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#2 memo	For the Chairman, JCS re: Draft Scenarios Top Secret <i>open 12-10-93 NLJ 92-215 29 p.</i>	4/23/64	A
#3 memo	For Chairman, JCS re: Draft Scenarios Top Secret <i>open 12-10-93 NLJ 92-215 1 p.</i>	4/23/64	A
#4 memo	JCSM-422-64 re: Draft Scenarios w/attachments Secret <i>open 12-10-93 NLJ 92-215 12 p.</i>	5/16/64	A
#5 memo	For the President re Cross-Border Operations Top Secret <i>open 12-10-93 NLJ 92-215 1 p.</i>	6/25/64	A
#5a memo	DJSM-1069-64 re Military Planning w/attachments Top Secret <i>open 12-10-93 NLJ 92-215 19 p.</i>	6/25/64	A
#5b memo	JCSM-541-64 re Combined Planning w/appendix Top Secret <i>open 12-10-93 NLJ 92-215 4 p.</i>	6/24/64	A

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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March 17, 1964

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 288

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, United States Information Agency
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Administrator, Agency for International Development

SUBJECT: Implementation of South Vietnam Programs

1. The report of Secretary McNamara dated March 16, 1964 was considered and approved by the President in a meeting of the National Security Council on March 17. All agencies concerned are directed to proceed energetically with the execution of the recommendations of that report.

2. The President, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, has designated the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to coordinate the execution of the recommendations in the report.

McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

cc:

Mr. Bundy
Mr. Forrestal
Mr. Johnson
NSC Files

C. Casper 3/17/64

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *NSC memo 5/23/78*
By *NRE*, NARS, Date *6/6/78*

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

Smith 1a
Testimony by
Attorney Gen
March 16, 1964 assigned 3/23

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March 16, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Memorandum on Viet Nam, dated March 16, 1964

The enclosed memorandum to the President from the Secretary of Defense is circulated for consideration at the Council meeting to be held in the Cabinet Room of the White House at noon on March 17, 1964.

Bromley Smith
Bromley Smith
Executive Secretary

Annex A
Annex B
Annex C
Annex D } *not attached*

DETERMINED TO BE AN
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SEC. 1.1(a)

BY *DCH* ON *2-22-90*

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NSC Control No. 154

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

16 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: South Vietnam

This report addresses two questions:

1. What is the present situation in Vietnam? (What is the trend of the counterinsurgency program, how stable is the Khanh government, and what is the effectiveness of our current policy of assisting the South Vietnamese Government by economic aid, military training and logistical support?)

2. How can we improve that situation? (What are the plans and prospects of the Khanh government and what more should they be doing, and what more should the U. S. be doing under present or revised policy, in South Vietnam or against North Vietnam?)

To answer the questions, the report will review: I. U. S. Objectives in South Vietnam; II. Present U. S. Policy in South Vietnam; III. The Present Situation; IV. Alternative Present Courses of Action; V. Possible Later Actions; VI. Other Actions Considered But Rejected; and VII. Recommendations.

I. U. S. Objectives in South Vietnam

We seek an independent non-Communist South Vietnam. We do not require that it serve as a Western base or as a member of a Western Alliance. South Vietnam must be free, however, to accept outside assistance as required to maintain its security. This assistance should be able to take the form not only of economic and social measures but also police and military help to root out and control insurgent elements.

Unless we can achieve this objective in South Vietnam, almost all of Southeast Asia will probably fall under Communist dominance (all of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia), accommodate to Communism so as to remove effective U. S. and anti-Communist influence (Burma), or fall under the domination of forces not now explicitly Communist but likely then to become so (Indonesia taking over Malaysia). Thailand might hold for a period with our help, but would be under grave pressure.

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By DAH, NARA, Date 2-22-80

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Even the Philippines would become shaky, and the threat to India to the west, Australia and New Zealand to the south, and Taiwan, Korea, and Japan to the north and east would be greatly increased.

All of these consequences would probably have been true even if the U. S. had not since 1954, and especially since 1961, become so heavily engaged in South Vietnam. However, that fact accentuates the impact of a Communist South Vietnam not only in Asia, but in the rest of the world, where the South Vietnam conflict is regarded as a test case of U. S. capacity to help a nation meet a Communist "war of liberation."

Thus, purely in terms of foreign policy, the stakes are high. They are increased by domestic factors.

II. Present U. S. Policy in South Vietnam

We are now trying to help South Vietnam defeat the Viet Cong, supported from the North, by means short of the unqualified use of U. S. combat forces. We are not acting against North Vietnam except by a very modest "covert" program operated by South Vietnamese (and a few Chinese Nationalists) - a program so limited that it is unlikely to have any significant effect. In Laos, we are still working largely within the framework of the 1962 Geneva Accords. In Cambodia we are still seeking to keep Sihanouk from abandoning whatever neutrality he may still have and fulfilling his threat of reaching an accommodation with Hanoi and Peking. As a consequence of these policies, we and the GVN have had to condone the extensive use of Cambodian and Laotian territory by the Viet Cong, both as a sanctuary and as infiltration routes.

III. The Present Situation in South Vietnam

The key elements in the present situation are as follows:

A. The military tools and concepts of the GVN/US effort are generally sound and adequate. a/ Substantially more can be done in the effective employment of military forces and in the economic and civic action areas. These improvements may require some selective increases in the U. S. presence, but it does not appear likely that major equipment replacement and additions in U. S. personnel are indicated under current policy.

B. The U. S. policy of reducing existing personnel where South Vietnamese are in a position to assume the functions is still sound.

a/ Mr. McCone emphasizes that the GVN/US program can never be considered completely satisfactory so long as it permits the Viet Cong a sanctuary in Cambodia and a continuing uninterrupted and unmolested source of supply and reinforcement from NVN through Laos.

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Its application will not lead to any major reductions in the near future, but adherence to this policy as such has a sound effect in portraying to the U. S. and the world that we continue to regard the war as a conflict the South Vietnamese must win and take ultimate responsibility for. Substantial reductions in the numbers of U. S. military training personnel should be possible before the end of 1965. However, the U. S. should continue to reiterate that it will provide all the assistance and advice required to do the job regardless of how long it takes.

C. The situation has unquestionably been growing worse, at least since September:

1. In terms of government control of the countryside, about 40% of the territory is under Viet Cong control or predominant influence. In 22 of the 43 provinces, the Viet Cong control 50% or more of the land area, including 80% of Phuoc Tuy; 90% of Binh Duong; 75% of Hau Nghia; 90% of Long An; 90% of Kien Tuong; 90% of Dinh Tuong; 90% of Kien Hoa; and 85% of An Xuyen.

2. Large groups of the population are now showing signs of apathy and indifference, and there are some signs of frustration within the U. S. contingent:

- a. The ARVN and paramilitary desertion rates, and particularly the latter, are high and increasing.

- b. Draft dodging is high while the Viet Cong are recruiting energetically and effectively.

- c. The morale of the hamlet militia and of the Self Defense Corps, on which the security of the hamlets depends, is poor and falling.

3. In the last 90 days the weakening of the government's position has been particularly noticeable. For example:

- a. In Quang Nam province, in the I Corps, the militia in 17 hamlets turned in their weapons.

- b. In Binh Duong province (III Corps) the hamlet militia were disarmed because of suspected disloyalty.

- c. In Binh Dinh province, in the II Corps, 75 hamlets were severely damaged by the Viet Cong (in contrast, during the twelve months ending June 30, 1963, attacks on strategic hamlets were few and none was overrun).

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d. In Quang Ngai province, at the northern edge of the II Corps, there were 413 strategic hamlets under government control a year ago. Of that number, 335 have been damaged to varying degrees or fallen into disrepair, and only 275 remain under government control.

e. Security throughout the IV Corps has deteriorated badly. The Viet Cong control virtually all facets of peasant life in the southernmost provinces and the government troops there are reduced to defending the administrative centers. Except in An Giang province (dominated by the Hoa Hao religious sect) armed escort is required for almost all movement in both the southern and northern areas of the IV Corps.

4. The political control structure extending from Saigon down into the hamlets disappeared following the November coup. Of the 41 incumbent province chiefs on November 1, 35 have been replaced (nine provinces had three province chiefs in three months; one province had four). Scores of lesser officials were replaced. Almost all major military commands have changed hands twice since the November coup. The faith of the peasants has been shaken by the disruptions in experienced leadership and the loss of physical security. In many areas, power vacuums have developed causing confusion among the people and a rising rate of rural disorders.

5. North Vietnamese support, always significant, has been increasing:

a. Communications between Hanoi and the Viet Cong (see classified annex).

b. Since July 1, 1963, the following items of equipment, not previously encountered in South Vietnam, have been captured from the Viet Cong:

Chicom 75 mm. recoilless rifles.

Chicom heavy machine guns.

U. S. .50 caliber heavy machine guns on Chicom mounts.

In addition, it is clear that the Viet Cong are using Chinese 90 mm rocket launchers and mortars.

c. The Viet Cong are importing large quantities of munitions and chemicals for the production of explosives: Approximately 50,000 pounds of explosive-producing chemicals destined

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for the Viet Cong have been intercepted in the 12 months ending March 1964. On December 24, five tons of ammunition, of which one and one-half tons were 75 mm recoilless rifle ammunition, was captured at the Dinh Tuong Viet Cong arsenal. Ninety percent was of Chicom manufacture.

D. The greatest weakness in the present situation is the uncertain viability of the Khanh government. Khanh himself is a very able man within his experience, but he does not yet have wide political appeal and his control of the Army itself is uncertain (he has the serious problem of the jailed generals). After two coups, as was mentioned above, there has been a sharp drop in morale and organization, and Khanh has not yet been able to build these up satisfactorily. There is a constant threat of assassination or of another coup, which would drop morale and organization nearly to zero. a/ Whether or not French nationals are actively encouraging such a coup, de Gaulle's position and the continuing pessimism and anti-Americanism of the French community in South Vietnam provide constant fuel to neutralist sentiment and the coup possibility. If a coup is set underway, the odds of our detecting and preventing it in the tactical sense are not high.

E. On the positive side, we have found many reasons for encouragement in the performance of the Khanh government to date. Although its top layer is thin, it is highly responsive to U. S. advice, and with a good grasp of the basic elements of rooting out the Viet Cong. Opposition groups are fragmentary, and Khanh has brought in at least token representation from many key groups hitherto left out. He is keenly aware of the danger of assassination or coup and is taking resourceful steps to minimize these risks. All told, these evidences of energy, comprehension, and decision add up to a sufficiently strong chance of Khanh's really taking hold in the next few months for us to devote all possible energy and resources to his support.

IV. Alternative Present Courses of Action

A. Negotiate on the Basis of "Neutralization"

While de Gaulle has not been clear on what he means by this -- and is probably deliberately keeping it vague as he did in working toward an Algerian settlement -- he clearly means not only a South Vietnam that would not be a Western base or part of an alliance structure (both of which we could accept) but also withdrawal of all external military assistance and specifically total U. S. withdrawal. To negotiate on this

a/ Mr. McCone does not believe the dangers of another coup (except as a result of a possible assassination) at this time are as serious as he believes this paragraph implies.

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basis -- indeed without specifically rejecting it -- would simply mean a Communist take-over in South Vietnam. Only the U. S. presence after 1954 held the South together under far more favorable circumstances, and enabled Diem to refuse to go through with the 1954 provision calling for nationwide "free" elections in 1956. Even talking about a U. S. withdrawal would undermine any chance of keeping a non-Communist government in South Vietnam, and the rug would probably be pulled before the negotiations had gone far.

B. Initiate GVN and U. S. Military Actions Against North Vietnam

We have given serious thought to all the implications and ways of carrying out direct military action against North Vietnam in order to supplement the counterinsurgency program in South Vietnam. (The analysis of overt U. S. action is attached as Annex A.) In summary, the actions break down into three categories:

1. Border Control Actions. For example:

✓ a. An expansion of current authority for Laotian over-flights to permit low-level reconnaissance by aircraft when such flights are required to supplement the currently approved U-2 flights.

✓ b. Vietnamese cross-border ground penetrations into Laos, without the presence of U. S. advisors or re-supply by U.S. aircraft.

✓ c. Expansion of the patrols into Laos to include use of U. S. advisors and re-supply by U. S. aircraft.

✓ d. Hot pursuit of VC forces moving across the Cambodian border and destruction of VC bases on the Vietnam/Cambodian line.

✓ e. Air and ground strikes against selected targets in Laos by South Vietnamese forces.

2. Retaliatory Actions. For example:

✓ a. Overt high and/or low level reconnaissance flights by U. S. or Farmgate aircraft over North Vietnam to assist in locating and identifying the sources of external aid to the Viet Cong.

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✓ b. Retaliatory bombing strikes and commando raids on a tit-for-tat basis by the GVN against NVN targets (communication centers, training camps, infiltration routes, etc.).

✓ c. Aerial mining by the GVN aircraft (possibly with U. S. assistance) of the major NVN ports.

3. Graduated Overt Military Pressure by GVN and U. S. Forces.

This program would go beyond reacting on a tit-for-tat basis. It would include air attacks against military and possibly industrial targets. The program would utilize the combined resources of the GVN Air Force and the U. S. Farmgate Squadron, with the latter reinforced by three squadrons of B-57's presently in Japan. Before this program could be implemented it would be necessary to provide some additional air defense for South Vietnam and to ready U. S. forces in the Pacific for possible escalation.

