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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#3 memo	Chester L. Cooper for Mr. Bundy Secret [sanitized]; <i>Some sanitization per RAC, 3/02</i>	2 p 3/13/65	A
<del>#5a memo</del>	<del>Draft NSAM</del> <i>open 12-6-99</i> <del>Secret</del>	<del>1 p</del> n.d.	<del>A</del>
<del>#7 memo</del>	<del>Robert McNamara to President</del> <del>Secret</del> <i>open 12-6-99</i>	<del>1 p</del> 2/15/64	<del>A</del>

## FILE LOCATION

National Security File, NSAM File, NSAM 280

## RESTRICTION CODES

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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January 8, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF NSAM 280

Effective January 8, 1965 Mr. Leonard Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, becomes chairman of the interdepartmental committee for the management of U.S. policy and operations in South Vietnam. The responsibilities and authority of the committee remain unchanged.

Mr. Chester L. Cooper has been designated as White House representative on the committee.

*McGeorge Bundy*

McGeorge Bundy

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Distribution will be made to:

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*Repts #8-11 & 14*

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*C. Cooper 2/12/65*

Rcpts. nos. 8-11 & 14



48  
Cooper  
20

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

January 5, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

FROM: Mr. Michael V. Forrestal NF

SUBJECT: Leonard Unger's NSAM

I attach a copy of a suggested NSAM for Len Unger. Bill suggests that it be issued and that the appointment be made public on Tuesday or Wednesday.

He would also appreciate it if you would have Jim Thomson let Marshall Jones know when a White House statement on Len's new job will be issued, so that the Department can announce his appointment as Deputy Under Secretary at the same time.

Asst

Attachment:

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January 5, 1965

48  
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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. \_\_\_\_\_

MEMORANDUM TO:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE ADMINISTRATOR, AID

Effective January 8, 1965, Leonard Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, will become chairman of the interdepartmental committee for the management of U.S. policy and operations in South Vietnam.

I request ~~that~~ the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development <sup>to</sup> continue <sup>if their responsibilities</sup> their participation in the activities of this committee <sup>& The</sup> whose responsibility and authority <sup>of the committee</sup> continue, as set forth in NSAM 280. <sup>remain unchanged</sup> The departments and agencies <sup>will</sup> shall provide to the committee such support as the chairman shall request. <sup>I have designated Chester Cooper as White House representative on this committee.</sup> ~~Mr. Michael V. Forrestal, the present chairman of the committee, will return to my staff.~~

I share the confidence of the senior officials of all the departments and agencies concerned in the experience

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2.

and judgment of Ambassador Unger; and I call upon all the officials of the Executive Branch to give him the assistance he and his committee will need in dealing with one of the most important struggles which this country now faces.

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January 8, 1965

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Mr. Chester L. Cooper has been designated as White House representative on the committee.

*McGeorge Bundy*

McGeorge Bundy



SANITIZED

Authority NSC 44/28/77, 44/28/77, 44/28/77  
By NMG, NARS, D-1 6/10/77

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 13, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SANITIZED

SUBJECT: Vietnam: Policy vs Implementation  
in the Pacification Field

The Problem

From the Washington point of view the war in Vietnam can be broken down, roughly speaking, into three parts:

1. Direct military operations within South Vietnam and against the North.
2. Individual Agency programs and activities within South Vietnam -- AID waterworks, USIS press relations, etc.
3. Programs and activities involving more than one Agency.

In the case of direct military operations and individual Agency programs, planning and implementation proceed with apparent dispatch. It is in the area of multi-Agency programs where difficulties and delays tend to arise. This stems from problems of jurisdiction, responsibility and competing requirements on time and resources of major individual Agency programs. This is understandable, and could be taken in stride were it not for the fact that most of the activities and programs that are affected fall into the general category of Pacification -- a critical and faltering aspect of our overall policy in Vietnam.

NSAM 280

This problem has been recognized and an effort was made to resolve it in February 1964 through NSAM 280. This established "a small committee for the management of U. S. policy and operations in South Vietnam." The committee was originally headed by Bill Sullivan who was made directly responsible to the Secretary.

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- 2 -

Sometime later, during Forrestal's tenure as Chairman, the activity was brought under the general aegis of the Assistant Secretary and, upon Unger's arrival, was pretty much incorporated within the Far East Bureau. The Committee has done a useful job as a weekly forum for interagency views, and as a clearing-house for certain interagency problems. But it has been hampered by the fact that the "small" committee now consists of about 15 personalities, by the fact that no committee, large or small, can "manage operations", and by the fact that sticky interagency problems requiring quick resolution can best be resolved outside, rather than within, a given Department.

### A Proposition

One way to lubricate the machinery might be to assign the task of expediting, follow-through and log-jam breaking to the White House/NSC. Such an operation should be a part of, rather than a replacement for, existing policy-planning-operations institutions as they relate to the Pacification (i. e., non-military, multi-agency) program).

One Lord High Needler and two, possibly three, additional disagreeable but able assistants should be all that is necessary to do the job.

