NUMBER END QTE. IN THE MID-70'S. THE COMMITTEE ALSO ADDRESSES THE INTERIM STEP: THE TIMING OF THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE FIRST OPERATIONAL MISSILE.

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FOLLOWING ARE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (TO BE USED ON AN IF-ASKED BASIS):

QUESTION: THE COMMITTEE REPORT STATES THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS ARE NOW IN A POSITION TO USE NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL THROUGHOUT ASIA. IF THE ASIAN NATIONS RENOUNCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THEY ARE GOING TO WANT SOME KIND OF PROTECTION. THE JOINT COMMITTEE SEEMS TO IMPLY THAT THEY ARE NOW MORE VULNERABLE THAN EVER. DO YOU AGREE WITH THIS ASSESSMENT?

SUGGESTED RESPONSE: THE ELEMENTS IN THE SITUATION HAVE BEEN KNOWN AND ~~UNDERSTOOD~~ UNDERSTOOD FROM THE BEGINNING. IT BEGAN IN 1964 WHEN THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS EXPLODED THEIR FIRST NUCLEAR DEVICE. AT THAT TIME THE PRESIDENT, AWARE OF THE PROBLEM -- NAMELY, THE PROBLEM OF GIVING UP NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE FACE OF POSSIBLE NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL -- SAID: "THE NATION S THAT DO NOT SEEK NATIONAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAN BE SURE THAT IF THEY NEED OUR STRONG SUPPORT AGAINST SOME THREAT OF NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL, THEN THEY WILL HAVE IT." SECRETARY MCNAMARA ~~POINTED TO THE OVERPOWERING DETERRENT FORCE~~ POINTED TO THE OVERPOWERING DETERRENT FORCE OF THE UNITED STATES IN HIS POSTURE STATEMENT TO CONGRESS LAST JANUARY. HE HAS FREQUENTLY EMPHASIZED THAT THE U.S. HAS -- AND ALWAYS WILL HAVE -- THE STRATEGIC CAPABILITY TO DET#R THE INITIATION OF NUCLEAR WAR BY ANY NATION -- AND THAT INCLUDES ~~THE CHINESE EVEN MORE THAN THE SOVIETS.~~ THE CHINESE EVEN MORE THAN THE SOVIETS.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 15366

ALSO A AND A'S PREPARED FOR STATE DEPT. SPOKESMAN.

TEXT OF DOD TALKING PAPER:

THE EMERGING CHINESE COMMUNIST NUCLEAR CAPABILITY HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF CONTINUOUS DEFENSE ANALYSIS, PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING. THE ESTIMATES REGARDING THE TIMING OF THIS THREAT CONTAINED IN THE JOINT ATOMIC ENERGY COMMITTEE'S REPORT ARE GENERALLY CONSISTENT WITH THOSE PRESENTED TO THE CONGRESS BY SECRETARY MCNAMARA IN HIS ANNUAL "POSTURE STATEMENT" TO CONGRESS LAST JANUARY. THE SECRETARY DESCRIBED THE OBJECTIVES OF OUR DETERRENT POSTURE IN THESE WORDS: QTE. TO DETER DELIBERATE NUCLEAR ATTACK UPON THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES BY MAINTAINING, CONTINUOUSLY, A HIGHLY RELIABLE ABILITY TO INFLICT AN UNACCEPTABLE DEGREE OF DAMAGE UPON ANY SINGLE AGGRESSOR, OR COMBINATION OF AGGRESSORS, AT ANY TIME DURING THE COURSE OF A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR EXCHANGE, EVEN AFTER ABSORBING A SURPRISE FIRST STRIKE. END QTE.

REFERRING BOTH TO THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST CHINA, HE ADDED: QTE. AS LONG AS DETERRENCE OF A DELIBERATE SOVIET (OR RED CHINESE) NUCLEAR ATTACK UPON THE UNITED STATES OR ITS ALLIES IS THE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE OF OUR STRATEGIC FORCES, THE CAPABILITY FOR 'ASSURED DESTRUCTION' MUST RECEIVE THE FIRST CALL ON ALL OF OUR RESOURCES AND MUST BE PROVIDED REGARDLESS OF THE COSTS AND THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED. 'DAMAGE LIMITING' PROGRAMS NO MATTER HOW MUCH WE SPEND ON THEM, CAN NEVER SUBSTITUTE FOR AN ASSURED DESTRUCTION CAPABILITY IN THE DETERRENT ROLE. IT IS OUR ABILITY TO DESTROY AN ATTACKER AS A VIABLE 20TH CENTURY NATION THAT PROVIDES THE DETERREST, NOT OUR ABILITY TO PARTIALLY LIMIT DAMAGE TO OURSELVES. END QTE.

APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE TO THE PROBLEM OF A FUTURE RED CHINESE ATTACK, MR MCNAMARA SAID: QTE. CHINA IS FAR FROM BEING AN INDUSTRIALIZED NATION. HOWEVER, WHAT INDUSTRY IT HAS HEAVILY CONCENTRATED IN A COMPARATIVELY FEW CITIES. WE ESTIMATE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT A RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER OF WARHEADS DETONATED OVER 50 CHINESE URBAN CENTERS WOULD DESTROY HALF OF THE URBAN POPULATION (MORE THAN 50 MILLION PEOPLE)

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 STATE 15366

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THE ESTIMATES OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY ON

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 STATE 15366

A POSSIBLE TIMETABLE FOR DEVELOPMENT OF CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE STATEMENT MADE BY MR. MCNAMARA IN HIS POSTURE STATEMENT: QTE. WITH REGARD TO AN ICBM, WE BELIEVE THAT THE RED CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS ARE BEING PURSUED WITH HIGH PRIORITY. ON THE BASIS OF RECENT EVIDENCE, IT APPEARS POSSIBLE THAT THEY MAY CONDUCT EITHER A SPACE OR A LONG-RANGE MISSILE LAUNCHING BEFORE THE END OF 1967. HOWEVER, IT APPEARS UNLIKELY THAT THE CHINESE COULD DEPLOY A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF OPERATIONAL ICBM'S BEFORE THE MID-1970'S, OR THAT THOSE ICBM'S WOULD HAVE GREAT RELIABILITY, SPEED OF RESPONSE, OR SUBSTANTIAL PROTECTION AGAINST ATTACK. END QTE.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 05 STATE 15366

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NUCLEAR STRIDES ASCRIBED TO CHINA

Missile Attack Possible by
1970's Congress Is Told

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 2 —

The Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy reported today that Communist China was making "rapid progress" in developing thermonuclear warheads and predicted that it would be capable of launching a missile attack on the United States by the early nineteen-seventies.

