

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1a memo	NSAM 279 <i>open 1/7/00</i>	2/8/64	A
1b	S ^{2 p} (<i>Sanitized NLT 88-163</i>) <i>same sanitization 5.11.98</i> <i>NLT 97-252 1.5(0)</i>		
#1c memo	Duplicate of #1a <i>open 1/7/00</i>		
#3 cable	Deptel 1686 to New Delhi <i>more info released 2-25-94</i> S ^{2 p} <i>NLT 93-321</i> [Duplicate of #43, NSF, Country File, India, <i>open 9/20/01</i> Vol. I, Box 128; Sanitized 1976]	2/21/64	A
#5 memo	Duplicate of #1a <i>open 1/7/00</i>		
#7 memo	Komer to President <i>Open 6/25/01 NLT 97-252</i> S ^{1 p}	1/30/64	A
#7a memo	Duplicate of #7 <i>Open 6/25/01 NLT 97-252</i>		
#8 memo	Duplicate of #1a Komer to Pres. S ^{1 p} Open 5-30-95 NLT 93-320	1/22/64	A
#9 memo	Komer to President <i>Open 6.9.98 NLT 97-252</i> S ^{1 p}	1/21/64	A
#11 cable	New Delhi 2140 <i>open 9-25-97 NLT 97-246</i> S ^{3 p} <i>sanitized 2-25-94 NLT 93-321</i>	1/14/64	A
#13 memo	To SecState and SecDef (draft) <i>sanitized - more released 5.11.98</i> S ^{1 p} <i>sanitized 5-30-95 NLT 95-520</i>	NLT 97-252 undated	<i>same sanitization per RAC 3/02</i> A
#16 memo	<i>dup of #1a</i> <i>sanitized 5-30-95 NLT 93-320</i> <i>same sanitization</i>		

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSAM, NSAM 279--Military Assistance to India and Pakistan

Box 2

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

EXTRA COPIES

~~SECRET~~

February 8, 1964

1a

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 279

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Military Assistance to India and Pakistan

I have no objection to going forward with exploratory approaches looking toward possible five year MAP programs for India and Pakistan under the conditions described in the Secretary of State's 16 January memorandum to me.

However, I do not believe that we should yet discuss MAP levels with either country. Until we have a clearer idea of the prospects for the FY 1965 aid program, it seems to me premature to indicate to India or Pakistan how much military aid they might be able to count upon, regardless of how tentatively we put it. Instead, we should indicate to both governments that they should prepare austere minimum five year programs. Then, as their plans mature and as we get a better reading on Congressional attitudes, we can make a final decision on what MAP to provide.

Furthermore, in the course of these discussions I desire that the following precautions be observed:

1. We should make clear to both countries what we expect of them in return for prospective long-term military aid. As to India, we particularly want it to hold foreign exchange diversions from development to defense to a reasonable level, lest we end up indirectly helping finance an excessive defense effort via aid which we provide for quite another purpose.
2. In the case of Pakistan, our MAP help should be appropriately linked to satisfactory performance with respect to its alliance obligations and to our intelligence facilities.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC F97-248

By mxs NARA, Date 12-3-99

~~SECRET~~

Page Two

3. Both governments must be made to understand that no irrevocable five year MAP commitments can be undertaken by the US, both because aid levels each year will depend on Congress and because our actual aid each year will depend on continuing Pakistani and Indian performance.
4. Our approaches to India and Pakistan should be timed for optimum impact. For example, I do not believe that we should initially approach Pakistan until we have assessed the results of the Chou En-lai visit.

With these caveats, I approve proceeding along the lines of the Secretary of State's 16 January proposals.

s/Lyndon B. Johnson

cc: The Administrator, AID
The Director of Central Intelligence

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

February 8, 1964

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 279

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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However, I do not believe that we should yet discuss MAP levels with either country. Until we have a clearer idea of the prospects for the FY 1965 aid program, it seems to me premature to indicate to India or Pakistan how much military aid they might be able to count upon, regardless of how tentatively we put it. Instead, we should indicate to both governments that they should prepare austere minimum five year programs. Then, as their plans mature and as we get a better reading on Congressional attitudes, we can make a final decision on what MAP to provide.