The analysis of the more serious of these military actions (from 2(b) upward) revealed the extremely delicate nature of such operations, both from the military and political standpoints. There would be the problem of marshalling the case to justify such action, the problem of communist escalation, and the problem of dealing with the pressures for premature or "stacked" negotiations. We would have to calculate the effect of such military actions against a specified political objective. That objective, while being cast in terms of eliminating North Vietnamese control and direction of the insurgency, would in practical terms be directed toward collapsing the morale and the self-assurance of the Viet Cong cadres now operating in South Vietnam and bolstering the morale of the Khanh regime. We could not, of course, be sure that our objective could be achieved by any means within the practical range of our options. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, unless and until the Khanh government has established its position and preferably is making significant progress in the South, an overt extension of operations into the North carries the risk of being mounted from an extremely weak base which might at any moment collapse and leave the posture of political confrontation worsened rather than improved.

The other side of the argument is that the young Khanh government needs the reinforcement of some significant success against the North and without them the in-country program, even with the expansion discussed in Section C below, may not be sufficient to stem the tide.

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On balance, except to the extent suggested in Section V below, I recommend against initiation at this time of overt GVN and/or U. S. military actions against North Vietnam.

C. Initiate Measures to Improve the Situation in South Vietnam.

There were and are sound reasons for the limits imposed by present policy -- the South Vietnamese must win their own fight; U. S. intervention on a larger scale, and/or GVN actions against the North, would disturb key allies and other nations; etc. In any case, it is vital that we continue to take every reasonable measure to assure success in South Vietnam. The policy choice is not an "either/or" between this course of action and possible pressures against the North; the former is essential without regard to our decision with respect to the latter. The latter can, at best, only reinforce the former.

The following are the actions we believe can be taken in order to improve the situation both in the immediate future and over a longer term period. To emphasize that a new phase has begun, the measures to be taken by the Khanh government should be described by some term such as "South Vietnam's Program for National Mobilization."

Basic U. S. Posture

1. The U. S. at all levels must continue to make it emphatically clear that we are prepared to furnish assistance and support for as long as it takes to bring the insurgency under control.

2. The U. S. at all levels should continue to make it clear that we fully support the Khanh government and are totally opposed to any further coups. The ambassador should instruct all elements, including the military advisors, to report intelligence information of possible coups promptly, with the decision to be made by the ambassador whether to report such information to Khanh. However, we must recognize that our chances would not be great of detecting and preventing a coup that had major military backing.

3. We should support fully the Pacification Plan now announced by Khanh (described in Annex B), and particularly the basic theory -- now fully accepted both on the Vietnamese and U. S. sides -- of concentrating on the more secure areas and

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working out from these through military operations to provide security, followed by necessary civil and economic actions to make the presence of the government felt and to provide economic improvements. This so-called "oil spot" theory is excellent, and its acceptance is a major step forward. However, it is necessary to push hard to get specific instructions out to the provinces, so that there is real unity of effort at all levels. A related matter is to stabilize the assignment of province chiefs and senior commanders and clarify their responsibilities and relationships.

Many of the actions described in succeeding paragraphs fit right into the framework of the Plan as announced by Khanh. Wherever possible, we should tie our urging of such actions to Khanh's own formulation of them, so that he will be carrying out a Vietnamese plan and not one imposed by the U. S.

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Civil and Military Mobilization

4. To put the whole nation on a war footing -- to obtain the manpower for these efforts described below and to remedy present inequities and inadequacies in the use of manpower -- a new National Mobilization Plan (to include a National Service Law) should be urgently developed by the Country Team in collaboration with the Khanh Government. The present structure of decrees, dating from the Diem Government, is haphazard and produces substantial injustices. The new Program for National Mobilization would both greatly increase the effectiveness of the war effort and be a strong visible sign of the Government's determination and will. Full attention should be given to the way it is presented so that it appears as a remedy for past injustices and not as a repressive or totalitarian act.

5. The strength of the Armed Forces (regular plus paramilitary) must be increased by at least 50,000 men. About 15,000 of these are required to fill the regular Armed Forces (ARVN) to their present authorized strength. Another 5,000 would fill the existing paramilitary forces to authorized strengths. The balance of 30,000 men is required to increase the strength of the paramilitary forces, in whatever form these may be organized (see paragraph 7 below). (All of the foregoing strength figures are illustrative and subject to review, which review I have directed General Harkins to make in consultation with General Khanh.)

6. A Civil Administrative Corps is urgently required to work in the provincial capitals, the district towns, the villages, and the hamlets. "Hamlet civic action teams" of five men each are now beginning to be trained, on a small scale, to go into hamlets after they have been cleared, start the rehabilitation process, and train hamlet leaders to carry on. School teachers and health technicians are now assigned in some hamlets, many more are needed, and those on the job need to be retrained to higher competence. Many other types of technicians (e. g., agricultural workers) are needed, in varying numbers. Taking into account the fact that many hamlets are not now secure, and that adequate training is required, the initial goal during 1964 should be at least

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7,500 additional persons; the ultimate target, at least 40,000 men for the 8,000 hamlets, in 2500 villages and 43 provinces. The administrators would come largely from the areas in which they serve and would be paid by the national government. The U. S. should work with the GVN urgently to devise the necessary recruiting plans, training facilities, financing methods, and organizational arrangements, and should furnish training personnel at once, under the auspices of the AID Mission. Further, maximum effort should be made to make use of the available trained personnel by assignment to provincial and village administration where needed.

Improved Military Forces

7. The paramilitary forces are now understrength and lacking in effectiveness. They must be improved and re-organized.

Specifically:

a. What remains of the present hamlet militia (and related forces of a part-time nature for hamlet defense) should be consolidated with the Self Defense Corps into a single force compensated by the national government,

b. Pay and collateral benefits must be substantially improved at once. A reasonable course of action would be to raise the pay scale of the Civil Guard approximately to that of the regular Armed Forces, and to raise the pay scale of a reorganized Self Defense Corps approximately to the present level of the Civil Guard. In addition, measures should be taken to improve the housing and allowances of the families of both forces, so that they can live decently in areas near where the forces are operating.

c. Strength should be maintained and expanded by conscription, effectively enforced, and by more centrally directed recruitment policies.

d. Additional U. S. personnel should be assigned to the training of all these paramilitary forces.

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e. The National Police require special consideration. Their strength in the provinces should be substantially increased and consideration should be given to including them as part of an overall "Popular Defense Force". In expanding and improving the police, the AID Mission should make special arrangements to draw on the advice of the present British training mission under Brigadier Thompson because of its experience in Malaya. (Mr. Bell has instructed Mr. Brent, the USOM Chief, to accomplish this.)

8. An offensive Guerrilla force should be created to operate along the border and in areas where VC control is dominant. Such a force could be organized around present Ranger Companies and ARVN Special Forces and provided with special training and advice by U. S. Special Forces. The force should carry the fight to the VC on their own basis in advance of clear-and-hold operations on the conventional pattern.

Additional Military Equipment for the GVN

9. The Vietnamese Air Force should be strengthened at once by the substitution of 25 A-1H aircraft for the present 25 T-28s. The A-1H aircraft has a much greater bomb load and slightly better speed. a/

10. Although there are no major equipment deficiencies in other forces, we should act at once to replace the present M-114 armored personnel carriers by 63 M-113s and to provide additional river boats. Additional lesser deficiencies should also be met at an estimated cost of approximately \$10 million.

Economic Actions

11. The approved, but unannounced, Fertilizer Program should be particularly stressed and expanded and publicly announced. Its target of 85,000 tons for the present planting season (April - June) should probably be doubled for the next season and trebled the following season both to provide immediate

a/ Concurrently, the effectiveness of the USAF's Farmgate operation will be increased by assignment of A-1E aircraft in replacement of B-26s and T-28s. Furthermore, in another important area, we are strengthening the U. S. intelligence and reporting system.

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and direct benefits to peasants in secure areas and to improve the rice crops and export earnings. Estimates are that an additional ton of fertilizer costing around \$70 can, if properly applied, produce additional yield of an equivalent two tons of rice, which might be sold for \$110 per ton. Thus, the potential export improvement alone could be on the order of \$20 million from this year's 85,000 ton input.

US and GVN Costs of the Above Actions

The above actions will involve a limited increase in U. S. personnel and in direct Defense Department costs. More significantly, they involve significant increase in Military Assistance Program costs and in the budget of the GVN itself, with the latter requiring additional US economic aid. The estimates of additional annual costs are as follows:

<u>Action</u>	<u>GVN Budget Costs</u>	<u>Cost to U. S.</u>
a. Raise military and paramilitary numbers and pay scales	5-6 billion piastres	\$30-40 million _{a/}
b. Enlarge civil administrative cadre	250 million piastres (1st year)	\$1,500,000 (first year)
c. Furnish additional military equipment		\$20 million (one time)

a/ Increases in GVN budget expenditures do not automatically require equal increases in U. S. economic aid. As a rough approximation, subject to later refinement, an increase of 5-6 billion piastres of GVN budget expenditures might require an increase of \$30-40 million worth of imports financed through U. S. economic aid. Some of the imports undoubtedly could be obtained under P. L. 480.

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Conclusion

If the Khanh Government can stay in power and the above actions can be carried out rapidly, it is my judgment that the situation in South Vietnam can be significantly improved in the next four to six months. The present deterioration may continue for a part of this period, but I believe it can be levelled out and some improvement will become visible during the period. I therefore believe that this course of action should be urgently pursued while we prepare such additional actions as may be necessary for success.

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V. Possible Later Actions

If the Khanh government takes hold vigorously -- inspiring confidence, whether or not noteworthy progress has been made -- or if we get hard information of significantly stepped-up VC arms supply from the North, we may wish to mount new and significant pressures against North Vietnam. We should start preparations for such a capability now. (See Annex C for an analysis of the situation in North Vietnam and Communist China.) Specifically, we should develop a capability to initiate within 72 hours the "Border Control" ^{a/} and "Retaliatory Actions" referred to on pages 5 and 6, and we should achieve a capability to initiate with 30 days' notice the program of "Graduated Overt Military Pressure." The reasoning behind this program of preparations for initiating action against North Vietnam is rooted in the fact that, even with progress in the pacification plan, the Vietnamese Government and the population in the South will still have to face the prospect of a very lengthy campaign based on a war-weary nation and operating against Viet Cong cadres who retain a great measure of motivation and assurance.

In this connection, General Khanh stated that his primary concern is to establish a firm base in the South. He favors continuation of covert activities against North Vietnam, but until such time as "rear-area security" has been established, he does not wish to engage in overt operations against the North.

In order to accelerate the realization of pacification and particularly in order to denigrate the morale of the Viet Cong forces, it may be necessary at some time in the future to put demonstrable retaliatory pressure on the North. Such a course of action might proceed according to the scenario outlined in Annex D.

a/ Authority should be granted immediately for covert Vietnamese operations into Laos, for the purposes of border control and "hot pursuit" into Laos. Decision on "hot pursuit" into Cambodia should await further study of our relations with that country.

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VI. Other Actions Considered But Rejected

We have considered the following actions, but rejected them for the time being except to the extent indicated below:

1. Return of Dependents. We recommend that the present policy be continued of permitting dependents to return home on a voluntary basis, but not ordering them to do so. The security situation in Saigon appears to have improved significantly, and ordering dependents home would now, in the universal judgment of our senior people in Saigon, have a serious impact on South Vietnamese morale. It would also raise a serious question whether tours of duty for AID personnel would not have to be shortened. Thus, unless there are further serious incidents, or unless we were taking more drastic measures generally, we believe compulsory return should not be undertaken.

2. Furnishing a U.S. Combat Unit to Secure the Saigon Area. It is the universal judgment of our senior people in Saigon, with which we concur, that this action would now have serious adverse psychological consequences and should not be undertaken.

3. U.S. Taking Over Command. It has been suggested that the U.S. move from its present advisory role to a role that would amount in practice to effective command. Again, the judgment of all senior people in Saigon, with which we concur, is that the possible military advantages of such action would be far outweighed by its adverse psychological impact. It would cut across the whole basic picture of the Vietnamese winning their own war and lay us wide open to hostile propaganda both within South Vietnam and outside. Moreover, the present responsiveness of the GVN to our advice -- although it has not yet reduced military reaction time -- makes it less urgent. At the same time, MACV is steadily taking actions to bring U. S. and GVN operating staffs closer together at all levels, including joint operating rooms at key command levels.

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VII. Recommendations

I recommend that you instruct the appropriate agencies of the U.S. Government:

1. To make it clear that we are prepared to furnish assistance and support to South Vietnam for as long as it takes to bring the insurgency under control.
2. To make it clear that we fully support the Khanh government and are opposed to any further coups.
3. To support a Program for National Mobilization (including a national service law) to put South Vietnam on a war footing.
4. To assist the Vietnamese to increase the armed forces (regular plus paramilitary) by at least 50,000 men.
5. To assist the Vietnamese to create a greatly enlarged Civil Administrative Corps for work at province, district and hamlet levels.
6. To assist the Vietnamese to improve and reorganize the paramilitary forces and to increase their compensation.
7. To assist the Vietnamese to create an offensive guerrilla force.
8. To provide the Vietnamese Air Force 25 A-1H aircraft in exchange for the present T-28s.
9. To provide the Vietnamese Army additional M-113 armored personnel carriers (withdrawing the M-114s there), additional river boats, and approximately \$5-10 million of other additional material.
10. To announce publicly the Fertilizer Program and to expand it with a view within two years to trebling the amount of fertilizer made available.

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11. To authorize continued high-level U.S. overflights of South Vietnam's borders and to authorize "hot pursuit" and South Vietnamese ground operations over the Laotian line for the purpose of border control. More ambitious operations into Laos involving units beyond battalion size should be authorized only with the approval of Souvanna Phouma. Operations across the Cambodian border should depend on the state of relations with Cambodia.