China's progress, the committee said, "has been more rapid and surprisingly more effective than had been expected or indeed predicted."

The report said China seemed to be placing high priority on producing thermonuclear weapons and might be forgoing production of smaller fission weapons to conserve materials for hydrogen-bomb warheads.

China, according to the committee, already has the capability of designing a multi-megaton thermonuclear bomb for delivery by an airplane and, by about 1970, should be able to develop a warhead in the megaton, or million-ton, class for an intercontinental ballistic missile.

Based on Testimony

The committee's five-page report, "The Impact of Chinese Communist Nuclear Weapons Progress on United States National Security," is the most definitive official appraisal of China's nuclear weapons program to be made public. It is based on secret testimony earlier this year from representatives of the State and Defense Departments, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission and atomic-weapons laboratories.

The report differed from the Johnson Administration's public assessment of how soon China would be able to attack the United States with ballistic missiles armed with thermonuclear warheads.

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara has estimated that China would not deploy "a significant number" of intercontinental ballistic missiles before the mid nineteen-seventies and that the missiles then would not have great reliability, speed of response or substantial protection against attack.

The differences may be more semantic than real. By "significant" Mr. McNamara is referring to perhaps 50 missiles. The committee's point is that even a few missiles, each armed with a thermonuclear warhead capable of wiping out a city, could be significant in terms of military threat.

Time for Decision

Mr. McNamara has argued that the United States has time before a decision must be made on deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system. The committee report implies that the United States has less time than presumed by the Administration.

The stated purpose of the report was to describe the technical aspects of China's nuclear weapons progress and not to go into the implications for the future.

The committee members hoped, however, that the report would provide a basis for discussion by Congress of China's emergence as a nuclear power.

The committee said that the Chinese were "well ahead of the French in thermonuclear weapon design" and had succeeded, in two and a half years and six experiments, in testing a multi-megaton thermonuclear device, while the French, after many more tests over a seven years, had yet to test a thermonuclear device.

The Chinese, the report said, took a "major step toward a thermonuclear weapon" with their fifth test, in December, 1966, in which thermonuclear materials were included.

Results of Sixth Test

With their sixth test, last June, the report continued, the Chinese achieved "a considerable improvement" in increasing explosive yield and decreasing weight.

Although China is capable of developing a thermonuclear bomb for an airplane, the report said that the Chinese bomber force consisted of a few hundred short-range jets and a handful of longer-range bombers. It said there was no indication that China planned to develop heavy intercontinental bombers.

Rather, the report said, the Chinese seem to be emphasizing missiles as the delivery systems for their thermonuclear warheads. There is evidence, it said, that China has already completed development of a missile with a range of around 800 miles, but there is no indication that it has been deployed.

The committee said that China appeared to be interested in developing submarines equipped with relatively long-range missiles, but "at this time we have not determined the exact nature or status of a program."

Wed., Aug. 2, 1967
3:55 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

There may be minor changes in this, but this is ~~the~~
the statement Defense wishes to make available
this afternoon to the Pentagon correspondents
already writing their stories on the Joint
Committee Report.

W. W. R.

I have already suggested to Paul Nitze that the
statement begin by being more directly re-
sponsive and stating: -- the Chicom nuclear
program has been for long the subject of
Defense plans and programs; and that
the timing estimates of the Joint Committee
are consistent with those in Sect. McNamara's
statement of January 1967.

August 2, 1967

Secretary McNamara has long emphasized that the deterrent to nuclear attack upon the United States by any nation or combination of nations is our capability of destroying the attacker. He has emphasized that this capability must be provided regardless of costs and regardless of difficulties.

In his annual "Posture Statement" to Congress last January, the Secretary described this objective in these words:

"To deter deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States and its allies by maintaining, continuously, a highly reliable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any single aggressor, or combination of aggressors, at any time during the course of a strategic nuclear exchange, even after absorbing a surprise first strike."

Referring both to the Soviet Union and Communist China, he added:

"As long as deterrence of a deliberate Soviet (or Red Chinese) nuclear attack upon the United States or its allies is the overriding objective of our strategic forces, the capability for 'Assured Destruction' must receive the first call on all of our resources and must be provided regardless of the costs and the difficulties involved. 'Damage Limiting' programs, no matter how much we spend on them, can never substitute for an Assured Destruction capability in the deterrent role. It is our ability to destroy an attacker as a viable 20th Century nation that provides the deterrent, not our ability to partially limit damage to ourselves!"

Applying this principle to the problem of a future Red Chinese attack, Mr. McNamara said: "China is far from being an industrialized nation. However, what industry it has is heavily concentrated in a comparatively few cities. We estimate, for example, that a relatively small number of warheads detonated over 50 Chinese urban centers would destroy half of the urban population (more than 50 million people) and more than one-half of the industrial capacity. Moreover, such an attack would also destroy most of the key governmental, technical, and managerial personnel and a large proportion of the skilled workers. Since Red China's capacity to attack the U.S. with nuclear weapons will be very limited, even during the 1970's, the ability of even a very small portion of our strategic offensive forces to inflict such heavy damage upon them should serve as an effective deterrent to the deliberate initiation of such an attack on their part."

