

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~#1 memo~~	~~McNamara to Bundy~~ ~~S 3 p~~ <i>open 8-4-09 NL 09-116</i>	~~4/15/64~~	~~A~~
#1a rpt	Attachment to #1 S 2 p	undated	A
#1b memo	Duplicate of #1		
#1c rpt	Duplicate of #1a		
~~#2 memo~~	~~Intelligence Memorandum~~ <i>open 4-17-09</i> ~~S 4 p~~	~~4/6/64~~	~~A~~
~~#3 memo~~	~~Duplicate of #2~~ " "		
~~#4 memo~~	~~Read to Bundy~~ <i>open 12-6-99</i> ~~C 2 p~~	~~2/14/64~~	~~A~~
~~#4a memo~~	~~Rusk to Assistant Secretaries~~ <i>open 12-6-99</i> ~~C 2 p~~	~~7/2/62~~	~~A~~
~~#4b memo~~	~~Hughes to SecState~~ <i>open 12-6-99</i> ~~S 7 p~~	~~2/6/64~~	~~A~~
~~#5 memo~~	~~Read to Bundy~~ <i>open 7-17-97 NL 97-84</i> ~~S 1 p~~	~~5/8/64~~	~~A~~
~~#5a rpt~~	~~"National Security Planning"~~ ~~S 4 p~~ <i>open 7-17-97 NL 97-84</i>	~~undated~~	~~A~~
~~#6 memo~~	~~Rostow to Planning Group Members~~ ~~S 23 p~~ <i>open 2-2-10 NL 09-117</i>	~~3/27/64~~	~~A~~
~~#7 memo~~	~~Smith to Bundy~~ ~~S 1 p~~	~~3/30/64~~	~~A~~
~~#8a rpt~~	~~"Policy Planning Council" (PPC 61-17)~~ ~~C 19 p~~ <i>open 12-6-99</i>	~~12/5/61~~	~~A~~

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSAM, NSAM 277--Review of our Procedures for Anticipating Foreign Crises Box 2

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#9 rpt	"WH Situation Room" PCI ~~2 p~~ <i>open 12-6-99</i>	~~undated~~	~~A~~
#10 memo	Shepard to Bundy PCI ~~2 p~~ <i>open 2/6/92</i>	~~10/28/63~~	~~A~~
#11 memo	Shepard to Smith <i>open 12-6-99</i> S ~~2 p~~	10/22/63	A
#12 memo	Duplicate of #10		
#14a memo	Komer to Bundy <i>open 12-6-99</i> C ~~1 p~~	2/4/64	A
#15 memo	Duplicate of #5 <i>open 7-17-97 NLJ 97-84</i>		
#15a memo	Duplicate of #5a <i>"</i>		
#16 memo	Bundy to RFK, McCone, Vance, Wilson, Johnson... S ~~1 p~~ <i>open 12-6-99</i>	2/21/64	A
#17 memo	Read to Bundy <i>open 12-6-99</i> C ~~2 p~~	2/14/64	A
#18 memo	Duplicate of #17 <i>open 12-6-99</i>		
#19 memo	NSAM 277 C ~~1 p~~ <i>open NLJ 92-271</i>	1/30/64	A
#20 memo	Duplicate of #19		

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~~SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

15 APR 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

SUBJECT: NSAM 277, Anticipation of Foreign Crises

The President's memorandum of January 30 (NSAM 277) requested a review of the procedures in effect in the Department of Defense for anticipation of foreign crises.

In its overall context, crisis anticipation includes the elements of foreseeing and forestalling possible crises perceived at long range, as well as recognition of and reaction to impending or incipient crises in order to deal with these latter at the lowest level of involvement if they cannot be forestalled.

Long-Range Planning. The Department of Defense analysis and planning cycle provides for a long range estimate of the threats to U.S. basic security and an analysis of the military forces or systems needed to deal with these threats. This long-range analysis and planning is done initially by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the development of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), which becomes the basis for force planning and research and development activity, after my review.

The Department of Defense Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program, which follows the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, describes a wide range of capabilities for forestalling or dealing with the anticipated threats. A major effort is made to provide highly mobile tactical forces and counterinsurgency and internal defense techniques so that crises may be forestalled or met at the appropriate level.

Shorter Range Planning. A shorter-range review of the threats and suitable military programs, particularly force deployments and special programs of military assistance, counterinsurgency and counter-subversion is described in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, prepared annually by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, the JCS review and modify deployments as necessary to meet existing or estimated threats and indicate precise tasks to be carried out in the event of crisis.

Intelligence and Policy Interaction. Additionally, there is constant activity in the intelligence and policy fields in the anticipation of foreign crises not foreseen in the formal planning and analysis cycles and contingency planning to forestall or cope with the emergency.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 09-116

By id, NARA, Date 6-30-05

SecDef Control No. X2119

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I have emphasized to my principal assistants their responsibilities to anticipate problem areas. I have also stressed their responsibility to make themselves available for immediate consultation with our watch officers when the judgment of a senior official is required in the identification of an incipient crisis.

My regular meetings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their periodic meetings with senior officials of the State Department exemplify our continuing efforts to examine those situations where military forces or military activity might be involved.

My principal assistant for politico-military matters, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), is in daily contact with the Department of State. He informs both me and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff of developing problems as they surface in the Department of State and as they are perceived by him. Similarly the Director of the Joint Staff, under his responsibility for supervision of the National Military Command System, informs us of operational matters which may lead to crises.

Offices Specifically Charged with Crisis Anticipation. Department of Defense elements specifically charged with anticipation of foreign crises include the National Military Command Center (NMCC), the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Plans and Operations Directorates and the Office of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency of the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). The key element for immediate reaction to crises is the NMCC.

The National Military Command Center. As soon as intelligence identifies an impending crisis, the NMCC is the focal point to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and higher authority turn for an immediate review of the situation and for advice as to the available courses of action in time of emergency. The Deputy Director for Operations (NMCC), a General/flag rank officer, and the NMCC maintain an around the clock evaluation of world-wide situations with the goal of recognizing incipient problems before they have become crises. The State Department, CIA, DIA, the National Security Agency and other Defense agencies are represented in the NMCC and support the NMCC mission of anticipating and evaluating foreign crises. In addition, the NMCC is linked with the other key operational centers in the Washington area, including the White House Situation Room and the State Department and CIA Operations Centers, as well as with the Services and the Unified and Specified Commands. The NMCC has facilities for immediate and comprehensive alert notification.

Defense Intelligence Agency. DIA gathers and disseminates intelligence through its own Indications System and through links with the rest of the intelligence community. DIA participates in the preparation of National Intelligence Estimates, and prepares the Insurgency Criticality List, which is

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used to review preparation for impending crises. DIA furnishes the chief intelligence support of the NMCC; it briefs responsible Defense officials immediately after receipt of information dealing with a possible early crisis. The Appendix describes these functions in greater detail.

Review of Contingency Plans. In addition to the quick reaction capabilities of the NMCC and DIA in the identification and review of information dealing with possible foreign crises, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ISA participate in the preparation and review of military contingency plans for crises foreseen at a somewhat longer range. They are assisted in this planning by full access to the intelligence reports and analyses of CIA and DIA, and State Department reports. Joint Staff and ISA representatives participate in interagency planning, as, for example, for Berlin contingencies, for Latin America and Cuba, and for South Vietnam.

Joint Staff and Defense representatives conduct and participate in more general planning of policy alternatives. An example is the Tuesday Luncheon Meetings of the Interagency Planning Group.

Exercises and Games. Additionally, it should be noted that the exercises of the National Military Command System and the several political-military war games sponsored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and various Defense offices have been of considerable value in examining the possible development and management of important problems facing the United States in relation to foreign crises.

I do not intend to convey the idea that our current arrangements are adequate and need no improvement. On the contrary, we are continually studying ways of improving our modes of crisis management. Several studies, with this as their objective, are currently underway.

Robert S. McNamara

Attachment

Appendix, "Review of Procedures
for Anticipating Foreign Crises"

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1843



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

2

6 APR 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT : The Anticipation of Foreign Crises

REFERENCE : NSAM 277

1. The anticipation of foreign crises is a fundamental problem, running across the whole range of political, economic, sociological and even military intelligence. It is also an exceptionally intractable one. Furthermore, unlike the specialized problem of providing warning of impending military action, it cannot usefully be attacked by the methodology of "indications intelligence". A nation preparing to go to war normally must do certain things; a pattern of these things may sometimes be detectable. Political crisis, however, arises from the complex interaction of all-too-human beings and political and social dynamics which they do not necessarily understand or control. This is not to say that detection of impending military action is any less difficult, but only that it is different. Examination of the most recent crises with which the US Government has had to deal--Vietnam, Cyprus, Panama, East Africa, Malaysia--shows few patterns or similarities. Specifically, Communist policy cannot be singled out as a unifying element; only in Vietnam is the crisis primarily a result of deliberate Communist action.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NLJ-015-002-1-3
By: abm/jc, NARA, Date: 8-24-09

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2. CIA believes that the anticipation of crises depends less on simplistic mechanical approaches, "quick fixes", or organizational questions than on the general quality of intelligence produced, and essentially on the caliber of intelligence personnel. Within this framework, and recognizing that no system can guarantee the US Government that it will not occasionally be surprised by foreign developments, there are elements in the present system which can and should be strengthened.

a. Collection: An effective country team, with reporting responsibilities clearly determined and vigorously pursued, is essential if political warning is to be provided.

b. Analysis: In general, present procedures seem adequate. The difficulty is to get and keep the best possible people. Warning is as likely to come from a trained analyst's visceral reaction to a seemingly innocuous bit of information as from a circumstantial field report of high evaluation.

c. Reporting: The most important problem, and one that has never been adequately solved, is that of communications between the intelligence producer and the national policymaker, notwithstanding the number of intelligence publications devoted to this purpose. I am giving this subject fuller treatment in the following paragraphs.

3. Both producer and policymaker are at fault. The intelligence officer may take out cheap insurance by publishing extensive "laundry lists" of potential crises in which genuine warnings are buried, or may coordinate his product until warning is effectively camouflaged by qualifiers and over-formal language, or may lose focus on his audience by treating the dramatic and immediate in one publication and the dull and gradual in another. The senior policymaker may be too reluctant to accept warnings that go counter to his own policies, or too dulled by cumulative exposure to read his intelligence perceptively, or too preoccupied with the immediate to

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respond to the longer-range. More often than not, an extraordinary number of administering, reviewing, coordinating, editing, and sometimes operating echelons insulate him from the intelligence desk officer.