12. To prepare immediately to be in a position on 72 hours' notice to initiate the full range of Laotian and Cambodian "Border Control" actions (beyond those authorized in paragraph 11 above) and the "Retaliatory Actions" against North Vietnam, and to be in a position on 30 days' notice to initiate the program of "Graduated Overt Military Pressure" against North Vietnam.

Robert S. McNamara

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~~TOP SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTONDECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-215
By , NARA, Date 12-6-93

April 23, 1964

Tab I 2

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Draft Scenarios for Recommendation 12 (NSAM 288)

Attached are three draft scenarios (each in tabular and narrative form) for Recommendation No. 12 in NSAM 288:

- Tab I. "Uncommitting" steps which should be taken now
(a) Chart (b) Narrative
- Tab II. GVN/Formgate graduated overt military pressures on DRV
(a) Chart (b) Narrative
- Tab III. Contingency Plan for US overt response to DRV/Chicom reactions to Scenario II
(a) Chart (b) Narrative

It should be noted that carrying out Scenario I does not necessarily commit the US to commence Scenario II; and that Scenario II may be carried out without requiring resort to Scenario III. However, since Scenario II cannot be launched without our being prepared to carry out Scenario III, you should assume that it may be necessary for the D-Day of Scenario III to occur as soon as 10 days after the D-Day of Scenario II. Scenario III is a contingency plan of action which we would contemplate putting into effect only if the DRV's or Chicom's reaction to Scenario II was judged by the President to require overt US response.

I would appreciate your comments on these scenarios -- particularly on the suggested military actions and the sequence and timing of actions within the scenario. Also I would appreciate your comments on military factors (such as weather) affecting the choice of time when Scenario II could most effectively be begun.

Attachments

(As stated above)

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WITH ATTACHMENTS

Refer to : 1-35608/64

MEMO TO CHAIRMAN, JCS to be signed by SecDef

Subj: Draft Scenarios for Recommendation 12 (NSAM 288)

w/3 attachments (TABS 1, 2 & 3 of 1-35583/64 & 1-35608/64 as listed in Memo)

Covering Memo from Mr. McNaughton 7
to SecDef 6 cys

- Orig - Sec Def
- Cy 2 - DepSecDef
- 3 - Mr. Friedman
- 4 - OSD files
- 5 - RSC files
- 6 - Mr. McNaughton

- Cy 1 & 2 - Chairman, JCS (cys 2 & 3 incls of
- 3 - SecDef (cy 4 of incls)
- 4 - Mr. Vance (cy 5 of incls)
- 5 - Mr. Sullivan (cy 6 of incls)
- 6 - Mr. Forrestal (cy 7 of incls)
- 7 - Mr. Rowen (Cy 8 of incls)
- 8 - Adm. Blouin (Cy 9 of incls)
- 9 - Mr. Friedman (Cy 10 of incls)
- 10 - Mr. McNaughton (Cy 1 of incls)
- 11 - Mr. Murray (Cy 1 of series B)
- 12 - OSD files w/o incls
- 13 - RSC files (Cy 2 of Series B)
- 14 - extra

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POLITICAL/MILITARY SCENARIO I - UNCOMMITTING STEPS WHICH SHOULD BE TAKEN NOW

OPTION	WHITE HOUSE	STATE	OSD	JCS	GVN/OTHER
1.		See that Khanh's speeches are made (distribute excerpts in US)	Participate		Khanh (other GVN) speeches describe kind of country for which war waged, lay out programs and progress
2.	Participate	State (P) prepare materials for friendly congressmen on neutralization, US objectives, GVN programs & reforms, DRV involvement	Participate (LA)		
3.	Participate	State (P) prepare for Lodge-Markins background briefings on status Sino Def recs & progress in war			
4.	Participate	State (P) coordinates	PA develops modest program to increase public awareness of US interest & involvement in SEA & SVN (e.g., public service newspaper ads, radio, TV)		
5.	Participate	Diplomatic exchange w/UK & other principal allies (who?) to be sure they understand US view			
6.		State (FE, INR) complete Jordan Report; provide for continuous updating		DIA coordinates (ensures that relevant materials available)	CIA coordinates (ensures that relevant materials available)
7.		INR coordinates (ensures that relevant materials available)		DIA prepares (separate from Jordan Report), & keeps updated, evidence of DRV/VC use of: -1) Cambodia and of any Cambodian complicity & -2) Laos	CIA coordinates (ensures that relevant materials available)
8.		Participate (INR)	Participate	Participate (DIA)	CIA, coordinating w/other agencies, prepares assessment of: -1) Chances of success of GVN, Farmgate or US pressures on DRV in reducing insurgency -2) Probable DRV/Chicom/Soviet political & military reactions -3) Probable Laotian/Cambodian/DRV/Chicom/Soviet reaction to Laotian/Cambodian border operations -4) Effect of (1) above on Chicom-Soviet relationship
9.		Obtain host country consent for external training	Participate	-1) Enhance VNAF non-Farmgate aerial mining, bombing (air escort?) capability. Consider VNAF training in advanced aircraft, including B-57s -2) Consider creation of Farmgate air escort capability	
10.	Participate	Consider political contingencies and how US would deal with them	Participate	Consider possible enemy reactions and responses open to US	

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Draft of 4/20/64

VIETNAM: POLITICAL/MILITARY SCENARIOS FOR PRESSURES ON DRVSCENARIO 1. "UNCOMMITTING" STEPS WHICH SHOULD BE TAKEN NOW

During the period extending from the present to the time when and if the U.S. decides to undertake one or more of the additional actions presently under consideration, we should do two things: First, we should do all we can to obtain public and international understanding and support of the present effort in Vietnam, including its consequences for all of Southeast Asia; and, second, we should undertake and complete all preparatory actions supporting the additional military actions so that if and when a political decision is made, these actions may be commenced without delay.

The GVN and the U.S. should make clear to the World the nature of the underlying facts and rationale which support the GVN's efforts against the VC and our support of these efforts. There should be produced by speeches, articles, interviews and other methods, a consistent historical picture of SVN since World War II, a general description of North Vietnamese involvement in events since 1959 and a more detailed description of the desired state of affairs in Southeast Asia after control of the insurgency from the North. Secretary McNamara's speech on March 26 is an excellent start on such a program. The following additional actions are proposed:

1. Khanh Speeches (Action: GVN, State)

General Khanh (and other GVN officials) should describe the kind of country for which the war is being waged and the programs

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in support of the same. (A start was made in his speech of March 9.) Subsequent speeches laying out specific programs and progress in the fulfillment of those programs should be made by Khanh and other members of his government. ^{should} state/assure that appropriate speeches are made by Khanh and should prepare a brochure of significant excerpts from these speeches for dissemination in this country.

2. Materials for Congress (Action: State, Cong Rel; Defense, Leg Aff)

Material for friendly Senators and Congressmen should be prepared on the subject of neutralization, U.S. objectives in South-east Asia as a whole, new programs and reforms undertaken by the GVN, and a general description of DRV direction and control of the VC.

3. Background Reports to the Press (Action: State, FE; Defense, ISA)

State should prepare for Lodge and Markins background briefings to the press on the status of the McNamara report recommendations and other material relating to the progress of the war.

4. Inform the U.S. Public (Action: State, Pub Aff; Defense, Pub Aff)

A modest program aimed at increasing public awareness of U.S. interest and involvement in Vietnam should be carried out. Additional material along the lines of the recently issued AID poster should be developed and distributed. Public service advertisements in magazines, newspapers and radio/television should be encouraged.

5. Diplomatic Exchange with Allies (Action: State)

Another diplomatic exchange should take place with the

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British and our other principal allies (who?) to make sure that they understand our view of the war in South Vietnam and the importance of DRV involvement. (Something like this was done recently when Lord Home and Butler were in Washington.) Bohlen probed deGaulle recently on "neutralization." Other such efforts should be made shortly, perhaps by sending an emissary to London and Paris to report on progress made in SVN. At that time, the North Atlantic Council should also be given a presentation of the U.S. view.

6. Complete Draft Jorden Report and Keep Updated
(Action: State, DIA and CIA Coordinate)

The draft Jorden report, containing the most recent information on DRV involvement, should be completed and kept updated as new material becomes available so that a report could be published on short notice.

7. Marshal Evidence of DRV/VC Use of Laos and Cambodia
(Action: DIA, CIA, State (INR))

In any political justification of possible military actions in Laos and Cambodia, we must be prepared to show the manner and extent to which those countries are used as infiltration routes, supply bases, rear support areas and training camps. Much of this information will be contained in the updated Jorden report, but since that report is directed primarily to establishing DRV involvement rather than use of Laos and Cambodia as such, all information relating to the latter matters should be assembled and kept up to date separately. This should be done on a contingency basis since our main object is to direct world attention to the primary target, North Vietnam.

8. Immediately Undertake a New Intelligence Estimate of Probable Enemy Reactions (Action: CIA, DIA, INR)

These should include, among other things, evaluations of:

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- a) Chances of success of GVN, Farmgate or U.S. pressures on DRV in reducing insurgency
- b) Probable DRV/Chicom/Soviet political & military reactions
- c) Probable Laotian/Cambodian/DRV/Chicom/Soviet reaction to Laotian/Cambodian border operations
- d) Effect of (a) above on Chicom-Soviet relationship

9. Enhance GVN Air Capabilities (Action: JCS)

Steps should be taken now to enhance the VNAF capability for effective aerial mining and aerial attack upon DRV targets independently of Farmgate. (E.g., possibly immediate training with advanced aircraft.) Consider the need for Farmgate air escort capability.

10. Political Contingencies (Action: State)

Consider political contingencies and how U.S. would deal them. E.g.:

Prepare political and legal case in support of U.S. actions.

Determine our public position on U.S. involvement in

Farmgate.

Prepare U.S. strategy in response to probable Communist/neutralist efforts to obtain a condemnatory UN resolution.

11. Military Contingencies (Action: JCS)

Consider possible enemy responses and actions the SVN or the U.S. could take with respect to them. E.g.:

Expanded insurgency and/or terrorism in SVN and/or Laos.

Chicom/Soviet augmentation of DRV air defense capability by way of interceptors, anti-aircraft guns or SAM.

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Chicom/Soviet minesweeping activities in DRV mined harbors.

Chicom/DRV Farmgate type or overt air attacks on SVN/

Thai air bases or population centers or on U.S. carrier task forces.

DRV/Chicom invasion of SVN/Laos/Thailand with or without
Soviet logistic support (trucks, POL, air supply).

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POLITICAL/MILITARY SCENARIO II: GVN/FARMGATE GRADUATED OVERT MILITARY PRESSURES ON DRV

ACTION	TIME	WHITE HOUSE	STATE	OSD	JCS	GVN
1	D-40	NSC meeting at which President decides to initiate this Scenario and establishes EXCOM arrangement				
2 & 3	D-35		Seek consent of Thais/Philippines to necessary in-country actions (deployments, staging, SVN pilot training); if proposed actions disclosed, assure Thais of protection from retaliation (WH & OSD participate)	SecDef visits Saigon with agreed US program on overt GVN/Farmgate actions against DRV; requests Khanh agreement (WH & State participate)		
4	D-30 onward					Deploy long lead time items described in contingency plans (including Scenario III - e.g., amphibious lift, prepositioning, radar early warning) ²
5 & 6	D-20	President tells key Congressional leaders that Khanh asks US to assist GVN pressures on DRV; discloses special intelligence (COMINT); says US intends covert support ¹	Participate		Participate	Khanh delivers speech, based upon SecDef suggestions, details DRV activity, threatens military action (possibly justified as tit for tat) unless activity ceases, and holds out promise of peaceful DRV-SVN relations (e.g., SVN rice to DRV)
7	D-19 onward		USIA direction and assistance as required		Direction and assistance as required	Propagandize DRV by radio broadcasts and leaflet drops publicizing Khanh's message.
8	D-18	Participate	Public release of Jordan report: low key (State press conference) or high level (speech by President, SecState, or SecDef)			
9 & 10	D-15	Participate	-1) Disclose COMINT to selected allies (assume possible leaks); stress U.S. support of Khanh position -2) Reassure Thais/GVN of U.S. air/ground protection in event of DRV/Chicom retaliation	Participate		Participate
11	D-10	President meets with broader Congress group (and possibly public opinion leaders, Republican candidate); describes situation (including Khanh request, US agreement re SVN air defense; US deployments); indicates US actions; discloses COMINT and other intelligence; emphasizes need to support Khanh				

(CONTINUED)

- Need definition of "covert support" in relation to, e.g., Farmgate flights (reconnaissance, mining, bombing), U.S. air defense in SVN, US/Farmgate fighter escort for GVN attacks on DRV. What significance of COMINT and other Special Intelligence; what compromise on disclosure?
- Advisability of preparing logistics for rapid escalation, including Chicom/DRV air or ground response?
- Will "compliance" be cessation of insurgency or of specified DRV/VC activities (that may or may not be related to tit-for-tat)?
- Would not low-level reconnaissance reinforce (without added risk) this psychological move and also provide needed targeting data?
- What tell Congress re: Farmgate? Is there need for Congressional resolution authorizing direct US involvement if subsequently required?

