

## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

181

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	to President from Califano confidential <i>open 1/16/92</i>	2 p	02/01/68 A
#2 memo	to President from Rostow confidential <i>open 1/16/92</i>	1 p	01/30/68 A
#2a memo	to President from Lodge confidential <i>open 3-28-95 NLS 94-470</i>	2 p	01/30/68 A
#3 memo	to President from Rostow secret <i>open 1/16/92</i>	1 p	01/31/68 A
#3a memo	to President from Walt secret <i>Open 9/94</i>	2 p	01/31/68 A
#4 memo	meeting with President re: Pueblo case top secret <i>open 5-5-95 NLS 94-473</i>	2 p	01/30/68 A
#4b report	meeting of Advisory Group <i>Sanitized - More Released 6/19/01 NLS 93-471 Appeal</i> Top secret <i>Sanitized 7/31/96 NLS 93-471</i>	3 p	01/29/68 A
#5 cable	MAC 01449 from Gen. Wheeler secret <i>open 1/16/92, DA MEMO 1/5/88</i>	<del>4 p</del> <del>10 p</del>	01/31/68 A
#7 memo	for record by Adm. Gramer secret <i>OPEN 1/16/92 NLS 87-125</i>	2 p	01/30/68 A
#8 cable	#3-68 <del>XXXXXX</del> situation report secret <i>open 7-3-95 NLS 94-466</i>	1 p	01/31/68 A
#11 report	State Dept. Activities Report secret <i>open 3-28-95 NLS 94-470</i>	2 p	01/29/68 A
#15 cable	MAC 01438 from Gen. Westmoreland secret <i>open 1/16/92 OSD 11-22-78</i> <i>duplicate in VN Co. File Box 69, 2C(3), #40</i>	4 p	01/30/68 A
5a cable	FROM BUNKER, SAIGON 361 TO WH SECRET  <i>Sanitized 3-28-95 NLS 94-470</i> <i>Same as VFG 021-010-1-2(2/82)</i>	2 p	1/30/68 A

## FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Files of Walt W. Rostow  
The President's file for Korea, Vietnam (Briefing)  
Box 10

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 1, 1968  
Thursday, 2:30 p. m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM Joe Califano 

Rostow, McPherson, Roche and I met this morning on the question of a Presidential statement to the people and to the Congress on the current situation in South Vietnam and the PUEBLO incident.

After considering a wide variety of alternatives, we concluded that -- as nearly as we could now make an assessment -- the best thing for you to do would be to give a talk on television and radio on Tuesday night and send (but not personally deliver) a message to Congress on Wednesday. We say Tuesday night, because we are accepting Secretary Rusk's judgment that there are enough activities going on to make it prudent to wait until that time before you speak.

We rejected the idea of a personally delivered message to Congress because proposed actions now are not sufficient to justify that. Presidents go personally to the Congress to deliver State of the Union messages, declare war, impose some kind of general mobilization or cool the country off at a time of great racial strife. The items now contemplated are: authority to extend enlistments and call individual reservists, \$100 million for Korean aid; and perhaps some funds for a Cabinet Committee on Price Stability and the mandatory control program in the Commerce Department, both of which were previously announced.

Furthermore, we thought we had to keep in mind the worst possibility down the road: that we lose Khesanh or have a debacle there and (although even more unlikely) that the North Koreans take some severe steps vis-a-vis South Korea. As unlikely as these things may be, they are possible and we feel that if they happen within a few days or a few weeks after you make your statement, you would have to go to the Congress for a much more sweeping authority. That would be the time to appear there personally.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE  
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF  
MAR. 16, 1983.

BY Ng ON 1-16-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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We also believe that the tone of your statement on television and your message to the Congress should be prudence: that you are the prudent leader asking for the authority you need at this time and that you should make it clear, either explicitly or implicitly, that events change rapidly and as events change, needs change and you may be back again.

We believe this approach, particularly if the tax bill is only mentioned in passing (if at all) helps you avoid three dangers:

1. Accusation that you are using the current incident to get the tax bill passed.
2. Accusation that you are by implication using some relatively meager legislative requests to get a blessing to do what you want vis-a-vis North Korea.
3. A feeling in the country that you are undecided and don't know what you really want (a feeling that could arise if one of the worst contingencies mentioned above came to pass).

Parenthetically, because we felt that merely having the JCS and General Westmoreland on the line about Khesanh may not be enough for you if the roof fell in over there, we thought you might want to give some consideration not merely to agreeing with the military, but also adding some force (if any force were available and could be promptly moved) above what they requested as a little extra insurance. Roche feels, for example, the average American would not be impressed by a JCS letter; he would ask "who appointed those incompetents?"

Unless you disagree with our general approach, Harry will begin the statement for radio and television, Larry Levinson will start on the message and Roche and Rostow will go over both the drafts.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

2

CONFIDENTIAL

Tuesday, January 30, 1968  
5:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Lodge provides a  
comforting note from history and  
encouragement to moderation on the  
Pueblo.

*Walt*  
W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *rg*, NARA, Date *1-15-92*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~Confidential~~

2a

January 30, 1968

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-470

By ing, NARA, Date 3-13-95

TO: The President

FROM: H. C. Lodge *H.C. Lodge*

In connection with the "Pueblo" the following may be of interest:

On May 13, 1861, the United States naval vessel "San Jacinto" fired a shot across the bow of the British Royal Mail packet "Trent," one day out of Havana and steaming through the Bahama channel. When the "Trent" did not slow down, the American sloop sent a shell that burst right in front of the bow.

The "Trent" then hove to and Captain Wilkes, U.S. Navy, sent a party to board her and remove the two Confederate Commissioners to Great Britain and France, respectively, Mason and Slidell, who were then imprisoned on an island in Boston harbor.

The event created an uproar on both sides of the Atlantic. In the northern states Captain Wilkes was a hero and anyone who even suggested releasing Mason and Slidell were fiercely denounced.

In England, public opinion was in an uproar because the United States had humiliated the British flag on the

high seas and had violated international law The air was filled with reports of England and the United States going to war.

President Lincoln was caught between the understandable pressure of the British due to our illegal act on the one hand and of the patriotic fervor of the Americans on the other. Finally, after an enormous amount of excitement and travail Lincoln told Seward, the Secretary of State: "One war at a time." "It was very humiliating", Lincoln said later, "but we had one big war on our hand and we didn't want two at the same time."

The humor of Lincoln's statement plus its brevity, simplicity and wisdom meant that Mason and Slidell were released, reaching their destination some eighty days later than they had intended. Carl Sandburg says that Lincoln "refused to yield an inch to the public clamor and the press outcry for war" and "held with tenacious humility to his policy declared in five words: "One war at a time".

While the circumstances concerning the "Pueblo" are different in many ways, it is similar in one respect: we don't want another war.

INFORMATION

3

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, January 31, 1968 -- 1:00 p.m.

1<sup>12</sup><sub>7</sub>

Mr. President:

You might wish to read what I had just finished dictating before you put me to work on the Friday message.

I shall drop the Kosygin draft letter; although you might wish to send a letter to him simultaneously with your message to Congress.

*W. W.* Rostow

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *rg*, NARA, Date 1-15-92

~~SECRET~~



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
OSD 10-25-80; NSC 8-14-80  
By JTW/RG, NARA, Date 9-7-94  
36  
Wednesday, January 31, 1968  
11:45 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

1. I gave some quiet thought last night to our position in the face of the crises in Viet Nam and Korea; and, also, to the enemy's view of our position.

2. In general, it appears to be his judgment that we are sufficiently weak and uncertain at home, sufficiently stretched in our military dispositions abroad, and sufficiently anxious to get the war in Viet Nam off our necks, so that we are likely to accept not defeat, but what I might call unbalanced or "double standard" behavior. For example:

-- a degree of humiliation in order to get the men of the PUEBLO and the ship back;

-- a defensive stance in the face of increasing incursions across the 38th parallel and the attack on President Park;

-- gross and open violations of the DMZ at the 17th parallel without our moving ground forces into North Viet Nam;

-- increasingly overt violation of Laos and Cambodia, despite international obligations to the contrary;

-- a formula for negotiations which promises, in effect, nothing but talk for a major military act -- the end of the bombing of North Viet Nam.

3. In one way or another in the days ahead, we have to rally our country so that the enemy comes to believe that we will insist on a single standard in the application of rules of international law and the terms of international agreements.

4. Before proposing a course of action, I believe we must wait a few days to see what we get out of the Rumanian (who arrives in Bucharest tomorrow, February 1st) and out of the North Koreans at Panmunjom. Right now, therefore, I am not proposing a course of action.

5. But let us assume that the Rumanian gives us an unsatisfactory answer, while urging us to keep the channel open; and that the North Koreans demand some kind of phony apology based on the Captain's "confession" in order to get our men and ship back. In the circumstances, I believe, we should consider three courses of action which would represent not a radical change in our present policy, but a stiffening of that policy. The three actions would be:

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-2-

-- a letter to Kosygin (I attach at Tab A a rough draft to give you the flavor of what I have in mind);

-- a somewhat toughened set of military moves in both Viet Nam and Korea, the exact character of which we would have to work out with the JCS and Defense;

-- going to the Congress and the country on the theme of "a single standard" asking for support for a limited group of additional measures, but in so doing signaling to the world this stiffening of the national spine.