4. To the extent that there is an answer to these difficulties, it lies not in creating additional publications or repeating warnings by rote in existing ones, but in sharpening intelligence warning and aiming it more directly at responsible officials. For instance, consideration might be given to holding regular National Security Council meetings limited to examination of crises which can be expected in the months ahead. Such a meeting would give the intelligence community the opportunity to ensure that the highest levels of the government have been warned, in specific and direct terms, of problems which it foresees.

5. Our widening of the distribution of the President's Intelligence Checklist is one effort to tighten the crucial relationship between policy-maker and intelligence analyst. Another, perhaps less direct, is the increased attention we are giving in National Intelligence Estimates to warning of developments which are realistic possibilities, even if less probable than others. We continue to highlight the main lines of probability, but attempt to convey greater awareness of variations and contingencies.

6. Beyond these measures, I would propose within CIA to:

a. Conduct more systematic periodic reviews of the raw intelligence received on each target country to make sure we know what is going on there.


b. Conduct similar reviews of our finished reporting on quiescent but inflammable situations with a view to providing

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more sharply focussed warning to responsible senior officials, perhaps by personal memorandum.

c. Circulate with occasional issues of the Central Intelligence Bulletin selected longer-range articles from the Current Intelligence Weekly Review which deal with potentially dangerous situations not susceptible to normal daily reporting.


JOHN A. MCCONE
Director

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By ebm/jc, NARA, Date 2-24-09

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JOHN A. McCONE
Director

-4-

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s/s 1835

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 14, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: NSAM #277 - Anticipation of Foreign
Crises

The President's memorandum of January 30 to Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara and Director McCone called for a review of procedures in effect in this Department, Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency for anticipating foreign crises. I understand that you are coordinating the replies.

Crisis anticipation procedures within this Department have been reviewed and revised periodically during the last three years, with particular attention to the early identification of situations which could develop into crises. Secretary Rusk, in the attached memorandum of July 2, 1962, described the procedure for strengthening our performance in "the systematic planning for crises". This directive is still in effect and has been utilized, for example, for the preparation of studies on possible succession problems in Ghana, Spain, France and Portugal. It requires members of the Policy Planning Council to consult regularly with the operating bureaus and other areas of the Department to review possible problems and to develop specific plans to avert or mitigate undesirable consequences.

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research participates in the above mentioned review of problem areas. In addition, it prepares monthly a list of actual and potential trouble spots in all parts of the world and publishes them in the form of a monthly "Global Alert List". The list for February 1964 is attached. It serves as a useful method of briefing principal officers about expected crises.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By 18, NARA, Date 12-3-99


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More generally, however, it is clear that our ability to anticipate crises rests on the continuous alertness and efficiency of the Department as an organization. Many officers and offices play important roles in this process. As you know, the Secretary considers the country desk officer the focal point for the identification of important policy implications of unfolding events. It is for this reason that he wishes to up-grade the desk officer's status. When crises develop with little warning, the Operations Center in the Secretariat puts into effect carefully worked out procedures for alerting the Department. These procedures tie in to the White House Situation Room, the National Military Communications Center and the Central Intelligence Agency. The Secretary's daily staff meetings, including both intelligence briefings and consideration of operating problems, are used frequently to flag possible crisis areas. Many other devices are used for the same purpose, but it would not seem desirable to prolong this memorandum with a detailed discussion of these procedures and practices.

The Secretary of State has reviewed this memorandum and has advised me that he would be available to discuss these problems and to provide additional information and suggestions if desired.



Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Memorandum to Assistant Secretaries, July 2, 1962.
2. Global Alert List for February 1964.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 2, 1962

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARIES

SUBJECT: Systematic Planning for Crises

As a result of several meetings on the anticipation of crises, I am requesting a new procedure to strengthen our performance in this area.

While the exact shape and date of a particular crisis is virtually unpredictable, we can endeavor to isolate and act briskly to exploit moments of transient opportunity, observe trends and situations that are likely to produce crises, and systematically think out ahead of time the critical dimensions of the problems these crises will create. In the light of such thought we may generate lines of action which could prevent, mitigate, or even turn such situations to our advantage. A great deal of work within the Department is already addressed to these objectives.

A successful program to meet these objectives will require the closest cooperation among those who illuminate the alternatives available to us, those who make decisions, and those who carry them out. I want to insure that a greater portion of the energies of the desk officers, who are so often absorbed in the day's immediate problems, are directed toward steps we should be taking now in order to improve our posture in the future. The purpose of this program is to provide a systematic means for strengthening the contribution of the Policy Planning Council to the operating bureaus in this respect. The operating bureaus retain full discretion and responsibility for the implementation of recommendations emanating from the informal working groups organized under this program.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By 12, NARA, Date 12-3-99

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I am therefore requesting Mr. Rostow to consult with each of you in order to undertake the following program:

1. Arrangements for consultation on a regular and systematic basis, between designated officers of the Policy Planning Council and the operating bureaus to select an initial list of problems for anticipatory planning on a priority basis and to establish a regular procedure for identifying situations of opportunity.

2. Establishment of small, informal working groups under the leadership of the Policy Planning Council, including representation from the responsible bureaus, and the intelligence and planning community, to develop specific plans and time tables for action on each designated priority problem.

3. Presentation of reports and recommendations of the working groups to the Assistant Secretary of the responsible bureau for his consideration and such action as he finds appropriate.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

JWF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

46

Research Memorandum
INR-5, February 6, 1964

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *Thomas L. Hughes*
Subject : Global Alert List for February 1964

2152

This working paper is a selective and by no means comprehensive list of developing situations of potential concern to the US in Free World countries. It is issued informally, and primarily for use within the Bureau by INR briefing officers.

FAR EAST

Cambodia - Sihanouk, though he desires US aid to continue, is unwilling to reopen negotiations by publicly requesting aid.... It is still doubtful that Filipino mediation efforts will succeed.... The UK co-chairman of the Geneva Conference has presented a draft treaty to Sihanouk for the international recognition of Cambodian neutrality; Sihanouk's tentative reaction has been favorable. The Thai and South Vietnamese governments remain strongly opposed to Phnom Penh's request for neutralization.

Republic of China - Concern over the effect of French recognition of Peiping may lead the GRC to step up guerrilla actions against the mainland as a token of its determination to continue the civil war.... After a series of warning measures during January against Japanese business in Taiwan, the GRC government is closely watching Japanese reaction to Paris-Peiping relations.

Indonesia - A preparatory conference for a second Bandung meeting is tentatively scheduled for late February.... Indonesian communists may urge more Indonesian control over British business interests in Indonesia. (See Malaysia).

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By ry, NARA, Date 12-3-99

GROUP I
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Japan - Similarities between US relations with Okinawa and with Panama are a potential source of trouble.... Tokyo does not presently envisage diplomatic recognition of Communist China, but the recent move by de Gaulle will encourage trade expansion between Japan and the Chinese mainland, and may greatly strain the already shaky relationships between Tokyo and Taipei.

Republic of Korea - The government may seek some dramatic assurance of continued US support in the wake of French recognition of Communist China.... Korean opposition parties may effectively obstruct normalizing of diplomatic relations between Japan and Korea.... There may shortly be a series of strikes in protest against inflationary prices for food.

Laos - The Pathet Lao assault on the Na Kay Plateau seems to have suspended all prospects for early tri-partite negotiations on the neutralization of Luang Prabang and the transfer of the government there. The ICC has agreed unanimously to investigate the attacks but it is unlikely that the Pathet Lao will grant access to the area.... Souvanna plans to visit Phnom Penh in February, Hanoi, and Peiping in March.

Malaysia - The Tunku has agreed to a February meeting in Phnom Penh with Filipino President Macapagal, without pre-conditions. The Malaysian, Filipino, and Indonesian foreign ministers started discussion February 5th at Bangkok. The heads of the three governments will come together soon afterwards, if sufficient progress is made at the Bangkok meeting.... The potential for Indo-Malaysian disagreement over implementation of the current cease-fire is considerable. Malaysian troops will facilitate the deportation of Indo paramilitary units currently in Sabah and Sarawak, although under orders not to shoot first. The terms of the cease-fire do not apply to Indo subversion in Singapore and Malaya.... An Australian mission will visit Malaysia this month to discuss arms and equipment assistance.

Philippines - President Macapagal makes a state visit to Cambodia February 8-15, during which he will meet the Tunku of Malaysia (see Malaysia). Macapagal will also visit Indonesia at the end of February.

Republic of Vietnam - General Khanh intends to create a government of politicians, in contrast to the Minh-Tho administration of generals and technicians. Whether this "national unity" regime will prove more energetic and more effective against the Viet Cong is not foreseeable as yet. Khanh lacks the prestige of Minh, and some of his military supporters are considered opportunists. His standing with the urban population is not as high as Minh's.

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WESTERN EUROPE

Germany - Negotiations for an exchange of trade missions with Bulgaria will open early in February.... The SPD party congress of February 15-16 is expected to elect Willy Brandt to the party chairmanship, while Fritz Erler will replace him as deputy chairman and also become SPD Bundestag floorleader.... Erhard's scheduled visit to France in mid-month is unlikely to produce significant indications of agreement on further progress of the Six toward European political integration.

Italy - President Segni and Foreign Minister Saragat will visit Paris in late February to complete the round of consultations with Italy's major allies following establishment of the Moro government.

Portugal - Recent events in East Africa have strengthened Portuguese confidence that the US will come round to the same point of view as Lisbon on the issue of self-determination for the African territories. Lisbon's resistance to US pressures in the UN forum have therefore solidified.

Spain - There are many rumors that Spain is about to recognize the USSR, but the chances that Madrid will do so in the near future still appear dim.

United Kingdom - Prime Minister Douglas-Home will arrive for talks with President Johnson February 12, while Labor's Wilson is scheduled to see the President March 2.... Although general elections are still considered more likely in May or June, Labor is preparing itself for a possible March call.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Bolivia - Vice-President Lechin's expulsion from the MNR opens the door for an attempt to rally the MNR Left Sector and heretofore fragmented opposition parties behind a presidential bid by Lechin in the June elections. A coup attempt against the Paz government is also possible, though less likely.

Brazil - Goulart may still plan a cabinet shuffle, although there is little chance of his giving way to the radicals' demands for ministerial representation.

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CONTROLLED DISSEM

Chile - At the Socialist Party congress in mid-month a small pro-Peiping faction might split off, and thus perhaps weaken the Socialist-Communist coalition in the 1964 elections.... Cuban offers to buy nitrates and foodstuffs in return for sugar might tempt the economically pressed government.

Cuba - Full details of Castro's visit to the USSR remain unknown, but one of the results may be the prospect of a more aggressive policy towards the US regarding Guantanamo and overflights.... Increased efforts to establish trading and diplomatic relations with West European and nonaligned countries are expected.