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12 & 13	D-8		U.S. communicates with DRV via third country; deplores need for but supports GVN actions; suggests GVN/DRV negotiations might be useful ⁶		Complete SVN/Thai air defense capability (US TFS?) and deployments for possible escalation	
14 & 15	D-5	When GVN attacks are imminent and U.S. deployments become known, President informs U.S. public of U.S. approval and support of GVN actions, U.S. concurrence on DRV involvement, U.S. air defense for GVN, and risks to DRV of any attacks on SVN.			U.S. dependants depart Saigon; any statement is couched in terms not under-cutting confidence in U.S. air defense	
16	D-1		Participate			Khanh speaks again if DRV does not comply; announces start of military actions (justified as retaliation and to force DRV to stop insurgency); stresses retaliation not against civilians but DRV means of aggression; "Acts of justice for acts of terror"
17	D-Day				Direction and assistance as required	First attacks (including mining) are targeted for maximum psychological effect; targets: (a) import facilities (port, rail); (b) industrial complexes (e.g., POL) ⁶
18	D-day to date DRV complies				Direction and assistance as required	Attacks continue against various targets, accompanied by Khanh statements, justifications, and calls for meeting at Hue and cessation of VC attacks; attacks continue until satisfactory compliance ⁷ or conference results obtained
19 & 20	After DRV compliance		Direction and participation as appropriate			-1) After indications of DRV compliance, Sihanouk will be more tractable and GVN may reach settlement with Cambodia, including elimination of VC bases and guarantee of Cambodian territory. -2) After pressure on DRV is effective, GVN and Thai forces (disguised as FAR) and FAR forces seize route 9, establish picket line blocking logistics from North, and seal Lao/GVN border below 17th parallel

6. Should some or all of initial targets be more directly related to war in SVN? Will US provide fighter escorts (Farmgate or overt) if DRV air defense becomes effective?
7. Possible measures of compliance: DRV plain language cease fire to VC; large scale VC surrenders. Does planned elimination of VC/DRV hard core in Laos (Action 19) require definition of "compliance" by DRV to include DRV acquiescence in sealing of Laos corridor by "FAR" forces?

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SCENARIO II: GVN/FARMGATE GRADUATED OVERT MILITARY PRESSURES ON DRV

The decision to initiate these actions would have to be taken at the highest level of the US government, but it must, nevertheless, be remembered that political initiative should surface in Saigon and not in Washington, so as to maintain the credibility of the sovereignty of the GVN. The following actions are proposed:

1. NSC Meeting (Action: White House) (D-40)

The President's decision to initiate this Scenario is made at a National Security Council meeting. EXCOM arrangements are established at that time.

2. Consultation with Khanh (Action: White House, State, Defense) (D-35)

Secretary McNamara makes another trip to Saigon. His object should be to secure General Khanh's agreement to begin overt SVN action against the North. Publicly, his trip will be explained as the next in a logical series but particular emphasis will be placed on his on-the-spot review of the problems posed by increasing evidence of North Vietnamese involvement. McNamara reports to the President on his return.

3. Consultations with Thailand and the Philippines. (Action: State) (D-35)

Since it is hoped that the US will not be directly involved in the proposed actions we should, in the early stages, discuss them with as few third nations as possible. Depending upon the refinements of our ultimate plan of action and upon possible preparations for escalation, it may nevertheless be necessary to seek the consent of Thailand or of the Philippines to force deployments, staging or other activities. Some of the possibilities are these:

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The stationing of **additional forces** in Thailand (air defense and interdiction, **small ground forces**) for the purpose of deterring or **dealing with a possible escalation**.

The use of Thai **bases for attacks** upon Western DRV if that course is absolutely **essential** to military effectiveness.

Staging through **the Philippines**.

Possible use of **Philippine bases**.

If it is necessary to disclose the nature of the proposed action to the Thais, we should offer **them** assurances of protection in the event of **retaliation**.

4. Commence Deployment of Any Long Lead Time Items Described in Military Contingency Plans. (Action: JCS) (D-30)

Note: Include items **required** for Scenario III.

5. Consultations with Congress. (Action: White House) (D-20)

The President consults **with** a limited number of Congressional **leaders** and discloses that the US has been asked by General Khanh to **help the GVN** bring pressures on the **North** for the purpose of convincing Hanoi to cease its insurgency in the **South**. He discloses COMINT to **them** on a **confidential** basis and informs them that USG intends to give **SVN** covert **support** in these operations.

Note: Through this and the following scenario considerable **emphasis** is laid upon the usefulness of COMINT information to convince **sceptics** of the reality of DRV control. The government should take a **hard look at the** COMINT information to see if it really has the **significance** we have ascribed to it and how and to what extent public **disclosure** (either deliberately or by way of an unavoidable leak)

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would compromise US intelligence operations.

6. Khanh Speech. (Action: Defense, State) (D-20)

On his trip to Saigon, Mr. McNamara had carried with him some suggestions for a Khanh speech. As delivered, the speech details DRV activity, demands that that activity cease and threatens unspecified military actions against the North if DRV involvement continues, if possible on a justified retaliatory "tit for tat" basis as a just reprisal for DRV involvement. The speech also described the future of Indochina if Hanoi would cooperate. General Khanh foresees a period of two independent but separate Vietnams, gradually increasing peaceful contacts with each other, including SVN rice to the North followed by eventual reunification on a satisfactory basis.

Note: Consideration must be given to the manner in which DRV compliance will be defined and communicated. One alternative would be to demand the same type of specific compliance as that which would be required in the event of overt US pressures. See Scenario III. It might, however, be better to define compliance rather generally demanding only that the DRV "stop the aggression in the South." The hope would be that the pressures applied would discourage DRV involvement to a sufficient extent that counterinsurgency efforts would have a greater possibility of success.

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7. Commence Propaganda in the North. (Action: JCS, GVN, USIA) (D-19)

By radio, and leaflet drops, commence to publish Khanh's message in DRV. Continue as the SVN actions progress.

8. Public Release of Updated Jordan Report. (Action: State) (D-18)

For low key effect, the Jordan Report might be released at a State press conference. In answer to a question, the Secretary might indicate that the report fairly substantiates General Khanh's claims of DRV involvement. (The Secretary would not know precisely what military actions General Khanh had in mind.) For high key effect, release of the Report in a speech by the President, Secretary of State, or Secretary of Defense, should also be considered.

9. Discussions with Allies. (Action: State) (D-15)

We should release COMINT on DRV to certain allies and possibly certain other countries with the realization that this information might leak. At the same time, we might indicate that although General Khanh has not asked us to participate directly in his program, we understand his point and support him.

10. Offer Reassurances to Thailand and SVN. (Action: State) (D-15)

After the Khanh speech, there can be no harm in offering to protect Thailand from any ill-considered DRV retaliation in response to Khanh's efforts. GVN would already have been offered assurances in Secretary McNamara's initial visit and would know that air defense to SVN was on the way.

11. Second Presidential Consultation with Congress and Briefing of Public Opinion Leaders. (Action: White House) (D-10)

The President consults broader group of Congressional leaders,

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describes the gravity of the situation, makes full disclosure of COMINT and other evidence of DRV involvement and emphasizes need to support Khanh in his initiative. President indicates that General Khanh has requested and U.S. has agreed to supply air defense capability for SVN and that actions in that connection, as well as preparatory force deployments, are now in progress. President does not ask for formal action by Congress.

The President also gives a background briefing, including COMINT, to selected group of public leaders (editors, publishers, and Congressmen). Depending on timing, it might also be necessary to brief the Republican candidate.

12. Creation of SVN Air Defense Capability and Complete Deployment of Necessary Preparatory Forces. (Action: JCS) (D-8)

Military deployments will include whatever overt force changes are considered necessary by JCS to prepare for escalation and possible U.S. air cover for SVN action (e.g., deployment of task force 77 to South China Sea and air or ground forces to SVN or Thailand).

13. U.S. Communications with DRV (Action: State) (D-8)

The U.S. uses third country (i.e., Canada, UK or France) to transmit the message to Hanoi; while the U.S. deplores the need for the threatened actions, it understands their necessity and supports them. The U.S. also indicates particular interest in that part of

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Khanh's speech offering food to the North, and wondering if negotiations between North and South might be useful.

There might be some advantage in making similar communications to the Chicom.

14. President Informs the Public. (Action: White House) (D-5)

Now that destructive GVN action is imminent and US force deployments are being made openly, the US public should be informed what the US position is. The President might say at a press conference that he agrees with General Khanh's conclusions concerning DRV involvement and that we recognize the essential justice of the actions in the North and approve of and support them. He might add that, at General Khanh's request, the US is providing an air defense capability for Saigon, and that it would be foolish and dangerous for DRV to attempt to retaliate against the South.

15. Departure of American Dependents. (Action: White House) (D-5)

The President should announce the departure of American dependents from Saigon, but such a statement should be couched in terms which would not undercut confidence in the effectiveness of the air defense provided by the US.

16. Second Khanh Speech. (Action: State) (D-1)

On the assumption that no change has occurred in DRV attitude and behavior over the period of a few weeks, General Khanh makes a second speech and announces the commencement of GVN military action against DRV as a measure intended to force the North to cease the insurgency. The speech could come immediately after an appropriate incident -- i.e.,

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cutting of a rail line, killing of civilian or US personnel, or destruction of a POL depot -- and the attack would be described as justifiable SVN retaliation. Khanh stresses that the attack is directed not against innocent civilians but against the facilities used by DRV in its aggression against the South. SVN, he says, is repaying "acts of terror" with "acts of justice." General Khanh deplores the necessity for taking such action, as well as the situation which makes it necessary for SVN to send military force to the North instead of food and medicine.

17. First Targeted Attack. (Action: JCS, GVN) (D-Day)

The attack occurs as promptly as possible after General Khanh's speech, and the first group of attacks should be directed against targets which will have maximum psychological effect on the willingness of North Vietnamese officials to continue the insurgency. Such targets are:

(a) those concerned with their importing of raw materials, and (b) their newly established industrial plants. Under category (a) would come aerial mining of North Vietnamese port approaches and interruption of the two rail lines from South China. Under category (b) would come, as a first increment, a major POL installation (e.g., Vinh).

18. Additional Targeted Attacks and Khanh Statements. (Action: JCS, State, GVN) (D-Day to date DRV complies)

Additional air attacks (extended to other industrial and logis-

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tics targets) continue on a **sporadic -- and**, where advantageous, "tit for tat" -- basis accompanied by a call by General Khanh for a GVN/DRV meeting at Hue and a cessation of VC attacks. Attacks continue until compliance (reduction in level of insurgency, or successful conference) is obtained; and are recommenced in the event of a return of insurgency to a high level of activity. Counterinsurgency actions continue in SVN.

19. Problems of Compliance

It is not possible to predict with certainty what indicators would demonstrate the proven success of this course. If plain text signals, ordering the Viet Cong to cease their operations, were intercepted on their communications net, this might be significant, but not necessarily conclusive proof, even if it were followed by a visible cessation of Viet Cong operations. This could be a ruse.

Perhaps the only true indication would be the actual emergence of great numbers of Viet Cong from the underground with the expressed desire either to surrender or to be repatriated North. The latter request would be most unlikely, and again would have to be treated with suspicious reserve. On the other hand, a massive surrender program would seem a convincing demonstration of success.

20. Laos-Cambodia Actions. (Action: GVN, Thais) (After DRV Compliance)

If these measures succeed in reducing effective Viet Cong insurgency in South Viet Nam to a point which would prove manageable within the current resources of the Vietnamese Government, it is predictable that there would be a Viet Cong withdrawal to Cambodian

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and Laotian sanctuaries. At this point of time, however, the problem would take on new dimensions.

In Cambodia, we would be faced with a government and a prince who would be able to recognize that the Viet Cong insurgency had begun to ebb and that South Viet Nam was now a permanent feature of his neighborhood. We could anticipate in that instance, that he would have a much more forthcoming attitude towards the elimination of Viet Cong from Cambodian territory. We would expect the Vietnamese government to be able to make an arrangement with Sihanouk under which Viet Nam would recognize his ultimate territorial sovereignty, assure him against future depredations, and provide him with international sanctions for his state -- in exchange for cooperative operations, including cross-border action, for the purpose of eliminating Viet Cong bases of operation for his territory.

Laos, on the other hand would present a more complex problem. The territory along the Saigon-South Vietnamese frontier being what it is, and the so-called coalition government being so impotent, there would have to be a different approach. Essentially, the problem of the Laos infiltration zone is a problem which exists in the cordillera south of the 17th parallel and east of the Bolovens Plateau. It is in this area that attention needs to be given to the problem of cleaning up a Viet Cong sanctuary. The indicated solution, once the pressure on North Viet Nam has become demonstrably effective, would seem to be an understanding between South Viet Nam, Thailand, and the pro-Western

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forces in Laos to mount an operation to open up the traffic across Route 9 from Viet Nam to Thailand. This would be done by a two-pronged drive from east and west. The forces involved would be Thai and Vietnamese, encadred, however, and uniformed as FAR units. These forces would have the mission of clearing the terrain across Route 9, establishing a picket against further north-south traffic crossing that route, and eventually policing up the area all along the South Vietnamese border from the 17th parallel south. This action would then secure the Mekong River Valley not only against the east-west threat but also against north-south infiltration use. It would provide a buffer around Cambodia and would leave that state protected, but dependent upon the goodwill of its Thai and Vietnamese neighbors.