6. If you decided to move down this path in the days ahead you would, I am sure, wish to get as much of the Congressional Leadership aboard from the beginning as possible -- and possibly even groups like the Douglas Committee, labor and business leaders, etc.

*Walt*



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION  
DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-473

By lig, NARA, Date 4-11-95

~~TOP SECRET~~

Meeting with the President  
Tuesday, January 30, 1968, 8:30 a.m.

Presentation to Congressional Leadership: the PUEBLO case

Agenda

1. The facts. (General Wheeler)

Essentially, what we know about the location of the PUEBLO before, during, and after seizure, from all sources. Also: its orders; navigational gear; probabilities of error between January 10 and its seizure.

2. Questions raised and answers (Sect. McNamara and General Wheeler)

-- Why was the PUEBLO on this mission?

(To get necessary intelligence concerning the activities of armed forces which have been increasingly aggressive over the past year.)

-- Why was the PUEBLO not escorted?

(It was on the high seas. If we apply the principle of escorting vessels in international waters, the scale of our naval and air forces would have to be greatly expanded; intelligence missions would become much more provocative; the chances of incidents would increase; and the minimum principles of international law and order would be undermined.)

-- Why did Capt. Bucher delay in asking for assistance?

(He thought he was being harassed, not seized. The PUEBLO sister ship, the SS BANNER, was harassed seven times over the last year. In the past four years, there were more than a hundred such harassing incidents.)

-- Why did the naval base at Yokohama not respond to the first message from the PUEBLO?

(It believed that the message transmitted at 10:52 p.m. (EST) and received at Yokohama, seemed a harassing message, as did the PUEBLO's second message.)

-- Why did the 5th Air Force not respond in the period between its notification that the PUEBLO was in danger and the arrival of the PUEBLO in Wonsan port?

(The commander of the 5th Air Force made the judgment that air operations would be ineffective or imprudent. He could not re-rig the strike aircraft in Korea in time (nor could the USS ENTERPRISE get its aircraft over Wonsan bay in time). Beyond that, the poor weather, poor late afternoon visibility, and the presence of substantial numbers of hostile aircraft made it, in the air commander's judgment, unlikely that his aircraft could do anything useful for the PUEBLO and its crew: in fact, the outcome might have been an ineffective operation against the PT boats in which U. S. aircraft and crews would have been lost, the PUEBLO and its crew additionally endangered.)

~~TOP SECRET~~



-- Why were only four U.S. aircraft in Korea?

(We have greater flexibility for the whole Pacific area if we do not tie down our aircraft in Korea itself, but keep them in Japan and Okinawa for swift deployment. As the movements of aircraft after the PUEBLO attack indicate, they can be moved into Korea in a matter of hours.)

-- Why were the aircraft in Korea and elsewhere not on the alert for this kind of event?

(It was a unique event. No one had attempted to capture one of these ships before. It was not judged a contingency worthy of the allocation of significant resources.)

3. Diplomatic action since seizure (Secretary Rusk)

- approaches to the Russians;
- demarche in all the capitals;
- UN Security Council meeting;
- Panmunjom machinery;
- future possibilities of offer of impartial arbitration.

4. Actions that might be undertaken (Secretary McNamara)

Our objective is to get back the crew and the ship; keep the South Koreans confident and willing to put an extra division into South Vietnam; and avoid the opening up of a second front.

We have examined a number of possible courses of military action, if diplomacy fails, to achieve the return of the men and the ship (tab A). We have not decided on any such courses of action yet.

But we may have to take certain actions that will permit us to maintain a situation of confidence in South Korea, and in particular keep them to their tentative commitment to place an extra division in South Vietnam.

In particular, we might be considering with the Congress:

- the grant to the President of the right to extend enlistments;
- the maintenance of some -- but by no means all -- the reinforcements we have put into the area; and
- a substantial increase in military aid to South Korea so that it can face the possibility of increased infiltration from North Korea with confidence, while going forward with its plans to reinforce in South Vietnam.

W. W. Rostow

4a



~~TOP SECRET~~

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 93-471 appeal  
By Cbm, NARA Date 6-5-01

4-8

January 29, 1968

Report on Meeting of Advisory Group, January 29, 1968

Messrs. George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Henry Cabot Lodge, Cyrus Vance, and General Maxwell Taylor.

Having been fully briefed by the Secretaries of State and Defense yesterday, Sunday, January 28 (except for Mr. McGeorge Bundy), the group met at noon to consider the operational alternatives immediately ahead of us and, perhaps, further down the road. The meeting opened by bringing them up to date with the latest word of the Panmunjom contact and Gromyko's reaction to Sec. Rusk's message.

It was universally agreed that we should make no further diplomatic or military moves, beyond those already undertaken, until we could form a judgment as to whether the Panmunjom contact might be fruitful.

The first substantive issue addressed was whether and at what stage the President might offer arbitration via the World Court, or some other "suitable international tribunal" after the men <sup>and</sup> on the ship were returned. After examining the problems posed by the World Court formula (implicit recognition of North Korea as a state) and the precedent represented by the RB-47 in 1960, it was agreed that some such offer might well be made if the Panmunjom exercise doesn't work or is bottlenecked.

The group then examined the following 11 possible courses of action.

1. Advising Soviets of actual or possible military moves. In the light of Tommy Thompson's cable, it was agreed we should not proceed now with an informal contact, although we might consider in the future the use of the hot line with the proviso about the press, laid down by Thompson. In general, it was judged, however, that communications with the USSR were in pretty good shape.
2. Conduct airborne reconnaissance. It was agreed that for the next several days no recce of North Korea should be conducted; if it were judged that recce was desirable at a later time, BLACK SHIELD, rather than DRONE, photography was recommended.
3. Sail USS Banner into area where Pueblo was seized. For the time being it was felt unwise to put the Banner on station. When the incident has been settled, it was agreed the U.S. would wish to assert its rights to international waters off Wonsan Bay. Depending on the situation at that time, we might wish to assert our rights in that area via an armed vessel -- perhaps a destroyer -- rather than via a communications monitoring ship like the USS BANNER.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

4. Action to recover crypto material jettisoned from the Pueblo. It was agreed that the recovery of the crypto material jettisoned from the Pueblo was an almost impossible task which would put no significant pressure on the North Koreans. Therefore, it should not be undertaken.

5. Mine Wonsan Harbor.

[REDACTED]

3.4(b)  
(1), (6)

6. Seize North Korean vessels.

[REDACTED]

3.4(b)  
(1), (6)

7. Selected air strikes on North Korea. It was agreed that such strikes would be an act of retaliation; large forces required for success might give the appearance of large-scale hostilities initiated by the U.S.; ~~we~~ would be unpopular internationally; and would diminish the prospects for early release of the Pueblo and its crew.

8. Raid across the DMZ.

[REDACTED]

3.4(b)  
(1), (6)

9. Naval blockade of Wonsan.

[REDACTED]

10. Free World Economic Pressures on North Korea. The Free World's trade with North Korea is limited. And the impact of increased controls of trade and shipping with the Free World would, therefore, be small. With

~~TOP SECRET~~

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-3-

respect to a total embargo on trade with North Korea, [REDACTED]

3.4(b)  
(1), (6)

11. U.S. bombing practice in South Korea. [REDACTED]

3.4(b)  
(1), (6)

At lunch today with the President, the group examined with the President certain lines of action that might be taken up with Congress at a future time. In particular:

-- Provision to the President of the right to extend the period of enlistment;

-- The maintenance in the area of forces sufficient to give the South Koreans a sense of security and provision of sufficient additional military aid so that they go forward with their plan to provide an extra division to the struggle in South Vietnam.

-- It was the universal judgment of the group that we should keep our eye on the major objectives in this crisis:

-- Get the men of the Pueblo and, if possible, the ship itself returned;

-- Keep the <sup>confidence</sup> ~~question~~ of the South Koreans and, especially, their willingness to provide an increment of force in South Vietnam

-- Avoid a second front in Asia.

W. W. Rostow

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OO YEKADSDE YSNKGA 17 0311307  
O 311249Z ZYH ZFF-5  
FM GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH DC  
INFO GEN JOHNSON C/S ARMY  
GEN MCCONNELL C/S AIR FORCE  
ADM MOORER CNO  
ZEN/GEN CHAPMAN CMC  
MR ROSTOW WHITE HOUSE WASH DC  
MR RUSK STATE DEPT WASH DC  
MR HELMS CIA  
O 312918Z ZYH ZFF-1  
FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON  
TO GEN WHEELER CJCS WASHINGTON  
ADM SHARP CINCPAC HAWAII  
ZEM

SECRET MAC 01449 EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS  
REF: NMCC MSG 310127Z

THROUGHOUT THE PAST TWENTY-FOUR HOURS, THE ENEMY HAS CONTINUED HIS COUNTRY-WIDE ATTACKS AGAINST AIRFIELDS AND KEY POPULATION CENTERS. SINCE EARLY THIS MORNING, ATTACKS HAVE BEEN HEAVY IN THE SAIGON/BIEN HOA AREA AND THROUGHOUT IV CTZ. I CTZ AND II CTZ HAVE CONTINUED TO RECEIVE WIDE SPREAD ATTACKS WITH ONLY THE DMZ/KHE SANH AREA BEING COMPARATIVELY QUIET. THE SIGNIFICANT EVENTS BY AREA ARE AS FOLLOWS:

III CTZ

COMMENCING ABOUT 310300 THE ENEMY LAUNCHED HEAVY ATTACKS AT BIEN HOA, LONG BINH, TAN SON NHUT, AND THROUGHOUT SAIGON.

