

**WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)**

| FORM OF DOCUMENT | CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE  | DATE    | RESTRICTION |
|------------------|--|---------|-------------|
| #1 rpt           | "Debriefing by the Pres. on his talks..."<br>PCI 6 p open 4-17-95 NLJ 94-486 | 6/23/67 | A           |
| #2 memo          | Rostow to President, 6:15 p.m. NLJ 91-14; 9/20/94<br>S 3 p                   | 6/21/67 | A           |
| #4a memcon       | Rusk and Gromyko<br>PCI 27 p open 1-9-95 NLJ 94-488                          | 6/23/67 | A           |
| #5a memo         | Rusk to President open 3/16/95 NLJ 91-356<br>TS 1 p                          | 6/24/67 | A           |
| #5b rpt          | "The US anticipates that it..." open 3/16/95 NLJ 91-356<br>TS 1 p            | undated | A           |
| #5c memcon       | Rusk and Dobrynin<br>TS 1 p open 1-9-95 NLJ 94-488                           | 7/24/67 | A           |
| #5d memcon       | Rusk and Dobrynin "<br>TS 1 p  | 7/26/67 | A           |
| #5e cable        | Moscow 450 (Kornienko to Thompson)<br>TS 1 p open 1-9-95 NLJ 94-488          | 8/5/67  | A           |
| #5f rpt          | Rusk to Thompson "<br>TS 1 p   | 8/6/67  | A           |

FILE LOCATION

**NSF, Files of Walt W. Rostow, "Hollybush--6/23-5/67, Glassboro, NJ"**

**Box 10**

**RESTRICTION CODES**

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Debriefing by the President on his talks with Chairman Kosygin, morning of June 23, 1967, at Hollybush, Glassboro State College, Glassboro, New Jersey.

The talks were not denunciatory or argumentative. Kosygin was reserved, contained, but jolly.

Kosygin pointed out that he had an 18-year old grandson and granddaughter and was the senior grandfather present. They both had a duty to protect them by maintaining peace between their countries of 200 million.

The President said they had a responsibility not only to the 200 million but to the whole world of 3 billion. He hoped their grandsons would grow up to know each other. They had lived through the horrors of two wars and they did not wish their grandchildren to share that kind of experience.

Kosygin said that during the second world war he had responsibility in Leningrad. He would never forget American help at that time. He said he wanted peace, but you don't. The President said, I believe you are sincere but I am also. At which Kosygin appeared a big chagrined at his first play.

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NIJ 94-486  
By Cb, NARA, Date 4-3-95

The President explained that in the 3 years he had been in office, we had made no new treaties. He had wished to make progress in relations with the Soviet Union. He began with a letter to Khrushchev urging that they both cut back their nuclear production, and they did. He urged they both cut back their levels of defense expenditure, and they did. Things then changed. There were hard words about Viet Nam.

In these 3 years, despite their stopping Mary Martin's going to Moscow, they had concluded the cultural agreement and civil agreement, Consular Agreement. Working hard on non-proliferation, ready next week to start discussions on ABM's and ICBM's. He was awaiting answer which had been delayed 3 months. (President made this point three times and never got a reply.)

The President said that on the Middle East he had presented his 5 points but got no comment from Kosygin. Kosygin said that the President before the war had talked about territorial integrity, asserted this on hot line, but wound up protecting aggression. Kosygin said that he had been

Stalin's deputy for 12 years. He had served in Leningrad. He would never forget the time when arm in arm we resisted Fascism. He wished we could agree on some of these moves now. Kosygin then said we must bring back the troops to the original armistice lines, and put the question of Aqaba into International Court of Justice. Then we could discuss other problems. Then came the nearest thing to a threat. He said, unless you do this there will be a war, a very great war. I'm against it. They will fight with arms if they have them; if not, with fists. All troops must be withdrawn at once. They will fight with their bare hands, if necessary.

(The President said it was not clear in this passage whether the Soviets would supply the arms for this blow up or engage themselves.) The President then leaned forward and said very slowly and quietly, let us understand one another. I hope there will be no war. If there is a war, I hope it will not be a big war. If they fight, I hope they fight with fists and not with guns. I hope <sup>you</sup> and we will keep out of this matter because, if we do get into it, it will be a "most serious" matter. The President's

judgment was that this was not an ultimatum and he backed away from the implication that the Soviet Union might itself become involved.

On the NPT, the President asked Kosygin to set a date and let us table the agreement.

On ABM's and ICBM's, he said let us go to work. Sec. McNamara can go to Moscow. We can meet in Washington or some neutral point.

On Viet Nam, the President drew a map and urged the separation of North Viet Nam from South Viet Nam. Kosygin attacked corruption of the regime in Saigon. The President did not engage in the quality of our allies.

President said some think we should invade North Viet Nam -- not Sec McNamara, but some do urge that. We think bombing of North Viet Nam is better than invading it. If you could get them to stop invading the South, you could say to us don't invade North Viet Nam. But they must get their people out of South Viet Nam. The UK, ICC or anyone. could have free elections. They could have any kind of government they want.

Kosygin said Sec. McNamara couldn't wait three days in February before he started bombing the North. The President said, well you didn't have any influence in Hanoi. The Chinese had taken over. You couldn't deliver them.

Kosygin said that Fawzi had given Sec. Rusk important proposals. Kosygin complained <sup>about</sup> ~~that~~ Amb. Goldberg's position at the UN.

The President pressed him on sending arms to the Middle East. Said he hoped we both could avoid doing that. By working the hot line, they had achieved a cease-fire. The U.S. knew nothing of the attack. Had no knowledge of the Israeli attack. They thought they had commitments from both parties. He said he assumed the Soviet Union did not know of the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba before it took place.

The President repeated he hoped both of us would stay outside the area with our armed forces. If we engaged, it would be quite serious.

At one point Kosygin complained about our bombing Hanoi when he was there. The President explained that our bombing had nothing to do with his presence. Sec. Rusk was bombed when at Saigon. This was a problem of travelers going into war areas. In fact, we made clear in our Tonkin resolution we <sup>would</sup> ~~did~~ not take such attacks. When they killed 60 of our men asleep at Pleiku, we had to take action. Totally unrelated to Kosygin's visit.

President pressed on Middle East, Viet Nam, non -proliferation, ABM's.

He got no positive reaction in the first talks. But he found Kosygin friendly, jolly and warm. He enjoyed him.

There was some exchange on the two Ambassadors. President said he thought very well of Amb. Dobrynin and Tommy Thompson had his full confidence. He had returned to Moscow as duty to all humanity as well as to his country.

Kosygin said Dobrynin reports very objectively. He says nothing that will increase the heat between the two countries.



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

2  
Wednesday, June 21, 1967  
6:15 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

1. The case for seeing Kosygin:

-- At home it will cover your flank to the left and among the columnists. If you don't do it, they will blame every difficulty that follows on the lack of a meeting. The Republicans will run on: I will go to Moscow.

-- There is a 20% chance that it will have a net favorable effect in U.S. -Soviet policy;

-- Given the present state of affairs, I think the chance is well under 10% that it could make things worse between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (The trouble with Vienna was not the meeting itself, but that Khrushchev had decided to see if he could break President Kennedy on Berlin. I do not see the Soviets in an ultimatum mood on either Viet Nam or the Middle East at the moment. There is always, of course, the chance. But if the chance exists it is because the Soviet Government, which is a collective organization, has so decided. And we might as well get it straight and soon, as obscurely and later.)

2. On a cold, hard, objective basis I am confident that your net impact on Kosygin (and through him on his colleagues) will be positive. I have had the privilege of seeing you deal with a wide range of governmental leaders. Your batting average justifies this confidence. Kosygin should feel both the steel and compassion; the determination and flexibility; and, above all, your willingness to treat the Soviet Union as one of the two older responsible children in the human family if they will so behave.

For these reasons, on balance, I am for the meeting, if it can be arranged in ways which leave you feeling comfortable and not cornered. That is why I support strongly Maguire Air Force Base, although it's going to be a little tough for them to swallow.

3. What might come out of the meeting? Aside from your impact on Kosygin, nothing hard that they have not already decided. But it could accelerate the pace.

4. With respect to the Middle East, they may have decided to move in time from a straight confrontation on the question of Israeli withdrawal to playing a role in a settlement. If so, that would emerge in the days ahead

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By SP1/mw, NARA, Date 8/1/94



6/21/67

via Gromyko. You may be able to smoke him out a little in advance.

5. With respect to ABM-ICBM, Kosygin is in a position where he must give you a simple Yes-No answer on whether his government is willing to engage in serious talks. Again, that has probably been decided. It could be communicated diplomatically. You might, through this meeting, get authoritative word earlier than otherwise.

6. On the substantive side, the serious case for talking with Kosygin is Viet Nam. Frankly, I am a little impressed by the fact that the North Vietnamese have initiated contacts with us at several points. I am impressed by the fact that Kosygin dropped "permanent" from his bombing formula. It may be that our polls, which show popular support for a harder policy, have led them to believe that they will not be saved by the election of 1968; they may believe that we are about to make important decisions to increase our forces and perhaps apply more pressure against the North; that the bombing we have been doing is too unpleasant to be accepted over a period of years ahead; that there is danger, if we proceed on our present track, of either a clear-cut Hanoi defeat or a U.S. /Soviet confrontation which they do not want; and that Hanoi is coming to believe that time is no longer its friend.

7. If there is anything at all in this line of thought then, of course, a meeting with Kosygin could be most important. And certainly the most important thing on which you must make up your mind is what you say to Kosygin -- after hearing him out -- on Viet Nam.

8. My own thoughts are not final, but here they are. You might say that he knows our commitment and our views; and that the formula of the Foreign Minister in Hanoi is not satisfactory to us. We cannot accept a stoppage of bombing simply for the possibility of talk. What are his views? If it emerges that he does not repeat the permanent formula and goes on to say he is sure talks could take place if we stop bombing unconditionally, you could then explain that so long as the DMZ is being violated you cannot make a commitment to stop bombing. You might ask him if they would respect the DMZ if we stopped bombing the North. He is most unlikely to be able to give you a definite answer on this; but he might agree to find out.