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~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSFF 97-248

By 13 NARA, Date 12-3-95

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Page Two

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With these caveats, I approve proceeding along the lines of the Secretary of State's 16 January proposals.

A handwritten signature, likely of the President, is written in dark ink. It consists of a stylized 'C' followed by a series of loops and a horizontal line at the end.

cc: The Administrator, AID
The Director of Central Intelligence

Sum

10100

2

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

58
Origin
SS
Info

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI

Amembassy KARACHI

INFO: Amembassy LONDON (ROMEN)

CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA

LINDIS REF: DEPTTEL 1686 ACTION NEW DELHI

VERBATIM TEXT

PRIORITY

1687

1084

5305

FEB 21

4 53 PM '64

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State/tra 2/11/76, OSD 5/1/77

By JHlw, NARA, Date 2/6/92

Text of Secretary's memo Jan 16 to President follows:

Subject:

QUOTE: / Military Assistance to India and Pakistan: General Taylor's Report.

I have reviewed with General Taylor the results of his trip to India and Pakistan. He has come back with excellent ideas about future military assistance to those two countries. These supplement and refine the basic approach worked out by the Standing Group and embodied in my recommendations to you of December 11.

General Taylor would fix responsibility on the Indians for coming up with a satisfactory five-year defense plan which would limit their force goals, hold down procurement from the Soviets and hold to a minimum the diversion of their resources from economic development. Within such a plan it would be up to the Indians to set the priorities among the competing needs of their own services. Such a plan might include a limited number of high performance aircraft from Free World sources.

I believe the foregoing course of action would permit us to follow the roughly parallel course with India and Pakistan on high performance aircraft which we believe to be quite essential for political reasons.

I recommend that you authorize us to proceed along the lines of my

Drafted by:

NEA:SOA:FJCrawford:fah:2/11/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - James P. Grant

Clearances:

SOA - Mr. Cameron

DOD/ISA - Col. Miller

G/PM - Mr. Muller

S/S - Mr. Rowe

White House - Mr. Komer

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~~SECRET~~

FORM 100-100

~~SECRET~~

proposal to you as refined by General Taylor's findings.

To move this matter ahead, the following steps are in order:

1. Inform the British and other Commonwealth aid donors fully about our military assistance planning for both India and Pakistan and obtain their continued cooperation and participation.

2. Tell the Indians that:

- we are willing to provide longer run military assistance if they work out a satisfactory five-year defense plan, as defined above;
- this plan would assume a mutually acceptable political framework (i.e., Indian policies towards Pakistan and China);
- for the purpose of preparing their plan they could use a planning figure of about \$50 million MAP annually from the United States which, of course, is subject to Congressional appropriations;
- we look to them to make the initial decision on priorities among the competing needs of their services, bearing in mind that an acceptable plan must not excessively strain Indian resources;
- we intend to continue with an interim program over the next year at roughly current levels while they work out their plan.

3. Tell the Pakistanis that:

- we are willing to support a satisfactory five-year Pakistani military plan within a mutually acceptable political framework (i.e., fulfillment by Pakistan of its obligations to CENTO, SEATO and the United States);

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- we are willing to work with the Pakistanis in developing the priorities of this plan;
- we want to resume discussions looking towards the expansion of our facilities.

4. Keep both the Indians and Pakistanis generally informed of our assistance activities in each country. General Taylor has already done much of this job with Ayub, drawing a surprisingly mild reaction. However, a long-term military program for India, including possibly some supersonics, and the provision of additional supersonics to Pakistan will very possibly create an initial storm in each country about our policy in the other. We shall have to find ways of riding this out. UNQUOTE
GP-3.

End.

BALL

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FEUS 64-68, 21.25-13

By JC NARA Date 9-10-01
and state/WH guidelines

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

10098

3

VERBATIM TEXT

54
Origin
SS
Info
ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1686
Amembassy KARACHI 1083
INFO: Amembassy LONDON (SECRET) 5304
~~KANIKS CINCSTRIKE/CINCMAFSA~~
LIMDIS
New Delhi's 2221 to Dept.