AT BIEN HOA THE ATTACK INCLUDED THE AIRFIELD AND THE III CTZ HQ. DAMAGE KNOWN AT THIS TIME: ONE A-37 DESTROYED, ONE F-100 DESTROYED, NINE AIRCRAFT DAMAGED, WITH VARYING DAMAGE TO BUILDINGS AND FACILITIES. THE ATTACK HAS BEEN REPULSED AND THE US/ARVN FORCES ARE PRESENTLY IN CONTROL.

AT LONG BINH, THE II FFORCEV HQ, THE AMMUNITION DUMP AND THE POW CAMP CAME UNDER MORTAR AND GROUND ATTACK. HEAVY FIGHTING TOOK PLACE AROUND THE POW CAMP BUT IT HAS BEEN HELD SECURE. IN THE AMMO DUMP, AN UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF 105 HEAT ROUNDS AND 8 INCH ROUNDS, AS WELL AS PROPELLANTS WERE DESTROYED. THE ENEMY CONTACT HAS BEEN BROKEN.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988

By Jow, NARA, Date 1/16/92

PRESERVATION COPY



IN SAIGON, THE MAIN ATTACK WAS ON THE U. S. EMBASSY. THIS HAS BEEN REPORTED TO YOU SEPARATELY. IT IS NOW SECURE WITH THE STAFF OPERATING. SELECTED BILLETTS WERE HIT INCLUDING BOQ-3. THIS AREA IS STILL CONTESTED. JGS COMPOUND WAS PENETRATED AND SPORADIC FIGHTING CONTINUED UNTIL NOON. THROUGHOUT THE CITY, SMALL ENEMY UNITS ARE HOLDING OUT. FOUR ARVN AIRBORNE AND THREE VNMC BATTALIONS ARE IN THE CITY, OR WILL BE BY DARK, TO CONTINUE THE COUNTER ATTACKS.

AT TON SON NHUT, A SERIES OF ATTACKS HAVE BEEN LAUNCHED BY THE ENEMY FROM THE WEST, SOUTH WEST, AND NORTHEAST. THE PERIMETER IS SECURE AT PRESENT, BUT THE ENEMY POSES A SERIOUS THREAT. THREE AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN DAMAGED. TWO U.S. BATTALIONS HAVE MOVED IN FROM THE 1ST DIVISION, AND ADDITIONAL UNITS ARE ON THE ALERT.

#### I CTZ

THE HUE CITADEL AND PHU BAI AIRFIELD CAME UNDER MORTAR, ROCKET AND GROUND ATTACK AT 310430. NO MAJOR DAMAGE TO AIRFIELD OR FACILITIES. ENEMY HAS APPROXIMATELY THREE COMPANIES IN THE HUE CITADEL AND MARINES HAVE SENT A BATTALION INTO THE AREA TO CLEAR THEM OUT. THIS ACTION CONTINUES.

SOUTH OF DANANG, THE ENEMY LAUNCHED ATTACKS IN THE 7TH MARINES/ 52 ARVN REGIMENT AREA AND NEAR HOI AN. THESE ATTACKS HAVE BEEN REPULSED WITH ENEMY LOSSES OF 89 KIA, 86 POWS AND 80 WEAPONS.

THE MARBLE MOUNTAIN AIR FACILITY WAS ALSO ATTACKED THIS MORNING BY 122MM ROCKETS. SEVENTEEN HELICOPTERS WERE DAMAGED.

CHU LAI AIRFIELD WAS SHELLED BY ROCKETS AND MORTARS. THREE F-4'S WERE DESTROYED AND FIVE WERE DAMAGED.

QUANG NHAI CITY CAME UNDER GROUND AND ROCKET ATTACK. CURRENTLY, THE ENEMY HOLDS THE HOSPITAL IN THE CITY. SO FAR 100 ENEMY HAVE BEEN KILLED WITH NO FRIENDLY CASUALTIES REPORTED.

#### II CTZ

THE MOST SERIOUS SITUATION APPEARS TO BE AT KONTUM, WHERE THE AIRFIELD, HQ 24TH STZ, AND SECTOR HQ ALL CAME UNDER HEAVY ATTACK FOR THE SECOND DAY. U.S. 4TH INF DIV AND ARVN FORCES HAVE REINFORCED THE AREA, BUT FIGHTING CONTINUES IN THE TOWN. SINCE YESTERDAY, AN ESTIMATED 300 ENEMY HAVE BEEN KILLED.

BAN ME THUOT WAS HIT AGAIN TODAY WITH THE MACV COMPOUND AND 23D ARVN DIVISION HQ BEING MAIN TARGETS. ENEMY UNITS ARE STILL IN THE CITY. THE COASTAL AREA, ALTHOUGH THE SCENE OF SEVERAL ATTACKS SEEMS TO BE UNDER CONTROL. ENEMY FORCES HAVE BEEN PUSHED OUT OF NHA TRANG, PHAN THIET AND PHAN RHANG. QUI NHON IS QUIET, ALTHOUGH THE ENEMY HOLDS THE RADIO STATION. HE HAS THREE HOSTAGES AND THE STATION IS SURROUNDED BY ROK FORCES.

AT PLEIKU CITY, ELEMENTS OF THE 22D ARVN RANGERS ARE IN CONTACT JUST OUTSIDE THE CITY. U.S. FORCES ARE ALSO OPERATING IN THE AREA.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

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O 311253Z ZYH ZFF-5  
FM GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH DC  
TO GEN JOHNSON C/S ARMY  
GEN MCCONNEL C/S AIR FORCE  
ADM MOORER CNO  
ZEN/ GEN CHAPMAN CMC  
MR ROSTOW WHITE HOUSE WASH DC  
MR RUSK STATE DEPT WASH DC  
MR HELMS CIA  
O 310707Z ZYH ZFF4  
FM ADM SHARP, CINCPAC, HAWAII  
TO GEN WHEELER, CJCS, WASH DC  
INFO ZEN/NMCC  
ZEM

T O P S E C R E T EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO  
8. IN IV CORPS, THE ENEMY HAS MORTARED AND ATTACKED SEVERAL  
PROVINCIAL TOWNS. REACTION FORCES ARE MOVING INTO THE AREA.  
INITIAL REPORTS INDICATE ENEMY KIA TO BE 5 TO 1, BUT THE  
SITUATION IS VERY FLUID/ PRESIDENT THIEU STAYED IN MY THO LAST  
NIGHT DURING A MORTAR ATTACK. HE WAS NOT INJURED AND JUST RETURN-  
ED TO SAIGON FROM WHERE HE CALLED WESTY. WESTY REPORTED THAT  
PRESIDENT THIEU WAS MOST CONCERNED SINCE HE HAD HEARD A RUMOR  
THAT WE MIGHT NOT RESUME THE BOMBING. WESTY REASSURED HIM  
THAT THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO TRUTH TO THE RUMOR. WESTY WAS  
INFORMED THAT WE HAD NO EVIDENCE OF A STANDDOWN IN

BOMBING AND THAT A CINCPAC MESSAGE HAD BEEN TRANSMITTED TO THE JCS RECOMMENDING THAT THE FIVE MILE PROHIBITED AREA AROUND HANOI AND HAIPHONG BE REMOVED IN LIGHT OF THE VIOLENT ATTACKS TAKING PLACE AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAM. WESTY EXPRESSED FULL AGREEMENT WITH THE CONTENT OF THE MESSAGE AND ASKED THAT HIS CONCURRENCE BE RELAYED.

9. IN II CORPS THE WEATHER HAS BEEN GOOD AND THE SITUATION IS IN HAND. A NUMBER OF VC WERE KILLED AT BAN ME THEOUT. THE ARVN IS ENGAGED HERE AND THEIR MORALE IS HIGH. INFORMATION IS NOT COMPLETE FROM II CORPS.

10. THERE HAS BEEN RECENT ACTIVITY AT HUE. THE VC ENTERED THE CITADEL, HEADQUARTERS OF THE 1ST ARVN DIVISION. THERE WAS AN EXCHANGE OF FIRE AND AT LEAST ONE HELO LOST. CHU LAI HAS BEEN ROCKETED WITH 122MM AND UNKNOWN CALIBER MORTARS. MAJOR DAMAGE TO 2 F4B AIRCRAFT AND MINOR DAMAGE TO OTHERS. PHU BAI AIRBASE HAS COME UNDER ROCKET AND MORTAR ATTACK. ONE HAMLET 10 KILOMETERS NORTH OF DANANG IS FLYING A VC FLAG. BODIES ARE SEEN IN THE MARKET PLACE, PROBABLY THOSE OF THE HAMLET OFFICIALS. LAST NIGHT III MAF INTERCEPTED A LARGE NUMBER OF ROCKET CARRIERS. THEY WERE ATTACKED BY BOTH AIR AND

ARTILLERY WITH MANY SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS. III MAF ESTIMATES 80 ENEMY KIA DURING THIS ENGAGEMENT. WESTY ATTRIBUTES THIS INTERCEPTION AS REASON FOR DANANG ESCAPING ROCKET ATTACK LAST NIGHT. ANOTHER B52 STRIKE HAS BEEN CONDUCTED AGAINST THE SUSPECTED ENEMY HEADQUARTERS IN I CORPS. HE SUSPECTS THAT THIS MAJOR SITE CONTROLS ALL ENEMY UNITS IN QUANG TRI AND THUA THIN PROVINCES. TWENTY MORE SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS WERE NOTED. A BIG CAVE HAS BEEN UNCOVERED, AND ATTACK BY NAVY WALLEYE IS EXPECTED.