You could then indicate that there is a certain urgency in this matter. Your forces are under great pressure. They are taking heavy casualties every week. Secretary McNamara is going out to review the situation and to make recommendations. You might then add this; every mature American remembers that we lost more casualties during the Panmunjom negotiating period than we did during the Korean War. The critical question that must

~~SECRET~~

-3-

6/21/67

be answered by Hanoi is whether they are or are not willing to make peace on the basis of the 1954 and 1962 agreements and leave the South Vietnamese to settle their own political affairs on the basis of politics and not violence. We are looking for peace in Southeast Asia at the earliest possible time; but not on the basis of turning South Viet Nam over to North Viet Nam.

W. W. R.

(13)

## SAFEGUARDS

The issue on safeguards (Art. III) in the NPT is not an issue between us and the USSR. It is between the EURATOM countries (France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium) and all the rest. EURATOM views depend essentially upon the veto and negative attitude of France.

Gromyko told Rusk that they would talk to France about this.

What we now want is: USSR agreement to table the existing draft with Article III blank. We agree that we and Soviets (as co-chairmen) will work urgently on Article III. Gromyko and Rusk are meeting early this week on Article III.

If USSR can accept our present language for Article III, of course we could table complete draft.

However, we are committed to our allies (especially the Germans) not to discuss alternative language on Article III with the USSR before discussing it with our allies.

*Mr. Raton*

(H)

## MIDDLE EAST

Mr. Kosygin said to the General Assembly that we should try to find "common language". We agree to try.

The General Assembly's function is to make recommendations to the Security Council and to the parties. It is inconceivable to us that the Assembly would not recommend the elements of a permanent peace in the Middle East.

We have studied Kosygin's speech carefully and believe we ought to find "common language" on:

- Withdrawal of forces.
- Acceptance of Israel as an independent national state.
- Elimination of a state of war or rights of belligerence.
- Re-affirmation of non-use of force or threat of force.
- Rights of innocent passage -- Suez as well as Aqaba.
- Dampening of arms race.
- Commitment to face and solve refugee problem.
- Effective UN presence until peace treaties between Middle East states worked out.
- A mediation procedure.
- Intensified economic and social development.

Some of these elements were contained in the Chairman's speech before the General Assembly. None is inconsistent with Soviet policy as we understand it.

We should work in New York for a resolution and action we both can support.

C  
*Mr Rostow*  
3-b

VENEZUELA

We have firm evidence that Cuba is directly and actively encouraging guerrilla operations in seven Latin American countries, This is a form of aggression and it is dangerous to peace in the Western Hemisphere and the world.

In Venezuela, for example, Soviet-manufactured weapons were captured from Cubans landed in Venezuela illegally in July 1966. Their boat and motors are known to have come from Cuba.

In May 1967 a party of Cubans and Venezuelans trained in Cuba landed in a Cuban fishing vessel. Several Cubans were captured.

On March 13, 1967, Castro openly stated his determination to support such activities.

The Venezuelan government is determined that there shall be effective action against it.

Our Ambassador Sol Linowitz is now in Venezuela investigating the evidence along with his OAS colleagues.

It is of the highest importance that Castro be persuaded to stop such illegal activity.

4

~~TOP SECRET~~

July 1, 1967

Mr. Secretary:

Herewith my notes on your conversation with Foreign Minister Gromyko at Glassboro on Friday, June 23. Aside from a copy in my hands, this is the only one that exists.

I leave editing and distribution to you.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993  
By Qut, NARA, Date 1-27-92

40

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-488  
By 118, NARA, Date 12-21-94 Friday, June 23, 1967

Memorandum of Conversation of Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko  
Hollybush conference, Glassboro State College, Glassboro, New Jersey,  
June 23, 1967.

Secretary Rusk opened by reporting that Foreign Minister Fawzi (UAR) had spoken at some length to him the previous evening about the desirability of limiting arms shipments to the Middle East. The Secretary emphasized this was a private conversation and he might not be speaking for his government. Nevertheless, it was interesting. He went on to point out that arms shipments become circular and cumulative. Arms competition exists in the area not only between Israel and Arab states but as between various Arab states.

Gromyko said that the UK had also raised this question.

Sec. Rusk pointed out he had raised the question of smaller arms race at <sup>the</sup> opening of Geneva conference. He asked if there is some way we can act? He asked Gromyko if he had any sense of what de Gaulle's attitude towards an agreement to limit the arms flow to the Middle East might be? Gromyko said he didn't know.



Sec. Rusk said that Fawzi had underlined that <sup>the</sup> other needs of the region were so great that it was wrong to divert resources to ~~other~~ military purposes.

Gromyko said the arms issue should not be tied to other matters.

(At this point he made the first of several glancing blows at Secretary McNamara with a remark about those interested in the use of military force.)

He went on to say we should give the matter further thought. We know the UK position, we don't know the French position. He recalled Anthony Eden raised the question in 1956, concluding, however, that the arms limitation should not be tied as a string to other Middle Eastern issues.

Sec. Rusk said we could be flexible in the matter of procedures.

Gromyko then asked: <sup>the Secretary</sup> did the Secretary, when he talked of the Middle East, <sup>did he refer merely to Israel and the Arab states or did he</sup> include other ~~regions~~ <sup>countries of the region</sup> (implying Turkey and Iran)?

Sec. Rusk replied that the problem lay between Israel and the Arab states on the one hand, and as between certain Arab nations on the other.

He said we both agree on <sup>the</sup> necessity of keeping nuclear weapons out of the

whole area, to which Gromyko assented with a nod.

Gromyko then turned to non-proliferation. He asked how soon could the obstacles be overcome and a treaty completed, including <sup>the achievement</sup> ~~the work of~~

<sup>of agreement among</sup>  
the Eighteen.

Sec. Rusk replied that once we tabled a draft, with or without an agreed paragraph on controls, the problem would lie with governments who have not yet seen the text; for example, India and Japan. He made clear that the U.S. does not have pledges from other governments. The U.S. and the Soviet Union may present the draft but then these principal problems would arise:

-- <sup>assurances</sup> ~~guarantees~~ for India;

-- <sup>the</sup> question of the length of the treaty, where the Italians and others seek a length that is something short of eternity, perhaps 25 or 30 years.

-- finally, both U.S. and Soviet Union will be pressed on <sup>the</sup> question of reducing and controlling nuclear arms as between themselves.

Gromyko interposed that if you accept general and complete <sup>disarmament,</sup> ~~disagreement,~~

that would settle it; or we might have <sup>a</sup> general provision in the preamble of the <sup>treaty</sup> indicating we would do our best to move towards disarmament.

Gromyko then asked if we had <sup>the</sup> seen draft given by Soviet Union to India.

Sec. Rusk said we have <sup>an important</sup> ~~number of~~ constitutional problems <sup>I am giving</sup> to give assurances from the Executive Branch <sup>this would involve</sup> ~~would involve~~ putting matter as treaty to Senate, <sup>where</sup> ~~or would have to generate~~ 2/3 majority vote <sup>is required.</sup> ~~if we worked~~ via a resolution in the Security Council, we could avoid this difficult consitutional and procedural matter.

Gromyko said the Soviet draft was based on and rooted in the Charter of the UN.

Sec. Rusk asked Gromyko if he had also gotten <sup>the</sup> impression <sup>the</sup> Indians had separated <sup>the</sup> non-proliferation treaty from matter of assurances.

Gromyko replied that he had always thought the statements of assurances <sup>would</sup> ~~might~~ be made in connection with the treaty. They were flexible as to whether they would be attached in some way or be made as an accompaniment to the act of concluding the treaty.

Sec. Rusk ~~said~~ <sup>that</sup> repeated point that if we made <sup>a</sup> statement unilateral

*assurance*

<sup>a</sup> we would have to be careful because of the constitutional problem involved

for the Executive Branch. Operating through the Security Council would

be easier. Sec. Rusk <sup>then</sup> said: what would our position be if <sup>the</sup> Indians did not

insist on assurances, and ~~Gromyko~~ asked if Gromyko had any more

information. Gromyko said Indians had raised matter in connection with

NPT.

Sec. Rusk said one problem might arise: <sup>the</sup> if Indians asked for assurances,

*the other non-nuclear powers*  
~~everyone else~~ might ask for them

Gromyko replied that the statement made would not be adapted specifically  
to India but <sup>to</sup> non-nuclear powers in general.

Sec. Rusk said there might be differences of views as among non-nuclear  
powers as to what kind of assurances are required. <sup>Some</sup> might want  
stronger language than in the draft the Soviet Union gave to India.

Sec. Rusk <sup>then</sup> said: if you and we table a draft soon, could we complete it  
perhaps by October?

Gromyko said that seemed reasonable if the main obstacles were removed.

Sec. McNamara agreed : ~~Said~~<sup>the</sup>, let us try for October.

Gromyko repeated, that is reasonable, very reasonable.

Sec. Rusk said we must wrestle with problems of control..

Gromyko said that except for Western Europe, there is no problem.

Sec. Rusk said we can't command Western Europe. The three communities of Western Europe have a new chairman, Mr. Rey, a Belgian.

He had urged him to go deeply into the matter of <sup>the</sup> EURATOM-Geneva control question. The ultimate problem is <sup>with</sup> General de Gaulle.

Gromyko said he had gotten <sup>the</sup> impression in Paris that <sup>the</sup> French favor the treaty. They probably do not plan to sign it, but they are not definite even on this point.

Sec. Rusk said they also take <sup>the</sup> <sup>that</sup> view, EURATOM must exercise its own controls.

Gromyko replied, let EURATOM also control in addition <sup>to</sup> ~~or an~~ IAEA safeguards.

Sec. Rusk said U.S. is not member of EURATOM. We engage in technical cooperation with it but we have no direct interest.

Gromyko said; try to explain to them that their position makes trouble for the NPT: <sup>the</sup> ~~He went on to say~~ question poses great difficulties.

It is impossible to combine bloc and international principles <sup>of</sup> ~~and~~ control.

The three year transitional period doesn't help. They must have an international system.

Sec. Rusk said if <sup>the French</sup> ~~France~~ were to discover its attitude were <sup>an</sup> ~~a~~ obstacle to <sup>the</sup> ~~international~~ treaty, it is possible <sup>they</sup> ~~they~~ would change its mind.

Gromyko said it is better you explain this to the French.

Sec. Rusk said our ability to <sup>persuade</sup> ~~explain to~~ General de Gaulle is somewhat limited. <sup>then</sup> He ~~He~~ went on to ask Gromyko if he anticipated that the Soviet Union would be willing to have its peaceful atomic installations inspected by <sup>IAEA.</sup> ~~HEAT~~

Gromyko said; that is your privilege. ~~We~~ shall not.

