

**WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 memo	Klein to Bundy <i>open 12-6-99</i> <del>S</del> 1 p	12/12/63	<del>A</del>
#3 memo	Bundy to SecDef <i>open 12-6-99</i> <del>TS</del> 1 p	12/10/63	<del>A</del>
#4 memo	Bundy to Holders of NSAM 270 <i>open 12-6-99</i> <del>S</del> 1 p	11/5/63	<del>A</del>
#5 memo	Bundy to Holders of NSAM 270 <i>open 12-6-99</i> <del>S</del> 1 p	10/30/63	<del>A</del>
#6a rpt	"Excerpt from Proposed Speech by Rusk..." <i>open 12-6-99</i> <del>C</del> 3 p	10/27/63	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

**NSF, NSAM, NSAM 270--Meeting with President, 10/24/63**

**Box 2**

RESTRICTION CODES

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Mr. Bundy

The Top Secret

Classification greatly  
slows down Pentagon  
staffwork on the European  
deployment problem.

Defense requests  
NSAM be made Secret.  
Chargen it will be  
recommended shortly. BKS



*True Copy*

1a

March 3, 1964

**NOTE TO HOLDERS OF NSAM 270 (Dated October 29, 1963)**

**As of this date, the above referenced National Security Action Memorandum is downgraded to SECRET.**

/s/

McGeorge Bundy

**Copies sent:**

**Secretary of State  
Secretary of Defense  
Chairman, JCS**

**cc:**

**Mr. Bundy  
Col. Smith  
Mr. Johnson  
NSC Files**

*Dispatched 3/4/64*

NSAM 276

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December 12, 1963

~~SECRET~~

McGB-

SUBJECT: NSAM 270 Meeting

We are holding this meeting at 10:00 a.m. because Jeff Kitchen felt it had to be held. We are frankly short on substance and both I and DOD would have been pleased to let it slip another week. For an agenda we have agreed on the following:

1. Kitchen will bring you up to date on where the 270 actions stand.
2. The Pentagon will produce its first tries at preparing the status report that we proposed at the first meeting.
3. We want to look at the fallout from McNamara's statement on the closing down of seven overseas bases (in addition to the domestic bases that are being closed in the announced economy move.).

We don't think this meeting should take more than fifteen minutes.

David Klein

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 14, NARA, Date 11-16-98

December 10, 1963

NSAM 270

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~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM TO: Secretary of Defense

After our talk about the tactical squadron problem, I checked NSAM 270 and I can see how the State Department lawyers would be upset, under paragraph 2, subparagraph (9), by reports that there have been preliminary conversations with Von Hassel on this matter. That paragraph says that plans will be prepared by State and Defense "for final approval of the President before any implementation."

Your description of your conversation with Von Hassel does not suggest that any harm was done, but I do think that given the text of the NSAM and the fact of a new President we ought all to be very careful about discussing further withdrawals with any foreigners at this time.

I do not regard this as a formal memorandum from the White House to you, but only as a footnote to a telephone conversation.

McGeorge Bundy

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By JS, NARA, Date 1-16-85

November 5, 1963

~~SECRET~~

NOTE TO HOLDERS OF NSAM 270 (Dated October 29, 1963)

Subparagraph (6) of paragraph 2 of NSAM 270 is rescinded.

The following is substituted for subparagraph (7) of the same paragraph:

(7) The second LONG THRUST battle group, which is scheduled for redeployment in January 1964, will be replaced by an equivalent force. In addition, a reinforced battalion of approximately 900 men will be deployed during January 1964 on rotation to the Federal Republic of Germany in accordance with previous commitments by this Government to the Federal Republic of Germany.

McGeorge Bundy

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 5, NARA, Date 11-16-95

~~SECRET~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

October 30, 1963

NOTE TO HOLDERS OF NSAM 270

The President believes it would be advisable to have a small interdepartmental group exercise over-all supervision and monitor implementation of NSAM 270 and similar actions. The group will consist of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA. The group will meet every other Tuesday at 4:00 p.m., in the White House Situation Room until such meetings seem no longer required. In addition to the individuals above, the Chairman of the State/Defense Interdepartmental Steering Committee and the Senior DOD representative thereon should also attend.