Guatemala - An increase in urban terrorism by Castroite elements is possible, following the low impact of their campaign in the countryside. The return to normal political activity, decreed by the Peralta government for March 30, may thus be postponed.

Panama - The possibility of an anti-Chiari coup continues strong.... A Government-Opposition Alliance fusion ticket, designed to defeat Arnulfo Arias' candidacy in the May elections, may be in the offing.

Uruguay - Persistent attempts by bloc countries to increase their share in the Uruguayan economy might find some welcome in Montevideo, after the visit of Foreign Minister Zorilla to Prague this month.

Venezuela - Decisions should be reached this month by the Social Christians (COPEI) and the Democratic Republican Union (URD) relevant to forming a governing coalition with President-elect Leoni's AD.... As a result of a purge of its left wing, the URD may lose perhaps 25% of its membership.... Terrorist activity may pick up in an attempt to prevent the installation of Leoni in office March 1.

NEAR EAST - SOUTH ASIA

Arab Summit Results - Implementation of the decision to set up an Egyptian-led Joint Military Command will prove a difficult problem, due to mutual Arab suspicions.... Communist Chinese support for the Arabs against Israel may lead those Arab nations (Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia) who have diplomatic representation in Taipei to condition its continuance on equal support from Nationalist China.

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CONTROLLED DISSEM

-5-

Cyprus - The agreement by both Greece and Turkey to accept a NATO peacekeeping force for Cyprus may ultimately persuade Makarios and Greek Cypriots to withdraw their present objections to the US-UK proposals or at least accept a compromise formula. The danger that fighting might erupt again is ever present.

Greece - National elections scheduled for February 16 are expected to return the Center Union to power. Both major parties are trying to keep Cyprus out of the election issues, and would welcome a compromise solution which preserves the basic rights of Greek Cypriots.

India - The debate on Kashmir in the UN Security Council might exacerbate Indo-Pakistan relations, particularly if bilateral discussions do not follow.... The Bengal area, recently wracked by Hindu-Muslim rioting, will remain in a high state of tension.

Pakistan - The Paks may be hoping to press the US to modify its policy on aid to India via a forthcoming UN Security Council debate on Kashmir.... Chou en-Lai's visit to both parts of Pakistan this month may lead to further cultural or trade agreements.

Syria - The al-Hafiz government is under increased pressure for reconciliation with Nasser due to the latter's success at the recent Cairo summit meeting of Arab governments. Deputy Premier 'Umran is rumored as the leader of the next coup attempt.

Turkey - The shortrun prospects for Inonu's present coalition appear good. The opposition is reluctant to accept responsibility for causing its downfall during the Cyprus crisis.... The Turkish military is exerting considerable pressure on the government to maintain a firm line on the protection of the Turkish Cypriots and to assert Turkey's right of unilateral intervention should the NATO peacekeeping efforts fail.

United Arab Republic Nasser will work out details for a preparatory meeting of participants in a proposed second Conference of Non-aligned States during Tito's February visit to Cairo. The Egyptian-Yugoslav initiative is in competition with an Indonesian plan for a second Bandung parley of Afro-Asians.

Yemen - Further governmental changes to placate anti-Egyptian feeling may be expected. King Husayn of Jordan has offered to mediate the Saudi-Yemeni conflict.

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AFRICA

OAU Affairs - A meeting of OAU foreign ministers will begin February 25 in Lagos.

Algeria - A proposed February congress of the FLN may be postponed by Ben Bella if present internal discords show no signs of being glossed over.

Angola - Holden Roberto plans to send an exploratory delegation to Moscow and Peiping in the near future to discuss assistance to his rebel movement. The current Portuguese military position in Angola is firm.

Congo (Leopoldville) - Disturbances in Kwilu province are likely to go on despite Congolese Army action to secure major centers. Mulele's guerrilla force may extend its depredations into neighboring Unite Kasaienne and Kwango provinces.... Disputes among the members of the Constitutional Commission will probably require that their scheduled deliberations be extended.

East Africa - Severe measures against suspected dissidents are being introduced in Tanganyika, and will probably be adopted also in Uganda and Kenya. Nyerere, Obote, and Kenyatta may try to redress the impression of being dependent upon British protection by attempting to create new links to the USSR, which apparently had no hand in the recent disorders.

Ethiopia - Addis Ababa is expected to recognize Communist China, and will probably follow other African states in advocating a "Two Chinas" policy.

Ghana - Nkrumah may be considering deportation of some American officials and professors.... Should Nkrumah begin a purge of moderate elements, an army coup is possible.

Horn of Africa - Ethiopian-Somalian relations remain tense. Somalia expects a hearing of its irredentist claims at the OAU foreign ministers' conference in February, but has apparently dropped for a time the notion of pressing its case in the UN.

Libya - The recent removal of Prime Minister Fikini and his replacement by the conservative Muntasir may precipitate manifestations of growing popular discontent with the monarchy.

Mali - Criticism of President Keita has broken into the open for the first time, and his attempted purge of higher-echelon "plotters" has back-fired.

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Southern Rhodesia - The coup and mutinies in East Africa have strengthened the ruling whites' determination to resist a sudden transfer to majority rule, and support for a unilateral declaration of independence from Britain is growing within the government.

Zanzibar - Moderate President Karume still enjoys the support of most of the populace, but without some form of intervention by East Africa, particularly Tanganyika, the extremist group around Babu and Hanga will almost certainly take power.

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MAY 8 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

5/12

Subject: National Security Planning

In connection with NSAM 277 on Crisis Anticipation, I enclose for your information a listing of the major tasks on which the planning community is working under the aegis of the Department of State.

C. C. Moore

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Memorandum re National
Security Planning.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-84
By is, NARA Date 6-18-97

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5a

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Subject: National Security Planning

This memorandum summarizes the three categories of National Security Planning now going forward in the government under the aegis of the State Department's Policy Planning Council. If more detail is wanted on any of these projects, we will be glad to provide it. If there is a desire for additional planning projects, or for accelerating any of these projects, we would be glad to learn your wishes.

In addition to these specific projects, we have prepared a draft of Basic National Security Policy, which would replace the last Presidentially approved over-all statement of U.S. national security policy - the one which President Eisenhower approved on August 5, 1959. We have kept this draft up-dated, so that it could be promptly made available for NSC consideration, if this is desired.

Ever hopeful

Category I: Planning Tasks. These cover unresolved problems surfaced in the course of continuing review of national security policy. The following are some major examples of such planning tasks:

a. U.S. Overseas Bases and Installations. A complete survey of (i) existing military and civilian bases overseas; (ii) future U.S. requirements for bases, set against their economic and diplomatic costs.

b.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-84
By isa, NARA Date 6-18-97

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b. Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation and Nuclear Capability. The political and military implications for U.S. policy of anticipated Chinese Communist acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. A summary of this task has been forwarded to you separately.

c. Private Enterprise in the Underdeveloped Areas. This involves study of two topics: (i) Development of local private enterprise, notably through the National Market concept, which aims to close the economic gap between urban and rural areas. (ii) Enlarging the role of foreign private enterprise on terms acceptable to both developed and developing countries.

d. Atlantic Policy. A new look at U.S. policy toward Europe, centering on the long-term role of Germany in the Western community, and taking account of both de Gaulle's temporary blockage of European integration and the thaw in Eastern Europe.

e. French Policy. A review of U.S. policy toward Gaullist and post-de Gaulle France, focusing on third areas as well as Europe.

f. Insurgency in Vietnam and Laos. Feasibility of U.S. and GVN actions which might be taken against NVN, in an effort to force Hanoi to cease support and direction of insurgency operations in Laos and South Vietnam.

g. The Soviet Union. Analysis of economic and political forces at work, to see if there are actions which we could take from here on in to influence the period when Khrushchev leaves the scene.

h. The Future of Japan. Analysis of trends in Japan and recommendations on U.S. policy.

i. African Strategy. Review of our long-term policy toward Africa.

j.

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j. Foreign Aid Review. Review of U.S. economic and military aid policy, to see if there are any changes in the scope, purpose and method which should be considered before next year's budget is decided on.

k. Disarmament. Study of inter-relation between arms control, political objectives, and military strategy in Central Europe.

Category II. National Policy Papers. These are comprehensive policy papers setting forth proposed U.S. political and defense strategy toward selected countries for the next 3-5 years. They are designed to provide the basis for coordinated interagency programs in Washington and the field. Under National Security Action Memorandum No. 281 issued in February of this year, the State Department has taken the lead in developing such National Policy Papers on a number of countries, as follows:

1. Cleared interdepartmentally and issued: Ethiopia.
2. In final stages: Nigeria, Colombia, the Republic of China, and South Africa.
3. In process: Ghana, Liberia, Thailand, Indonesia, Brazil, Chile, India, Pakistan, Turkey, United Arab Republic.

Category III. Political Contingency Plans: Crisis Anticipation. These represent systematic efforts to project possible crises, and to generate lines of action which could prevent, mitigate, or even turn such crises to U.S. advantage. Contingency planning work currently underway includes:

1. Chile. Possible implications for U.S. of victory of FRAP presidential candidate in the September 1964 elections.

2.

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2. Succession Problem in Portugal. Actions from here on out, looking toward the post-Salazar period.

3. Europe. U. S. policy in the event of: a) break-up of the EEC; b) the failure of the Kennedy Round.

4. Indonesia. U. S. policy, in event that Sukarno leaves the scene.

5. Jordan. Possible effects of intended diversion of Jordan waters.

6. Ceylon. U. S. policy in event of collapse of the Government of Ceylon.

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Number 8 of 31 copies, Series A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Counselor and Chairman
Policy Planning Council
Washington

6

March 27, 1964

TO: Planning Group Members

SUBJECT: Anticipation of Foreign Crises

At the Planning Group meeting on Tuesday, March 31, 1964, 12:00 noon, in addition to our discussion of the program of National Policy Papers for FY 1965, I should also like to spend some time discussing the topic of "Anticipation of Foreign Crises." Attached is a paper which will be the basis of this discussion.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment:

Paper Entitled "Anticipation of Foreign Crises," Dated March 23, 1964.

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 09-117
By is NARA, Date 1-11-10

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March 23, 1964

Anticipation of Foreign Crises

The President, in National Security Action Memorandum No. 277, of ~~February 14,~~ ^{January 30,} 1964 addressed to Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and Director McCone, called for a review of procedures in effect in their respective Departments for the anticipation of foreign crises. The purpose of this review was to stimulate ideas and suggestions looking toward improving this important phase of planning work. The White House has been informed of the procedures currently in effect in the Department.

