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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
01	rpt	"US Policies on Nuclear Weapons" sanitized 12/12/18 per NLJ 17-26	TS-	6	12/12/64	A
10	rpt	Joint JCS/AEC Rpt sanitized 12/12/18 per NLJ 17-26	S-	19	11/7/63	A
11	rpt	Joint JCS/AEC Rpt sanitized 12/12/18 per NLJ 17-26	S-	22	undated	A
13a	ltr	Ink to Johnson	S-	2	12/16/64	A
13b	ltr	duplicate of #13a	S-	2	12/16/64	A
13c	ltr	Howard to Luedecker	S-	7	5/14/64	A
18a	memo	U. Johnson to SecState	S	3	7/11/66	A
27	ltr	McNamara to Rusk sanitized 12/12/18 per NLJ 17-26	TS-	1	5/23/64	A
27a	charts	re: NATO	TS-	10	undated	A
27b	ltr	Rusk to McNamara sanitized 12/12/18 per NLJ 17-26	TS-	3	7/28/64	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Charles E. Johnson
Folder Title "NUCLEAR - Nuclear Proliferation, Cmte On. (NSAM #320)"

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
31	memo	Johnson to Bundy	TS-	1	11/5/64	A
32	memo	BOB control sheet	TS-	1	11/64	A
33	rpt	"Estimated Costs"	TS-	2	11/5/64	A
35	note	Johnson to Howard	TS-	1	11/10/64	A
36	rpt	"Estimated Costs"	TS-	2	12/8/64	A
37	rpt	"Estimated Costs"	TS-	2	12/9/64	A
38	chart	re: NATO	TS-	1	undated	A
38a	rpt	Summary	TS	1	undated	A
40	rpt	"Problems of Nuclear Proliferation outside Europe" [Duplicate of #1, NSF, Committee File, Cmte on Nuc Prolif, "Problem 2...", Box 1]	S	17	12/7/64	A
42	notes	Handwritten Notes on Briefing - Gilpatric Cmte	PCI	9	12/1/64	A

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44	rpt	Intelligence Report	S	7	undated	A
		open 5·13·10 NLJ 09·256				
45a	rpt	"Appendix B"	PCI	1	undated	A
		open 7/14/11 NLJ 09-244				
45b	rpt	"Appendix C"	PCI	2	undated	A
		open 7/14/11 NLJ 09-244				
45c	rpt	"Appendix D"	PCI	2	undated	A
		open 7/14/11 NLJ 09-244				
45d	rpt	"Appendix E"	PCI	4	undated	A
		open 7/14/11 NLJ 09-244				
45e	rpt	"Appendix F"	PCI	1	undated	A
		open 7/14/11 NLJ 09-244				
45g	rpt	"Appendix H"	PCI	1	undated	A
		open 7/14/11 NLJ 09-244				
45h	rpt	"Appendix I"	PCI	1	undated	A
		open 7/14/11 NLJ 09-244				
45i	rpt	"Appendix J"	PCI	3	1964	A
		open 7/14/11 NLJ 09-244				
45j	rpt	"Appendix K"	PCI	2	undated	A
		open 7/14/11 NLJ 09-244				

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
45k	rpt	"Appendix L"	PCI	1	undated	A
		open 7/14/11 NLJ 09-244				
45l	rpt	"Appendix M"	PCI	1	undated	A
		open 7/14/11 NLJ 09-244				
45m	rpt	"Appendix N"	PCI	1	undated	A
		open 7/14/11 NLJ 09-244				
45n	rpt	"Appendix O"	PCI	1	undated	A
		open 7/14/11 NLJ 09-244				
45o	rpt	"Appendix P"	PCI	3	undated	A
		open 7/14/11 NLJ 09-244				
45p	rpt	"Appendix Q"	PCI	1	undated	A
		open 7/14/11 NLJ 09-244				
48a	rpt	"Agenda"	PCI	1	12/1/64	A
		open 1/17/18 per RAC 1/18				
52	rpt	Partial duplicate of #45i	PCI	5	1964	A
		open 7/14/11 NLJ 09-244				
56	rpt	"Material Provisions in Agreements..."	PCI	11	undated	A
		open 7/14/11 NLJ 09-244				

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U. S. POLICIES ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

General Policy

The basic policy of the U. S. with respect to the custody and control of nuclear weapons is based on the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, That Act and its predecessor, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, required that ownership, custody and control of U. S. nuclear weapons shall be effectively retained in U. S. hands and shall be utilized only as directed by the President. This basic statutory requirement applies to all weapons regardless of whether they are to be employed by U. S. forces or by non-U. S. NATO forces.

In the period 1946 - 1953, all U. S. nuclear weapons wherever deployed were intended for use only by U. S. forces. Beginning in 1953, the forces of our European partners began to be equipped with weapons systems designed to deliver U. S. nuclear weapons dispersed to Europe but held by U. S. custodial detachments for delivery to these non-U. S. forces when the U. S. President had decided that the weapons were to be used. This latter development resulted from the strong desire of our NATO Allies to participate more fully in the defense of Europe by playing some significant role in the nuclear component of the NATO defenses.

Numbers of Nuclear Weapons

Europe is the only area in which the U. S. is providing nuclear weapons for use by non-U. S. forces. The other major area of the world to which U. S. nuclear weapons are dispersed is the Far East.

Costs

The following illustrates the magnitude of the U. S. investment in nuclear weapons now dispersed to NATO Europe and the Far East.

Requirements Determinations

The number of weapons dispersed to Europe is directly related to U. S. membership in NATO and the obligation the U. S. has assumed for providing the nuclear shield for Western Europe. The weapons requirements are the end product of joint military staff planning in NATO and the political decisions formulated in the North Atlantic Council and annual NATO Ministerial meetings. The current NATO strategy and military doctrine is the end product of developments that can be traced to the beginnings of NATO when it reached for the U. S. nuclear monopoly as a shield against a possible overwhelming conventional Soviet attack bent on seizing Western Europe. The current estimates of NATO's present conventional capabilities and resulting force goals are still basically the same as those developed in 1952, at a time when substantial U. S. and Allied forces and resources were engaged in Korea and therefore not available in Europe.

Because of this history and the size of the nuclear shield provided by the U. S. and costly and politically unpalatable aspects of raising adequate conventional forces, the NATO Allies have continuously pressed for more and more commitment of U. S. nuclear weapons to NATO in support of a NATO nuclear strategy in preference to the painful choice of having to

develop a meaningful non-nuclear defensive posture. As a result, NATO's current strategic directive (MC 14/2) gives first priority to preparations for general nuclear war and SACEUR posture and plans focus primarily on general nuclear war. As a consequence, SACEUR's non-nuclear potential is not fully realized. According to a recent OSD paper, SACEUR's forces are not properly deployed for conventional war and there are personnel, equipment, and logistics shortages due to Allied shortfalls in meeting commitments or improper allocations of resources. SACEUR's Emergency Defense Plan based on MC 14/2, the NAC Strategic Directive, and its implementing procedures contemplate the introduction of nuclear weapons in the defense of the "population, territories, forces and vital sea area within SACEUR area of responsibility." Although the EDP does state that "in aggressions less than general war," the Allied Command Europe (ACE) is supposed to contain an attack and force a withdrawal by conventional means if possible but nuclear weapons will be introduced if conventional means are inadequate.

The NATO strategic directive based in large part on obsolete estimates of European military capabilities, an outdated estimate of the nature and capability of the Soviet military threat, and the nature and use of nuclear weapons themselves, results in demands for ever increasing numbers of U. S. nuclear weapons in all categories regardless of their proposed use and ever increasing commitments of U. S. recources without corresponding and proportionate contributions by all NATO partners.

U. S. Weapons Policy and Nuclear Spread

There are several ways in which U. S. weapons policy may influence or encourage the spread of nuclear weapons:

(1) Although the official position of the U. S., reaffirmed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as recently as August, 1964, has argued the feasibility and desirability of a major non-nuclear option in Europe and has rejected the view that the tactical nuclear option can be an adequate substitute for the non-nuclear option (although it supports the maintenance and increase of NATO nuclear capabilities), the U. S. is not identified in professional military or political circles in Europe or in the European public opinion as being opposed to the use of nuclear weapons in favor of conventional means of defense. The large U. S. investment in nuclear delivery systems and weapons, the active nuclear weapons R&D program, the active underground testing program, and public and private statements of responsible U. S. citizens plus many other contributing factors produce a strong impression that the U. S., as the strongest military power in the Free World, believes in the nuclear weapon and is devoted to its use as the primary means of defense of the West.

With the example set by the U. S. before them, the European countries and any other countries having a modern industrial base and adequate resources are obliged to choose whether, as a matter of national policy, they will follow the example of the U. S. and find a nuclear role either as participating partners of a multilateral defense organization such as NATO or through the development of independent national capabilities, or else deliberately refrain from doing so on idealistic or moral grounds. This poses a dilemma that few statesmen or politicians feel strong enough to resolve in favor of remaining non-nuclear in a world in which nuclear weapons seem to be the cachet of power and national importance. This is clearly evidenced by Pompidou's recent statement during the debate on French defense policy in the National Assembly that the ability to have atomic arms carries with it the obligation to have them.

(2) As a result of NATO's commitment to the nuclear mode of defense, the non-nuclear NATO partners in effect become nuclear powers in time of war. It can be said that at that time nuclear weapons proliferate throughout NATO even though the U. S. retains the final decision on the use of the weapons. All the NATO partners, with the exception of the Scandinavians, have so-called dual capable weapons delivery systems for which the U. S. has nuclear weapons available. Unfortunately, these dual capable forces are largely trained and deployed in such a way that their conventional capability is absolutely minimal because it is expected that the aircraft or artillery piece will be used as a part of a nuclear defense. Moreover, in the case of the FRG the completely nuclear PERSHING and SERGEANTS have been made available and FRG military personnel have been trained and exercised in the use of these weapons systems. A change in NATO military strategy and tactics to place primary emphasis on the non-nuclear mode of defense would constitute a radical and traumatic change in the military thinking, indoctrination and organization of the "non-nuclear" NATO countries.

(3) The formula for providing nuclear muscle for NATO is now being discussed in the foreign offices and ministries of defense in other parts of the world, particularly in South and Southeast Asia. It is an obvious solution to the dilemma facing these countries posed by the Red Chinese achievement of a nuclear capability. If the potential victims of Chinese aggression can obtain either a U. S. or some form of NATO guarantee accompanied by the provision of "dual capable" weapons delivery systems (presumably through MAP) and with the nuclear components provided without cost by the U. S., it would relieve them of the hard choice of whether or not they should attempt to develop a national nuclear capability.

The extension of the NATO formula or the creation of "Far Eastern MLF" should be considered to be a form of nuclear proliferation just as much as though countries had obtained their own independent capabilities because it would be the result of the same exaggerated reliance on nuclear weapons that produced the overemphasis on the nuclear mode now characteristic of NATO military thought.

(4) U. S. weapons policy has a direct relationship to possible measures of arms control. The Secretary of Defense in a recent memorandum has stated his belief that a major non-nuclear option for NATO is feasible and desirable. He has stated, "Possible measures of arms control, including actions to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, are facilitated by the kind of military diversification that includes a major non-nuclear option."

Command and Control and Physical Security

The problem of command and control of the use of nuclear weapons has both a negative and positive aspect. As previously stated, the U. S. by lay and policy retains the decision on the use of nuclear weapons up until the last possible moment when it is dispatched on its way. Therefore, the U. S. command and control system has been designed, insofar as possible through the application of procedural, hardware, and doctrinal safeguards, to insure that the nuclear weapons can be used only when such use has been duly and lawfully authorized, that they are used when such authorization is received, and that they are withheld from any unauthorized access that would result either in physical contact with the weapon or compromise of design information.

The only aspect of the command and control problem that has any interesting relationship to the problem of proliferation lies in the possibility that one or more of the countries in which U. S. nuclear weapons are stored might successfully obtain control of such weapons for unilateral purposes.

To foreclose such a development, the U. S. has developed an elaborate system of safeguards to insure the security of the weapons or to prevent them from falling into unfriendly hands even if this requires that the weapons be destroyed if such seizure is imminent. The details of the physical security arrangements are not considered germane to this study, but it should be noted that the cornerstone of the existing custodial policy and procedures lies in the fact that we expect the host country to be a friendly country and the responsibility for the protection of the weapons is actually divided between the U. S. custodial forces and the Allied forces of the host country. The host country provides the external protection for the weapons

storage area and U. S. personnel are responsible for the internal security of the weapons storage area and for weapons custody. In addition, U. S. nuclear weapons are being provided with electronic or mechanical locks (Permissive Action Links) and unilateral destruct capabilities. These devices prevent the weapons from being used until a higher echelon releases a numerical code to unlock the weapons. Although these locks can be "cracked" or bypassed, this would take both time and an organized effort and probably effectively secures the weapons against unauthorized use by individuals in time of peace or war. The security of weapons dispersed overseas obviously will never be perfect but detailed inspections and surveys of the security measures at atomic weapons storage facilities for the support of non-U. S. NATO forces by the Department of Defense and AEC have resulted in a consensus by and large that we have achieved a reasonable degree of security for these weapons against individual unauthorized acts.

The U. S. obviously has only a limited physical capability in these host countries to prevent the armed forces of that host country from seizing control of the nuclear weapons. Obviously such a seizure would be a violation of agreements made in good faith by the U. S. and the host and the user NATO countries and be a hostile act against the U. S. Government.

[redacted]

However, in this case the only absolute security against seizure or compromise would be to remove the weapons entirely.

Charles E. Johnson
December 12, 1964

PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

From the beginning there has been general agreement in both Branches of Government on the vital importance of Presidential control over the nuclear weapon. President Roosevelt approved the development of the weapon; President Truman authorized its first wartime use. And Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson have lived daily with the overwhelming responsibility and knowledge that only the President can authorize the use of this dreadful weapon.

The original Atomic Energy Act passed by the Congress in 1946 carefully vested solely in the President the authority to direct the Atomic Energy Commission to deliver atomic weapons to the armed forces for such use as he might deem necessary in the interest of national defense. The Senate Report on the bill, S1717, commented that, "In view of their enormous military significance, atomic weapons are subject under the bill to full control by the President as Commander in Chief."

The Congress also considered it essential that control over the atom be in the hands of civilians. The Senate Report stated the following apropos the composition of the Atomic Energy Commission, "The decision to limit membership eligibility to civilians was adopted by the committee in keeping with established traditions of our Government. It accords with principles cherished and maintained throughout American history. Departure from these principles has occasioned judicial, executive, and legislative disapproval. This is not to say that the committee fails to recognize legitimate and important areas of atomic energy development and control touching on the responsibilities of the military departments. Indeed, throughout the bill, wherever these areas are involved, provision is made for full military participation, and independent activities of the military departments, especially in research and development, are not infringed but expressly encouraged."

These essential elements of national policy concerning nuclear weapons have been retained without change for the past 18 years.

The wisdom of those responsible for the basic legislation has been strongly reaffirmed by subsequent developments. The existence of the nuclear weapon and its evolution from the relatively simple Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs to the present strategic and tactical weapons in all their variety, has produced a revolution in military technology involving new problems of command and control and strategic doctrine undreamed of in World War II.

President Kennedy and President Johnson have been aware of the new dimensions of warfare implicit in nuclear warfare. In March, 1961, President Kennedy in a message to the Congress stated, "In my role as Commander in Chief of the American Armed Forces, and with my concern over the security of this Nation now and in the future, no single question of policy has concerned me more since entering upon these responsibilities than the adequacy of our present and planned military forces to accomplish our major national security objectives."

Among the problems he brought to the attention of the Congress was the one with which he and all Presidents must live from day to day. He stated, "Our arms must be subject to ultimate civilian control and command at all times, in war as well as peace. The basic decisions on our participation in any conflict and our response to any threat -- including all decisions relating to the use of nuclear weapons, or the escalation of a small war into a large one -- will be made by the regularly constituted civilian authorities. This requires effective and protected organization, procedures, facilities, and communication in the event of attack directed toward this objective, as well as defense measures designed to insure thoughtful and selective decisions by the civilian authorities. This message and budget also reflect that basic principle. The Secretary of Defense and I have had the earnest counsel of our senior military advisers and many others -- and in fact they support the great majority of the decisions reflected in this budget. But I have not delegated to anyone else the responsibilities for decision which are imposed upon me by the Constitution."

Further clarification of the nature and importance of Presidential control is found in a recent "Foreign Affairs" article by the former Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell Gilpatric. He stated, "Our military power must be such that the President can apply the measure and kind of force appropriate to any provocation, so that he may use force, when justified, with some confidence that history will judge his actions as serving the best interests of the nation and of the world, and not merely as the trigger for massive mutual destruction."

The President's responsibility for the employment of the nuclear weapon rests not only on his role as Commander in Chief, but also on his constitutional responsibility for the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States. The concept of a strategy of controlled response and graduated deterrent is essentially a concept of maintaining deliberate and meaningful communication with

the enemy through which the nuclear war might be suspended before complete and mutual annihilation has been achieved. This rules out the so-called "spasm" reaction or the "broken back" wars in which the counter strike by a country subjected to a sneak attack would be so blind and indiscriminating that it would destroy completely the enemy country. A controlled response could allow for accidents and mishaps and would be based on authorized retaliation by the President passed down through protected command channels to the point at which the weapon is to be used. Such a concept completely rules out proposals to give battlefield commanders the discretion for initiating nuclear hostilities as being militarily anarchic and naive.

The Secretary of Defense has stated that given the current balance of nuclear power, a surprise nuclear attack would not be a "rational" act for any enemy, but this would not guarantee that a nuclear war cannot take place. However, if such an attack should take place we must answer it with a controlled response of force, directed at the destruction of the enemy's military forces and giving the enemy the greatest possible incentive to refrain from striking our cities. Such a strategy of controlled response absolutely requires unity of planning and concentrated executive authority and direction. There must not be competing and conflicting strategies imposed and employed by semi-independent and uncoordinated points of authority. General nuclear war is indivisible.

The platoon leader or division commander about to be overrun by the enemy cannot and should not have the discretion for determining whether or not he may pull the nuclear trigger. The line commander's decision could seal the fate of 100 million Americans. Once the line is crossed between conventional and nuclear arms, there is no sure or deliberate way to prevent the escalation from the use of tactical battlefield weapons to the full unleashing of the strategic weapons. Regardless of the sentimental pleas of those who are unaware of the realities of nuclear warfare or the strategic implications thereof, there is no alternative for the United States but to follow its present course of maintaining the tightest possible command and control over the nuclear weapon, keeping the ultimate responsibility in the hands of the President, hoping that the weapon will not have to be used but ensuring that if it is used, it will be done properly.

August 13, 1964

IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 21, 1965

Office of the White House Press Secretary

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THE WHITE HOUSE

The President met today for an hour with his Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, headed by Mr. Roswell Gilpatric, and discussed its work. Present at the meeting, held in the Cabinet Room shortly after 1:00 p.m., were the ten members of the advisory committee and the President's principal advisors in the national security area.

The Committee was established by President Johnson in November to study the problems for world peace and security posed by the increase in the number of nations capable of building nuclear weapons. At that time, the Committee was asked to present its findings during the month of January.

Mr. Gilpatric was formerly Deputy Secretary of Defense under Presidents Johnson and Kennedy and is now a New York attorney. Other members of the Committee are:

Mr. Arthur H. Dean, formerly Chairman, U. S. Delegation to the General Disarmament Conference.

Mr. Allen W. Dulles, formerly Director of Central Intelligence

General Alfred M. Gruenther, formerly Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky, formerly Scientific Adviser to President Eisenhower

Mr. John J. McCloy, formerly High Commissioner for Germany and Co-ordinator U. S. Disarmament Activities

Dr. James A. Perkins, President Cornell University

Mr. Arthur K. Watson, Chairman of the Board, IBM World Trade Corporation

Mr. William S. Webster, President, New England Electric System

Dr. Herbert F. York, formerly Director, Research and Engineering, Department of Defense

IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 21, 1965

Office of the White House Press Secretary

- -

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
TO THE COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION

Yesterday the Nation reaffirmed its dedication to the pursuit of peace. Today, we find that problem, once again, first on our national agenda.

Tomorrow and in the years ahead, our future and the future of the world will be shaped in no small measure by what we now do in the face of the complex and difficult problems posed by the spread of nuclear weapons.

I am grateful, therefore, that such distinguished and experienced men have today given me and my advisors the benefit of their patient and searching counsel.

# # # # # #

PRESS RELEASE

January 21, 1965

The President met today with his Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, headed by Mr. Roswell Gilpatric, and received an hour-long report of its findings. Present at the meeting, held in the Cabinet Room shortly after noon, were the ten members of the advisory committee and the President's principal advisors in the national security area.

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Mr. Arthur K. Watson, Chairman of the Board, IBM World Trade Corporation

Mr. William S. Webster, President, New England Electric System

Dr. Herbert F. York, formerly Director, Research and Engineering, Department of Defense

POSSIBLE STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

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LBJ Johnson 7

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January 21, 1965

A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

BY

THE COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

At your request, we have studied the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. In our examination, we consulted widely with your principal officers from relevant agencies of the Government. In the process, we considered a range of possible policies for the future and their consequences for the Nation. We have noted a significant diversity of views within the Government about the feasibility and the costs of preventing nuclear proliferation, and consequently about appropriate policies for the United States.

Among ourselves there was also a diversity of opinions at the outset of our study. As a result of our study, however, the Committee is now unanimous in its view that preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons is clearly in the national interest despite the difficult decisions that will be required. We have concluded, therefore, that the United States must, as a matter of great urgency, substantially increase the scope and intensity of

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our efforts if we are to have any hope of success. Necessarily, these efforts must be of three kinds: (a) negotiation of formal multilateral agreements; (b) the application of influence on individual nations considering nuclear weapons acquisition, by ourselves and in conjunction with others; and (c) example by our own policies and actions.

Specifically, we have concluded that:

1. The spread of nuclear weapons poses an increasingly grave threat to the security of the United States. New nuclear capabilities, however primitive and regardless of whether they are held by nations currently friendly to the United States, will add complexity and instability to the deterrent balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, aggravate suspicions and hostility among states neighboring new nuclear powers, place a wasteful economic burden on the aspirations of developing nations, impede the vital task of controlling and reducing weapons around the world, and eventually constitute direct military threats to the United States.

As additional nations obtained nuclear weapons, our diplomatic and military influence would wane, and strong pressures would arise to retreat to isolation to avoid the risk of involvement in nuclear war. Nevertheless, even then, we could not escape the

problem. There would be additional nuclear powers -- perhaps some in this hemisphere -- individually possessing the capability of destroying millions of American lives. Major defensive efforts might help substantially to diminish such limited threats, but millions of American lives would always be at risk.

2. The world is fast approaching a point of no return in the prospects of controlling the spread of nuclear weapons. Nuclear power programs are placing within the hands of many nations much of the knowledge, equipment and materials for making nuclear weapons. The recent Chinese Communist nuclear explosion has reinforced the belief, increasingly prevalent throughout the world, that nuclear weapons are a distinguishing mark of a world leader, are essential to national security, and are feasible even with modest industrial resources. The Chinese Communist nuclear weapons program has brought particular pressure on India and Japan, which may both be approaching decisions to undertake nuclear weapons programs.