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POLITICAL/MILITARY SCENARIO III: CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR US
OVERT RESPONSE TO DRV/CHICOM REACTIONS TO SCENARIO II

ACTION	TIME	WHITE HOUSE	STATE	OSD	JCS	GVN
(0)	(0-30)					(See Action 4 in Scenario II)
1	D-10			Participate		Commence overt, low-level reconnaissance of DRV
2 & 3	D-5	President consults Congressional leaders; discloses intelligence (including COMINT) on DRV involvement in SVN, attacks on US installations and personnel; states need for retaliation; asks support and possible later Congressional resolution; indicates SEATO meeting	Call emergency meeting of SEATO Council, inform them of US intentions, and seek support and contributions (e.g., Thai/Philippine bases) (OSD/JCS participate)			
4 & 5	D-4	President (in public speech) details aggression from DRV (special intelligence?) and violations of 1954 & 1962 Geneva Agreements; declares that DRV must cease forthwith or the US will attack DRV at times and places of US choosing; points out that US is prepared for any contingency, that we have no objectives other than halting the DRV aggression		Participate		Commence visible deployment of substantial US forces (air/sea/ground) to SVN, Thailand, and South China Sea
6	D-3	Participate	-1) Contact ⁽⁶⁾ via third country; state generally type of compliance required -2) State privately to Soviets and Chicoms our objectives and warn against direct or indirect aid (air/SAM/trucks/POL) to DRV			
7,8,9	D-Day	President again speaks; refers to DRV failure to heed US warning; announces that US punitive actions will continue until compliance is obtained; that targets will not be civilians but DRV means of aggression	Justify military actions: -1) US mining and bombardment as affecting logistics to SVN -2) Air attacks as directed not at cities but at LOC, VC training areas and aggressive potential	Participate		Commence US destructive military actions, possibly including: -1) US mining of approaches to DRV ports -2) Naval bombardment of DRV -3) Air strikes against DRV
10	D-Day until compliance	Participate	Conference begins ⁴	Participate		US military actions continue and increase until DRV compliance and/or acceptable settlement is obtained Comparable military actions Military actions continue

1. As a complementary course, the President could say that the US is requesting an immediate UN Security Council meeting at which the US Ambassador (and General Khanh?) will present the case against the DRV.
2. The advantage of the advanced warning (possible face-saving DRV compliance) must be balanced against its risks (premature enemy disclosure of US intentions and consequent compromise of US initiative). Would a sufficient DRV compliance at this stage be a general, unpublicized reduction in the level of VC insurgency? Because of DRV/VC subterfuge and the scarcity of reliable indicators, defining and measuring DRV compliance will be difficult. Among the possibilities are: DRV/VC cease fire order; a significant reduction in the level of VC activity (as measured by MACV indicators?); actions diminishing VC capabilities (surrender and amnesty, weapons/communications turn ins); DRV/PL agreement to improve inspection procedures (US/GVN monitors at roads and airports in Laos/DRV).
3. Possible military actions might be in this ascending order, bringing ever increasing pressure on the DRV. But consider the advisability of making the initial US actions strong (e.g., a crippling air attack on a prized target, accompanied by overflights and leaflet drops) and allowing time to pass before a second attack were launched.
4. Though a conference may not be helpful in achieving US aims, international pressure will make it difficult to refuse one. At the conference the US must have a position on these questions, among others: continuation of military pressures during the conference if DRV does not comply; compromise of our compliance criteria in conference outcome (e.g., ICC vica US determination of compliance); overt US conference goals re permanent settlement (e.g., Geneva accords with better inspection); treatment of VC (amnesty? GVN free to hunt down holdouts?); provisions for reimposition of US pressure on VC; US military presence in SVN; GVN-DRV contacts (e.g., trade); political structure of DRV & SVN; treatment of Laos/Cambodia.

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SCENARIO III: CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR OVERT U.S. RESPONSE TO DRV/CHICOM REACTIONS TO SCENARIO II

The move from the previous scenario to this one can be made either suddenly or slowly, depending upon the array of military actions from which we choose. In other words, the U.S. could proceed slowly and logically from covert to overt support of SVN-sponsored actions or the U.S. might decide to move quickly and dramatically if international pressures had reached a dangerous point or if we wish to lend support to four-power conference in Geneva. In any event, the U.S. must be prepared to initiate the specific actions listed below if DRV or Chicom response to Scenario II requires direct U.S. response.

(0. U.S. Long Lead Time Deployments (Action: JCS) (D-30)

This action has already been referred to (See Action 4, Scenario II).)

1. Commence Overt Low Level Reconnaissance of DRV (Action: JCS) (D-10)

The purpose of this action is to suggest further destructive attacks and, at the same time, to obtain target information.

2. Presidential Conference with Congress (Action: White House) (D-5)

The President consults congressional leaders; discloses full intelligence on DRV involvement, including COMINT; reviews histories of attacks against U.S. installations and personnel in SVN; states necessity for retaliation directly against the North; and asks congressional support and possibly a congressional resolution to be announced at an appropriate time.

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3. SEATO Meeting (Action: State) (D-5)

An emergency SEATO meeting is held to inform the members of U.S. intentions and to seek their support and contributions. We may wish to deploy additional forces to Thailand and the Philippines both to provide additional air defense and for deterrent effect.

4. Presidential Speech (Action: White House) (D-4)

In public speech, the President describes the aggression from the North (intelligence disclosure?) and violations of 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements; declares U.S. determination that the aggression should cease; indicates U.S. intention to punish and deter aggression through U.S. attacks at times and places of our own choosing; and points out that U.S. forces in SEA are sufficient to deal with any contingency but that our sole objective is to suppress DRV aggression. (Consider taking offensive in UN and attempting to make our case there, as in the Cuba crisis.)

5. Commence Visible U.S. Force Build-up (Action: JCS) (D-4)

This force build-up would include interceptors and fighter bombers to Thailand and SVN; ground forces (perhaps a marine brigade) to Thailand and perhaps SVN; and one or two carrier task groups to the South China Sea. The deployment would be designed to warn the DRV of further U.S. actions and at the same time to deter possible DRV/Chicom air/ground responses to further U.S. actions.

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6. Contact With the DRV and Soviets/Chicom (Action: State) (D-3)

Convey to DRV U.S. demands which need to be satisfied in order to stop our action, expanding on points in Presidential speech. Make clear limited intentions and determinations. State actions we want taken by North and fact that compliance will have to be visible to us. Possibly identify some specific VC units we want to see comply with our demands.

As a supplement to what was said in the President's speech, state privately to the Soviets and Chicom our objectives and warn the Soviets and Chicom against support of the North either directly or by way of arms and logistics (SAM, interceptors, trucks, POL).

7. President Speaks Again (Action: White House) (D-Day)

The President again speaks; refers to DRV failure to heed U.S. warning; announces that U.S. punitive actions will continue until compliance is obtained; that targets will not be civilians but DRV means of aggression.

8. Attacks Commence (Action: JCS) (D-Day)

U.S. destructive military actions commence possibly including:

- a) Mining of approaches to DRV ports
- b) Naval bombardment of DRV
- c) Air strikes against DRV

9. Justification for U.S. Military Actions (Action: State) (D-Day)

U.S. military actions are justified to the world:

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- a) U.S. mining and bombardment as affecting logistics to SVN;
- b) Air attacks as directed not at cities but at LOC, VC training areas and aggressive potential.

10. Conference Activity (Action: State) (D-Day until compliance)

Conference begins in Geneva and U.S. action continues unless visible cessation of DRV action in South occurs. Note: The possibility should be considered of making the initial U.S. action strong, so as to permit some time to pass before second action is needed. If, as it should be, our measure of compliance is a reduction in the insurgency, rather than DRV promises, it is possible that military pressures might have to be continued over a period of several months and perhaps even longer. We will have to be prepared to deal with the international pressures which might build up during this period.

The following are some of the questions with which we must be prepared to deal at a conference and upon which we must prepare a position:

Our overt goal.

Geneva Accords brought up to date?
Better ICC?
Cessation of logistic support?
Reduction of VC insurgency?

The problem of dealing with the VC.

Will there be an amnesty?
Will we insist that the GVN be free to hunt down the holdouts?

Provisions for reimposing military pressures:

U.S. military presence in GVN?

Controls on indigenous forces?

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GVN-DRV diplomatic and other contacts.

North-South trade?

Treatment of Laos and Cambodia.

Conference reaches acceptable settlement or US actions
continue and increase.

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Mr. Michael Forrestal

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 92-215

By ju, NARA, Date 12-6-93

23 APR 1964

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SVN.
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Scenario
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Draft Scenarios for Recommendation 12 (NSAM 288)

Attached are three draft scenarios (each in tabular and narrative form) for Recommendation No. 12 in NSAM 288:

- Tab I. "Uncommitting" steps which should be taken now
(a) Chart (b) Narrative
- Tab II. GVN/Farngate graduated overt military pressures on DRV
(a) Chart (b) Narrative
- Tab III. Contingency Plan for US overt response to DRV/Chicom reactions to Scenario II
(a) Chart (b) Narrative

It should be noted that carrying out Scenario I does not necessarily commit the US to commence Scenario II; and that Scenario II may be carried out without requiring resort to Scenario III. However, since Scenario II cannot be launched without our being prepared to carry out Scenario III, you should assume that it may be necessary for the D-Day of Scenario III to occur as soon as 10 days after the D-Day of Scenario II. Scenario III is a contingency plan of action which we would contemplate putting into effect only if the DRV's or Chicom's reaction to Scenario II was judged by the President to require overt US response.

I would appreciate your comments on these scenarios -- particularly on the suggested military actions and the sequence and timing of actions within the scenario. Also I would appreciate your comments on military factors (such as weather) affecting the choice of time when Scenario II could most effectively be begun.

Signed
ROBERT S. McNAMARA

Attachments
(As stated above)

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJL 92-215
By ju, NARA, Date 12-6-93

JCSM-422-64
16 MAY 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Draft Scenarios for Recommendation 12
(NSAM 288) (U)

1. Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 23 April 1964, subject as above. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the draft scenarios and provide the following comments.

2. It is noted that subject scenarios do not follow the guidance contained in Recommendation 12 of NSAM 288. Specifically, the scenarios do not treat border control operations or retaliatory operations. In contrast, military planning by COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been made to conform to all three categories of action in Recommendation 12. It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the subject scenarios should be made to conform likewise.

3. With reference to Scenario III, the title connotes US reaction to DRV/CHICOM actions, while the substance of the scenario deals with US initiated actions which, in effect, are a continuation and expansion of Scenario II to achieve the objectives. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered overt US operations against North Vietnam (NVN) to be beyond the terms of reference but recognize the possibility of such an eventuality. In this case, operations could be launched against NVN almost immediately with forces that would have been prepositioned to deter enemy reaction.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the draft scenarios are used as a means of directing additional studies (paragraph 11, page 4), investigating new concepts (picket across Laos, pages 14, 15), and dealing with the range of possible enemy reactions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the purpose of the politico-military scenario(s) should be to indicate the coordinated and time-phased actions of all appropriate US Government agencies and the Government of Vietnam necessary to implement Recommendation 12, NSAM 288. Allied studies and new concepts should be separate actions.

Vietnam 381

16 Jan 64

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5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the military operations against the DRV to help stabilize the situation in the Republic of Vietnam, and other operations planned to help stabilize the situation in Laos, involve the attack of the same target systems and to a considerable extent the same targets. Assistance in the achievement of the objective in the Republic of Vietnam through operations against NVN could likewise have a similar result in Laos, offering the possibility of a favorable long-term solution to the insurgency problem in Southeast Asia.

6. A listing of military actions in support of Recommendation 12 has been prepared which should be a part of restructured politico-military scenarios in substitution for those contained in the scenarios under consideration. The listing is attached as Appendix A hereto. Due to the interrelationship of the political and military actions, it is suggested that an interagency ad hoc working group is the most feasible means of accomplishing expeditiously the revision. Timing of all actions has not been indicated in Appendices A and B hereto because of this interrelationship, although where purely military matters are involved, such as deployment times, timing has been indicated. Detailed comments on the draft scenarios are contained in Appendix B hereto.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are reviewing the military factors which affect the choice of time when Scenario II could most effectively be begun. A reply on this matter will be forwarded separately. The climatology of North and South Vietnam has been investigated and the results are contained in Appendix C hereto.

8. In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. The draft scenarios be withdrawn and that new scenarios based on the foregoing be constructed by an ad hoc interagency planning group.

b. A calendar of agreed readiness dates be established, to include a date for the completion of Scenario I actions (uncommitting steps) as well as the planning action in subparagraph a, above.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Signed

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachments

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APPENDIX A

MILITARY ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF RECOMMENDATION 12 (NSAM 288)

SCENARIO 1 - UNCOMMITTING STEPS WHICH SHOULD BE TAKEN NOW

1. Complete planning and coordination with RVNAF for contemplated actions. 1
2. Take steps to develop plausible cover for introduction of B-57 into RVN (FARM GATE). 2
3. Perfect VNAF aerial mining capabilities. 3
4. Develop FARM GATE aerial mining capabilities. 4
5. Expedite RVNAF training, re-equipping programs and force level increases. 5
6. Be prepared to move participating and to alert deterrent forces. 6
7. Increase intelligence watch of DRV, Laos, Cambodia and Communist China, to include aerial reconnaissance. 7
8. Perfect procedure for timely implementation of retaliatory operations. 8

SCENARIO II - BORDER CONTROL, (BEYOND RECOMMENDATION 11),

RETALIATORY ACTIONS AND OVERT MILITARY PRESSURES AGAINST NVN.