11. WESTY CONCLUDED THAT ENEMY TACTIC HAS BEEN TO MINGLE WITH THE PEOPLE AND TO USE INNOCENT CIVILIANS AS A SHIELD. THEIR ATTACKS HAVE BEEN RUTHLESS AND TERRORISM WIDESPREAD. THE SITUATION IS UNFOLDING MINUTE BY MINUTE. CASUALTY TABULATIONS FOR PAST 24 HOURS NOT COMPLETE NOR VERIFIED BUT BEST INFO IS 1040 ENEMY KIA, 112 FRIENDLY KIA. A FURTHER PERSONAL REPORT WILL BE MADE AS THE SITUATION PERMITS.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

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~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY 301204Z JAN 68 [REDACTED]  
FM AMB BUNKER SAIGON 361  
TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EYES ONLY WALT ROSTOW

25X1C

AS I WAS PREPARING TO SEND YOU A MILITARY WRAP-UP OF THE SITUATION WESTY TOLD ME THAT HE HAD JUST TALKED TO THE WHITE HOUSE MILITARY STAFF AND GAVE THEM FACTUAL RUN-DOWN ON THE MILITARY SITUATION. HE BELIEVE THE ENEMY IS ACTING DESPARATELY AND APPARENTLY HAD ORDERS TO GO ALL OUT, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE TET HOLIDAYS TO ACHIEVE SURPRISE. ACTION IS CLEARLY SPEARHEADED BY NVN WITH MAJOR ATTACKS IN I AND II CORPS, AND ALSO SOME ACTIVITY IN III AND IV CORPS. WESTY BELIEVES THESE ACTIONS WERE TIMED TO COINCIDE WITH AN OFFENSIVE AGAINST KHE SANH, WHICH HE FEELS HAS BEEN HELD OFF AS RESULT OF HEAVY AIR STRIKES IN THE AREA, MADE POSSIBLE BY GOOD WEATHER.

AS INDICATED IN JOINTLY AGREED GVN ANNOUNCEMENT TODAY (SAIGON 17281),, ENEMY ACTION WAS OBVIOUSLY PREMEDITATED AND CAREFULLY PLANNED WELL IN ADVANCE. IT IS CLEARLY NOT REPEAT NOT A RESPONSE TO OUR ACTION IN LIMITING TRUCE TO II, III AND IV CORPS, SINCE WITH THE TIMING OF THE GVN BROADCAST LAST EVENING (8 P.M.) IT COULD NOT BE. AREAS IN WHICH MAIN ENEMY ACTIVITY IS TAKING PLACE, I AND ESPECIALLY II CORPS, ARE THOSE OVER WHICH HANOI HAS THE MOST DIRECT MILITARY CONTROL AND ORDERS ON ENEMY ACTION ARE CLEARLY COMING FROM NORTH VIETNAMESE.

ONE MILITARY MOTIVE, RELATED TO THAT MENTIONED BY WESTY, MIGHT BE TO DIVERT OUR ATTENTION FROM NVA KHE SANH BUILD-UP (KHE SANH ITSELF IS QUIET), AND PERHAPS FORCE US TO DIVERT SOME OF OUR FOURCES FROM THEIR MISSION IN NORTHERN I CORPS AREA, WHICH WE STILL THINK IS THE MAJOR FIELD OF ENEMY MILITARY INTEREST AT PRESENT TIME.

SANITIZED

Authority NLT 021-010-1-2  
By JP, NARA, Date 2/14/02

ANOTHER MOTIVE MAY WELL BE TO TRY TO DEMONSTRATE TO US AND TO SOUTH VIETNAMESE THE CONTINUING DETERMINATION TO WIN ON PART OF VC/NVA, A DETERMINATION SO GREAT THEY ARE WILLING TO INCUR INTERNATIONAL OPPROBRIUM FOR VIOLATING TRUCE SO BLATANTLY AND LOCAL VIETNAMESE INDIGNATION AT CALLOUS DISREGARD FOR VIETNAM'S MOST IMPORTANT AND FAMILY-CENTERED HOLIDAYS. MOREOVER, THEIR PROVEN CAPACITY TO DISRUPT SO MANY POPULATION CENTERS AND EVEN TO HOLD KEY AREAS IN THEM FOR SEVERAL HOURS SEEMS A CONTINUATION OF THEIR EARLIER EFFORTS (LOC NINH, DAK TO, ETC.) TO DEMONSTRATE MILITARY INITIATIVE AND HOPEFULLY TO ACHIEVE A LOCAL MILITARY VICTORY.

ONE CAN SPECULATE THAT THESE MOTIVES COULD BE MADE TO FIT WITH A PRESUMPTION THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE SERIOUS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF STARTING NEGOTIATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE, IF THIS PROVES TO BE FEASIBLE. THEY WOULD CERTAINLY WISH TO PLACE THEMSELVES IN THE BEST POSSIBLE MILITARY POSITION BEFORE SUCH A NEGOTIATION AND TO LEAVE US AND OUR VIETNAMESE ALLIES IN AS FRUSTRATED AND DISCOURAGED A MOOD AS POSSIBLE. THIS WOULD BE A LOGICAL PART OF THE "GENERAL OFFENSIVE" LEADING TO NEGOTIATIONS THEY HAVE BEEN TALKING ABOUT IN RECENT MONTHS IN CAPTURED DOCUMENTS GIVING POLITICAL GUIDELINES TO THEIR CADRE.

I SUGGEST THAT WASHINGTON STATEMENTS ON ENEMY ACTIONS AND RESULTANT CANCELLATION OF TRUCE NEW FAIRLY CLOSELY TO LINE WE HAVE TAKEN PUBLICLY (SAIGON 17251 AND 17197). EMPHASIS COULD BE PLACED ON OBVIOUSLY LONGPLANNED NATURE OF ENEMY AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, FACT THAT MASSIVE ENEMY BUILD-UP IS NOT INFILTRATION BUT OPEN INVASION, POINTING OUT INCIDENTALLY THAT THE ACTIONS CLEARLY COULD NOT HAVE BEEN ONLY A RESPONSE TO OUR OWN RESTRICTIONS ON TRUCE, WHICH WERE NECESSITATED BY ENEMY ACTIONS. WOULD ALSO STRESS CALLOUS NATURE OF ENEMY'S TERRORIST ATTACKS ON POPULATION CENTERS AT TRADITIONAL VIETNAMESE FESTIVE PERIOD. FINALLY, RECOMMEND REITERATION OF OUR DETERMINATION, AND THAT OF OUR VIETNAMESE ALLIES, WHICH HAS NOT BEEN AND WILL NOT BE SHAKEN BY THESE LATEST EXAMPLES OF ENEMY'S TACTICS.

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~ [REDACTED]

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 MR ROSTOW WHITE HOUSE WASH DC  
 MR RUSK STATE DEPT WASH DC  
 MR HELMS CIA  
 O 310707Z ZYH ZFF4  
 FM ADM SHARP, CINCPAC, HAWAII  
 TO GEN WHEELER, CJCS, WASH DC  
 INFO ZEN/NMCC  
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am  
207, EST

Mr. President  
 This is the  
 Text from  
 which Bas  
 Wheeler

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO

1. I HAVE JUST TALKED WITH WESTY BY TELEPHONE. HE PROVIDED ME AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION AS OF NOW BY SECURE TELEPHONE AND FILLED IN THE COMPLETE DETAILS WHICH FOLLOW.
2. THE SITUATION IS STILL CONFUSED BUT IT IS APPARENT THAT THE ENEMY HAS TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE GENERAL STATE OF RELAXATION EXISTING DURING TET. HIS FORCES INFILTRATED INTO SAIGON IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES. THEY ARE MOVING THROUGHOUT THE CITY AGAINST GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS AND IN A GENERAL CAMPAIGN TO TERRORIZE AND KILL CIVILIANS. THEIR CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN WELL PLANNED AND OBVIOUSLY FORMED OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME.
3. THE EXPECTED ATTACK AGAINST KHE SAN OR ACROSS THE DMZ HAS NOT MATERIALIZED, BUT IT COULD COME MOMENTARILY AND WE MUST BE READY FOR IT. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE MASSIVE AIR ATTACKS CONDUCTED IN I CTZ AND ALONG THE DMZ MAY HAVE THROWN HIM OFF HIS TIME TABLE BUT THE THREAT OF HIS ATTACK STILL REMAINS.
4. IN THE CAPITAL DISTRICT ONE OF THE MOST DRAMATIC ATTACKS TOOK PLACE AGAINST THE U.S. EMBASSY. THE ENEMY BLEW A HOLE IN THE WALL AND ATTEMPTED TO ENTER ACROSS THE COMPOUND. A DETACHMENT OF THE 101ST AIRBORNE LANDED ON THE ROOF AND JOINED MARINE GUARDS AND MPS IN REPELLING THE ATTACK. WESTY

DECLASSIFIED

PRESERVATION COPY

Authority JCS 10-10-78By 50W, NARA, Date 1/16/92



HAD JUST RETURNED FROM THE EMBASSY WHERE HE VIEWED 19 VC BODIES ON THE GROUND OUTSIDE THE EMBASSY BUILDING. WESTY STATES THAT NO VC ACTUALLY ENTERED THE BUILDING. THIS CHANGES MANY CONFLICTING REPORTS WHICH WE HAD RECEIVED EARLIER IN THE DAY INDICATING THAT ENEMY TROOPS WERE ACTUALLY INSIDE THE EMBASSY. ONE MARINE WAS KIA, AND 4-5 ARMY MPS WERE KILLED AT THE EMBASSY. THE BUILDING WAS PARTIALLY DEFACED BUT THERE IS NO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. THERE IS MINOR DAMAGE IN THE LOBBY DOWNSTAIRS BUT NOTHING THAT CANNOT BE REPAIRED.

