

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	Read to Bundy <i>open 12-21-04</i> S 1 p	7/31/65	A
#1a rpt	Status report on NSAM 295... <i>open 12-21-04</i> S 7 p	undated	A
#2 memo	Read to Bundy S 1 p <i>open 4-17-09</i>	10/15/65	A
#2a rpt	Comments on Status report on NSAM 295 S 4 p " "	4/24/64	A
#3 memo	Komer to Frutkin C 1 p " "	12/16/65	A
#4 memo	Frutkin to Williams S 1 p " "	12/14/65	A
#6 memo	Duplicate of #4 " "		
#7 memo	Duplicate of #2 and 2a " "		
#8 memo	Duplicate of #1 and 1a " "		
#9a memo	Bundy to Read S 1 p -1	7/14/65	A
#9c memo	Haynes to Komer S 1 p <i>Dep. #358, NSF, Files of Haynes, "Chrono" Box 1</i> "	7/6/65	A
#9g memo	Read to Bundy S 6 p	4/2/65	A
#11 memo	Brubeck to Bundy S 1 p <i>open 4-17-09</i>	5/5/64	A
#12b rpt	Status report of NSAM 295 S 4 p " " [Duplicate of #66a, NSF, Country File, So. Africa, Vol. I, Box 78; sanitized NLJ 88-101, appeal]	7/30/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSAM, NSAM 295--US Policy Toward South Africa

Box 4

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#13 memo	Smith to Bundy S 1 p <i>open per RAC 12/18/17</i>	4/13/64	A
#14c memo	NSAM draft S 3 p <i>open 8-11-10 NLJ 09-118</i>	undated	A
#14e memo	Taylor to SecDef S 2 p	4/7/64	A
#14f memo	Taylor to SecDef S 3 p	4/13/64	A
#16 memo	Bundy to President S 2 p <i>open 4-17-09</i> <i>(dup. # 21, NSF, Memoirs to the President, Bundy, Vol. 3)</i>	4/20/64	A
#17 rpt	"South Africa and SW Africa" S 2 p <i>open 8/26/02 per FRUS, Vol. XXIV, # 579</i> [Duplicate of #61, NSF, Country File, So. Africa, Vol. I, Box 78; sanitized NLJ 88-100]	3/10/64	A
#18 rpt	"South Africa and SW Africa" S 23 p <i>open 8/26/02 per FRUS, Vol. XXIV, # 579</i> [Duplicate of #61, NSF, Country File, So. Africa, Vol. I, Box 78; sanitized NLJ 88-100]	3/10/64	A
#23 rpt	"Annex 5--Briefing for NSC Standing Group" C 3 p <i>open 8/28/02 per NLJ-S 98001</i>	3/10/64	A
#25 rpt	"Annex 7--Supp. Briefing Paper for NSC..." S 4 p <i>open 8/28/02 NLJ-S 98001</i>	3/13/64	A
#26a memo	Read to Smith S 1 p <i>open 4-17-09</i>	4/6/64	A
#26b memo	NSAM draft S 3 p <i>open 8-11-10 NLJ 09-118</i>	undated	A
#27a memo	NSAM draft S 3 p <i>open 8-11-10 NLJ 09-118</i>	undated	A
#27b memo	Brubeck to Smith S 2 p <i>open per RAC 12/18/17</i>	3/19/64	A

FILE LOCATION

[Dup. # 7+34, Papers of Smith, "NSC Standing Group mtg. Vol. II" Box 28]

NSF, NSAM, NSAM 295--US Policy Toward South Africa

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February 7, 2007

PROCESSING NOTE

Documents #9b, 9c, and 14g were determined to be missing from the file, "NSAM 295—US Policy toward South Africa," on this date.

Shannon Jarrett
Archivist



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 31, 1965

IN REPLY REFER TO: 12161

3290


1-Komer/2
2-Ret.

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Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

Subject: U.S. Policy Toward South Africa -
Status Report on NSAM 295

In response to your memorandum of July 14, there is attached the current status report on implementation of decisions set forth in National Security Action Memorandum No. 295 of April 24, 1964 regarding South Africa and South West Africa. Included are recommendations for future action along the lines of NSAM 295 and the National Policy Paper on South Africa, which continue to comprise adequate policy framework.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Report of Actions Taken.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By Sj, NARA, Date 12-21-04

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1a

Status Report on NSAM No. 295
of April 24, 1964 - South Africa

Key Factors in Current Relations
with South Africa

Apartheid and Tracking Stations

The South African Government has informed our Ambassador that it does not wish or intend that past public statements relating apartheid to tracking stations should lead to official confrontation. The Prime Minister's extemporaneous speech at De Aar on June 25 was for internal political consumption according to Foreign Minister Muller. No South African official has commented in public on the issue since that date. It appears that the South African Government in the face of sharp attacks from its political opposition and some growing concern among business leaders is prepared pro tem to abandon the subject, except for lingering echoes in the Nationalist press.

Alternate Sites

As the result of actions begun over a year ago, NASA and DOD would be prepared, if necessary, to move all space tracking operations from South Africa to alternate sites (principally Malagasy, Spain, Ascension) by June 1966 without serious degradation to scheduled programs. (See details below in action on paragraph 4 of NSAM 295).

Timing of ICJ Judgment on South West Africa

The best current prediction is that the ICJ, now in summer recess, will not make its decision on the pending South West Africa cases until March or April 1966. This is based on recent estimates by the Court Secretariat and by Ernest Gross, Counsel for the Applicants. The South African Government has called up numerous witnesses and will continue this process when the Court resumes session this fall.

Future Action

Lines of action set forth in NSAM 295 and the National Policy Paper on South Africa continue to comprise adequate policy framework. NASA and DOD are proceeding as rapidly as possible to complete and equip alternate tracking stations. Other issues will continue

/to complicate

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Authority FRUS, '64-'68, vol. XXIV, #609
By Sj, NARA, Date 12-21-04

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- 2 -

to complicate our relations with South Africa, and Prime Minister Verwoerd may well move to create new incidents. We are currently involved in a serious situation involving a South African Government initiative against personnel of our Embassy. This was unpredictable. A further deterioration in increasingly strained relations may come with a possible showdown between South Africa and the United Nations over South West Africa in late 1966. Between now and then the perennial problem of apartheid resolutions in the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly may complicate relations with Afro-Asian powers. Pressures may increase in Security Council and General Assembly sessions this coming fall for more concerted UN action against apartheid in South Africa.

Consideration is being given to US-UK strategy during the period still ahead before the ICJ decision. Diplomatic discussion designed to persuade South Africa that its best long-range interests would be served by complying with the ICJ decision will be resumed later this year. Informally this point is being made whenever the opportunity arises in talks with both official and non-official South Africans here and at our posts in South Africa. Consideration of additional measures such as higher level approaches will be reserved until the date of the ICJ judgment approaches.

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NSAM Decisions - Implications
and Prospects

Following numbered paragraphs correspond to the seven numbered paragraphs of NSAM 295:

1. Defer Implementation of Odendaal Report

The South African Government has continued to postpone action on controversial political recommendations of the Odendaal report. However, the Government has continued to lay the groundwork for dividing South West Africa into little Bantustans largely responsible to departments of the Republic. Such actions include buying land to facilitate redistributing the population, a propaganda ploy about Ovambo chiefs petitioning for an Ovambostan, a Government-sponsored visit by South West African chiefs and headmen to the Transkei "State", and planning by a South African Government committee for administrative reorganization of the relationships between South African and South West African units of government. The South African Government also has rushed economic and social development such as roads, airfields, schools and hospitals in an obvious attempt to influence favorably the International Court of Justice and world and South African opinion. To ensure that this outpouring of funds is fully appreciated, the South African Government has invited the Court to visit South Africa and South West Africa as well as other parts of the continent.

2. Policy Regarding Military Sales

The arms ban policy continues to be carefully observed. Consistent with the posture adopted by the President in the case of the proposed sale to South Africa of Lockheed Orion anti-submarine warfare aircraft, United States representatives in the appropriate NATO committee have been successful in deferring action on the sale to South Africa of a NATO consortium-sponsored aircraft, the Brequet Atlantique. So called "Gray Area" items continue to arise either in Commerce or in the Department of State, and they are treated on an ad hoc basis. These are items suitable for either military or civilian end use but not on the controlled Munitions list; or on the Munitions List, but covered by exceptional treatment accorded in the case of some follow-on spare parts.

3. Suspension of Action on Applications for United States Government Loans and Investment Guarantees

In June, 1965, the Department interposed no objection to an application to the Eximbank for a guarantee to cover diesel

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- 4 -

engines manufactured in the United States to be supplied to South Africa for assembling in 25 locomotives for the Mozambique Department of Port, Railroad and Transportation Service. We looked upon this transaction as mainly concerning the United States and Mozambique. Only one other rather special case has arisen in connection with this policy. A New York firm had applied to FCIA for Short Term Political Risks Insurance coverage, including \$30,000 in military equipment to be exported to South Africa in the next twelve months. The Department requested the Eximbank to advise the exporter that, because of our strict arms embargo policy, the Eximbank would not be prepared to cover any proposed military shipments to South Africa.

4. Alternate Space Tracking Facilities

By June 1966 NASA and DOD space stations in South Africa, if necessary or desirable, could be closed down without damage to programs other than relatively minor degradation.

NASA and DOD have been planning and arranging for facilities alternate to those in South Africa. NASA's needs can be met elsewhere by mid-1966 through: (1) the completion of alternate facilities at Ascension Island by April 1966, and in Spain and Malagasy by June 1966; (2) the continued use in South Africa by DOD on NASA's behalf of DOD's GLOTRAC system near Pretoria through the second quarter of 1966 to support NASA's testing of the Centaur launch vehicle (to be used by Surveyor); and (3) the assumption by NASA on Madagascar of certain DOD tracking and telemetry tasks being performed now at the DOD station in South Africa. These latter tasks include support of NASA launches. The NASA facilities in Malagasy are being planned to handle these DOD tasks, if DOD were to withdraw from South Africa. DOD's needs can be met on six-months notice by equipment installed, or removed, to available sites elsewhere. Thus, after the completion of the Centaur tests in the second quarter of 1966, the DOD facilities will not be critical for either DOD or NASA projects, provided NASA can assume certain tracking and telemetry tasks on Madagascar.

Negotiations for additional land in Malagasy and Spain were initiated in May and June 1965, respectively. Completion of negotiations in Spain is expected by mid-October. In Malagasy, oral agreement has been obtained; however, these negotiations relate only to NASA facilities. It is now believed that the Malagasy Government's approval should be obtained for NASA to cover certain DOD requirements. No difficulty is expected, but a delay in obtaining the necessary approval may occur. Such delays in negotiations need not slow up the contingency

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- 5 -

program, however.

5. Program to Persuade South Africa to Comply with International Court of Justice Decision and to Encourage Moderate Whites in South Africa

US-UK Talks with Foreign Minister Muller. Due primarily to the number of witnesses South Africa is using, the judgment of the International Court of Justice on South Africa's obligations as Mandatory of South West Africa is now not expected until March-April 1966. The British and American Ambassadors separately commenced in April 1965 a dialogue with the South African Foreign Minister about the South West Africa issue. They sought to influence the South African Government in the direction of contingency planning for prompt compliance with the judgment of the International Court of Justice, whatever its substance might turn out to be. Ambassador Satterthwaite stressed United States support for the rule of law and for the authority of the Court, and the advisability of contingency planning by the South African Government for the possibility of an ICJ decision adverse to South Africa. The INDEPENDENCE and tracking station incidents in May-July 1965 delayed resumption of the United States talks; but the British Ambassador on May 24, in an interview with Foreign Minister Muller before going on long leave, brought up the subject a second time. He used a possible Security Council debate on the report of the Security Council Committee on Measures as the occasion for mentioning the desirability of avoiding a confrontation. The British Embassy in Pretoria, like our own, intends to raise the South West Africa issue with the Foreign Affairs Department as occasions arise. United States contingency planning for the prospective Security Council session on apartheid and the next General Assembly could provide such occasions for resumed talks with Muller.

Other Talks and Briefing. In the Department at all levels opportunities are used to implant among South African as well as foreign diplomats of countries such as Canada, Australia, Japan, Netherlands, Italy, Germany and Belgium the importance of the International Court of Justice judgment and the serious problems, if the South African Government were to fail to comply. Non-official Americans on the way to Africa and South Africa, such as jurists and historians, and South Africans also are briefed thoroughly on this subject, particularly those likely to discuss the matter with influential South Africans.

After further talks with Foreign Minister Muller, it will, at an appropriate stage, be desirable to make more systematic our

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- 6 -

conversations about the issue with governments other than the British. These could be carried on in Washington, various capitals and New York in conjunction with talks about the prospective Security Council session on apartheid and sanctions, and before and during the upcoming United Nations General Assembly session.

The Department repeatedly has endeavored to encourage writers--scholars as well as journalists--to treat adequately in their publications the potential significance of the International Court of Justice case to South Africa's future prospects, in a manner to bring maximum realization to South Africa of the possible consequences of failure to comply without delay. The Department discreetly has encouraged public ventilation of the issue in ways likely to impress South Africans.

Encouragement of Moderate Whites. In diverse ways efforts have been made to help moderate whites in South Africa. On the initiative of the Department of State, an AFL-CIO officer has been working with the multiracial South African Trade Union Council for several months training labor organizers. The United Automobile Workers are arranging to send a fraternal delegation to South Africa. A special effort is being made by the Embassy and Consulates to reach South African youth. Religious and educational groups in the United States have been encouraged to support the moderate Christian Institute in South Africa and to maintain closer contact with their sister churches in South Africa. American businessmen and scientists have been urged to encourage their moderate South African contacts, the businessman by their example as well as in discussions. Most such briefings have been with individuals, but Ambassador Satterthwaite in South Africa and Governor Williams in Washington have talked to groups of American businessmen along these lines.

United States officials have carefully avoided actions which would further strengthen extremists in South Africa--actions such as public espousal of "one-man, one-vote" for South Africa or a United States Government contribution to private funds for legal and welfare aid to persons on trial in South Africa. At the same time, the United States positions during the INDEPENDENCE and tracking station incidents were in part encouragement to moderate whites critical of the South African Government's racialism.

6. Program to Explain United States Objectives to Interested African Countries

In addition to supplying copies of the National Policy Paper on South Africa to all our embassies in Africa, background and

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- 7 -

instructions about our objectives regarding South West Africa are provided on a continuing basis to USUN and to all United States diplomatic missions in Africa. A special effort is made to brief our Ambassadors going out to Africa, the many visitors here from Africa, including students, and Americans likely to discuss the subject with influential Africans. American leader grantees from the legal and judicial fields have been briefed on the South West Africa case and sent to the Hague during the ICJ proceedings prior to their visiting African countries (including South Africa), where they have discussed the issue with influential persons and groups. Departmental officers on African trips also have emphasized the issue in discussions with Africans as well as our own missions.

Because the judgment of the Court is not expected until Spring 1966, the United States and the United Kingdom will be increasingly exposed to African pressure for action now regarding apartheid in South Africa itself. To relieve such pressure in the Security Council and General Assembly, instructions to the field have included emphasis on the comprehensiveness of the United States arms embargo and have suggested the desirability of making the embargo effective on the part of other countries. Before the United Nations is asked to consider additional pressures on South Africa, co-operative action should be instituted to close existing gaps in the arms embargo.

7. Analysis of Sanctions

The respective bureau heads of the Department concerned with the comprehensive study of possible sanctions against South Africa have been asked for final clearance of the study by August 2, 1965. United States and United Kingdom United Nations delegations in the near future will conduct a series of joint discussions on tactics and strategy in the United Nations after the Court decides the current case on South West Africa. The Department is developing proposals, for discussion with the British, of possible limited measures which could, as appropriate, be used in case of non-compliance by South Africa with the Court's decision. This is still in the preliminary stage.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

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McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE
This document consists of 5 pages
No. 1 of 11 Copies, Series A

IN REPLY REFER TO:

1965 OCT 16 AM 9 24

October 15, 1965

16434

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Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

Subject: U.S. Policy Toward South Africa -
Comments re Status Report on NSAM 295

In response to Mr. Komer's memorandum of September 2, 1965, we have prepared the attached supplementary comment concerning the Department's status report of July 31, 1965, on National Security Action Memorandum No. 295 of April 24, 1964.

for Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Supplementary Comment

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Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
automatically declassified

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cbu/jr, NARA, Date 2-1-09

OCT 16 1965

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2a

Comments on Status Report
on NSAM No. 295
of April 24, 1964 - South Africa

1. Support of Friendly Countries for US-UK Approaches
to the South African Government on Apartheid and
the South West Africa Case

Among the sixteen other nations with diplomatic representation in Pretoria, those most likely to lend useful support to US-UK approaches to the South African Government on South West Africa and related aspects of apartheid are Canada, the Netherlands, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Australia, Sweden, Israel, Brazil and possibly Belgium. As indicated in the status report of July 31, 1965, the Department plans to approach such governments in Washington and in their respective capitals in a systematic series of briefings and efforts to enlist support following the next round of US-UK talks with the South African Foreign Minister. It is anticipated that this should take place soon after the Foreign Minister's return from the United Nations in October. Ultimately we would probably canvas all sixteen other nations with diplomatic representation in Pretoria except for Rhodesia and Portugal.

U.S. policy objectives would indeed be furthered if support could be enlisted for US-UK approaches from a number of these friendly countries. Some may wish to defer their separate representations to the South African Government until after the ICJ decision on South West Africa. However, it would be our aim to seek maximum action as the date for the decision approaches, while welcoming additional overtures soon after the Court decision is announced.

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- 2 -

2. Political advantage in transferring space-tracking facilities from South Africa, before events force us to do so

Important continuing U.S. military and scientific space requirements make it disadvantageous to withdraw U.S. space-tracking facilities from South Africa prior to July 1, 1966, when alternative facilities will be available and could be used with relatively minor impact on planned programs. The completion of these alternative facilities will substantially lessen military and scientific considerations from our planning. (We may, however, still have to take into account the six months' termination notice provided for in the DOD agreement; there is no such grace period in the NASA agreement). Once the alternative facilities are ready, therefore, the decision as to their immediate use or their reservation for use only if we were forced to evacuate can be taken on largely political grounds.

United States-South Africa relations have become considerably strained as a result of the Independence incident, South African criticism of United States diplomatic receptions, South African efforts to remove certain U.S. diplomatic personnel, and public efforts by Verwoerd to apply racial restrictions to our space-tracking stations. The possibility therefore exists that the South African Government will unilaterally decide to terminate its space-tracking agreements with the United States. At present, South African action of this kind appears slight in view of Prime Minister Verwoerd's failure to follow up with any official request or action after his speech of June 25, 1965, in which he publicly aired the view that American personnel in such facilities are subject to racial restrictions, or after the United States publicly denied and rejected this view. The Prime Minister's more recent public statements have indicated a desire on the part of the South African Government to back away from the issue.

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Group 3

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- 3 -

For the moment, therefore, the initiative on vacating present facilities in South Africa remains ours. To take that initiative could be politically advantageous in that such an act of dissociation would be approved by the Afro-Asian states. To take it with respect to the military tracking station alone would be fully consistent with our posture of caution in military relations with the South African Government.

In addition to their concentrated efforts to persuade the United States and others to institute economic and military sanctions against South Africa, the Afro-Asians have sought the termination of all agreements with South Africa, specifically citing our space facilities, which might in some way encourage South Africa's pursuit of its present racial policies. The transfer of American facilities out of South Africa would not diminish pressures for military and economic sanctions. However, since any overt dissociation with South Africa would be welcomed by the Afro-Asians and others, would remove one element of criticism of our South Africa policy, and would strengthen our hand in counseling moderation pending an ICJ decision, there would be some political advantage in moving the stations as soon as alternative facilities are available.

It would seem of greater political advantage, however, to reserve such a step for use as one small way to bring psychological leverage on South Africa in connection with the ICJ proceedings on South West Africa.

The expected time of the decision (April - June 1966) is sufficiently close to the completion of alternative

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Group 3

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-4-

facilities to enable us to keep open the option of withdrawal from the tracking stations at our initiative in connection with the South West Africa issue. Such withdrawal would have more effectiveness if it were directly linked vis-a-vis both South Africa and the Afro-Asian states to the clearly delineated objective of producing South African compliance with the ICJ decision or were taken to show disapproval of a negative South African reaction to it. In the event of such a negative South African reaction, the tracking stations would probably become an unnecessary liability which could be jettisoned.

