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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	Smith to Rusk C 1 p	1/20/64	A
	<i>open 9-30-97 NLJ 97-117</i>		
#2 memo	Rusk to President C 1 p	1/16/64	A
	<i>open 3-26-99 NLJ 97-118</i>		
#4 memo	Bundy to Holders of NSAM 253 C 1 p	8/30/63	A
	<i>open 9-30-97 NLJ 97-117</i>		
#5 memo	Bundy to SecDef C 1 p	7/13/63	A
	<i>open 1-27-97 per NSC letter</i>		

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSAM, NSAM 253--Multilateral Force

Box 2

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January 20, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has approved the implementation of a MLF mixed-manning demonstration along the lines recommended in Secretary McNamara's memorandum of August 26 and your memorandum of January 16, 1964.

/s/

Bromley Smith

cc:

Secretary of Defense

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-117
By is, NARA Date 9-24-97

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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January 16, 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Approval for Mixed-Manning Demonstration

I recommend that you approve prompt implementation of the MLF mixed-manning demonstration along the lines set forth in Secretary McNamara's memorandum of August 26. Defense concurs in this recommendation.

You will recall that the Secretary of Defense submitted his report in response to President Kennedy's instructions. It recommended that such a demonstration be carried out in a U.S. Navy ship.

The Paris MLF Working Group has discussed this subject, approved the project, and invited governments to participate. We have now heard from the Germans, Greeks, Turks, Italians, and British, who wish to join us, using a U.S. guided missile destroyer in the demonstration. The Italian decision is particularly encouraging, since it must reflect a decision by the Socialists, as well as the other three Coalition parties.

The Dutch representative has indicated that his country, which joined the Paris Working Group talks only this week, is still studying the matter. The Belgians have said that they do not intend to participate.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

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NLJ 97-118
By is, NARA Date 3-20-99

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

26 AUG 1963

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Authority DOO Dir 5200.10

By SP, NARA, Date 2/4/92

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Experimental Mixed-Manning of a US Navy Ship (NSAM 253)

In response to your request in NSAM 253, the Joint Chiefs of Staff report that such an experiment is feasible, provided certain specific conditions are met. They recommend that a Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG) can most effectively fulfill the objectives of the demonstration, but also suggest that a naval auxiliary ship could be used for a second ship or as an alternative.

I concur in the conclusion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and recommend implementation of the project, with the following qualifications which are based on an examination of the JCS study and on views expressed by the responsible offices of the State Department.

1. Success of the project, both from a technical and political point of view, is mandatory. In this connection, any official publicity given the project should emphasize the fact that its purpose is to assist in isolating and resolving some of the operational, administrative, and personnel considerations involved in the mixed-manning concept already generally accepted by the prospective participants, and in no sense a test of the MLF itself.

2. The demonstration should be undertaken only with the prior understanding that it would in no way be considered a condition precedent to further progress in the MLF negotiations or to convening a treaty drafting group as soon as possible.

3. The possibility of such an experiment should be introduced informally in the current multilateral discussions, in such a way that the initiative for detailed consideration will be at least as much on the part of the foreign participants as on that of the US.

4. Implementation of the project should come as a result of US agreement to a proposal put forth by the other participants.

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5. Details for implementing the experiment, if it is approved, should be developed in the multilateral discussions.

6. The US should suggest the possibility of carrying out the experiment in two phases, initially utilizing an auxiliary-type ship similar to the ships envisaged for the MLF, and simultaneously undertaking the preparation of a DDG to become multilaterally operational at a later date.

7. The times of 4 and 12 months required to man and commence multilateral operation of the auxiliary and DDG, respectively, should be considered as minimums, starting after agreement on the details by prospective participants in the experiment.

I have attached for your information a more detailed consideration of the factors which I believe bear on the feasibility of the experiment.

Paul S. Mc Newman

Enclosure

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ATTACHMENT TO THE MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I. BENEFITS OF THE DEMONSTRATION.

A. The experiment would demonstrate in practice the feasibility of nationals from at least three countries effectively manning a complex modern warship. Since the military leadership of the possible participants have acknowledged the feasibility of mixed-manning, this would be primarily useful in providing operational experience in areas previously considered largely in theoretical terms.

B. An experimental ship would be a clear concrete demonstration of both American interest in creating an MLF and our belief in its operational concepts. The results of such experience would also be quite useful in later hearings here and in Europe, on the ratification of a treaty.