Sec. Rusk asked, what are the difficulties?

Gromyko said there is no need for it. If you wish to, that's all right.

But not for the Soviet Union.

Sec. Rusk pointed out that acceptance by the Soviet Union, as well as by the U. S., would have good effect on <sup>Page 2</sup> ~~Indians~~ <sup>which</sup> who were concerned with

discrimination. In cases where discrimination is not required for non-proliferation, <sup>it would be wise to avoid it.</sup> ~~(It has been explained to them that the treaty poses no~~

~~obstacle.~~ It would be helpful if Soviet Union and U. S. would demonstrate that fact themselves. It would make a deep impression on countries which might make trouble in <sup>accepting</sup> ~~passing~~ the treaty.

Gromyko concluded that when the text is sent to the Committee of Eighteen, <sup>four</sup> months ought to be enough <sup>to complete work.</sup> The target date of October was good. If possible, the treaty ought to be concluded sooner.

Sec. Rusk ~~said that~~ asked when would we have a common text.

Gromyko said that depends on when <sup>we</sup> overcome our differences of control.

On other matters, we are closer than before. ~~We will give final reply on~~



~~this matter.~~ Perhaps the Chairman and the President are now talking about it. He urged U.S. to pay attention to the question of control, which must be international.

Sec. Rusk said we find ourselves in a difficult situation. If we could give ourselves <sup>three</sup> years beginning now, we could gain time.

Gromyko said what happens if <sup>the three</sup> years run out and there is no solution? But <sup>as said: we</sup> ~~we~~ do not exclude the possibility of submitting the treaty with a blank Article III

Sec. Rusk said we would work hard on this question.

Gromyko urged Sec. Rusk to look into it again and try to find common ground and try to convince <sup>our</sup> allies.

Sec. Rusk asked if the Soviet Union had again talked to the French.

Gromyko said just in passing. He thought that Debre had mentioned EURATOM.

Sec. Rusk pointed out that the problem was not EURATOM installations in France. France, as nuclear power, takes the view that the Geneva

safeguards cannot be applied on its territory. ~~But then this was understanding~~  
~~the other countries did not object.~~

Gromyko said; why not have both EURATOM and IEAE safeguards.

Sec. Rusk said Soviet Union may underestimate <sup>the</sup> strong interest <sup>within</sup> ~~of this~~  
<sup>the EURATOM</sup>  
~~group~~ against further nuclear powers in Europe. For example, Belgium,  
Netherlands, France, ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> Soviet Union should have more confidence in <sup>the</sup>  
EURATOM safeguards system.

Gromyko said he was not against the system but there was no  
connection  
organic ~~system~~ between an international system and regional system.

<sup>the</sup> ~~Two~~ systems <sup>are</sup> different in scope and membership, although presumably many  
tasks would be similar.

<sup>asked</sup>  
Sec. Rusk ~~said~~; do you have a non-proliferation expert on your  
delegation. <sup>?</sup>

Gromyko said; yes, Vorontsov.

<sup>Sec. Rusk said perhaps Mr. Fulbright could get together with him.</sup>

Sec. Rusk noted that the Latin Americans had concluded an agreement  
on a nuclear free region.

Gromyko asked, was the agreement formalized?

Sec. Rusk replied, not yet. They have to clear up <sup>the alleged</sup> some ideas of ~~distinction from~~ <sup>between</sup> a nuclear explosion <sup>or</sup> and nuclear weapons. But the missing piece of the puzzle is Cuba. Did Gromyko have any idea what Cuban position was.

Gromyko said he didn't know but thought they had stated their position some time ago. So far as he knew, their position had not changed. That was two years ago when <sup>the treaty was</sup> embryonic.

Sec. Rusk said he had <sup>the</sup> impression <sup>the issue</sup> had been raised by some Latin American countries with Cuba and they had gotten <sup>a</sup> negative reaction. <sup>He explained</sup> Said <sup>the</sup> ~~he~~ <sup>Soviet</sup> hoped Gromyko would use <sup>the</sup> influence to get them to join Latin American agreement.

Gromyko said he didn't know much about it. <sup>The Soviet Union</sup> Had not been consulted. <sup>The question</sup> (Does not relate to the Soviet Union, but he thought <sup>Cuba</sup> they had stated <sup>the</sup> their position before at General Assembly in 1965.

Sec. Rusk said he thought <sup>the</sup> Latin American agreement <sup>a</sup> good idea as example for other regions -- the Middle East, for one. But these agreements don't work if there is <sup>one</sup> a country outside.

Gromyko said; but if the Middle Eastern nations sign a non-rpoliferation agreement, the problem would be solved, although he recognized that a treaty on ~~an~~ nuclear free zone went beyond a non-proliferation agreement.

Gromyko took the occasion to say that until the Middle Eastern issues before the General Assembly are solved, none of the other problems can be handled. He said he didn't know what would happen.

Sec. Rusk said some countries of the area believe regional ideas might take some of the ~~heat~~ heat out of Arab-Israeli confrontation. Fawzi had mentioned, for example, regional work in economic and social development.

Gromyko then probed further Secretary Rusk's conversation with Fawzi.

Sec. Rusk said it was very limited. They talked about <sup>the</sup> Strait of Tiran;

~~and perhaps~~, Fawzi thought, <sup>perhaps</sup> an answer could be found on a informal basis. It would be hard to settle it on a formal basis.

Gromyko said the distinction was artificial, <sup>I</sup> it was the substance that matters.

Sec. Rusk said they also talked about arms limitation. Beyond these two matters, he was frankly discouraged by Fawzi's attitude.

Gromyko ~~asked~~ <sup>Fawzi</sup> asked if ~~he~~ was specifically speaking for his government.

Sec. Rusk said, no, they had spoken on a personal basis since there are no relations between the UAR and the US. He could not say that Fawzi's view on arms flow <sup>to the Middle East</sup> was Nasser's view. But Fawzi is an experienced and careful diplomat. He doubted that his views were wholly personal; but he just doesn't know exactly how official his statements were.

<sup>asked</sup>: what  
Gromyko said, ~~and~~ other points were raised?

Sec. Rusk said the principal difficulty was that the UAR couldn't move to resolve any issues if it appeared that <sup>then</sup> this resolution was related to military action <sup>issue</sup> or <sup>of</sup> were settled because of military action. Frankly,

he got the impression that making peace <sup>w</sup>ould not be easy. Going back to armistice lines was no solution. An armistice is inherently temporary. The Arabs claimed the rights of belligerence; that is, a state of war with Israel. That also meant Israel could take the view a state of war existed. The task was to eliminate belligerence and establish permanent frontiers. The Israeli remember that Nasser closed the Strait of Tiran by exercising his rights of belligerence; that is, <sup>a</sup> state of war with Israel.

Gromyko said the question of degree is very important here. When territory is occupied the situation is very different. If we tried to deal with this question on the basis of everything or nothing, it would be difficult or impossible to solve, so far as ~~we know~~ <sup>he said</sup> ~~we know~~ <sup>he could judge</sup>.

Sec. Rusk said that the Chairman's statement before the UN had emphasized that the Soviet Union regards Israel as a state. The question is, how do those <sup>who</sup> ~~that~~ accept that view demonstrate that it is <sup>the</sup> ~~a~~ case.

Gromyko said that you and we stand responsible for ~~for~~ the creation of Israel as a state. Without us it would not have been created. He seemed to remember it had been created in the UN by only one vote. It would not have been possible unless the Soviet Union and the U.S. <sup>had</sup> agreed. The Soviet Union had established diplomatic relations with Israel, which is <sup>the</sup> highest form of recognition. Those relations had been broken in 1956 and again in 1957 when there was a second round of aggression; but he stood by the Chairman's statement.

Sec. Rusk said, how can we establish that with sufficient clarity so that the Middle Eastern states will not constantly whip up propaganda urging the extinction of Israel?

Gromyko said you can't stop propaganda. We can't settle that. Let us be practical. Let us start with the Strait of Tiran, as Fawzi indicated.

Sec. Rusk said he could get no answer from ~~Amr~~ Fawzi on Suez. On the Strait of Tiran, Fawzi would like <sup>the</sup> U.S. and <sup>the</sup> Soviet Union to go to Israel and say the Strait of Tiran was open de facto. But the credibility of U.S.,



in Israel is <sup>low</sup> ~~little~~ on that point. That is what we told Israel 10 years ago.

Gromyko said, let us not make artifical problems.

Sec. Rusk asked if the Security Council might not assume responsibility on this question .

Gromyko said that Tiran is not a simply case of territorial waters.

It is a complex case. Such cases have been dealt with through international conventions.

Sec. Rusk asked if Gromyko had seen Fawzi, before or after he had seen him (between 7:30 and 9:00 p. m., <sup>2</sup> <sup>9</sup> June 22), Gromyko said: before.

Sec. Rusk said in general Fawzi was cautious with him except on <sup>the</sup> question of Tiran and the arms flow to the Middle East.

Gromyko said, but he gave the answer. It would be very good to create a situation with withdrawal. Without withdrawal the situation was very dangerous.

Sec. Rusk said, if withdrawal comes about and a state of war persists, what about Israel's relations with Syria and the UAR in the future.

Gromyko pointed out that Japan and the Soviet Union had ended the war and then taken 10 years to sign a peace treaty.

Sec. Rusk asked how was this done.

Gromyko said Prime Minister Hatayama had made a declaration that a state of war had ended.

Sec. Rusk said that perhaps it could be done through similar but unilateral, if not joint, declarations.

Gromyko said that we should not be unrealistic. We should look for factual situations. Try to create an absence of tension by withdrawal.

This was very important. Although you may not like the word, we would say that the situation should be approached dialectially.

Sec. Rusk <sup>(ed.)</sup> [no mean dialectician himself] said that some of the Latin Americans ~~are~~ fancy themselves as lawyers. They take the view that if the UAR considers itself in a state of war <sup>with Israel,</sup> Israel cannot commit aggression against the UAR.

Gromyko said that the situation is dangerous to everyone in the Middle East, including Israel. They appear to show no concern for the future.

Sec. Rusk said that a concern for the future is precisely the issue with respect to Belligerence.

Gromyko said the Arabs want peace.

~~Sec. Rusk said we must find~~

Sec. Rusk said we must find a way to register that as a fact.