5. THE ENEMY HAS BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL IN GETTING INTO TAN SON NHUT AND A FRIENDLY BATTALION IS NOW SWEEPING THE FIELD. TWO TROOPS OF CAVALRY HAVE ARRIVED AT TSN AND ONE COMPANY IS ENGAGING THE ENEMY IN THE RACE TRACK AREA. THERE IS A BIG FIGHT NOW IN PROCESS THERE. ROCKETS FROM U.S. GUN SHIPS COULD BE HEARD OVERHEAD WHILE GENERAL WESTMORELAND MADE THIS REPORT. HE ADVISED THAT THE IMPACT WAS APPROXIMATELY 1000 YARDS AWAY.

6. AN ORDNANCE DEPOT IN GIA DINH PROVINCE HAS BEEN PENETRATED BY THE VC AND THEY ARE NOW BEING ENGAGED BY ARVN RANGERS. A VC CAPTAIN HAS BEEN CAPTURED AND CLAIMS THAT 30 VC BATTALIONS ARE IN THE ENVIRONS OF SAIGON. ANOTHER POW STATES THAT 21 BATTALIONS HAVE INFILTRATED THE CITY. BOTH REPORTS ARE UNCONFIRMED BUT IT IS OBVIOUS THAT INFILTRATION IS WIDESPREAD, THAT THE ENEMY CAN BE EXPECTED IN ANY KIND OF UNIFORM, AND THAT HE IS WELL EQUIPPED AND ARMED WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS. ATTACKS HAVE TAKEN PLACE AGAINST THE PALACE, SEVERAL OF OUR BOQS AND GENERALLY THROUGHOUT THE CITY.

7. BIEN HOA IS CLOSED TO JETS BUT THE VNAF IS TAKING OFF ON AN OPEN RUNWAY. THERE IS ROCKET FIRE NOW TAKING PLACE THERE, WITH A BATTALION SWEEPING THE AREA. THE ENEMY HAS ATTACKED THE POW CAMP AT HIEN HOA BUT HAS NOT PENETRATED. II FIELD FORCE HEADQUARTERS HAS BEEN INFILTRATED AND MORTARED WITH ONE FRIENDLY KIA. 199TH BRIGADE HAS BEEN IN AN INTENSE FIRE FIGHT WITH THE ENEMY IN A VILLAGE NORTHEAST OF BIEN HOA. FIRST REPORTS INDICATE THAT UPWARDS OF 500 ENEMY KIA MIGHT BE ANTICIPATED, BUT WESTY DOES NOT ATTACH TOO MUCH RELIABILITY TO THIS FIRST REPORT. OUR CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN LIGHT IN THE 199TH.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

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MR RUSK STATE DEPT WASH DC  
MR HELMS CIA  
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~~SECRET~~ MAC 01449 EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO

REF: NMCC MSG 310127Z

IV CTZ

THE SITUATION IN IV CTZ IS NOT CLEAR, BUT A SERIES OF ATTACKS HAVE BEEN MADE BY FIRE AND GROUND ELEMENTS AGAINST MY THO, CAI LAY, CHAU PHU (TOWN OVERRUN), TRUC GIANG, QUANG LONG, VINH LONG CITY, VUNG LIEM, SA DEC, CAN THO, SOC TRANG, RACH GIA AND VINH LOI. THE MOST SERIOUS SITUATION APPEARS TO BE AT VINH LONG AND IN CHAU DUC PROVINCE. ALL ENEMY ACTIONS HAVE BEEN MET BY ARVN REACTION FORCES. I AM PASSING OPCON OF THE MRF TO SA IV CTZ TO ASSIST IN COUNTER-ATTACKS.

AN EARLY SUMMARY

Y INDICATES THAT TWENTY-FOUR AIRFIELDS HAVE BEEN HIT THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

IT IS ESTIMATED THAT ENEMY HAS LOST OVER 3,000 KIA SINCE 291800H, WITH FRIENDLY KIA REPORTED AT LESS THAN 300, INCLUDING AN ESTIMATED 100 U.S. KIA.

ENEMY SITUATION

ENEMY ATTACKS DURING THE TET HOLIDAYS REVEAL AN EMPHASIS ON DRAMATIC RESULTS IN HEAVILY POPULATED AREAS AND DAMAGE TO FRIENDLY AIR INSTALLATION. MILITARILY, THESE ARE DIVERSIONARY EFFORTS WHILE THE ENEMY PREPARES FOR HIS MAJOR ATTACK IN NORTHERN I CTZ. HIS TARGETING OF AIRFIELDS ARE DESIGNED TO HINDER FRIENDLY AIR SUPPORT. THE ENEMY ALSO HOPES FOR CONSIDERABLE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT BOTH IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND WORLDWIDE. AT A MINIMUM, HE PROBABLY EXPECTS THESE ACTIONS TO PREVENT A REPETITION OF LAST YEAR'S HEAVY LOSSES TO THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM AROUND TET.

ENEMY ATTACKS ON 30 JANUARY WERE CONFINED PRIMARILY TO MR V AND NOT PARTICIPATED IN BY ENEMY UNITS IN THE COSVN AREA OR IN NORTHERN I CORPS. THE 31 JANUARY ATTACKS WERE PRIMARILY CONCENTRATED IN THE COSVN AREA, WITH A FEW OF THE PREVIOUS DAY'S ATTACKS CONTINUING IN MR V. THUS FAR, THE ENEMY UNITS CONDUCTING THE ATTACKS HAVE

LONG BEEN IDENTIFIED IN THE AREA OF CONTACT AND IN MOST CASES THEIR PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR RECENT ACTIONS WERE KNOWN. THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION IS THE PROBABLE PRESENCE OF THE 167, 169, & 506 BNS AND REPORTED PRESENCE OF 272D VC REGIMENT IN THE ATTACKS ON TAN SON NHUT. HOWEVER, THIS REPORT REMAINS UNCONFIRMED.

IN VIEW OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND HIS ACTIVITIES OVER THE PAST TWO DAYS, WE BELIEVE THAT HE CAN CONTINUE SIMILAR ATTACKS FOR AT LEAST ANOTHER DAY OR TWO. THESE ADDITIONAL ATTACKS SHOULD BE EXPECTED AS A PRELUDE TO MAJOR OFFENSIVE EFFORT IN NORTHERN I CTZ.

THE ENEMY AROUND KHE SANH, IN THE DMZ, AND AT TRI THIEN MILITARY REGION COULD ATTACK AT ANY TIME. HOWEVER, THERE ARE NO SIGNS AT PRESENT THAT THE ENEMY WILL MOUNT AN ATTACK IN THESE AREAS WITHIN THE NEXT 24 HOURS. ENEMY PLANS HAVE ALMOST CERTAINLY BEEN DISRUPTED TO SOME EXTENT BY FRIENDLY AIR AND ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT IN THE AREA.

THE ENEMY ATTEMPTS HAVE THUS FAR PRODUCED NO SIGNIFICANT MILITARY RESULTS AND HAVE COST THE ENEMY HEAVILY. INCOMPLETE REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE ENEMY HAS LOST AT LEAST 3000 KILLED IN ACTION. DUE TO THE NATURE OF THESE ACTIONS A LARGE NUMBER OF ENEMY HAVE ALSO BEEN CAPTURED, BUT WE HAVE NO RELIABLE FIGURES NOW.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS  
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Q. Why was the PUEBLO on this mission?

A. To get necessary intelligence concerning the activities of armed forces which have been increasingly aggressive over the past year.

Q. Why was the PUEBLO not escorted?

A. It was on the high seas. If we apply the principle of escorting vessels in international waters, the scale of our naval and air forces would have to be greatly expanded; intelligence missions would become much more provocative; the chances of incidents would increase; and the minimum principles of international law and order would be undermined.

Q. Why did Capt. Bucher delay in asking for assistance?

A. He thought he was being harassed, not seized. The PUEBLO sister ship, the SS BANNER, was harassed seven times over the last year. In the past four years, there were more than a hundred such harassing incidents.

Q. Why did the naval base at Yokohama not respond to the first message from the PUEBLO?

A. It believed that message reflected harassment, not seizure.

Q. Why did the 5th Air Force not respond in the period between its notification that the PUEBLO was in danger and the arrival of the PUEBLO in Wonsan port?