FEB 21 4 49 PM '64

President has examined military assistance proposals for India and Pakistan contained in Secretary's memo Jan 16 (text in immediately following telegram) and has approved following course of action (NSAM 279, Feb 8, 1964):

QUOTE. I have no objection to going forward with exploratory approaches looking toward possible five year MAP programs for India and Pakistan under the conditions described in the Secretary of State's 16 January memorandum to me.

However, I do not believe that we should yet discuss MAP levels with either country. Until we have a clearer idea of the prospects for the FY 1965 aid program, it seems to me premature to indicate to India or Pakistan how much military aid they might be able to count upon, regardless of how tentatively we put it. Instead, we should indicate to both governments that they should prepare austere minimum five year programs. Then, as their plans mature and we get a better reading on Congressional attitudes, we can make a final decision on what MAP to provide.

Furthermore, in the course of these discussions I desire that the following precautions be observed:

Drafted by:
NEA:SOA:FJCrawford:fah:2/11/64

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - James P. Grant

Clearances:

SOA - Mr. Cameron

S/S - Mr. Rowe

G/PM - Mr. Muller

White House - Mr. Komer

DOD/ISA - Col. Miller

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

1. We should make clear to both countries what we expect of them in return for prospective long-term military aid. As to India, we particularly want it to hold foreign exchange diversions from development to defense to a reasonable level, lest we end up indirectly helping finance an excessive defense effort via aid which we provide for quite another purpose.

2. In the case of Pakistan, our MAP help should be appropriately linked to satisfactory performance with respect to its alliance obligations and to our intelligence facilities.

3. Both governments must be made to understand that no irrevocable five year MAP commitments can be undertaken by the US, both because aid levels each year will depend on Congress and because our actual aid each year will depend on continuing Pakistani and Indian performance.

4. Our approaches to India and Pakistan should be timed for optimum impact. For example, I do not believe that we should initially approach Pakistan until we have assessed the results of the Chou En-lai visit.

With these caveats, I approve proceeding along the lines of the Secretary of State's 16 January proposals. UNQUOTE

Embassies should take no steps inform GOI or GOP until receipt separate instructions. Since above text is Presidential directive it should receive appropriate protection.

GP-3.

End

BALL

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

10128

4

58
Origin
SS
Info

ACTION: Amembassy KARACHI

PRIORITY

1086

FEB 21 6 51 PM '64

INFO: Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy NEW DELHI
CINCSTRIKE
Amconsul HONG KONG

5310
1691
893

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Htr 2/11/76, OSO Htr 5/10/76

By SP/lw, NARA, Date 2/6/92

LIMDIS

We are transmitting by separate messages Secretary's January 16

Memorandum to the President on QUOTE Military Assistance to India and Pakistan
UNQUOTE and National Security Action Memorandum of February 8 giving
President's approval with certain caveats. Following represents our thoughts
how best proceed within above policy guidelines. (Separate instructions
being sent Embassy New Delhi).

In view para 4 of NSAM, we can go no further now than to pass to you
our preliminary thoughts about communicating our decisions to Ayub. As we
see it, this process involves four distinct steps:

1. A signal to Ayub that our thinking on military aid is well along
and that we hope to be able to talk in greater detail before end of March.
Deptel 1045 authorized you to take this step with Ayub in your conversation
on Feb. 13 and we see from Embtel 1530 that you have done so. Our thoughts
behind this instruction were:

(a) Since we plan convey our decisions to GOI within near future
estimating effect
but to GOP only after ~~the~~ Chou visit, it was urgent to give a signal to Ayub

Drafted by
NEA:SOA:TCCameron,Jr.:bk:atm 2/21/64

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by

NEA - Phillips Talbot

Clearances

NEA:NR - Mr. Walsh

SOV - Mr. Norbury (draft)

BNA - Mr. Meade (draft)

DOD/ISA - Mr. Solbert

FE - Mr. Dean (draft)

G/PM - Mr. Meyers (draft)

AID/PC - Mr. Hirshberg (draft)

BNA - Mr. Meade (draft)

AID/NESA - Mr. Gaud (draft)

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M

-Gov. Harriman

WHITE HOUSE - Mr. Komer

SECRET

S/S ~~PROHIBITED~~ ~~UNLESS~~ "OFFICIAL USE
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that we still planned to move ahead roughly in parallel.