~~Gromyko said Israel should either behave as if the~~

Gromyko said Israel <sup>is</sup> behaving as if <sup>it is</sup> they were more powerful than <sup>the</sup> U. S.

and Soviet Union put together.

Sec. Rusk said he thought there were forces of moderation in Israel as well.

Gromyko said the answer lay in withdrawal.

Sec. Rusk said <sup>the</sup> ~~this~~ question <sup>was</sup> of withdrawal to state of peace or

~~xx~~ withdrawal to state of war? The issue was one of the status of relations

among the states of the area rather <sup>er</sup> than territory.

Gromyko said the shooting itself has stopped. Military action has stopped. But occupation is a continuation of war. It is still an application of force. This must be eliminated first. He said you overlook-and please don't overlook-that withdrawal will create <sup>w</sup>atmosphere more favorable for consideration of other matters. Taking the view that everything must be settled or nothing, is unrealistic and dangerous.

Sec. Rusk said there will be great <sup>difficulties</sup> ~~difficulties~~ so long as Israel <sup>believes</sup> ~~feels~~ the Arabs feel free to pursue a policy of destroying Israel.

Gromyko said that thinking and doing are different. Some Arabs want to live in peace. It would be good if there were no propaganda; but at <sup>the</sup> same time, if there are no attacks, <sup>the</sup> atmosphere for solution of other problems will improve. You can't solve all problems at once. Take, for example, nuclear question. We <sup>couldn't</sup> ~~can't~~ solve it all at once, so we stopped atmospheric tests. We proceeded realistically. Then we went forward to non-proliferation which, again, is only a partial step. If we are successful, who knows, perhaps we will take a further step. We haven't exhausted all <sup>the</sup> possibilities.

In many fields of international life, including Middle East, we must make progress by being realistic. We must not be controlled by moods. We must rise above our ~~sentiment~~ sympathies.

Sec. Rusk said we have mentioned questions such as refugees, arms flows to the Middle East, regional and economic and social development. Of course they cannot all be determined at once. But no partial measure will work if one side wants to leave open the possibility of shooting.

Gromyko said what matters most is that there is no shooting.

Sec. Rusk referred again to Nasser's posture on Tiran.

Gromyko said, let us look not to the past but to the future. Think it over. It would be good if we could get withdrawal. Israel itself would gain. You and we must accomplish this.

Sec. Rusk said we will be in touch. Sec. Rusk asked, when will your side be willing to talk about ABM's and ICBM's?

Gromyko said perhaps the Chairman and the President are talking about it right now.

Sec. Rusk said: we must not get in the way of our masters.

Gromyko then turned to Sec. McNamara and said, what are we going to do about McNamara who wants to make more and more arms?

Sec. Rusk said Sec. McNamara was a dove; and Rostow added he was the strongest advocate of arms control in the U.S. Government.

Sec. Rusk then said, how do you judge the efforts of the Federal Republic in trying to improve its relations with Eastern Europe. Was this a difficulty for you. What is your view?

Gromyko said; frankly, they did not detect any real steps by the Federal Republic of Germany to improve its relations with the Soviet Union and its friends. They made statements. They express willingness to improve relations. They appeared to change their foreign policy; but later <sup>they</sup> explain this was merely <sup>a</sup> matter of tactics, of methods, <sup>a question of</sup> form rather than substance. On all important matters -- the GDR and international affairs -- they took same position as Adenauer and Erhard. <sup>The</sup> Soviet Union would like to see real change in German policy towards <sup>the</sup> Soviet Union and

*the was*

the Socialist countries. But regretted to say: no change. Relations were not satisfactory.

Sec. Rusk said he thought Gromyko was underestimating the readiness of the Federal Republic to improve its relations with Eastern Europe.

*that the*  
Our impression is <sup>a</sup> new government wanted more relaxed relationships.

*It* <sup>a</sup> would be unfortunate if those initiatives were turned aside. It seemed *there was* to us <sup>a</sup> more flexible and constructive thinking in Germany.

*asked:*  
Gromyko ~~said~~, what, for example?

Sec. Rusk said: <sup>a</sup> willingness to come to arrangements with Czechoslovakia and resolve <sup>the</sup> question of <sup>the</sup> Munich agreements. They were trying to find ways to cooperate and talk about differences. He was certainly not <sup>a</sup> spokesman for Bonn. They could speak for themselves. He merely expressed hope *the* Soviet Union would encourage these attitudes and policies.

*the was*  
Gromyko said if there were real changes, <sup>a</sup> Soviet Union <sup>a</sup> ready to respond.

They would like to improve relations with Germany. The Soviet Union had suffered greatly from Germany, but was ready to think about the future.

*but they found only statements*



but they found only statements. In real policy -- in the concrete steps taken -- we can see no change; for example, Bonn is still hostile towards the GDR. They have not settled the question of European borders. They have an unsatisfactory position on the question of nuclear arms. Every day there is evidence of revanchism and propaganda. There is a steady rise of pro-Nazi organizations and parties. We cannot overlook these recent elections.

On the economic front, he said relations are more or less satisfactory. Both sides have a direct interest and there are no difficulties.

Sec. Rusk said he had the impression some Eastern European countries are alarmed when Germany takes constructive steps. Every time they ~~step~~ take a step forward toward Eastern Germany, East Germany takes two backward. Some countries appear fearful.

Gromyko said we are <sup>not</sup> ~~more~~ fearful. We are not afraid of West Germany as a military power. But Germany must not be guided by adventurism or revanchist ideas.

Sec. Rusk said, perhaps our masters had settled all our problems.

Gromyko persisted, saying, what are the changes? What can you prove? We see nothing but statements. We consider Germany <sup>the</sup> most dangerous spot in Europe. He asked, what is your interest in the matter?

Sec. Rusk said we don't want to get in the way of the process, but we have followed <sup>the</sup> discussions between <sup>the</sup> Germans and Rumanians. They apparently wanted to proceed to similar talks with the Czechs and other Eastern European countries. But they <sup>rather</sup> drew back.

Gromyko said, perhaps they just kept straight up because <sup>there</sup> ~~they~~ were no real signs of improvement. He said, if you wish, you could have a positive influence on the Germans. They make difficulties for ~~the~~ non-proliferation -- in making difficulties they are rather ahead of the others.

Sec. Rusk asked, do you expect all Warsaw Pact countries will sign a non-proliferation agreement?

Gromyko said that each will have finally to state its own position.

Our allies have not seen final text nor have yours.

Sec. Rusk asked; did <sup>the</sup> non-proliferation question come up in ~~your~~

conversation with Prime Minister Moro and the Chairman.

Gromyko said virtually not at all.

Sec. Rusk said Italy is against <sup>a</sup> treaty for eternity.

Gromyko said it is still a Catholic country. He had talked, however, at great length with Fanfani, perhaps two hours. He had explained in great

detail <sup>the</sup> non-proliferation treaty <sup>and carried away the</sup> ~~had~~ impression some points had been

misunderstood. <sup>that the</sup> For instance, <sup>was</sup> Soviet Union <sup>1</sup> against peaceful uses of atomic

energy. He pointed out the Soviet Union was for unlimited uses of atomic

energy for science and industry. <sup>He</sup> <sup>the</sup> ~~Had~~ impression that his explanation to

Fanfani had been helpful.

Sec. Rusk said some countries misunderstood this question of the industrial uses, but those misunderstandings had now been overcome.

Gromyko stated also on question of nuclear explosions, Fanfani understood

better than before that there was no <sup>difference</sup> ~~difficulty~~ between explosive devices and weapons.


Sec. Rusk said there were two points he would like to make. First, <sup>he</sup> ~~would~~ greatly regret if <sup>the</sup> tabling of <sup>the</sup> draft <sup>were</sup> delayed because of differences <sup>over</sup> of control; and, secondly, we were ready to go to work on <sup>the</sup> question of control with the Soviet Union, but there should not be substantial delay.

Gromyko replied, <sup>I would be</sup> better if we could agree. It would save time in the future. But he didn't exclude tabling the draft with <sup>a</sup> blank Article ~~III~~. The Soviet Union was against "family control." <sup>There</sup> Could be several layers of control, if people <sup>wished. The</sup> like, Soviet Union <sup>(is)</sup> interested in only one layer.

<sup>After</sup> At end of certain private remarks, Sec. Rusk said it could all be ~~done~~ done very quickly if you would say yes to our draft.

Gromyko said, also, if you said yes to our draft.

Sec. Rusk asked, as you interpreted your draft on the question of assurances to the Indians and others, would that instrument be put forward inside or outside the Security Council.

Gromyko said that the UN Charter was <sup>the</sup> basis for their draft. The Indians wanted something more <sup>definite</sup> difficult. 

Sec. Rusk said he was not being negative, but we have problems unless the Security Council has passed a resolution. We can vote for a Security Council resolution. <sup>9 Gromyko</sup> ~~[Sec. Rusk]~~ said our formulation will be all right for you, given your problems.

5

Glasgow special

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

5a

June 24, 1967

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The enclosed is our suggestion of a paragraph which you could give as an oral message tomorrow. For the convenience of the Chairman, you could actually give him a copy. But since his message to you was oral, it might be better that the enclosed be oral, at least in form.

In addition to the enclosed, we believe you should say the following to the Chairman:

"Mr. Chairman, you and I have a very special responsibility on matters involving peace. It is of the greatest importance that you and I not misunderstand each other and that no problems of good faith arise between us. Therefore, I want you personally to know that we are prepared to stop the bombing as a step toward peace. We are not prepared to stop the bombing merely to remove one-half of the war while the other half of the war proceeds without limit. I am accepting very large risks in giving you the message for transmittal to Hanoi which I have just given you. I want you to know that if talks do not lead to peace or if protracted talks are used to achieve one-sided military advantage against us, we shall have to resume full freedom of action. I say this to you and not to Hanoi because I think it is of great importance that you and I fully understand each other. I do not ask you to agree; I am merely asking you to understand what is in my mind."

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:  
Suggested paragraph

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-356  
By isa/30w, NARA, Date 3/16/95

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

*Handed to Kosygin*

*5-b*

The United States anticipates that it could stop the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. The United States further anticipates that, following the cessation of bombing, there could be immediate discussions between representatives of the United States and of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. These discussions could be held in Geneva, Moscow, Vientiane, or any other suitable location. The United States further anticipates that its own and allied forces in the northern provinces of South Viet-Nam would not advance to the north and that elements of the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam in the northern part of South Viet-Nam and in the southern portions of North Viet-Nam would not advance to the south. The United States anticipates that, if discussions are held between its representatives and those of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, all questions which either side might wish to raise could be raised. The United States would hope, on the basis of the anticipations expressed above, that the results of such talks could be the stabilization of peace in Southeast Asia. The United States would be glad to know of the reactions of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to the thoughts expressed above.