The United States started development of a ballistic missile defense system in 1955. Technology and our understanding of such defenses have evolved rapidly. So far we have spent more than \$4 billion for a high-priority development program on ballistic missile defenses. We are continuing this effort at a level of about \$400 million a year on Nike-X. We also spend well over \$100 million a year on new approaches to ABM defense and on development of sophisticated penetration devices for our offensive forces.

A light ABM system which would give additional protection to MINUTEMAN missiles in their silos would also have the effect of offering protection against possible Chinese Communist irrationality. The advisability of installing such an ABM defense is under close and continuing review.

Although the Chinese have on occasion talked boldly about nuclear weapons, they have in fact conducted their ^{military} foreign policy with extreme caution. Close study of their statements indicates that they clearly understand the great destructive power of nuclear weapons. Specifically, they understand that it would be suicidal for them to use nuclear weapons.

The United States Strategic Defense Force deters an attack upon the United States by hundreds of Soviet missiles. This overwhelming power is similarly designed to deter a future Chinese attack by a handful of missiles.

The estimates of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on a possible timetable for development of Chinese nuclear weapons are consistent with the statement made by Mr. McNamara in his Posture Statement:

"With regard to an ICBM, we believe that the Red Chinese nuclear weapons and ballistic missile development programs are being pursued with high priority. On the basis of recent evidence, it appears possible that they may conduct either a space or a long-range ballistic missile launching before the end of 1967. However, it appears unlikely that the Chinese could deploy a significant number of operational ICBMs before the mid-1970's, or that those ICBMs would have great reliability, speed of response, or substantial protection against attack."

Note that Secretary McNamara has referred to the possibility of the initial launch

launching of an ICBM in 1967 and to the deployment of a "significant number" in the mid-70's. The Committee also addresses the interim step: the timing of the achievement of the first operational missile.

8

THUNDER OUT OF CHINA

BY THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

IN ONE SEARING MOMENT LAST JUNE 17, THE WORLD CHANGED SUDDENLY AND DRASTICALLY.

RED CHINA EXPLODED AN A-BOMB.

WITHIN 30 MONTHS, SHE MAY WELL HAVE 100 OF THE MAMMOTH BOMBS, DR. RALPH LAPP, A NUCLEAR PHYSICIST, ESTIMATED.

WITHIN THAT SAME BRIEF TIME, SHE COULD BE STOCKPILING THE MISSILES NEEDED TO LOBY CITY-OBBLITERATING BOMBS AT AMERICAN OR OTHER TARGETS.

THIS IS FAR AHEAD OF INITIAL GOVERNMENT ESTIMATES--INVESTIGATION SHOWS U.S. OFFICIALS HAVE CONSISTENTLY MISCALCULATED THE SPEED OF CHINA'S NUCLEAR PROGRESS.

IRONICALLY, THE RECORD ALSO SHOWS THE UNITED STATES EDUCATED AND THEN DEPORTED TO COMMUNIST CHINA SOME OF THE KEY NUCLEAR AND MISSILE EXPERTS WHO CONTRIBUTED ENORMOUSLY TO HER ACHIEVEMENTS.

SUPERTERROR WEAPONS ARE COMING INTO THE HANDS OF A CHINESE REGIME REGARDED BY THE WEST AS RECKLESS AND PARANOID.

"IF THEY THINK ABOUT IT, AMERICANS GET A GUT FEELING THIS SPELLS BIG TROUBLE," DECLARES REP. CRAIG HOSMER OF CALIFORNIA, A REPUBLICAN MEMBER OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY.

CHINA'S NUCLEAR PROGRESS "IS FRIGHTENING," SAYS SEN. JOHN O. PASTORE, D-R.I., COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN.

"CHINA WITHIN FIVE YEARS WILL BE A FORMIDABLE NUCLEAR POWER."
LT952AED 8/2

15

ADD THUNDER OUT OF CHINA (14)

THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCE FROM CHINA'S DEALING HERSELF IN AS A NUCLEAR POKER PLAYER ARE WIDESPREAD AND DISMAYING, AN ASSOCIATED PRESS STUDY FINDS:

--IT COULD RESOLVE AFFIRMATIVELY A HOT DEBATE WHETHER THE UNITED STATES SHOULD DRIVE AHEAD NOW FOR ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES AND PERHAPS CIVILIAN SHELTERS--AT A COST TO TAXPAYERS THAT COULD REACH \$70 BILLION AS A STARTER. SUCH A DECISION, OPPONENTS ARGUE, WOULD ONLY EXPLODE THE ARMS RACE INTO A NEW, DANGEROUS AND USELESS SPIRAL.

--CHINA MIGHT DONATE A FEW A-BOMBS TO ARAB COUNTRIES IN THE TOUCHY MIDDLE EAST. ISRAEL THEN COULD BE IMPELLED TO BUILD, BEG OR BORROW BOMBS OF HER OWN.

--CHINA MIGHT USE BOMBS TO BLACKMAIL WEAKER COUNTRIES INTO KEEPING HANDS OFF "PEOPLE'S LIBERATION" WARS OF REBELLION WITHIN THEIR OWN BORDERS.

LT954AED 8/2

ADD THUNDER OUT C. CHINA (15)

--JAPAN, INDIA, OTHER COUNTRIES COULD DECIDE TO MAKE THEIR OWN BOMBS, KILLING ALL HOPES FOR A NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY.

--CHINA, UNDER MAO TSE-TUNG OR MORE COOPERATIVE SUCCESSORS, MUST BE RECKONED AS A FIRST-CLASS POWER. THE H-BOMB GIVES A SOARING BOOST TO CHINESE MORALE, SAYS ONE TOP ADVISER ON CHINA TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

"AFTER 10 YEARS OF IGNOMINY AND HAVING TO ACCEPT BATTLESHIPS, BOOZE AND BIBLES FORCED ON THEM BY FOREIGNERS, AFTER SUFFERING HEARTACHES AND BURNING IN THEIR BELLIES FROM ALL THAT, THE BOMB IS A TREMENDOUS SYMBOL OF EMANCIPATION FROM SECOND-CLASS STATUS," HE REMARKS.