Although one might be tempted to accept Indian or Japanese nuclear weapons to counterbalance those of China, we do not believe the spread of nuclear weapons would or could be stopped there. An Indian or Japanese decision to build nuclear weapons

would probably produce a chain reaction of similar decisions by other countries, such as Pakistan, Israel and the UAR. In these circumstances, it is unrealistic to hope that Germany and other European countries would not decide to develop their own nuclear weapons.

We are convinced, therefore, that energetic and comprehensive steps must be taken in the near future to discourage further acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities or an accelerating increase in the number of nations engaged in nuclear weapons programs will occur -- possibly beginning within a matter of months.

3. Success in preventing the future spread of nuclear weapons requires a concerted and intensified effort. Although non-proliferation has been a declared part of United States foreign policy since 1945, we must now greatly intensify our efforts -- both to obtain appropriate multilateral agreements and to affect directly the motivations of individual nations -- if we are to have any hope of success in halting the spread of nuclear weapons.

We have been impressed in the course of our study by the fact that actions affecting the spread of nuclear weapons also relate to a very broad range of United States interests: relations with our allies and with other nations, weapons deployments at home

and abroad, programs in peaceful atomic energy, and commerce with foreign nations. In order that our efforts to stop nuclear proliferation may succeed, each of these areas of interest, as well as the agencies of Government which deal with them, must be truly responsive to our non-proliferation policies, and must give such non-proliferation policies far greater weight and support than they have received in the past.

We must acknowledge the importance of participation by the Soviet Union in efforts to stop proliferation. Furthermore, it is unlikely that others can be induced to abstain indefinitely from acquiring nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union and the United States continue in a nuclear arms race. Therefore, lessened emphasis by the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear weapons and agreements on broader arms control measures must be recognized as important components in the overall program to prevent nuclear proliferation.

4. A major effort on our part has promise of success in halting or retarding the spread of nuclear weapons. The dangers of proliferation affect all countries, creating a widespread common interest in early and effective steps to halt the nuclear spread. To date, initiatives within the United Nations and in disarmament

negotiations have been only partially successful, but the Irish Resolution of 1961 and the limited nuclear test ban treaty of 1963 continue to offer a basis on which to take more comprehensive and effective steps. There remains broad support for multilateral measures to control nuclear proliferation.

We believe that the Soviet Union, because of its growing vulnerability to proliferation among its neighbors, probably shares with us a strong interest in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. Further, we believe that the change of leadership in the Soviet Union and the possible resulting review of Soviet nuclear policies may now provide an immediate opportunity for joint or parallel action in the near future to stop the nuclear spread.

Of course, even major efforts on our part may not be successful in halting or greatly retarding the spread of nuclear weapons. But we are unanimous in our agreement that such efforts should be made. The rewards of long-term success would be enormous; and even partial success would be worth the costs we can expect to incur.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We therefore recommend that the United States undertake the following measures to implement its policy to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons:

1. Multilateral agreements.

Measures to prevent particular countries from acquiring nuclear weapons are unlikely to succeed unless they are taken in support of a broad international prohibition applicable to many countries. We should seek to obtain on a multilateral basis formal treaty commitments of three kinds:

a. Non-proliferation agreement. We should intensify our efforts for a non-proliferation agreement and seek the early conclusion of the widest and most effective possible international treaty on non-dissemination and non-acquisition of nuclear weapons. We should be prepared to bring strong pressure on significant countries (including for example Germany, France, India, Japan, Israel, the UAR and Sweden) to achieve their participation in such an agreement. Our initiatives in this area should not wait, or be dependent upon, the resolution of any issues relating to an Atlantic nuclear force, however helpful such resolution might be.

As recommended in paragraph 3 below, we should intensify our efforts to persuade the Soviets of our strong non-dissemination objectives in connection with any Atlantic Nuclear Force in order to make it possible for the Soviets to take the lead with us in seeking worldwide support for a non-proliferation treaty. In any event, any conflict between our non-proliferation and ANF objectives may not become critical until the future of the MLF/ANF is known; but if it arises strongly before then, the priorities of the two proposals with respect to our overall national security should be carefully reviewed.

b. Comprehensive test ban. We should renew our efforts to negotiate a verified comprehensive test ban with the Soviet Union. Assuming there will be an adequate withdrawal provision in the treaty, we should be prepared to go ahead without the participation of either France or China. We should be prepared to accept the minimum number of on-site inspections in the Soviet Union that would be consistent with a viable treaty. In this connection, we should consider our anticipated improved capabilities for seismic detection and identification, and our other relevant unilateral intelligence capabilities. Inspection procedures and quotas covering other countries should also be reviewed to facilitate the widest and most effective application of the treaty. We

should be prepared to propose an exception to such a treaty for peaceful nuclear explosions if a satisfactory procedure can be promptly devised that would preclude the development of nuclear weapons under the guise of a peaceful explosives program and if such an exception would be acceptable to other nations. An early approach should be made to the Soviet Union, and we should seek the widest adherence to the agreement and be prepared to bring strong influence to bear on significant countries to participate in it.

c. Nuclear free zones. We should actively support the establishment of Latin American and African (including, if possible, Israel-UAR) nuclear free zones. To facilitate such agreements, we should be prepared to modify our requirement for verification and our position on transit rights and declarations with respect to United States nuclear weapons to the maximum extent consistent with demonstrable United States security needs.

2. Policies toward non-nuclear powers.

In conjunction with the multilateral measures described above, we should intensify our efforts on a country-by-country basis to influence the decisions of individual non-nuclear powers not to undertake the development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and to secure workable commitments to this effect. We should ourselves

refrain from actions that would contribute to or suggest a future contribution to the development of nuclear weapons by these countries.

The State, Treasury and Commerce Departments should develop programs of economic restrictions and other measures which could be quickly imposed by Executive action and which would be strong enough to produce a reversal of any decision to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.

a. India - to deter India from building nuclear weapons:

(1) While attempting, if possible, to avoid formal guarantees, we should be prepared, to the extent necessary and if requested by the Indians, to offer credible assurance of United States action in the event of a nuclear attack on India in exchange for an Indian commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons. We should be prepared to undertake, if requested by the Indians, parallel action with the Soviets and/or the United Kingdom. Appropriate agencies of the Government should give early consideration to the form such United States assurances might take.

(2) We should assist India in reasonable and economically justifiable scientific programs designed to build the

prestige she might otherwise attempt to obtain from the development of a nuclear device. Such programs should be of a character that will not contribute significantly to future nuclear weapons capabilities. Particular attention should be given to those areas (such as natural resources, health and birth control) most relevant to India's economic and social problems. We might also initiate a major coordinated United States-Indian program of scientific, cultural and educational exchanges. In consultation with appropriate agencies, your Science Advisory Committee should be called upon to submit recommendations regarding United States assistance to Indian scientific activities and United States-Indian exchanges.

(3) We should back India for a larger role in the United Nations. Such support, and, to the extent feasible, any new role, should be conditional on India's remaining a non-nuclear power.

(4) We should reconsider the level of our economic and military assistance to India in the event she decides to develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. To the extent that advance knowledge of this intention by Indian officials would

be likely to have a constructive influence, it should be disclosed to them.

b. Japan - to deter Japan from building nuclear weapons:

(1) We should reaffirm, and if necessary, reinforce our present defense commitment. As in the case of India, early consideration should be given to the form these commitments might take.

(2) We should, as in the case of India, attempt to help the Japanese with appropriate prestige alternatives.

(3) We should support Japan's desire for a more important role as a world leader.

c. Israel-UAR.

(1) Israel. As long as Israel remains a non-nuclear power, we should continue to give Israel assurances against being overrun by the UAR. We should make clear to Israel that these assurances would be withdrawn if she develops a nuclear weapon capability and that we would be prepared to consider other measures as well.

(2) UAR. We should make it clear to the UAR that our policy restraining an independent Israeli nuclear force is

unlikely to be effective if the UAR acquires nuclear weapons. If the UAR should make a decision to do so, we should be prepared to take measures designed to reverse that decision.

(3) We should make major efforts to persuade France, Germany or others against providing missile or nuclear assistance to Israel or the UAR, and should work for Soviet cooperation in keeping the Israeli-UAR confrontation non-nuclear.

d. Spread of weapons technology. We should revise and broaden NSAM 294 so that it will restrict United States contributions to the development of nuclear warheads or strategic nuclear delivery capabilities of any country (including the United Kingdom if she can be induced to fold her strategic nuclear force into the ANF). Moreover, we should seek to enlist the cooperation of other advanced nations in parallel actions designed to complement the actions of the United States.

3. Policies toward Europe and the Atlantic Nuclear Force.

Our present policies in this area are defined in NSAM 322. In dealing with the Soviet Union, it should be made clear that any Atlantic Nuclear Force must reinforce and contribute to our basic policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. To this end, it should be emphasized that any treaty establishing such a Force

would include undertakings whereby the nuclear members would agree not to disseminate nuclear weapons to the independent control of non-nuclear members and the non-nuclear members would undertake not to develop or acquire or obtain control over nuclear weapons; that in all cases the agreement of the United States would be required in order to have the Force fire nuclear weapons; and that the voting procedures could be revised only with the unanimous agreement of all participating nations. Moreover, it should be emphasized that any ANF agreement would prevent the proliferation of individual nuclear capabilities among the participants and may reduce the number of nations having independent strategic nuclear capabilities by at least one (the United Kingdom).

Several of the members of the Committee believe that an MLF/ANF or something like it may be essential if the Germans are to be inhibited from eventually acquiring an independent nuclear capability. Others feel that more modest measures such as increased sharing in nuclear consultation and planning and further exploitation of bilateral arrangements for nuclear weapons systems would suffice to deter the Germans from an independent nuclear course, particularly since the Germans are aware that such a course would be strongly opposed by France and the Soviet Union.

In addition, it could be made clear to the Germans that the maintenance of United States forces in Germany would be inconsistent with the independent possession of nuclear weapons by Germany. Others of the Committee, seeing a basic incompatibility between the goal of German reunification and German acquisition of nuclear weapons, feel that greater emphasis should be placed on reunification as a means of shifting German interests away from nuclear weapons toward an objective more consistent with long-term European stability.

In any case, all members agree that the appropriate agencies of the Government should continue urgent exploration of possible alternatives to an MLF/ANF which would permanently inhibit Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons, but would nevertheless assure that, in the absence of German reunification, West Germany would remain as a real ally on the Western side.

4. Policies toward existing nuclear powers.

a. France. While maintaining a place for France in the structure of any ANF, as provided in NSAM 322, we should make it clear to France that her insistence upon the development of an independent nuclear-strategic capability and upon atmospheric testing are unacceptable. Accordingly:

(1) We should in no way assist the French atmospheric or underground nuclear test program and should be prepared to support international measures initiated by others having the effect of impeding or penalizing French nuclear tests.

(2) Insofar as France is concerned, we should interpret NSAM 294 strictly.

b. United Kingdom.

(1) We should continue to favor the incorporation of the United Kingdom independent strategic nuclear deterrent in an ANF-type arrangement.

(2) In consultation with the United Kingdom, we should undertake an appropriate revision of the 1958 amendment of the Atomic Energy Act authorizing nuclear assistance to nations with advanced weapons capabilities that would be consistent with the future course of a special relationship with the United Kingdom while removing the implicit encouragement of existing law to other countries to achieve advanced nuclear capabilities.

c. Soviet Union. In view of the great importance of Soviet support and cooperation in connection with efforts to stop

nuclear proliferation, we should undertake new initiatives to obtain such support. We should make early approaches to the Soviets, seeking cooperation on as broad a basis as possible in achieving the objectives described in this report, and to the extent possible, the relevant specific actions set forth in paragraphs 1, 2 and 5 of these recommendations.

In addition to the direct non-proliferation measures described in paragraph 1 above, we should undertake early initiatives toward the following United States-Soviet arms control agreements as a means both of reducing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union and creating an atmosphere conducive to wide acceptance of restraints on nuclear proliferation:

(1) A verified fissile materials production cutoff for weapons purposes, to be established by treaty (with appropriate provisions permitting the production of tritium).

(2) A verified strategic delivery vehicle freeze coupled with significant agreed reductions (e.g. 30%) in strategic force levels, to be established by treaty.

(3) An 18 to 24-month halt in the construction of new ABM or ICBM launchers, to be accomplished by reciprocal Executive action based on unilateral verification capabilities.

d. China. We believe that it will prove difficult over the long term either to halt nuclear proliferation or to obtain worldwide peace and stability until China has joined the society of nations and is willing to participate responsibly in arms control measures. In view of the complexity and difficulty of the problem, we recommend that the Government undertake a major high-level reexamination of our policies toward China, taking into account the effect of those policies upon all aspects of our national security and our alliances in the Far East.

5. Peaceful uses of atomic energy.

While we recognize that in the long run fissionable materials will probably be available in all industrial countries as a result of nuclear power programs, we believe that every effort should be made at this time to ensure that peaceful atomic energy programs do not unreasonably contribute to potential proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. We should in all cases insist on adequate safeguards for all peaceful programs. Moreover, our support should be limited to those programs which will advance the economic development of friendly countries; and we should not press such programs with special subsidies. Careful consideration should be given to the political stability and

reliability of countries where such programs are undertaken. We should make an effort to get all potential suppliers to agree to offer materials and facilities only under adequate safeguards.

We should take the following actions with regard to IAEA and Euratom:

a. IAEA.

(1) We should increase our efforts to build up the IAEA, including broader responsibilities, increased operational activities, larger budgets and improved technical capabilities.

(2) We should exert stronger influence on all nations, including supplying nations and the Soviet Bloc to accept IAEA safeguards on reactors and separation plants and should offer, in return, to extend safeguards to additional United States facilities.

(3) We should explore additional means of establishing control practices with respect to uranium and fuel elements which would reduce the risk of nuclear power facilities being used for military purposes.

b. Euratom.

(1) We should press Euratom in order to obtain satisfactory United States verification of Euratom safeguards.

(2) We should work toward Euratom acceptance of IAEA safeguards and IAEA acceptance of Euratom.

While we recognize that the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives (Project Plowshare) may have long-term economic importance, we do not believe that that program should be allowed to jeopardize a comprehensive test ban treaty or to encourage interest in nuclear weapons. Undue emphasis on such programs tends to make nuclear explosives appear desirable, necessary and acceptable for countries presently considering undertaking nuclear weapons programs. In addition, attempts to incorporate provisions permitting such programs under a comprehensive test ban treaty may be difficult, if not impossible, without providing a loophole under which nuclear weapons could be developed. We should not, therefore, actively seek to interest other countries in such programs until we better understand their relationship to the comprehensive test ban and the general nuclear proliferation problem.

6. United States weapons policies.

If we are to minimize the incentives for others to acquire nuclear weapons, it is important that we avoid giving an exaggerated impression of their importance and utility and that we stress the current and future important role of conventional armaments. It

is also important that our physical arrangements minimize the possibility of unauthorized seizure or compromise of design information regarding United States nuclear weapons deployed abroad. Accordingly, we should take the following actions:

a. NATO strategy. We believe that the prospects for success of our effort to stop the spread of nuclear weapons will be enhanced by adoption of a revised NATO strategy, along the lines now being proposed by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, placing greater stress on a non-nuclear option and relying less upon tactical nuclear weapons. (Such a policy would of course maintain a tactical nuclear capability for deterrence, credibility and flexibility.)

b. Physical security. The program for the installation of Permissive Action Links (PALs) in weapons deployed in Europe should be continued and expanded to apply to all weapons deployed overseas. Intensified research to develop improved safeguards against seizure or unauthorized use should be continued. We should consider appropriate assistance to the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union in connection with the development of PALs and safety devices for their respective weapons.

c. Research and development. The Department of Defense should reexamine future requirements in the light of the

policies recommended in this memorandum. Consideration should be given, among other matters, to damage limitation systems effective against lesser nuclear threats; to detection and identification systems related to such threats; and to the development of any weapons systems necessary to back our commitments to nations electing not to develop their own nuclear weapons.

The program outlined above should not preclude other measures to prevent nuclear proliferation and the appropriate agencies of the Government should be called upon to undertake to develop additional proposals to that end. All agencies should carefully consider the implications for nuclear proliferation of all their actions and information policies, and their progress on non-proliferation matters should, we think, be followed closely by you and your senior advisers.

Arthur H. Dean

James A. Perkins

Allen W. Dulles

Arthur K. Watson

Alfred M. Gruenther

William Webster

George B. Kistiakowsky

Herbert F. York

John J. McCloy

Roswell L. Gilpatric
Chairman

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SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. ____

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: Prevention of the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

It is the policy of the United States to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to the control of other nations. The recent Chinese nuclear explosion has increased the urgency and complexity of this problem by creating strong pressures on India and Japan to develop independent nuclear forces, which, in turn, could strongly influence the plans of other potential nuclear powers. To meet this situation, we must take immediate steps on a broad front to intensify and expand our efforts to implement our non-proliferation policy. There will be instances where the objective of preventing proliferation of nuclear capabilities may conflict with other United States objectives. In the resolution of such conflicts, I desire that our non-proliferation policy receive substantially more weight than has been the case in the past. The program to implement this policy will include, but not be limited to, the following measures:

1. Multilateral agreements.

a. Non-proliferation agreement. We will intensify our efforts for a non-proliferation agreement and seek the early conclusion of the widest and most effective possible international treaty on non-dissemination and non-acquisition of nuclear weapons. Our initiatives in this area should not await, or be dependent upon, the resolution of any issues relating to an Atlantic Nuclear Force. We will be prepared to bring strong pressure on significant countries (including Germany, France, India, Japan, Israel, the UAR and Sweden) to achieve their participation in such an agreement.

b. Comprehensive test ban. We will renew our efforts to negotiate a verified comprehensive test ban with the Soviet Union. As soon as possible, the Committee of Principals will recommend to me the minimum number of on-site inspections in the Soviet Union that would be consistent with a viable treaty, taking into account our anticipated improved capabilities for seismic detection and identification and our other relevant unilateral intelligence capabilities. Inspection procedures and quota covering other countries will also be reviewed to facilitate the widest and most effective application of the treaty. We will be prepared to propose an exception to such a treaty for peaceful nuclear explosions if a

satisfactory procedure can be promptly devised that would preclude the development of nuclear weapons under the guise of a peaceful explosives program, and if such an exception would be acceptable to other nations. While the initial approach will be to the Soviet Union, we will seek the widest adherence to the agreement and be prepared to bring strong influence to bear on significant countries to participate in it.

c. Nuclear free zones. We will actively support the establishment of Latin American and African (including, if possible, Israel-UAR) nuclear free zones. To facilitate such agreements, we shall be prepared to modify our requirement for verification and our position on transit rights and declarations with respect to United States nuclear weapons to the maximum extent consistent with demonstrable United States security needs.

2. Policies toward non-nuclear powers.

In conjunction with the multilateral measures described above, we shall intensify our efforts on a country-by-country basis to influence the decisions of individual non-nuclear powers not to undertake the development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and to secure workable commitments to this effect. We shall ourselves refrain

from actions that would contribute to or suggest a future contribution to the development of nuclear weapons by these countries.

The Departments of State, Treasury and Commerce shall develop a program of economic restrictions and other measures which could be quickly imposed by Executive action and would be strong enough to produce a reversal of any decision to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.

a. India - to deter India from building nuclear weapons:

(1) While attempting, if possible, to avoid formal guarantees, we will be prepared, to the extent necessary and if requested by the Indians, to offer credible assurance of United States action in the event of a nuclear attack on India in exchange for an Indian commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons. We will be prepared to undertake, if requested by the Indians, parallel action with the Soviets and/or the United Kingdom. Appropriate agencies of the Government should give early consideration to the form such United States assurances might take.

(2) We will assist India in reasonable and economically justifiable scientific programs designed to build the prestige she might otherwise attempt to obtain from the development of a nuclear device. Such programs should be of a character

that will not contribute significantly to future nuclear weapons capabilities. Particular attention should be given to those areas (such as natural resources, health and birth control) most relevant to India's economic and social problems. We will also initiate a major coordinated United States-Indian program of scientific, cultural and educational exchanges. In consultation with appropriate agencies, my Science Advisory Committee will submit recommendations regarding United States assistance to Indian scientific activities and United States-Indian exchanges.

(3) We will back India for a larger role in the United Nations. Such support and, to the extent feasible, any new role should be conditional on an Indian commitment not to become a nuclear power.

(4) We will reconsider the level of our economic and military assistance to India in the event that she decides to develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. To the extent that advance knowledge of this intention by Indian officials would be likely to have a constructive influence, it should be disclosed to them.

b. Japan - to deter Japan from building nuclear weapons:

(1) We will reaffirm and, if necessary, reinforce our present defense commitment. As in the case of India, early consideration should be given to the form these commitments might take.

(2) We will, as in the case of India, attempt to help the Japanese with appropriate prestige alternatives.

(3) We will support Japan's desire for a more important role as a world leader.

c. Israel-UAR.

(1) Israel. As long as Israel remains a non-nuclear power, we will continue to give Israel assurances against being overrun by the UAR. We should make clear to Israel that these assurances would be withdrawn if she develops a nuclear weapon capability and that we would be prepared to consider other measures as well.

(2) UAR. We should make it clear to the UAR that our policy restraining an independent Israeli nuclear force is unlikely to be effective if the UAR acquires nuclear weapons. If the UAR should make a decision to do so, we should be prepared to take measures designed to reverse that decision.

(3) We shall make major efforts to persuade France, Germany or others against providing missile or nuclear assistance to Israel or the UAR, and shall work for Soviet cooperation in keeping the Israeli-UAR confrontation non-nuclear.

d. Spread of weapons technology. In accordance with the provisions of NSAM 294, we will restrict our contributions to the development of the nuclear weapons or strategic nuclear delivery capabilities of any country(including the United Kingdom if she can be induced to fold her strategic nuclear force into the ANF). Moreover, we shall seek to enlist the cooperation of other advanced nations in actions to carry out the provisions of NSAM 294.

3. Policies toward Europe and the Atlantic Nuclear Force.

Our present policy in this area is defined in NSAM 322. In dealing with the Soviet Union, it should be made clear that any Atlantic Nuclear Force must reinforce and contribute to our basic policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. To this end, it should be emphasized that any treaty establishing such a Force would include undertakings whereby the nuclear members would agree not to disseminate nuclear weapons to the independent control of non-nuclear members and the non-nuclear members would

undertake not to develop or acquire or obtain control over nuclear weapons; that in all cases the agreement of the United States would be required in order to have the Force fire nuclear weapons; and that the voting procedures could be revised only with the unanimous agreement of all participating nations. Moreover, it should be emphasized that any ANF agreement would prevent the proliferation of individual nuclear capabilities among the participants and may reduce the number of nations having independent strategic nuclear capabilities by at least one (the United Kingdom).

4. Policies toward existing nuclear powers.

a. France. While maintaining a place for France in the structure of any ANF, as provided in NSAM 322, we will make clear to France that her insistence upon the development of an independent nuclear-strategic capability and upon atmospheric testing are unacceptable. Accordingly:

(1) We will in no way assist the French atmospheric or underground nuclear test program and should be prepared to support international measures initiated by others having the effect of impeding or penalizing French nuclear tests.

(2) Insofar as France is concerned, we should interpret NSAM 294 strictly.

b. United Kingdom.