A. Background: There are all types of crises with which the Bureaus daily are concerned and which are subject as a matter of course to intensive planning efforts. There are, however, crises which, by reason of their importance, occupy a substantial portion of the time of the President and the Secretary, and which may require additional planning efforts. To meet this problem the Secretary issued a memorandum on July 2, 1962 in an effort to improve our overall contingency procedures and to cover any gap which might exist. (Attachment A) This memorandum was amplified under date of May 17, 1963. (Attachment B)

B. Current

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B. Current Contingency Planning Lists and Problems

Selected for Contingency Planning in Future. The geographic bureaus have drawn up a list of contingency plans considered current as well as a list of problems selected for contingency planning in the future. INR has contributed a list of problems which, from an intelligence viewpoint, appear to be worthy of anticipatory planning. An idea of the nature and scope of contingency planning, as well as suggestions for the future, can be gained by reference to Attachment C.

C. Key Questions for Discussion.

(1) What forms should contingency plans take to make them most useful for all concerned?

(a) Should they focus on specific contingencies and attempt to provide such guides as may be possible for those with operational responsibility?

(b) Should they be primarily educational devices without attempting to lay out blueprints for managing a crisis?

(c) Should there be a standard procedure and outline?

(d)

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(d) Should these plans be developed and/or approved interdepartmentally and in the field, as is currently done in the Latin American Policy Committee?

(2) Is there a proper division of responsibility among the bureaus, S/P, and INR? (Among the criteria for S/P participation might be: (a) the importance of the problem; (b) requirements for a new approach; and (c) its inter-departmental character.)

(3) Given the demands on our limited resources, what should be the criteria for the selection of problems for planning? (For example: (a) Importance - impact of the crisis on vital US interests, and the likelihood of its involving a considerable portion of the President's and the Secretary's time; (b) Probability - the likelihood of the crisis occurring and whether it will happen in the near future; (c) Resources - availability of resources (personnel, etc.) to study the particular crisis.)

Attachments:

- A. Memorandum of the Secretary, of July 2, 1962.
- B. Recommendation Approved by Gov. Harriman for the Secretary, of May 17, 1963.
- C. Current Contingency Planning Lists and Problems Selected for Contingency Planning, of March, 1964.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 2, 1962

ATTACHMENT A

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MEMORANDUM TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARIES

SUBJECT: Systematic Planning for Crises

As a result of several meetings on the anticipation of crises, I am requesting a new procedure to strengthen our performance in this area.

While the exact shape and date of a particular crisis is virtually unpredictable, we can endeavor to isolate and act briskly to exploit moments of transient opportunity, observe trends and situations that are likely to produce crises, and systematically think out ahead of time the critical dimensions of the problems these crises will create. In the light of such thought we may generate lines of action which could prevent, mitigate, or even turn such situations to our advantage. A great deal of work within the Department is already addressed to these objectives.

A successful program to meet these objectives will require the closest cooperation among those who illuminate the alternatives available to us, those who make decisions, and those who carry them out. I want to insure that a greater portion of the energies of the desk officers, who are so often absorbed in the day's immediate problems, are directed toward steps we should be taking now in order to improve our posture in the future. The purpose of this program is to provide a systematic means for strengthening the contribution of the Policy Planning Council to the operating bureaus in this respect. The operating bureaus retain full discretion and responsibility for the implementation of recommendations emanating from the informal working groups organized under this program.

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I am therefore requesting Mr. Rostow to consult with each of you in order to undertake the following program:

1. Arrangements for consultation on a regular and systematic basis, between designated officers of the Policy Planning Council and the operating bureaus to select an initial list of problems for anticipatory planning on a priority basis and to establish a regular procedure for identifying situations of opportunity.

2. Establishment of small, informal working groups under the leadership of the Policy Planning Council, including representation from the responsible bureaus, and the intelligence and planning community, to develop specific plans and time tables for action on each designated priority problem.

3. Presentation of reports and recommendations of the working groups to the Assistant Secretary of the responsible bureau for his consideration and such action as he finds appropriate.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

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ATTACHMENT B

In a memorandum of May 17, 1963 Governor Harriman approved for the Secretary of State the following recommendation concerned with the anticipation of crises. This recommendation reads as follows:

"It is recommended that, at regular intervals, each regional bureau, in consultation with INR, survey the possible crisis situations within its region (as well as potential occasions of opportunity for positive US initiative); that it select those which it regards as most important and most likely; and that it arrange with S/P that contingency planning exercises be conducted for those where the character of the problem or the resources available to the bureau do not make it convenient to conduct the contingency planning exercise wholly within the bureau itself. As a matter of information, S/P should be informed of the current contingency planning lists and the assignments of responsibility made to effect them."

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Policy Planning Council

CURRENT CONTINGENCY PLANNING LISTS
AND PROBLEMS SELECTED FOR
CONTINGENCY PLANNING
IN FUTURE

MARCH 1964

<u>BUREAU</u>	<u>Page No.</u>
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GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

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BUREAU: INR

CONTINGENCIES WHICH FROM THE INTELLIGENCE VIEWPOINT
SEEM WORTHY OF A PLANNING EFFORT

RUSSIA AND EAST EUROPE

1. The succession to Khrushchev.
2. A complete break in Sino-Soviet party and state relations.
3. Anti-Communist uprisings in any of the Eastern European countries.
4. A complete break between Moscow and any Eastern European country.
5. The overthrow of the Hoxha regime in Albania, either from within or without.
6. Soviet ABM deployment is stepped up.
 - a. Additional cities protected, possibly accompanied by increased civil defense measures, but no ABM defenses deployed around strategic attack facilities.
 - b. ABM deployment at ICBM and LRAF sites begins.

FAR EAST

1. South Vietnam. A neutralist coup would face the US with grim alternatives, some unmentionable at this classification.
2. Burma. The circumstances in Burma under which Ne Win could be overthrown, his likely successors, and probable courses of action a successor government would pursue.

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FAR EAST - Cont'd

3. Cambodia. The possible dimensions of communist support to Sihanouk and the extent of the damage that could be done to US positions.
4. China. Attempted detonation of nuclear device, under particular subcontingencies:
 - a. Attempt fails (and we have some evidence of failure).
 - b. Attempt succeeds, but is followed (next day or so) by one or two additional detonations of nominal yield devices.

NORTH AND EAST AFRICA

1. Zanzibar. A seizure of power by communist-oriented Zanzibari radicals and the transformation of the islands into a training center for southern African revolutionary forces.
2. Horn of Africa. An escalation of Ethiopian-Somali conflict in which Ethiopian internal stability is severely threatened. (See Horn of Africa, NIE 75/76-64.)
3. Algeria. A collapse of government authority in Algeria resulting from popular discontent and intra-mural rivalries among the country's political and military leaders.

WESTERN AFRICA

1. Ghana. Two alternatives:
 - a. A rupture in US-Ghana relations, necessitating a major withdrawal from the country.
 - b. Less likely, the removal or elimination of President Nkrumah.

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WESTERN AFRICA - Cont'd

2. Congo-Leopoldville.

- a. Immediate: The contingency we most seriously face is the scheduled withdrawal of UN military forces from the Congo by mid-1964.
- b. Longer run: Increased instability in the provinces, including serious secessionist dissidence in the Katanga (and other eastern provinces), coupled with a growing inability of the central government to exert control, either political or military, outside of Leopoldville.

MIDDLE EAST

1. Aden. The UAR and the YAR use the Nasser-oriented Aden Trades Union Confederation (ATUC) for terrorist activity against British installations in Aden.
2. Oman and Persian Gulf. The conflict in Oman revives, and the smaller Persian Gulf sheikhdoms break, their special ties with the UK.
3. Iraqi Kurds. Fighting breaks out again and leadership of the Kurdish forces passes to younger men who might be prepared to spread the trouble to Iran.
4. Israel. Arab attempts to sabotage Israeli water diversion or to resume fedayeen raids into Israel. Israel might be tempted to take strong counteraction of its own. In case of an Arab-Israeli armed conflict of larger scale than border incidents, subcontingencies:
 - a. Prompt Soviet assistance is provided to further alienate the US from the Arab world.
 - b. UAR threatens to use MRBMs, possibly with CW warheads.

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MIDDLE EAST (Cont'd)

5. Cyprus. The possibility of greater Soviet involvement, especially if the UN effort fails, and if Makarios continues to feel thwarted by the Western powers. The Soviet involvement relates to the problem of British bases. These bases have considerable strategic importance for the UK and an important value for the Cypriot economy. The Soviet Union would want to see the UK (and the US, too) pushed out of Cyprus and might attempt to make Soviet economic assistance contingent upon Greek Cypriot determination to deprive the UK of its base rights.
6. Kashmir. The continuing possibility that fighting could break out along the cease-fire line in Kashmir.

AMERICAN REPUBLICS

1. Cuba. Two contingencies:
 - a. Action against overflights and the introduction of Soviet submarines in Cuban waters for eventual Cuban use.
 - b. A clear-cut case of Cuba's delivery of arms to insurgents in a second country.
2. Chile. Victory of FRAP presidential candidate in September 1964 elections in Chile.
3. Brazil. Two contingencies:
 - a. Swing to the left before October 1965 presidential election or any attempted solution by force.
 - b. Soviet financing of a large-scale development project, e.g., \$1 billion to Brazil for Parana River hydro-electric development.

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WESTERN EUROPE

1. Germany. Berlin.
2. British Guiana. Two contingencies:
 - a. If Labor government in UK reverses the British decision to hold proportional representation election.
 - b. If Jagan wins proportional representation election.
3. Spain. Succession to Franco.
4. Portugal. Two contingencies:
 - a. Succession to Salazar.
 - b. Military defeat in its colonies.
5. France. Possibility of nuclear sharing with Germany.
6. Finland. Increased Soviet pressure.
7. NATO. The following contingencies:
 - a. Withdrawal of all French forces from commitment to NATO.
 - b. Failure of MLF.
 - c. Cyprus dispute.
 - d. Withdrawal of all or most of British forces from Germany.
8. EEC. Break-up of Common Market.

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BUREAU: AF

A. CURRENT CONTINGENCY PLANNING LIST

<u>Title of Report, Telegram, Airgram, Memorandum, Etc.</u>	<u>Date of Report, Etc. or Date of Revision</u>
1. Nigeria - National Policy Paper	March 10, 1964
2. South Africa - National Policy Paper	March 2, 1964
3. Ghana - National Policy Paper	January 20, 1964
3a. Ghana - AFW memo - Operational Plan for Ghana (Immediate Future Steps Vis-a-vis Nkrumah)	March 3, 1964
4. Ethiopia - National Policy Paper	December 19, 1963
5. Congo (Brazzaville) - memo	March 9, 1964
6. Algeria - Action Program for Algeria Draft - post and inter- agency comments being requested.	February 28, 1964
7. Rwanda and Burundi - memo	February 24, 1964
8. Congo (Leopoldville) - memo for President on Training of Congolese Army	February 15, 1964
9. Portuguese Territories - paper for meeting of NSC Standing Group	February 15, 1964
10. Moroccan-Algerian Border Dispute: Contingency Plans	January 2, 1964

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Title of Report, Telegram,
Airgram, Memorandum, Etc.