LT957AED 8/2

JOHN O. PASTORE, R.I.
CHAIRMAN
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CLINTON P. ANDERSON, N. MEX.
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CARL T. CURTIS, NEBR.
JOHN T. CONWAY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

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WILLIAM H. BATES, MASS.
JOHN B. ANDERSON, ILL.
WILLIAM M. MCCULLOCH, OHIO

Congress of the United States
JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY

August 1, 1967

C. Johnson

The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.


Dear Mr. Rostow:

In furtherance of Senator Pastore's letter to you of July 25 and your response dated July 28, 1967, I am sending you enclosed two advanced copies of the Joint Committee report, "Impact of Chinese Communist Nuclear Weapons Progress on United States National Security." The report will be released to the public August 3, 1967.

In accordance with my telephone conversation with you and your letter to Senator Pastore I met with a representative of the CIA July 28 and reviewed the suggestions of the Intelligence Community. On the basis of this discussion some changes were made in the original draft to accommodate the points raised by the Intelligence Community. A number of the suggestions of the Intelligence Community were good ones and were incorporated verbatim in the report. In the case of others, I believe sufficient modifications were made that were mutually satisfactory.

Thank you for your courtesy and cooperation.

Sincerely yours,


John T. Conway
Executive Director

Enclosures:
2 copies of JCAE report

~~SECRET~~

31 July 1967

SANTIZED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

**SUBJECT: Meeting with JCAE Staff on Intelligence Aspects
of JCAE Study**

1. Following a 28 July meeting with representatives of appropriate intelligence components of CIA, DIA, State and AEC (Enclosure 1 with its attachments describes that meeting and its outcome) the undersigned discussed the intelligence suggestions relating to the JCAE study with John Conway, Executive Director, and George Murphy, Staff Member, of the JCAE. The outcome of this discussion is as follows:

a. The words "to date" will be added to the sentence referring to the effect of internal strife in China.


b. Mr. Conway decided not to delete the sentence referring to the reduced yield of the fifth test.

c. Mr. Conway will discuss the proposed substitution for the ICBM sentence on page 4 with Senator Pastore, who will decide what text will be included. Mr. Conway was of the opinion that the proposed substitution will probably not be accepted. I explained the problem raised by the unqualified nature of the present text and urged that, should it be used, qualifying words like "will probably", and "unless the program encounters major problems" be inserted.

d. The recommended changes to the submarine paragraph on page 5 were accepted by Mr. Conway except that he preferred to limit the Committee's forecast to a lesser time period and substituted "within the next five years" for the recommended "before the late 1970's".

DOE review
completed.

DIA Review
Completed


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SANTIZED

**SUBJECT: Meeting with JCAE Staff on Intelligence Aspects
of JCAE Study**

e. Mr. Conway will discuss the recommended change to the first sentence of the second paragraph in the summary with Senator Pastore. Mr. Conway recognized the inaccuracy of the sentence as it now stands and I believe that some alteration will probably be made.

2. The Committee Staff has made some additional changes in the text on pages 3 and 6 designed to identify the Committee itself as the source of the judgments and conclusions. A copy of the JCAE study with these changes and the accepted intelligence suggestions inserted is attached as Enclosure 2.



25X1

**Chief
Nuclear Energy Division/SI**

Enclosures (2):

1. Memorandum for the Record,
dated 28 July 1967, with
two attachments
2. JCAE Study with inserted
changes

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
28 July 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of 28 July 1967 on JCAE Study

1. The meeting called and chaired by the undersigned was held at CIA on 28 July 1967 to discuss the intelligence aspects of a draft JCAE study "Concerning the Impact of Chinese Communist Nuclear Weapons Progress on United States National Security." The discussion of the meeting was limited to intelligence aspects of the JCAE study, namely to the question of finding phraseology that best expresses intelligence community judgments and that could be proposed as a substitution for or amendment to language now in the text of the Joint Committee report. The proposed changes are attached (attachment 1). These proposals were accepted for their Agencies by the participants who are listed in attachment 2.

2. The undersigned undertook to discuss these changes with the Joint Committee staff and to urge that they be incorporated in the report.




25X1

**Chief
Nuclear Energy Division/81**

**Attachments: 2
As stated**

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ATTACHMENT I

The following suggested changes would bring the intelligence judgments and statements in the Joint Committee study more in line in content and tone with the current judgments of the intelligence community.

1. On page 1 in the last sentence of the next to last paragraph we suggest the addition of the words "to date" at the end of the sentence.

2. On page 3 it is suggested that the sentence indicating that the Chinese may have limited the yield of their fifth test be deleted. The basis for this suggested deletion is not an intelligence security problem but rather that this type of sentence is felt by the AEC to be likely to lead to questions and press speculation of a restricted data category.

3. It is suggested that the sentence starting on the second line of page 4, which starts "On the basis of.... before 1973." be deleted and the following sentences substituted. "We believe that the Chinese can have an ICBM system ready for deployment in the early 1970's. Conceivably, it could be ready as early as 1970-1971. But this would be a tight schedule and makes allowance for only minor difficulties and delays."

4. On page 5 we suggest that the words "and conventionally" be deleted from the sentence dealing with nuclear powered submarines and that at the end of that sentence the clause "but there is no reason to believe that they will have a nuclear submarine before the late 1970's." be added.

5. On page 6 we recommend that the phrase, "by the early 1970's." be inserted at the end of the first sentence of the second paragraph of the summary.