A. The commander of the 5th Air Force made the judgment that air operations would be ineffective or imprudent. Poor weather, poor late afternoon visibility, and the presence of substantial numbers of hostile aircraft made it, in the air commander's judgment, unlikely that his aircraft could do anything useful for the PUEBLO and its crew: in fact, the outcome might have been an ineffective operation against the PT boats in which U. S. aircraft and crews would have been lost, the PUEBLO and its crew additionally endangered.

Q. Why were only four U. S. aircraft in Korea?

A. We have greater flexibility for the whole Pacific area if we do not tie down our aircraft in Korea itself, but keep them in Japan and Okinawa for swift deployment. As the movements of aircraft after the PUEBLO attack indicate, they can be moved into Korea in a matter of hours.

~~SECRET~~



THE JOINT STAFF

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

30 January 1968  
1904 EST

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Enemy Attacks in South Vietnam

1. This memorandum is a continuation of the NMCC 301658 Jan EST MFR.

2. FONECON MACV 301630 EST. Heavy small-arms fire continues on the west end of Tan Son Nhut. Viet Cong have penetrated the northwest gate and are probing the main gate area. There has been sporadic fire in the vicinity of Gen Momyer's quarters.

3. TELECON MACV 301637 EST. Two gunships are in the US Embassy area but are not firing for fear of hitting friendly personnel.

4. TELECON MACV 301640 EST. A number of province towns, district towns, and airfields in the 4th Corps area have been hit. Attempts are also being made to deliver ammunition to the US Embassy by helicopter. USMC personnel are in the building; VC are in the compound. Military Police reaction force cannot get in the gate to assist. Medical evacuation helicopters are receiving ground fire.

5. TELECON MACV 301643 EST. Bien Hoa is under attack by an estimated VC battalion. All Viet Cong killed to this time are in ARVN Military Police and/or National Police uniforms. Viet Cong are being driven out.

6. TELECON MACV 301649 EST. The USAF 6924th Security Squadron at Da Nang is under attack.

7. TELECON MACV 301658 EST. A US rifle platoon from Long Binh is on the way to the US Embassy. The troops will be off-loaded on the roof of the building.

8. TELECON MACV 301700 EST. Movement of US troops into Saigon is not contemplated until daylight (Saigon time)

9. TELECON MACV 301710 EST. Sporadic mortar fire continues on Tan Son Nhut. There is heavy contact at the west end of

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12356 SEC. 3.4  
NLS 87-125

By JON, NARA, Date 1/16/92

~~SECRET~~

the base. Small Viet Cong elements are roaming inside the perimeter. Security elements have been reinforced by ARVN (number unknown).

10. Information received from MACV corrects paragraph 10 of the memorandum published at 1658 EST; a SVNMC battalion at Vung Tan, rather than a USMC battalion from Con Thien, is being considered for movement to Saigon.

11. Information received through State Department channels indicates two MP jeeps have been captured by the enemy in Saigon. The US Ambassador's location is secure. The Saigon government has not exercised emergency powers.

12. FONECON MACV 301723 EST. Elements of a US rifle platoon have landed on the US Embassy roof. The situation in the embassy area is slackening.


13. FONECON MACV 301730 EST. Tan Son Nhut command post has been evacuated, except for emergency personnel; all others have moved to bunkers.

14. FONECON MACV 301752 EST. The runway at Tan Son Nhut is still being shelled.

15. FONECON MACV 301812 EST. Small-arms fire is still continuing outside the US Embassy; rounds have been fired into the building.

16. FONECON MACV 301814 EST. A helicopter with ammunition has landed on the embassy roof and has evacuated an injured man.

17. FONECON MACV 301818 EST. There has been a large explosion inside the US Embassy, possibly a recoilless rifle round. Everything is secure in the embassy building. Firing continues on the streets of Saigon and those leading to Tan Son Nhut; the situation is not subsiding. Several Air America aircraft at Tan Son Nhut have been damaged.

  
S.D. CRAMER, JR.  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Deputy Director for  
Operations (NMCC)

Distribution:  
See attached page.

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1968 JAN 31 00#24/85

Mr. Rostow  
Latest from

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN CRITIC NO 3-68  
COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM  
DOI: 30 JANUARY 1968  
SOURCE: CIA SAIGON  
ACQ: VIETNAM, SAIGON

Embassy Office  
via CIA  
BFS

7:05 EST

AS OF 2305 THE SITUATION IS AS FOLLOWS:  
EMBASSY STILL RECEIVING SMALL ARMS FIRE BUT ROCKET AND  
MORTAR FIRE HAS ABATED.  
NO ONE HAS BEEN ABLE TO COME INTO THE EMBASSY SO AT  
PRESENT TIME THERE ARE 4 CIA PERSONNEL AND 2 STATE IN  
BUILDING. 3 MARINE GUARDS HAVE BEEN WOUNDED. THEY WERE  
EVACUATED BY HELICOPTER AFTER SEVERAL PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO  
LAND ON EMBASSY ROAD HAD BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL BECAUSE OF GROUND  
FIRE.

~~THE CIA DUTY OFFICER HAS COMMO AS DOES THE SIGNAL  
CENTER WITH ALL BRANCH HEADS.~~

THIS SEEMS TO BE A WELL COORDINATED ATTACK.  
THE RADIO STATION HAS BEEN ATTACKED AS WELL AS TAN SON  
NHUT AIRBASE.  
AT PRESENT TIME AMERICAN INFANTRY ARE ON THE WAY TO  
EMBASSY BY HELICOPTER TO SECURE THE AREA.  
C DTG 310014Z F/T 0310015

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-466  
By ing, NARA, Date 6-15-95

per Ben Read, S/S

6:20 p.m. EST Phone call from U.S. Embassy

Viet Cong still in and around compound. Embassy building still under seige.

Rifle platoon still unable to land on the roof.

3 or 4 people left in compound.

A number of police and people around compound.

No idea how many in the compound area.

~~Viet Cong~~  
None in the Embassy but they might be inside at any time.

They are hitting foreign compounds all over Saigon.

(per Alan Went in Saigon)

Mr. Boston

Fuller report in 10 minutes

80/12  
Draft Press Guidance for White House and State Dept. Spokesman  
SUBJECT: Pueblo

10  
I do not have anything new for you on the Pueblo problem. We have no new information on the welfare of the crew. Our efforts to obtain the immediate release of the crew and the ship are continuing.

Q. Can you describe these efforts?

A. Other than what you know about, it wouldn't serve our purposes to talk about what we are doing.

Q. Do we have any reason to be encouraged that these efforts will succeed?

A. The efforts are still going on; I don't want to try to characterize their outcome one way or another. Obviously we hope that they will succeed.

Q. Would the US favor inviting the North Koreans to participate in the Security Council proceedings? Do we demand that they first release the crew and ship, or at least the crew?

A. The North Koreans have made no request to appear before the Security Council. If such a request is made, we will respond to it in the course of discussions among the Security Council members.

Q. How about reports that the US is willing to hold discussions with North Korea in some third country and without consultation with the Republic of Korea?

A. USUN issued a statement on that point yesterday (attached).



Q. Are we requesting another MAC meeting?

A. I don't want to discuss the details of what we may or may not be doing.

Q. Has South Korea expressed dissatisfaction to us regarding the way the matter is being handled?

A. We have been in constant and close consultation with the Government of the Republic of Korea. We of course fully share its view that the North Koreans, in addition to returning the Pueblo and its crew, must cease its provocative actions against South Korea.

Q. What connection do you see between the Viet Cong attacks in Saigon and other Vietnam cities and North Korean actions in the current crisis?

A. The Communists in Vietnam and in North Korea have similar objectives and use many of the same violent tactics. I would not want to speculate on the relationship between the recent developments in these two areas.

Q. What are the similar objectives?

A. FYI and for use on background as appropriate. The Communists in North Korea and in North Vietnam have both made clear they wish to have US forces leave and to take over in the south by force.

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MORNING

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-470

~~SECRET~~ By ~~ip~~, NARA, Date 3-13-95

11

January 29, 1968

STATE DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES REPORT

1. Gold Coverage Legislation - Senator Russell Long is leading an effort in the Senate to link bills providing for quota restrictions on textile and oil imports to legislation eliminating the requirement for gold coverage against Federal Reserve notes.

Last year Senator Hartke introduced a bill providing for the elimination of gold cover and obtained unanimous consent for the assignment of this bill to the Finance Committee. The Administration bill introduced by Senator Sparkman has been assigned to the Banking and Currency Committee, which begins hearings tomorrow. It can be assumed that Senator Long will attempt to have this bill also referred to his committee, or to amend it from the floor to include restrictive textile and oil import provisions.

Senator Smathers believes that in the light of the large number of cosponsors of the Hollings textile bill (68 at the close of last session), the Administration should anticipate that these maneuvers might be successful. In his opinion, the best chance of blocking the quota bills would be if the Senate loaded on so many amendments that the House conferees would have to stand firm against any amendments to the gold cover provisions or share the blame for a "ridiculous" piece of legislation.

We do not share Senator Smathers' optimism on the position of the House conferees in such a contingency.

2. Release of U.S. Airmen - Governor Harriman's staff has been in touch today with David Dellinger, the editor of the magazine "Liberation", to find out his plans in connection with the North Vietnamese invitation to him reported in the press to send a representative immediately to Hanoi for the release of three U.S. pilots. Dellinger said he plans to send a representative tomorrow with a view to catching the ICC plane Friday in Phnom Penh. He and the representative hope to be in Washington tomorrow to seek passport validation and are prepared to discuss with the Governor arrangements in connection with the release of the prisoners. He asked that no publicity be given to such discussions.