Date of Report, Etc.
or Date of Revision

- | | |
|---|---------------------|
| 11. Somalia - Mogadiscio's A-288:
"Internal Security - Somali Republic" | December 14, 1963 |
| 12. Southern Rhodesia | May 3, 1963 |
| 13. Libya - Contingency Planning
Regarding Political Future of
Libya (Top Secret) | Continuing Revision |

B. LIST OF PROBLEMS SELECTED FOR
CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN FUTURE

Identification of Problem by
Country, Situation, Etc.

Officer Assigned
Responsibility

- | | |
|------------------------------------|---|
| 1. Liberia - National Policy Paper | Stephen Gebelt,
plus team of two
officers currently
visiting Liberia
to revise draft of
paper. |
|------------------------------------|---|

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BUREAU: ARA

A. CURRENT CONTINGENCY PLANNING LIST

<u>Title of Report, Telegram, Airgram, Memorandum, Etc.</u>	<u>Date of Report, Etc. or Date of Revision</u>
1. <u>Panama</u> - Contingency Plan Read-Bundy memo; transmitted to White House	February 10, 1964
2. <u>Colombia</u> - Political Contingencies-- Extra-legal Changes - A-731 from Bogota.	May 10, 1963
3. <u>Cuba</u> - General Contingency Plan (Subordinate plans to be prepared)	December 17, 1963
4. <u>Brazil</u> - Contingency Plan (Tentative plan subject to revision)	Drafted December 11, 1963
5. <u>Haiti</u> - Contingency Plan Joint State/DOD CA-1989	August 16, 1963

B. LIST OF PROBLEMS SELECTED FOR
CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN FUTURE

<u>Identification of Problems by Country, Situation, Etc.</u>	<u>Officer Assigned Responsibility</u>
1. <u>Bolivia</u> - Contingency of President Paz' death or incapacitation (Target date for completion of initial draft March 11, 1964; will be submitted to Embassy La Paz for comment)	Herbert B. Thompson (After ARA reorganiza- tion, William Dentzer)
2. <u>Chile</u> - Contingency paper on Sep- tember 1964 elections (being pre- pared by Country Team; target date for submission to Department April 20, 1964)	Herbert B. Thompson (After ARA reorganiza- tion, William Dentzer)

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Identification of Problems
by Country, Situation, Etc.

Officer Assigned
Responsibility

3. Ecuador - Contingency of changes in composition of military junta or its withdrawal from the government (Target date for completion of initial draft March 20, 1964; will be submitted to Embassy Quito for comment)

Herbert B. Thompson
(After ARA reorganization, Jack D. Neal)

NOTE: The list above does not include elements of contingency planning that may be contained in such documents as National Policy Papers or regular Latin American Policy Committee papers. Nor does it list contingency papers of other agencies for which the State Department provides political portions. In addition, it should be noted that certain of the contingency plans listed above serve as the basis for further contingency planning by other agencies.

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BUREAU: EUR

A. CURRENT CONTINGENCY PLANNING LIST*

<u>Title of Report, Telegram, Airgram, Memorandum, Etc.</u>	<u>Date of Report, Etc. or Date of Revision</u>
1. <u>Spain</u> - The Succession Problem in Spain	July 17, 1963
2. <u>Portugal</u> - The Succession Problem in Portugal	July 30, 1963
3. <u>Germany</u> - Berlin Contingency Plans	

B. LIST OF PROBLEMS SELECTED FOR
CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN FUTURE

<u>Identification of Problem by Country, Situation, Etc.</u>	<u>Officer Assigned Responsibility</u>
1. US Policy in the Event of the Break-up of the EEC	John C. Renner
2. US Policy in the Event of the Failure of the Kennedy Round	John C. Renner

*NOTE: The above list of contingency plans is considered current as of March 12, 1964.

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BUREAU: FE

A. CURRENT CONTINGENCY PLANNING LIST

<u>Title of Report, Telegram, Airgram, Memorandum, Etc.</u>	<u>Date of Report, Etc. or Date of Revision</u>
1. <u>Korea</u> - Supplement to Korea Guide- lines Paper	February, 1963
2. <u>Republic of China</u> - Contingency Paper on Taiwan Straits	September 26, 1962
Possibility of Unilateral Action Against Mainland CA-1488	August 3, 1963 August 9, 1962
Possibility of GRC Expulsion or Walkout from UN - Memorandum to Mr. McConaughy	FE/EA October 10, 1961
Presidential Succession Problem - Annex F to National Policy Paper CA-13487	January 17, 1964 May 31, 1963
3. <u>Communist China</u> -	
Possible Uprisings in Mainland China - FE/ACA working draft	February 1962
Studies on ChiCom Leadership and Succession	October 1963 and January 1964
A ChiCom Nuclear Detonation and Nuclear Capability - Draft S/P Policy Planning Statement	October 15, 1963

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Title of Report, Telegram,
Airgram, Memorandum, Etc.

Date of Report, Etc.
or Date of Revision

4. Cambodia - Alignment by Sihanouk with Communist China and DRV and Lesser Contingencies in Possible Sihanouk Shift to Bloc - FE/RA memo to Mr. Hilsman

December 16, 1963

5. Portuguese Timor - Indonesian Designs on Timor, S/P paper

January 5, 1963

NOTE: The above FE list of contingency plans is considered current as of March 11, 1964. Planning under standing E and E procedures is not covered.

B. LIST OF PROBLEMS SELECTED FOR
CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN FUTURE*

Identification of Problem by
Country, Situation, Etc.

Assigned Responsibility

1. Far East-Wide - U.S. Policy in Case of a UNCA Decision to Admit Communist China

FE/RA and IO

2. Japan - Effects of a Possible Change in Japanese Policy Toward US Policy in the Ryukyus

3. Communist China - Implications of Total ChiCom Break with Moscow

FE/ACA

Concerted ChiCom Campaign of Sweet Reasonableness

FE/ACA

*FE is presently undertaking preliminary study and drafting on these possible contingencies.

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<u>Identification of Problem by Country, Situation, Etc.</u>	<u>Assigned Responsibility</u>
4. <u>Philippines</u> - Use of Philippine Bases in Event of U.S. Military Involvement in Indonesia-Malaysia	FE/SPA
5. <u>Burma</u> - Intense Civil Unrest and Prospect Then of ChiCom Inter- vention	FE/SEA
6. <u>Indonesia</u> - Removal of Sukarno from the Scene for Any Cause	FE/SPA
7. <u>Oceania</u> - Outbreak of Large-Scale Violence on Fiji Between Indians and Fijians	FE/SPA

NOTE: S/VN - Contingency plans in the event of a coup or
assassination in South Vietnam. (This subject is contained in
present plans and will be the topic of future exercises.)

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BUREAU: NEA

A. CURRENT CONTINGENCY PLANNING LIST

<u>Title of Report, Telegram, Airgram, Memorandum, Etc.</u>	<u>Date of Report, Etc. or Date of Revision</u>
1. Anglo-American Contingency Planning on Jordan	May 9, 1963
2. Session Four - Contingency Planning for Oil Emergencies (Agreed US-UK positions)	June 10-14, 1963
3. Jordan Waters: United Nations Contingency Plan	January 15, 1964
4. Sudden Removal of the Shah of Iran	October 31, 1962 (Revision of Oct. 31, 1963 being cleared)
5. (A Military Encounter Between (India and Pakistan (Indo-Pakistan Relations (Memo for McGeorge Bundy)	August 1, 1962 December 11, 1963
6. Suggested United States Responses to Likely Chinese Communist Initiatives (Memo, Roger Hilsman to Secretary Rusk, containing section on Suggested U.S. responses to renewed Chinese attack on India)	July 31, 1963

NOTE: The above list of contingency plans is considered current as of March 10, 1964. The individual plans are of varying scope and quality.

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B. LIST OF PROBLEMS SELECTED FOR
CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN FUTURE

<u>Identification of Problem by Country, Situation, Etc.</u>	<u>Officer Assigned Responsibility</u>
1. <u>Jordan</u> - Threat to Jordan (Revision of current Plan)	Andrew I. Killgore
2. <u>Saudi Arabia</u> - Contingency Plan (Now being cleared following field comment)	Talcott W. Seelye
3. <u>Kuwait</u> - Contingency Plan (in draft)	Talcott W. Seelye
4. <u>Cyprus</u> - Contingency Plan (previous plan being revised)	Gordon King
5. <u>Persia</u> - Persian Gulf Oil Emergencies (previous plan revised periodically)	Slater C. Blackiston
6. <u>Jordan</u> - Diversion of Jordan Waters (plan being implemented and revised as necessary)	William R. Crawford
7. <u>Ceylon</u> - Collapse of the Government of Ceylon	Robert Caldwell

NOTE: The current contingency planning list (Part A) is largely made up of high priority "live" topics which require continuing review and revision. Accordingly, a number of items from it are repeated in the future list. Some of the documents mentioned in the future list (Part B) are sufficiently advanced to be of practical use.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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March 30, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Walt Rostow has sent you the attached papers on "Anticipation of Foreign Crises". He wishes to tell the Planning Group meeting tomorrow what State has done in this general area.

You will recall that NSAM 277 of January 30 asked State, Defense and CIA to review their procedures for anticipating foreign crises and assigned to you the responsibility for pulling together any suggestions which might be worthy of consideration. The status of the replies is as follows:

- (a) The State Department on February 14 summarized its existing procedures. The Secretary said he was available to discuss the problem and to provide additional information and suggestions if desired. *(attached)*
- (b) Defense has prepared its response under General Vogt. The paper has been discussed with both McNamara and Vance who have additional suggestions which they want to include and
- (c) An Agency draft response has been prepared by Ray Cline who is ~~today~~ discussing it with Director McCone.

BKS

Bromley Smith

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*When all replies are in we can decide
on the next step. BKS*

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By As, NARA, Date 12-3-99

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL

8

March 27, 1964

TO: MEMBERS OF PLANNING GROUP

SUBJECT: Planning Group Meeting of
Tuesday, March 31, 1964.

In connection with the discussion of
"Anticipation of Foreign Crises" on the
above date, Mr. Rostow felt you might
want to look at the attached S/P paper
on the subject of contingency planning
prepared in 1961.