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ATTACHMENT 2

C. A. Sommer

AEC

Jim Leonard

State/INR

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ONE/CIA

Dave Brandwein


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FOR COMMITTEE USE ONLY
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Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
Study
Concerning the Impact of Chinese Communist Nuclear Weapons Progress
on United States National Security

Introduction

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is charged under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 with making continuing studies of problems relating to the development, use and control of atomic energy. In recognition of the important responsibility assigned to the Joint Committee, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 imposes upon the Atomic Energy Commission and the [redacted] a mandatory obligation to "keep the Joint Committee fully and currently informed" on atomic energy matters. All other Government agencies are required by law to furnish any information requested by the Joint Committee with respect to the activities or responsibilities of that agency in the field of atomic energy.

3.3
(b)(1)

One of the crucial matters affecting United States national security is the development by foreign nations of nuclear weapons and the accompanying delivery systems. The present nuclear threat to the United States and the Free World comes from the Soviet Union and Communist China. In order properly to understand the scope and magnitude of this threat, the Joint Committee has over the years held executive hearings at which nuclear weapons experts have charted the progress of foreign nations as they developed and refined their nuclear arsenals.

The emergence of a serious threat from the Chinese Communists began in 1964. In a brief span of less than three years, Red China has had six nuclear tests. The last one on June 17, 1967 was in the megaton range and indicated that they were making rapid progress in thermonuclear design. They are also making progress in the development of delivery vehicles for megaton weapons. The internal strife in Red China appears to have had little, if any, effect on their nuclear weapons program to date.

The trends in nuclear weapons development by foreign nations have been followed closely by the Joint Committee. These trends have been borne out by subsequent events. Progress, particularly by Red China, has been more rapid and surprisingly more effective than had been expected or indeed predicted.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 09-203
By isf NARA, Date 3-10-11

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ENCLOSURE 2.

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The nuclear and thermonuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union are generally well-known and understood by the American public. The Joint Committee's intention in this report is to bring into perspective the accomplishments and possible future trends in the development of Red China's nuclear offensive force.

Background

As the nuclear threat posed by the Chinese Communists became more pronounced, Chairman Pastore decided to conduct a special inquiry regarding Chinese Communist nuclear weapons development. This probe began on January 11, 1967 and was formally announced at the Joint Committee's first public hearing of the 90th Congress on January 25, 1967.

In connection with this study the Joint Committee received the following testimony in Executive Session:

January 11, 1967 - Mr. Richard Helms, Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency

February 1, 1967 - Dr. Norris Bradbury, Director, Los
Alamos Scientific Laboratory, and
Dr. Michael May, Director, Livermore
Radiation Laboratory

March 13, 1967 - Secretary of State Dean Rusk

July 13, 1967 - Representatives of the [redacted]
[redacted] CIA and AEC

3.3
(b)(1)

These witnesses presented testimony concerning advances being made by Communist China in developing nuclear weapons as well as their progress in developing the capability to deliver these weapons against neighboring countries or the United States.

Detailed technical presentations were heard concerning each individual Chinese Communist nuclear test and an assessment was made of future developments by Red China in the field of nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems.

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An analysis of the impact of the emergence of Red China as a nuclear power on U. S. foreign policy with particular emphasis on the proposed nonproliferation treaty was also presented.

Information concerning French and Soviet nuclear weapons and delivery methods were also discussed but principal emphasis was on Red China.


Conclusions

On the basis of various hearings we have had and studies made by the Joint Committee, the following ~~information has~~ been developed:

Analysis of Chinese Communist Nuclear Capability

The Chinese Communist test of June 17, 1967 at the Lop Nor Nuclear Test Site was her sixth nuclear test in the atmosphere and her first in the megaton range. Such a test was expected because of the success of the preceding thermonuclear experiment conducted on December 28, 1966. The Chinese purposely may have limited the yield of that test--their fifth test--to keep the fallout in China at an acceptable level. The fifth test indicated that the Chinese had taken a major step toward a thermonuclear weapon.

There is evidence that the sixth test device--with a yield of a few megatons--was dropped from an aircraft.



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The sixth Chinese nuclear test has confirmed the conclusion reached from the analysis of the fifth Chinese nuclear test that they are making excellent progress in thermonuclear design. They now have the capability to design a multi-megaton thermonuclear device suitable for delivery by aircraft.

We believe that the Chinese will continue to place a high priority on thermonuclear weapon development. With continued testing we believe they will be able to develop a

* substitute the words "committee conclusions have"

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
thermonuclear warhead in the ICBM weight class with a yield in the megaton range by about 1970. On the basis of our present knowledge we believe that the Chinese will achieve an operational ICBM capability before 1972. We believe that the Chinese have already completed the development of a Medium Range Ballistic Missile. We have no indication of any deployment.

X We also believe that by about 1970 the Chinese Communists could develop a thermonuclear warhead with a yield in the few hundreds of kilotons in the MRBM class and that they could develop an MRBM warhead with a megaton yield about a couple of years later. Meanwhile, should they desire a thermonuclear bomb for delivery by bomber, they could probably begin weaponizing the design employed in the sixth test.

The missile-delivered fourth Chinese test demonstrated that the Chinese now have the capability to design a low yield fission warhead compatible in size and weight with a missile. With a few tests, the Chinese could probably design an improved fission weapon for MRBM or bomber delivery. However, they may forego extensive fission weapon production in order to have materials and facilities available for thermonuclear weapon systems.

The Chinese bomber forces consist of a few hundred short range jet bombers and a handful of somewhat longer range bombers. We have no knowledge of a Chinese plan to develop heavy inter-continental range bombers.