II. QUALIFICATIONS. Success of the project both from a technical and political point of view is mandatory. Irreparable damage could be done to the MLF if difficulties were blown up out of proportion or the project should fail. If it is decided to implement the demonstration, certain factors which might lead to a misunderstanding of the experiment and the possibility of its jeopardizing the MLF should be kept in mind.

A. To insure the successful impact of the demonstration, the proposal should arise naturally, and preferably informally, within the multilateral discussion now in progress in Washington, rather than being proffered separately as an independent American initiative. Its emergence from the discussions would help forestall its distortion in the press as an attempted diversion or "gimmick" and the possibility of its being so construed in Europe.

B. The time required to obtain meaningful data on mixed-manning, even with the JCS alternative auxiliary ship plan which could be operational in about four months, would extend well beyond the anticipated

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convening of a charter drafting group. The experiment could cause serious delay if interested nations deemed it prudent to await the "results" of the experiment before formally committing themselves to the MLF. Consequently, any demonstration should be agreed to only on the prior understanding that the experiment would in no way be considered a condition precedent to further progress in the negotiations or to convening a treaty drafting group as soon as possible.

C. The JCS proposal -- including its alternative plan -- has only some points of true relevance to the envisaged MLF and there are several significant divergencies (Tab A).

1. While the experiment would help resolve some of the administrative and personnel problems which the MLF would encounter, there remains a major dissimilarity in that the demonstration would be an isolated sample carried out under the aegis of an established U.S. Navy command and logistical support structure, rather than under the proposed multilateral MLF organization.

2. Since the ship should present management complexities similar to those involved in a surface missile ship force, the choice of a DDG would present the most appealing challenge to the NATO Allies to participate. A two-phase demonstration beginning with an auxiliary ship such as an AKS and succeeded by a DDG made operational at a later date would allow an earlier start of operations than the one-year preparation for a DDG would permit and would also allow an adequate preparation time for insuring the success of the more complicated DDG operation. The possibility of European reluctance to accept the relatively simple and unglamorous AKS would be met by initiating the DDG phase simultaneously and giving equal publicity to its development.

3. Since the phrase, "mixed-manned" is in the public eye, synonymous with "The Multilateral Force," it is conceivable that the proposal, unless modified to include more multilateral participation, could erroneously be construed by our Allies and the press as the manning pattern for the MLF. Therefore, the manning parameters suggested in JCSM 569-63 should be reexamined to determine if the manning proportions can be made more similar to those envisaged for the MLF.

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RELATIVE COMPARISON BETWEEN MIXED-MANNING EXPERIMENT AND THE MLF*

	<u>JCS Proposal</u>	<u>MLF</u>
Ship Operation	Complex (DDG) Simple (AKS)	Simple (MerShip)
Weapons System -- Operation and Maintenance	Complex (DDG)	Complex
Manning	51% with US C.O. 49% Foreign nationals	Maximum 40% nationals any one country with minimum of 3 countries in each ship.
Command and Staff Control	US	MLF
Logistics Support	US	MLF
Minor Discipline	0 in C's national detachments in co- operation with US C.O.	MLF C.O.
Operations	In company with other ships (DDG) Independent (AKS)	Independent

* The above comparison is limited to the most significant features of divergence.

Tab A

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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August 30, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR

HOLDERS OF NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 253

The President has received the attached response from the Department of Defense, and has also discussed the matter with the Department of State, and he now requests that diplomatic action be initiated with a view to determining whether a group of the Governments interested in the MLF would look with favor upon a joint project of this sort. Action in this matter should be taken by the Department of State, and appropriate technical and military consultations in support of this action are hereby authorized and requested.

If these discussions indicate a clear desire for such a project, the President expects to authorize the necessary supporting actions by the United States Government. It is the President's desire that this matter should proceed promptly and that it should be conceived as a means of maintaining the real interest of other countries in the MLF, and also as a means of demonstrating the continuing commitment of the United States to the effort to meet the legitimate interests of non-nuclear members of the Alliance.

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NLJ 97-117
By is, NARA Date 9-24-97

McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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July 13, 1963

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 253

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The President thinks that it would be helpful to the future of our efforts with the multilateral force if a beginning could be made in mixed manning somewhere in existing NATO forces. He would like a prompt study and report of the feasibility of establishing an experimental mixed manned ship or ships in the 6th Fleet, for the purpose of testing the effectiveness of the mixed manned concept and also of showing the continued interest of the United States in progress on this front.

McGeorge Bundy

McGeorge Bundy

CC: The Secretary of State

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Authority NSC letter 8-31-95

By fw/mj. NARA. Date 1-27-97