In the absence of new factors, we believe we should reserve decision on the question of withdrawal until July 1, 1966. In the meantime, the preparation of alternative facilities should proceed as rapidly as possible so that the option belongs to the United States.

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Group 3

✓ McGBundy

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR ARNOLD W. FRUTKIN
ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
NASA

December 16, 1965

SUBJECT: South Africa--Tracking Stations

Your memorandum of December 14 to Governor Williams, a copy of which I have received, raises two important questions, answers to which I would appreciate at your earliest convenience:

1. What is the earliest date by which the alternate tracking facilities in Spain will be completed?
2. Either the Rhodesian crisis or reactions to the International Court's decision in the South West Africa case in the Spring or Summer of 1966 could precipitate an immediate confrontation between the US and South Africa in spite of our efforts to avoid it. How has NASA prepared to assure continuity in the lunar landing program in this event?

R. W. Komer
Deputy Special Assistant to
the President for National
Security Affairs

cc: Mr. Webb
G. Memmen Williams
McGBundy ✓
Mr. Pollack, D/S-SCI
C. E. Johnson

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By ebm/jc, NARA, Date 2-1-09

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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

RECEIVED
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

DEC 14 1965

IN REPLY REFER TO: AI

1965 DEC 15 PM 1 03

This document consists of
1 pages, No. 2 of 5
copies, Series AZ-45-7

MEMORANDUM TO Honorable G. Mennen Williams
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of African Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: US Action toward South Africa

Since the conference you called in your office on impending South African questions, I have discussed this matter with Mr. Webb and wish to confirm the position I took for this agency in that discussion.

NASA fully appreciates the importance attached to a political crisis in relations with South Africa and has moved with the utmost dispatch to establish the agreed substitute facilities in three other locations. Delays in the Spanish area, over which we have had no control, make it possible that the South African situation might become critical before we are prepared to shift ground support coverage for the critical Apollo and Surveyor programs from South Africa to Spain. The US would then have to decide whether (1) to press a confrontation with South Africa and risk a delay in the manned lunar program, or (2) to delay the political confrontation in order to assure continuity in the lunar landing program.

Obviously two considerations of great national importance are involved, both involving major national commitments before the world. The decision as to which should be given precedence, in the circumstances which exist at the time, must, we believe, be made with the full knowledge of the President.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By dm/jp, NARA, Date 2-1-09

Arnold W. Frutkin
Assistant Administrator
for International Affairs

cc:

Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Mr. Herman Pollack, D/S-SCI
Mr. Webb

GROUP I
Excluded from Automatic
downgrading and declassification

~~SECRET~~

DEC 15 1965

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Haynes
Homer
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1 meeting
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See Raw K to
Frutkin
12/16/65



S/S # 18341

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

RECEIVED
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

5000
~~1-C. Johnson~~
2-ret.
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1965 NOV 16 PM 5 47

November 16, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY,
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Status of Construction Plans for Alternate
Tracking Station Facilities for the NASA
Station in South Africa - Report on NSAM 295

You will recall that NSAM 295 requires NASA and DOD immediately to plan for and construct the alternative standby facilities required if it became necessary to evacuate the facilities in South Africa on 6 months' notice. In the July 31, 1965 status report you were informed it was anticipated that alternative facilities would be available by July 1, 1966.

Critical to meeting the July 1 deadline was the completed construction of Deep Space Instrumentation Facility (DSIF) No. 2 near Madrid as well as the construction of additional facilities on Ascension Island and Malagasy. The Department for some months had been negotiating with the Government of Spain for the acquisition of additional property in Spain to accommodate DSIF No. 2. The target date for the acquisition of the land was late August; however, these negotiations were not concluded until October 8 when the agreement for the additional land was finally signed.

The Department, aware that this slippage would effect the July 1 target date, conveyed its concern orally to NASA and asked for a current status report which took this delay into account. Of significance in the NASA

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GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By isp, NARS, Date 2-11-80

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-2-


report were the following:

a. The Surveyor and lunar orbiter program cannot be conducted simultaneously using DSIF No. 1 in Madrid and it is therefore important, if NASA's lunar program is not to slip, that all possible efforts be made to retain the use of the facilities in South Africa until October 30, 1966 at which time DSIF No. 2 will be operational.

b. Current construction schedules, providing for the expansion of the Satellite Tracking and Data Acquisition Network (STADAN) facilities on Madagascar, under an accelerated schedule, provide for completion of those facilities in October 1966.

c. NASA strongly prefers to remain in South Africa, if political circumstances permit, since this area continues to be the optimum location for instrumentation supporting all unmanned lunar and planetary programs and the majority of major scientific satellite programs.

The Department is following this situation very closely and, although assured by both the DOD and NASA that every possible measure is being taken to expedite the replacement program for the South African tracking stations, has the matter under constant review and will continue to urge both agencies to move with all possible speed.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Memorandum from
NASA to SCI Dated Oct. 28, 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

5a
NASA HEADQUARTERS
Washington, D.C.

TO : Acting Director, International Scientific and Technological Affairs (SCI) DATE: ~~XXXX~~

FROM : Assistant Administrator for International Affairs

SUBJECT: Status of alternate plans for NASA station in South Africa

The current status of NASA's implementation of alternative facilities in the event a withdrawal from South Africa should become necessary is set forth below. It is emphasized again that while these facilities will provide suitable alternative support, it is still NASA's strong preference to remain in South Africa if political circumstances permit, since this area continues to be the optimum location for instrumentation supporting all unmanned lunar and planetary programs and the majority of major scientific satellite programs.

Spain

It was estimated in May 1965 that the operational readiness date for the second deep space station near Madrid, including capability for Surveyor support, was June 1966. This estimate was based on the assumption that Spanish approval of the facility would be forthcoming in time to permit construction to begin no later than July 1965; and NASA was prepared to award a construction contract as early as June 1965. As you know, the Spanish Council of Ministers approved this facility only on October 8. The earliest completion date is now estimated to be October 30, 1966. This schedule could suffer further slippage, since construction is now being forced into the winter months. A further assessment of this will not be possible until early in 1966 after construction has been underway for several months.

To avoid jeopardy to the Surveyor program, NASA is currently implementing emergency plans to adapt the existing deep space station near Madrid (DSIF No. 1) to enable it to provide minimum support to Surveyor. This adaptation is scheduled to be completed about July 1, 1966. However, DSIF No. 1 is also the only station which can provide support to Lunar Orbiter near 0° longitude; DSIF No. 1 cannot support both Lunar Orbiter and Surveyor simultaneously; thus, support capability for Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter by DSIF No. 1 under these conditions is below desired standards.



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With a single station rather than two now being relied upon for both Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter support, a project support conflict exists, since both programs are scheduled for flights in June 1966. The serious aspect of this situation is the loss of flexibility and freedom in launch scheduling so vital to both these programs at this time. Since, in May 1965, NASA planning presupposed the existence of a contingency capability in June 1966 (operational readiness of DSIF No. 2), the impact on the Lunar Orbiter program by virtue of the loss of South Africa was not considered. However, now, both the Lunar Orbiter and Surveyor are being potentially denied the capability to execute missions which overlap or occur simultaneously, or in relatively short sequence. The Lunar Orbiter program is considered of equal importance with Surveyor for lunar exploration, and is vital to the manned lunar landing project. It is therefore extremely important that the capability to support Surveyor from South Africa station be maintained until DSIF No. 2 at Madrid is completely operational, estimated to be October 30, 1966, to avoid the necessity for establishing priorities on the utilization of DSIF No. 1 which could result in serious program delays.

However, in early 1966 NASA will re-examine the updated launch schedules and at that time endeavor to ascertain if any change in the above conflicts will permit the period of critical dependence on South Africa until October 1966 to be shortened.

Malagasy Republic

The current expansion of STADAN facilities on Madagascar is proceeding as rapidly as possible; however, some slip has occurred in previously stated operational dates. While equipment acquisition has been maintained essentially on previously determined schedules, construction on site could not be initiated sooner than September 1965. Based on the most realistic construction schedule the local contractor can maintain, current operational schedule estimates provide for limited capabilities in August and September 1966, and full capability with the 40-foot antenna system in October 1966. As previously stated, the unavailability of a full STADAN facility for a limited period would result in a loss of valuable data; however, under the circumstances this temporary loss could be accepted.

The recent change in contingency planning on the part of the GSB has forced NASA to plan the installation of a radar (and additional telemetry equipments) to provide launch and insertion support now provided by GSB Station 13. It is estimated that this radar installation can be completed, at the earliest, in September 1966. Radar

coverage is essential to all major programs, including the Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter. Should support by Station 13 be lost prior to that date, it would become necessary to initiate emergency measures to support the launch schedule with shipboard radar, or by relocation of the existing radar at Station 13, both involving schedule delays.

Ascension Island

Implementation is proceeding satisfactorily with some schedule delays resulting from the recent shipping strike. Facilities for Deep Space Network support are expected to be operational by May 1966.

W. F.
Arnold W. Prutkin



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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

RECEIVED
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

DEC 14 1965

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2-Rit.

IN REPLY REFER TO: AI

1965 DEC 15 PM 1 03

This document consists of
1 pages, No. 2 of 3
copies, Series A7-45-7

MEMORANDUM TO Honorable G. Mennen Williams
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of African Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: US Action toward South Africa

Since the conference you called in your office on impending South African questions, I have discussed this matter with Mr. Webb and wish to confirm the position I took for this agency in that discussion.

NASA fully appreciates the importance attached to a political crisis in relations with South Africa and has moved with the utmost dispatch to establish the agreed substitute facilities in three other locations. Delays in the Spanish area, over which we have had no control, make it possible that the South African situation might become critical before we are prepared to shift ground support coverage for the critical Apollo and Surveyor programs from South Africa to Spain. The US would then have to decide whether (1) to press a confrontation with South Africa and risk a delay in the manned lunar program, or (2) to delay the political confrontation in order to assure continuity in the lunar landing program.

Obviously two considerations of great national importance are involved, both involving major national commitments before the world. The decision as to which should be given precedence, in the circumstances which exist at the time, must, we believe, be made with the full knowledge of the President.

Arnold W. Frutkin
Assistant Administrator
for International Affairs

cc:
Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Mr. Herman Pollack, D/S-SCI
Mr. Webb

GROUP I
Excluded from Automatic
downgrading and declassification

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By bcw/jc, NARA, Date 2-1-09



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

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This document consists of 5 pages
No. 2 of 11 Copies, Series A

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OCT 15 1965

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Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

Subject: U.S. Policy Toward South Africa -
Comments re Status Report on NSAM 295

In response to Mr. Komer's memorandum of September 2, 1965, we have prepared the attached supplementary comment concerning the Department's status report of July 31, 1965, on National Security Action Memorandum No. 295 of April 24, 1964.

/s/ HERBERT B. THOMPSON
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Supplementary Comment

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Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
automatically declassified

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cbm/jc NARA, Date 2-1-09

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Comments on Status Report
on NSAM No. 295
of April 24, 1964 - South Africa

1. Support of Friendly Countries for US-UK Approaches
to the South African Government on Apartheid and
the South West Africa Case

Among the sixteen other nations with diplomatic representation in Pretoria, those most likely to lend useful support to US-UK approaches to the South African Government on South West Africa and related aspects of apartheid are Canada, the Netherlands, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Australia, Sweden, Israel, Brazil and possibly Belgium. As indicated in the status report of July 31, 1965, the Department plans to approach such governments in Washington and in their respective capitals in a systematic series of briefings and efforts to enlist support following the next round of US-UK talks with the South African Foreign Minister. It is anticipated that this should take place soon after the Foreign Minister's return from the United Nations in October. Ultimately we would probably canvas all sixteen other nations with diplomatic representation in Pretoria except for Rhodesia and Portugal.

U.S. policy objectives would indeed be furthered if support could be enlisted for US-UK approaches from a number of these friendly countries. Some may wish to defer their separate representations to the South African Government until after the ICJ decision on South West Africa. However, it would be our aim to seek maximum action as the date for the decision approaches, while welcoming additional overtures soon after the Court decision is announced.

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- 2 -

2. Political advantage in transferring space-tracking facilities from South Africa, before events force us to do so

Important continuing U.S. military and scientific space requirements make it disadvantageous to withdraw U.S. space-tracking facilities from South Africa prior to July 1, 1966, when alternative facilities will be available and could be used with relatively minor impact on planned programs. The completion of these alternative facilities will substantially lessen military and scientific considerations from our planning. (We may, however, still have to take into account the six months' termination notice provided for in the DOD agreement; there is no such grace period in the NASA agreement). Once the alternative facilities are ready, therefore, the decision as to their immediate use or their reservation for use only if we were forced to evacuate can be taken on largely political grounds.

United States-South Africa relations have become considerably strained as a result of the Independence incident, South African criticism of United States diplomatic receptions, South African efforts to remove certain U.S. diplomatic personnel, and public efforts by Verwoerd to apply racial restrictions to our space-tracking stations. The possibility therefore exists that the South African Government will unilaterally decide to terminate its space-tracking agreements with the United States. At present, South African action of this kind appears slight in view of Prime Minister Verwoerd's failure to follow up with any official request or action after his speech of June 25, 1965, in which he publicly aired the view that American personnel in such facilities are subject to racial restrictions, or after the United States publicly denied and rejected this view. The Prime Minister's more recent public statements have indicated a desire on the part of the South African Government to back away from the issue.

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- 3 -

For the moment, therefore, the initiative on vacating present facilities in South Africa remains ours. To take that initiative could be politically advantageous in that such an act of dissociation would be approved by the Afro-Asian states. To take it with respect to the military tracking station alone would be fully consistent with our posture of caution in military relations with the South African Government.

In addition to their concentrated efforts to persuade the United States and others to institute economic and military sanctions against South Africa, the Afro-Asians have sought the termination of all agreements with South Africa, specifically citing our space facilities, which might in some way encourage South Africa's pursuit of its present racial policies. The transfer of American facilities out of South Africa would not diminish pressures for military and economic sanctions. However, since any overt dissociation with South Africa would be welcomed by the Afro-Asians and others, would remove one element of criticism of our South Africa policy, and would strengthen our hand in counseling moderation pending an ICJ decision, there would be some political advantage in moving the stations as soon as alternative facilities are available.

It would seem of greater political advantage, however, to reserve such a step for use as one small way to bring psychological leverage on South Africa in connection with the ICJ proceedings on South West Africa.

The expected time of the decision (April - June 1966) is sufficiently close to the completion of alternative

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Group 3

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facilities to enable us to keep open the option of withdrawal from the tracking stations at our initiative in connection with the South West Africa issue. Such withdrawal would have more effectiveness if it were directly linked vis-a-vis both South Africa and the Afro-Asian states to the clearly delineated objective of producing South African compliance with the ICJ decision or were taken to show disapproval of a negative South African reaction to it. In the event of such a negative South African reaction, the tracking stations would probably become an unnecessary liability which could be jettisoned.

In the absence of new factors, we believe we should reserve decision on the question of withdrawal until July 1, 1966. In the meantime, the preparation of alternative facilities should proceed as rapidly as possible so that the option belongs to the United States.

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Group 3



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 31, 1965

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
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Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

Subject: U.S. Policy Toward South Africa -
Status Report on NSAM 295

In response to your memorandum of July 14, there is attached the current status report on implementation of decisions set forth in National Security Action Memorandum No. 295 of April 24, 1964 regarding South Africa and South West Africa. Included are recommendations for future action along the lines of NSAM 295 and the National Policy Paper on South Africa, which continue to comprise adequate policy framework.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Report of Actions Taken.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By abm/jc NARA, Date 2-5-09

AUG 2 1965

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Status Report on NSAM No. 295
of April 24, 1964 - South Africa

Key Factors in Current Relations
with South Africa

Apartheid and Tracking Stations

The South African Government has informed our Ambassador that it does not wish or intend that past public statements relating apartheid to tracking stations should lead to official confrontation. The Prime Minister's extemporaneous speech at De Aar on June 25 was for internal political consumption according to Foreign Minister Muller. No South African official has commented in public on the issue since that date. It appears that the South African Government in the face of sharp attacks from its political opposition and some growing concern among business leaders is prepared pro tem to abandon the subject, except for lingering echoes in the Nationalist press.

Alternate Sites

As the result of actions begun over a year ago, NASA and DOD would be prepared, if necessary, to move all space tracking operations from South Africa to alternate sites (principally Malagasy, Spain, Ascension) by June 1966 without serious degradation to scheduled programs. (See details below in action on paragraph 4 of NSAM 295).

Timing of ICJ Judgment on South West Africa

The best current prediction is that the ICJ, now in summer recess, will not make its decision on the pending South West Africa cases until March or April 1966. This is based on recent estimates by the Court Secretariat and by Ernest Gross, Counsel for the Applicants. The South African Government has called up numerous witnesses and will continue this process when the Court resumes session this fall.

Future Action

Lines of action set forth in NSAM 295 and the National Policy Paper on South Africa continue to comprise adequate policy framework. NASA and DOD are proceeding as rapidly as possible to complete and equip alternate tracking stations. Other issues will continue

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to complicate our relations with South Africa, and Prime Minister Verwoerd may well move to create new incidents. We are currently involved in a serious situation involving a South African Government initiative against personnel of our Embassy. This was unpredictable. A further deterioration in increasingly strained relations may come with a possible showdown between South Africa and the United Nations over South West Africa in late 1966. Between now and then the perennial problem of apartheid resolutions in the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly may complicate relations with Afro-Asian powers. Pressures may increase in Security Council and General Assembly sessions this coming fall for more concerted UN action against apartheid in South Africa.

Consideration is being given to US-UK strategy during the period still ahead before the ICJ decision. Diplomatic discussion designed to persuade South Africa that its best long-range interests would be served by complying with the ICJ decision will be resumed later this year. Informally this point is being made whenever the opportunity arises in talks with both official and non-official South Africans here and at our posts in South Africa. Consideration of additional measures such as higher level approaches will be reserved until the date of the ICJ judgment approaches.

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NSAM Decisions - Implications
and Prospects

Following numbered paragraphs correspond to the seven numbered paragraphs of NSAM 295:

1. Defer Implementation of Odendaal Report

The South African Government has continued to postpone action on controversial political recommendations of the Odendaal report. However, the Government has continued to lay the groundwork for dividing South West Africa into little Bantustans largely responsible to departments of the Republic. Such actions include buying land to facilitate redistributing the population, a propaganda ploy about Ovambo chiefs petitioning for an Ovambostan, a Government-sponsored visit by South West African chiefs and headmen to the Transkei "State", and planning by a South African Government committee for administrative reorganization of the relationships between South African and South West African units of government. The South African Government also has rushed economic and social development such as roads, airfields, schools and hospitals in an obvious attempt to influence favorably the International Court of Justice and world and South African opinion. To ensure that this outpouring of funds is fully appreciated, the South African Government has invited the Court to visit South Africa and South West Africa as well as other parts of the continent.

2. Policy Regarding Military Sales

The arms ban policy continues to be carefully observed. Consistent with the posture adopted by the President in the case of the proposed sale to South Africa of Lockheed Orion anti-submarine warfare aircraft, United States representatives in the appropriate NATO committee have been successful in deferring action on the sale to South Africa of a NATO consortium-sponsored aircraft, the Brequet Atlantique. So called "Gray Area" items continue to arise either in Commerce or in the Department of State, and they are treated on an ad hoc basis. These are items suitable for either military or civilian end use but not on the controlled Munitions list; or on the Munitions List, but covered by exceptional treatment accorded in the case of some follow-on spare parts.

3. Suspension of Action on Applications for United States Government Loans and Investment Guarantees

In June, 1965, the Department interposed no objection to an application to the Eximbank for a guarantee to cover diesel

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- 4 -

engines manufactured in the United States to be supplied to South Africa for assembling in 25 locomotives for the Mozambique Department of Port, Railroad and Transportation Service. We looked upon this transaction as mainly concerning the United States and Mozambique. Only one other rather special case has arisen in connection with this policy. A New York firm had applied to FCIA for Short Term Political Risks Insurance coverage, including \$30,000 in military equipment to be exported to South Africa in the next twelve months. The Department requested the Eximbank to advise the exporter that, because of our strict arms embargo policy, the Eximbank would not be prepared to cover any proposed military shipments to South Africa.

4. Alternate Space Tracking Facilities

By June 1966 NASA and DOD space stations in South Africa, if necessary or desirable, could be closed down without damage to programs other than relatively minor degradation.

