

## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	<del>Komer to Bundy</del> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 2/5/92</i>	<del>8/6/65</del>	<del>A</del>
#2 cable	Deptel Circular 2368 C 8 p	6/16/64	A
#3 cable	Deptel Circular 2369 C 4 p	6/16/64	A
#4 memo	<del>Komer to Bundy</del> <i>open 4-17-09</i> <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>3/31/64</del>	<del>A</del>
#4a memo	<del>Read to Bundy</del> <i>Dup. # 5, this file; dup. # 51, NSF, Files of Komer</i> <del>S 4 p</del> <i>Indian Ocean, Box 26</i>	<del>3/27/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<i>open 7-8-05 NW 05-29</i> #5 memo	<del>Duplicate of #4a</del> <i>open 7-8-05 NW 05-29</i>		
#7 memo	Komer to President S 1 p	3/16/64	A
#8 memo	Rusk to President S 6 p	3/15/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSAM, NSAM 289--Indian Ocean Naval Deployment

Box 3

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 304(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 22,  
By DA, NARA, Date 2-5-92

*Bunchy Office for  
File*

SECRET

August 6, 1965

Mac -

I'm inclined to agree with attached rationale for holding off on Indian Ocean cruise for a while. Am passing by you because of your interest. I'll tell State we want another reading by 15 October.

*OK  
mga*

*RWK*  
RWK

*I notified S/S (Christensen)  
6 Aug '65*



3371



S/S 12224

~~SECRET~~  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON  
RECEIVED  
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

August 4, 1965

1- Kofner  
2- Ret.

1965 AUG 5 AM 11 07  
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

1a

Subject: Naval Visits to the Indian Ocean

NSAM 289 of March 19, 1964 approved the concept of periodic naval task force cruises in the Indian Ocean, and directed that plans for regular intermittent deployments be developed and submitted.

Two successful Concord Squadron cruises have since taken place under this concept and, until recently, planning for a third Concord Squadron cruise was actively in process. State and Defense have concluded, however, that it would not be practical for Navy to program a carrier task force, given the heavy drain on naval resources for current operations in the Caribbean and the South China Seas, as well as the continuing Cyprus situation. Moreover, we would prefer to avoid stimulating the kind of adverse reaction to a Concord Squadron cruise which might affect the US/UK negotiations for military facilities on islands in the Indian Ocean, presently at a rather critical stage.

On balance, State and Defense, with the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, agree that a Concord Squadron cruise should not now be scheduled. We will reconsider this matter in a few months, looking to the possibility of a Concord cruise later this year.

*John E. Newman for*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By ing, NARS, Date 2-11-80

~~SECRET~~

Downgraded at 3 year intervals; declassified after 12 years

AUG 6 1965

~~SECRET~~

Mac -

March 31, 1964

Here's a piddling example of the way we risk larger interests to meet lesser convenience. Now that we've informed everybody and his brother "in confidence" risks of leak are multiplied.

✓ Damage is done, however, so all we can do is cross our fingers.

*Let's do it*  
*a*

*RWK*  
RWK

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By *etm/jc*, NARA, Date 2-24-09



S/S-4785

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 27, 1964

1711  
NSAM 289

4a

MEMORANDUM FOR McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: "Concord Squadron" Cruise in  
Indian Ocean

1. On receipt of NSAM 289 a State/Defense message was sent to all posts in the area transmitting the tentative schedule: April 4 passage through Malacca Strait; April 14-17 Diego Suarez (Malagasy Republic); April 20-23 Mombasa; April 27-29 Aden; May 2-3 Gulf of Oman, (for an on-board weapons demonstration for the Shah; no port call).
2. Bearing in mind the delicate situation in Indonesia, all posts except London and Paris originally were instructed not to divulge any information prior to April 4, the date of the passage through the Malacca Strait. London and Paris were instructed to inform the British and French Governments immediately with a request for confidential treatment.
3. We also advised our posts that we wish to emphasize friendly interest and peaceful resolve rather than crisis anticipation.
4. As pointed out in the Secretary's memorandum to the President of March 15, our primary concern with negative reaction has centered on Indonesia. After full consultation with Ambassador Jones it has been decided that we should take advantage of his trip with Sukarno March 30-April 2 to inform Sukarno of the Concord Squadron cruise on a personal and confidential basis. Jones agreed that while giving

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 05-29  
By iss, NARA, Date 4-18-05

MAR 30 1964



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-2-

Sukarno advance notice might have its dangers, it would, in balance be the most prudent course because it would eliminate the possibility of the information coming to his attention through leakage; further, if the passage of the squadron through the Malacca Strait stirred Communist elements into action against American-owned estates on Sumatra, the Indonesian government would not be in any position to take precautionary measures if it did not have advance information. Authorization was given to Ambassador Jones to proceed as he recommended.