Earlier, the Communist Chinese conducted four other nuclear detonations:



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(b)(1)

* see comments on memorandum for record,

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The Chinese were able to continue their nuclear Program after the Soviets apparently ceased technical assistance in this area by 1960, and [REDACTED]

3.3
(b)(1)

X We believe that the Chinese are interested in the development of nuclear ~~and conventionally~~ powered submarines equipped with suitable relatively long-range missiles; at this time we have not determined the exact nature or status of the program, *but there is no reason to believe that they will have a nuclear submarine before the late 1970's within the next five years.*

Turning to the French nuclear test program, in 1966 the French conducted five nuclear tests. In 1967 they held a short series of three tests. Another series of tests is planned for next summer. All of the 1966 tests were plutonium fission devices. The last two tests in 1966 were experiments aimed at the thermonuclear development.

This year's tests were conducted on June 5, June 27 and July 2. They were suspended by balloons, above the Mururoa lagoon. The tests all had low yields. The French announced that all of the tests were to be of triggers for thermonuclear devices which the French still have not tested.

Although French officials continue to state publicly that France will detonate her first thermonuclear device in 1968 when enriched uranium becomes available, there have been hints in the press that France is having difficulties with its program. Should this be true, the first generation of both the land-based and submarine-launched missile systems might have to use warheads developed in the 1966 series.

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To recapitulate, the Chinese are well ahead of the French in thermonuclear weapon design. In two and one-half years and six tests the Chinese have successfully tested a multi-megaton thermonuclear device. The French, on the other hand, have conducted many more tests over a seven-year period and have not yet tested a true thermonuclear device or achieved a megaton size yield.

The French have developed higher yield fission weapons than the Chinese. The French have achieved yields of up to 250 kilotons while the Chinese fission devices have had lower yields.

The French now have an operational strategic force of about 60 Mirage IV aircraft with a stockpile of 60 to 70 KT nuclear weapons. At this time the Chinese do not have such an operational strategic force.

Summary

The Joint Committee believes that the American public needs to know the threat that is posed by Red China. Communist China has emerged with a fledgling, but effective, nuclear weapons capability. This capability has and will continue to have a great effect on United States foreign policy in the Far East. It will have an effect on our relations with the South East Asia Treaty Organization. It will have an effect on the nonproliferation treaty principally because of the close connection between Chinese nuclear power and the national security of India. Its effect will also be felt by Japan. Moreover, the Chinese Communists could use nuclear blackmail to assert their position not only broadly in Asia, but specifically in Southeast Asia.

Perhaps most significant for the United States is the fact that a low order of magnitude attack could possibly be launched by the Chinese Communists against the United States.* At present we do not have an effective anti-ballistic missile system which could repel such a suicidal (for the Chinese) but nevertheless possible strike.

It is for these reasons that the Joint Committee feels the assessment it has received in executive sessions should be brought before the American public --not to overemphasize or to underplay but to state clearly and concisely with due regard for the protection of intelligence sources where we stand in relation to this emerging threat to our national security.

* See The memorandum for record.

insert, "made based upon ⁶ information it has"

file

July 28, 1967

Dear Senator Pastore:

Thank you for your courtesy in making available for my information the draft of the Joint Committee's report on the status of the French and Chinese Communists' weapon programs.

As I told Mr. Conway, the Executive Director, this morning, I would not presume to try to influence the Committee as to the content of the report or the timing and manner of its release. These are matters on which the judgment and decision of your Committee are and should be unchallengeable by any officer in the Executive Branch.

Mr. Conway and I both recognize that the draft report you were kind enough to send me contained more material than the statement that had been reviewed by the knowledgeable Executive Agencies concerned for purposes of assuring that it did not contain any classified information. Therefore, we concluded that it might be prudent to have the entire text given a final review by the Director of Central Intelligence.

I also told Mr. Conway that there were certain portions of the information appearing as the indented material on pages 3 through 6 that were not completely in harmony with the views of certain parts of the intelligence community. I said that, in view of this lack of agreement, the Director of Central Intelligence had been requested to ask the principal intelligence officers concerned to consult as a matter of urgency to develop a coordinated intelligence community view that could be made available to the Committee as soon as possible and that I understood that such information would be forthcoming next week.

Finally, I advised Mr. Conway that there were statements in the report that had important policy implications of special interest to the Departments of State and Defense and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I said that I was certain that the responsible senior people in these agencies would be pleased to consult with the Committee or its staff to answer such questions they may have or to inform the Committee of the views of the Executive Branch with respect to the policy implications of the emergence of Communist China as a nuclear power.

You should know that your courtesy and cooperation with the Executive Branch in this -- as in other matters affecting our national security -- are greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ W W Rostow

W. W. Rostow

Honorable John O. Pastore
Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

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July 28, 1967

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In response to Mr. Conway's questions this morning, I did inform him that I was aware that the draft report you were kind enough to send me contained more material than the statement that had been reviewed by the knowledgeable Executive Agencies concerned for purposes of assuring that it did not contain any classified information and, therefore, it might be prudent to have the entire text given a final review by the Director of Central Intelligence. I also told Mr. Conway that there were certain portions of the information appearing as the indented material on pages 3 through 6 that was not completely in harmony with the views of certain parts of the intelligence community. I said that, in view of this lack of agreement, the Director of Central Intelligence had been requested to ask

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Your courtesy and consistently demonstrated desire to work together with this Administration on these important matters affecting our national security is strongly appreciated.

Sincerely,

W. W. Rostow

The Honorable John O. Pastore
Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
United States Senate
Washington

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 27, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Joint Committee's Study Concerning the Impact of Chinese Communist Nuclear Weapons Progress on United States National Security

Walt -

1. Yesterday there was a meeting called by State at my request to go over the text of the Committee report that Senator Pastore sent you. Present were representatives from AEC, ACDA, CIA, DIA, and DOD. The State representatives were Gathright from S/P and Jerry Trippe and Leon Sloss, G/PM.

2. These points developed in the discussion:

(a) The text does not contain qualifying language that CIA had understood from the Committee staff would be accepted. The most important omission was in regard to the prediction that the Chinese will achieve an operational ICBM capability before 1972. CIA had understood that there was agreement with the Committee that the phrase "unless the program encounters serious difficulties" would be inserted as a qualifier. There were other changes suggested which CIA thought were accepted. However, these did not appear in the text as received by you.