The group will review the progress and suggest what additional steps should be taken to improve the implementation of NSAM 270 and related actions, with particular emphasis on the development of politico-military plans, and the establishment of a political base for the actions contemplated. At each meeting the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Steering Committee should be prepared to identify and discuss the key problems the Steering Committee has encountered since the last meeting of our Principals' group.

The group will convene initially on 5 November.

*McGeorge Bundy*  
McGeorge Bundy

Copy for:

Mr. U. Alexis Johnson  
Mr. William Bundy  
Lt Col W. Y. Smith

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By *SP*, NARA, Date *11-16-93*

SECRET

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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October 29, 1963

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 270

TO: The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President, Thursday, October 24, 10:30 a.m.,  
in the Cabinet Room, on European Matters

1. Based on Secretary Gilpatric's summary of recent Presidential decisions concerning the redeployment of US military forces from Europe and the schedule for implementing the approved actions, the President reaffirmed that:

a. Possible redeployments of US forces under consideration within the government should not be discussed publicly nor with our allies until a decision has been made and a politico-military plan for action approved. Following these steps, we should consult as appropriate with our allies before any public announcement is made, and then proceed with our intended actions. Wherever possible action of low visibility should be taken without public announcement.

b. The United States will maintain in Germany ground forces equivalent to six divisions as long as they are required, and this policy is to be reaffirmed by Secretary Rusk in Frankfurt.

2. The following actions were approved by the President, to take place under the above guidelines.

(1) The three C-130 squadrons permanently stationed in France will be returned as scheduled; two squadrons will be maintained in France on rotation.

(2) US Army lines of communication forces in France will be reduced by approximately 5400 as scheduled.

(3) The inactivation of the Lacrosse and 280mm gun battalions will proceed as scheduled.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC memo 5/23/78  
By MEE, NARS, Date 6/6/78

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(4) A plan for the further reorganization of the Army's European logistics forces, entailing an additional reduction of about 30,000 personnel over the next two calendar years, will be developed by the Department of the Army for review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.

(5) The specific 10% reduction in headquarters staff of 7th Army and USAREUR and the over-all 15% reduction worldwide in headquarters staffs (which may involve further adjustments in Headquarters, 7th Army, and USAREUR) will go forward as scheduled.

(6) The President approved the return to the United States, commencing early in 1964 and to be completed within FY 1964 with the minimum explanation practicable, the six Berlin "Roundout" units consisting of three artillery battalions, two armored battalions, and one cavalry regiment, with its support units. The schedule of this action and the manner of disclosure to the FRG were left for later decision by the President.

(7) The redeployment of the second LONG THRUST battle group will not be discussed until January, although planning should go forward for its probable return to the United States in early spring.

(8) B-47 units will be withdrawn from Spain and the United Kingdom as scheduled by the spring of 1965. The President reaffirmed this decision after being informed that although the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended against this action the Deputy Secretary and the Secretary of Defense strongly supported it.

(9) The President approved in principle the proposal to withdraw three fighter squadrons from France and seven fighter squadrons from the UK by the end of FY 1966. Defense should urgently prepare, in connection with State, a plan of action to carry this out, with an estimate of the political and military problems (including the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) involved for final approval of the President before any implementation.

3. On the basis of the above guidelines and decisions, section IV of Secretary Rusk's draft speech for Frankfurt on 27 October was reviewed and appropriate modifications were made. The President approved the attached revised draft.

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4. At the conclusion of the meeting, the President set forth the following rationale for use by US officials publicly, with the guidance that it should be used only as required, and only in such detail as is necessary.

a. The United States intends to keep the equivalent of six divisions in Europe as long as they are required. The United States will continue to meet its NATO commitment.

b. Operation BIG LIFT should be viewed as an example of our ability to add rapidly additional forces to Europe. Were it a replacement division, it would use the equipment of one of the divisions now in place. Instead, it is using one of the two division sets of equipment prestocked in Europe. In reality, the US thus will have over seven divisions in Europe over the next month or more.