(b) In the event info of our approach to GOI reaches GOP, the fact that we had given a signal to GOP could be helpful in dampening its reaction. If leak occurs you could also remind GOP of statements about US military aid to India made by General Taylor to Ayub (Embtel 1189).

(c) Conceivably our signal could exert some moderating influence on GOP during Chou visit.

2. An assessment of the results of the Chou visit in terms of US-Pak-Chicom relations would be second step.

3. Third step would be a formal approach to Ayub setting forth the political framework within which we are prepared to engage in long-term military assistance to Pakistan. This step would take place as soon as practicable after completion of step two and certainly before visit to Pakistan by General Adams (JCS 4526 from CJCS for MG Ruhlen). Intent of formal approach will be to use prospect of continued military assistance both as a carrot to demonstrate value of continued alliance relationship and as a lever to get from Pakistan the necessary assurances that it will limit its relationship with Peiping and pursue policies in general which will not be adverse to US interests. We expect to insist on a genuine meeting of minds on these issues, and continuing performance, as the condition for this aid.

4. The fourth step would be technical discussions on military level about planning for five year program. Believe General Adams might initiate these discussions.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

We will count on you and Hong Kong to give us your best judgment on results Chou visit. We shall then send you instructions on carrying out steps 3 and 4.

FYI. ~~We see no problem on going ahead with approach to India, since we~~ We have already told Paks in December that we intend going ahead with longer term aid. In fact, by our indicating general magnitude of \$50 million, the Paks now know more of our intentions than we are as yet able to tell Indians.

Therefore, if US-GOI talks raised with you before you are able to have full discussion with Ayub, you should take line that (1) GOP already informed in December that we are going ahead with military aid program for India and general thinking within Executive Branch about its scope, (2) we are having discussions this future program, (3) GOP will be kept informed when talks with GOI come into clear focus, and (4) we hope to hold parallel discussions with GOP on appropriate occasion before end of March. END FYI.

END

GP-3

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~

February 8, 1964

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 279MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Military Assistance to India and Pakistan

I have no objection to going forward with exploratory approaches looking toward possible five year MAP programs for India and Pakistan under the conditions described in the Secretary of State's 16 January memorandum to me.

However, I do not believe that we should yet discuss MAP levels with either country. Until we have a clearer idea of the prospects for the FY 1965 aid program, it seems to me premature to indicate to India or Pakistan how much military aid they might be able to count upon, regardless of how tentatively we put it. Instead, we should indicate to both governments that they should prepare austere minimum five year programs. Then, as their plans mature and as we get a better reading on Congressional attitudes, we can make a final decision on what MAP to provide.

Furthermore, in the course of these discussions I desire that the following precautions be observed:

1. We should make clear to both countries what we expect of them in return for prospective long-term military aid. As to India, we particularly want it to hold foreign exchange diversions from development to defense to a reasonable level, lest we end up indirectly helping finance an excessive defense effort via aid which we provide for quite another purpose.
2. In the case of Pakistan, our MAP help should be appropriately linked to satisfactory performance with respect to its alliance obligations and to our intelligence facilities.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC F97-248By 24 NARA, Date 1-7-00

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Page Two

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4. Our approaches to India and Pakistan should be timed for optimum impact. For example, I do not believe that we should initially approach Pakistan until we have assessed the results of the Chou En-lai visit.

With these caveats, I approve proceeding along the lines of the Secretary of State's 16 January proposals.