NASA and DOD have been planning and arranging for facilities alternate to those in South Africa. NASA's needs can be met elsewhere by mid-1966 through: (1) the completion of alternate facilities at Ascension Island by April 1966, and in Spain and Malagasy by June 1966; (2) the continued use in South Africa by DOD on NASA's behalf of DOD's GLOTRAC system near Pretoria through the second quarter of 1966 to support NASA's testing of the Centaur launch vehicle (to be used by Surveyor); and (3) the assumption by NASA on Madagascar of certain DOD tracking and telemetry tasks being performed now at the DOD station in South Africa. These latter tasks include support of NASA launches. The NASA facilities in Malagasy are being planned to handle these DOD tasks, if DOD were to withdraw from South Africa. DOD's needs can be met on six-months notice by equipment installed, or removed, to available sites elsewhere. Thus, after the completion of the Centaur tests in the second quarter of 1966, the DOD facilities will not be critical for either DOD or NASA projects, provided NASA can assume certain tracking and telemetry tasks on Madagascar.

Negotiations for additional land in Malagasy and Spain were initiated in May and June 1965, respectively. Completion of negotiations in Spain is expected by mid-October. In Malagasy, oral agreement has been obtained; however, these negotiations relate only to NASA facilities. It is now believed that the Malagasy Government's approval should be obtained for NASA to cover certain DOD requirements. No difficulty is expected, but a delay in obtaining the necessary approval may occur. Such delays in negotiations need not slow up the contingency

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program, however.

5. Program to Persuade South Africa to Comply with International Court of Justice Decision and to Encourage Moderate Whites in South Africa

US-UK Talks with Foreign Minister Muller. Due primarily to the number of witnesses South Africa is using, the judgment of the International Court of Justice on South Africa's obligations as Mandatory of South West Africa is now not expected until March-April 1966. The British and American Ambassadors separately commenced in April 1965 a dialogue with the South African Foreign Minister about the South West Africa issue. They sought to influence the South African Government in the direction of contingency planning for prompt compliance with the judgment of the International Court of Justice, whatever its substance might turn out to be. Ambassador Satterthwaite stressed United States support for the rule of law and for the authority of the Court, and the advisability of contingency planning by the South African Government for the possibility of an ICJ decision adverse to South Africa. The INDEPENDENCE and tracking station incidents in May-July 1965 delayed resumption of the United States talks; but the British Ambassador on May 24, in an interview with Foreign Minister Muller before going on long leave, brought up the subject a second time. He used a possible Security Council debate on the report of the Security Council Committee on Measures as the occasion for mentioning the desirability of avoiding a confrontation. The British Embassy in Pretoria, like our own, intends to raise the South West Africa issue with the Foreign Affairs Department as occasions arise. United States contingency planning for the prospective Security Council session on apartheid and the next General Assembly could provide such occasions for resumed talks with Muller.

Other Talks and Briefing. In the Department at all levels opportunities are used to implant among South African as well as foreign diplomats of countries such as Canada, Australia, Japan, Netherlands, Italy, Germany and Belgium the importance of the International Court of Justice judgment and the serious problems, if the South African Government were to fail to comply. Non-official Americans on the way to Africa and South Africa, such as jurists and historians, and South Africans also are briefed thoroughly on this subject, particularly those likely to discuss the matter with influential South Africans.

After further talks with Foreign Minister Muller, it will, at an appropriate stage, be desirable to make more systematic our

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conversations about the issue with governments other than the British. These could be carried on in Washington, various capitals and New York in conjunction with talks about the prospective Security Council session on apartheid and sanctions, and before and during the upcoming United Nations General Assembly session.

The Department repeatedly has endeavored to encourage writers--scholars as well as journalists--to treat adequately in their publications the potential significance of the International Court of Justice case to South Africa's future prospects, in a manner to bring maximum realization to South Africa of the possible consequences of failure to comply without delay. The Department discreetly has encouraged public ventilation of the issue in ways likely to impress South Africans.

Encouragement of Moderate Whites. In diverse ways efforts have been made to help moderate whites in South Africa. On the initiative of the Department of State, an AFL-CIO officer has been working with the multiracial South African Trade Union Council for several months training labor organizers. The United Automobile Workers are arranging to send a fraternal delegation to South Africa. A special effort is being made by the Embassy and Consulates to reach South African youth. Religious and educational groups in the United States have been encouraged to support the moderate Christian Institute in South Africa and to maintain closer contact with their sister churches in South Africa. American businessmen and scientists have been urged to encourage their moderate South African contacts, the businessman by their example as well as in discussions. Most such briefings have been with individuals, but Ambassador Satterthwaite in South Africa and Governor Williams in Washington have talked to groups of American businessmen along these lines.

United States officials have carefully avoided actions which would further strengthen extremists in South Africa--actions such as public espousal of "one-man, one-vote" for South Africa or a United States Government contribution to private funds for legal and welfare aid to persons on trial in South Africa. At the same time, the United States positions during the INDEPENDENCE and tracking station incidents were in part encouragement to moderate whites critical of the South African Government's racialism.

6. Program to Explain United States Objectives to Interested African Countries

In addition to supplying copies of the National Policy Paper on South Africa to all our embassies in Africa, background and

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instructions about our objectives regarding South West Africa are provided on a continuing basis to USUN and to all United States diplomatic missions in Africa. A special effort is made to brief our Ambassadors going out to Africa, the many visitors here from Africa, including students, and Americans likely to discuss the subject with influential Africans. American leader grantees from the legal and judicial fields have been briefed on the South West Africa case and sent to the Hague during the ICJ proceedings prior to their visiting African countries (including South Africa), where they have discussed the issue with influential persons and groups. Departmental officers on African trips also have emphasized the issue in discussions with Africans as well as our own missions.

Because the judgment of the Court is not expected until Spring 1966, the United States and the United Kingdom will be increasingly exposed to African pressure for action now regarding apartheid in South Africa itself. To relieve such pressure in the Security Council and General Assembly, instructions to the field have included emphasis on the comprehensiveness of the United States arms embargo and have suggested the desirability of making the embargo effective on the part of other countries. Before the United Nations is asked to consider additional pressures on South Africa, co-operative action should be instituted to close existing gaps in the arms embargo.

7. Analysis of Sanctions

The respective bureau heads of the Department concerned with the comprehensive study of possible sanctions against South Africa have been asked for final clearance of the study by August 2, 1965. United States and United Kingdom United Nations delegations in the near future will conduct a series of joint discussions on tactics and strategy in the United Nations after the Court decides the current case on South West Africa. The Department is developing proposals, for discussion with the British, of possible limited measures which could, as appropriate, be used in case of non-compliance by South Africa with the Court's decision. This is still in the preliminary stage.

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9
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 14, 1965

McGB

Bob Komer has seen and agrees
that recent developments call for
a status report on NSAM 295.

Rick

Rick Haynes

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July 14, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR BENJAMIN READ,
Executive Secretariat

SUBJECT: US Policy Toward South Africa --
Status Report on NSAM 295

In view of the increasing imminence of many problems in Southern Africa, it would be desirable to have another status report on actions taken to implement the decisions set forth in National Security Action Memorandum No. 295 of April 24, 1964 regarding South Africa and South West Africa. The report should include recommendations for future action to the extent recent developments call for it. The report should be submitted by August 1, 1965.

McGeorge Bundy

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
Bvcbm/jc, NARA, Date 2-1-09

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Despatched 7/14

Rept # 282

Rich was

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Inquiring
about this

Yes -
request through S/S
new status report by
1 August, including recomm.
for future action!

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July 6, 1965

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RWK

Subject: US Policy Toward South Africa -
Status Report on NSAM 295

I recommend that we call for a general status report on NSAM 295 (copy attached). The last status report (copy attached) is dated April 2, 1965. Since that time there has been a significant deterioration in our relations. I have the impression that our Embassy in Pretoria is doing no more than reporting on the events that mark this deterioration.

A general status report at this time would be in addition to the status report on the tracking station problem which presents us with some immediate decisions.

You will note that the April 2 status report on NSAM 295 states that "periodic status reports on NSAM will be discontinued and future reports limited to major developments considered to be of special interest to the White House".



Rick Haynes

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By abm/jc, NARA, Date 2-1-09

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96
April 24, 1964

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 295

MEMORANDUM TO: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Treasury
Director, U. S. Information Agency
Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration

SUBJECT: U. S. Policy Toward South Africa

1. The State Department should as a matter of urgency develop a comprehensive program of diplomatic activity, based on the response of the South African Government to our two aide memoires, to the end of assuring that the implementation of the Odendaal report is deferred as long as possible and, hopefully, until the decision on the merits of the case in the International Court of Justice. In developing this program, the Department should consider all available diplomatic techniques, including the use of special emissaries, Presidential communications, etc. It should include modes of securing concerted or parallel action by other interested governments, particularly those in Western Europe.

2. Existing policy regarding military sales to South Africa will be continued. Decision regarding possible sales of submarines or any variations in existing policy will be postponed and considered only in light of further developments, including those in the South West Africa - ICJ problem.

3. US Government lending agencies will for the time being suspend action on applications for loans or investment guarantees with respect to South Africa. There should be no avoidable disclosure of this policy to interested parties, however, and agencies should continue to accept and process applications. No policy of warning private investors not to invest in South Africa will be undertaken pending further developments.

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Authority NSC 79E00486
By inf, NARA, Date 12-4-87

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- 2 -

4. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of Defense should immediately undertake such planning for and construction of alternative stand-by facilities as would be required if it became necessary to evacuate the facilities in South Africa on six months' notice. In support of this, the Department of State will determine immediately the political acceptability of countries which the DOD and NASA may indicate as technically feasible and desirable. The Department of State will give priority to accomplishing required site surveys and negotiating necessary base agreements and assisting in needed land acquisition recommended by DOD and NASA. This program shall be carried out in such a manner as to avoid its coming to public notice as long as feasible, and in close consultation with the Department of State particularly so that the public aspects and the diplomatic aspects of our relations with South Africa may be coordinated.

5. The State Department will develop a program for actions during the months ahead, pending final ICJ decision in the South West Africa case, aiming to persuade the South African Government to acceptance of the Court's decision. In addition to use of available pressures, particular attention will be given to exploring possible bases for accommodation and understanding with more moderate members of the South African white community along the lines proposed by the State Department's memorandum of March 10th.

6. The State Department, in consultation with other interested agencies, will develop a program to explain privately to interested African countries the character and objectives of our program in order to try to obtain their understanding and cooperation.

7. The Department of State shall immediately undertake a comprehensive analysis of the various sanctions that could be considered if South Africa does not accept the ICJ decision on South West Africa. This analysis should include an estimate of the effectiveness on South Africa of the sanction if general compliance were obtained and of the prospects for obtaining such compliance.

McGeorge Bundy

Information copy:
Secretary of Commerce

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10
April 24, 1964

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 295

MEMORANDUM TO: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Treasury
Director, U. S. Information Agency
Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration

SUBJECT: U. S. Policy Toward South Africa

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3. US Government lending agencies will for the time being suspend action on applications for loans or investment guarantees with respect to South Africa. There should be no avoidable disclosure of this policy to interested parties, however, and agencies should continue to accept and process applications. No policy of warning private investors not to invest in South Africa will be undertaken pending further developments.

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Authority NLS 82-23
By us, NARS, Date 5-27-82

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- 2 -

4. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of Defense should immediately undertake such planning for and construction of alternative stand-by facilities as would be required if it became necessary to evacuate the facilities in South Africa on six months' notice. In support of this, the Department of State will determine immediately the political acceptability of countries which the DOD and NASA may indicate as technically feasible and desirable. The Department of State will give priority to accomplishing required site surveys and negotiating necessary base agreements and assisting in needed land acquisition recommended by DOD and NASA. This program shall be carried out in such a manner as to avoid its coming to public notice as long as feasible, and in close consultation with the Department of State particularly so that the public aspects and the diplomatic aspects of our relations with South Africa may be coordinated.

5. The State Department will develop a program for actions during the months ahead, pending final ICJ decision in the South West Africa case, aiming to persuade the South African Government to acceptance of the Court's decision. In addition to use of available pressures, particular attention will be given to exploring possible bases for accommodation and understanding with more moderate members of the South African white community along the lines proposed by the State Department's memorandum of March 10th.

6. The State Department, in consultation with other interested agencies, will develop a program to explain privately to interested African countries the character and objectives of our program in order to try to obtain their understanding and cooperation.

7. The Department of State shall immediately undertake a comprehensive analysis of the various sanctions that could be considered if South Africa does not accept the ICJ decision on South West Africa. This analysis should include an estimate of the effectiveness on South Africa of the sanction if general compliance were obtained and of the prospects for obtaining such compliance.

McGeorge Bundy

Information copy:
Secretary of Commerce

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ✓
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON 11

May 5, 1964

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. BUNDY

I had a talk with Seamans of NASA this morning on the relocation of South African tracking stations per NSAM 295. He feels that in view of the money and complexities involved there should be a strong coordinator among State-Defense-NASA interests and I agree. I am therefore asking Alex Johnson if he will take it on using G/PM to staff.

For example --

NASA alone will spend \$19 million for alternate facilities and will need to seek reprogramming authority on the Hill in the next few weeks. Once they have been to the Hill and start actual programming, the likelihood the South Africans will find out is great. So we have got an immediate political handling problem, e.g. what kind of cover story to be used, what to say on the Hill.

It is going to take nearly 18 months to complete alternate facilities. And if, for example, the South Africans in reaction to our program throw NASA out in the next 9 months it would delay by at least 6 months the Surveyor moon landing program.

The Defense side undoubtedly raises similar problems, so I think we have to be sure of continuing high level attention and coordination, going beyond AF's preoccupation with its own political objectives.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By ebm/jc, NARA, Date 2-1-09

Bill Brubeck 6

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

4141
12
This document consists of 5
pages. No. 1 of 9 copies, 5
Series A.

August 1, 1964

1. *Bozubeck*
2. *ret.*

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: US Policy Toward South Africa -
Status Report on NSAM 295

Enclosed herewith for your information is a report of actions taken to implement policy decisions set forth in National Security Action Memorandum No. 295 of April 24, 1964, regarding South Africa and South West Africa. Results of action and status of related problems are also discussed where pertinent.

Benjamin Read
Benjamin Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:
Report of actions taken

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State ltr 4/29/77
By pl/rq, NARA, Date 2/6/92

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Group 3

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pages. No. 2 of 9 copies,
Series A.

JUL 31 1964

12a

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: US Policy Toward South Africa -
Status Report on NSAM 295

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C C MOOR FOR
Benjamin Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:
Report of actions taken

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Hr 4/24/77

By SP/sg, NARA, Date 2/6/92

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July 30, 1964

STATUS REPORT ON NSAM NO. 295
of April 24, 1964 - South Africa

1

Following numbered paragraphs correspond to the seven numbered paragraphs of NSAM 295:

1. Defer Implementation of Odendaal Report in South West Africa

a. Action taken:

After negative South African Government responses to US and UK representations to Foreign Minister Muller on this subject in February, we convinced the British after some discussion that a second effort should be made with Prime Minister Verwoerd directly. Our approaches to the Prime Minister on March 19th brought a much more conciliatory, but not entirely clear South African response on March 27. Meanwhile Mr. Clarence Randall, whom we had briefed and enlisted before his private trip to South Africa, made strong personal representations to both Muller and Verwoerd in mid-March. Applicants in the International Court cases, Ethiopia and Liberia, were kept generally informed of progress and their Counsel was encouraged to refrain from seeking interim ICJ action.

b. Results:

In a Government White Paper and statement to Parliament on April 29, Prime Minister Verwoerd came round to full acceptance of our representations with regard to postponement. Citing South African technical reasons for delay, as we had suggested, he said inter alia and included in the White Paper the statement that the South African Government would "refrain from action which may be regarded - even theoretically - as detrimental or prejudicial to the alleged rights of the applicant states, or which may unnecessarily aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court". In effect, all controversial aspects of the Odendaal Report were postponed pending Court judgment and certain economic and social development projects not involving shifts of population or changes in administration were approved for action.

Ethiopian and Liberian Ambassadors expressed satisfaction with this achievement and indicated that interim Court action which might have precipitated a Security Council crisis this year would not be sought.

The larger problem of South African intentions after Court judgment is still very much with us. While agreeing to postponement of implementation of the Odendaal Report, Dr. Verwoerd nonetheless accepted it "in broad principle" and said "it will be implemented when the time is ripe". Thus, twelve to fourteen months' time was gained, but the issue will become even more critical by mid-summer 1965 when final Court decision on the merits is expected.

2. Policy

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Authority FRUS, Vol. 24, #593
By cbw, NARA, Date 2-24-07

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-2-

2. Policy Regarding Military Sales

Thus far during 1964 the South African Government has not initiated any official requests for arms or military equipment. Existing policy has been adhered to save for two technical exceptions under which it was decided to approve the sale of 100 helicopter firing heads (a safety device, not a weapon) and 12 sets of MK 32-5 torpedo tubes and 6 control panels as accessory equipment for torpedoes purchased by South Africa prior to inauguration of our arms embargo policy last August.

3. Suspension of Action on Applications for US Government Loans and Investment Guarantees

Implementation of this policy has involved refusal of only one application thus far and no others are presently pending. The application which was not approved was in the form of a request for a special political risk guarantee covering a proposed loan of approximately \$7 million by Chase Manhattan Bank to the Palabora Mining Company of South Africa. The loan was to have been for purchase of mining machinery and equipment. The Palabora Company, an international consortium including Newmont and American Metals Climax of the United States, has since obtained alternate capital. The venture involves development of an extensive copper mine complex in the Republic of South Africa to begin production in 1966. There has been no repercussion from the South African Government as the result of the Ex-Im Bank action. A high functionary of the South African Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) did complain irately to one of our Embassy officers and vowed that in retribution the mining equipment would not be purchased in the United States. Ultimately about 95 percent is to be purchased in the United States, however, because letters of intent had already been signed for much of it and Palabora technicians insisted for the rest only US-manufactured machinery would be satisfactory.

Knowledge of the Palabora refusal has spread to some extent among American firms under contract for equipment as well as other US firms, some involved in the venture and some not. However, the general policy has been kept secret and no action beyond that indicated in the NSAM has been taken.

US private investment is continuing at a high rate in South Africa because of unusually favorable returns. Depending on future developments it may become necessary to review the policy of no warnings late this year or early in 1965.

4. Alternate Space Tracking Facilities

NASA and DOD are proceeding actively with plans and preparations for alternate space tracking facilities. NASA will locate various

alternate

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-3-

alternate facilities in Malagasy, Spain and Ascension Island. Separate equipment will be installed and used in supplementary fashion pending any possible requirement to substitute entirely for present South African stations. NASA expects to complete its alternate sites by late 1965. Consent of the Spanish and Malagasy Governments has been obtained. The Ascension site is still subject to final negotiation with the British. DOD requires only stand-by land for a transfer of equipment which can be accomplished within six months. Malagasy is the prospective site for this. At some point later this year South African technicians will be able to deduce the purpose of alternate NASA facilities despite plausible and to some extent real additional reasons for their existence which NASA is fully prepared to make known. It is anticipated that the South African Government will not be likely to raise the issue with us in present circumstances so long as NASA and DOD continue normal operations in South Africa as planned. The questions of whether and when we should inform the South African Government about our alternate sites are still under consideration.

5. Program to Persuade South Africa to Comply with ICJ Decision and to Encourage Moderate Whites in South Africa

The State Department has discussed this problem in preliminary fashion with Mr. Millard of the British Foreign Office. The British had been thinking of taking a renewed diplomatic initiative re South West Africa after the Court decision next year. Mr. Millard conceded during discussions in Washington in June that there might be some risk in waiting until that stage to take diplomatic action. We told him that we were developing a plan for approaching the South African Government later this year to allow time for repeated discussion and for the South African Government to develop an alternative to the Odendaal Report (which took two years), before the Court decision and resultant heightening of international pressures make South African adjustment much more difficult, if not impossible. The British will be prepared to explore with us in late summer or early fall the possibility of cooperating in such an earlier approach.

The substance and strategy of new diplomatic approaches to the South African Government concerning the future of South West Africa are currently in the process of inter-agency review as part of the final draft National Policy Paper on South Africa. This is scheduled for final inter-agency clearance by mid-August.