(1) We should continue to favor the incorporation of the United Kingdom independent strategic nuclear deterrent in an ANF-type arrangement.

(2) In consultation with the United Kingdom, we should undertake an appropriate revision of the 1958 amendment of the Atomic Energy Act authorizing nuclear assistance to nations with advanced weapons capabilities that would be consistent with the future course of a special relationship with the United Kingdom while removing the implicit encouragement of existing law to other countries to achieve advanced nuclear capabilities.

c. Soviet Union. We will undertake new initiatives to obtain the support and cooperation of the Soviet Union in our efforts to stop nuclear proliferation. Accordingly, we should make early approaches to the Soviets seeking cooperation on as broad a basis as possible in achieving the objective of this NSAM, and to the extent possible, the relevant specific actions set forth in paragraphs 1, 2 and 5 of this NSAM.

In addition to the direct non-proliferation measures described in paragraph 1 above, we would undertake early initiatives

toward the following United States-Soviet arms control agreements as a means both of reducing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union and creating an atmosphere conducive to wide acceptance of restraints on nuclear proliferation:

(1) A verified fissile materials production cutoff for weapons purposes, to be established by treaty (with appropriate provisions permitting the production of tritium).

(2) A verified strategic delivery vehicle freeze coupled with significant agreed reductions (e.g. 30%) in strategic force levels, to be established by treaty.

(3) A reciprocal 18 to 24-month halt in the construction of new ABM or ICBM launchers, to be accomplished by Executive action based on unilateral verification capabilities.

d. China. The future course of our relations with the Chinese Communists will have a critical bearing on our ability to achieve our non-proliferation objectives. Accordingly, in a separate NSAM, I intend to establish a special study to review and make recommendations with regard to our policies toward China.

5. Peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Every effort shall be made to assure that peaceful atomic

energy programs do not unreasonably contribute to potential proliferation of nuclear weapon capabilities. In all cases, we will insist on adequate safeguards for all peaceful programs. Moreover, our support will be limited to those programs that will advance the economic development of friendly countries; and we should not press such programs with special subsidies. Careful consideration shall be given to the political stability and reliability of countries where such programs are undertaken. We will make an effort to get all potential suppliers to agree to offer materials and facilities only under adequate safeguards.

We will take the following actions with regard to IAEA and Euratom:

a. IAEA.

(1) We will increase our efforts to build up the IAEA, including broader responsibilities, increased operational activities, a larger budget, and improved technical capabilities.

(2) We will exert stronger influence on all nations, including Western supplying nations and the Soviet Bloc, to accept IAEA safeguards on reactors and separation plants and shall offer, in return, to extend safeguards to additional United States facilities.

b. Euratom.

(1) We will press Euratom in order to obtain satisfactory United States verification of safeguards.

(2) We will work toward Euratom acceptance of IAEA safeguards and IAEA acceptance of Euratom.

In addition, we should not actively seek to interest other countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives (Project Plowshare) until we better understand its relationship to the comprehensive test ban and the general anti-nuclear proliferation problem.

6. United States weapons policies.

If we are to minimize the incentives for others to acquire nuclear weapons, it is important that we avoid giving an exaggerated impression of their importance and utility and that we stress the current and future important role of conventional armaments. It is also important that our physical arrangements minimize the possibility of unauthorized seizure or compromise of design information regarding United States nuclear weapons deployed abroad. Accordingly, we will take the following actions:

a. Overseas deployments. We will work for the adoption of a revised NATO strategy which places greater stress

on a non-nuclear option and relies less upon tactical nuclear weapons (though maintaining a tactical nuclear capability for deterrence, credibility and flexibility).

b. Physical security. The program for the installation of Permissive Action Links (PALs) in weapons deployed in Europe will be continued and expanded to apply to all weapons deployed overseas. Intensified research to develop improved safeguards against seizure or unauthorized use shall be continued. We will consider appropriate assistance to the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union in connection with the development of PALs and safety devices for their respective weapons.

c. Research and development. The Department of Defense shall reexamine future requirements in the light of the policies expressed in this memorandum. Consideration should be given, among other matters, to damage limitation systems effective against lesser nuclear threats; to detection and identification systems related to such threats; and to the development of any weapons systems necessary to back our commitments to nations electing not to develop their own nuclear weapons.

The program outlined above is not intended to preclude other measures to prevent nuclear proliferation. The appropriate agencies should undertake to develop additional proposals to that end. I further desire that all agencies carefully consider the implications for nuclear proliferation of all their actions and information policies. I intend to follow closely their progress in these matters.

Copy to: Secretary of the Treasury
Director, Bureau of the Budget
Director, Office of Science and Technology

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OFFICE OF THE GENERAL MANAGER

To: Mrs. Florence Gwyer

Secretary to Mr. Johnson

CEJ

Enclosed are the two joint DOD-AEC NATO security inspection reports which you requested for Mr. Johnson on December 9.

Mr. Ink has indicated he would be glad to discuss these reports with Mr. Johnson, at his convenience, if he so desires.

Thelma V. Fleming

Thelma V. Fleming
Secretary to Mr. Ink

Enclosures: (2)

Office of the General Manager

GPO 929026

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This document consists of 17 pages
No. 27 of 70 Copies, Series A

REPORT ON THE JOINT DOD-AEC ON-SITE SURVEY OF SECURITY MEASURES AT ATOMIC WEAPONS STORAGE FACILITIES FOR THE SUPPORT OF NON-U.S. NATO FORCES JULY - AUGUST 1963 (C)

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RESTRICTED DATA
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT 1954

I. GENERAL

1. During the period 29 July - 1 August 1963, representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense conducted a joint survey to determine the adequacy of the security afforded U. S. nuclear weapons provided in support of non-U.S. forces in NATO. Survey team members and observers are listed in Inclosure 1. The team's mission is described in Inclosure 2. [redacted] These are also the initial non-U.S. sites to receive PAL equipped weapons.

2. A similar security survey team visited selected NATO support sites in April 1962 and reported the need for further improvement in certain areas. The current survey revealed that commendable progress has been made in the security program in effect at NATO support sites visited. With the exception of the personnel clearance program (discussed further in 3.b., below), the security program in effect at Air Force units visited was considered to be satisfactory. Specific areas of noteworthy progress are as follows:

a. PAL Devices.

(1) It was noted that all nuclear weapons in Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) areas were equipped with permissive action link devices. [redacted] The team noted that all of these weapons were locked with interim codes and that enabling procedures were in effect which meet the quick reaction time requirements of less than 15 minutes. PAL devices now installed on these weapons are "first generation," category "A", XMC-1541 devices. It was the consensus of the team that these devices provide an additional measure of control in safeguarding against the unauthorized use of the weapon since the weapon cannot be used unless U.S. custodial personnel receive the appropriate code from higher authority for unlocking the weapons. Although the PAL is an added impediment to be overcome by an individual who may desire unauthorized use, it should be recognized that other existing safeguards make it highly unlikely that he could accomplish unobserved, an unauthorized detonation with or without PAL. Surprise forcible seizure of the QRA sites and capture of the weapons would vitiate existing controls. First generation PAL's do not offer sufficient safeguard to unauthorized use of the weapons, if captured by a hostile group of individuals intent on using them. (This is due to the fact that knowledgeable individuals in counterintelligence methods, who can be presumed to be available, can either "by-pass" the PAL or "pick" its code.) In this regard the group has been informed that the JCS is making a thorough study of the effectiveness of PAL's in response to a request by the Secretary of Defense. [redacted] This DOD approved criteria was based upon the estimated capability of the devices available at the inception of the "crash" program. While the devices

viewed at sites visited will provide some delay, PAL's with a self-destruct capability would more effectively safeguard weapons against unauthorized use rather than merely delaying it. Presently installed PAL devices have no penalty response, e.g., self-destruct, in the event that tampering or by-pass is attempted. The group feels that continued efforts must be made toward developing and procuring devices which will more effectively safeguard against unauthorized use.

(2) Questions relating to the reliability of the PAL equipment were raised by the EUCOM staff at the debriefing held in EUCOM Headquarters following the field visits. The EUCOM staff advised that considerable difficulty has been experienced in achieving proper operation of PAL's on a theater-wide basis. The AEC representatives made arrangements for technical assistance to be assigned immediately to the theater for resolution of difficulties being encountered.

[redacted]

b. Defense Against Clandestine Radiography. At all three sites visited, procedures in effect to detect clandestine radiography of nuclear weapons in storage and QRA areas and during movement were considered well planned and very effectively executed with equipment available. Current programs have been standardized and now appear to be adequate. It is not considered necessary for field units to expend additional effort over and above the present program. However, further AEC-DOD development requirements are discussed in paragraph 3h, below.

c. Communications.

(1) It was noted that a high priority has been assigned to providing a flexible communications system in support of the U.S. custodial detachments. In order to expedite the satisfaction of the requirement, the program was broken into two phases: (a) high frequency single-sideband (HF/SSB) for immediate communications, to be followed by, (b) a more

reliable tropospheric forward scatter (TROPO) radio system. All sites are now served by a HF/SSB voice radio network capable of push-button frequency change through four pre-tuned, pre-selected frequencies, thereby reducing susceptiblity to hostile jamming operation, a weakness inherent in all radio systems. It was noted that at sites visited, the HF/SSB terminal was located in the administrative area. It is believed that relocating the HF/SSB terminal transmitter and receiver or remoting an operational position in the SAS area would result in a gain in response time and security. It is suggested that the DOD examine this question to determine if relocation would improve response time and result in greater security for the communications. The second phase will provide a Tropo radio system of advanced design and concept; and although this program has been delayed (approximately three years) it is presently under construction. The Tropo system will become the primary communications system for the custodial units.

Although of great reliability (approximately 99 percent) and considered far superior to either HF/SSB or indigenous PTT landline systems available in the European area, the Tropo system is subject to disruption by hostile/sabotage action at key linking points within the trunk system. DCA/CINCEUR has advised that in light of the above, the HF/SSB equipment will be retained as back-up system to obviate loss of communications over any segment of the overall system. In addition, the facilities available to the custodial detachment commanders via Tropo will be increased from one voice channel to one voice and one teletype channel after completion of the system. Again, as with the HF/SSB, the group assumes that planning for the Tropo will consider operating positions within the SAS site or in the QRA area for reasons suggested above, giving full consideration to electro-magnetic radiation hazards. The group has been informed that the HF/SSB and Tropo systems will provide the U.S. Custodial Detachment Commander the capability of radio contact with higher headquarters, independent of host or user nations communications networks, assuming a minimum of jamming or damage from enemy actions.

(2) The group noted that, although the aforementioned communications links afford USCINCEUR acceptable reliability for command and control of his forces in a peacetime environment, the existing and planned communication links are quite vulnerable in a warfare environment. The possible connection between this communications vulnerability and the vulnerability of PAL equipped nuclear forces dependent on good communications for effective performance, is considered to be a matter of grave concern and should be studied further. The group is of the opinion that, as an initial step toward minimizing this vulnerability, PAL codes must be disseminated on a much wider basis than at present (e.g., to lower echelons of command, exclusive of non-U.S. NATO Bases).

(3) The group was advised that the communication time from EUCOM to the bases was about 12 minutes in recent exercises. From receipt of the authorization message at the base, 12-15 minutes are required (versus a requirement of 15 minutes) to enable the PAL and launch the aircraft. It is the feeling of the survey team that the total time from EUCOM authorization to launch does not provide adequate reaction time in the event of surprise attack.

(4) It was also noted that four (4) civilian contractor personnel were assigned to operate the HF/SSB communications system at each site visited. CINCEUR has informed the team that these civilian contractor personnel are being utilized due to non-availability of military communications technicians trained in the maintenance and operation of the HF/SSB system, and that information as to when civilian contractor personnel will be replaced by military communications technicians is not currently available. CINCEUR has also advised that, if available, military communications technicians could operate the HF/SSB network at approximately half the annual salary cost of civilian personnel. It was also observed by the team that custodial detachment commanders were uncertain as to the extent of their authority and control over the civilian contractor personnel assigned to their units.

d. Site Inspection Program. The 1962 DOD-AEC survey report recommended that "EUCOM actively pursue the role it has recently assumed in carrying out the supervision and periodic inspection of the program." As observed by the group and from a review of the files and data maintained at EUCOM Headquarters, it was obvious that this recommendation has been carried out. The reports on the various sites prepared by the EUCOM staff were excellent.

II. FINDINGS

3. The findings of the survey team with respect to the subject areas assigned for consideration are as follows:

a. Division of Responsibility for Protection of Weapons Between U.S. Forces and Allied Forces.

(1) The survey team found that the division of responsibility for protection of weapons between U.S. forces and allied forces was in accordance with specific agreements between the U.S. and user nations involved. These agreements specifically established the responsibility of the user nation to provide external protection for weapon storage areas and overall security for QRA areas. U. S. personnel were responsibile for internal security of weapon storage areas and for weapon

custody. The group notes and reaffirms the findings of previous surveys that the U.S. has only a limited physical capability at non-U.S. sites to prevent the host or user nation from seizing control of nuclear weapons.

(2) The cornerstone of the existing custodial policy and its implementing arrangements lies in the fact that an act of force would be in violation of agreements made in good faith between the U.S. and the host and user NATO nations, as well as a hostile act against the U.S. Government. The existing custodial program is considered adequate to implement this policy. Improved PAL's with a wide range of capabilities and the achievement of a more effective unilateral destruct capability will improve the security and control at these sites in safeguarding against the unauthorized use of weapons. The group feels that the unilateral destruct time for weapons in the SAS areas must be reduced to terms of a few minutes, and recommends that efforts continue in this area. However, careful evaluation must be made of efforts in reducing the time of destruction, so that the vulnerability of weapons to sabotage is not increased to an unacceptable level.

b. Security Clearance Procedures for Guard and Security Force Personnel and Status of Clearance of Such Personnel Assigned.

(1) Host/User Nation Personnel. Based upon information furnished by U.S. personnel, the team is of the opinion that the host/user nations are satisfying the requirements of the security annex of the bilateral agreements pertaining to personnel security clearances. It is understood that all allied guard force personnel and other personnel having access to QRA areas had national clearances described as being generally equivalent to U. S. Top Secret or Secret clearances.

(2) U. S. Custodial Detachment Personnel.

(a) It was noted that the clearances of personnel assigned to U. S. custodial detachments visited met the requirements of Air Force Regulation 35-9, dated 28 June 1963. Within these custodial detachments, certain positions are designated as critical or limited. Critical positions are those in which the incumbents have technical knowledge of atomic weapons and authorized access to nuclear weapons, e.g., in such manner as to allow the opportunity to cause a nuclear detonation. Limited positions are those in which the incumbents may acquire both technical knowledge and access. The survey team was informed that all weapons maintenance specialists and technicians were considered to be filling critical positions and that all such technicians assigned at the time of this survey had completed Background Investigations (BI); however, under the provisions of Air Force Regulation 35-9,

incumbents in these critical positions are required to have only a favorable National Agency Check (NAC) and, concurrently on assignment, a requested BI.

(b) It is pointed out that the investigative requirements contained in AFR 35-9 which sets policy on this subject for the custodial detachments visited, do not meet the ultimate requirements of DOD Directive 5210.41, dated 8 December 1962, in that the latter directive requires background investigations for incumbents in both critical and limited positions. The group notes that the 1962 AEC-DOD survey group found that both CINCUSAFE and CINCUSAREUR were applying higher standards for security clearance than the minimum required by their respective service directives. All Air Force Personnel were cleared on the basis of a background investigation except those who qualified for Top Secret clearance on the basis of service and a National Agency Check.

(c) The group has been advised that Air Force personnel assigned to U. S. custodial detachments as of 26 July 1963 are now considered to be an exception to AFR 35-9, dated 28 June 1963, and that all assigned personnel, regardless of position have a background investigation. This continues in effect the 1962 arrangements which have been considered adequate.

(d) It is the view of the AEC-DOD group that because of the uniquely sensitive missions of U.S. custodial detachments at non-U.S. NATO sites, all personnel assigned to these detachments should be subject to a background investigation.

(e) The definition of the word "access" in DOD Directive 5210.41 is related to the ability of personnel to cause a nuclear detonation. This definition now forms the basis for the security clearance program for personnel assigned to duty in proximity to nuclear weapons. The survey group noted and some of the members share opinions expressed by EUCOM staff personnel concerning the inadequacy of the definition of "access". It was understood that the USCINCEUR was studying appropriate recommendations on this subject.

c. Organization of Guard Forces.

(1) Host/User Nation Guard Forces. The security protection afforded U.S. nuclear weapons by the host/user nation at bases visited appeared excellent.

(2) U. S. Custodial Detachments.

(a) More emphasis should be placed upon language training. The operational difficulties which could result from the existing language barrier between the majority of the U. S. and allied

personnel, particularly in emergencies, was a matter of special concern of the survey team. It was noted that by current EUCOM policy directive, custodial detachment commanders are making an effort to conduct on-the-job tutoring in the language of the host/user nation. However, the team observed that the results of this training arrangement have been generally unproductive.

(b) At some locations, more emphasis should be placed upon maintenance and training in small arms.

(c) The group noted that the role of the custodial agents and their responsibilities had been clarified and standardized as was recommended in last year's survey. The group feels that since the custodial agents are a symbol of U.S. possession and control of weapons, it is most important that custodians continue to be carefully selected for assignment to U. S. custodial detachments. It is also important that each individual assigned custodial duties be completely trained in order that they may fully understand their responsibilities and discharge them with confidence. This is particularly important, since the survey team noted that host or user nation forces guarding and securing SAS and QRA areas were elite, combat-experienced troops in most instances. [redacted] These forces were in field uniform and combat armed and equipped while on guard duty and they offered an impressive appearance. In this connection, consideration may well be given to arming and equipping U. S. custodial personnel with more effective weapons/ordnance.

d. Emergency Procedures.

(1) Exercises observed involving emergency procedures, personnel, and equipment were considered responsive and adequate for both U. S. and host/user nation units. Especially noteworthy was the excellent attitude of cooperation displayed by host/user nation officials at bases visited.

(2) Security alert forces at each base visited included a sabotage alert team (SAT) of 5 men to respond to the Special Ammunition Storage (SAS) area or to the QRA area within 5 minutes. Additionally, a backup alert force of 40-50 men was required to respond to any emergency within 20 minutes. Lastly, a reserve force of company/battalion strength is scheduled to arrive at the area of emergency within 2-4 hours. Demonstrated response times for SAT forces were well within requirements.

e. Physical Plant and Control of Access.

(1) Problems involving physical plant and access control systems and procedures which were encountered by the survey team last year were not evident.

(2) All sites visited were located on permanent bases and facilities were generally excellent and well maintained.

(3) Physical barriers and circulation control procedures in effect at both SAS and QRA areas facilitated control of access to these security areas. Access procedures were coupled with the "no lone zone" restriction, i.e., requiring a minimum of two "equally knowledgeable" persons to be present whenever access to a nuclear weapon is involved. For access to storage areas, lists of authorized persons were available to custodial personnel and badge exchange systems were properly enforced. QRA and SAS areas were both enclosed by double security fences, adequately lighted during hours of darkness, and constantly patrolled by walking guards during the day and sentry dog teams at night. The external security protection provided by user nation security forces was excellent.

(4) Although it was observed that CINCEUR/SACEUR physical security criteria in effect at sites visited considerably exceeded the minimum storage and security requirements set forth in DOD Directive 5210.41, the group was of the firm opinion that existing security standards at non-U.S. custodial units should be retained in view of the sensitive nature of their assigned mission. In order to insure retention of the excellent physical security posture at these units, the survey group considers it desirable that DOD Directive 5210.41 be revised to authorize higher physical security standards for U. S. custodial units in NATO, as well as other overseas nuclear weapon storage sites, as determined to be necessary by the theater commander concerned.

f. Security Procedures for Weapons Transportation. No actual transporting of nuclear weapons was observed. However, plans and established procedures appeared to be adequate.

g. Evacuation and Destruction Procedures.

(1) Destruction of Nuclear Weapons

(a) At all sites visited, destruction devices and trained personnel were readily available at all times to accomplish destruction of nuclear weapons, if such action is directed by proper authority. The authorization would normally come from Headquarters,

EUCOM, but authority is automatically delegated down through intermediate command levels to the senior U.S. officer on duty at the custodial detachment in the event of communications failure and the necessity to evacuate or destroy becomes evident.

(b) The planned destruction method consists of shaped charges aimed at the weapon's high explosive, initiated electrically or by time fuse. Authoritative sources have advised the team that this technique will deny non-U.S. use of the nuclear weapons but will not necessarily destroy the design information revealed by the internal nuclear components of the weapon. It is understood that recent tests arranged by the Defense Atomic Support Agency indicate that total destruction of design information in such cases is very difficult, if not impossible, under ideal conditions.

(c) Tests of weapon destruction procedures were observed by the survey team at the three bases. The time involved in completing this action was found well within the 1 hour requirement. In fact, the procedures were standardized at all locations and completion was accomplished in an effective manner on the order of 30 minutes. In this connection it is noted that the 1962 DOD-AEC survey team established that weapons destruct in some Army units could be accomplished in five (5) minutes. In consideration thereof, the group feels that the unilateral destruct time for weapons in the SAS areas can be further reduced, and recommends that efforts continue in this area. However, careful evaluation must be made of efforts in reducing the time of destruction, so that vulnerability of weapons to sabotage is not increased to an unacceptable level. It is noted that the present procedures for the destruction of weapons in the QRA area require the cooperation of the "user nation" forces and is a coordinated effort. In order to clear the area, notification is normally given to the user nation personnel at the initiation of the action.

(d) Unilateral U. S. weapon destruction procedures were discussed and briefed at the three bases. Destruction of weapons in the QRA areas poses a difficult problem. In the event some level of cooperation exists with the non-U.S. force, at the time the procedure is initiated, it would be possible to (a) destroy the weapon on the aircraft or (b) return the weapon to the SAS site (after a non-U. S. download operation) and then destroy it. However, if for political or other reasons, there is any effort by the non-U.S. force to impede the destruction of QRA weapons, it would be extremely difficult or impossible to accomplish. In such a situation, it is hoped that some timely warning of an impending action of this nature would be available to the U. S. custodial detachments. However, since the receipt of an advance

warning cannot be depended upon in all cases, continuing efforts should be made to reduce further the time required for destruction of weapons on QRA and to increase the U.S. capability for unilateral destruction.

(2) Evacuation of Nuclear Weapons

(a) According to current planning, emergency evacuation of nuclear weapons will be by air transport where possible. Aircraft are not specifically assigned for this mission, but a support requirement has been imposed upon USAFE to divert planes on a priority basis as necessary. Under emergency conditions, the Commanding Officer should have authority to waive the nuclear weapon safety rules as well as other directives, which would jeopardize the successful evacuation.

(b) Current planning envisages that, in the event surface evacuation becomes necessary, it will normally be to the nearest usable airfield or seaport. In this event, host/user nation transportation must be relied upon in most instances.

(3) Because of the custodial unit commanders's responsibility for emergency evacuation and destruction, it is considered highly desirable that he be provided current intelligence on host or user nation activities which may influence his planning in these areas. The receipt of accurate and timely intelligence information may have a direct application on the decisions regarding destruction or evacuation he must be prepared to make.

h. Clandestine Radiography.