CSJ

cc: The Administrator, AID
The Director of Central Intelligence

Pres 3/9 (albright)

cc:

Mr. Bundy
Mr. Komer
Mr. Johnson
NSC Files

Dispatched 2/10/64

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State/lt 2/11/76; OSD/lt 5/10/76
By q/lw, NARA, Date 2/6/92

839

January 16, 1964

Taylor trip
*Kanner*6

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Military Assistance to India and Pakistan:
General Taylor's Report

I have reviewed with General Taylor the results of his trip to India and Pakistan. He has come back with excellent ideas about future military assistance to those two countries. These supplement and refine the basic approach worked out by the Standing Group and embodied in my recommendations to you of December 11.

General Taylor would fix responsibility on the Indians for coming up with a satisfactory five-year defense plan which would limit their force goals, hold down procurement from the Soviets and hold to a minimum the diversion of their resources from economic development. Within such a plan it would be up to the Indians to set the priorities among the competing needs of their own services. Such a plan might include a limited number of high performance aircraft from Free World sources.

I believe the foregoing course of action would permit us to follow the roughly parallel course with India and Pakistan on high performance aircraft which we believe to be quite essential for political reasons.

I recommend that you authorize us to proceed along the lines of my proposal to you as refined by General Taylor's findings.

To move this matter ahead, the following steps are in order:

1. Inform the British and other Commonwealth aid donors fully about our military assistance planning for both India and Pakistan and obtain their continued cooperation and participation.

2. Tell the Indians that:

- we are willing to provide longer run military assistance if they work out a satisfactory five-year defense plan; as defined above;

this

~~SECRET~~
GROUP 3Downgraded at 12-Year Intervals;
Not Automatically Declassified.

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

- this plan would assume a mutually acceptable political framework (i.e., Indian policies towards Pakistan and China);
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- we are willing to work with the Pakistanis in developing the priorities of this plan;
- we want to resume discussions looking towards the expansion of our facilities.

4. Keep both the Indians and Pakistanis generally informed of our assistance activities in each country. General Tayler has already done much of this job with Ayub, drawing a surprisingly mild reaction. However, a long-term military program for India, including possibly some supersonics, and the provision of additional supersonics to Pakistan will very possibly create an initial storm in each country about our policy in the other. We shall have to find ways of riding this out.

/s/ Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

21-1-64
January 30, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a revised NSAM embodying your instructions to me on India/Pakistan MAP. Also attached are the original 16 January recommendations of Rusk and McNamara.

I have given the first paragraph a positive tone so that the NSAM will not be wrongly interpreted to mean that you are in fact rejecting the Rusk/McNamara/Taylor proposals. I think this important. But note that it only says DOD can plan on this basis, nothing more (it is doing so now).

The next paragraph makes clear your point to me that we cannot decide now, or tell India and Pakistan, how much MAP we will give them. Instead they should come up with their own austere five-year programs, and we will then decide how much we can do.

The remainder of the NSAM is the same cautionary language I have put in all drafts.

Bob:
Pres. doesn't
want to use
figures =
W.S.

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-252

By Sj, NARA Date 6-20-01

~~SECRET~~

January 30, 1964

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R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-252
By Sj, NARA Date 6-20-01

File *[initials]*
7a 11.

Semi D BKS 1/30/64

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

January 22, 1964

THE PRESIDENT

I have revised the draft NSAM on India-Pakistan the way Bill Moyers tells me you want. First sentence now specifies a \$50 million annual ceiling for India and \$40 million for Pakistan.

DOD had struck the "40" from Rusk's memo because it thought we might be able to get by for less. I've protected their freedom of action, and yours, by caveat saying "always subject to further review". This no more than states the facts of life.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 93-320
By clg, NARA, Date 5-22-95

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-252

By iss, NARA Date 6-7-98

January 21, 1964

9

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Tab A is Secretary Rusk's proposal on how to handle MAP for India and Pakistan. It is based on Taylor's recommendations following his December trip, and concurred in by McNamara and Bell.

In essence, they say let's put the bee on the Indians to come up with a sensible five-year anti-China program, telling them that if it is satisfactory India can plan on around \$50 million MAP per annum from us. Bowles thinks this sum much too small given the strategic stakes involved (Tab B). State, Bundy and I wanted to go a bit more his way; even with only \$1 billion annual MAP we could easily find another \$10 million by marginal cuts in other countries which are far less important. But we caved when DOD was adamant on \$50 million.