The basic task would be to assure expeditious (i. e., instant) follow-up on existing, agreed-upon programs or activities, to undertake a quick fix on stalled programs, and to spark new ideas.

The White House/NSC designee could be described as the action officer for the Unger Committee and any other interagency group dealing with Vietnam. He would be given considerable authority and latitude, but at the same time he would operate only within the framework of agreed-upon policy. He would keep in daily touch with key officials throughout Washington, but would not necessarily be required to deal through a particular chain of command. Since he would concern himself primarily with issues, programs, and activities already agreed upon, the operative concept should be action rather than discussion (there will, of course, be instances where agreement in principle has been reached and where heat would have to be applied to achieve approval of specifics). In short, and in conclusion, this will be a difficult, dirty, job.

C 1C  
Chester L. Cooper

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March 22, 1965

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MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Chester Cooper

1. After talking with my brother Bill, I think he and I have a clear understanding of the nature and limits of the job of White House needling which you and I have been discussing.
2. In essence, my brother's concern is simply to keep the basic interdepartmental responsibility where NSAM 280 has put it -- namely, with Len Unger and his group. Because Rafferty has proved himself particularly valuable in this kind of work, Bill wants to keep him there, and naturally I told him we would not try to make a raid.
3. Bill thinks that when the work of expediting can be done directly through Unger's office, it is better that way. I told him that you and I agreed, but that we had both seen a number of cases in the past where agreed, or almost agreed, projects suffered heavy delay because for one reason or another they required support up near the top of various agencies, at levels that might be inaccessible to a man like Rafferty -- levels which, on the other hand, might well respond to repeated phone calls from you.
4. Bill saw the point of this, and though he continues to believe that Unger & Co. can do most of it, he would be very happy to have you help on specific undertakings which have either direct Presidential approval or the approval of himself or Len Unger.
5. In this situation, my suggestion is that you should pick out two or three such projects and see if Len Unger will agree to let you police them for a while. Nothing will teach us more about this process than the experience of working on two or three tough ones.
6. I am sending a copy of this memo to Bill and to Len, and unless they see something wrong with it, I suggest you take it from here for a while.

McG. B.

From William Bundy.

5

*Wm*

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~~SECRET~~NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. \_\_\_\_\_

## MEMORANDUM TO:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE ADMINISTRATOR, AID

In view of the assignment of Mr. William Sullivan to Saigon, I hereby designate Mr. Michael Forrestal to serve as Chairman of the committee for the management of US policy and operations in South Vietnam, established under NSAM Memorandum No. 280. Mr. Forrestal is relieved as White House representative on this Committee, and will be replaced by appropriate members of my staff.

Mr. Forrestal will serve under the supervision of the Secretary of State and he and the Committee will operate in other respects in accordance with the terms of NSAM 280.

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By ry, NARA, Date 12-3-99



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

February 14, 1964

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 280

MEMORANDUM TO:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE ADMINISTRATOR, AID

I have today determined that it is essential to establish in Washington a small committee for the management of U. S. policy and operations in South Vietnam. After consultation with the Secretary of State, I have designated Mr. William Sullivan of the Department of State to serve as Chairman of this committee, under the direct supervision of the Secretary of State.

I now request that the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development nominate to me individuals from their departments and agencies to serve as members of Mr. Sullivan's committee. The officers so nominated will be expected to give an absolute priority to their obligations as members of this committee and as agents for the execution of approved decisions. On this basis, I have already designated Mr. Michael Forrestal to serve as the White House representative on this committee.

Major questions of policy and operations will be subject to my approval in consultation with heads of departments and agencies as appropriate. In the execution of approved policy, it is my desire that Mr. Sullivan's committee shall move energetically, and that department appeal from Mr. Sullivan's decisions shall be kept at a minimum. He is being appointed because

~~SECRET~~

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Authority

*NSC memo 5/23/78*

By

*KTE*

NARS, Date

*6/6/78*

THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

he commands the confidence not only of myself and of the Secretary of State, but also of senior officials of all agencies concerned.

It is my hope and expectation that the establishment of this committee will permit an energetic, unified and skillful prosecution of the only war we face at present.



~~SECRET~~

1. Xerox by Cooper 3/12/65

~~SECRET~~

458

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

15 February 1964

2/15  
1- Bundy  
2- Forrestal

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In response to your request in NSAM No. 280,  
I nominate Mr. William P. Bundy and Maj. General  
Rollen H. Anthis to serve as members of Mr. Sullivan's  
committee.

*Robert S. McNamara*  
Robert S. McNamara

cc: ASD(ISA)  
CJCS  
Maj. Gen. Anthis

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Authority: DOD Directive 5200.30  
By My, NARA, Date 12.3.99

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February 14, 1964

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
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Authority NSC memo 5/23/78  
By MIE, NARS, Date 6/6/78

THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

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- 2 -

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cc:

Mr. Bundy  
Mr. Forrestal  
Mr. Johnson  
NSC Files

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