A. Border Control Actions. (72 Hour Notice):

1. Direct CINCPAC to undertake border control operations (approximately five-ten days advance notice required for battalion-size or larger operations). 16
- a. RVNAF conducts hot pursuit of VC forces moving across the Cambodian border and Laos border. 17
- b. RVNAF destroys VC bases on Vietnam/Cambodian line. 18
- c. RVNAF attacks selected targets in Laos. 19
- d. US conducts high and low-level reconnaissance of Laos and Cambodia with FARM GATE, USAF and USN aircraft. 20
- e. Airlift and air resupply beyond the capability of the VNAF. 21
- f. Advisor support. 22

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2. Alert appropriate forces. 1
 - B. Retaliatory Actions. (72-Hour Notice): 2
 1. Direct CINCPAC to undertake retaliatory actions (approx- 3
imately 10 days advance notice required for platoon or company 4
size airborne and amphibious operations; 30 days notice re- 5
quired for battalion-size or larger operations). 6
 - a. RVNAF/FARM GATE conducts tit-for-tat air operations 7
against selected targets. 8
 - b. RVNAF amphibious/airborne commando raids. 9
 - c. Aerial mining by VNAF, FARM GATE or USN from 10
aircraft carrier or combination. 11
 - d. Overt high and low-level reconnaissance of NVN by 12
FARM GATE, USAF and USN and low-level by VNAF. 13
 2. Alert appropriate forces. 14
 - C. Graduated Military Pressures Against NVN 15
 1. Direct CINCPAC to undertake graduated plausibly 16
deniable military operations against North Vietnam (approx- 17
imately 12 days notice required, less if a decision is made to 18
delay or withhold deployment of ground forces). 19
 - a. RVNAF and FARM GATE, including B-57s, conduct attacks 20
against selected military and industrial targets in NVN. 21
 - b. Continue reconnaissance. 22
- SCENARIO III - EXPANDED US MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST NVN 23
(BEYOND NSAM 288) 24
1. Be prepared to implement CINCPAC OPLANS 32, 33 or 99. 25
- Forces are in position expeditiously to: 26
- a. Expand air strikes against NVN. 27
 - b. Undertake naval bombardment of NVN. 28
 - c. Air and surface harassment of maritime traffic 29
in South China Sea and Gulf of Tonkin. 30
 - d. Naval quarantine of NVN. 31

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APPENDIX B

COMMENTS ON DRAFT SCENARIOS

1. Suggest a statement of the objective at the outset. 1
2. The term "COMINT" appears throughout. A broader and 2
possibly more suitable term is "intelligence." 3
3. Page 4, paragraph 9, suggest deletion and substitution 4
of the following: 5
 "9. Military Steps (Action: JCS)" 6
 - a. Complete planning and coordination with RVNAF for 7
contemplated actions. 8
 - b. Take steps to develop plausible cover for intro- 9
duction of B-57 into RVN (FARM GATE). 10
 - c. Perfect VNAF aerial mining capabilities. 11
 - d. Develop FARM GATE aerial mining capabilities. 12
 - e. Expedite RVNAF training, re-equipping programs 13
and force level increases. 14
 - f. Be prepared to move participating and to alert 15
deterrent forces. 16
 - g. Increase intelligence watch of DRV, Laos, 17
Cambodia and Communist China, to include aerial 18
reconnaissance. 19
 - h. Perfect procedure for timely implementation of 20
retaliatory operations." 21

REASON: For a more complete indication of uncommitting 22
military steps. 23
4. Page 4, paragraph 11, suggest deletion. 24
 REASON: To orient the thrust of the scenarios to 25
implementation of Recommendation 12. 26
5. Scenario II, paragraphs 4 and 12, suggest deletion 27
and substitution of the following, renumbering accordingly: 28

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- "4. Military Actions. (Military operations which cannot be undertaken within time limitations are noted.)
- a. Border Control Actions (72-Hour Notice):
- (1) Direct CINCPAC to undertake border control operations (approximately five-ten days advance notice required for battalion-size or larger operations).
- (a) RVNAF conducts hot pursuit of VC forces moving across the Cambodian border and Laos border.
- (b) RVNAF destroys VC bases on Vietnam/Cambodian line.
- (c) RVNAF attacks selected targets in Laos.
- (d) US conducts high and low level reconnaissance of Laos and Cambodia with FARM GATE, USAF and USN aircraft.
- (e) Airlift and air resupply beyond the capability of the VNAF.
- (f) Advisor support.
- (2) Alert appropriate forces.
- b. Retaliatory Actions (72-Hour Notice):
- (1) Direct CINCPAC to undertake retaliatory actions (approximately ten days advance notice required for platoon or company size airborne and amphibious operations; 30 days notice required for battalion-size or larger operations).
- (a) RVNAF/FARM GATE conducts tit-for-tat air operations against selected targets.
- (b) RVNAF amphibious/airborne commando raids.
- (c) Aerial mining by VNAF, FARM GATE or USN from aircraft carrier or combination.
- (d) Overt high and low level reconnaissance of NVN by FARM GATE, USAF and USN and low level by VNAF.

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(2) Alert appropriate forces.

c. Graduated Military Pressures Against NVN.

(1) Direct CINCPAC to undertake graduated plausibly deniable military operations against North Vietnam (approximately 12 days notice required, less if a decision is made to delay or withhold deployment of ground forces).

(a) RVNAF and FARM GATE, including B-57s, conduct attacks against selected military and industrial targets in NVN.

(b) Continue reconnaissance."

REASON: For a more complete and accurate listing of military actions.

6. Page 11, paragraph 15, suggest shifting chart entry to "State."

REASON: Evacuation of dependents is a State Department responsibility.

7. Page 12, paragraphs 17 and 18, recommend deletion and substitution of the following, renumbering accordingly:

"17. Target Systems for Recommendation 12 Actions

a. Border Control

(1) Target area for GVN/Laos border control will encompass an area from Route 8 in central Laos, South to the Cambodian border; and include that portion and road network of the Eastern Laos panhandle which is under Pathet Lao control and is used by the Viet Cong for transit into SVN.

(2) Targets in Laos for air strike by GVN forces under this category of action include highway bridges, barracks/storage areas, selected airfields, and armed recce against road routes.

(3) Transitory targets of opportunity for ground and/or air strikes by GVN forces will be selected

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from current intelligence or intelligence obtained through low-level photo reconnaissance. Targets will include convoy or troop movements over suspect infiltration routes, regrouping and rest areas, trans-shipment supply dumps and vehicle parks, and training areas.

(4) Transitory targets in the RVN/Cambodia border area will be selected from current intelligence including intelligence obtained from low-level photo reconnaissance when authorized, which identifies Viet Cong troop movements over suspect infiltration routes, regrouping and rest areas, supply dumps, and training areas.

b. Retaliatory

(1) The plan includes targets for air strike on a tit-for-tat basis by GVN/FARM GATE forces against targets in North Vietnam. Targets are selected for psychological impact on DRV. Selected target categories include POL storage, selected airfields, barracks/training areas, railroad and highway bridges, railroad yards, port facilities, communication facilities, and armed recce against road and rail routes and infiltration routes.

(2) Targets include military objectives located near DMZ and along coastal areas in ascending order from the DMZ to 20° North. Categories include barracks/training areas, bridges, port facilities, airfields, and radar sites. Routes 7, 8, and 12 in North Vietnam are included for airborne infiltration to interdict lines of communication and harass logistic traffic.

(3) The plan includes port facility targets in North Vietnam for aerial mining by GVN aircraft (possibly with US assistance).

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c. Graduated Overt Military Pressures. This category of action includes air attacks against military and possibly industrial targets. Targets include an expansion of the same target categories as in retaliatory operations with the addition of industrial targets."

REASON: To present a more accurate indication of target systems.

8. Page 14, paragraph on "Laos", second sentence, suggest amending as follows:

"The territory along the Saigon-South-Vietnamese Laos-RVN frontier . . ."

REASON: Accuracy.

9. Page 15, recommend deletion of the concept of a picket across Laos in view of the comment in paragraph 4, basic memorandum. In addition, initial investigation indicates that a picket across Laos would be of limited effectiveness and desirability in view of the operations that have taken place. It is probable that such an operation could not be undertaken while the coalition Government of National Union is still in being. Also, the availability of Thai forces for this purpose is problematical. It is considered that US objectives, broader than the clearing of southern Laos, may be appropriate.

10. Scenario III. Suggest changing the title to the following:

"U.S. Overt Operations Against North Vietnam."

REASON: To orient the course of action to one of US initiative, if required, to achieve the objective.

11. Page 16, general paragraph. In view of comments in paragraph 3, basic memorandum, suggest amending as follows:

"Although beyond the terms of reference (NSAM 288), it may be necessary to exert pressures beyond those provided for in Scenario II to achieve US objectives. Overt use of

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US forces would then be required as well as other measures
involving the population, the Congress and the GVN."

12. Page 16, paragraphs 0, 1, 5, and 8, suggest deletion,
together with the chart entries, and substituting the
following, renumbering accordingly:

"Expanded US Military Actions Against NVN.

Be prepared to implement CINCPAC OPLANS 32, 33 or

99. Forces are in position expeditiously to:

a. Expand air strikes against NVN.

b. Undertake naval bombardment of NVN.

c. Air and surface harassment of maritime traffic
in South China Sea and Gulf of Tonkin.

d. Naval quarantine of NVN."

REASON: To reflect follow-on military actions, if
required.

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APPENDIX C

WEATHER OF NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM

1. General Climatology 1
 - a. Two main influences determine the weather in this area: 2
 - (1) Monsoonal air circulation (northeast winds in 3
winter, southwest in summer). 4
 - (2) Local topography 5

To these might be added a third during autumn - destructive 6
typhoons entering North Vietnam (NVN). 7

 - b. There are two main seasons: 8
 - (1) The winter season, or northeast monsoon period, 9
is the dry season. 10
 - (2) The summer season, or southwest monsoon period, 11
is the wet season. 12
 - c. The terms "wet" and "dry" are generalities. Excep- 13
tions are due principally to mountain terrain effects. The 14
intervals between seasons are transition periods. The date 15
of onset of each major season varies by about one month 16
from the extreme North to the extreme South. 17
2. North Vietnam 18
 - a. Winter (Northeast Monsoon). The average date of onset 19
of this season in North Vietnam is 15 September. Winter is 20
a period of minimum cloudiness and rainfall over the interior 21
and North portions of the country. Along the coastland low- 22
lands, however, a phenomenon known as "Crachin" - low cloudi- 23
ness with widespread fog and drizzle or light rain-sets in in 24
late December and lasts intermittently into April. February 25
and March are the worst months for this type of weather. 26
Over Hanoi and the coastal areas "Crachin" will hinder 27
visual aerial reconnaissance efforts for prolonged periods 28
and will degrade air strikes into North Vietnam. Relatively 29

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low temperatures, humidity, and rainfall during the winter 1
favor ground operations. 2

b. Summer (Southwest Monsoon). The average date of onset 3
of this season in North Vietnam is 1 June. This is the season 4
of maximum rainfall, cloudiness, temperature, and humidity. 5
All of these conditions become worse as the summer progresses. 6
Precipitation is showery and heavy and there are frequent 7
thunderstorms. Except in the showers, cloud bases run 2,000 - 8
2,500 feet over low lying terrain. Cloud bases in mountain 9
foothills however, are often too low to allow air-ground 10
support operations by attack aircraft. Photo or visual 11
reconnaissance must be largely limited to low-level opera- 12
tions because of the high percentage of daytime cloudiness. 13
North Vietnam is most subject to typhoons during the seasonal 14
transition period of September and early October. Other 15
military problems associated with summer weather are troop 16
morale and welfare; protection of equipment and supplies 17
against rust, rot, and mildew; limitations on mobility 18
caused by extensive flooding, untraffickable roads; and 19
disease. 20

3. South Vietnam 21

a. Winter. The average date of onset of this season in 22
South Vietnam is 15 October. The winter months offer the 23
most favorable conditions for nearly all military operations 24
in South Vietnam, since general weather conditions of least 25
cloudiness, rainfall, and humidity prevail. Furthermore, 26
except for the central coastal region, the area is not 27
subject to the effects of "Crachin" weather on low-level 28
air operations. 29

b. Summer. The average date of onset of this season 30
in South Vietnam is 1 May. The weather is similar to that 31
described for North Vietnam, except even hotter. A plus 32

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

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6/25
J. S. S. S.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Authorization of Combined US/GVN Planning and Training
for Cross-border Operations from South Vietnam into Laos

NSAM 288 of 17 March 1964 authorized, among other things, South Vietnamese ground operations into Laos for border control purposes (Recommendation 11) and also directed preparation of a full range of Laotian border control actions (Recommendation 12).

Unilateral U. S. planning has been completed for both covert and overt cross-border operations into Laos and for a full range of Laotian border control actions. The essential US/GVN negotiations, planning and training to attain the desired state of readiness for these operations have not been initiated, except for limited covert intelligence collection patrols authorized into Laos.

In view of the present situation in Laos and South Vietnam, it is recommended that you now authorize such negotiations with the GVN and such combined US/GVN planning and training as is necessary to achieve a state of readiness to conduct cross-border operations from South Vietnam into Laos in the event a decision is made to initiate such actions. This would not involve any commitment to carry out such operations.

2 Enclosures

- A. DJSM-1069-64
25 June 1964 (copy 1)
- B. JCSM-541-64
24 June 1964 (copy R-3 ISA Ser)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-215
By ju, NARA, Date 12-6-93

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Page 1 of 1 Pages



THE JOINT STAFF

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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DJSM-1069-64
25 June 1964


MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ISA)

Subject: Military Planning in Support of NSAM 288

Reference: JCSM 541-64, 22 June 1964

1. In response to your verbal request, briefs of CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64, CINCPAC OPLAN 98-64 and CINCPAC OPLAN 98A-64 are attached. The former plan was prepared as a direct result of the approval of the recommendations of NSAM 288. Supporting plans have been prepared by CINCPAC component commanders. The latter two plans were prepared by COMUSMACV and are, in effect, supporting plans of OPLAN 37-64.

2. It is noted that the request by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the referenced paper for authority to plan and train with the GVN forces was not limited to border control operations.