(1) At the three sites visited, a covert effort existed to detect attempts to obtain weapon information by radiography. Programs were in effect at the installations to monitor radiography attempts when weapons were being maneuvered from SAS areas to QRA areas and passive detection equipment was attached to weapons at the QRA locations. The group considers that CINCEUR/USAFE is fulfilling this responsibility in a commendable manner.

(2) At the sites visited, the physical arrangements were such that it would be difficult to acquire weapon design information by means of radiography. While this is true of the type site visited, physical arrangements differ among sites. Therefore, the group feels that continuing efforts are required by DOD and AEC in the development of devices to detect clandestine attempts at the time of occurrence and during maneuvering of weapons where the physical layout would accommodate radiography equipment and where weapons are maneuvered outside controlled areas. Although the Air Force is doing an excellent job in this field,

DOD and AEC should continue their efforts to provide field units with improved equipment in order to minimize manhours expended by operational units in the current program. It should be pointed out that the physical security provisions and procedures for prevention of clandestine radiography are the backbone of the present program and should continue to be, supplemented as practicable, by improved detection devices.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

4. In view of the findings of the survey team outlined in paragraph 3 above, and in order to improve the security protection afforded U.S. nuclear weapons positioned in support of non-U.S. forces in NATO, it is recommended that:

a. The Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission take action to effect further improvement in the quality of PAL associated controller and test devices and to furnish CINCEUR instructional manuals for necessary field servicing and maintenance of these equipments. Further, that the DOD and AEC continue present developmental efforts to provide improved PAL devices with greater capabilities in safeguarding weapons against unauthorized use, particularly if threatened by capture. (Ref: Para 2a(2), page 2)

b. Until there is proven reliability in the first and second generation PAL equipment, the desirability of further proliferation of this equipment and its employment outside NATO should be reviewed by the Department of Defense and other interested agencies. (Ref: Para 2a(2), page 2)

c. The Department of Defense should examine the feasibility of relocating the HF/SSB transmitter and receiver station or remoting an operational position in the SAS area at the U.S. custodial units in an effort to improve response time and communications security. (Ref: Para 2c(1), pages 2 and 3)

d. The Department of Defense should take necessary action to expedite the installation of the "TROPO" communications system in view of the importance of reliable communications to the accomplishment of the support mission assigned to the U.S. custodial units. (Ref: Para 2c(1), pages 2 and 3)

e. As an initial step towards minimizing the threat to the wartime operational effectiveness of PAL equipped nuclear forces which is posed as a result of the vulnerability of communication links with higher command, PAL codes should be disseminated on a much wider basis than at present. (Ref: 2c(2), page 3)

f. The Department of Defense should review the adequacy of existing reaction time requirements for QRA aircraft from EUCOM/SACEUR authorization to launch in event of surprise attack. (Ref: Para 2c(3), page 4)

g. The Department of Defense take action to expedite the assignment of trained military technicians to replace the civilian contractor personnel currently maintaining and operating the HF/SSB communications system at the U.S. custodial detachments; further, CINCEUR should take immediate action to clarify the status of these civilian contractor personnel and the extent of the authority and control to be exercised over these personnel by commanders of the custodial detachments to which they are assigned. (Ref: Para 2c(4), page 4)

h. Necessary action be taken by the DOD to require that all personnel assigned to non-U.S. NATO sites be made the subject of a background investigation. (Ref: 3b(2)(d), page 6)

i. CINCEUR study the adequacy of the definition of the word "access" as contained in DOD Directive 5210.41 and submit recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the desirability of broadening or clarifying this definition with respect to sabotage and intentional damage to weapons. (Ref: Para 3b(2)(e), page 6)

j. Action be taken to insure that replacement personnel for overseas custodial detachments are qualified for their assigned duty. (Ref: Para 3c(2)(c), page 7)

k. Action be taken by CINCEUR to insure that greater emphasis is placed upon unit training in the custodial detachments with respect to instruction in the language of the host/user nation and in small arms. (Ref: Para 3c(2), pages 6 and 7)

l. Action be taken by the Department of Defense to approve, as recommended by the theater commander concerned, higher physical security standards for U.S. custodial units in NATO, as well as other overseas nuclear weapon storage sites. (Ref: 3e(4), page 8)

m. Action be taken by CINCEUR to reduce further the time required for the emergency destruction of nuclear weapons and to increase the U.S. capability for unilateral destruction, particularly for weapons in the QRA area, with due consideration to the resultant increase in vulnerability of the weapons to sabotage. Further, that the Department of Defense and the AEC assist CINCEUR in this effort

by conducting further research to develop more quickly activated destruction devices and more effective techniques. (Ref: Para 3g(1), pages 8 and 9)

n. That the commanding officers of custodial detachments be given the authority to waive, in emergency conditions, the nuclear weapon safety rules and other directives in cases where the requirement may jeopardize a successful evacuation. (Ref: Para 3g(2), page 10)

o. Timely intelligence should be provided U.S. custodial detachment commanders concerning host/user nation political activities which may affect the commander's decision with respect to emergency evacuation or destruction of weapons. (Ref: Para 3g(3), page 10)

p. In order to reduce to the minimum the manhours expended by field units in the detection and prevention of clandestine radiography, the Department of Defense and the AEC should continue their efforts to develop and provide effective devices and equipment for detecting and annunciating, at the time of occurrence, any such attempts to compromise nuclear weapons design information. (Ref: Para 3h(2), page 10 and 11)

This report has been approved by the following members of the survey team, with the exception noted in the case of Mr. Drake.

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DWIGHT A. INK
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DOD Member

*Mr. Drake's minority opinion concerning the last sentence of paragraph 2c(2), page 3, and recommendation e, page 11, is presented as Inclosure 3.

Inclosure 1

TEAM MEMBERSHIP

Department of Defense Representatives

Captain M. Vance Dawkins, USN, DASA (Chairman)

Colonel William H. Fleming, U. S. Air Force, OSD

Captain Charles A. Iarrobino, USN, JCS

Mr. Robert L. Applegate, OSD

Mr. James F. Drake, OSD

Lt Colonel Walace E. Hawkins, U.S. Army, DASA

Mr. Eugene E. Brown, Air Force

Atomic Energy Commission Representatives

Mr. Dwight A. Ink

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Cdr Charles A. Sommer, USN, DMA/AEC

OBSERVERS

Mr. George F. Murphy, Jr., Staff Member, Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy

Mr. Jerry C. Trippe, State Department

Inclosure 2

MISSION

In his memorandum to Chief, DASA, dated 5 July 1963, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), stated that the current survey would be conducted under the same terms of reference as outlined in his 28 March 1963 memorandum pertaining to the survey conducted at NATO sites in April 1962, and described the committee's purpose and the subjects to be surveyed as follows:

"Purpose: The purpose of the survey is to determine the adequacy of security of U.S. nuclear weapons provided in the custody of the United States in support of non-U.S. forces in NATO. The survey will be limited strictly to security considerations.

Subjects to be Surveyed:

a. Division of responsibilities for protection of weapons between the U.S. forces and Allied forces.

b. Security clearance procedures for guard and security force personnel, status of clearances of such personnel assigned.

c. Organization of guard forces.

d. Emergency procedures, personnel and equipment for security alert force.

e. Physical plant and control of access to facilities and weapons.

f. Security procedures for weapons transportation when weapons are not being transported by U. S. forces.

g. Evacuation and destruction procedures.

h. Measures to protect against clandestine radiography."

Inclosure 3

Minority Opinion Concerning Dissemination of PAL Codes

Mr. Drake of ODDR&E, OSD objects to paragraph I.2.c.(2), page 3, last sentence and paragraph III.4.3., page 11, of the recommendations. The objection is raised for the following reasons:

1) Unless the response time for the QRA force discussion in paragraph I.2.c.(3), page 4, is materially reduced, the vulnerability of the force will not be significantly improved by placing the PAL code at one echelon above the weapons release as proposed in the report.

2) The risk of loss of positive control of weapon release is more critical than the possible gains in survivability.

3) The redundant communication means that could provide the R-hour message to the lower echelon of command could also provide the PAL release code, if this thought to be desirable. This would result in less risk of loss of positive control of the force.

4) The placement of the PAL code at lower echelons defeats to some degree the benefits in positive control offered by the PAL device since the individual commander would have the means to make a unilateral decision now reserved by the President. Lacking the required intelligence data and communication with higher echelons at a time when he is pressed by momentary destruction of his force, the commander could make a decision to release the weapons and further escalate the conflict.

Recommendations:

1. [redacted]

2. Investigate the possibility of reducing the vulnerability of communications and command and control centers.

3. Reduce the response time for communication of the R-hour and PAL message and the QRA force reaction to a level appropriate to the flight time of Soviet missile threat.

~~SECRET~~

THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF 20 PAGE(S)
NO. 52 OF 60 COPIES, SERIES A

Report on the Joint DOD-AEC
On-Site Survey of Security Measures at Atomic
Weapons Storage Facilities for the Support of Non-U.S. NATO Forces

DASA 63720

~~SECRET~~

RESTRICTED DATA
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT 1954

1. In April 1962, representatives of the AEC and representatives of the Department of Defense conducted a joint review of the security measures in effect for the protection of U. S. nuclear weapons that are held in the custody of U. S. personnel for the support of NATO forces. Representatives of the Department of State and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy participated in the survey as observers. Committee members and observers are listed in Inclosure 1. The committee's mission is described in Inclosure 2.

[redacted] The sites visited are shown in Inclosure 3.

3. In November-December 1960, representatives of the AEC participated in a review of the security measures in effect at the same types of facilities in the European Theater. The current survey established that substantial progress has been made in furthering the adequacy of the security program in effect at these installations. Specific progress to date includes:

a. Top Level Interest. Military personnel with whom the committee met exhibited much greater awareness of the problems associated with the handling and storage of atomic weapons than had been true during the November-December 1960 survey.

b. Qualified Personnel. The committee was impressed with the number of qualified personnel now in the special weapons program, many of whom have been associated with atomic weapons for five or ten years.

c. Physical Arrangements. Generally speaking, the physical arrangements have improved substantially in the past sixteen months. Some of this is due to the fact that several of the units have been able to move from temporary facilities to permanent facilities. An access control system has been placed in effect which requires that two U. S. personnel be present whenever the igloos are open. The keys and combinations to the igloos are held by two different custodial personnel. [redacted]

d. Evacuation and Destruction. In contrast to the situation existing in November-December 1960, evacuation and destruction plans have been developed at all sites.

e. Communications. All sites now have the single side band radio system which permits almost instantaneous contact with Wiesbaden, Heidelberg and Paris, independent of host government communication networks.

f. Inspection. The committee found that EUCOM had recently placed in effect an inspection program which, when fully developed and implemented, will provide EUCOM with specific information on which to base an evaluation of the adequacy of security at all sites.

g. Radiography. While instrumentation is still lacking, the radiography inspection program has been initiated in all locations visited.

h. Human Reliability. A human reliability program is now in effect which is designed to screen out those under emotional stress.

i. Security Clearance of Individuals. The committee found that the Department of the Air Force was applying a standard of personnel security clearance which required that all personnel assigned to USAFE special weapons units be processed for Top Secret clearance.

4. The committee believes, as indicated above, that much progress has been made in improving the program in recent months. There remains, however, as identified in this report, a number of areas in which further improvements are needed. These include standardization of the custodial program, continued supervision of the selection program to assure qualified personnel, further efforts to reduce the language problem, establishment of uniform personnel clearance and human reliability programs, and full implementation by EUCOM of its role in supervising and inspecting.

5. The committee believes that the current survey should be of substantive value in that it makes available to responsible authorities a direct source of detailed knowledge concerning the implementation of the security aspects of the program. In this regard the committee has amassed a considerable amount of detailed documentation pertaining to individual locations visited. The committee welcomes the opportunity to provide any of this data to interested recipients of this report.

6. The following section of this report is devoted to general findings and recommendations within the subject areas assigned for committee consideration:

a. Division of responsibilities for protection of weapons between the U. S. forces and allied forces.

(1) It was found that the division of responsibility was a matter of specific agreement between the U. S. and the host nation involved and that these agreements specifically established the

responsibility of the host nation to provide external protection of the area in which the weapons are stored. U. S. personnel are responsible for the custody of weapons. With respect to U. S. custody arrangements, the committee found procedural differences existing between the programs established by the U. S. Air Force and the U. S. Army components.

(2) It is a matter of some concern that in one instance it was found that a special ammunition storage area located some distance from the main post had only one custodial agent on duty at the site. From his fixed post he was unable to see each of the igloos in the area that he was responsible for. In such a situation the committee notes that any incapacitation of the single custodial agent would, of course, result in the loss of custodial control. The maintenance of U. S. custody of nuclear weapons is a cornerstone of the present U. S. national policy with respect to the dispersal of nuclear weapons for the support of non-U. S. forces. The importance of maintaining constant and inexorable U. S. custody dictates that a minimum of two custodians be assigned in all nuclear weapons storage and operational areas. The committee also believes that frequent inspections should be made to assure that buildings and igloos in which weapons are stored are properly secured and that unauthorized personnel have not gained access to the interior of the site.

(3) In several cases special ammunition storage areas are located in isolated places substantial distances from the custodial detachment headquarters. In such locations it is conceivable that immediate supervision and direction could not be provided by the detachment headquarters to custodians at the storage sites. In order to obviate the difficulties that would arise if control by the headquarters were interrupted, the committee believes it necessary in such situations to assign an officer for duty within the immediate vicinity of the storage area on a 24-hour a day basis.

(4) The situation cited in paragraph 6a(2) above, in which only one custodian was on duty in the special ammunition storage area exemplifies one difference that exists in the application of custodial measures. At other locations, 2, 3, and, in one case, 4, custodians were found in the special ammunition storage area. These differences could not be accounted for on the basis of the area's size, location, or terrain, or the weapons system present. In addition, variations were found in the instructions that had been issued to the custodians. These variations involved fundamental aspects of the custodial duties, such as the custodian's use of his weapon to protect himself and the special ammunition and his obligation to check the area. A determined effort should be made by EUCOM to clearly define the custodian's duties so that his basic instructions can be standardized. The numbers of custodial personnel on duty will be standardized to an acceptable extent by the criteria contained in this report.

(5) The position described thus far with respect to the question of custody has the unanimous approval of the committee. Beyond this there are certain fundamental points of disagreement between the AEC and DOD members of the committee. It is believed that these points which concern the nature of the custodial concept and its legal foundation are deserving of separate exposition. The AEC and DOD positions are presented in Inclosures 4 and 5.

(6) The committee notes that studies currently in progress in the AEC and DOD with respect to the development of "permissive links" may give some additional assurance against the unauthorized use of weapons.

b. Security clearance procedures for guard and security force personnel and status of clearance of such personnel assigned.

(1) The survey of the personnel security program involved the consideration of both U. S. and non-U. S. forces. In the case of the U. S. personnel it was found that certain variations do exist in the personnel clearance program of U. S. service components. As a basic consideration we consider it a valid premise that special weapons require greater protection than would be necessary on the basis of security classification alone. From this it follows that every effort should be made to assign only personnel who have been properly screened and cleared prior to assignment. Since the problems associated with special weapons storing and handling and the threats likely to be encountered at locations where this work is done are roughly equal in both Army and Air Force units, it appears desirable to apply uniform standards in the investigation of personnel for this work. Both CINCUSAFE and CINCUSAREUR are applying higher standards for security clearance than are required by their respective service directives. However, the standards established by the two component commands are different in that USAFE requires a minimum of Top Secret clearance for assignees to custodial detachments, while USAREUR requires a minimum of Secret clearance for like assignments, except where an individual's access to information or weapons requires a Top Secret clearance.

(2) In view of the uniquely sensitive mission of custodial detachments the committee believes all personnel assigned to these detachments should be subject to background investigation and recommends that necessary action to accomplish this be taken. Further, this clearance should be completed when the individual reports for duty. The prohibition now in effect at several installations visited against permitting personnel with interim clearances access to weapons should be universally established in all U. S. custodial detachments.

(3) The committee noted that a human reliability program, in conformance with the Department of the Air Force Regulation 35-9, is in effect or being placed in effect at all Air Force units. In this connection, the committee believes that the Air Force program is most effective in that it requires the pre-screening of individuals prior to assignment to atomic facilities. Army units inspected also had a human

reliability program. However, in the Army, the program consisted only of advising officers and supervisors of the need for alertness and judgment in detecting evidence of impending mental illness or emotional stress among assignees. The committee understands that a human reliability program of comparable scope and application to that of the Air Force is not intended for application within Army units. The committee believes that all services involved in the atomic weapons program should apply a program for human reliability of the scope as now established for Air Force units. At a future date when more operational experience has been gained, the human reliability program should be evaluated by DOD to determine its effectiveness and any improvements required.

(4) Although the quality of personnel in the program appears to be good, this appears to have been often accomplished only as a result of very intensive effort on the part of supervisory personnel. The committee wishes to stress the importance of continuing an active program designed to assure that future generations of officers and enlisted personnel assigned to these custodial detachments are equally as well trained and qualified. The custodial units carry a unique responsibility, yet their activities are routine and uneventful and are not looked upon as challenging duty, particularly after a unit becomes well established. It is important that the commanding officer, key officer and non-commissioned officer personnel have previous training and experience in special weapons or weapon delivery assignments and that the rank of individuals in key positions be high enough to assure maturity and effectiveness in dealing with host nationals. In addition, recognition should be given to the isolated nature and austere environmental conditions connected with assignment to many of these custodial detachments. The services should take all action feasible to enhance the attractiveness of assignment to these duties.

(5) Notwithstanding the obvious difficulties in assessing the procedures for selecting and clearing allied personnel who are involved in the security of the storage locations, based on information furnished by U. S. personnel, the committee is of the opinion that the host nations were satisfying the requirements of the agreements which control this activity. It was understood that the allied personnel had national clearances that were described as being equivalent to U. S. Top Secret or Secret clearances. The committee understands that assurance that host nation personnel are properly cleared is received by custodial detachment commanders.

c. Organization of guard forces.

The host nation guard forces used for the protection of sites are considered to be entirely adequate. These forces were invariably present in sufficient numbers to provide good security coverage. [redacted] The posts appeared to be organized and located to permit thorough security control of the areas without exposing weapons to access by the guards.

d. Emergency procedures.

Within each guard force, there are varying numbers of men assigned to sabotage alert teams. These teams usually consist of 5 to 10 men who are prepared to respond to emergencies in less than 5 minutes. In addition, alert plans require backup forces of as many as 50 guards to respond to emergencies within 20 minutes. There is also a requirement for augmentation alert forces of at least company strength to be designated to respond to emergency situations within 4 hours. Although the arrangements were not inspected at all facilities, the committee, based on discussions with U. S. officials, believes that these arrangements are generally satisfactory. In several cases the sabotage alert teams and backup alert forces were exercised and the response times were well within requirements.

e. Physical plant and control of access.

(1) In the course of its survey the committee visited both temporary and permanent sites. It was found that permanent sites were for the most part well located and well maintained. Temporary sites have, because of operational requirements, been occupied pending the completion of permanent facilities. The committee understands that difficulties in acquiring suitable land in many cases necessitated the occupancy of less desirable positions. However, aside from being poorly located, it was noted that improvements to some temporary sites required an inordinate length of time to complete. Greater emphasis should be placed on speeding the movement from temporary to permanent locations, or, in cases where that is impossible, to reducing the length of time that is now taken to improve the temporary sites.

(2) There were deviations in the physical security programs from one site to the other which, while on their face would not seriously affect the over-all adequacy of the program, tend to establish a lack of basic uniformity in the application of the program which the committee believes is undesirable. Standardization from program to program, and from Service to Service, is desirable and EUCOM should take necessary action toward that end. The committee also believes that the authority to grant waivers with respect to security requirements should be reserved to EUCOM. The committee noted examples of sites located on terrain that increased the difficulty of providing proper security protection. Waivers had been given in some instances for these sites. It was explained that these sites were the only ones available and had been approved because of the urgent necessity to achieve operational capability. When it is necessary to establish sites on terrain that is difficult to protect, or in cases where waivers are granted for other conditions, the committee believes that the usual security measures should be supplemented.

(3) Procedural differences notwithstanding, the physical arrangements at quick reaction alert areas and weapon storage areas of the sites visited did permit proper control of access. The access procedures were coupled with application of the requirement that at least

two persons be present whenever access to a weapon is involved. In the case of access to storage areas, lists of authorized persons were on hand and badge exchange or personal recognition systems were enforced. Quick reaction alert areas were surrounded by fences and constantly patrolled by walking guards or dog patrols or combinations of both. The external security protection provided by user nation security forces appeared to be entirely adequate.

f. Security procedures for weapons transportation.

The security measures in effect for the protection of nuclear weapons in transit were found to be adequate and consistent with the requirements of the Service to Service agreements. As a minimum the convoys consist of a convoy commander, security guards in front of and behind the weapons transport, buffer vehicles in front of and behind the transport, a U. S. custodian and a wrecker. The vehicles of the commander, custodian, guards, and in some cases buffer vehicles, are equipped with radio communications. Demolition material was also carried with the convoys. The numbers of guards in the convoys and the composition of the convoys did vary between commands. However, on the basis of the information furnished by the U. S. officials contacted, it appears that weapons are well protected in transit.

g. Evacuation and destruction procedures.

(1) The need for and problems associated with evacuation and/or destruction plans for nuclear weapons in the NATO area seemed to be well understood in the locations visited. However, the procedures which have been developed are limited in their probable effectiveness under some conditions which could arise.

(2) In general, three sets of plans are ready in each locale; (1) evacuation with host nation support, (2) evacuation without host nation support, but without hindrance by host forces, and (3) destruction ir place (including in routine or evacuation convoy). Expected times required range from 2 to 48 hours to be on the move in the first case, from 4 hours to essentially impossible in the second, and 20 minutes to 14 hours in the third.

(3) Responsibility for evacuation and/or destruction seemed to be quite clearly established. The authorization would normally come from EUCOM, but authority is automatically delegated in steps down the line to the senior officer on duty of the individual units in the event of communication failure and the requirement to evacuate or destroy is evident.

(4) Where possible, evacuation is planned to be by air transport. No aircraft are specifically held ready for this, but a support requirement has been imposed on USAFE to divert planes on a

priority basis as needed. Assuming evacuation of only one or a few bases, aircraft should be available by the time the weapons are ready for loading. Massive evacuation would undoubtedly flood the system.

(5) When surface evacuation is necessary, it will normally be to the nearest usable airfield or port only. In most cases, host nation transportation must be used, or else U. S. transportation sent in. The road nets have been studied to the extent possible, and normal convoy transportation over these roads has been observed to get time and potential trouble estimates. No specific evacuation exercises had been performed at the locations visited. The committee agrees that full scale exercises would be impracticable.

(6) At all locations visited, destruction devices and trained personnel are available near the weapons at all times to accomplish destruction, if ordered. Shaped charges aimed at the weapon's high explosive, initiated electrically or by delay fuzes, are planned. These techniques will deny the use of the weapons to the enemy, but will not necessarily destroy the design information revealed by the weapon. This is particularly true in the case of two-stage weapons. The committee understands that recent tests indicate that such destruction of design information is very difficult, even under ideal conditions.