(b) The group, representing all the principal agencies comprising the intelligence community, agreed they could not support the long indented statement on pages 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Committee text. This material is introduced by the statement "On the basis of various hearings we have had and studies made by the Joint Committee, the following information has been developed . . ." Although the section is described as being "information", it contains unsupported conclusions and statements of Committee belief that are at variance or not supported by the U. S. intelligence community and are inconsistent with the current draft NIE now pending before USIB. The most important contradictions or inconsistencies have to do with the predicted timetable for Chinese ICBM and MRBM operational capabilities, and the interest of the Chinese in developing nuclear powered submarines.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: RAC 030-3642-6

By: 502 VARA Date: 1-16-17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(c) The meeting covered certain policy implications of the report. The problems are largely caused by the section headed "Summary" on page 6, although policy difficulties are present throughout the report; for instance, as you have previously noted, the first page states that the Chinese internal strife has had little effect on their nuclear weapons program. The report states that testimony has been taken from (and it lists them) a number of very important governmental witnesses. It is implied that the statements and conclusions in the report stem directly from the testimony of these witnesses. Presumably other committees, particularly the foreign affairs and armed services committees will have some curiosity and will press for more detail on the interesting findings of the Joint Committee.

As an example, the report predicts that the Chinese nuclear capability will have great effects on U. S. foreign policy in the Far East, on SEATO, on the non-proliferation treaty, and on our relations with India and Japan. In addition, it even points out the possibility of nuclear blackmail in Asia, specifically in Southeast Asia (Vietnam?). Moreover, the report holds out the prospect of a suicidal attack on the United States against which we have no effective anti-ballistic missile defense. This prospect is offered without any qualification as to when it might happen and leaves the impression that the risk is already present.

(d) The State and ACDA representatives are of the view that the report if released as written would be harmful to our non-proliferation efforts. It would strengthen the opposition in India by giving them an official U. S. Government source to quote concerning the Chinese threat, and it would encourage those everywhere who oppose a non-proliferation treaty that does not include Red China. Gathright feels that the statement about Chinese suicidal nuclear attacks undercuts the credibility of the U. S. deterrent and will intensify demands by our Asian allies for ABM defenses against Chinese nuclear blackmail.

3. The intelligence representatives suggested that if it were possible to get the Committee to defer issuing its report, it might be possible to complete USIB action on an expedited basis within three days. This would deal with the most important elements of the estimate on which there are differences with the Committee -- ICBM and MRBM operational capability timetables and nuclear submarine development.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

I requested the CIA representative to transmit in your name a request to Dick Helms that this be done. Helms was expected to respond directly to you this morning or back to me through Wally Howard. State will prepare a policy commentary on the Committee draft. This should be available by this evening.

4. I do not know if the Committee will issue the report in the absence of a response from you to the Chairman's letter of July 25. The letter sounds as though the Committee has already agreed to publish and is offering you an opportunity to meet with the members of the Committee. Obviously, you cannot and should not, be another witness for the Committee, but it might be possible by informal contact with John Pastore to suggest that the Committee delay publication in order to take advantage of the new intelligence estimate that is due next week. Moreover, the Chairman, as a supporter of the non-proliferation treaty and generally of the Administration's foreign policies, should be responsive to a suggestion that parts of the report as drafted would not advance the national security interests of the United States and might have to be, if necessary, contradicted or repudiated by the Administration.

Charles E. Johnson

cc: Bremley Smith
Spurgeon Keeny
Al Jenkins

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JOHN O. PASTORE, R.I.
CHAIRMAN
RICHARD B. RUSSELL, GA.
CLINTON P. ANDERSON, N. MEX.
ALBERT GORE, TENN.
HENRY M. JACKSON, WASH.
BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, IOWA
GEORGE D. AIKEN, VT.
WALLACE F. BENNETT, UTAH
CARL T. CURTIS, NEBR.
JOHN T. CONWAY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

CHET HOLIFIELD, CALIF.
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THOMAS G. MORRIS, N. MEX.
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JOHN B. ANDERSON, ILL.
WILLIAM M. MCCULLOCH, OHIO

Congress of the United States
JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 25, 1967


The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Rostow:

Attached is a draft of an unclassified report on the status of the French and Communist Chinese weapons programs which the Joint Committee has decided to publish within the next several days. This report has been reviewed by the knowledgeable executive agencies concerned to be certain that it does not contain any classified information.

We trust that this meets with your approval. If you wish to discuss this matter with the members of the Committee, we certainly would welcome it and can easily arrange for a time that would be mutually convenient.

Sincerely yours,



John O. Pastore
Chairman

Enclosure

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Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
Study
Concerning the Impact of Chinese Communist Nuclear Weapons Progress
on United States National Security

Introduction

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3.3
(b)(1)

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Cordale X [The emergence of a serious threat from the Chinese Communists began in 1964. In a brief span of less than three years, Red China has had six nuclear tests. The last one on June 17, 1967 was in the megaton range and indicated that they were making rapid progress in thermonuclear design. They are also making progress in the development of delivery vehicles for megaton weapons. The internal strife in Red China appears to have had little, if any, effect on their nuclear weapons program.]

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SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 09-203

By *id* NARA, Date 3-10-11

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Background

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July 13, 1967 - Representatives of the [REDACTED] 3.3
[REDACTED] CIA and AEC (b)(1)

These witnesses presented testimony concerning advances being made by Communist China in developing nuclear weapons as well as their progress in developing the capability to deliver these weapons against neighboring countries or the United States.

Detailed technical presentations were heard concerning each individual Chinese Communist nuclear test and an assessment was made of future developments by Red China in the field of nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems.