~~TOP SECRET~~

**DECLASSIFIED**

**E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4**

**NIJ 91-356**

**By *isp/JDN*, NARA, Date *3/16/75***



5c

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY

~~TOP SECRET~~

July 24, 1967

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN

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Before we were joined by Ambassador Kohler, Ambassador Dobrynin and I had a few minutes alone in my office. I asked him whether he had had any message from Hanoi. He said, referring to a brief handwritten note, that he had been instructed by Moscow to say that the attitude of the United States in Viet-Nam and in the Middle East precluded any effort by the Soviet Union to assist in bringing the Viet-Nam matter to a conclusion. I reminded him that I had not asked him about Soviet assistance but whether they had had any word from Hanoi. He declined to answer, saying that he was merely relaying to me his instruction.

He then said that it appeared that we were building up our military operations in Viet-Nam. The trip to Viet-Nam of Secretary McNamara, just after the Glassboro meeting, and the discussion of more troops had created a very unfavorable atmosphere in Moscow. I reminded him that McNamara's trip had been scheduled before there was even any knowledge that Chairman Kosygin was coming to the United Nations, and that troop requirements were related to what the North was doing and what the requirements were in Viet-Nam. I referred to the recent heavy fighting in the Northern part of South Viet-Nam and to the large North Vietnamese forces in and near the DMZ. He said "well, you haven't seen that large offensive by these North Vietnamese forces which was being talked about some weeks ago." I asked him if he were telling me that some decision had been taken by Hanoi with respect to these divisions — but he refused to clarify.

At that point Ambassador Kohler joined us and we turned to the Middle East.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-488  
By 108, NARA, Date 12-21-94

DR  
Dean Rusk

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY

5-d

~~TOP SECRET~~

July 26, 1967  
6:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR  
DOBRYNIN OF THE USSR

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I asked Ambassador Dobrynin to come in to put to him the following: It was the understanding of President Johnson that Chairman Kosygin had said at Glassboro that he (Kosygin) would pass on to Hanoi a certain message which the President had given him. The President would like to know whether there has been any reply of any sort from Hanoi. Ambassador Dobrynin said he understood the question, agreed that he had not given me an answer to it in our conversation of July 24th, and said that he would relay the question to Moscow.

DR  
Dean Rusk

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-488  
By rig, NARA, Date 12-21-94

S:DR:jmr

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

KORNIENKO TO THOMPSON  
(Moscow 450)  
August 5, 1967

5-e

From what was communicated earlier by us to Secretary of State Dean Rusk it is evident that the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was informed of the proposal of the President of the USA.

What was said at Glassboro for transmittal to Hanoi cannot, however, be considered without regard to the practical actions of the USA. What in effect has happened? Even at the very time when this proposal was being transmitted, the scale of American military actions in Vietnam was by no means reduced. Moreover, immediately after that a series of steps were taken by the USA in the direction of expanding the war. No secret whatsoever was made about this, nor was any secret made about the purposes of the trip of Defense Minister R. McNamara to Vietnam. It was openly stated that the meeting of R. McNamara with the American Command in South Vietnam and the trips of the special advisers of the President M. Taylor and C. Clifford to the countries of Southeast Asia had as their purpose the further escalation of military actions with the wider involvement of the allies of the USA. Can one expect that in such circumstances the other side will react favorably to an American proposal? It is clear that the very actions of the United States place the government of the DRV in such a position that it is deprived of the possibility of assessing the proposal of the government of the USA advanced at Glassboro as conveying anything new in the situation which has developed. Furthermore, it is not the first time that it has happened that immediately following upon a sounding taken by the USA a new buildup of military actions against the Vietnamese people and an intensification of the bombing of the territory of the DRV have occurred.

Why this is always done in this manner -- in timing and in substance -- is more evident to the President.

One can only express regret in connection with this turn of events, which does not at all contribute to a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-488

By lig, NARA, Date 12-21-94

~~TOP SECRET~~

5-f

RUSK TO THOMPSON  
August 6, 1967

~~TOP SECRET~~

We do not plan an immediate reply at high level to the message in Moscow's 450. However, if you see any of your senior Russian colleagues who are "in the know" down at the Black Sea, you should reflect the following as our reaction:

On the Washington end, the message in Moscow's 450 was read to mean that there had been no reply at all from Hanoi, or, if there were a reply, it was completely negative. We appreciate the fact that Hanoi was informed of the so-called "proposal" but we cannot accept the reason given for the absence of any significant reply. The principal military orders given on our side after Glassboro were to make far more stringent any activity which might by accident involve Soviet ships and a temporary restriction of bombing in the immediate vicinity of Hanoi. In any event we are not informed of any effort being made by Hanoi to reduce the scale of violence in the south on their side. It is to be deeply regretted that there is no sign of any willingness on the part of Hanoi to think seriously about a mutual deescalation of the conflict. Washington remains ready at any time to enter into discussions of that and related subjects.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-488  
By 48, NARA, Date 12-21-84

~~TOP SECRET~~

# THE WHITE HOUSE

From the President's pocket

June 24, 1967  
5:00 a. m.  
LBJ Ranch

GLASSBORO STATE COLLEGE

Student body            3200 full-time  
                         5000 extension, Saturdays, and  
                         summer school  
                         total 8200

Faculty                320

Founded 1923    Age 44

8 new buildings since 1960

THE WHITE HOUSE

Why don't attack -

Why don't pull


Report on their material -

New sort expert del -

new man



ABOARD AIR FORCE ONE

- ① Exchange by 
- ② Civ Air Agreement
- ③ Space Agreement
- ④ Corvairs -
- ⑤ Non Prolye  
at the



THE WHITE HOUSE

Very relaxed message right off  
Didn't know <sup>see him</sup> - saw on t.v.

Agreed meeting - We ready  
to go on non proliferation  
Viet Nam

offer

Unconditional - What do  
while we talked -  
now none of our leaders have been in

Glassboro is in Gloucester County

The following are Gloucester County election results:

PLURALITIES

1964

Johnson -----> 17,000 (D)

1965

Hughes-----> 2,000 (D)

1966

Congressman Hunt-----> 14,000 (R)

MAYOR JOSEPH L. BOWE (pronounced "bo")

Mayor of Glassboro since 1959

Died yesterday, June 22, 1967, after a long illness.

Passed away early in the morning without knowledge of today's meeting.

He was a long-time Democratic leader and good friend of Governor Hughes.

11:30

HAS BEEN  
41 MIN.

It is Now 12:11

LUNCH IS SCHEDULED  
FOR 1:00

6/23/67

Mr. Chairman:

It is good that we are meeting today because we have very special responsibilities not only to our own peoples but to the whole human family.

The world is made up of many nations and many peoples. They will forge their own futures -- each nation in the light of its own history, traditions, and ambitions.

But ~~the power we command should be used~~ <sup>we have an obligation.</sup> <sup>the</sup> to make ~~all~~ relations between our countries as peaceful and constructive as they can be. <sup>we have an obligation</sup> And ~~it should also be used~~ to make it possible for other nations to develop themselves in peace.

That is why we have been discussing arms control measures and the non-proliferation agreement, the possibilities of peace in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

The results of our efforts today will be <sup>judged</sup> ~~changed~~ by what happens in the future.

But I know it was good for us to meet and to talk.

I ask you to drink with me to the good health of Chairman Kosygin, <sup>and our co-operation for</sup> ~~prosperity of the Soviet people, and~~ peace in the world.



# Johnson and Kosygin Confer for 5 Hours and Then Agree to Meet

## AGENDA INCLUDES 3 MAJOR ISSUES

Leaders Seem to Establish Good Relations but There is No Sign of Real Progress

Continued From Page 1, Col. 1

But Johnson proposed a Russian on arms shipments to the Middle East, about the Arab position, justice for Arab rights and better border relations, respect for maritime boundaries.

The Russians were described as particularly tough in their argument that Israel must withdraw from occupied territories before there can be talks of peace settlements. Mr. Kosygin was said to have been emphasizing this point of apparent importance to his relations with the Arabs and unwilling even to debate it in the known Soviet interest in according to all nations the right to self-determination in the East of Africa.

On Vietnam, too, there appeared little real agreement. Mr. Johnson said only that it was useful to "at least explore" the Southern Asian situation.

But the outcome of the past week appeared to have been deflated by their face-to-face encounter.

The Soviet leader left no doubt that he endorsed Mr. Johnson's main theme of the day, which the President uttered in a luncheon toast that the Soviet Union and the United States had a special responsibility to achieve "peace and constructive" relations and a special obligation "that we make it possible for other countries to live in peace with each other if this can be done."

Mr. Johnson added the hope that the meeting had "contributed to getting us to know each other better and therefore to the much other better, just as our ambassadors in Moscow and Washington have become more acquainted and liked by the people they deal with."

The display of good fellowship continued as each man moved from the college president's house past a long, patient crowd of several thousand Chesham residents after the luncheon.

After driving only about 10 yards, Mr. Kosygin jumped from his limousine and stood atop an embankment to acknowledge the crowd. He shook a few hands and finally signaled the people to disperse for a few words that the Soviet Ambassador to Washington, Anatoly F. Dobrynin, translated and delivered through a megaphone.

"I want to thank you," he said, "for the warm and friendly atmosphere that has surrounded this meeting. I wish first of all to thank you for arranging this meeting, and more so that he arranged a meeting in so pleasant and beautiful a setting and a time."

And I also want to thank the hosts, the press and Mr. Kosygin while sitting - much as Mr. Johnson often does - at the job of his left ear.

The Soviet leader then closed that he was planned to remain in the United States until Sunday night and that if the President wished to discuss matters further, he was prepared to do so. They then quickly agreed to return to the college campus.

Though there were sharp disagreements about the Middle East and other questions, there appeared to have been some of the table-clumping or wringing that marked Premier Khrushchev's confrontations with President Eisenhower in Paris in 1960 and with President Kennedy in Vienna in 1961. This first meeting in six years between a United States President and a Soviet Premier appeared to get underway in an extremely pleasant atmosphere. If there was any suspense left from the working wrangle over the terms and site for the conference, it was well hidden.