Lois Nivens

Attachment:

"Foreign Affairs Contingency Planning,"
PPC 61-17 of 12/5/61.

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PPC 61-17

8a

POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL

BACKGROUND STUDY SERIES

FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONTINGENCY PLANNING

December 5, 1961

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By rs, NARA, Date 12-3-99

FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONTINGENCY PLANNING

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Dissemination Note: This document is circulated for the information of addressees and their staffs. Views of the Policy Planning Council are advisory and do not necessarily reflect approved policy.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONTINGENCY PLANNING

"What tremendously easy riddles you ask!"
Humpty Dumpty growled out. "...Why, if ever I
did fall off - which there's no chance of - but
if I did ---"

- Through the Looking-Glass

I. What is Contingency Planning?

All planning involves contingencies. It would be
meaningless in a world of perfect certainty.

"Contingency planning" however has a more limited
set of meanings which distinguish it from other forms
of planning.

It is most widely used by the military, who restrict
it to local contingencies as contrasted with general
war - although the latter is really also a contingency.

The term is less current in business life, but the
practice - under whatever name - is universal. A com-
pany's reserves are in effect a contingency fund, and
readiness to deal with sudden market or other changes is
one of the tests of good management.

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In foreign affairs the term has only recently come into vogue - apparently by contagion from the military, through such combined planning as that for Berlin. But it is still unfamiliar to many and has no established definition, although a good deal of informal contingency planning goes on without being so labelled.

For present purposes a contingency may be defined as a possibility which is not yet a probability, at least for any particular time - e.g., the death of a foreign ruler. Contingency planning is that which focusses on such possibilities.

Ordinary planning has to keep an eye on relevant contingencies, but it centers on our own objectives and courses of action in the context of what is probable. A contingency is thus a deviation from the expected train of events which would cause us substantially to modify our objectives or courses of action.

This study examines contingency planning in the narrow sense: the production of separate analyses for specified contingencies.

II. Why

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II. Why Make Contingency Plans?

1. The Department of State is frequently criticized for not doing enough contingency planning. To some extent this doubtless reflects impatience with recurring crises and a naive demand for magic cures. Crises are with us for the duration of this time of troubles, no matter how skillfully we plan.

2. Yet there are valid reasons for doing certain kinds of contingency planning in foreign affairs, and if we did these, at least some of the outside criticism would be mollified.

3. The central value of contingency planning is education for the time of decision: doing advance homework while there is time to think it through, calmly and objectively. A contingency plan is thus a form of insurance: it is intended to put us in a better position than would otherwise be the case if the contingency happens.

4. Like other insurance however it has to be selective: staff time is finite, contingencies

infinite

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infinite. The criteria of selection are based on the essential values of contingency planning:

(a) Importance - The magnitude of the dangers or opportunities involved is obviously the basic criterion for contingency planning. Where major decisions will have to be made, for good or ill, it is well to have done advance homework. A sudden change of regime in a foreign country frequently confronts us with such decisions.

(b) Likelihood - While it is wasteful to plan for remote contingencies, it is common prudence to attend to important ones that have a serious chance of occurring. Napoleon said that in planning a battle he took greatest pains in thinking out what he would do if he lost. We were caught unprepared in the Congo -- even the radio for contact with Brazzaville was left uninstalled until the day before -- partly because Belgian assessments of the army's loyalty made trouble seem extremely unlikely.

(c) Specificity

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(c) Specificity - Some contingencies can be only vaguely described; they get lost in a fog of possibilities; nothing stands out. Others are relatively clear-cut, thus give a planner something to take hold of. Berlin contingency planning has been capable of extensive development for this reason.

(d) Complexity - Some contingencies seem to call for fairly simple reactions which are largely matter of good judgment at the time, but others require extensive orchestration of details. Legal documents may need to be drawn up, many people or agencies coordinated, lead times or other aspects of logistic feasibility nicely calculated. In such cases, unless there has been contingency planning it is a safe bet that some key actions will be overlooked, others not attempted because it is then too late to master the details.

(e) Speed - If a contingency will demand immediate action when it occurs, there is greater need to plan for it than if it will allow time to collect

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our thoughts. The speed required by military contingencies is one of the reasons why contingency planning is so extensively developed by the military, and why political contingency planning often has military aspects. Slow-moving contingencies such as gradual shifts in trade patterns, while often of major importance as ingredients in general planning, hardly justify separate plans as long as they remain contingencies, i.e., improbable.

(f) Scope for Preparation - Some of the most useful contingency planning is that which leads to preparatory action. There is all the more reason to plan if there are things that could and should be done ahead of time. Such action may consist in logistic measures, such as securing and training personnel, or in operations which lay the groundwork abroad, e.g. cultivating contacts in opposition groups. In many cases it should include measures to minimize the likelihood of unfavorable contingencies or maximize that of favorable ones. Deterrence is an important aspect of

Berlin

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Berlin contingency planning.

5. In deciding whether to produce a study for a given contingency, we should weigh its probable value, as measured by the above criteria, against the competing demands on staff time and resources. The emergency evacuation plans prepared by Foreign Service posts score highly on all the above criteria, and are our most developed examples of contingency planning probably for this reason.

III. Some Lessons of Experience

1. A common danger connected with contingency planning derives from the tendency to see the actual event, when it occurs, in terms of the plan instead of reality. Based on plans in case a Latin American dictator was overthrown, steps were set in motion which did not suit certain aspects of the situation as it turned out.

"Stop, look and listen before using" might therefore be stamped in large letters on every contingency plan. There is also an antidote to misuse that can be built

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built into the plan itself: it should not as a rule be a single-track formula, but should indicate alternative lines of action and mark out the ranges of at least the main variables. Such flexibility is also desirable in order to permit proper initiative by the man on the spot.

2. An associated danger is the temptation to hasty action. If a plan exists, after suitable adaptation to the facts at first reported there is apt to be strong pressure to launch it. Prompt reaction is after all one of the main values of contingency planning. But the most decisive facts often do not show at first. If a cover story had not been pre-planned for the U-2 incident, the Government would probably have taken long enough before acting to realize that it had better say either nothing or the truth. Hence the urge to act should be balanced by the will to wait and see.

3. Experience will in the nature of things keep on supplying instances of failure to estimate soundly the likelihood and shape of contingencies, and governmental reactions

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reactions to them. Pearl Harbor highlighted a frequent tendency to underestimate the enemy's boldness or timing. There is a corresponding tendency of planners to overestimate our own boldness to act when the chips are down. How reality will be confronted in the moment of truth is extremely difficult to gauge in advance, yet planning that is unrealistic on this point can fall wide of the mark.

4. A popular cliché speaks of contingency plans as "filed away" once they are made, to be pulled out for use when the event occurs. Once a plan is completed there is a natural tendency to consider the problem disposed of, thus putting minds to sleep instead of keeping them alert. The remedy devised by military planners is to require that contingency plans be frequently reviewed and kept up to date.

A similar rule should apply to foreign affairs contingency planning. It may have been because Berlin contingency plans had not been recently reviewed that the Soviet note of November 1958 caught the Western Powers

unprepared:

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unprepared: the old plans rested on an "agent" theory for East German control of access which was no longer viable.

5. The most common objection to contingency planning in foreign affairs holds that events usually turn out so differently from anticipations that the plans end up as so much waste paper. The selective approach described in Section II above answers this objection in general terms. There are also several specific lessons of experience in this connection:

(a) While even the most brilliant talents will continue to be surprised by events from time to time - the traumatic effect of the Berlin wall is an example - the art of projecting the possible shapes of things to come has made great strides in recent decades and should continue to do so. The answer to the failures of the past is not to give up but to keep improving.

(b) Any activity tends to become prisoner of its own momentum. To look in one direction is to

look

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look away from others. This is an added reason for contingency planning, but also a warning against its misuse. The vogue of "psychological warfare" made advance planners largely overlook what turned out to be the most promising possibility connected with Stalin's death - a move for a genuine detente.

Contingency planning for one pattern of events thus needs constantly to be balanced by experimenting with novel patterns which might yield quite different perspectives. That is all the more true because it is easy for planners to gravitate toward a readily manageable scenario and neglect others that are tough - and more likely to be chosen by an enemy for that reason.

(c) The chief value of a contingency study generally lies less in the paper end product than in the education of the men who make or read it. If they participate in handling the event when it occurs, they will at least be better aware of some key factors and relationships, therefore able to make sounder

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sounder decisions.

6. The word "plan" suggests to many people a detailed blueprint saying exactly what various people will do at specified times. Hence there is a tendency for pedantic minds to go "plan happy" and grind out reams of useless or even misleading detail. This should be countered by a resolute adaptation of planning to the problem at hand.

In some cases the wisest plan for a contingency is to do nothing. In that case the function of advance planning is to protect us against ill-advised action. In most contingency planning it is undesirable to try to be very specific, since events never turn out exactly as anticipated. Enumerating detail also offers an escape from the intense exercise of creative imagination that is really needed.

In the early postwar period a great deal of effort was expended in planning for the contingency of Stalin's death. Attempts to project specific patterns of action produced little of value, but the

background

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background analyses - notably those done by CENIS at MIT - were genuinely helpful in making better balanced decisions when the event came.

For these reasons it may be desirable as a rule for contingency planning to take the form of a contingency analysis rather than a plan in the full sense of the term. The task would be primarily to pre-think the main variables of the problem, canvass available resources to the extent that present knowledge permits, and flag questions that might otherwise be overlooked when the event occurs.

Then in certain cases where the analysis justified specific outlining of orchestrated action it could lead on to something that would more properly be called a plan - or preferably several plans for alternative possible courses. Such plans are particularly necessary when complicated action must be undertaken instantly - e.g. if Israel suddenly occupied the left bank of the Jordan. The careful thinking out of concrete courses of action also has its educational value

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which should not be forgotten.

An opportunity for further experimental development of contingency planning tailored to the nature of varying problems has arisen in connection with the Department's Policy and Operations Guidelines for countries and regions. These contain sections which list important contingencies. Each chief of mission will be asked to do a brief analysis for each contingency listed in his country paper. In selected cases more extensive planning will doubtless prove desirable. A sample format for contingency analyses is given in Annex A.

As more experience is gained, more systematic arrangements for selecting and analyzing contingencies may be justified.

7. We have acquired a growing body of experience in combined politico-military contingency planning, which at various times in recent years has been conducted, with colleagues in other agencies, on Berlin, the Congo, the SEATO area, and limited war in

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a number of other plausible places. These exercises have been highly useful, not only in preparation for the specific contingencies contemplated but also in generally educating political and military planners in each others' requirements and capabilities. It seems desirable to expand the collaboration of political and military planners on a more systematic basis. Lack of it caused serious risks when the Lebanon plan was put into effect in 1958.