J. W. DAVIS
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 92-215

By fw, NARA, Date 12-6-93

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OPLAN 98-64

Plan Title: COMUSMACV OPLAN 98-64, COVERT CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS INTO LAOS

Mission: This plan provides for expanding RVN covert cross-border operations into Laos south of the 17th Parallel. The operations are designed to obtain positive evidence of communist use of Laos and an infiltration route into RVN and to disrupt such infiltration. The operations are covert to the extent that no RVN or US uniforms will be worn and equipment will be sanitized to allow plausible denial of responsibility by RVN and the US. No US Military personnel will participate outside the limits of RVN.

Concept of Operations: The covert operations will penetrate the Laos-RVN border at multiple places south of the demilitarized zone. Penetrations by ground forces will be initially in vicinity of known or suspected border crossing points and along suspected infiltration routes. Operations will include:


1. Aggressive ground patrolling by I and II Corps and maximum air reconnaissance and photographs as can be provided by RLAF and sanitized aircraft.
2. Combat patrols of half-squad to platoon size to take prisoners; attack targets of opportunity; set up ambushes; lay mines; conduct sabotage; propagandize villagers.
3. Planned attacks by units of appropriate size against targets located by any source of intelligence. Air strikes by RLAF may be arranged and patrols may be delivered by sanitized aircraft.

The operations are divided into four categories determined by distance in Laos from the RVN border. Category I, border / 15 km; II, border / 30 km; III, border / 50-60 km; and IV, beyond 50-60 km requiring coordination with CAS Vientiane.

Forces: This plan can be implemented using in-country resources.

Reaction Time: CINCPAC has estimated that Category I actions (Border / 15 km) could commence immediately after necessary US/GVN negotiations and joint US/GVN planning and training is completed. Limited intelligence collection patrols involving four 8 man teams were launched on 24 and 25 June into the vicinity of Tchepone.

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
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TARGET KEY - KNOWN TARGETS
OPLAN 98

-  MILITARY AREA
-  MILITARY INSTALLATION
-  TROOP CONCENTRATION
-  LIAISON STATION
-  BRIDGE

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OPLAN 98A-64 (Old 34B-64)

Plan Title: COMUSMACV OPLAN 98A-64, OVERT CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS INTO LAOS

Mission: This is a unilateral US plan for expanding RVN cross-border operations into Laos to a depth of approximately 50 kilometers to obtain positive evidence of communist use of Laos as an infiltration route into RVN, and to disrupt such operations. US Military personnel will accompany RVN forces in a non-combatant, advisory capacity.


Concept of Operations: Operations generally fall into three categories: Reconnaissance/Intelligence; Interdiction/Attrition/Assault, and Psychological. They will penetrate the Laos-RVN border at multiple selected places south of the demilitarized zone; shallow at first but continuing to increase in depth, size and activity. Ground forces will penetrate the area by land, helicopter or air drop. The operations will include:

1. Aggressive and continuous ground and air reconnaissance to locate and provide intelligence.
2. Ground combat patrols varying from squad to company.
3. Armed VNAF patrols to attack enemy targets of opportunity.
4. Planned combat action by units of appropriate size against targets produced by any source of intelligence.
5. Concurrent psychological operations.

Forces: GVN existing in-country resources are adequate.

Reaction Time: Initial operations could be launched within 5 days on the assumption that the necessary US/GVN agreements had been reached and joint US/GVN planning and training had been undertaken.

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DEMARICATION
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- TARGET KEY**
OPLAN 98A
- KNOWN
 - TARGET
 - SUSPECTED
 - STORAGE AREA
 - TROOP INSTALLATION
 - BORDER CROSSING POINT
 - STAGING AREA
 - LIAISON STATION

48-12
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II

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TAB B

CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64

1. MISSION - PACOM forces will support or participate with RVN forces in the conduct of graduated operations to eliminate or reduce to negligible proportions DRV support of VC insurgency in the Republic of Vietnam, in the following categories:

a. Control or curtailment of VC activity on or through RVN/Laos and RVN/Cambodia borders;

b. Selective retaliatory actions by RVN forces against North Vietnam; and

c. Expanded military pressures by both US and RVN forces against North Vietnam.

Concurrently, PACOM will assume a strategic posture in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, to the degree necessary to deter enemy reaction to the operations set forth above, and to ensure a high level of readiness for expanded operations should the military situation escalate.

2. OBJECTIVES

a. The national objective of the United States in the Republic of Vietnam is to develop an independent non-communist Republic of Vietnam which can maintain internal security and eliminate or control insurgent elements.

b. The military actions discussed herein are designed to achieve a political objective which can be cast in terms of eliminating North Vietnamese control and direction of insurgency in South Vietnam. In practical terms it is directed toward eliminating Viet Cong cadres now operating in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

c. The military objectives of operations contemplated in this plan are to:

(1) Demonstrate to the people of Southeast Asia concrete evidence of US national determination and willingness to take military action against the forces of communism in support of the Republic of Vietnam.

(2) Convince the DRV and the CHICOM unequivocally of the US and GVN capability to execute effective military actions against the North Vietnamese homeland, and to effectively deal with any retaliation or escalation resultant from our actions.

(3) Cause cessation of DRV support of VC insurgency in the Republic of Vietnam by:

(a) Eliminating the privileged sanctuaries and interdicting supply/reinforcement routes of the VC in Laos and Cambodia.

(b) Disrupting selected portions of the DRV military, logistic, and economic structure in North Vietnam.

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(4) Concomitantly establish an adequate strategic posture and readiness for the conduct of US offensive and defensive actions in the event of DRV/CHICOM retaliation or major aggression resulting from US/GVN operations conducted under this plan.

3. CONCEPT

a. This is a capabilities plan which provides for military operations by PACOM forces, in support of and in coordination with GVN military operations. The operations will be directed at VC, their bases and infiltration routes in Laos and Cambodia and against North Vietnam. They are envisaged under conditions short of general war. They have been developed for bilateral action by the United States and GVN, primarily the latter, but may include limited participation or support by the nationals of third countries and the governments thereof.

b. This plan is consistent with the concept that to halt North Vietnamese control, direction and support of the VC insurgency in South Vietnam, efforts should be directed at VC and Communist sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia and against North Vietnam.

c. Military operations envisaged in this plan are designed to provide for a sequential implementation of categories of actions, and of actions within these categories. However, while these actions may be executed in a step-by-step sequence, they can also be executed selectively out of sequence, or in combination, provided the US/GVN military deterrent and contingency posture has achieved the appropriate level.

d. Operations are divided into three categories of operation:

(1) Border Control Operations - These are to be conducted by GVN forces with US and FARMGATE aerial recce, airlift, and advisor support. They embrace expansion of authority to permit low level reconnaissance as a supplement to currently approved high-level reconnaissance; limited incursions by GVN patrol forces into Laos which can be expanded to include US advisors and if beyond RVNAF capabilities, US airlift and aerial resupply; hot pursuit of VC forces moving across the Cambodian border; destruction of VC bases on Vietnam Cambodian line and finally, air and ground strikes by GVN forces against selected targets in Laos.

(2) Retaliatory Actions - These are to be executed by GVN and FARMGATE forces and are "tit-for-tat" retaliatory actions with US aerial recce and other support. They are directed against NVN. They embrace overt high and/or low level reconnaissance by US and FARMGATE aircraft; retaliatory bombing strikes and commando raids by GVN forces against selected NVN military targets such as communications centers, training camps, and infiltration routes, coupled with aerial mining by GVN aircraft of major NVN ports. The aerial mining may be conducted with US assistance. Certain US deployment repositioning will be required to achieve an adequate strategic posture.

(3) Graduated Overt Military Pressures by GVN and US Forces - These are envisaged as going beyond the "tit-for-tat" basis. They will include air attacks against NVN military, and possibly industrial, targets by utilizing

the combined resources of GVN Air Force, FARMGATE, augmented by B-57s from Clark AB. Additionally, prior to implementation it will be necessary to provide some additional air defense for RVN and to ready US forces in the Pacific for escalation, or for expanded offensive operations against NVN.

4. TARGETS

a. Target lists are included under the following three categories of action:

(1) Border Control

(a) Target area for GVN/Laos border control will encompass an area from Route 8 in central Laos, South to the Cambodian border; and include that portion and road network of the Eastern Laos panhandle which is under Pathet Lao control and is used by the Viet Cong for transit into SVN.

(b) Targets in Laos for air strike by GVN forces under this category of action include highway bridges, barracks/storage areas, selected airfields, and armed recce against road routes.

(c) Transitory targets of opportunity for ground and/or air strikes by GVN forces in the GVN/Laos border area are not included. These targets will be selected from current intelligence or intelligence obtained through low level photo reconnaissance when authorized by this plan. Targets will include convoy or troop movements over suspect infiltration routes, regrouping and rest areas, transshipment supply dumps and vehicle parks, and training areas.

(d) Transitory targets in the RVN/Cambodia border area will be selected from current intelligence or intelligence obtained from low level photo reconnaissance when authorized, which identifies Viet Cong troop movements over suspect infiltration routes, regrouping and rest areas, supply dumps and training areas.

(2) Retaliatory

(a) The plan includes targets for air strike on a tit-for-tat basis by GVN forces against targets in North Vietnam. Targets are selected for psychological impact on DRV and for positive identification by GVN crews on each military objective. Selected target categories include POL storage, selected airfields, barracks/training areas, railroad and highway bridges, railroad yards, port facilities, communication facilities, and armed recce against road and rail routes and infiltration routes.

(b) The plan includes targets for commando raids by GVN forces against selected targets in North Vietnam. Targets include military objectives located near DMZ and along coastal areas in ascending order from the DMZ to 20° North. Categories include barracks/training areas, bridges, port facilities, airfields and radar sites. Routes 7, 8 and 12 in North Vietnam are included for airborne infiltration to interdict lines of communication and harass logistic traffic.

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(c) The plan includes port facility targets in North Vietnam for aerial mining by GVN aircraft (possibly with US assistance).

(3) Graduated Overt Military Pressures. This category of action includes air attacks against military and possibly industrial targets. Targets include an expansion of the same target categories as in Category 2 with the addition of industrial targets.

b. Targets by Category follow:

(1) Air Strike Targets, Laos, North of 17th Parallel	6
Air Strike Targets, Laos, South of 17th Parallel	8
(2) Air Strike North Vietnam	23
Armed Recce Routes	16
Commando	14
Aerial Mining	6
(3) Airfields	6
POL	5
LOC	7
Rail Routes	2
Military Installations	25
Industrial Targets	<u>14</u>
TOTAL	132

5. FORCES

a. In all cases US forces which are required to conduct the actions are characterized as modest. They include the FARMGATE squadron, aerial reconnaissance units, a B-57 Tactical Bomber capability, US Army Special Forces Units, US Military Advisors to various Vietnamese units, portions of an Attack Carrier Air Wing, plus a US submarine and/or destroyer type for lifeguard/or early warning purposes. The bulk of US force involvement is in maintaining an appropriate strategic posture. Force requirements consider both those necessary to conduct the envisaged operations and those necessary to adopt the appropriate deterrent posture and enhance readiness in event of escalation. Force requirements are presented in the following categories:

(1) US and GVN forces required to conduct the envisaged operations, which are on hand in or adjacent to Southeast Asia.

(2) Additional PACOM/CONUS forces which are required to conduct envisaged operations.

(3) Total US and GVN forces required in the area of operations in order to conduct the actions.

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(4) PACOM/CONUS forces which should be pre-positioned in the area of operations to provide the necessary deterrent and to enhance readiness in event of escalation.

(5) Additional PACOM/CONUS forces which should be placed in an alert status in the event the conduct of actions results in a DRV/CHICOM offensive reaction.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in approving OPLAN 37-64 noted the planned deployment of ground forces and while recognizing the desirability of such measures for planning purposes, anticipated that circumstances may justify initiation of certain Category 3 actions prior to or without deployment of such forces.

c. Abbreviated force Tabs for CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64 are contained in the Enclosure.

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FORCES

CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64

CATEGORY 1 - US and RVN Forces Border Control Force Requirement

RVN FORCES

Present Location

Planned Location

Reaction Time

Air

1 TAC Recce Sq	TSN	TSN	In Place
1 TAC Fighter Sq, T-28	Nha Trang.	Nha Trang	In Place
2 TAC Fighter Sq, A1-H	Bien Hoa	Bien Hoa	In Place
3 Helo Sqdn, UH-34D	TSN	TSN	In Place
2 Troop Carrier Sq, C-47	TSN	TSN	In Place

Ground

2 Gps, Special Forces	III CTZ	I/II CTZ	72 Hours
10 Bns, Ranger	Various	Various	In Place
42 Sep. COs. Ranger	Various	Various	In Place
6 Bns Airborne	III CTZ	III CTZ	In Place
64 Strike Force COs, CIDG	Various	Various	In Place
ARVN & Marine, As req.	Various	Various	In Place

Enclosure
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Category 1 (continued)

US FORCES

USAF

1 TAC Recce Sq RF-101, RB-57	TSN	TSN	In Place
3 Troop Carrier Sq C-123	TSN/DA NANG	TSN/DA NANG	In Place
1 Air Commando Sq	Bien Hoa	Bien Hoa	In Place

US Navy & Marine

1 Helo Sq, med, UH-34	Da Nang	Da Nang	In Place
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US Army

Special Forces

1 C Det	Nha Trang	Nha Trang	In Place
1 C Det (mod)	Saigon	Saigon	In Place
4 B Det	Various	Various	In Place
37 A Det	Various	Various	In Place
9 AVN/UTT, CH-21	Various	Various	In Place
AVN COS, UH-1B U-1A CV-2			

Enclosure
to TAB B

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Category 1 (continued)

PACOM/CONUS Forces which should be prepositioned as deterrent and to enhance readiness in case of escalation.