*McGeorge Bundy*

McGeorge Bundy

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CONFIDENTIAL

EXCERPT FROM PROPOSED SPEECH BY SECRETARY RUSK AT  
FRANKFURT, GERMANY, ON SUNDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1963.

#### IV. DEFENSE PARTNERSHIP

I turn now to the second field in which President Kennedy indicated that the principle of European unity and Atlantic partnership can be given new meaning -- that of defense.

We need substantial and diversified western power to protect the Atlantic area.

This power must include both nuclear and non-nuclear components.

The NATO military authorities have approved force goals whose attainment would help to give us a balanced force structure. It is important that these goals be attained. Then no one anywhere could conclude that the West is lax or indifferent to the defense of its vital interests.

I hope that the alliance as a whole can meet its goals. In a genuine partnership, burdens must be equitably borne; all countries must contribute their fair share to the total strength of the alliance.

The United States is making, and will continue to make, its full contribution to this partnership. It is a source of pride that the United States has generally met or exceeded its goals, and a source of regret that certain others in the alliance have not. It is our strong conviction that the alliance as a whole should meet its commitments and we earnestly hope it will do so.

Since you of the Federal Republic and we of the United States are carrying the heaviest burden of NATO, let me speak to you very frankly. You and we are working in the closest partnership in NATO. We consult each other intimately. When we say that your defense is our defense, we mean it. We have proved it in the past. We will continue to demonstrate it in the future.

We have six divisions in Germany. We intend to maintain these divisions here as long as there is need for them -- and under present circumstances there is no doubt that they will continue to be needed.

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By       , NARA, Date 11-16-93

CONFIDENTIAL

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Our forces in Germany are supported by the world's largest logistical system, which maintains these forces in the highest state of readiness with the most modern and powerful equipment. And they are backed by nuclear forces of almost unimaginable power.

And let me remind you that the central NATO front is not the only frontier of freedom on which the forces of the United States stand guard. We have more than 2,700,000 men under arms. Of these, we maintain nearly one million outside the continental United States, ashore or afloat.

As a nation with more than 40 allies and with worldwide defensive commitments, we are naturally very much interested in the mobility of our forces.

In this connection, let me say a word about the airlift of a United States armored division to Germany for maneuvers. This exercise was an experiment and demonstration arising directly from the airlift capability we committed ourselves to create in 1961, in the context of the Berlin crisis. Its fundamental objective was to permit the swift deployment of reinforcements in the face of a major crisis. It was thus the testing of a new and important additional capability which strengthens the military partnership between the United States and Europe.

Does the airlift of an armored division mean the withdrawal of American troops from Germany? The answer is "No," -- the opposite is the case. Because of this airlift we have at the moment a seventh division temporarily in Europe. Moreover, equipment is in position for still another division. Thus, the airlift capability developed by the United States at such great expense provides a major source of added strength to the Alliance.

The partnership among the North Atlantic Allies must extend to nuclear defense.

The occasion to do so arises, as in the case of political consultation, from the need to meet a specific problem. That problem is posed by a growing Soviet nuclear power, reflected in hundreds of Soviet missiles aimed both at Western Europe and at the United States.

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It has seemed to two successive United States administrations that the most effective way to meet this threat was by a combination of United States missiles and of MRBM's deployed to Allied forces under multilateral manning, control and ownership.

Such a multilateral missile fleet would be militarily effective. Its accurate and well-protected missiles would be counted toward the total needs of Western deterrence.

It would strengthen Atlantic partnership by binding the United States and Europe in an inextricable nuclear tie. The missiles and warheads would be jointly owned and controlled; they could not be unilaterally withdrawn.

And it would strengthen European cohesion by providing the presently non-nuclear powers an opportunity to share in ownership, manning and control of a powerful nuclear force on the same basis as other members of that force.

It would thus be an effective means of giving effect to the principles of which General Marshall spoke within the present political framework of Europe.

As that framework progresses, there must, of course, be room for evolution in this field, as in the field of political consultation. The President spoke clearly of this possibility in relation to the missile fleet when he said here last June that as Europe moves toward unity it can and should assume greater responsibility in this field.

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