5. Ambassador Bell has requested reconsideration of the State/Defense position that port calls in Malaysia should be scheduled only if there are such calls in Indonesia. He would like to inform the Government of Malaysia prior to April 4 and recommends that a port call be scheduled. We have told Bell he may inform the Malaysians on April 3 and that we will consider visits to both countries in light of the Indonesian reaction to the passage through the Malacca Strait. The cruise is open-ended to permit such calls if the situation warrants.

6. Ambassador Battle in Canberra has requested permission to give the Australians information prior to April 4. We are giving him this in his discretion; he may also tell the Australians that we are seriously considering a port visit to Australia on a subsequent cruise. Ambassador Powell is being given similar authority on advance notification.

7. Embassy London reports the British reflect a cooperative attitude throughout. Embassy Paris reports the French will respect our request for confidential treatment. They are also to be advised by the Malagasy Republic in the framework of the France-Malagasy defense accords.

8. Embassy Tananarive requested authority to inform the government immediately of the impending

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-3-

visit in order to ensure time for adequate preparations. Since, in the Embassy's view, the government was likely to keep the matter confidential this permission was granted. A request by Embassy Nairobi to inform on a confidential basis senior British officers serving the Kenya government was granted and the Embassy given discretionary authority to inform the Kenya government March 31.

9. We have told our Embassies in Karachi and New Delhi that the Pakistan and Indian governments should be informed of our plans after April 4, but that we will make no requests for port calls. If either of these governments should then take the initiative in suggesting a port visit, this should be referred to Washington.

10. With respect to public affairs handling, we propose to give interim replies, if there should be any leaks or queries prior to April 4. After April 4 we hope that announcements regarding port calls will be made by host governments as desired and suitably replayed by us. We do not intend to take the initiative in making announcements unless strong pressures by the press should develop in Washington.

11. If an announcement has to be made it will be as routine and low key as possible, highlighting our friendly interest and peaceful resolve, without reference to our SEATO/CENTO defense commitments, but permitting our presence to speak for itself. The point is we do not want to involve non-aligned countries, where it is important that we visit now, in implication of indirect support of our treaty commitments.

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-4-

12. We have given Defense and the JCS an "all clear" signal today, March 27 which will enable them to authorize the fleet movement. It is expected that the squadron will sail from Subic Bay on March 31 to meet its schedule.

*D. Read (h)*  
Benjamin N. Read  
Executive Secretary

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 19, 1964

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 289

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: INDIAN OCEAN NAVAL DEPLOYMENT

The President approves both the concept of periodic naval task force cruises in the Indian Ocean and the initial deployment recommended in the Secretary of State's March 15 memorandum to him on "Cruise of 'Concord Squadron' in Indian Ocean." He regards this as a most appropriate use of mobile air/sea power in an area of considerable strategic importance to the United States.

In the light of this decision, it is requested that plans for regular intermittent deployments be developed and submitted.

*McGeorge Bundy*  
McGeorge Bundy

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority NSC 81F00140  
By isf, NARA, Date 12-4-87

~~SECRET~~

MAR 30 1964



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MAR 27 1964

NSAM 289 1711  
Komer 3/28  
5

MEMORANDUM FOR McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 05-29  
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D. ROWE  
Benjamin H. Read FOR  
Executive Secretary

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FILE COPY

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 19, 1964

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 289

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: INDIAN OCEAN NAVAL DEPLOYMENT

The President approves both the concept of periodic naval task force cruises in the Indian Ocean and the initial deployment recommended in the Secretary of State's March 15 memorandum to him on "Cruise of 'Concord Squadron' in Indian Ocean." He regards this as a most appropriate use of mobile air/sea power in an area of considerable strategic importance to the United States.

In the light of this decision, it is requested that plans for regular intermittent deployments be developed and submitted.

2

*McGeorge Bundy*  
McGeorge Bundy

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Authority NSC 81F00140

By inf, NARA, Date 12-4-87

~~SECRET~~

cc:

Mr. Bundy ✓  
Mr. Komer  
Mr. Johnson  
NSC Files



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 19, 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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