(7) Further emphasis should be placed on destruction as the major defense against take-over, both in the planning in the field and in the AEC/DOD design areas. Although evacuation will always be desirable, emergency situations which present take-over situations may very well preclude it. Better methods for achieving destruction and better procedures for using these methods should be studied. Systems which could be used to destroy the contents of a storage igloo, for example, without the preparations being clearly obvious to the host nation forces (or any other observer) would be worthwhile.

h. Clandestine radiography.

(1) During the past six months, an initial sweep to detect attempts at clandestine radiography has been performed at all locations visited. In general, the storage areas, vehicles used for transportation, alert areas, and potential trouble spots on normal convoy routes have been checked, by visual inspection for unusual or unexpected objects, and, where equipment was available, with radiation monitoring equipment.

(2) Present plans call for such sweeps on a periodic basis; monthly for quick reaction alert areas; quarterly for other areas such as storage igloos; and, each time a vehicle is used. In addition, on a local basis, various techniques for handling special problems, like convoys, have been developed and are in use. These range from placing dental X-ray film plates inside weapon containers to having explosive ordnance disposal personnel with radiation monitoring equipment accompany each convoy.

(3) The initial sweeps and the procedures now in effect appear adequate as an interim measure, both to alert custodial units to the possibility of clandestine radiography and to provide reasonable assurance for the detection of surreptitious radiography. Further work is needed to better define the problem and, if found to be necessary, to develop improved techniques for handling it in the field. This activity should be done primarily by the AEC/DOD design agencies, with inputs from the operating forces as appropriate.

7. In the course of the survey the attention of the committee was focused in several instances on the difficulty that might arise from problems in communication between U. S. and allied personnel, particularly in times of emergency. In each location the committee noted that a number of the allied personnel, particularly in the officer category, had some fluency in English. Headquarters, EUCOM has now published a directive which requires that U. S. personnel be given on-duty instruction in the language of the nation in which they are assigned. The implementation of this program has already begun at several of the locations visited by the committee. These two developments should do much to reduce the language problem. The committee notes that the various technical agreements generally provide that U. S. weapon check lists and safety rules should be translated into the host nation language. Since this was not found to have been accomplished in all instances, it is recommended that EUCOM pursue the accomplishment of this requirement at the earliest possible date to ensure the safe handling of nuclear components. The committee suggests that the Department of Defense support EUCOM to the extent possible in developing training courses which will provide the language capability desired.

8. The committee findings and recommendations have been discussed in the body of the report. However, in order to emphasize those issues which require immediate action, the following list of summarized recommendations is submitted. It is recommended that:

a. The Department of Defense take action to standardize the implementation of the custodial system. In this respect the committee believes that as a minimum at least two custodians should be on duty at all times and that their present scope of responsibilities should be extended to include the frequent inspection of buildings and igloos in which weapons are stored. The committee further recommends that at installations where detachment headquarters are located so remotely from storage areas that immediate supervision and direction of custodians cannot be provided, a U. S. officer custodian be assigned at the storage site on a 24-hour basis.

b. Present personnel requirements be revised to provide that all personnel assigned to U. S. custodial detachments receive a clearance based on background investigation. These clearances should be completed before an individual reports for duty and the present policy of permitting personnel with interim clearances access to weapons should be cancelled.

c. The Department of Defense require all services to institute a human reliability program of a scope equal to the present Air Force program.

d. The Department of Defense assure that action is taken to eliminate temporary facilities at the earliest possible time. In cases where temporary facilities must be continued, the length of time involved in improving the sites should be reduced.

e. The authority to grant waivers of security measures be centralized in EUCOM.

f. Without de-emphasizing the need for thorough and realistic evacuation plans, concentrate efforts on providing unilateral emergency destruction means. With as many weapon systems as possible, research should be directed toward the development of quickly activated destruction equipment. In this connection the committee notes that the Department of Defense and Atomic Energy Commission are currently studying permissive link applications to weapons, which could, depending on the success of the development, affect this recommendation.

g. The Department of Defense determine what further research and development work is necessary to provide a better capability for custodial detachments to carry out assigned missions. Consideration might be given, for example, to quick destruction devices, security alarms or other equipment.

h. The Department of Defense make available to the custodial detachments further information concerning radiography techniques.

i. That EUCOM actively pursue the role it has recently assumed in carrying out the supervision and periodic inspection of the program.

This report has been approved by the following members of the committee:

CHARLES B. LAYTON
Colonel, GS
Chairman

DWIGHT A. INK
AEC Member

C. DONALD GARRETT
DOD Member

WILLIAM T. RILEY
AEC Member

THOMAS M. METZ
Colonel, USA
DOD Member

RICHARD E. GEORGI
AEC Member

DAVID J. DUFF
Lt. Colonel, USAF
DOD Member

D. M. OLSON
AEC Member

Inclosure 1

COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP

Department of Defense Representatives

Colonel Charles B. Layton, Chairman

Mr. C. Donald Garrett

Colonel Thomas M. Metz, U. S. Army

Lt. Colonel David J. Duff, U. S. Air Force

Atomic Energy Commission Representatives

Mr. Dwight A. Ink

Mr. William T. Riley

Mr. Richard E. Georgi

Mr. D. M. Olsen

COMMITTEE OBSERVERS

Mr. John S. Graham, Commissioner, Atomic Energy Commission

Mr. John T. Conway, Assistant Director, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

Mr. Alan James, State Department

Mr. John H. Pender, State Department

Inclosure 2

MISSION

The following quotation, from a letter dated 28 March 1962, from the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), to the Committee Chairman, describes the committee's purpose and the subjects to be surveyed:

"Purpose: The purpose of the survey is to determine the adequacy of security of U. S. nuclear weapons provided in the custody of the United States in support of non-U.S. forces in NATO. The survey will be limited strictly to security considerations. The purpose of the visit will be referred to as 'inspection of arrangements for U. S. custody of nuclear weapons.'

Subjects to be Surveyed:

a. Division of responsibilities for protection of weapons between the U. S. forces and Allied forces.

b. Security clearance procedures for guard and security force personnel, status of clearances of such personnel assigned.

c. Organization of guard forces.

d. Emergency procedures, personnel and equipment for security alert force.

e. Physical plant and control of access to facilities and weapons.

f. Security procedures for weapons transportation when weapons are not being transported by U. S. forces.

g. Evacuation and destruction procedures.

h. Measures to protect against clandestine radiography."

Inclosure 3

LOCATIONS VISITED

Headquarters, U. S. European Command



Inclosure 4

VIEWS OF AEC REPRESENTATIVES CONCERNING THE ADEQUACY OF CUSTODIAL ARRANGEMENTS

As stated in the body of the committee report, we believe that very substantial progress has been made in the last eighteen months in improving the security arrangements at NATO sites containing nuclear weapons. Although the committee report suggests additional steps to be taken, it should be recognized that these recommended steps, which we all support, have been developed within the limitations of the existing policy framework applicable to retention of possession over U. S. weapons. The committee report does not attempt to review this policy.

The AEC representatives believe that any conclusion with respect to the adequacy of the United States' custodial arrangements requires evaluation of this basic policy as well as the effectiveness of its implementation. Without, in any way, detracting from the excellent work done in this area over the past eighteen months, we believe it necessary to point out that the policy within which all U. S. custodial units are functioning provides only a very minimal degree of U. S. control and possession of U. S. nuclear weapons. In this respect, the U. S. now has only a very limited physical capability at non-U. S. NATO sites to prevent guards or other personnel of the host nation from seizing control of U. S. nuclear weapons.

The cornerstone of the existing policy and the arrangements made to implement it lies in the fact that such an act would be in violation of the agreements which have been entered into with the host country and a direct act against the U. S. government. It is asserted that this provides a reasonably effective deterrent and that the custodial arrangements, therefore, meet the requirements of national policy as embodied in the Atomic Energy Act.

In a sense, our principal custodial efforts have been directed, not toward ensuring a physical capability to keep U. S. weapons from the hands of host country nationals, but rather, toward developing physical arrangements under which a technical act of force against the U. S. would have to take place before such an event could occur.

The survival of the U. S. and the free world demands that the U. S. concentrate on providing a powerful nuclear striking force which can be used to deter Communist aggression. In providing this force, the U. S. cannot overlook the possible consequences of custodial arrangements which could at a very critical time result in the sudden loss of the nuclear weapons necessary for this deterrent.

One of the most disastrous consequence which could flow from a take-over of nuclear weapons by a host country would be the firing of one or

more nuclear weapons into Sovier Bloc territory, thus risking the triggering of the nuclear holocaust the world is trying to avoid. Yet, such a firing could well be an important goal to certain elements who were either impatient with our willingness to negotiate with the Soviets, or who had come to doubt seriously U. S. willingness to use atomic weapons in defense of their country. A similar firing into a non-Communist or neutral country, with whom the host nation was in difficulty, could also have grave consequences.

In evaluating the present concept of custodial possession, it is necessary to take into consideration other types of situations which could develop during the life of our stockpile agreements. Conditions can change greatly over the course of a few years. For example, a sudden coup could conceivably take place in one of these countries which would place that nation in the hands of a Pro-Communist - or at least Anti-American neutralist - ruler. Under present custodial arrangements, and in the absence of timely intelligence information which would permit appropriate U. S. action, such a ruler should have little difficulty in taking over all U. S. atomic weapons located at non-U. S. bases in his country. He would then possess the full design of these U. S. weapons and could use those weapons to greatly strengthen his hand in international power plays and to enhance his prestige and power within his country.

Other kinds of developments can also be visualized which would produce sufficient chaos or unfriendly military action in at least a portion of a host country to permit the takeover of weapons. These actions would seem to be logical objectives of the Communists in those areas in which they have substantial numbers of followers within reach of a nuclear installation. Furthermore, our present arrangements offer only limited U. S. protection against dissident groups infiltrating the host guard force at weapons sites and seizing nuclear weapons for use in an internal uprising or contemplated coup. The same is true regarding an act of sabotage involving an atomic detonation designed to force withdrawal of the United States nuclear capability from that nation.

It seems completely impractical to provide sufficient U. S. guards at all contemplated NATO nuclear sites to ensure against the physical takeover of U. S. weapons in the event a host country wished to make such a move. Withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from non-U. S. sites in NATO would also seem to be an impractical alternative, though the extent of dispersal of U. S. weapons in support of non-U. S. forces is an appropriate matter for review, particularly those weapons capable of being delivered beyond the borders of the country in which they are located. The more extensive the dispersal of U. S. weapons, the greater the opportunity for takeover of the weapons by the host country and the possible compromise of Restricted Data. Balanced against these concerns, however, are other important factors such as the decreased vulnerability to enemy attack which results from widespread dispersal.

CONCLUSION:

We believe that the above discussion lends emphasis to the importance of improving existing custodial arrangements in part through measures not fully dependent upon the cooperation of the host nationals. These include the following:

1. The U. S. should make every effort to retain such positive control over its nuclear weapons as to be able to destroy the weapons in order to prevent them from passing into non-U. S. hands. Under present plans, destruction of the weapons would be performed by U. S. personnel, but only with the full knowledge and cooperation of the host nationals who could easily prevent destruction if they wished. As is recommended in the report, the U. S. should strive to develop destruction plans which could be carried out by U. S. personnel independent of the wishes of the host nationals. This effort should include immediate developmental work in the laboratory concerning existing systems and should be a consideration at the time of development of new weapons.

There are situations in which such an independent U. S. destruct capability probably cannot be made adequate. This destruct capability would require at least some advance warning, which may not materialize. Further, it may be very difficult to develop an independent destruct technique applicable to weapons on alert aircraft which would not degrade operational capability or pose a safety problem. Therefore, overreliance should not be placed upon this capability.

2. U. S. control of nuclear weapons would be materially enhanced in some situations by the use of "permissive links". Such devices could substantially delay their use by foreign nationals and, to the extent we can safely develop means of assuring the self-destruction of the weapons in the event of attempts to by-pass the permissive link, such groups would be denied use of the weapons. It should be stressed that the feasibility of installing such devices in existing weapons systems may vary considerably from one system to another and is affected substantially by the environment in which the weapon system exists. This area also merits substantial developmental effort on a rapid timescale.

3. The AEC representatives also believe that the role of the custodial personnel should be standardized in order to assure the application of the same basic philosophy in regard to the custodians' obligation to defend the weapons, and his responsibilities to assure U.S. possession and control of these weapons. At several installations, custodians have been instructed to use their sidearms not to defend the nuclear weapon, but only in defense of their lives, or when requested by the host national forces to assist in repelling a threat to nuclear weapons. At other installations, custodians had been specifically instructed to use force in defending the weapons.

We believe that the custodians throughout the whole program should be assigned responsibility for providing internal security protection of the site, including frequent inspection of the weapon storage areas, with clear instructions to use force in protecting nuclear weapons in their custody. In this connection, we recommend rescinding the provision of Annex E, CINCEUR SUP SASP (REV.), which states: "Minimum custodial requirements are met by: ...Preventing the use of custodial personnel as security guards or as sentries." The limited capabilities of the custodial force to resist a major assault should not preclude their use as a deterrent against sabotage activities involving individuals or small groups. Further, we cannot reconcile ourselves to the philosophy that U. S. personnel should not attempt to protect weapons which are required by law to remain in U. S. possession.

Inclosure 5

DOD REPRESENTATIVES' POSITION WITH RESPECT TO CUSTODY

The DOD members of the committee feel that any consideration of the legality of present custodial arrangements or postulation as to the appropriateness of the custodial concept in relation to U. S. - NATO overall military strategy is not within the purview of this committee. Further, such considerations were not formally discussed with the EUCOM representatives and the committee has not had access to or considered the vast volume of material which is involved. If existing arrangements are thought to require such extensive review, responsible officials within the several interested agencies should address the subject. However, we do not have reason to believe that such a review is indicated. Present custodial requirements are considered to be adequately described and understood within the DOD. Over an extended period of time the DOD has operated on the premise that the present arrangements are authorized by law and have at least the tacit acceptance of the executive and legislative branches of the government. We are aware of no fundamental changes in the program or in the national objectives and strategies which would indicate a need for re-evaluation by this committee or by the DOD.

The program for the dispersal of weapons for the use of our allies rests upon the mutual trust that exists between our nation and a user or host nation. When dispersal in support of NATO forces is accomplished, the U. S. agrees to rely upon the security that is furnished by an ally. This agreement does not contemplate a second echelon of security to be furnished by U. S. forces. It certainly does not envisage that small, lightly equipped custodial detachments should be expected to forcibly protect weapons. These detachments can only provide a manifestation of this nation's ownership, possession and control of weapons. Even heavily augmented custodial detachments could not themselves provide adequate protection against many types of threats that could conceivably exist.

It is of paramount importance to recognize that a clear distinction must be made between custody and security. A custodian under the current concept does not have security responsibility. That responsibility is vested in the user nation. In any case of threat to the security of a special weapon the user nation is obliged to provide the amount of force necessary to cope with that threat. We believe this clear separation between custody and security is not only convenient but necessary in order to avoid the added confusion that would exist if security responsibility were to be somehow divided between U. S. and non-U. S. forces. This division of responsibility does not preclude the use of force by the U. S. custodian in a situation when all established host nation security resources available to him have failed or have not responded in time to prevent loss of custody.

It is possible to speculate at great length about the possibility of penetration of a storage location by a dissident group of nationals of a host nation. It is conceivable that such a group may even consist in part or entirely of members of the guard force that is responsible for the protection of our weapons. It is understandable that these paths of speculation could lead to a feeling of uneasiness about the present dispersal of special weapons, when followed without the benefit of full information on contingency plans.

The DOD members believe that contingencies, such as those mentioned by the AEC members as being necessary to consider in evaluating the custody concept, have been considered many times by civilian and military authorities who have been empowered and required to make such evaluations. They have undoubtedly been weighed in the balance against U. S. and NATO politico-military policies and objectives. Also, any hypothesis which considers the repercussions from a loss of custody should recognize the whole body of physical, psychological and political deterrents in effect ant not only be related to the adequacy of the security guard force on duty.

To the arguments concerning the legality and adequacy of existing arrangements the DOD can only rely on the response that the present system has been expressly designed to meet legal requirements and protect U. S. interests while at the same time making possible the responsive NATO nuclear capability that is generally conceded to be necessary. We feel that the legal requirements are met and that U. S. interests are protected by providing weapons storage and operational environments that are as physically secure as practicable and in which custody is maintained by U. S. personnel.

Consequently, while the DOD members believe that it is appropriate to recognize the wide range of problems associated with the dispersal of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, it should be the present purpose of this committee to concentrate on evaluating the system which has been devised to assure that the U. S. retains custody and control over the arming and use of these weapons. The DOD members believe that a meaningful evaluation has been made by the committee as reflected in the conclusions and recommendations of the report.

FG

file with the 2 reports

13

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL MANAGER

To: Chuck

I thot this might be helpful to you. However, I am sure you will be looking to DOD for a more complete rundown on implementation, if you pursue the matter further.

Dwight

Office of the General Manager

GPO 929026

2232

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : Amcongen TORONTO

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AIRA

DATE: JUN 27 1966

FROM : Embassy OTTAWA

SUBJECT : International Assembly on Nuclear Weapons

REF : Ottawa's A-1207, May 31, 1966 AE 6 SCI

Enclosed are four copies of an address delivered by the Prime Minister at the International Assembly on Nuclear Proliferation at Scarborough (Toronto) on June 25.

Also enclosed are four copies of a newspaper article by Cameron Smith of the Toronto Globe and Mail describing the accomplishments of the Assembly.

BUTTERWORTH

Enclosures: all w.m.

1) Prime Minister's speech (4)
2) Newspaper article (~~4~~) 1 Copy

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

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☒ In ☐ Out

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ADDRESS BY THE PRIME MINISTER,
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE L.B. PEARSON,
TO THE INTERNATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
SCARBOROUGH, ONTARIO, JUNE 25, 1966.

It is a great pleasure for me to have the opportunity to address such a distinguished gathering. On behalf of the Canadian Government I wish to extend a warm welcome to the members of other governments, the senior diplomatists and public officials, scientists, newspapermen and scholars who have come from many countries to consider together the question of controlling nuclear weapons. I also wish to express my appreciation to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, to the American Assembly, to the Institute of Strategic Studies, and to the Board of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, all of whom have co-operated in making this conference possible.

During these last few days you have been discussing the broad topic of "nuclear proliferation" and the many dangers arising from the threat of the further spread of nuclear weapons. Tonight I venture to place before you, briefly and in an over-simplified way, my views on these dangers and on possible measures to reduce them.

In recent years, arms control proposals have foundered on the reef of what is judged to be the national interest, without sufficient weight being given by governments to their broader responsibility to the international community as a whole. Yet when the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons makes national interest coincide with international responsibility, surely it is the common national objective of all peoples and governments, to remove the possibility that these weapons will be used.

There is no need for me to dwell on the frightening and fantastic development of military power since the end of World War II. By the early sixties, this development, fortunately, had resulted in a relatively stable, if uneasy, balance of nuclear strength between the United States and the Soviet Union; a balance based on the ability of each to destroy the other regardless of who or where the first attack was launched; the balance of shared capacity for mutual annihilation. The certain knowledge that rash and ill-considered action by either one which threatened the vital interests of the other might lead to a nuclear exchange fatal to both, has up to the present deterred both sides from pushing any such actions to a showdown. The frightening realities of this power balance were revealed in the Cuban crisis of 1962.

One result of the reaction to that particular confrontation was the subsequent agreement between Washington, Moscow and London on a Partial Nuclear Test Ban. It was agreed to install a direct communication link between Washington and Moscow. A short time later, the great powers were able to agree on a United Nations resolution prohibiting the orbiting in outer space of weapons of mass destruction.

These measures were important in themselves, since they were the first tangible steps towards arms control after continuous debate and negotiation since 1946. But beyond their intrinsic value, I suggest that they are also of importance because they mark a tacit understanding by the two nuclear superpowers to avoid direct confrontations which would threaten the outbreak of nuclear war. In this way, both East and West have acknowledged the danger of disrupting the existing power balance. They have attempted to reduce conflicts of interest even if they have by no means succeeded in eliminating all potentially dangerous situations.

The existence now of a detente between East and West - even an uneasy one - provides us with an opportunity to re-examine afresh the need to control the arms race; to question whether we should continue to devote such a tragically large proportion of human and material resources to the improvement of weapons whose use would threaten humanity's very survival.

A thorough re-appraisal is particularly appropriate today, when both the major powers face the question of whether or not to take a significant step in the arms race - that is, whether to produce and to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system. The deployment of such a system would be an enormously costly undertaking which in the end would probably lead, as the ballistic missile race did, to ever-mounting defence budgets without any permanent increase in national security or international stability.

There are those who will argue that it is not just a question of the two major powers agreeing not to deploy A.B.M. systems in relation to each other. They point to the need for protective measures against the looming threat of Communist China, with its potential nuclear capability. But I suggest that the day when North America or Europe should be genuinely concerned about a nuclear attack by China is still many years in the future. Moreover, it is my view that fear of possible future developments should not deter us from a course of action which offers promise of substantial benefits in the immediate future. If the result of such a re-assessment were a tacit understanding by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to refrain from the development of A.B.M. systems - and so prevent a new dimension of escalation of the arms race - the dividends in terms of reduced tension and enhanced international stability would place us all in a much better position to examine the vital political issues which still divide us and which so largely determine our prospects for reducing armaments.

We accept the inevitability of change in international relationships and institutions. The world does not stand still so any balance of power which now exists is not permanently assured. The elements of the nuclear equation do not remain constant. New factors emerge, and old ones change. The major powers are continually refining and improving their nuclear weapons. Within the present decade, two additional nations have emerged as nuclear powers. Other potential candidates are now weighing the advantages of joining the nuclear club. Moreover, the number of states capable of developing their own nuclear weapons is constantly increasing. We face - not as an academic problem but in a very real and urgent form - the dangers of proliferation. These dangers are upon us. The further spread of nuclear weapons will increase the risk of nuclear war and so the insecurity of all nations. It could add a new and threatening factor to historical, ethnic and territorial disputes existing between nations. A decision by one country to acquire nuclear weapons would almost certainly generate strong pressure on others to take similar action. International relations would thereby be made more complicated and more dangerous. Agreements on arms control measures would become more difficult to achieve and any prospect of progress in this field would recede. Moreover, there would be greater risk of nuclear war breaking out as a result of human error flowing from defective control arrangements or through the action of irresponsible elements into whose hands the weapons might fall.

Further nuclear proliferation is most likely to occur in countries faced with a conventional or nuclear threat but lacking the protection and security afforded by membership in a nuclear alliance. In such circumstances, certain non-aligned countries might be persuaded to create a nuclear arsenal in the vain hope of improving their national security; or in anticipation of a similar development by a hostile neighbour; or in order to enhance their national prestige and their international influence.

The prevention of such nuclear proliferation is important and urgent. In his annual report for 1965, the U.N. Secretary-General describes it as "the most urgent question of the present time which should remain at the very top of the disarmament agenda". President Johnson has made clear the central place in his administration's policy of the effort to control, to reduce and ultimately to eliminate modern engines of nuclear destruction; to act now to prevent nuclear spread, to halt the nuclear arms race and to reduce nuclear stocks.

In his message to the ENDC of last February 1, Chairman Kosygin said "If we do not put an end to the proliferation in the world of nuclear weapons, the threat of the unleashing of nuclear war will be increased many times." Unfortunately, not all the potential nuclear powers have tkan such an unequivocal stand.