We'd also work out a 5-year plan with the Paks, as a means of protecting our Pak assets. Of course, neither proposal really involves a big new outlay we wouldn't be undertaking otherwise. As long as we have a MAP, we'd presumably want to invest so much in India and Pakistan. So all that is really proposed is to package our MAP in five-year terms rather than annual increments in order to maximize the needed impact and get the most leverage.

Moreover, we suggest in both cases only an opening gambit. Then we check our bets until we see their responses. And even if both agree to our terms, we'd make clear there can be no irrevocable five-year "commitments." We'd of course declare our Executive Branch intent, but make clear it is dependent on annual Hill action and Pak/Indian performance.

The options are to: (1) remand the proposal again for further study if you have reservations; (2) simply delay action further on grounds that time is still not ripe; (3) approve going ahead with initial approaches. The chief reasons arguing for (3) are to get a handle on the Indian buildup and to show India, now in disarray over Nehru's illness, that we're still backing it against China. The post-Nehru leadership could be far more pro-US than Nehru. These are big stakes. And if we go ahead with India, we also want to protect our flank with the Paks.

You could either have a meeting or, in view of inter-agency agreement, just sign off along the lines of Tab C (which embodies certain cautionary words I think you'd want).

R. W. Komer
R. W. KOMER

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

308

A

10

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

839

Authority State/1r2/11/76; OSD/1r5/10/76
By SP/ew NARA. Date 2/6/92

January 16, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Military Assistance to India and Pakistan:
General Taylor's Report

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- we are willing to provide longer run military assistance if they work out a satisfactory five-year defense plan, as defined above;

this

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-Year Intervals;
Not Automatically Declassified.

6/64

✓

SECRET

- 2 -

- this plan would assume a mutually acceptable political framework (i.e., Indian policies towards Pakistan and China);
- for the purpose of preparing their plan they could use a planning figure of about \$50 million MAP annually from the United States which, of course, is subject to Congressional appropriations;
- we look to them to make the initial decision on priorities among the competing needs of their services, bearing in mind that an acceptable plan must not excessively strain Indian resources;
- we intend to continue with an interim program over the next year at roughly current levels while they work out their plan.

3. Tell the Pakistanis that:

- we are willing to support a satisfactory five-year Pakistani military plan within a mutually acceptable political framework (i.e., fulfillment by Pakistan of its obligations to CENTO, SEATO and the United States);
- we are willing to work with the Pakistanis in developing the priorities of this plan;
- we want to resume discussions looking towards the expansion of our facilities.

4. Keep both the Indians and Pakistanis generally informed of our assistance activities in each country. General Taylor has already done much of this job with Ayub, drawing a surprisingly mild reaction. However, a long-term military program for India, including possibly some supersonics, and the provision of additional supersonics to Pakistan will very possibly create an initial storm in each country about our policy in the other. We shall have to find ways of riding this out.



Dean Rusk

SECRET

TELEGRAM

Department of State

11

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-246

By isa, NARA Date 9-12-97

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ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 2140 INFO LONDON 685 FROM NEWD
JANUARY 14, 6 P.M.

LIMDIS

SEE PP 2-3

FILE COPY

PASS WHITE HOUSE AND DEFENSE

LONDON FOR AMBASSADOR

AFTERNOON JAN 13 I HAD LONG VISIT WITH BRITISH HICOM GORE-
BOOTH. ALTHOUGH I HAVE SEEN HIM BRIEFLY EVERY WEEK OR SO,
HE HAS BEEN AWAY FROM DELHI ON PERIODIC VISITS FOR LAST
THIRTY DAYS AND WE HAVE NOT HAD CHANCE FOR DISCUSSION IN
ANY DEPTH SINCE BEFORE CHRISTMAS.
CFN 2140 685 14 6 13

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 472 ~~SECRET~~

I BROUGHT GORE-BOOTH UP TO DATE ON RESULTS OF OUR PROBING
OF INDIAN MILITARY SITUATION, AND PARTICULARLY OF THE AIR
FORCE. HE EXPRESSED BELIEF THAT OUR EVALUATION AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS ARE CORRECT.