Waiting to the Crowd  
Mr. Johnson had been waiting at the 113-year-old house for 15 minutes, alternately conferring with his advisers inside and waiting to the large and enthusiastic crowd outside.

Then, at 11:15 A.M., 15 minutes after the appointed hour, Mr. Kosygin's black Cadillac limousine, following four state police cars, came up through the woods behind the house. The Premier's vehicle was open and he was inspecting the set-



President Johnson (left) and Premier Kosygin (right) are seen in a moment of conversation during their meeting.

## Remarks by the 2 Leaders and Johnson Toast

Following, as recorded by The New York Times, are the transcripts of remarks by President Johnson and those of Premier Kosygin through an interpreter after the two leaders met yesterday in Glassboro, N. J., and the toast, made public by the White House, of the President's toast at the luncheon there for the Soviet visitors:

### By President Johnson

The Chairman and I have met since we arrived here a little after 11 today. Our meeting gave us an opportunity to get acquainted with each other, and we have exchanged views on a number of international questions.

Among these were problems of the Middle East, Vietnam, the question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. We agreed that it is now very important to reach international agreement on a nonproliferation treaty.

We also exchanged views on the question of direct bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

Finally, we agreed that discussions on these questions should be continued in New York between Secretary Rusk and Mr. Gromyko during next week.

This meeting today was a very good and very useful meeting, and we are in the debt of the great Governor of New Jersey for his hospitality.

We are inviting ourselves to return here again at 1:30 on Sunday afternoon, and we will continue our discussions here then. And those of you that have Sunday afternoon off - we'll be glad to have you come, too.

### By Premier Kosygin

Dear friends and guests,  
I wish first of all to thank you for arranging this meeting, and more so that he arranged a meeting in so pleasant and beautiful a setting and a time.

And I also want to thank the hosts,

the masters of the house, who have given us these facilities, who've given us a roof over our heads under which we could meet.

And I suppose you can get the impression from what the President said that we have amassed such a great number of questions that we weren't able to go through them all today, which is why we have decided to meet again this Sunday.

As regards the statement which the President has just made to you, I have nothing whatever to add, and I think it was very correctly stated.

And I hope you won't be offended with us if we've kept you here for all this time and have not told you very much. Please excuse us.

### President Johnson's Toast

Mr. Chairman, distinguished guests, Mr. Foreign Minister, Mr. Ambassador - We are delighted that you have had a chance to even briefly visit this country, and we are especially pleased that you have come here today for a meeting with us.

We both have special responsibilities for the security of our families - and ever and beyond of our families - the security of the entire human family in this world. We must strive to get that there are many people in this world, many different nations, but with their own values and traditions.

There is a special peace between us in this world and a special responsibility placed upon our two countries because of our strength and our resources. This demands that the relations between our two countries be as constructive as we know how to make them.

It is also our obligation that we make it possible for other countries to live in peace with each other if this can be done. We are inviting ourselves to return here again at 1:30 on Sunday afternoon, and we will continue our discussions here then. And those of you that have Sunday afternoon off - we'll be glad to have you come, too.

And I also want to thank the hosts,

later Gromyko and Secretary McNamara and the other distinguished guests present here that you and I have discussed various aspects and possibilities for strengthening peace in the world, such as the nonproliferation agreement and various questions arising out of the Middle East situation.

### Come Fly to the Middle East

We also agreed that both of us, as well as our two nations, made some small contribution to bringing about a measure in the Middle East. We only regret that this contribution between us had not made it possible to prevent the outbreak of hostilities although we tried.

I want to emphasize that the results of today's meeting will be judged by what we can achieve in the future in order to achieve peace.

I quoted to the Chairman the story about the author Charles Lamb, who there shows in a book he had been reading. To his sister's question of whether he knew the author, he said, "No, because if I did, I would like him." And by the same spirit, Mr. Chairman, I hope that today's meeting has contributed to getting us to know each other better, and therefore to the much other better, just as our Ambassadors in Moscow and Washington have become more acquainted and liked by the people they deal with.

And so, Mr. Chairman, I should like to thank you for coming here. We thank you for coming. We want very much to resolve some of these questions.

We would like to have the opportunity to sit down further and discuss some aspects of the antiballistic missile system, nonproliferation, perhaps some questions arising out of the Middle East situation, and at least explore the situation of mutual interest in Europe and the Western Hemisphere.

And now I would like to ask each of you to stand and raise your glass to the health of the Chairman, the Soviet Union and to peace in the world.

I want to thank Secretary Rusk for

expansive meetings all around. Premier Kosygin shook hands with Secretary of State Rusk and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and all the American members of the Foreign Minister Gromyko and Ambassador Dobrynin.

The two leaders found for pictures and the President introduced his guests to Gov. and Mrs. Richard J. Hughes of New Jersey and to Dr. and Mrs. Robinson, who were seated from their home without notice last night to provide a site for the meeting.

There was much cordial banter, the two principals chatting through their interpreters, Mr. Bushrod and Mr. Krimer. Only one moment was overheard, Mr. Kosygin's compliment to the President - "You chose a nice place."

It had taken some doing to choose it, with Mr. Kosygin insisting that he had come to the United States primarily to attend the emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly and refusing at first to venture out of New York and Mr. Johnson expressing a strong preference for Washington and, finally, almost any other place except New York.

The search for a site did not begin until the underlying issue had been settled - and until it had been agreed to have a

discussion of substantive issues, without an agenda and outside the context of the United Nations propaganda battle.

### Swarm, Tangle, Hum

Despite the swarm of people and the tangle of wires and the hum of huge air-conditioning units hurriedly installed during the night, Mr. Johnson agreed with the Premier that it was a nice place, cradled his elbow and led him inside.

Inside the rambling old two-story house topped by a bell-tower and faced with white, wrought-iron grillwork, the furniture had been removed during the night to make room for a boat-shaped table, conference table from the college president's office and 20 straight-backed chairs to match.

Mr. Johnson and Mr. Kosygin remained in the sitting room for a few moments for official photographs.

The Soviet leader, noting that he had been a grandfather for 20 years, used the time to congratulate the President on the birth two days ago of his grandson, Patrick Lyndon Nugent. Mr. Johnson is 63 years old and Mr. Kosygin is 61.

The President, who was heard to express appreciation for the welcome into the grandparents' club, offered his guest some ice water and then led him into



After the meeting, Premier Kosygin is seen in a moment of conversation.

## 3 Networks to Live Coverage

The meeting between President Johnson and Premier Kosygin will be covered by three major television networks. The coverage of the summit meeting will be reported in their depth.

The President and the Premier met alone in this room with their interpreters for two hours while the rest of the delegates gathered around the conference table in the living room, exchanging views in English, at least at the start.

### Food From White House

In the family dining room, a hastily constructed table had been set for a lunch for 17 at 1:30 P.M. The meal, prepared by the White House, was a simple affair, consisting of roast beef, potatoes, asparagus, dinner rolls and Calumet margarine and wine. A choice of pineapple sherbet or butter pecan ice cream in various sizes was served for dessert.

Mr. Johnson's lunch table, the text of which was made public by the White House staff, expressed a strong desire to continue high level discussions between the two countries. He indicated that anything could be resolved with regard to Vietnam but said he wanted to know what the situation was on exploring that situation as well as questions of mutual interest in Europe and the Western Hemisphere and the other topics he had listed.

Substantive discussions continued at the lunch table and the American side used this opportunity to press again its interest in continuing talks on placing a limit on the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe and the Western Hemisphere. The results of this exploration were not disclosed.

Mr. Kosygin made a brief tour of the park and then returned to his own but it has not been published.

### 1 O'Clock Breakfast

After lunch, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Kosygin had another hour by themselves with their interpreters before joining the larger group for the closing remarks.

The larger conference was said to have been dominated by Mr. Rusk and Mr. Gromyko, setting forth their views, primarily on the Middle East and the proposed treaty against proliferation.

After finishing his good-bye tour, Mr. Johnson stood at the door waving. He then was escorted by Mr. Rusk to New York, presumably to be near the Russians for the Sunday meeting.

He went to Ambassador Thompson to Gettysburg, Pa., to brief President Eisenhower.

Mr. Johnson sat at the middle of one side of the lunch table, with Mr. Kosygin at the right and an interpreter crunched between them. They Philadelphia during the night.

## Jockeying on Site for Summit Recalls Earlier Maneuverings

By ARTHUR K. KING

Diplomacy is an international game played by adults in what has sometimes seemed to many people to be a childish manner. This week's tangled dialogue over where President Johnson and Premier Nikolai N. Kosygin could meet without diplomatic discomfort recalls earlier maneuverings over venue, surroundings, and who should arrive first.

Napoleon may well have established an early record in jockeying for a place to sit. In July 1807, he sought a peaceful ending of the war with Great Britain.

To overcome the fear of loss of face by coming to Napoleon, the French Emperor arranged for an elaborate site to be built and anchored in the exact center of the River Niemen in Prussia, the boundary between their two empires.

On the large Napoleon had two identical apartments built each with a door facing a bank of the river.

After lengthy diplomatic maneuvering it was agreed that each monarch would arrive at the same moment on his river bank and be rowed to the raft at the same time. However, Napoleon had the faster boat and was waiting at the foot of the raft a quarter when the Russian got there.

When the United States and Communist China finally agreed to end the Korean war, a similar jockeying for a place to sit took place. In August 1954, the two nations agreed to a conference table, which was placed at the site of the center was precisely over the the Russo-Japanese war.



ROUTE TO GLASSBORO: Bold heavy line shows the route of Premier Kosygin's motorcade from New York to the conference site and broken line shows President Johnson's route by plane and helicopter from Washington.



SITE OF CONFERENCE: Cross shows where President Johnson and Premier Kosygin met on the campus (diagonal shading) of Glassboro State College. The heavy line is the route followed by the Soviet leader's motorcade.



# Johnson and Kosygin Confer for 5 Hours and Then Agree to Meet

## AGENDA INCLUDES 3 MAJOR ISSUES

Leaders Seem to Establish  
Good Relations but There is  
No Sign of Real Progress

Continued From Page 1, Col. 8

President Johnson proposed a limitation on arms shipments to the Middle East, direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab countries, justice for Arab rights and better border arrangements for refugees, respect for maritime arrangements.