IV. Policy Implications

1. Contingency planning (or analysis) on a selective basis has a valid role in foreign affairs. It will never be foolproof, but progress has been made in the art and much more can be.

2. The type of treatment and degree of elaboration should vary with the nature of the problem. But to have analyzed at least the main elements of the more serious contingencies on his horizon should be a responsibility of each chief of mission and of

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corresponding authorities in Washington.

3. The central value of contingency planning (or analysis) is education for the time of decision. Such education can do more harm than good, however, unless it is balanced by a fresh look at the facts as they actually evolve.

4. The Department's contingency planning has tended to occur on a hit-or-miss basis, stimulated by dramatic events. A moderate systemization of the process would be useful.

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SAMPLE FORMAT FOR CONTINGENCY ANALYSES

1. Contingency: state briefly: give reasons for selection if not obvious.

2. Analysis

a. Facts bearing on the problem: Data and variables that may be relevant to the situation and our capacity to influence it no matter what form our action takes,

i) now known or predictable.

ii) to be developed meanwhile.

iii) to be obtained only at the time.

b. Alternatives: the forms the situation may take that are likely enough to plan for; the main variables within each situation; corresponding suggested lines of US action, also with variables and relevant caveats noted and pros and cons discussed. Attention should be given to public opinion aspects, e.g. the need for silence or for prompt direct or indirect publicity.

In cases where the analysis justifies orchestrated action plans, e.g. for logistic aspects, such a plan may be inserted after the analysis of each alternative or attached as an annex. In the case of complicated plans, a checklist of things that must be thought of urgently at the time may be helpful.

3. Implications for Present Policy and Action

a. What should be done now to get ready - e.g. preparing logistics, drafting treaties.

b. What should be done meanwhile either to make the contingency less likely to happen (if unfavorable), more likely (if favorable), or to influence the form it is likely to take.

4. Responsibility for updating (to be assigned when the analysis is approved)

THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

The White House Situation Room is a part of the National Security Council complex under the direct supervision of McGeorge Bundy, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Its primary purpose is to facilitate the work of the President in the national security field during a "cold war" period. Its main function is to serve as a channel of information to the President and White House staff members working in the national security area. It does not supplant arrangements planned for the President's use in the event of a national emergency. It serves as a repository for such current military information covering the contingency deployment and use of U.S. forces as is provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Information, mostly in written form, is received by the Situation Room from many government departments and agencies and press associations, but mainly from the State Department, the Defense Department, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The responsible staff officers ensure that the President is kept informed on the basis of information received. Only in rare instances of extreme urgency is information sent from the Situation Room directly to the President.

Support for the Situation Room comes from various sources, but its operation is integrated. Personnel assigned to the Situation Room are responsible to Mr. Bundy for the duration of their tours of duty. The facilities of the Situation Room are available to all White House staff officers, but especially to those working in the national security field.

Personnel requirements for the Situation Room during regular business hours are:

- a. The full time of a civilian career officer to carry out specified duties (CIA Officer detailed to NSC staff).
- b. The full time of a civilian to maintain the Room (Mr. Carl Werner).
- c. Part time of an officer from WHCA to assist on communications problems.
- d. Part time of the liaison officer to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure close relations with the NMCC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Colonel Smith).

Personnel requirements for the Situation Room during non-regular business hours will continue to be met by assigning sufficient Watch Officers detailed by CIA to the NSC staff to ensure the presence of one of them in the Room during non-duty hours, including Saturday and Sunday. The duties of these officers are as contained in the Watch Officers' Book.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

28 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Bundy

In Cuba Crisis I it became evident that the Joint War Room in the Pentagon -- its store of information and its ability to communicate -- was not adequate to serve the President in time of emergency. Shortly afterwards you asked if I could establish a Situation Room in a week's time. This was done and there has been a continued effort to improve the ability of the Room and its staff to satisfy the need so apparent during time of emergency. This room is in no way a duplication of the NMCC, and performs for the President the same thing the NMCC does for the Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense. (The Joint Staff, by contrast, performs for the Chiefs in the area of military planning, what the NSC staff does for the President in the political area.)

CDR Hallett does the following:

1. By maintaining a close intelligence watch, keeps alert for areas of possible trouble. Where trouble is indicated, he obtains whatever additional information is available from NMCC and other sources, to provide a ready fund of information in the situation room. This includes contingency planning, training forces in the area, and indigenous capabilities and obstacles.
2. Maintains daily contact with opposite numbers in each agency who provide the information required above. Whenever a possibility of trouble is apparent, they alert each other, open up channels, and are prepared for quick response in the crisis. A small example of anticipation occurred just last week. CDR Hallett noted that all airlift aircraft were being employed in BIG LIFT and asked J-3 if this would affect our ability to react in the implementation of contingency plans, such as those for Latin American countries. The response was affirmative, and the plans were covered with aircraft from another source.
3. Ensures availability of secure communications -- voice and teletype -- for outgoing traffic in an emergency, as well as a daily exchange of information.
4. Receives and passes on incoming teletype traffic.

In Cuba Crisis II I believe the room functioned as planned, although it became evident that until there is an actual military engagement the President has no need for the depth of military information that is available. Nevertheless, to be prepared for that situation when he requires it, it must be kept up at all times. There have been many situations where the close relationship ~~with~~ the NMCC has been peaked for crisis output, although it has never been outwardly manifest. This has occurred when trouble flared in the Dominican Republic, Indonesia-Malaysia, Laos, South Viet Nam, Haiti, Honduras, Algiers-Morocco, Berlin Autobahn Crisis, China-India Boarder Dispute, Ecuadorian Tuna Boats, Hurricane Flora, and others.

As the NMCC and the ability to communicate grow, the need for close liaison will likewise increase. CDR Hallett at present keeps close touch with this developing situation through DCA, J-3, Jerry Wiesner's staff, and OEP (telecommunications).

In recent weeks Bromley has advanced the position that the Situation Room is overstaffed by day, that its message routing and liaison function could be performed by NSC staff members presently assigned, and that CDR Hallett's talents could be better used elsewhere. He has stated that -- because of the capabilities of your staff and of the NSC staff -- during normal working hours, the only full-time personnel requirement in the Situation Room is for Carl Werner to maintain it. He believes that liaison with the NMCC should be handled by your JCS liaison officer, LTCOL Smith.

It is my belief that CDR Hallett should function as I outlined above, and that Bill Smith should continue to serve as liaison in the planning area between General Taylor and yourself -- an entirely different function.

Your comments are requested.


TAZEWELL SHEPARD, JR.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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22 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Bromley Smith

Apparently our personal opinions as to the purpose and value of the Situation Room are much closer together than I first believed. I would, therefore, like to set forth a series of tasks which I believe the personnel of this Room should perform. I request your comments so that in the end we may be in complete agreement.

The Situation Room Staff should:

1. Serve as a focus for incoming calls from all departments concerned with national security, providing information for which there is no individual addressee. This will generally be operational information in the national security area.

2. Notify immediately cognizant personnel in the White House when such information is received.

3. Where applicable, be prepared to react to the developing situation by establishing contact with the proper agencies or departments, breaking out appropriate information already held, and preparing necessary maps or charts.

4. Serving as a point of contact, and action agent, for members of the White House/NSC staff desiring information where again they are not talking to opposite numbers in another department, but merely want service. This channel for such requests is particularly important from a security aspect. An untold amount of classified information is daily passed over open telephone circuits. The Situation Room does have secure communications with all likely sources of such information.

5. By holding important publications and receiving daily reports, be prepared to brief on all contingency plans; provide information on deployment of own forces and of other forces in areas of trouble, or those where such is anticipated.

6. Exercise in the course of daily operations the circuits provided for command in a crisis. Improve these communication channels where possible.

NSC Memo, Guidelines
By 4, NARA, Date 12-8-81

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7. Provide support in the form of maps and charts.

I certainly concur that matters of sensitive policy and head-of-government exchanges, EXCEPT WHERE THEY PRESAGE MILITARY EMPLOYMENT OR DEPLOYMENT, should have minimum distribution, which would not include watch officers -- day or night. In other words, where such a message is received at night it should either be held, or the lowest official in the knowledgeable chain should come down to open it. However, I believe that in most cases where sensitive material leaks, it is because the careless one is promoting something -- himself, or a policy line in which he believes. I would have absolutely no concern about the security of information which was held by the one to three persons in the Situation Room who might become aware of sensitive subjects. I would put them in the same category, for example, as the watch supervisor in the communications center who takes EYES ONLY messages off the machine, puts them in an envelope, and sends them through the tube.

As we have discussed, those running the Situation Room need information to be able to perform their functions. I would, therefore, urge that you make clear to Art McCafferty that he is responsible for routing to the Situation Room any military information, or political information with military overtones, which he receives, as fast as practicable.

In order that this organization may perform at its best, I strongly recommend that Commander Hallett be charged with the performance of the CIA watch officers in the areas described above. It matters not to me to whom he reports, although I believe that it should be Mr. Bundy.

Your comments are requested.


TAZEWELL SHEPARD, Jr.

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12
28 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Bundy

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In Cuba Crisis II I believe the room functioned as planned, although it became evident that until there is an actual military engagement the President has no need for the depth of military information that is available. Nevertheless, to be prepared for that situation when he requires it, it must be kept up at all times. There have been many situations where the close relationship of the NMCC has been peaked for crisis output, although it has never been outwardly manifest. This has occurred when trouble flared in the Dominican Republic, Indonesia-Malaysia, Laos, South Viet Nam, Haiti, Honduras, Algiers-Morocco, Berlin Autobahn Crisis, China-India Boarder Dispute, Ecuadorian Tuna Boats, Hurricane Flora, and others.

As the NMCC and the ability to communicate grow, the need for close liaison will likewise increase. CDR Hallett at present keeps close touch with this developing situation through DCA, J-3, Jerry Wiesner's staff, and OEP (telecommunications).

In recent weeks Bromley has advanced the position that the Situation Room is overstaffed by day, that its message routing and liaison function could be performed by NSC staff members presently assigned, and that CDR Hallett's talents could be better used elsewhere. He has stated that -- because of the capabilities of your staff and of the NSC staff -- during normal working hours, the only full-time personnel requirement in the Situation Room is for Carl Werner to maintain it. He believes that liaison with the NMCC should be handled by your JCS liaison officer, LTCOL Smith.

It is my belief that CDR Hallett should function as I outlined above, and that Bill Smith should continue to serve as liaison in the planning area between General Taylor and yourself -- an entirely different function.