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3. Security Council - Following postponement of the Security Council meeting scheduled for this afternoon, discussions are continuing on the question whether to invite the North Koreans -- and the South Koreans also -- to participate in the Council's discussions. While the Soviets seemed cool yesterday to such an invitation, they are now saying that the North Koreans could come on two days notice if invited. However, we are far from certain that this indicates any change in the North Korean refusal to accept UN competence. No date or time has been set for resumption of the Security Council proceedings.



Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 29, 1968  
Monday, 7:15 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Barefoot Sanders *BS*

LEADERSHIP MEETING AGENDA

Tuesday, January 30, 8:30 a.m.

1. U. S. S. Pueblo.

I am sure the Leadership would like to be briefed to the extent possible on the present situation about the Pueblo.

2. Message Scheduling.

This week the Veterans Message will go Tuesday and the Economic Report on Thursday. Joe Califano will have the most recent tentative schedule in the event you wish to discuss dates beyond this week.

3. This week's schedule:

House floor: San Rafael Wilderness Conference Report  
Truth in Lending  
Fire Research and Safety

Senate floor: Civil Rights Debate

There will be a fight on the San Rafael Wilderness Conference Report. This is a left over item from last session which we would really like to get out of the way now.

Truth in Lending will be on the floor with three hours of debate. We would like to have general debate finished Tuesday so that the amendments can be offered Wednesday.

The three chief issues are:

- (1) the \$10.00 exemption
- (2) revolving credit, and
- (3) garnishment.

The principal argument will be over revolving credit. The House Leadership has pitched in behind Chairman Patman and Mrs. Sullivan and it appears there will be very substantial Democratic support to include revolving credit. The President's Consumer Advisory Council has sent a letter to all members of Congress endorsing the inclusion of revolving credit.

Whether or not revolving credit is included we do not believe there will be any serious problem on final passage of the bill.

Fire Research and Safety is another consumer item remaining from last session which, like Truth in Lending, has already passed the Senate. The \$10 million authorization in it will be halved to \$5 million by floor amendment; the Senate bill authorized \$5 million. There should not be any difficulty in passing this bill which is a part of the Administration program.

On the Civil Rights debate you may wish to discuss with the Senate Leadership the current situation on the possibility of compromise and what the outlook is for closing debate and obtaining an early vote.

#### 4. Authorizations and Appropriations.

We have provided a list of major authorization measures. The various departments are this week contacting committee chairmen urging early hearings on the necessary authorization measures.

Chairman Mahon is willing to adopt an Appropriations Committee schedule for reporting out bills provided that he can agree with the Leadership on a schedule for the authorization measures which must precede the appropriations bills.

It would be very helpful if the House Leadership would meet with Mahon on this, and if the Senate Leadership could work out a similar program on the Senate side with respect to authorization measures.

5. Highway Beautification.

This Senate passed bill is pending in Rules Committee. We would like to get early favorable action by Rules so that the House Leadership can decide the appropriate time to schedule the bill for floor action. This is a must item.

6. Housing Legislation.

You will be sending to the Hill in the near future an Omnibus Housing bill. Pending on the Senate calendar is a Housing bill (S. 2700) reported last session. We would like to withhold Senate action on this bill pending the arrival of the new Omnibus Housing bill on the Hill.

You may want to discuss with the Senate Leadership whether S. 2700 should be permanently put aside or brought up for Senate debate. (Probably, it would be better to lay it aside, and wait for the Committee to report the Omnibus bill. In this way there would be only one floor fight on Housing legislation this session - and that is plenty.)

7. Tax bill.

Now might be a good time to emphasize your keen interest in early passage of the Administration's Tax bill. What can be done with Mills and his Ways and Means Committee to get early and favorable action on this measure?



8. Safe Streets and Crime Control.

This House passed bill is pending in Senate Judiciary. We need the bill without state bloc grants. What should be done with Senator McClellan and to Senate Judiciary Committee to bring a strong bill to the Senate floor at an early date?

You may wish to point out that you intend to lay great stress in the Crime Message on the necessity for early action on this bill.

9. Recess Dates.

At last week's Leadership meeting Senator Mansfield said that the Senate had already announced the dates on which it will be in recess for holiday periods. Those days are:

Lincoln's Birthday: Conclusion of business February 8 to noon February 14.

Washington's Birthday: No business after reading of farewell address on February 22.

Easter: Conclusion of business April 11 to noon April 17.

Memorial Day: Conclusion of business May 29 until noon, June 3.

July 4: Conclusion of business July 3 until July 6.

The Speaker has as yet made no similar announcement for recess dates in the House. It would be particularly helpful to us in scheduling messages, and it would also be helpful on the attendance problem, if the House Leadership could adopt and announce a similar schedule. Even if the House recess dates do not coincide with those of the Senate, there are great advantages in knowing these dates as soon as possible.

1/19/68

Major authorization and extension  
bills on which appropriations  
bills are dependent

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1. Military construction authorization (Defense)
2. Defense procurement and RDT&E (Defense)
3. Foreign aid authorization (AID and Defense)
4. Peace Corps authorization
5. NASA authorization
6. AEC authorization
7. Maritime Administration authorization (Commerce)
8. Coast Guard authorization (Transportation)
9. Saline water program authorization (Interior)
10. Export-Import Bank -- extend life and increase authorization
11. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency authorization
12. National Foundation on Arts and Humanities authorization
13. P.L. 480 program extension (Agriculture)
14. Federal-aid highway biennial authorization (Transportation)
15. Federal payment to D. C. formula (D. C. Government)
16. Regional medical program (HEW)
17. Defense Production Act extension (OEP)
18. Renegotiation Act extension (Renegotiation Board)

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Tuesday, January 30, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following is the situation as given us by Gen. Westmoreland's aides.

Danang.

There were quite a few incidents between 2:00 and 4:00 pm EST yesterday afternoon. Marble Mountain air base received 30 mortar rounds and numerous aircraft were damaged.

At 2:30 pm the Danang Air Base also received 20 mortar rounds with 5 aircraft destroyed and 18 damaged.

US casualties were one killed and 10 wounded with an additional 37 nonbattle casualties.

Between 2:30 and 4:40 pm, the ARVN headquarters in Danang came under mortar and ground attack by an enemy force of a company or larger. A total of 40-50 mortar rounds were fired. The attack was repulsed with reports of 2 ARVN killed against 64 enemy killed and 7 captured.

Artillery missions and gunships have attacked enemy positions south of Danang. The exact toll on the enemy is not known.

Second Corps

Nha Trang -- at approximately 10:00 pm on January 29 a patrol outside the city came under attack by small arms fire. By 11:40 pm mortar fire had landed at various areas inside the city, including the Korean regimental headquarters, the subsector headquarters, the POW compound, the commanding general's compound and quarters.

A detainee stated that the city was infiltrated by a battalion of enemy forces.

An estimated two Sapper companies are still in the city.

At 4:00 am this morning the Koreans reported that the city was secure with contact on the outskirts.

Friendly casualties are reported as 28 killed (including 12 US, 7 ARVN, and 7 Koreans.) There were 33 wounded (10 US, 23 ARVN)

The enemy lost 30 killed and 9 captured.

*more to follow*  
*2*



Ban Me Thuot -- the attack here began at 12:55 pm, initially with mortar and rockets. The enemy then infiltrated into the city.

At 8:20 pm the Viet Cong were reported to still be in the populated areas.

At 9:15 pm mortar, rocket and small arms fire was continuing. The 25th ARVN regiment was sweeping the area.

A detainee stated that the 33rd North Vietnamese regiment planned to infiltrate and take the town.

The last report, as of 4:30 am this morning indicated that friendly losses were 7 killed, 15 wounded. Five aircraft (helicopters) had been damaged and one destroyed.

Enemy losses were reported as 91 killed and 28 captured.

Pleiku -- at 12:30 pm the town came under mortar attack, followed up by a ground assault by an estimated two enemy companies.

At 4:30 am this morning the city was still occupied by enemy forces and the US commanders in the city were reporting it would be tomorrow before they could clear them all out.

Kontum -- at 12:35 pm approximately 500 to 1,000 enemy moved on the city from the north. A reaction force from the US 4th Infantry countered from the south.

Sporadic fire is reported in the city and at the Special Forces camp outside.

It is estimated that three companies of Viet Cong and one battalion of North Vietnamese are in the area.

There are no reports of friendly casualties at this time. Enemy losses are reported as 139 killed and 3 captured.

Qui Nhon -- at approximately 11:30 am the radio station came under attack by a Viet Cong platoon. Contact continues around the radio station and a sub area maintenance complex. The enemy is surrounded in these areas. Fighting also continues in the eastern part of the city.

It is estimated that an enemy Sapper company is in the area.

Casualties reported thus far are: 3 civilians killed and 5 US forces wounded. Enemy casualties are reported as 6 killed and 6 captured.

Gen. Westmoreland added that it would be tomorrow (tonight our time) before he had the full story and he would be sending you a report. He sent you his best.

Arthur McCafferty



14

Tuesday, January 30, 1968

6:40 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We have just finished talking to Gen Westmoreland and his duty personnel in Saigon.