U. S. Navy

1 VAP Det RA-3B

GUAM

CUBI

12 Hours

Forces to be Alerted

USAF - DEFCON 3

1 TAC Recce Task Force

Kadena or Misawa

TSN/Don Muang

24 Hours

1 Recce Task Force

CONUS

Kadena/Misawa

72 Hours

1 TAC Fighter Sq (-)

Clark

Takhli

12 Hours

1 TAC Fighter Sq

CONUS

Clark

72 Hours

1 Fighter Interceptor
Sq

Clark

TSN/Da Nang

12 Hours

US Navy-Marine - DEFCON 3

1 CVA Gp

WESTPAC

South China Sea

48 Hours

1 VA Det, A-1H

WESTPAC

South China Sea, aboard CVA

12 Hours

TG 76.5 (Ready Amph Gp/
Spcl Land Force)

WESTPAC

South China Sea

48 Hours

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FORCES

CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64

CATEGORY 2 - Retaliatory Actions

GVN - Additive Forces Required

Navy

Amphibious Shipping

Various

Various

In Place

Patrol & Escort Vessels

US FORCES

USAF

1 TAC Recce Task Force, Kadena/Misawa
RF-101

TSN/Don Muang

24 hours

Navy

1 VAP Det

Cubi

CVA/Cubi

In Place

PACOM/CONUS Forces which should be prepositioned for deterrent and to enhance readiness in event of escalation.

USAF

1 Recce Task Force,
RF-101

CONUS

Kadena/Misawa

72 Hours

1 TAC Fighter Sq

Clark

Takhli

12 Hours

1 TAC Fighter Sq

CONUS

Clark

72 Hours

1 Fighter Intercept.
Sq

Clark

TSN/Da Nang

12 Hours

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(Category 2 (continued))

US Navy-Marine

1 CVA Gp	WESTPAC	South China Sea	48 Hours
1 VA Det, A-1H	WESTPAC	South China Sea, aboard CVA	12 Hours
TG 76.5	WESTPAC	South China Sea	48 Hours

FORCES TO BE ALERTED

USAF - DEFCON 3

1 TAC Fighter Sq	Yokota Misawa	Korat	24 Hours
2 TAC Bomb Sq. B-57	Clark	Bien Hoa/Da Nang	6 Hours
1 TAC Fighter Sq.	CONUS	Misawa	5 Days
1 TAC Fighter Sq.	CONUS	Clark	5 Days
1 TAC Fighter Sq.	CONUS	Yokota	5 Days
1 Refuel Elem	Yokota	Takhli	3 Days
1 Refuel Elem	CONUS	Yokota/Clark	3 Days

US Navy-Marine - DEFCON 3

2 Min Div	WESTPAC	WESTPAC	6 - 8 Days
1 Min Div	EASTPAC	WESTPAC	45 Days
4-6 Subm.	MIDPAC	WESTPAC	10-15 Days

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(Category 2 (continued))

US Navy-Marine - DEFCON 3 (continued)

1 VP Ron	EASTPAC	WESTPAC	7 Days
1 MEB	Okinawa/Japan	Danang	8 Days
1 RL/T/MAG	Hawaii	Okinawa/Japan	25 - 28 Days
Amphib. Forces	WESTPAC	Okinawa/Japan	3 Days
TF 14 (Ready Force, 1st Flt)	EASTPAC/MIDPAC	WESTPAC	15 - 28 Days

US ARMY - DEFCON 3

1 Abn Inf Bn (Rein)	Okinawa	To be Determined	72 Hours
1 Inf Bde (2 Inf Bn Rein.)	Hawaii	Thailand	10 Days
1 Term Svc Co.	CONUS	Thailand	5 Days

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CATEGORY 3 - Graduated Overt Military Pressures

Additional PACOM/CONUS Forces required.

USAF

2 TAC Bomb Sq. B-57	Clark	Bien Hoa/ Da Nang	6 Hours
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US Navy-Marine

1 DLG/DDG/DDR	Gulf of Tonkin	Gulf of Tonkin	In Place
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PACOM/CONUS Forces which should be prepositioned to provide the necessary deterrent and for readiness for escalation.

USAF

1 TAC Fighter Sq	Yokota Misawa	Korat	24 Hours
2 TAC Fighter Sq	CONUS	Misawa/Yokota	5 Days
1 TAC Fighter Sq	CONUS	Clark	5 Days
1 Refuel. Elem.	Yokota	Takhli	3 Days
1 Refuel. Elem.	CONUS	Yokota/Clark	3 Days

US Navy-Marine

1 CVA Gp.	WESTPAC	South China Sea	48 Hours
1 CVS Gp.	WESTPAC	South China Sea	2 - 5 Days

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FORCES

CENCPAC OPLAN 37-64

Enclosure
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Category . 3 (continued)

US Navy-Marine (continued)

1 Patrol Force

1 AV, 2 VP Ron

WESTPAC

Da Nang/Cubi

3-7 Days

8-12 DD

EASTPAC

South China Sea

20-23 Days

Support Force

Various

Various

2-25 Days

Mine Forces

Various

South China Sea

6-45 Days

TG 76.5 (Reconstituted)

WESTPAC

Da Nang

14 Days

Amph. Force (Less SLF)

WESTPAC

Okinawa/Japan

None

4-6 Submarines

MIDPAC

WESTPAC

10-15 Days

1 MEB

Okinawa

Da Nang

8 Days

(SLF)

At Sea

Da Nang

24 Hours

1 RLT/MAG

Hawaii

Okinawa/Japan

25-30 Days

US Army

1 Inf Bde TF

Hawaii

Thailand

5-30 Days

(4 Inf Bns)

Hawaii

Thailand

5-12 Days

1 X Log Command

Various

Thailand

20-30 Days

1 Term Svc Co.

CONUS

Thailand

5 Days

Enclosure
to TAB B

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Category 3 . (continued)

Enclosure
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Forces to be placed on alert and prepared to deploy.

ALL - Forces for CINCPAC OPLAN 32-YR - DEFCON 3

USAF

PACDM - Forces in WESTPAC - DEFCON 3
Remaining - DEFCON 4

AFSTRIKE - OPLAN 32-YR - DEFCON 3

SAC - Assume appropriate higher state of alert.

US Navy-Marine

PACOM - All WESTPAC forces - DEFCON 3

TF 14 (Reconstituted) - DEFCON 3

Remaining forces - DEFCON 4

1st LAAM (HAWK) - DEFCON 3

US Army

PACOM - Forces in WESTPAC - DEFCON 4

ARSTRIKE - 2 HAWK MSL BNS - DEFCON 3

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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JCSM-541-64

24 JUN 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: US/GVN Combined Planning (U)

1. Reference is made to NSAM 233, dated 17 March 1964, in which the President directed the following actions:

a. Recommendation 11. To authorize continued high-level US overflights of South Vietnam's borders and to authorize "hot pursuit" and South Vietnamese ground operations over the Laotian line for the purpose of border control. More ambitious operations into Laos involving units beyond battalion size should be authorized only with the approval of Souvanna Phouma. Operations across the Cambodian border should depend on the state of relations with Cambodia.

b. Recommendation 12. To prepare immediately to be in a position on 72 hours' notice to initiate the full range of Laotian and Cambodian "Border Control" actions (beyond those authorized in Recommendation 11, above) and the "Retaliatory Actions" against North Vietnam and to be in a position on 30 days' notice to initiate the program of "Graduated Overt Military Pressure" against North Vietnam.

2. In order to comply with this NSAM the following US military operations plans have been prepared:

a. COMUSMACV OPLAN 93-64, Covert Cross-Border Operations into Laos. (To implement Recommendation 11).

b. COMUSMACV OPLAN 93A-64, Overt Cross-Border Operations into Laos. (To implement Recommendation 11).

c. CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64, Military Actions to Stabilize the Situation in RVN. (To implement Recommendation 12, but includes also the operations visualized in Recommendation 11). Cy R-4 (074) 15A Ser

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By fw, NARA, Date 12-6-93

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3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned over the general lack of progress in implementing these recommendations. Their status is as follows: .

a. Recommendation 11. Although this recommendation authorizes "hot pursuit" and ground operations into Laos under varying circumstances, agreement has been reached with the Department of State only for limited covert intelligence collection patrols. The full range of operations authorized has not been discussed with the GVN, nor has combined planning and training for these operations been initiated. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter are contained in CM-1332-64, dated 23 April 1964.

b. Recommendation 12. Unilateral US planning has been completed; however, the essential US/GVN negotiations, planning, and training necessary to attain the desired state of readiness for US/GVN operations have not been initiated.

4. In view of the present situation in Laos and South Vietnam, it would appear prudent that we reduce the lead time required for the military operations envisaged in these operations plans by obtaining authorization for non-committing negotiations with the GVN to the extent necessary to permit the combined US/GVN planning and training which is required to attain a state of readiness for US/GVN operations. Such authority need not include authority to launch operations at this time. As a collateral benefit, it should be noted that such negotiations, planning, and training could be used to convince Hanoi further of US resolve to take such action as necessary to defend the US position in Southeast Asia.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you sign the attached draft memorandum to the Secretary of State which recommends that authority be granted for such preliminary negotiations and combined US/GVN planning and training as is required to attain the proper degree of readiness to conduct operations in the event a decision is made to initiate US/GVN military operations.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment

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APPENDIX

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: US/GVN Combined Planning (U)

1. Reference is made to NSAM 288, dated 17 March 1964, in which the President directed the following actions:

a. Recommendation 11. To authorize continued high-level US overflights of South Vietnam's borders and to authorize "hot pursuit" and South Vietnamese ground operations over the Laotian line for the purpose of border control. More ambitious operations into Laos involving units beyond battalion size should be authorized only with the approval of Souvanna Phouma. Operations across the Cambodian border should depend on the state of relations with Cambodia.

b. Recommendation 12. To prepare immediately to be in a position on 72 hours' notice to initiate the full range of Laotian and Cambodian "border control" actions (beyond those authorized in Recommendation 11, above) and the "Retaliatory Actions" against North Vietnam and to be in a position on 30 days' notice to initiate the program of "Graduated Overt Military Pressure" against North Vietnam.

2. In order to comply with this NSAM the following US military operations plans have been prepared:

a. COMUSMACV OPLAN 98-64, Covert Cross-Border Operations into Laos. (To implement Recommendation 11).

b. COMUSMACV OPLAN 98A-64, Overt Cross-Border Operations into Laos. (To implement Recommendation 11).

c. CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64, Military Actions to Stabilize the Situation in RVN. (To implement Recommendation 12, but includes also the operations visualized in Recommendation 11).

GROUP-1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

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Appendix

7 3,6258/64

3. These operations plans have been reviewed and approved 1
by the proper US military authorities, i.e., CINCPAC for 2
the COMUSMACV plans and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection 3
with the CINCPAC plan. The plans are consistent with the 4
NSAM actions they implement and offer a full range of actions 5
which can be undertaken individually or in concert, against 6
Cambodia, Laos, or North Vietnam. 7

4. Although these plans involve the use of RVN 8
military forces they have not been discussed with the GVN 9
nor has the combined US/GVN planning and training which is 10
essential to the success of these operations been undertaken, 11
with one minor exception relating to the limited covert 12
intelligence collection patrols which have been authorized* 13
into Laos. 14

5. In view of the deteriorating situation in Laos, it 15
would appear prudent that we reduce the lead time required 16
for the military operations envisaged in these operations 17
plans by authorizing noncommitting negotiations with the GVN 18
to the extent necessary to permit the combined US/GVN planning 19
and training which is required to attain a state of readiness. 20
Such authority need not include authority to launch oper- 21
ations at this time. As a collateral benefit, it should be 22
noted that such negotiations, planning, and training could 23
be used to further convince Hanoi of US resolve to take such 24
action as necessary to defend the US position in Southeast 25
Asia. 26

6. I recommend that, without delay, we send instructions 27
to Saigon which will authorize, on a noncommitting basis, 28
such preliminary negotiations and combined US/GVN planning 29
and training as is required to attain a readiness posture 30
for US/GVN operations which will permit immediate execution 31
of these plans upon Washington decision. 32

* JCS message 6163, DTG 051933Z May 1964

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FILE COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 17, 1964

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 288

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, United States Information Agency
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Administrator, Agency for International
Development

SUBJECT: Implementation of South Vietnam Programs

1. The report of Secretary McNamara dated March 16, 1964 was considered and approved by the President in a meeting of the National Security Council on March 17. All agencies concerned are directed to proceed energetically with the execution of the recommendations of that report.
2. The President, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, has designated the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to coordinate the execution of the recommendations in the report.

McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ NSC # 76 E00514
By ing, NARA, Date 12-4-87

cc:

Mr. Bundy
Mr. Forrestal
Mr. Johnson
NSC Files

C. Casper 3/17/65

~~SECRET~~

~~Secret~~ 7

*Implementation of Recommendations on South
Vietnam Programs*

NSAM _____

Done

1. The report of Secretary McNamara dated March 16, 1964 was considered and approved by the President in ^{a meeting of the} ~~the~~ National Security Council ~~meeting~~ on March 17, ~~and~~ ^{and} all agencies concerned are directed to proceed energetically with the execution of the recommendations of that report.

2. The President, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, has designated the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to coordinate the execution of the recommendations in the report.

McGeorge Bundy

Distribution:

Secretaries of State
 Defense
 Treasury

The Attorney General

Chairman JCS

Director AID
 CIA
 USIA

BoB

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Authority NSC 5/23/78
By DCM, NARA, Date 2-22-90