During the past few months discreet liaison with and encouragement of the major opposition party, United Party, in its active campaign against the Odendaal Report has been successfully carried out by AmEmbassy Pretoria. More effective liaison between interested private American groups and similar groups in South Africa has been assisted in response to inquiries to the Department of State from American

groups

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-4-

groups in the fields of business, labor, religion, youth and science.

6. Program to Explain US Objectives to Interested African Countries

Background and instructions have been provided USUN and all US diplomatic missions in Africa on our objectives concerning South West Africa and the Odendaal Report. These have been used as the basis for private conversations to bring about greater African understanding of the US position. To some extent this effort may have contributed to African willingness to go along with our current position on thorough and time-consuming study of sanctions in the UN Security Council.

7. Analysis of Sanctions

A comprehensive series of studies of sanctions and other possible enforcement measures, including estimates of their effectiveness, costs and prospects for compliance, has been launched in the State Department. First drafts on all topics are scheduled for completion between July 31 and August 15. These will be timely and useful both for the purposes envisaged in the NSAM and as supporting information for USUN participation in the Security Council Study Committee on enforcement measures. The British are doing a similar series of studies and have indicated willingness to exchange views and information with us as they proceed.

Clearances: AF - Mr. Fredericks
SCI - Mr. Dillery (subs)
UNP - Mr. Kriebel (inf.)
EUR/BNA Mr. Judd
G/PM - Mr. Warren
S/P - Mr. Duggan (subs.)

AF: AFE: PHooper: ams 7-30-64

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13 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Tracking Stations

Let me add two comments concerning land-based versus sea-based tracking stations, one of which I thought of at the meeting but chose not to mention, and another which just occurred to me.

Land-based facilities are controlled by the Army or the Air Force, sea-based by the Navy. Particularly in the case of the Air Force, which wants to preserve its DOD-assigned primacy in space matters, I am certain they would fear that making tracking stations sea-based would give the Navy a resurgent role in space matters. In the case of the Army, they want to maintain their influence in world-wide land-based communications. In addition, they want to maintain American presence overseas; it is in line with their forward strategy concept. All Services would agree that US military presence is more often than not a stabilizing factor. Whether this is always true or not is another matter.

The second point is that at some land-based facilities considerable covert intelligence activities are accomplished. I need not go into these, but they are of very considerable value to the US.

The proposed NSAM should bring at least the second of these matters into focus, if not the first. It may remain buried under other reasons.

W. Y. Smith
W. Y. SMITH

*a good memo
keep in top of it*

for him to see

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Authority RA 015K-4-1-2-9
By JDN vARA Date 11-15-17

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Staff Ints

14

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

April 16, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. BUNDY

Attached (Tab A) is my proposed final draft of the South African NSAM, taking into account the views of State, Defense and the JCS.

State is in substantial concurrence with this text. I have rejected two Defense suggestions which I do not believe are serious problems -- (a) variant language in paragraph 2 (postponement of military sales) which would add nothing; and (b) a proposal for quarterly reports to the President from the African Policy Committee on South West Africa (see paragraph 8, Tab B).

In addition to the views of OSD, Defense has forwarded separately the comments of JCS on the NSAM, which present a more substantial problem (Tab C); and a separate JCS memo proposing that we proceed at an early date with sales of "submarines and other appropriate military equipment." (Tab D)

The views of the Chiefs are familiar:

1. We should proceed with sales of strategic equipment which the South Africans want, such as submarines, air-to-air missiles, etc.

2. The stability of South Africa "under all the circumstances," maintenance of "US ties and influence", "alignment of the Republic with the Western powers and the continuance of existing US deep space and tracking facilities" should be the primary objectives of US policy.

While the Chiefs raise some philosophic problems, the practical disagreement is limited. The Chiefs want a protracted effort at friendly persuasion with any consideration of sanctions pushed off to the future. As a practical matter, that is what the NSAM does. There are, however two specific problems:

1. On military sales the Chiefs have consistently been dissenters from present policy and I see no reason why we must take this issue to the President now. The NSAM would continue to "postpone" decision and the Chiefs can always reopen the question with OSD and State when they want to.

2. On the issue of moving the tracking stations I think the Chiefs can more properly argue their case in the context of our other proposed NSAM on the general tracking station problem.

Commerce has also expressed concern with the effect on the Export Expansion Program and, consequently, on the balance of payments of suspending government loans and guarantees. I have advised them that they can raise this issue at any time, in terms of specific cases, after the NSAM is issued.


I recommend that you sign off the attached NSAM without further discussion.

Bill Brubeck 


Attachments:

As stated.

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. _____

Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Treasury
Director, U.S. Information Agency
Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward South Africa

1. The State Department should as a matter of urgency develop a comprehensive program of diplomatic activity, based on the response of the South African Government to our two aide memoires, to the end of assuring that the implementation of the Odendaal report is deferred as long as possible and, hopefully, until the decision on the merits of the case in the International Court of Justice. In developing this program, the Department should consider all available diplomatic techniques, including the use of special emissaries, Presidential communications, etc. It should include modes of securing concerted or parallel action by other interested governments, particularly those in Western Europe.

2. Existing policy regarding military sales to South Africa will be continued. Decision regarding possible sales of submarines and naval equipment, or any other variations in existing policy and other major items which may be viewed as appropriate for the maintenance of international peace and security, will be postponed and considered only in light of further developments, including these in the Southwest Africa ECF problem.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 09-118
By ml, NARA, Date 7-27-10

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. _____

TO: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Treasury
Director, U.S. Information Agency
Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward South Africa

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2. ~~Existing policy regarding military sales to South Africa will be continued. Decision regarding possible sales of submarines and naval equipment, or any other variations in existing policy will be postponed and considered only in light of further developments, in the South West Africa-ICJ problem.~~ *INCLUDING THOSE*

3. U.S. Government lending agencies will for the time being suspend action on applications for loans or investment guarantees with respect to South Africa. There should be no avoidable disclosure of this policy to interested

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4. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of Defense should immediately undertake such planning for and construction of alternative standby facilities as would be required if it became necessary to evacuate the facilities in South Africa on six months' notice. In support of this, the Department of State will determine immediately the political acceptability of countries which the DoD and NASA will indicate as technically feasible and desirable. Further, the Department of State will arrange for required site surveys and will negotiate for the necessary base agreements and assist in needed land acquisition recommended by DoD and NASA. This shall be carried out in such a manner as to avoid its coming to public notice as long as feasible, and in close consultation with the Department of State particularly so that the public aspects and the diplomatic aspects of our relations with South Africa may be coordinated.

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7. The Department

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-2-

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7. The Department

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7. The Department of State shall immediately undertake a comprehensive analysis of the various sanctions that could be considered if South Africa does not accept the ICJ decision on South West Africa. This analysis should include an estimate of the effectiveness on South Africa of the sanction if general compliance were obtained and of the prospects for obtaining such compliance.

8. In view of the serious situation in connection with Southwest Africa, the African Policy Committee shall prepare a report for the President by 30 June and each 90 days thereafter as to the effectiveness of our policies and courses of action towards achieving our objectives in South Africa.


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FILE COPY 15

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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April 24, 1964

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 295

MEMORANDUM TO: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Treasury
Director, U. S. Information Agency
Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

SUBJECT: U. S. Policy Toward South Africa

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Authority NLS 82-23
By irs, NARS, Date 5-27-82

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- 2 -

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McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

Information Copy:
Secretary of Commerce

cc:

Mr. Bundy
Mr. Brubeck
Mr. Johnson
NSC Files

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Mr. Haynes 4/24/65

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Approved
16
1003
April 20, 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Sometime within the next year, and perhaps within the next month or so South Africa may refuse to abide by a World Court decision which will probably forbid South Africa to extend apartheid to its mandated territory of South West Africa. We would have no real alternative except to uphold the Court's authority, particularly in light of our own Article 19 case, and therefore may find ourselves in the near future in a major confrontation with South Africa. The attached NSAM represents the substantial agreement of State and Defense on a program to deal with this problem.

Specifically the NSAM will --

1. Suspend military sales (already being done, in practice) and government loans or guarantees.
2. Begin contingency planning for alternate tracking station sites if we have to give up our South African facilities.
3. Direct the State Department to develop a program to persuade the South African Government to accept the authority of the Court.

The only significant disagreement with this NSAM is that of the JCS who continue to want military sales to South Africa. However, their position has been previously overruled and they are now restating it for the record. In any event the JCS can reopen the question any time Defense wishes to do so. I believe, therefore, we should proceed with the NSAM but I have prepared it for my signature rather than involve you directly so that you can more freely reconsider the issue at a later time if this becomes necessary.

Under this program, we have a year in which to solve the World Court problem, and, at the same time, make a start on the underlying problem of getting the South Africans to adopt a more practical policy than apartheid.

I don't think we can get the imagination and flexibility, or the high level talent, or the kind of action we need, however, if we depend on the usual processes of the State Department. Instead I propose to discuss with Secretary Rusk the

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By chulic, NARA, Date 2-5-09

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1011

appointment of a special representative to handle South Africa -- a distinguished man, on a part-time basis but with a staff of his own and with full authority, reporting directly to the Secretary. I think we would also need a new Ambassador in South Africa with some real skill in personal diplomacy and I propose to explore this with Walter Jenkins and Ralph Dungan.

If you agree I will sign off the NSAM and talk with the Secretary along these lines.

✓ R
APPROVE _____

TALK TO ME ABOUT THIS _____

McG. Bundy

McGeorge Bundy

Attachment:

As stated

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1428
South Africa
This document consists of _____
pages. No. _____ of _____ copies.
Series A.

March 10, 1964.

BRIEFING FOR NSC STANDING GROUP

Subject: South Africa and South West Africa

SUMMARY

1. Current and contemplated actions of the South African Government in South West Africa threaten to bring about a critical situation in the Security Council involving strong and legally valid demands for enforcement measures to support International Court decisions any time from April this year through the spring or summer of 1965, when a final Court judgment on the merits of pending cases is expected. New and extreme apartheid measures in South Africa will complicate this situation further when reflected in the report of the UN Study Committee on this subject in June.

2. A review of basic US interests, of the urgent timetable and of the risks and advantages of various courses of action open to us in the face of predictable developments points to the following recommended courses of action:

a. Delay UN confrontation with South Africa as long as possible through a series of diplomatic actions, and attempt to put off consideration of major enforcement measures until after a final Court decision next year.

b. Undertake immediate review of problems relating to our space tracking stations in South Africa and move to locate them elsewhere as quickly as possible.

c. Continue our existing policy of refusing sales to South Africa of arms, ammunition, equipment to manufacture arms, military vehicles, firearms and other items of significant use in combat or in training for armed, police or para-military forces, except for the fulfillment of existing contracts and the reservation of right to supply under the "strategic exception" provision in case the international situation so warrants. Continue to postpone decision on possible sale of submarines, other naval vessels and spare parts and equipment for naval vessels, pending developments with respect to the South West Africa situation. Decisions on the latter category would be made in the light of developments with respect to South West Africa, and might constitute an element which can be utilized as an inducement to bring about a change in South African policy.

d. Warn major US investors of new risks they face in South Africa and cease US Government loans and guaranties for investments in South Africa during this critical period.

e. Undertake

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, Vol. XXIV, #579
By cfm, NARA, Date 8-23-02

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e. Undertake a modest program of increased contact with and limited covert aid to non-communist African political refugee leaders from South Africa and moderate groups of all races within South Africa.

f. Launch without delay a series of studies to permit evaluation of the probable effectiveness of various possible measures against South Africa, which to some extent may ultimately be needed to support a final judgment of the International Court of Justice and to protect basic US interests elsewhere.

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BRIEFING FOR NSC STANDING GROUP

Subject: South Africa and South West Africa

I. Introduction

The timetable for basic decisions concerning Southern Africa has been drastically foreshortened by actions now being taken in South West Africa and in South Africa by the Verwoerd Government. At issue in the Security Council, probably as soon as this April, will be the question of supporting action by the International Court of Justice in the nature of a cease-and-desist order against South Africa with respect to its proposed measures in South West Africa. Under Article 94 of the Charter the Security Council could decide on appropriate measures to enforce the ICJ's order. In June the Security Council's Committee of Experts will report on apartheid now being drastically extended in South Africa. As a consequence of these developments, international pressures for action against South Africa over the issues of South West Africa and apartheid will reach unprecedented heights in the UN in the months immediately ahead. Important US interests in South Africa will be pitted against extensive US interests elsewhere in Africa and in the UN to a far greater degree than ever before. Time has become a crucial factor with regard to these interests, to selection of a basic strategy and to related decision-making on a variety of practical problems now before us.

II. Background1. Apartheid and Repressive Measures

Eighty-one percent of the population in South Africa and eighty-six percent of the population in South West Africa are denied political rights and freedoms on the basis of race by the South African Government. Non-whites in both areas are exploited economically and subjected to the manifold suppressions and indignities of the system of apartheid. Rule of law has been set aside by arbitrary arrest and detention. African political organizations, with strong backing from independent Africa, having been barred from all peaceful courses of action, take resort in spasmodic sabotage and are preparing for more extensive violence, in some cases with Soviet or Communist Chinese assistance.

Apartheid has been somewhat less rigorously and less directly administered in South West Africa and until last January no plan for separate racial "homelands" or Bantustans had been projected for the mandated territory as has been the case in South Africa.

2. Political

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By cfm, NARA, Date 8-23-02

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2. Political and Judicial Responses

For more than 15 years apartheid has been under attack in the United Nations, and because of it, so has the South African administration of South West Africa. In the same period the system of apartheid has become steadily more extreme, more ruthlessly administered and more repugnant to the world at large. The Afro-Asian nations, with strong support from the Communist bloc and varying degrees of support from Latin America and some West European countries, have no more patience with hortatory UN resolutions and are demanding action. In particular, they look to the US and the UK to exert pressure on South Africa.

The International Court of Justice has played a central role with respect to South West Africa.

In three advisory opinions communicated to the United Nations General Assembly between 1950 and 1956, the Court advised that South Africa remained bound by the Mandate, that it must accept UN supervision and could not terminate or alter the Mandate without UN consent. The United States has supported these opinions. South Africa has consistently refused to conform to them. Ethiopia and Liberia, with full support of the OAU nations, brought an action in 1960 in the International Court of Justice charging South Africa with violation of the Mandate on several counts. A strong case has been made by them to the effect that various discriminatory aspects of apartheid, as well as South African refusal to submit to UN supervisory jurisdiction, are in violation of the Mandate. Thus far, the Court has given judgment on preliminary objections that the Mandate binds South Africa and that the Court has jurisdiction to decide the case. A court decision against South Africa, which would open the way for seeking Security Council enforcement measures under Article 94 of the Charter, is expected early in 1965. More recent developments point to an interim Court decision this year, which will be discussed later.

3. US Policy

Up to now our policy on South Africa has been something of an ad hoc combination of continuing to preserve basically good relations with the Republic in the light of our considerable trade, investment, strategic and scientific (e.g. space tracking stations) interests there, while at the same time making clear our opposition to apartheid. We have been able to maintain a degree of influence, in the UN, albeit a diminishing one, on the issues of South West Africa and apartheid by supporting a series of resolutions short of sanctions. We are on record in these resolutions as (1) supporting the ICJ with respect to South West Africa, (2) concurring in UN findings that apartheid violates South Africa's obligations under the Charter, and (3) concurring in the UN view that South Africa has violated its Mandate obligations in the administration of South West Africa. In August and December last year we supported resolutions calling on member states to ban the sale to

South Africa

South Africa of arms, ammunition, military vehicles, and equipment for the manufacture of arms. We have taken a repeated stand against sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter, and have urged other UN member states not to press for them prior to an ICJ decision in the pending South West Africa case.

III. Emerging Situation

The next 12 months in the United Nations were expected to be more difficult on issues affecting South Africa in any event. With acceleration of crisis over South West Africa by April and the Experts' Report on Apartheid by June, the pressures on South Africa's main trading partners to do more will become even greater than expected.

1. Bantu Laws Amendment Bill

These pressures are being exacerbated by provocative actions now being taken by the South African Government, both in the Republic and in South West Africa. The most extreme apartheid legislation yet proposed - the Bantu Laws Amendment Bill - was introduced by the South African Government early this year. It has passed second reading and will soon become law. In brief, it will remove the last vestiges of job and residence security for several million non-whites who live and work in the white urban and rural areas of the country (87% of the area of the Republic). It would have the effect of reducing them to the status of migratory workers, with no roots or future outside the overcrowded native reserves (13% of the area of the Republic) where many have never lived. This bill has been bitterly contested by the white opposition party (United Party). Its enactment will have a strong adverse impact on the Study Committee report to the UN in June.

2. Odendaal Commission Recommendations

Even more serious in terms of UN impact and international reaction is South African legislation now being prepared for adoption before the end of June on South West Africa. This would implement the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission which were published late in January. In addition to a projected economic development, these recommendations have the effect of (1) extending apartheid in its most extreme form to South West Africa, including shifting and separation of peoples to form 10 restrictive, racial "homelands", and (2) bringing about a shift in governing powers which is tantamount to annexation of the Territory. Under this plan the bulk of South West Africa's population of over 500,000 would be restricted to less productive and near-desert areas while about 60 percent of the Territory and most of its wealth would be controlled by 73,000 whites.

These

These planned actions are directly prejudicial to the contentious case currently before the International Court of Justice. They are in defiance of three ICJ advisory opinions and of the 1962 ICJ judgment that the South West Africa Mandate continues to exist and that the Court has jurisdiction in the case now before it.

In South Africa the minority United Party is in the process of preparing a strong attack against the planned moves of the South African Government in South West Africa. In South West Africa various African and colored leaders have indicated their total rejection of the plan.

3. African Counter-Action

With the backing of the member states of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the applicants (Ethiopia and Liberia) in the pending ICJ case have just authorized their counsel to seek interim measures amounting to a "cease-and-desist" order from the ICJ. It is anticipated that this order will be sought in March (unless the SAG gives evidence of postponing implementation of the Odendaal Commission recommendations) and could be obtained by April. If the South African Government does not comply, as the weight of current evidence indicates it will not, the plaintiffs may be expected to bring the issue to the Security Council under Article 94 of the Charter and seek enforcement measures. Thus, as early as this spring, we may be faced with the most difficult of decisions: (1) whether to uphold the arm of the Court and respect for international law through additional measures, including sanctions as a large majority of nations will be pressing us to do, or (3) to adopt a negative position which might involve us in our first veto on the worst possible question - colonialism or breach of Mandate obligations - relating to the worst possible issue - virulent racism or apartheid. A further and very important consideration is fact that US position on loss of vote in UNCA under Art. 19 rests squarely on support of authority of ICJ.

IV. Probable Timetable of Events

1. March 15-30 - Ethiopia and Liberia may request the ICJ to enjoin SAG, under Article 41 of the Court's statute, from implementing those portions of the Odendaal Commission's report which conflict with the issues of the contentious case.

2. April - Committee of 24 will discuss South West Africa, including implications of Odendaal Report and investigation of foreign economic interests in the Territory.

3. April 1-15 - ICJ probably will grant injunction, if it has been requested. Hearings would be brief and Court action would be summary and couched in general terms.

4. April 15-30 - Security Council session calling on South Africa to comply with Court injunction.

5. May

5. May - Security Council will meet again to consider South African reaction to injunction and to previous Council appeal. Action taken under Article 94 will be based on degree of South African compliance with injunction.

6. June - Security Council meeting on apartheid, based on Experts' Committee report.

7. June 20 (no later than) - Ethiopia and Liberia will file their reply to the South African Counter-Memorial (submitted in January 1964) on the merits of the ICJ case.

8. Fall 1964 - 19th UN General Assembly. (Under normal circumstances we would anticipate that this would commence after US elections. Earlier special session might be called on either South West Africa or South Africa issues depending upon interim developments in the Security Council.)

9. November 20 (no later than) - South Africa will file Rejoinder to Ethiopian and Liberian replies (see 7 above).

10. Early 1965 - Oral hearings in the ICJ.

11. Mid-1965 - ICJ decision.

12. Mid- or late 1965 - Security Council session under Article 94 of the Charter to consider South Africa's performance of its obligations under the ICJ's final judgment.