Gen. Westmoreland said to tell you the situation is well in hand. He states that we have killed more enemy today than at any other time in his memory. It appears the total will be 700 or well over, while our casualties are light.

The enemy displayed an attitude of almost desperation. Their forces spearheaded an attack on the populated areas, in some cases disguised as civilians. They were ordered to terrorize the civilian population and attack government installations and radio stations.


The ARVN performed very well, supported by US and South Korean troops. Many enemy were killed and many captured.

The situation in the DMZ and Khe Sanh is Quiet. His aide was in Khe Sanh this morning and the morale was good. They state they can take care of any attacks. The weather in the area was good and there were many airstrikes against enemy positions in the area.

The General feels that this enemy deception and violation of the TET truce was met and blunted. He has talked with all of his commanders in the field and they are very pleased with the reaction of all Allied forces and feel confident.

The General feels that we have hurt the enemy and our airstrikes in the northern part of the country may have blunted any attacks they have planned there.

I will send up next the situation report for the areas attacked as given by Gen. Westmoreland's aides.

  
Arthur McCafferty

I passed on to Gen. Westmoreland Mr. Rostow's suggestion that he call in the press in Saigon and personally brief them along the above lines in order that the press back here reflect his feeling of confidence this morning.



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30 JAN 1968  
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FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON  
TO ADM SHARP CINCPAC HAWAII  
GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH DC  
ZEM

~~SECRET~~ MAC 01438 EYES ONLY

TO: MR RUSK-STATE

TO: MR HELMS-CIA

TO: MR. McCAFFERTY  
WHITE HOUSE

From: GEN WHEELER

THE EVENTS OF THE PAST 18 HOURS HAVE BEEN REplete WITH ENEMY ATTACKS AGAINST CERTAIN OF OUR KEY INSTALLATIONS IN THE I AND II CTZS. THE HEAVIEST ATTACKS WERE LAUNCHED AGAINST DANANG, KONTUM, PLEIKU, NHA TRANG, BAN ME THUOT, AND TAN CANH IN THE DAK TO AREA. LESSER ATTACKS WERE MADE ON QUI NHON AND TUY HOA. ALTHOUGH ENEMY ACTIVITY IN III AND IV CTZS WAS COMPARATIVELY LIGHT DURING THIS PERIOD, WE ARE ALERT TO ATTEMPTS BY THE ENEMY TO ATTACK SIGNIFICANT TARGETS IN THESE AREAS. REPEATED ATTEMPTS CAN ALSO BE EXPECTED IN THE I AND II CTZS. WHILE OUR OPERATIONS REPORTS TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS HAVE COVERED THESE ATTACKS IN SOME DETAIL, I FELT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO GIVE YOU A WRAP-UP ON THE SITUATION AS IT STANDS NOW.

IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT IN I CTZ NONE OF THESE ATTACKS WERE DIRECTED AGAINST OUR INSTALLATIONS NORTH OF THE AI VAN PASS, PERHAPS BECAUSE OF THE THICKENING OF US FORCES IN THAT AREA. DANANG WAS THE PRIME TARGET AND WAS ATTACKED BEGINNING AT 20 MINUTES PAST MIDNIGHT. THE FACILITIES AT MARBLE MOUNTAIN AND THE DANANG AIR BASE WERE MORTARED AND ROCKETED WITH A NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT RECEIVING DAMAGE, TO INCLUDE FIVE JET AIRCRAFT DESTROYED. THE ROCKET SITE WAS IMMEDIATELY LOCATED AND BROUGHT UNDER FIRE WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS AT THIS TIME. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE ARVN CORPS HEADQUARTERS CAME

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 11-22-78

By JOW, NARA, Date 1/16/92



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UNDER ENEMY MORTAR AND GROUND ATTACK BY AN ESTIMATED REINFORCED ENEMY COMPANY. AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE AGAINST THE DANANG BRIDGE BY UNDERWATER SWIMMERS. IT WAS THWARTED WITH THREE ENEMY KIA AND ONE CAPTURED. TIMELY WARNING OF THE ATTACKS PLUS RAPID REACTION BY US/ARVN/ROK FORCES HAS BROUGHT THE SITUATION IN THE DANANG AREA UNDER CONTROL AT THIS TIME. CASUALTIES SO FAR LIST 89 ENEMY KIA AND 7 FRIENDLY KIA. NOTEWORTHY AMONG THE COUNTERACTIONS LAUNCHED IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS WAS THAT OF THE ROK MARINES, WHO, IN RESPONSE TO AN ENEMY GROUND ATTACK IN THE HOI AN AREA, INSERTED A FORCE BY HELICOPTER, ENGAGED THE ENEMY, KILLING 21 WITH NO FRIENDLY CASUALTIES.

THE II CTZ RECEIVED THE BULK AND INTENSITY OF THE ENEMY ATTACKS. IN THE KONTUM AREA, IN EXCESS OF 500 ENEMY ATTACKED FROM THE NORTH IN THE VICINITY OF THE AIRFIELD, AND WERE ENGAGED BY ELEMENTS OF THE 4TH U.S. DIVISION AND ASSORTED VIETNAMESE UNITS. THE AREA IS NOW UNDER CONTROL WITH ARTILLERY AND AIR STRIKES BEING EMPLOYED AGAINST AN ESTIMATED TWO ENEMY BATTALIONS. SEVEN U.S. WERE KILLED IN THIS ACTION, WITH 165 NVA KIA. VIETNAMESE CASUALTIES ARE UNKNOWN. IN TAN CANH OF KONTUM PROVINCE, CONTACT IS SPORADIC WITH ELEMENTS OF THE 3/42 ARVN REGIMENT OPPOSING AN UNKNOWN SIZE ENEMY FORCE. FOUR FRIENDLY HAVE BEEN KILLED AND FIVE NVA. IN PLEIKU, CONTACT CONTINUES WITH AN ENEMY OF UNKNOWN SIZE IN THE CITY, WITH FRIENDLY FORCES ATTEMPTING TO CUT OFF THE ENEMY FORCES TRYING TO ESCAPE. THE 4TH INF DIV CAPTURED 220 ENEMY IN THE VICINITY OF PLEIKU. OF THESE, 20 HAD NORTH VIETNAMESE MONEY ON THEIR PERSON. THE VAST MAJORITY ARE MONTAGNARDS BELIEVED TO BE PRESSED INTO SERVICE. AVERAGE AGE

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APPEARS TO BE 18 TO 30. 58 CLAIM TO BE HOI CHANH. ARVN FORCES ARE IN THE CITY. (PLEIKU). SEVEN FRIENDLY HAVE BEEN KILLED AS AGAINST 103 ENEMY. IN NHA TRANG, SPORADIC FIGHTING CONTINUES IN THE CITY. FRIENDLY LOST 21 KIA; ENEMY 60 KIA. FIGHTING CONTINUES AGAINST THE ENEMY ATTEMPTING TO WITHDRAW. CITY FIGHTING CONTINUES IN BAN ME THUOT WITH ENEMY STILL IN THE VICINITY. CASUALTIES ARE REPORTED TO BE 7 FRIENDLY KIA AND 131 ENEMY KIA. IN ADDITION, 36 ENEMY HAVE BEEN KILLED IN THE TUY HOA AREA AND 11 NVA KIA IN THE NINH HOA AREA. IN QUI NHON, THE ENEMY HOLDS THE RADIO STATION AND THE MAINTENANCE AREA BUT HAS LOST 50 KIA. THE ROKS HAVE THE RADIO STATION SURROUNDED BUT HAVE NOT ATTACKED, SINCE THE ENEMY IS HOLDING THREE HOSTAGES.

IN III CTZ IN BINH DINH DOUNG PROVINCE, SOUTHWEST OF BEN CAT, UNITS OF THE 25TH US DIVISION MADE A SIGNIFICANT CONTACT WITH AN ENEMY FORCE, RESULTING IN 66 ENEMY KILLED, WITH EIGHT FRIENDLY KILLED AND 14 WOUNDED. IV CTZ HAD ONE SIGNIFICANT ENCOUNTER IN THE VINH LONG AREA, WHERE GUNSHIPS AND TACTICAL SUPPORT AIRCRAFT ENGAGED A CLEARED TARGET OF SAMPANS IN A CANAL AREA, KILLING 80 ENEMY, DESTROYING 124 SAMPANS, WITH THREE SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS.

DURING THE COURSE OF THE DAY WE HAD A MAXIMUM AIR EFFORT, WHICH WAS REPORTED TO BE EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE.

THE CURRENT OUTLOOK DEPICTS A SITUATION SIMILAR TO MY FOREGOING ACCOUNT.

IN SUMMARY, THE ENEMY HAS DISPLAYED WHAT APPEARS TO BE DESPERATION TACTICS, USING NVA TROOPS TO TERRORIZE POPULATED AREAS. HE ATTEMPTED TO ACHIEVE SURPRISE BY ATTACKING DURING THE TRUCE PERIOD.

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THE REACTION OF VIETNAMESE, US AND FREE WORLD FORCES TO THE SITUATION HAS BEEN GENERALLY GOOD. SINCE THE ENEMY HAS EXPOSED HIMSELF, HE HAS SUFFERED MANY CASUALTIES. AS OF NOW, THEY ADD UP TO ALMOST 700. WHEN THE DUST SETTLES, THERE WILL PROBABLY BE MORE. ALL MY SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS REPORT THE SITUATION WELL IN HAND.

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