The Russians were described as particularly tough in their argument that Israel must withdraw from occupied territories before there can be talk of peace settlements. Mr. Kosygin was said to have been unyielding this point of apparent importance to his relations with the Arabs and unwilling even to relate it to the known Soviet interest in according to all nations the right to sail into the Gulf of Aqaba.

On Vietnam, too, there appeared little real agreement. Mr. Johnson said only that it was useful to "at least explore" the Southeast Asian situation.

But the stiffness of the past week appeared to have been dispelled by their face-to-face encounter.

The Soviet leader left no doubt that he endorsed Mr. Johnson's main theme of the day, which the President uttered in a luncheon toast: that the Soviet Union and the United States had a special responsibility to behave "reasonably and constructively" and a special obligation "that we make it possible for other countries to live in peace with each other if this can be done."

Mr. Johnson added the hope that the meeting had "contributed to getting us to know each other better and therefore to like each other better, just as our ambassadors in Moscow and Washington have become more acquainted and liked by the people they deal with."

The display of good fellowship persisted as each man moved from the college president's home past a long, patient crowd of several thousand Glassboro residents after the conference.

After driving only about 50 yards, Mr. Kosygin jumped from his limousine and stood atop an embankment to acknowledge the crowd.



BEFORE: President Johnson clasps his hands as he waits with Gov. and Mrs. Richard J. Hughes for Premier Kosygin



AFTER MEETING: Premier Kosygin gesture

## Remarks by the 2 Leaders and Johnson Toast

Following, as recorded by *The New York Times*, are the transcripts of remarks by President Johnson and those of Premier Kosygin through an interpreter after the two leaders met yesterday in Glassboro, N. J., and the text, made public by the White House, of the President's toast at the luncheon there for the Soviet visitors:

### By President Johnson

The Chairman and I have met since we arrived here a little after 11 today. Our meeting gave us an opportunity to get acquainted with each other, and we have exchanged views on a number of international questions.

Among these were problems of the Middle East, Vietnam, the question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. We agreed that it is now very important to reach international agreement on a nonproliferation treaty.

We also exchanged views on the questions of direct bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

Finally, we agreed that discussions on these questions should be continued in New York between Secretary Rusk and Mr. Gromyko during next week.

This meeting today was a very good and very useful meeting, and we are in the debt of the great Governor of New Jersey for his hospitality.

We are inviting ourselves to return here again at 1:30 on Sunday afternoon, and we will continue our discussions here then. And those of you that have Sunday afternoon off—we'll be glad to have you come, too.

R. Johnson

the masters of the house, who have given us these facilities, who've given us a roof over our heads under which we could meet.

And I suppose you can get the impression from what the President said that we have amassed such a great number of questions that we weren't able to go through them all today, which is why we have decided to meet again this Sunday.

As regards the statement which the President has just made to you, I have nothing whatsoever to add, and I think it was very correctly drawn up.

And I hope you won't be offended with us if we've kept you here for all this time and have not told you very much. Please excuse us.

### President Johnson's Toast

Mr. Chairman, distinguished guests, Mr. Foreign Minister, Mr. Ambassador:

We are delighted that you have had a chance to even briefly visit our country, and we are especially pleased that you have come here today for a meeting with us.

We both have special responsibilities for the security of our families, and over and beyond all our families is the security of the entire human family inhabiting this earth. We must never forget that there are many peoples in this world, many different nations, each with its own history and ambitions.

There is a special place, however, in this world and a special responsibility placed upon our two countries because of our strength and our resources. This demands that the relations between our two countries be as reasonable and as constructive as we know how to make them.

ister Gromyko and Secretary McNamara and the other distinguished guests present here that you and I have discussed various aspects and possibilities for strengthening peace in the world, such as the nonproliferation agreement, and certain questions arising out of the Middle East situation.

### Cease-Fire in the Middle East

We also agreed that both of us, as well as our two nations, made some small contribution to bringing about a cease-fire in the Middle East. We only regret that this contribution between us had not made it possible to prevent the outbreak of hostilities—although we tried.

I want to emphasize that the results of today's meeting will be judged by what we can achieve in the future in order to achieve peace.

I quoted to the Chairman the story about the author Charles Lamb, who threw down in disgust a book he had been reading. To his sister's question of whether he knew the author, we said, "No, because if I did, I would like him." And by the same spirit, Mr. Chairman, I hope that today's meeting has contributed to getting us to know each other better, and, therefore, to like each other better, just as our Ambassadors in Moscow and Washington have become more acquainted and liked by the people they deal with.

And so, Mr. Chairman, I should like to thank you for coming here. We thank you for coming. We want very much to resolve some of these questions.

We would like to have the opportunity to sit down further and discuss some aspects of the antiballistic missile system, nonproliferation, perhaps some questions arising out of the Middle East

Dr. Robinson's private study behind the sitting room.

It had been especially arranged for the more private part of the conference, with the Robinson family's pedestal rocker placed opposite two large, upholstered easy chairs alongside a three-seat sofa. Pictures, apparently family portraits, had been removed from the room, which had a dark green carpet and light brown drapes.

The President and the Premier met alone in this room with their interpreters for two hours while the rest of the delegates gathered around the conference table in the living room, exchanging views in English, at least at the start.

### Food From White House

In the family dining room, a hastily constructed table had been set for a lunch for 17 at 1:30 P.M. The meal, prepared by the White House mess and flown up this morning, consisted of shrimp, roast beef, rice pilaf, asparagus, dinner rolls and Cabernet Sauvignon red wine. A choice of pineapple sherbet or butter pecan ice cream in caramel sauce was offered for dessert.

Mr. Johnson's luncheon toast, the text of which was made public by the White House staff, expressed a strong desire to continue high level discussions between the two countries. He indicated doubt that anything could be resolved with regard to Vietnam but said he wanted to go on exploring that situation as well as questions of mutual interest in Europe and the Western Hemisphere and the other topics he had listed.

Substantive discussions continued at the lunch table and the American side used this opportunity to press again its interest in continuing talks on

### 3 Networks to Live Coverage

The meeting between President Johnson and Premier Kosygin, which began at approximately P.M. tomorrow in N. J., will be covered by three television networks.

The coverage of the summit meeting between Kosygin and Mr. Johnson is expected to begin with a report on their departure from the meeting. The coverage, however, will open to the television works.

were observed at the meal in animated conversation, each leaning toward interpreter while checking facial expressions to make certain he was understood. Mr. Rusk, with Gromyko on his right, the middle of the other the table.

Mr. Johnson began his day in Washington at 6 o'clock breakfast with members of his delegation, including Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Ambassador Thompson, who flew down from New York today after completing assignments for the conference. Also in Washington were Under Secretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, the President and his family. The President and his family flew in his small Jetstar Washington National Airport. Mr. Johnson has indicated his desire to lay civilian instead of military field. The party reached F

a few hands and finally signaled the people into silence for a few words that the Soviet Ambassador to Washington, Anatoly F. Dobrynin, translated and shouted through cupped hands.

### I Want Friendship . . .

Most of the words were lost in the tumult but they included the following: "I want friendship with the American people and I can assure you we want nothing but peace with the American people."

There were more cheers. Then, at 5 o'clock, Mr. Kosygin finally drove off.

Fifteen minutes later Mr. Johnson emerged and he, too, went before the crowd, which was by now chanting, "We want Johnson, we want Johnson!"

"We had a good meeting today," he said, "and we liked things here so well we're coming here again on Sunday. You people have served your nation well by having us here."

In his brief statement summarizing the meeting, the President also announced that whatever business was left unfinished Sunday would be carried on by Secretary Rusk and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei A. Gromyko, in New York next week.

Soviet sources said that the decision to resume the discussions Sunday was made "at the last minute" after most of the talks had been wound up.

### Some Small Contribution

President Johnson said he and Premier Kosygin had agreed that they had made "some small contribution" to the cease-fire in the Middle East war and were only sorry that they were unable to prevent it altogether — "although we tried."

The Johnson-Kosygin conference was the fifth postwar meeting between an American President and a Soviet Premier. It was the second in this country and, like the first, between President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev at Camp David, Md., in 1959, appeared destined to create at least a momentary sense of a "new spirit" in relations between the two countries.

Not only were the difficult questions between the two countries not solved but there appeared to have been no subsidiary agreements in relations to them. Nor had any such agreement been anticipated by the members of the American delegation as they arrived for this conference.

But besides finding that they had many points of coincident interest, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Kosygin appeared to have hit it off extremely well on a personal level.

The President remarked at lunch, after the two men had spent two hours alone with their interpreters, Viktor M. Sukhodrev and Bill Krimer, that the real results of their conference "will be judged by what we can achieve in the future in order to achieve peace."

It was as they were winding up their talks that the idea of talking further was broached by the Soviet leader. Mr. Johnson was outlining the brief statement he proposed to make

Esteemed ladies and gentlemen.

I wish first of all to thank the President for arranging this meeting, all the more so that he's arranged a meeting in so pleasant and beautiful a locality and a town.

And I also want to thank the hosts,

to the press and Mr. Kosygin subscribed to it, officials recalled.

The Soviet leader then disclosed that he now planned to remain in the United States until Sunday night and that if the President wished to discuss matters further, he was prepared to do so. They then quickly agreed to return to the college campus.

Though there were sharp disagreements about the Middle East and other questions, there appeared to have been none of the table-thumping or warnings that marked Premier Khrushchev's confrontations with President Eisenhower in Paris in 1960 and with President Kennedy in Vienna in 1961.

This first meeting in six years between a United States President and a Soviet Premier appeared to get underway in an extremely pleasant atmosphere. If there was any annoyance left from the week-long wrangle over the terms and site for the conference, it was well hidden.

### Waving to the Crowd

Mr. Johnson had been waiting at the 118-year-old house for 35 minutes, alternately conferring with his advisers inside and waving to the large and enthusiastic crowd outside.

Then, at 11:19 A.M., 19 minutes after the appointed hour, Mr. Kosygin's black Cadillac limousine, following four state police cars, came up through the woods behind the house. The Premier's window was open and he was inspecting the set-

ting while tugging—much as Mr. Johnson often does—at the lobe of his left ear.

Llewellyn E. Thompson, the United States Ambassador to Moscow, who has been home for consultations, was the first to greet the Soviet leader, but the President was a few steps behind, arm extended for an elaborately negotiated handshake.

Until that moment they had known each other only as signatures at the foot of private communications. But the most recent of these—the first exchanges on their Hot Line teletypewriter connection at the start of the Arab-Israeli war 18 days ago—had set the mood for their encounter. The moment shooting began, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Kosygin exchanged pledges to stay out of the conflict, avoiding a direct clash despite their rivalry in the situation.