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An analysis of the impact of the emergence of Red China as a nuclear power on U. S. foreign policy with particular emphasis on the proposed nonproliferation treaty was also presented.


Information concerning French and Soviet nuclear weapons and delivery methods were also discussed but principal emphasis was on Red China.

On the basis of various hearings we have had and studies made by the Joint Committee, the following information has been developed:

Analysis of Chinese Communist Nuclear Capability

X The Chinese Communist test of June 17, 1967 at the Lop Nor Nuclear Test Site was her sixth nuclear test in the atmosphere and her first in the megaton range. Such a test was expected because of the success of the preceding thermonuclear experiment conducted on December 28, 1966. The Chinese purposely may have limited the yield of that test--their fifth test--to keep the fallout in China at an acceptable level. The fifth test indicated that the Chinese had taken a major step toward a thermonuclear weapon.

There is evidence that the sixth test device--with a yield of a few megatons--was dropped from an aircraft.



3.3
(b)(1)

The sixth Chinese nuclear test has confirmed the conclusion reached from the analysis of the fifth Chinese nuclear test that they are making excellent progress in thermonuclear design. They now have the capability to design a multi-megaton thermonuclear device suitable for delivery by aircraft.

We believe that the Chinese will continue to place a high priority on thermonuclear weapon development. With continued testing we believe they will be able to develop a

COPY

*unless the program
instructions
show
difficulties.*

initial
X thermonuclear warhead in the ICBM weight class with a yield in the megaton range by about 1970. On the basis of our present knowledge we believe that the Chinese will achieve an operational ICBM capability before 1972. We believe that the Chinese have already completed the development of a Medium Range Ballistic Missile. We have no indication of any deployment.

X We also believe that by about 1970 the Chinese Communists could develop a thermonuclear warhead with a yield in the few hundreds of kilotons in the MRBM class and that they could develop an MRBM warhead with a megaton yield about a couple of years later. Meanwhile, should they desire a thermonuclear bomb for delivery by bomber, they could probably begin weaponizing the design employed in the sixth test.

The missile-delivered fourth Chinese test demonstrated that the Chinese now have the capability to design a low yield fission warhead compatible in size and weight with a missile. With a few tests, the Chinese could probably design an improved fission weapon for MRBM or bomber delivery. However, they may forego extensive fission weapon production in order to have materials and facilities available for thermonuclear weapon systems.

The Chinese bomber forces consist of a few hundred short range jet bombers and a handful of somewhat longer range bombers. We have no knowledge of a Chinese plan to develop heavy inter-continental range bombers.


Earlier, the Communist Chinese conducted four other nuclear detonations:



3.3
(b)(1)

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The Chinese were able to continue their nuclear Program after the Soviets apparently ceased technical assistance in this area by 1960, and [REDACTED]



3.3

(b)(1)

- X We believe that the Chinese are interested in the development of nuclear- and conventionally-powered submarines equipped with suitable relatively long-range missiles; at this time we have not determined the exact nature or status of the program.

French Nuclear Test Program

Turning to the French nuclear test program, in 1966 the French conducted five nuclear tests. In 1967 they held a short series of three tests. Another series of tests is planned for next summer. All of the 1966 tests were plutonium fission devices. The last two tests in 1966 were experiments aimed at the thermonuclear development.

This year's tests were conducted on June 5, June 27 and July 2. They were suspended by balloons, above the Mururoa lagoon. The tests all had low yields. The French announced that all of the tests were to be of triggers for thermonuclear devices which the French still have not tested.

Although French officials continue to state publicly that France will detonate her first thermonuclear device in 1968 when enriched uranium becomes available, there have been hints in the press that France is having difficulties with its program. Should this be true, the first generation of both the land-based and submarine-launched missile systems might have to use warheads developed in the 1966 series.

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To recapitulate, the Chinese are well ahead of the French in thermonuclear weapon design. In two and one-half years and six tests the Chinese have successfully tested a multi-megaton thermonuclear device. The French, on the other hand, have conducted many more tests over a seven-year period and have not yet tested a true thermonuclear device or achieved a megaton size yield.

The French have developed higher yield fission weapons than the Chinese. The French have achieved yields of up to 250 kilotons while the Chinese fission devices have had lower yields.

The French now have an operational strategic force of about 60 Mirage IV aircraft with a stockpile of 60 to 70 KT nuclear weapons. At this time the Chinese do not have such an operational strategic force.

Committee Conclusion
Summary

X The Joint Committee believes that the American public needs to know the threat that is posed by Red China. Communist China has emerged with a fledgling, but effective, nuclear weapons capability. This capability has and will continue to have a great effect on United States foreign policy in the Far East. It will have an effect on our relations with the South East Asia Treaty Organization. It will have an effect on the nonproliferation treaty principally because of the close connection between Chinese nuclear power and the national security of India. Its effect will also be felt by Japan. Moreover, the Chinese Communists could use nuclear blackmail to assert their position not only broadly in Asia, but specifically in Southeast Asia.

X Perhaps most significant for the United States is the fact that a low order of magnitude attack could possibly be launched by the Chinese Communists against the United States. At present we do not have an effective anti-ballistic missile system which could repel such a suicidal (for the Chinese) but nevertheless possible strike.

It is for these reasons that the Joint Committee feels the assessment it has received in executive sessions should be brought before the American public --not to overemphasize or to underplay but to state clearly and concisely with due regard for the protection of intelligence sources where we stand in relation to this emerging threat to our national security.

*Don't
help on 4/5*

Attendees

Charles E. Johnson	NSC	
W.E. Gathright	State/S/P	
C.A. Sommer	AEC	
H. Joorille	ACDA	
[REDACTED]	CIA	STAT
JACK VORONA	DIA	
KENNETH E. ROBERTS	DOD/ISA	
MORTON H. HALPERIN	DOD/ISA	
James Howard	IVR	
JERRY TRITPE	STATE/G/PHI	
Don Alon	STATE/C/PH	

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