WE TALKED AT SOME LENGTH ABOUT MANNER, EXTENT AND NEED
FOR BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN GOI DEFENSE PROGRAM AND FORM
THIS MIGHT TAKE. GORE-BOOTH'S DEPUTY, BELCHER, WHO HAS JUST
RETURNED FROM LONDON, REPORTS SITUATION THERE GREATLY CON-
FUSED BY PENDING ELECTION AND ADDED PROBLEMS CREATED BY
CYPRUS. IT IS DIFFICULT IN LONDON TO GET TOP PEOPLE TO DEAL
REALISTICALLY WITH ANY PROBLEM THAT IS NOT A CRISES.

GORE-BOOTH EXPRESSED PRIVATE VIEW THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT
BRITISH PARTICIPATE IN INDIAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
TO EXTENT OF \$12 TO \$15 MILLION ANNUALLY, AND THAT BRISTOL
OPORPHEUS ENGINE BE GIVEN HIGH PRIORITY IN THEIR CONSIDERATION.
HE WARNED, HOWEVER, THAT BRITISH WOULD COME IN ONLY IF STRONG
PRESSURE WERE APPLIED BY US.

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PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~


-2- 2140, January 14, 6 P.M., From New Delhi

GORE-BOOTH AGREED FULLY WITH MY MINIMUM US -UK FIGURE OF \$75-\$80 MILLION PER YEAR FOR FIVE YEARS FOR INDIAN MILITARY BUILDUP WITH ASSUMPTION OF MODERATE PRICES ON ITEMS INVOLVED.

PAGE THREE RUSBAE 472 ~~SECRET~~

WHEN I TOLD HIM I HAD STRONGLY RECOMMENDED TO OUR GOVT THAT WE PROVIDE FULL SUM IF UK WERE UNWILLING TO GO ALONG, HE EXPRESSED VIEW THIS WAS STRONGEST ARGUMENT WE COULD GIVE BRITISH; WITH THEIR MASSIVE NATIONAL, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STAKE HERE THEY COULD NOT AFFORD TO BACK OUT OF MILITARY DEFENSE OF INDIA LEAVING FIELD WHOLLY TO US.

I HOPE SPECIAL DISCRETION WILL BE USED IN REGARD TO THIS PRIVATE CONVERSATION IN WHICH GORE-BOOTH EXPRESSED HIS STRONG VIEWS ON HIGHLY PERSONAL BASIS. IT UNDERSCORES FACT THAT BRITISH, AS WE HAVE SUSPECTED FOR LONG TIME, WILL PARTICIPATE ADEQUATELY ONLY IF WE OURSELVES ARE PREPARED TO TAKE BOLD POSITION IN INDIA.



IN THIS REGARD I AM DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT SEVERAL RECENT REFERENCES TO LIMIT OF \$50-\$60 MILLION ON US AID WITHOUT APPARENT REGARD FOR BRITISH ASSISTANCE. OUR RECOMMENDED ANNUAL BUDGET OF \$75-\$80 MILLION MINIMUM ANNUALLY FROM BOTH SOURCES REPRESENTS UNEASY AND RELUCTANT COMPROMISE FROM \$100 MILLION DISCUSSED WITH PRESIDENT KENNEDY LAST APRIL. FURTHER TO REDUCE THIS ALREADY CURTAILED AMOUNT INCREASES POSSIBILITY POLITICAL-MILITARY SITUATION HERE CANNOT BE CLARIFIED AS OUR INTERESTS REQUIRE IT TO BE.

PAGE FOUR RUSBAE 472 ~~SECRET~~

IF WE CAN PERSUADE BRITISH TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR \$15 MILLION OF THIS SUM, LEAVING US WITH \$60-\$65 MILLION, ALL WELL AND GOOD. IF WE CANNOT, I BELIEVE IT TO BE ESSENTIAL THAT WE AGREE TO PUT UP FULL SUM.