Your comments are requested.

TAZEWELL SHEPARD, JR.

February 13, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Director of Central Intelligence

In accordance with NSAM 277 the NSC Standing Group will undertake over the next few weeks a review and consideration of outstanding problems in the field of African policy.

The Standing Group will meet on Tuesday, February 18 at 5:00 PM to consider US policy in the Portuguese African territories.

McGeorge Bundy

13a

February 13, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE HONORABLE W. AVERELL HARRIMAN

I understand that Bill Brubeck has discussed this
with you and that you are in agreement with the
attached.

McGeorge Bundy

14
MEMORANDUM FOR: McGB

Mac, this is just a little crisis anticipation, along lines President suggested. I'm working with State, etc. on both these, though there's not a hell of a lot we can do.

✓
RWK

2/4/64
(DATE)

NSA 277

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 4, 1964

14a

McGB:

Two places that could give us trouble this spring are Libya and Afghanistan.

Recent riots in Libya may have put permanent cracks in this feeble monarchy. Though the King squeaked through, he's lost a lot of face. And our influence is waning just at this crucial time, because Libya's skyrocketing oil revenues end its dependence on our aid. Pressure is mounting against Wheelus base, while AID for domestic reasons here proposes closing its mission. Our problem is how to influence a conservative regime to run a successful economic revolution instead of just keeping the lid on. If it doesn't, the nationalists will bring it down--and Wheelus if not our \$670 million oil investment with it. State and AID are so busy haggling over whether to close the AID mission that they're not focussing on developing influence when we can't use aid as a lever.

In Afghanistan, King Zahir is pushing ahead with a new constitution that will turn the government over to commoners. He plans to put it to the Afghan version of a national convention this spring. But conservative opposition is rallying around ex-Prime Minister Daud, who as a member of the royal family would be disqualified from holding office, and the PM is sick, which may lead to a coup. We see the new constitution as essential to Afghanistan's modernization and for winning support from the young progressives. A showdown would invite Soviet meddling just as the King is moving a little toward us. And it would harden the lines against the peaceful revolution which will undercut the Commies in the long run. It's not clear yet how we can give the King more than moral support, but it's plain we should do whatever we can.

RWK

RWK

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By 14, NARA, Date 12-3-99

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S/S 6849

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 8, 1964

2472
NSAM 277.

✓ Bundy

15

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: National Security Planning

In connection with NSAM 277 on Crisis Anticipation, I enclose for your information a listing of the major tasks on which the planning community is working under the aegis of the Department of State.

CCU for
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Memorandum re National
Security Planning.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-85
By iss, NARA Date 9-18-97

~~(SECRET)~~

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Subject: National Security Planning

This memorandum summarizes the three categories of National Security Planning now going forward in the government under the aegis of the State Department's Policy Planning Council. If more detail is wanted on any of these projects, we will be glad to provide it. If there is a desire for additional planning projects, or for accelerating any of these projects, we would be glad to learn your wishes.

In addition to these specific projects, we have prepared a draft of Basic National Security Policy, which would replace the last Presidentially approved over-all statement of U.S. national security policy - the one which President Eisenhower approved on August 5, 1959. We have kept this draft up-dated, so that it could be promptly made available for NSC consideration, if this is desired.

*Ever
hopeful*

Category I: Planning Tasks. These cover unresolved problems surfaced in the course of continuing review of national security policy. The following are some major examples of such planning tasks:

a. U.S. Overseas Bases and Installations. A complete survey of (i) existing military and civilian bases overseas; (ii) future U.S. requirements for bases, set against their economic and diplomatic costs.

b.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-84

By iss, NARA Date 6-18-97

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- 2 -

b. Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation and Nuclear Capability. The political and military implications for U.S. policy of anticipated Chinese Communist acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. A summary of this task has been forwarded to you separately.

c. Private Enterprise in the Underdeveloped Areas. This involves study of two topics: (i) Development of local private enterprise, notably through the National Market concept, which aims to close the economic gap between urban and rural areas. (ii) Enlarging the role of foreign private enterprise on terms acceptable to both developed and developing countries.

d. Atlantic Policy. A new look at U.S. policy toward Europe, centering on the long-term role of Germany in the Western community, and taking account of both de Gaulle's temporary blockage of European integration and the thaw in Eastern Europe.

e. French Policy. A review of U.S. policy toward Gaullist and post-de Gaulle France, focusing on third areas as well as Europe.

f. Insurgency in Vietnam and Laos. Feasibility of U.S. and GVN actions which might be taken against NVN, in an effort to force Hanoi to cease support and direction of insurgency operations in Laos and South Vietnam.

g. The Soviet Union. Analysis of economic and political forces at work, to see if there are actions which we could take from here on in to influence the period when Khrushchev leaves the scene.

h. The Future of Japan. Analysis of trends in Japan and recommendations on U.S. policy.

i. African Strategy. Review of our long-term policy toward Africa.

j.

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- 3 -

j. Foreign Aid Review. Review of U.S. economic and military aid policy, to see if there are any changes in the scope, purpose and method which should be considered before next year's budget is decided on.

k. Disarmament. Study of inter-relation between arms control, political objectives, and military strategy in Central Europe.

Category II. National Policy Papers. These are comprehensive policy papers setting forth proposed U.S. political and defense strategy toward selected countries for the next 3-5 years. They are designed to provide the basis for coordinated interagency programs in Washington and the field. Under National Security Action Memorandum No. 281 issued in February of this year, the State Department has taken the lead in developing such National Policy Papers on a number of countries, as follows:

1. Cleared interdepartmentally and issued: Ethiopia.
2. In final stages: Nigeria, Colombia, the Republic of China, and South Africa.
3. In process: Ghana, Liberia, Thailand, Indonesia, Brazil, Chile, India, Pakistan, Turkey, United Arab Republic.

Category III. Political Contingency Plans: Crisis Anticipation. These represent systematic efforts to project possible crises, and to generate lines of action which could prevent, mitigate, or even turn such crises to U.S. advantage. Contingency planning work currently underway includes:

1. Chile. Possible implications for U.S. of victory of FRAP presidential candidate in the September 1964 elections.

2.

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-4-

2. Succession Problem in Portugal. Actions from here on out, looking toward the post-Salazar period.

3. Europe. U. S. policy in the event of: a) break-up of the EEC; b) the failure of the Kennedy Round.

4. Indonesia. U. S. policy, in event that Sukarno leaves the scene.

5. Jordan. Possible effects of intended diversion of Jordan waters.

6. Ceylon. U. S. policy in event of collapse of the Government of Ceylon.

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February 21, 1964

NSA m

16

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Honorable Robert F. Kennedy
The Honorable John McCone
The Honorable Cyrus Vance
The Honorable Don Wilson
The Honorable Alexis Johnson
The Honorable Thomas Mann
General Maxwell Taylor

I owe everybody an apology. The study of possible crisis situations and advance means to meet them which I thought everybody had seen was actually conducted quite outside regular channels, at President Kennedy's direction, last spring.

I now attach the documents which were developed at that time, and as you will see, they bear mainly to the question whether a Declaration against any further Communist cooperation would be helpful. At Tab B are the scenarios which show how hard it is to plan concretely and in detail against possible future events.

The long speech draft at Tab A is of little present interest, except perhaps for the last six or seven pages which try to set a framework for a policy declaration.

The actual policy result of all this was a few sentences in the President's November 18 speech, which was blanketed almost immediately by his death.

What is most interesting about this document, perhaps, is that in 1964 it seems considerably easier to do what seemed difficult nine months ago.

McGeorge Bundy

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By 12, NARA, Date 12-3-95



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

FEB 14 1964

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17
NSAM 277

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY 2/18
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: NSAM #277 - Anticipation of Foreign
Crises

The President's memorandum of January 30 to Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara and Director McCone called for a review of procedures in effect in this Department, Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency for anticipating foreign crises. I understand that you are coordinating the replies.

Crisis anticipation procedures within this Department have been reviewed and revised periodically during the last three years, with particular attention to the early identification of situations which could develop into crises. Secretary Rusk, in the attached memorandum of July 2, 1962, described the procedure for strengthening our performance in "the systematic planning for crises". This directive is still in effect and has been utilized, for example, for the preparation of studies on possible succession problems in Ghana, Spain, France and Portugal. It requires members of the Policy Planning Council to consult regularly with the operating bureaus and other areas of the Department to review possible problems and to develop specific plans to avert or mitigate undesirable consequences.

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research participates in the above mentioned review of problem areas. In addition, it prepares monthly a list of actual and potential trouble spots in all parts of the world and publishes them in the form of a monthly "Global Alert List". The list for February 1964 is attached. It serves as a useful method of briefing principal officers about expected crises.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By 14 NARA Date 12-3-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

More generally, however, it is clear that our ability to anticipate crises rests on the continuous alertness and efficiency of the Department as an organization. Many officers and offices play important roles in this process. As you know, the Secretary considers the country desk officer the focal point for the identification of important policy implications of unfolding events. It is for this reason that he wishes to up-grade the desk officer's status. When crises develop with little warning, the Operations Center in the Secretariat puts into effect carefully worked out procedures for alerting the Department. These procedures tie in to the White House Situation Room, the National Military Communications Center and the Central Intelligence Agency. The Secretary's daily staff meetings, including both intelligence briefings and consideration of operating problems, are used frequently to flag possible crisis areas. Many other devices are used for the same purpose, but it would not seem desirable to prolong this memorandum with a detailed discussion of these procedures and practices.

The Secretary of State has reviewed this memorandum and has advised me that he would be available to discuss these problems and to provide additional information and suggestions if desired.

/s/ John A. McKesson

for
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Memorandum to Assistant Secretaries, July 2, 1962.
2. Global Alert List for February 1964.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

944

18

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: NSAM #277 - Anticipation of Foreign
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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By 4, NARA, Date 12-3-99

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- 2 -

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Executive Secretary

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1. Memorandum to Assistant Secretaries, July 2, 1962.
2. Global Alert List for February 1964.

Clearances:

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S/S:GGHilliker:BHRead:mj
2/11/64

S/P - Mr. Rostow
INR - Mr. Evans
O - Mr. Stern

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

19

January 30, 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 5.4
NJ 92-271
By JP, NARA, Date 3/25/92

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 277

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

Because we may have to be dealing with a continuing series of fast-moving foreign developments, I would like to have an early review of our procedures for anticipating foreign crises.

I am asking McGeorge Bundy to pull together for me any suggestions in this area which might be worthy of consideration.



cc:

Mr. Bundy
Mr. Johnson (second copy to C. Johnson 2/10)
NSC Files

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Dispatched 1/31/64

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

20

January 30, 1964

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
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-271
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