V. Options Open to US

Theoretically there are two extreme options which are here dismissed as being unrealistic: (1) full support for South Africa in its present course, or (2) immediate support for extreme international action against the South African Government such as suspension of South Africa from the UN, revocation of the Mandate and occupation of South West Africa by military force. Between these two extremes there appear to be three basic courses of action which we could consider taking:

(1) Go along much as we have in the past, declaring our abhorrence to apartheid and decrying South African refusal to observe the Mandate, but avoiding a showdown and carrying on business as usual; and

(2) Take a lead, especially with South Africa's trading partners, outside as well as in the UN, in instituting graduated pressures against South Africa in order to influence the course and degree of such pressures, to see that South Africa is given reasonable opportunity to comply with ICJ findings and to accompany pressures on South Africa with a political strategy designed to strengthen moderate elements in the Republic and bring about a modification of internal policies of apartheid.

(3) Seek to

(3) Seek to delay major UN confrontation with the South African Government over the South West Africa issue until after the ICJ judgment on the merits in the spring or summer of 1965, using the time gained to analyze alternative measures open to us in the event of major confrontation and to make alternate arrangements for space tracking stations and other requisite adjustments relating to basic US interests in and policies toward South Africa.

1. Continuation of Present Policy

The principal advantage of the first course would be preservation of reasonably good relations with the South African Government and consequent maintenance of basic US defense, scientific, and economic interests on the present footing for possibly several more years. To accomplish this we would have to withstand much more intense international press ure for change over the next two years and be willing to accept certain political and possible strategic losses elsewhere. In the forthcoming Security Council consideration of an ICJ restraining order, this course of action would involve at best our abstention behind a British or French veto of enforcement measures, at worst our own first veto. Our influence over subsequent consideration of the problem would be greatly diminished. A bad precedent would have been established undercutting the International Court by demonstrating that its restraining orders need only be resolutely challenged and the force of its judgment removed by fait accompli. The Soviet Union and Communist China would jump on the issue and point out that our support for international law was secondary to our economic and military interests. They and the OAU would bring great pressure to bear on nonaligned African nations where we have important bases or facilities (Morocco, Libya, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Zanzibar and the Malagasy Republic) to terminate all agreements. Our influence in black Africa, and possibly even diplomatic relations, would be broken or severely damaged. The South African Government would be encouraged to proceed with the shifting of the non-white populations in South West Africa and implementation of extreme apartheid there. To recoup our position we would probably be forced to support even more severe measures than otherwise might have been the case when the final ICJ decision is made next year. If at that time we failed to support Security Council action to uphold a Court judgment on the merits, the adverse effects on our position in Africa, and in international affairs generally, would be drastic indeed.

The advantages and risks of this policy are summarized below:

Advantages

(a) Keep our bases in South Africa, surely for a short term, at a considerable saving in money and effort at this time and without sacrifice of technical advantages of location.

(b) Keep open the opportunity of private investment in an economy providing very high short-term profits.

(c) Retain

(c) Retain friendship of South African Government (without significant influence on major issues).

(d) Support of US interests with short term stakes related to foregoing.

(e) Avoid considerable disruption to the British economy.

Risks

(a) The possibility of being forced by international pressures to abandon this course with little or no time to protect our basic interests in South Africa, which would thus be adversely affected.

(b) Loss of some or all bases and facilities elsewhere in Africa. Possible eventual loss of bases in South Africa with consequent severe and possibly irremediable disruption to the tight, time-scheduled space projects.

(c) Loss to private investments in longer term arising from SAG restrictions and pressures as it invokes emergency procedures in face of internal and external threats.

(d) Loss of foreign policy support on the part of significant elements of the US population.

(e) Heavy loss of influence throughout Africa and breaks in diplomatic relations. Serious loss of prestige and influence in UN and world at large through reversal of our previously indicated support for the International Court. Loss of influence over any courses of action against South Africa which may be decided upon by a majority in the General Assembly.

(f) Loss of a major opportunity to support moderates in South Africa and help bring about peaceful racial adjustment.

(g) Provision of an opening to a more dangerous Soviet and Chinese Communist manipulation of the South West Africa and apartheid issues.

(h) Grave weakening of the effectiveness of the UN and the ICJ in world affairs.

2. Taking the Lead in Graduated Pressures and Political Action

The second alternative course would involve taking positive action to support Security Council measures designed to obtain South African compliance with a restraining order from the ICJ re South West Africa, as well as a series of political actions vis-a-vis apartheid in South Africa which are subsequently discussed. By indicating our support for the Court order, we would be in a stronger position to

influence

influence Security Council measures. Our initial effort would be in the direction of following through on representations already made, and exhausting every reasonable means of discussion and diplomatic persuasion to obtain South African compliance. In the face of continuing South African intransigence, we would then seek the support of South Africa's principal trading partners and others in a selective resort to pressures of gradually increasing severity, probably of an economic nature, to bring about compliance, holding off any moves to revoke the Mandate as long as possible. It is difficult to predict whether, or at what stage, the South African Government might adjust to UN demands regarding South West Africa in order to secure international consent to its retention of the Mandate. The chances of its doing so would, however, be at a maximum, if we were able to persuade the UN to move along the lines of this course of action. Dr. Verwoerd may be testing now to see how far he can go in flouting the UN and the Court with relative impunity. On the other hand he may be determined to proceed unilaterally in South West Africa until literally forced to stop. UN pressures injurious to the South African economy or its prospects might very well increase present internal opposition to his South West Africa policies to the point where he would be forced to modify them.

In order to intensify such internal pressures it would be important at an early stage to follow a political strategy which holds forth for moderates of all races in South Africa a positive and promising alternative to the destructive course of apartheid. This could be done by a US-UK approach to the Verwoerd Government urging an early conference of representative leaders of all races in South Africa concerning amelioration of repressive measures, restoration of the rule of law and the consideration of transitional arrangements permitting representation of all groups. Some assurances could be given of our support for such a change in course. These assurances should include indication of our willingness under such conditions to: (1) seek understanding and restraint in the UN, (2) provide practical assistance as desired by the SAG in furtherance of its new course, (3) state our support for continued residence and basic rights of the white population, and (4) if useful to continued progress of this new course, issue a joint statement of our intention to use our best efforts to prevent the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or independence of the Republic. Furthermore, the prospect of a productive South Africa in harmonious relations with neighboring High Commission Territories, South West Africa and ultimately the entire African continent could be held forth. Once the Verwoerd Government rejected such an alternative, as it probably would, the proposal and the South African Government's rejection of it would be revealed to the South African public and utilized to heighten the opposition to Verwoerd's extreme course. Pressures brought to bear on South Africa in connection with the South West Africa issue would, against this background, have a better chance of dividing the whites, strengthening Verwoerd's moderate opposition and inducing adoption of policies in the Republic more conducive to peaceful political transition there.

The advantages

The advantages and risks of this policy are summarized below:

Advantages

- (a) Increase the chances of dissuading the Verwoerd Government from implementing its plans for South West Africa by credible indications of our determination to support the Court.
- (b) Maintain sufficient influence to give South Africa every reasonable chance to comply with the Court decisions.
- (c) Influence the course of mounting pressures against South Africa within and outside the UN in such a way as to maximize the chances of peaceful and constructive solutions in both South West Africa and South Africa.
- (d) Obtain time through advance decision and planning to minimize the losses to our basic interests in South Africa.
- (e) Strengthen US position in making timely and effective moves elsewhere in Africa to discourage policies of discrimination, repression and disregard of international obligations.

Risks

- (a) Earlier loss of tracking stations, investments and use of military facilities in South Africa, if obduracy of Verwoerd Government continues to extent of requiring our participation in severe pressures against South Africa.
- (b) Considerable disruption of British economy.
- (c) Probable strain on our relations with UK and France because of difficulties which may come up in coordinating enforcement measures.

3. The third alternative course may be the most difficult to achieve, but has much to commend it. In this we would seek to delay confrontation between the UN and South Africa and to postpone consideration of severe enforcement measures until after the ICJ judgment in 1965, while using the time gained to establish alternate tracking stations, to analyze alternative measures open to us in the event of major confrontation, and to make other requisite adjustments relating to basic US interests in and policies toward South Africa. It could include the following diplomatic efforts:

a. Second US-UK demarche to the South African Government urging it not to proceed with implementation of the Odendaal Commission recommendations pending final judgment in the ICJ cases.

(b) Enlistment

b. Enlistment of support of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan and the Scandinavian countries in pressing the South African Government not to execute its planned actions in South West Africa before next year.

c. Solicitation of further delay on the part of Ernest Gross, Counsel for Liberia and Ethiopia, in filing pleadings for an interim ICJ injunction by advising him of these continuing efforts and stressing the advantage to his clients of holding off until the South African Government had taken more concrete action to implement the Odendaal recommendations.

d. Seek to direct initial consideration by various UN bodies of the Odendaal Report along lines of thorough study and consultation with South African Government representatives, with representatives of various parties and tribes from South West Africa, and urge the South African Government to permit a UN representative to visit South West Africa with members of the Odendaal Commission to get a first-hand view of the problems to which their report relates.

e. Indicate support of the interim ICJ injunction at such time as it may be granted. Undertake a further demarche to the South African Government urging it to comply with the injunction.

f. When the issue is referred to the Security Council, we could urge that it be handled in two stages each of which it could be our objective to prolong. In the first stage we could seek recommendatory action under Article 94 that the SAG comply with the ICJ injunction. Every opportunity to delay through discussion of the definition of compliance and the extension of a reasonable period for negotiation with and consideration by the South African Government would be exploited.

g. Depending upon the degree to which Verwoerd was intent upon forcing the issue, a delay of weeks or months might be achieved at this stage.

h. In the second stage we could employ a strategy designed to persuade UN members of the advisability of applying only such limited pressures as appear feasible at the time, leaving consideration of other enforcement measures until after the final Court decision in 1965.

The following advantages and risks relate to this course:

Advantages

(a) Obtain up to 18 months before US involvement in enforcement measures which might cause the SAG to retaliate by closing down our tracking stations.

(b) Get us by both UK and US elections before occurrence of a major confrontation over the South West and South African problems with South Africa.

(c) Develop

(c) Develop and retain a range of possible graduated pressures or sanctions for employment after the final ICJ judgment in 1965.

(d) Establish a much stronger basis in international law and opinion for pressures which may ultimately be required.

(e) Maintain flexibility in adopting US actions to the realities of existing risks.

Risks

(a) Diminish further our influence in the UN and among African nations concerning the South African issues, or maintain it in part at the cost of apparent commitment to support strong enforcement measures to obtain South African compliance with a final Court decision.

(b) Perhaps have to cope with punitive action against South Africa in the General Assembly with strong Soviet support consequent upon a Security Council veto.

(c) Encourage the South African Government to proceed with rapid implementation of the Odendaal Commission recommendations, including virtual annexation, which would make enforcement of the final ICJ decision all the more difficult.

(d) Invite sharp condemnation abroad and at home of negative US policy on what is generally viewed as the major problem of racial injustice in the world, at a time when we are striving to improve our image through progress in civil rights legislation here.

In addition to the foregoing political considerations the hard facts of basic US interests at stake in South Africa, and those of the United Kingdom, have to be weighed in this complex equation of tangibles, intangibles and predictable events in coming to basic decisions concerning our present and future policy.

VI. Brief Inventory of Major US Interests in and Relating to South Africa

Our basic interests in South Africa briefly stated include the following:

A. Tracking Stations

1. NASA Deep Space Instrumentation Facility near Johannesburg (capital value approximately \$11,000,000).

2. DOD Missile and Space Tracking Station at Grootfontein (capital value approximately \$500,000).

3. Minitrack and Data Acquisition Station for tracking unmanned scientific satellites near Johannesburg (capital value \$7,400,000).

4. Baker-Nunn Optical Tracking Station supporting all space programs at Olifantsfontein (capital value about \$100,000).

Continued use of these stations, or use of new alternate stations in the same geographic region including a variety of possible locations outside South Africa, is essential to accomplishment of the space and missile programs to which the US is already committed in this decade. NASA has need for at least one additional station now and other increments may be necessary before 1970.

B. Port and Airfield Facilities; South African Forces

1. Several ports and airfield facilities are used by DOD in the Republic of South Africa for staging aircraft and ships in support of long range missile impact testing in off-shore waters.

2. In the event of major world conflict or other major contingencies (e.g. the closing of the Suez Canal), the use of such port and airfield facilities would be important, but not indispensable to our strategic capabilities. The British Foreign Office has indicated that the Simonstown Naval Base is similarly important, but not indispensable.

3. The South African Air Force and Navy could perform supporting actions in any major conflict. Their value would depend upon existing conditions.

C. US investments and Trade

1. Current direct US investment in South Africa is approximately \$400 million.

2. Indirect or portfolio investment is approximately \$250 million.

3. Estimated total of announced, pending and projected investments, for the most part not yet finally committed, is \$150 million.

4. US exports to South Africa were \$238 million in 1962 compared to imports totalling \$247 million. Total trade in 1963 was greater and the slightly unfavorable balance may have been eliminated.

5. US investments in South Africa are only slightly less than total US investments elsewhere in Africa. British investments run to nearly twice our total in South Africa and British trade is over half again as much and proportionately of greater significance to the United Kingdom.

D. Political Objectives

1. South West Africa - eventual solution consonant with the findings of the ICJ and consent of the people in the Territory, which might include: federated or integrated relationship with South Africa

following elimination of apartheid, federation with Bechuanaland or Angola after their independence, or separate sovereignty. Preservation of the economy and all elements of the population.

2. South Africa - diversion from the present course of racial estrangement and repression of non-whites through internal political change, before widespread racial violence or warfare with dire consequences throughout the world breaks out. Preservation of the economy and all elements of population.

E. Special Problems of the United Kingdom

The UK is in substantial agreement with us in our analysis of the situation and prepared to cooperate in representations to the SAG. It may be expected to oppose and would probably veto major economic sanctions under presently foreseeable circumstances. UK inhibited by necessity of retaining SAG tolerance High Commission Territories, fact that substantial part of whites in South Africa are of British origin and general opposition to economic boycotts in time of peace. In addition to sterling system dependence on South African gold flow, UK has heavy trade with South Africa, substantial UK investments in South Africa and defense interest in Naval Base at Simonstown. UK, our most important ally, will expect us to join it in opposing strong coercive measures.

VII. Immediate Problems Requiring Decision

Whatever decision is taken concerning our basic course of action, we are currently faced with a wide range of practical problems of considerable importance in terms of national interest, the solution of which in many instances may have significant impact on the course of events. Basically these can be dealt with in three ways: (1) business as usual without regard to the predictable risks and complications ahead; (2) delaying decision, while awaiting further clarification of developments; (3) resolving the problems within the framework of a policy with clearer objectives and lines of strategy than the present ad hoc mixture of anti-apartheid, pro-South African Government practices.

The following is a resumé of the range and types of problems now being treated or by-passed variously in the absence of a clear policy.

1. Tracking Stations

The current and projected needs of NASA and Defense for space tracking stations constitute perhaps the most serious problem we face in the category of US interests in the area. In view of the insecure future prospects in the Republic of South Africa and the long lead time required to establish replacement sites elsewhere after alternate sites have been obtained—18 months for the NASA deep space station, 6 months for the Defense missile tracking station -- this problem has become urgent indeed. Should we assume all the indicated risks of depending upon them solely in South Africa over the next year

or two years? If we support the Court and the UN either fully or partially on the South West Africa issue, our relations with the South African Government would inevitably worsen. The odds are great that once he was convinced he could no longer count on the United States to deter UN pressures, Prime Minister Verwoerd would order us out - quite abruptly. Without advance preparation of alternate sites we would risk serious interruption of our space programs over a considerable period.

Preliminary study indicates that a variety of geographically feasible alternate sites exist outside South Africa and South West Africa. They range from Bechuanaland to Spain. Rather than add yet a fifth tracking station, which NASA now needs, to the vulnerable area of South Africa, the whole question of feasibility and costs of relocation should be reviewed immediately and decisions made as quickly as possible.

2. Investments

US firms are currently in various stages of the process of committing up to \$150 million in new investments in South Africa. One of these investments, involving \$40 million in US private capital and another \$60 million in foreign capital for a large copper-mining venture, is pending final EX-IM Bank decision concerning a loan guaranty of approximately \$7 million. The mine - Palabora Mine - would not go into production until 1966. This was approved by the State Department late last year, before the shape of the pending crisis over South West Africa had become clear. Such investments lend great support to the Verwoerd regime despite their purely commercial motivation; they also run increasingly serious risk of future expropriation. US firms are being required to go beyond normal practices of plant and storage expansion under the South African drive for self-sufficiency. Should they be encouraged? Should they receive EX-IM Bank support? Is it not our responsibility to warn US investors of the full nature of political risks ahead? Should US Government loan and guaranty support be given to such investments in the light of expected developments? Early decision is required on our whole investment policy toward South Africa.

3. Arms and Military Equipment

Differences continue to exist in the US Government in the interpretation of our arms embargo to South Africa as announced by Ambassador Stevenson last August. Aside from fulfilling explicit, existing contracts the only exception to complete embargo was the exception for maintenance of international peace and security which reads as follows:

"The United States reserves the right in the future to interpret this policy in the light of requirements for assuring the maintenance of international peace and security. If the interests of the world community require the provision of equipment for use in the common defense effort, we would naturally feel able to do so without violating the spirit and the intent of this resolution."

It is

It is important that remaining questions relating to current implementation of our arms embargo policy toward South Africa be settled. At issue now is the question of a possible sale to South Africa of two or three small submarines, torpedoes, air-to-air missiles, and a ground-to-air defense system for a naval base which would amount to approximately \$150 million. The South African Defense Ministry is also interested in obtaining tankers, ships, anti-submarine equipment and military aircraft. To be weighed in the balance in such decisions are the following factors:

(1) The considerable assistance this could be to our balance-of-payments problem, if payment were made in the near future despite delivery delays of three to four years;

(2) The usefulness that such a sale might have in the short run to help maintain friendly relations with the South African Government and its willingness to continue tracking station arrangements. (This, of course, would be limited to the brief period prior to any US participation in UN measures to enforce a Court decision on South West Africa.)

(3) A very marginal increase in the military readiness of forces that in the next few years might be available to participate in free world defense;

(4) The possibility that relations with South Africa might have worsened during the next three years to the point that either they or we would break the contract of sale;

(5) The considerable risk that South Africa would publicize the sale to demonstrate US support for the South African Government while the UN majority is clamoring for increased pressures;

(6) The extensive loss of influence in the UN on South African issues which would be involved once word got out on the sale, no matter how we tried to rationalize it under our announced policy which is generally interpreted strictly;

(7) The fact that South Africa has alternate sources for this military equipment and is not in fact being hurt by our arms embargo;

(8) The best political estimate of our Embassy in South Africa and experts in the Department, that the South African Government would not close down our tracking stations over the arms embargo issue, but would save that move for the crisis over South West Africa which is far more important to it.

Other problems

Other problems in the military field and currently being decided on an ad hoc basis include: (1) participation in joint military exercises like CAPEX, (2) military visits to South Africa in the face of official policies which have denied entry to Negro officers of the US Army, (3) military training of South Africans in the United States, and (4) dual purpose items such as large orders of trucks by the South African Defense Department which are not currently on our positive list for control through military licensing, but which clearly could be used by the South African military against the civilian population.

4. Contact with African Refugees and Moderates of All Races in South Africa

An essential adjunct to any policy of promoting peaceful, political change in South Africa will be greater effort to be in contact with and support as appropriate of: (1) moderate groups of all races within South Africa and (2) African refugees and political leaders temporarily exiled from South Africa. In addition to current aid to refugee students (providing up to 120 scholarships per year for South African non-whites in the US), other appropriate aid and training in administration, office work and technical vocations should be inaugurated. Church, professional and labor groups in the US should be encouraged to contact and support like organizations in South Africa which are seeking a sane, multiracial solution to the present dangerous racist dichotomy.

5. Domestic Considerations

A high-level and expert review of the probable impact of pending critical developments in South West Africa and South Africa on our own race problems at home and political attitudes in this country should be undertaken. Letters from colleges, civil rights and other responsible groups already indicate a growing degree of dissatisfaction with our ambivalent policies toward South Africa. AFL-CIO has recently adopted a strong resolution calling inter alia for an oil embargo.

It is interesting that prominent US businessmen and industrialists are concerned and eager to discuss South African prospects. In a recent closed meeting, Clarence Randall, normally a friend of South Africa, expressed the view that South African defiance of an ICJ decision should be met with immediate military action.

VIII. Recommended Actions

1. Adopt the third course of action discussed in Section V of this paper, namely:

Seek to delay major UN confrontation with the South African Government over the South West Africa issue until the ICJ judgment on the merits in the spring or summer of 1965, using the time gained to:

(1) analyze

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(1) analyze alternative measures open to us in the event of major confrontation, (2) make alternate arrangements for space tracking stations, and (3) make other requisite adjustments relating to basic US interests in and policies toward South Africa.