The issues involved in this matter are so complex that no single measure is likely to provide a solution. Where considerations of national security and international prestige are closely intertwined, answers must be sought in several directions if we are to succeed in preventing nuclear proliferation. Measures proposed will need to take into account the factors motivating countries to seek nuclear weapons and to make provision for appropriate disincentives. Obviously, too, we must concentrate on those countries capable of achieving nuclear status - not in the more remote future, but over the next decade.

The discussions at present going on - or shall I say dragging on - at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee for an international treaty to limit the spread of nuclear weapons make little progress, despite the urgency of the matter. But the time used for argument on general principles will have been wasted unless it results in an instrument linking both the nuclear and non-nuclear countries. These discussions have revealed the existence of two different types of problems. The first is the question of

multilateral nuclear-sharing. This has its origin in the desire of the non-nuclear members of NATO for a voice in the planning and management of the nuclear forces on which they feel their own security so largely depends. The discussion here has made plain the importance of a clear and precise definition of proliferation.

On this issue, we in Canada stand on the principles embodied in the Irish Resolution adopted by an overwhelming majority at the General Assembly in 1961. We are convinced that proliferation would not occur under the terms of a treaty which required that the present nuclear powers must retain full control of their nuclear weapons. Perhaps such a treaty should prohibit, specifically, the transfer of such control to states, groups of states or other entities; requiring that the present nuclear states must at all times maintain the power of veto over deployment and firing of such nuclear weapons.

The nuclear-sharing issue is, of course, closely connected with a second and broader question, that of European security, which, in its turn, is concerned with the settlement of important political questions on that continent.

While much of the present lack of progress in efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation derives from difficulties about nuclear-sharing and European security, it seems to me that in the long run these questions may prove less intractable than the other problem of the national development of nuclear weapons by states with the technical skill, resources, and industrial base which could enable them to produce such weapons; and who feel that this is necessary for security reasons.

For the non-aligned countries, security assurances to prevent this development raise complex issues affecting their non-aligned status, their relations with the great powers and with their immediate neighbours. In India, for example, which is confronted

by a hostile China, these issues are particularly acute and have recently given rise to public discussion. Within the last few weeks Foreign Minister Swaran Singh stated in the Indian Parliament that if the nuclear powers wished a non-proliferation treaty, they must be prepared to make some sacrifices. Among other things he went on to recount the merits of a multilateral international guarantee to reassure the non-nuclear countries against nuclear blackmail.

Security assurances of this kind raise important issues for the nuclear powers. They already have commitments to their allies and the acceptance of new commitments might tend to strain their military resources and complicate their political relations with other nuclear powers as well as with rivals of countries to whom a guarantee was extended. While the great powers might be prepared to accept responsibilities commensurate with their status, there are of course limits to the responsibilities they can be expected to undertake.

Attention has been given recently to this question of providing the non-aligned countries with adequate assurances about security which at the same time might help to dissuade them from developing their own nuclear weapons. President Johnson made a constructive contribution when he declared in 1964 that "nations not following the nuclear path will have our strong support against threats of nuclear blackmail". At the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, U.S. delegates suggested that such assurances might take the form of an Assembly resolution.

More recently Chairman Kosygin has proposed a type of indirect assurance under which the nuclear powers would undertake not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries which do not have nuclear weapons on their territory. While this proposal may have certain attractions, we must recognize a difficulty in establishing as a fact whether nuclear weapons are present in certain areas.

Furthermore, the additional security offered by this suggestion will be measured against its possible disruptive effect on the collective security aspects of alliances.

Non-alligned countries, however, faced by a credible nuclear threat, may wish to enter into some form of collective security agreement with all the nuclear powers, or, if this proves impracticable, into arrangements with individual nations on an ad hoc basis.

A United Nations resolution signifying the intention of members to provide or support assistance to non-nuclear states subject to nuclear attack, or threats of attack, might also provide a form of useful collective assurance in no way incompatible with other and more direct arrangements.

Mention should be made of another difficult question, that of safeguards. Over the past decade, considerable progress has been made in elaborating the concept and in developing the practical application of the means of preventing nuclear materials which are supplied for peaceful use from being diverted to the manufacture of weapons. As a major uranium exporter, committed to supplying nuclear materials only for peaceful purposes, Canada is much encouraged to see the acceptance of international safeguards steadily gaining ground, either under the efficient system developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency or through equivalent arrangements of an organization such as Euratom. In the common effort to contain the nuclear threat, we regard safeguards as one of the important instruments which the international community has at its disposal.

Canada has participated actively in the working out of the IAEA safeguards system. Only this week we demonstrated again our support for and confidence in that system, in respect to our agreement with Japan for co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. We signed an agreement in Vienna under which the International

Atomic Energy Agency assumes the responsibility for administering the safeguards incorporated in the Canada-Japan Agreement.

If a non-proliferation treaty is to be effective, to inspire confidence, and to endure, it will require some means of verifying that the obligations undertaken by the signatories are being carried out. This should include a provision to ensure that peaceful nuclear activities and materials for them are not being used clandestinely for military purposes.

But if safeguards are to be acceptable and effective they must be acceptable and applicable to all states. These recognized systems of safeguards which are already applied by many countries to transactions involving transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes should be applied to cover all such international transfers. In this way an important step forward would be taken to prevent the development of nuclear weapons by additional countries. We in Canada support the inclusion in any treaty of a provision designed to achieve this objective.

I have suggested that the production of nuclear weapons by non-aligned countries would serve neither their individual national interest nor their collective responsibility to the international community. But I also suggest that it is unreasonable to expect such non-aligned countries to renounce in perpetuity modern methods of defence, if the nuclear powers themselves are not prepared to accept some restraints and parallel obligations; such as the extension of the nuclear test ban to underground testing. Such a comprehensive test ban would help to prevent the indigenous development and hence the further spread of nuclear weapons. At the same time, it would meet some of the objections of the non-aligned to what they suggest are the one-sided commitments they are being asked to make. Moreover, the political and psychological benefits likely to flow from such an agreement would help create the atmosphere in which it would be possible to make progress on further steps towards arms control.

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In order to ensure that it would not be clandestinely violated, however, a comprehensive test ban treaty must also make provision for adequate verification machinery. We must never lose sight of the importance of verification in agreements which affect the essentials of international security and stability.

There is a further question - that of nuclear-free zones. Some efforts - so far unsuccessful - have been made towards the establishment of nuclear-free zones in Latin America and Africa. Again, one of the major stumbling blocks is national interest. Nevertheless, it is well to remember that in 1959, countries with interests in the continent of Antarctica - both nuclear and non-nuclear states - were able to reconcile their differing viewpoints and to conclude a treaty which among other things established the continent as a nuclear-free zone and laid down procedures whereby treaty obligations could be effectively verified. This required some surrender of narrow national interest in favour of a broader collective responsibility to the international community. I would hope that in such areas as Latin America and Africa, and perhaps eventually the Middle East, the Far East, Europe, the Arctic and other regions where political factors are admittedly far more complex than those obtaining in Antarctica, we shall also see the immediate national interest subordinated to the wider national interest of stability and peace. All nations should encourage the countries that are now actively engaged in working out the mechanism of potential nuclear-free zones. Should one be successfully established in a populated area, we shall have an important precedent and a model for further arrangements of this kind which would contribute to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

I have already mentioned the emergence of China as a nuclear power and as a new factor in the nuclear equation. The Chinese leaders appear bent on achieving an effective military nuclear capability however long it takes and however much it costs. To

those seeking a peaceful world order, this prospect can only be viewed with deep concern. So long as China remains outside existing international councils, isolating herself from the influence of other governments and world opinion, she is the more likely to remain a recalcitrant and disturbing factor in the world balance of power.

Yet it seems clear that progress towards the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective measures of arms control require that all the principal world powers - including continental China - must be party to international discussions of these questions. Therefore, we should do everything possible to bring China into discussions about disarmament and other great international issues. This may make her more conscious of her responsibility as a member of the international community. In this endeavour, those who already have direct contact with Peking have a special and important role to play.

I have spoken tonight of some of the realistic and I believe, acceptable measures that could at least help to solve the problem of proliferation. Any or all of them could be incorporated in an eventual non-proliferation treaty, or associated with such a treaty, or agreed upon independently.

Agreed upon in any context, they would at least constitute some restraint on the spread of nuclear weapons. They would focus world interest on the fact that the world community is, indeed, trying to find the answer to this vital life-or-death question; they would reassure a world fearful of nuclear devastation that the world family, finally, accepts its collective responsibility for limiting a further spread of these weapons which, left unchecked, threaten to destroy our civilization.

Surely man, in 1966, is capable of giving at least these indications that our civilization is not only worth saving but, also capable of doing what is so desperately wanted in the hearts of all men.

Experts call for ban on subsurface tests

Toronto Globe and Mail 6/27

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By CAMERON SMITH

In what could be a prelude to a breakthrough at the deadlocked Geneva disarmament negotiations, scientific and political experts from 26 countries, including every major world power except China, called yesterday for a temporary halt to underground nuclear testing.

In a communique issued after a four-day conference here of the International Assembly on Nuclear Weapons, the experts suggested that all military nuclear powers should forego underground testing for a trial period during which suspicious earth tremors would be checked by a system of challenge and invitation.

Under the proposed system, if tremors emanating from a country could not be established as natural, the government of that country would be bound to either supply explanatory data or invite observers to investigate.

The experts, many of whom were senior government officials, were invited to the conference in their personal capacities. They emphasized they did not attend as representatives of their governments.

Following the conference, many of them expressed delight at the unexpected accord between Western and Communist-bloc participants.

"The final communique has a great deal more agreement in it between East and West than I would have thought possible," said Conference chairman Arnold Heeney, chairman of the Canadian section of the International Joint Commission.

During the summer of 1963, the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union signed a limited test ban treaty, but since then efforts to expand the treaty to include underground tests have proved fruitless.

The formal obstacle to a prohibition of underground tests has been the insistence of the Western powers on an inspection system to determine whether suspicious tremors result from earthquakes or secret explosions.

V. P. Pavlichenko, assistant scientific secretary of the Soviet Presidium, compared yesterday's conference to the Pugwash Conferences, which he said had contributed greatly to the formation of the limited test ban treaty.

The Pugwash Conferences, a series of annual meetings, designed to allow experts from various countries to discuss international problems informally were originally sponsored by U.S. industrialist Cyrus Eaton in Pugwash, N.S.

Yesterday's conference was sponsored by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Institute for Strategic Studies (a British organization) and the American Assembly.

One of the four Indian participants — Krishna C. Pant, the general secretary of the Congress Party in the Indian Parliament — said the greatest value of the conference lay in communication among the participants so they could better understand the psychological and political pressures that dictate the conduct of different nations.

Technical data could be readily understood, he said, but it was "only when you start discussing the other aspect, the human motivations, that the whole thing becomes complicated."

The head of the Soviet group — V. S. Emelyanov, chairman of the Soviet Academy of Sciences — said the conference was an important step toward the solution of the general problem of disarmament.

The communique said that if the trial suspension is not instituted, an alternative would be a "threshold treaty" banning all underground explosions above a minimum force.

The communique, described as generally acceptable to all participants, made a strong plea for a treaty limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

"In certain troubled areas, such as Europe, the Middle East and Asia, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by opposing powers might indefinitely postpone the prospects of political settlements."

The non-proliferation treaty would have to be signed by all nations having any nuclear capability, whether for civil or military purposes.

Civil nuclear powers could not be expected to sign a treaty to which the military powers were not parties, because "few, if any, countries would find much reassurance in any form of guarantee by one or more of the military powers, and because the civil nuclear powers in Asia have severe doubts about the wisdom of signing a treaty imposing mutual restraints, to which China is not a party."

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BRITAIN TO ALLOW CHECK ON REACTOR

Inspection by World Agency Set for Big Nuclear Plant

Special to The New York Times

LONDON, June 16—The Government disclosed today that it had decided to bring Britain's largest nuclear power plant within the control system of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Lord Chalfont, the Disarmament Minister, made the announcement in the House of Lords. It concerned the nuclear power station at Bradwell in Essex.

There were reports last winter that Britain was resisting appeals from the international agency to bring her nuclear installations under its inspection. But informed sources here said that there was no resistance, that the principle of international regulation had always been accepted and that only the details had remained.

N.Y. Times 6-17-65

Camera Press-Pix

Lord Chalfont

Nevertheless, the announcement was significant. Lord Chalfont noted that the Bradwell plant would be the largest in the world yet submitted to the control system of the international agency.

Inspection a Main Issue

Acceptance of the agency's rules includes willingness to undergo regular inspection. Inspection has long been the heart of the Western approach to disarmament but has thus far rejected by the Soviet Union.

The willingness of Britain to join in the international control system for civil uses of nuclear energy was the more important because it was a concession by a nuclear power.

The international agency has strong leverage with nonnuclear powers because it can offer in exchange technical assistance on the development of nuclear power.

"The Government hopes," Lord Chalfont told the House of Lords, "that this initiative will encourage other countries to take similar steps, thus increasing the effectiveness of the safeguards system and supporting the efforts made within the United Nations to limit the spread of nuclear weapons."

The United States agreed last year to bring its Yankee atomic electric power reactor in New England within the international agency's control system.

13 Teen-Agers in Jersey Beer-Party Raid



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Task Force
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N. Y. Times APR 18 1965

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U.S. URGES ALLIES TO BACK CONTROLS IN ATOMIC TRADING

International Safeguards in Reactor Sales Sought to Avoid Military Uses

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 17—The United States is urging its Western allies to join in a common front in insisting upon international controls over all foreign sales of atomic reactors and fuels.

Behind this diplomatic move is a concern that, in the developing competition to sell atomic power plants and fuel abroad, the Western nations may also spread the capability to produce atomic weapons.

The Administration's desire, therefore, is to achieve some agreement among the Western supplier nations that in all foreign sales they will require inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency to assure that any reactors or atomic fuel sold abroad are not diverted to military purposes.

Aggressive Efforts Urged

The desirability of international controls has been discussed periodically with the Western allies ever since the "Atoms for Peace" agency was established in 1958. But within some atomic energy and Congressional circles there has been criticism that the State Department has not been pushing aggressively enough to get the Western allies to accept the principle of international controls.

According to diplomats, a more aggressive effort on behalf of international controls has been undertaken in recent weeks, with overtures made in Britain, France, West Germany and other nations that are potential suppliers of reactors or uranium fuel.

This recent diplomatic campaign resulted from a realization that the need for international controls was no longer an academic question but an immediate problem. Within the last year or so, atomic power has advanced to the point of economic attractiveness. It seems likely that there will soon be growing international sales of atomic reactors and fuel.

As they have viewed this potential "traffic" in atomic equipment, officials have become increasingly concerned about the gap that now exists in international controls over the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

In its dealings with the Western nations, the United States has insisted upon bilateral controls, and more recently international controls. Within the six-nation European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), controls over atomic power plants are also set up.

There is however, no requirement for bilateral control, much less international controls over any atomic equipment or fuel that the Euratom nations or other Western countries may sell abroad. At present the international control system is only mandatory in the cases of atomic reactors or fuels sold through the international agency.

The United States recently adopted a firm policy of requiring international agency controls over all reactors sold abroad.

Temptation Cited

In principle, most of the Western nations have expressed a willingness to go along with with policy. But there is a concern that without a specific agreement, some of the Western nations, in the commercial competition to win a reactor contract, will be tempted to relax the control requirements. These requirements have been viewed by many underdeveloped nations as a discriminatory affront to their prestige and sovereignty.

Among the Western nations, France is viewed as the one nation likely to resist a common front on international controls. France traditionally has been somewhat cool and skeptical toward the international agency. Furthermore, there is a concern within France that the Administration has an ulterior purpose of ending the special relationship between the United States and Euratom and of shifting the present Euraton control function to the international agency.

A test case of France's attitude, as well as of Canada, another potential supplier of reactors and fuels, will be presented by two foreign sales now under negotiation. One is the sale of a French atomic power plant to Spain; the other is the sale of about $700 million worth of Canadian uranium ore to France.

The Washington Post Outl

SECTION E SUNDAY, APRIL

Our Bomb Factories

Passion and Frenzy Have Left The Business, But Dedicated Men Keep Arsenal Sound

By Howard Simons and Chalmers M. Roberts

Washington Post Staff Writers

"NOBODY LIKES to work in a bomb factory."

This comment by one of the key figures in the United States nuclear weapons program tells a part, but far from all, of the story of America's nuclear arsenal 20 years after the way of the world was irrevocably altered when the first atomic bomb exploded at Trinity Site near Alamogordo, N.M.

The frenzy of fashioning that first bomb is gone. The determination to end a world war is gone. The excitement of achieving something never before achieved is gone.

But American weapons designers are still improving and tinkering with the most powerful destructive force concocted by man. And there is always the hope, however faint, that a new weapon concept might be discovered in what otherwise has settled down to a grim, routine business.

In 1945, there was one key nuclear arsenal, the Los Alamos, N.M. Scientific Laboratory. Today there are three: Los Alamos, the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at Livermore, Calif., and the Sandia Corp. in Albuquerque, N.M. A recent visit to these centers left us with these impressions:

• The key men in these laboratories are worried about their future. They are apprehensive about talk of disarmament, about the bureaucracy in Washington, about the Russians and the Chinese and about other countries that they fear will join the Nuclear Club.

• But these same men are fiercely dedicated to their art and to their concept of the national interest. They only worry that their views may not be adequately considered by the White House, the Pentagon, the Atomic Energy Commission and Congress.

Though there is no direct relationship between the nuclear weapon and the kind of war now being fought in South Viet-Nam, the genie blown out of the bottle on July 16, 1945, continues to dominate what happens militarily and diplomatically there and everywhere else. Neither Russia nor China can move in Viet-Nam without considering whether it would provoke (a) a United States-Soviet nuclear war or (b) an American attack on China's still infant nuclear weapons establishment.

Treaty Has Compensations

AGAINST THIS backdrop, then, what are the present and the future of America's nuclear weaponry? This is the question to which we sought an answer, and what follows is what we heard.

The limited test-ban treaty, which restricts atomic weapons tests to underground blasts, has not slowed American weapons development as much as some predicted during the treaty debate. Los Alamos director Norris Bradbury, for example, says that his people have never had it so good, explaining that the regularity of underground testing insures a meaningful program.

Since the treaty was signed on Aug. 5, 1963, the United States has announced 40 weapons tests. Russia has

One of our early efforts:

Looking for Love



n underwater A-bomb test at Bikini Atoll in the Pacific in 1946.

conducted only a half dozen or so.

But the test ban does limit what can be done. It deprives testers of the environment in which weapons would be used; wars are not fought underground. Accordingly, some weapons scientists worry about the effects of nuclear blasts on radar and communications and on other nuclear weapons, and about whether the warheads and delivery systems will work in time of need.

One of the niggling concerns of some weapons designers is what the Russians may have learned during their last atmospheric test series in 1962, when they apparently pitted nuclear warheads against one another at high altitudes.

This kind of information could tell designers just how effective a nuclear blast can be in crippling an incoming missile and how best to protect warheads against such a possibility. Despite Washington judgments that the Russians learned nothing to upset the present balance of knowledge, weapons designers remain uneasy, for they live in the realm of possibility as well as of probability.

'Package Tests' Lacking

ANOTHER KIND of uneasiness is shown by those responsible for operational nuclear arms. Will they work? Some of the designs in the Nation's stockpiles have never been tested. Others have been tested piecemeal; that is, the warhead and its delivery system (such as the rocket) have been tested separately.

Of all our key defense weapons, however, only the Polaris has been "proof-tested"; that is, fired from a submarine and exploded "on target" as it would be in actual warfare. Yet United States defense is based not only on 416 Polaris missiles but also on 800 (soon to be 1000) intercontinental ballistic missiles buried in remote steel and concrete silos. Nor has the Davy Crockett atomic bazooka, the Army's chief nuclear weapon, been tested as a single package.

This uneasiness over operational reliability is reflected in a number of ways. Strategic Air Command officers express a preference for SAC's 710 su-

See BOMB, Page E3, Column 1

BOMB, From Page E1

perbombers—which they can physically control—over untested missiles. On the other hand, the March 1 test firing of a Minuteman missile (minus nuclear warhead and most of its fuel) from an underground silo in South Dakota gave the Air Force the same kind of good feeling about its weapon that the Navy got when the Polaris (with warhead) was fired off Johnston Island in 1962.

In contrast, the weapons designers are highly confident of the reliability of their atomic products though less so about the complicated electromechanical delivery systems that will put the warheads on target. Sandia Corp. president Siegmund P. Schwartz says of the atomic devices in the stockpile, "The reliability is not 100 per cent, but it's damn close."

Sandia, a nonprofit subsidiary of Western Electric under contract to the Atomic Energy Commission, designs the arming, fusing, firing and safety features of the nuclear explosives produced at Los Alamos and Livermore and fashions the shell casings into which it all must fit.

Total Ban Opposed

DESPITE A TREATY that limits testing, American atomic weapons experts are not overly unhappy with their present lot. Their tone changes drastically, however, when the possibility of a comprehensive test ban is mentioned.

Los Alamos's Bradbury, who supported the limited test ban, implied that he would balk at a comprehensive. He points out that the limited test ban has had no effect in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons.

John Foster, the youthful director of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, opposed even the limited test ban and believes that continued underground testing, at least, is necessary to maintain technical competence.

"These gadgets cannot be put into a silo or onto a shelf indefinitely," he said. "They rot—like any other hunk of electromagnetic equipment. And if we lose the skills to repair them, we will lose confidence in our stockpile."

Bradbury, Schwartz, Foster and others nonetheless concede that their techniques could survive even a comprehensive test ban for a time, just as they survived the 1958-61 moratorium on atomic testing. Bradbury, for example, estimates that ideas now kicking around could keep his weapons people busy for two to three years.

Los Alamos Diversified

IN SOME RESPECTS, Los Alamos (older than Livermore by ten years) is suffering from the same doubts that plague a middle-aged man who wonders whether he is as secure as he thought. Perhaps this explains why Los Alamos, where it all began, started to diversify in the late 1950s and today is only half a weapons laboratory. The other half, in terms of annual dollars ($50 million) if not in manpower, is devoted to civilian pursuits of atomic energy.

At Livermore, however, 90 per cent of its roughly comparable budget still goes to weapons work. Perhaps that explains the scrappier, more youthful attitudes there about the future of atomic weapons.

This does not mean that Livermore doesn't worry about its future. Like Los Alamos, it is having a difficult time attracting first-rate young physicists and engineers, hence the Foster comment that "nobody likes to work in a bomb factory." The chief reason, it seems, is that few young scientists and engineers regard nuclear weapons work as the cutting edge of science as it was when Fermi and Oppenheimer, Rabi and Teller were at Los Alamos.

The weapon-makers would like to counteract the curse of the bomb by stressing today's peaceful uses, such as radioisotopes in medicine and agriculture, electric power from the atom and the productive application of nuclear explosives. For example, Livermore is plugging for Carryall, a proposal to excavate a 10,000-foot-long, 350-foot-deep pass through California's Bristol Mountains for both Interstate Highway 40 and the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway.

Perhaps the most exciting area of physics today is high-energy research which probes atomic nuclei. That is why Los Alamos is fighting hard to win a "meson factory," scientific jargon for a high-energy atom-smasher.