### Warm and Friendly Shake

The symbolism of that agreement to compete without a confrontation was what Mr. Johnson most wished to preserve and enhance in discussions with Mr. Kosygin. The President has long spoken respectfully of the Soviet leader as a man who was not likely to be rash but who also was not easy to budge once committed. Furthermore, Mr. Johnson thought that he had registered the same impression in Moscow.

In any case, the handshake was warm and friendly. If anything, the small group of Soviet officials was even more forthcoming than the Americans in the first moments, but there soon were big smiles and

It is also our obligation that we make it possible for other countries to be done. And that is why today we have here discussed with you some questions affecting the peace of the entire human family of three billion people.

I want to inform Secretary Rusk, Min-

situation, and at least explore the situation of mutual interest in Europe and the Western Hemisphere.

And now I would like to ask each of you to stand and raise your glass to the health of the Chairman, the Soviet Union and to peace in the world.

expansive greetings all around. Premier Kosygin shook hands with Secretary of State Rusk and Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, and all the Americans renewed their acquaintance with Foreign Minister Gromyko and Ambassador Dobrynin.

The two leaders posed for pictures and the President, introduced his guests to Gov. and Mrs. Richard J. Hughes of New Jersey and to Dr. and Mrs. Robinson, who were excited from their home without notice last night to provide a site for the meeting.

There was much cordial banter, the two principals chatting through their interpreters, Mr. Sukhodrev and Mr. Krimer.

Only one comment was overheard, Mr. Kosygin's compliment to the President: "You chose a nice place."

It had taken some doing to choose it, with Mr. Kosygin insisting that he had come to the United States primarily to attend the emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly and refusing at first to venture out of New York and Mr. Johnson expressing a strong preference for Washington and, finally, almost any other place except New York.

The search for a site did not begin until the underlying issue had been settled — and until it had been agreed to have a

discussion of substantive issues, without an agenda and outside the context of the United Nations propaganda battle.

### Swarm, Tangle, Hum

Despite the swarm of people and the tangle of wires and the hum of huge air-conditioning units hurriedly installed during the night, Mr. Johnson agreed with the Premier that it was a nice place, cradled his elbow and led him inside.

Inside the rambling old two-story house topped by a belfry-like tower and faced with white, wrought-iron grillwork they entered the family sitting room. The furniture had been removed during the night to make room for a boat-shaped teak conference table from the college president's office and 20 straight-backed chairs to match.

Mr. Johnson and Mr. Kosygin remained in the sitting room for a few moments for official photographs.

The Soviet leader, noting that he had been a grandfather for 20 years, used the time to congratulate the President on the birth two days ago of his grandson, Patrick Lyndon Nugent. Mr. Johnson is 58 years old and Mr. Kosygin is 63.

The President, who was heard to express appreciation for the welcome into the grandparents' club, offered his guest some ice water and then led him into

placing a limit on the deployment of costly antimissile defense systems. The results of this exploration were not disclosed.

Mr. Kosygin made a brief toast on his own but it has not been published.

### 8 O'Clock Breakfast

After lunch, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Kosygin had another hour by themselves with their interpreters before joining the larger group for the closing remarks.

The larger conference was said to have been dominated by Mr. Rusk and Mr. Gromyko, setting forth their views primarily on the Middle East and the proposed treaty against proliferation.

After bidding his guests goodbye, Mr. Johnson stood at the door waving. He then dispatched Mr. Rusk to New York, presumably to be near the Russians to prepare for the Sunday meeting. He sent Ambassador Thompson to Gettysburg, Pa., to brief President Eisenhower.

Mr. Johnston sat at the middle of one side of the luncheon table, with Mr. Kosygin at his right and an interpreter crouched between them. They

flew the remaining 1 by helicopter in seven. The President landed low center field at the baseball park and drove hundred yards through trees to the Robinson known as Holly Bush.

The other members American delegation. Walt W. Rostow and Ma Watson, special assistants the President; Mr. Bundy, who is on leave; ident of the Ford Foundation to manage White House tion of Middle Eastern during the current crisis; George Christian, the House press secretary.

The Soviet delegation in ed Leonid M. Zamyatin, he the Foreign Ministry's press; Yuri Voroni counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, and Y. sov and B. Batsanov, assistants to Premier Kosygin.

Nearly 1,000 correspondents hundreds of policemen a security agents and more hundreds of military personnel descended on this small community 15 miles southeast of Philadelphia during the night

## Jockeying on Site for Summit Recalls Earlier Maneuverings

By SETH S. KING

Diplomacy is an international game played by adults in what has sometimes seemed to many people to be a childish manner.

This week's tangled dialogue over where President Johnson and Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin could meet without diplomatic discomfort recalls earlier disagreements over venue, surroundings, and who should arrive first.

Napoleon may well have established an early record in placemanship. In July, 1807, he sought a peaceful carving up of Europe with Czar Alexander.

To overcome the Czar's fear of loss of face by coming to Napoleon, the French Emperor arranged for an elaborate raft to be built and anchored in the exact center of the River Niemen in Prussia, the boundary between their two empires.

On the barge Napoleon had two identical apartments built, each with a door facing a bank of the river.

After lengthy diplomatic maneuvering, it was agreed that each monarch would arrive at the same moment on his river bank and be rowed to the raft at the same time. However, Napoleon had the faster boat and was waiting at the door of the Czar's quarters when the Russian got there.

When the United States and Communist China finally decided to end the Korean war, the site for armistice talks was a thorny matter in the face-conscious Orient. But diplomatic ingenuity prevailed.

Near the village of Panmunjom, the habitation closest to the 38th Parallel, a conference house was set up. In it was placed a conference table whose center was precisely over the

parallel, with a crease marking this fact.

During 575 meetings, the negotiators from the two sides never set foot in the other's territory. Nor did they ever use the ash trays, placed in the middle, at the same time.

For pure stubbornness—with a purpose, of course—nothing has exceeded the wrangle in May, 1959, between the Soviet Union and the Western powers over the tables at the Big Four foreign ministers' conference in Geneva.


The Russians wanted a round table, with the East Germans seated with them around one section and the West Germans seated with France, Britain, and the United States around the other.

But the Western powers wanted no part of this, since it would imply recognition of East Germany. They wanted a rectangular table, with themselves face to face with the Russians and the Germans in the background.

After days of great discussions, the inevitable compromise came. There was a round table for the big powers. The East and West Germans were seated at separate rectangular tables, placed exactly three pencil lengths from opposite sides of the big circle.

Glassboro's residents may well have felt that a strange destiny had jabbed a finger at them and projected their city into the history books.

But Portsmouth, N. H., could understand. In August, 1905, that placid harbor town quite suddenly became the site of the Treaty of Portsmouth, ending the Russo-Japanese war.



The New York Times

June 24, 1967

**ROUTES TO GLASSBORO:** Solid heavy line shows the route of Premier Kosygin's motorcade from New York to the conference site and broken line shows President Johnson's route by plane and copter from Washington.



The New York Times

June 24, 1967

**SITE OF CONFERENCE:** Cross shows where President Johnson and Premier Kosygin met on the campus (diagonal shading) of Glassboro State College. The heavy line is the route followed by the Soviet leader's motorcade.



6/23/67 8

Today's meeting gave us an opportunity to become acquainted with each other and to exchange views on a number of important international problems. Among other things, we talked about the situation in the Middle East, the situation in Southeast Asia, and the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We agreed that it is now urgently important to reach international agreement on such a non-proliferation treaty.

We also exchanged views on questions of the direct bi-lateral relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Finally we agreed that discussions on a number of these questions should be continued in New York between Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Rusk.

It was a good and useful meeting.

6/23/67

Mr. Chairman:

It is good that we are meeting today because we have very special responsibilities not only to our own peoples but to the whole human family.

The world is made up of many nations and many peoples. They will forge their own futures -- each nation in the light of its own history, traditions, and ambitions.

*our obligations require us* . *the*  
But ~~the power we command should be used~~ to make ~~all~~ relations between our countries as peaceful and constructive as they can be.  
*Our obligations require us*  
And it should also ~~be used~~ to make it possible for other nations to develop themselves in peace.

That is why we have been discussing arms control measures and the non-proliferation agreement, the possibilities of peace in the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, *and other areas*.

The results of our efforts today will be *judged* by what *we have* ~~happens~~  
*can achieve in the future in the cause of peace.*  
~~in the future.~~

But I know it was good for us to meet and to talk.

I ask you to drink with me to the good health of Chairman Kosygin, and *to the co-operation of our people for*  
~~prosperity of the Soviet people, and~~ peace in the world.

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday, June 23, 1967 -- 7:05 a.m.

Mr. President:

Dick Moose reports from Glassboro. *(Draft scenario attached!)*

The house is a simple Victorian residence, but fixed up overnight just fine.

The main conference room -- to the left of the front door -- holds about 20 and now has a conference table.

Off the conference room is a small study which will serve well if you and the Chairman wish to go off by yourselves.

Beyond the conference room is the dining room. Holds 24.

To the right of the entrance is another big room -- holds about 20.

Half way upstairs is a room fixed up as a small office. Could be used by Marie.

Upstairs are two rooms which could be used for delegation meetings if the two sides wished to confer at some point during the conference.

The air conditioning has been installed and is now operating.

A few questions for your decision:

1. Moose suggests Gov. Hughes and college President Robinson might meet you on arrival at the helicopter pad.

Yes ✓ No       

Question: Should they ride with you to the house?

Yes ✓ No       

2. Should ~~be~~ prepare a toast for lunch?

Yes        No

3. Kosygin's car will pull up very close to the front of the house, but not directly in front, because of TV camera locations. Moose suggests the President might be on the porch at the time. Either the President or (say) Amb. Thompson might go down to greet Kosygin and walk him to the porch where pictures could be taken before the Soviet party went in to meet the U.S. party.

The President will greet \_\_\_\_\_  
*Seit funk will not* \_\_\_\_\_  
Amb. Thompson will greet \_\_\_\_\_

We should let Gov. Hughes' man know by 8:30 a.m. the answer to question 1.

Incidentally, the press and filing facilities are in a gymnasium about one-half mile from the President's house. We will need a joint press statement or communique at the end. In addition, we will want to get someone to go down to the gymnasium and background the press after the conference.

*W. A. R.* Rostow