2. In addition to the diplomatic actions listed under this course of action in Section V, the following supporting actions are considered necessary:

(a) Tracking Stations: Immediate State-NASA-Defense review of alternate space tracking station locations outside South Africa and South West Africa and early decision on a program to establish replacement sites for all space tracking stations now located in South Africa as soon as possible. The additional site required by NASA for the 1967-70 period should also be sought outside South Africa and South West Africa, and if possible, co-located with replacement sites.

Comment: It would be intended to continue operation of the tracking stations in South Africa as long as possible while replacement locations are being established, and hopefully for at least 18 months. There is no reasonable expectation that NASA and DOD could depend on continued operation of their present tracking stations in South Africa for the next five years. NASA was advised by State in 1959 that five years would be the limit of the period it could depend on at that time.

(b) Continue our existing policy of refusing sales to South Africa of arms, ammunition, equipment manufacture arms, military vehicles, firearms and other items of significant use in combat or in training for armed, police or para-military forces, except for the fulfillment of existing contracts and the reservation of right to supply under the "strategic exception" provision in case the international situation so warrants. Continue to postpone decision on possible sale of submarines, other naval vessels and spare parts and equipment for naval vessels, pending developments with respect to the South West Africa situation. Decisions on the latter category would be made in the light of developments with respect to South West Africa, and might constitute an element which can be utilized as an inducement to bring about a change in South African policy.

Comment: In coming sessions of the Security Council and the General Assembly our position vis-a-vis the Afro-Asian bloc and other nations supporting them on the South West Africa and apartheid issues will be much more difficult than it was at the time we announced our arms embargo policy last year. This policy has been generally viewed in the United Nations as a total embargo in the current situation. Any indication that we were supplying or planning to supply arms to South Africa at this juncture would seriously complicate our problems at the UN in the months ahead. Agreement with the South African Government to provide military equipment at this time would seriously weaken our representations to it concerning South West Africa. Failure to provide such equipment, South African queries ^{concerning} which have been tentative and low-key, would not at the present time jeopardize continued operation of our tracking stations.

(c) Investments

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(c) Investments: In view of the many political risks ahead we should take early action to inform major US firms currently considering new investments of the possibility that a critical situation may develop over South West Africa during the year ahead which could markedly increase their own risks of stricter South African Government controls and possibly expropriation. No further US Government loans or guarantees should be granted for investments in South Africa until the South West Africa problem has been resolved or until it subsides as a major issue affecting US-South African relations and US interests elsewhere.

(d) Contact with African Refugees and Moderates of All Races in South Africa: State and CIA should devise a program of increased contact with non-communist African refugee leaders from South Africa and limited appropriate covert aid to reliable African leaders.

Comment: A limited and carefully conceived program would serve several purposes: (1) improved intelligence collection, (2) possibilities of counter ing growing Soviet and Chinese Communist influence among African nationalists, (3) establishing areas of influence which might later be used to support a black-white compromise in South Africa, and (4) improving US standing with leaders of the vast majority of South African people who one day will have significant political power in South Africa.

(e) Essential Studies: In order to be better able to cope with anticipated mounting pressures for enforcement measures against South Africa in the months ahead, and to be able to evaluate the probable effectiveness of such measures, the following studies should be undertaken in detail as a matter of priority:

(1) Study of South African imports and vulnerability of the South African economy to an interruption in their availability, including review of possible substitutes and alternate sources.

(2) Study of economic vulnerability of countries supplying South Africa to an embargo on sales to South Africa, including review of alternate markets.

(3) Study of South African exports, including vulnerability of South African economy to boycott, and vulnerability of countries which normally buy from South Africa to loss of South African supplies, including review of alternate sources.

(4) Study of South African gold sales, including effect on world money market of withholding by South Africa of gold, and vulnerability of South Africa to boycott of its gold output.

(5) Study of

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(5) Study of South African vulnerability to possible actions in the fields of transportation and communications, including denial of landing and bunkering rights, and possible effect of South African countermeasures in this area.

(6) Review of the political feasibility of instituting such measures as hold promise of being economically effective through repeated discussions with the British and other major trading partners of South Africa at appropriate future stages.

(7) Study of the implications for the United States and problems involved in any UN military action to take over South West Africa and in establishing a UN or other substitute administration over the Territory.

(8) Study of the implications for our domestic race problem of the increasingly critical situation in South West Africa and South Africa.


ANNEXES

1. Data on South Africa
2. Data on Southwest Africa
3. Chronological Summary of UN Resolution on South Africa
4. Chronological Summary of UN Resolution on Southwest Africa
5. Chronology of Recent Steps Taken by the United States to Induce the South African Government to Change Certain Policies
6. The Course of Events in the International Court of Justice and the United Nations if South Africa Implements the Odendaal Report
7. Steps to be Taken by NASA and DOD to Reduce Dependence on Republic of South Africa


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
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PROPOSED HOMELANDS



SOUTH AFRICA – BANTU RESERVES





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ANNEX 1

DATA ON SOUTH AFRICA

Briefing for NSC Standing Group

I. Population

A. Non-white Preponderance

In a population of 17 millions, the 3.3 million Whites are outnumbered 4 to 1. Blacks comprise 70 percent of the total population, and Asians and Coloreds (mulattoes) the rest. Although 84 percent of the Whites are urban dwellers, they are outnumbered by non-Whites in every city and town, usually in ratios of 2 or 3 to 1. In the White-owned farming areas Blacks outnumber them 7 to 1. About one-third of the 11.7 million Blacks live in the rural, tribal Reserves (which comprise about 13 percent of the country). Another third live in the "White" farming areas and the remaining third in the "White" urban areas. Despite official efforts, the flow of Blacks to the cities continues. Between 1951 and 1960 the urban White population grew by half a million, 25 percent; the urban Blacks by 1.2 million, 48.3 percent, to a total of 3.5 million, more than all the Whites in the country. Despite especial efforts to remove Blacks from the traditionally White and Colored Western Cape Province, according to newly-released figures for the Cape Town region, Blacks increased 10 percent there between 1960 and 1963. In Cape Province the Coloreds outnumber the Whites, in Natal Province the Asians. The natural increase of the Coloreds is more than double and the Asians' almost double that of the Whites. For generations the Blacks' rate of increase has been about the same as the Whites, but in the last decade the Whites increased only 16.9, the Blacks 27.4 percent. South African demographers estimate that by the year 2000 the White proportion of the population will be about one-seventh: 22 million Blacks, 4.5 million Whites, as many Coloreds, and over a million Asians.

B. Cultures

The difficult race relations and politics of South Africa are greatly complicated by its variety of cultures, different stages of acculturation within groups, and differences of privilege and affluence. The Whites are the aristocrats enjoying social, economic and political advantages. The Blacks are mainly a proletariat of manual laborers and primitive agriculturists subject to all sorts of restrictions. At an intermediate level are the Asians, who include a large shopkeeper class, and the Coloreds, who include many artisans. These two groups enjoy some advantages over the Blacks but suffer major disabilities compared with the Whites.

The main groups are themselves divided into sub-groups. The largest group, the Blacks, includes not only many tribes, languages and dialects, but also rural-urban, Christian-animist, and educated-illiterate divisions. The Whites are divided mainly into the English-speaking and the Afrikaner

Nationalists

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Nationalists in a 2/3 ratio. Most Whites are bilingual and in many respects homogeneous, but the Afrikaner Nationalist is caught up in an intricate, overlapping web of cultural, political, economic, educational and social organizations which from the cradle to the grave instill in him doctrines, myths, fears and aspirations which set him apart as culturally unique from the "detrribalized" Afrikaners (15-20 percent) and the non-Afrikaner. The English-speaking, including the hundred thousand Jewish community, dominate big business and finance, while the majority of urban Afrikaners are semi-skilled workers, artisans and foremen. The 1.7 million Coloreds, a mixture of Hottentot, White, Malay, African and other strains, lack cohesion as a group and are basically an appendage of the Whites. They comprise a loose assortment of small communities and a class structure based on affluence, education, occupation and racial appearance. The half-million Asians are numerically the weakest and culturally the most diverse group but have more unity than the amorphous Coloreds. They are two-thirds Hindu and a fifth Moslem, but the Indians include culturally different Dravidians and Aryans speaking a variety of languages. Almost all were born in South Africa. The Asians have a much larger proportion of businessmen and professionals than the other non-White groups, but over two-thirds are unskilled and semi-skilled laborers living mainly in Natal close to the margin of existence.

C. Inter-group Relations

Inter-group attitudes and relations are the core of South Africa's racial problem. The main interaction is between White and non-White, with its crux relations between White and Black. This basic division is blurred by attitudes between non-White groups, by the distrust and even fear Asians and many Coloreds have of Blacks, by Colored and Asian attitudes of superiority toward Blacks, and by Black contempt of Coloreds as mixed breeds and of Asians as aliens. The Whites' attitudes of fear, prejudice and self-interest regarding the non-Whites are the most intractable aspect of the racial situation. The interaction between the rival White sections - Afrikaner Nationalists versus the English-speaking section and their "detrribalized" Afrikaner allies - also is important. Race relations of all groups are ostensibly the main issue of the political rivalry between White sections. The Coloreds and Asians would like to be absorbed, except in cultural respects in the case of the Asians, by the Whites. Perhaps the aspect of the South African cultural scene most underrated by many White South African policy-makers - it is even a political issue - is the extent of Westernization attained by the hundreds of thousands and even millions of Blacks in both urban and rural areas.

II. Politics

A. General

Prime Minister Verwoerd's Nationalist Party is firmly in power, since only Whites have significant political say and most of the Afrikaans-speaking majority of the White group support their sectional party. It has a two-thirds majority in the main house of Parliament, although it received only about 55 percent of the estimated popular (White) vote in the 1961 general election. Constituencies are delimited to favor heavily

the rural voters, who are predominantly Afrikaners. The Government's popular vote did not include an appreciable number of swing voters; it was, instead, the culmination of a slow but steady growth since 1948 in the Nationalists' parliamentary and electoral strength. The main factors have been the Afrikaners' faster natural increase, thorough indoctrination of the young, and exploitation of the Black Peril issue. Instability in Africa and the retreat of colonialism are magnifying the Black Peril issue and bringing at least passive support of the Government by many of the English-speaking opposition. The next election need not be held before late 1966.

B. White Politics

The stuff of White politics is controversy over racial policy. The Nationalist Party adheres to the doctrine of the White Republic, in which non-Whites should have no political power affecting "White" affairs and Blacks should only be present to serve the needs of the White man. To justify the denial of rights to Blacks in "White South Africa", to divide them into at least seven weak tribal groupings, and to make the tribal areas more attractive to the Blacks, the Government has a broad program for the economic and political development and gradual consolidation of the numerous and widely scattered Reserves. This so-called Bantustan policy is intended to make possible eventually the removal from "White South Africa" of a large proportion of the Blacks. Those staying in the White areas are supposed to exercise the privileges of citizenship in their tribal Bantustan, except for some suburban self-government. This policy of apartheid depends on a host of restrictive laws and practices which define where a non-White may live, his pay, kind of employment, kind of education, and rights of movement. The Transkei State of the Xhosa-speaking tribes, which was established in late 1963, is supposed to be the prototype of these Bantustans; and the Government intends to apply the policy whole-sale in the mandated Territory of South West Africa. In South Africa the compact, almost wholly Black Transkei area is better suited to this Bantustan policy than the other Reserves, which are mostly small and scattered. The South African Government is encountering serious difficulties in its program: the popular leaders in the Transkei are opposed to apartheid, the powerful Zulu tribe is resisting application of the policy to it, and the Government is not doing much about consolidating other Reserves because so many White farmers would be affected. Most Reserves are crowded rural dormitories for "White South Africa" and the Government is doing little to industrialize them.

The United Party, the main Opposition party, and the small Progressive Party reject the Bantustan policy and apartheid as being dangerously divisive and discriminatory and doomed to failure. They consider South Africa to be irrevocably a multiracial society, and believe Parliament must represent all racial groups. The United Party proposes, instead of the "White Republic" and Bantustans, a "racial federation" including a strong federal government and as much communal self-government for each

racial group

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racial group as practicable. Representation would be in proportion to each racial group's "level of civilization". The Progressive Party, which has only one member in Parliament, advocates both federalism and a heavily qualified single roll franchise. The extra-parliamentary Liberal Party's advocacy of universal suffrage and complete nonracialism repels most Whites as suicidal.

C. Non-white politics

Except for four Whites who represent the Coloreds and Asians of Cape Province, the non-whites are unrepresented in the all-powerful national parliament and in the four provincial councils. Coloreds share the Whites' municipal franchise in Natal, and in Cape Province Coloreds and Asians can even be elected to city councils. In the Free State and Transvaal no non-white has the vote. In place of real political power, the Government is giving Coloreds and Asians, like the Blacks, suburban self-government, and also Asian and Colored Councils which are supposed to legislate for and in time administer some local affairs, education, health and the like. Blacks are supposed to exert their political rights mainly in the tribal Reserves, where chiefs and headmen salaried by the Government are given the majority of parliamentary seats.

In the face of this restrictive policy, most politically active non-whites either oppose the whole apartheid policy or go along with it only for opportunistic reasons. The leaders of all main non-white political organizations consequently are in jail, banned (from membership in organizations, from attendance at meetings of more than two persons, from movement outside a specified area, such as one's house, from having their writings or speeches published) or in exile. The main African organizations, the African National Congress and the rival Pan-Africanist Congress, have turned to violence as a last resort, after agitating fruitlessly by peaceable methods since the African National Congress was founded in 1912. Police action, using extraordinary powers of arrest without charge and indefinite detention, have shattered the old leaderships of both organizations, and each is reorganizing underground and training many followers abroad, many in African countries, others in Communist countries including Cuba. The African National Congress permits Communists in its ranks and cooperates with Communist-influenced or dominated organizations in the resistance movement. The Pan-Africanists emphasize African nationalism in South Africa and Pan-Africanism, and refuse to cooperate with Communists and other racial groups.

III. Economic

A. General

South Africa has a highly developed modern economy based on a large manufacturing industry, mining and agriculture and excellent communications. During recent years the rate of economic growth has exceeded 4 per cent annually, and a mild boom is now under way. Partly as a deliberate program of self-defense, South Africa is becoming increasingly self-sufficient. Food

production

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production suffices for basic needs; and the steel, chemical, rubber and other industries are being rapidly expanded. Only about 10 per cent of the country's petroleum consumption is locally produced, from coal, but an expansion program is being given priority. About a third of the African population derives part of its income from primitive subsistence agriculture in the reserves, where production is so low that food has to be imported.

B. Finance

South Africa each year has a substantial budgetary surplus which is ploughed into development projects. The budget for 1963/64 provides for a total expenditure of \$1.76 billion. Defense expenditures have risen 200 per cent in five years, and amount to 12.5 per cent of the 1964 budget. In 1962 the GNP exceeded \$8.4 billion. Per capita income exceeded \$427, the highest in Africa, and the Whites' was \$1380; but the Blacks' \$167 was exceeded by Ghana, Gabon and the Ivory Coast. By means of moderate import and exchange controls and systematic suppression of political unrest, South Africa has built up its exchange balance to a high level. The outward flow of private capital after racial troubles in 1960 has been succeeded by a considerable inflow. In the past two years, of \$980 million invested in new South African enterprises, one-half came from abroad. UK investment totals \$3 billion, U.S. over \$600 million (including \$353 million corporate investment in 1962). Total foreign investment in 1963 exceeded \$4.4 billion. Public and private South African holdings abroad are substantial, in 1961 \$1.47 billion. Of the \$820 million private holdings, over half were in the Rhodesias, in copper and coal. About one-fourth of the private holdings are in the UK.

C. Trade

In 1963 South Africa's imports totalled \$1,700 million, merchandise exports (excluding gold) \$1,269 million. Gold production in 1963 was valued at \$961 million, most of which is sold on the London gold market. The UK is South Africa's best customer, taking 33 per cent of South Africa's exports and providing 29 per cent of its imports. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland has been South Africa's second-best customer, but its dissolution and economic decline in Southern Rhodesia is likely to reduce this greatly. The United States ranks third and Japan fourth. United States exports to South Africa in 1962 amounted to \$222 million, about 17 per cent of South Africa's imports. United States imports from South Africa totalled \$256 million. In view of the healthy state of South Africa's foreign exchange reserves, the South African Government intends to continue relaxation of import control during 1964, but cautiously. Principal exports by South Africa include manufactures, agricultural products and minerals. Main imports are machinery and vehicles, textiles, and oils. United States purchases are mainly minerals, including diamonds. Record gold production, with a large uranium by-product, along with a large number of other export minerals, including chrome, manganese, asbestos and platinum solidly support South Africa's trade position. Technologically, its manufacturing industry compares favorably with Canada and Australia.

Trade

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Trade boycotts by other independent African nations have been more an irritant than a danger to South Africa. Most trade little with South Africa, and some, despite their bitter attacks on South Africa, have even increased their trade with South Africa during 1963. These include Senegal, Ivory Coast, Ghana and Kenya. Moreover, South Africa has found new markets for its fish products, fruit and sugar, manufactures, and ores, notably in Japan.

IV. Social

Barred from significant political power and limited by the apartheid or segregation policy from significant economic power by means of labor unions and training, the non-whites suffer the disabilities of lower wages, poorer working conditions, poorer health facilities, inferior educational opportunities and reservation of the best jobs for Whites. In all these regards the Asians and the Coloreds occupy a position intermediate between the favored Whites and the feared Blacks. The Government has considerably expanded education for Blacks at the lowest levels, to such an extent that 60 per cent are now claimed to be literate, but it has prescribed that their educational system should prepare them only for their expected status in life as members of a segregated group. The Blacks, even those such as Chief Kaiser Matanzima, who is collaborating with the Government, are opposed to an adulterated "Bantu" education. Coloreds and Asians fear the same trend for them, as their education is being separated from that of the Whites and handed over to their communal department of government. Only the Whites' education is compulsory. African labor unions are not illegal, but are not recognized for purposes such as collective bargaining. Consequently, they are tiny and tend to be short-lived. The most notable Nationalist accomplishment has been in the field of housing, where many slums in the metropolitan areas have been eradicated and substantial if monotonous housing erected.

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ANNEX 2

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By g/p, NARA, Date 2/6/92

DATA ON SOUTH WEST AFRICA

Briefing for NSC Standing Group

I. Population

A) Preponderance of non-whites:

The population of South West Africa, by racial groups, according to 1960 population estimates is roughly as follows:

White	73,000
"Natives"	428,000
Coloreds	24,000
Asians	<u>None</u>
Total	525,000

Thus, the preponderance of non-whites over whites in the territory is roughly in the ratio of 7 to 1.

B) Cultures:

It is estimated that the language break-down of the white population of South West Africa is as follows (based on the 1951 census):

Afrikaans	66.3%
German	23.9%
English	8.3%
Other languages	1.5%

Most Afrikaners came to South West Africa from South Africa after the German colonial period. Although Afrikaans and English are the official languages of the Territory, German cultural influence remains strong.

Linguistically

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Linguistically and ethnologically, the non-whites of South West Africa are of diverse origins. The principal ethnic groups are the Bantu Negroes: Ovambos (239,000), the Okavangos (28,000), the Hereros (35,000), Kaokovelders (9,000), East Caprivians (16,000), and Tswana (10,000). The Damaras (44,000) are a negroid people who speak Hottentot. The Namas or Hottentots total (35,000) and the Bushmen (12,000). The Rehoboth Basters (11,000) and the Cape Coloureds (13,000) are mixtures of Hottentot, European and other strains and speak Afrikaans.

C) Intergroup Relations:

There is no social contact between whites and non-whites except the employer-servant relationship. The laws of the Republic of South Africa, which to a large extent apply in South West Africa, implement the policy of apartheid and effectively prohibit any relationships between whites and non-whites based on equality. Even the terminology of those laws governing the relationships of whites and non-whites makes it clear that the one is the "Master" and the other the "Native".

Exponents of South Africa's Bantustan policy in South West Africa try to justify apartheid by claiming that the various non-white ethnic groups are incompatible and even hostile to one another. With the exception of a war between the Hereros and Namas in 1864, there has been little evidence of tribal conflict in South West Africa. On the contrary, today there has been considerable inter-tribal cooperation. The youthful leadership of the two major indigenous nationalist movements (SWANU and SWAPO) are having some success in counteracting the particularism of the tribal and ethnic groups. These nationalist movements advocate non-racialism and acknowledge that whites in South West Africa must play an important role in a "free" South West Africa.