With this kind of tool, Los Alamos feels that it will be able to attract the talent it needs. And the experience of both Los Alamos and Livermore has been that even those most negative about working in a "bomb factory" find weapons work exciting and scientifically challenging once they get their hands dirty, so to speak.

Meanwhile, there is the continuing problem of keeping the morale high among the scientists and the engineers who have devoted their careers to weapons work. Foster says, in effect, that his people must believe that their contributions have an influence on the changing balance of power. The fact is, of course, that the kind of work undertaken in the weapons laboratories is determined by Washington and Moscow, and soon, perhaps, by Peking.

There is no clear line of innovation in nuclear weaponry. Sometimes the military will ask for a weapon that can do a specific job. Sometimes the weapons researchers come up with a concept that appeals to the military.

It's a continuing effort that includes dusting off old ideas to see if technology that was lacking a decade ago has caught up with theories once cast aside as impracticable. High-speed computers, for example, now make it possible to tinker with a host of ideas in a way that was not possible in the 1950s.

A Hiroshima Miniature

THE UNITED STATES is not now actually fashioning new tactical or battlefield weapons. The Davy Crockett (originally designed to be fired from a throwaway fiber glass launcher) remains the smallest weapon in the Nation's arsenal.

In a warhead about the size of a basketball, it carries a nuclear punch estimated at from 20 to 40 kilotons and probably closer to the smaller figure than the larger. A 20-kt. warhead would hame 1/1000th the punch of the Hiroshima bomb.

The physicists say that even smaller weapons are possible but so far there is no Pentagon request for them. The problem is less one of physics or even engineering than a matter of strategy and tactics: How could or should such weapons be employed?

Conventional artillery and even smaller arms now compete with tactical nuclear weapons. Officials are reluctant to unleash nuclears in a jungle war such as in Viet-Nam, where they probably would not be very effective, and the late President Kennedy's concept of the "pause" before using nuclear weapons in the event of a European war is still the military rule.

At the other end of the spectrum is the superweapon, the 100-megaton



The "Fat Man," a plutonium bomb similar to that used on Nagasaki.

monster that the Russians boast is in their arsenal. There has never been a strong interest in a like American weapon, even though there is no trick to fashioning one. Pentagon strategy argues that it would make for more sense to place 100 one-megaton warheads accurately on a variety of targets.

All this does not mean that atomic weaponmakers today busy themselves with little more than adding chrome to their basic product, though there admittedly is an element of this. They do think of more exotic weapons: the neutron bomb (which worries the West Germans because neutrons can penetrate tank armor without destroying the tank), concentrated beams of light called lasers and an antimatter bomb. But few appear to believe that either the United States or Russia is likely to make the quantum jump into such exotic concepts.

A Job of Tailoring

WHAT IS IT, then, that the weaponmakers are doing? For the most part, they are shaping new warheads for new delivery systems and reshaping old warheads for improved delivery systems.

Livermore, for example, is expending 25 per cent of its time and talent on the warhead for Minuteman II, an improved Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile with greater range, greater accuracy and a more powerful nuclear punch. Another 25 per cent of Livermore's time and talent is being spent on the warhead for Poseidon, which will be to Polaris what Minuteman II is to Minuteman I.

Other weapons activities include work on a warhead for Lance, an Army surface-to-surface guided missile with a range of 30 miles, and on atomic demolition devices which, for example, could be placed on a railroad car, run into a tunnel and set off.

The weaponmakers also worry about strategy. One of the strategic concerns expressed to us is the possibility that the United States may come to rely too heavily on 1000 fixed Minuteman missiles.

Essentially, the view is that in time the Russians can pinpoint each of the missile sites and then concentrate on a defense against such missiles. What makes this possible is the imbalance between what the Russians know about our weapons and what we know about theirs—a penalty that an open society pays to remain open.

A Kaleidoscopic Target

THE ALTERNATIVE, as viewed by the weaponmakers, is to mix the American deterrent. This would involve not only continually changing warheads but maintaining a variety of delivery systems, such as the manned bomber. The effect of this would be to scatter the Russian defense research effort and keep the Russians off balance.

Administration officials maintain that this is really what has been happening. They cite the improvements being made in the Minuteman and Polaris and the investment in devices to help warheads penetrate enemy defenses, and they declare that the United States has not made a final decision to scrap the manned bomber.

At the same time, Washington officials put far more trust in the Nation's intelligence-gathering ability than do the weaponmakers, who often don't have access to all of the intelligence picture. Perhaps most important, Washington must weigh the relevant political factors in deciding what weapons to develop and deploy, a concern outside the purview of the weaponmakers.

The very interest of these physicists and engineers in America's nuclear strategy, however, is a token of their hope that wise management of the deadly hardware they build can prevent the use of such a weapon.



Smallest nuclear weapon in the Nation's arsenal, the Davy Crockett packs about 1/1000th of the punch of the Hiroshima bomb in its warhead.

18

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

FOR: Mr. Walt Rostow
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

As per our conversation this morning for possible luncheon discussion.

LW — Please copy for F. B. S. R. C. J.

File

Mr Johnson

Non proliferation treaty

19

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

December 16. 1964

TO: Mr. Charles Johnson

Attached are two copies of Harlan Cleveland's speech.

Section IV relates to the proliferation question.

IO - Elmore Jackson

2233

File Nuclear Proliferation

19a

UNITED STATES MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

FOR RELEASE AT 4 P.M. E.S.T.
SUNDAY, DECEMBER 13, 1964

Press Release No. 4479 80
December 12, 1964

An Address by the Honorable Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations Affairs, to the United Nations Association of the U.S.A., at the Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, New York City, Sunday, December 13, 1964 at 3:30 p.m.

THE EVOLUTION OF RISING RESPONSIBILITY

I.

Somewhere in his writings, Ralph Waldo Emerson advised young people to be very careful about what they really wanted for themselves, as they are more than likely to achieve it.

As the UN stands on the threshold of a twentieth birthday called International Cooperation Year, every member of the United Nations will do well to think hard about what kind of UN we want, for that is what we are likely to achieve.

The Year of International Cooperation opens at a moment of political drama and constitutional crisis. I do not propose to detain you with yet another description of the tangled and fascinating issue that has grown up around Article 19 of the UN Charter. The issue is essentially whether the Assembly will hang on to its power to tax the membership for the costs of maintaining a peace which is in every member's interest. One way or another, I hope and believe this parliament of the world's peoples will defend the powers it has -- as every parliamentary institution in the long history of free institutions has had to do from time to time to stay in business at all.

But for the purposes of our discussion this afternoon, I would like to assume that the UN's broad membership will work out a way to clear up its debts and start afresh. The Nineteenth General Assembly, now in a state of suspended

animation

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animation and animated suspense, has much important work to do. The UN system as a whole has opportunities to serve mankind which are limited only by the capacity of its members to work together, and keep on working together.

II.

We can see the danger to our working together in many walls and barriers -- walls of brick and steel, and walls of paper which limit the flow of people and goods for the benefit of all.

And we can see danger most clearly these days in the loosening of civilized restraints on international behavior.

The ugly book burnings in Europe a generation ago are matched now by the burning of books as a political instrument. When responsible governments organize or permit mobs in their own streets to attack foreign embassies, we are witnessing not just the breakdown of diplomatic niceties, but an uglier process, in which racial and national passions break through the fragile crust of civilization itself.

Almost fifteen years ago, when I was working for Paul Hoffman in the Marshall Plan, I had to substitute for him in making a speech at Colgate University. Remembering Edmund Burke's famous commentary on the turbulence of his time, I called this speech "Reflections on the Revolution of Rising Expectations". The phrase has since been attributed to nearly every literate American of our time but I think this was the first time that phrase saw the light of day.

In the decade and a half since then, the revolution of rising expectations has swept across the colonial world and doubled the count ofnational sovereignties. Men and women who fifteen years ago were students or revolutionaries, or both, are today in charge of their countries' governments - or have already given way to younger students and more effective revolutionaries.

The aspirations that have risen so fast were well described in the Charter of the United Nations as "better standards of life in larger freedom". How the passions of our time have been aroused by passionate versions of that sober and balanced phrase!

It is

It is surely time, as Pope Paul said this week, to "raise a dyke" against the passions of men, for they threaten to swallow up in passionate indignities the natural dignity of individual men and women, on the perverted theory individuals belong to the state, rather than vice versa.

Nationhood is heady stuff. Every nation, and every national leader, can be expected to overindulge once in a while. But continued overindulgence in nationalist emotion can lead to much senseless killing, and to the death of common sense itself.

The question about our world, and the question about the UN in this International Cooperation Year, is this: Can we all graduate fast enough from the Revolution of Rising Expectations to the Evolution of Rising Responsibility?

III.

The need for a rising standard of responsibility is most evident in the UN, because the UN is a magnified mirror of the tensions and dilemmas of the world at large. I cannot even mention here all the divisions in our divided world, East and West, North and South, political and economic and philosophical too. But as we look ahead to the UN's next twenty years, four kinds of issues stand out as most likely to threaten the peace -- because they threaten to unstick the glue that holds the world community together.

One of these issues is the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Another is the growing practice of unsolicited intervention by nations in each others internal affairs. A third problem is how the international community does something effective about internal human rights. And there is finally, a constitutional question about the organization of the UN itself.

IV.

First, then on the problem of nuclear weapons:

The world is face-to-face now with a disturbing trauma. Advanced science has made the instruments of murder and destruction so efficient that "there is no alternative to peace". The nuclear powers have learned, or are learning, that

their

their inconceivable power could only be used in the presence of almost inconceivable provocation.

And now the prospect is that within the next few years, half-a-dozen countries, or perhaps as many as ten or twelve, could readily develop their own nuclear weapons. They have the scientists, the industry, the imagination, and the will to do the job.

Nobody thinks this would make any sense. But it could happen. And the reason that it could happen is that there is no agreed machinery for making it unnecessary.

Ever since we offered to give our atomic weapons to the UN under the Baruch Plan, the United States has been looking for an agreed way to prevent the spread of these weapons around the world. There has been a little progress -- a ban on tests in the atmosphere, a UN resolution against putting bombs in orbit, a "hot line" to reduce the danger of war by accident or miscalculation. We will keep on working at disarmament, which is always more important than it is discouraging. But meanwhile, something can surely be done to prevent a rapid decline in the prospects for any general disarmament at all.

That something is to get agreement that no further nations will develop their nuclear weapons capabilities. For in a world already oversupplied with destructive capacity, both the ease and the madness of further proliferation is evident to every person that studies the matter with thoughtful attention.

That the Chinese Communists poured resources and talent into building a bomb is sad, and in the long run is very dangerous. But the worst thing about the Chinese action is that it is contagious. Peiping's neighbors, and Peiping's adversaries in world politics, can hardly be expected to watch another nuclear power develop nearby without thinking hard about what this means for their own security. The world community must either stop the further growth of nuclear weaponry altogether - which is what we have been trying to do in the Geneva disarmament talks - or it must somehow give assurances to the non-nuclear countries against domination by those nations that can make and deliver wholesale destruction.

The debate

The debate on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will doubtless be used by many nations this year for their own purposes. But beyond the sounds of Assembly debate, there are the silent prayers of men and women who don't understand very much about nuclear energy but know only that they do not want their homes destroyed, their children burned alive, and their hopes snuffed out by the miscalculated rivalries of their political leaders. Here in truth is a problem for all the world -- and all the world had better start treating it with the urgency it deserves.

V.

For the moment, we are all precariously protected from the largest war by the nuclear confrontation called mutual deterrence. But the alternative to world war is unhappily not necessarily world peace. It can be a world full of small wars and near wars.

Here we have made some real progress in limiting the kinds of warfare that killed so many people and occupied so many citizens in times gone by. Nearly all nations have come to believe now that it is unfashionable to raise a flag, roll the drums, and march across an international frontier onto the territory of another nation. Looking back on the story of man from the beginning of things, the outlawing of formal advertised aggression is no mean accomplishment. There are plenty of boundary disputes left in the world -- forty-nine of them, if the State Department's researches are up to date. But there is a presumption against overt military operations in somebody else's country, and that is one up for the progress of civilization.

But the very fact that formal invasions are unfashionable has led to a new practice -- the more or less hidden intervention by nations in the internal politics of their neighbors. Most of the fighting and killing that goes on in Asia, in Africa, and in Latin America can be traced to outside interventions designed to overthrow governments by violent means.

In Asia, Africa, and Latin America, nearly every country wants and needs the help of outsiders in achieving those better standards of life in larger freedom which are the goal of their rising expectations and the promise of their political independence. So outsiders are bound to be involved to some extent in their internal affairs. The question therefore is: Under what restraints will the outsiders operate on the inside?

Over the

Over the years, more through the practice of nations than teachings of scholars, we have developed a rough and ready ethic to guide this widespread practice of mutual involvement.

Where the legitimate government, the constituted authorities of a nation asked for outside help as a sovereign act, an expression of their own independence, then the involvement of outsiders is all right.

But where outsiders come in without the permission of the national government, to help dissident insiders in an internal struggle for power, that is not all right, it is all wrong.

It is not an easy line to draw. The principle that outsiders should be invited, not crash the party, is far from an infallible guide to good conduct. Invitations can be forged, and the government officials who issue them can be bribed or seduced. But still, the principle of permission is the best ethic mankind has yet developed to prevent a reversion to imperialism and foreign domination.

This is, in a nutshell, the issue in the current Congo affairs. The hostages were removed by permission of the Congo's legitimate government. The Stanleyville rebels are being aided without any such permission.

Yet it is, surely, in the interest of the independent and developing Africa to have some rules that prevent intervention.

If the principle is established that the outsiders not the insiders decide when intervention is right, the fragile fabric of nationhood will come apart at the seams in dozens of nations in Africa and elsewhere. Every nation has its dissidents, its internal struggle for power, its internal arguments about who should be in charge and how the country should be run. But if every internal rivalry is to become a Spanish Civil War, with each faction drawing in other Africans and great powers from other continents, the history of independent Africa in this century will be bloody and shameful, and the aspirations of Africa's wonderful peoples will be cruelly postponed into the 21st Century. This is why we supported the UN operation in the Congo and were sorry that it had to be withdrawn, its mission incomplete because of the UN's financial difficulties. And that is why we oppose, and must continue to oppose, foreign intervention in the Congo.

VI.

The moment

VI.

The moment will come, I hope and believe, when the third great issue of the UN's next twenty years is how -- and indeed whether -- to bring to life the human rights provision of the Charter.

It is not yet clear that the national leaders in the world, either in the large countries or in the small ones, really mean to promote (as they have agreed in Article 55 of the Charter to promote) the universal respect for an observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. Nor is it clear that the governments of the members of the UN intend to take (as Article 56 enjoins us to take) "joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55".

The words I have just quoted from the UN Charter are not very familiar ground to most Americans -- or to the citizens of other countries, either. The reason is simple: they are the underdeveloped area of the Charter.

Part of the trouble, I suppose, is a confusion between nationhood and freedom. Self-determination, that noble goal which brought a billion people out from under foreign rule, was sometimes a racial as well as a national battlecry. Too often in the modern nationalist revolution -- let us say it with all honesty - the promise of freedom was a promise of "separate but equal" status in the world.

Thus, the leaders of most nations were perfectly clear that they wanted a UN to protect the achievement of nationhood by pressing for the self-determination of groups and peoples. But there is a good deal of uncertainty as to how far we -- and our fellow members -- want the UN to go in criticizing and correcting the ethical delinquencies of peoples once they have declared their national independence.

It is this uncertainty, this confusion between nationhood and freedom, this feeling that national and racial and ethnic groups, not individual men, women and children, should be the beneficiaries of the continuing struggle for freedom -- which in the longer run may prove to be the most divisive and troublesome threat to a viable world organization. Yet if the central question about freedom is man's humanity to man, the UN's relevance to our future will partly rest on what it does, or neglects to do, about individual human rights.

VII.

While the

VII.

While the General Assembly is sorting out the ethics of nuclear weapons, non-nuclear intervention, and international attention to human rights, a great constitutional issue will be increasingly discussed in the corridors of the UN and the chancellaries of the world. We might call it the international apportionment issue, because this word "apportionment" has come to mean something to Americans through the actions of our own Supreme Court and our own state legislatures in recent months.

And indeed, the constitutional issues that now face the UN are not so different from those which almost tore our own Constitutional Convention apart, in Philadelphia, nearly two centuries ago. There the problem was how to reconcile the sovereign equality of states in an infant nation, with the fact that some of the states were very small and others were very large.

Here in the United Nations, today, there are two clearly discernible facts which nobody disputes, but which are not easy to combine into one political system: On the one hand the sovereign equality of nations, an immutable principle of the Charter; on the other hand the uneven distribution of real power and real resources in the real world. Somehow the small number or large and powerful countries must come to terms with the sovereign equality of nations. And somehow the small-country majority in the United Nations must come to terms with the minority of nations that make the UN, not a debating society but an action agency for peace.

The issue comes up in all sorts of ways. One day it's an argument about how the new UN trade institutions will be set up -- whether there will be voting by an automatic majority, or a conciliation procedure by which the developing countries and the industrialized countries try to persuade each other to change their own economic and commercial policies.

On another day, it may be a budget argument; recently in one Specialized Agency, a budget was voted by a large majority of votes which, however, represented less than thirty percent of the funds that had to be raised to make the budget a reality.

But the

But the most striking example of this constitutional issue is the Soviet claim that all peacekeeping matters should be handled solely in the Security Council.

I think it's fair to say that no non-communist country in the world agrees with this extreme position. Peacekeeping is the UN's most important function, and it is clear that the membership at large intends to have something to do with the function.

But on the other hand, the command and control of UN peacekeeping operations must provide an adequate voice for those nations which provide the troops and the airlift and the money to carry out UN decisions.

So we're going to have to work out a compromise somewhere in the mainstream between the view that wants to give the peacekeeping monopoly to the Security Council, and the view that wants the General Assembly to be the main reliance of a turbulent world. I think that we will sooner or later find a middle way. Because "there is not alternative to peace" there is also no alternative to workable peacekeeping machinery in this fragile and dangerous world.

There are many ways in which the Security Council and the General Assembly can share the responsibility for keeping the peace. The search for the best way -- that is to say, the way that can work in practice, however messy it may look in theory -- may be the most important single thing going on in the UN during International Cooperation Year 1965.

VIII.

These four great issues

- the spread of nuclear weapons,
- the ethics of intervention,
- the dilemma of human rights, and
- the reconciliation of resources with representation in the UN's system

-- these are, it seems to me, major issues visibly ahead of us in UN affairs. As we grow beyond the revolution of rising expectations toward the evolution of rising responsibility, you and I, as Americans, have to face these complex and difficult issues squarely. For on their outcome depends the

success

success or failure of the primary aim of American foreign policy - to help create a world safe for diversity.

This vision of a world of cultural pluralism, of independent nations following their own historical bent, diverse in social systems, economic orders, and political creeds -- participating nonetheless in mutual enterprise based on consent, constructing by stages a new system of world order based on common interest, defending the human rights of individual men and women and children -- this vision is anything but visionary.

What is visionary -- because it cannot come to pass -- is the Communist conception of a monolithic one-world suffocated by a universal dogma, impossibly boring in its bureaucratic uniformity and its predetermined history, implacably stifling to gay and colorful variety and the "natural dignity" of individual human beings, implausibly operating under a plutocratic elite that calls itself -- of all things -- the party of the masses.

The vision of a world safe for diversity is the sounder conception -- the more practical goal -- the more realistic prospect -- as the record of recent years makes wholly clear.

That is why those nations which do not yet have free institutions -- in which men and women are not yet accorded the right of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness -- can look forward to a mighty turbulent time until they do.

And that is why, on the other side of an increasingly porous Iron Curtain, the once monolithic communist bloc is in political disarray -- and philosophical ferment as well.

Indeed, the old fixation that there is something somehow immutable and irreversible about communism has gone the way of other delusions, a casualty of that simple irresistible idea -- that all men are equal by reason of their natural dignity.

There is nothing inevitable about our future. The real world has little room, and less patience, for the Communists' claim they are bound to succeed, or for tired and discouraged voices who say we are bound to fail.

We who

We who believe in human dignity have hold of a hard reality. We can see the realism of saying a cheerful "yes" to a world of diversity -- and the plain necessity to make common cause with others in the United Nations to save that world from poverty, conformity and war.

This task, which is the task of peace, the President recently called "the assignment of the century". To show they want to get on with this task, the American people have just voted him the mandate of the century.

* * * * * * *

Results Not Disclosed

Johnson Gets Report On Nuclear Policies

By Howard Margolis
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Johnson took another opportunity yesterday to warn of the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons. But he kept to himself what new or strengthened policies, if any, he may have in mind to deal with the problem.

Press photographers were invited into the Cabinet Room of the White House to record a meeting with the members of the Gilpatric Committee, which the President established last fall to review the Government's anti-proliferation policies.

Vice President Humphrey and most members of the National Security Council were with the President to receive the Committee's report. But a statement issued in the President's name after the meeting avoided even mentioning that the report had been made, or that the Committee's work is now done.

In the statement the President thanked the Committee for its advice. He warned again that "the future of the world will be shaped in no small measure by what we do now in the face of the complex and difficult problems posed by the spread of nuclear weapons."

But he said nothing substantive, and those attending the meeting were given strong instructions to keep silent about the nature of whatever recommendations were made.

All of this leaves clear what was already known: that the Administration is worried about the problem, and about what the world might be like if the day comes when every country that can afford it starts stockpiling its own nuclear bombs.

But it leaves unclear not only what the Administration proposes to do about it, but even whether the Administration has any new ideas on what to do about it.

The secrecy surrounding the report could reflect a desire to prevent premature disclosure of new and possibly controversial policies in a particularly delicate area of national security. Or it could merely cover a failure of the Committee to produce a set of recommendations of any real consequence.

It is known that there have been differences of opinion within the Government both on policies affecting proliferation of nuclear weapons, and on whether those policies that are being pursued are being pushed as strongly as they could or should be.

Such differences have existed on the urgency of pushing for a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing; on the effect that various forms of peaceful exploitation of atomic energy might have on proliferation tendencies; on the effect of the proposed multilateral nuclear force for NATO; on degree and form of military assistance and guarantees that might most usefully be given to allies and neutrals threatened by powers with access to nuclear weapons; on the feasibility and wisdom of various ways to seek to restrain international trade in materials and equipment useful in the development of nuclear weapons and on half a dozen other issues.

There have also been differences on more general questions: even on how urgent the problem is, compared to other national security problems; and on the division of responsibilities within the Goverment for dealing with the problem.

The Gilpatric Committee was set up last fall, after the Chinese nuclear detonation caused the Administration to think about its anti-proliferation efforts with a new sense of urgency.

The chairman was Roswell L. Gilpatric, who until a year ago had served as Deputy Secretary of Defense under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. The Committee's membership reflects a typical selection of established figures, many of whom have served Republican as well as Democratic Administrations. It is assumed that the Committee was expected to play a useful role in the President's efforts to establish policy in this area, and to sell these policies, when need be, to Congress and to the public. Its staff was drawn from inside the Government.