INDIA IS BIG AND CRUCIAL COUNTRY OFFERING US A BIG AND CRUCIAL OPPORTUNITY IN ASIA. TO GAMBLE OVER \$10 MILLION,

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-3- 2140, January 14, 6 P.M., From New Delhi

WHICH MAY TURN OUT TO BE A DECISIVE AMOUNT, IN AN OVER-ALL MILITARY AID BUDGET OF A BILLION DOLLARS SEEMS TO ME WHOLLY UNREALISTIC AND TO REPRESENT DISTORTED PRIORITIES.

IF IT SERVES U.S. INTERESTS TO PUT NEARLY \$600 MILLION IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE INTO SOUTH KOREA, IRAN, TAIWAN, TURKEY AND PAKISTAN WITH TOTAL POPULATION OF LITTLE MORE THAN ONE-THIRD OF INDIA, WE CAN SURELY AFFORD TO INVEST \$80 MILLION (IF BRITISH LET US DOWN) HERE, OR ONE-SEVENTH THAT AMOUNT, TO HELP ASSURED MILITARY SECURITY OF INDIA AND STRENGTHEN HER POLITICAL POSITION AND THUS OUR OWN.

EVER SINCE 1949 WE HAVE BEEN IMPLORING IN DIA TO SEE COMMUNIST CHINESE DANGER IN MORE REALISTIC LIGHT. NOW BECAUSE OF CHINESE AGGRESSION GOI IS PREPARED TO TAKE A SUBSTANTIALLY

PAGE FIVE RUSBAE 472 ~~SECRET~~
TOUGHER POSITION IN REGARD TO PEKING THAN ANY OF OUR SO-CALLED ALLIES WITH EXCEPTION NATIONALIST CHINA.

I AM RELUCTANT AGAIN TO STRESS THIS CENTRAL POINT, BUT I MUST REMIND DEPT THAT AT NO TIME HAVE I SAID ODDS ARE BETTER THAN 50-50 IN GETTING KIND OF MILITARY UNDERSTANDING WITH INDIA THAT IS SO VITAL TO OUR INTERESTS IN ASIA.

IN LAST DECADE US GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN RELUCTANT TO TACKLE SITUATIONS UNTIL THEY HAVE EXPLODED IN OUR FACES AT WHICH POINT WE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN WILLING TO POUR IN MONEY WITHOUT LIMIT. THIS HAS COST US HEAVILY. I STRONGLY SUGGEST IT IS NOW TIME TO BREAK LOOSE FROM THIS TRADITION AND DEAL ADEQUATELY WITH IMPORTANT BASIC PROBLEMS THAT ARE IN MANAGABLE STATE AT A TIME WHEN THEY CAN BE HANDLED WITH MODEST INVESTMENT.

GP-3.

BOWLES

NOTE: PASSED DEFENSE 1/14/64, 2 P.M.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE 1/14/64, 2:30 P.M.

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C

THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Military Assistance to India and Pakistan

I generally approve the lines of action proposed in the Secretary of State's 16 January memorandum to me on this subject. However, in proceeding to work out a meeting of minds with India and Pakistan, I desire that the following precautions be observed:

1. In approaching both governments, we should make clear what we expect of them in return for prospective long-term military assistance. As to India, we particularly want it to hold foreign exchange diversions from development to defense to a reasonable level, lest we end up indirectly helping finance an excessive defense effort via aid which we provide for quite another purpose.
- 1.5 (d) 2. In the Pakistani case, our MAP help should be appropriately linked to satisfactory performance with respect both to alliance obligations
3. Both governments must be made to understand that no irrevocable five-year MAP commitments can be undertaken by the US, both because aid levels each year will depend on Congress and because our actual aid each year will depend on continuing Pakistani and Indian performance.
4. Our approaches to India and Pakistan should be timed for optimum impact. For example, I do not believe that we should initially approach Pakistan until we have assessed the Chou-En-lai visit.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-252
By ius, NARA Date 5-11-98

cc: The Administrator, AID
The Director of Central Intelligence

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