II. Politics

A) General:

The Administration of South West Africa was vested in the Government of the Union (now Republic) of South Africa as a Class C mandate of the League of Nations in 1920. Under a constitution granted by the South African Government in 1925 South West Africa enjoys a limited measure of self-government. In 1949 the Whites were given representation in the South African parliament. However, the non-white population is not permitted to vote and is not represented in either the territorial or republican government.

As a result

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As a result of the manner in which South Africa has administered South West Africa and because of its continued refusal to place South West Africa under UN Trusteeship, the Republic has been repeatedly called to task in the United Nations. In an advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice ruled in 1950 that the UN General Assembly was legally qualified to exercise the supervisory functions previously exercised by the League of Nations with respect to the administration of the Territory. On November 4, 1960, the Governments of Ethiopia and Liberia, which were members of the League of Nations when South West Africa was mandated to the Union of South Africa, filed a complaint with the International Court of Justice charging the South African Government with violations of the terms of the mandate. The action was taken on behalf of all the independent African states in accordance with a decision made at a Conference of these countries in Addis Ababa in June 1960. The case is now being argued before the Court and a decision is not expected before 1965. However, as a result of the release of the South African Government's Odendaal Commission Report (discussed below), the applicants in the ICJ case (Ethiopia and Liberia) soon may ask for a Court order restraining South Africa from implementing the apartheid and administrative integration sections of the Report while the case is still pending in the ICJ. Such a move might lead to Security Council consideration of the issue under Article 94 of the Charter, which permits a wide range of mandatory actions to force South African compliance.

B) White Politics:

The white population of South West Africa is virtually unanimous in its opposition to placing the Territory under the United Nations Trusteeship System. The Nationalist Party, which won a decisive victory on March 8, 1961, in the South West African Legislative Assembly elections, favors eventual incorporation of the Territory as a fifth province of South Africa and is determined to maintain white domination of most of the country. The United National South West Africa Party, which barely won two of the eighteen Legislative Assembly seats, espouses a loose federal relationship between South West Africa and the Republic of South Africa. It opposes the doctrinaire extremism of the Afrikaner Nationalists with respect to race relations.

C) Non-White Politics:

Two African political organizations were formed for the first time in 1959, the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO) and South West Africa National Union (SWANU). They advocate the removal of all racial discrimination in the Territory, and independence. Formerly they called for an interim period of trusteeship with the United Nations serving as Administrator. Now they seek immediate independence with the United Nations providing technical and administrative assistance. Two other non-white political groups include the Herero Chiefs Council which represents the Herero tribe and now is closely allied with SWAPO, and

the South

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the South West African United National Independence Organization (SWAUNIO), a Nama grouping. All of these groups have petitioned the United Nations for assistance in attaining their goals.

III. Economics

A) General:

South West Africa is a country rich in mineral resources with a diversified economy but little manufacturing. Through the application of the Republic of South Africa's policies of apartheid and the use of contract labor, the fullest development of its human and natural resources has been inhibited during the period of the South African mandate. A few large mining interests and some smaller entrepreneurs have acquired considerable wealth. Inequitable sharing of the country's resources and the political uncertainty about the future of the Territory are severely limiting its full economic expansion.

B) Mining and Agriculture:

The biggest industrial operations in South West Africa, and the Territory's greatest source of wealth, center around the mining of diamonds and such base minerals as copper, lead and zinc. Among the other minerals exported are salt, lime guano, lithium ores, vanadium, flourspar, and semi-precious stones (e.g., jasper, tourmaline, and amethyst). Explorations are presently being undertaken by concessionaires for petroleum and natural gas.

Accounting for more than 90% of the territory's diamond production is Consolidated Diamond Mines of South West Africa, Ltd., controlled by the South African company of De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. The biggest producer of base minerals is the Tsumeb Corporation in which American capital (American Metal Climax and Newmont Corp.) has the controlling interest. It produces copper, lead, zinc and germanium concentrates.

The fishing industry, controlled by the South West Africa Administration, is the next most important industry after mining.

South West Africa is essentially a livestock-raising country, where cattle are raised for both beef and dairy purposes and ~~karakul~~ sheep for Persian lamb skins. However, corn, potatoes and beans can be grown in some districts in favorable years. Generally, the corn is used for the production of silage, which is important to the dairy industries in those districts. Wheat is produced in a few small areas

in the east-central

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in the east-central part of the territory where artesian water is plentiful or flood-water irrigation possible.

C) Trade:

An examination of South West Africa's infra-structure shows it to have considerable potential economic viability. Except for cattle, most exports go to countries other than the Republic of South Africa. Even more impressive is the fact that the Territory has a very favorable balance of trade. Its 1962 exports (ca. \$131.6 million) were nearly double the value of imports (\$77 million).

D) Odendaal Commission Report:

In late January 1964 the South African Government's Odendaal Commission proposed a five-year development plan for South West Africa. It recommended that: 1) apartheid should be applied in an extreme degree to South West Africa, 2) the administration of the Territory should be almost entirely incorporated into that of the Republic, and 3) the development plan should include transfers of population and land. Major expenditures of the allotted \$218 million would be for trunk roads, the paper cost of government land transferred to the non-whites, and a hydro-electric and water project in the extreme north. Only \$7 million would be for health and education.

The report recommended that South West Africa be divided into ten non-white "homelands" and the White area, which would include most of the better land, known mineral resources, and towns and ports. Non-white land would be increased by over 50 per cent, mainly from government land in remote arid regions. Non-whites, except for the Cape Coloreds scattered over the Territory, would be citizens of their particular "homeland" with the franchise, a legislature, and an executive committee. In urban areas of "White South Africa" each group would have powers of suburban self-government. Each "homeland" is to become increasingly "independent" of the others. Of the "homelands" only Ovamboland, isolated in the extreme north, has a substantial population, about a quarter million. Others would have populations in the 9 through 40 thousand range. The report's advocacy of self-determination and individuality for such small groups is an extreme, even absurd, extension of the South African Government's "Bantustan" policy.

Prime Minister Verwoerd in a speech at Windhoek on February 15, 1964 endorsed the Commission's main recommendations and warned "Whatever happens to South West will also happen to the Republic." South West, he said, could be labelled a dagger in the heart of the Republic, so there

could be no

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could be no toleration of occupation of South West by enemies of the Republic. He ridiculed any potential attempt by the "chaotic UN" to intervene in South West African affairs. The UN and other powers, he said, could not offer the Territory the prosperity that implementation of the Odendaal report would bring.

IV. Sociological Aspects

A) Apartheid and the Contract Labor System:

There are two mutually-wedded policies which pervade almost every aspect of life in South West Africa: (1) the Republic of South Africa's policy of apartheid, and (2) the contract labor system. Under both policies, those fundamental and all-important rights which have become known as "human rights" are being denied the more numerous, non-white segment of the population of the territory. Expressions of the policy of apartheid are to be found in such practices as the restricting of the majority of non-whites to poor and relatively unproductive reserves, the complete disfranchisement of non-whites, the establishment of the pass system for non-whites restricting freedom of movement, the introduction of the system of "Bantu Education" for non-whites.

The economic partner of apartheid is the contract labor system by which the privileged white mincrity has constant access to a steady, cheap source of African labor which is fed to it by the semi-governmental institution, the South West African Native Labour Association. The Bantu Affairs Commissioners in the non-white reserves have as one of their important functions seeing that SWANLA has an opportunity to recruit.

The policies of apartheid and contract labor are responsible for the splitting of South West Africa into the larger, more productive Police Zone and the smaller, poorer "Bantu" reserves (about 1/3 of the country). The urban areas of the Police Zone and the white farming areas are the sole province of the white settler; and only those non-whites from the reserves needed to fill his cheap labor needs are permitted to remain there so long as they are employed. The vast majority of Africans and coloreds is restricted to the small reserves within the Police Zone and the larger reserves along the territory's northern border.

B) Education and Health Services

Education in South West Africa is compulsory only for white children, through the 10th school year (Standard VII). Education for non-whites is not compulsory and more than half of the schools for non-whites (about 57%) are still operated by missionaries with a small subsidy from the territorial administration.

Hospital and

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Hospital and medical facilities for non-whites are operated by three of the mining companies (providing 182 beds) who, after all, have an economic interest in the health of their employees. In 1961 (last date for which statistics available) Government hospitals provided 1,540 beds for non-whites in South West Africa. Most missions provide hospital and medical facilities for non-whites. The South African Government provides only one Health Inspector for the entire Ovamboland Native District which has a population of about 205,000. That same district has only four medical practitioners; presumably all four are attached to Missions. For the non-white population, most of which lives under endemic disease conditions, the health services provided by the government are woefully inadequate.

AF: AFE: UHaynes, Jr:sv
3/6/64

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Briefing for NBC Standing Group

Chronological Summary of the 27 Resolutions of the
UN General Assembly and Security Council re:
South Africa's Racial Policies

A) General Assembly Resolutions on Treatment of People of Indo-Pakistani Origin in South Africa. (Beginning in 1946)

Beginning with the first session of the newly created United Nations General Assembly in 1946, the General Assembly passed a resolution condemning the South African Government's treatment of people of Indo-Pakistani origin in South Africa. Every year for fifteen years thereafter the General Assembly repeatedly passed resolutions of the following sort: (1) urging negotiations between South Africa, India and Pakistan, (2) condemning the Group Areas Act as against the principles of the UN Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights and (3) creating a Good Offices Commission. With stubborn consistency the South African Government has repeatedly refused to cooperate with the UN, or to negotiate meaningfully with India and Pakistan, has ignored resolutions and has, in fact, taken steps that have resulted in deterioration of the position of people of Indo-Pakistani origin.

B) General Assembly Resolutions Condemning "Apartheid" (Beginning in 1952)

With the General Assembly resolution of 5 December 1952 (616A (VII)), the General Assembly began to broaden its consideration of South Africa's racial policies to encompass all aspects of "apartheid". Beginning in that year it adopted a series of resolutions condemning apartheid, calling upon South Africa to abandon that policy, and urging the Secretary General to play a constructive role in the solution of the problem.

C) The First Security Council Resolution on Apartheid (1960)

Following the shooting down and killing by South African police of African participants in an unarmed, peaceful demonstration against government repression in Sharpeville, South Africa, in March 1960, the UN Security Council passed a strongly-worded resolution deploring the racial policies and actions of the South African Government as a potential threat to international peace and security and urging South Africa to bring about racial harmony.

D) UN Impatience and Effect of Increased African Membership (1961)

The General Assembly resolution of 13 April 1961 (GA 1598 (XV)) signalled the beginning of the adoption of a harder line by UN member states, although a proposal for diplomatic and economic sanctions failed of adoption. The harder line was a reaction to South African Government's continued blatant defiance of 15 years of condemnatory resolutions and also the consequence of increased African membership in the UN extremely hostile to South Africa. The resolution requested

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requested "all States to consider such separate and collective action as is open to them... to bring about abandonment of these policies."

E) US Negative Vote on a General Assembly Resolution (1962)

The General Assembly resolution (1761 (XVII)) of 6 November 1962 requested member states to take the following measures against South Africa:

- 1) Break or refrain from establishing diplomatic relations;
- 2) Close ports to ships flying South African flag;
- 3) Forbid their ships to enter South African ports;
- 4) Boycott South African goods and refrain from any exporting to South Africa;
- 5) Refuse landing and passage facilities to South African aircraft.

It also requested the Security Council to call for "sanctions" to secure the South African Government's compliance with UN resolutions. Finally it established a Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. The United States voted against the resolution which was adopted by a vote of 67-16 (U.S.) -23.

F) Second Security Council Resolution - Arms Embargo (1963)

Representatives of those nations attending the Conference of Heads of African States and Governments (Addis Ababa, 22-26 May 1963) requested the Secretary General to convene the Security Council (11 July 1963, S/5348). The Council was convened and on 7 August 1963 it passed a resolution taking note of South Africa's intransigence on its racial policies and calling upon all States "to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa," (7 August 1963, S/5386). Vote: 8(US)-0-2 (Fr. UK)

G) "Treason Trials" Resolution (1963)

On 11 October 1963 the General Assembly passed a resolution (1881 (XVIII)) condemning the trials of large numbers of political prisoners under arbitrary laws prescribing the death sentence and asking the South African Government to abandon the trial and release all political prisoners. Vote: 106(US) -1-0.

H) Third Security Council Resolution - Expert Group (1963)

The Security Council Resolution of 4 December 1963 (S/5471) repeated its call for an arms embargo and appealed for an extension of the embargo to include equipment and material for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition. It also requested the Secretary General to establish a group of experts to examine peaceful methods of resolving the problem. The group of experts was created and is composed of members from Sweden, the United Kingdom, Yugoslavia, Ghana and Morocco. Vote: Unanimous.

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I) Assistance to South African Political Refugees (1964)

The General Assembly resolution of 2 January 1964 repeated the appeal to all States to take measures to get South African compliance with the UN resolutions. Further, it specifically urged the Secretary General, Member States and organizations to contribute to the relief and assistance of persons persecuted by the South African Government for their opposition to apartheid. Vote: 100 (US) - 2-0.

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ANNEX 4

DATA ON SOUTH AFRICA

Briefing for NSC Standing Group

Chronological Summary of the 71 Resolutions of the General
Assembly With Regard to South West Africa
Passed since 1946

A) First Attempts to get South West Africa Under UN Trusteeship (1946)

The South West Africa problem arose in the UN when the General Assembly passed a resolution /65 (I) on 14 December 1946 reminding the Union of South Africa that, under Articles 77 and 79 of the UN Charter, the trusteeship system shall apply to territories under mandate as may be subsequently agreed and inviting South Africa to place South West Africa under the trusteeship system.

In 1947 South Africa submitted one report on its administration of South West Africa and, thereafter, refused to submit any others or to place South West Africa under trusteeship, in spite of repeated General Assembly resolutions appealing for compliance.

B) Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on South West Africa's Status (1950)

By a resolution /338 (IV) of 6 December 1949, the General Assembly requested the International Court of Justice to render an advisory opinion on the status of South West Africa. The following year (1950) the Court determined in part that 1) South Africa continues to have the international obligations it had under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations regarding its South West Africa mandate, 2) the supervisory functions now reside with the UN to which South Africa must submit annual reports, 3) South Africa may not unilaterally modify the international status of South West Africa, and 4) South Africa is not obliged to place South West Africa under UN Trusteeship. The General Assembly accepted the Court's advisory opinion by its resolution /449 (V) of 13 December 1950 and again urged South Africa to comply with earlier UN resolutions.

The same resolution set up a Committee of five nations to study the problem and report periodically to the General Assembly. Repeated resolutions requesting South Africa to submit reports on the territory had been ignored. The Committee, therefore, was obliged to obtain information on the territory from other sources such as the press and from written and oral petitions.

C) Appearance

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C) Appearance of South West African Petitioners at UN (1950's)

Beginning with the 1950s the General Assembly granted hearings to petitioners from South West Africa with grievances against the South African Government. As an outgrowth of these hearings further resolutions followed condemning the policies of South Africa, drawing South Africa's attention to the problem, and drawing the attention of the petitioners to past resolutions of the General Assembly.

D) Good Offices Committee (1957 - 1959)

On 25 October 1957 1143 (XII) the General Assembly established a Good Offices Committee, composed of the US, UK and Brazil, to discuss with South Africa a solution to the problem of the mandated territory. One of the solutions considered by this Committee was partition of the territory with the northern portion being placed under trusteeship and the southern portion annexed by South Africa.

E) Ethiopia and Liberia Bring South Africa before the International Court of Justice (1960)

The General Assembly resolution of 18 December 1960 1565 (XV) commended Ethiopia and Liberia for having brought an action in the International Court of Justice (4 November 1960) against South Africa for violation of the terms of the League Mandate. Vote: 86(US) -0-6.

F) Subsequent Resolutions (1960 - 1961)

Subsequent resolutions urged the UN specialized agencies to examine ways of helping South West Africa's development, invited the Committee on South West Africa to make an on-the-spot investigation, appealed to member States to bring their influence to bear and called the attention of the Security Council to the problem. A new UN Special Committee for South West Africa was constituted and charged with visiting the territory and making recommendations to the South African Government. At the same time the establishment of special education and training programs for South West Africa was urged.

G) "The Committee of 24" and South West Africa (1962)

The General Assembly resolution of 14 December 1962 1805 (XVII) assigned the functions of the UN Special Committee for South West Africa to the Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples ("Committee of 24"). This resolution also requested the Secretary General to appoint a UN Technical Assistance Resident Representative for South West Africa. By that same resolution, it was decided to maintain South West Africa on the agenda "as an item requiring urgent and constant attention." Vote: 98(US) - 0 - 1.

H) US Negative

H) US Negative Vote on a General Assembly Resolution - Oil Embargo (1963)

The most far-reaching resolution on South West Africa to date is the one /1899 (XVIII)/ of 13 November 1963 which drew the attention of the Security Council to the problem and, further, urged all States (1) to refrain from supplying petroleum and petroleum products to South Africa as well as (2) refrain from supplying any arms or military equipment. Vote: 86-6(US)-17.

I) Most Recent Resolution (1963)

The most recent resolution of the General Assembly /1979 (XVIII) of 17 December 1963 "requests the Security Council to consider the critical situation in South West Africa," but specified no time for such consideration. Vote: 89(US)-2-3.

Clearances:

AFE - Mr. Campbell

AFI - Mr. Strong

AF: AFE: UHaynes, Jr: sv
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ANNEX 5

23

Briefing for NSC Standing Group

Chronology
of Recent Steps Taken by the United States to
Induce the South African Government to Change Certain Policies

- October 6, 1962 - The Secretary and Foreign Minister Louw held two-hour conversation in N.Y. Secretary stressed US good relations with SAG complicate our dealings with rest of Africa and emphasized dangers apartheid poses to security of Africa.
- October 11, 1962 - Mr. Plimpton stated that US sells no arms that could be used to enforce apartheid.
- December 4, 5, 1962 - Department officials met with UK officials at London to discuss campaign to induce South Africa to moderate its national policies.
- January 28, 1963 - Assistant Secretary Cleveland voiced to South African Ambassador in Washington our concern over extent of racial segregation in South West Africa.
- March 1, 1963 - Ambassador Satterthwaite, on instructions from Department, made oral presentation to Louw urging SAG adopt positive attitude to UN presence in South West Africa.
- March 22, 1963 - US Ambassador delivered Aide-Memoire to SAG (re South West Africa and the International Court of Justice).
- April - May 1963 - US approached 19 governments requesting them to join us in bringing pressure on SAG.
- May 1963 - Department and Embassy officers expressed informally to SAG representatives US disapproval new South African repressive legislation.
- June 12, 1963 - Embassy instructed to indicate projected informal visit by South African Chief of Staff inappropriate at this time.
- June 18, 1963 - Department representatives suggested to South African Ambassador his Government should consider voluntary withdrawal from certain international bodies such as Economic Commission for Africa.
- July 11, 1963 - Department authorized US Mission Geneva to discuss with friendly members introduction of resolution stating that SAG participation in Economic Commission for Africa is not possible until that Government alters its domestic policies.

July 17, 1963

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By cbm, NARA, Date 8-23-02

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- July 17, 1963 - The Secretary called in South African Ambassador to discuss forthcoming meeting of Security Council and our anticipated position vis-a-vis South Africa. The Secretary also told South African Ambassador that the US will probably impose an embargo on arms sales to South Africa at the end of the year.
- July 19, 1963 - President Kennedy met with Guinean President Sekou Toure's Special Envoy, Diallo Telli. In the course of discussions the President told Ambassador Telli that he felt South Africa's policies would not be changed by expulsion from world organizations or by sanctions. The President also felt that any UN action against South Africa should be taken under Chapter VI (Peaceful Settlement of Disputes) of the UN Charter rather than Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression).
- July 20, 1963 - Continuing conversation of July 17th. The Secretary met with South African Ambassador Naude who gave lengthy justification of SAG's "Bantustan" policy. The Secretary impressed upon the Ambassador that the USG considered the SA problem a very serious issue.
- July 24, 1963 - Deputy Under Secretary Johnson met with South African Ambassador at the latter's request to hear the SAG's arguments against a possible US arms embargo of SA. The Deputy Under Secretary pointed out that US had strategic bases in other parts of Africa where strong sentiment against SA's policies existed. Good relations with these countries, the Secretary said, was important to both US and SA interests in keeping communism out of Africa.
- August 2, 1963 - Ambassador Stevenson announced at UN that US expected to terminate sale of all military equipment to South Africa by December 31st.
- August 9, 1963 - Deputy Under Secretary Johnson informed SA Ambassador that US policy on arms embargo was exactly as enunciated by Ambassador Stevenson at UN.
- August 26, 1963 - Continuation of the Secretary's "Bantustan" talks with SA Ambassador Naude.
- October 18, 1963 - In discussions with SA Ambassador and Head of the SA UN Delegation, the Secretary urged the SAG to keep the interests of the inhabitants of South West Africa paramount. The SA officials gave the Secretary a preliminary idea of the contents of the Odendaal Commission Report. They also talked, privately and at some length, to the Secretary about the US vote with the

majority

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majority in the General Assembly on the resolution about the current political trials. On the same day, the SA Ambassador expressed to Assistant Secretary Cleveland his disappointment with the US vote on the political trials.