In addition to Gilpatric, the committee included:

George Kistiakowsky, science adviser to President Eisenhower; James A. Perkins, president of Cornell University; Arthur K. Watson, chairman of the board, IBM World Trade Corporation; William S. Webster, president of New England Electrical System; Herbert York, former director of defense research and engineering; Allen W. Dulles, former CIA chief; Arthur H. Dean, former chief delegate to the Geneva disarmament conference; Gen. Alfred Gruenther, former NATO commander; and John J. McCloy, a frequent adviser to postwar Administrations.

FORM DS-10
4-1-55

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REFERENCE SLIP

DATE
12/15/64 23

TO: NAME OR TITLE	ORGAN. SYMBOL	ROOM NO.	BLDG.	INITIALS	DATE
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	APPROVAL		NOTE AND FORWARD
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REMARKS OR ADDITIONAL ROUTING

GPO 939117

I started out by treating the zero and third cases and have not had time to do anything with the first and second ones. I will try to think about those between now and Thursday.

FROM (NAME AND ORGANIZATION)	ROOM NO. AND BLDG.
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IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 21, 1965

Office of the White House Press Secretary

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THE WHITE HOUSE

The President met today for an hour with his Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, headed by Mr. Roswell Gilpatric, and discussed its work. Present at the meeting, held in the Cabinet Room shortly after 1:00 p.m., were the ten members of the advisory committee and the President's principal advisors in the national security area.

The Committee was established by President Johnson in November to study the problems for world peace and security posed by the increase in the number of nations capable of building nuclear weapons. At that time, the Committee was asked to present its findings during the month of January.

Mr. Gilpatric was formerly Deputy Secretary of Defense under Presidents Johnson and Kennedy and is now a New York attorney. Other members of the Committee are:

Mr. Arthur H. Dean, formerly Chairman, U. S. Delegation to the General Disarmament Conference.

Mr. Allen W. Dulles, formerly Director of Central Intelligence

General Alfred M. Gruenther, formerly Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky, formerly Scientific Adviser to President Eisenhower

Mr. John J. McCloy, formerly High Commissioner for Germany and Co-ordinator U. S. Disarmament Activities

Dr. James A. Perkins, President Cornell University

Mr. Arthur K. Watson, Chairman of the Board, IBM World Trade Corporation

Mr. William S. Webster, President, New England Electric System

Dr. Herbert F. York, formerly Director, Research and Engineering, Department of Defense

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IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 21, 1965

Office of the White House Press Secretary

- -

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
TO THE COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION

Yesterday the Nation reaffirmed its dedication to the pursuit of peace. Today, we find that problem, once again, first on our national agenda.

Tomorrow and in the years ahead, our future and the future of the world will be shaped in no small measure by what we now do in the face of the complex and difficult problems posed by the spread of nuclear weapons.

I am grateful, therefore, that such distinguished and experienced men have today given me and my advisors the benefit of their patient and searching counsel.

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SELECTIVE RELAXATION OF EFFORTS TO CONTAIN PROLIFERATION

I. Actions to be Taken

1. Should go ahead with the MLF on any basis on which Europeans can agree.

2. We might go ahead with a highly mobile IRBM force for potential use in the Pacific, and train Indians and Japanese in the US in advance. In addition, or alternatively, We should indicate to India our willingness to provide now or later, at her option, long range air delivery systems (e.g., SAC version of TFX).

3. Sales of equipment that might be useful for testing, production, or delivery of nuclear weapons would generally be permitted to allies and friendly neutrals if such sales would help the gold flow problem or promote US foreign policy objectives in any ares and if they did not clearly violate the test ban treaty.

4. We probably should go ahead with an active R&D program on ABM defense looking to the desirability of possibly initiating a deployment and a fallout shelter program designed to cope with a limited (Chinese) nuclear threat within the post-1975 time period or possibly before.

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5. We probably should go ahead with an attempt to negotiate a comprehensive test ban with several on-site inspections. (Desirable because of its probable effect on the Soviet-US military balance, and because it might inhibit proliferation, thought in this context the latter objective would ~~not~~ be less important than if the test ban were considered along with other anti-proliferation measures). Any comprehensive treaty should, if possible, have provision permitting Plowshare to go ahead. (We may judge a treaty not desirable in this context unless an arrangement permitting Plowshare can be worked out.)

6. Pending ratification of a comprehensive treaty we should probably assist India, France and other friendly countries, who might wish to conduct nuclear tests, by providing information, equipment and instrumentation that would facilitate their testing underground rather than in the atmosphere. (Desirable in the interest of minimizing the probability of withdrawal from the partial treaty and fallout, and so that the disadvantage to which parties to the treaty, such as India and Israel, would ~~not~~ have been put, as compared with non-signers, will be minimized.)

II. The Near Term Consequences

1. India will probably go ahead with a decision to produce nuclear weapons within a year, particularly if China conducts further tests.

2. Relations between the NATO powers and the Soviet Bloc will become more strained though a comprehensive test ban, if negotiated, would provide temporary relief.

3. Problems in NATO ~~will~~ may be slightly less acute ✓ though the French may in fact withdraw with negotiation of the MLF However, ✓ ~~this~~ any slight improvement compared with the present is more likely to be the result of a hardening of Soviet attitudes in response to the MLF than to any real solution of fundamental differences.

III. Longer Term Consequences (assuming no actual nuclear warfare in the interim).

1. Between 1975 and 1985 China will pose a sufficient threat to the US itself and to US tactical forces and friendly countries in Southeast Asia (if any are left) so that US nuclear superiority will be almost completely neutralized. This does not mean that the Chinese capability will even come close to matching that of the US in quantity or quality. Rather it means that we would be unlikely to be able to use tactical nuclear capabilities because our tactical forces (Seventh Fleet) and

bases from which they operate would be vulnerable (and generally far more attractive nuclear targets than most of the adversary's forces might offer); and while we might devastate China in a strategic attack the threat of destruction of a few US cities and tens of millions of Americans would probable make the US threat one of doubtful credibility. A US ABM deployment could probably significantly extend the time period before China could pose a major strategic threat to US.

2. If the US had not provided India with systems for delivery of weapons against Chinese targets, she would have developed her own.

3. The Indian-Pakistan dispute might be peacefully resolved but this seems unlikely. It would be particularly unlikely after India acquired a nuclear capability. Assuming no peaceful resolution, Pakistan will probably either have gone to China for help in getting a nuclear capability or will have used that threat to get help from us.

4. Japan will either have acquired a nuclear capability or will have adopted a policy of neutralism in the US-Chinese confrontation.

5. As regards Europe, at best Western European unification will have gone very far with German interests submerged in those of a larger Western union. Such a union would have its own fairly substantial nuclear capability having taken over the French, British and/or MLF systems. At worst such union will not have proceeded with sufficient rapidity. In that case Germany would presumably acquire a nuclear capability of its own either by independent means (rationalizing its violation of the Brussels treaty by pointing at the French violations thereof) or by a deal with France. In ~~either~~ case, but particularly in the latter, the sharp East-West polarization in Europe will have continued. There will be virtually no movement toward German reunification and the satellites will move closer to the USSR. It would seem unlikely, but not impossible, that they would have acquired nuclear capabilities. (This prognosis is predicated on no nuclear war, but that seems a tenuous assumption in these circumstances. There would seem to be a moderately high probability that a war would come about: (a) because of Soviet intervention in West Germany because of concern about German acquisition of nuclear capabilities; or (b) because of West German intervention in response to supression of East Germans by the USSR.) Sweden will probably acquire a nuclear capability.

2] German sentiment for reunification could develop to the point where it was a political issue of such significance that a choice would have to made between continuing a pro western German policy with acquisition of nuclear weapons portfolio, & a Rapallo deal in the hope of reunification. The a choice in form of the latter seems not ~~[illegible]~~ greatly unpredictable.

3. As regards Europe, at best Western European unification will have gone very far with German interests submerged in those of a larger Western union. Such a union would have its own fairly substantial nuclear capability having taken over the French, British and/or MLF systems. At worst such union will not have proceeded with sufficient rapidity. [1] In that case Germany would presumably acquire a nuclear capability of its own either by independent means (rationalizing its violation of the Brussels treaty by pointing at the French violations thereof) or by a deal with France (or from the US in response to the threat of a deal with France). In ~~either~~ either case, but particularly in the latter, the sharp East-West polarization in Europe will have continued. There will be virtually no movement toward German reunification [2] and the satellites will move closer to the USSR. It would seem unlikely, but not impossible, that they would have acquired nuclear capabilities. This prognosis is predicated on no nuclear war, but that seems a tenuous assumption in these circumstances. There would seem to be a moderately high probability that a war would come about: (a) because of Soviet intervention in West Germany because of concern about German acquisition of nuclear capabilities; or (b) because of West German intervention in response to suppression of East Germans by the USSR. Sweden will probably acquire a nuclear capability.

[1] This assumes four or more [illegible] countries that France [illegible] in [illegible] NATO [illegible] be continued with [illegible] NATO & the EEC.

6. The US and/or the USSR may find it necessary to withdraw from the test ban treaty (whichever version is in force at the time) because of need to improve ABM defenses in response to a growing Chinese threat in the late 1970s; or because one will feel its offensive capabilities vis-a-vis the other's rendered questionable in the light of the other's deployment of an ABM defense system.

7. Isarel will probably have developed and tested nuclear weapons and will have a capability for delivery against the Arab states. They in turn may have acquired a nuclear capability though unless provided by the USSR, which seems unlikely, or China such acquisition would seem unlikely prior to 1975.

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A RADICAL SHIFT IN POLICY INVOLVING MAJOR EFFORTS TO STOP PROLIFERATION INCLUDING REDUCTION IN INCENTIVES THROUGH ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

I. Courses of Action

1. We should negotiate a comprehensive test ban under which all nuclear tests including Plowshare are prohibited. (It seems desirable in this context to play down the general utility of nuclear weapons and the price paid in giving up Plowshare for at least 10 to 15 years during which major changes in the world political structure might evolve, seems worthwhile in this connection and also because it will make a comprehensive test ban simpler.) Note: in this context considering the other measures proposed, two or three on-site inspections would certainly seem to be acceptable to the USSR.

2. We should negotiate a non-dissemination, non-acquisition agreement including a prohibition on transfer of nuclear weapons, etc., to collections of states (i.e., MLF).

3. A full cut-off on fissionable material for military uses should be negotiated to which all states would be urged to adhere. We should insist on international inspection of

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all power and production reactors, plutonium separation facilities, and diffusion (and other) isotope separation plants outside US and USSR and preferably on those within as well.

4. There should be a cessation of any aid regarding nuclear matters to countries (and EURATOM) not accepting IAEA safeguards.

5. If feasible, and assuming the Chinese would not go along with the aforementioned agreements, her fissionable materials production facilities should be destroyed (hopefully with Soviet cooperation, but at least with Soviet acquiesence).

6. Assuming France would not agree to go along with the above limitations, we ought at least to: (a) try to get international agreement by all countries preventing landing or overflight by French aircraft, similarly use of ports and territorial waters by ships, in support of her nuclear test program; (b) get international agreement prohibiting any trade with France that would support her nuclear materials production program. In addition we might: (a) adopt a policy of secondary boycott and encourage others to do so in connection with (a) and (b) above; (b) blockade the

French test site in the South Pacific; and (c) acquiese if the Soviet Union wishes to undertake the destruction of French nuclear materials production facilities.

7. Strive to get agreements on nuclear free zones, including prohibitions on transit, in Latin America, Africa and the Moddle East.

8. The US and the USSR might offer joint guarantees to India (and other Asian states) against Chinese aggression.

9. We should negotiate a freeze on strategic delivery systems and ABM and a reduction in strategic systems with the USSR. Probably we should be prepared to go to 50-75% reductions with verification of destruction only. We should indicate willingness to move toward minimum deterrent postures under appropriate inspection. We should seek to have space programs internationalized, or at least subject to inspection.

10. We should make a statement and use any influence we can to get others to recognize the present borders of Germany.

11. We would have to have an access agreement on Berlin.

12. We should begin removal of tactical nuclear capabilities from Europe, starting with those deliverable by non-US forces.

13. We should agree to limited withdrawal of US and Soviet forces from Germany.

14. Soviet MREM/IREM's should be reduced rapidly and substantially.

15. We should accept and try to work out with the USSR and others a program for demilitarization in Central Europe and reunification of Germany, the latter probably to involve some sort of confederation first, and ultimately policed limits on levels of German armaments.

16. US military forces should be reorganized such that all except SAC are designed to fight primarily with non-nuclear weapons.

17. We should try to get established at least the nucleus of a permanent UN police force.

II. Consequences and Implications

1. There is likely to be a rapid growth in polycentrism in Eastern Europe.

2. Western European unification would be slowed down as the problem of German reunification took precedence in Germany.

3. It would seem likely that a program as drastic as that outlined above would stop proliferation provided:

a. we were able to destroy Chinese nuclear capabilities (but see 4a below);

b. That if there were a major conflict in the Middle East between Israel and the UAR we or an international police force would effectively intervene to stop it; particularly (in the interests of preventing nuclear weapons proliferation and aside from question of equity) it would be necessary to stop Israel from being defeated; and

c. adequate aid were provided India in case of a second Chinese attack.

4. The major risks would seem to be: (a) that over the long term we would fail to bring China into some world community wherein she would renounce nuclear ambitions. (She could probably be prevented forceably from getting nuclear weapons for not more than a decade or so.) In that case a nuclear armed international police force might be a partial and perhaps effective response; (b) the USSR might intervene in Germany, (i) in support of internal Communist efforts to take over (probably drastic deterioration in economic conditions would be required to make this a plausible possibility), (ii) because the system for policing German armaments will have

broken down and the Soviets will be concerned about growing German strength, or (iii) in response to conflict that could break out between Germany and one of its eastern neighbors.

The Washington Post

FRIDAY, JANUARY 8, 1965

Loosening the Test Ban

The remarks of Chairman Seaborg of the AEC about international cooperation on the use of atomic explosives will cause some uneasiness. The sharp distinction that now exists between conventional and nuclear explosives is a good thing. To keep it we would gladly forego for a few extra years the undoubted economic advantages of these devices in handling massive projects such as the proposed second Panama Canal. It helps underline the idea that atomic explosives—even for peaceful uses—are not to be considered merely a more efficient version of TNT. It is not reassuring at all to find the Israelis and Egyptians among the small list of countries the AEC has cited as being actively interested in these peaceful explosives.

If the economic advantages of using nuclear explosives for large scale excavation projects are as great as the AEC believes, and if the prospects for limiting radiation hazards are as good as the AEC now reports—both of which are probably true—then interest in nuclear excavation is bound to grow, both here and abroad. The prospect raises the possibility of two very different sorts of international cooperation that might be sought. One would begin now to lay the groundwork for some form of international organization to actually control and conduct any peacetime use of nuclear explosives. An arrangement of this sort, if feasible, might serve several useful purposes: it might serve to emphasize, rather than blur, the special nature of nuclear explosives; it might serve to limit the opportunities for further proliferation of nuclear weapons under the rationale of developing merely explosives for peaceful uses; it might limit the opportunities of nations which have developed these weapons to exploit the development by offering to conduct nuclear excavations for non-nuclear countries; it might, in general, limit the tendency to think of the world as divided between the important countries, which have access to nuclear technology, and the second class countries, which do not. For that sort of division naturally presses any country which regards itself as important, of which there are many, to join the club. And finally, placing the peaceful use of nuclear explosives firmly within the control of an international organization might help establish the notion that no nation has the unilateral right to detonate such devices. All of these possibilities deserve to be considered, and if they seem sound then serious efforts to seek a feasible method of international control ought to be pushed.

But it is not at all clear that anything going so far as this is what the AEC has in mind. If all the AEC has in mind when it talks of international cooperation is the promotion of international interest in nuclear excavation so that the test ban can be relaxed to allow essentially national, rather than international, exploitation of this resource, then the Administration would do well to restrain the understandable enthusiasm of the AEC for exploiting its technical achievements.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

5/22/64

Honorable Dean Rusk
The Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Dean:

Enclosed is a tabulation of the status of U.S. plans, as we understand them, for the provision of nuclear support to non-U.S. NATO forces. These are planning figures only and are intended to serve both as useful guidance for future individual NSAM 143 and NSAM 197 submissions and as a first step in developing agreed U.S. Government planning guidelines for dispersing nuclear weapons to the NATO Atomic Stockpile.

[redacted]

I am sure you appreciate the importance to the Department of Defense of having agreed dispersal guidelines to help in its forward planning. I would therefore welcome the comments of the Department of State on the suitability of the enclosed tabulation for eventual presentation to the President in accordance with NSAM 143 and NSAM 197.

Sincerely,

BOB

Enclosure
Tabulation - Plans for U.S. Nuclear Support to Non-US NATO Forces

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

Cys 1,2,3 addee (E-16469)
Cys 4,5,6 - CJCS (E-16452)
Cy 7 - ATSD(AE)(E-16453)
Cy 8 - ExReg (ISA)
Cy 9 - SecDef Files
Cy 10 - DepSecDef Files
Cy 11 - CSD Files
Cy 12 - R&C
Cy 13 - ISA/RF
Cy 14 - PPS Comeback
Cy 15 - Plans Div Chron
Cys 16 & 17 - COL Legere

Prep: COL L.J. Legere, USA/ar/18May/1964
OASD/ISA/PPS/Plans Div/4E843/79693

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 28, 1964

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Col Legere

Dear Bob:

On May 23 you invited our comments on the suitability for presentation to the President of a tabulation of plans for the provision of nuclear support to non-US NATO forces.

The critical question for us (noted in Alex Johnson's November 13, 1963 letter to Ros Gilpatric commenting on the proposed dispersal plans for FY 63-64) is still that of the relationship of the proposed plan to previous US commitments. Pursuant to the NSC policy "NATO and the Atlantic Nations," State and DOD agreed in the spring of 1961 to the fulfillment of those commitments. Furthermore, NSAM 143 reflects a complementary authorization for dispersal of nuclear warheads in support of these commitments. It is our view that these commitments should not be expanded until there has been developed a definitive concept and study of NATO tactical nuclear warfare which would be jointly reviewed by State and DOD.

We believe it useful to address this subject, as the DOD tabulation does, in a total-NATO, all nuclear system way. However, we continue to feel that a recommendation to the President concerning any changes in national policy in this matter should be rested on an agreed general concept which, in turn, is supported by intensive study of both military and political aspects of the matter. The tabulation, by itself, does not seem to us adequate as an action

The Honorable
Robert S. McNamara,
Secretary of Defense.

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document, if the President is to be asked to approve any expansion in existing commitments.

There are two areas in your letter which call for expansion in existing commitments and which should, I believe, therefore be deferred until an over-all study has been completed, particularly in view of the President's concern, noted in National Security Action Memorandum 305, about the increase in nuclear weapons dispersed in support of non-US forces:

(a) The rather significant build-up in eight-inch howitzer, Honest John and Nike Hercules levels. This proposed build-up goes to the heart of issues which the over-all study referred to above is intended to resolve.

(b) [redacted] Alex Johnson in his letter of January 14, 1964, to Ros Gilpatric indicated that we could not concur in this proposal in the absence of the detailed study referred to above.

I also note that your position on the recommendation for employment of the light-weight strike fighter (G-91) in a nuclear role is still being formulated. Again our questions and concerns about such a role were sent to Ros Gilpatric by Alex Johnson in the letter of May 3, 1963.

We are, of course, ready to consider unusual cases where special circumstances create such extraordinary urgency as to make it infeasible to await a basic policy review and where the scope is sufficiently limited so as neither to alter the level reflected in existing

commitments nor prejudice the outcome of the basic policy review. With regard to such cases, the provisions of NSAM 197 would seem to require the presentation of detailed justification, i.e., an explanation of the special circumstances which make it infeasible to await basic policy studies and review.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Dean Rusk

Mission of the Task Force

The Task Force shall study the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and make recommendations to the President for action to this end. In the course of its work, the Task Force shall consider the following aspects of the problem:

1) The spread of nuclear weapons to the national control of nations not now possessing them through transfer or through independent national programs of weapons manufacture.

2) The spread of basic nuclear technology, materials, and facilities useful for weapons research and production through the application of atomic energy for non-weapons purposes (i.e., power reactors and peaceful use of nuclear explosives).

3) Improvement in the military nuclear capabilities of existing nuclear powers (France and China) through direct or indirect assistance from the more advanced nuclear powers (U.S., U.K., USSR).

4) Attainment of additional or improved delivery capabilities for nuclear weapons through direct sale of strategic delivery systems or through technical assistance contributing to development of such systems.

5) Dispersal of nuclear weapons through U.S. bilateral and multilateral arrangement with countries not at present having an independent nuclear capability.

6) Dispersal of nuclear weapons outside U.S. through deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons to U.S. units overseas.

7) Measures to maintain the security of countries affected by any actions proposed in connection with the above problems.

C. Johnson

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 7, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF NSAM 320

SUBJECT: Committee on Nuclear Proliferation

The Presidential study group covered in NSAM 320, formerly referred to as the Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation, will henceforth be referred to as the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation.

McG. Bundy

McGeorge Bundy

THE NEW YORK TIMES
Tuesday, November 10, 1964

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Halting Nuclear Spread

President Johnson's appointment of a high-level task force on nuclear spread underlines the need for a thorough policy review in this field. There is an increasing danger that proliferation of atomic weapons will grow out of peaceful uses of the atom. New safeguards are becoming as urgent as an agreement against the diffusion of nuclear arms as such.

India, for example, is debating whether to follow Communist China into the atomic arms race and Japan soon may have the same thoughts. Prime Minister Shasbris reiterated a day or two ago that India intends to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes only, but the debate in New Delhi has been fed by an official estimate that a first atomic device could be exploded in eighteen months at a cost of $368,000, an astonishingly small sum. Evidently there are no provisions for inspection or effective control in the 1956 agreement under which Canada built a test reactor near Bombay—India's only source of plutonium—for "peaceful purposes only."

Some of Britain's exports of research reactors also are sketchy in safeguards against military use. And if there are any safeguards attached to the Israeli test reactor built with French assistance, they remain secret.

A far greater proliferation danger lies ahead in the approaching nuclear power era. Big power reactors generate plutonium in quantity, and about a dozen now have been sold to countries outside the Communist world by the nuclear nations and Canada. Many buyers resist inspection and argue that their "sovereign assurances" of nonmilitary use are sufficient. There is a tendency for the supplying countries to compete not only in price, quality and delivery date but also in relaxing safeguards.

The United States in the past eighteen months has placed all its new atoms-for-peace agreements and renewals, one-third of its 40 bilateral agreements, under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. A major effort now is needed to get the other Western reactor suppliers—Britain, Canada and France—to do the same. A similar agreement by uranium-exporting countries should follow.

It has become clear that I.A.E.A. safeguards, important as they are, do not go far enough. For example, India—with the aid of two British chemists it employed—has become the first non-nuclear country to build a chemical separation plant. That plant, subject to no external inspection or control, now enables India to extract weapons-grade plutonium from the fuel elements in its reactors.

In looking into the safeguards surrounding peaceful uses, President Johnson's task force should consider making inspection the responsibility of an arms control agency other than I.A.E.A. The latter is an organization primarily concerned with spreading nuclear knowledge.

An effective system of international control is urgently needed. The genie of nuclear diffusion, once out of the bottle, will never be returned.

November 17, 1964

NOTE FOR MR. HENRY ROWEN
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

This is the memorandum Mr. Neustadt referred to in his telephone conversation with you.

Charles E. Johnson