November-December 1963 - Several meetings were held between the Secretary, Governor Williams, other US officials and the SA Ambassador in response to SA Prime Minister Verwoerd's personal instruction to refuse a visa for American Negro diplomat to stop off in SA in connection with routine orientation trip to High Commission Territories for which he is desk officer. After Department refused to compromise on this matter, SAG finally granted diplomatic transit visa providing for multiple entries.

February 12, 1964 - The American and British Ambassadors in Cape Town presented Aides-Memoire to the South African Foreign Minister urging the South African Government to postpone implementation of controversial parts of the Odendaal Report while the South West Africa case is pending before the ICJ. Governor Harriman made similar representations two days later to the South African Ambassador in Washington, emphasizing our fear that South African Government action in South West Africa might precipitate the issue into the Security Council.

March 3, 1964 - The SA Ambassador delivered to Governor Williams his Government's negative reply to the US-UK Aides-Memoire.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 88-100

By gpl/p, NARA, Date 2/6/92

THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE AND THE UNITED NATIONS IF SOUTH AFRICA IMPLEMENTS
THE ODENDAAL REPORT

1. Initiation of action for provisional measures in the ICJ. Ethiopia and Liberia will probably await some overt action in implementation of the Odendaal Report before applying to the ICJ for provisional measures designed "to preserve the rights of the applicants" under Article 41 of the Statute of the Court. A likely triggering action would be the introduction of implementing legislation in the South African Parliament. This would sufficiently establish the intention of the South African Government and yet would not face the Court with a fait accompli. We have indications that the South African Government may be planning to proceed with legislative steps beginning in mid-April with a view to concluding the legislative action by the time its Parliament rises on June 15.

2. Action in the ICJ. The Court could handle an application for provisional measures with dispatch. A similar application in the Anglo-Iranian oil case produced an indication of provisional measures within 13 days. Analogous proceedings before the Permanent Court of International Justice ordinarily consumed several weeks. Assuming that the South African Government appears and contests the application, the proceedings would probably take two to three weeks. Even if the South African Government were to suspend its implementation of the Odendaal Report pending a decision on provisional measures, the proceeding should not run beyond four to five weeks.

The likely result of the proceeding would be that the Court would indicate that South Africa should refrain from implementation of the main features of the Odendaal Report. Assuming an application for provisional measures in late April, a conservative estimate is that the decision would be given no later than the latter part of May.

3. Action in the Security Council. Unless the South African Government were to take decisive action to comply with the Court's decision, Ethiopia and Liberia will certainly resort to the Security Council. Proceedings in the Security Council might be divided into two phases, the first hortatory, and the second a consideration of actual enforcement measures. It is not certain that the first of these phases will occur or that, if it does, it will be sharply separated from the second. On the schedule assumed above, Security Council consideration would be going forward throughout most of June. During

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this time the report of the Committee of Experts on apartheid will have been completed and presented to the Security Council; in South Africa the legislative session will be winding up; and the British election may well be taking place.

a. Hortatory Phase. The applicants could go at once to the Security Council asking it to endorse the decision of the ICJ and urge compliance with it. They would be well advised, however, and can probably be induced to await some indication that the South Government was planning not to comply with the provisional measures indicated by the Court. On this assumption, the first phase of Security Council consideration might be delayed until the early part of June.

The Security Council would almost certainly adopt a critical hortatory resolution urging the South African Government to comply with the Court's decision.

b. Enforcement Phase. If the hortatory resolution of the Security Council failed to produce results in short order, the applicants would be back in the Council asking for enforcement measures, probably within a period of a couple of weeks.

The legal situation in the Security Council would be markedly different from what it has been in previous Security Council debates on apartheid in South Africa itself. There the issue was whether the Council could impose sanctions under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter in the absence of a finding of a present threat to the peace, and in a matter arguably internal to a member state. In this case, the issue will be whether the Security Council can take measures in a matter concerning South Africa's international obligations as a mandatory power acting under Article 94 of the Charter to secure compliance with an order of the International Court of Justice. Although the Security Council's power to take enforcement action in these circumstances is not wholly free from doubt, the better conclusion on the law is that it has the power. In any case, the arguments contra are not strong enough to prevent the Security Council from exercising its political discretion.

There will almost certainly be at least a seven vote Security Council majority for some form of sanctions to enforce the order of the Court. A list of possible Security Council actions of this kind is attached. Only a veto could block such a decision. Aside from ourselves, the only possible candidates are the United Kingdom and France. The decision would be exceedingly painful for any British Government. It would have to balance important economic and emotional interests in South Africa against Britain's traditional commitment to

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the rule of law in international affairs and the sentiment of the overwhelming majority of the United Nations members, with all that implies for British interest elsewhere in Africa and in Asia. United States support for such a resolution would make a British veto even more difficult.

As to France, although she has important interests in Africa, General de Gaulle has little use for the United Nations or indeed for any collective international action binding on sovereign states.

4. Recourse to the General Assembly. If there is a veto in the Security Council, Ethiopia and Liberia will almost certainly ask for a special session of the General Assembly, and the necessary support for such a session would be forthcoming. The General Assembly, apart from its power under Article 10, would act as successor to the supervisory powers over the mandate vested in the League of Nations. Unlike the Security Council it would have no authority to take decisions on sanctions that would bind member states but it probably could revoke the mandate.

A special session of the Assembly would precipitate in acute form both the Article 19 question and the Chinese representation issue. On both of these, we will need substantial African support if we are to make our view prevail. Unless our earlier record in the Security Council has fully supported the ICJ, it is hard to see how we will be able to convince the Africans to support the Court in the Article 19 contest, especially to disenfranchise countries that would vote against South Africa. It would be equally hard to muster their support on Chinese representation. The prospect of these questions coming to a head must necessarily influence our decisions on our stand in the Security Council.

On the schedule projected above General Assembly debate would occur in mid-summer around the time of the US political conventions.

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POSSIBLE SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

Most Likely Security Council Actions

1. Embargo on sale and supply of petroleum to South Africa.
2. Embargo on purchase of South African wool.
3. Broadening arms embargo, e.g. all items destined for military establishment, including dual purpose items, and technical military assistance (including training and technical information).
4. Prohibit new foreign investments or loans, public and private, for the South African Government or South African companies.

Other Possible Security Council Actions

1. Recommend expulsion from UN Specialized Agencies.
2. Recommend suspension from UN participation.
3. Recommend expulsion from the UN.
4. Reduce diplomatic missions from Embassies to Legations.
5. Prohibit provision by international agencies of economic or technical assistance, except humanitarian aid to apartheid victims.
6. Prohibit emigration to South Africa.
7. Close ports to South African vessels.
8. Refuse landing and passage facilities to all South African aircraft.
9. Prohibit ships from entering South African ports.
10. Sever diplomatic relations.
11. Boycott all exports from South Africa.
12. Prohibit any exports to South Africa
13. Recommend revocation of South West Africa mandate.
14. Secondary boycotts.
15. Naval blockade.
16. UN military action.

(A coordinating committee might be set up to assure implementation of United Nations action against South Africa.)

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ANNEX 7

March 13, 1964

SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEFING PAPER FOR NSC STANDING GROUP

SUBJECT; Steps to be taken by NASA and DOD to reduce
Dependence on Republic of South Africa

NASA

There is enclosed a table outlining the specific actions which will have to be taken if NASA is informed that operation of the stations in the Republic of South Africa cannot be assured past June, 1965. The actions include approaching host governments on desired alternate sites; procurement of new equipment to be added to existing stations outside of South Africa; diverting to other stations some equipment presently scheduled for South Africa; and expediting work on the deep space station in Spain which is now under construction.

If NASA is advised to commence this course of action, a major proportion of the estimated \$20 million* cost of relocating the stations would have to be obligated immediately. NASA funds would have to be reprogrammed with the consent of the Congress and contracts let for new equipment. These two actions would result in public knowledge of the activity and possibly recognition that dependence on the stations was being reduced.

Although the attached table is based on the assumption of loss of South Africa in June, 1965, the steps indicated would be the same if the event occurred any time within the next 18-24 months. NASA's planning would be different only if the use of South Africa could be assured for about 30 months. If so, NASA

*The NASA estimate of the cost of relocation is based on purchasing all new equipment, except for a 10 ft. dish which would be transferred from Johannesburg to Ascension Island. NASA feels that it must keep the facilities in the Republic of South Africa operating as long as possible and that the additional expense is justified to avoid any discontinuation of tracking services during the important 1965-67 time period.

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NLJ-S 98001

By cbm, NARA, Date 8-23-02

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would continue to use Johannesburg as presently planned while making arrangements in Ascension, Madrid and Madagascar on a more leisurely basis.

It should be noted with the assumed date of loss of South Africa of June 1965 and even if the resulting actions were effected immediately, a delay of 3-6 months in the SURVEYOR project would result.

The actions described herein and in the table would need to be taken immediately but NASA would not commence them unless formally advised by the Department.

DOD

The Department of Defense has prepared a preliminary assessment of alternate sites for AMR station #13 as requested by the Department. This study resulted in the following description of geographic alternates.

"A single site for coverage of AMR launches should be located within about 150 nm either side of a line between 16°S 10°E and 26°S 35°E. The center of this corridor is the center of the 90°-114° lunar and planetary launch window, or the ground projection of the first pass of a 100 nm parking orbit on a flight azimuth of 102°. To cover 200 nm or higher polar orbits launched from PMR, the station should be east of 25° east longitude. Two sites will be needed if a selected site does not meet both criteria."

The specific sites which the DOD considered in this preliminary estimate were: Lorenzo Marques, Mozambique, Mbabani, Swaziland; Francistown, Bechuana-land; Bulawayo, So. Rhodesia; Tulear, Madagascar; Windhoek, So. Africa.

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The DOD has indicated that it would prepare specific and detailed contingency plans for the site or sites selected after State Department recommendation as to which of the five sites mentioned would be desirable. If the DOD were informed that they could not be assured of the use of AMR station #13 after June 1965, it would be necessary to make an immediate decision as to which alternate site to consider; to approach the government concerned; and to let contracts for new equipment if it appeared that it would not be possible to remove the present equipment from So. Africa.

The standing group should be aware that the DOD also has under consideration those actions which must be taken to secure alternate bunkering arrangements which are now maintained in the event of a blockage of the Suez Canal. Other staging operations are similarly under review.

Enclosure:

List of Relocation Actions

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Assume South Africa is lost June 1965

ACTION REQUIRED

TIME SCALE

DEEP SPACE UNMANNED

Ascension

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|---|--|
| (1) Move 10-foot mobile facility from Joburg to Ascension. | (1) Approach U.K. immediately. |
| (2) Divert Surveyor project peculiar and S-Band equipment intended for Joburg to Ascension. | (2) Action required in two to three months. |
| (3) Buy 30-foot antenna and temporary trailers to house equipment listed in (2). | (3) Emergency reprogramming and procurement action must start immediately. |

Madrid

- | | |
|---|--|
| (1) Speed up Madrid to try for end of March 65 S-Band capability instead of June. | (1) Action required within two months. |
| (2) Procure Surveyor and Mariner project-peculiar equipment. | (2) Procurement must start immediately. |
| (3) Procure complete 85-foot antenna facility to replace Joburg. | (3) Emergency reprogramming and procurement action must start immediately. |

UNMANNED SATELLITES

No launches would be delayed because of a loss of Joburg but immediate steps would have to be taken to replace tracking facilities to maintain continuous data receiving operations.

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|---|---|
| (1) Take steps to replace electronic station preferred location Malagasy. | (1) Approach Malagasy immediately. Start emergency reprogramming and procurement actions immediately. |
| (2) Take steps to replace optical station - preferred location as high a southern latitude in Africa or Madagascar as possible. | (2) Approach concerned government immediately. |

Note: Future stations for which the Republic of South Africa would be preferred and on which Department guidance should be given immediately.

- (1) Supplementary facility to present Zanzibar station for Gemini.
- (2) Near earth orbital tracking station to be located preferably in Madagascar for Apollo.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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April 7, 1964

BKS -

This looks excellent.

WHB



S/S-4520

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 6, 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BROMLEY SMITH

SUBJECT: Draft NSAM on "U. S. Policy Toward South Africa."

Attached is a revised draft of the NSAM on South Africa which has been approved by the Secretary of State.

for Grant G. Hillman
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Draft NSAM on "U.S. Policy Toward South Africa."

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. _____

26-5

TO: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Treasury
Director, U. S. Information Agency
Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

SUBJECT: U. S. Policy Toward South Africa

1. The State Department should as a matter of urgency develop a comprehensive program of diplomatic activity, based on the response of the South African Government to our two aide memoires, to the end of assuring that the implementation of the Odendaal report is deferred as long as possible and, hopefully, until the decision on the merits of the case in the International Court of Justice. In developing this program, the Department should consider all available diplomatic techniques, including the use of special emissaries, Presidential communications, etc. It should include modes of securing concerted or parallel action by other interested governments, particularly those in Western Europe.

2. Existing policy regarding military sales to South Africa will be continued. Decision regarding possible sales of submarines and naval equipment, or any other variations in existing policy will be postponed and considered only in light of further developments, including those in the South West Africa - ICJ problem.

3. U. S. Government lending agencies will for the time being suspend action on applications for loans or investment guarantees with respect to South Africa. There should be no avoidable disclosure of this policy to

interested

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 09-118
By id, NARA, Date 7-27-10

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interested parties, however, and agencies should continue to accept and process applications. No policy of warning private investors not to invest in South Africa will be undertaken pending further developments.

4. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of Defense should immediately undertake such planning for and construction of alternative stand-by facilities as would be required if it became necessary to evacuate the facilities in South Africa on six months' notice. This shall be carried out in such a manner as to avoid its coming to public notice as long as feasible, and in close consultation with the Department of State particularly so that the public aspects and the diplomatic aspects of our relations with South Africa may be coordinated.

5. The State Department, in consultation with other interested agencies, will develop a program to explain privately to interested African countries the character and objectives of our program in order to try to obtain their understanding and cooperation.

6. The State Department will develop a program for actions during the months ahead, pending final ICJ decision in the South West Africa case, aiming to persuade the South African Government to acceptance of the Court's decision. In addition to use of available pressures, particular attention will be given to exploring possible bases for accommodation and understanding with more moderate members of the South African white community along the lines proposed by the State Department's memorandum of March 10th.

7. The Department

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7. The Department of State shall immediately undertake a comprehensive analysis of the various sanctions that could be considered if South Africa does not accept the ICJ decision on South West Africa. This analysis should include an estimate of the effectiveness on South Africa of the sanction if general compliance were obtained and of the prospects for obtaining such compliance.

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27
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 20, 1964

To: Benjamin H. Read

From: Bromley Smith

The attached is the draft NSAM on South Africa which came out of the Standing Group meeting on the State memorandum of March 10. We will await the Secretary's comments before moving further.

D R A F T

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27a
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 09-118
By NARA, Date 7-27-10

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. _____

TO: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Treasury
Director, U.S. Information Agency
Administrator, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward South Africa

1. In order to delay South African confrontation with the UN on the South West Africa issue as long as possible pending final judgment in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) case, the State Department will give high priority to diplomatic measures to dissuade South Africa from implementation of the Odendaal report, including consultation with other governments regarding representation by them to South Africa; sending a high level U.S. emissary to South Africa; and other appropriate measures.

2. The Department of Defense will continue its existing policy regarding military sales to South Africa. Decision regarding possible sales of submarines and naval equipment, or any other variations in existing policy will be postponed and considered only in light of further developments in the South West Africa-ICJ problem.

3. U.S. Government lending agencies will suspend for the time being any further loans or guarantees to South Africa, including

any now under consideration. There should be no disclosure of this policy to interested parties, however, and agencies should continue to accept and process applications. No policy of warning to private investors will be undertaken pending further developments.

4. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of Defense should begin immediate planning with a view to termination of existing tracking station and other base facilities in South Africa within eighteen months. When these actions are about to become visible, there should be close consultation with the State Department so that it can, if it seems wise, talk privately to South Africa to try to avoid a premature South African reaction -- e.g. explain this to South Africa as contingency planning in light of the perspective serious impasse over the ICJ decision.

5. The State Department, in consultation with other interested agencies, will develop a program to explain privately to interested African countries the character and objectives of our program in order to try to obtain their understanding and cooperation.

6. The State Department will develop a program for actions during the months ahead, pending final ICJ decision in the South West Africa case, to persuade the South African Government to acceptance of the Court's decision. In addition to use of available pressures, particular attention will be given to exploring possible

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bases for accommodation and understanding with more moderate members of the South African white community along the lines proposed by the State Department's memorandum of March 10th.

cc: Director of Central Intelligence

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

Secret

27b

March 19, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: BROMLEY SMITH

The material below is the substance of the Standing Group decisions for incorporation in a NSAM which would then be circulated to the interested agencies for comment. You should point out to Bundy that the State Department paper on which this is based was cleared only through the Harriman level and for discussion. It was not a final State Department position cleared by the Secretary, and he may want to make substantial changes. In addition there is a covert track (a modest program with the refugee nationalists as well as groups in South Africa) which Ray Klein undertook to get started and which you may want to check on. Finally, although not appropriate for inclusion in a NSAM it was emphatically agreed (per Carl Rowan's proposal) that we should have a deliberate campaign of explaining privately to interested American Negro leaders what we are up to. This we can undertake informally through Carl, Wayne Fredericks and others.

While the notes I have made below are probably more explicit and detailed than you want for a NSAM they should be conveyed in some form because none of the action people from State were there except Chayes and the guidance is important. If you have any problems with this the program is essentially that of the summary covering the memo to the Standing Group.

Draft

Action Points for NSAM:

Subject: US Policy Toward South Africa

1. In order to delay South African confrontation with the UN on the South West Africa issue as long as possible pending final judgment in the ICJ case, the State Department will give high priority to diplomatic measures to dissuade South Africa from implementation of the Odendaal report, including consultation with

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Authority NAc 015R-4-1-3-8

By JDL vARA Date 11-15-17

Secret

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other governments regarding representations by them to South Africa; sending a high level US emissary to South Africa; and other appropriate measures.

2. DOD will continue its existing policy regarding military sales to South Africa. Decision regarding possible sales of submarines and naval equipment, or any other variations in existing policy will be postponed and considered only in light of further developments in the SWA-ICJ problem.

3. US Government lending agencies will suspend for the time being any further loans or guarantees to South Africa, including any now under consideration. There should be no disclosure of this policy to interested parties, however, and agencies should continue to accept and process applications. No policy of warning to private investors will be undertaken pending further developments.

4. NASA and DOD should begin immediate planning with a view to termination of existing tracking station and other base facilities in South Africa within eighteen months. When these actions are about to become visible, there should be close consultation with ^{the Dept} State so that ^{the} State can, if it seems wise, talk privately to South Africa to try to avoid a premature South African reaction -- e.g. explain this to South Africa as contingency planning in light of the perspective serious impasse over the ICJ decision.

5. The State Department, in consultation with other interested agencies, will develop a program to explain privately to interested African countries the character and objectives of our program in order to try to obtain their understanding and cooperation.

6. The State Department will develop a program for actions during the months ahead, pending final ICJ decision in the South West Africa case, to persuade SAG to acceptance of the Court's decision. In addition to use of available pressures, particular attention will be given to exploring possible bases for accommodation and understanding with more moderate members of the South African white community along the lines proposed by the State Department's memorandum of March 10.

~~Bill Brubeck~~